

**Army White Paper**  
**October 1994**

***Decisive Victory: America's Power Projection Army***

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

America's Army has changed. It is no longer the massive, European-focused force of the Cold War, but has become a much more agile and complex power projection force for the 21st century. Three things have guided the Army's transformation and point the way to the future: an understanding of the changed international environment, the strategic purposes for which the nation requires military force, and the characteristics and capabilities required to fight and win on the modern battlefield. This paper charts the direction of change in America's Army.

The transformation of the strategic environment is readily apparent. The threat and danger of conflict with the Soviet Union no longer heads the list of our international security concerns, but the list which remains is neither short nor without danger. Our nation's well being remains linked to interests around the globe, and we are pursuing a strategy of "engagement" to support and defend those interests.

While the specific threats to the U.S. have changed, the Army's role endures. The Army is the nation's force for conducting prompt and sustained land combat, which has been its role throughout our history. Combined with air and naval forces, the Army provides the nation with the ability to employ its military might in support of national policy. Its unique contribution to the joint team, however, is the ability to dominate the land, including populations and other resources. While all forms of military force derive their power from the capability to inflict violence, it is the conduct of sustained land operations which forms the core of the nation's ability to implement a desired policy. The employment of the Army is an action which an opponent cannot ignore, and because of this the Army provides the National Command Authorities the ability to force a decision, an essential tool of statecraft.

The international threat, the national military strategy of engagement, the requirement to force a decision on land, and our vision of technological dominance, all serve to define the characteristics and capabilities required for the Army of the 21st century. The nation needs an Army that is ready, deployable, and versatile. It needs an Army that can respond to a range of missions: from humanitarian assistance through regional war to general war. It needs an Army of citizen-soldiers who represent the values of democracy and freedom to the world. It needs an Army that can rapidly deploy, fight, and win. Grounded in the

institutional values that have sustained it for over 200 years, the 21st century Army is today and must be in the future a power projection force capable of achieving decisive victory for the nation.

## SECTION 2

### THE STRATEGIC PURPOSES OF AMERICA'S ARMY

*We are determined that before the sun sets on this terrible struggle our flag will be recognized throughout the world as a symbol of freedom on the one hand—of overwhelming power on the other.*

*General George C. Marshall, 1942*

By public law and Department of Defense directive, the role of the Army is “to conduct prompt and sustained operations on land.” Within the Army that role is traditionally reformulated to the phrase “to fight and win the nation’s wars.” While both phrases capture the spirit of the organizational mission, the changing international environment suggests a reexamination of our traditional statement of purpose. Yes, the Army exists to fight and win the nation’s wars, but we must now understand war in a strategic sense as more than the conventional clash of the armies of opposing nation-states.

America has forged economic, cultural, and security-related links to nations all around the globe. All three kinds of connections involve critical interests that affect our national well being and could even impact our national survival. America cannot ignore what goes on around the world. This is a simple matter of fact.

For the foreseeable future, the United States’ national interests will require us to remain engaged in a world in transition, an uncertain world where we have global interests. We must be able to protect and promote those interests—sometimes through the use of force. The Army’s challenge in this environment will be to respond to threats ranging from regional war, through lesser conflicts, to peace operations. It must also be prepared, if necessary, to confront any future global threat. As an instrument of American policy, the Army must be ready to provide the nation a variety of tools to influence the international environment and ultimately force a decision.

In the past we have seen that sometimes our readiness to conduct prompt and sustained land combat alone can suffice to achieve our policy objectives. As we look back on the period of 1945 through 1989, we observe that the United States fought and emerged victorious from the Cold War. The Army contributed to that victory—but not in actual battle with the Warsaw Pact. Likewise, in the years to come, there will be periods of time—long ones we hope—when the United States will not be fighting opposing armies. Yet every day the Army will be, as it is now, employed around the globe in support of national interests. The core competency of the Army is its capability to conduct prompt

---

*Decisive Victory*

and sustained land combat, but the nation relies on the organization and the capabilities associated with that core competency for a variety of purposes both at home and abroad.

#### INTERNATIONAL PURPOSES: COMPEL, DETER, AND REASSURE

The Army represents a portion of the potential military power of the nation. That power translates directly to influence in the international system. We use military power to **compel** an adversary to accede to our will. That potential also contributes to the nation's ability to **deter** opponents from actions inimical to our interests. Peaceful employments of military forces **reassure** our allies, demonstrate our capabilities, promote stability, and contribute to our ability to influence international outcomes.

