

~~SECRET~~

77-4 10.21

P E R S O N A L F I L E

O F

MAJOR H. A. DRUM

REPORTS - STATEMENTS - ETC.

PAPERS RELATING TO JOSE BATTALION, 77TH DIV

C O N T E N T S

-0-

Papers referring to cutting off of 7 Companies
and 1 Machine Gun Co of the 77th Div. on Oct. 3, 1918.

Extract from report of First Army Corps, covering
period from Oct 2 to Oct 9, 1918.

Letter from Chief of Staff, 1st Army Corps to Corps
Inspector - Reference to inspection 77th Div. Note:-
The inspection mentioned not on file in G-3 office.

Extract from Report of Operations 77th Div., covering
period from Nov. 1 to Nov. 8, 1918. Report dated Nov. 13,
1918.

Field Orders 50 -51- 52 - 77th Division

Daily Operations Reports
77th Division - Oct. 2 to Oct. 9, 1918.

Messages sent and received Headquarters 77th Division

Report of Division Inspector 77th Division dated Oct.
9, 1918.

Report of 154th Infantry Brigade, dated 29 Oct., 1918,
covering period from Oct. 2 to Oct. 7, 1918.

Field Orders 50 to 55 - 154th Infantry Brigade

Report 307th Inf., covering period from Oct. 2 to Oct.
8, 1918.

Report 308th Infantry, covering period from Oct. 2 to
Oct. 8, 1918.

Supplementary Report on Operations of 308th Infantry
covering period from Oct. 2 to Oct. 8, 1918.

CONTENTS - Page #2

Report of Operations of 306th Field Artillery covering
period from Oct. 4 to Oct. 7, 1918.

Report 152 Field Artillery Brigade - Oct. 1 to Oct. 8, 1918.

Report of Inspection of the 77th Div. by Capt. A.T. Rich,
Asst. Inspector General, 1st Army, dated Oct. 8, 1918.

COPY

**PAPERS REFERRING TO CUTTING OFF OF
7 COMPANIES AND 1 MACHINE GUN
COMPANY OF 77TH DIVISION
ON OCTOBER 3, 1918.**

EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF
FIRST ARMY CORPS
COVERING PERIOD FROM
OCTOBER 2 TO OCTOBER 8, 1918.

REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF FIRST ARMY CORPS

THE REDUCTION OF THE ARGONNE FOREST AND THE ADVANCE TO THE MEUSE.

* * * * *

On the night of October 2-3, the regiment of the 82d Division which had been assigned to the 28th Division was withdrawn and the 1st Division spread out on the left up to the original limit of the 38th Division sector - having on its left the 28th Division with one regiment of each brigade and the 77th Division with all four regiments in line.

The 5th French Cavalry Division at Le Glaon and the 82d Division (less one regiment) south of Clermont-en-Argonne, were in reserve.

October 3d brought to a close the first stage of the operations. After the original advance, progress was slow. Our troops successfully withstood two counter attacks, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy and, furthermore, were subjected to constant harassing artillery fire.

The enemy, obliged to fill in gaps or otherwise strengthen their lines by despatching various units (regiments and smaller organizations) to the front, thereby separating them from their main body, presented a confused order of battle.

An attack in accordance with F.O. #63 was launched by the Corps on October 4th with 77th, 28th and 1st Divisions, all with four regiments in line from left to right. The 82d Division (less artillery) in vicinity of Varennes, and the 5th French Cavalry at Le Glaon, were held in reserve.

With no artillery preparation, the infantry, accompanied by tanks, set out at 5 h 25 preceded by a rolling barrage. The 1st Division, overcoming strong resistance, captured Montrefagne Wood, the 28th Division advanced their right Brigade to Chahery on the east bank of the Aire, but their left brigade and the 77th Division, viciously opposed by machine guns, and under a heavy counter barrage which inflicted serious losses on them, were unable to advance. The 77th withdrew one regiment; holding it as divisional reserve. The liaison detachment on the left of our front having lost contact with the right elements of the 38th French Corps, the enemy took advantage of the densely wooded terrain and began infiltrating his troops behind our flank. This resulted in the cutting off of a battalion in the Charlevaux ravine and rendering their position perilous.

Further to the west, two regiments of the 1st Guard Division counter-attacked Fleville and drove our patrols out of the town. On October 5th, the 1st Division, after an advance of two kilometers, succeeded in taking Arictal Farm and in occupying Hill 240 in force.

The artillery of the 82d Division joined the division at Varennes in the afternoon.

During the night of October 6-7 the Bois de Moncy was cleared of the enemy by our troops, who had worked around from the west.

At this juncture, the enemy order of battle was as follows: East of the

Aire River were the 52d Division, 37th Division, astride the Aire were elements of the 5th Guard Division and west of the river were the 2d Landwehr Division and the 76th Division - the 1st Guard Division had been withdrawn.

On October 7th with F.O. #67 commenced another stage in the operations. The 82d Division with artillery had been brought up during the night October 6th and at 5 h, with two regiments and divisional artillery, attacked on the 28th Division's front between Fleville (exclusive) and Chatel Chabery. Between Chatel Chabery and Apremont one regiment of 28th Division was in line and aided in this flank attack on the forest.

Artillery support was furnished by the brigades of the 28th Division and 82d Division, together with one regiment of 75's from the 1st Division. Corps and Army artillery concentrated their fire on the roads and towns at the north edge of Forêt d'Argonne. During this action we captured Hills 180, 225, 244 and Chatel Chabery, and the enemy was forced to evacuate Chene Tendu, but clung with great tenacity to the high ground above Chatel Chabery and Gernay, causing heavy losses among our assaulting troops. At the same time, a withdrawal by the enemy in the western part of the Argonne, permitted elements of the 77th Division to advance and thus release their battalion which had been surrounded.

* * * * *

EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF
FIRST ARMY CORPS
COVERING THE PERIOD FROM
OCTOBER 2 TO OCTOBER 8, 1918.
WITH STATEMENT OF ENEMY UNITS ENGAGED

OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST ARMY CORPS

THE REDUCTION OF THE ARGONNE FOREST AND THE ADVANCE TO THE MEUSE

STATEMENT OF ENEMY DEFEATS ENLARGED -- TIME AND PLACE

This period of the attack ended October 5d. After our original advance there was slow progress through the dense and well fertilized forest. On the right we were subjected to constant harassing fire of Artillery and two counter attacks, both repulsed with losses.

The enemy battle order was confused. Regiments of divisions were separated from each other. They were put in to meet immediate needs for defense or counter attacks.

Second Stage: October 4th to October 6th.

On October 4th we drove the enemy back about two kilometers on the east bank of the Aire to a line Arstal Farm - Fleville (exclusive). Until October 7th there was no change in the front line.

The attack which resulted in this advance was made without artillery preparation. Enemy infantry was unable to defend hastily prepared positions in the Montrebeau Woods. In the fields further west they had no defensive works. A heavy counter barrage fire inflicted serious casualties on our assault troops. We captured the machine guns placed in the northern edges of the woods.

Two regiments of the 37th Division, which had been in reserve at Lamires, were put in line the afternoon of October 4th. Two regiments of the 1st Guard Division counter-attacked at Fleville the same afternoon, driving our patrols from town.

On the left, the enemy began infiltrating troops behind our left flank. This was possible because of the dense underbrush and the fact that our flank liaison detachment was not in contact with the advance guards of the left division.

The following day this infiltration continued and the battalion in the Charlevaux ravine was surrounded. Their position was difficult because of machine guns preventing any moves in the daytime.

On the night a little advance was made Oct 6th, the Bois de Hmey being cleared of the enemy by our troops working around from the west.

The enemy order of battle at this time from east to west was as follows: East of the Aire River - 52d Division, 5th Guard Division. West of the Aire, 2d Landwehr Division with elements of the 45th Reserve Division, the 76th Division Reserve. The 37th Division was now east of the 1st Corps Sector, the 1st Guard Division withdrawn.

Third Stage: October 7th to October 10th.

On October 7th we attacked west from the Aire between Commy and Chatel Chehory, at the same time pushing through the Forest from the south and southeast.

The enemy evacuated Chene Tandy but held the high ground further north, particularly above Castel Chabery and Cornay with great tenacity. Machine guns and trench mortars inflicted heavy losses on our troops attacking Cornay and Champredon from the east. Elements of the SSd Reserve Division were in this vicinity.

The enemy realized the danger of being out of it by the flank attack at Cornay. The troops in the western part of the Argonne were drawn back, releasing the battalion of the 77th Division that had been surrounded, and reserves were thrown in to strengthen the position in the Bois de Maray and Bois de Cornay. The 5th Guard division had been relieved by the 41st Division and two regiments of the 45th Reserve Division came into line October 8th, west of Castel Chabery. The 57th Division was now opposed to the 1st Corps zone west.

* * * * *

LETTER FROM CHIEF OF STAFF, FIRST ARMY CORPS

T O

CORPS INSPECTOR

REFERENCE TO

INSPECTION 77TH DIVISION

Note: The inspection mentioned not on file
in G-3 office.

722/0-5

ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS

October 7 1918

From: Chief of Staff, 1st Army Corps, U.S.

To: Corps Inspector.

Subject: Troops of the 77th Division cut off by the enemy.

1. The Corps Commander directs that you make, without delay, a careful inspection of the facts concerning the cutting off of units of the 77th Division and the attempt made to relieve them.
2. This report will include the action of Col. O'Connell Stacy in command of one of the relieving expeditions and will contain a definite summary of findings and recommendations.
3. Pertinent data on this subject may be obtained from the Lt. Colonel Gordon Johnson, General Staff; A. J. H. and Col. Joseph I. Hunt, Inspector General's Department in addition to other witnesses whom you will examine.

By command of Major General McGoff:

WALTON CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF OPERATIONS

77TH DIVISION

COVERING PERIOD FROM

NOVEMBER 1 TO NOVEMBER 8, 1918.

REPORT DATED NOVEMBER 13, 1918.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

HEADQUARTERS 77TH DIVISION

18th November 1918

From: The Commanding General, 77th Division
To: The Adjutant General, A.E.F. (Thru military channels)
Subject: Report of Operations; FORET D'ARGONNE.

* * * * *

7. The Division continued its advance from day to day, attacking each morning and continuing to attack and advance during the day. Steady progress was made each day; the positions occupied were firmly held - no position, once occupied by the Division, being given up - altho many counter attacks were launched against front line elements in the course of the advance. It seemed that after passing the enemy first line of resistance, formal organization of the terrain was not encountered, until the position was reached running along the crest as shown on the 1:20,000 map as the BOIS de NAZA, extending thence westward along the adjacent ridge into the trench system shown as running south and southeast from the BAGATELLE PAVILLION. -- It must not be understood from this, however, that the advance was made without opposition; improvised defences were encountered everywhere, machine guns covered every opening thru the thick forest and it was impossible to use effectively the Artillery for the purpose of assisting the Infantry advance.

8. The position referred to, in the BOIS de NAZA and continuing across the ridge to the westward to the end of the trench system extending southward from the BAGATELLE PAVILLION, was encountered on the morning of October 1st. On the right of the position referred to, improvised defenses had been constructed by the enemy consisting of slashed and wired underbrush and small trees covering the entire front of the position. This improvised organization extended beyond the right (eastern) flank of the Divisional sector; the organization on the left extending eastward from the southern end of the BAGATELLE trench system. This latter appeared to be a trench system which had been begun but not entirely completed. This entire position was attacked, but very little progress was made during the day. During the 2d of October the attack being resumed at an early hour in the morning, the position was penetrated on the left toward evening, by the 1st Battalion of the 308th Infantry together with elements of the 397th under Captain Murphy and elements of the 306th Machine Gun Battalion. This detachment, under command of Major Charles S. Whittlesey, advanced as far as the position near the BOIS de la BUISSONNE, on the LA VIERGETTE Road about five hundred meters to the east of the MOULIN de CHARLEVAUX. The troops on his right, however, were unable to penetrate the positions in their front. As soon as I learned of the position of Major Whittlesey's detachment I immediately ordered the Battalion which was part of the Divisional Reserve held up til then in the vicinity of LA HARAZEE, to proceed to the vicinity of the DEPOT DE MACHINES; at the same time I notified the Commanding General of the 18th Brigade of my action in regard to the Divisional Reserve Battalion and directing

with page

him to use the Battalion which was his Brigade Reserve for the purpose of covering the left flank of the troops in their advanced position. It appears that owing to the darkness of the night, this Battalion - formerly in Brigade Reserve, did not reach the position where the function expected of it could be performed and during the night the enemy forces penetrated the trenches south of the BAGATLLE position, and linked up these trenches by wire entanglements with the position on the ridge west of the BOIS DE HAZA in such manner as to isolate the detachment commanded by Major Whittlesey. 'a'

9. On the morning of the 3d of October the attack was renewed, the purpose being primarily to advance and secondly to re-establish communications with the advanced detachments, but owing to the difficulties of terrain, the inevitable absence of adequate artillery preparation and the thick character of the country, no appreciable progress was made during the day, either on the right or left. In this connection it may be stated that on neither flank of the Division were there friendly troops within covering distance.

10. The French Division on the left did not advance beyond the road running east and west thru BINAUVILLE and all that was to be found on the right were scattered parties of the 28th Division. These scattered detachments had no connection with the main body of that division.

11. Five determined attacks were launched by the 154th Brigade against the position in its front for the purpose of breaking thru, carrying the line forward, and re-establishing communication with Major Whittlesey's command, but without success. This lack of success was not due in any sense to incorrect direction of these attacks. It was brought about by the extreme difficulties of terrain; the lack of adequate Artillery support, due to the impossibility of observation of fire, and the close proximity of the opposing lines.

12. Meanwhile every effort was being made to advance along other portions of the Divisional front, and finally at about noon of the 7th an opening was found between the position in the BOIS de HAZA and the position on the ridge to the west of that Bois. At this point, at the junction of ravines shown on map, it was found that the wire did not extend entirely across from one position to the other. By a process of infiltration and taking advantage of inequalities of the ground, detachments from the left of the 153d and the right of the 154th Brigades finally reached positions from which reverse fire could be brought to bear on the hostile organization in front of our right and left, respectively.

13. I am informed that about the same time an attack was delivered on our right by a brigade of the 82d Division in the direction of CORNAY and CHATEL CHONERY and it is probable that this attack assisted somewhat in relieving the situation in my front. However, that may be; the evident thing to us was that by the reverse fire brought from the detachments of the 153d and 154th Brigades as indicated above, the opposition in our front was driven out and liaison re-established with the detachment under Major Whittlesey about 9 PM on the night of the 7th of October.

14. Major Whittlesey's command had been cut off from the remainder of the Division for a period of five days, during which time no communication had been had with them except by pigeon messages, copies of which are attached hereto as part of this report. The men of the command had carried into action with them two days reserve rations, upon which they subsisted during the five days of their isolation. 2

Too much credit cannot be given Major Whiteley, Captain Murray (since proved to be Major) and the other officers and men of this detachment. On short notice they were surrounded by numbers continually under fire; having suffered losses of about 50% they still resisted and fought with courage a demand for surrender made by the German commander on the morning of the 7th of October. Even though the Division had been plighted nothing else during the course of this campaign, the exploits of Major Whiteley and his detachment would be worthy of the highest honor. It exemplifies the indomitable spirit which sustains the Division and which has enabled it to prevail to triumph over very serious obstacles which it has encountered.

(Signed) ROBERT ALTYMIR
Major General,
Commanding.

Encls:
Maps,
Messages,
etc.

FIELD ORDERS 50 - 51 - 52

77TH DIVISION

H. Q. 77th Div.,

A.E.F.,

3rd October, 1918 - 20H30

FIELD ORDER

No. 50

MAP: FORET D'ARGONNE - 1/20,000

1. Indications point to the conclusion that the enemy is holding the KRIEMHILDE-STELLUNG as his main line of resistance. Between this position and our lines he maintains a deep out post zone.

The 1st Army Corps will attack the enemy on its front tomorrow, October 4th. The French on our left will attack at the same time.

2. This Division will attack at 5:45 A.M., tomorrow morning.

3. (a) Boundaries between Brigades will remain unchanged.

(b) The assaulting Battalions will advance so as to maintain a front abreast of that of the 28th Division on our right, and the French on our left.

(c) Such artillery fire as Brigade Commanders deem absolutely necessary will be employed. Such artillery support as they request will be furnished by the Commanding General, 152nd Field Artillery Brigade. There must be as sensible use of ammunition and none wasted by fire which can be accomplished as well by the use of less ammunition.

(d) Liaison must be secured with the 28th Division on the right and with the French forces on the left and the two infantry Brigades must coordinate their advance so as to secure and maintain constant contact during the advance.

4. Administrative arrangements - no change.

5. Division P. C. - no change.

Distribution:

C.G. 153rd Brigade
C.G. 154th Brigade
C.G. 152nd F.A. Brigade
C.G. 1st Army Corps
File

ROBERT ALEXANDER,
Major General,
Commanding.

P. C. 77th Division,
American E.F.,
7 October, 1918 - 22h15

FIELD ORDER

No. 51

**MAP: FORET D'ARGONNE
1/20,000**

1. The enemy continues to withdraw in the face of our advancing troops. Our line has been materially advanced along the entire front. The attack of the 1st Army Corps will be continued tomorrow, October 8th.

