

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

UA
27
: T7
USA
1953


UNCLASSIFIED

REPORT
OF

U.S. ARMY MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE

ARMY FIELD FORCES INSPECTION OF TRIESTE US TROOPS

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED BY
AUTHORITY OF DOD DIR. 5200.1 R
BY RAWLERS ON 2 SEP 94



DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

DEC 17 1953

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

OCTOBER 1953

AWC LOG #

53-12-148-R

UNCLASSIFIED

CONTROL No 83403

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

PROPERTY OF US ARMY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECURITY INFORMATION
OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

ATCH 319.1/85(C)(10 Nov 53)

10 November 1953

SUBJECT: Report of Visit of AFF Team to Trieste United States Troops,
October 1953

U.S. ARMY MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE

TO: Chief of Staff
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D.C.

1. Submitted herewith is the report of the team from this Office which visited Trieste United States Troops (TRUST) on 7 to 9 October 1953, for the purpose of determining whether or not the training standard and doctrines used in the training establishment in CONUS are meeting the requirements of oversea commanders, and to note and comment on deficiencies reported by last year's team.

2. a. The report shows that, in general, the training standard and doctrines used in the CONUS are adequate to meet TRUST requirements, no major deficiencies in either being noted or reported.

b. No major deficiencies were reported by last year's team.

3. Two detriments to operational effectiveness, noted in the letter transmitting last year's report, have been generally corrected or improved; a third continues to be critical. These are:

a. There is an air defense plan, however TRUST lacks air warning facilities.

b. There is still no definite service responsibility to provide TRUST with tactical air support, but a control agency has been created and tested thoroughly with naval aviation and gunfire.

c. Although regulations restricting the promotion of NCO's have been considerably relaxed, TRUST has not received sufficient NCO promotion allocations to correct the shortage. Rotation of NCO's and their replacement with privates continues to aggravate the situation. The shortage is essentially the same as last year.

4. The important observations and conclusions.

a. An effective air-ground operations system has been established and trained. It is fully prepared to operate with naval support.

CN 83403

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

PROPERTY OF US ARMY

b. A critical shortage of NCO's continues to limit training and operational effectiveness.

c. There is no air warning system in TRUST.

5. I have initiated action on all deficiencies appearing in the report which fall within the purview of my Office.


6. I recommend that Department of the Army:

a. Study the matter of providing TRUST with the means to establish an adequate air warning system.

b. Give consideration, consistent with limitations imposed on the Army Establishment, to alleviating the critical shortage of NCO's by increasing the allocation of promotions to grades E-6 and E-7, and by furnishing replacements in appropriate grades.

c. Study the matter of obtaining a positive service commitment to provide tactical air support to TRUST.

1 Incl
Report of AFF visit to
US Army, Trieste,
7-9 Oct 53


JOHN E. DAHLQUIST
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Chief

DISTRIBUTION
(See next page)

ATCH 319.1/85(C)(10 Nov 53)


10 November 1953

Subject: Report of Visit of AFF Team to Trieste United States Troops,
October 1953

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 Chief of Staff, DA
- 49 The Adjutant General
- 2 Chief Chemical Officer
- 2 Chief of Ordnance
- 2 Chief of Engineers
- 2 Chief Signal Officer
- 2 The Surgeon General
- 2 The Quartermaster General
- 2 Chief of Transportation
- 2 The Provost Marshal General
- 2 Chief of Chaplains
- CG's
- 5 Trieste US Troops
- Comdt
- 2 The Armored School
- 2 The Infantry School
- 2 The Artillery School
- 2 Army War College
- 2 Command and General Staff College
- 2 Army General School
- 2 Army Language School
- 2 Physical Training School
- 1 USAF Air-Ground Operations School
- 2 Asst Comdt, The Artillery School
- AA&GM Branch
- OCAFF
- 1 COFS
- 1 G1
- 2 G2
- 7 G3
- 2 G4
- 1 DT
- 1 Inf Div, Combat Arms Advisory Gp
- 1 Arty Div, Combat Arms Advisory Gp
- 1 Armor Div, Combat Arms Advisory Gp
- 1 Engr
- 1 Med
- 1 Ord
- 1 QM
- 1 Sig
- 1 Trans
- 1 Cml
- 1 Compt
- 2 AG Records
- 10 Extra Copies

17 DEC 33 PM



DISPATCHED
AFF DISTRIBUTION

CN: 83403

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECURITY INFORMATION
OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

10 November 1953

SUBJECT: Report of Visit of 1953 European Team to Trieste United States Troops

TO: Chief of Army Field Forces

1. Reference is made to letter, OCAFF, 3 September 1953, subject: "Letter of Instructions."

2. In accordance with instructions contained in reference, the report of the visit of the 1953 European Team to Trieste United States Troops (TRUST) is attached.

