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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

NO. 18 FOR WEEK ENDING 9 DEC. 44

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HEADQUARTERS
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
A.P.O. 655

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HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 655

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FOR WEEK ENDING 092400 DECEMBER 1944

INDEX

<u>Paragraph</u>		<u>Page</u>
1.	<u>GENERAL SUMMARY</u>	1
2.	<u>ENEMY OPERATIONS</u>	3
3.	<u>ENEMY DISPOSITIONS</u>	3
4.	<u>ENEMY STRENGTH ON WESTERN FRONT</u>	4
5.	<u>ENEMY SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION</u>	8
6.	<u>ENEMY DEFENSE TRENDS</u>	10
7.	<u>GAF ACTIVITY</u>	11
8.	<u>ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE NOTES</u>	
	a. Dummy Target Positions.....	12
	b. Radio Communication With the Enemy Verboten.....	12
	c. Evacuation in Western GERMANY.....	13
	d. Estimated Enemy Casualties.....	14

A N N E X E S

- ANNEX 1 - GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE, NORTH FRANCE AND
LOW COUNTRIES
- ANNEX 2 - MILITARY ASPECTS OF TERRAIN, AREA OF
RHEINLANDESS
- ANNEX 3 - GERMAN CLOCKWORK LONG-DELAY FUZE (J-FIEDER 504)
- ANNEX 4 - CONDITION OF THE DEUTSCHE REICHSBAHN
- ANNEX 5 - RHINE ODYSSEY
- ANNEX 6 - GERMAN VIEWS ON THE NORMANDY LANDINGS
- ANNEX 7 - SIXTH SS PANZER ARMY

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Brigadier General, GSC,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
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12 December 1944

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 18
FOR WEEK ENDING 092400 DECEMBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

It is now certain that attrition is steadily sapping the strength of German forces on the Western Front and that the crust of defenses is thinner, more brittle and more vulnerable than it appears on our G-2 maps or to the troops in the line.

Two outstanding facts support this unqualified statement:

a. The first is that there is ample evidence that the strength of the infantry divisions that have been in the line on active sectors since the beginning of our offensives has been cut at least 50% and several other divisions are known to have been virtually destroyed. It is true that these emaciated divisions are supported by ten battered Panzer or Panzer Grenadier type divisions which make up the tactical reserves and by the fattening and still untouched Sixth SS Panzer Army. It is also evident, however, that to keep these infantry divisions alive at all the enemy has had to give them almost daily transfusions from the fortress troops which were once counted as a separate source of strength.

b. The second fact is that while the enemy's minimum replacement need in the face of our offensives is twenty divisions a month, the estimated total available to him from all sources, for the foreseeable future, is fifteen a month. Recently the enemy has not even been able to keep up this rate--his replacement rate for several weeks being only two or three a week.

These two basic facts--the deathly weakness of the individual infantry division in the line, plus the inevitability of the enemy falling still further in replacement arrears--make it certain that before long he will not only fail in his current attempt to withdraw and rest his tactical reserve but he will be forced to commit at least part of his Panzer Army to the line.

The enemy's primary capabilities continue to relate to the employment of the Sixth SS Panzer Army but it may not be possible for the enemy to have complete freedom of choice as to the time and place of its employment. The situation is becoming similar to that which existed at CAEN and ST. LO. In the NORMANDY situation the enemy committed his armor at CAEN with the result that when he needed it to control the ST. LO break-through he had difficulty in disengaging it. It was badly battered by the time it could be brought against the American forces. A break-through by the Third and Seventh U.S. Armies could easily develop into a similarly disastrous "end run" and RUNDSTEDT appears to be determined

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to avoid the NORMANDY mistake. The decision to commit it will be forced upon him, however, by Allied pressure and his inability to supply adequate infantry reinforcements to the line. The enemy, furthermore, may have little discretion as to whether he will commit this armor in the North or in the South. RUNDSTEDT must appreciate that a break-through in the COLOGNE - DUSSELDORF area spells disaster. This is amply demonstrated by the fact that he immediately located this armor behind the line in that area. He must also realize that a break-through of the WEST WALL in the STRASSBOURG - SAAR area would also have the gravest consequences. If the situation deteriorates seriously in the South, he will be forced to transfer some of the armor quickly to that area. At the same time, he must keep a strong reserve in the North to deal with a potential break-through in that area.

If lack of adequate infantry reinforcements requires the commitment of his strategic reserves, the enemy's capability of counter-attacking any bridgeheads established East of the ROER is greatly diminished. Similarly the capability of mounting a major counter-offensive would be virtually destroyed if his armor is already engaged. All of the enemy's major capabilities, therefore, depend on the balance between the rate of attrition imposed by the Allied offensives and the rate of infantry reinforcements. The balance at present is in favor of the Allies. With continued Allied pressure in the South and in the North the breaking point may develop suddenly and without warning.

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-2-

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2. ENEMY OPERATIONS

a. Ninth US Army.- Resistance on the front continued to be stubborn at all points of contact. On 3 December the 115 Panzer Grenadier Regiment of 15 Panzer Grenadier Division launched a counter-attack at LEIFFARTH. Resistance continued until the end of the week in the SPORTZPLATZ where elements of the 363 Division put up stiff resistance. Throughout the period the enemy continued to dig and improve his defensive positions East of the ROER River, and was very sensitive to any patrolling on our part. A patrol which crossed the river on 7 December was driven back, but it encountered no mines on the east bank of the river.

b. First US Army.- Bolstered by the newly arrived 3 Parachute Division the enemy exerted strenuous pressure to keep us away from the ROER River and from breaking out of the forests. On 3 December 3 Parachute Division resisted stiffly advances towards the INDE River, counter-attacking the following day. The 246 Infantry Division also came into the fight in the LUCHERBERG area on that day. On 7 December resistance on the front decreased slightly, but considerable movement West and Southwest of PRUM was observed on this and the last two days of the week, indicating a possible regrouping as two new divisions had arrived in the U.S. VIII Corps area.

c. Third US Army.- The heaviest fighting in the West was concentrated during the week on the Third US Army front where the enemy made use of every possible device to hold the MAGINOT Line forts and the line of the River SAAR until he had gained sufficient time to man the SIEGFRIED Line. On 3 December resistance at first encountered in SAARLAUTERN was spotty as remnants of 48 Infantry Division and 559 Infantry Division were encountered. However, resistance stiffened quickly and the enemy tried desperately to recapture the bridge which had been seized over the SAAR River, even to the extent of using tanks loaded with explosives in an effort to destroy the bridge which his intensive artillery fire was failing to do. Further to the East intensive fighting was going on in SAAREUNION where Panzer LEHR and 11 Panzer Divisions were fighting alongside of 25 Panzer Grenadier Division. On 4 December approximately half of SAARLOUIS RODEN was cleared despite a determined counter-attack by 21 Panzer Division, while heavy fighting continued in the vicinity of SAAREUNION. On the 7th stiff fighting was going on in FORRACH, while on the northern portion of the XII US Corps front the enemy started to dig in. At the end of the period intensive fighting raged in the bridgeheads in the SAARLAUTERN and SAARQUEMINES areas, as the enemy tried desperately to stave off any further penetration of the SIEGFRIED Line in the former, and attempted to parry the thrust towards SAARBRUECKEN in the latter area.

3. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS

a. General.- Despite considerable losses in the battle for the SIEGFRIED Line between TRIER and KARLSRUHE, the enemy continued to be miserly in his commitment of reinforcements in that area, leaving the badly battered divisions in that area to do most of the fighting. Panzer LEHR apparently found the going a bit tough, because after the first of the week it was no longer in evidence, and the old standbys, 11 and 21 Panzer, aided by 25 Panzer Grenadier, were the armor that did all of the fighting. On the First US Army front the enemy continued to display his sensitivity towards any possible thrust onto the COLOGNE Plain, and two new divisions arrived to replace those lost by attrition, 326 Infantry

coming from DENMARK into the northern VIII US Corps front, and 352 Infantry arriving from MUENSTER further to the south. Although there were continued indications of movements out of 21 Army Group area, none of the divisions reported to be moving have as yet been identified elsewhere.

b. Twelfth Army Group

(1) Ninth US Army. - There were no changes in the enemy's disposition on the front, the newest arrival, 363 Infantry Division, doing the bulk of the fighting. Contact was lost with 10 SS Panzer Division, and it may have withdrawn for its refitting which was promised when it left the ARHEM area nearly a month ago. Enemy strength continued to be a nominal 8 divisions, equivalent to 3-4 divisions (27,000 men) with some 90 tanks.

(2) First US Army. - The arrival of 352 and 326 Infantry Divisions on the front of the VIII US Corps filled in the gaps created by the gradual movement North of the divisions into the more active fighting, particularly 353 and 89. The bulk of the fighting on the front fell to 3 Parachute Division, although it appeared to have suffered quite heavily, despite its short stay in the line, and 353 and 89 Infantry Divisions were engaged in heavy fighting. Enemy strength on the front increased to a nominal 15 divisions, but due to losses equivalent strength remained at approximately 8 divisions (79,000 men), with an estimated 65 tanks.

The Sixth SS Panzer Army, with 1, 2, 9 and 12 SS Panzer Divisions, continues to hold its position East of the ROER River behind the First and Ninth US Army fronts, with an estimated strength of 32,000 men and 320 tanks.