Of course, these purposes are not entirely independent of one another. Our ability to compel an adversary is essential to our ability to deter him. If deterrence fails, we must be able to use force to protect our interests—and our adversary must know it. Actions to reassure our allies of our commitments to a region or a nation enhance American credibility, and therefore contribute to deterrence. The distinctions among the purposes blur in the actual conduct of day to day operations but, no matter the purpose, they all require **strength**. This strength derives from the physical capabilities of the force, its values, and the political will of the nation. The Army must be of sufficient size and capability to defeat adversaries on land. And only by maintaining an Army rooted in democratic values will we have an Army that can be employed around the world to contribute to the reassurance of our allies.

#### *Compel*

As a last resort, we go to war; we use military force to compel an opponent to accede to our will. In war, the nation employs the Army against some other actor to achieve a desired outcome—to achieve a policy desired by the National Command Authorities. That policy may entail the unconditional surrender of an opponent as in the case of World War II. Or it may specify a lesser condition, such as the withdrawal of the Iraqi Army from Kuwait in 1991. Normally used in response to a failure of deterrence, the Army is employed to force an enemy to terminate hostile actions.

When used to compel, Army forces usually are employed as part of joint and often combined task forces, for our greatest strength is obtained in the synergism of land, air, and sea operations. However, it is the Army element alone that has the ability to exercise direct, continuous, and comprehensive control over both terrain and people, and thus provides the joint team the ability to force a decision.

**The Panama Intervention  
Operation Just Cause**

*Following two years of provocations against American citizens and against the liberties of the local people, the United States intervened in Panama to destroy the renegade Panamanian Defense Force and secure key American facilities. Joint Task Force South employed surprise, technological overmatch, and overwhelming force to decapitate and neutralize the PDF. Under cover of darkness, well-rehearsed combined arms teams from all four services successfully attacked 26 objectives, accomplishing all assigned tasks within a few hours. By daybreak on 20 December 1989, the hostile forces had been shattered, American forces controlled Panama, and JTF South began to transition to the restoration of the legitimate local government.*

***Deter***

We build an Army with a view toward its employment, but as a nation we would prefer that our preparations make the actual use of force unnecessary. Our perceived ability to defeat an adversary in combat, or even our ability to raise his costs to an unacceptable level, deters an opponent from actions adverse to the interests of the United States.

During the Cold War, our ability to mount a credible defense of Europe, our ability to reinforce the ground forces there, and our clear commitment to its defense—as evidenced by the stationing of Army forces in Germany and Italy—all contributed to deterring a ground attack by the Warsaw Pact. The Army today continues to deter actions adverse to U.S. interests through the maintenance of sufficient numbers of trained and ready forces prepared to defend those interests.

**Defense of the Republic of Korea**

*In March 1994, tensions on the Korean peninsula had increased as a result of substantial evidence of possible North Korean production of nuclear weapons. In response, the National Command Authorities ordered the deployment of a Patriot missile battalion. The battalion commenced deployment on 22 March, deployed by "roll-on, roll-off" ships, and was operational on 29 April as directed by JCS order. The Patriot battalion provided additional capability to the Combined Forces Command to destroy both enemy aircraft and missiles that might be used to attack positions in South Korea. Its immediate deployment enhanced both defense and deterrence on the Korean peninsula.*

***Reassure***

The United States has a unique capability to ameliorate the security dilemma faced by many nations in the world, and it is often in our national interest to do so. In so far as

---

***Decisive Victory***

localized conflicts have the potential to disrupt our global linkages and threaten U.S. interests, the nation will attempt to influence the outcome of these conflicts, thus sustaining a peaceful and favorable international environment.

We reassure and thus strengthen our ties to other Nations and regions through a variety of peaceful actions. The Army reassures allies of America's commitment through the forward basing of forces, as in the Republic of Korea. We maintain negotiated peace settlements, as with our participation in the Multi-National Force and Observers in the Sinai. And we foster stability on volatile pieces of geography, as with our battalion of soldiers in Macedonia.

The Army is uniquely capable of providing reassurance to other nations and enhancing the influence of the United States. First, the employment of American soldiers is an unambiguous signal of national commitment. The presence of U.S. Army soldiers overseas is directly visible to foreign citizens and leaders, and it is an action which directly employs the power and authority of our nation. Second, the overwhelming majority of international militaries are armies as opposed to naval or air forces. The U.S. Army is engaged with the armies of friends around the world through military assistance programs, joint training exercises, and military to military exchanges. Through these continuous programs, the Army contributes daily and directly to America's international influence.

