

**DRAFT #5**

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## II. The Evolving Global Security Environment

In his biennial report to the Secretary of War for the period July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945, the Chief of Staff of the Army, George C. Marshall wrote:

*Returning from France after the last war with General Pershing, I participated in his endeavors to persuade the Nation to establish and maintain a sound defense policy. General Pershing was asked against whom do we prepare? Obviously, that question could not be answered specifically until 20 years later when Adolf Hitler led the replenished armies of defeated Germany into world conflict. Even as late as 1940, I was asked very much the same question before a committee of Congress. Not even then could I say definitely exactly where we might have to fight.*

Just as General Pershing and General Marshall were hard-pressed to identify specific future threats with which to justify post-war force structure, so are we today. However, what we can identify are certain trends and consistencies, especially in the Third World countries which bear close scrutiny and demand a trained and ready Army to ensure that the fundamental belief of our government — peace and freedom for all peoples — can be preserved.

### International Security Environment

The international security environment is undergoing change on an unprecedented scale. The precepts of the Cold War -- ideological hostility, bipolar global competition, and the unitary Soviet military threat -- are no longer valid. While the sum of global changes is overwhelmingly positive, the high degree of uncertainty about the emerging global security environment and continuing threats to U.S. security interests demand caution. The United States now faces more complex concerns about how to effectively manage dramatic change to promote regional stability and institutionalize the growth of democracy and market-oriented economies. Central to this challenge is the ability to contain or reverse negative trends such as instability, terrorism, drug trafficking, weapons proliferation, poverty, and environmental degradation in order to prevent these present dangers from developing into major threats.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union removes one paramount security concern, but leaves other significant dangers unchanged and promotes new destabilizing trends. The rise of new economic centers of influence, new political organizations, and new regional military powers

presages competition for scarce resources or territory. Uneven economic development will prolong poverty throughout many parts of the globe, promoting terrorism and malignant drug-based economies. Traditional national and ethnic enmities will sustain the demand for both high and low technology weaponry, further retarding economic development while raising the stakes of escalation. The end result is the replacement of the pervasive Soviet global threat with an ambiguous and diverse security environment, full of potential for future peace and prosperity, but also carrying significant risks to the interests of the United States and our allies.

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#### Transition to the Post-Communist Era

The collapse of Soviet communism has dealt a severe blow to the vitality and longevity of communist states worldwide. The Soviet breakup represents the conclusion of the colonial era, as the last colonial empire (the USSR) fragments. However, the true measure of future stability will be the emergence of peaceful successor states. The twelve former Soviet republics face the necessity of extended economic cooperation; the political and military arrangements of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) will be the source of long and difficult negotiations. The emergence of weak and vulnerable nations from the ruins of the Soviet Union could promote instability along the Eur-Asian periphery for decades.

Communism has not yet disappeared as a force on the international stage. China, Vietnam, Cuba, and North Korea continue to resist the trend toward democracy. Several authoritarian regimes with communist

leanings continue to cling to power. While many of the newly free states expect steady economic and political progress, others such as Romania, Bulgaria, and large portions of the former Soviet Union will encounter major obstacles to real reform. Finally, the economies of several African and Latin American nations will continue to suffer from chronic debt and poverty, with inadequate technology and infrastructure to enable progress.. Uneven development, and the instability that usually accompanies such a trend, will be the enduring characteristic of the developing world in the 1990's.

### Weapons Proliferation

One of the most hazardous and widespread trends in the developing world is the proliferation of military capabilities. At least 56 countries are already capable of engaging in mid-intensity conflict, with military forces which meet at least two of the following criteria: 700 tanks/armored personnel carriers, 100 combat aircraft, 500 artillery pieces, and over 100,000 soldiers. The number of mid-intensity conflict capable nations will continue to rise, with the majority of the growth occurring in the developing world.

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Accelerating technology transfer and growing intraregional competition will result in an increasing number of developing states acquiring advanced weapons systems. As precision-guided munitions and deep acquisition/engagement systems proliferate, future Third World battlefields will become higher risk environments.

## Terrorism

International terrorism remains a potent threat to U.S. interests worldwide. The end of the Cold War removed several significant state sponsors of terrorism, as well as eliminating many terrorist havens. However, terrorism worldwide has proven resilient, and selected terrorist groups can still rely on patron states such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya. The terrorist threat is complex; yet several trends are evident. Terrorists will continue to accept minimal risk, and achieve maximum publicity, by attacking unarmed or undefended targets. Terrorists pursuing wider publicity will seek more dramatic targets with more damaging results, including environmental terrorism as illustrated on a grand scale by Iraq's severe environmental damage in Kuwait and the Persian Gulf.

## Drugs

International drug trafficking poses a similarly intractable problem. Heroin smuggling appears to be on the rise, and the potential exists for expansion of Andean Ridge cocaine production. While the United States has made counterdrug operations a national priority, and has achieved real cooperation from many drug producing nations, sustained progress is elusive. Developing nations have so far been able to combat threats of drug cartels attempting to overthrow their governments, but the United States could face the appearance of a narco-regime in the future. These facts demonstrate the continued need for military support to law enforcement agencies combatting this threat.

## Foreign Intelligence Services

The beginnings of democracy and the sweeping political changes in former communist states have altered the very nature of the espionage threat. Army counterintelligence now faces a disturbing variety of collection attempts orchestrated by known antagonists, former enemies, neutral states, and even friendly nations bent on gaining a competitive advantage in a given field. Nations have always gathered information on one another; however, the focus of intelligence collection is now moving away from military issues to the scientific/technical aspects of economic competition. Through increased emphasis on security and defense protection programs, the Army will husband scarce resources, and reduce the risk of losing our technological edge through foreign collection efforts.

## Regional Assessments

The end of the Cold War brought with it an inevitable lessening of international tensions, especially with regard to the prospect of global war. But the changed face of international relations also resurrected age-old conflicts and brought to the fore festering hostilities once subsumed by East-West competition. Although regional conflicts are increasingly commonplace, not all of these crises directly threaten U.S. interests. During a period of evolving international security arrangements, the Army must remain prepared to respond to unforeseen regional contingencies which threaten vital U.S. interests or allies.

Indeed, the role of alliances and collective security agreements will remain a cornerstone of U.S. efforts to promote international stability. The success of organizations like NATO in containing the spread of communism reinforces the U.S. belief in the importance of collective responsibility; the recent actions of the United Nations in responding to Iraqi aggression further illustrate the benefits of this approach.

#### Eur-Asia

The new Commonwealth of Independent States' military leadership will require time to dismantle the huge military establishment. Should the independent republics' search for security end in upheaval, the resulting chaos could pose a threat of spillover violence to Europe. There is already widespread concern over the control of nuclear weapons among the republics, and over the outflow of nuclear technology and scientists from the former USSR.

Barring a descent into disorder, Europe will focus on the creation of new political, economic, and security structures to manage the transition from the Cold War. NATO will provide continuity and organization to ease the transition period. A U.S. forward presence in Europe is a vital stabilizing influence that is welcomed by most of our allies and many emerging European states.

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## Middle East

The superiority of high technology weaponry, so starkly demonstrated in the Persian Gulf, has only added fuel to the wildfire of Mid-East militarization. Nearly every nation in this region is pursuing the capability to deploy ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, on top of already huge inventories of modern conventional weaponry. Continued expansion of regional military capabilities, coupled with chronic regional instability and the continued importance of the region's oil supplies, ensure a prominent role for the Middle East in U.S. defense and security planning.

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The Arab-Israeli negotiations signify the start of the long and arduous peace process. Still, several factors will continue to foster instability. Iraq, defeated but neither disarmed nor repentant, will continue to vie with Iran for dominance in the Persian Gulf. The role of Syria, longtime state sponsor of terrorism and recent ally against Iraq, remains to be seen. Several nations in this region have yet to come to grips with deep socioeconomic problems, including the growth of Islamic fundamentalism,

endemic poverty amidst huge arms expenditures, and increasing scarcity of essential resources, especially water. Any of these factors could provide the spark for terrorism, internal unrest, or war.

### Asia/Pacific

Whether in political, economic, or military terms, this region contains a diverse set of challenges and opportunities. Conditions vary widely in every field: from the sharp poverty of the Indian subcontinent to the growing prosperity of emerging Pacific Rim economic powers; from the nascent democracy of the Philippines to the retrenched communist regimes in Beijing and Hanoi; from the tranquility of Australia to the armed truce of the Korean DMZ. The diversity of U.S. interests and the variety of security environments in Asia and the Pacific Rim illustrate almost every element of possible Army involvement within the operational continuum, from peacekeeping operations through nation assistance to regional conflict.

Despite modest political overtures, North Korea remains an intransigent and overly-armed foe. China continues to take only cautionary steps toward economic reform, while squelching the possibility of political opposition. For Southeast Asia, the end of Vietnam's quest for regional dominance could be a key to stability. Nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia are predominant security problems; both India and Pakistan are developing ballistic missile systems that could threaten the stability of the entire Asian continent.

### Latin America

Latin America is another region bearing witness to the spread of democracy. Yet this region faces a three-fold challenge to the gains so recently achieved: the problems generated from imposing debt, resilient insurgencies, and drug trafficking. Cuba, onetime instigator of regional instability, faces the near-term certainty of drastic change or collapse. Panama and Nicaragua are prime examples of fledgling democracies that require support to complete their transition. The governments in Colombia and Peru will continue to be besieged by powerful drug cartels. Due to traditional interests in stability in the Western Hemisphere, the Army can expect to undertake major counterdrug, counterterrorism, and nation assistance missions in Latin America during this decade.

### Africa

Most African states are weak and poor, and they suffer acutely from the social and economic stresses which afflict the developing world. The absence of strong political institutions or regional security structures will hamper attempts to maintain stability in the face of ethnic strife. U.S. interests in many of these conflicts will remain low, but could be raised due to the presence of strategic minerals (throughout Sub-Saharan Africa) or military basing privileges (in the Horn of Africa). The primary role for the Army will be to support U.S. policy by engaging in nation assistance missions designed to promote economic sufficiency and internal stability.

### Conclusions

The challenges to the U.S. Army are complicated by the ongoing changes in the global security environment. Uncertainty demands flexible Army forces, capable of dealing with a variety of national security requirements on short notice. Residual concerns about the stability and final outcome of The Commonwealth of Independent States will compete with a greater regional emphasis, including nation assistance, counterdrug, and special forces operations. The threat of regional instability increases the importance of the Army's peacetime role in assisting nations to address root causes of instability, obviating the need for lethal force. Regional threat contingencies, considering plausible threats and stressful operating environments, have replaced the global Soviet threat as the basis for Army force development and planning.

### Supporting the National Security Strategy

The Army performs a key role as the primary land component of U.S. military power in support of the country's National Security Strategy. The National Security Strategy is designed to protect and further the vital interests of the United States in the changing world strategic environment. U.S. vital interests are relatively constant and endure throughout changes in the international political environment. Yet our national strategy has had to change to respond to the changes in the security environment currently taking place. Our new National Security Strategy provides the policies needed to defend our interests and meet our global responsibilities with smaller, more flexible military forces.

### The National Military Strategy (NMS)

The National Military Strategy provides the military component in support of the National Security Strategy of the United States and is

designed to meet specific objectives. The most important objective remains to deter or defeat aggression in concert with our allies. Other objectives include ensuring global access, promoting regional stability and cooperation, stemming the flow of illegal drugs, and combatting terrorism.

The essential foundations of the NMS are as follows:

- Strategic Deterrence and Defense. Deterring a nuclear attack remains the number one defense priority of the United States. A growing priority is to provide a defensive system against limited attacks, a mission in which the Army will have a major role.

- Forward Presence. Multiple forms of forward presence such as forward deployments, prepositioning equipment, visits, shows of force, training exercises and military-to-military relations are required to maintain a positive influence in distant regions of the world.

- Crisis Response. If our best efforts at deterrence fail, we must be able to respond quickly and effectively to meet a wide variety of potential adversaries who possess a full range of modern weapons.

- Reconstitution. Beyond the crisis response capabilities provided by active and reserve forces, we must have the ability to generate additional forces should a global threat reemerge. We must be able to reconstitute a credible defense by generating required forces and equipment faster than any potential opponent can generate an overwhelming offense. Particular attention must be paid to the ability to activate the industrial base on a large scale.

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The foundations of our NMS are supported by commitments to project overwhelming force to ensure victory if required, maintain our technological superiority, maintain a high degree of readiness to respond to regional contingencies, and use multilateral arrangements and institutions whenever possible.

The essence of the NMS is a shift from the emphasis on a global Soviet threat to regional crises and the sources of instability. The Army will execute the NMS with its portion of the Base Force, as described by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Army has the responsibility to organize, train, and equip the Army active and reserve component forces and provide them through the component commanders for the theater combatant commanders, known as Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), to carry out theater missions. In coordination with Army component commanders, the Army establishes priorities and allocates assets to meet CINC requirements.

### The Army's Strategic Roles

To execute the new National Military Strategy, Army forces, acting under the operational command of the Commanders in Chief of the unified and specified commands, must be able to perform five broad strategic roles which provide the nation with the means to deter aggression, respond to crises, wage war, support civilian authorities, and conduct peacetime operations.

First, the Army maintains combat ready ground forces -- armored, light, and special operations -- for crisis response and other immediate requirements worldwide. The events of the past 24 months, in which Army forces were committed to combat twice, illustrate how quickly conflict requiring uniquely tailored force packages can result from unforeseen developments. For example, we used primarily airborne, light, and special operations forces during Operation Just Cause, and a mix of armored, light, and special operations forces during Operation Desert Storm.

Second, the Army provides forward presence with units forward deployed in regions of vital interest overseas. The Army plans to reduce the number of forward deployed forces, but will retain sufficient forces overseas to sustain U.S. and allied commitments and contribute to regional

stability. Through exercises and other temporary deployments, Army forces based within the U.S. and at forward locations also contribute to forward presence.

Third, the Army maintains units able to reinforce forward deployed and contingency forces. In addition, the Army provides the capacity to expand to levels required to counter a resurgent global threat.

Fourth, the Army supports civilian authorities by participating in disaster relief, providing emergency assistance, and aiding foreign governments and U.S. Law Enforcement Agencies in combatting the flow of drugs at the source, in transit, and across U.S. borders. The Army has provided operational and intelligence support, military facilities, and training support for national counterdrug efforts to 40 Federal and 2000 local law enforcement agencies. In addition the Army has provided military assistance programs, training, and counterdrug intelligence to a growing number of Latin American countries such as Ecuador, Honduras, Paraguay, Costa Rica, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia and Mexico. The Army also plays a key role in combatting terrorism -- first by protecting its soldiers, civilian employees and family members from terrorist attack; and secondly by organizing, training, and equipping forces capable of responding to terrorist attacks against U.S. interests.

Fifth, the Army integrates and coordinates U.S. Army participation in all peacetime activities programs that bring Army personnel into contact with foreign peoples, governments, and armed forces. The goals of Army international activities planning are: to encourage and assist allied and friendly nations' ground defense forces to support U.S. security objectives; to assist a friendly nation in reducing underlying sources of conflict for regional stability; and to promote U.S. access, influence, and interoperability with other countries to enhance U.S. warfighting capabilities. Army international activities include peacekeeping operations, senior level visits, combined exercises, cooperative research and development, nation and security assistance support, and other army-to-army initiatives that support U.S. security objectives. The Army International Activities Plan, FY92-96, provides an integrating mechanism to coordinate the full spectrum of the Army's peacetime interactions with foreign armies and governments. It provides a standardized approach for the selection and planning of international activities to ensure that they are conducted in a coherent, consistent, and unified manner.

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## Arms Control

United States arms control objectives are designed to enhance overall security by strengthening deterrence, reducing the risk of war, supporting alliance relationships, and ensuring a militarily acceptable balance of forces. Recent events in the former Soviet Union and Europe and President Bush's unilateral reduction initiatives drastically change the context in which arms control discussions will proceed in the future.

Of significant impact to the Army, the United States is unilaterally eliminating its inventory of ground-launched theater nuclear weapons (artillery fired atomic projectiles and Lance surface-to-surface missiles). Future theater nuclear fire support will be primarily from Air Force Dual Capable Aircraft.

As the service which maintains responsibility for the U.S. chemical stockpile, the Army upholds the U.S. goal of achieving a global and effectively verifiable chemical weapons (CW) ban. During 1990-91, the Army hosted visits by the Soviets to several U.S. CW storage, production and demilitarization sites and provided the data on the U.S. CW stockpile for exchange with the USSR. The Army is preparing for additional site inspections as well as more detailed CW data to be exchanged with the Soviet Union to include developing a standardized training program for foreign national CW inspectors and their U.S. escorts.

The world's first fully integrated, production scale chemical disposal facility located at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific is safely destroying chemical weapons. Another facility is currently being constructed in the State of Utah with additional facilities planned in CONUS. A disposal training facility was completed in July 1991 at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. It will be used to train workers and management for future disposal facilities and could be used for showing other nations how the United States process works.

### Burdensharing

Burdensharing is a central element of the nation's coalition warfighting strategy. The sharing of roles, risks, and responsibilities is fundamental to alliance relationships. In support of the foundations of the National Military Strategy, and especially of the forward stationing element of forward presence, the United States looks increasingly to its allies and host nations to assume a greater and more equitable share of the overseas stationing costs of U.S. forces deployed to deter and to defend common interests.

### The Army's Role in Space

Space has become an integral component of Army efforts to contend with the widely disparate, unforeseen conflicts that may arise in the future. Consequently, we continue to work to provide space systems support to tactical commanders in the areas of position location and navigation; worldwide communications; satellite weather and terrain coverage; and surveillance and target acquisition.

USCINCSpace has responsibility for space support to the warfighting CINCs. The U.S. Army Space Command (ARSPACE), as a component command, provides operational forces for the ground portion of designated space systems. ARSPACE also provides space systems support to operational forces, as in Operation Desert Storm, where ARSPACE provided Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation, weather, and map and terrain support.

The U.S. Army, a pioneer in the exploration of space, continues to pursue space systems essential for the defense of the Nation. Among current programs, the demonstration of the Small, Lightweight, Global Positioning System Receiver (SLGR) received the most publicity during Operation Desert Storm. However, this was only one of many efforts by Army space users that contributed to the success of the war effort. Army

elements were closely involved in the SCUD warning provided to U.S. units and friendly nations in the Middle East during the war, and in developing maps using satellite data. Ongoing programs include use of communication satellites to provide tactical ground commanders with readily accessible space-based communications, and other tactical support programs are underway using both existing and planned space-based assets.

### Conclusions

As the global strategic environment changes, the National Military Strategy continues to evolve to support the National Security Strategy. The threat-oriented paradigm based on global war with the Soviet Union has given way to a regionally-focused strategy oriented on furthering U.S. global national interests, deterring regional crisis and conflict, and if deterrence fails, defeating aggressors.

While the conditions of warfare will change with time and circumstance, and specific scenarios for the mid-1990's cannot be predicted with any certainty, the fundamental dynamics of conflict will remain constant. Land forces, supported by air, naval, and amphibious forces, will continue to be the only force that can physically drive armies from terrain they are occupying. In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct prompt and sustained land combat, the Army provides the nation with unique capabilities -- capabilities that will be as relevant to U.S. security in the years ahead as they have been since the founding of our Republic.

### III. Maintaining The Edge

In Clay Blair's The Forgotten War, General Omar Bradley, then the Army Chief of Staff, states that in March of 1948 — less than 3 years after proving itself the finest Army ever assembled by any nation — an Army of over 8 million men had dwindled to 500,000 men and was “in a shockingly deplorable state.” It had “almost no combat effectiveness” and “could not fight its way out of a paper bag.” This Army had lost its edge, and perhaps its essence.

Blair also writes, “The total of ten tactical divisions then authorized... (was) egregiously misleading. In order to stay within budget, Collins (General J. Lawton Collins — Bradley's successor as Chief of Staff) had been forced to deactivate one battalion of three in each division's three infantry regiments, and one of three firing batteries in each of the four divisional artillery battalions. In as much as Army doctrine and training were rigidly based on the concept of three battalion regiments and no substitute to doctrine had been (or could be) promulgated, the deactivation gravely impaired — even crippled — the combat capability and readiness of the divisions.” This Army was a hollow force.