2. The Division will continue its advance tomorrow morning.

3. The 153rd and 154th Brigades will carry out the tasks previously given them in instructions from these Headquarters.

4. Administrative arrangements - no change.

5. Division P.C. - No change.

**ROBERT ALEXANDER
Major General
Commanding.**

Distribution:

**C.G. 153rd Brigade
C.G. 154th Brigade
C.G. 152nd Field Artillery Brigade
File.**

FIELD ORDER
No. 52

MAP: FORET D'ARGONNE
1/20,000

1. The enemy continues to retire in the face of our advancing troops. The 1st Army Corps will continue the attack tomorrow, October 9.

2. The Division will continue its advance tomorrow morning.

3. (a) The advance will be so conducted that the divisional front will be at right angles to the axis of the zone of advance of the Division.

(b) The advance regiment of the 153rd Brigade will be formed on the line of the railroad and road running perpendicular to the Divisional zone of advance from 96.4-78.2 to 95.4-77.3.

(c) The advance regiment of the 154th Brigade will be brought up on to the line mentioned in the preceding paragraph as soon as it is light enough to conduct the march.

(d) As soon as all the elements of the first line are on the line of the railroad and road above mentioned, the advance of the entire front line will commence. Close liaison between the two brigades and by each brigade with the forces on its outer flank, will be maintained throughout the entire advance.

(e) The rear regiments of the brigades will carefully and systematically mop up the areas over which the troops advance.

4. Administrative arrangements - no change.

5. Division P.C. - No change.

ROBERT ALEXANDER,
Major General,
Commanding.

Distribution:

C.G. 153rd Brig.

C.G. 154th Brig.

C.G. 152nd F.A. Brig.

File

DAILY OPERATIONS REPORTS

77TH DIVISION

OCTOBER 2 TO OCTOBER 9, 1918.

OPERATIONS
 12h 2 Oct. to 12h 3 Oct.

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DAY: Weather-clear. Line-98.1-76.25-to 98.0-76.3 to 97.9-75.95 to 96.3-75.75 to 95.8-76.5 to 95.1-76.5 thence along Road 93.8-76.25.

II. SUMMARY OF EVENTS:

INFANTRY ACTIVITY

Our own.	:	Enemy
Favorable progress made on left:	:	Very little rifle fire. Increased
Prisoners captured. Right held up by M.G. and artillery fire.	:	activity of M.G.'s.

III. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY:

Our Own.	:	Enemy
Quiet. Local concentrations on enemy rearguards and centers of resistance, principally on the left, continuing the operation in the region of LA PALETTE	:	Considerable shelling this morning. No reports of damage received.

IV. AERIAL ACTIVITY:

Our own.	:	Enemy
Two reports of line yesterday and two this morning. One or two machines in air constantly during daylight. One machine down 2 km. west of ST. THOMAS with engine trouble. Nobody hurt.	:	Nothing to report.

V. CASUALTIES:

	Officers	Men
Killed	0	1
Wounded	2	124
Gassed	0	1

VI. MISCELLANEOUS: Prisoners - 1 Officer, 10 M.G.O's, 32 privates. Infantry report that rolling barrage of yesterday noon landed fairly on the enemy trench, killing several, and causing the surrender of the remainder.

By Command of Major General ALEXANDER:

J.R.R. HANNAY
 Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

C.G.	305th Inf.	Div. Engr.
C of S	306th Inf	War Diary
G-1	307th Inf	File
G-2	308th Inf	26th Am. Div.
G-3	Div. M.G. Bn.	1st Corps
153rd Brig.	C.O. 305 M.G. Bn	1st Div. Foot Cav. (Fr)
154th Brig.	C.O. 306 M.G. Bn.	French Mission

OPERATIONS
12h 3 Oct. to 12 h. 4 Oct.

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DAY: Weather: Clear. Line-same as yesterday.

II. SUMMARY OF EVENTS:

INFANTRY ACTIVITY.

Our Own.	:	Enemy
Due to fact that French Div. on our:		Still very active with machine
left is 1200 meters south of us the :		guns and seem determined to hold
Beche have filtered in behind our :		line.
left and cut communications from the:		
rear with that flank.	:	

III. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY:

Our Own.	:	Enemy
Put down a rolling barrage this		: 300-77's fell in RAVINE de
morning at 5 H. Guns of heavier		: CHARLEVAUX and slope back to cross-
calibre firing beyond ours.		: roads 297.5-275.8. Some mortar
		: fire reported on right.

IV. AERIAL ACTIVITY:

Our Own.	:	Enemy
Two reports received this morning :		19 planes seen over our lines
of troop movements (friendly) along :		at about 11:00 H. Fired at by our
BINARVILLE-APREMONT Road.		: A.A's.

V. CASUALTIES:

	Officers	Men
Killed	1	2
Wounded	5	236
Gassed	0	9

VI. MISCELLANEOUS:

Prisoners - No reports.
P.C's. - No change - Corrected coordinates of Div. P.C.
(300.4-271.9)
Liaison complete with 28th Div. and between Brigades.

By Command of Major General ALEXANDER

J. R. R. HANNAY
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

G.C.	305th Inf.	G.O. 305th M.G.Bn.	28th Am. Div.
G of S	306th Inf.	G.O. 306th M.G.Bn.	1st Corps
G-1, G-2, G-3	307th Inf.	Div. Engr.	1st Div. Foot Cav.
153rd Brig.	308th Inf.	War Diary	French Mission
154th Brig.	Div. M.G.Bn.	File	

CORRECTED COPY

P.C. 77th Divisi
American E.F.
5 Oct. 1918-15h.

G-3

OPERATIONS
12h 4 Oct. to 12h 5 Oct., 1918.

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DAY: Weather- clear; Line-same as yesterday.

II. SUMMARY OF EVENTS:

Our Own.	<u>Infantry Activity</u>	Enemy
C.O. 154th Brig. was directed to attack the Boche behind our left flank at 18h50 today. The French on our left are cooperating in this attack.	:	Very active with M.G.'s and still making a determined resistance.

III. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY:

Our Own.	:	Enemy
Harassing fire on enemy front lines. Local preparation and barrage from H-30 to H to assist in operation on right sector.	:	No report.

IV. AERIAL ACTIVITY:

Our Own.	:	Enemy
Two reports yesterday afternoon and two this morning, all verifying former information. Messages from Division Commander dropped this A.M. to C.O. left Bn. who is out off	:	Several hostile planes over our lines at 16h yesterday. Fired at by A.A's. No reports as to result.

V. CASUALTIES:

	Officers	Men
Killed	0	5 (*)
Wounded	5	242
Gassed	0	6

(*) (Total killed not yet reported. These enumerated above died during evacuation.)

VI. MISCELLANEOUS:

Prisoners - none reported.
P.C.'s - no change.

By Command of Major General ALEXANDER:

J. R. R. HANNAY,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

G.G.	305th Inf.	G.O. 305 M.G. Bn.	28th Am. Div.
G of S	306th Inf.	G.O. 306th M.G. Bn.	1st Corps
G-1, G-2, G-3	307th Inf.	Div. Engr.	1st Div. Foot Cav.
153rd Brig.	308th Inf.	War Diary	French Mission
154th Brig.	Div. M.G. Bn.	File.	

OPERATIONS
12h 5 Oct. to 12h 6 Oct.

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DAY: Weather - clear (298.4-276.2) to (298.3-276.3) to (298.0-276.0) to (297.8-275.9) to (296.3-275.7) and (295.7-276.4) to (295.0-276.4) and along road to eastern boundary of Div. Sector.

II. SUMMARY OF EVENTS:

Infantry Activity.

Our Own	:	Enemy
Efforts to drive enemy from behind left flank of our advanced elements near MOULIN de CHARLEVAUX not successful. Renewed efforts being made this morning. Slow progress reported against stubborn resistance.	:	Continues very active. Our front line is being constantly fired upon by machine guns and trench mortars.

III. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY:

Our Own.	:	Enemy
Normal. Destruction fire on train cars signalled by airplane. Harassing fire on roads and enemy front line positions.	:	Active during the night shelling our front lines and areas and roads occupied by our support troops. A total of 310 - 77's were reported. During the morning the vicinity of ABRI du CROCHET was shelled with gas.

IV. AERIAL ACTIVITY:

Our Own.	:	Enemy
Dropped 6 messages at 18h0 to detachment referred to under II. Dropping food, ammunition and pigeons now. Flares reported at 14h45 at 294.5-275.5.	:	Eight planes flew over our front line, one of which was a bombing plane. Dropped 10 bombs. No damage has been reported. Three balloons seen, one of which was brought down in flames.

V. CASUALTIES:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Men</u>
Killed	0	3 (*)
Wounded	5	242
Gasped	0	6

(*) Total killed not yet reported. Those enumerated above died during evacuation.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS:

Prisoners - no report.
P.C.'s - no change.

247 R.A.C. (French) relieved from this sector night of 5/6 Oct. 2nd Bn. 305 F.A. moving this a.m. to positions about 2 kms. south of BINARVILLE.

By Command of Major General ALEXANDER:

J. R. R. HANNAY
Chief of Staff.

P. C. 77th Division,
American E.F.
7 Oct., 1918 14h45

OPERATIONS
12h 6 Oct. to 12h 7 Oct.

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DAY: Weather - Rain. Line-same as yesterday.

II. SUMMARY OF EVENTS:

INFANTRY ACTIVITY

Our Own.	:	Enemy
Yesterday afternoon and this morning our left made unsuccessful attempts to advance against trenches N.E. of BINARVILLE. Opposed by rifle machine gun and artillery fire, wire and trenches. No advance of line.	:	Strong resistance to our attacks. The number of machine guns seem to have been increased.

III. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY:

Our Own.	:	Enemy.
Harassing fire and interdiction fire. Counter battery this morning	:	Very active in shelling our front lines and our attacking troops.

IV. AERIAL ACTIVITY:

Our Own.	:	Enemy
Very good work done by observers in dropping food, ammunition and pigeons to forces cut off. 3 panels reported by observer at 294.8-276.4 at 11h30 today.	:	7 planes over CHAMPMAHAUT fired on by anti-aircraft. Enemy balloon direction of MARCQ brought down in flames.

V. CASUALTIES:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Men</u>
Killed	0	0
Wounded	2	34
Gassed	0	19

TRIAGE REPORT - 1 DIED.

Yesterday's report of casualties in error.
Correct report as follows:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Men</u>
Killed	0	9
Wounded	7	232
Gassed	0	55

VI. MISCELLANEOUS: Prisoners - No report. P.C.'s no change.

It is thought that food dropped yesterday to our forces cut off has been received and that they are still fighting.

By Command of Major General ALEXANDER:

J. R. R. HANNAY,
Chief of Staff.

OPERATIONS

12h 7 Oct. to 12h Oct. 8.

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DAY: Weather - rain and clear
line 296.6-278.1 to 296.3-277.8 to 295.7-276.7 to
295.3-276.55 to 293.8-276.6.

II. SUMMARY OF EVENTS:

Infantry Activity.

Our own.	:	Enemy
Since noon yesterday our line has advanced to position given above against reduced hostile resistance. The 307th Inf. occupies the front line of our left sub-sector and the 306th Inf. the right sub-sector. Communication reestablished with command under Major Whittlesey, which has been the advanced element of our line.	:	Reduced resistance from machine guns. Resistance on left still stubborn, holding up French on our l

III. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY:

Our own.	:	Enemy
No firing.	:	70-77's reported falling behind our left flank in vicinity of LA HARAZEE and PONT a l'AUNE.

IV. AERIAL ACTIVITY:

Our Own.	:	Enemy
Food and supplies dropped to forces formerly cut off about 15h0. No reports this A.M.	:	Several planes over our lines yesterday afternoon.

V. CASUALTIES:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Men</u>
Killed	0	0
Wounded	2	67
Gassed	0	1

TRIAGE REPORT - One enlisted man died during evacuation.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS: Prisoners - No report
P.C.'s - No change
An advance BAKOTA now being established.

By Command of Major General ALEXANDER:

J. R. R. HANNAY
Chief of Staff.Distribution:

C.G.	305th Inf.	Div. Engr.
C of S	306th Inf	War Diary
G-1	307th Inf	File
G-2	308th Inf	28th Am. Div.
G-3	Div. M.G. Bn.	1st Corps
153rd Brig.	C.O. 305 M.G. Bn.	1st Div. Foot Cav.
154th Brig.	C.O. 306 M.G. Bn.	French Mission

P. C. 77th Division, American E.F.
9 Oct. 1918.

G-3

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DAY: Weather - clear. Line 295.2-279.25
along road S.W. to 292.95 - 278.2.

II. SUMMARY OF EVENTS:

INFANTRY ACTIVITY

Our own.	:	Enemy
Our line advanced in liaison with divisions on right and left to position given above.	:	Very active in afternoon with M.G.'s, grenades and T.M.'s. Practically no resistance in our front this morning.

III. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY:

Our Own.	:	Enemy
Inactive - changing positions.	:	Harassing fire in valley near Moulin de CHARLEVAUX during night.

IV. AERIAL ACTIVITY:

Our Own.	:	Enemy
Line staked out at 16h20. Battery in action at 96.5-84.8 at 16h15.	:	Several planes reported over our front lines during afternoon.

V. CASUALTIES:

	Officers	Men
Killed	0	0
Wounded	5	202
Gassed	0	6

x-Triage report 3 E.M. died during evacuation.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS:

Prisoners - 3 reported.
P.Cs Div. - no change.

153rd Brig - 100 yds west of La VIERGETTE
154th Brig. - to be moved today.

By Command of Major General ALEXANDER

J. R. R. HANNAY,
Chief of Staff.

MESSAGES SENT AND RECEIVED
HEADQUARTERS 77TH DIVISION

Note: This includes only
those messages which refer
to the lost battalion and
the situation on that sec-
tion of the line.

From Lieut. de la CHAPELLE
To Dreadnought 7

Oct. 3, 1918 18h05

Situation is unchanged. The Boche counter-attacked very heavily during the past 24 hours. The Division had to give way very slightly. The Boche hold LA PALETTE TRENCH. Expect to push ahead tomorrow.

Dreadnought 7 (speaking) Our situation today remains unchanged. The Boche have gotten in behind our left flank and we have been trying to get word to you to help drive them out. I will send you further information later on.

No. 494

PIGEON MESSAGE

Copied Oct. 3, 1918

From 1st Bn 308th Inf.
To: C.O. 308th Inf.

Germans are on cliff North of us in small numbers and have had to evacuate both flanks. Situation on left flank very serious.

Broke through two of our runner posts today near 294.7-275.7. I have not been able to reestablish posts today.

Need 8000 rounds rifle ammunition 7500 chauchot 23 boxes Machine Gun ammunition.

Casualties yesterday in Cos A, B, C, E, G, H, 8 killed, 80 wounded. In the same Co's today 1 killed 60 wounded.

Present effective strength of companies here 245. Situation serious. Place 294.6-275.3.

(Signed) WHITTLESEY

No. 496

Bird released 4:05 P.M.
Arrived loft 4:25 P.M.
Phoned M.C. 4:55 P.M.

Message No. 6 - Received by Dreadnought 7 over phone at 2.45 P.M.
From Delaware 1.

He stated the situation was as follows:

He stated that he had ascertained from a representative from Corps that the French on his left were further in rear than he had previously thought them to be. He had contact with them previously but he now finds they are some distance to his left rear. He has six companies on the road LA VIERGETTE - MOULIN de CHARIEVAUX but the Germans have penetrated around his left in front of the French to the rear of these 6 companies and have cut off his communication with those companies. He states that the 155d is so far behind him that other Germans are now behind his right rear. He states he is unable to get communication with his six front line companies but he has ordered five companies up to clear out the Germans in his rear.

(Message No. 498 continued on following page)

Message No. 6 (Continued)

I informed him that the Division Commander wanted him to hold his lines and clear out the Germans in rear and reestablish communication.

A few moments afterwards I stated to Delaware 1 that Dreadnought 1 directed that he hold what he has and clear the Germans out from behind him. He asked me to say to Dreadnought 1 that that was what he was doing.

No. 498.

PIGEON MESSAGE

From 1st Bn 308th Inf at 294.6 -
276.3

Received over phone 12.10 P.M.
Message Center 3 Oct. 18.

To C.O. 308th Inf.

Bird released 10.45 A.M.

Bird received 11.35 at French Left #66 at COLOMBEY

Our runner posts are broken. One runner captured. Germans in small numbers are working in our left rear about 294.6-276.2. Have sent K company 307th to occupy this hills and open the line.

Patrol to east run into Germans at 295.1 276.3 6 Boche.

Have located German mortar at 294.05 276.3 and have sent platoon to get it.

Have taken a prisoner who says his company of 70 men were brought in here last night 294.6 276.2 from rear by motor truck. He saw only a few infantrymen here when he came in German machine gun constantly firing on valley in our rear from hill 294.1 276. "K" company (sent to meet "D", NF) met heavy resistance at least twenty casualties. Two squads under Lt. Leake have just fallen back. Here.

(Signed) WHITTLESEY

Major 308th Inf.

No. 500

From Old Dreadnought 10h55 Oct. 3, 1918.

To 308th Inf.

We are being shelled by German artillery. Can we not have artillery support. Fire is coming northwest Place - 294.6-276.3.

(Signed) WHITTLESEY

Pigeon released 8h50

Major, 1st Bn 308th Inf.

Q. Do you want me to get that to the 308th. Yes, I will do that right away.

No. 505

Pigeon Message - Copies Oct. 3, 1918.

