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HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY SECTION
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP, VIETNAM
Saigon, Vietnam

MAGAR-OT (OP)

11 April 1962

SUBJECT: "Lessons Learned" Number 3

TO: See Distribution

1. GENERAL: Operation "Jungle Jim" (Phase I) was conducted in the Dak Bron valley and surrounding mountains (approximately 500 square kilometers), 22d DTA, II CTZ during the period 19 Feb - 9 Mar 62.

2. PARTICIPATING UNITS: The units participating in the operation were an Inf Regt minus one Bn, one Ranger Co, two Ranger Platoons and an Inf Bn in reserve supported by one Btry (-) (105) Arty, one Btry (-) (155) Arty, one Engr Bn, eight Civic Action Teams, two PsyWar Platoons, one Co of U.S. Helicopters, and two AD-6's.

3. MISSION: The mission was to kill or capture VC personnel, destroy VC installations, equipment, and food supplies, regain support of Montagnard population, relocate local population, obtain volunteers for area intelligence net, and assist respective district chiefs in assuming control over newly cleared areas.

4. CONCEPT: The concept of the operation was to utilize two Bn sized Task Forces converging from North and South. Each Co was given a zone of responsibility upon occupation of designated battalion areas. The Companies then were to form smaller teams of approximately squad size plus appropriate Civic Action and PsyWar personnel to cover a specified area. Artillery with one F.O. per Co was to be used primarily to interdict VC routes of withdrawal. Engineer support was to maintain MSR (Highway #14) and act as reserve when necessary. Available helicopters were to be used for appropriate troop lift, resupply, medical evacuations, and aerial reconnaissance. The AD-6's were to be on strip alert at Pleiku.

5. RESULTS: The operation was considered successful with VC losses of 16 KIA, 31 WIA and 4 POW compared to friendly losses of 2 KIA and 6 WIA, destruction of an estimated 4,000 kilos of VC rice, relocation of approximately 300 Montagnards, establishment of an indigenous intelligence net, and small quantities of VC weapons and materiel captured or destroyed.

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6. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. SUSTAINED ANTI-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS CAN WREST CONTROL OF AN AREA FROM THE VC. Over a period of 18 days the regiment moved in and occupied large VC controlled areas. The unit used aggressive small unit patrols, combined with Civic Action and PsyWar Teams to break VC control over the local population. The VC potential was reduced to a point where local sector forces could assume responsibility of the area.

b. ALL COMMANDERS SHOULD TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF AVAILABLE FIRE SUPPORT. Artillery and mortar fire support was used to the maximum and proved very effective in interdicting VC routes of withdrawal. The placement of F.O.'s with each Co size unit provided timely and accurate fire support upon request. A feeling of mutual respect and confidence was developed between the supporting and supported units.

c. SMALL UNIT LEADERS OPERATING ON INDEPENDENT MISSIONS MUST BE MORE FORCEFUL AND AGGRESSIVE THAN NORMAL. Initially, small unit leaders operating independently, failed to display proper initiative on several occasions. However, as the operation progressed, self confidence in operating alone developed, and many leaders showed a great degree of forcefulness and aggressiveness.

d. HELICOPTERS ARE A MULTI-PURPOSE AIRCRAFT AND SHOULD BE UTILIZED TO THE MAXIMUM. Extensive use of helicopters was made throughout the operation with one Co being airlifted into an area, one Bn being partially resupplied, six wounded personnel being evacuated, and several reconnaissance missions being preformed.

7. The foregoing is for your information and guidance.

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