#### **The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai**

*In 1978, long-time enemies Egypt and Israel signed a peace accord, an event engineered by years of American diplomacy. Under the provisions of this agreement, Israel returned control of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, and both sides agreed to demilitarize their frontier districts. An international security force, which included an American infantry battalion, was interposed between the former belligerents. This organization occupied the southern third of the eastern Sinai Desert beginning in 1982. Joined by forces from eleven other countries, the American troops of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) stand as a symbol of U.S. commitment to a lasting peace between Egypt and Israel. To date, the MFO has kept the peace.*

#### **Sources of Strength**

The ability of Army forces to compel, deter, and reassure relies on the physical strength of our military forces and on the value base of the organization. Obviously, the size and capability of our forces, our physical strength, determines our ability to compel an adversary. Armies exist as organizations to apply force. In an abstract sense, we can understand the strength of an Army simply in terms of the quantity of force it can apply. And the abstract questions are simple ones. Given an adversary and an objective, does the organization possess sufficient size and capability to compel our opponent? Will that size

and capability deter him, persuade him to refrain from actions inimical to our national interests? Will that size and capability reassure allies?

However, there is more to this business of strength. The institutional values, the fundamental character of America's Army is also a source of strength. America's Army is an army of citizen-soldiers; it is the Army of the people of the United States. The soldiers, civilians, and families who make up the Army are dedicated to selfless service to the nation. They embody the values of duty, honor, and loyalty to country. The commitment of America's Army to a mission is a commitment of the character, will, and citizens of our nation. The strength of America's Army is more than the number of rifles, tanks, artillery pieces, and helicopters. We are the army of a democracy, and our strength is derived from the very soul of our nation.

#### DOMESTIC PURPOSE: SUPPORT TO THE NATION

Army units support the nation in times of natural disaster, civil disturbance, or other emergency requiring humanitarian assistance. Specifically, the nation uses the Army in support of civil authority. While principally focused on providing the ability to defeat external threats to our interests, the Army is also organized to effectively perform important missions at home.

The soldiers of the Army are organized into the Active, National Guard, and Army Reserve components. Each of these components contributes to the support of domestic authorities. The National Guard provides support to civil authority within individual states as directed by the Governor. These units are directly responsible to the state governors, are composed of soldiers from the community they support, and thus are the first source of support for states in time of domestic emergency.

The United States Army Reserve and Active component also provide support to civil authority as directed by the President. An individual state may not have within its National Guard units the requisite expertise, equipment, or sufficient units and individuals to respond to a specific emergency. In these cases the other two elements of America's Army are available for employment.

#### **Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki**

*In August and September 1992, hurricanes struck the states of Florida and Hawaii. In both cases the Army, as the Department of Defense executive agent for domestic disaster assistance, coordinated military support to the devastated communities. America's Army—Active, Guard, and Reserve—provided over 23,000 soldiers to support communities in Florida and over 4,500 to the island of Kauai. These soldiers, along with sailors, airmen, marines, and Department of Defense civilians purified water, delivered food, treated the sick and injured, created electric power, and secured community property until*

---

*Decisive Victory*

*civil services were resumed. In the two hurricanes, the Joint Task Forces provided over 2 million meals, removed over 500,000 cubic yards of debris, and treated almost 50,000 patients in field medical facilities.*

## FORCE OF DECISION

The strategic purposes of Army forces—to compel, deter, reassure, and support—all define areas in which the nation expects the Army to achieve success. Each of these purposes requires Army forces to perform—or to have the potential to perform—the tasks of destruction or control on the land.

Victory in the classic sense results from the Army's application of its strength to counter threats to our interests. In concert with the other components of a joint force, the Army has the ability to destroy opposing armies and armed forces. Given the strategic problem of an attacking Army, decisive victory is most likely achieved through the destruction of enough of that force to render it ineffective. Alternatively, the Army may deter an attacking force if the enemy knows that we have the potential to destroy it.

So much for victory in the classic sense. Today, the strategic environment necessitates more complex tasks than mere destruction. While destruction is an inherent and essential part of war for all the services, the attainment of decisive victory will most likely require the establishment of control, the domination of land and populations through the occupation of terrain.