From: 1st Bn. 308th Inf.
To: C.O. 308th Inf.

Germans are on cliff north of us in small numbers and have had to evacuate both flanks. Situation on left flank very serious.

Broke through two of our runner posts today near 294.7-273.7. I have not been able to re-establish posts today.

Need 6000 rounds of rifle ammunition; 7500 chauchat, 23 boxes machine gun ammunition, 250 offensive grenades.

Casualties yesterday in Cos. "A" "B" "C" "E" "G" "H", 8 killed 80 wounded. In the same Cos. today I killed, 60 wounded.

Present effective strength of companies here 243. Situation serious. Place 294.6 - 276.3

(Signed) WHITTLESEY

Bird released 4.05 P.M.
Arrived left 4.35 P.M.

Phoned M.C. 4.55 P.M.

No. 517.

No. 518

Pigeon Message Rec'd Message Center Oct. 4, 1918

From: C.O. 1st Bn., 308th Inf., at 294.7-276.3
To: C.O. 308th Inf.

All quiet during the night. Our patrols indicate Germans withdrew during the night. Sending further patrols now to verify this. At 12.30 and 1.10 A.M. six shells from our own light artillery fell on us. Many wounded here when we can't evacuate. Need rations badly. No word from D. and A Company.

(Sgd.) WHITTLESEY, Major, 308th Inf.

Bird released 7.25 A.M.

" received 7.48 A.M.

Phoned to Message Center 8.00 A.M.

Oct. 4, 1918

Message Center 11.30 A.M.

Pigeon Message

From: Major Whittlesey, 308th Inf.
To: C.O. 308th Infantry.

Germans are still around us, but in smaller numbers. We have been heavily shelled by mortar this morning. Present effectives A.B. C, E, G & H companies 175; K. Co. 307th 45; M.C. Detachment 17 - Total here about 235.

Officers wounded Lt. Harrington, A; Capt. Strohnol, C.;

Lt. Buskler, G; Lts. Peabody and Reeves of M.C.; Lt. Wilhelm Co. E missing.

Cover bad if we advance up the hill. Very difficult to move the wounded if we re-change our position. Situation is cutting into our strength rapidly. Men are suffering from hunger and exposure, and the wounded are in very bad condition. Cannot support be sent at once.

Position 294.7-276.3. (Signed) WHITTLESEY, Major 308th Inf.

Bird released at 10.35 A.M.
Arrived left 10.38 A.M.

(No. 518 continued on following page)

(518 - Continued).

Pigeon Message
Rec'd at Message Center 4.22 P.M.
To: C.O. 308th Inf.
From: 1st Bn., 308th Inf.

Oct. 4.

We are along the road parallel 276.4.

WHITTLESEY
Major 308th.

Headquarters, 77th Div.,
American E.F.
4 October 1918 22h20

From: Commanding General, 77th Division.
To: Major Whittlesey, Commanding 1st Bn., 308th Infantry.

1. Defend yourself in your present position. Help is coming to you.

By Command of Major General ALEXANDER

M.W. HOWZE, A. C. of S. (G-3).

No. 518.

Oct. 5th.

Oct. 5th, 17h30

Message for Major Whittlesey, Commanding 1st Bn., 308th Inf.

1. Retire with your forces to Regimental P.C. The attention of the enemy in your rear is being held by our rifle and machine fire. This should enable you to locate the enemy by his fire and strike him in the rear and flank.

By Command of Major General ALEXANDER.

J. R. R. HANNAY
Chief of Staff.

No. 519.

PIGEON MESSAGE

Oct. 4, 1918.

From: Major Whittlesey 308th Inf.
To: C.O. 308th Inf.

Message Center 11:20 A.M.

Germans are still around us, but in small numbers. We have been heavily shelled by mortar this morning. Present effective strength, A, B, C, E, G & H companies 175; K Co. 307th 45; M.G. Detachment 17.
Total here about 235.

Officers wounded Lt. Harrington, A. Capt. Strahmell, G.
Lt. Dashler, G. Lts. Peabody and Revnos of Machine Gun Lt. Wilhelm Co.

No. 536 (Continued)

Cover bad if we advance up the hill. Very difficult to move the wounded if we rechange our position. Situation is cutting into our strength rapidly. Men are suffering from hunger and exposure, and the wounded are in very bad condition. Cannot support be sent at once.
Position 294.7-294.2

No. 536 (Continued)

Cover bad if we advance up the hill. Very difficult to move the wounded if we rechange our position. Situation is cutting into our strength rapidly. Men are suffering from hunger and exposure, and the wounded are in very bad condition. Cannot support be sent at once.

Position 294.7-276.3.

(Signed) WHITTLESEY
Major, 308th Inf.

No. 536

PIGEON MESSAGE

Received at Message Center 4:22 P.M. Oct. 4.
To G.O. 308th Inf.
From 1st Bn 308th Infantry.

We are along the road parallel 276.4. Our artillery is dropping a barrage directly on us. For Heaven's Sake stop it.

WHITTLESEY,
Major 308th.

No. 540

PIGEON MESSAGE

From: G.O. 1st Bn. 308th Inf. 294.7-276.3 Message Center Oct. 4, '18.
To: G.O. 308th Inf.

All quiet during the night. Our patrols indicate Germans withdrew during the night. Sending further patrols now to verify this. At 12:30 and 1.10 A.M. six shells from our own light artillery fell on us. Many wounded here whom we can't evacuate. Need rations badly. No word from D and A Company

Sgd WHITTLESEY Major 308th Inf.

Bird released: 7.25 A.M.

Bird Received 7.48 A.M.

Phoned to Message Center 8.00 A.M.

Note on this memo by Chief of Staff J. R. R. HANNAY:

Upon telephone inquiry informs me he now has a dump of rations within 1200 meters of front line, supplied from railroad, and he is now getting up rations and arranging to evacuate wounded via R.F.

No. 548

Headquarters 77th Division
American E.F.

22h20

4th October, 1918.

From: Commanding General, 77th Division.

To: Major Whittlesey, Commanding 1st Bn. 308th Inf.

1. Defend yourself in your present position. Help is coming to you.

By Command of Major General ALEXANDER:

M.W. HOWZE, Asst. C of S G-3.

At 7.55 dropped at Supply Co 307 RONDCHAMP

No. 549.

S E C R E T

Headquarters, 77th Division,
American E.F. 21h00

4th October, 1918.

Message No. 3.

To Chief of Air Service 1st Army Corps (Rear Echelon).

1. The Division Commander directs me to enclose four messages for Major Whittlesey, in accordance with my telephonic conversation with you this afternoon. It is requested that a plane be sent out at daybreak tomorrow morning, that is, that it be sent out at the earliest possible moment that observation can be secured, and each of these four messages dropped as nearly as possible in the vicinity of Major Whittlesey's P.C. He is cut off from the rear and beaches are both in front of him and in rear of him and it is vitally necessary that these messages reach him at his, Major Whittlesey's P.C., which, taken from all messages received from him, is given as 294.6--276.3. Major Whittlesey commands 1st Bn. 308th Infantry.

To effect this purpose, therefore, it is necessary that the aeroplane endeavor first to locate his position with extreme accuracy, then to attract his attention and then to drop the messages so as to insure that at least one of the messages will reach Major Whittlesey. It is also important, of course, that they be dropped so near him as to avoid the danger of their falling into the hands of the enemy.

It is further requested that you acknowledge receipt of these messages by telephone to me at my office when they reach you, in order that we may be assured of their safe arrival at your office, from whence, according to your statements of this afternoon you will send them to the 50th Aero Squadron by an officer courier.

By Command of Major General ALEXANDER:

No. 550

J. R. R. HANNAY
Chief of Staff.

Message No. 21. Recd. h15.

Oct. 5, 1918.

A report through Delaware 1 from Capt. Labour, French and American Liaison officer between Right of French and Left of 154th Brig. Time 4.40 P.M.

I have been to see the French Major on our left. The French are ordered to hold their old line. Just sent a message to the French Major telling him that the elements of his command were slightly behind us and asking him to connect up with our line.

No. 560.

No. 17

P.C. 77th Div. 5 Oct. 1918 16h05 P.M.

From Delaware 1 (94.5-75.5) Message #3

Have not been able to advance my line more than 300 yards beyond this point and up against wire and trenches on both slopes of valley. I am still trying to push my men forward and pass between end of trenches. The Boche has machine guns in bottom of valley which commands this interval. I am putting Stokes Mortars on the point I believe these guns to be located. Shall continue to push and have just directed Captain Breckenridge who is in immediate command, to push his troops forward.

(Signed) Johnson.

No. 564.

From DELAWARE 1 to Dreadnought 1 8:35 P.M. Message No. 2, -5 Oct. 1918.

94.5-75.5

I am being held on general line 75.5, heavy artillery, machine gun and rifle fire. French upon our immediate left or slightly to our rear. Two of their liaison group are with me. I am attempting to advance and passed company through interval in wire which exists in bottom of ravine. I am myself with the company which is attempting to pass through and who in the last few minutes have lost over 20 killed and wounded out of 85.

No. 565.

From Delaware 1.

At 94.5-75.5

5th Oct. 1918 ShO

TO: DREADNOUGHT 1

Attack started from this point at 2:45 P.M. On Company deployed on each side of Ravine (1 Co. 2 Cos consolidated) following as support. Line about 300 yards in advance of this point. Left against wired entanglements. Night advancing slowly. Have given orders to pass support companies through bottom of Ravine with view to outflanking the Germans. Meeting heavy machine gun fire from both sides of the Ravine; also Infantry and Artillery fire. Pushing for all I am worth. Personally directing.

Dreadnought 7 (speaking) DREADNOUGHT 1 directs that he push forward as hard as he can and cut through to his troops in front.

No. 569.

From Buster 19 to Dreadnought 7 -13h30 Oct. 5, 1918.

Verification of former message: Messages were given to two machines, 3 to one and 1 to the other. 3 were dropped in the right place; 1 was dropped in the rear area due apparently to the observer losing his way in the fog.

No. 572.

P.C. 77th Division 20h00

5 Oct. 1918.

FIELD MESSAGE No. 4.

TO: Commanding Generals 153d and 154th Infantry Brigades and 153d Field Artillery Brigade.

1. It is desired that for the 6th instant the effort to penetrate the hostile position in our front be continued. It is further desired that every effort be made to establish communication with the detachment of the 308th Infantry reported to be at MOULIN de CHARLEVAUX. The infiltration of the enemy line by way of the RAVINE de CHARLEVAUX will be continued, as also the effort by the 153d Brig. to advance some of its elements north along the general line of the HAUTE CHEVAUCHEE Road.

The Commanding General of the 154th Brigade will establish and maintain liaison among the elements of his command, placing a Bn. to be used as Divisional Reserve in the vicinity of the dugouts shown on the 1 to 20,000 map at 94.9-74.6. Liaison will be established and maintained with the French Division on our left. It is believed that the right of that Division will be found in the vicinity of the place where road running East from BINARVILLE enters the Divisional Area. The principal effort of the Commanding General of the 153rd Brig. will be to clear his front of the enemy, and advance his line. The principal

(No 589 continued on next page)

No. 589 (Continued).

effort of the Commanding General of the 154th Brig. will be to establish communication with the elements of the 308th Infantry near the MOULIN de CHARLEVAUX, and to clean out the bodies of the enemy now believed to be in rear of that position.

ROBERT ALEXANDER,
Major General,
Commanding.

No. 589.

Message for Major Whittlesey Oct. 5th 17h30 m.
Commanding 1st Bn., 308th Infantry.

1. Retire with your forces to Regimental P.O. The attention of the enemy in your rear is being held by our rifle and machine gun fire. This should enable you to locate the enemy by his fire and strike him in the rear and flank.

By Command of Major General ALEXANDER:

J. R. R. HANNAY,
Chief of Staff.

No. 590.

Message No. 3.

P.O. 77th Div. 17h15
5th October 1918.

Dreadnought 1 desired airplane to go out at once and drop a message for our troops who are out off. Here is the message:

MESSAGE FOR MAJOR WHITTLESEY - Coordinates 294.6-276.3
Commanding 1st Bn. 308th Inf.

Our troops now attacking German Trenches in ravine Southeast of MOULIN de CHARLEVAUX. The Division Commander directs that you retire and fight your way through, attacking the Germans from the rear while our troops engage their front.

Sent 5:15 P.M.

HANNAY
Chief of Staff.

No. 591

5 October, 1918 17 hr.

No. 2

Message for Major Whittlesey, Commanding 1st Bn. 308th Inf.

Brigade Commander now attacking German Trenches in ravine southeast of MOULIN de CHARLEVAUX.

Division Commander directs you retire and fight your way through, attacking the Germans from the rear while our troops engage their front.

HANNAY
Chief of Staff.

No. 592

Headquarters, 77th Division,
American E.F.

10h05
5th October, 1918

Memo to Commanding General, 154th Inf. Brig.

1. Take the 4 companies now in Divisional Reserve in the vicinity of the Depot de Machines, proceed with them personally so that you can direct their vigorous action against the Boche trenches shown on the 1:20,000 Plan Directeur as running southeast from La Palette Pavillon. The French have now taken La Palette Pavillon and are depending upon our co-operation to hold it. Attack vigorously and drive out the Germans which intervene between you and the position indicated.

ROBERT ALEXANDER,
Major General,
Commanding.

No. 594.

G-2 77th Division, A.E.F.
October 6, 1918.

Message received by G-2 at 19h30.
From: Lt. Bolt, 50th Aero Squadron.

"We're up trying to drop food and ammunition but motor went bad. At 6.15 P.M. saw big white flares being shot up from the battalion, then later, on the APREMONT-BINARVILLE Road -- one big white flare. Saw our troops on that road at same place - 297.8-275.8. Squadron has been dropping food and ammunition all day."

No. 599

No. 18
Memorandum to G-3, 17h56 Oct. 6, 1918.

Signal Officer reports that while at DETROIT two officers from the 50th Aero Squadron flying plane No. 8 came in after being forced to land near BINARVILLE and were shown back to Brigade Headquarters, 154th Brig. This was the plane that was carrying food, ammunition and medical supplies to Major Whittlesey's battalion, and from the information gained they had dropped the above articles at the place where battalion was last known to be. Signal Officer said that the aviators had made a complete report to Intelligence Officer, CAPT. DELHANTY of the 308th Infantry.

No. 605.

Message No. 16.

Received by DREADNOUGHT 7 from Office of BONEHEAD 3.

Direct that a vigorous effort be made this afternoon to relieve the Companies on the left of the 77th Division that are out off. Suggest that they be notified by aeroplane of the attack so that the action of the people out off will be coordinated.

Above order from Army - transmitted by Corps.

DREADNOUGHT-7 stated that all that had been ordered had already been done and every effort was being made looking to relief of the forces out off, and was being looked after by DREADNOUGHT-1 in person.

No. 606.

Message No. 13

DREADNOUGHT 5 13h20 Oct. 6, 1918.

Six planes working to carry out the supplies two of them had come back before I left the field, the first one returning claimed that he saw some movement around the point. The second plane did not see anything at all, dropped the supplies at point designated.

The 1st plane dropped pigeons and says that he dropped the cage overboard in good shape and that the parachute opened so he thinks the pigeons were delivered all right.

They feel pretty good about that, do they. Good work, that's fine business.

No. 614.

No. 11; 12h50 Oct. 6, 18.

DREADNOUGHT 10 reports 7 planes have gone forward with food, ammunition and medical supplies. Two planes have returned and have gone forward with another load. They did not see anyone on their first trip but threw the stuff and the material at the coordinates given.

DREADNOUGHT-7 Just keep them going - have them continue to carry out that mission.

No. 616

DAKOTA 1 - 19h10 October 7, 1918 (Through Dakota 11) 6:45 P.M.

About 250 yards west of the cross-roads LA VIERGETTE on the north side of the road. Our men have practically reached this road. The 3rd Battalion 306th has pushed up to the road 97.2-77.6 to 96.5-77.4. The 1st Bn. 306th is on the railroad spur running out northwest between the two roads at the cross-roads LA VERGETTE. The C.O. of that battalion has orders to proceed tonight up to the railroad that runs along 78. I have sent the Engineers to cut roads for him so that he can reach that point. The 28th Division is east of us and has about 5 companies, 800 to 1000 yards north of LA VIERGETTE. They are stopped by strong machine gun fire from the direction of CHATEL. I am going to place troops in position extending practically along from the eastern boundary between the wood road where the 306th Infantry battalion is and the railroad where I have ordered the 1st Battalion 306th. These troops will assist the 28th in clearing out those guns so that we may continue along the road. I have seen Col. Conger and have told him that I would place men on his left. The 2nd Bn. 306th is up on this road and covers entirely to the left of our sector.

I have strong patrols along the road to continue to the western edge of the Division sector and to hold that road so that no pressure can be brought on the front of the 154th Brigade.

There has been continual machine gun fire in the valleys in front of the 154th Brigade. I have sent Officers to stop any Americans from firing to protect any of our men shooting into each other.

You can reach me here on the telephone whenever desired. I am now trying to locate a place for all the elements of the command for the night. Nearly all the elements are in the vicinity of this road.

No. 644.

Message from Delaware 1715 Oct. 7, 1918.

Just heard from Houghton: his advanced elements are now on the line 95.4-75.9 at 2 o'clock, and he is probably on 76 now. He is moving up towards WHITTLESEY and taking rations and medical supplies.

