[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

ATING-64 350.05/43(DOCI)(C)(21 Apr 52) 21 April 1952

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information

LIBRARY
ARMY WAR COLLEGE
PERIODICALS SECTION
APR 28 1952
COPY 1

TO: See distribution

1. In accordance with SR 525-85-5, Processing of Combat Information, the inclosed EXTRACTS are forwarded to Department of the Army, Army Field Forces and the Service Schools for evaluation and necessary action. It may be appropriate, in certain cases, for these agencies to take action upon a single extracted item; in others, it may be desirable to develop a cross-section of accumulated extracts on a particular subject before initiating action; and often, the extracted item serves to reaffirm our doctrines and techniques.

2. Copies of Dissemination of Combat Information are forwarded, with Department of the Army approval, to information addressees for use at the headquarters of the installation or activity concerned to keep them informed concerning theatre problems from front line through the logistical command.

3. These EXTRACTS are derived from reports which are classified SECRET. For the greater convenience of the user, this Office downgrades each extracted item to the lowest classification compatible with security. No effort is made to paraphrase or delete any portion of the extracted remarks, so that none of the original intent is lost.

4. Generally, the EXTRACTS which pertain to training appear under the classification of RESTRICTED. For combat information of training value at the Company-Battery level, addressees are referred to Army Field Forces TRAINING BULLETINS, which are also published under the classification of RESTRICTED.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

P. C. CASPERSON
Major, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl
Extracts from sources
309 thru 328

DISTRIBUTION:
(Over)

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF
TAGO 760924 ON
1976 BY Rakers

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

52/4-133-5

DISTRIBUTION:

3	ACOFS, G-1, DA
3	ACOFS, G-2, DA
15	ACOFS, G-3, DA
20	ACOFS, G-4, DA
10	CCMLO
10	COFENGRS
1	COFPSYWAR
10	CSIGO
10	COFT
2	Chief of Mil History
10	TQMG
10	TSG
2	TAG
10	COFORD
	Comdts
3	Army War College
2	CGSC
2	Army Gen Sch
	CG's
2	The Armd Cen
2	The Arty Cen
2	The Inf Cen
2	The AAA&GM Cen
1 ea	Pres, AFF Boards
1	CO, Arctic Test Br
	OCAFF
1	DCOFS
1	G1
1	G2
14	G3(60)
2	G4
5	RD
1	Cml
1	Engr
1	Med
1	Ord
1	QM
1	Sig
1	Trans
1	AG
1	Off of the Compt
1	Ch
1	Info
1	PM

Copies furnished:

70	TAG (10 ea - CINC's, European Comd, Far East, CG's, Trieste US Troops, US Forces in Austria, US Army, Alaska, US Army, Pacific, US Army, Caribbean)
1	PIC, Atlantic Fleet Intel Cen, Hq, US Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, Va, ATTN: Grd Forces Off
2	Supt, USMA
2	Chief, Army Advisory Gp, Air Comd & Staff Sch, Air Univ, Maxwell AFB, Ala
3	TPMG (2 - Comdt, The Provost Marshal Gen Sch)
2	CG, CIC Cen
2	Comdt, Marine Corps Sch
2	Comdt, USAF Air-Ground Operations Sch
	CG's
2 ea	Continental Armies
4	Army AA Comd
2	TAC
1	CO, Mountain & Cold Weather Tng Comd
1	Chief, AFF Human Research Unit No 1
	OCAFF
4	Insp Sect
20	G3(64)
1	AG Records

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

EXTRACTS OF COMBAT INFORMATION

SOURCE: Command Report - 176th Armored Field Artillery Bn

DATE: December 1951 Source No. 309

FIRE DIRECTION CENTER

This Battalion's T/O&E 6-166N provides two (2) personnel carriers for housing Battalion FDC. Personnel carriers by nature of their size are inconvenient and preclude a complete installation in one vehicle. This handicaps efficient operation of FDC by either over-crowding or requiring a split between two (2) or three (3) vehicles, especially in cold weather.