3. The following matters were given particular attention:


a. Adequacy of the training standards and doctrines used in the CONUS to meet theater requirements.

b. Action taken on deficiencies noted in 1952 visit.

4. Incidental to accomplishing the mission presented in the reference letter, certain matters pertaining to training, personnel and logistics, which affect training, came to the attention of team members. Cognizance is taken of the most outstanding of such items in this report for information and, where appropriate, action to assist the theater.

5. The command had noticeably high morale and was outstanding in general administrative and maintenance matters. Within the limitations of a small and restricted area, training was effective.

1 Incl
Rept of 1953 European
Team on TRUST


CHARLES D. PALMER
Major General
Team Chief

Control Number: 83403

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

ARMY-OCAFF-4657

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

REPORT
OF THE
1953 EUROPEAN TEAM

OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES

ON

TRIESTE UNITED STATES TROOPS

Control Number: 83403

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONTENTS

SECTION I	General	Page 1
II	Personnel	Page 3
III	Intelligence	Page 6
IV	Organization and Training	Page 8
V	Conclusions and Recommendations	Page 12
VI	Annexes	Page 14

Control Number: 83403

UNCLASSIFIED

Control No. 83403

SECTION I

GENERAL

1. General.

a. In accordance with letter instructions from the Chief of Army Field Forces (Annex 1), the team (Annex 2) visited Trieste US Troops (TRUST) from 7 to 9 October 1953. The general itinerary recommended by CG, TRUST, was accepted and consisted of the following:

- (1) Visit by team chief to CG, TRUST.
- (2) Briefing by the staffs of the major commands.
- (3) Conferences with staff officers and subordinate commanders.
- (4) Observation of staff and troop activities.

b. Training standards and training doctrines used in the CONUS are adequate to meet theater requirements, no major deficiencies in either being noted or reported. Some minor deficiencies are covered in the body of the report.

c. No major deficiencies were noted in the report of last year's team.

d. Incidental to accomplishing the team mission, the following items were noted as having a marked adverse effect on the training effort:

- (1) Critical lack of certain ranges and training areas necessary for practical combat training.
- (2) The administrative burden placed on troops by reduction in civilian employees.

e. The command was outstanding in the following:

- (1) Morale, discipline, courtesy, and cleanliness and maintenance of quarters, equipment and areas.
- (2) The effort made by the command to provide its part of the air-ground operations system, and to train its personnel, in conjunction with naval air and gunfire support. The results obtained were the best observed in Europe.

2. Detailed comments are given in subsequent sections, with conclusions and recommendations in the last section. Logistics activities were not specifically covered.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

3. At the conclusion of the visit, the substance of all comments made in this report was presented to the specifically designated representative of the Commanding General, in the absence of the latter which was required by local conditions.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECTION II

PERSONNEL

UNCLASSIFIED

1. General.

a. Comments are based upon conferences with staff officers at TRUST headquarters, and visits to the following:

- (1) Headquarters 351st Infantry
- (2) Medical Company, 351st Infantry
- (3) Company D, 351st Infantry
- (4) TRUST Orientation Center
- (5) NCO Academy

b. Morale, discipline and appearance were outstanding. This resulted primarily from a leadership which evidenced an interest in the welfare of the individual soldier. The 1953 venereal disease, AWOL, stockade confinement and court martial rates were markedly lower than 1952 rates. Classification, assignment, and orientation procedures, the character guidance program, and the recreational facilities were superior.

2. Adequacy of CONUS Training Bases in meeting theater requirements.

a. The theater was satisfied with the proportions by branch and MOS of the replacements received during July, August, and September 1953. During the first half of 1953, however, it had been necessary to assign infantry basic trained replacements to military police, armor, and technical service units. Subsequently, the troop basis for FY 54 forced a reduction of over 400 spaces. The bulk of the reduction was absorbed by the service units. Excess personnel in these organizations were then transferred to the combat units. Reassignment of this nature resulted in additional cross training.

b. The theater was short 500 personnel on 8 October 1953. Replacements en route and Department of Army allocations will result in a slight overstrength by 30 November 1953.

c. The theater is noticeably short the following enlisted MOS:

- 1641 Field Wireman
- 1729 Combat Construction Specialist
- 1745 Light Weapons Infantryman
- 1766 High Speed Radio Operator

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

1795 Tanker

1812 Heavy Weapons Infantryman

1814 Infantry Operations and Intelligence Specialist

d. The theater was over MOS 1301, Counter Intelligence Agent.

