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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

NO. 19 FOR WEEK ENDING 16 DEC. 44

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

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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 19

FOR WEEK ENDING 162400 DECEMBER 1944

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Wm M. Weaver Jr
for EDWIN L. SIBERT,
Brigadier General, GSC,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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19 December 1944

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 19

FOR WEEK ENDING 162400 DECEMBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

The enemy on 16 December opened his biggest offensive since the beginning of the campaign in Western EUROPE. By taking full advantage of adverse weather conditions which restricted Allied reconnaissance and by rigidly applying radio silence, he skillfully regrouped his forces and launched attacks simultaneously at five places along seventy miles of the central part of the Western Front. The skill in regrouping and launching the simultaneous attacks achieved a high degree of surprise. The element of surprise was heightened by the enemy's disregard of terrain in selecting the points of attack and he threw his armored forces into sectors considered ill-adapted for the use of tanks. He struck weakly held areas which had been quiet for many weeks. To maintain surprise as long as possible, his attacks initially in many areas were light and had the appearance of reconnaissance in force. It was not until the night of 16-17 December that he showed his hand completely by utilizing airborne forces and making his greatest air effort since early in the NORMANDY campaign.

In the Weekly Intelligence Summary dated 12 December an analogy was drawn between the then current situation and that which existed at CAEN and ST. LO. The chief similarity was that attrition appeared to be wearing down the enemy's infantry strength to a point at which it was possible that a ST. LO "end-run" might develop through the sectors of the American Third and Seventh Armies. The great dissimilarity, as pointed out, was that the enemy reserves, both tactical and strategic, were largely free and available for employment. It seemed likely that the enemy would be forced to commit these reserves due to his increasing weakness in infantry forces since it was not clear that he could bring forward sufficient infantry replacements.

The analogy with CAEN and ST. LO has now broken down. The enemy decided not to await the inevitable result of the wearing-down process. He decided to seize the initiative, to commit his reserves momentarily, and to gamble all on the success of a single, bold stroke. Rather than the ST. LO - CAEN situation, the present attack bears a strong resemblance to his efforts to mass his forces and to break through at MORTAIN in order to cut the Allied bottleneck at AVRANCHES. At MORTAIN, KLUGE decided--perhaps aided by the FUEHRER's intuition--to gamble all on one operation. He lost. The fundamental factors in the current situation are similar. Faced with inevitable disaster, RUNDSTEDT or HITLER decided that a huge and decisive gamble was justified. RUNDSTEDT informed the soldiers of the Western Front that the hour of destiny had struck and that a mighty offensive faced the Allies with everything at stake. His

weary infantry divisions were left in the line and all of the recently brought-up infantry divisions were committed. Six of the ten divisions in his tactical reserves and four of his six armored divisions in strategic reserve were thrown into the battle. Success in this effort will be seriously damaging to the American forces; failure will be disastrous to the Germans. In view of the desperate nature of this decision, the enemy must be expected to bring to bear all available forces on the ground and in the air and to employ every weapon at his command with the probable exception of gas.

The fundamental weaknesses in the German situation should not be disregarded. The initial phases of the present offensives are undoubtedly based upon supplies accumulated over a period of time. The inherent weaknesses of the enemy as to fuel, motor transport, infantry and transportation are, however, of fundamental importance. The importance of denying enemy supplies cannot be overemphasized since he will undoubtedly endeavor to live off the country and captured dumps as in his first invasion of FRANCE. With Allied air power harassing enemy railheads and lines of communication, the full power of the current offensives should diminish rapidly once his initial hoard of supplies is exhausted.

The enemy's primary capabilities relate entirely to the employment of his remaining reserves. The most probable use is that he will commit them to exploit his penetration in the central part of the front or slightly further North to protect the Northern flank of his salient. A much less likely capability is an attack Southwesterly along the MEUSE from the GEILENKIRCHEN area. This attack would form the Northern arm of a pincers converging on LIEGE in conjunction with the current penetration. Irrespective of the exact place of commitment the MAEUR - LIEGE area appears to be the objective of the current offensive. A third capability is to press the attack from MONTERIMACH towards LUXEMBURG possibly in conjunction with a new crossing of the MOSELLE from South of TRIER. Such an attack would be designed to widen the base for his salient further North and the recapture of LUXEMBURG could be represented as an outstanding victory to bolster the morale of the German Army and the public in the REICH. While there is accumulating evidence that such an attack is contemplated, its strength is not yet evident.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS

a. Ninth US Army.- Enemy activity on the front during the period was confined to limited counter-attacks, patrolling and harassing artillery fire. On 9 December the last enemy resistance West of the ROER and INDE Rivers in the XIX US Corps zone was eliminated as SPORTZPLATZ and HASENFELD CUT were cleared, and a small counter-attack East of MULLENDORF was dispersed by artillery fire. Throughout the rest of the period the enemy was quiet on the front, although reacting vigorously to our patrols across the flood-swollen ROER River, until 16 December when unsuccessful counter-attacks were attempted near LEIFFARTH and between LINNICH and LINDERN.

b. First US Army.- The enemy resisted stubbornly throughout the week our efforts to clear the West bank of the ROER River in the area of DUREN, and our pushes through the HURTGEN Forest further to the South. At the end of the week the Germans took the initiative in the VIII US Corps front and after artillery preparations launched strong counter-attacks in the area between KRONENBURG and ECHTERNACH. On 9 December the enemy opposed our advances into PIER and STRASS stubbornly, and continued the stiff resistance in the VOSSENACH region. On 10 December enemy troops were forced out of OBERGEICH, ECHTZ and GEICH after heavy fighting, and the following day MERODE and SCHLICH were captured after several days of bitter combat and a small counter-attack was repulsed at STRASS. On 12 December all organized resistance ceased in MARIAWEILER and DERICHSWEILER, but heavy resistance was met West and South of SCHOPHOVEN. The West bank of the ROER River was almost completely cleared except for pockets of resistance in the area of MERKEN. On 13 December heavy resistance failed to stop our progress into KESTERNICH and SIMMERATH. The enemy launched a strong counter-attack in the region of GUERZENICH on 14 December and continued to put up bitter opposition Southwest of BERZBUIR and in KESTERNICH which fell the following day. On 16 December the VIII US Corps front sprang to life with attacks in company strength at KREWINKEL and at ROTH, and one in battalion strength at HECKHUSCHEID. In the vicinity of ECHTERNACH and BERDORF the enemy threw two companies across the SAUER River and succeeded in establishing a small bridgehead, although his first attempts to bridge the river were abortive due to our artillery. All divisions on the Corps front came into contact, augmented by the arrival of three new infantry divisions from GERMANY plus one from HOLLAND and one from the VII US Corps front, and four Panzer divisions from reserve, indicating the opening of a major diversionary counter-attack on the part of the Germans.

c. Third US Army.- During the week there was stubborn resistance against the enlargement of our bridgeheads across the SAAR River and into the SIEGFRIED Line, but as the week drew towards a close it was becoming more apparent that additional reinforcements would have to be placed alongside 719 Infantry Division if the enemy were to prevent a break-through on the front. On 9 December the enemy counter-attacked repeatedly at DILLINGEN, pillboxes changing hands several times, and fighting continued from house to house in the eastern section of SAARLAUTERN. On 10 December scattered enemy resistance South of NEUNKIRCH and FORBERSVILLER stiffened as the towns were entered, while SAARGUEMINES was almost cleared of the enemy. DREISACH was captured on 12 December and the bridgeheads were enlarged against bitter

opposition, progress from block to block being made in the city of FRAULAUTERN. On 13 December FT. JEANNE D'ARC, the last of the METZ forts held by the enemy, surrendered, while there was house-by-house fighting in HABKIRCHEN Northeast of SARREGUEMINES. On 14 December the enemy's aggressive opposition against the bridgeheads across the SAAR River declined, although his defense of the SIEGFRIED Line positions continued to be tenacious. A captured map indicated that the 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division had been ordered to withdraw into WEST WALL positions. On 15 December the enemy continued his attempts to reduce our bridgehead across the BLIES River, while KIRLING was cleared and the outskirts of GUIDERKIRCH reached. The 21 Panzer Division which had been offering stubborn resistance in the SAARLAUTERN region appeared to be moving to the HAGENAU region of the Sixth Army Group front where enemy resistance seemed to be deteriorating. On the night of 15-16 December there was a continuation of the movement through the MERZIG area towards the South which had been observed on previous nights, and it was believed that 212 Infantry Division was moving South to bolster some of the weak parts of the line. On 16 December fighting continued in FRAULAUTERN, local counter-attacks were made on the XII US Corps front, and considerable movement was observed moving South into NEUNKIRCHEN and HOMBURG. The inexperience of the enemy infantry was evident throughout the period as it fought well in pillboxes and fixed defense, but very poorly in the open.

3. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS

a. General.- Although the enemy was faced with serious prospects if the attack of the Third US Army and Sixth Army Group against the SIEGFRIED Line between MERZIG and KARLSRUHE continued to develop, the principal changes in disposition resulted in the addition of seven divisions to the strength of the forces opposing the First US Army and the launching of a diversionary counter-attack against the VIII US Corps. Enemy strength in the West was a nominal 69 divisions, with an equivalent strength of 39-40 divisions (309,500 men) supported by approximately 840 tanks.

b. Twelfth US Army Group

(1) Ninth US Army.- As the Army front was quiet there was comparatively little change in the enemy dispositions. However, both 2 Panzer Division, which came into contact on the First US Army front at the end of the period, and 3 Panzer Grenadier Division were yielded to the front of the army to the South, while 246 Infantry Division shifted the bulk of its attention northward to this front. Enemy strength on the front was a nominal 7 divisions, equivalent to 3-4 divisions (26,500 men) supported by approximately 95 tanks.