An alternate provision of present T/O&E is the use of a CP tent. This is satisfactory only in a stable or semi-permanent situation. Where sudden or rapid changes of position are required, the movement is "bottlenecked" by the unwieldy installation of wires, radios, tables, and tentage required by a normal Battalion FDC. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 937th FA Bn

DATE: October 1951 Source No. 310

VT FUZE FOR 155MM GUNS

Fuze VT for this weapon is not available and this unit had learned from past experiences the need for more ammunition of this type. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - IX Corps

DATE: November 1951 Source No. 311

AIRCRAFT TOW-BAR

It is recommended that an aircraft tow-bar, similar to one currently used as a field expedient by units in Korea, be manufactured and made an item of T/O&E for all aviation sections.

INCLOSURE

UNCLASSIFIED (Over)

OCAFF Form No 73
(Revised 15 Oct 51)

SECURITY INFORMATION
[redacted]

52/4-133-5

Towing of aircraft by vehicles has been found to offer a number of advantages over taxiing or ground handling by manpower alone, particularly under adverse weather conditions. Towing reduces to a minimum the danger of nosing up while moving the aircraft on muddy, sandy, or rocky parking areas. It has reduced the damage to propellers and windshields caused by flying mud, sand, and gravel. The rigid tow-bar has made the problem of backing aircraft into revetments a comparatively simple one. On an extremely muddy field, two men, one driving the towing vehicle and one directing the driver, can ground handle an aircraft that would otherwise require five or more men.

The tow-bar now in use is made of two pieces of angle iron each nine feet long, joined at one end to form a "V". The apex is fastened with bolts and sufficient washers to make possible any alteration necessary in the size "V". A ring is fastened to the apex for attachment to the pintle of the towing vehicle, and a pin is driven downward through the end of each arm to be dropped through the towing rings of the aircraft landing gear. This tow-bar has proven itself completely practical in the field. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 24th Inf Div Arty

DATE: October 1951 Source No. 312

USE OF WP TO MARK TARGETS

White phosphorous smoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The enemy, understanding the meaning, will often fire white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to confuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The wide use of white phosphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank units makes it difficult to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 1st FA Obsr Bn

DATE: November 1951 Source No. 313

COUNTERBATTERY INTELLIGENCE

All OP's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they might obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they

had made a location. This proved to be very successful in that it aided the CBI section at Corps Artillery to obtain a "fix" (when coupled with data from their other intelligence agencies.) (RESTRICTED)

* * * * * * * *

SILENCE PERIODS FOR FRIENDLY ARTILLERY

Inadvertently, during one day in the period, the artillery of the Corps was unusually quiet whereas the enemy was active in his usual manner. Because the sound tapes were only recording incoming artillery the percentage of locations made to all enemy activity was extremely high. The use of "Silence Periods" for friendly artillery in order that Sound Ranging might be fully utilized has not been readily accepted by firing units during this war. This particular event, however, tends again to bring out its value. (CONFIDENTIAL)

* * * * * * * *

SURVEY ACCURACY

One important deficiency noted in survey of Artillery batteries is lack of emphasis on accuracy. Although control is available in the area, unit survey officers have used their aiming circle compass needle for direction rather than carry it in from true control. Battery centers are sometimes observed to be "paced in" or inspected on the map 1/50,000. Some units have used inspected locations and aiming circle azimuth for direction as a general practice even though true control exists. One unit was going to turn in an aiming circle because it did not have a declination constant recorded on it. All of these problems can be solved by assigning officers to the job who have had survey training. Artillery Battalion Survey officers should inquire at Division Artillery or adjacent units about location of the SIG or what control is available in their areas. More emphasis should be placed on survey of deliberate occupation of position. The T/O&E transit issued to each unit should be utilized in this case. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * * * * *

VALUE OF OBSERVATION BATTALION

It is recommended that more emphasis be given in schools and higher staff courses on the tactical use and value of the Observation Battalion. Actual results of World War II and Korean campaigns can be published as proof of its value. Credit also should be given to the five (5) non-target getting missions of the Observation Battalion such as Survey, Meteorology, Intelligence, Calibration of Friendly Artillery, and Registration and Adjustment of Friendly Artillery. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 64th Heavy Tank Bn