I have given him orders to take over the entire line of the Brigade sector on arrival and the 308th will constitute the second line regiment. On the left I have sent out a company on each side to try out what's on the front, particularly those trenches on the left, and given orders for rations and medical supplies to be rushed up on the railroad.

I think they have probably had orders to get out all along, Sir. That's what it looks like. You were doing the best you could. I understand.

No. 653

No. 3.

P. C. 77th Division,
8 Oct., 1918 18h15

TO: Officer in Charge of Truck Train sent for Major Whittlesley in MOULIN de CHARLEVAUX ROAD.

1. Major Whittlesley's command has been taken to DEPOT des MACHINES. You will therefore report back to your station. Arrange in route to pick up the clothing sent up to the bathing and delousing plant near Division Headquarters and send them around to Major Whittlesley at the DEPOT des MACHINES via BINARVILLE.

J. R. K. Hannay,
Chief of Staff.

No. 677.

October 8, 1918.

WHITTLESEY'S COMMAND

Strength

Entered action on Oct. 2d with	When reached on October 7th	Losses Killed & Missing	
308th Inf. and 2) Cos. 306 M.G. Bn.)	375 Officers and men	321 Officers and men	54
Co. K, 307th Inf.	88 " "	75 " "	15
Total	463 Officers and men	396 officers & men	69 officers and men

No. 679 (Continued)

Of these returned following wounded:	156	} of which 3 officers
Effectives	258	

Of killed and missing - Total 9 officers of which 4 known to be killed and 5 others missing, 2 known to be wounded.

No. 679.

To the Commanding Officer of the
2nd Batl. J. R. 308 of the 77th
American Division.-

Sir:

The Bearer of the present, COWELL R. HOLLINGSHEAD, has been taken prisoner by us on October. He refused to the German Intelligence Officer every answer to his questions and is quite an honourable fellow, doing honour to his fatherland in the strictest sense of the word.

He has been charged against his will, believing in doing wrong to his country, in carrying forward this present letter to the Officer in charge of the 2nd Batl. J. R. 308 of the 77th Div. with the purpose to recommend this Commander to surrender with his forces as it would be quite useless to resist any more in view of the present conditions.

The suffering of your wounded men can be heard over here in the German lines and we are appealing to your human sentiments. A white Flag shown by one of your men will tell us that you agree with these conditions.

Please treat the CROWELL R. HOLLINGSHEAD as an honourable man. He is quite a soldier we envy you.

The German Commanding Officer.

No. 680.

8 Oct. 1918 18h05

FROM: DELAWARE
TO: DREADNOUGHT-3

Colonel Johnson reports that all of his elements are in shape. He brought back Major Whittlesley and his troops. DREADNOUGHT-3;-- We have got everything ready for him here - delousing, clothes, billets, etc., DREADNOUGHT-1 gave specific orders about that. Didn't he give direct orders to Whittlesley about it. He gave me direct orders about it. I will see that I can do about getting the other stuff to them. Can you tell me about where your line is now?

(continued on next page)

No. 688 (Continued).

DELAWARE-1: 295.8-276.5 right of 307th Infantry; 295.2-277.2. French are not up with my left line, but they are coming up tonight, they report. Now on the line with the 308th. Tonight they are to move up. Shelling the valley in our Sector, pretty heavy down as far as the Command Post of the 308th Infantry.

No. 688.

No. 22

From DELAWARE 1 - 15h20 Oct. 8, 1918.

Have now the position of the front line troops and their connection.

The line of our front line rests coordinate 295.8, 276.5 and the right 295.35-276.6. On the right is the 1st Bn. with 2 companies in the front line and 2 companies in the 2nd line, and the 3rd Bn. is on the left with the same formation.

The reserve battalion (the 2nd) is held back on the line 75.6 behind the line of wire.

On the right the line is connected with the 153rd Brig. They have touch on the left with the French. LA PALETTE TRENCH and the Boche in our rear have been wiped out by the 308th and the French. The Boche have CHARLEVVAUX Trench, but I think they will get out. We have strong post out on a line of ridge generally defined by the coordinate 77. We stand now ready to advance with the 153rd and the French.

Disposition of the 308th not known until Johnson returns.

No. 693.

No. 20

From Delaware 1 14h45 8 Oct. 18

I had food, overcoats and medical supplies rushed up to the front this morning and they reached there all right. Johnson took command of the 308th at 12. He went forward to learn of the situation and conditions and to organize the command. He also intends when he goes to the front to turn the Germans out of the trenches which they occupy in the vicinity of the woods O.B. S.E. of LA PALETTE. They are said to be in there and the French who are moving forward on our left have stopped at that point. Johnson will report on positions as soon as he returns but he intends to drive them out of that trench and of that line in our sector. Houghton has thrown out patrols along the ridge practically on the 77th parallel. He is not attempting to move forward and he went go forward until the 153rd

(continued on next page)

No. 695 (Continued)

Brigade does on his right. He has got to get set and cover his sector to the left before he will move forward. His object is to move forward on the ridge as soon as possible. The French are still held up there at LA PALETTE. There is a French Company holding east of observatory at point on map 4059. Will let us know when he hears from Johnson or Houghton.

That is not the right of their line but one company only which came forward as liaison group. The right of our line is further back. I have troops beyond the observatory and we are going to try to turn to the left and turn them out this afternoon.

Houghton has found very little opposition this morning - a little machine gun resistance.

No. 695.

WHITTLESEY'S COMMAND			Losses
Strength			Killed
Entered action on Oct. 24 with		When reached on	& Missing.
		Oct. 7th	
308th Inf. and 2 Cos. 306 M.G. Bn.)	375 officers & Men	321 officers & men	54
Co. K, 307th Inf.	<u>88</u> men	<u>73</u> " " "	<u>16</u>
Totals	463 Off. & men	394 " " "	69 Off. & men

Of these returned
following wounded

156 - of which 3 officers

Effectives

238

Of killed and missing

Total 9 officers of which 4 known to be
killed and 5 others missing 2 known to be
wounded.

No. 701

No. 16 - Oct. 8, 1918.

From DREADNAUGHT 1 to DREADNAUGHT 3.

Tell G-1 to send ten trucks to the point on the LA VIERGETTE MOULIN de CHARLEVAUX Road, where he will find Major Whittlesey's command. Bring Major Whittlesey and his command to the vicinity of the present Div. P.C. where they can have an opportunity to get

(continued on next page)

704 (Continued)

a bath and change of clothes. Arrange to have kitchen facilities for these men. Direct G-1 to have a complete change of clothes ready for about 150 men.

No. 704.

Message No. 12. From: Denver 1. Recd. 11h30 8 Oct. 1918.

The 308th when they went in with Whittlesey had 375 men, inclusive C. and D Cos. of the 306th M.G. Bn. of which we have 321 men and officers left. Co. K. 307th, went in with 88, of which we have 73 remaining, a total of 394, all ranks; of these 156 are wounded, 51 stretcher cases. Killed and missing: 9 officers, of which 4 are known to be killed; of the 5 missing officers, 2 known to be wounded. 3 other officers wounded now in our hands. 50 enlisted men killed and missing. Total killed and missing 59.

The French are slowly coming up on my left and meeting just a little resistance around LA PALETTE. Am pushing out to the left to give them a lift behind the Hunds. Everything cleaned out behind me at daylight.

No. 707.

No. 10
MESSAGE 10h45 8 Oct. 1918.

DREADNOUGHT 1 has directed DAKOTA 1 to have an ambulance station established at point on road 96.1-76.7 at once. There are about 30 casualties down the road over in the other sectors belong to WHITTLESEY's Bn.

No. 709

No. 8.
FROM DELAWARE-1 8 Oct., 1918 10h50
TO DREADNOUGHT-7

The French have not taken LA PALETTE PAVILION and there are some Germans in the trenches immediately to the right of that—the OBSERVATORY it is called. The French are now working around and I am going to get HOUGHTON to swing into the rear and try and get these people out. I am bringing the rolling kitchens up along that road. I mean way around the right flank by LA VIERGETTES. The road is under shell fire. In my opinion it would be much better to bring them around by BINARVILLE. From there we could bring them up by pack train and would be able to carry them right clear up to the front line and would very greatly ease getting supplies up to the troops. (continued on next page)

No. 710 (Continued).

DREADNOUGHT-3 says that DREADNOUGHT-1 directs that they be brought around by that other road. Where is that road under shell fire.

DELAWARE-1 The whole front is more or less under shell fire. The men in Whittlesey's Battalion who have been lying along the road up there are constantly under shell fire. By bringing transport along that road it would expose these men up there to shell fire and it would be much easier to bring transport up the other road.

DREADNOUGHT-7 Alright go ahead and do it. HOUGHTON reported that there was no shell fire on that other road.

No. 710

No. 7
P.C. 77th Div. (G-2) 1h Oct. 8, 1918.

After conversation with some one at DENVER-1 who was talking with the Sgt. Maj. of Whittlesey's Bn., I phoned as follows to Corps:

"Whittlesey's Bn. rec'd nothing from air men. Whittlesey is O. K. Men are weak."

He further estimated effective strength of Bn. as 125 men and 50 wounded coming out.

(Signed) MOREY, Lt. Col.

No. 712.

REPORT OF DIVISION INSPECTOR

77TH DIVISION

DATED OCTOBER 9, 1918.

THIS COPY TO LIEUTENANT COLONEL
R. G. PECK.

Headquarters, 77th Division
American E.F.
Office of the Division Inspector.

9 October, 1918

From: The Inspector, 77th Division, American E.F.
To: The Inspector General, General Headquarters, American E.F.
Subject: Daily Report.

1. As per instructions contained in Memorandum, Headquarters, First Army, A.E.F., office of Inspector General, 8 October, 1918, I report the following:

(a) On October 7th the stubborn resistance of the enemy decreased and our line succeeded in reaching the positions of the companies near MOULIN DE CHARLEVAUX. The decreased enemy resistance indicated a withdrawal.

(b) Efforts were made in the morning to advance and a heavy artillery preparation was planned for 1400. This artillery preparation was not called for, however, due to the withdrawal in our front.

(Signed) F. R. Rich
F. R. RICH,
Major, Infantry, U.S.A.
Division Inspector

FRE/s.

REPORT OF 154TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

DATED 29 OCTOBER 1918

COVERING PERIOD FROM

OCTOBER 2 TO OCTOBER 7, 1918.

Headquarters 154th Inf. Brigade,
American E.F. 29th October 1918.

Report of Operations of the 154th Inf. Brigade 77th Division
in the Argonne Forest from September 26th to October 17th 1918.

* * * * *

October 2nd 1918. In the morning of this day the attack was again made and the attempt to advance was unsuccessful. At 12.50 p.m. an attack was made with the following results; On the left six companies of the 398th Inf. and one company of the 397th Inf., which followed the 398th Inf., succeeded in penetrating the gap in the enemy line of trenches which was found in the bottom of a ravine running north and south on the left of the Brigade sector, and advanced as far as the ravine at Charlevaux Mill. On the right, the 397th Inf., was again checked by wire and trenches. Up to this time my left flank had been partially covered first by the 92d Division, U.S.A. and later by the 71st Division, French, altho at all times these units were to my rear. The detachments of the 397th Inf. and 398th Inf. under command of Major Whittlesey, advanced far to the front, carrying out the instructions received from the Division Commander to "push forward without regard to flanks," leaving my left flank dangerously exposed, particularly in view of the fact that the trench line which had heretofore checked my advance continued to the left, where it was held in force by the Germans who had successfully opposed my advance on this front attempted by the French. Their holding this line of trenches made it possible for them to pass by the flank in rear of the elements of my command which had advanced to the vicinity of Charlevaux Mill. Two companies of the 398th Inf., moved forward with a view to checking any such movement on the part of the enemy and my brigade reserve was also moved well to the front as far as it could be taken before night set in. Major Whittlesey had had orders on reaching the Charlevaux Mill to hold that position until the other elements of the line had reached him.

Oct. 3d 1918. On this morning, under the foregoing directions, the Brigade less the elements under Major Whittlesey, attacked the enemy front with a view of pushing forward to the line of Charlevaux Mill. They were checked at all points, the enemy during the night having moved in from the right of trenches already constructed and having during the night placed wire in the bottom of the valley. Two attacks during this day to penetrate the enemy's position were made, but failed and at night the conditions remained as before - communication with Major Whittlesey being out off.

October 4th 1918. On October 4th pursuant to Field Order No. 59 77th Div., 3d October 1918, c.s. the attack on the enemy's position was resumed with the idea of advancing to the line held by Major Whittlesey at Charlevaux Mill.

On this occasion, the French attacked in conjunction on our left but the French on our left and our left, were again checked. Colonel Stacey at this time asked to be relieved from command of this regiment, 398th Inf., stating that he was unwilling to use his command for further such attacks owing to its exhausted condition. His request was not complied with at this time, altho reported to the Division Commander. On this day, recognizing the fact that to force a passage through the enemy's wire and trenches even after careful artillery preparation would likely be unsuccessful, the 397th Inf. was directed to move one battalion

well to the right and endeavor to pass by a ravine around the left flank of the enemy's wire, flanking him out and cutting his rear, endeavoring to reach Major Whittlesey by this means. At the same time arrangements were made with the 154th Brigade on our right for them to move by the left flank through the same ravine - the two brigades acting in conjunction in the attempt. Late in the afternoon two companies of the 307th Inf. succeeded in passing the wire by the left flank of the enemy's position and night fall found the command, except these companies, in the same position as the previous day.

October 5th 1918. On this morning the attempt to advance was continued under previous orders. On the left the 308th Inf. simply made a demonstration, as was the case along the front of the 307th Inf whilst to the extreme right of the 307th Inf. the attempt to pass around the flank was resumed. This movement progressed very slowly owing to resistance encountered and owing to the fact that from time to time it ran into light wire around which it had to work, but it progressed steadily and night fall found the entire battalion on the flank of the enemy's position, working toward Major Whittlesey. On the left of the position in front of the 308th Inf. at 11:30 o'clock, no progress had been made and on reporting this fact to the Division Commander, the Brigade Commander of the 154th Inf. Brigade was told to take a battalion (the Divisional Reserve, which the night before had been drawn from the line and replaced by another battalion) and to forward personally and see that the attack against the enemy's trenches in front of the 308th was properly launched and to relieve Colonel Stacey from command of his regiment. This put the command of the 308th Infantry in the hands of Capt. Breckenridge. The attack was launched as directed by the Division Commander, with one battalion of the 307th - the Divisional Reserve and in addition, three companies of the 308th Inf., the Brigade Commander not only launching the attack but personally taking command and directing the same. On this occasion the French were to have assisted us under arrangements made by higher headquarters. They failed to do this and the attack, which lasted from half past two to 5 p.m. was unsuccessful.

October 6th 1918. Under the provisions of Field Message No. 4 Hqs 77th Division, c.s. the attempt to break the enemy's line and relieve Major Whittlesey was continued. On the part of the 307th Inf. there was a demonstration against the enemy's front by one battalion and the battalion which had passed by the flank continued its advance toward Major Whittlesey. As stated before, this movement was extremely slow on account of the determined resistance of the enemy and the difficulties of the terrain over which the advance was being made. In front of the 308th Inf., under orders of the Division Commander, an attack was again launched by 9 companies - 4 of the 307th Inf (Divisional Reserve) and 5 of the 308 Infantry. Again the French were to have assisted us in the attack by passing through us and assaulting the first line trenches and our troops passing through them, were to have assaulted the trenches in the rear. This plan failed - the French not coming up, altho coming up later on our left, to a point somewhat in rear of our left, along the Binerville road, where they were held up by fire from the enemies line of trenches at La Palette Pavilion. The enemy's trenches in front of the 308th Inf. had been subjected to a heavy artillery fire during the night, but apparently without effect, the wire on our advance, being found practically intact. Later on this evening word was received that the flanking elements of the 307th Inf., were well to the front and approaching Major Whittlesey.

October 7th 1918. On this morning, orders were given to feel out the front of the position, in front of the 308th Inf., and if no resistance was

encountered, to push forward as rapidly as possible. In the meantime, word was received that the 507th Inf. was approaching Major Whittlesey and a short time later, word was received that the 508th Inf. had penetrated the enemy's position and had reached Major Whittlesey, relieving his command. On this day, the entire command was on a line of Charlevaux Mill about 276.4 where it reorganized.

* * * * *

(Signed) Evan M. Johnson
Brigadier General
Commanding

encl.

FIELD ORDERS 50 TO 55
154TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

Headquarters 154th Inf. Brigade
American E.F. Oct 4th 1918.

FIELD ORDERS
NO. 50

5:30 P.M. confirming telephone
instructions of 12:15 p.m.

Map: FORET D'ARGONNE
1/20,000

1. The situation is approximately as indicated in Field Order No. 49
Headquarters 154th Inf. Brigade, 3rd October 1918.

2. The attack of the 77th Division will proceed this afternoon.

3. a) Boundaries between Brigades remain unchanged.

b) The 307th Inf. will attack the enemy now occupying the line of
trenches in front of their position this afternoon. At 2:30 p.m. destructive fire will
be placed on that line of trenches at points designated by the Commanding Officer of
the 307th Inf. The command will be formed as close as possible to the fire, ready to
advance through the gaps in the wire at 4:30 p.m. After passing over the line of
trenches, the 307th Inf. will continue their advance to the road and railroad, organ-
izing in position abreast of the 308th Inf. on their left and refusing their right
flank to establish liaison with the 153d Brigade, moving their right flank forward as
the 153d Brigade comes up on line.