(2) First US Army.- Three infantry divisions from GERMANY and NORWAY, two Panzer-type divisions from the Ninth US Army front, two Panzer divisions from the 6 SS Panzer Army, and one parachute division from HOLLAND all arrived on the front during the week, while one division, 246 Infantry, moved out of the area slightly North to the Ninth US Army front. The arrival of 276 Infantry Division from DRESDEN in the ECHTERNACH area following 352 Infantry Division into the region, coincided with the advent of 560 Infantry Division, which has been expected to show up from NORWAY for some time, slightly to the North. When the enemy opened his counter-attack on 16 December both 2 and 116 Panzer Divisions, which had been lurking in the background for some weeks, put in an appearance, and the seriousness of the enemy's intentions were shown by the commitment of one corps of 6 SS Panzer Army as 1

and 12 SS Panzer Divisions were identified. In addition, 5 Parachute Division was also believed to be in the ECHTERNACH region although the only substantiating evidence was the statement of a deserter. Two prisoners were taken from 62 Infantry Division in the PRUM area, indicating the presence of this reformed division on the front. Enemy strength on the front jumped to a nominal 22 divisions, equivalent to 15 (115,500 men), with 363 tanks.

(3) Third US Army.- The enemy continued to starve the front between TRIER and KARLSRUHE as far as reinforcements are concerned, as only 719 Infantry Division from HOLLAND arrived to bolster the line during the week. The shortage of Panzer divisions was further increased by yielding 21 Panzer Division to the front of the 6th Army Group. Enemy strength on the front continued at 9 nominal divisions with an equivalent strength of 4-5 (37,500 men), supported by 105 tanks.

c. Sixth Army Group.- The addition of 21 Panzer Division from the Third US Army front added some to the strength of the enemy in the region North of HAGENAU where 256 and 245 Infantry Divisions continued to carry the burden of the battle. In the pocket around COLMAR the enemy continued to resist strenuously all efforts of the First French Army to eliminate his remaining elements West of the RHINE in this area. Strength on the front was a nominal 13 divisions, with an equivalent of 5 (38,500 men), supported by 75 tanks.

d. Twenty-One Army Group.- Enemy strength on the front continued at 17 nominal divisions as 719 Infantry Division was lost to the Third US Army front and 606 z.b.V. Division was picked up, with an equivalent value of 9-10 divisions (75,500 men), supported by 40 tanks.

4. ENEMY STRENGTH ON THE WESTERN FRONT

NINTH US ARMY FRONT

DIVISION	COMMANDER	EST. TOTAL PERSONNEL	EST. TOTAL TANKS	EST. TOTAL ARTY BNS	ARMY	CORPS
183 Inf	LANGE	3,500		3	5 Pz	12 SS
340 Inf	TOLSDORF	3,000		2	5 Pz	12 SS
363 Inf	DEITLING	4,000		3	5 Pz	12 SS
246 Inf	KOERTE	3,000		2	5 Pz	81
10 SS Pz	HARMEL	3,000	15	3	OUT OF CONTACT	
9 Pz	ELVERFELDT	4,000	45	3	OUT OF CONTACT	
49 Inf	LUEBBE	3,000		1	OUT OF CONTACT	
MISC.		3,000	* 35	12		
TOTAL		26,500	* 95	29		

* INCLUDES BOTH TANKS AND ASSAULT GUNS.

FIRST US ARMY FRONT

DIVISION	COMMANDER	EST. TOTAL PERSONNEL	EST. TOTAL TANKS	EST. TOTAL ARTY BNS	ARMY	CORPS
12 Inf	ENGEL	2,500		2	7	66
47 Inf	BORK	2,500		2	5 Pz	81
3 Prcht	WADEHN	3,500		3	5 Pz	81
353 Inf	MAHLMANN	2,500		2	7	74
344 Inf	KOENIG	2,000		2	7	74
89 Inf	BRUNS	2,000		2	7	74
272 Inf	KOSMALA	3,000		3	7	74
326 Inf		7,000		4	7	74
277 Inf	VIEWEG	5,000		3	7	74
18 Inf	HOFFMAN-SCHONBORN	5,000		3	7	66
26 Inf	KOKOTT	5,500		3	7	66
352 Inf		7,000		3	7	80
212 Inf	SENSFUSS	6,000		3	7	80
3 Pz GR	DENKERT	3,500	20(LG)	3	OUT OF CONTACT	
116 Pz	WALDENBURG	5,500	* 65	3	7	66
276 Inf		7,000		4	7	80
62 Inf		7,000		4	7	66
2 Pz		8,000	* 70	4	7	80
560 Inf		7,000		4	7	80
1 SS Pz	MAHNKE	8,000	80	4	6 SS Pz	1 SS Pz
12 SS Pz	KRAEMER	8,000	80	4	6 SS Pz	1 SS Pz
MISC		8,000	* 50	28		
TOTAL		115,500	*365	93		

* INCLUDES BOTH TANKS AND ASSAULT GUNS.

RESERVE ON NINTH AND FIRST US ARMY FRONTS

DIVISION	COMMANDER	EST. TOTAL PER-SONNEL	EST. TOTAL TANKS	EST. TOTAL ARTY BNS	ARMY	CORPS
2 SS Pz	BAUM	8,000	80	4	6 SS Pz	
9 SS Pz	BOCK	8,000	80	4	6 SS Pz	
TOTAL		16,000	160	8		

THIRD US ARMY FRONT

DIVISION	COMMANDER	EST. TOTAL PER-SONNEL	EST. TOTAL TANKS	EST. TOTAL ARTY BNS	ARMY	CORPS
416 Inf	PETLINGER	2,500		2	1	82
19 Inf	BRITZELMEIER	3,000		2	1	82
719 Inf	SCHMALZ	4,500		3	1	82
559 Inf	MUEHLEN	1,000		1	1	13 SS
347 Inf	GRIMBERG(?)	2,500		2	1	13 SS
36 Inf	WELLM	2,000		2	1	13 SS
17 SS Pz GR	FICK (?)	2,500		2	1	13 SS
11 Pz	WIETERSHEIM	4,500	30	3	1	58 Pz
Pz LEHR	BAYERLEIN	5,500	* 50	3	OUT OF CONTACT	
MISC		9,500	* 25	15		
TOTAL		37,500	*105	35		

* INCLUDES BOTH TANKS AND ASSAULT GUNS.

SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT

DIVISION	COMMANDER	EST. TOTAL PER-SONNEL	EST. TOTAL TANKS	EST. TOTAL ARTY BNS	ARMY	CORPS
25 Pz GR	BURMEISTER	2,000	15	?	1	58 Pz
361 Inf	PHILIPPI	2,500		2	1	58 Pz
245 Inf	KEGLER	3,000		3	1	89
256 Inf	FRANZ	3,000		3	1	89
21 Pz	FEUCHTINGER	4,000	25	3	OUT OF CONTACT	
553 Inf	UTZ	1,500		2	OUT OF CONTACT	

SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT
(CONT'D)

DIVISION	COMMANDER	EST. TOTAL PER-SONNEL	EST. TOTAL TANKS	EST. TOTAL ARTY GUNS	ARMY	CORPS
198 Inf	SCHIEL	1,500		2	19	
703 Inf	FLECKMANN	2,000		2	19	
716 Inf	RICHTER	2,000		2	19	
16 Inf	HÜCKEL	2,000		2	19	
269 Inf	WAGNER	3,000		3	19	
159 Inf	DERNEN	2,000		2	19	
30 SS Inf		3,000		2	19	
189 Inf	ZORN	2,000		2	19	
MISC		5,000	* 35	12		
TOTAL		38,500	* 75	42		

* INCLUDES BOTH TANKS AND ASSAULT GUNS.

TWENTY-ONE ARMY GROUP FRONT

DIVISION	COMMANDER	EST. TOTAL PER-SONNEL	EST. TOTAL TANKS	EST. TOTAL ARTY GUNS	ARMY	CORPS
85 Inf	SCHILL	4,000		3	OUT OF CONTACT	
346 Inf	STEINMÜLLER	3,500		2	15	?
711 Inf	ROSE	3,500		2	15	?
59 Inf	POPPE	3,500		2	15	?
712 Inf	MEUMANN	4,000		2	15	?
331 Inf		4,000		3	OUT OF CONTACT	
2 Prcht		7,000		3	REFORMING	
5 Prcht	WILKE	7,000		3	REFORMING	
6 Prcht	PLOCHER	6,500		3	15	?
84 Inf	KOSSACK	3,500		2	1 Prcht	2 Prcht
190 Inf	HAMMER	3,500		2	1 Prcht	2 Prcht
406 zbV	SCHERBENING	1,500		1	1 Prcht	2 Prcht
7 Prcht	ERDMANN	4,000		3	1 Prcht	86
180 Inf	KLOSTERKAMP	4,000		2	1 Prcht	86

(CONT'D) TWENTY-ONE ARMY GROUP FRONT

DIVISION	COMMANDER	EST. TOTAL PERSONNEL	EST. TOTAL TANKS	EST. TOTAL ARTY BTS	ARMY	CORPS
606 zbV		1,500		1	1 Prcht	86
176 Inf	STUHM	2,000		2	5 Pz	12 SS
15 Pz GR	DECKER	3,500		3	5 Pz	12 SS
MISC		9,000	* 40	12		
TOTAL		75,500	* 40	51		
TOTAL FOR WESTERN FRONT		309,500	*840	258		

* INCLUDES BOTH TANKS AND ASSAULT GUNS.

5. ENEMY SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT

a. Gasoline.- A document captured from 62 Division stresses the urgency of saving gasoline and states that the unit is to be equipped with 2½ consumption units of gasoline, rather than the 3 which had been promised for the attack of 16 December. A consumption unit is the amount of fuel which will move all the vehicles in the formation 100 kilometers, so that 2½ units is sufficient for about 150 miles of uninterrupted open road haul.