These and similar lessons are not lost on the Army of today. Our requirement is to “break the mold” of historically reducing to an unacceptable level the capabilities of America's Army after every major conflict. This will take a concerted effort both from those who influence the Army from outside and from within the Army. We will continue to evolve our doctrine, conduct realistic training, enlist and retain quality people, and promote outstanding leader development to ensure that our Army remains trained and ready. There is at least one certainty in our highly uncertain world, and that is that the Army will be called to support the nation's interests in the future as we have in the past.

#### **"Breaking the Mold"**

Two essential requirements must be met to maintain the warfighting edge needed to face uncertain future threats to our security: the Army must be clear about its institutional essence, and we must have the appropriate mix of capabilities implied by the need to counter those threats. The first requirement is related to the formulation of the Army's

vision, a topic previously addressed. This chapter will look at the second requirement: how to fulfill the broad strategic roles of the Army by ensuring that essential capabilities are retained as we reshape our force in response to the changed strategic environment. To maintain the edge, we must ensure a trained and ready Army at each point in time throughout the period of change. This means we must retain the core warfighting advantages we demonstrated over our opponents in Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm. In addition, the current strategic environment requires us to possess other peacetime capabilities that complement those associated with warfighting and deterrence. In short, our challenge is maintaining the edge during the internal turmoil caused by significant force reductions..

Meeting this challenge, however, entails breaking a historical pattern. In the past, our Army has repeatedly suffered a decline in warfighting effectiveness as it adjusted to post-war changes. This decline has occurred despite the best efforts of many of our most outstanding and dedicated leaders. The explanation for the decline is complex but the proximate causes normally include a combination of concerns about the cost of defense, a change in strategy following the conflict, and the American propensity to discount the need for a large standing military establishment during peacetime. Time after time, we have dismantled a battle-proven Army only to fall short in answering the next call for effective combat capability.

The pattern began in 1812 when the British raided Washington and burned the White House. History calls our attention to the more recent examples of Kasserine Pass in 1943, Task Force Smith in 1950 and the failure of Operation Desert One in 1981. In each case, America's Army was not ready for the demands of the national military strategy and paid for these lapses with the blood of the nation's finest young men. The most critical challenge that confronts us today and in the future is to avoid a repeat of this pattern. Our task is to break the historical mold and maintain a trained and ready Army.

An essential element of remaining trained and ready is adapting our doctrine -- a doctrine which has served us well in the area of warfighting - - to be a doctrine for peace, crisis and war. The process of expanding and modifying our doctrine while maintaining our essence as the pre-eminent warfighting Army in the world has begun. Both the collapse of our erstwhile enemy (and former doctrinal focus) and the experiences of ODS and its aftermath will have major impacts on this doctrinal revision.

The importance of the outcome, and even the conduct, of this re-examination of Army doctrine points to the reality that an intellectual response to the changed strategic environment is needed. Doctrine must not be static, but forward looking and dynamic, as it affects much of what the Army does on a day-to-day basis. In this chapter, following a summary of some of the most critical lessons of our recent combat experience in the Persian Gulf, we will focus on the essential daily business of training, and then conclude with a review of doctrinal issues.

### **Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS) Lessons**

As the Army looks to the future, the multifaceted operations conducted during ODS provide a wealth of information to apply to all aspects of military planning. The Army has made a comprehensive effort to capture and evaluate the plethora of lessons learned from ODS, while cognizant of the often difficult task of applying lessons from a conflict with its unique aspects to other circumstances. Nevertheless, a sampling of significant observations provides examples of policies that led to success, as well as areas that need continued emphasis or improvement.

Quality soldiers, both Active and Reserve, made modern, high-tech weapons work. It was reaffirmed that our people are key to success; technology alone is not enough. As we restructure, we must retain the same quality we have today to assure the capabilities and readiness displayed in ODS. This crisis also demonstrated that the effectiveness of Reserve Component combat service support (CSS) units is tied directly to a timely mobilization decision, which is a critical reconstitution consideration of the current NMS.

Active and Reserve Component capabilities at our current end-strength were adequate for ODS; however, the appropriate mix of forces within the Total Army is a critical issue for future force structure decisions.

The Army's AirLand Battle doctrine was validated during ODS. Integrated Land-Air-Sea operations, not single-service approaches, were vital to success. Work is still needed in the area of Joint Operations, although much progress has been made in recent years. The capabilities to conduct deep, close and rear operations with a variety of forces assured operational and tactical flexibility on the battlefield.

Host nation infrastructure may not be adequate to support a large-scale deployment of U.S. forces. There must be adequate combat service

support structure with the appropriate active/reserve mix to support contingency operations. Operating as part of ad hoc coalitions will continue to be an important part of our planning.

Rigorous training at the Army's Combat Training Centers and in joint and combined exercises (REFORGER, Team Spirit, etc.) was the key to readiness, discipline, and the outstanding performance displayed by soldiers in ODS. The Army's past emphasis to "train as you will fight" will continue to be important in the future.

Emphasis on an effective counter-terrorist program will continue in the future, and may increase in importance. During ODS, there were only two successful terrorist attacks against Army interests worldwide, far below the number predicted by most analysts. Despite this success, we must maintain a vigilant posture toward known and potential terrorists.

Mobilization on the scale executed in ODS had not been accomplished since World War II and had never been accomplished this rapidly. This success was largely the result of innovative and professional leaders focused on mission accomplishment. However, to provide access to the right numbers and skills of reservists necessary to execute the National Military Strategy, greater flexibility is required in mobilization statutes and policies. The system to activate reservists must be more responsive to the immediate demands imposed by major contingencies.

### **The Importance of Strategic Mobility**

The United States may have little or no warning before having to commit forces in future crises. We must have the capability to rapidly project the right mix of armored, light and special operations forces anywhere in the world. The lack of sufficient lift, a key lesson from ODS, may be the most critical shortcoming as it relates to the new NMS, which is based on power projection from the CONUS base. Shortcomings in our ability to execute the strategy must be addressed at the national level.

Vital to a versatile and deployable Army is the appropriate mix of the strategic mobility triad of airlift, sealift, and prepositioned equipment. This triad must meet the requirements for projecting three CONUS-based divisions in 30 days (two armored divisions by sea and one light division by air) and a full corps in 75 days. The triad must be capable of supporting diverse options ranging from reinforcing our forward presence forces, deploying a contingency force in response to crises, and/or sustaining the total deployed force.

The third leg of the triad, prepositioned equipment, is a responsive means to provide an equipped and sustainable force in a predetermined location. It is a subtle form of forward presence which demonstrates our commitment to regional stability. It lessens the airlift and sealift requirement to a specific theater and provides a visible deterrent in terms of national resolve. It is, however, less flexible than the other legs of the triad. Afloat materiel reserves provide the timely reinforcement of staying power for the forward presence forces and the initial warfighting sustainability for the CONUS-based contingency forces as they respond to missions worldwide.

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Strategic mobility requirements were documented in the Defense Mobility Requirements Study (DMRS). This study used the contingency force as one of its base cases in establishing specific quantities and types of craft and vessels required. This important study has identified strategic sealift capabilities as representing our most significant shortfall. This shortfall impairs our ability to project power from CONUS-based forces anywhere in the world. The increased capacity and versatility of the C-17 will meet airlift requirements and greatly expand airfield access, thereby ensuring that the National Command Authority has more viable policy options, a key component of the new strategy. This will, in turn, increase our deterrent capability by contributing to the ability of Army forces to complement those of other services.

### **Training**

Although major reductions to the current force structure and available resources are taking place, one facet remains constant — the Army's basic

mission is training. Irrespective of change, the training of soldiers, leaders, and units to win in combat will remain the Army's single most important task. Just as strategic mobility is required to adequately project power from the CONUS base in response to crises, so is a force that is trained and ready needed to respond on short notice. Whereas doctrine guides how the Army trains to support the strategy, training is the business of what soldiers, leaders, and units do to accomplish their assigned missions.

### Unit Training

Founded on a solid doctrinal base and recently proven in battle, unit training programs must continue to be tough, challenging, and realistic. The extensive use of training aids, devices, and simulators, simulation and innovation to maximize training benefit will be a critical part of this effort. Lessons learned and the tactical and technical proficiencies displayed by units during Desert Storm will serve as stepping stones for the design and development of future training programs.

### Combat Training Centers (CTC)

The Army's four Combat Training Centers are an essential part of the Army's unit training strategy. They support highly demanding joint tactical training for Army forces by addressing unit mission essential tasks at all echelons, from squad/crew through corps staff, under a wide variety of conditions. The CTCs provide variable threats and operational concepts to address a broad range of training requirements. CTC training provides conditions which cannot be replicated at home station and feedback to commanders which they can then use to build better unit home station training programs. Collectively, the CTCs form an essential capability which molds training to doctrine and reinforces essential mission skills.

The CTCs played a vital role in support of ODS. The National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California evaluated threat capabilities, and formulated/disseminated operational techniques with direct application to the situation in Southwest Asia. The NTC also provided invaluable training for those Army Reserve Component brigades which were mobilized. The Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at Hohenfels, Germany provided tailored training to VII Corps units immediately prior to their deployment. The 82d Airborne and 101st Airmobile Divisions along with special operations forces received extensive training at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas prior to deployment to Southwest Asia. The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas provided tailored support to deploying divisions and

also committed a team to Saudi Arabia. That team assisted each corps and the Army component of Central Command to perfect battle plans for the ground phase of the conflict. All of this support resulted in tangible benefits for operational commanders in accomplishing their missions.

The NTC provides realistic combat training under mid to high intensity conflict conditions. Scenarios concentrate on armored and integrated armored and light operations. Thirty-three maneuver battalions are scheduled to train in FY92.

JRTC provides training focused on low to mid intensity regional contingency operations. Forces trained include airborne, air assault, light infantry, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and other rapid deployment units. Sixteen battalion rotations are scheduled during FY92.

The CMTC provides training to the forward deployed forces of U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). Focused on mid to high intensity armored force scenarios, the CMTC goal is to provide extended training for every USAREUR maneuver battalion once every twelve months.

The BCTP extends CTC training to division and corps commanders and battle staffs. The two-part BCTP experience consists of an AirLand Battle Seminar followed some months later by a "Warfighter" computer battle simulation. The Seminar affords commanders an opportunity to review doctrine with their staff and sets the stage for the Warfighter Exercise. The Warfighter is an intense exercise which requires division and corps staffs to plan and execute a variety of combat missions against an opposing battle staff. Both phases can be conducted at the unit's home station. BCTP is structured to fully support the Army's corps and AC and RC divisions. In FY 92, BCTP will expand support to the RC divisions and will refine the integration of SOF which began in FY 91. Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs unit staffs will participate in BCTP in support of corps and division operations.

#### The Army Exercise Program

One of the primary objectives of the Army exercise program is to train commanders, staffs, and units in a wartime operating environment to execute assigned operation plans (OPLANS), and to apply contemporary doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures.

The Army exercise program includes unilateral, joint and combined exercises, in recognition of the reality that the Army will seldom fight as

an independent service. Unilateral exercises involve military forces of only one service. A joint exercise involves forces of two or more services, and a combined exercise involves forces of more than one nation. Unilateral exercises conducted by the Army are conducted at corps level and below, and include simulations of other services and forces.

The capability to exercise in a wide variety of settings and possible contingencies is an essential requirement of our overall strategy. These exercises are programmed at all levels within the Army and include Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)-designated exercises. Exercises in the CJCS program range in size from small detachment deployments to worldwide command post exercises and large-scale overseas deployment exercises including:

REFORGER - a strategic mobility exercise emphasizing U.S. capability and resolve to reinforce NATO with CONUS-based forces.

TEAM SPIRIT - a large-scale, joint/combined field training exercise in Korea. The exercise demonstrates U.S. resolve to support the Republic of Korea (ROK) against external aggression.

KEEN EDGE - a joint/combined exercise in Japan designed to exercise, train and evaluate U.S. and Japanese forces in joint tactics and techniques.

BRIGHT STAR - a large-scale overseas deployment exercise conducted every other year in Egypt and several other Southwest Asian countries.

FUERTES CAMINOS - joint/combined engineer construction exercises conducted in a number of countries in the SOUTHCOM area of operations. Exercises are conducted in those countries where we can contribute to nation assistance, or where we desire to support a subsequent exercise phase. In FY92, Fuertes Caminos exercises will be conducted in Honduras, Panama and Bolivia. Engineer units from both the Active and Reserve Component participate in this exercise.

A comprehensive exercise program is a vital part of the requirement to remain trained and ready, and will continue to be vital in the future, even as the composition and nature of our alliances change.

### Soldier Training

Individual soldier training serves as the foundation for all unit training. The focus of individual training is to provide the essential tactical

and technical skills necessary for a soldier to function as an effective member of his unit. Training in basic and specialized soldier skills along with a comprehensive Physical Fitness Program are the foundations of more complex unit training and exercises.

With decreasing Army accessions, the training base will realign and restructure to meet the Army's future needs without a degradation in training. Consolidation of training bases and training functions will enable the Army to maintain quality Initial Entry Training (IET) while reducing training resource requirements. The strategy of small group instruction, with drill sergeants as primary instructors, is the cornerstone of IET training.

Fitness training toughens soldiers physically and mentally and helps prepare them to meet the challenges of their mission. The overall physical conditioning of active and reserve component units has significantly improved in recent years due in large part to the assistance provided by the Army's Physical Fitness School. Through the efforts of the School and leaders throughout the Army, improved physical fitness training and instruction have been institutionalized in the Army.

Army specialized training is designed to teach special skills required for various unit functions. Specialized individual training includes Airborne, Ranger, Pathfinder, and Jumpmaster training at Fort Benning, GA, Chemical Decontamination Operations training at Fort McClellan, AL, and Foreign Area Officer Program training at Fort Bragg, NC. The Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has training courses to meet its unique special operations requirements. These courses include: Advanced Military Parachuting, Scuba Operations, Survival, Escape, Rescue, and Evasion (SERE), Civil Affairs Operations, and foreign language training.

### Training Support

Training support encompasses a wide range of very diverse but essential functions. The training support component of the Army budget provides resources for air traffic control, automatic data processing, base communications, range operations and modernization, travel and per diem for school attendance, materials and systems development, printing support, visual productions, school evaluation, and operations of the headquarters of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command and its field operating agencies. Since these functions are not driven directly by student load, training support cannot be scaled back proportionately with the reduced force or the reduced number of students in the classroom.

## Training Aids, Devices and Simulators

Training aids, devices and simulators form an integral part of the training strategy for all Army forces. They close the readiness gap caused by a constrained budget, environmental restrictions on training, and a smaller force required to be trained for a variety of contingency missions.

While training devices cannot completely replicate "full-up" training experiences, they do provide excellent training in locations where access to local or major training areas is limited. This capability is especially important in Europe and for the Reserve Components. At the Combat Training Centers, they enhance combat realism by providing training otherwise too dangerous or too costly to conduct.

The Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer (UCOFT) is an excellent example of a device which allows units to practice firing thousands of tank main gun and Bradley rounds at a small fraction of the cost of firing live rounds. Before training with full-sized equipment and live ammunition, individuals and crews now demonstrate proficiency on a prescribed regimen of training devices and simulators. This ensures units make the optimum use of training ammunition and field exercises. The UCOFT is just one example of numerous state-of-the-art training devices the Army uses to provide the best quality and lowest cost training available in the world today.

## Battlefield Training Simulations

The Army has led the way in use of battlefield training simulations. Leader and staff warfighting competence are now honed to a keen edge using Corps Battle Simulation (CBS), Brigade/Battalion Battle Simulation (BBS) and JANUS, a company/team battle simulation. The Army Family of Simulation (FAMSIM) allows full scale command and staff training exercises to be conducted without the deployment of personnel, vehicles, planes or ships. These training tools are at the forefront of preparing the Army for combat operations and form a solid building block within the Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS).

All units within the Total Army are required by CATS to pass through checkpoint gates that assess their training level. Reserve Component units can maximize training pace through the expanded opportunities offered at the armory or at a centralized training facility. Simulation is a tool that enables all commanders to practice wartime missions and insure that their unit will pass through the next gate.

Battlefield simulation scenarios were used effectively during Desert Storm. Wargaming the many options provided insight to that battlefield and provided team building for staffs, both extremely important to the Army performance in the war. U.S. Army simulations can and do train the best warfighting leaders and staffs in the world.

### Range Modernization Program

The Army's Range Modernization Program provides challenging, realistic and efficient facilities for soldiers, crews and units stationed worldwide to perform live-fire gunnery training. These facilities provide an environment of demanding gunnery scenarios from which warfighting proficiency is developed and maintained. The gunnery proficiency of Army crews, combined with the capabilities of deployed weapons systems, were devastating to Iraqi forces during Operation Desert Storm. The number of first round hits at near and far ranges compared with relatively low number of friendly casualties is a testimony to the combat capability derived from modern Army ranges.

The range modernization program will support the process of equipment modernization planned for the Army's Reserve Components by providing local and regional range facilities that support their new equipment, while promoting uniform standards and methods of training.

### Distributed Training

Distributed training consists of a wide variety of exportable instructional materials intended to maintain the current level of training effectiveness while adjusting to the reductions in Army size and resources. The goals of the program are to save resources, reduce the size of resident training, deliver training to soldiers when and where needed, expand training opportunities, and improve training standardization. Distributed training will attain those goals with the use of off-the-shelf technology and proven instructional media to reach more students with fewer instructors.

### Reserve Components Training Strategy

The Reserve Component Training Strategy is designed to produce a RC force trained to mobilize, deploy, fight, and win upon commitment. The battle focus of the training strategy develops and maintains task proficiency on mission essential tasks. The RC Training Development Action Plan (RC TDAP) implements the RC Training Strategy which

currently identifies 38 training-related issues which affect the conduct of realistic and effective training in the RC. Training-related issues identified by other actions or working groups, such as the Roundout Brigade Task Force and the RC Leader Development Action Plan, are being incorporated into the RC TDAP. The RC TDAP provides the Army a single-source plan to implement actions needed to improve and enhance RC training readiness.

### Regional Training Sites (RTS)

RTS provide facilities which offer Reserve Component units and soldiers hands-on training opportunities on equipment not located at their home station.

RTS-Maintenance sites provide Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) transition and sustainment training on newly acquired systems and MOS sustainment training on current ground mobility and fire support systems. Two "high-tech" sites provide transition and sustainment training for soldiers in low density, highly technical communications-electronics MOSs. Seventeen (15 standard and 2 high-tech) of the planned 21 RTS-Maint sites are open for training.

RTS-Intelligence sites allow RC soldiers to work with highly classified information in a field station environment. RTS-Intel sites also offer foreign language refresher and sustainment training. Five sites are now operational; construction of the permanent facility at Fort Gillem, GA, is ongoing and should be completed in FY 92.

RTS-Medical sites offer new equipment training (NET) on Deployable Medical Systems (DEPMEDS) and other force modernization equipment, unit level sustainment training, and other medical training as required. Four of the planned 7 RTS-Med sites are fully operational. The ARNG RTS-Medical, at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, did pre and post Desert Storm mobilization training on Deployable Medical Sets for 35 hospitals.

The High-Technology Training Center (HTTC) at Fort Dix, New Jersey is equipped with training devices and simulators not available at most RC unit home stations. It provides individual, small unit, and battle staff training to Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers. During FY 91, approximately 60,000 man-days of training were provided.

Centralized ARNG Aviation Training Sites (AATS) in Pennsylvania and Arizona provide standardization and specialized aviation training. The Eastern AATS stresses individual aviator qualification training in utility and cargo rotary wing aircraft and selected fixed wing aircraft. In FY91, over 20,000 cockpit training hours were logged. The Western AATS focuses on attack and aeroscout rotary wing training. The Western Site logged over 8,000 cockpit training hours. These two sites are the only RC training sites authorized to conduct helicopter instructor pilot qualification courses. They provide an immediate expansion capability in non-modernized systems for the Army's aviation training base upon mobilization.

Training provided by the regional training sites has materially contributed to improve capabilities of RC units and soldiers. During the post-mobilization training phase of ODS, regional training sites played an important role in preparing RC units for deployment.