(3) Third US Army. - One division was dropped from the strength on the front as all of the units on the front with the exception of 19 and 416 Infantry Divisions in the northern XX US Corps sector were actively engaged in bitter fighting. The burden of the counter-attacks was as usual placed on the three armored divisions, 11, 21 and 25 Panzer Grenadier, as Panzer LEHR defaulted. Of the infantry divisions, 36 and 347 supported by 17 SS Panzer Grenadier were bearing the burden. There were 9 nominal divisions on the front, equivalent to 4-5 divisions (37,000 men) with an estimated 130 tanks.

c. Sixth US Army Group. - There were no major changes in enemy dispositions on the front, except for the dropping of 338 Infantry Division. The enemy appeared to be attempting to withdraw to the East of the RHINE with his heavy equipment and best troops. The enemy had an equivalent 13 divisions on the front, equal approximately to 5 divisions (38,000 men), with an estimated 35 tanks.

d. Twenty-One Army Group. - There was no change in the known enemy dispositions on the front, with 17 nominal divisions, equivalent to 10 divisions (78,000 men), with approximately 25 tanks.

4. ENEMY STRENGTH ON WESTERN FRONT

(SEE FOLLOWING PAGES.)

NINTH US ARMY FRONT

DIVISION	COMMANDER	ESTIMATED TOTAL PERSONNEL	ESTIMATED TOTAL TANKS	EST. TOTAL ARTY BNS	ARMY	CORPS
10 SS Pz	HARMEL	3,000	15	3	Out of Contact	
9 Pz	ELVERFELDT	4,000	45	3	5 Pz	47 Pz
363 Inf	DEITLING	4,000		3	5 Pz	12 SS
340 Inf	TOLSDORF	3,500		2	5 Pz	81
3 Pz Gr	DENKERT	3,000	15 (A.G.)	3	Out of Contact	
2 Pz		?	?	?	Reforming	
49 Inf	LUEBBE	2,500		1	Out of Contact	
183 Inf	LANGT	3,500		3	5 Pz	12 SS
Misc		3,000	15	12		
TOTAL		26,500	*90	29		

FIRST US ARMY FRONT

DIVISION	COMMANDER	ESTIMATED TOTAL PERSONNEL	ESTIMATED TOTAL TANKS	EST. TOTAL ARTY BNS	ARMY	CORPS
246 Inf	LIST	3,500		2	5 Pz	81
12 Inf	ENGEL	2,000		1	5 Pz	81
47 Inf	BORK	2,000		1	5 Pz	81
3 Pzcht	WADTIN	4,000		3	5 Pz	81
353 Inf	MAHLMANN	3,500		2	7	74
344 Inf	KOENIG	2,500		2	7	74
89 Inf	BRUNS	2,500		2	7	74
272 Inf	KASSEMALIA	5,000		3	7	74
277 Inf	VIEWEG	5,500		3	7	74
18 Inf	HOFFMAN- SCHÖNBORN	5,500		3	7	66
326 Inf		7,000		3	7	66
26 Inf	KOKOTT	5,500		3	7	66
352 Inf		7,000		3	7	80
212 Inf	SENSFUSS	6,000		3	7	80
116 Pz	WALDENBURG	5,000	50	3	Out of Contact	
MISC		12,000	15	25		
TOTAL		78,500	65	62		

* INCLUDES BOTH TANKS AND ASSAULT GUNS.

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DIVISION	COMMANDER	ESTIMATED	ESTIMATED	ESTIMATED	ARMY	CORPS
		TOTAL PERSONNEL	TOTAL TANKS	TOTAL ARTILLERY		
1 SS Pz	MAHNKE	8,000	80	BNS 4	6 SS	Pz
2 SS Pz	BAUM	8,000	80	4	6 SS	Pz
9 SS Pz	BOCK	8,000	80	4	6 SS	Pz
12 SS Pz	KRAEMER	8,000	80	4	6 SS	Pz
TOTAL		32,000	320	16		

THIRD US ARMY FRONT

DIVISION	COMMANDER	EST	EST	EST	ARMY	CORPS
		TOTAL PERS.	TOTAL TANKS	TOTAL ARTY		
416 Inf	FFLIEGER	2,500		BNS 2	1	82
19 Inf	BRITZMEIER	2,500		2	1	82
21 Pz	FEUCHTINGER	4,000	25	3	1	82
559 Inf	MUEHLEN	1,500		1	1	13 SS
347 Inf	GRIMBERG	2,500		2	1	13 SS
36 Inf	WELLM	2,000		2	1	13 SS
17 SS Pz Gr	OSTENDORF(?)	2,500		2	1	13 SS
11 Pz	WIETERSHEIM	4,500	40	3	1	58 Pz
Pz LEHR	BAYERLEIN	5,000	*40	3	Out of Contact	
MISC		10,000	25	12		
TOTAL		37,000	*130	32		

* INCLUDES BOTH TANKS
AND ASSAULT GUNS.

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-6-

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SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT

DIVISION	COMMANDER	ESTIMATED:	ESTIMATED:	ESTIMATED:	ARMY:	CORPS
		TOTAL PERSONNEL	TOTAL TANKS	TOTAL ARTILLERY:		
:25 Pz Gr	:BURMEISTER	2,000	15	BNS ?	1	:58 Pz
:361 Inf	:PHILIPPI?	2,500		2	1	:58 Pz
:245 Inf	:SANDER	3,000		3	1	:89
:553 Inf	:UTZ	1,500		2	1	:89
:256 Inf	:FRANZ	3,000		3	1	:89
:198 Inf	:SCHIEL	1,500		2		:19
:716 Inf	:RICHTER	2,000		2		:19
:16 Inf	:HACKEL	2,500		2		:19
:269 Inf	:WAGNER	3,500		3		:19
:159 Inf	:DERNER	2,500		2		:19
:189 Inf	:ZORN	2,500		2		:19
:30 SS Inf		3,500		2		:19
:708 Inf	:FLECKMANN	2,500		2		:19
:MISC		5,000	*40	10		
:TOTAL		37,500	*55	37		

TWENTY-ONE ARMY GROUP FRONT

DIVISION	COMMANDER	EST	ESTIMATED	ESTIMATED:	ARMY:	CORPS
		TOTAL PERSONNEL	TOTAL TANKS	TOTAL ARTILLERY:		
:85 Inf	:CHILL	3,000		2		Out of Contact
:346 Inf	:STEINMULLER	3,000		2	15	?
:711 Inf	:BOSE	3,000		2	15	?
:719 Inf	:SCHWALBE	5,000		3		Out of Contact
:59 Inf	:POPPE	3,500		2	15	?
:712 Inf	:NEUMANN	4,000		2	15	?
:331 Inf		3,000		2		Out of Contact
:6 Precht	:PLOCHER	6,500		3	15	?
:84 Inf	:KOSLACK	3,500		2	1	Precht: Precht
:190 Inf	:HAMMER (?)	4,000		2	1	Precht: Precht

* INCLUDES BOTH TANKS AND ASSAULT GUNS.

TWENTY-ONE ARMY GROUP FRONT (CONT'D)

DIVISION	COMMANDER	EST	ESTIMATED	ESTIMATED	ARMY	CORPS
		TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL		
		PEK-SONNEL	TANKS	ARTILLERY: BNS		
406 z.b.V.	SCHERBENING	1,500		1	1	2
2 Prcht		7,000		3		Reforming
5 Prcht	WILKE (?)	7,000		3		Reforming
7 Prcht	ERDMANN	4,500		3	1	86
180 Inf	KLOSTERKAMP	4,500		2	1	86
176 Inf	STUMM	2,000		2	5 Pz	12 SS
15 Pz Gr	DECKER	4,000		3	5 Pz	47 Pz
MISC		9,000	* 25	10		
TOTAL		78,000	* 25	49		
TOTAL FOR WESTERN FRONT		289,500	* 685	225		

* INCLUDES BOTH TANKS AND ASSAULT GUNS.

5. ENEMY SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION

a. Supply. - Colonel K. Meyer, Military Commander of METZ from 6 October until his capture on 20 November, and previously Commanding Officer of the 257 Infantry Regiment on the Russian front, has given from memory some rough percentages of the extent to which requisitioned materials were actually delivered during the first nine months of 1944, and for some period of time earlier:

PERCENTAGE OF REQUISITION RECEIVED

WEAPON	Up to Jan	Jan to Apr	Apr to Sept
	1944	1944	1944
MGs (light and heavy)	50 to 75	33	33
AT guns (all calibers)	75	50	33
Mortars (8.1 and 12 cm)	100	75	50
Mortars (5 cm)	?	0)
Inf Guns (light and heavy)	50	30	less than 30
Small arms, automatic	75	50	30 to 40
Ofenrohre	-----	less than 50	-----
Close-combat weapons (grenades, etc.)	44 to 50	25 to 50	25 to 50
Optical instruments	40	20	20

PERCENTAGE OF REQUISITION
RECEIVED

<u>AMMUNITION</u>	<u>Up to Jan</u>	<u>Jan to Apr</u>	<u>Apr to Sept</u>
	<u>1944</u>	<u>1944</u>	<u>1944</u>
MG	100	100	100
AT guns (all cal.)....	100	50	60 x
Mortar, 8.1 cm.....	60	50	50
Mortar, 12 cm.....	50	50	75 xx
Inf gun, light.....	75	75	100 x
Inf gun, heavy.....	-----	more than 50	-----
Small arms, automatic.....	-----	less than 50	-----
Ofenrohr.....	50	50	50
<u>SIGNAL EQUIPMENT</u>			
Field telephones.....	90	60	less than 40
Telephone cable.....	80	50	25
Radio sets.....	100	70	50

x - Increase due to decline in requisitions, arising from shortage of weapons.

xx- Explanation for increase not known to P/W.