While under normal conditions, it was standard for enemy formations to maintain 3 consumption units of liquid fuel at all times at Army level dumps, and even higher amounts at divisional echelon (4 units in armored formations, except reconnaissance elements, 5 units in other formations and 6½ units in reconnaissance outfits), this standard is completely obsolete. Since the Spring of 1944 fuel in units and at army level has been on a hand-to-mouth basis. It appears, therefore, as if the wave of further conservation which gripped the formations under C-in-C WEST in October and November has resulted in the accumulation of a reserve for the current operation in VIII US Corps area. That the reserve is not as large as planned is suggested by the last-minute reduction in unit stocks, and some ancillary, if minor, additional measures for gasoline conservation.

b. Ammunition.- Few if any reports of local shortages of ammunition have appeared in PW statements of the past two weeks on any sector of the 12th Army Group front. Judged by enemy artillery activity, moreover, supplies are being delivered to the front in ample quantities. Through 16 December, shelling was particularly heavy in XII and V US Corps sectors; on that day, intense artillery fire was received in connection with the opening of the offensive in the VIII US Corps area.

Information from prisoners on ammunition supply methods continues to be received mainly from the First US Army area. A further officer PW, Commanding Officer of a 105 gun-howitzer battery in 344 Infantry Division, substantiates earlier testimony from the same area that ammunition supplies are for the most brought up daily, rather than stored in forward

dumps. His battery consisted only of 3 guns, but it had fired a maximum of 350-400 rounds in a single day, or approximately 125 rounds per gun.

In the Third Army area, eloquent testimony as to the effectiveness of the enemy's ammunition supply system is provided by XII US Corps shell reports. Intense shelling of the XII US Corps bridgeheads at DILLINGEN and SAARLAUTERN began on about 3 December and has continued through to the end of this past week. Rates of fire have varied between 6,000 rounds a day on the SAARLAUTERN bridgehead at the peak, and approximately 1,000 rounds; shelling of the DILLINGEN bridgehead has on the whole been on a less intense scale, but has been substantial.

Some fluctuations in the rate of fire may be due to counter-battery fire (although observation of Allied fire has been limited by the first systematic attacks on Allied artillery spotting-planes from the ground); or due to the necessity to shift positions. On the whole, however, the observed irregularities appear due in considerable part to fluctuations in the scale of ammunition deliveries. Following peak activity on 6, 7, 8 December, shelling of the SAARLAUTERN bridgehead has varied sharply on a daily basis. It is believed that heavy ammunition deliveries are followed by intense shelling and then by lulls until new stocks of ammunition can be accumulated.

c. Armament Manpower.- Some interesting if incomplete evidence upon the comparative position in various branches of the armament and Allied industries is furnished by a First US Army survey of prisoner and German civilian information on the industrial comb-out of skilled workers. Much of the information relates to Wehrkreis VI; but it appears likely to be of wider applicability.

Three classes of skilled workers are recognized: "ordinary", "skilled" and "key". It is stated that men in these three classes were supposed to be combed out under "total mobilization", which went into effect in August, in the proportions 40 per cent, 20 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. In actuality, however, it is believed that the wholesale character of Wehrmacht requirements, and participation of the Nazi party in the selection of draftees has resulted in actual percentages running closer to 90, 6 and 4 respectively.

As among industries, synthetic gasoline and ammunition plants appear to be the best protected, with automobile manufacturers and makers of V-1 and V-2 weapons next. The motor vehicle industry, it was stated, was mercilessly stripped of skilled workmen in 1942-43 when requirements were underestimated, with the consequence that the present labor position of the industry is critical. A reverse case has occurred in aircraft, where protection of skilled workers, well maintained until May 1944, has recently been relaxed. Workers in bombed plants are partly transferred to other factories, and partly released to the Army. In steel and mining, protection has recently been relaxed although skilled workers in the "key" category are still safe in the steel industry. In mining, workers born earlier than 1906 are protected in the "ordinary" and "skilled" categories of trained labor.

In preparation for the comb-out, the Armament Inspectorate in Wehrkreis VI computed that the ammunition industry in its district then employed 9.5 per cent skilled workers

to total workers, the motor industry 18-23 per cent, the airplane body factories 18 per cent and the airplane parts industry 26 per cent. Informant who possessed these secret calculations believed that the industries concerned required 40 to 60 per cent skilled to total labor in order to function effectively under present-day conditions.

d. Ordnance Repair.- Evidence from prisoners suggests that German forward repair organizations have lately expanded, as steel and engineering factories near the front, evacuated by industry, are reoccupied by maintenance units. Enemy formations falling back on the SAAR industrial area are particularly well situated in this respect. It is reported that the 17 SS Division workshop at BLIES KASTEL has 30 tanks under repair; a similar number of tanks is stated to be in the repair shop of 21 Panzer Division at ST. INGBERT, where the same shop handles motor-vehicle repair for a variety of other units in the area.

Intelligence is not as clear on the location of divisional ordnance workshops in the First U.S. Army sector, although prisoners have pinpointed such in BERGHEIM and BERG GLADBACH. Several reports, however, have referred to a larger 4th echelon maintenance installation in the OPLADEN railroad repair shop, which is stated to be 10 per cent engaged on railroad car repairs and 90 per cent converted to maintenance work for front-line units. This factory, it is said, repairs motor vehicles and armored vehicles on an assembly-line basis.

e. Transport.- Intelligence continues to accumulate of the extent to which the German railways have subordinated economic and even armament traffic to the movement of divisions to the Western Front. Military rail movements were carried on during the past week with unabated vigor, as noted under the paragraphs covering tactical reconnaissance and new unit identifications. These movements have probably been subject to delays similar to those reported by prisoners from units arrived in previous weeks. All sources suggest that travel times have doubled or tripled. Two reports in particular mention delays due to the necessity to wait 48 and 10 hours for locomotive replacements after engines in operation had been halted by strafing. It is apparent, however, that the Wehrmacht has relied on rail movements in preference to road, for purposes of fuel conservation. An announcement by HITLER, quoted in an order by Field Marshal Von RUNDSTEDT on 28 October (published in Sixth Army Group Weekly Intelligence Summary Number 12) states:

> "No Hq, Military posts or unit commanders will use motor transportation when the same mission can be accomplished by using railroads. The resulting conservation of fuel outweighs all difficulties and delays".

Enemy military railroad movement appears still to be accompanied by a full measure of difficulty and delay. It is nonetheless accomplished.

6. ENEMY DEFENSE TRENDS

a. Twelfth Army Group

(1) Ninth US Army.- Between the ROER and ERFT River Defense Lines there are numerous villages which have been surrounded by entrenchments in accordance with the

enemy's plan for perimeter defenses. This plan, with particular emphasis on the JULICH area, is further discussed in Annex 4 of this report.

(2) First US Army.- Recent aerial photography reveals that the gap in the ERFT Defense Line Southwest of KOLN is now defended by trenches, thus forming a continuous line from ARZDORF (F5423) North to BEDBURG (F1867). Several trenches on the West bank of the RHINE in the vicinity of UNKELBACH (F6122) indicate that this may form the southern anchor of the ERFT Defense, although the AHR River a few kilometers further South would be more logical. In the area West of KOLN entrenchments now partially surround the towns of BOCKLEMUND, PULHEIM, LOVENICH, BRAUWEILER, FRECHEN and STOMMELN. These defended towns form an important part of the perimeter defenses of KOLN (See Defense map). A prisoner states that troops are busy building a defense line from HERGARTEN to ZULPICH and FIRMENICH to EUSKIRCHEN (See figure 1 on Defense Map). The latter line would be a portion of the defenses reported by prisoners two weeks ago as extending from BONN to EUSKIRCHEN to SCHLEIDEN. Other than the defenses in the vicinity of ZULPICH photo sources have not confirmed the existence of these defense lines. Along the KYLL River from MURLENBACH to KYLLBURG (See figure 2) a prisoner states that 800 Russian and Polish prisoners of war are digging anti-tank ditches.

(3) Third US Army.- Perimeter defenses on the outskirts of KOBLENZ on each side of the MOSELLE River are rapidly being constructed. In the South the enemy is becoming concerned with one of his weaker links--the LANDSTUHL Corridor. Recently numerous fire trenches approximately 100 feet in length have appeared along the road traversing the corridor East of KAISERSLAUTERN (See figure 3). Also, a prisoner relates that machine-gun positions have been prepared North of the KAISERSLAUTERN road in the vicinity of LANDSTUHL.

b. Sixth Army Group.- A fair source reports that the enemy has blocked another possible route through the BLACK FOREST by a line of casemates across the LURG Valley between GERNSBACH and BADEN BADEN. Further confirmation has been received of the construction of field works along the East bank of the Upper RHINE, in a report of German women engaged in digging at STAUFEN Southwest of FREIBURG.

c. Twenty-One Army Group.- Additional anti-aircraft artillery emplacements in the RUHR Valley have been converted into infantry strongpoints. Numerous fire trenches have been dug on the East bank of the RHINE across from WESEL probably for protection of the bridges in this area.

d. Interior GERMANY.- Various prisoners of war have referred to a defense line existing between BREMEN and FRANKFURT on MAIN. The proposed course of the line appears to be along the river valleys from BREMEN (L54/W79) via VERDEN (L53/X08) - MINDEN (L53/W81) - HAMELN (L53/C19) - CASSEL (L52/C20) - FULDA (L51/H31) - HANAU (L51/M87) - ASCHAFFENBURG (L50/N05) to HEILBRONN (L50/S06). Existing air cover examined by SHAEF offers no confirmation of this, but it is possible that there are old defense positions, constructed at the same time as the WECHAR line, in the vicinity of ASCHAFFENBURG and FULDA.

The enemy is evidently concerned with the possibility of a landing on the North German coast, as a prisoner of war states community digging is taking place in the vicinity of CUXHAVEN (L54/R68) at the mouth of the ELBE River.