#### Overseas Deployment Training (ODT)

Overseas Deployment Training is one of the Army's most effective programs to train the Reserve Components in their wartime missions. ODT program participation projected for FY 91, prior to the commencement of ODS activities, was 44,000 soldiers. FY 92 ODT participation is projected to be approximately 40,000.

#### Leader Development

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm proved that the Army's leader development system works. It produces competent, confident leaders. The future challenge, however, is to continue to produce the same talented leaders despite a shrinking force and constrained resources. The Army is committed to this challenge. Action plans that address leader development for officers, NCO's and civilians are currently in place. Similar plans are being developed for the Reserve Components and Warrant Officers Corps. DA PAM 600-32, "Leader Development for the Total Army, The Enduring Legacy" has institutionalized three development pillars: institutional training, operational assignments, and self development.

#### Officer Leader Development

The goal of the Officer Leader Development is tactically and technically competent leaders who are confident in themselves and enjoy the confidence of subordinates. To achieve this goal, a path of progressive

and sequential training experiences and education culminate in the development of professional leaders who understand and are able to exploit the full potential of present and future Army doctrine.

The Military Qualification Standard (MQS) Program evaluates the professional knowledge of officers at various points of their career progression. This program links the three pillars of leader development and ensures the leader development efforts of school commandants, unit commanders and individual officers are coordinated and complimentary. The goal of MQS is to produce officers well versed in warfighting tasks and prepared for service in positions of greater responsibility.

Institutional training begins with the Officer Basic Course, which prepares newly commissioned officers for their first duty assignment at the platoon or section level. The Officer Advanced Course shifts the focus of leader development training from platoon level to the company, team, battery or troop. This enhanced level of instruction orients on preparing the captain grade officer to lead, train, maintain and fight units of greater size, scope, and responsibility.

The Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS<sup>3</sup>) is a two phased training experience that trains captains to perform in staff positions. Phase I is an intensive correspondence course which lays the groundwork for instruction provided in the phase II resident course. CAS<sup>3</sup> instruction emphasizes problem analysis, solution development, and staff coordination in a concentrated, fast paced course of study. CAS<sup>3</sup> course enrollment is 4000 students annually. Army policy now requires CAS<sup>3</sup> attendance for all officers as a prerequisite to attending any staff college course. RC CAS<sup>3</sup> has also been developed to extend this valuable instruction throughout the Total Army.

The Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) provides the field grade officer with the skills and knowledge required to serve as general staff officers and field grade commanders. As the Army's senior tactical school, training is focused on the operational art of war fighting and combined/joint operations. While in-resident instruction is limited to 1280 students per year, over 17,000 other officers annually participate in various phases of the corresponding studies course. The Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) provides selected CGSOC graduates who display an acumen for tactics and operations an intensified course analysis of the tactical and operational art of warfighting. Following graduation from AMSP, students serve a mandatory 18 month internship at a division

or corps level staff where their advanced skills are best utilized in managing the Army's critical warfighting training and planning.

The Army War College (AWC) is the Army's capstone educational institution. Here senior officers are trained for critical positions in the Army, Department of Defense, and other related agencies concerned with national security. The training focus is on the study of national security affairs, with emphasis on the development and employment of ground forces. Course content includes analysis and development of national security policy and the formulation of national and theater military strategy. Other studies include the formulation and execution of combined and joint campaign plans, mobilization, force development, and operational projection and employment of military forces.

The Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) program began in June 1990. JPME is a two phased course of joint level instruction which builds on the joint training received in CGSOC and AWC. Phase I requires the completion of an intermediate or senior level school such as CGSOC or AWC. Phase II includes instruction at the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, VA. Major areas of study include: National Military Capability and Command Structure, Joint Doctrine, Joint Planning, Joint and Combined Operations, and Campaign Planning. Students will attend either the intermediate level or senior level course. In FY92, over 350 Army officers will attend JPME.

### Warrant Officer Leader Development

The Warrant Officer Leader Development Action Plan will dramatically improve the Warrant Officer (WO) leader development system. Scheduled for publication in 1992, it addresses such issues as leadership training for Senior and Master Warrant Officers, clarification and marketing of WO duties and responsibilities, standardized selection criteria and position coding. The Warrant Officer Training System provides a three-level progressive and sequential certification for warrant officers. Training and certification occur at entry, senior, and master warrant officer levels.

At the entry level, the process requires the selection of WO candidates by a centralized board, successful completion of the Warrant Officer Candidate School, and successful completion of the Technical and Tactical Certification Course. The Warrant Officer Candidate School is a standardized training course that all warrant officer candidates must

attend. Technical and tactical certification concentrates on those skills and tasks in which the candidate must be proficient for his specific specialty.

Senior warrant officer training is designed to refresh and enhance common skills, update technical knowledge, and train senior warrant officers to perform successfully in senior-level positions.

Master warrant officer training is the capstone level of WO training. It is designed to develop selected senior warrant officers as systems integrators, managers, and trainers in a senior leadership role at various Army organizational levels.

### Noncommissioned Officer Leader Development

The Army's NCO education system complies with leader development doctrine in that it is progressive and sequential. Consisting of the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC), the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC), the Advance Noncommissioned Officers Course (ANCOC), the Sergeants Major Course, and various functional courses, it provides successive levels of education as well as special training for specific duties. The system ensures that NCOs are trained to uniformly high standards so that they are fully qualified to train and lead soldiers.

The Primary Leadership Development Course is a four-week, non MOS specific, field-oriented leadership course built around basic soldiers skills. PLDC is taught at NCO academies throughout the Army and is designed to prepare soldiers for leadership responsibilities at the grade of sergeant.

The Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course prepares NCOs for duties as staff sergeants. The Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course prepares staff sergeants and sergeants first class for duties in platoon sergeant and equivalent positions. ANCOC has a common leadership core and stresses MOS-related tasks, emphasizing leadership skills and knowledge of the subjects required for training and leading soldiers at the platoon and comparable level.

The Sergeants Major Course is the capstone of enlisted training. It prepares selected soldiers for Sergeant Major and Command Sergeant Major duties. Master Sergeants and Sergeants Major are prepared for both troop and staff assignments. The Sergeants Major Academy is a prerequisite for appointment to the duty position of Command Sergeant Major. The senior-level training is obtained through a six-month resident course taught at Fort Bliss, Texas, or through the two-year Corresponding

Studies Program. In either case, attendees are selected by an Army selection board.

### Reserve Components Leader Development

For RC leaders, institutional training includes resident and exportable professional development as well as functional courses for NCOs and officers. RC leader participation in operational assignments is important, but limited by the geographical environment of RC units. Self development has always been a hallmark of RC leaders.

The institutional training pillar of the NCO leader development is the RC Noncommissioned Officer Education System (RC-NCOES). It provides common leader training for each level and MOS specific training similar to that provided to NCO's in the active force. All courses are exportable and are taught by RC Training Institutions (RCTI). For those selected, the First Sergeants, Sergeants Major and Command Sergeants Major Designee Courses are available through the Sergeants Major Academy. In addition, the First Sergeants Course and the Senior NCO Battle Staff Course are exportable and taught by RCTI.

The only exportable course in the RC Warrant Officer Training System (RC WOTS) is the Warrant Officer Entry Course (WOEC). It is a four-week course conducted at Fort McCoy, WI in either one or two phases. Technical and tactical certification courses must be taken in residence at active army schools, though many of these courses are shortened for the RC and involve self development phases for home study in addition to attending a branch school for other phases.

The RC officer education system (RC-OES) is progressive and sequential, built around the Military Qualification Skills (MQS) structure. Regardless of source of commission, each new officer receives the same basic soldiering and leadership instruction based on the MQS-1 (precommissioning) model. Branch tactical and technical competency is developed in the Officer Basic Course (OBC) which is the same resident course for both RC and AC officers. The RC-OES includes exportable or resident instruction in branch officer advanced course (OAC) which focuses on company-level operations, and in the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) which focuses on higher level leadership and tactical instruction. OBC and OAC are part of MQS-2, which includes self development as an integral part. A new RC-OES has been approved which will feature a shortened RC-OAC, the addition of an exportable Combined Arms and Services Staff School Course (RC-CAS<sup>3</sup>) focusing on teaching

officers required staff skills, and a realigned CGSOC that teaches tactics, followed by instruction on the operational level of war.

### Civilian Leader Development

The Army is committed to resourcing civilian leader development initiatives to the greatest extent possible. The need for a high degree of competency in civilian leadership is increasingly important as the Army draws down. To promote technical, professional, and leadership competencies, the Army is institutionalizing the Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System (ACTEDS) for its professional civilian workforce. ACTEDS sets the standards for quality job performance and leadership from intern to senior executive service levels, and provides the progressive and sequential training, development and job assignments employees need in order to acquire necessary knowledge and abilities.

A civilian leader development program of courses, designed and delivered by the Center for Army Leadership (CAL), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is an integral part of ACTEDS. The courses offer leader training at three major phases of civilian careers: intern, supervisory, and managerial.

The Army Management Staff College (AMSC) further prepares individuals for advancement through a 14-week course in sustaining base systems and philosophies, leadership and managerial skills, and national defense policy and strategy.

### Army Continuing Education System

The Army Continuing Education System (ACES) encompasses a variety of programs and services that support self-development efforts, e.g., post-secondary activities, workplace literacy programs, vocational-technical programs, and non-traditional education activities.

Eventually, all soldiers leave active service, usually to join the nation's workforce, go to school, or retire -- a separation that may not always be voluntary in these turbulent times. ACES staff members help make the transition as smooth as possible. This may entail assisting soldiers gain acceptance to the college or technical school of their choice; helping determine if schooling should be full or part time; and ensuring they understand the financial aspects of their education benefits.

Education offers a special advantage to the Total Army and society as a whole. Efforts are also being made to support the continuing education

needs of adult family members and DA civilians within legal restraints. To meet the need, Army dollars continue to be supplemented by sources such as other Federal agencies, state educational funds, and local institutions.

### Training for the Future

As the cornerstone of readiness, training remains the Army's most important peacetime mission. A changing threat coupled with technological developments, environmental concerns, and significant reductions in resources requires a constant reevaluation of training strategies and methods. These methods and strategies must continue to evolve to meet future training requirements.

One current example of innovative approaches to meet the special training needs of the RC is Operation Bold Shift, a major FORSCOM program that is intended to enable critical parts of the RC to be more deployable and to increase the combat readiness of certain units by a combination of manpower, leader development and training initiatives. Initiatives such as the Bold Shift program are a response to some of the lessons learned in the aftermath of ODS. Other responses to these lessons can be found in the plan which implements the RC training strategy (RC Training Development Plan) by innovative utilization of Regional Training Sites and expanded participation in the Overseas Deployment Training (ODT) program for FY92.

The Army's Long Range Training Plan (ALRTP) provides the training azimuth for all Army trainers and serves as a key departmental document in the development of specific long range training plans by subordinate headquarters. Derived from the Army Long Range Planning Guidance, it addresses the Total Army's training needs for the next several years. The ALRTP describes future trends, provides assumptions concerning relevant future training issues, and defines future Army training requirements. This document provides the conceptual framework for Army trainers to build future training programs and policies.

### Role of Doctrine

Doctrine has two fundamental purposes: to link strategy and force structure, and to guide training. Doctrine must support the strategy from which it is derived and must serve as a foundation for Army policies in areas such as training, force design, modernization, personnel and logistics. Doctrine underlies much of the Army's business, and an understanding of its importance is vital to those that are shaping the Army of the future.

The Army must be prepared to deploy on short notice and operate successfully on many battlefields and in many environments. It must tailor its forces to the task at hand to conduct activities throughout the continuum of military operations described below. Based on these challenges, the Army will continue to develop forward looking concepts and doctrine to guide its forces for the 1990's and beyond.

### Continuum of Military Operations

Future Army activities will be conducted throughout the continuum of military operations. The strategic environment within each theater consists of a variety of conditions -- political, economic, military -- and a range of threats that result in varied responses. The continuum of military operations is an analytical construct which links the strategic environment and threats within a theater to appropriate military actions. This continuum consists of three general states: peacetime activities, hostilities short of war, and war.

Peacetime activities represent a predominantly non-hostile state of the continuum characterized by the benign use of military forces along with political, economic, and informational measures to achieve national objectives and to complement our efforts to deter conflict or, should deterrence fail, win in combat. Operations in support of peacetime activities are normally interagency in character and are designed to address the fundamental causes of instability that can lead to regional conflict.

Hostilities short of war involve armed struggle between organized parties within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. While conventional forces may be involved, special operations forces or non-combat forces frequently predominate. Hostilities short of war are often protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area and constrained in weaponry and level of violence. Limited objectives may be achieved by the short, focused, and direct application of force.

War involves the sustained use of armed force between nations or organized groups within a nation employing appropriate military forces in a series of connected battles, major operations and campaigns to achieve vital national objectives. War may be limited or it may be general, with the total resources of a nation employed and the national survival of a belligerent at stake.

Although the states of the continuum are described in discrete terms, in actual circumstances there may be no precise distinctions where a particular state ends and another begins. The Army's doctrine must be sufficiently broad and flexible in order to address operations throughout this range of military operations, by all types of Army forces.

### AirLand Operations

Since its promulgation in 1982, AirLand Battle doctrine has guided the Army well, providing guidance for training, organizational design, materiel requirements and leader development efforts. It produced the best trained, most ready Army in our nation's history -- an Army victorious in Operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm.

AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine was set in the context of the US-Soviet conflict. It focused on combat operations in Central Europe against a massive, echeloned Warsaw Pact threat. The doctrine was assumed to be applicable to other theaters, such as SWA or Korea - and this was validated to some extent by its success in ODS. However, recent changes in the strategic environment dictate that sound warfighting principles embedded in ALB doctrine be updated and expanded to meet new challenges.

In response to this change, a new operational level "umbrella concept" has been developed to describe how Army forces will operate in the future as the land component in joint, combined, and interagency operations. It builds on the strengths of the current AirLand Battle doctrine. Of importance for the future is the Army's role in achieving deterrence through demonstrating a credible capability to project overwhelming combat power; the interaction and synchronization of activities throughout the continuum of military operations; and a recognition of the Army's role in peacetime activities that improves democratic and economic development of our allies and friends.

The revision of FM 100-5, Operations, the basic doctrinal publication of the Army, is an important task. While reaffirming the basic principles and tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine, the updated version will reflect a wider coverage of global commitments, the non-linear nature of future battlefields, and greater emphasis on power projection operations from the CONUS base. AirLand Operations (ALO) is the name of the new overarching doctrinal concept that will replace AirLand Battle.

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### Joint Operations

In the 1990's and beyond, Army forces will be in an operational environment which is generally joint, usually combined, and frequently interagency. Joint Doctrine will assist commanders in conducting successful operations with other services. The basic purpose of continuing to refine our joint doctrine is to capitalize on the complementary capabilities of the individual services in order to best meet our overall national security objectives.

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the development of joint doctrine continued unabated. The war presented some dramatic challenges and opportunities. Joint doctrine was used and sometimes developed by deployed forces in such areas as ground combat operations, shipboard helicopter operations, combat search and rescue, special operations, and many others. Doctrinal lessons learned are being included in the development of all future joint publications and training efforts.

### Combined Operations

The U.S. Army of the 1990's and beyond must remain a strategic, global force. Inherent in this responsibility is a strategy based on regional alliances which require interoperability and standardization between US forces and our allies. Combined/coalition doctrine and procedures are required to provide guidance for the conduct of multi-national operations.

Many of the principles institutionalized during past training in NATO, with the Republic of Korea and with other alliance arrangements were validated during Operation Desert Storm. However, the Army of the future cannot rely solely on principles evolved through mature alliances. As force

structure and forward deployed forces are reduced, the Army will be subjected to increased potential for operations in immature theaters. To meet these challenges, the Army is developing combined/coalition doctrine based on the new AirLand Operations concept and emerging lessons from Operation Desert Storm.

#### IV. Reshaping The Total Force

The Army's accomplishments in the past year have added another important chapter to the proud history of our great institution. While answering our nation's call to Southwest Asia, the Army was already deeply involved in fundamental adjustments.... In size, it will be reminiscent of the Army prior to World War II and the Korean War. In capability, however, it must not resemble those armies. It must not only retain all the capabilities of Operation Desert Storm, but it also must improve upon those capabilities by incorporating lessons learned and new technological developments.

- Secretary of the Army Michael P.W. Stone

Our plan is to reshape the force of the future to maintain its viability as a fighting force. We must maintain the proper mix and number of Active and Reserve forces and maintain our lead in equipment superiority by targeting research and development funds on leap-ahead technologies.

#### Structuring The Total Army of the Future

A central task of the Army leadership is the effective management of change, both to ensure the Army retains its unique capabilities, and that it remains a credible element of national military power. Profound change in the security environment, as reflected in the new National Military Strategy will have fundamental implications for tomorrow's Army. Besides being substantially smaller, the Army will be largely CONUS-based. In a diverse, unpredictable environment, the Army must be versatile, deployable, lethal, sustainable, and expandible. The Army's unique capabilities provide the National Command Authorities (NCA) a power projection force to deter potential adversaries, and that can decisively defeat them in sustained combat.

The Army shapes its forces to fulfill the U.S. need for a worldwide, sustained land combat capability. Its structure is carefully tailored within manpower and fiscal constraints to optimize warfighting capabilities against the multiple and varied threats to U.S. interests abroad. The Army is composed of armored, light, and special operations forces (SOF) that offer flexible capabilities in any environment.

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U.S. Army armored forces, consisting of armored and mechanized infantry divisions, provide an unequaled capability to fight and win against armored and mechanized enemy threats. Light infantry divisions provide the NCA the unique capability to place capable, versatile combat power on the ground anywhere in the world within hours of a crisis.

The versatile nature of SOF provides a large range of options across the entire continuum of military operations. SOF consist of special forces (SF), ranger, special operations aviation (SOA), psychological warfare (PSYOP), and civil affairs (CA) units. Special forces plan, conduct, and support unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance and counter terrorism as primary missions. Ranger forces are highly skilled light infantry and can be employed in small groups to execute unique direct action operations. Army SOA provide specialized aviation support to SOF. CA forces are employed to enhance relationships between military forces and civilian authorities and populations. PSYOP forces are employed to favorably influence the attitudes and behaviors of specific foreign audiences in support of U.S. objectives.

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## Completed Force Structure Actions

The Army is already changing rapidly from a force structure of 28 divisions, 18 Active Component and 10 Reserve Component, to a significantly smaller force. During FY91 22,000 Active Component (AC) soldiers positions were reduced, as were 17,000 in the Reserve Component (RC). Numerous units were realigned and inactivated in Germany and CONUS.

Already in FY92, the 3rd Armored Division and the 8th Infantry Division have been inactivated, with the VII Corps headquarters to follow in March 1992. The V Corps, with 2 divisions, will remain as the Corps forward deployed to Europe.

## Shaping the Total Army

While reshaping the Army to respond globally to a wide range of contingencies, we have retained the ability to reconstitute a larger force to respond in the event of escalation. Forward presence will be maintained through both permanently and intermittently forward deployed forces that can also respond to worldwide regional contingencies.

One Active Component (AC) power projection corps will provide the capability to deploy on short notice for immediate response to regions of potential conflict. This tailorable force, with required command and control will have a forcible entry capability and will be capable of sustaining deployed units for 30 days with only limited reliance on Reserve Component augmentation.

Additional active and reserve forces to reinforce the rapidly deployable divisions will be available after a more extended period for mobilization and training. These will consist of active divisions with RC roundout brigades and full RC divisions.

This increased reliance on power projection is a prudent risk, given the changed strategic environment and the longer warning available to counter a resurgent global threat, which allows the Army more time to generate the forces necessary to prosecute major war.

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As the Army shapes the Total Force for the future, the size and composition of both the Active and the Reserve Components will evolve to allow the Army to accomplish our strategic roles, tempered by considerations of affordability and risk.

**Shaping the Support Structure**

A considerable effort is underway to reshape the Army's Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) structure. Emphasis has been given to building a rapidly deployable contingency force which is less reliant on the Reserve Component (RC). Although still limited, these primarily active component resources will be structured to meet the initial support requirements for a wide variety of short-notice contingency operations. Regardless of these efforts, contingency forces will normally require the mobilization of significant reserve component support forces to provide continued sustainment operations. A major initiative underway to enhance the CONUS contingency capability is the programmed restationing of CS and CSS units from Europe to various military installations in the United States.