People live on land. Most economic activity is land-based. We raise our families, grow our crops, and manufacture goods on land. The application of military force on land is an action the enemy cannot avoid and therefore, unlike other forms of power, the employment of the Army forces a decision. The enemy must respond—he must make a decision to either fight us or accede to our demands. In most cases, successful military operations will require control of all three operating environments: land, air, and sea. Finally, however, the ability to impose our will depends on the ability to control the land.

Control is essential to the implementation of American policy and will remain so in the years to come. Therefore, to the extent that the Army has sufficient forces to exercise this control and sustain it over time, it provides the nation with an essential tool of statecraft. The Army's ability to establish itself on the soil of another land, hold it for as long as necessary, and control its population and resources is the means through which the Army achieves victory for America.

## CONCLUSION

The Army provides the nation the ability to conduct prompt and sustained land combat. That legal role, combined with the purposes for which the nation employs the Army in the

current strategic environment, mandate an Army that can be rapidly deployed to the decisive point, that has sufficient forces to establish control of the environment, and that can be sustained for an indefinite period of time. Our nation's strategic purposes and the strategic environment define the need for a power projection Army.

### SECTION 3

#### A POWER PROJECTION ARMY: CHARACTERISTICS AND CAPABILITIES

*You can fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman Legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.*

*T.R. Fehrenbach  
This Kind of War*

Like most enduring institutions, America's Army has changed its shape repeatedly. The Army of the 1880's bore little resemblance in character or organization to the Army of the Spanish American War, World War II, or the Cold War. America's Army has, since its birth from the colonial militias, been an adaptive, flexible organization—not always ready to succeed in the first battle; but always capable of adapting to the mission at hand and succeeding at last.

The Constitution authorizes the Army's existence, and the body of law that has grown up around that document, as well as our American traditions, have defined the Army's character over the years. But it is the strategic environment, together with the national security policy of the United States and an understanding of the role of armies and the theory of warfare, from which we must derive the characteristics and capabilities required of the Army at any given time.

Today the Army serves a nation that is engaged around the world—a troubled and uncertain world. To be so engaged, the nation must be able to rely on its Army, in concert with its naval or air forces and the forces of other nations, under United States or coalition command, to project military power to compel, deter, or reassure at the point of some crisis or incipient crisis. The world recognizes that the presence of American soldiers, on the ground, is the strongest and most emphatic demonstration of moral and physical strength and determination that the United States can make in the international community.

Given this situation, the essential characteristics of the Army must be readiness, deployability, versatility, and sufficiency. To conduct sustained land combat, the Army must be capable of dominating maneuver, conducting precision strikes, winning the

battlefield information war, protecting the joint force, and projecting and sustaining combat power. These capabilities are not independent—they are interrelated across the joint force.

## CHARACTERISTICS

### *Readiness*

Today the Army must be ready to respond, with essentially no *actionable* warning (as was the case in the Gulf War) to an almost infinite variety of missions and tasks. The war plans of the Cold War were based on relatively detailed assumptions with respect to location, enemy, and warning time. Today we face an increased potential for the employment of forces on short to no notice, against unknown forces, on undetermined terrain.


The maintenance of a ready Army in peacetime is a burden of global leadership that we, as a nation, have refused in the past. The strong and victorious Army of World War I atrophied rapidly in the 1920's as the nation retreated into isolationism, relying too heavily on reserve forces, maintaining an oversized and underfunded military basing and depot structure, and denying both active and reserve forces vital resources for training and modernization. Despite these handicaps, the Army was able to plant the intellectual seeds for modernization and expansion, and to develop the leaders who would win World War II. But it would be three years from the invasion of Poland before the United States could deploy significant forces on the ground, and four years before it could impose its strength in a decisive way.

Readiness does not mean that all forces are ready today for immediate combat. Selected active forces are prepared to deploy initial elements in 18 hours. Other active forces are prepared to follow as mobility assets become available. Selected reserve forces are prepared to deploy or to man deployment facilities within a few days or even hours. Other reserve forces are prepared to deploy only after 90 days of training, 180 days, or even longer periods.

This force generation concept provides the nation an efficient and economical approach to readiness at the strategic level, while enabling Army units to train in a logical and rational way. The essence of power projection readiness is to be able to field a wide range and mix of forces as they are needed and as transportation becomes available. Our active/reserve mix and mobilization doctrine postures all parts of America's Army at the appropriate level of readiness.