ENEMY DEFENSE LINES
Legend
MAGINOT LINE
SIEGFRIED LINE
OTHER LINES
Eder
Lahn
Giessen
Wetter
Bad Nauheim
Friedburg
Nidder
Frankfurt
Main
Wiesbaden
Darmstadt
SCALE 1:500,000 - MILES
ONE INCH=APPROX. EIGHT MILES


Lahn
Bad Nauheim
Friedberg
Nidder
Frankfurt
Main
Wiesbaden
RHEIN
Darmstadt
Worms
Mannheim
Ludwigshafen
Heidelberg
Neckar
Kaiserslautern
Neustadt
Speyer
Landau
Bruchsal
RHEIN
Karlsruhe
Durlach
Enz
SCALE 1:500,000 - MILES


MOSEL
Lahn
MURLENBACH
Kyll
KYLLBURG
RHEIN
Nahe
Trier
Prims
Glan
3
Saar
Kaiserslautern
LANDSTUHL
Neunkirchen
Homburg
Zweibrücken
Blies
Pirma
Bitche
SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED


St Vith
APPROX. FRONT LINE
MURLENBACH
2
Kyll
KYLLBURG
Sure
Trier
Luxembourg
MOSELLE
P
U
Q
Prüm
Saar
Nied
Metz
Seille
PREPARED BY G-2 TWELFTH ARMY GROUP


ERRATA - A TO B SHOULD BE SHOWN AS OTHER DEFENSE LINE, NOT SIEGFRIED LINE.
München Gladbach
Rheydt
Stommeln
Pulheim
Bocklemund
Brauweiler
Lovenich
Köln
Frechen
Erft
Aachen
Düren
ZULPICH
EUSKIRCHEN
FIRMENICH
1
St Vith
APPROX. FRONT LINE
MURLENBACH
2
Kyll
KYLLBURG
Sure


SECRET
ENEMY
LI
Le
MAGINOT LI
SIEGFRIED
OTHER LIN
Lüdenscheid
Lenne
Siegen
Siegen
Siegen
Bonn
F G
L M
Koblenz
Lahn
MOSEL
RHEIN
Wiesbaden
Frankfu

7. VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE SUMMARY.- The building up of trains in the deeper marshalling areas and the over-changing numbers of cars at the forward detraining points appeared to be evidence of continued, though light, military train movement in all sectors at the beginning of the period. Weather continued to handicap observations, limiting both range and visibility. At the middle of the period activity was apparent between PHILIPPSHEIM (L25) and TRIER (L23). The use of this line freed the KOBLENZ - TRIER route for heavier runs to the VIII and XX US Corps sectors which, in retrospect, might have indicated a shifting of large units. The week closed on a day of strong enemy attacks in weather which provided visibility and observations over a wide area. The extent and degree of railroad activity far exceeded any previous day for two months and, lacking frequent favorable flying conditions, comparisons are impossible. The lines from GIESSEN (G62) to LAHNSTEIN (L98) and GIESSEN (G62) to FRANKFURT (M66) carried very heavy probable military traffic on 17 December, while the short line between KAISERSLAUTERN (R09) and LAUTERECKER (L91) revealed a large scale movement southward.

8. GAF ACTIVITY.- The GAF has reappeared as a striking force. On 17 December, in support of the enemy breakthrough, more than 500 single-engine fighter sorties were flown over the area between VENLO and ST. VITH. This effort, meeting heavy Allied aircraft and flak defenses, provided continuous close support throughout the day, at an incomplete cost of 96 aircraft. On the preceding night, 90 Ju.52's had dropped an estimated 1,000 parachutists over a large area centering around the Forest of EUPEN. At the same time 46 He.111 sorties were mounted, and although most of these were presumed to be engaged in flying bomb launching, it appears from incomplete intelligence that some of these may also have carried parachutists. A small covering force of Ju.88's was also active while the landing operations were in process.

These events climaxed a busy week of operations over the front. On two days weather had limited effort to less than 35 single-engine fighter sorties, but aggressive attacks on Allied fighter bombers had employed 200/300 fighters on the remaining days. In the event of heavy bomber operations within a hundred miles of the RHINE, the enemy had, however, diverted most of his effort to interception of these attacks. There have been renewed instances of GAF reliance on variation in weather, between Allied bases and those of the enemy, to mount sorties over the front when there would be little possibility of our own aircraft remaining up for interception. This has been true of night fighter activity as well. The usual re-supply missions have been flown to the beleaguered garrisons in the West. Apparently the policy of conservation, and the recent increase in production of synthetics, has yielded sufficient gasoline to permit a level of activity much higher than had been attempted through September and October when heavy bomber attacks had forced German oil production down to less than 30 per cent of pre-attack output. In view of the competition for gasoline which will be met from the Wehrmacht during the current push, there is little possibility that the GAF can sustain this all-out effort for more than a few days.

9. ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE NOTES

a. What is HITLER's Condition?.- "Is HITLER alive or is he dead?" "If he is alive is he still running the war and GERMANY?" "If not, or if he is dead, how can we still be bound to him under our oaths?" These are some of the questions currently in German soldiers' minds according to voices from the Prisoner of War cage which claim to speak the thoughts of their less-fortunate fellow-sufferers.

For weeks reports have been coming in concerning HITLER's alleged indisposition: his hands were burned in the 20 July attempted Putsch; he was wounded in the head; he has lost his hearing and is "deaf as a stove"; "he recovered quickly from the immediate effects of the attempt on his life, but later had some sort of cerebral hemorrhage resulting from shock and has been in bed for approximately three months"; he is suffering from loss of nerve which makes him afraid to appear in public--fear of assassination or possibly of a nervous breakdown; HITLER is still in EAST PRUSSIA and when seen there a month ago by a high Austrian general he was obviously in a bad state of health and had great difficulty in talking. Such is the gist of the reports, unconfirmed, based on rumor, conflicting.

Nothing reliable is known of HITLER's condition, not even whether he is certainly alive or dead. He spoke over the radio a few hours after the attempt on his life. He allegedly received PAVELITCH on 20 September. Since then he has failed to give a speech in connection with the mustering of the Volkssturm, a mass movement which normally would have called forth some rabble-rousing from him. Since then he has failed for the first time in 21 years to make his November speech on the anniversary of the famous Bierhalle Putsch--instead of which a long harangue represented to be from the FUHRER was read at a mass rally in MUNICH several days after the anniversary by HIMMLER. And he has failed to appear in public even upon the burial of colleagues such as BURCKEL and SCHMUNDT. A communique from HITLER's headquarters, not always the source of unquestioned truth, stated (according to DNB Home Service) that on 4 December 1944 HITLER received the newly appointed Slovak and Hungarian Ministers. Thus, HITLER has undergone a long public silence during which only a few personal receptions have been announced. This silence, however, is not the first of his fade-outs: he missed an important occasion on 30 January 1943 when he failed to speak on the tenth anniversary of his accession to power, and since his vigorous performance at the Bierhalle Anniversary a year ago he has tended more and more to avoid the limelight.

Whatever the cause, the recent record of silence through several significant developments may be accepted as reasonable indication that HITLER has for some time been almost entirely removed from the day-to-day life of GERMANY, even if temporarily. As far back as early October the Kölnische Zeitung was justifying his eclipse with the plea of overwork, and helpful Goebbels was substituting in his Master's job by addressing armament workers close to the Western Front and by visiting MODEL's headquarters in order to obtain "a comprehensive picture" of the military position. Possibly it was overwork--overwork in planning (as he is now alleged to have done) how to conduct a diversionary counter-attack without enough gasoline, tanks, airplanes and men; overworry for the consequences after the counter-attack peters out and the Twilight of the Gods sets in.

b. Party vs. Army.- The last phase of the struggle between the Nazi Party and the Wehrmacht for political power in GERMANY was the recent amending of the Wehrmacht Law of 1935 which prohibited all political activities and Party membership in the Army. Thus, the way is now cleared for the Party, through its Political Guidance Officers and otherwise, to seek and obtain Party members in the Army. Now the Party will have its network of agents and watchdogs in all military echelons circumventing military channels and reporting any unapproved political activity directly to it. It is difficult to see, therefore, how the Army leadership can again gain an important degree of freedom outside the military operational field so long as the Party machine continues to function.

The struggle has been waging since HITLER, in smashing ROEHM in 1934, reached an alliance with the Army leadership which enabled the Army to survive as by far the most independent of GERMANY's traditional ruling groups. This parallel separate structure of Party and Army continued for ten years, until it collapsed under the impact of the July 1944 revolt. Since that time the Party has step-by-step eaten away the Army's influence except in military operational matters which is retained in the old officers' corps because of the indispensability of its brains and experience.

Although the Party has had to yield in operational command, it has immeasurably increased its influence in fields hitherto under Army control. It has won key positions in Army administration and reserves; has wrested, as the war crossed the frontiers of the REICH, the control of the rear zones of operations from the Army; and has finally extended its political control over the soldiers and officers in the field in a way which erases the original agreement of 1934. (Source material: OSS, R & A)

c. Estimated Enemy Casualties

(1) Prisoners of War

(a) First US Army

Cumulative enemy P/W captured to 162400..... 214,999

P/W captured during current offensive to 162400..... 13,899

(b) Third US Army

Cumulative enemy P/W processed to 162400..... 138,581

P/W processed during current offensive to 162400..... 35,374

(c) Ninth US Army

Cumulative enemy P/W processed to 162400..... 60,326

P/W captured during current offensive to 162400..... 8,548

(d) Cumulative enemy P/W captured or processed through cages by U.S. Forces, not including Seventh U.S. Army, for period ending 162400..... 413,906

(e) P/W captured or processed through cages during current offensive by U.S. Forces, not including Seventh U.S. Army, for period ending 162400..... 57,821

(2) Recent estimates of total enemy casualties by Armies have resulted in the following figures for Twelfth Army Group during the first sixteen days of December:

Prisoners of War	17,017
Estimated Killed	10,527
Estimated Long-Term Wounded	13,745
TOTAL	41,289
TANK LOSSES	106

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
GERMAN ORDER of BATTLE
NORTH FRANCE & LOW COUNTRIES
AS OF 16 DEC. '44
ANNEX NO. 1 TO TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 19
LEGEND
ENEMY CONTACT (Front Line)
GAINS SINCE LAST REPORT
MILES
MEUSE
ARDENNES
H
B
First
Fifth Pz
Fifth Pz.
Seventh
353
344
89
272
326

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



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
First Nineteenth
HUNSRUCK
LXXXII
LXXXII
XXX
XIII SS
XIII SS
XXX
LXXXIX
TAUNUS
MAIN
FRANKFURT
ODEN
WALD
NECKAR
VOSGES
FLOODED
MULHOUSE
BASEL
SCHWARZ
WALD
LXXXIX
LXIV
LXXXV
LXIII
21
19
719
361
245
256
553
216(?)
405
198
108
146
116
269
159
304
189

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ANNEX NO. 2 TO TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 19

V-2

The accompanying diagram of the rocket weapon, designated as V-2, is published to give those who have not had the opportunity to study technical descriptions of the missile and as a possible aid in the differentiation of incidents from those which may be caused by the more familiar V-1.