It is not considered appropriate to regard the decline as a measure of the deterioration in enemy military supplies, since priority during the period may have shifted from divisions in the line to newly-formed units. Even if the figures cannot be relied upon for this purpose, however, the relative shortages among the various items conform by and large to the picture of the supply position built up from separate prisoners of war on the Western Front. The emphasis given to the shortage of signals equipment is, however, new.

b. Gasoline. - The Working Committee on Oil Production of the Combined Strategic Targets Committee has estimated enemy oil production for the past three months:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>METRIC TONS</u>	<u>PERCENT OF PRE-RAID NORMAL</u>
Pre-raid (April 1944)	1,344,000	100
September 1944	310,000	23
October 1944	400,000	30
November 1944	445,000	33
December 1944	558,000	42

Some uncertainty attaches to the October and November figures because of lack of cover of three synthetic oil plants. The estimate for December represents the anticipated recovery of oil production, without allowance for prospective attacks.

Total oil products production for November and December are estimated in breakdown among separate products as follows:

	PRE- RAID (000 METRIC TONS)	NOV (000 METRIC TONS)	PER CENT OF PRE- RAID NORMAL	DEC (000 METRIC TONS)	PER CENT OF PRE- RAID NORMAL
Gasoline.....	532.....	178.....	34%.....	243.....	46%
Kerosene.....	100.....	17.....	17%.....	18.....	18%
Gas/Diesel oils...	284.....	112.....	40%.....	150.....	53%
Fuel oils.....	280.....	104.....	38%.....	106.....	38%
Lube oils.....	148.....	34.....	23%.....	41.....	28%
TOTAL.....	1344.....	445.....	33%.....	558.....	42%

c. Transport. - For a discussion of the condition of the DEUTSCHE REICHSBAHN, see Annex No. 4.

Separate prisoner of war accounts have now been received of two crossings of the RHINE River in the RUHR area by tactical units coming to the Western Front and using ferries. The later of these reports relates to mid-November and deals with replacements for the 10th Company, 115 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 15 Panzer Grenadier Division, which crossed at ORSAY (A272255) North of DUISBURG. P/W crossed the river in a ferry carrying 30 men and two vehicles. It is not known whether this means of crossing the river was due to lack of capacity of the bridges in the area or to keep the ferries operational against the possibility of eventual emergency use.

d. Materiel. - The Economic Warfare Division of the American Embassy in LONDON has estimated that the production of KOENIGSTIGER (TIGER II) tanks during the first six months of 1944 constituted about 35% of total TIGER output amounting to 120 tanks per month. It is expected that the proportion of KOENIGSTIGER to total TIGERS has increased since the middle of 1944, and may reach as much as half or three-quarters of the total by March 1945. Production of total TIGER tanks is not expected to reach a level higher than 150, and may be considerably lower currently because of the bombardment of the HENCKEL Plant at KASSEL in early November. Production was probably cut in half by these raids at the sole producer of TIGERS, but a rapid recovery was expected.

There is no information available on output of self-propelled guns mounted on KOENIGSTIGER chassis. The manufacturing problems involved in converting from tank to assault-gun production in a single factory are not regarded as formidable.

6. ENEMY DEFENSE TRENDS

a. Twelfth Army Group

(1) Ninth US Army. - SHAETF reports that a defense line is rapidly being developed along the main road from DUSSELDORF to VIERSON with NEUSS as its southern anchor. Since this line would join the existing defenses which extend North through GELDERN to the RHINE at REES, it would afford flank protection for the RUHR in the event of an Allied breakthrough onto the Southern extreme of the KOLN Plain. Photo coverage during the past week reveals that the enemy is intensifying his effort in the ERFT River Line by digging many more fire trenches along the east side of the ERFT Canal from BEDBURG to GREVENBROICH.

(2) First US Army.- The ROER River Line was strengthened by additional trenches from DUREN to ZULPICH, and the defenses around DUREN itself were thickened. Along the SWIST River, an upper tributary of the ERFT, additional defenses were dug in the vicinity of METTERNICH, so that an almost continual line of defenses extend in the SWIST and ERFT River Valleys from ADENDORF North to NEUSS. Prisoners touring the EIFEL state the villages of BERZBURG (South of DUREN) and SCHOENECKER (South of PRUM) are encircled by entrenchments. The town of BOLHEIM located on the NEFFEL River East of DUREN also has perimeter defenses.

(3) Third US Army.- There were no significant developments of enemy defenses in this sector during the past week.

b. Sixth Army Group.- A fairly good source reports additional defenses across the RHINE Plain Northeast of BASLE consisting of over 50 bunkers between LORRACH and SCHOPFHEIM. Also there are tank traps that have been built along many of the roads in this area. The numerous reports of fortifications in this area indicate that the enemy is extremely sensitive to the Allied capability of crossing the RHINE and by-passing the BLACK FOREST by advancing Eastward along the Upper RHINE Plain.

c. Twenty-One Army Group.- A large part of the lowlands between the RHINE and the WAAL Rivers Southwest of ARNHEM has been inundated by the breaching of one of the RHINE dikes. The River IJSEL has overflowed its banks to the flood dikes for practically the entire stretch from DEVENTER to KAMPEN. As a result of this flooding the enemy's defense line on the eastern bank of the river has been inundated. A considerable increase in entrenching activity was noted to the South and West of ZWOLLE, and around the perimeter of UDEM. Numerous minor defense positions are appearing along the coastal areas of Northwest GERMANY. These positions are not related in any way as yet and consist almost entirely of isolated slit trenches and machine-gun emplacements.

d. Interior GERMANY.- A fair source reports that defenses consisting of camouflaged casemates and pillboxes exist across the RHINE from KOLN in the vicinity of MULHEIM. Many more anti-aircraft sites in the vicinity of DUSSELDORF have been converted into infantry strongpoints. F/W heard from refugees that German civilians and Russian prisoners of war are digging anti-tank ditches and dugouts along the East bank of the RHINE between KOLN and WESEL.

7. GAF ACTIVITY.- Enemy air action over the front, while continuing to employ about 200 sorties per day, increased in effectiveness during the past week. Successful ground attack missions were reported on two occasions in the middle of the day, with casualties among our troops fairly heavy. An increasing proportion of the attacks was mounted at night, and more of the units appeared to be carrying bombs. As suggested previously, fighters engaged in strategic defense have appeared over the front, serving primarily as cover for the tactical fighters more skilled in ground attack. Eight prisoners from J.G. 4, taken from planes shot down during the attack of 3 December, imply that the 86 fighters sent out by their unit (one primarily employed in strategic defense) were dispatched very hurriedly and without proper briefing. Their mission was designed to take advantage of bad weather moving in from West to East, closing in the bases of Allied fighters while leaving the

enemy sufficient time to harass our ground troops and return to base. Significantly, none of our fighters was met, but flak defenses were intense and accurate. The unit was available for this mission only because the Eighth Air Force did not operate against strategic targets on 3 December.

Ju.88's have shown increased activity recently, with up to 75 sorties being recorded on a single night. There is some evidence that at least one Gruppe (30 aircraft) has moved its bases considerably nearer to the front. He.111's continued their nightly re-supply missions from bases in the FRANKFURT/MAIN area.

An interesting sidelight on the gasoline shortage has appeared in two recent reports that fully assembled Me.109's (wings detached) are being transported by rail. Apparently the great need to conserve gasoline, together with the shortage of competent ferry pilots, has forced the GAF to deliver new aircraft in packaged lots direct from factory to operational fields.

8. ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE NOTES

a. Dummy Target Positions.- Two captured documents, one an order of the 1010th Security Regiment (motorized) dated 4 October 1944, and the other a training memorandum published by the commanding general of the 82nd German Corps dated 15 October 1944, each direct the preparation of an increased number of dummy target positions to mislead American artillery batteries. The first said, "Experience has shown that the Americans mostly fire from a map. Thus, they have for days fired upon old fortifications; although there never was a single German soldier in them. We must accommodate the Americans in this respect. This can be done only by fully camouflaging the positions we occupy and disclosing not even the slightest movements during the daytime, while at the same time skillfully and cunningly preparing dummy positions which will divert the fire from positions actually occupied". The training memorandum, observing that "the enemy's artillery observation works very fast and very skillfully", added that "the enemy is registering more and more accurately on our battery positions and other heavy weapons. Therefore, steps must be taken immediately to insure that during the coming nights positions are changed as often as possible. For each position of the artillery or other heavy weapons, there must be at least two alternate positions. Every battery, etc. which has fired during the day must change its position not later than the following night whenever possible. Roving guns will be used extensively. Divisions will from now on report in the first morning report how many batteries, etc., have changed their position during the night."

b. Radio Communication with the Enemy Verboten.- The Commander-in-Chief of GERMANY's Army Group G, in an order dated 1 October 1944, issued a command "under the provisions of the Fuehrer's Order No. 7" which suggests that any future radio communication to Allied troops initiated by German troops should more than ever be carefully weighed--for it may come from high authority, and it may be laying the foundation for a trap. Citing an instance where the signal unit of a German armored division arranged by radio with Americans for the evacuation of a wounded German officer in which the officer was detained by the Americans "in violation of their promise" and allegedly "murdered in cold blood", the order stated, "I command the following:

"Commanders of signal units who let their subordinates establish radio communication with the enemy, radio operators who do so on their own responsibility, and commanding officers who order or permit such action, will be shot immediately, without trial by court-martial, by orders of the next higher officer, in chain of command, having the rank of a battalion commander. The units are to be instructed that we are fighting a treacherous, brutal and cunning enemy. All 'Rip-Van-Winkle' tendencies must cease. So-called German-Americans are particularly loathsome as a rule".

c. Evacuation in Western GERMANY. - That the Nazi Party intends to keep on fighting, if proof is needed, is amply manifested by the Party's efforts to evacuate civilians from the threatened areas in Western GERMANY. The history of the evacuation attempt illuminates, further, the popular reaction in GERMANY to the military crisis; and it demonstrates that the old control system was not strong enough to meet the demands of the new situation, but had to be bolstered by various drastic improvisations, the efficiency of which has still to be tested.