**FY92-95 Force Structure Actions**

The FY92 National Defense Appropriations Act approved Army force reductions of 50,000 AC and 22,000 RC for FY92. The legislation slows the Army's programmed reduction of the Reserve Component for FY92 from the scheduled 83,000 to 22,000 in order to study the effects of those reductions. The Army desires to return to the programmed ramp in FY93 in order to continue appropriate and balanced reductions to attain the base force of four corps and twenty divisions by the end of FY95. The AC

reductions could be increased further in FY92 by a possible accelerated reduction of forces from U.S. Army Europe, after appropriate consultations with our NATO allies.

This acceleration of reductions reflects the rapid changes in the strategic threat against NATO and in the Army's capability to adjust to these changes. However, while the altered strategic environment (and lower risk) allows these adjustments, the Army must continue to take advantage of technology to provide the equipment necessary to achieve its diverse missions.

**\*SLIDE\***

### **Modernization of the Force**

Army Force Modernization is an essential component in achieving power projection as the Army becomes smaller. It is the continuous process by which the Army develops and fields warfighting capabilities to deter war, and, if necessary, fight and win. It includes the integration of doctrine, organization, leader development, sustainment, and training programs with new and product improved equipment to produce the highest quality, most lethal and survivable force possible within available resources. Modernization initiatives before and after deployment to Operation Desert Shield/Storm were key in attaining a ready warfighting force. The success of Desert Storm is an example of the Army's force modernization strategy in action.

Threat.

The threat environment has changed significantly over the past two years. The Army's focus on the Soviet Union for the last forty years has been healthy. The results of the Cold War, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have shown that a doctrine centered on fighting outnumbered and winning against technically challenging equipment produced a flexible and responsive military. Today, the massive integrated forces of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact have disappeared, but much of the armies' equipment and technology remain. Where and when they will appear in confrontation with U.S. interests, and in what combination with other developments worldwide, cannot be known with precision. The crucial difference today is that significant capabilities exist around the world, but a single threat focus possessing the most advanced capabilities no longer exists. Nevertheless, to win decisively and quickly, with minimum casualties, means the Army must maintain the ability to fight outnumbered and win against capable antagonists in any environment, across the operational continuum.

#### Status of the Current Force

The Army is nearing the end of a remarkable era of force modernization. The efforts of the past 15-17 years have produced the most capable and lethal Army in history. The Army is moving toward fielding the total force with some systems such as Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles and Apache attack helicopters for close combat, Heavy Expandable Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTT), High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), and Heavy Equipment Transports (HET) to provide rapid wheeled mobility to Combat, Combat Support and Combat Service Support units, and Patriot missile systems to destroy hostile aircraft or surface to surface missiles. This modernized equipment fully supports the needs of the warfighting CINCs, and significantly enhances their ability to execute AirLand Battle Doctrine.

However, modernization is a journey, not a destination. The journey towards fulfilling this era of modernization is still in progress, with systems such as the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) being fielded to support the Deep Attack, command and control systems such as Multiple Subscriber Equipment (MSE) and Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) to enhance secure communications, plus many other systems included in the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) that are a required part of the Army's overall goal to achieve a balanced force capability.

Nonetheless, fiscal constraints prevent the Army from fielding the entire force with some items of equipment. Blackhawk (UH-60) and Kiowa (OH-58D) helicopters are examples. As a result of these fiscal constraints, 30 year old UH-1 and less capable OH-58A/C models will remain in the force and will require a service life extension program to keep them flying. The same is true in the truck fleet which will retain a large number of very old 2 1/2 ton trucks.

### Modernization Strategy.

The Army has developed a comprehensive strategy to guide its modernization efforts. This strategy addresses all aspects of force modernization and is especially effective in times of scarce resources. The Army must continue to invest in the future to maintain its lead as the most effective fighting force in the world. Listed below are the six modernization principles that guide the Army's overarching modernization strategy. They provide consistency of direction and continuity of effort as we steer through an era of challenge and change.

Field advanced warfighting capabilities through continuous modernization. The objective is to maintain an overmatching qualitative lead versus the potential warfighting capability of possible opponents, and to adapt force modernization based on lessons learned by operational experience. Fielded equipment will be upgraded for a high Return on Investment (ROI) such as: identified warfighting deficiencies, safety, or Operations and Support (O&S) cost reductions.

Field new equipment in priority, beginning with units that are first to fight. The Army must continue to expect constrained budgets unless the security environment changes significantly. This means the Army will not be able to field the most capable equipment to the entire Army. Priority will go to those units identified as being the first-to-fight, primarily contingency and forward deployed forces.

Modernize by force package. A Force Package is a discrete grouping of units by warfighting priority. The Army has designated four force packages to which units may be assigned according to their mission and potential for deployment/employment. Equipment within a force package can be block modified or replaced en masse, thus providing equivalent capability and compatibility for all units within a force package. As modernized equipment is fielded to the units in a force package, useful equipment it replaces is cascaded down to the next force package. The Army will eliminate equipment and structure which has an operations and

support cost higher than the replacement costs (unless essential for Army missions), or is redundant, outmoded or no longer suitable for its intended purpose. Least-capable equipment is retired as early as possible while maintaining unit readiness.

Provide maximum lethality and survivability of the force. Weapon systems must have overmatching lethality to defeat the enemy while providing weapon system, unit, and individual soldier survivability. The force modernization strategy must ensure the force is protected from technological surprise on the battlefield.

Design, build, and distribute equipment to optimize readiness and training. Incorporating imbedded systems training devices and other innovative training and maintenance features reduces the personnel, training and maintenance support resources required to sustain readiness. This leads to increased training time for a more effective force.

Build and maintain a balanced force capability. As the Army reduces in size, it must ensure there is a proper mix of combat capabilities which are supported and sustained by Combat Support and Combat Service Support units.

A summary of these principles is on the chart below:

**Force Modernization  
Strategy  
(Guiding Principles)**

- **CONTINUOUS MODERNIZATION**
  - Field overmatch capability before potential opponent
  - Maintain lead over opponents warfighting capability
  - Adapt to lessons learned (e.g. Desert Storm)
  - Upgrade for high ROI (identified warfighting deficiencies, Safety, O&S cost savings)
- **PRIORITY TO FIRST TO FIGHT**
  - Provide essential warfighting capabilities
  - Insure readiness for power projection/contingency capability
- **MODERNIZE BY FORCE PACKAGES**
  - Total force is stratified into 4 discrete packages
  - Equipment is cascaded, units in each force package are compatibility equipped
- **PROVIDE MAXIMUM LETHALITY AND SURVIVABILITY OF THE FORCE**
  - Systems must have overwhelming lethality while preserving weapon system and soldier survivability
  - Prevent technology surprise on the battlefield
- **OPTIMIZE READINESS AND TRAINING**
  - Minimize new training tasks (incorporate embedded training devices)
  - Maximize existing soldier skills
- **BUILD AND MAINTAIN BALANCED FORCE CAPABILITY**
  - Battlefield operating systems resourced to deploy, employ, and sustain

**Force Modernization Program.**

The force modernization strategy addresses key warfighting deficiencies and programs necessary to continue this era of force modernization. Army force modernization requirements differ significantly from that of other services. There are no multiple, big ticket items such as the B2 or Sea Wolf in the Army budget. The Army budget is characterized by many different systems, procured in large quantities at relatively low dollar cost, when compared to the other services that procure a small number of high cost items. This means that in order to achieve a balanced force capability, each system must be judged on how it contributes to the total force in consonance with other systems. Modernized combat maneuver forces (Light, Armored, and Special Operations Forces) must also have their combat support and combat service support elements equally competent to achieve flexibility, supportability and sustainability. Examples of the link between the Army's force modernization strategy, the National Military Strategy, and the Future Years Defense Plan follow:

## MANEUVER

FOCUS- A combat force that provides the commander close combat, anti-armor, and aviation capabilities for all weather, day/night combat. Systems capabilities focused on lethality, deployability, and versatility to conduct sustained combat operations.

ASSOCIATED HARDWARE SYSTEMS- Close combat capability includes improved small arms and mortars along with an improved combat identification capability. Anti-armor programs include development and fielding of increasingly lethal systems such as the Armored Gun System (AGS), Line of Sight Anti-tank (LOSAT), and Javelin provide overmatching capabilities to the anti-armor force. RAH-66 Comanche/Comanche Longbow provide the maneuver force an adverse weather day/night armed reconnaissance capability along with a true fire and forget missile.

FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES- Signature reduction, modular composite armor, advanced armaments (e.g., electro-thermal/electro-magnetic guns and advanced penetrators,), second generation thermal imagery, and active and passive protection system technologies will continue to advantage our forces.

## FIRE SUPPORT

FOCUS- 24 hour, all weather, system of systems (Target Acquisition, Weapons and Munitions, Command and Control, and Support and Sustainment) that interacts to perform the roles of Close Support (direct support to maneuver), Counterfire (destruction of enemy fire support capability), and Deep Attack (attack of uncommitted forces) resulting in the destruction, neutralization and/or suppression of enemy forces.

ASSOCIATED HARDWARE SYSTEMS- Cornerstones are Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) and Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) for accomplishment of multiple roles. Key to close support role is M119 Howitzer for light forces, and Paladin followed by Advanced Field Artillery System (AFAS)/Future Armored Resupply Vehicle - Ammunition (FARV-A), for armored forces. Counterfire relies on fielding Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM) submunition and product improved Firefinder radar. Deep Attack capability is based upon Army Tactical Missile I (ATACMS I) augmented by Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) or ATACMS II with Brilliant Anti-Armor (BAT) submunition.

Thrust is systematic, coordinated, improvement of fire support system of systems.

**FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES-** Improved range, accuracy and lethality for fire support attack or delivery systems. Conventional precision (brilliant) munitions, positive identification of friend or foe (IFF), near real-time information fusion, multi-static phased array radars, and high capacity jammer resistant communications. Applications which match target acquisition and weapons systems capabilities and provide near real-time system fusion for enemy and friendly force status will assist in resolving fratricide issues.

### AIR DEFENSE

**FOCUS-** Protects all Army elements that include maneuver units and fixed assets such as depots, lines of communication, air bases, key command and control facilities and other vital assets, from the air and ballistic missile threat.

**ASSOCIATED HARDWARE SYSTEMS-** Low altitude air defense is provided by the Forward Area Air Defense System, encompassing the Line of Sight-Forward (Heavy), Avenger Pedestal Mounted Stinger, Combined Arms Initiatives and command and control systems. Medium to high altitude air defense and tactical Ballistic Missile Defense is provided by Improved Patriot, Corps Surface to Air Missile, and the Theater High Altitude Air Defense System.

**FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES-** Future technologies include passive aircraft/missile detection and identification, jam-resistant high speed data communications, faster signal/radar processing, enhancements in missile fuzing, guidance and range capabilities, decreased probability of signal intercept, and anti-radiation missile countermeasures.

### COMMAND, CONTROL & COMMUNICATIONS

**FOCUS-** Global, secure, survivable, anti-jam, mobile radio and single/multichannel communications, focused on joint operations with sufficient fusion and planning assets to execute warfighting doctrine.

**ASSOCIATED HARDWARE SYSTEMS-** At corps and below, the Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) consists of an integrated system of communications, computers, and integrated command posts. Major communications systems are the Single Channel Ground and

Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) for combat net radio, Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) for area common user voice and data, and the Army Data Distribution System (ADDS) for data and position location. Computer hardware and software support maneuver, fire support, air defense, intelligence, and combat service support commanders and staffs. Hardware is sheltered in Standardized Integrated Command Post Systems (SICPS). Satellite Communications (SATCOM) and Improved High Frequency Radios (IHFR) give the tactical commanders long range communications. Global Positioning System receivers (GPS) give commanders impressive land navigation and fire support accuracy. The Standard Theater Army Command and Control System STACCS will provide timely, accurate information on hostile and friendly forces so as to monitor and execute operations at echelons corps and above. The world wide Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) supports long-haul, strategic signal requirements. A future command and control vehicle will put commanders, communications, and computers under armor on a fast, cross country vehicle.

**FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES-** Downsized, multi-band combat net radios with internal position navigation; lighter tactical satellite communications receivers; improved high rate data transfer technology; proliferation of position navigation receivers down to the squad level; software improvements in ATCCS to include decision aids, and improved single and multichannel, satellite, anti-jam tactical communications.

#### INTELLIGENCE / ELECTRONIC WARFARE

**FOCUS-** All-weather, day/night, deployable, 2nd generation, intelligence systems that provide modular, multi-mission and technologically advanced capability designed to satisfy intelligence requirements of commanders at each echelon in support of rear, close, and deep battles across the operational continuum. Contribute to Army's lethality by providing comprehensive view of the battlefield while locating specific high-value targets with the precision required of the Army's most sophisticated weapons systems.

**ASSOCIATED HARDWARE-** Tactical Exploitation of National Capability (TENCAP) systems, Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Guardrail Common Sensor, Groundbased Common Sensor, Advanced QUICKFIX, and All Source Analysis System (ASAS).

**FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES-** High Power Microwave/Directed Energy-based electronic warfare, greater and continuing capability to operate against Modern Modulations/Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) emanations, high-resolution synthetic aperture radars, higher precision direction finding, conformal and/or multi-mission antennas, advanced data compression and rapid dissemination.

#### COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

**FOCUS-** Tactical Support infrastructure systems and equipment to provide strategic deployability support, unit tactical mobility, logistics sustainment, and enhanced soldier survivability and effectiveness.

**HARDWARE SYSTEMS-** Palletized Loading System (PLS), Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET), Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV), Integrated Family of Test Equipment (IFTE), Mobile Field Kitchens, Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units, Front and side-loading forklift, and Extreme Cold Weather Clothing Systems (ECWCS).

**FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES-** Ceramic and advanced light weight vehicle materials; application of robotics to materiel handling and explosive ordnance disposal, soldier clothing items containing micro electronics and power assisted exoskeletal load carrying capability.

Other major elements of force modernization supported in the FYDP include training, ammunition, technology base, and test and evaluation.

#### Training

Modeling and Simulation Technology for Training, Readiness and Development. Current programs such as the Army Family of Simulations Program use computer war games to support company through Corps staff and leadership training. Computerized range complexes enhance training effectiveness. Future non-system training devices (e.g. Close Combat Tactical Trainer) will provide units the opportunity to refine their wartime skills in a force-on-force environment without incurring the costs of going to the field, and without adverse environmental impacts.

#### Ammunition

Modern war reserve and training ammunition represent a major portion of the Army's procurement account in the FYDP. War reserve requirements reflect a changing worldwide geopolitical environment and a

reduced budget. These requirements, developed to support multiple regional contingencies and responsive force packages, remain high, particularly in the modern items. This reflects the predominate use of preferred modern ammunition which is increasingly lethal.

Modern ammunition, both war reserve and training, is much more expensive than ammunition for older systems. For example one 120MM M1A1 tank training round costs \$885 while the same training round for the older 105MM M1 tank costs \$129. Budget constraints have required the Army to make some tough decisions regarding resourcing ammunition. These decisions have placed priority on the procurement of modern ammunition at its much higher cost per unit. Training ammunition is supported at 80% of historical levels and only 11 war reserve items are funded, at minimum economic production levels, within the FY 93 budget. Training requirements of non-modern items are met by drawing down war reserve stocks.

The ammunition budget attempts to strike a balance between competing demands for training ammunition, war reserve sustainment ammunition, and maintenance of the production base. The high cost of war reserve and training ammunition results in low volume production. This low volume limits the capability of the production base to surge for war or provide rapid reconstitution after war. The Army is aggressively studying a balanced approach to live fire training, simulation, and maintenance of War Reserves.

#### Technology Base.

The Army budget for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) is also affected by fiscal reality. Included in the budget are programmed resources for at least 0% real growth for the tech base, in accordance with DoD guidance, and to ensure the Army is moving towards greater capability in the mid and far term. These scarce RDT&E dollars must be carefully invested to ensure the next generation of equipment can be fielded with the overmatch capability required to fight and win when outnumbered. The Army cannot afford to spend these dollars on marginal improvements in current weapons systems, but must invest in the technologies and systems that will ensure an overmatch capability against future antagonists for the next generation of soldiers.

#### Test and Evaluation.

Testing new equipment and technologies is a critical part of the force modernization process. New equipment must be tested to ensure it meets operational performance parameters and minimum acceptable performance requirements. Testing new technologies and equipment is complex and increasingly expensive. As systems become more complex and technologically advanced, the costs for testing increases dramatically. Instrumentation costs have increased due to the complexity of the tests required and the equipment used to evaluate each new system. With the increased emphasis on user needs and involvement, testing has become event driven, supporting the acquisition process through milestone decisions. Complex and technologically advanced systems also require more data collectors and maintainers.

#### Resourcing to Support Modernization.

The current FYDP fulfills this era of modernization by correcting known deficiencies in the force and charts a path for the next era of modernization - an era that will see the Army field the next generation of equipment built on technologies of the 90's and beyond.

In this era of sharply declining resources, a strategy of continuous modernization is still required. The Army cannot afford to satisfy every requirement with a new system or to execute all needed programs. There will be system shortfalls and force deficiencies which cannot be accommodated. The aim is to pursue near-term materiel solutions for the most critical battlefield deficiencies; and to also ensure the development of leap-ahead, overmatching technologies for far-term (post 2000) warfighting capabilities. The Army must allocate resources to ensure a proper balance between these two requirements.


Modernizing by force package is particularly effective in times of constrained resources. First-to-fight units within Force Package 1 support power projection requirements and are the most modernized units in the Army. Given the extended lead time required for a potential threat to develop any real offensive capability, Force Package 2 ( Rapid Reinforcing units) and Force Package 3 (Reinforcing units) could participate in an accelerated modernization program. POMCUS is an integral part of force modernization and power projection. POMCUS is modernized with the same priority as Force Package 2, providing an additional measure of warfighting flexibility. When Force Package 2 units fall in on POMCUS stocks, their equipment becomes available to Force Package 3 units. In this manner, Force Package 3 is modernized very quickly with the

equipment left by Force Package 2, though not with first line weapons in the near term, but fully capable of warfighting,

The Army's investment strategy is threat and resource driven. It considers an analysis of threat investment to prevent technological surprise and reduces risk by allocating resources to provide future capabilities that respond to the threat. An initial investment in technology development transitions to systems development with the application of additional resources. If the threat continues to develop, additional resources can be applied for system production and limited fielding, providing a contingency capability for the U.S.. As the threat continues to mature, full production will provide the lowest level of risk through a total force capability (see the chart below).

To guard against this, the Army must plan to bring tech base programs into engineering development, and to upgrade and/or field new systems on a regular basis, thereby introducing significant advanced technologies for warfighting and replacing aging fleets which become increasingly costly to maintain and support. The Army must continually evaluate the security environment and determine if we should continue production to equip the remaining force, or move to the next generation and replace systems by Force Packages. This strategy will always allow the Army to increase production rates by increasing resource allocation when the national interests are threatened. This approach best supports the requirements for reconstitution since it provides the potential for reducing lead time to equip a much larger force.

Manufacturing technology required to support Army force modernization needs revision. The Army should not protect an industrial plant built in the 1980's with 1970 technology. The Army must recognize a need to invest in manufacturing technology for the 21st Century. This technology should be flexible - capable of producing more than one type of equipment. It needs to be far less dependent on cost-quantity relationships than today's system. It must be expansible so the entire Army could be equipped if the security environment required, but a surge requirement is questionable. Investing in idle capacity that takes years, not months, to equip a division must be reevaluated and used only when no alternatives are found, especially in times of constrained resources.



The Bottom Line...

Modernization in the near term will be accomplished by upgrading our fielded equipment to insert modern technology that will provide us with the capability necessary to maintain an overwhelming combat edge. When upgrades are no longer effective (dictated by a credible new threat - current equipment exhausts its growth potential--or the emergence of a new technological opportunity requiring a new end item), new systems will be developed, manufactured, and fielded. In concert with these near-term solutions, the Army will focus long term solutions on leap ahead technologies and shape them for appropriate applications.