DATE: October 1951 Source No. 314

USE OF TANK FIRE IN ASSAULT

Throughout the past operations the tank unit commanders complained that the infantry units would not permit the tanks to fire as close to the attacking infantry as the tank commander would have liked. In many cases the infantry tended to consider the tank fire as if it were artillery with a large dispersion instead of a direct fire, high velocity weapon with pinpoint accuracy. In many instances the infantry commander would place a large artillery, tank and mortar barrage on an objective and then lift the fire prior to the advance of the infantry instead of allowing the tanks to continue to fire just ahead of the advancing infantry. In most instances the tanks were in a position to the flank of a ridge, down or up which friendly infantry was trying to advance and when the tanks were forced to lift their fires it was necessary for the tanks to sit and watch friendly infantry receive machine gun and grenade casualties from enemy positions which could have been taken under tank fire at no danger to friendly infantry (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 21st AAA AW Bn

DATE: October 1951 Source No. 315

T16 ARMOR SHIELD

At present, only fifty of our seventy-six (76) M16's are equipped with the T16 Armor Shield. This shield has proven to be invaluable and has resulted in the saving of many lives. It is recommended that until such time as a full tracked, well armored vehicle is developed, T16 shields be provided for all M16 half track vehicles. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - 7th Inf Div Arty

DATE: November 1951 Source No. 316

COLORED SMOKE SHELLS

Numerous occasions have arisen where the present colored smoke shells using M-67 fuzes have proven inaccurate and ineffective for

marking targets for air strikes. This has been largely due to the M-67 fuze being erratic. It is recommended that a colored smoke shell which will burst similar to the white phosphorous shell be developed. White phosphorous has proven unsatisfactory in marking targets because the enemy has similar ammunition which can be fired on our positions to cause confusion when a target is being marked for an air strike. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corps

DATE: October 1951 Source No. 317

ATTACK AGAINST FORTIFIED POSITIONS

1. General

The highlight of operations during the month was Operation "COMMANDO". The enemy had had ample time to fortify his positions and had taken full advantages of the opportunity. The defense works were not similar to a conventional "fortified position" such as might be encountered in Europe with concrete blockhouses, dragon's teeth, tank ditches, and barbed wire. The defense system resembled more nearly the Japanese "cave-type" defense of World War II which employed heavily protected earth and log bunkers, deep dugouts, tunnels, and a network of connecting trenches. Tactics of defense were to hold the bulk of the defenders of a strong point in the dugouts and bunkers during our artillery preparations; then, upon the lifting of the artillery, come out and man the fire trenches to meet the assault. This method was very successful because all positions were on the crests of very high and steep hills which operated to reduce the speed and momentum of the assault, and limited the ability of the assault troops to maintain assault fire while climbing the steep slopes. Early in the operation, it became apparent that ultimate success would require the utmost in aggressiveness and proper use of the supporting arms.

2. Planning

It was learned that the planning for an operation against this type of defense had to be much more thorough than during previous operations in the Korean campaign. For example:

a. A thorough reconnaissance of the objective must be made by the unit which will conduct the attack. Sufficient time must be allowed for the attacking unit to determine in detail the exact location of the enemy strong point, his fields of fire, and adjacent points which must be neutralized by friendly fire.

b. Complete and detailed fire plans must be prepared, utilizing supporting weapons in the most effective manner. If heavy artillery is to be used in direct support, the heavy artillery unit must be given adequate time for selection and preparation of positions. Air support, if used, must be arranged for in sufficient time to ensure proper preparation by the pilots and air controllers. If air support is essential to the success of the plan, then the plan must be sufficiently flexible to allow for delays due to weather conditions.

c. A reserve force should be held out whenever possible, to be committed at a critical time or when there is an opportunity for a successful exploitation.