(1) The Decision to Evacuate. announced from the outset as a Party matter, was attributed to HITLER himself and was carried out by Party authorities. The motive was probably threefold: for its obvious morale value to offer refuge from the advancing enemy; to conserve to the Party and deny to the enemy the threatened manpower resources; to prevent a weakened internal strength in the REICH which would inevitably develop if news spread throughout the country that sizable sections of the RHINELAND and other "lost" territories were living under and collaborating in an orderly Anglo-American occupation. It is the fear of this latter consequence, a political fear, that best explains the trouble taken to evacuate persons of little value to the war effort, and the use of strong-arm methods to move unwilling civilians back from the front.

(2) The Evacuation Plan called for evacuation by stages, the women, children, old and disabled going first, and able-bodied males remaining as long as safe in order to work on fortifications in the meantime. The able-bodied males were put to work and in practice generally moved out, if at all, about two days before the Allied armies moved in. The Party's promises were illusory--promises that "evacuation will take place into areas where all preparations for proper accommodation have already been made". Evacuees travelled chiefly by foot, only pregnant women, children under 12, and the disabled getting transportation. The Plan assumed there would be resistance; all evacuation orders and instructions contained statements like these: "Disobedience will be dealt with on the spot...Anyone impeding the work of evacuation, or refusing to be evacuated, not only endangers his own life but will necessarily be regarded as a traitor to the cause and be dealt with accordingly..."

(3) Resistance to Evacuation did in fact occur. In virtually every community entered by the Allied armies, substantial portions of the population had remained behind, hiding in their own homes, in ruins, or in nearby forests or caves. Allied interrogators discovered they were motivated by a desire to stay with their homes and property; by their seeing nothing in evacuation but a difficult, continuous retreat ahead of the Allied armies; above all, by

sickness to death of war. They had been encouraged to remain behind by Allied propaganda, by native anti-Nazis, by the early departure of local Nazi officials, and by the Wehrmacht's opposition to having transport monopolized and communication lines clogged for the purpose of evacuating women.

(4) Nazi Enforcement Measures. - Naturally enough, the Party did not take such resistance lying down. The Nazis immediately set to work shoring up their control system with one emergency measure after another. An early move was the organization of trench-digging. The political shock troop organization was expanded and its forces from no less than eight Gaue were operating in the Gau KÖLN-AACHEN early in September. Mobile squads of SA and SS began to appear, implementing formal evacuation orders with characteristic ruthlessness. Some accounts tell of actual pitched battles in village streets between civilians and SA and SS. Latest and most sweeping of the improvised controls is the Volkssturm and its Standbat-taillone which carry the threat of court-martial to evaders, have power to deal with Wehrmacht objections to evacuation, and will tend to deter local Party officials thinking of flight.

d. Estimated Enemy Casualties

(1) Prisoners of War

(a) First US Army

Cumulative enemy P/W captured to 092400..... 210,514

P/W captured during current offensive to 092400..... 9,414

(b) Third US Army

Cumulative enemy P/W processed to 092400..... 134,605

P/W processed during current offensive to 092400... 31,649

(c) Ninth US Army

Cumulative enemy P/W captured to 092400..... 60,214

P/W captured during current offensive to 092400..... 8,436

(d) Cumulative enemy P/W captured or processed through cages by U.S. Forces, not including Seventh U.S. Army, for period ending 092400..... 405,333


(e) P/W captured or processed through cages during current offensive by U.S. Forces, not including Seventh U.S. Army, for period ending 092400..... 49,499

(2) Recent estimates of total enemy casualties by Armies have resulted in the following figures for Twelfth Army Group during the first nine days of December:

Prisoners of War.....	8,750
Estimated Killed.....	5,469
Estimated Long-Term Wounded.....	<u>7,742</u>
TOTAL	21,941
TANK LOSSES.....	79

GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE NORTH FRANCE & LOW COUNTRIES

AS OF 9 DEC. '44
ANNEX NO. 1 TO TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 18




LEGEND
— ENEMY CONTACT (Front Line)
▨ GAINS SINCE LAST REPORT

BRUSSELS
ARDENNES

B Seventh
G First

Detailed map section showing military units and terrain. Units are marked with diamond symbols containing numbers: 352, 212, 416, 19, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300. The terrain is marked with 'ARDENNES' and 'Müchlen'. A hatched area is labeled 'GAINS SINCE LAST REPORT'. A solid black line is labeled 'ENEMY CONTACT (Front Line)'. The map also shows 'St. Avold' and 'St. Wendel'.



HARR

HILLS

WESER

WALD

TEUJOBURGER



NERRA


FELDA

UNLOCATED
XXVIII (P) Pcht

XXVIII (P) Pcht

XXVIII (P) Pcht






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GBR
Seventh
First

First
Nineteenth



ANNEX NO. 2 TO TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 18

TERRAIN OF THE PFALZER BERGLAND

SUMMARY

The most favorable paths from LORRAINE to the strategic FRANKFURT, MAINZ, DARMSTADT triangle are through that part of the PALATINATE called PFALZER BERGLAND, including the LANDSTUHL depression to the south and the valley of the NAHE to the north.

The "BERGLAND" is a moderately difficult rolling hill country largely open or in cultivation, but complex in origin and therefore transitional in relief, growing successively more difficult from south to north. It is essentially a drainage saddle lying between higher and more rugged barriers to the north and south, and forming a gap connecting LORRAINE with the valley of the RHINE.

SAARLAUTERN and ZWEIBRUCKEN are the two portals to the BERGLAND, lying north and south respectively of the SAARBRUCKEN obstacle formed by the forest-covered area of the coal fields.

These two portals lead to three possible lines of subsequent action in the eastward negotiation of the BERGLAND, namely, first, the LANDSTUHL depression via the KAISERSLAUTERN gate and the valley of the PPRIMM to the RHINE; second, a broad front penetration along the mid-axis of the BERGLAND; and third, the valley of the NAHE.

Whether these three lines are exploited simultaneously or not, the second line of action is considered the best, being a broad front penetration utilizing an adequate road net, through rolling hills, only the steep slopes of which are forested, and crossing only minor headwater streams.

TACTICAL EFFECT OF THE TERRAIN

1. The following discussion of the tactical effect of the terrain of the PFALZER BERGLAND is based on various Engineer and I.S.T.D. reports covering in detail the general topography, military aspects of the terrain, and critical terrain features, none of which will therefore be summarized. These basic considerations, however, limit tactical use of the terrain. Moreover, strategic factors also determine to some extent the degree of risk in the military negotiation of moderately difficult terrain.

2. The PFALZER BERGLAND may be considered moderately difficult country from the point of view of military action. However, it is relatively the best available passage through the natural barrier of rugged country reaching from AACHEN to BELFORT. It is therefore a critical feature, and its examination reveals canalization within the compartment imposed by the transitional character of relief. It is not a uniform or homogeneous sub-area, but varies from the peculiar formation of the

LANDSTUHL depression in the south, the rolling hills in the center, and the deep-cut valleys of the NAHE system flanked by the HUNSRUCK Mountains to the north. (See cross-sections on attached sketch map.)

3. LORRAINE terminates at the SAAR. There are two portals from LORRAINE to the BERGLAND, separated by the coalfield area reaching northeastwardly from SAARBRUCKEN. These coalfields lie generally within the heavily forested region forming a military obstacle separating the ZWEIBRUCKEN portal from the SAARLAUTERN portal. The southern approach to the LANDSTUHL depression through the ZWEIBRUCKEN sector is northward up the BLIES Valley utilizing the upland to the east and west. The immediate vicinity of ZWEIBRUCKEN is the bottleneck to this avenue. East and west-flowing branches of the BLIES are in themselves not serious obstacles to military crossing, but the steep sidewalls of some of the valleys and the high ridges projecting into the valley of the BLIES have been utilized by the enemy as the strong basic position of the WEST WALL. The WEST WALL in this sector, while not as deep as in the SAARBRUCKEN-SAARLAUTERN reach, is very dense, and well sited with respect to terrain. It has been described as one of the strongest sectors of the SIEGFRIED Line. East of ZWEIBRUCKEN, reaching nearly to PIRMASENS, a deeply but not intricately dissected plateau known as the WESTRICH, presents a pattern of flat blocks of open or cultivated plateau, with new valleys cut deep and steep-sided, limiting opportunities for broad maneuver. However, negotiation of this terrain is favored by a preponderance of ridge or upland roads, probably well drained and not defiladed, by the open landscape and the scarcity of compact settlement with the attendant risk of staggered hedgehog defense. West of ZWEIBRUCKEN the landscape is more mature in relief, but just as rugged insofar as steep slopes are concerned, and with major roads leading through valley and forest defiles to the LANDSTUHL depression. Of these two lines of approach, that to the east is probably preferable from a tactical point of view, although a detailed stereoscopic comparison is not at present available.