Long range modernization objectives are designed to avoid technological surprise and maintain overmatch capabilities in lethality and survivability. Prior to investment in new materiel solutions a review of potential doctrinal solutions-force structure changes, tactics, the contribution of joint or coalition partners--will be considered as a possible cost-effective alternative to a new start.

A key component of our modernization strategy will be to retire, at the earliest opportunity, our old, technology-obsolete equipment. Criteria for retirement will focus on: high operating and support costs, low combat effectiveness in our most likely scenarios, and little growth potential for technology insertion, among others.

Our force modernization strategy includes a resource allocation strategy and an acquisition strategy. We will seek to keep procurement funding high in relation to research and development funding. With more resources for RDA, we can afford a mix of tech base, large FSD programs, new production, and upgrades. If we can at least protect the current level of RDA funding, we can afford a strong tech base, improvements to our current equipment, and a limited number of FSD programs/new production starts.

We will strive to resource those programs which meet a strong user need. We will strive to buy our equipment efficiently. This will usually mean that we should not buy at less than minimum efficient production rates. We will fully-fund all acquisition programs that are included in our budget.

Although we intend to procure meaningful quantities, we may, on an exception basis, field to a limited operational capability in small quantity to meet a limited need or take advantage of an exceptional technological opportunity.

#### SUMMARY.

The Army is committed to supporting the warfighting CINC's by developing and deploying weapons systems for the future. We will modernize only our most essential warfighting capabilities, upgrading systems where high payoff in operational capability or support and personnel savings are evident, and by terminating programs that provide marginal improvements in warfighting or sustainability. This will require fielding a mix of newly developed and deployed systems, and applying product improved/technology upgrades to existing systems to exploit the vulnerability and weaknesses in our potential adversaries.

The FYDP supports this modernization strategy and support of the FYDP will ensure the Army can field a credible force that can fight outnumbered and win against superior numbers and technologically advanced weapons in the future. The future of the Army has been charted, and a path representing the continuous journey of force

modernization is present in the FYDP. The next generation of Army warfighters will need the same technological edge as those soldiers that fought, and won, in Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm. If we are not ready to replace the Abrams tanks, Cobra helicopters, and Bradley Fighting Vehicles early in the 21st century, we will be asking our next generation of soldiers to fight their Desert Storm in the equivalent of M60 tanks, first generation Cobra helicopters, and M113 personnel carriers.

### **Army Technology Base Master Plan (ATBMP)**

The ATBMP, prepared and published annually, is the detailed projection of Army technology base programs covering a 15-year period. The plan reflects the realities of the changing global threat and emphasizes promising emerging technologies required to achieve a more versatile, deployable, sustainable and lethal future Army. It is the Army's strategic plan to maintain technological superiority and to achieve our vision of the future trained and ready Army as constrained by realistic funding limits. It provides "top-down" guidance to all Army technology base organizations and also helps industry and academia with their long-range planning. The plan is a vital link between the Defense Technology Strategy and resource-constrained Army modernization plans.

The ATBMP stresses the essential technologies and demonstrations of equipment and materiel needed to develop and field the key operational capabilities of the future. One key element of the technology base highlighted in the ATBMP is the "Advanced Technology Transition Demonstration" (ATTD) program. ATTDs are technically sound programs offering potentially high payoff technology to be inserted into the force through product improvement or advanced systems. ATTDs risk reducing proof of principle demonstrations are conducted in an operational rather than laboratory environment; they last for approximately three years and provide the potential of new or enhanced military operational capability. Importantly, they involve active participation of the user, the materiel developer and industry to obtain a sound requirement and solid understanding of the technology.

### **Coordinated Modernization Plans**

Army modernization plans formally state the Army's plan for force development and modernization, and clearly articulate goals in specific modernization efforts. Army modernization plans establish a rate of modernization through the long term (20-30 years) that is both competitive with expected growth by potential enemy forces and

addresses known, current shortfalls in the Army's ability to execute power projection missions. They are the key planning documents to assist in providing long term continuity of effort within mission areas, and will discipline efforts in accordance with the Army's force modernization principles.

### **Reserve Components Modernization**

In 1981, Congress directed the establishment of the Dedicated Procurement Program (DPP) to assist Reserve Component (RC) units to meet established readiness goals. Since the program's inception, the National Guard Bureau has committed over \$2.6 billion dollars toward improving equipment on-hand readiness of the ARNG. These improvements are evidenced in unit reporting statistics. Levels for equipment on-hand are at an all time high.

The RC slice of procurement funds for DPP were included in the FY91 budget. These funds were committed toward the procurement of UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopters, C-23 and C-26 Aircraft, Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, SINCGARS FM Radios, M-916 Truck Tractors, and several other items crucial to improving readiness in the ARNG.

Since 1981, the United States Army Reserve (USAR) has committed over \$1.2 billion in DPP funding to enhance unit readiness. Some significant USAR DPP procurements include M198 howitzers, M113A3 personnel carriers, large tugboats, M939 series 5-ton trucks, electronic shop sets, and medical sets.

### **Major USAR Initiatives**

The Army Reserve is the beneficiary of some modern equipment as a result of the drawdown of the Active Army following Operation Desert Storm. While much of the Army's most modern equipment was designated for active units or POMCUS sites, the Army Reserve continues to share in modernization distribution. The Army Reserve continues to provide the majority of the Total Army's combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) assets. The reduction in the Active Army combat units, therefore, may be less significant to the Army Reserve than the Army National Guard, in terms of equipment benefits and transfer of trained personnel.

The following summaries illustrate the major modernization initiatives for the USAR:

**Combat Arms:** The modernization of USAR units with M1 tanks continues with the two USAR armor battalions and the 84th Training Division receiving 20 M1 tanks by FY94.

**Transportation:** The USAR anticipates receipt of four new large tug boats in addition to completing the fielding of Landing Craft Utility 2000's in FY 93 and FY 94. New 7,500 gallon tankers and 5 ton linehaul tractors will be fielded to petroleum medium truck units which upgrades the existing fleet to linehaul transports. The Heavy Equipment Transport System (HETS) will be fielded in FY 94/95. HETS are primarily used to transport M1 tanks to the battlefield.

**Medical:** As part of the on-going plan to modernize the medical units (Medical Force 2000), the fielding of Minimum Essential Equipment for Training (MEET) sets of the Deployable Medical Systems (DEPMEDS) equipment sets continues to USAR hospital units. New equipment training for DEPMEDS is being conducted at regional training sites and at home stations using MEET sets.

**Quartermaster:** The USAR is scheduled to complete Logistics Unit Productivity System (LUPS) conversions during FY 93. Conversion to the LUPS design will give USAR combat service support (CSS) forces the ability to provide battlefield commanders with enhanced support through realigned missions and modernized equipment.

**Signal:** The three USAR area signal battalions will begin their conversion to the tri-service tactical communications system (TRITAC) configuration beginning in FY 93. Fielding of the single-channel ground and air radio system (SINCGARS) will begin in FY 93 for the 157th Separate Infantry Brigade (Mechanized).

**Aviation:** The Army Aviation Modernization Plan calls for the replacement of dated helicopter systems with new state-of-the-art systems. Two of four assault helicopter battalions will receive the remainder of their UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters in FY93. The remaining assault battalions will start receiving UH-60s in FY 94. In FY93, the replacement of all CH-47C (Chinooks) medium lift helicopters with the upgraded CH-47D model will complete the modernization of all three medium helicopter companies. The plan also calls for two of the three Army Reserve attack helicopter battalions (AH-1) to be modernized with the AH-64 (Apache) helicopters in FY 93 and FY 94.

## **Major ARNG Initiatives**

Prior to Operation Desert Storm, the ARNG had achieved its highest levels of equipment on hand (EOH) and equipment readiness (ER) in history. Because of equipment requirements of the Gulf war, these ratings dropped expectedly, but will recover. The results of ODS and the emerging new world order promise to change the future of the ARNG. Equipment from ODS and excess from restructuring the Army will create both a windfall and a challenge for the ARNG. Modernization which had been programmed and budgeted over the next five years may now be compressed into one or two years. This accelerated pace will occur in an atmosphere of reduced budgets and significant force structure changes. Among these major new systems are M1/M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tanks, Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, Heavy Equipment Mobile Trailer Transports (HEMTT), Heavy Equipment Transports (HET), High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and Single Channel Radio System (SINCGARS). Because most of the equipment to be transferred to the ARNG is coming from Southwest Asia or from deactivating units, much of it is in need of maintenance. The ARNG will establish regional maintenance locations where the equipment can be repaired prior to issuing to the using units. ARNG soldiers will perform this work with funds provided for this purpose by the Army.

The ARNG will continue to utilize its Equipment Readiness Analysis (ERA) program to redistribute equipment displaced by modernization. An aggressive excess reduction program also contributes to maximizing the equipment status of the ARNG.

## **The Army Role in Ballistic Missile Defense**

According to recent estimates, 24 nations will have ballistic missile capabilities with conventional, biological, or chemical warheads by the year 2000. Regional conflicts will increase greatly the potential for future use of such weapons. Despite the Patriot's success in Desert Storm, it is critical that we continue to pursue an even more effective defense for our forward-deployed and contingency forces against short-range ballistic missiles.

The Army's Strategic Defense Command (USASDC) has been exploring advanced technologies and architectures that can be used for theater missile defense. It is conducting extensive research into systems capable of providing active defense against the theater missile threat, such as the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) program and the extended-

Range Intercept Technology (ERINT). Patriot system upgrades and the Corps Surface to Air Missile program are being developed to complement the high altitude area defenses against TBMs.

In January 1991, because of the changing world situation, the President announced his plan to scale down the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). The Army, with more than 35 years of experience in ballistic missile defense (BMD) research and development, is making increasingly significant contributions to this SDI effort. The goal is to ultimately provide a highly effective defense against limited strategic missile attacks. The first step would be an initial ground-based Strategic Defense System deployment near Grand Forks, North Dakota.

Numerous contributions to the Army such as the advanced crystal growth process materials technology are derived from USASDC work in SDI technologies. This new process will have many applications such as infrared windows, semiconductor devices, and integrated circuits, with potential annual production savings in excess of \$100 million. In another area, advanced semiconductor component technology will provide more efficient lightweight components with less cooling required. Additionally, USASDC advancements in artificial intelligence and neural networks continue, with application for medical diagnosis, machine failure analysis, optical character readers, air traffic control and many other areas.

These SDI technology efforts continue to support the needs of the Army, the Nation, and our Allies in developing a system that will hedge against the threat of ballistic missile attack, while assuring that new technology developments are included in other national security and quality of life programs.

### **Base Realignments and Closures**

Closing bases is one of the Army's most difficult and contentious restructuring actions. With the announcement of the latest round of base realignments and closures in 1991, the Army is much closer to tailoring its base structure to the smaller force of the future. Fewer forces need fewer bases; however, a changing force structure alone is not the only reason to reshape the base structure. The Army also is seeking greater efficiencies in the training and industrial installations so that scarce resources can be allocated to the most important military needs.

As the base structure shrinks, the remaining installations will support a higher intensity of training and sustain weapons that are heavier, faster, and have greater ranges. It is becoming more important to understand the environmental pressures and capacities at our installations as the Army fashions the base structure of the 21st century.

Reshaping the Army's installations is an evolutionary process and will not be complete for many years. There are four rounds now underway to reshape the base structure with more actions to follow.

The first round, developed by an independent commission chartered by the Secretary of Defense in 1988, includes initiatives to eliminate unnecessary installations and improve the efficiency of the base structure. By late 1995, 76 installations (including 53 stand-alone housing sites) will close and another 57 will realign, enabling substantial future savings.

The Army originated the second round and reported its recommendations to Congress in 1990 with the FY91 budget. These proposals execute a series of force structure reductions and base structure adjustments that reflect the Army's first step toward a smaller Army (from 18 active divisions to 16).

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Reshaping the Army's installations is not limited to the United States. A strategy of forward presence relies less on forward deployments (and their attendant basing requirements) and more on power projection from CONUS. Force reductions overseas allows the return of Army installations to the host nation. Thus far, the Department has announced 248 installations for return. More can be expected until the number of forces fit the changing security needs.

Last year, the nation witnessed a new and extremely open process that will govern the proposal, review, and approval of all base closures and realignments in the U.S. during FY91-FY95. An independent presidential commission thoroughly reviewed the information, criteria and rationale used to arrive at the Army's latest recommendations. For the most part, it adopted the Army's wide-ranging proposals in whole or in part. Five bases will close; 6 others and 17 laboratories will realign. These actions allow the Army's major commands to begin needed restructuring efforts, like consolidating laboratories, creating training war-fighting centers, and finding a permanent home for the Joint Readiness Training Center.

Difficult work faces the Army; accomplishing the base closures and realignments will be more demanding than arriving at the decisions. Although the Army must execute the latest round by July 1997, we are moving aggressively to close installations and dispose of excess property as early as possible. The goal is to shorten the period of turbulence that accompanies the movement of units, quickly realize the savings made possible by the consolidations, and assist the economic recovery of the local communities that have been supportive of the Army. Although there are substantial savings over the long haul, implementation requires an investment of over one billion dollars in the next few years to pay for round four.

### **Installation Management**

Our military installations will have to undergo significant changes to successfully support the Army of the future. We will be faced with two primary challenges: to project, sustain and reconstitute a ready and capable force anywhere in the world; and, to provide a living and working

environment for soldiers, civilians and family members equal to that provided by American communities. Both challenges must be met in an era of significantly reduced resources.

The Army is already transitioning its installations into the power projection bases our nation requires and the quality "hometowns" that our soldiers, civilians, and their families deserve. Base Realignment and Closure and Defense Management Review Decisions provide opportunities to restructure installation functions and their associated management. Installation/Garrison Commanders will employ modern business practices from the private sector, incorporate new management techniques and continue successful programs such as Army Communities of Excellence in order to continue quality services. Installation automation is being developed to integrate functional areas in an effort to support installation users.

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Movement from a forward-deployed Army to one primarily concentrated in CONUS will present a new set of challenges. The return of our forces from overseas will significantly challenge the abilities of our current CONUS installations to meet training, facility and support requirements. Training areas will have to support greater numbers of both active and reserve component units. Simultaneously, installation commanders will be accountable for protection of endangered species, compliance with public law and preservation of our valuable natural and cultural resources. Our Army faces the future with even greater commitment to the wise stewardship of its environmental resources.

The traditional belief that each installation must be a self-sustaining entity is rapidly changing. Budget reductions compel us to look beyond the fences of the installation. Installation Commanders will need to pursue cooperative service arrangements with local civilian communities and to expand their reliance on contracted services provided by private enterprises. Greater bonds will need to be established between the military installation and its civilian "sister city." We must train our installation managers in city management and Public Administration in order to give them the strong foundation they will need to lead their Army community.

### **Environmental Program**

The Army leadership is committed to protecting our nation's environment and conserving natural resources for present and future generations. To this end the Army is executing an environmental program with four major pillars: compliance, restoration, prevention and conservation. The Army's goal is full compliance with all applicable environmental laws and regulations; restoration of past environmental damage; prevention of environmental degradation through effective planning and analysis of future and ongoing actions; and conservation of the land, water, air and all other natural and cultural resources.

Within the Army a Senior Executive Environmental Council (SEEC) has been created to integrate environmental efforts, an Environmental Policy Institute was established to recommend future policy to meet the needs of the environmental program, and an Army Automated Environmental

Management Information System (AAEMIS) is under development. Other key initiatives to improve areas critical to our mission include developing and implementing an Environmental Compliance Assessment System to continue our environmental audits worldwide, developing an automated system for tracking and reporting compliance status; formulating an integrated Five Year Hazardous Materials Management Plan; developing a life-cycle approach to hazardous waste management; and creating an environmental law division within the Office of the Judge Advocate General. For the long term, the Army is developing an Environmental Training Master Plan. Most importantly, environmental awareness is being incorporated into every element of training for the soldier and civilian members of the Army.

For FY92, the Army will allocate in excess of \$1 billion to our environmental program. This includes funding for compliance with regulatory requirements, restoration of lands damaged through past practices, prevention of pollution, and minimizing the generation of hazardous wastes. The Army continues aggressive actions to clean up contaminated sites on our installations. During FY91, \$311 million was spent for environmental restoration activities at Army installations with cleanup completed at 135 sites.

## V. Quality Force

*In 1948, owing to the shortage of funds, "basic training" had been cut to a mere eight weeks. The cycle was increased to fourteen weeks in March 1949, but that did not include specialty or "branch" training. The 1948, 1949, and 1950 "peacetime" drafts, which provided a total of 300,000 men, had filled the Army with all too many disgruntled, indifferent, or even hostile soldiers. (For the affluent the draft was not difficult to evade.)*

*Nor was the Army combat-minded. Most enlisted Army volunteers of that era had not joined to fight. An Army general put it this way in 1951: "In an attempt to fill their quotas, our recruiting officers had painted a rosy picture: 'Join the Army and see the world.' 'Have fun in Japan.' 'Good pay. Many benefits.' . . . Recruiters didn't stress the obligations of a soldier." (Blair, The Forgotten War)*

Quality soldiers are key to any successful Army. Regardless of where we end up with our force structure, quality will always be paramount. We plan to maintain high standards for recruiting and retaining soldiers. Quality soldiers are the cornerstone of a trained and ready Army.

### Quality Personnel

The ability to attract and retain high quality young Americans to serve as soldiers remains the critical element in the success of the volunteer Army. Quality soldiers are easier to train and perform better in all critical skills than those less qualified. The flexibility offered by quality soldiers is critical to shaping the Army of the future, as the demands placed on the soldier will continue to increase as technology and associated requirements advance. Quality is the most critical of the Army's imperatives, as it fosters the synergy necessary for continued success of the modern volunteer Army. FY91 accessions represent the highest quality ever recruited, and our goals for the future will continue to reflect the need to maintain a quality force.

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### Recruiting and Retention

The Army is facing the most turbulent period since the force reduction following the Vietnam War. Critical to maintaining readiness during the drawdown will be the recruitment and retention of the best soldiers. Retention programs have been designed to retain the best soldiers, to eliminate substandard soldiers earlier in their careers, and to direct the reclassification of soldiers out of overstrength skills.

To recruit and retain a quality force, the Army still needs an attractive set of enlistment and reenlistment programs, a sound marketing strategy, and compensation packages to ensure an adequate quality of life. The retention of quality soldiers in the Active and Reserve Components will continue to require leaders to conduct challenging training, demonstrate genuine care and concern for their soldiers, and garner support from family members and employers.

### Recruiting Initiatives

The Army College Fund (ACF), to include the ACF Plus, along with the Montgomery GI Bill benefits and enlistment bonuses for quality applicants continue as integral components to Army recruiting. These incentives allow the Army to efficiently attract young men and women in a highly competitive market. Adequate resources are needed to maintain the world class Army advertising program required to increase and maintain awareness of these initiatives.

### Retention and Reserve Component Transition

Manning the Total Force through the 1990s will provide significant challenges as the Army reduces its structure to meet post-Cold War defense requirements. The retention of quality initial term soldiers in the active Army and the transition of quality soldiers leaving the active Army to Reserve Components (RC) units are essential to fielding a competent, ready force despite planned force reductions.

As we transition to a smaller Army, the focus of the active Army retention program will be the selective retention of our top performers to fill Army requirements. This is a significant change from our recent efforts to retain the maximum number of qualified soldiers. Changes to the Retention Control Points Program, which governs how long enlisted soldiers may remain in the service in their current rank, and the implementation of a qualitative retention system will provide increased flexibility in the reenlistment process as a means of improving the quality of our smaller active Army. The active Army will complete its transition to a revised retention program by FY94.

The goal of the RC Transition Program is to continue the placement of eligible transitioning specialists, corporals, and sergeants into units of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the United States Army Reserve (USAR). This will be accomplished by an extensive counseling program and supporting automation systems designed to enhance RC unit readiness.

Transitioning active component soldiers will be placed into RC units where their Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) are required or where they can be easily trained in another MOS.