The complexity of American interests in the world today leaves us no choice as a nation but to maintain a ready Army as a critical element of the joint team. To rely too heavily on naval or air forces is to risk impotence—for while useful, those forces lack the ability to compel on the ground and force a decision. To accomplish its policy objectives, the United States must allocate resources to maintain balanced, ready, forces.

## America's Army—August 1994



*5 August 1994 was a typical day for America's Army. 15,941 soldiers were performing 1,826 missions in 105 countries: the 5-14th Infantry Battalion was standing watch on the Sinai Peninsula as part of the Multi-National Force and Observers, 41 soldiers from 7th Medical Command were supporting a hospital in Moldova, the 2-7th Air Defense Battalion (Patriot) was reinforcing the defense of the Republic of Korea, and 573 soldiers were providing humanitarian assistance in Rwanda. Everyday the nation calls upon the Army to provide a wide variety of capabilities in support of our international objectives. When the nation calls, no one asks if the Army is ready—they expect it to be ready.*

### ***Deployability***

Although we must be prepared for domestic assistance within our states or across the nation, our combat operations will take place beyond our borders. That, taken together with the uncertain nature of the world, drives the imperative that the Army be deployable. Our strategic intent must always be to move quickly to the point of our operations, conduct operations for however long they might take, and then return to our bases.

To be deployable, the Army relies on its partnership with naval and air forces, including mobilized assets from the civil sector such as the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and maritime charters.

The Army is responsible for moving the force from “fort to port,” and possesses an extensive fleet of rail cars and other infrastructure to do that. Army forces also operate ports, both in the continental United States and in the theater of operations. To accomplish this mission, the Army maintains the necessary unit structure to operate and clear sea and air ports as well as a fleet of small boats, cranes, and other port handling equipment capable of operating under a wide range of circumstances. This theater support structure plays an essential role in joint task forces, supporting units from all the services.

---

***Decisive Victory***

Strategic mobility involves more, however, than ships and airplanes. The third critical element of America's strategic mobility triad is prepositioned equipment. During the Cold War, the United States Army maintained prepositioned equipment configured in unit sets (POMCUS) in Europe to facilitate rapid reinforcement of NATO's critical Central Region. Today the Army maintains a smaller POMCUS program which includes prepositioned equipment afloat and ashore in Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific. The Army currently has a mechanized infantry/armor brigade of equipment afloat. This equipment, combined with "linebacker" ships carrying supplies and support equipment, provides a capability to place mechanized infantry and armor forces in theater much earlier in a crisis than would otherwise be the case. It is a capability that must be maintained.

### *Versatility*

There is no single overarching threat, or even a single type of threat, for which the Army can optimize its force structure. The Army must be able to respond to crises as diverse as humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping (Kurds in Turkey-Northern Iraq, 1991 to the present), the need to enhance alliance defense (Patriot deployment to Korea, 1994), or a regional crisis of Gulf War proportion. Thus, it is not simply a requirement to have specific ready forces; the Army must also have a sufficient variety and quantity of forces to respond to virtually any crisis or situation involving the use of military force, literally anywhere in the world.

The Army's force structure, the mix of heavy and light divisions and the balance between active and reserve forces, is designed to provide the nation with a versatile force that can rapidly respond across the range of potential missions. The Army does not get to pick its missions—the nation demands an Army that can respond to calls for humanitarian assistance across diverse geographical or cultural circumstances and an Army that can fight and win against large regional armies.

Given the strategic environment, Army units, in general, are not optimized against a particular scenario or war plan. That is, the Army does not design units nor do units train against a precise mission, threat, or set of employment conditions. Rather they are designed to be highly flexible—to be able to be employed in a wide variety of situations. This flexibility, inherent in the design and training of Army units and in the development of Army leaders, provides versatility at the operational level of war. The Army is employed strategically by using adaptive force packages, task oriented groupings of forces capable of a wide range of tasks. It is this strategic and operational versatility that, for example, enables American combat infantry battalions to be not only the best infantry in the world, but also, in the words of both MFO and UN Commanders, the best peacekeepers in the world.