1. LAUNCHING.- The weapon is set on its stern end in a vertical position on a small square steel platform provided with jacks for the proper leveling. The large wheeled vehicle used to transport the rocket is provided with a crane-like arrangement to do this and is also provided with ladders and platforms for servicing with fuel, making adjustments and settings prior to the launching. The rocket is placed on its platform, oriented so that the horizontal tail fins are perpendicular to the line of flight. Any firm and fairly level area can be used for this and a clearing of perhaps 50 yards' radius is sufficient to prevent serious blast damage to trees or houses when the launching takes place. The alcohol and liquid oxygen are placed in the main fuel tanks, hydrogen peroxide and permanganate being added to the smaller tanks to provide fuel for the turbine-driving fuel pumps. Necessary settings are made for the trajectory desired and launching initiated.

2. FLIGHT.- The rocket rises following a straight course, usually within thirty degrees of the vertical, gathering speed and assuming a steady course. This course persists for about a minute at the end of which the speed is about 5,000 feet per second and is, to all intents and purposes, similar to the course of an ordinary projectile within a gun barrel. The secondary power source, the permanganate-driven fuel pumps, must pump over eight tons of alcohol and liquid oxygen during a period of one minute and therefore is designed to generate about 600 horsepower. At the end of this time the fuel is cut off and the rocket, now in the stratosphere, follows a parabolic course to the target. Storage batteries supply power to run motors that move the control vanes, radio and other electrical apparatus. The rocket does not revolve but maintains a steady keel by means of two gyroscopes, and is aided in keeping its course by means of the internal vanes that operate within the jet stream while that is functioning and external vanes that are in the air stream. The period of radio control, if any, is probably only during the initial rise. A novel feature of the jet is the fact that the double walls are cooled by the alcohol before it enters the combustion jets, and an arrangement is provided for by-passing a portion of the alcohol fuel and cutting the thrust effect of the driving mechanism by about 50%. The friction of the air as it falls decreases the speed to about 2,500 feet per second and causes some heating of the surface of the weapon probably accounting for air explosions or disintegration in some cases before the ultimate target is reached.

3. IMPACT.- The warhead contains 2,150 pounds of explosive and because of the tremendous terminal velocity even the instantaneous fuze does not cause explosion to take place quickly enough to prevent penetration and crater formation. The noiseless approach is probably the reason for a greater number of casualties from this weapon than from a V-1 with a similar warhead. Parts that may be found after an incident are the large venturi jet, chains and sprockets for driving the control vanes, air bottles, complicated radio apparatus, the fuel pumps and turbine drive, and main or secondary fuel tanks.

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

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ANNEX NO. 3 TO TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 19

SURFACE ICING CONDITIONS IN GERMANY

1. GENERAL.- The advent of cold weather may make possible the use of information gathered from German sources regarding ice as an aid in crossing rivers, swamps and other water barriers. Freezing temperatures will in general aid in overcoming water obstacles. This is accomplished through two phases: first, the amount of run-off water is diminished by virtue of its being fixed in place; and secondly, by freezing a coating on deep water that will support traffic. Frozen ground diminishes mud and will provide a firm base for vehicles though its surface may be melted if the traffic is heavy and continuous.

2. ICING ON RIVERS.- Needless to say, the amount of ice that will form in any given winter is difficult to predict. On the RHINE itself most of the ice found is in the form of ice-flows that have entered the river from tributaries. Figures show that these flows hinder navigation for an average of twenty days per year. On the RHINE below COLOGNE there is little ice formation on the river, seldom more than ten days per year. This is in contrast to more than fifteen days further upstream, near MAINZ. Still further upstream near KARLSRUHE are found the most ice-free stretches of the river. When ice formation occurs it is usually between 20 November and the end of February. Ice-free years are common for the entire river. In the exceptional year of 1929 the RHINE was completely frozen over (except for a few small spaces of open water) from LORELEY to KARLSRUHE. Downstream from KOBLENZ it was completely frozen at ENGERS, LINZ, UNKEL, COLOGNE, VERDINGEN and from DUISBERG to the Dutch Frontier. In HOLLAND the LEK and WAAL were also frozen over a large part of their course. The general thickness of the ice varied from 28 inches near the banks to 12 inches in the middle of the river. In backwaters and deep areas an exceptional thickness of as much as 16 feet was found. A study of the table on page 4 of this Annex shows that in the general area of this Army Group not much helpful freezing will take place until some time in January. Data is not available as to the dates of freezing of small streams, lakes and ponds, but it seems reasonable to assume that freezing of this type will soon be of some aid on our present front.

3. USE OF ICE TO SUPPORT MILITARY EQUIPMENT.- Ice itself has a carrying capacity which is surprising to the uninitiated. It will be recalled that during the siege of LENINGRAD the Russians brought supplies to the city over frozen Lake LADOGA by regular railroad trains, pulled by steam locomotives on tracks laid on the frozen surface. German documents show that about two feet of ice will support the Tiger tank. Certain precautions should be observed when ice is used as a bridge to insure that its carrying capacity has been properly judged and that it will stand up under constant use. The actual thickness should be measured by means of test holes. These should be made near the banks as well as towards the middle of the stream or lake and if tributaries, springs or currents are present, test holes should be made in their vicinity to ascertain whether or not warmer currents of

water or agitation has not caused thin areas to persist. Careful observation should be made close to banks, near protruding rocks, logs or vegetation, especially if there is a possibility that the water level is not constant. The ice must be in contact with water underneath to make strength estimates valid. Newly formed ice is usually stronger than old ice and ice with snow on it will not thicken and become stronger because the snow serves as an insulator and prevents the cooler atmosphere from freezing the layer of water beneath the ice. Several days of warm thaw may weaken the ice because it will become porous even though its actual thickness does not change.

4. SUPPORTING POWER OF ICE.- The following table has been compiled from available data. American figures insofar as they exist are given to aid in establishing the reliability of the German figures.

GERMAN

LOAD	THICKNESS ADVOCATED
Single infantryman	1½"
Infantry in open order	2"
Single horses	4"
Infantry and horsed cavalry in march column including light motor transport	6"
Light artillery up to 2½ tons, horse-drawn	8"
Four-wheeled vehicles, maximum axle load 2.7 tons and 65' intervals	
Ten-ton wheeled vehicles, maximum axle load 7 tons and 65' intervals	12"
Twenty-ton wheeled vehicles, 100' intervals	14"
Pz. Kpfw. I or II, 38' interval, 10 tons	13 3/4"
Pz. Kpfw. III or IV, 40' interval, 22 tons	15 3/4"
Pz. Kpfw. Panther, 53' interval, 45 tons	19½"
Pz. Kpfw. Tiger (Model E), 66' interval, 60 tons	21½"

AMERICAN
(Page 115, FM 5-35, Feb. 15, 1941)

LOAD	THICKNESS ADVOCATED
Small groups of men	3"
Horse cavalry in small groups	4-5"
Wagons and 75-mm guns	7"
Divisional loads (Class 10)	9-12"
Army loads	20"

5. PRECAUTIONS AND AIDS.- If ice is going to be used for traffic it should be prepared, after first having been measured to insure it to be capable of carrying the desired load, by clearing off all snow for a space at least 16 feet wide on either side of the intended roadbed. The road itself should have sand or gravel spread over it following a search made for cracks.

Those running transverse to the road are not dangerous and can be filled by running water into them so that they will fill and freeze. Development of cracks that are parallel to the road denote inability of the road to continue to carry its load. Clearing off the snow on the sides of the road serves to allow inspection for the presence of these danger signs. Thin ice can be reinforced for infantry loads by the use of the footbridge, supporting the light infantry bridge with planks in place of the floats. Ice that is an inch thick can be reinforced by building it up on top with layers of ice formed by adding water on top. The addition of brush or straw will add to the strength of the layers. For practical purposes the weight-bearing quality of the added layer should be regarded as one-half that of normal ice. Ice sheets or blocks can be cut and frozen in place by filling in the cracks with water. Snow dams will serve to keep any added water in place till freezing occurs. Ice that has been reinforced by added layers of ice should be test-loaded, and test-loading of all ice should be done if time and circumstances permit.

Ice will cause severe damage to pontons and assault boats, piles, rope cables and bridging. These should be sheathed by metal and fiber ropes protected by wooden box-like covers. Steel cables are not endangered by ice. If the ice is heavy it can crush light boats and barges even though there is little or no current.