4. The northern portal to the PFALZER BERGLAND is via the SAARLAUTERN sector, by-passing the forest-covered coal fields to the north. The SAAR River is the major natural obstacle, immediately backed by the WEST WALL in a degree of depth and density directly reflecting the enemy's appreciation of the natural advantage of this approach. The BERGLAND country touches the SAAR in this sector. It is a region of low monotonous hills with orientation favoring northeastward penetration. A penetration here may be exploited in at least three obvious lines of action, the first or northernmost leads northeastwardly along the converging upper drainage of the NAHE to descend along the well established routes in the narrow valley of the NAHE itself to the RHINE plateau. The second is by a broad front along the major axis of the BERGLAND, through open rolling country. The third is to the east, to enter the LANDSTUHL depression, leading through the KAISERSLAUTERN gate and the PPRIMM Valley to the RHINE. (See attached sketch map showing drainage, routes, sub-areas and cross-sections.)

5. The first of these corridors, the NAHE Valley, is the most difficult, since movement is canalized along valley roads where defense is relatively easy. The second corridor, a broad front penetration through the center of the BERGLAND, would encounter terrain generally similar in broad relief to that already crossed in eastern LORRAINE, but favored by fewer and smaller patches of forest, by an adequate transverse and longitudinal network of roads, and by less severe water crossings than the wide north-flowing rivers of LORRAINE. However, this

country is dominated in the north and east by scattered prominent volcanic hills which would afford the enemy some advantage in observation and fire, from which concealment and cover would be limited to valley protection with much less forest cover than found in LORRAINE. The third route of advance, skirting the coal fields to the north, is coincident with the second route as far as the region of NEUNKIRCHEN. Its subsequent junction with the LANDSTUHL corridor would be in the neighborhood of HOMBURG or LANDSTUHL. Passage of the LANDSTUHL corridor is gentle and easy as far as gradients are concerned, but this is a relatively narrow valley, dominated to the east by the SICKINGER HOHE, and obstructed by woods and bogs, and subject to flooding.

6. In conclusion, the transitional character of the terrain of the BERGLAND imposes a variation in the severity of passage, canalizing most favorable lines of action through two portals and along three subsequent lines. Of these, even under simultaneous exploitation of all three, the center passage through the axis of the BERGLAND is probably the most favorable.

7. The following extract is from a popular and obviously Nazi-inspired treatise in the Geopolitic of the PFALZ and SAAR, and emphasizes the strategic importance of this compartment from the enemy point of view. Its penetration opens up both the HESSIAN Corridor (see Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 16) and the KRAICHGAU:

LANDSCHAFT UND STADT IN PFALZ UND SAAR (1936)

By Eugenie Löffler

The series of gaps leading from the LORRAINE rampart, including the MOSELLE gap, the PALATINATE (PFALZ) gate and the SAVERNE Pass, are very important. However, the MOSELLE gap is ultimately blocked by the High WESTERWALD (surrounding KOBLENZ) which can only be by-passed to the south, while the SAVERNE gap is obstructed as a passage into Southern GERMANY by the northern part of the BLACK FOREST. The KAISERSLAUTERN depression, on the other hand, is the old pathway of the LORRAINE-PALATINATE invasion route, running from METZ via SAARBRUCKEN directly towards the densely populated northern part of the upper RHINE Basin with its many cities and the MAINZ, FRANKFURT, WORMS triangle. At FRANKFURT, this passage contacts the MAIN River line, GERMANY's narrowest and most sensitive spot, and from there offers free access to the heart of GERMANY by way of the HESSIAN Basin. At the same time, this passage reaches out towards MANNHEIM and SPEYER, opening a path to Southern GERMANY through the lower NECKAR and the KRAICHGAU.

The SAAR is the key to the most important transverse axis of the upper RHINE Basin: the PALATINATE is the land around this major axis.

River terrace country and northern mountain region extend over both the PALATINATE and the SAAR, the sandstone forests of the western PALATINATE continue without change into the large forest areas of the SAAR.

The PALATINATE is described by W. H. Riehl as "a topographic fragment". It lacks a natural focal point. It and the SAAR constitute anything but a geographical unit. Its natural transitional character is evident in the landscape which includes segments of larger patterns, and show a changing picture in different parts of the country.

INCLOSURE NO 1 TO ANNEX NO 2
 TO TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
 WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 18






MILITARY ASPECTS OF TERRAIN



AREA OF


PFALZER BERGLAND



LEGEND


- RIVERS 
- ROADS:
 - MAIN 
 - AUTOBAHN 
- ROADS IN DEFILE 
- CORRIDORS 
- WATERSHED DIVIDES 
- TERRAIN SUB-AREAS 
- CITIES 
- INTERNATIONAL BORDER 
- AIRFIELDS
 (RUN OF 1,000 TO 2,000 YDS.) 
- ENEMY DEFENSE AREAS 





INTERNATIONAL BORDER
 AIRFIELDS
 (RANGE OF 1,000 TO 2,000 YDS.)
 ENEMY DEFENSE AREAS

POPULATION INDEX OF CITIES
 (50,000 TO 600,000)




10000
 R. RHINE

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


PROFILE 'C'


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

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PROFILE 'A'




PROFILE 'B'



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Map copied from GERMAN book "Rural Areas
and Towns in Palatinate and Saar" - Eugenie Loffler
Illustration No.2, Page 4

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ANNEX NO. 3 TO TENTH ARMY GROUP
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 18

GERMAN CLOCKWORK LONG-DELAY FUZE

(J. FEDER 504)


Further advance into German territory will probably disclose additional incidents of delayed-action bombs such as occurred in the Third U.S. Army and Sixth Army Group areas. These bombs contained from 150 to 1,500 pounds of TNT and employed the "J-Feder 504" time delay fuze. Time bombs for the most part were located in culverts but were found in the artillery barracks and public utility buildings at ST. AVOLD (62554). The type of clockwork delay-igniter thus far encountered is illustrated in full size and two smaller photos show the method of disarming. The igniter is well made and can be set to fire for any time from ten minutes to 21 days. It is enclosed in an aluminum or bakelite case and the clock-work portion can be seen from the attached illustration to be about the size of a "C" ration can.

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
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GERMAN CLOCKWORK LONG-DELAY FUSE (J-Feder 504)

FUNCTIONING



1. At end of delay period, lever arm on rotating control disk in clockwork bears against trip lever, disengaging striker.
2. Striker, driven by spring, explodes percussion cap in base.



TYPE. Clockwork


COLOR. Black

CASE. Aluminum casting or Bakelite


EMPLOYMENT. For large-scale delayed demolitions. May be set for 14-hour to 21-day delay

GERMAN CLOCKWORK LONG-DELAY FUSE (J-Feder 504)

DISARMING



1. Remove set screw marked SCHLAF to allow spring to push safety block between striker and cap, and screw in plug marked BLIND.



2. Turn red mark on release ring from GEHT (go) to STEHT (stop), arresting clockwork.
3. Remove fuze and detonator from charge.

CONDITION OF THE DEUTSCHE REICHSBAHN

The comb-out of the Reichsbahn, which reached its peak with total mobilization of August 1944, has resulted in the capture of a variety of German railroad workers on the Western Front, and the acquisition of a wealth of information on the railroad system. One of the most informative of these prisoners is a young, anti-Nazi station master from CASTROP RAUXEL, who had also served in various capacities at DUISBURG-RUHRORT, RECKLINGHAUSEN and ESSEN. Interrogated at length by PWI team, Third US Army, and by A.P.W.I.U., IX Air Force, he provides broad confirmation of the current intelligence picture of the German railways, with elaboration of interesting detail, and correction of minor misconceptions. The report below relies heavily on this testimony, but includes information from other sources. The prisoner was called up on 30 August 1944, but kept in some touch with Reichsbahn performance through correspondence and observation.

1. Rail Traffic.- Overall rail traffic in GERMANY has fallen in the last several months, but no estimate is available of the extent of the decline. Passenger traffic was only 20% of pre-war normal in September, with subsequent timetable revisions cutting back the schedule even further. According to the prisoner, coal traffic in the RUHR had declined by August from some 5-6,000 cars (representing not actual coal cars but units of 10 tons of coal) to 3-4,000 a day. According to an OSS report emanating from VIENNA, coal loadings in the RUHR had fallen from 6,000 (presumably units) to 2,000 a day during the first week of November, of which only 400 reached their destination on schedule. Turn-around time for coal ("O") cars circulating within the RBD ESSEN has increased by a third; on longer journeys turn-around time has risen from an average of six days to approximately two weeks. The cause of the longer turn-around time, and of the reduction in speed of all traffic was assigned by the prisoner as 50% overloading of trains, 40% Allied air action and 10% to adverse weather and breakdowns in passage. The overloading of trains, required in coal because of the shortage of "O" cars, in turn produced by the lengthening of turn-around time, has reduced speed of trains and led to longer halts at stations. The causation in this instance is both circular and cumulative.

Speed of trains on the open line has in practice been reduced because of the poor shape of engine boilers on the one hand and overloading on the other. Deterioration of the roadbed, particularly in sections where it has been bombed and repaired, also contributes to the loss of speed on open line and through stations.