3. Artillery Support

Operation "COMMANDO" provided ample opportunity for artillery units to apply the technique of assault fire and direct laying. Due to the nature of the enemy's defensive works, this type of artillery support was found to be vitally necessary, in addition to normal high angle concentrations and harassing and interdicting fires. In accomplishing this type of close support, some difficulty was encountered by Corps Artillery units, particularly with respect to the movement into position, and the coordination with supported infantry units. The following are some specific comments and recommendations made by the participating artillery battalion commanders:

a. Reconnaissance. Prior to the selection of firing positions, a reconnaissance should be made with a representative of the supported unit, to permit detailed designation of preliminary targets.

b. Selection of positions. The type of terrain encountered by this operation prevented the use of assault fire from defilade positions in most instances. Therefore, in order to provide the type of fire requested, the artillery pieces had to be placed in positions on or near the tops of hills, with resultant exposure to counter-battery fire. Positions were selected to permit gun-target ranges of 1,000 to 2,500 yards. At these ranges, precision adjustment on the enemy bunkers was very satisfactory.

c. Occupation of positions. Engineers should be made available to construct trails to positions and to level the tops of hills. This is necessary to prevent canting of the piece.

d. Liaison. Some delay was encountered in establishing effective liaison between the heavy artillery units and the supported infantry units. The most desirable situation was to have a representative from the infantry unit stationed at the artillery observation post; the fire of the heavy artillery being controlled by the observer of the light artillery battalion which normally supported the infantry unit. Controlled in this manner, the maximum support was obtained from the heavy artillery in the assault fire role.

4. Air Support

As the operation progressed, certain inadequacies in the utilization of air support became apparent. They were:

a. In some instances, air strikes were requested on specific targets, with specific types of ordnance, on only a few hours' notice In these cases the air force found it difficult, if not impossible, to provide the type of support desired.

b. Instances were noted wherein air strikes were cancelled after the aircraft had reached the target area because artillery fire was being placed on the target. Precise control over both the aircraft and the artillery must be maintained by the ground commander in order that coordination can be properly effected between the two.

c. Some US units failed to utilize the available aircraft to the maximum advantage in close support of the ground attack. For example, at the time the ground attack was being pressed against enemy positions on one hill, without air support, the air support would be placed on enemy positions on another hill several thousand yards away which was not under ground attack. While considerable damage can be inflicted on the enemy in this manner, the shock and demoralization effect of the air strike is wasted unless the air strike can be followed up by a ground advance. As the operation progressed, however, all US units became more and more aware of the necessity for utilization of air strikes in close support of the infantry advance.

5. Conclusion

The principle lesson learned was that proper close coordination between all arms involved in the attack is a must. This requires meticulous planning in advance and tight control during execution. This is not a new lesson, but serves to illustrate the soundness of established doctrine and the importance of emphasizing it in training at all levels of command. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * * * * *

ENEMY ANTITANK MINES

The antitank mine was the most potent antitank weapon employed by the enemy. Of the forty-two tank casualties sustained by the Corps during the month of October, thirty-nine were caused by mines. Two friendly tanks caught fire and burned as a result of mine explosions.

The enemy attempted to destroy rather than merely damage friendly tanks. An M46 tank of the 64th Heavy Tank Battalion struck a mine, which exploded under the rear of the right track. The M46 tank was

flipped over, the gun tube and turret were blown off, and the tank landed upside down off the side of the road. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corps Arty

DATE: October 1951 Source No. 318

EMPLOYMENT OF CORPS ARTILLERY

1. Operation "COMMANDO" mounted during the first half of October was the first offensive action of I US Corps as a whole against resistance of a well prepared and determined enemy since the middle of June. This action pointed up sharply the danger inherent in violating well established doctrines. In so far as they affected the employment of Corps Artillery these lessons are as follows:

a. PLANNING: Insufficient planning of artillery ammunition resupply at levels higher than Corps Artillery resulted in the development of a critical situation on the third or fourth day of the offensive. While none of the Ammunition Supply Points were completely exhausted of any one type of artillery ammunition, the critical situation caused the attention of the Corps Commander to be distracted from other matters to the problem of artillery ammunition resupply.

Artillery firing, like any other operation, should be carefully planned to yield the maximum results and yet, several times during the operation requests for additional artillery support in a preparation for an attack came to division or corps artillery fire direction centers too late and in insufficient detail for proper planning.

b. CENTRALIZATION OF ARTILLERY CONTROL: It is well established artillery doctrine that in order to make maximum use of the ability of artillery to mass its fires throughout the battle zone, the control of artillery fires should be highly centralized as long as communications permit. This centralized control is especially essential during an attack on a prepared position.