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CLIMATIC TABLE

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MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS WITH ICE, AND DATES OF FIRST AND LAST ICE, ON GERMAN RIVERS

River	Place	Mean No. of Days With Ice	Mean No. of Days With Fast Ice	Max. No. of Days With Ice	Max. No. of Days With Fast Ice	Mean Date of First Ice	Mean Date of Last Ice	Extreme Limit First Ice	Extreme Limit Last Ice	Extreme Limit First Fast Ice	Extreme Limit Last Fast Ice
Oder	Ratibor	28.9	14.7	65	41	21 Dec	25 Feb	11 Nov	24 Mar	23 Dec	2 Mar
"	Frankfurt-am-O	43.2	19.4	120	59	20 "	26 "	9 "	28 "	3 "	20 "
Neisse	Schurgast	40.2	22.4	100	60	16 "	26 "	8 "	24 "	8 "	21 "
Elbe	Dresden	30.8	3.7	68	28	25 "	15 "	10 "	18 "	16 "	15 Feb
"	Magdeburg	29.8	5.7	69	50	26 "	13 "	11 "	11 "	6 "	1 Mar
"	Hamburg	34.9	1.0	76	15	27 "	15 "	17 "	9 "	4 Feb	19 Feb
Fulda	Kassel	20.2	17.8	71	66			20 "	13 Feb	20 Nov	12 Mar
Weser	Minden	14.8	2.7	41	13			19 "	22 "	10 Dec	19 Feb
Aller	Verden	12.7	3.6	45	26			11 "	8 Mar	30 "	19 "
Ems	Lingen	10.0	2.8	34	14	27 Dec	24 Jan	27 "	3 "	11 "	6 "
Hase	Herzlake	4.5	2.3	23	20			27 "	8 "	3 Jan	22 Jan
Ems	Hesum	17.4	10.3	37	23			20 "	26 Feb	21 Nov	26 Feb
Rhine	Mainz	15.5	--	31	--			20 "	26 "	--	--
	Koblenz	12.8	--	35	--			7 Dec	28 "	--	--
	Köln	12.7	--	30	--			7 "	27 "	--	--
	Emmerich	10.2	--	28	12			8 "	26 "	9 Feb	20 Feb
Bodensee	Konstanz	20.2	14.3	58	38			2 Jan	24 Mar	17 Jan	24 Mar
Main	Frankfurt-am-M	21.9	1.7	46	27			19 Nov	28 Feb	20 "	15 Feb
Saar	Saarburg	6.9	1.4	18	15			7 Dec	20 "	1 "	20 "
Mosel	Trier	9.6	--	25	--			19 Nov	24 "	--	--
Ruhr	Mulheim	2.3	--	12	--			22 Dec	17 Jan	--	--
Lippe	Hamm	4.0	1.8	21	13			18 Nov	23 "	20 Nov	8 Jan

Period of observation not known. Based on official sources.

Extract from NID Geographical Handbook.

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ANNEX NO. 4 TO TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 19

THE DEFENSE OF GERMAN TOWNS

A collection of recent captured documents reveals the system used for the fortification of towns and villages in the defense of JULICH. A summary of these documents may afford an insight into the method which the Germans may employ in the future in transforming uncaptured towns into strong defensive positions. This information is more detailed and of later date than previous instructions reported on page 9 of 12th Army Group Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 13, which should be read with this report.

1. GENERAL PLAN.- A secret order issued by the G-3 of the 49th Infantry Division, dated 19 October 1944, reveals HITLER's general instructions for the manner in which towns will be prepared for defense. Villages near the town will be combined into a defense system consisting of a series of strongpoints connected with each other and with the town itself. In all cases, because of the limited forces available, defensive positions will be constructed in built-up areas, utilizing basement windows, garden walls, etc., in a manner affording fields of fire along streets and houses. Since the defenders must anticipate attacks spearheaded by armor, all roads not absolutely necessary for present use will be permanently blocked in such manner, that by-passing is prevented by buildings, walls, or sunken roads. The periphery of each town will be prepared so as to form a solid tank obstacle, preventing, or at least delaying any penetration into the town itself.

In addition, dominant terrain features in the vicinity of each town will be converted into strongpoints by use of foxholes, machine-gun and anti-tank positions, fire and communication trenches and barbed wire. Details on the earthwork emplacements, machine-gun nests and foxhole constructions are set forth in a directive annexed to the above G-3 order.

Appendix A is a German representation of a typical town, showing the proper defensive emplacements and demolitions as described in the documents referred to above.

2. PERSONNEL.- Personnel for the defense of the town is to be obtained from two sources: (a) It is anticipated, and experience in and around JULICH confirmed this, that there would be many soldiers available who had strayed from their units or who were sent to the rear for rest. (b) Further personnel is obtained from the Volkssturm, into which all reasonably able-bodied males between the ages of 14 and 60 have been drafted, and from the ranks of workers who may be engaged in labor at the particular town when needed.

The urgency of the construction of defensive emplacements in the area between front and RHINE is illustrated by the above-mentioned order of the 49th Infantry Division, according to which all soldiers up to and including the rank of major are ordered to participate in the work of digging and preparing these emplacements.

In the event of an attack, all personnel are notified by the town commander (Ortskommandant) by the ringing of church bells and by messengers. All inhabitants of the town are thereupon placed under military command and the defense of the town proceeds in accordance with previously prepared plans.

3. ARMAMENT.- The armament of each village consists of light machine guns, machine pistols, rifles and a limited number of anti-tank guns. The assigned quantity and type of these weapons cannot be established, as, because of the shortage of German materiel, captured equipment is substituted whenever possible, the army having priority for the issue of German weapons. In addition, each person is issued two hand grenades, of either the egg or stick type, which he must have on his person after the alarm is sounded.

4. SPECIFIC EXAMPLE.- The documents upon which this report is based concern the defense of JULICH, a town of approximately 52,000 population, bisected by the ROER River, the last water obstacle before the RHINE. As specified in the directive previously referred to, the defense of this town depends upon the fortification of three outlying villages, KOSLAR, BOURHEIM and KIRCHBERG. Appendix B shows the location of these villages with respect to JULICH. All these villages have as their mission the defense of JULICH from the West. We shall use as an example the central village, BOURHEIM (population 600), Southwest of JULICH. Its mission, as set forth in an order of 14 October 1944, is to defend JULICH from the West and Southwest, the right boundary being the road from JULICH to ALDENHOVEN, the left boundary joining with the KIRCHBERG defense line.

The defenses of this village consisted of machine-gun nests in the basements of houses, roadblocks in the streets, and strongpoints erected on the heights west of the village.

For personnel purposes a battle commander was appointed and the village was divided into three districts. Each of these had a complement of approximately one officer, five NCOs and twenty men. Six men were left in reserve, who were to report to the battle commander in the event of alarm. In addition, 21 men of the Volkssturm who could not be used because of shortage of weapons and insufficient training, were to assemble in the cellar of the local school building, to be used as messengers and supply carriers.

The following weapons and ammunition were assigned to the village by the 4th Battalion of the 246th Artillery Regiment:

30 large anti-tank rocket projectors (Panzerfaust)
2700 rounds rifle ammunition
4 German rifles
1300 wooden mines (Holzmine)

However, the 2700 rounds of ammunition were not delivered. At a later date the village received 3,000 anti-tank mines of an unspecified type. All of this ammunition was to be stored in the basement of a house, to be distributed only in the event of the sounding of an alarm.

The documents fail to indicate whether the preparations were completed in time for the defense of JULICH. The dates of issuance of these orders indicate that approximately four weeks' time was available for the construction work.

APPENDIX A

EXAMPLE FOR THE DEFENSE OF A COMMUNITY



Infantry trenches.
a = Bridges prepared for demolition.
b = Stream, impassable to tanks, depth 1.60 m, width 4.20 m.
c = Tank obstacle (wall).
d = Tank ditches.
e = Prepared street obstacles.
f = Street prepared for demolition.
g = Abatis.
h = Bridge, demolished.

APPENDIX B

JULICH AND SURROUNDING VILLAGES



ANNEX NO. 5 TO TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 19

DESERTION IN THE GERMAN ARMY

(Based on Material Assembled by
P & PW Section, 12th Army Group)

That desertion is one of the great problems facing the German Army and Nazi Party is amply indicated by the disciplinary and propaganda measures taken against it: death to the families of deserters promised and ordered by HIMMLER himself, and death as an accomplished fact dealt out to arrested would-be deserters.

1. THE CAUSES OF DESERTION.- Officers, NCOs and EMs are deserting--for causes differing with the individual but subject to some classification; and with an ingenuity mothered in distress. Officer desertion is a relatively new development. Deserters come from no certain type of unit, but do arrive at the Allied lines in greater numbers from units of known low morale and deteriorated fighting quality, such as newly-committed machine-gun battalions, Volksgrenadier divisions, March battalions and GAF units. Members of "convalescent battalions" are frequently among the deserters, and disillusioned veterans of the Russian campaigns. They come from all sectors of the 12th Army Group front and flow in greatest quantity over inactive lines. Of all the patrols which went out from one company in the 553rd Division during a month, only one returned. The reasons for their action given by prisoners who declare they deserted extend from strong anti-Nazi conviction and consequent long-range planning to desert at the first opportunity, to hatred of Nazidom combined with deep love of GERMANY which has caused great inner struggle and last-minute decision to desert.

Analysis of the reasons given for their action by a large number of deserters from different PW cages reveals a number of contributory factors, each deserter declaring himself impelled primarily by one factor. A conviction that the war is lost to GERMANY and that the soldier's first obligation is therefore to himself and his own survival was given by many as the cause. Other causes were an awareness of the overwhelming air superiority of the Allies; receipt of letters from German prisoners being held in the United States relating the comforts of their captivity; the statements of exchanged German medics relating the conditions of German prisoners being held by the Allies; fear of punishment for anti-Nazi views expressed by themselves in meetings with Nazi Political (or Guidance) Officers; harsh treatment by their officers and NCOs and threats that if they "straggle" they will be shot; being given orders impossible to execute and orders to sacrifice men senselessly. One deserter was impelled primarily by word of the effect of Nazi laws upon his home-folks--that his 69-year-old father had had to close his bakery and go into the Labor Service, his 50-year-old mother had been called to the East for trench digging, and his fiance had been impressed

into defense work. Sixty men from an NCO School received orders to proceed to METZ and defend it. Instead, they proceeded--to desert. Allied leaflet and Public Address system propaganda were given by many as the final cause of their desertion--many carrying the safe-conduct pass "document" and feeling the safer the more official it looked. During a recent Public Address broadcast to units opposite the 83rd U.S. Division, the Germans sent out a 6-man patrol to discover where the broadcast was originating and to arrest would-be deserters--and the patrol itself deserted.