Operation Desert Shield/Storm brought to the forefront the vital role of the family in the retention of the soldier in the Total Army. The goal of the Total Army Family Program is to contribute to readiness through the retention of quality soldiers. The increased reliance on the Reserve Components (RC) has changed the nature of membership for the families of RC soldiers. The Total Army Family Program provides an infrastructure that develops a partnership between the families and the soldiers. This partnership is designed to contribute directly to the mission. Both the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Army Reserve (USAR) have regionally based family programs. In the ARNG there is a full time family coordinator in each state. In concert with the full time attrition/retention force, the family coordinator works directly with commanders in developing the partnership. In the USAR, family coordinators provide effective linkage and training for USAR commanders and family members. The success of these endeavors will be measured in the retention of quality soldiers and increased personal affairs readiness.

#### Transition Assistance

The Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP) is a comprehensive program designed to provide transition and job assistance services to the Army family: soldiers, civilians, and their family members. Its objective is two-fold. First, it ensures eligible soldiers and civilians are informed of all benefits and entitlements prior to separation. Secondly, it promotes retention of quality personnel and those with critical occupational skills. The result is that the Army is seen as an employer that cares which ultimately enhances its recruitment efforts.

The Army has established a total of 62 Army Career and Alumni Program transition offices worldwide which are capable of serving approximately 180,000 to 220,000 people each year. Fifty-five of these offices are also coupled with contracted Job Assistance Centers. The Job Assistance Centers provide job search preparation through seminars, workshops and individualized assistance. Preparation includes small group sessions on resume writing, job interviewing, negotiating for salaries, and networking. The Army Career and Alumni Program is not a job placement agency; however, job leads are provided through the automated Army Employer Network (AEN). The Army Employer Network lists employers interested in hiring Army alumni geographically. It also provides, among

other things, a nationwide listing of state employment agencies for placement referral.

## Personnel Management

The Army personnel management system must meet the rapidly paced and fundamental changes ahead if we are to preserve the high quality of the force while shaping the smaller Army to meet the warfighting requirements of the future.

### Officer Personnel Management

The challenge in Officer Personnel Management is to use the solid foundation of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) to shape the officer corps to meet the needs of the 21st century. The smaller officer corps of the future must be balanced, able to answer new leadership challenges and maintain warfighting readiness, while providing continued career opportunity.

We must use the increased flexibility which the National Defense Authorization Acts of 1991 and 1992 granted the Army to reduce the officer corps carefully and prudently. These acts authorize the Army to maximize voluntary losses during the drawdown years through waiving service and time-in-grade requirements, to increase early retirements, and, if necessary, conduct reductions-in-force. The Army needs Congressional support to execute these difficult programs effectively. In addition, we need to maintain the incentive for officers to voluntarily leave the Army through a Voluntary Separation Incentive and Special Separation Benefit sustained throughout the drawdown.

### Warrant Officer Personnel Management

The Warrant Officer Management Act (WOMA) modernizes the outdated warrant officer (WO) management laws by establishing a single promotion system, selective retirement authority, regular below zone promotions, equitable release requirements, selective continuation, a new grade (Chief Warrant Officer 5), and provisions for a complete warrant officer career pattern. Many features of WOMA parallel those in the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) from which WO's were excluded. The law permits implementation of WOMA in the RC under regulations approved by the Secretary of the Army.

### Noncommissioned Officer Requirements

The caliber of the Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) has been, and will remain, key to victory for our Army. NCO's are essential to the Army's ability to fulfill its worldwide strategic role in spite of our decreasing size.

NCOs are the day-to-day leaders of our soldiers. It is the NCO who must ensure the soldiers' ability to succeed in combat as in Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm. With their officers, NCOs are responsible for the planning, execution, and assessment of training. They are the cohesion in the unit, to lead and train our high quality junior soldiers -- our NCO Corps of the future.

With a smaller NCO Corps in the Army of the future, experienced and skilled NCOs will become increasingly critical. Our goal is to make an already outstanding NCO Corps even better by continuing to focus on the noncommissioned officer mission to lead, train, maintain standards, and enforce discipline.

As we face constrained fiscal resources, we will continue to sustain and expand, where possible, the tools NCOs use to accomplish their mission, ensuring opportunities for promotion, enhancing the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES), linking NCOES to promotions, and emphasizing quality of life programs. Our priorities are to sustain an acceptable promotion flow, maintain personnel readiness, minimize involuntary separations during the reshaping years, and retain the quality NCOs essential to our professional volunteer force. Everything we do to build the trained and ready force of the future must have, as its basic foundation, top-notch men and women in the NCO Corps of the Total Army.

#### Reserve Component Personnel Management

Personnel management within the Reserve Component (RC) will be a major challenge of the 90's. As the world threat changes and the Army reshapes to meet that threat, the RC role is significantly more critical to the success of the Army's new contingency mission.

The establishment of the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) as a major subordinate command of the U.S. Army Forces Command has been completed. This new command has the mission of developing and implementing those personnel management programs necessary to maintaining the high level of personnel readiness attained by the USAR. Individual soldier development and career progression

programs continue to be developed to ensure soldiers are ready to serve effectively in their military specialties upon mobilization.

The USAR and ARNG continue to progress in integrating all of their personnel data bases through the Total Army Personnel Database (TAPDB). They have tested and will implement the Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) designed to take the Reserve Components into the 21st century.

#### Full-Time Support (FTS) Program

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm served to show just how critical our full-time support force is to the readiness of the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard. The ability of the USAR and ARNG to meet their mission-essential requirements is directly related to the availability and professional competence of their full-time support force. Active Guard Reserve and military technician soldiers mobilized and deployed shoulder-to-shoulder along with other reservists and Active Army counterparts. There is little doubt that our high level of deployable units is due in large part to our FTS program.

Proposed reductions to the Full Time Support force carry the risk that the future force will be less capable and responsive. The USAR and ARNG supports efforts to maintain our current numbers of Full Time Support personnel as the force structure decreases, effectively raising the percentage "level of support".

#### Military Retirees as an Army Manpower Resource

It has long been recognized that military retirement contributed towards the accomplishment of two objectives. The first objective was to compensate individuals for their arduous military service to the nation. The second objective provided for a pool of trained soldiers for the purpose of a rapid expansion of the active duty force, should it be necessary. The legal authority established by Congress in the U.S. Code provides for the various degrees of expansion of the active duty force with soldiers from the Reserve Component, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve.

Retired soldiers drawing retirement pay are subject to recall to active duty at anytime the Secretary of the Army determines a need. These retirees are a valuable source of trained manpower and are available for most military assignments, for deployment, and for critical civilian

positions, subject to physical or other restrictions dictated by Department of the Army. Retirees not receiving retirement pay are also available, but only after Congress has declared war or a national emergency.

Retirees may volunteer for active duty to meet specific operational requirements at any time, however, recall to active duty is subject to approval on a case-by-case basis by the Secretary of the Army. Military retirees may be used as follows: to fill shortages or to augment deployed or deploying units; to fill shortages or to augment supporting units and activities in CONUS, Alaska, and Hawaii; to release other military members for deployment overseas; to fill Federal civilian work force shortages within DoD, Coast Guard, or other government entities; to meet national security needs in organizations outside DoD with Defense-related missions.

To meet individual shortages during the early phases of Operation Desert Storm/Shield the Army sought volunteers, and involuntarily recalled members of the Retired Reserve. Retired soldiers responded to both the voluntary and involuntary calls. There were over 10,000 volunteers with 1,381 actually being recalled to duty. The voluntary response to the operation reduced the requirement for involuntary recalls which accounted for only 127. A few retirees served in Southwest Asia; stateside service included serving in Health Services Command hospitals, augmentation of Army Reserve Personnel Center staff and the Casualty Assistance Commands. In addition to the volunteers, retired medical officers, retired warrant officer physician assistants and retired warrant officer aviators were involuntarily recalled.

Without the availability of the Retired Reserve, the Army would have had difficulty in meeting the shortage fill requirements of units during ODS without further degrading the readiness and capability of the Army to meet world wide requirements. ODS fully validated the Army's Retiree Recall Program and documented the viability of the military retired soldier as a mobilization asset. As the Army reviews the lessons learned from ODS, it may be necessary to seek legislative changes to provide the Secretary early availability of this important national resource.

Retirees also continued to support the active force daily by volunteering for family support activities at installations, by service in the community, and by support to installation commissaries, exchanges, and other MWR activities. As the active Army becomes a smaller force, continued support from retirees will take on an even greater magnitude. As retirees are "still serving," the nation should continue to support them with the benefits and entitlements they have earned.

## Army Civilians

The number of Army civilian employees is projected to be reduced significantly during the next several years. This is the direct result of Congressional budget reductions and reshaping of the force structure both in the United States and overseas areas. Additional reductions are anticipated as the Army implements internal management efficiencies such as the Defense and Army Management Reviews and directed base realignments and closures.

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Civilian employees comprise approximately one-quarter of today's Total Force and are expected to make up an even greater percentage in the future despite overall reductions. Retention and recruitment of quality civilians in the much smaller Army are key elements in the personnel plan for the future. The Army civilian personnel system is committed to ensuring this while diminishing the effects of force structure changes on individual employees. In the past, Army has relied on attrition, retirements, release of temporary employees, and outplacement to achieve needed manpower and dollar reductions and mitigate personnel turbulence. Programs such as the DOD Priority Placement Program and the Army Career and Alumni Program provide the Army civilian employees needed outplacement and transition assistance. However, these management tools alone are not adequate to satisfactorily manage the programmed civilian reductions of almost 25% (100,000 people).

The Army's plan for civilian reductions is to ensure that commanders have maximum flexibility to shape the residual work force consistent with reduced requirements, to continue to provide leader development and training to those employees who are retained and, for those civilians who must be released, to provide maximum outplacement and transition assistance.

### Managing Civilians to Budget (MCB)

MCB is a major Army initiative in support of civilian personnel modernization. Under MCB, managers have the authority to build their civilian organizational structure and redistribute resources to maximize mission accomplishment. They operate under a civilian pay plan rather than traditional personnel controls, such as end strength, average grade, and high grade ceilings for civilian positions. MCB increases financial flexibility and strengthens the accountability of supervisors for the cost of their organizational structure and personnel decisions.

CONUS implementation of MCB began in FY91, with OCONUS following in FY92. Initial feedback indicated that managers believe that the MCB concept is superior to previous ways of doing business. The increased flexibility of MCB will continue to be institutionalized as the Army proceeds with reductions.

### Quality of Life

#### Army Communities of Excellence (ACOE)

The goal of the ACOE program is straightforward: to provide in a quality environment, excellent facilities and services everywhere, always. Army communities are where the great work of the Army is accomplished—training, developing leaders, teaching, planning and taking care of families. The ACOE program consists of:

**Facilities Excellence:** The degree of quality in Army facilities makes a strong statement about how much we really care about soldiers, family members and our employees.

**Services Excellence:** Each day in every Army community, there are thousands of customers seeking assistance. For most of our services, there are simply no alternatives to turn to. Quality services require committed leadership and enthusiasm that permeates all the way to our service providers.

**Environmental Excellence:** Environmental stewardship must be part of everything we do. Our citizenship and our legacy to future generations requires nothing less. The United States Army will set the environmental standards by which other federal agencies are judged.

Providing the best possible working and living conditions for the day-to-day business of soldiering is what the Army Communities of Excellence (ACOE) program is all about. As the Army moves ahead to shape a smaller, more CONUS-based force for the future, we must maintain the excellence in our Army communities just as surely as we maintain it in our training.

### Facilities

Quality Army facilities are the base which provides the infrastructure, (roads, airfields, railroads and utility systems) from which landpower is rapidly projected worldwide. Army facilities significantly impact unit readiness by supporting our training and maintenance programs. Our facilities must be expansible, support mobilization and transportation requirements, and provide staging areas for force reconstitution. Additionally, our CONUS facilities must provide the sustaining base to support forward deployed forces worldwide. ODS significantly highlighted the importance of properly maintaining the readiness of our training, sustainment, mobilization and deployment facilities.

Army facilities impact "Quality of Life" and provide the means to support families during deployment. Revitalized Army facilities improve individual and unit productivity. They also help attract and retain soldiers, their families and DA civilians. To enhance our ability to attract and retain a Quality Force, Army facilities must attain "Quality of Life" standards in living and working environments at levels commensurate with the rest of American society.

The leadership challenge throughout the Army is to maximize facilities utilization and readiness in a constrained resource environment. The Army has adjusted its facility strategy to meet the new National Military Strategy. We must reduce facility inventory, seek sufficient resources to execute the facilities revitalization program, and protect and focus the investment for the future. The key element of the Army's facilities strategy is the facilities revitalization program. The goal of this program is to revitalize facilities on a 57 year revitalization cycle. In FY93, the Army's revitalization funding rate is on a 142 year cycle, well below the goal.

The Army Family Housing program is designed to provide quality housing for all eligible Army families. Sources of quality housing include rentals and sales, third-party investments and government owned assets. In FY93, the Army Family Housing budget is projected to be approximately 1.4 billion dollars and provide over 170,000 units. Current revitalization funding to bring Army Family Housing up to contemporary standards for government owned units remains underfunded and is on a 66 year revitalization cycle versus our goal of every 35 years.

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The Army must have excellent facilities to support the force. Army facilities readiness is essential to the successful transition to a smaller, high quality, more lethal and deployable force. Effective power projection is difficult and may prove impossible without a revitalized infrastructure.

#### Coordinated Healthcare

Access to quality health care is an important factor in the recruitment and retention of a quality force. The Army health care system has made great strides in improving access to primary care and is actively pursuing innovative ways to increase access to secondary and tertiary care.

One of the vehicles for increasing access to primary care is Primary Care for the Uniformed Services (PRIMUS), which has been in existence since 1985 and is extremely popular with our beneficiaries. Presently, 10 Army PRIMUS Clinics are in operation. These 10 clinics accounted for

approximately 2.5 million primary care visits and almost 3.8 million other types of visits such as prescription refills, physicals, and mammograms. PRIMUS, along with programs such as civilian partnership and VA-DOD sharing agreements, have increased access to health care for the 2.5 million Army beneficiaries. The Army plans to expand the PRIMUS program to 6 other sites by the end of FY93.

The next step is to improve access to secondary and tertiary care while containing cost growth. The Gateway To Care Program is the Army's short-term approach for restructuring the future of our delivery of health care to soldiers, families and retired beneficiaries by making efficient use of federal and civilian resources. Gateway To Care will help prepare Army treatment facilities for the conversion to the Department of Defense's Coordinated Care Program which is under development.

Comprehensive health care also will remain a focus for Army personnel and families serving overseas. Programs like the alternate use of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) Funds Test will continue to seek cost-effective ways of meeting the needs of beneficiaries away from home. The European After-Hours Test Project, which provides acute care outpatient services from local German medical facilities, is being continued and is proving to be immensely successful and popular among commanders and beneficiaries.

The Army's Dental Care System, by providing a comprehensive dental care program, is another tool for maintaining quality of life. The Federal Government administers a voluntary dependent dental insurance plan for active duty military family members who reside in the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam. Additionally space-available care may be provided for family members at uniformed services clinics as authorized by Congress in 1985.

#### Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR)

Morale, Welfare and Recreation programs are crucial contributors to readiness, directly through soldiers and indirectly through families and the supporting Army civilian workforce. As the Army restructures to a smaller, CONUS based force, commanders will be forced to make hard choices due to reduced resources. The impact on MWR programs is already being felt with the elimination and/or reduction of services offered at many installations. Scrutiny of appropriated fund (APF) support for MWR has intensified. Army MWR leaders are developing strategic plans, centered on the efficient management of available nonappropriated fund

(NAF) and APF resources, that will carry MWR through the transition into the 21st century. These plans call for continued appropriated fund support for MWR, while requiring more streamlined program overhead.

Of primary concern is the fiduciary responsibility Army leaders hold for nonappropriated funds. Monies received for nonappropriated fund services come directly from our soldiers and into Army NAF cash reserves. The Army owes soldiers the maximum payback of benefits for these dollars. Investment strategies in this environment call for a comprehensive analysis of both long-term and short-term investments. Expansion of the MWR patron base to include civilian participation will increase NAF revenue and will serve as incentives in recruiting quality professional personnel.

None of these strategies will be easily accomplished. MWR faces its greatest challenge of providing high quality, customer-oriented services in an efficient and economical manner. The current period of transition in the Army will create added stress on soldiers and families which high quality, well operated MWR programs will reduce.

### Family Support

Operations Desert Shield/Storm offered both the opportunity and challenge to critically review the Army's system for supporting families of deployed soldiers. ODS clearly identified that family support initiatives, programs, and services play a key role in the overall success of the mission. The total community effort, both military and civilian, to provide support to soldiers and families was one of the most gratifying accomplishments during this difficult time. Coordination and sharing among U. S. Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and Active Component Family Program staff ensured quality services for the total Army family. Coordination among services helped strengthen family support initiatives and ensured assistance to families at the installation nearest to them, regardless of branch.

### Army Community Service (ACS)

The three basic objectives of the Army Community Service (ACS) program are as valid for tomorrow's smaller, higher quality Army as they are today. These objectives include developing and implementing education and prevention programs which enhance wellness; serving as the commander's primary resource agency for developing, coordinating, and delivering soldier and family support services that contribute to

overall morale and welfare; and establishing and supporting volunteer opportunities for the ACS program. ACS has an additional mission during force reductions as the installation agency tasked by law to provide transitioning services in the areas of relocation counseling, consumer affairs and financial assistance.

### Child Development Services

Child development programs reduce the conflict between parental responsibilities and unit mission requirements. Army child care policies reflect corporate trends which show company-sponsored child care programs are an effective means of reducing both absenteeism/lost duty time and turnover while increasing productivity levels, mission responsiveness and employee loyalty.

In FY91 care was provided to more than 174,783 children, an increase of 17,040 over FY90; yet demand for services still exceeds capacity. In FY91 the Army identified its outyear demand for child care. Even with force restructuring, identified demand will remain at or close to current levels.

### Youth Services

Youth Services programs impact on readiness and retention by assuring soldiers that their children have opportunities to develop under the supervision of trained, qualified professionals anywhere in the world the soldier and family are stationed. Youth Services programs teach abilities and skills that promote confidence and competence to meet the stresses of military life. Youth Services programs for Army youth of today are an investment in tomorrow's leaders.

### Religious Support

Army chaplains and chaplain assistants serve around the world. During the trauma of the Army reductions, there will be an increased demand for chaplains to care for people who undergo the potentially devastating effects of uncertainty, transition and separation from the Army.

### Legal Services

Through the Judge Advocate General's Corps (JAGC), the Army provides various legal services to soldiers and their families. These

services directly contribute to the well being of the military family, and thereby indirectly to the overall readiness of our Army.

Over 500 attorneys, 220 full time and 300 part time, serve the personal legal needs of the Army community. The variety and frequency of services rendered reflect the value of the Army's Legal Assistance Program (ALAP). Last year ALAP attorneys assisted in over 11,000 adoptions, 5000 immigration matters, 44,000 consumer affairs, contracts, or personal finance matters, 49,000 divorces or separations, 20,000 cases of nonsupport or paternity, and 12,000 landlord-tenant problems. ALAP attorneys drafted over 540,000 powers of attorney and almost 250,000 wills, many in support of Operation Desert Storm. ALAP's aggressive tax assistance program prepared almost 130,000 federal and 44,000 state tax returns saving soldiers millions of dollars in tax preparation fees. The electronic filing of almost 47,000 federal returns expeditiously placed refunds in the hands of soldiers.

Another facet of the JAGC, the United States Army Claims Service (USARCS), oversees the claims submitted by soldiers for personal property lost or damaged incident to government service. When soldiers move, property gets lost or damaged. Under the authority of the Personnel Claims Act, in the last year USARCS paid over 70,000 claims from soldiers totaling over \$40,000,000. During the high stress times of moving, this is an important morale enhancing service.

#### Army Health Promotion Program (AHPP)

The AHPP is the foundation for maintaining the personnel readiness of our Army. Individual soldier health behaviors are identified in a Health Risk Appraisal (HRA). Those with unhealthy habits are educated about risks and how to modify their behaviors. Weight control programs, drug and alcohol abuse programs, suicide prevention, and stress management are just a few programs under the AHPP.

#### Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program (ADAPCP)

The ADAPCP is designed to assist in combating drug and alcohol abuse, and enhance unit readiness. Alcohol and drug abuse in the Army have been on a steady decline since 1982. Overall command involvement, education, increased urinalysis testing, and consistent disciplinary action have proven effective in deterring substance abuse and returning soldiers to productive duty.

## Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Policy

HIV infection continues to pose a threat to all soldiers. The focus of the Army effort to combat this epidemic is four-fold: periodically test all soldiers (Active and Reserve Component), develop high quality information and education oriented to prevention and breaking the chain of transmission, provide treatment (Active Army only), and conduct research including vaccine development. This campaign has resulted in a drop in the rate of new infections in the Army from 0.49 per 1000 soldiers in the 1985-87 period to the current rate of 0.29 per 1000. The Army continues its policy that requires all soldiers be tested for HIV at least every 24 months. Active duty soldiers who are infected are retained on active duty until they become clinically ill. Reserve component soldiers must prove fitness for duty and, if fit, may serve in a nondeployable position.

## Women in the Army

Women continue to make significant contributions to our Total Army. To maximize this valuable resource, all skills and positions are open to women soldiers with the exception of those direct combat positions closed to women. Presently, 86 percent of enlisted military occupational specialties, 91 percent of warrant officer specialties, and 96 percent of commissioned officer specialties are open to women.

The active Army currently has 81,104 women (68,436 enlisted and 12,668 officers) comprising 11.2 percent of the active force. The U. S. Army Reserves (USAR) has 57,057 women (46,556 enlisted and 10,501 officers) comprising 20.5 percent of the USAR. The Army National Guard has 31,823 women (27,984 enlisted and 3,839 officers) comprising 7.1 percent of the Army National Guard.

## Army Equal Opportunity Program

The Equal Opportunity (EO) Program continues to demonstrate positive returns to the Army. Commanders are charged not to tolerate any form of discrimination based on race, color, ethnicity, religion, or gender. Army leaders continue to do the things necessary to develop cohesive, loyal teams.

As an institution, the Army must continue to demonstrate that its personnel policies will assure equality for all -- those already in the military and those who will enter in the future. Reductions are difficult

and must be done fairly -- with the individual soldier and his or her family in mind. The Army continues to set the example for our society in equal opportunity. The Army is an institution where participants can achieve to their fullest potential, based on effort, capability, quality, and performance.

### Single Parents/Dual Military Couples

Single parenthood is a growing category among Army personnel. Well over 45,000 soldiers identify themselves as single parents, most of whom have full or joint legal and physical custody of one or more dependent family members. No special consideration for duty assignments or duty stations are afforded single parents based solely on their responsibility for dependent family members. In spite of significant personal sacrifice and hardship, many single parents, like dual military couples, continue to distinguish themselves as outstanding soldiers and competent parents. Single parents are required to maintain viable Family Care Plans to ensure adequate care of their dependent family members upon deployment.

Married soldiers comprise 57 percent of the total force. Included in this percentage are over 52,000 soldiers who are married to other servicemembers. The Married Army Couples Program attempts to provide opportunity for joint domicile by arranging assignments of Army dual military couples to the same geographical locale when operationally feasible. In cases where one member of the couple is of another Service, such arrangements are far more difficult, though not impossible. Like single parents, dual military couples are required to submit a Family Care Plan which outlines in detail provisions that have been made for care of their dependent family members in the event one or both parents are required to deploy.

### Army Safety Program

The safety mission is to minimize accidental losses of human and materiel resources to preserve warfighting capability. The Army's approach is to provide commanders mission-oriented policies, procedures, standards, and proactive accident prevention programs and to integrate safety and risk management into operations, training, and materiel acquisition.

The Army's FY91 accident experience was heavily influenced by ODS. Even considering ODS, the number of total Army military accidents and the number of military fatalities were at an all time low in FY91, thereby

continuing a steady annual decline. Major aircraft accidents increased; however, of the 49 major aircraft accidents in FY91, 25 occurred in ODS. Comparison of ODS non-battle deaths and injuries to those occurring in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam reveals reduced rates for ODS.

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Lessons learned from ODS have been instrumental in focusing future Army Safety Program efforts. The Army is aggressively incorporating safety standards into training exercises, including into evaluation criteria, to demonstrate to soldiers and leaders that unsafe operations can render a unit ineffective before the battle even begins. This reinforces the concept of "train as we fight."

Another highlight of FY91 was a reduction in the number of civilian injuries and occupational illnesses to the lowest number since the Army started keeping detailed records in 1984. The steady rise in associated costs (to \$155 million) was also halted for the first time. Continued aggressive action, which includes a Civilian Accident Prevention Campaign, is ongoing to reduce this persistent drain on our already scarce resources.

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Future challenges include integrating risk management into all Army processes by such methods as crosswalking safety considerations between operational commanders and acquisition program executives. Secondly, the Army is pursuing a better understanding of human performance versus mission requirements in areas such as night operations, fatigue during extended operations, and fratricide. Thirdly, we must capitalize on technological advances for investigating accidents, such as installing flight data recorders in Army aircraft. Finally, we seek total integration of safety into state-of-the-art automated systems.

## VI. Provide Resources For The Force

"...the great democracies were sick nations when Hitler openly massed his forces to impose his will on the world. As sick as any was the United States of America. We had no field Army. There were bare skeletons of three and one-half divisions scattered in small pieces over the entire United States. It was impossible to train even these few combat troops as divisions because motor transportation and other facilities were lacking and funds for adequate maneuvers were not appropriated. We lacked modern arms and equipment. We must never again face a great national crisis with ammunition lacking to serve our guns, few guns to fire, and no decisive procedures for procuring vital arms in sufficient quantities." (General George C. Marshall, Biennial Report to the Secretary of War, June 1945)

**B**y making tough decisions and establishing priorities, we plan to adequately resource the force within current budget constraints. Our concept is to maximize the return from every dollar to ensure that, when called upon again to support the national security objectives of this nation, our young men and women will be equipped with the very best their nation is willing to provide.

### Logistical Support in Operation Desert Storm

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (ODS) represent the largest logistics operation our Army has conducted since the Vietnam War. Strategic mobility, modernization, equipment readiness, host nation support, security assistance, industrial preparedness and training were key aspects of our logistics mission which proved critical to our overwhelming victory. The challenge for the future is to build upon the successes of ODS by identifying the appropriate lessons to be learned and adjusting our Combat Service Support (CSS) doctrine, force structure and training accordingly. The vision of Army logistics of the future will encompass those lessons emerging from analysis of logistics operations and systems performance during ODS and focus on reshaping logistics to sustain a primarily CONUS-based Army required to project combat power rapidly around the world.

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## Sustainability

Sustainability is the capability to maintain the required level (intensity) and duration (time) of combat operations to achieve the planned objective. It represents the balanced capability for all logistics and combat service support functions which provide the force staying power over time. It includes the force structure, prepositioned and war reserve materiel, prescribed loads and operating stocks, and the wholesale sustaining and industrial base which in their totality comprise Army capability to project and reconstitute the Total Army force.

## War Reserve Materiel

War Reserves are those combat-essential stocks of munitions, fuel, equipment and secondary items acquired in peacetime to replace combat losses until the CONUS production base can resupply. There are three separate types of Army War Reserves: first, OCONUS (Theater), afloat, and CONUS Reserves (normally all classes of supply measured in days of sustainment), second, Prepositioned Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS), and third, Operational Projects (stocks set aside to support specific contingency operations). All three were used to support ODS, and all are being modified as they are reconstituted in order to better support the Army of the future.

As War Reserves are reconstituted, several revolutionary changes are being made to the basic policy under which they are defined, calculated and positioned. The key is to stock mission essential/critical items in strategic locations so as to be responsive to multiple contingencies. We need a level of sustainability in each theater that can take care of the initial surge of a most likely contingency. That stock could have an on-the-ground, in-theater, and/or an afloat/prepositioned component. The latter will serve as "swing stocks," responsive to and useable by more than one CINC.

The POMCUS program has long been the key to the rapid deployment of forces to Germany. We utilized many of these stocks (including all M1A1s, Heavy Equipment Transporters, and Materiel Handling Equipment) to support ODS. The demise of the Warsaw Pact and of the Soviet Union has allowed for reduced POMCUS stocks which will assist in meeting the force and budget constraints of the future Army, while still providing full support to our NATO Allies.

Operational Project stocks supporting ODS included: uniforms, organizational clothing, individual equipment, tactical water and petroleum distribution systems, and aluminum airfield matting for tactical helipads. We are using ODS lessons learned to re-evaluate our Operational Projects stocks to better support contingency operations.

The Army's War Reserve Program continues to be an integral part of our country's ability to build-up rapidly and sustain an expanded force capable of encountering a broad range of divergent scenarios. The Army is developing processes, in line with the evolving National Military Strategy (NMS), that merge risk, funding, and positioning into a viable and affordable program.

#### Wholesale Logistics Sustaining Base

The Wholesale Logistics Sustaining Base provides the capability to support operations over time. It includes inventory control points, maintenance points, depots, arsenals, data banks, plants and factories under the command of the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and Defense Logistics Agency. Wholesale functions are generally performed in CONUS, however, during ODS wholesale logistics activities were employed in theater with a command and control structure and forward and special repair activities (FRA/SRA) providing an immediate link to battlefield demands.

## Depot Maintenance Program

The Depot Maintenance Program supports the supply system. It uses production-line management and is performed by commodity oriented activities, special repair activities, Army Materiel Command (AMC) depots, and contractor personnel. The funded level of depot maintenance has exceeded \$1.5 billion annually, but new initiatives will alter this figure as missions transfer to the stock fund.

Secondary item repair costs will come under the stock fund, reducing the depot maintenance appropriation without changing actual dollar amounts of the work load. Major item repair requirements are funded at only 63% in FY 93 and 53% in FY 94, generating a large unfinanced requirement. This situation is further complicated by requirements from ODS which were not accomplished in FY 92 and by hidden maintenance problems which are continuing to drive up requirements. Much of this equipment, the majority of which is in the hands of reserve components, must still be brought up to issuable condition. The full extent of the requirements will not be known until all items are returned, inspected, and costed. Preliminary estimates are that a robust funding level will be required for years.

## Supply Program

Supplies include all items or materiel necessary for the equipment, maintenance, and operation of a military command. Some of the Army near term supply challenges are: the transition of 93 percent of the depot level materiel distribution function to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the integration of Army wholesale and retail logistics operations, a revamping of supply and repair parts funding, increased system automation, soldier sustainment issues, and extensive inventory management.

## Industrial Base Preparedness

The focus of future Army efforts in the Industrial Base Program is an integrated strategy to achieve and maintain a flexible, capable and responsive industrial base. The capability must exist to support peacetime procurement, produce future weapon systems, and to mobilize, in a graduated, but timely fashion, to support contingency and prolonged operations. The strategy includes greater commonality with the commercial base and exploitation of dual-use technologies, at both the prime and subtier level, for future weapon system designs. To ensure the

base is configured to support the most probable types of contingencies, the Army is taking the lessons learned from ODS and reassessing industrial base requirements in light of reduced budgets and force structure.

It is inevitable that the existing defense industrial base will decline. DOD policy is generally to let market forces shape the industrial base without intervention by the government. In some selected cases, however, the Army may seek to protect those portions of the base that produce critical militarily unique equipment and capabilities which are not readily reconstitutable. In those sectors of the base with excess capability, we will reduce to an essential core of producers through competitive "best value" acquisitions.

Industrial base considerations will be an integral part of weapon system acquisition strategies. Consideration of industrial base implications will occur at the very beginning of the process. We will consider all aspects including, for example, simplifying manufacturing, reducing foreign dependency and utilizing commercial specifications and standards rather than military specifications where possible. These considerations will continue throughout the acquisition process.

The development and improvement of domestic capabilities to support critical technologies is also an important piece of the integrated strategy. The Army will continue to support the Manufacturing Technology program, focusing our resources on applying advanced technology to manufacturing with the goal of improving the quality and efficiency of those processes.

#### Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)

LOGCAP obtains civilian contractual assistance in peace to meet U.S. Army wartime or crisis support requirements worldwide, through the advance identification and planned acquisition of global corporate assets. The overall objective is for the MACOM to establish self-supporting ("Turn Key") umbrella contracts. These contracts would meet CS/CSS shortfalls in several functional areas; maintain peacetime acquisition, operational and management bases; and provide the base for an expanded and sustained contractual support effort in crisis and war.

LOGCAP complements Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) and U.S. organic unit capabilities. Extensive multinational contractual resources were used during ODS to support deployment, sustainment, and redeployment efforts throughout Southwest Asia.

## Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS)

WHNS is key to U.S. burdensharing initiatives and acquisition of foreign governmental resources to complement U.S. support capabilities in crises. As the force restructures and becomes more CONUS based, WHNS gains increasing importance for supporting the rapid projection of combat power over extended Lines of Communication (LOC). Though the German WHNS is currently being revised to meet changing European Theater needs, it is the model military program and provides critical CS/CSS for U.S. reinforcement and resupply efforts along multi-lateral LOC's into the Central Region of Europe. This critical support consists of 44 security and CS/CSS German Army Reserve units with a combined strength of 29,900 persons, which operate from 39 mobilization bases.

Extensive WHNS has also been agreed upon from the civil sectors of 10 countries (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, and the United Kingdom). Although no WHNS agreements were formally activated, WHNS LOC procedures and civil assets from most of these countries were used to support U.S. deployment, sustainment and redeployment operations in support of ODS. The years of WHNS planning, verifications, and exercises resulted in the expeditious provision of critical ODS support, especially along multi-lateral LOC's during the initial buildup in Southwest Asia. A U.S. - Republic of Korea WHNS umbrella agreement, the first such agreement in the Pacific, is in the process of being signed.

## Transportation Programs

Over the next several years, the Army transportation program will require significant resources to support the realignment of forces worldwide. While the Army is reducing our forces overseas, the cost of transferring equipment among units -- to keep the most modern equipment and retire older, less capable equipment -- will temporarily offset the lower cost of transportation to sustain and resupply the reduced force structure overseas. As these equipment transfers among units occur, the Army is also simultaneously starting to draw down European war reserve stocks. As all these changes occur, the Army will change our transportation funding policy to reduce the number of programs supported by centrally-funded transportation; as much as possible, we will realign transportation funds with the funding for the programs they support.

The Army continues to convert from the non-tactical vehicles (NTV) fleet to the General Services Administration (GSA) plan. As of September 1991, over 46,000 vehicles were converted to GSA, with an identified annual initial savings of over \$30 million.

The current fleet of Tactical Wheeled Vehicles (TWV) will be modernized through a plan that encompasses procurement, distribution, retention, and retirement policies designed to meet operational requirements while reducing peacetime costs. Within the plan, vehicle types are being reduced through a family concept where applicable. The light fleet is based on the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). The Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) will modernize current 2 1/2 and 5 ton fleets and take full advantage of the family concept, given the substantial commonality between all models. However, because of the large quantities of trucks to be procured and the age of the current fleet, a service life extension program (SLEP) is required to upgrade the 2 1/2 ton trucks in the current medium fleet. The program will permit the Army to reduce operation and support costs while extending the life of current assets until they can be replaced by the FMTV.

The family of Heavy Tactical Vehicles, with their unique missions, has been modernized with the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) which served as the fuel and ammunition hauling workhorse of ODS. The family will be further modernized with the 70 ton capacity Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET) system and Palletized Load System (PLS). PLS, part of a new ammunition distribution concept, reduces manpower and support equipment requirements with its unique demountable cargo bed (flatrack) and load handling system.

The maneuver requirements of the Army's future war fighting doctrine (AirLand Operations) will require increased tactical wheeled vehicle mobility. The Army will support future contingencies through continued modernization of a balanced mix of the light, medium, and heavy tactical wheeled vehicle fleets.

#### Logistics Automation and Battlefield Communications Architecture

The Army is taking immediate action to correct the deficiencies in logistics automation/communications architecture that were exacerbated by environmental and operational conditions experienced in Operation Desert Storm (ODS). Combat Service Support (CSS) units have become

dependent on a level of host nation telecommunications support that was not available throughout Southwest Asia (SWA). CSS units in SWA had to send transactions on floppy disk or magnetic tape over extended distances by courier from echelon to echelon. Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE), while significantly improving CSS command and control communications, was not designed to support increasing requirements for transmission of CSS data. A new product improvement, Tactical Packet Switching, is being added to help meet the critical requirements for passing data on the battlefield.

Current problems with the CSS architecture are due in part to a focus on Western Europe and to dwindling resources which limited the capabilities and capacities of both automation and supporting communications architectures. The logistics and signal communities are working towards an in depth review of the CSS architecture and business practices by way of a CSS Automation/Communications Study and a CSS Corporate Information Management (CIM) Assessment. Efforts are concentrating on near and mid-term fixes for early deploying units to ensure effective force projection of logistics operations into any future conflict.

### Supplying the Warfighting Force

Army long range plans to supply the warfighting force include development of logistics doctrine, procedures, and equipment to support integrated battlefield sustainment into the 21st Century. Our mid-range objectives include development of a total distribution system, with asset visibility, from source to foxhole. We are supporting improvements in automation, tactical communications, field mobility, wholesale and retail supply procedures and logistics force structure that will provide a seamless logistics distribution system to sustain the reshaped Army.

### Bulk Petroleum Distribution

During ODS, the Army deployed over \$98.1 million worth of tactical petroleum pipelines and storage systems in support of all U.S. Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps combat forces. These systems were planned and procured to meet a Southwest Asia scenario. In addition, we deployed mobile labs, petroleum barges, Refuel-On-The-Move kits and other fuel distribution equipment. The Army will continue to procure tactical petroleum distribution equipment in FY 93/94 to provide for future contingencies.

## Preferred Munitions

The term "preferred munitions" is used to describe the most modern and lethal munitions preferred by combat commanders. Preferred munitions will differ depending on the operation, but they all offer greater lethality over their older counterparts and thus can often require less quantities to achieve the same results. Our emphasis on preferred munitions paid off during ODS with the use of Patriot Anti-Tactical Missiles, Hellfire Missiles, Multiple Launch Rocket System, the Army Tactical Missile System, as well as improved penetrators for M1 Tank main gun rounds and M2/3 Bradley 25mm rounds.

## Reparable Spares

An initiative currently being implemented is the acquisition and depot level repair of reparable secondary items utilizing stock funds instead of appropriated funds. Many of these items such as engines, transmissions, and circuit card assemblies, can only be completely repaired at depot level. This initiative will make customers more cost conscious and bring Army procedures in line with proven cost saving commercial practices.

Army customers will begin buying reparable spares in April 1992. This initiative is currently being demonstrated in Korea to validate and refine the plan prior to Army-wide implementation. The Army's budget has been adjusted for this initiative by decreasing the procurement appropriations and increasing customer appropriations (primarily operation and maintenance). Total estimated recurring savings of \$651 million for FY92-95 have already been decremented in the Army's budget.

## Clothing and Individual Equipment

Resourcing a quality warfighting force must include support to our most important system on the battlefield, the individual soldier. The soldier system consists of all individual equipment and clothing worn, carried and consumed by the soldier in the field.

The Congressionally mandated Soldier Enhancement Plan (SEP) accelerates evaluation and procurement of nondevelopmental items that can be quickly fielded to enhance the soldier's warfighting capability and survivability on the battlefield. Examples of FY 92 SEP projects include improved laser/ballistic eye protection, intermediate cold-wet glove, desert combat boot, and soldier ground insulating mat.

The threat of chemical and biological (CB) warfare during the ODS posed a significant logistical challenge. Despite a very limited industrial base and a poor surge capability, the Army met its CDE requirements during Desert Storm, not only contributing to the deterrence of CB warfare during the conflict, but also improving its ability to sustain the force on a future CB battlefield. For example, replenishment plans for Battledress Overgarments (BDO) have resulted in an improved industrial base for this critical commodity, with six active contractors compared with only two prior to the war.

### Tactical Water Support

Adequate supplies of potable water are critical to success on the battlefield. To date, capabilities for the detection, purification, storage, distribution, and cooling of water have been developed or enhanced. Purification equipment can produce potable water from any source, including Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) contaminated sources. Storage and distribution systems utilizing collapsible fabric tanks insure adequate water support throughout the theater of operations. In FY92, 3000 Gallons Per Hour (GPH) Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPU) will begin to be issued to nondivisional and general support units. Future funds will procure additional purification units for divisional and nondivisional units, collapsible fabric storage and distribution tanks, and water quality analysis units. The Army has also recognized that a better balanced Active/Reserve Force is necessary for contingency operations in general support water unit structure. Actions have been initiated to resource Active Component Water Units for the Army of the future.