The Commanding Officer of the 308th Inf. will proceed at once, taking
with him the provisional Reserve (2nd Btn. 307th Inf.) to the relief of the troops
of that regiment (308th) now under command of Major Whittlesey occupying the front
line of the 308th Regimental Sector. On the way forward, the C.O. 308th Inf. will pick
up the three companies under command of Capt. McDougall, 308th Inf. When the relief
has been made, the position now held by the six companies on the front line, will be
occupied, the flank refused toward the left (enemy).

c) Artillery preparation as per paragraph 3, sub-paragraph b, above.

4. Administrative and liaison arrangements - No change.

5. Brigade P.C. - No change.

Regimental P.Cs - No Change.

By Command of Brigadier General Johnson

Distribution:
C.O. 307th Inf.
C.O. 308th Inf.
C.O. 306th M.G. Btn.
77th Division
War Diary
File

(S) F.H. McKnight
F.H. McKnight
Capt. Inf. USA,
Operations Officer

Headquarters 154th Inf. Brigade
American E.F., Oct. 6th 1918.
8:30 a.m.

FIELD MESSAGE NO. 1

To C.O. 307th Inf.
308th Inf.
306th M.G. Bn.

1. In accordance with orders from the Division Commander, and confirming verbal orders issued yesterday evening by the Brigade Commander, the following will be the program of the 154th Inf. Brigade for 6th October, 1918:-

The effort to penetrate the enemy's position in our front will be continued. Every effort will be made to establish communication with the detachment of the 308th Inf. reported to be at the Moulin de Charlevaux. The infiltration of the enemy's line by way of the ravine de Charlevaux will be continued in co-operation with the elements of the 153d Brigade with whom we are in touch.

The battalion of the 307th Inf. now in Divisional Reserve and in the sector of the 308th Inf. will be placed in the vicinity of the dugouts shown on the 1 to 20,000 map at 94.9 - 74.6.

Close liaison with the French Division on our left will be maintained by the liaison groups already established, at approximately where the road running east from Binarville enters the Divisional Area, the liaison group moving forward to correspond with the movements of the element with whom they are connected. Liaison with the 153rd Brigade will be continued by the groups already designated.

The principal effort of all elements of this Brigade today will be to establish communication with the elements of the 308th Inf. now near the Moulin de Charlevaux and to clean out the bodies of the enemy believed to be in rear of that position.

By Command of Brigadier General Johnson.

(S) F. H. McKnight
F. H. McKnight
Capt. Inf. USA
Operations Officer

77th Division
153d Brigade
War diary

Headquarters 154th Infantry Brigade
American E.F. October 6, 1918
10:30 p.m.

FIELD ORDERS
NO. 52

MAPS: FORET D'ARGONNE 1-20,000
BINARVILLE - 1-10,000

1. The enemy maintains his position across the sector occupied by the 154th Inf. Brigade, approximately at a line midway between the east and west coordinates 275. and 276.

The 153rd Inf. Brigade is on the right of this Brigade, and the French are on the left. In the sector occupied by this brigade, the 307th Inf., are on the right and the 308th Inf. are on the left.

Brigade and regimental boundaries and zones of advance remain as they have been indicated in previous orders.

2. An Advance of the 154th Inf. Brigade will take place at 6 a.m. 7th October 1918.

a) The 307th Inf. (less one battalion in the Division Reserve) will continue their deliberate advance of yesterday, holding themselves in readiness to press forward rapidly abreast of the 308th Inf. when the last named regiment attains the trenches on line 275.6 which are their first objective.

b) The 308th Inf. will attack the enemy occupying the trenches at co-ordinate 294.2 and extending east along the coordinate 275.6 as far as the railroad in the ravine. This attack will be made in conjunction with the French who will attack immediately upon our left; there must be the closest coordination with the French forces.

At 5:30 a.m. the 5 companies of the 308th Inf. along the line 275.0 will be disposed as follows:

Two companies on the east side of the ravine; one company in the first line, one company in the second line.

Three companies on the west side of the ravine - the company on the left to maintain constant liaison with the French on the left flank of the brigade.

The 2nd bn. 307th Inf (Divisional Reserve) will be placed at the disposal of the Commanding Officer 308th Inf. and will be formed at the same hour immediately in rear of the 308th Inf., and will advance as the support in two lines, closely following the first line companies.

The Stokes Mortars and 57 mm. guns of the 308th Inf. will be placed by the Commanding Officer of the 308th Inf., so as to cover the area to the right of the ravine from the trenches in this area to the rear, and east of the railroad, with a destructive fire to keep down fire from enemy machine guns or Stokes Mortars which may be placed on that side of the ravine, this fire to be in conjunction with that of the Field Artillery as hereafter ordered. All available machine guns will be placed, under direction of the Brigade Machine Gun Officer, so that from 5 a.m. they will sweep both sides of the ravine in the valley north of the enemy's trenches. At 6 a.m. this machine gun fire will lift and sweep

the east side of the valley from along a line which may be described by the co-ordinates 94.5 to as far north as the coordinate 76.0. This harassing fire will be with the intention of keeping down the enemy fire which may be directed from that side of the valley on troops that may be advancing to the west. It is expected that the destructive effect of the combined Stokes Mortars, 37 mm. and machine gun fire, together with that of the combined artillery as hereafter directed, will allow the advance of the troops along the western side of the valley.

Prior to 6 a.m. the entire line of the 308th Inf. will move forward as far as can be done with safety in view of the artillery fire of preparation, and at the lifting of the fire at 6 a.m., this entire front will move forward to the objective. On the right of the ravine, the two companies will advance to the line of enemy trenches which they will take and hold, not advancing beyond this point but assisting the advance of the troops on the eastern side of the ravine by their fire. On the western side of the ravine the enemy trenches will be attacked and taken, the advance continuing until the heights beyond the road running east and west from the Moulin de Charlevaux in the regimental sector, is reached.

The Commanding Officer of the 308th Inf. will lead the attacking column and make the necessary detailed arrangements for the advance.

3. At 12 p.m. midnight 6/7 October 1918, a fire of preparation will be placed by the heavy artillery on these trenches and will remain there until 6 a.m. October 7th, when it will lift and at 5. a.m. the trenches and prolongation of these lines on the east side of the ravine will be covered by fire of 75 mm. guns, which fire will remain on these places for one hour and then will lift to the rear and cover the area to the rear of these trenches with searching fire, continuing this fire until 8 a.m.

4. Runner systems will be provided for and established as the advance is made, and constant information as to the progress will be sent back to the advance regimental P.C.

The Brigade Signal Officer will push forward lines of communication as rapidly as possible, so as to maintain communication with the advancing columns.

During the advance, the closest liaison must be maintained with the French on our left, who will attack in conjunction with us.

5. The Brigade P.C. temporarily at advanced P.C. of the 308th Inf. to which point messages and information will be sent back to the Brigade Commander.

By Command of Brigadier General Johnson.

(S) P. H. McKnight
Captain, Inf. U.S.A.
Operations Officer.

Headquarters 154th Inf. Brigade
American E.F. Oct 7th 1918.
3:30 p.m.

FIELD MESSAGE
NO. 2

MAPS: FORET D'ARGONNE 1/20,000
BINARVILLE 1/10,000

1. There are indications that in the sector of the 153d Inf. Brigade, on the right of this brigade, and in the sub-sector occupied by the 307th Inf. of this Brigade, the enemy is withdrawing his troops.

2. a) In accordance with telephonic instructions given this afternoon, the 307th Inf. will swing its advance toward its objective (heights beyond the road running east and west from Moulin de Charlevaux) to the west, so as to reach and relieve companies A, B, C, D, G and H of the 308th Inf. and Company K of the 307th Inf. now in position near the Moulin de Charlevaux, at the earliest possible moment.

b) The 308th Inf. will establish and maintain in close proximity to the enemy's front line, (approximately at co-ordinate 275.6) close contact with the enemy reporting promptly to the Brigade Commander when any indication is seen of his retirement.

3. a) When the 307th Inf. has attained its objective beyond the Moulin de Charlevaux ravine as above described, it will organize defensively in depth, occupying the entire Brigade front and thus covering the sectors formerly occupied by both the 307th and 308th Infantry. The 2nd Bn. 307th Inf. now in Divisional Reserve will report to the Commanding Officer 307th Inf. for duty and assignment. Two battalions of the 307th Inf. will constitute the main line of resistance of the forward system of defense, with one battalion in support.

b) The 308th Inf. will organize for defense in rear of the 307th Inf. constituting the support system, across the entire brigade sector. One battalion 308th Inf. will be reported to the Brigade Commander for assignment to Divisional Reserve.

c) Machine Gun companies will remain attached to the battalion to which they have been assigned in previous orders.

4. Combat liaison will be established and maintained between the elements of the forward system and the neighboring units on both flanks.

5. Brigade and Regimental P.C's no change until further orders.

By Command of Brigadier General Johnson

(S) F. H. McKnight
Captain, Inf. U.S.A.
Operating Officer

Headquarters 154th Inf. Brigade
American I.F. 8th October 1918.
7:40 p.m.

FIELD ORDERS
NO. 55

MAES: FORET D'ARGONNE 1/20,000
BINARVILLE 1/20,000

1. The enemy appears to have retired from the position which he occupied yesterday, and is probably now in position facing our front line which extends from point 93.85 - 74.5 to point 95.2-77.2.

The 153d Brigade is on the right of this brigade and its left is in touch with our right flank. The French are on the left of this brigade and have cleared out the Germans in La Palette trench to our left rear.

2. The Brigade zone of advance is as given in Field Message No. 4,
Headquarters 154th Inf. Brigade 8th October 1918.

3. The 77th Division will continue its advance tomorrow.

4. a) The 154th Inf. Brigade will advance at 6 a.m. tomorrow in conjunction with the 153d Inf. Brigade on its right and the French on its left.

b) The 307th Inf. forms the first line and covering the brigade sector will advance at 6 a.m. tomorrow and will march to the line which is defined by the wood road in the Bois de Quatre Chenes, generally along the co-ordinate, in the left of the sector 77.2 and the right of the sector 77.8. Upon reaching this line it will halt and establish touch with the 153d Inf. Brigade on its right. When both brigades are on the line the advance will be continued toward the ultimate objective.

c) The 308th Inf. (less 1st Bn. withdrawn today for Divisional Reserve) will form the second line of advance and will march behind the first line at a distance of about 1000 meters so as to cover the left flank of the first line, marching generally along the line of railroad in the western part of the Divisional sector. It will pay particular attention to the left flank of the advance, and will mop up the area in the rear of the first line of any enemy forces which may be found therein.

The 1st Bn. 308th Inf. which has withdrawn today from the first line will rest tomorrow and on the following day will march forward (in Divisional Reserve) and gradually gain distance to the front so as to come up to the other elements of the 308th Inf.

5. Liaison will be maintained during the advance by telephone and other available means; runners will be dropped back as the advance progresses, messages from the front line being passed through the 308th Inf. constituting the 2d line, and relayed back to the

6. P.C. 307th Inf. Moulin de Charlevaux

P.C. 308th Inf. No change

P.C. 154th Inf. Brigade - Until 9 a.m. 9th October 1918 no change;
at 9 a.m. 9th October P.C. of this Brigade will open at point 294.8 - 275.5, where the Binarville road enters the valley running north and south in the western section of the brigade sector.

By Command of Brigadier General Johnson

(S) F. H. McKnight
Capt Inf. USA
Operating Officer

REPORT 307TH INFANTRY
COVERING PERIOD FROM
OCTOBER 2 TO OCTOBER 8, 1918.

REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF THE 307TH INFANTRY FROM SEPTEMBER
26TH 1918 TO NOVEMBER 8, 1918.

Part.2.
Page 6

2nd October 1918.

Regiment in Front Line.

After an artillery preparation, of little effect, the Regiment attacked with the 2d Battalion in the line, the 3d Battalion in support.

The enemy held. His artillery and trench mortar fire was very heavy. The troops drove through to his wire and were stopped. Here he used hand grenades, rifle grenades and rifle in addition to his machine guns.

The troops could not get through and were withdrawn.

The order for the attack is missing.

In the afternoon after another artillery preparation, this time of greater effect, the attack was renewed. Fifteen of the enemy who were on patrol in front of the wire were taken prisoners. Again the attack was stopped on the wire.

The order for the attack is missing.

Meanwhile the 1st Bn., 308th Infantry had advanced to MIN CHARLEVAUX.

The 3d Vn. of this Regiment was ordered to follow their line of advance and to take position to flank the enemy in position in our sector. During the night the Battalion with guides from the 1st Bn. 308th started forward. Company "K" got through, but the other Companies lost touch with Company "K" and did not pass beyond the flank of the line held by the enemy.

Dispositions night 2/3 October;

2nd Bn. Front Line

3rd Bn. 1 Co. Forward

3 Cos. in 308th area on extension
of our front line.

1st Bn. Edge Reserve at 94.7-71.4.

3rd October 1918.

Regiment in Front Line.

The remaining companies 3d Bn attempted to get through to the 1st Bn. 308th, but found that the enemy, having cut the line of communication, opposed them in force.

He had placed numerous machine guns along the heights above the ravine, and in the ravine that leads to Mtn CHARLEVAUX from the South.

The companies were unable to get through and withdrew to support.

Dispositions night 3/4 October:

The 1st Bn. 307th relieved the 2nd Bn. on the front line and the 2nd Bn. went into Edge Reserve in rear of DEPOT DE MACHINES.

The order for the relief is missing.

4th October 1918.

Regiment in Front Line.

According to statements of the Commander of the surrounded Battalion, obtained after he had been relieved on the 7th October, the enemy had concentrated heavy forces in front of us.

In the morning another attack was made. It was unsuccessful.

The order for the attack is missing.

In the afternoon after a heavy artillery preparation the attack was resumed in conjunction with an attack up the ravine by the 2nd Battalion 307th and a battalion 308th Inf.

Part 2.

Page 8

The attack up the ravine was under the personal direction of General Johnson.

No headway could be made. At nightfall the attack was discontinued. The casualties were very heavy.

The orders for the attacks are missing

Dispositions night 4/5 October:

1st Bn. Front Line
3rd Bn. in Support
2nd Bn. Brigade Reserve

5th October 1918

Regiment in Front Line.

The 1st Bn was attacked bringing heavy pressure to bear on the extreme right flank. The 2nd Bn. under Bgde control attacked up the ravine. On the extreme right the line was advanced several hundred meters through suffering a heavy fire from the BOIS DE APREMENT.

The 2nd Bn was unsuccessful and was withdrawn during the night.

The orders for the attack are missing.

Dispositions for night 5/6 October:

1st Bn. Front Line
3d Bn. Support
2d Bn. Bgde Reserve near Min. DE
L'HOMME MORT.

6th October 1918.

Regiment in Front Line.

The attack was resumed, heavy pressure being brought to bear on the extreme right flank in conjunction with the 153d Brigade, while the 2nd Bn. again attacked up the ravine.

On the right, though under heavy fire from the front and the right flank (BOIS DE APRENDRE) the line was carried forward several hundred meters.

On the left in the 308th sector the 2d Bn was unsuccessful, and at night was withdrawn to the ravine near MOULIN DE L'HOMME MORT.

The order for the attack is missing.

Dispositions night 6/7 October:

1st Bn. in front line
3rd Bn. in Support
2nd Bn. in Brigade Reserve

7th October 1918.

Regiment in Front Line.

The attack was resumed, the 3d Battalion on the left in our sector, the 1st Bn on the right extending into the sector of the 153d Bde.

Elements on the right penetrated the enemy positions and swung to the northwest with the mission to reach the 1st Bn 308th. This forced the evacuation of the position in our sector directly in front of the 3d Bn.

It penetrated the enemy wire and reached the crest of the hill.

Part 2.

Page 10.

11 h 00

The 2d Bn was brought forward under command of the regiment to point 95.5-75.5 in Support.

The enemy was still in position on this hill just above the ravine at 95.2-74.7. A Company was placed in position to protect the left flank as the right pushed forward.

At dusk the 1st Bn. 307th reached the 1st Bn. 308th and outposted this Bn. as well as its own position.

The presence of the enemy on our left flank being known the line of communication was heavily posted.

The order for the attack is missing.

Dispositions night 7/8 October:

1st Bn. Right Front
3rd Bn. Left Front and Flank
2nd Bn. Support

8th October 1918

Regiment in Front Line.

The enemy withdrew during the night from his position at 95.2-74.7.

The position was reorganized. This Regiment took over the Brigade Sector and extended its line over the top of the hill to the north of Mtn. CHARLEVAUX without opposition.

The order for the operation is missing.

9 h 00

P.C. established at Mtn. CHARLEVAUX.

Dispositions night 8/9 October:

1st Bn. Right Front
3rd Bn. Left Front
2nd Bn. Support at 95.5-75.5

REPORT 308TH INFANTRY
COVERING PERIOD FROM
OCTOBER 2 TO OCTOBER 8, 1918.

HEADQUARTERS 396TH INFANTRY,
AMERICAN E.F.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS
(September 26th. to November 8th 1918.)