3. Action on last year's deficiencies.

a. The command had half its authorized strength of noncommissioned officers. This condition still exists.

b. The receipt of large numbers of enlisted personnel during the past several months with less than six months service remaining seriously affected the continuity of operations. This has been corrected. Replacements currently being received in the theater have an average of 15 months service remaining.

c. There was a serious shortage of medical officers. No critical officer shortages were reported this year.

d. Records of replacements were generally inadequate and incomplete. Only a very small percentage of the records received during the past three months required correction.

4. Incidental matters affecting training.

a. Processing replacements.

Incoming troop ships are boarded at Leghorn, Italy, by a Classification and Assignment Officer who makes assignment to company units while en route to Trieste. Upon arrival, replacements are taken directly to their companies. This procedure reduces pipeline time and correspondingly increases time available for training.

b. Rotation.

From October 1952 through September 1953 the theater experienced an 84% turnover in personnel. Training specialists under such conditions was a major problem.

c. Promotions.

(1) Noncommissioned officer strength on 8 October was:

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>% Short</u>
E-7	193	164	15
E-6	397	218	45
E-5	736	231	69
E-4	1375	825	40

(2) TRUST reported fifty-four men eligible for promotion to E-7 in September and received a quota of three. Fifty-six men were reported eligible for promotion to E-7 in October and DA allocated a quota of nine.

(3) The above shortage was aggravated during the past three months by the rotation of first three graders to the United States and the receipt of privates as replacements. This adversely affected unit effectiveness.

INTELLIGENCE

1. General.

a. After a general briefing on the theater, ACOFS, G-2, was visited and a schedule arranged. This covered a conference with the air-ground staff, a visit and conference at the combined British-US Intelligence Center, and visits to troop units and the CIC.

b. CONUS training standards and doctrine are generally adequate for theater intelligence needs. Minor exceptions are noted below.

c. The recommendations made in 1952, to provide a MIS unit to support the headquarters, was not carried out due to a strength cut imposed by Department of the Army. The recommendation to provide an air-ground operations system has been implemented.

2. CONUS Training.

a. Individual basic replacements received from CONUS are considered adequately trained in basic intelligence and security matters. This is not sufficient for participation in combat, however, and unit training includes appropriate review and further development. Training literature is adequate to support this program.

b. Intelligence specialists furnished from CONUS, except PW interrogators, are excellently trained for their specialties. Army General School graduates are reported to be outstanding. PW interrogators, however, are reported as deficient in interrogator training, military vocabulary, or both.

3. Doctrine.

a. CONUS training doctrine, with two exceptions, is satisfactory to the needs of the theater.

b. One exception is the policy of giving interrogator training at the Army General School, and awarding an interrogator MOS to individuals who speak no foreign language. Intelligence officers unanimously considered this incorrect.

c. The other exception is a lack of understanding of the scope of survival training allocated to the theaters. This same misunderstanding was noted in the other theaters visited.

4. Action on last year's reported deficiencies.

a. The 1952 report recommended that a Military Intelligence Service unit be created to consolidate, coordinate and administer the

theater intelligence specialists and intelligence specialist operations. This recommendation was accepted by the theater. However, a cut of over 400 military spaces, coupled with a reduction in funds for civilian employees in administrative support of the army, so reduced the effective strength available for tactical units that action in the MIS matter was abandoned.

b. The 1952 report also recommended formation, on a standby basis, of the army elements of the air-ground operations and intelligence system. This has been effectively implemented, with all elements except having photo interpreters earmarked, trained and rehearsed. The lack of photo interpreters will largely nullify the arrangements made to obtain air photos, but in spite of this lack, which should be corrected, the results obtained by the command to provide its part of the air-ground operations system, and to train it in operations with air and naval support, is the best that has been observed in Europe.

5. Additional matters affecting training.

TRUST receives nearly its full requirement of intelligence specialists and staff personnel from CONUS. The small deficiency is adequately met by quotas from the USAREUR Intelligence School.

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECTION IV

ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING

1. General.

a. Within the scope of the assigned mission, observation of the organization and training of TRUST consisted of:

(1) Conferences with commanders and staff officers.

(2) Observation of the training activities of units and individuals and visits to training facilities.

(3) Questioning of selected officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted men.

b. At the time of the visit, units were undergoing training in garrison and close-in training areas. Visits were made to the majority of units.

c. The command stated that there were no major problems in existence. It was obvious that most personnel questioned were pleased with their assignment, and a spirit of ready cooperation existed.

d. The military courtesy and appearance of personnel were outstanding.

e. The facilities for billeting personnel are excellent, but training areas are limited by the size of the zone available to US forces.