### The Army Field Feeding System

The Army Field Feeding System (AFFS) supports the Airland Battle commander with flexibility to provide the soldier with meals at the right time and place depending on the tactical and logistical situation.

Continuous improvement of operational rations, equipment, distribution systems, and soldier training are key to building a smaller, more mobile and lethal force. Well nourished soldiers, the real product of AFFS, serve as a positive force readiness multiplier. Funding in the future must be provided to sustain existing developmental programs that enhance ration shelf life; provide large, more widely acceptable entrees; reduce manpower requirements; and improve soldier nutrition. Funds must also be provided for the procurement of sufficient operational rations

to sustain training and preserve the production base essential for mobilization.

### Field Service Programs

The Army's Field Service Support System (FSSS) encompasses laundry, showers, clothing repair and exchange, mortuary affairs, and delousing sprayers. In FY 92, the Army will lay out a plan for FSSS requirements thru FY 99 directed at a smaller and highly capable CONUS deployable force. The plan will be used to determine future resource requirements.

Using lessons learned from Desert Storm, the Army will field the new M85 Laundry Trailer in FY 92 to all authorized active and reserve component combat service support units. The Army's ability to decontaminate clothing and individual equipment will be greatly enhanced with equipment such as the Laundry and Decontamination Dry Cleaning System (LADDS). Resources for R&D and modernization of FSSS equipment are essential to ensure that a smaller and more lethal force has the capability to sustain and improve soldier quality of life.

### Support to other Services

During Operation Desert Storm, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned the Army Executive Agent responsibilities for: inland transportation, port operations, rations, back-up water support, barrier materials, fuels (bulk distribution), common munitions, medical supplies, veterinary services, construction support, and graves registration. Doctrinally, this support equates to over 20,000 Army logistics personnel, but reduces spaces for the DOD when compared to the alternative of inter-service support redundancy. Large materiel savings are produced through the elimination of separate stocks for each service.

Timeliness is a critical element of supporting other services. Force structure and stocks must be deployed in time to satisfy the theater commander's requirements. The commander needs sufficient strategic lift assets to meet both combat and support requirements. Without these assets, the commander is forced to choose between combat power and logistics. As the Army restructures, careful attention must be given towards force structure and strategic lift to support other services. This mission has proved to be a significant challenge in today's resource constrained environment.

### Strategic Logistics Program (SLP)

The Army recognized the need to institutionalize and centralize strategic logistics planning to ensure that logistics maintain pace with the Army's evolving requirements. In 1989, the SLP was established to improve and modernize the Army's logistics processes through the year 2010 and beyond. Program goals include melding a "seamless" logistics system, achieving combat logistics sustainment imperatives, and meeting budgetary savings objectives for selected Defense Management Review Decisions (DMRD).

Near-term initiatives include converting depot level reparable (DLR) to stock funding and integrating wholesale and retail logistics. In FY 92, previously developed initiatives will be implemented including conversion of DLRs to stock funding; fielding of the Objective Supply Capability which reduces the repair parts ordering leadtime from 15 days to 1 day; and other improvements to the Army provisioning process.

During FY 91, SLP demonstrated the capability to have global visibility of selected wholesale and retail repair parts and ammunition. In FY 92 this capability, called Total Asset Visibility, will be used in a spare parts requirements computation prototype. These initiatives contribute toward the near-term goal, achieving DMRD savings decremented over the FY91-95 time frame.

Mid-term initiatives encompasses developing logistics decision support applications, implementing a single stock fund, providing enhancements to combat service support control, developing weapon system sustainment management, and focusing on changes to logistics doctrine and processes required by the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Corporate Information Management (CIM) Initiative.

Long-term initiatives include a comprehensive functional analysis of logistics requirements for the period 2000 and beyond. Analysis results will be used to develop the master plan for the next generation of logistics management processes.

### Management Efficiency

The leadership of the Army is committed to accomplishing the reshaping of our force using a proactive philosophy and sound management principles. In order to realize our objective force, we have reviewed our management systems through a senior level study group. Our reassessment was founded on retaining the competencies which have

made the Army the most capable force in the Nation's history. However, we must fundamentally change from World War II requirements-driven thinking. We must build capabilities and capacities to meet ambiguous future threats. The Army of the 1990's must remain versatile and adaptive. This requires a certain state of mind: non-dogmatic, not wed to any particular solution or to the status quo. In this context, we must:

Create a corporate understanding that excessive advocacy is dysfunctional. The synergy of an Army in balance is superior to an Army where the capabilities of many parts are sacrificed for one.

Reaffirm "stewardship of the public's resources" as part of the definition of the soldierly value of "competence."

Manage the sustaining base in a business-like manner. Re-examine criticality of function, more efficient, cost-effective approaches, out-sourcing and "new ways of doing business."

Divest any function, organization, equipment or facility that does not contribute to the essence of the Army or to the Army's missions.

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Develop the most efficient management and organizational structures for the Army.

Consolidate functions and facilities when cost-effective, affordable and consistent with Army missions -- to include other services and defense agencies.

As should be clear from these principles, we are committed to changing the way we do business in order to support our base force.

### Army Implementation of the Defense Management Report

The Army continues to implement the Defense Management Report (DMR) decisions made during the FY91 and the FY92/93 reviews. We are tracking seventy initiatives, thirty nine of them generated within the Army. Approximately \$23.5 billion in savings and transfers (FY91-97) are expected to result from these initiatives.

The Defense Management Report (DMR) is a significant part of the Army total reshaping efforts. The Army Acquisition Corps and the Army's three tier reporting chain for acquisition program management established clear, abbreviated lines of authority, removed unnecessary layers, and streamlined the decision process in the materiel acquisition area.

The establishment of the Army Acquisition Corps has had a positive influence on improving the quality of the acquisition work force. The Army continues to develop the Acquisition Corps to improve the quality of its dedicated military and civilian acquisition managers consistent with the drawdown in forces and budget reductions. Centrally funded, mandatory developmental training continues as a keystone to improve the overall technical proficiency and professional competence of the acquisition workforce.

With the inevitable decrease in resourcing and without a corresponding decrease in mission requirements, the Army continues to look for various ways of doing business more efficiently. As previously reported, the Army has done that through the implementation of management initiatives.

Four overriding management themes define the process: consolidate where it makes sense, reduce overhead, reorient the support base toward business practices, and, restructure the Army logistics systems for the future. To this end, we have implemented numerous consolidations in various functional areas: logistics, information management, research and development, base operations, and personnel. Through these consolidations, administrative overhead and duplicative operations were either eliminated or drastically reduced, and ultimately, the operation was made more efficient.

We are implementing a "users pay for services" environment in all functional areas. This increases the visibility of operational costs and in the longer run causes the functional area to operate more efficiently. Care will be taken, however, that readiness does not suffer under the guise of efficiency.

The Army is continuing total support for the DMR process by the development of new management improvements along with the emphasis on execution of previously approved DMRs. Three new management initiatives have been developed and approved by the Army leadership: Streamlining of the Criminal Investigation Division Command, Consolidation of Intelligence Activities, and Streamlining of the Recruiting Command. These initiatives are already ongoing, with manpower savings already achieved by the Army.

### Total Army Quality (TAQ)

Total Army Quality is the management philosophy being adopted by the Army. Its value has been convincingly demonstrated in both the public and the private sectors. The Army's application of TAQ is action oriented. Increased effectiveness and improved efficiency are accomplished project by project through the participation and contributions of every soldier and Department of the Army civilian. Adopting this management philosophy will translate directly into continuous improvement of training, unit readiness, combat effectiveness and quality services to soldiers, civilians and families.

Implementing TAQ throughout the Total Army improves our ability to anticipate and manage change. A trained and ready total Army requires the talents, knowledge, creativity, unique experience and commitment of every soldier and Army civilian. Individual and team efforts must be encouraged and channeled to optimize the quality of the Total Army. The principles, tools and techniques of TAQ will shape the Army of the future.

Translating TAQ theory into practice will weave quality management into the fabric of the Army, beginning with the Army leadership and continuing down through the entire structure. It requires a redefining of current management practices and, in some cases, learning new behaviors. The knowledge and skills integral to the TAQ methodology will be incorporated in all Army professional development courses and practiced in operational assignments.

The implementation of the TAQ philosophy is not optional. However, because organizations are unique and differ in a multitude of ways, the leadership of each organization must tailor their approach to best fit their own circumstances. Making TAQ "the Army Management Philosophy" will take time. Nevertheless, the correct application of this approach will help us obtain a trained and ready Total Army as we reshape the force. In an environment of diminishing resources and force structure reductions, the quality of the force is not negotiable. Quality serves as the underpinning of readiness -- and readiness provides us with the edge to win.

### Information Mission Area Programs

Information technology continues to meet the challenges of today's volatile and uncertain environment. Technology provides the opportunity for productivity and efficiency gains with a smaller work force.

In March 1991, the Army developed a plan to consolidate 60 data processing facilities at four Major Commands (MACOMs). This realignment of resources will support the Army's transition to an Open System Environment (OSE).

The purpose of the Sustaining Base Information Services (SBIS) Program is to allow the Army's sustaining base functional applications to be re-engineered and operate in an OSE with common user processing, executive software and communications infrastructure. Once complete, all Army units will be able to reduce redundant applications, share data, standardize functions, use nondevelopmental hardware and software, and save significant costs. The scope of SBIS extends from 1992 to 2002.

### Budget Issues

#### FY92 Budget Overview

The FY92 Department of the Army budget, not including the Desert Storm supplemental, provides a Total Obligation Authority (TOA) of \$67.7 billion, reflecting a decrease of \$5.4 billion from FY91. For FY92 Congress appropriated \$3.5 billion for Army Reserve operations and maintenance, military personnel, and construction. Congress also restored force structure and end strength, authorizing DOD to adjust both by up to 2%. The Army National Guard FY92 TOA is \$5.5 billion.

The FY92 budget substantially reduces force structure while maintaining current readiness, protecting minimum essential sustainability

requirements and funding modernization in order to leverage technology for the future. This approach is in keeping with the Army commitment to prudent reshaping of both the fielded force and supporting infrastructure in a manner consistent with sustained readiness.

The budget continues to emphasize quality as the key ingredient in providing the best force possible, while accommodating force realignment actions required within the increasingly challenging fiscal environment. Personnel end strengths to include both the active and reserve components, and the civilian and contract workforces, will be reduced significantly to reflect Army restructuring. Further tough decisions include consideration of increasing the rate of reduction of personnel strength in Europe.

The FY92 construction appropriation supports a strategy which enhances soldier training, development, readiness and safety.

The budget maintains readiness objectives by funding air and ground operating tempo (OPTEMPO) and enhancing the quality of training at the Combat Training Centers and at installations. These issues represent the cornerstone to protect the vital training foundation upon which Army readiness is firmly based. While readiness issues have been emphasized, some training support initiatives have been resourced at reduced levels.

The Army's modernization strategy focuses on long-term technology that creates overmatch capabilities against a projected threat. This strategy seeks to avoid technological surprise at a time when the threat has changed from war with the Soviet Union to regional contingencies exemplified by Operation Desert Storm.

The Army continues to fully support and implement management initiatives through the Defense Management Report (DMR) process. The Army's progress in reducing layering, streamlining management and decreasing redundancy in operations through the implementation of management initiatives enables the Army to operate more efficiently within a challenging resource environment.

The Reserve Personnel, Army (RPA) budget appropriation can support a Selected Reserve end strength of 308,000 in FY92, although the 2% flexibility will reduce strength to 301,840. This includes sufficient incentive and educational benefit dollars to sustain a quality force. However, special training and mobilization training will be funded at less

than optimal levels. Additionally, the FY92 budget shows a decrease in the number of fulltime support personnel.

The Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve (OMAR) budget adequately supports the ground and air OPTEMPO as currently equipped. However, the Army Reserve is not funded for operation of any additional equipment that it may gain from the SWA retrograde, CFE nor the European drawdown. Civilian manpower (including military technicians) is funded at 14.4%, a reduction from FY91 which corresponds to the inactivation of USAR force structure. The activation of the U.S. Army Reserve Command, although underfunded for current year operation, will assist in optimizing OMAR fund use. The OMAR appropriation is inadequately funded to reduce the backlog in maintenance and repair of facilities, purchase of organizational clothing and equipment, leases in support of the force structure and depot maintenance.

The FY92 Army National Guard Budget (ARNG) reflects a balanced and prudent glidepath designed to continue our transition to a smaller Army that will remain trained and ready. This path is a reflection both of the evolving realities of the international order and our domestic fiscal environment. The budget reflects the minimum essential resources required to stabilize the force structure, maintain quality of life, and preclude unacceptable risks.

#### FY93 Budget Overview

The Army budget continues the declining budget trend started in FY86. The FY93 President's Budget provides \$64.2 billion dollars. The Army's buying power for FY93 is 30% lower than FY90, again measured in FY92 constant dollars. The Total Obligation Authority (TOA), by appropriation, depicts how these declining trends are reflected in major spending categories.

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The Army Reserve budget provides a TOA of \$3.2 billion, which represents a decline of 9.3 percent from FY92 in constant dollars. The FY93 Army National Guard (ARNG) budget provides a TOA of \$5.1 billion.

The Army has made difficult decisions, based on projected requirements of the rapidly changing security environment, that will provide a smaller but flexible and capable land force for the future. The Army's six imperatives provide a framework for reviewing resource allocations in the FY93 budget.

### Quality Force

Today, the Army represents the best equipped fighting force in the world. The FY93 budget pursues a strategy which enables the soldiers of the future to be equally well prepared and equipped. FY93 budget adjustments reinforce plans to resource training programs which will maintain those readiness levels that brought victory in Desert Storm. The quality of the Army's military and civilian members is the highest it has ever been. The Army continues to provide sufficient funds to maintain a quality, trained and ready total force. The FY93 budget includes a tailored program of incentives to induce voluntary separation and for recruitment and retention of just enough personnel to fill key positions requiring skills needed to man the force. With these programs we hope to minimize the number of involuntary separations required to shape the force to meet its reduced end state. In addition, the budget includes a bare minimum compensation program that encourages prospective soldiers and civilians to join the force and to continue their service. This package includes not only the more obvious elements of pay, promotions, allowances, and bonuses, but also programs that provide for the quality of life our Total Force deserves. These and other investments support programs that safeguard morale and welfare -- for those who will transition to civilian employment as well as for those that remain within the force.

### Doctrine

The Army's AirLand Battle doctrine forms the set of guiding principles that determine how we will fight. As such, doctrine provides the

underpinning for resource decisions: designing force structure, determining training and leader-development requirements, and setting modernization priorities. The FY93 budget reflects the Army's allocation of resources to ensure we retain the capabilities our Nation requires to deter war and to fight and win if deterrence fails. As we reshape the Army, doctrine -- continually refined to meet the needs of an evolving national security environment -- will remain the guide for our transition into the 21st century.

### Force Structure

The Army's budget and program reflect the shift from a strategy of containment of the Soviet Union to one of crisis response through power projection. They also reflect the current domestic fiscal situation that demands reductions in Federal spending. The Army of the mid-1990s will be a more CONUS-based force, postured for force projection operations and the generation of additional forces from the CONUS base. The FY93 budget significantly reduces military and civilian end strengths from FY92 levels. The Army remains committed to prudent reshaping of both the fielded force and our supporting infrastructure in a manner consistent with sustained readiness.

### Training

To ensure that the excellence of the force is retained and realistic training is maintained, the Army continues to support high readiness levels by budgeting for an active force operating tempo (OPTEMPO) of 800 miles annually for ground vehicles and 14.5 flying hours per month for aircraft. USAR OPTEMPO is funded at 200 miles annually for ground vehicles and 8.1 flying hours for aircraft. Comparable figures for the ARNG are 288 miles and 9 hours. The fact that these levels have been the Army's goal since FY90 reflects the importance we attach to maintaining adequate levels of training throughout the Total Force as we reshape our Army.

The Master Plan for the Combat Training Centers is fully funded. FY93 funding supports 33 battalion rotations through the NTC, 25 battalion rotations through the CMTC, 16 battalion rotations through the JRTC, and 13 divisions (9 AC and 4 RC) and 1 corps rotation through the BCTP.

### Modernization

The Army's modernization strategy is founded upon a central theme of continuous modernization. This provides our soldiers, both today and in the future, with a wide advantage over any adversary at any time. In the near-term, modernization will be accomplished by upgrading our fielded equipment with modern technology that will provide us with the capability necessary to maintain an overwhelming edge. When upgrades are no longer cost effective, or a credible new threat dictates, new systems will be developed, produced and fielded. As our dollars continue to decline, our long-term research and development efforts focus on leap-ahead capabilities to overmatch any projected threat. Although Desert Storm proved our warfighting capabilities are unsurpassed, our commitment to research and development and the technology base will preserve a long term technological edge.

### Leader Development

The Army continues to provide adequate funds for leader development programs at all levels of the Total Force. Maintaining funding in these accounts, in the face of an overall decline in real resources was not easy and reflects an enduring commitment to this key aspect of tomorrow's quality force. The FY93 budget provides full opportunity for the training of our current leaders and maintains our approach of progressive and sequential assignments and education to prepare them for future leadership responsibilities.

### The Reserve Component

The RPA budget reflects a decrease in end strength that markedly affects the school, special, and mobilization training accounts. The FY93 OMAR budget is also reduced significantly from the FY92 budget. Civilian strength is funded at a level 22.6% lower than the FY91 base, resulting in essentially no progress in improving the fulltime manning ratio. Ground and air OPTEMPO is marginally funded. As in FY92, no funds are included to reduce the backlog in maintenance and repair of existing facilities. Organizational clothing and equipment and depot maintenance remain underfunded. Because of the OSD construction pause, the Military Construction, Army Reserve budget will only support unspecified construction and planning and design in FY93.

The Army National Guard's Budget is the product of difficult decisions all based on providing the best reserve force available. The Army National Guard's Budget provides the resources to attract and retain the high quality soldiers needed to man the smaller, more capable force. The ARNG

continues to provide sufficient funds to maintain a quality, trained, and ready force. The ARNG's commitment to tough, realistic training is reflected in its ground and air OPTEMPO of 288 miles and 9.0 flying hours per crew per month respectively. The ARNG budget fully supports skill qualification and leader development training.

### Defense Business Operations

As the Army adapts to the changing world and fiscal environment, it is making significant changes in the way its logistical system supports the force. In addition to significant streamlining resulting from the Defense Management Report Decisions, the support forces are making a transition to a more business-oriented approach to operations. This business operations approach is designed to provide specific visibility of total unit costs and to establish customer-provider relationships similar to those in the private sector. The business operations concept will be implemented through expanded use of revolving, industrial type funding with most of the direct O&M funding being allocated to operating forces "customers". The result of this new approach will be faster, more economical delivery of needed supplies, equipment, and services with quality and quantities tailored to the consuming forces needs.

### Summary

The FY93 budget reflects a balanced and prudent glidepath designed to continue our transition to a smaller Army that is versatile, deployable, lethal, expandable, sustainable, and always trained and ready. This path is a reflection both of the evolving realities of the changing strategic and domestic fiscal environments. While it is clear that the Army can no longer conduct business as usual, the budget reflects the minimum essential resources required to stabilize the force structure, maintain quality of life, and preclude unacceptable risks. Programs have been tailored, now and for the future, to be consistent with global uncertainties and trends, and on worldwide commitments.

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The budget for FY93 meets the dual requirements of sustaining readiness and shaping the force of the future. It upholds our commitment to maintain the essential capabilities of the force by providing for quality men and women, military and civilian, excellence in training of soldiers and leaders and a technological edge in equipment.

The Army made extremely difficult decisions in submitting the FY93 budget adjustments. Budget adjustments were designed to align with an accelerated reshaping plan which is being vigorously implemented. The clear Army goal, as supported by the budget, is to maintain a trained and ready force during a period of constant change.