Prisoner was not aware of a shortage of locomotive coal, having seen reserves in the HANNOVER area in June 1944 which were sufficient for a week of normal or two weeks of restricted operations. He opined further that the DR would always take steps to assure its coal supply, except possibly in electrified areas where power failed. The OSS report already cited states that locomotive coal reserves are down to 48 hours' supply, without distinguishing among RBDs. Prisoner was convinced that no food shortage through distribution failure would be encountered in the RUHR, where reserve stocks took up the slack resulting from fluctuations in transport. Failure of food supplies to meet the ration in other areas might be related to the problem of evacuees and the additional burden which their requirements imposed on the railroads.

Military traffic in RBD ESSEN in August 1944 amounted only to five per cent of total traffic. It is not apparent whether military movements were routed around the RUHR, as seems to have been the case with recent TCOs, or whether this average was representative for a wide section of the country. The decline in total traffic, in which military movements had undisputed priority, has probably increased the percentage considerably.

Train composition has somewhat altered. According to other prisoners, the "I" train is no longer standard, whereas "K" and "S" combinations continue to be used. The previous regulations requiring four empties either side of a car of ammunition and two empties flanking inflammable material have been relaxed to reduce the number of axles hauled. Empties are still retained behind the locomotive--to minimize the danger from fighter attacks on the engine; but the danger of collision has been reduced because of slow speeds, so that empty cars no longer trail the caboose of ammunition trains.

2. Rolling Stock. Prisoner confirmed the seriousness of the locomotive position, but took almost an equally dim view of freight-car prospects. Statistically, he estimated that 20% of passenger cars, 25% of box cars, 70% of "O" wagons and 70% of locomotives stood in need of repair. Unserviceability is not this high, since coal cars with bullet-holes in them continue in use carrying a coarser variety of cargo, and locomotives are kept running until they actually break down. Locomotive unserviceability was estimated as at least one-third in August 1944 (SHAEF quotes a figure of 42% in mid-October.) One later observation is relevant: the MULHOUSE freight yard had 85 locomotives at the time of capture (end of November); 30 were unserviceable, divided between 15 in need of minor and 15 of major repairs.

Insufficient and inadequate lubricants, leading mainly to axle problems, was cited as a prime cause of unserviceability but the prisoner lays especial emphasis on overloading. Freight locomotives acquire coal and water and dump ashes after 150 kilometers, passenger locomotives after 250 kilometers (compare the former 400 kilometers maximum); the minor overhaul after two weeks has been abandoned in favor of waiting for a breakdown. On this occasion, the recalcitrant element is repaired, and the remainder of the machine overhauled. The reason for the apparent neglect is the shortage on the one hand, and the crowding of the repair shops on the other.

The prisoner is not impressed with strafing as a cause of unserviceability. In ESSEN, one locomotive was sent to the shop by fighter strafing every four days. Nearer the front, and away from the protection of the RUHR flak, the rate of casualty was sixteen times greater as four engines succumbed each day in RBD COLOGNE. Engines were hospitalized for one to two weeks after strafing. The DR estimates that ten roofed cars (passenger and freight) will require patching for each locomotive punctured. Repair for these--open cars are left unrepaired--again take one-two weeks. These figures, for August, imply that 40 locomotives and 400 covered cars were under repair as a result of fighter damage in COLOGNE at any one time. Prisoner's information on this subject may well be out of date for October and November.

Prisoner repeated without endorsement--for he had no estimate--the cliché of the DR worker that they need 30,000 new locomotives and 300,000 new freight cars. The number of locomotives in RBD ESSEN in August 1944 was remembered as 1,057, and included some veterans of two wars which the DR had parted with in 1919 as reparations and triumphantly reclaimed in 1940. The prisoner guesses that GERMANY has one-third to one-fourth fewer locomotives today than in 1939, due to wear and tear, and in particular to the first winter of Russian war.

In rolling stock, prisoner was satisfied that "O" cars were extremely short. He was unaware of surplus in other categories of car, at least in RBD ESSEN.

3. Traffic Handling.- Economic traffic, of which coal and food are the most important, has been seriously interfered with by damage to marshalling yards. Prisoner cites several examples of through running (which is all that affects Wehrmacht traffic) being re-established 24-48 hours after a heavy raid, of light marshalling being restored in two weeks, and regular freight classification after three weeks or a month. In the heaviest raid of which he was aware to the end of August, against HAMBURG in June 1944, the restoration of through traffic took two full days after 800 hits in the marshalling yard.

Traffic through a yard or station is seriously reduced if resort must be made to hand signalling. Prisoner cited two trains per hour per through track as normal for through-working (higher rates can be achieved); hand signalling slashes this rate to one train per hour per track. In marshalling, bomb damage which requires change-over to hand signalling currently requires railroad labor to learn the yard, which few temporary workers have come to know. This takes a week for German workers. With Russian labor, language complications introduce further delays. Finally, the road-bed of a heavily bombed marshalling yard, when repaired, is unstable and slows down the handling of overloaded cars.

As an indication of the steps taken by DR to meet the difficulties occasioned by reduction in marshalling facilities, prisoner cited the recent order of the RHEINISH-WESTPHALIAN Coal Syndicate; which is charged with responsibility for distributing RUHR coal. This organization, to minimize coal car handling, now redistributes orders among collieries and requires mines to make up full trains, for single destinations. This rationalization has eased the burden on marshalling facilities, such as those at HAMBURG, and by reducing sorting and moderated the lengthening of coal-car turn-around.

Prisoner was asked whether the dilution of labor had decreased the capacities of freight classification yards, apart from bomb damage. His reply was that longer hours, additional Russian labor, and night working compensated for the loss in capacity due to inefficiency.

Locomotive dispersal in RBD ESSEN in August took the form of scattering locomotives within the yard, rather than in outlying stations. A direct hit was required to destroy each locomotive. This dispersal made for little loss in efficiency. Train dispersal took the form of breaking up rakes. This applied even on through traffic, where an overnight halt was required.

4. Personnel.- Prisoner agreed that railroad workers in GERMANY are tired and hungry, but doubted that they could be induced to sabotage or strike. The comb-out, he stated, had increased the average age of the German railroad worker and thus reduced the ranks of those who might be encouraged to overt action against the Gestapo. Average age in the laboring sections of the DR, for fit men, is well over 50. The railroad, left to its own devices to produce its quota for total mobilization, decreed that with certain exceptions based mainly on efficiency, men would be offered up to the Wehrmacht by age groups according to the grade of official or worker. In the highest grade, men born in 1915 or later were turned loose; in the next three grades, from inspector down to worker, men born after 1908, 1903 and

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1890 respectively, made their way into field-gray if they could pass the lax physical requirements. Some bribery (Schmierpolitik) entered into the question of who was called up, but prisoner, who is thoroughly anti-Nazi, did not believe that a studied attempt has been made by the Party to weed out trouble-makers.

Foreign workers are used up to 75% in track maintenance, largely in gangs of 50, and up to 50% in shops and traffic handling. In the main, workers are Russian civilians of Ukranian extraction, now given equal pay and food to the German workers, and not inclined to rebellion. German women workers piece out the gaps left by the lack of German male railroaders; their contribution has not met with universal masculine approval, despite the efforts of the railroad authorities.

Prisoner does not believe that railroad running or yard personnel is much terrified by the prospect of death at the hand of strafing or rail center attacks. Casualties, to prisoner's knowledge, have thus far been relatively light in both sorts of attacks, except for one incident at BOCHUM when the alert was late. Locomotive engineers and stokers, under duress, have become skilled at the rapid application of brakes and the near simultaneous dive for the ditch.

5. Conclusion. - Prisoner emphasizes that despite the strains to which it is subjected and the blood-letting of personnel, the Reichsbahn remains extremely skilled in improvisation, and the ordering of priorities. In particular, he remains impressed with the technical virtuosity displayed in such matters as the routing of trains, except in the disorganized area of the battle front. This admiration includes a share of self-esteem, since the prisoner spent five months writing timetables for evacuation trains leaving the RUHR. Moreover, prisoner has had no experience with the damage to tele-communication centers in recent attacks on FRANKFURT a/M and KARLSRUHE. The performance of the Reichsbahn in moving the heavy volume of military rail traffic to and laterally along the front in the past three months, albeit at a considerable cost in other traffic and the attrition of the German economy, appears to justify this estimate.

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ANNEX NO. 5 TO TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 18

RHINE ODYSSEY

From an old-time boatman-on-the-RHINE comes an Odyssey as eventful as HOMER's, though lasting only months instead of years. It includes nine changes of cargo during a two months' trip up the RHINE from AMHEM to BASLE, the carrying of German booty from HOLLAND to GERMANY, inspections by the Gestapo which failed to uncover the Polish prisoners hidden in the cargo, arrest by the Gestapo, the sinking of ships around by the "Americans", refusal of pay because of delays--and the "complete demoralization" of his companions on the voyage.

The trip, "the gloomiest trip I have ever made", began with the loading of 1,250 tons of wheat stolen by the military authorities in HOLLAND. The RHINE boat left AMHEM only a few days before the "battle" began in that sector of HOLLAND. I had hardly crossed the German frontier before an SS guard stopped my boat. The SS examined the ship from top to bottom. My boat was one of the innumerable RHINE ships, 1,200 tons, and powered by a Diesel engine which uses heavy oil. Incidentally, the oils now used are of very bad quality and give off an odor which is insupportable unless one is accustomed to it."

The boatman's first port of call was MILLERICH where he stopped to unload the stolen wheat. "At first there were no wagons for my cargo. After three days' wait, two trains took charge of the cargo. The loading and unloading was performed by men and women carrying the load on their backs. During the following three days the boat was loaded with iron-ore destined for REES".