Ref.
FIELD ORDERS
NO. 48

Map Ref.
FORET D'ARGONNE)
SUZANCY 1/20,000)
RAUCOURT

* * * * *

October 2nd. Front Line: During the night our troops remained in their positions without incident and at 7:00 A.M. assisted by artillery advanced on time. First report received at (8:05) stated everything O.K. advance under way. At 9:00 A.M. word was received that they were going cautiously up west side of ravine, giving scouts time to develop valley to the east. At 9:40 A.M. the Support Battalion was at 294.7 - 275.1 and at that point established a mixed liaison post with the French. They were also in contact all the time with the advanced Battalion at 10:10 A.M. our advanced Battalion was held up at 94.8 - 75.8 by machine gun fire from the west. At 12:00 Noon word was received that the Germans had been driven off at L'Homme Mort and that we were pushing on. At 12:45 word came that we were held at 94.8 - 75.1 in ravine, by machine gun fire on hills both east and west but were pushing attack, and at 2:45 P.M. Scouts had reached parallel 75.5 east of ravine. At 5:10 P.M. word was received that the left flank had suffered losses while attacking machine guns on hills 94.5 - 75.2. The company was also shelled by artillery.

October 3rd Front Line:
1st Battalion: 294.7 - 275.5
2nd. Battalion: 294.7 - 275.5
3rd Battalion: Brigade Reserve.
Reg. Hqrs. 295.5 - 275.6

At 12:50 P.M. assisted by rolling barrage the 1st Battalion, resumed the advance, and at 1:25 P.M. reported a gain through heavy machine gun fire and sniping of 300 yards, to a point 294.5 - 275.5. Message at 2:30 P.M. stated that "B" Co, on right had captured 28 prisoners including one officer (1st Lt.) seven N.C.O's and twenty privates. They were taken from a dug out in the vicinity of 295.7 - 275.5, and were all members of the 3d Company 254th Regiment, 76 Reserve Division. Another reported at 3:00 P.M. said the "H" Company, on left, had captured three machine guns in the vicinity of ? numbers not as yet received.

October 4th Front Line at 294.6 - 275.5.
The filtering in of Germans on our left flank caused considerable trouble in maintaining our communications. The runner posts were broken and one runner captured. (This message by pigeon sent at 12:35 P.M. Oct 3rd) Also stated that Germans in small numbers were working to our left at about

294.6 - 276.3. One German prisoner captured has been held at advanced position will be sent through when runner system is established. Prisoner stated that his company of 70 men were brought up here last night (Oct 2nd) by motor trucks. Place captured 294.4 - 276.2. No further identifications.

At 10:35 A.M. word was received "Opposition on our front and on our flanks and that our positions were being shelled by Trench Mortars.

October 5th

Front Line: The situation on our front line remains unchanged. Enemy machine gun fire and shelling in Valley at 294.4 - 295.8 have prevented the reestablishing of communication without advanced companies. All attempts to reach advanced position met with heavy losses.

The attack of the French on our left at 6:30 A.M. was reported to have been unsuccessful and at 11:30 A.M. word was received that they had reached Pavillion la Palette. It is expected the situation now serious may be relieved by nightfall.

Enemy machine gun fire very active, bursts constantly pouring into valley south of our advanced position. Fire directed from hills on both flanks and also from front.

October 6th

Our support line is very close to 75.5 between 94 and 95. The advance made in the afternoon by our troops in support reached this point and held. Very heavy machine gun fire, artillery fire, one pounders and stokes mortars from the enemy, prevented our reaching our troops at 94.5 - 76.4. Prisoner taken by the French on our left during their operation of the morning of October 5th stated that our advanced elements are still holding.

Constant and increased enemy artillery fire during the afternoon. The valley and slopes above parallel 75 and between 94 and 95 receive almost constant shelling.

During the afternoon one allied plane from the 50th Aero Squadron attempted to drop message to our advanced elements. Result not known.

October 7th

Front Line position of advanced elements remains unchanged. The day was comparatively quiet, in preparation for another assault, to reach our advanced elements.

At 7:40 A.M. this morning our support troops consisting of the Divisional and Brigade Reserve assisted by artillery attacked with the purpose of driving the enemy from behind our left flank, and relieving our advanced position. First reports indicated that the attack had met with heavy resistance.

During the afternoon 24 allied planes from the 50th Aero Squadron dropped food and ammunition to our troops in advanced position. One of these planes piloted by Lt. George R. Philips with Lt. Brown (Observer) made a forced landing at 294.5 - 274.85 due to engine trouble (No damage). The aviators found it necessary to desert machine as it was under heavy machine gun fire. 12:45 P.M. plane coming from South, flying N.E. over Valley L'Homme Mort A.A.C. Guns active. Disappeared S.W.

October 8th

The attack of our troops for the purpose of reaching our advanced elements was forced to retire after reaching barbed entanglements, owing to very heavy machine gun fire and grenades from the enemy. During the afternoon there was little activity on patrol on the right and a company on the left moved forward to reconnoitre, and to determine whether or not the enemy was retiring. This movement made considerable advancement, but drew machine gun fire and found plenty of Germans to be still in the vicinity. Late in the afternoon patrols from the left flank of the 307th reached our advanced elements and during the night succeeded in getting food and surgical supplies to them. At 2:30 P.M. two men from our advanced elements broke through the line and reached Regimental Headquarters at 7:30 P.M. At 8:15 A.M. word was received from "K" Co. patrol on right of ravine which stated "Have reached our objective of yesterday. Germans have retired, are pushing forward."

* * * * *

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON OPERATIONS OF
308TH INFANTRY
COVERING PERIOD FROM
OCTOBER 2 TO OCTOBER 8, 1918.

Headquarters 308th Infantry
American E.F. France.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON OPERATIONS

From October 2d 1918 to October 8th 1918.

In the allied drive which commenced September 26th 1918, the 1st Bn. 308th Infantry was the advance Battalion in the Western Subsector of the 77th Division Sector in the Forest of Argoane; the 2d Bn 308th Infantry was in support commanded by Captain George McMurtry.

On October 2d these Battalions were at 274.9 - 275.95 (Rianarville map 1/20,000). The advance had been held up at this point on October 1st. by machine gun opposition. The terrain was difficult; a ravine running North and South thru the middle of the Regimental Subsector, with steep, thickly wooded hills on either side. The principle resistance had been encountered on October 1st on the west of the ravine where D and F Companies were in position.

At 11:35 A.M. the following morning order was received from Colonel Stacey, Commanding the 308th Infantry, "The advance of infantry will commence at 12:50 - 12:50 ~~xxxxxx~~. The Infantry action will be pushed forward until it reaches the line of the road and railroad generally along 276.5 where the command will halt, reorganize, establish liaison right and left and be ready for orders for a further advance. This does not change the plan as given you by (Code word for Colonel Stacey), you still leave two companies on your left as a containing force and push forward your right with the remainder of your force, that is the remainder of 1st and 2d Battalions. The General says you are to advance behind the barrage regardless of losses. He states that there will be a general advance along the line ~~xxxxxx~~."

The above plan referred to as given by Colonel Stacey was as follows: An attack along the hills East of the ravine, leaving two companies as a containing force on the supposedly more difficult Western side of the ravine, - one company to be detached from the force on the East when it had reached its objective to return and assist from there on an attack on the western side of the ravine.

D and F Companies were left in position on the western side of the ravine, and at 12:50 the remaining companies advanced on the East (ie A, B, C, E, E and G Companies) accompanied by sections of Machine Guns from Companies C and D, 306th Machine Gun Battalion. The advance was continued to the objective stated, which was reached at 6 P.M. with about 90 casualties from M.G. Fire. 2 German Officers, 28 Prisoners and three machine guns were captured. His trench system were crossed, one heavily wired.

A position for the night was taken up along the road generally paralleling 276.5. At this point a ravine runs East and West, connecting on the West with the ravine above referred to which runs North and South. The road referred to runs along the Northern side of the ravine, about 50 feet above the valley. The bottom of the ravine is marshy with a stream running thru it to the West. All of the country is heavily wooded. The Companies were placed just South of the road, being on a reverse slope protected from hostile artillery fire. A machine gun section was placed on each flank, and the left flank was refused somewhat to guard against attack from that supposedly more dangerous quarter. The men dug flank holes. The night passed quietly. The number of men present was about

OCTOBER 2nd At day break E Company was sent back to attack on the west of the ravine which runs North and South, the plan being to assist from the rear in bringing D and F Companies forward. Lt. Wilhelm was in command, Lt Lenke with him.

At 7:00 A.M. K Company, 307th Inf came up, having been sent to follow along our runner posts, with the mission of keeping in contact with the 308th Infantry till the 307th Regiment should come up on the right flank. Captain Holderman, Lt Pool and about 80 men.

Details were sent back for rations as the men had advanced carrying only one day's rations. All reserve rations had been consumed during the earlier phase of the advance. Fortunately water was found in a spring just south of the position. These ration details never returned.

At 8:30 A.M. German Artillery shelled the positions but without serious effect owing to the steep reverse slope.

Patrols that were sent out reported Germans on the right and left flanks in small numbers, and the impossibility of establishing liaison in either direction.

At 10 A.M. Lt Lenke returned with 18 men from E Company, reporting that E Company had been surrounded, and that Lt Wilhelm had ordered him to get his platoon out by any means possible. (Lt Wilhelm subsequently worked his way through to the south with a few remaining men.)

At 10:30 A.M. a report was received that the runner post system in the rear had been broken, two posts having been attacked and scattered by the Germans. A message reporting this fact was immediately dispatched the Regimental Headquarters by carrier pigeon. From this time on it was never possible to re-establish communication with the rear.

At 10:00 A.M. a German trench mortar opened fire from 600 yards to the West. Scouts reported the mortar protected by a machine gun. A Platoon was sent to attack the mortar, but met serious machine gun fire and accomplished nothing.

A prisoner who was captured during the day stated that his company of 70 men had been brought in during the night to take position in our rear.

At 5 P.M. the Germans attack our left flank (H Company Commanded by Lt Cullen) A small force also attempted to encircle the right flank. The attack lasted 45 minutes, and was successfully repulsed.

Casualties of the day about ten.
The night passed quietly.

OCTOBER 4th. The effective strength present, including K Company 307th Infantry, was now about 520. A constant drain was suffered by patrols killed or captured, as an increasing effort was made, throughout the entire period to get in touch with Regimental Headquarters in the rear, and with the 307th Infantry which was coming up on the right. These patrols were uniformly unsuccessful as the Germans occupied the heights to the rear in considerable force.

During the day we were successful in signalling our position to Division planes by means of the Battalion panels.

At 2:45 an intense barrage fell on our position from our friendly artillery, lasting for an hour and a half. The German trench mortar was also firing, and during this period of disorder a few men wandered away from camp and were either killed or captured. This barrage caused about 30 casualties. At this time our last carrier pigeon was released with a message concerning the effect of this artillery fire.

At the end of the barrage a small number of Germans attacked from the steep hill north of our position with potato mashers, getting through our outposts. They were driven off.

As a result of this day consideration was given to a change of position. It seemed inadvisable; to the West the Germans held a position strongly protected by Machine Guns; to the North and East we feared to encounter a barrage from our friendly artillery, as we had already reported the co-ordinates of our position and had no means of sending further messages. The hills to the South was objectionable as being exposed to German artillery fire which fell there at some time each day. The position which we occupied was well protected from German artillery, and was fairly protected from the trench mortar to the West which fired on our position about twice a day for a period of an hour each - not more than 10% of the shells falling on our position, the rest falling at the base of the hill in the rear.

The men were now suffering from hunger; and the condition of the wounded was very serious. No overcoats, blankets, slickers or shelter halves had been brought, and the cold nights intensified the suffering. However, throughout the entire period the weather was favorable considering the time of the year.

This night we heard the attack of the friendly forces to the South drawing closer and hoped that our own troops would soon break through to join us.

OCTOBER 5th. In the morning our outposts from the hill to the North reported that 200 Germans had been seen moving South to the Hills in our rear.

Encouragement was felt however at our friendly artillery barrage in the early morning, which commenced on the hill to the South, advanced to us, jumped our position, and continued North, showing that our positions was understood by our friendly forces.

Our effective strength was now about 375 (including all units present)

Sounds of fighting on the hill to the South were very clear during the day.

At 4 P.M. the Germans played a machine gun on our position for twenty minutes, firing in that time with an intensity difficult to exaggerate, altho it caused few casualties as the men stayed in their funk holes well. It was never repeated. It was immediately followed by a potato masher attack from the hill to the north. The attack was repulsed.

OCTOBER 6th. An exceedingly determined effort was made to get patrols through at this time; for the courage of the men had been shaken by the seeming failure of our troops in the rear to break through. The men were very hungry, and many requested permission to attempt individually to work their way back through the lines at night. Permission was refused.

Lieut. Peabody of Co. B, 306th M.G. Bn. and Lieut Noon, Co. C 308th Infantry were killed this day.

OCTOBER 7TH. The effective strength of all units present now amounted to about 275.

Discouragement was felt in the morning by shells falling on our position from the South East. This we assumed to be the fire of friendly artillery, although it subsequently proved to have been a German field piece placed behind us. Fortunately this fire was not prolonged, and was not repeated.

Lieut. Schenck, commanding C Company 308th was killed this day.

At 4 P.M. a private from H Company reported that he had left without permission in the morning with eight others. They encountered a German outpost, five of the nine were killed, the rest were captured. This man was given by the Germans a demand for our forces to surrender, a copy of which is hereto attached. He was then blindfolded and returned to our lines.

No reply to the demand to surrender seemed necessary.

At 7 P.M. the 307th Infantry was reported coming up through the woods on our right. The relief felt by our men is indescribable. The 307th generously gave up all the reserve rations which their men were carrying and nearly every one had food before going to sleep.

OCTOBER 8TH. During the night the Germans withdrew. In the morning, we were joined by the 3d battalion, 308th Infantry, and food and stretchers came promptly. The wounded were evacuated, and at 5 P.M. the remainder were marched to the rear to rest. At this time there were 128 present with the 1st Battalion Cos. A, B, C (41 wounded and 87 effectives.) 156 with the 2d Battalion, Cos. E, G, H (47 wounded and 109 effectives), 21 effectives 306th M.G. Bn and about 35 effectives Co. K. 307th Infantry.

REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF 200TH FIELD ARTILLERY
COVERING PERIOD FROM
OCTOBER 4 TO OCTOBER 7, 1918.

REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF THE 306TH FIELD ARTILLERY FROM SEPTEMBER
26TH 1918 TO NOVEMBER 9TH 1918 - INCLUSIVE

* * * * *

October 4th: 95.56—77.00
95.5—76.9
295.0—275.8

October 5th: 96.00—76.02

October 7th: With the purpose of relieving a battalion of the 308th Infantry which was cut off from the Division, a special concentration was fired by all guns of the regiment to cut the wire, destroy the trenches, and wipe out German troops reported to be occupying trenches southeast of La Palette Pavilion. This fire continued from 04hr to 6hr, a total of 750 rounds being fired in that time. On account of the dense woods and the nature of the terrain, no adjustment had been secured from the opening of the attack up to this time, so that the execution of this fire which would normally require accurate adjustment, was entered upon only account of the extreme urgency of the situation. Enemy artillery action was heavy at the same time. 2nd Lieut. Harold Flaks, Company C, 306th Machine Gun Bn. was killed by a German shell about 800 meters south of the northern point fired on by the 306th F.A., for the assumption was made that his death was due to inaccurate shooting on the part of this regiment. A subsequent thorough investigation by Corps authorities however, disclosed the fact that such an event was impossible, as recently set forth in Divisional General Orders.

* * * * *

(Signed) Chas. D. Winn
CHAS D. WINN
Colonel, 306th F.A., A.E.F.
Commanding

REPORT 152D FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE

OCTOBER 1 TO OCTOBER 8, 1918.

Headquarters 152nd Brigade Field Artillery

* * * * *

October 1st to 6th Inclusive

Firing by the forward guns and 75s assisted by 155s upon enemy strong points and machine gun positions, concerning which fire the details were arranged between the sub-ordinate commanders concerned. Reconnaissances were made for further advances as opportunity permitted. This period was characterized by a more rapid advance on the right of the Division sector and by a stubborn resistance on the left which was complicated by the fact that our attacks and those of the French who adjoined us on the left, were apparently not coordinated. It was at this time that a battalion of the 508th Infantry under Major Whittlesey became surrounded by the Germans and was only relieved after continuous attempts on the 7th of October.

October 7th

Between 5-H and 8-H a concentration of all the Divisional Artillery was laid on LA PALETTE trench to support a combined Franco-American attack on the German positions to relieve Major Whittlesey's battalion. The attack was not successful, but the Artillery fire caused such losses to the enemy in men and material as to compel his withdrawal on the night of 7-8. The results of this fire were later inspected more carefully than any other part of the entire operation to ascertain the accuracy of our fire, because a report was published that the fire was short. A careful investigation was made by the Artillery Brigade Commander, by the Division and Corps Inspectors and the report was found to be without foundation.

* * * * *

(Signed) Marus McCloskey
Marus McCloskey
Brigadier General U.S.A.
Commanding

REPORT OF INSPECTION OF THE 77TH DIVISION

BY

CAPTAIN A. T. RICH

ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL, FIRST ARMY

DATED OCTOBER 8, 1918.

HEADQUARTERS, FIRST ARMY, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Office of the Inspector General.

8 October 1918.

From: Captain Albert T. Rich, Assistant Inspector General, First Army.
To: The Inspector General, First Army.
Subject: 77th Division, cutting off of seven companies and one machine gun company, October 3, 1918.

1. This investigation was made 6-7 October 1918, in compliance with instructions received from Chief of Staff, First Army, 5 October 1918.