### *Sufficiency*

Last but far from least, fighting and winning the nation's wars mandates adequate force, force enough that, when combined with the elements of other services and our allies, it will ensure success with a moderate (and acceptable) degree of risk. Sufficiency in the case of the Army is related to the question of force mix, because the Army maintains a variety of unit types that are not completely interchangeable. Today, to face the challenges we anticipate, the Army needs a force of approximately 18 active and reserve divisions in a mix of types: heavy (armored and mechanized), light, airborne, and air assault.

In addition to forces for land combat, the Army also provides units to sustain the joint force. For example, the Army provides rations, water, common items of ammunition, bulk fuel, transportation, and other services to the joint force. To sustain both Army combat units on the battlefield and to execute executive agency functions throughout the theater, requires a robust mix of combat support and combat service support forces. These Army units are further supported by the sustainment base of approximately 26% of the force—a smaller percentage than any other service.

Future redesign of the force has the potential to give us greater capability from smaller, flatter organizations. But for the foreseeable future, the missions identified by the nation for the Army require a force of approximately 1.1 million men and women in uniform. If we wish to accept no more than a moderate level of risk to our national interests, a smaller Army is inadequate.

## CAPABILITIES

The function of sustained land combat and the range of purposes for which the nation uses forces, creates an imperative for an Army with the capability to dominate maneuver, conduct precision strikes, protect the force, win the battlefield information war, and project and sustain combat power. These capabilities provide the joint force commander the ability to fight and win on the land. Sustaining and improving these capabilities also gives the nation forces which can be rapidly tailored to deliver success at a range of complex tasks short of war. Army units, as part of a joint force, have the capabilities necessary to rapidly defeat an enemy army. Equally important, the Army's capabilities provide the joint commander the resources to establish control of the land in a wide range of environments for as long as it takes to accomplish the mission.

### *Dominate Maneuver*

To defeat an enemy force, the Army must dominate maneuver throughout the depth of the battlefield. We achieve maneuver dominance through our ability to see the battlefield, move at great speed through its depth, and direct weapons of superior range and lethality. Then we achieve final dominance of the battlefield through the simultaneous application of fires and control of terrain. This simultaneous employment of combat power throughout the battlespace permits the rapid exploitation of enemy vulnerabilities, denies him the initiative, and leads to his rapid defeat. All of this is made possible by commanders who

---

*Decisive Victory*

have control of the ground and air systems to rapidly integrate maneuver elements, direct fires, and indirect fires throughout the depth and breadth of the battlespace.

### ***Conduct Precision Strikes***

Maneuver is complemented by the ability to rapidly engage critical components of enemy forces with precision strikes. The speed, range, and lethality of modern weapons systems have changed the size of the geographical area of direct concern to the ground commander. Enemy targets which may be hundreds of kilometers away from the forward line of troops can have an immediate impact on the close battle and the Army maneuver units. Thus the ground commander must have the ability to rapidly detect, select, and destroy targets in support of ground maneuver throughout the depth of the battlefield. Our ability to execute those functions rapidly is essential to facilitating maneuver and unhinging enemy actions and plans.

This is both an air and ground battle with prompt, all weather, strikes coming from Army tactical missile systems or helicopters, and deeper or less time sensitive targets being engaged by air forces. Thus the conduct of precision strikes requires the ground force commander to have extensive sensors identifying targets through the depth of the battlefield; robust command, control, communications, and intelligence systems to rapidly direct multiple strikes; and control of a variety of "shooters" which can rapidly act to destroy enemy targets and facilitate both close and deep maneuver.

### ***Win the Battlefield Information War***

Winning the battlefield information war enjoins two tasks on us. First, we must have the ability to detect and attack enemy information gathering and processing systems. Second, we must be able to rapidly process, distribute, and protect friendly information. To maneuver and strike, the ground commander must be the master of information, and we will enhance that mastery by "digitizing the battlefield."

The Army is well on the way to constructing a common image of the battlefield for ground commanders. The advent of the global positioning system gives ground force commanders the ability to know with precision, in real time, the location of friendly units. Reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition systems (RISTA) provide an increasingly rapid and detailed profile of enemy forces. Furthermore, we will soon have control of maneuver and fires through digital as opposed to voice command. That ability will shorten the time between "sensor" and "shooter" and dramatically increase the speed and lethality of our current systems and units. Winning the battlefield information war means increasingly integrated systems to collect, disseminate, and rapidly act on information.