Others couch their reasons in terms of grievance--grievances at being forced into the Waffen SS and being tainted with its stigma; grievance that the lieutenant made a speech urging the men to forsake religion and believe only in the FUHRER; grievance over lack of heavy weapons: "... besides the rifles we had 2 light machine guns and one hand grenade in our platoon, and they wanted us to fight tanks with that!"

Many deserters from GOETZ VON BERLICHINGEN cited the locally famous "SCHUSTER Case", the story of the desertion of Major SCHUSTER, Commanding Officer of the Division's anti-tank battalion. SCHUSTER was arrested by the Division Judge Advocate and relieved of his command, and concurrently his family was arrested and imprisoned pending determination of the charges against him. The charges were: (1) that on several occasions he had said to his officers that it was madness to continue a lost war; (2) that at various times he had listened to the English news broadcasts; (3) that his cousin was a half-Jew; (4) that he had shipped 25 tons of tank spare parts East of the RHINE with the intent to steal them. During the investigation and prior to the trial he escaped from the house in which he was guarded, stole a motorcycle, swam the MOSELLE and delivered himself to the Americans. Thereafter, the officers of the Division's 38th Panzer Regiment, 4th Company, wore civilian clothes underneath their uniforms. Thereafter, a lieutenant from the Division's 45th Machine-Gun Battalion deserted under the ruse of pretending to inspect the battalion outposts. Thereafter, a squad leader in the Division's 38th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment declared in public: "Either we'll get food or I shall desert with my men". According to prisoners, the 17th SS Division has become so concerned over the desertions of its patrols that it has adopted a new policy of sending officers on patrols as being more reliable.

2. DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AGAINST DESERTION.- On 7 November 1944, the Judge Advocate of 559 Volksgrenadier Division published an order announcing the following "Punishment Awards" for October:

"1. Desertion: Death Sentence: Cpl. Franz Mossemann and Grenadier Stanislow Kwasniewski of the 1127 Grenadier Regt were surprised by a Reconnaissance patrol while attempting to go over to the enemy. They were court-martialled the same day and condemned to death. Sentence carried out by shooting.

"2. Desertion: Death Sentence: Cpl. Max Foessinger, 1559 A.A. Company, left his company while on the move under artillery fire and joined up with some local inhabitants who were being evacuated and represented himself to them as a doctor under a false name. He was recognized by a member of his company and arrested. He was condemned to death for desertion and shot.

"3. Desertion: Death Sentence: Grenadier Franz Hof of the 1127 Grenadier Regiment quitted his unit while on the march and, together with another deserter, obtained work with various farmers as a land worker, until he was arrested. He was condemned to death for desertion and shot".

Many other units have issued orders announcing the death penalty for deserters, and sometimes punishment for their families, both during and since the September internal crisis in the REICH. On 10 September HIMMLER issued a secret order reading as follows:

"Certain unreliable elements seem to believe that the war will be over for them as soon as they surrender to the enemy. Against this belief it must be pointed out that every deserter will be prosecuted and will find his just punishment. Furthermore, his ignominious behavior will entail the most severe consequences for his family. Upon examination of the circumstances they will be shot..."

An order from a higher headquarters was recently read to all officers of the 19th Infantry Division to the effect that any officer who loses more than two men due to desertion makes himself liable to a "drumhead court-martial". A secret order from the Commanding Officer of the 91st Infantry Division provided the following; death penalty which can be pronounced in absentia, to deserters; barred forever from the Fatherland; confiscation of entire fortune of family and family expelled from their homes; every soldier is duty-bound to shoot a deserter. All units of the 36th Infantry Division recently received this order: deserters immediately sentenced to death and executed after the war; families punished--rations and allowances discontinued at once; letters of deserters will not be forwarded; if a whole section of a unit deserts, every tenth man in the remainder of the unit will be shot. In a Battalion Order the Commanding Officer, 2 Battalion, 1215 Regiment, of the late-lamented 462 Infantry Division, states that a section of the 6th Company surrendered to an American assault group although the men were unwounded and were numerically superior to the Americans. These men are termed deserters. They and their families will have to bear all consequences resulting from desertions. The Commanding Officer of 3rd Company, 305 Security Battalion threatened his men not only with the execution of deserters after the war but also with the execution of their families. Members of 6th Company, 69th Volksgrenadier Regiment, had to sign a statement as follows: -

"I certify that my company commander informed me today about measures to be taken against deserters. The private capital of the men concerned will be confiscated and the members of their family will be put into a concentration camp".

Similar statements had to be signed in other units on every fifth day.

When he took command of METZ on 14 November 1944, Major General KITTEL ordered as follows:

"The seriousness of our position forces me to say that I shall report every commander and every unit among whose ranks men are captured or desert. Their families will have to bear the consequences! Stragglers found in the streets of METZ will be shot forthwith on the strength of

my plenary powers. Deserters and prisoners of war must count on our own artillery fire being directed against such troops just as though they were the enemy!"

The "scandal of straggling", which was threatening to "develop into an epidemic", was condemned also by the Commanding Officer, 553rd Volksgrenadier Division, who ordered that those guilty of straggling would be considered as deserters.

Fear of desertion has brought some interesting arrangements in front-line posts. Orders have been issued in many units of 275 Division stating that advance guards are to shoot at guards trying to advance further than their normal post. In the 1st Company, 20 GAF Fortress Battalion, moving from one's foxhole or other assigned position is punishable by death. The Commanding Officer in the same company has instituted the regular practice of assigning two men to each foxhole, one reliable, the other unreliable!

3. THE PROPAGANDA DRIVE AGAINST DESERTION is led by the Nazi Political Officers and is conducted through pep talks, leaflets, atrocity stories, threats, rumors. A current story circulating throughout the German Army is that President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin have agreed that all German prisoners will be sent to RUSSIA for post-war reconstruction work. A leaflet recently distributed in the 275th Division has given rise to another story now making the rounds--to the effect that deserters will be employed by the Allies to blow up mines. Other current rumors are that an agreement has been reached between the Allies and GERMANY providing that deserters held by the Allies will be exchanged in SWITZERLAND for prisoners held by the Germans; that the Americans report the names of deserters to the Germans by telephone (fear of which has caused some deserters to hesitate to use the safe-conduct pass in their possession); that Red Cross letters of prisoners will not be forwarded, and that American negro troops kill all deserters.

4. LONG-RANGE PLANS TO DESERT frequently involved clever pre-arrangements to avoid the consequences. One German carried an English dictionary and a piece of white cloth on his person at all times from the day of his induction to the hour of his desertion. Another, after five years in the Army in rear echelons, volunteered for the paratroops in order to desert--and did. Others obtained in advance the insignia of the Army Paymaster, and representing themselves as such, went to the outposts, ordered them to point out the minefield gaps, and moved out to the Allies. Another transferred his savings account to his mother-in-law while home on his last furlough, so that his wife would not suffer financially in case his intended desertion were discovered.

5. METHODS OF DESERTING.- By and large those intending to desert plan to do so alone or with one other, although lately group desertions are on the increase. Sympathizers get together through joking about desertion, a common subject of jokes. Great ingenuity is displayed in carrying out their intentions. Many volunteer for guard at special outposts or for reconnaissance patrol. Patrols fake fights, fire into the air, and disappear. Sometimes when outposts desert the remaining men in the bunker simulate combat firing and report the outposts captured. Sometimes the NCO in charge of the patrol will pick desertion-minded men, and at other times desertion-minded men in a patrol will

disarm the NCO in charge. Men in the front line have phoned back to cease artillery fire so that wounded could be collected--and then deserted. One soldier represented himself as ordered to learn where all mines were placed in a given area and to measure where new mines were to be laid--and thus learned the safe routes to the Allied lines. A truck driver removed the distributor cap just as the Allies were arriving and was told to stay and repair his truck and then to catch up with his retreating officer. He stayed and stayed and repaired and repaired, until he was overrun. When the Allies occupied EUPEN many German soldiers were in hiding waiting to give themselves up. Some had "taken up positions" in cellars. Some had obtained civilian clothing and food and shelter from civilians. One had deserted from a hospital in LEIPZIG, gone home to EUPEN, and awaited the Allies. Another had been sent to EUPEN to get his officer's phonograph repaired. Instead he went to his bride's home where he remained eight days until the Americans arrived.

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ANNEX NO. 6 TO TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 19

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THE EDELWEISS YOUTH MOVEMENT IN GERMANY

(SOURCE MATERIAL: OSS, R & A)

It is now certain that an oppositional youth movement is active in some 20 or more large German towns and at least two cities. Known generally as the Edelweiss--after the Alpine flower--it has been described by a great many recently-captured German soldiers, some of whom had been members; and there are official German statements confirming its existence and to some extent its growing strength.

1. TYPE OF ACTIVITY.- The Edelweiss is essentially an adolescent revolt against 10 years of authoritarian domination by the HITLER Youth (HJ), to which most of its members belong. It attempts to sabotage the HJ organization by propaganda, by non-cooperation, and frequently by beating up loyal HJ leaders. It combats the official HJ program, even to the point of injecting defeatist arguments into HJ meetings and distributing "end-the-war" pamphlets. Members hold meetings, often attended by young Wehrmacht men, conduct small-scale industrial sabotage, and in general make a nuisance of themselves. When the Nazi Party recently summoned the HJ to dig trenches in the threatened areas, the Edelweiss members of the HJ conducted a campaign of evasion, slow-down, and obstruction. Edelweiss is not a democratic movement. It is based on the "leadership principle". But it is the enemy of the Allies' enemy.