2. Circumstances: Conditions which resulted in the cutting off of seven companies and one machine gun company of the 77th Division, as reported by the Chief of Staff, 77th Division, on October 4, 1918.

3. Witnesses interviewed:

Major Gen. Robert Alexander, Commanding Officer, 77th Division, A.E.F.

Brig. Gen. Evan M. Johnson, Commanding Officer, 154th Brigade, 77th Div.

Lt. Col. Eugene Houghton, Commanding Officer 307th Infantry, 77th Div.

1st Lt. Weston Jenkins, 307th Infantry, Commanding Second Battalion.

4. Facts deduced from testimony:

(a) The line up of the regiments from left to right was: 308th, 307th, 306th. (5-6 p. 10).

(b) Liaison was established between regiments before the attack (5-6p.10)

(c) The terrain was covered with jungle (15 p.5), with no roads or paths (29 p.8), and it contained an organized defense (19 p.11) consisting of barbed wire, 60 to 80 feet in depth; machine guns, and artillery (4 p.10), including 77's (3 p.3); and trenches.

(d) In front of the 308th Infantry there was a ravine running apparently in a general direction perpendicular to the front line, flanked on both sides by enemy trenches. This ravine was "open" - not wired across, between trenches.

(e) During the afternoon of 2 October 1918, the 1st battalion, in line, two companies of the 2d battalion, in support, and part of the M.G. Co., all of the 308th Infantry pushed up this ravine (9 p.4) to their objective (7 p.10). This left that flank weak, and General Johnson threw in his Brigade Reserve to protect it. (16 p.8). The Division Commander had previously informed him that the French were ahead of his Brigade. This gave him to understand that his left flank was protected. (5 p.3).

(f) At this same time the 307th Infantry was held up on its own front (6 p.10), and later that night the regimental commander was ordered to push up the ravine, following the 308th, if they could not break through in their own sector. (7 p.10).

(g) The 3d Battalion, 307th Infantry was therefore ordered up this ravine. Due to thick underbrush and darkness this movement was delayed. Toward morning K Co. pushed through and joined the six advanced companies and the M.G. Co. of the 308th. M. Co. was thrown back by the enemy (who was then pushing in to cut off the advanced detachments), (top p.11).

(h) Up to this time there was liaison with this advanced party (16 p.5; 3 p.1). M. Co. was again thrown forward up the ravine, supported by a liaison company, but the enemy had pushed in, the advanced party was cut off, and M. Co. was thrown back again. This was about daylight 3 October (top p.11; 18 p.6).

(i) Half the Division Reserve (3 p.1), one battalion, had been placed at his, General Johnson's, disposal (17 p.6), but part of the 307th Infantry was moving up this ravine (16 p.5) and with the Brigade Reserve posted there, and with the understanding that the French were ahead of him, he did not deem it necessary to use the Divisional Reserve (17 p.6).

(j) An attack, prepared by artillery fire, was made during 3 October but relief of the party could not be accomplished (18 p.6).

(k) On the morning of the 4th, Col. Stacey, Commanding 308th Infantry attacked but was unsuccessful.

(l) That afternoon Col. Stacey attacked again, but again he failed to reach the party (20 p.6).

(m) Col. Stacey protested against using his troops for the second attack (22 p.6). His action on both occasions was "weak in the extreme" and he asked to be relieved, stating that his responsibilities were too great. He wanted to go to the S.O.S. (4 p.1).

(n) The Division Commander ordered him relieved. General Johnson protested that this would disorganize his brigade at that time. The former adhered to his decision and Col. Stacey was relieved at once.

(o) General Johnson, on the morning of the 5th, by order of the Division Commander, led a battalion in attack in person. The attempt again failed (5 p.2; 27 p.7).

(p) Two more attempts at relief resulted in failure (5-6 p.2).

(q) It was impracticable to keep in liaison with the French on the left, who assisted in the operations. The Division Commander took special steps to insure liaison, by sending one of his French liaison officers to the French P.C. to keep him informed, but the liaison broke down (5 p.2). Dis-jointed attacks by French and Americans resulted. (5-6 p.2)

(r) General Johnson's brigade had just received 2100 recruits. They were untrained, many had not fired a rifle, and had never seen a grenade. They had no idea of target designation, and had to be told how, where, and when to shoot. (4 p.13; 11 p.11; 32 p.3).

(s) On 2 October the Division Commander, General Alexander, having informed General Johnson that his flanks were protected by other troops, gave him most emphatic orders to advance (5 p.3), telling him that if he could not do so, he would

get some one else who could. General Johnson at once attacked. His flanks were not protected except later by his support battalion and brigade reserve, and it was in that attack that the 308th Infantry became isolated (8-9 p.4).

(*) On 5th October 1918. Col. Stacey reported to Chief Surgeon 77th Division, 2d echelon, Florent. He was evacuated the same day to Evacuation Hospital #9 at Vaubecourt. Condition was entered as "Medical - Not Determined." The surgeon on duty at this station reported to the Inspector verbally that Colonel Stacey appeared very nervous. Inspector interviewed the Commanding Officer at Evacuation Hospital No. 9 at Vaubecourt and found that Colonel Stacey had been evacuated on the 3d of October to Beaune. Condition was entered as Neurasthenia. He also stated that Colonel Stacey had difficulty in remembering things that had happened. That his loss of memory bothered him and that he appeared very nervous.

5. Conclusions:

(1) That the attacks ordered for the 308th Infantry to reach the out off companies failed because of the actions of Colonel Cromwell Stacey, 308th Infantry. This failure to comply with orders was due either to the fatigue of the command or to the physical condition of Colonel Stacey.

(2) That Colonel Stacey, though traced back to various hospitals, could not be located to be interviewed. It is apparent that he was both physically and mentally affected before reaching the hospital.

(3) That the actions of Colonel Stacey indicate that he does not possess the necessary qualifications to command a combat unit in action.

(4) That the cutting off of this detachment was due to:
a. Liaison with French units on the left breaking down, thus preventing the Division Commander being informed as to flank protection on the left.
b. Pushing the advance energetically regardless of flank protection by other units, in the belief that the enemy was in retreat and that the flanks could be taken care of (2 p.1).

(5) That General Johnson, knowing that the 307th Infantry was in the ravine, having his support battalion and Brigade Reserve on that flank and especially having been told by the Division Commander that the French on his left were in advance of his brigade, should not be censured for not using the Divisional Reserve placed at his disposal. Also that while knowing that the French on his immediate left were behind him (13 p.5) he supposed, from the Division Commander's message, that they were ahead further to the left (top p.4) and that the two allied forces would "pincer" them out of this pocket.

Recommendations:

1st. That Colonel Cromwell Stacey be ordered before a Disability Board under the provisions of G.O. #41, G.H.Q., C.S.

Testimony of Gen. Robert Alexander, taken at Hq. 77th Division, American E.F., 7 October 18, by Capt. Albert T. Rich, Inf., Asst. to Inspector General First Army, American E.F.

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, organization and duties.

A. Robert Alexander, Major General, Commanding 77th Division.

2. Q. Please state the orders, disposition, and movements of the 154th Infantry Brigade from October 2d.

A. On October 2d, I directed both Brigade Commanders, as I had been doing all the time, to push forward vigorously against the enemy lines, although at the time I knew that neither the French troops on my left nor the 28th Division on my right were up with my advance lines. This was done because I coincided with the belief expressed by the Army and the Corps Headquarters, that the Boche was in retreat and that my flanks would be sufficiently taken care of by my own people. Late that afternoon, General Johnson reported that certain elements of his Brigade belonging to the 308th Infantry had reached the line of the Moulin de Charlevaux - La Viergette road on his extreme left without meeting any serious opposition.

3. As at that time I had reason to think that my left flank was open for at least a kilometer, I directed General Johnson to use his Brigade Reserve for the purpose of stepping that gap and at the same time ordered the Divisional Reserve of one battalion up from La Harazee to a location on the 1/20,000 map known as the Depot des Machines. This battalion of the Divisional Reserve was on that flank because I could not concentrate the Divisional Reserve in one body on account of a lack of transverse roads and the impossibility of sending a separate company from a central position to either flank in time to be of any service. I therefore had one battalion behind each flank. The elements of the 154th Brigade which were on the line indicated, Moulin de Charlevaux-La Viergette road, kept up communication in the early part of the night by means of a line of runner posts running back to the left of the right elements of the 154th Brigade, which was the 307th Infantry, but during the night this line of runner posts was cut by the infiltration of the enemy around the flank. I could not understand at the time, nor can I now, except from statements of General Johnson, how this infiltration could have taken place, had the additional troops placed at his disposal been used in a proper tactical manner to stop the gap. Since that time early morning of the 3d of October, I have had no direct information of communication with the elements of the 308th Infantry reported on that line. These elements, as I have ascertained by inquiry, consisted of six companies or parts of six companies of the 308th Infantry, with a part of the machine gun company, the strength of these organizations as reported to averaging some 40 men per organization. Since the morning of the 4th inst., not less than five attempts have been made to break through the hostile line interposing between us and the position reported occupied by the detachment of the 308th Infantry which was under command of Major Whittlesey of that Regiment.

4. Two of these efforts were under the direction of Colonel Stacey of the 308th Infantry. I found from the report of General Johnson that Colonel Stacey's actions on both occasions was weak in the extremeness and on the second occasion he was quoted to me as saying that he wished to be relieved of his command, that he would rather be in the S.O.S., the responsibility being too great for him. I directed General Johnson upon receiving this report, to relieve Colonel Stacey summarily, and to send him down to the 2d echelon, from which place I understand he has been evacuated by the Surgeon, in a nervous condition. Colonel Johnson protested against his relief at that time, saying it would completely disorganize his Brigade, but I adhered to my decision, not thinking to retain a man whose will power and nerve had completely forsaken him.

Immediately on the relief of Colonel Stacey on the 5th inst., I directed General Johnson to take a battalion which had up to that time been in Divisional Reserve and was probably the freshest troops available, and, under his personal direction, make a determined effort to break through the line. This effort was made with the result that it failed after incurring a considerable loss to the troops involved. I believe that Colonel Gordon Johnson saw the latter part of this engagement. During the 5th further effort was made in attempted co-operation with the French on our left. Liaison was established with them under my personal direction by French Liaison Officer who was sent by my order from the 397th to the 398th Infantry for the purpose of securing close liaison. It appears, however, that it was impracticable to secure the close liaison desired, with the result that, altho the general commanding the French Division on my left made an attack with two companies on the LaPallette position, our troops did not move in co-operation with his, and the effort was disjointed and a failure.

A further effort was made on this date by directing the fire of the 155 Artillery on the trench running East and West by co-ordination on the 1/20,000 Map (west 94.2575.58 thence a little north or east to 94.5-75.65). The troops of the 154th Brigade which were in the immediate vicinity of this trench were directed by me to be withdrawn to a position not less than 500 yards south of that trench. That would place that Infantry approximately on the line of the railroad running east from Binarville where they were in close liaison with the French and with whom they were to advance this morning at 6 a.m. I learned from my own Infantry and from the French on my left that this fire instead of reaching the trench indicated fell along the Binarville railroad and on the trenches of my 154th Brigade causing losses to both elements. In the case of my troops, one officer being killed thereby. This incident, inexcusable if correctly reported, is being investigated by me and will be investigated further as soon as I have asked for a competent inspector to be assigned to this Division. Notwithstanding this action, by what ought to have been friendly artillery, the French advanced at the fixed hour but were unable to progress so as to take the trenches and have, I understand, fallen back to their original position. It appears from the report of the French that the troops of this command instead of advancing at 6 o'clock did not advance until 7 o'clock. In consequence the attack was a disjointed effort which resulted in failure.

The average facilities at my disposal have been used to the fullest extent for the purpose of getting in touch with Major Whittesley, and an effort has been made in the way of dropping supplies, ammunition, messages, etc. in the vicinity where he is expected to be. A thick woods make orientation even on the ground very hard, and I am not certain that results from aviation are to be depended upon. It was reported that a flight this morning saw a battalion panel and two company panels in the vicinity where Major Whittesley's command was last reported as being.

Testimony of Brig. General Evan M. Johnson, C.O. 154th
Brigade, taken at Hq., 6th October, 1918, by Captain
Albert T. Rich, Assistant Inspector General, First Army.

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, organization and duties.

A. Evan M. Johnson, Brigadier General, C.O. 154th Brigade.

2. Q. Please state the orders, disposition, and movements of the 154th Infantry Brigade from October 2d?

A. On the night of 1st October, 1918, I received an order in the shape of a Field Order (449) from the Divisional Commander to continue the advance of my Brigade, the objective being a crest or ridge traversing the divisional zone of attack just north of the road and railroad near LaVirgette (97.7--76.7) and Moulindachelevaux (94.5-76.4);

3. A. In conformity with this order based on the Divisional order, I issued my instructions for the attack which called for the two regiments in my Brigade each in its own regimental sector, to move on the designated objective. The regiments at the beginning of the attack were on a general line which may be described between the vertical co-ordinates 294.3 and 296.2 and on a horizontal co-ordinate of approximately 275.3 on the left, and 275.4 on the right. They moved out to the objective, and on reaching a point slightly advanced of the line which they occupied, the left elements ran into heavy fire coming from trenches on the general line of 275.6. These trenches were defended with machine guns, stokes mortars, and 77's.

4. A. The 307th Infantry on the right was held up at practically the same line in front of a line of trenches, running from 294.8 slightly northeast, then south east to 296.0, with a general average position along the co-ordinate 275.5. These trenches were defended with barbed wire, machine guns, etc., as stated.

5. A. After the attack was initiated I left my command post at LaHarizee to move forward to my present command post at Fontaine-Aux-Chaumes. Whilst on my way to this post, General Alexander called up on the telephone and left this message: "You tell General Johnson that the 154th Brigade is holding back the French on the left and is holding back everything on the right." and that the 154th Brigade "must push forward to their objective today. By "must" I mean must, and by "today" I mean today and not next week. You report heavy machine gun fire, but the casualty lists do not substantiate this. Remember that when you are making these reports."

6. A. At this time it was stated the French had taken Lancon, and the 153d Brigade was in advance of my position. As a matter of fact neither was the case. The 153d Brigade was actually in my rear, and relatively very much in my rear, for according to the line of advance they should have been in my front, whilst the French, far from being in Lancon, were five or six hundred meters to my left and rear as I knew from my liaison group, but I thought it probable the other French were in advance.

7. A. On arriving at my new post of command, I learned very shortly that the attack had been definitely held up, and at once prepared an order for the advance at 11:20 that day, and read same to General Alexander over the telephone.

8. A. I immediately communicated to the Divisional Commander the fact of the holding up of my brigade, and was told by him in a most preemptory way, that I must push on at once and everything on my right and left was ahead and I was holding back everything, and that if I could not do this he would get someone that could.

I had already made plans for an advance, and read him the order which I had issued for the new advance, to take place at 12:50. All this time I was under the impression of course, that both my right and left flanks were protected, where, as I have foresaid, the elements on both my right and left flanks were actually in my rear, but in any case I received orders to press on and would have obeyed them regardless of my flanks.

9. A. As a result of my order and the attack, six companies of the 308th Infantry, of first line battalions and two companies of the support battalion, accompanied by two sections of the Machine Gun Company, succeeded in pushing through an interval between the trenches which covered the right and left flanks of the ravine, these trenches at that time not having been connected by wire. One company of the 307th Infantry, which swung to the left and followed the 308th Infantry, also succeeded in passing through this interval.
10. A. The 307th Infantry on the right in its regimental sector coming up against the prepared position which had formerly stopped them, was again definitely stopped and was unable to advance, except the one company which as stated, had succeeded. In passing to the left forward at four o'clock p.m. on receipt of the report of the condition at the front, I telephoned to the Chief of Staff as follows:
11. A. The attack was made as directed in the 307th Regimental sector. The centre was held up by barbed wire, machine guns, hand grenades and infantry. The right was turning gradually around the right flank, and the left regiment had passed by the left of the wire and had captured 16 prisoners. At four o'clock P.M. this message was received from Colonel Stacey of the 308th Infantry, that his advance elements had reached the line 276.0 and were pushing forward:
12. "They have captured two machine guns and have passed one abandoned gun and captured twenty-eight prisoners, one of whom is a lieutenant. This makes a total of forty-two prisoners and two guns. There is a great deal of machine gun fire to the front and flanks. This is decreasing at present. The 308th is almost to its objective. The 307th is held up in the center by barbed wire and is working around the flanks to take the Boche in the rear. That was the conditions at 2:30, the hour the messengers were sent from the front elements. I do not know the exact conditions at this moment, namely, at 2:00 p.m."
13. This message I sent to the Chief of Staff and I added the following which I heard the Chief of Staff, Colonel Hanna, repeat word for word to General Alexander:

"I wish you would state this to the General, Hanna. He told me that if I could not do the work he would get someone that would. I want you to tell him just the conditions which I know to be a fact. On my left, the French are fighting on a line just in rear of my troops. I know this from a Corps observer who has just left them. On my right, the 153d Brigade is on a line 75.5. My Brigade is, and has been, away ahead of anything on my right or left. If he will look at the map he will see it. Relatively, the French should be on a line 275.0, but they are actually back of my line. The 153d Brigade should be relatively on a line 277. but they are also actually in my rear, so these elements are not only relatively but actually behind my troops. I want him to understand absolutely these conditions. The information about the French was given me by a Corps observer who has just left this office, and I know what I am talking about."