### ***Protect the Force***

***America's Power Projection Army***

---

In the current strategic environment, fully developed and industrialized nations, developing nations, and non-state actors all have the ability to procure weapons of significant range and lethality. Across the range of potential conflicts, weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological), long range artillery, and ballistic missiles are available to any number of international actors. Our ability to defeat an enemy, as well as our ability to deter potential conflicts, is directly related to our ability to protect the joint force from these threats.

Protecting the force requires the integration of complementary capabilities from all the services. Control of the air and the sea directly contribute to freedom of action for the commander on the land. Adequate protection of the force is achieved through measures to defend the force, such as fully integrated air and ground based air defense, and NBC defense, as well as through our ability to detect and destroy these weapons prior to their employment. To be successful, the ground commander must have the ability both to attack the enemy and to protect friendly forces.

### ***Project and Sustain Combat Power***

The Army must be deployable and sustainable to be able to achieve national policy objectives around the world. Indeed, America's commitment to power projection is embodied in programs of all the services. The Mobility Requirements Study identified obligations for all the services in support of the National Military Strategy. For the Army it is the ability to project 3 divisions in 30 days and a corps consisting of 5 divisions and all theater support in 75 days. We can only deploy and sustain such a force through continued support of Army programs such as prepositioned ships and "fort to port," as well as critical improvements to the nation's air and sealift capabilities.

Our ability to transport the force is only part of the equation. Sustaining the tip of the spear requires a sophisticated infrastructure that stretches back through our installations and to the industrial base. Through a variety of programs, such as "total asset visibility," the Army has created an efficient and effective structure to rapidly respond to the wide range of potential sustainment requirements.

### **CONCLUSION**

The world today presents America's Army with a complex strategic environment. Our potential enemies possess weapons which range from the primitive to the most modern. Our nation's interests stretch around the globe. There is no single enemy or environment against which we should build and train the Army of today and tomorrow.

The Army understands the diverse nature of the threats to our national interests and has developed the doctrine, training, and combat systems to meet the range of threats present in the world today and into the foreseeable future. Since decisive victory—success at whatever the nation asks—will ultimately come through the domination of the land, the

Army is the force of decision in the service of our nation. An Army of the characteristics and capabilities described above is the Army that can deliver decisive victory.

#### SECTION 4

#### THE WAY AHEAD

*If you do not work to make change your friend, then it will certainly become your enemy.*

*President William J. Clinton, 1993*

The Army today is a ready, deployable, and versatile force. We have made the intellectual changes necessary to understand and react to the changes in the international environment. These changes are evident in the doctrinal evolution of the last several years. Most significant has been the publication of *FM 100-5: Operations* (June 1993) and *FM 100-1: The Army* (June 1994). These manuals have been supported by a wide variety of other efforts, to include doctrine for mobilization and deployment, and for peace operations. The Army understands and is ready for the challenges of today.

#### **The Army Has Changed--Since 1989:**

##### ***Physical Change***

- *Released over 450,000 soldiers and civilian employees—through FY 94, more than the other three services combined.*
- *Reduced the active component from 18 to 12 divisions—as of July 94.*
- *Reduced the Army National Guard from 10 to 8 divisions.*
- *Accelerated withdrawal of 145 battalion equivalents from Europe.*
- *Reduced war reserve stockpiles from 19 to 5 fully modernized sites.*
- *Closed 62 installations in the United States and 380 overseas—over half of all DOD base closures through FY94 have been Army bases.*
- *Removed all nuclear weapons from Europe and commenced destruction of all stockpiles.*

##### ***Intellectual Change***

- *Joint Pub 1.0: Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, November 1991*
- *Joint Pub 3.0: Doctrine for Joint Operations, September 1993*
- *FM 100-1: The Army, June 1994*

- *FM 100-5: Operations, June 1993*
- *FM 100-17: Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization, October 1992*
- *FM 100-19: Domestic Support Operations, July 1993*
- *FM 100-23: Peace Operations, to be published fall 1994.*

We are preparing for tomorrow as well. If the Army is to continue to deliver victory in the 21st century, we cannot rest on our laurels. The world has changed, and every passing year brings new technology with the potential to change the character of warfare. The information age is upon us, and we must take full advantage of the maturation of information processing technology to maintain our standing as the finest army in the world.

The army that can most effectively gather, manage, and distribute information will have a decisive advantage on the 21st century battlefield. Thus, the Army's objective is to discover ways to maximize technology to give us that advantage. Individual programs are important, but even more important is the synergy produced by the integration of information technology from all of our systems. On the information age battlefield, we will have the ability to share information in real time across extended distances. We will know where friendly forces are and where they are not. We will know about the enemy in real time, and we will know our logistics posture on a continuing basis. We will be able—rapidly and simultaneously—to mass multiple forms of combat power at the critical point.