During this operation, one division completely de-centralized control of its organic artillery and the control of all Corps artillery battalions having a general support-reinforcing role. At one time the S3 of one direct support battalion was trying, from his battalion FDC, to control the fires of two light and two medium battalions. This overloading of direct support FDC's probably caused such misuse of artillery as: the firing of battery of 155-mm howitzers on a mortar position at a rate of one (1) gun two (2) rounds per minute until 1100 rounds had been fired over a period of approximately nine (9) hours;

or the firing of one battery one round every ninety seconds for over three hours. In several instances softening up fires were continued until the forward slopes of the objectives were pounded into a featureless mass. Volley after volley of artillery fire was observed on slopes that the enemy obviously had vacated. Apparently there was little or no surveillance of these fires. Ammunition was wasted and the capability of the artillery to hit remunerative targets was reduced by the number of weapons tied up on these unremunerative targets. Apparently it was a case of turning on the hose and letting it run until the gardener could get back to it.

Another result of the decentralization of control was the insistance by supported units, to the direct support artillery, on certain fires even to specifying unit to fire, method of fire and ammunition to be used, rather than describing the target and requesting fire from a higher headquarters that might be able to better analyze the mission and if desirable bring considerable additional artillery to bear.

c. INTELLIGENCE: Counterbattery fires were very effective during this period but one of the best tools of the counterbattery Intelligence Officer, the shelling report, was dulled through neglect. Shelling reports received were scant in number and many of those received lacked essential details. This caused the loss of time and overloading of communications in order to try to fill in some of the essentials. Better training among the infantry and the field artillery forward observer teams is needed to point up the value to the infantry of proper and prompt shelling reports.

d. MASSING OF FIRES: At the beginning of Operation "COMMANDO" the artillery with the corps had been so disposed as to offer the opportunity to mass artillery fires on a scale hitherto unknown in Korea. Yet due to the decentralization of control instituted by one division much of this capability was wasted.

e. ASSAULT FIRE: Because of the strength of the field fortifications it was found that indirect fire by normal methods was ineffective against the bunkers, emplacements, and covered trenches with which many of the objectives were honey-combed.

During Operation "COMMANDO" the 204th FA Bn employed its 155-mm guns on Motor Carriage M40 in direct fire and assault fire against enemy fortifications with good results.

The 17th FA Bn received one self-propelled 8-inch howitzer on 14 October and between the 15th and 18th employed this weapon in both direct and assault fire against bunkers, trenches and emplacements. One novel employment of this weapon was to cut a trench through the top of a ridge thus exposing a communications trench on the reverse slope which was then interdicted by a machine gun and a recoilless rifle.

The success of the assault fire can be measured by the statement of the Commanding General, 3d Infantry Division Artillery, "I attribute the success of this attack solely to the effective assault fire by the 204th FA Bn".

During much of the direct and assault firing one liaison aircraft was detailed to the sole mission of providing cover for the weapon by taking under immediate fire any enemy weapon trying to fire counter-battery. The 17th FA Bn reports that, on at least one occasion, this air cover paid off by prompt smothering of the enemy's fire.

Careful planning, detailed reconnaissance and the provision of complete communications paid off many times in the resulting speed and efficiency of operation while the heavy artillery was in an exposed position. The communications net should be so planned as to make maximum use of the artillery forward observers with the rifle companies. For complete coordination a liaison officer from each assaulting battalion of infantry should be stationed at the OP controlling the fire.