14. At this moment, Colonel Hanna called me and said, "General Alexander says, "Congratulations." I replied, "I do not consider it a matter for congratulations, but I wish to put him absolutely in possession of the facts."
15. During the evening, messages from the front showed that Companies A.B.D.D.G. and H. of the 306th Infantry, and it was stated that two companies of the 307th, but was found later to be an error, and but one company of the 307th Infantry - Co. K, was on the line of objectives, the position they still held, accompanied by four machine guns; that two companies of the support battalion had been held up on the left of the ravine by wire at a point about 275.5, not being able to get forward.
16. I made at once, such dispositions as were possible in the forest jungle and darkness to protect this left flank, which I felt was badly exposed, although at the time I was not alarmed as there was communication with the front line battalion and I felt that the 307th Infantry was gradually working around the left flank of the wire in its front, and that this movement would flank out the Germans in front, and allow that regiment to come up on the line. I sent word about 4,00 pm. to the two companies of the support battalion to guard that flank, and I directed my Brigade reserve, consisting of two companies and a Machine Gun battalion, by telephone, to move to a point on the map which will be indicated by the co-ordinates 294.6--275.2 with the idea of guarding the left.
17. The division Commander placed the Divisional Reserve at my disposition should I feel it necessary to use it. This reserve consisted of one battalion of the 307th Infantry, and was well to the rear, and I could not have brought it up that night through the jungles, but I did not actually feel it necessary to bring it up.
18. The next morning under orders from the Division Commander, the attack was resumed with the idea of pushing forward the elements of the line toward the given objective. This was on 3 October, 18. This attack was definitely held up practically in the positions occupied by troops at the commencement, and at the same time it was found that communication with the front line battalion was cut. The Germans had evidently filtered into position on both flanks of the ravine, occupying trenches they had constructed through the Charle Vaux trenches which confront the French Division and extending into my sector. The attack was prepared by artillery fire, and pushed vigorously throughout the day, but was unsuccessful.
19. On the morning of the 4th, orders were issued, based on the Divisional order, to resume the attack with the object of breaking through to relieve Major Whittlesley. I was told the French would assist on the left, and the 153d Brigade on the right. These attacks were launched, preceded by artillery fire, but again were unsuccessful. The French failed to attack.
20. In the afternoon, I again directed Colonel Stacey to endeavor to pass through the interval in the wire, and to use for this purpose the Division reserve and three companies of his own regiment, and for the 307th regiment on the right at the same time to endeavor to push forward through gaps in the wire, which it was proposed to cut with artillery fire. The attack was made, but was unsuccessful.
21. On the following morning I went forward to the post of command of the 307th Infantry to make the endeavor, in conjunction with the 153d Brigade, to pass by the right of our brigade position, and the left of the 153d Brigade position, with the view of getting through to the rear of the German trenches, flanking them and thus getting on the line occupied by Major Whittlesley and his command.

The troops of the 308th were posted and were simply to contain the enemy in front at this time, it being found impracticable to organize for an advance, and be prepared to go forward in liaison with the 307th Infantry on its right and the French on its left, it having been stated that the French would attack on the left this day.

22. Colonel Stacey the night before, on receipt of this order protested against the use of his men, saying that they were worn out and could not do this work, asking to be relieved of his command and sent to the rear. I told him that no action of that kind could be taken now, in as much as it was necessary to relieve the situation at the front, and that we had no other troops at our disposition but those on the line.
23. Whilst at the command post of the Commanding Officer of the 307th Infantry, to which I had gone at six o'clock that morning, I was called up at about ten o'clock by General Alexander and asked how we were progressing. I told him, "very slowly on the right. That the troops were operating in a dense jungle, meeting resistance, but going forward, but that I feared would not be able to get far enough owing to the condition of the country. He asked me what had been done on the left. I told him no advance had been made, as it was impossible for the troops of the 308th Infantry to advance until they were assisted by troops on the right and left.
24. He told me that the French on my left had advanced and taken LaPallette trench well in advance of the line held by the troops of the 308th Infantry, and were complaining that we had not assisted the advance, and directed me, personally, to take four companies of the Divisional reserve and proceed with them and direct their vigorous action against the Boche trench shown on the first column, 20,000 Directeur, as running southeast from LePallue-Pavillion which the French had taken and were depending on our operation to hold it, and to attack vigorously and drive out the Germans which intervened between me and the position indicated.
25. I asked him if he desired me to go personally with what battalion, that should I do so, I would, of course, lose touch with the general situation, and I would be beyond our communication. He replied that he did. I at once assembled the Divisional reserve, consisting of a battalion much depleted in strength, practically 250 men, which that morning had been drawn back from the line which had attacked last night, and with it proceeded to the line held by the 308th Infantry. This line was held by three companies, each company having a strength of about fifty-five men. Two other companies also much depleted, of this regiment, had been sent as a Liaison combat to act with the French in the morning.
26. On arriving at the line occupied by the 308th Infantry, which was immediately facing the German trench line, I found that the French had fallen back and were again in our rear, and that so far from having occupied LaPallette trench, they had attacked, reached it, were counter attacked, and at 6:30 in the morning had been driven out almost as soon as they reached the trench, and had returned to the position where I found them.
27. A message was sent to me by the French Liaison Officer, stating that it was the intention of this French command, to fall back still farther that night, which again left my flanks entirely unprotected. I personally organized and placed the reserve battalion in a position from which to launch the attack. This battalion was to be assisted by fire of the three companies of the 308th Infantry which faced the enemy's trenches. I launched and directed the attack, standing by the side of the Battalion Commander, a captain who had been placed in command by me, as all other Officers in the battalion were lieutenants, the others being killed or wounded. This attack was continued, preceded by artillery preparation from 2:30 until 5:00 p.m., and every possible means of which I was capable of using made, to penetrate the German lines.

The attack was definitely checked by 5:00 p.m. and the men placed in position for the night.

28. I did not at any time think it advisable to allow the elements of my command to proceed so far to the front unsupported, but I was under most peremptory orders to push forward regardless of flank conditions, which I constantly reported, and of which I was at all times fully aware, in spite of the fact that I was told that my flanks were covered and that I was behind, whereas I actually was, and am still, at all points of my line, in advance.
29. The country is a dense jungle, making it almost impossible to manouver and launch an attack, the control passing almost at once to squad leaders after being launched. The command was composed of men who had been about twenty days on the VESLE, subject to intense shell fire and attack, from which place they advanced on August 4th toward the Aisne, this movement continuing until, as I remember, September 17th, with constant fighting, on which date it was withdrawn from the line and brought to this place in caissons and by marching. Rested for a period of five days, after which it was immediately placed on the line, the present attack commencing September 26th. In moving forward the movement was through a mass of wire and trenches, and the ground covered by an undergrowth so dense as to be almost impassible. There were no roads and only one trail which commenced after the German trench line was reached. In order to get food to the men for the first six or seven days it was necessary to use carriers.
30. The conditions of the whole advance have been difficult in the extreme, and I estimate the casualties as known in this Brigade to be about 1600 men in killed and wounded. This number will probably be greatly increased for, as I have stated, the companies do not now average over 70 men.
31. There have been but very few stragglers, these having been rounded up by M.P.'s. but I believe that many men have been lost in the underbrush by dropping back on account of being exhausted, and unable to find their organizations.
32. Many of the men, approximately I should say 1600, joined just before the commencement of the battle, who had never fired a rifle or thrown a grenade. I made this general statement in order that the conditions under which the operations were carried on, may be fully understood. Every effort possible has been made to relieve Major Whittesley, but owing to the fact that he is moved far to the front with his flanks unprotected, and it was possible for the Germans owing to their trench system to move machine guns and troops to his rear and thus cut his line of communication, he has been definitely cut off to this date.
33. I have been in constant close touch with the left and right, and altho frequently told that the troops on my right and left have been in advance of my Brigade, this has never been the case. I am ahead at this writing, and have always been ahead.
34. The number of men at present with Major Whittesley, as last stated by him, is 257, this being the total number of men with the organizations.
35. Five companies of my Brigade do not average over 300 men, and there is nothing to relieve them.
36. The new men came from a Depot Division.
37. My men are in no condition to go forward owing to physical exhaustion.

Testimony of Lt. Col. Eugene H. Houghton, taken at Hq.
307th Infantry, American E.F. 6th October 18, by Capt.
Albert T. Rich, Inf., Asst. to Inspector General, First
Army, American E.F.

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, organization and duties.
A. Eugene H. Houghton, Lt. Col., Commanding 307th Infantry.
2. Q. Are any companies of your regiment missing at the present time?
A. Company K.
3. Q. How long has this company been missing?
A. Missing since October 2d.
4. Q. State the circumstances which led to this company being placed in the position that it is at present.
A. We were ordered to attack that morning. We had been attacking since the morning of the 26th of September. From a position which we had taken up on the far side of this valley, we attacked and advanced until we met strong resistance consisting of barbed wire and machine guns, and artillery. We were again ordered to attack under short preparation later in the day. These orders were transmitted to me by the Brigade Commander who had received them from the Division Commander. I explained to them that the position I was up against was very strong and doubted my ability to get through it, but we would try. I did attack and was stopped in front of this wire which was approximately 15 or 20 meters deep. We met very strong resistance, both machine gun, infantry and artillery fire. We got through a portion of the wire and ran on to a company of Germans of whom we captured 16 prisoners and killed the rest. We were then stopped by an organized defense system consisting of machine guns, wire, etc.
5. The mission of the 308th Infantry on my left was to clean up the valley up which they were advancing. Apparently they did not meet with organized resistance and were able to get through. My objective was the railroad track running roughly east and west from (294.8-276.4) to (295.7-276.75). Prior to the attack we had liaison with the 308th Infantry on our left which was approximately on a line with us.
6. The 306th regiment on our right was approximately a kilometer in our rear, where we had liaison with them through one of our support companies. I pointed out to the Brigade Commander at this time and also the Division Commander that I felt nervous about my right flank in view of the fact that the right brigade apparently were not as far advanced as this Brigade. After it had become apparent that we could not get through the wire, I so informed my Brigade Commander and told him that it would require a good deal of preparation to overcome this resistance. He informed me that the 308th Infantry was apparently making progress.
7. Later on that night he advised me that a portion of the 308th had reached their objective on the railroad track, and instructed me that if I could not overcome the resistance on my front, to pass my troops through the same gap which the 308th had fene through. I therefore issued orders to my 3d battalion commanded by Major McKinney to get in touch with the 308th, and arrange to move his battalion up through the 306th

to the railroad track, and extend to the right along the railroad track, and endeavor to get contact with troops on the right. In the event of his not being able to get contact, he was to turn his right flank back and refuse it. In the meantime I moved the 2d battalion close to the enemy defenses which were holding us up. As this movement took place at night, through very thick underbrush, it was more or less delayed and I received a report from the battalion commander that K. Company had apparently passed through and that M. Company had been turned back, meeting with heavy machine gun fire and rifle fire. I ordered them forward again to attack supported by a liaison company, but they were unable to get through. This was about daylight. This is the last connection we have had with K. Company. We have attacked continuously during daylight hours.

8. Q. About approximately how far is the distance between the present location and K Co?

A. About one kilometre.

9. Q. What is the nature of the terrain in this place?

A. Very thick underbrush, and a very strongly organized defense system. Well wire in, and with a great number of machine guns. The major portion is down hill over which the Hun has observation. Every attack is met with heavy direct and indirect rifle fire, hand grenades, rifle grenades, minenwerfers and artillery.

10. Q. Were these defense constructed after the morning of the 3d or are they a prior construction?

A. They are a prior construction, which we have discovered on a captured German map. They were not shown on our own map. These defenses seem to be a portion of an organized defense. They have since been improved by wire and machine guns. When I called the Brigade Commander's attention to the fact that we were getting pretty far in advance, he informed me that the Division Commander had told him that the French on our left flank were a long ways ahead of us and that the Americans on the right had advanced a long way ahead of us, and we were apparently holding back this attack. This information later was not confirmed.

11. Q. What class of men have you in your regiment?

A. This regiment when I took it over on the 29th of August was in the line between Fismes and Bazoches. It had suffered quite heavily in casualties, and on the German retreat from the Vesle to the Aisne, as this regiment was on the right flank during the entire engagement. Its casualties were very heavy. We came to this area direct from there in trucks. The regiment was short something over 1500 men. A day prior to the present offensive, I received a draft of between 850 and 900 men. It was reported to me by battalion and company commanders, that approximately 90% of these men had never fired a rifle, nor thrown a grenade, nor had they had the ordinary close order drill. Our companies were at such low strength that it was imperative that I use them in the attack. But in so far as possible, I instructed the battalion commanders to utilize them for carrying parties, etc. It became necessary later to employ them in the front line.

12. Q. Did you receive any reports from company commanders or platoon commanders about the additions of these new men?

A. Since the action started it has frequently been reported to me by company and battalion commanders that it was practically impossible to handle these men over the present terrain. They had no idea what it meant to extend and would have to be led around from place to place. They were continually getting lost and straggling, and as their officers and Platoon-Commanders Officers were practically strangers to them, it made it very difficult to handle them.

This list does not include today's (Oct. 6th) casualties, nor does it include K. Company, whose strength at the beginning of the action was 210 men.

About 120 Killed
About 400 wounded
about 350 missing
Total 870

Sworn statement of 1st Lt. Weston Jenkins, 307th Infantry commanding 2d battalion, 307th Infantry, taken at Brigade Headquarters, 6th October, 1918, by Captain Albert T. Rich, Assistant Inspector General, First Army.

1. Q. What was the approximate strength of your battalion at the commencement of the drive?
A. I am informed by the Sgt-Major that he was drawing rations for 700 men at that time.
2. Q. Were many of these men recruits?
A. Yes, a great many of them were.
3. Q. What was the character of these recruits to prior instruction, drill and nomenclature of the rifle?
A. They were not trained troops. Many of them we understand had never fired a rifle. Some had only fired 15 rounds, and some had fired 30 rounds. They did not seem to understand the use of a rifle as a weapon, and seemed to be absolutely ignorant of the bayonet and its use. So far as my inquiries went, and I inquired of many of them, not one of them had seen a hand grenade or a rifle grenade, and many of them did not know what these weapons were. They had never heard of them. Some of them had had elementary instruction in extended order drill, but we found that none of them had enough of it that under the excitement of battle they could get any of it into practice. They had spent a great part of their time since enlistment in travelling, most of them coming from the Western part of the United States. They also travelled considerably after their arrival in France.
4. Q. What Depot Division did these troops come from to your Division?
A. I have heard, but I have forgotten. I am not sure, but it sounds like the 163d. So far as we could learn, their training had consisted mostly of close order drill, but they had not half enough of this to insulate habits of obedience and discipline. They had no idea of the automatic rifle which we use. Some had had a few hours instruction so they informed us, on the Browning. They had no idea of target designation or fire control, and I speak from personal observation, when I say that "under fire" each man had to be told by an officer or non-commissioned officer where, how and when to shoot. They had had no instruction so far as we could ascertain in scouting or patrolling. They knew nothing of advanced guards or outposts and very little of guard duty. They were excellent material individually, but they lack the training and discipline which made the majority of them uncontrollable in battle. I can speak from experience, and all my officers and non-commissioned officers have the same tale, and that is, that their faculties seemed to be dulled or paralyzed when under severe shelling or machine gun fire, and they do not respond to the orders and directions given them.
5. A. In the attack on the afternoon of 5th October 1918, which was personally directed by the Brigade Commander, Lt. Goodwin and I, in passing two companies forward with the idea of passing round the flank of the enemy's trench line, had to stand and personally move small groups of men, under heavy artillery and machine gun fire, from cover to cover, in order to insure their not being killed before reaching the point from which they could approach the flank of the trench line.

HEADQUARTERS, FIRST ARMY
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, FRANCE
Office of G-3

France, 7 October 1918.

The following message was phoned from the Office of the Chief of Air Service, 1st Corps, at 12 noon:

"Chief of Staff, 77th Div. phoned to C.A.S., 1st Corps evening of October 4th, that he was sending down some messages that he wanted us to drop by plane to 1st Bn., 308th Inf. These were received at 2 a.m. of 5th and sent immediately to 50th Aero Sqdn. At daylight of 5th, 2 planes of 50th Aero Sqdn one carrying 3 copies and one carryine one copy, dropped these messages at 294.6 - 276.3, where the Bn. was supposed to be.

Message read: - "Hold out in your present position. Help is being sent you." Just at dusk of the 5th, 2 more planes carrying six copies of the message, reading something like this: "If you are attacked, fight your way back" was sent out and were dropped on the supposed position of the Bn. The planes dropping these messages of the 5th were fired at from both the North and South of the supposed position but not from the position itself. On October 6th, between daylight and dusk, 13 planes of the 50th Aero Sqdn, dropped one basket of carrier pigeons and 40 sacks containing ammunition, food and medical supplies, approximately one thousand pounds on the supposed position. They also dropped orders with the same text as those on the previous p.m. During these missions, one plane failed to return, 2 planes were shot down in our lines and Lt. McCurdy, observer in another plane, was fatally wounded in the neck; - all machine gun fire coming apparently from the supposed position of the lost Bn. This machine gun activity was during the late afternoon and evening. On none of these flights were the positions of this battalion verified. Our aviators were unable to locate this bn., though they flew exceptionally low and fired a signal for position many times. Tried to find them again this morning, but did not succeed and received machine gun fire from the position where they were supposed to be."

Received by Colonel F. P. Lahm