2. THE REACTION OF THE GESTAPO to the Edelweiss has been energetic and brutal. There have been executions, innumerable beatings, and many cases of deliberate facial disfigurement of boys caught by the police. The HJ's military police squads (Streifendienst) have assisted the Gestapo and have in turn been a special target for Edelweiss strong-arm squads.

3. COMPOSITION AND NUMBERS.- Edelweiss boys (girls are reported in one city only) are for the most part from 14 to 18 years old, although the leaders are often in their early twenties. The class composition is reported to be about equally divided between industrial workers and upper middle-class student groups, and there is considerable evidence that the latter form the active core of the movement. Groups up to 1,000 strong are reported in two cities. Some sources claim that Edelweiss adherents and sympathizers amount to 90-100% of the HJ membership in their towns, while others claim a 30-60% penetration in their districts. The movement is concentrated in Southern and Southwestern GERMANY, but by no means confined to these areas.

In addition to Edelweiss in the strict sense, a wide variety of kindred groups, operating under different names, have been identified. Except for a few out-and-out criminal bands, most of these are in no way different from those operating under the Edelweiss title, and several cases are known in which they adopted the Edelweiss label when they learned about the latter's existence and activities. There is virtually no trace of a central organization behind the movement.

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4. POSSIBLE POSITIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE EDELWEISS.- The Edelweiss is probably best described as a negative, unpolitical rebellion of adolescents against an adult society in which they find themselves intolerably restricted and regimented. Nevertheless it is possible that certain by-products of the movement may turn out to have a considerable positive political importance. In the first place, it is possible that the Edelweiss will offer a channel to German youth for revived political movements, with the Communists and Catholics apparently standing the best chance of exploiting it. There is already some evidence of Communist and Catholic influence in the Edelweiss. It is perhaps more likely that the Nazi party itself will attempt to make use of the Edelweiss as a part of its program for post-war underground political activity. It would obviously be in the interest of a secret Nazi organization to have some of its best young men active in the Edelweiss, whence, sporting a good "anti-Nazi" record, they could work themselves into leading positions in whatever youth organizations are sponsored by the Allies or a new German government after the war.

Finally, it should not be overlooked that in fighting the HJ the Edelweiss members are in fact, and whether they are aware of it or not, gaining valuable training in the techniques of political struggle. Nor should it be forgotten that by virtue of the Nazis' total mobilization of youth, the present youth opposition is recruited from a much broader section of the population than was the case with pre-Nazi youth movements. Thus--as has happened with the original unpolitical Confessional Church opposition--the very experience of fighting against the totalitarian regime may yet prove to have trained and prepared a large section of German young people for an active role in political life after the war.

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ANNEX NO. 7 TO TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 19

THE GERMAN CIVILIAN VIEW

Following are excerpts and condensations from a report prepared by three Intelligence Officers from Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section, 12th Army Group. The report was based on their conversations with more than 100 German civilians--mostly from small communities: ROETGEN, HAAREN, MONSCHAU, KALTERHERBERG, LAMMERSDORF. A smaller proportion came from AACHEN, COLOGNE, STOLBERG, ESSEN, DUSSELDORF, WIESBADEN and KREFELD. Those with whom they conversed were men and women, boys and girls, Nazi Party members and Nazi Party enemies, ex-Wehrmacht soldiers, students, teachers, writers, factory workers, policemen, machinists, miners, engineers, dentists, barbers, physicians, farmers, priests, civil servants, shopkeepers, stenographers, salesmen, manufacturers, housewives. The views below represent their views.

1. WAR GUILT.- There seems to be a consensus of opinion among Germans that GERMANY--that is, HITLER--started the war. This does not mean, however, that they consider GERMANY responsible for the war. On the contrary, they say that because of a variety of reasons GERMANY, or the FUHRER, had to invade POLAND, attack RUSSIA first, etc. "America had to be attacked because she attacked our Ally, JAPAN". Non-Nazis put all the blame on HITLER and the Nazi Party. Thus, neither Nazis nor anti-Nazis feel in the least responsible for the war, the former attributing all the guilt to GERMANY's enemies, the latter attributing it to the Nazis.

2. THE EVIL OF WAR.- One interviewer reports that he found a good deal of criticism of German aggression because it failed, not one word of criticism on moral or humanitarian grounds. HITLER is blamed for losing the war, not for starting it.

3. MILITARISTS.- The German generals have again managed to wind themselves through the vicissitudes of political upheavals and catastrophic defeats without the slightest loss of prestige. They are considered "Fachleute", specialists, who take orders from higher-ups and who have done as good a job as possible.

4. ATTITUDE TOWARD VICTORS.- Success in arms is a great criterion with Germans, particularly with German youths, and Allied power, material, organization and victories have left a deep impression on them. Young Germans speak with awe and enthusiasm of American planes, knowing each name. Young girls say with joking seriousness that they have set their caps on marrying an American soldier. The people show intense interest in the sources of American power, readily believe the most fantastic stories about Allied might, and some of them even attribute Allied accomplishments to the "free life" in England and America. Some inveterate militarists seem to conclude that the American way of life must be better because it resulted in better arms.

5. LEFTISTS.- Despite all persecutions there are still Socialists and Communists in GERMANY, and though many of them have suffered in concentration camps and are more vehement

and verbose than ever, they are the same as those of the pre-HITLER days. No amount of oppression and propaganda has changed their convictions and though their vehemence is strictly limited to phrases, they are nevertheless the best friends the Allies have in GERMANY today--perhaps "the only trustworthy friends". They know who is a Nazi and who can be trusted. Many of them are men of education and pan-European orientation.

6. POST-WAR EXPECTATIONS.- Many Germans of all social strata expect that the REICH will become an Allied "colony" or protectorate, or find itself with an American or British government. They are not disinclined to accept such possibilities. On the contrary, many appear to derive a feeling of security and comfort from such prospects, hoping to shift the whole responsibility for maintaining "order" and for providing "work and bread" on Allied shoulders. Even the job of rooting out Nazism and punishing leaders is considered an Allied problem, to be handled at Allied discretion; albeit Germans are quick to suggest the cruelest form of punishment--"bullets are too good for them". The prospect of partition alarms very few people who are all but chauvinistic and perfectly willing to leave it all to the Allies, including "politics" which they say got them into this mess".

7. RUSSIANS.- The attitude toward the Russians has the characteristics of a phobia. It is primarily a dread of retribution for the horrors inflicted by the Wehrmacht on the Russians about which Germans appear to know much more than they care to admit. Fear and bad conscience are at the source of the violent name-calling that practically all Germans, regardless of age and social standing, practice in connection with the Russians.

8. A WARNING.- One of the interviewers concludes: Hate the Russians, flatter the Americans--such seems to be the Germans' present technique. Their sole hope, they say, lies with the Americans. By this attempt to divide the Allies they expect to escape severe retribution. The Americans, they feel, might tolerate mild punishment but not anything drastic. The deeper we penetrate into GERMANY, the more we may expect to see a systematic campaign of kisses for the Americans and hisses for the Russians. This, in the opinion of the reporter, could become the deadliest booby trap yet encountered.

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BRITTANY Base Section, Com Z, APO 350	1
G-2, OISE Base Section, Com Z, APO 351	1
G-2, Channel Base Section, Com Z, APO 228	1
G-2, NORMANDY Base Section, Com Z, APO 562	1
G-2, SEINE Base Section, Com Z, APO 350	1
Office Chief Signal Officer, Intelligence Section, Hq Com Z, ETOUSA	1
Intelligence Division, OCOT, Hq Fwd Ech Com Z	1
OB School, Hq MIS, ETO, APO 887	1
Hq Field Intelligence Detachment, Military Intelligence Service, ETOUSA, APO 654	1
Mobile Field Intelligence Unit No. 1, APO 654	1
Mobile Field Intelligence Unit No. 2, APO 654	1
CO, MIS, Hq Com Z, ETOUSA, APO 887	1
SID, ETOUSA	1
Office Director of Intelligence, Hq United States Strategic & Tactical Air Force, APO 633	1
G-2, Hq First Allied Airborne Army	1
A-2, Eighth Air Force	1
A-2, Ninth Air Force	5
18th Airborne Corps, APO 109	2
First TACAF (Prov), APO 374	1
G-2, Hq Sixth Army Group, ADV, APO 23	5
G-2, Hq Sixth Army Group, REAR, APO 23	1
GS(I), Main Hq 21 Army Group	1
GS(I), Hq 21 Army Group TAC	1
Allied Force Headquarters	1
Allied Armies in ITALY	1
G-2, First US Army, APO 230	15
G-2, Third US Army, APO 403	11
G-2, Seventh US Army	10
G-2, Ninth US Army, APO 339	9
G-2, Fifteenth US Army, APO 408 (ATTN: Colonel CONWAY)	1
OSS PARIS (ATTN: Col. FORGAN)	1
OSS (ATTN: Captain KIRKPATRICK)	2
CG	1
C/S	1
DC/S	1
SG/S	1
G-1 TAC	1
G-1 MAIN	1
G-2 (AIR) (ATTN: Lt. Col. JACOB)	8
G-2 TAC	5
G-3 TAC	2
G-3 MAIN	3
G-4	1
G-5	1
AG REAR	1
Hq "T" FORCE	2

DISTRIBUTION (CONTINUED)

AG (MAIN)	1
AA	1
Arty	1
Engr TAC	1
Engr MAIN	1
Finance	1
JA	1
IG	1
Med	1
Armored	1
Ordnance	1
CW	1
PM	1
P&PW TAC	1
QM	1
Sp Troops	1
Sig	1
Signal Security Detachment "D"	1
PHANTOM	1
PHANTOM TAC	1
VIII Corps, APO 308	5
XX Corps, APO 340	5
23rd Hq, Special Troops, APO 655	1
G-2 MAIN, Twelfth Army Group	14

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