2. Adequacy of CONUS Training Standards and Doctrine.

a. Current Department of the Army training standards and doctrines are adequate for theater requirements. CONUS training policies are being followed. No deviations were noted except where local conditions dictate, and no recommendations for modifications were presented to the team.

b. Basic replacements received are reported adequately trained. Trained specialists (except interrogators, see paragraphs 2b and 3b, SECTION III) are reported to be excellent.

3. Action on Last Year's Deficiencies. - No major deficiencies were reported in the AFF inspection report of 1952.

4. Other Matters Affecting Training.

a. Personnel. - Troop requirements necessary to supplement TRUST activities coupled with normal absences, have reduced present-for-training strengths of the units to exceptionally low levels. Rifle

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

company strengths varied from a total of twenty-one (21) to sixty-five (65) enlisted men out of approximately 125 assigned present for the training period. These shortages had an adverse effect on the effectiveness of training, particularly with respect to crew served weapons training and training of the small unit team.

b. Organization and Equipment.

(1) No serious equipment shortages were noted. However, effectiveness of the regimental Heavy Mortar Company is limited to the capabilities of the 4.2 inch mortar, M2, with which it is equipped.

(2) The 12th FA Battery is organized in accordance with the Department of the Army T/O&E 6-137. This battery is ready to perform its T/O&E mission as part of a normal field artillery battalion. However, under its present organization, improvised support in such things as communications and logistics would be required to enable it to carry out its usual combat mission.

c. Equipment Deficiencies. - Six Prime Movers M-52 are on hand as substitutes for tractors M-5. These prime movers are unsatisfactory because there is no space for hauling the howitzer crew or the basic load of ammunition. The battery has no practice fuzes for shell 155-mm How.

d. Training.

(1) Firing ranges for crew served weapons and large scale maneuver areas are limited in number and in size. Sea ranges are used for firing recoilless rifles and caliber .50 machine guns at moving targets. No ranges for firing 90-mm tank guns are available, nor is there sufficient area for adequate tank maneuvers. Training areas and training facilities in Italy, Germany and the USAREUR schools supplement local training facilities.

(2) Training observed in the 351st Infantry Regiment was well organized and well conducted. Of particular note was the enthusiasm and spirit with which the various training activities were accomplished. The conduct of specific training observed varied from satisfactory to superior.

(3) Exceptionally high standards of maintenance and police prevailed through the battalion areas visited. Attention to minor details and uniform standards reflected superior command supervision and a high state of training within the command.

(4) Training directives are in conformance with Department of the Army policy. Additional training emphasizes those subjects peculiar to the tactical mission of the regiment. Riot formations and

control of civil disturbances assume positions of increased importance in current programs. Training in CBR warfare, mine warfare and demolitions was receiving increased command emphasis at the time of the visit.

(5) The theater has organized and operates an NCO Academy. Six classes of sixty students each are scheduled each year. Classes are of six weeks duration.

(6) Due to the troop ceiling, the commands cannot afford to operate other schools on a permanent basis. As the need arises, temporary unit schools are conducted as follows:

CBR
Armorer Artificer
Voice Radio
Demolition

(7) TRUST utilizes USAREUR and Seventh Army Schools in Germany. Quotas are requested as needed. TRUST has not been able to utilize these schools to a maximum due to a shortage of travel funds.

e. Air-Ground Operations.

(1) The Joint Training Directive for Air-Ground Operations provides doctrinal guidance and is considered adequate. However, as a result of TRUST's particular mission, its limited troop basis, and its lack of a normal joint Army-Air Force relationship, the air-ground system is unique. The proximity of the Sixth US Fleet has resulted in the bulk of air support training being done with the Navy. Excellent support has been received from this source.

(2) TRUST has made an outstanding, successful effort to provide itself with five combination tactical air/naval gunfire teams, and to obtain the necessary communications equipment. Personnel normally employed on other duties have been designated for this combat function, and trained and rehearsed in repeated practice with visiting naval elements. Considerable initiative was shown in obtaining necessary UHF communications equipment, which is not available through normal supply channels.

(3) At BRUSTAC level, a combined FSCC-TADC has been organized in order to coordinate and guide fire support efforts. This center includes both Navy and Air Force representation. The TACP net is also the air request net. A makeshift UHF radio has been installed in Army aircraft, giving the command a "Mosquito" capability.

(4) Except when naval ships are in the vicinity, TRUST has no adequate air warning system, nor does it have the equipment or trained personnel to provide one.