Upon his arrival in REES one day late from his fixed schedule, an "SS Oberbonzo" had the boatman imprisoned for twenty-four hours. "These gentlemen, the SS, realize that we do a great deal of sabotage and that we sail as slowly as possible in order to cause the maximum obstruction on the RHINE. However, they are without proof of our bad intentions. Necessary material is lacking everywhere, and that gives us an excuse justifying the delays.

"At ORSAY I loaded some machines and motors destined for the aviation factories at LAIBERWORTH...

"Upon arriving at SOMM which lives under the terror of an SS Major--also 'ein SS BOHEMIN'--I was refused my pay because of the delays. There they placed an additional burden on my boat of steel cables destined for the front. Delivery was to be made by me at KOBLENZ."

When the boat arrived at KOBLENZ there were no available railroad cars upon which to load the cables--"those which I saw had been burned out"--so they were loaded onto "wagonettes drawn by horses to be delivered to the Army of the RHINE. After ten days' stop I was finally able to continue the trip, this time with a cargo of airplane propellers. These propellers were going to the Arada Airplane Factory at OFFENHEIM.

"At OFFENHEIM I took on a load of scrap-iron for MANNHEIM and KARLSRUHE. Upon arriving at MANNHEIM we learned that there would be a forced stop, navigation on the RHINE being obstructed.

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"At KARLSRUHE I loaded coal for ALT-BREISACH. In the meantime we were attacked at least ten times by the Americans. I can certify that I saw with my own eyes 12 ships of at least 22,000 tons sink".

At BREISACH a load of potassium salt was taken on, destined for BASLE, and at PRANZHEIM three men were rescued from the river who turned out to be escaped Polish prisoners of war. "The police visited my ship for the last time at REMBS, but without discovering the three Poles who were hidden in the potassium salt".

The boatman expresses it as his belief that the German civil population cannot hold out until the end of this winter. As for the population along the RHINE, it is "undernourished and the children are frightfully dirty. The shortage of shoes and clothes is being particularly felt during these winter months. In certain ports the unloading cranes no longer exist and the discharge of cargoes is performed by men and women up to 60 years of age. They are human wrecks who are obliged to work like slaves. The lot of the prisoners is still worse-- many have fled". The boatman expressed the further belief that the population in the RHINE cities had only one wish: to be liberated by the Americans.

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ANNEX NO. 6 TO TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 18

GERMAN VIEWS ON THE NORMANDY LANDING

(Based on Special Tactical Studies No.
30, by MRS)

SUMMARY

A review of some 23 documents from high German headquarters reveals that in general the Germans were taken by surprise, not only in regard to time and places chosen for the NORMANDY landing, but also by the unprecedented Allied superiority; and that in many respects they were not prepared for the type of invasion which they were forced to face.

1. Planning.- The careful planning and preparation of the NORMANDY landing operation is stressed in all reports made by higher German headquarters. The following are the main points:

a. Such thorough reconnaissance and intelligence work that landing troops had maps showing all defense installations, strongpoints, obstacles and armed minefields--but omitting dummy minefields.

b. New and improved types of landing craft and equipment were used, including the "seagoing bazooka", rocket-firing craft, concrete-filled ships and pre-fabricated landing-stages.

c. All branches were carefully trained in their special tasks and in cooperation--landing troops received training in ground fighting on terrain similar to NORMANDY's, paratroops studied models, naval artillery became familiar with engaging land targets, etc. Entire landings were rehearsed on the English coast.

d. Secrecy and the factor of surprise were strictly safeguarded. The timing and place of the NORMANDY landing definitely took the defenders by surprise.

e. Strong preparatory air attacks preceded the landing operation. They were directed not only against the coastal defense zone itself, but against the rear area also, and even against the home theater, where the entire supply and communications net was thrown into confusion.

2. Unorthodox Landing Schedule.- In their pre-invasion planning and defense training the Germans anticipated a large-scale operation only where the following conditions were fulfilled: Point of landing in the neighborhood of at least one good harbor, not on cliffs unless with a wide foreshore, in deep water without reefs or shallows, where strong currents and surf were absent; Time of landing in fair, calm weather with a rising tide at new moon. In point of fact the Allies commenced the landing at full moon, away from large harbors, and landed at some points on sheer cliffs and in water stated by German Naval experts to be impassable by reason of underwater reefs and strong currents; in a strong wind (5-6 mph) with low cloud ceiling and a rough sea. The first waves went ashore at lowest ebb.

3. Conduct of Landing

a. Preliminary aerial softening up blanketed not only coastal defenses but the entire transport system up to 100-130 miles to the rear. Minefields were blown up and almost all position-finding installations were destroyed. Sabotage increased.

b. The Allied airborne landings, accompanied by incessant air attacks, had the double task of protecting the flanks of the invasion front, and cracking the coastal defenses from the rear, to open a way for the seaborne troops. The operations of the para and airborne troops were only partly successful. The British 6th Airborne Division did not succeed in linking up with the troops landed by sea; this may be due to the fact that reinforcements arrived only after twenty hours. The American 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were indeed able to link up with the seaborne forces as planned, but were prevented from launching an immediate attack to cut off the COTENTIN Peninsula, as planned, by German counter-attacks.

c. Preliminary naval bombardment and air bombing of terrible intensity began with the first light at 0521 hours on 6 June. All reports agree that the concentration and effectiveness of the naval and air bombardment were far greater than any previously experienced in ITALY. Fire was not opened on all points simultaneously, but in succession, with special fire concentration on places where it was intended to land. This terrific bombardment and bombing blew up all minefields near the coast, barbed wire entanglements, all field works, all flamethrowers, Goliath tanks (remote control) held in readiness, and eliminated signals communications, searchlight cables and position-finding installations. But even more disastrous than the material effect was the moral effect on the German troops--giving them a feeling of utter helplessness, which in the case of inexperienced recruits caused fainting or indeed complete paralysis.

d. Disembarkation took place on a broad front at ebb tide, which left the foreshore with its entanglements dry in a depth of approximately 700-850 yards. First to land were Commandos and Ranger Battalions, whose task was to remove the remaining mines and open lanes through the foreshore obstacles, marking them with flags. The Allies' precise knowledge of the positions of obstacles, and defended positions and their armament, is attributed primarily to espionage on the part of the civilian population, which was not evacuated. The lanes through the obstacles led directly to the adjoining roads, which had been blocked only at narrow places, or not at all, for the benefit of civilian traffic. It appears not only that the Germans were in error as to the timing and choice of landing points, but that also the overwhelming efficiency of the Allied naval and air bombardment and the unloading scheme itself took them by surprise. In accordance with their experiences hitherto, they were of the opinion that heavy material--light tanks excepted--would be unloaded only after several hours, so that the main role in smashing the invasion would fall to the long-range coast artillery, while local and strategic reserves finished off the troops landed. But in reality, most of the coastal batteries were eliminated by the preliminary bombardment, and those surviving were paralyzed by smoke screens. The Allies employed, by the side of the infantry, considerable numbers of tanks and heavy support weapons, which were most effective in supporting the penetrations of the infantry.

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4. The Fighting Ashore.- In their first advance the Allies pressed boldly inland, attacking artillery positions still intact but simply by-passing strongpoints not yet out of action. German counter-attacks cost the Germans heavy losses and were smashed by tanks and the fire of heavy naval guns. The extremely accurate firing of the warships eliminated every important target and individual heavy weapon and made the movement of strategic reserves impossible within range of their guns (20 miles inland). Cooperation between Allied air and ground forces was complete. High praise was paid by the commander of the German 6th Parachute Rifle Regiment to the marksmanship of the American parachute and airborne troops.

5. Deception and Strategy.- British and Americans proved themselves masters of camouflage. While paratroops were being dropped the rear area was heavily bombed to force anti-paratroop spotters and local reserves to take cover. In addition, dummy paratroopers filled with explosive were dropped, to mislead and split up the defenders. In one instance paratroops were dropped in the middle of a Panzer division just as it was developing a successful counter-attack, which was thus thrown into confusion and frustrated. Allied direction finders found German battle headquarters, and several attempts were made to interfere with the fire control of heavy German weapons and the tactical handling of German tank forces by giving false orders by radio.

6. German Weaknesses

a. Personnel.- Troops in the coastal defense area were suffering from overstrain because for weeks before the invasion they had been working every daylight hour building field works. A high percentage of the men were convalescent personnel "fit for labor service only" or "conditionally fit", or recruits with four weeks' training. Also, the commander of the German 6th Parachute Rifle Regiment complains that his company commanders were not equal to their battle tasks, so that regimental and battalion commanders had to supervise the execution of their orders themselves. Commanders up to the appointment of divisional commander evinced a remarkable lack of initiative and decision. Rear positions were constructed in ignorance of the requirements of the modern war of attrition.

b. Equipment.- 100 Panzer Replacement and Training Battalion was equipped with old French tanks, no more than 32 of which were in running order when the invasion started. The remainder of the Battalion, organized on an infantry basis, was armed with French machine-guns without sights, and obsolete rifles manufactured between 1900 and 1918. German front-line troops did not share the good opinion of close combat anti-tank weapons held by their higher headquarters: The "anti-tank rocket discharger" (Panzerfaust) was characterized as inaccurate, the "anti-tank rocket projector" (Puppehen) was called too heavy and immobile. Only the "grenade launcher" (Ofenrohr) was said to be effective.

c. Tactical Shortcomings.- The smoke barrages put down in the course of the Allied landing compelled the German artillery to fire blind. No provision had been made for the automatic weapons to lay down defensive fire on fixed lines in the dark or in smoke. Even in the later stages of the landing operations the German coastal artillery lacked flexibility and coordination. The seashore obstacles were only adequate at high tide, and left the beach unprotected at low water. Mines were laid along the coast without the assistance of the Navy, and this task was therefore not properly done. When Allied tanks broke through onto the roads leading inland, there were no

emergency barriers or engineers to improvise such. The GAF was entirely absent, the anti-aircraft artillery too scattered. Only two days' stock of ammunition was kept in the strongpoints, although there were rations for fourteen days.