2. RECOMMENDATION: That there be no change made in field artillery doctrines as taught at the Artillery School but that means be found to bring to the attention of supported unit commanders the capabilities and limitations of artillery fires, to eliminate requests for impossible or wasteful fires. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - IX Corps Arty

DATE: December 1951 Source No. 319

COMMUNICATION BETWEEN AIR FORCE AND ARMY PLANES

Many targets have been lost during the past year because of the inability of the army aircraft to talk to the mosquitos or fighter planes in their zones. On the few occasions when it was possible to talk to the Air Force mosquitos, excellent results were obtained. With the Army planes now equipped with VHF radio, this communication would be possible by the designation of a common channel for all planes operating within a corps sector. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE:	Command Report - 19th Infantry Regiment
DATE:	November 1951 Source No. 320

ENEMY TACTICS

The enemy allowed our patrol to advance with little or no resistance and permitted a portion of the objective to be taken with only moderate resistance; however, once the patrol was on the objective in an exposed position, he pinned the patrol down with an accurate crossfire of automatic weapons and then placed mortar on the patrol. As a result he inflicted heavy casualties on the attacking element. The accuracy with which his mortar fire fell on all avenues of withdrawal from the objective indicated pre-registered mortar fires. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE:	Command Report - 55th T Trk Bn
DATE:	June 1951 Source No. 321

POLICY FOR REPORTING TRUCK TONNAGE

The truck capacities set forth in par 224 of FM 101-10 are in accordance with the experience of this battalion as reported to higher headquarters. However, allowance must be made here for the "padding" demanded by some higher headquarters. For instance, one headquarters to which this battalion was attached insisted that any cargo which filled the cargo capacity of a 2½ ton truck be reported as five (5) tons regardless of its actual weight. Thus a shipment of floral wreaths which filled a truck but weighed no more than 250 pounds was reported as five (5) tons. It is suggested than an Army-wide policy be established to report truck tonnage in somewhat the same manner as ship tonnage is computed; weight tons or measurement tons, whichever is greater. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * * * * *

GASOLINE TANK TRUCK

This headquarters wishes to recommend the addition of one gasoline tanker per light truck company. The present 750-gallon tanker would be a great help but a tanker redesigned to carry about 1200 gallons, still utilizing the basic design of the 2½ ton 6 x 6 chassis, would be far more practical. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * * * * *

OCAFF Form No 73
(Revised 15 Oct 51)

[redacted]

CONVOY FORMATION

Higher authority consistently specifies that trucks will be formed into convoys in multiples of five. Repeated efforts have been made to form them in multiples of four thus retaining the integrity of the squad formation of a truck company. To date all such efforts have been futile. Higher headquarters still demand convoys in multiples of five, usually ten trucks. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 7th Cav Regt

DATE: November 1951 Source No. 322

TACTICAL RUSE

The following prearranged tactical device proved very effective during one engagement. A rifle company demonstrated during daylight hours on a patrol base. All but one rifle platoon withdrew at darkness. Prearranged artillery and mortar TOT's were plotted on top of the key ground of the patrol base. When enemy units made contact the rifle platoon withdrew secretly at top speed and in 12 minutes from time of first contact, called in friendly TOT's. Patrol investigation in the morning disclosed 135 enemy dead. The friendly patrol suffered no casualties. (CONFIDENTIAL)

* * * * * * * *

COMBAT OUTPOSTS OR PATROL BASES

The potentialities of a patrol base should be carefully studied and a firm doctrine established, leaving little doubt in the commander's mind as to whether his advance units are combat outposts or patrol bases. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 24th Inf Div

DATE: November 1951 Source No. 323

ATTACK BY FIRE

On 18 November, Operations Instructions were issued from Headquarters 24th Infantry Division, ordering "Attacks by Fire" to be placed on enemy positions to maintain maximum pressure on the enemy and inflict

damage to his personnel. An "Attack by Fire" consists of a heavy volume of supporting fires, artillery, mortar, tank, and air, as well as long range infantry direct fire weapons on a small target area for a brief period of time. The success of these attacks depends largely on the sudden and violent initial strike of all weapons, which naturally require close timing and coordination. The targets must be carefully chosen in advance and have to be worthy of the great volume of fire that is expended during each brief operation. In order to achieve effective surprise, all supporting fires should be registered hours before the time of the actual strike. As the "attack" commences, all available weapons must be brought to bear simultaneously on the target area. Mortars and high angle artillery work the topographical crest and reverse slopes; 57-mm, 75-mm recoilless rifles, machine guns, quad .50 half tracks and tank fires, including the 90-mm gun, lay direct fire against forward slope targets. The period of intense fire lasts approximately fifteen (15) minutes. The area covered should not be so broad as to make it difficult to achieve a high degree of saturation. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * * * * * *

SNIPING WITH .50 CAL MG

The .50 cal machine gun was put to a new use by elements of the 24th Division during the month. A .50 cal machine gun, mounted with a telescopic sight was used as a sniping weapon. The weapon was found highly effective at ranges of up to two thousand (2000) yards. In one instance three (3) Chinese were killed and three (3) wounded at a range of sixteen hundred (1600) yards. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 15th FA Bn

DATE: October 1951 Source No. 324

EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY OBSERVERS

In spite of all the manuals, training directives and instruction that exist on the subject of effective employment of artillery observers, there is still a tendency among young and inexperienced infantry commanders to get their observers so far forward that they become pinned down and ineffective at the first reception of enemy small arms fire. The basic principle that to be effective an artillery observer must be in a position to see and operate his communication equipment needs more stress in the training, not only of infantry commanders, but of artillery observers as well. (RESTRICTED)

(Received 12
OCVEE

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

SOURCE:	Command Report - 21st Inf Regt
DATE:	November 1951 Source No. 325

ILLUMINATING AMMUNITION

The CCF tendency to fight at night requires that some means be made available to aid in combating enemy night probing attacks. One way to accomplish this is to maintain ample stocks of illuminating ammunition in mortar positions for on-call illuminating fires.

It has so far been impossible to maintain adequate stocks of illuminating ammunition due to critical shortages which exist in all types. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE:	Command Report - 24th Inf Div Arty
DATE:	November 1951 Source No. 326

METEOROLOGICAL DATA

Due to the weather in this Theater, fog and ground haze in the mornings, and low cloud ceiling throughout many days, the visual means for securing meteorological data with which the headquarters battery of the division artillery is equipped, are not satisfactory. To secure consistently usable, and very necessary, accurate, meteorological data it is suggested that each division artillery headquarters be equipped with radio-sonde equipment and personnel for collection of this data. Should this not be feasible, each corps artillery headquarters should have radio-sonde equipment to furnish data to divisions for checking purposes during good weather, and for essential data during poor weather. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE:	Command Report - I US Corps
DATE:	December 1951 Source No. 327

MAINTENANCE EXPEDIENT

Idler wheels and road wheels for the M39 Utility Vehicle were in short supply, but the 73d Tank Battalion worked out an expedient to replace unserviceable idler wheels with worn out road wheels. When most of the rubber tire on a road wheel had worn off, the wheel was

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

not discarded but the remainder of the rubber was removed from the metal rim. The wheel was then bolted to the idler hub and served as a substitute for an idler wheel. The holes in the road wheel are spaced the same as the holes in the idler wheel; consequently there was no problem in bolting it to the hub. The 73d Tank Battalion reported satisfactory performance of this type of wheel. It was recommended that the wheels be used in pairs on the same idler hub since road wheels were slightly smaller than idler wheels. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - Survey of the Med Dispensary Facilities in the Chunchon Area 3d Historical Detachment

DATE: October 1951 Source No. 328

AREA MEDICAL DISPENSARIES

Department of the Army Circular Number 10 authorized the changing of certain unit dispensaries to area dispensaries to care for Army troops. The effect of this change in Korea has been to provide medical care for units which are spread out over large geographical areas. For example, the 728th Military Police Battalion has platoons in various locations between TAEGU and SEOUL. Its organic medical service, functioning as a unit dispensary, cannot give adequate medical care to all platoons. Therefore, each platoon now receives medical care from the closest area dispensary. An additional result of this change has been to prevent commanding officers of engineer, ordnance, or quartermaster units from limiting their unit medical detachments to serving their units only.

Where Army troops are stationed in large numbers, it is proposed to have an area dispensary to care for all the troops in that area.

In WONJU, a troop population center, the small unit dispensaries are now being consolidated into one area dispensary. This results in economy of personnel and more thorough medical coverage in the area. (RESTRICTED)

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

OCAFF Form No 73
([redacted] 16 Oct