(5) There are no K type cameras in the command, although they have been requisitioned. There are six AN/TRC-7 which were requisitioned after last year's report. An AN/TRQ-7 has been requisitioned but has not yet been received.

(6) While TRUST has been furnished adequate air support from Sixth Fleet for its peacetime training requirements, there is no definite service commitment for air support to TRUST in time of war. Local agreements between TRUST and Sixth Fleet may be invalidated in time of emergency.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECTION V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Conclusions.

a. Training of basic replacements in the CONUS is satisfactory for TRUST requirements. Except for interrogators, specialists are adequately trained.

b. Training standards, doctrine and literature are adequate to the theater needs, no major deficiencies being reported.

c. TRUST has attained a reasonable state of combat effectiveness within its capabilities. The principal factors which mitigate against obtaining a higher combat effectiveness are the rapid personnel turnover, the critical shortage of NCOs, and the lack of adequate local ranges and training areas.

d. Personnel activities are being conducted in a superior manner.

e. Interrogators furnished by CONUS are inadequately trained.

f. The scope of survival training delegated to the oversea theaters was not clearly understood.

g. With the exception of an inability to exploit aerial photography, the TRUST air-ground operations system is effectively organized, trained and rehearsed in operations with naval air and gunfire support in as realistic a manner as conditions permit.

h. A Military Intelligence Service detachment was not organized in accordance with last year's recommendation due to lack of military and civilian personnel.

i. The 12 FA Battery as currently organized will require certain augmentation to be able to accomplish its intended combat role (normal support elements furnished by FA Bn Hq and Svc Battery).

j. TRUST lacks an adequate air warning system.

2. Recommendations.

a. That OCAFF continue its efforts to improve interrogator training in CONUS schools.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

b. That DA study the matter of providing TRUST with the means to establish an adequate air warning system.

c. That DA study the matter of obtaining a positive service commitment to provide tactical air support to TRUST.

d. That DA, within the limitations imposed upon the Army Establishment, give consideration to alleviating the critical shortage of noncommissioned officers by increasing the allocation of promotions to grades E-6 and E-7, and by furnishing replacements in appropriate grades.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECTION VI

ANNEXES

1. Letter of Authority
2. Team Composition

OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA

3 September 1953

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions

TO: Major General Charles D. Palmer

1. You will head an inspection team to determine whether or not the training standard and doctrines used in the training establishment in CONUS are meeting the requirements of overseas commanders. In carrying out this mission, particular attention will be paid to:

- a. Joint training in air-ground opns.
- b. Training centers and facilities.
- c. Schools.
- d. Depots.
- e. Personnel assignment.

2. The team will be composed of the following:

a. Office, Chief of Army Field Forces

Colonel Ephraim H. McLemore
Colonel Benjamin T. Ammons
Colonel Thomas F. Van Natta
Colonel Donald M. MacWillie
Lt Colonel Howard C. Murray
Lt Colonel Tony F. Perpich
Lt Colonel Warren E. Besse
Lt Colonel Harvey J. Whitehouse
Lt Colonel Willard Pearson
Lt Colonel John M. Gaustad

b. The Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma

Lt Colonel Edwin G. Hickman

c. The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia

Lt Colonel Robert O. English

Subj: Letter of Instructions

d. The AA&M Branch, The Artillery School, Fort Bliss, Texas

Colonel Francis L. Beaver

3. Inspection itinerary will be completed with Commander-in-Chief, European Command, after arrival, to include visits to Austria and Trieste Commands by such members of the team as you consider necessary.

4. Three members of your team will be detailed to make a training inspection of U.S. Army units in Iceland. Tentative date of arrival in Iceland is 28 October. The visit should not exceed three (3) days.

5. Upon completion of your visit, you will report to the Commanding General in each command (or his designated representative), the findings resulting from your visit and the substance of the report you intend to submit to this Office. In all reports made as a result of your visit, a positive statement that the foregoing instructions have been carried out will be included.

6. Your report to this Office will be made as soon as practicable upon return. It is desired that deficiencies and inadequacies noted in the 1952 Inspection Report be particularly noted and commented upon.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAHLQUIST:

/s/ K.C. STROTHER
/t/ K.C. STROTHER
Colonel, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff

Annex 2

Team Composition

The following constituted the OCAFF team which visited TRUST from 7 to 9 October 1953.

Maj Gen Charles D. Palmer
Col Thomas F. Van Natta
Lt Col John M. Gaustad
Lt Col Edwin G. Hickman
Lt Col Howard C. Murray
Lt Col Willard Pearson
Lt Col Tony F. Perpich