7. Unsatisfactory German Expedients

a. Points of main effort, originally conceived by the Germans as an offensive concept to build up overwhelming local superiority at the point intended for a break-through, were recommended as a universal remedy against Allied superiority. Recommended were anti-aircraft points of main effort to protect the tactical employment of Panzer units, railroad line points of main effort, labor point of main effort consisting of engineers and civilians, artillery, anti-tank, mines, etc., points of main effort.

b. Tactics.- Responsible German commanders did not draw the same lessons from invasion experiences. Some thought strategic reserves and attached artillery should be located further forward and employed to strengthen defensive fire, whereas others stressed that defense should be conducted not in a single line but in depth and so reserves must be held in the rear. Still others see the salvation of defense in strongpoints, to be held to the last if cut off.

ANNEX NO. 7 TO TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 18

SIXTH SS PANZER ARMY

1. INTRODUCTION.- One of the major questions now facing Allied Intelligence personnel is "What is the present status and intended employment of the Sixth SS Panzer Army?" To answer this at the present time we have only the meager statements of a few prisoners from units in Fifth Panzer Army area behind which the four SS divisions of Sixth SS Panzer Army are now located, plus more or less detailed reports, some conflicting, on the organization and state of training of Panzer LEHR Division which was refitted and reorganized as a part of Sixth SS Panzer Army. Information on the four SS divisions is very scanty; however, one report on 12 SS Panzer Division indicates its training and personnel at least is somewhat similar to that reported of LEHR. From a study of Panzer LEHR Division which was committed into battle on 23 November, certain facts stand out which may well apply to the other divisions of Sixth SS Panzer Army; however, one must also take into consideration the fact that LEHR was the only non-SS unit in the Army and may for this reason have received unfavorable treatment in the issuance of personnel and equipment.

2. PANZER LEHR DIVISION

a. Reorganization and Training.- From the beginning of September to as late as 12 October the battered remnants of Panzer LEHR Division began assembling in the PFORZHEIM area where some replacements were received into those units still able to accomplish the task of controlling the influx of newcomers; however, no basic reorganization of the division took place during that period. On and after 20 October, the division moved into the PADERBORN area where the effort was made to totally reorganize and refit the division under Sixth SS Panzer Army. In this area, the various elements of the division were broken down into units as small as platoon and billeted in widely separated parts of WESTPHALIA. Reports on the training of the units of the division during this period are slightly conflicting due primarily apparently to a lack of coordination in training schedules; however, all agree that there was little training given to company-size units and no field exercises of battalion size or larger were ever carried out. This latter is attributed to the slow influx of personnel, lack of transportation and shortage of gasoline. Prisoners from 901 Panzer Grenadier Regiment report frequent "spit and polish inspections" while weapon training (with the exception of introductory lectures on the grenade-launcher and bazooka) was non-existent. Prisoners from 902 Panzer Grenadier Regiment report that marksmanship was emphasized at the expense of team and field exercises.

b. Organization.- The organization of the new Panzer LEHR Division was apparently intended to follow that of the 1944 Panzer division. However, due to lack of personnel and equipment, the division was not able to reach that standard. The two Panzer Grenadier regiments each have two battalions of three rifle and one heavy company each; the 901 Panzer Grenadier Regiment being armored while the 902 Panzer Grenadier Regiment is motorized. The tank component of the division has been reported both as a regiment and as a battalion, with the latter believed more likely. The only other component on which any report has been received is the anti-tank battalion which has three companies, each with twelve 75 mm anti-tank guns, 40 tractor-drawn, plus 12 light machine guns.

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c. Personnel.- The personnel of Panzer LEHR Division is made up of former members of the division which had fought through NORMANDY plus a large influx of raw recruits from replacement training units and some personnel from depleted units which were incorporated bodily into the division. In 901 Panzer Grenadier Regiment the 1 Battalion is composed almost entirely of personnel from the old regiment while 2 Battalion is 70% made up of the former 509 Mobile Battalion which was swallowed bodily and its units renumbered 5, 6, 7 and 8 Companies. A few NCO's and other replacements from Panzer LEHR were fitted into the new 2 Battalion to bring it up to the standard of the 1 Battalion. The total strength of 901 Panzer Grenadier Regiment before commitment, including both combat and service elements, was approximately 1,250 men. Little is known of the personnel of 902 Panzer Grenadier Regiment. However, as in 901 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, the replacements arrived in dribbles and came mainly from replacement and training units. The total strength of the regiment before commitment was given as 1,520 officers and men. From the above, it can be seen that at the time of commitment, the regiments had not reached their full strength in personnel. A report of 7 November stated the deficiency in personnel (mainly NCO's for the two Panzer Grenadier regiments) was 2,500 men for the division, indicating that the other components were comparatively up to strength.

d. Equipment.- The biggest surprise connected with the LEHR Division was its deficiencies in equipment both during its training period and upon commitment into battle. Although this unit had been undergoing refitting for almost two months, much of the equipment with which it was committed to battle did not arrive in the hands of the troops until a few days prior to their departure from their training areas. As late as 16 November, the 901 Panzer Grenadier Regiment had only those weapons which had been salvaged from their retreat through FRANCE, and those that some of the units contributing to the reforming had provided; companies were still lacking in about 50% of rifles and machine guns, and almost all heavy weapons. On 17 November, a large part of these missing weapons arrived, on the same day the regiment was alerted to move. At the time of commitment, the division was still lacking badly in motor transport and each company of the six light companies of 901 Panzer Grenadier Regiment was short 50% of the armored half-tracks or a total of 60 for the regiment. The heavy companies were badly deficient in 75 mm anti-tank guns, 120 mm mortars and 20 mm anti-aircraft guns. The anti-aircraft platoon of 901 Panzer Grenadier Regiment received the personnel to man their 20 mm anti-aircraft guns but as no guns arrived prior to commitment, the personnel was used to man the self-propelled 75 mm anti-tank guns after only two hours' instruction on the piece. To make matters worse, these 75 mm anti-tank guns were equipped for telescope sights, but no sights had arrived for them. The 130 Tank Battalion was supposed to have two companies of 17 MK IV tanks each and two companies of 17 MK V tanks each, or a total of 68. From interrogation, however, it is clear that the division had only about 25 tanks and an equal number of assault guns when committed. The 130 Reconnaissance Battalion was short about 50% of its armored cars and half-tracks on 7 November and since the Panzer Grenadier regiments were also very short of the same type vehicles, it is doubtful that the Reconnaissance Battalion was able to increase its strength much before commitment. The anti-aircraft Battalion was intended to have 18 x 88 mm anti-aircraft guns; however, by 7 November, the unit had only received 6-7 x 88 mm guns, 4 quadruple mount 20 mm anti-aircraft and 4 x 20 mm anti-aircraft guns. While the division was very short of motor equipment, that which it was able to obtain through new issue or repair of old was somewhat neglected due to the acute gasoline shortage. No gasoline was to be used at all during its PADERBORN

reorganization; consequently, none of the motors either new or repaired were broken in prior to the division's move. As it turned out, a large number of these vehicles developed defects during the move to the entraining area and from the detraining stations to the battle area. This lack of gasoline during the training period also prevented any joint exercises employing the mechanized elements of the division.

e. Commitments.- The report of 7 November, two weeks before the division re-entered battle, stated that the reorganization of the division was in no way completed, that replacements in men and material had not arrived as scheduled and in conclusion the Chief of Panzer Troops was asked to use his influence to prevent the division from being committed prematurely. The men had been told repeatedly that Panzer LEHR Division would only be employed when its reorganization was complete and then in conjunction with the other divisions of the Sixth SS Panzer Army. It was apparent to all prisoners that the division has been employed prematurely as an absolute necessity for the "defense of the REICH" which had been threatened by the break-through to STRASSBURG.

3. CONCLUSION.- It is difficult to use the Panzer LEHR Division as a yardstick for the four SS divisions of the Sixth SS Panzer Army. To begin with, Panzer LEHR was probably in much worse shape than the others at the time the divisions were withdrawn for their rest and refit program. Consequently it required more personnel and material. Being a non-SS unit it may have been given unfavorable treatment in obtaining new personnel and equipment. However, there is no evidence to support this statement. The fact that the division was given a considerable amount of its equipment just prior to departure from the PADERBORN area would indicate that either Panzer LEHR was suddenly given a last-minute priority and all available unallotted equipment under control of Sixth SS Panzer Army was given to LEHR to enable it to perform its emergency function, or that the equipment was taken partly from the other divisions of Sixth SS Panzer Army in order to equip the division being sent out. If the latter is true or even if they were all receiving the same priority prior to 17 November (the date LEHR apparently received the bulk of its equipment), it is apparent that the four SS divisions are not at present complete in their reorganization and are possibly still receiving their equipment. The only difference is that they are now located where they can be hurriedly employed, if the situation in front of COLOGNE becomes critical. On the other hand, the possibility still exists that the four SS divisions did receive favorable treatment and may be held by Sixth SS Panzer Army to operate as a team when and if a favorable situation presents itself.

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