This increased ability to share information constitutes nothing less than a revolution in command. During the Civil War, Grant received information by telegraph and messenger. He would piece together the operational situation from reports spread out perhaps over a period of weeks, and the decisions and planning to move and fight might take a month. The 21st century commander will have real time information from all dimensions of the battlefield, and must be capable of decisive action within hours if not minutes. As we insert digital technology into our battlefield systems, we are building an Army of unprecedented capability.

#### **Louisiana Maneuvers**

*To prepare the Army for World War II, Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall instituted a series of Army-level maneuvers in Louisiana and the Carolinas to assess readiness for what he knew lay ahead and to serve as a laboratory for examining what today we would call force development and combat development issues. Marshall used the "Louisiana Maneuvers" to test new warfighting concepts, such as armored warfare and air-ground operations, and to assess their impact on doctrine, force structure, and operational plans.*

*Today, through a process that draws its inspiration from Marshall's work over a half-century ago, the Army leadership is simultaneously focusing the forces of change while*

---

**Decisive Victory**

*keeping the Army trained and ready. It is a process to think about and grow the Army of the future. By providing a structured forum within which the senior leadership can ask very pointed questions and identify and examine the strategic issues, today's Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM) is a process that facilitates decisions to make change in the Army.*

*The LAM process is an integrating tool that begins with real world operations and large scale exercises based on real world scenarios and commitments. It uses these operations and exercises to integrate change, to accelerate good ideas, to identify shortcomings, and to help balance the allocation of scarce resources. LAM is a process to keep the Army focused on its warfighting essence and grow into the 21st century.*

The information age challenge is two-fold. We must seize the opportunity presented by technological advances and incorporate those advances into the force as rapidly as possible. Second, and more important, we must continue the restructuring of our organizations, both tactical and administrative, to take full advantage of the ongoing technological revolution.

The Army is well on the way to accomplishing both of these tasks. We are intellectually and physically building the Army of the 21st century; we are building FORCE XXI. This effort focuses most dramatically on the redesign of our tactical units, but it aims to accomplish much more than that. Information technology gives us the means to look at the complete organization through a new lens and to ask basic questions about the performance and distribution of organizational functions, so one of the most important outcomes of FORCE XXI will be a front-to-rear redesign that begins at the foxhole and ends in the industrial base

The work on FORCE XXI has already started in our schools and training centers. The Advanced Warfighter Experiment at the National Training Center in April 1994 showed the potential of the complete digitization of the battlefield. We have learned that the power of information gives us unprecedented battle command capability and enables much more efficient and effective power projection. Both the technology and the concepts are well in sight for the creation of the first truly information age army. We are building a fighting force of unprecedented capability that will be able to fight and win whenever and wherever it must.

The Army has already transformed itself to a power projection force. We are well on the way to taking full advantage of the opportunities presented by the information age. The change both completed and envisioned in the Army today is nothing short of revolutionary, but it is change informed by a clear understanding of the fundamentally unchanged nature of conflict.

Both the strategic environment and the technology available to conduct war have changed dramatically, but conflict remains a supremely human endeavor. Armed conflict is at its heart a contest of wills more than weaponry. The motivations for conflict in the world today are diverse, and the parties to conflict, be they nations or ethnic groups, have access to weapons of unprecedented destructive potential, so there is no reason we should expect our future to be any more peaceful than our past. Nor is there any reason to suspect that war in the future will be clean, quick, or effortless. Armchair strategists continue to search for the technological "silver bullet" that will make the task of capturing and holding territory irrelevant, but their many promises have yet to make an appearance in the real world. It is far more likely that war in the 21st century will continue to be a human struggle for the control of people, resources, and land. It will be a struggle in which America calls upon its Army for the ability to force a decision.

The heart of the Army is the American soldier. It is the soldier who masters the sophisticated weaponry of today, and it is the soldier who must be trained and ready to deploy, to fight, and to win for America. Our soldiers must have the absolute best in technology, but the nation will count on them for more. Courage, commitment, selfless service to the nation—the soldiers of the United States Army today serve the nation as they have for over two centuries. They stand ready to answer the nation's call and to deliver what America expects and demands—decisive victory.