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OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

ATTNG-26 350.05/59(DOCI)(C)(6 Oct 52)

6 October 1952

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information

TO: See distribution

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2. Copies are furnished to other military agencies to keep them informed concerning theater problems from the front line through the logistical command.

3. These EXTRACTS are derived from reports which are classified SECRET. For the greater convenience of the user, this Office downgrades each extracted item to the lowest classification compatible with security. No effort is made to paraphrase or delete any portion of the extracted remarks, so that none of the original intent is lost.

4. Combat information EXTRACTS herein which are applicable to training at the company-battery level also appear in Army Field Forces TRAINING BULLETINS.

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FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:
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1 Incl
Extracts from sources
490 thru 514

A. B. CHATHAM
Lt Col, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

AWC LOG # 52-10-80-48

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6 October 1952

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SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corps

DATE: January 1952

Source No 490

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MECHANIZED AND EMPLACED FLAME THROWERS. - An armored 1/4-ton truck was built and demonstrated, carrying the sponson and transmission units from the mechanized flame thrower, M3-4-3, to which was connected 100 feet of 3/4-inch engineer air hose coupled to a portable flame thrower gun. This vehicle will be further modified before its use.

Requirements for emplaced flame throwers were received during the period. The necessary hose, weighing over 8000 pounds, to provide a 100-foot extension for each emplaced flame thrower, arrived by air on 14 January 1952. Action was taken to secure extra flame guns and air compressors. Issue of this item is expected to begin early in February.

SOURCE: Command Report - 21st AAA AW Battalion (SP)

DATE: May 1952

Source No 491

(RESTRICTED)

COMMUNICATION ON M-16 HALF TRACK. - Past experience has proven the need for a reliable method of voice communication from the squad leader to the gunner in the M45 turret. During operations the noise of the power charger combined with the sound of the four .50 caliber machine guns firing makes word-of-mouth communication next to impossible.

Recommendation: That all M-16's be equipped with a built-in communication system between the gunner and the squad leader.

(OCAFF Comment: All M16's are being modified to include the built-in communication system as recommended.)

INCLOSURE

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NO LOG # 52-1080-88

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2

SOURCE: Command Report - 25th Division Artillery

DATE: May 1952

Source No 492

(CONFIDENTIAL)

COUNTERMORTAR RADAR. - It is recommended that a new radar set be developed to meet the following specific requirements:

- a. Sturdy and simple in construction to ease the maintenance problem.
- b. Portable for ease in transportation, emplacement and displacement.
- c. Tracking type, capable of picking up moving objects only so as to eliminate the limitations of terrain and clutter.
- d. Range up to 20,000 yards to facilitate counterbattery as well as countermortar work.
- e. Easily concealed to permit front line operation.
- f. Accuracy up to one-half of one percent of the range.

(OCAFF Comment: It is believed the new AN/MPO-10 will fulfill requirements outlined.)

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ARTILLERY USE OF INFANTRY COUNTERFIRE PLATOON. - Counterfire platoons are organizational to infantry regiments, but the results of their activities are primarily used by the artillery. The counterfire plots and azimuths derived from sound recordings of active enemy artillery and mortars are of considerable value to the direct support artillery battalion and to the Division Fire Support Coordination Center. The search for, and immediate neutralization and destruction of active artillery and mortar positions is assisted by these counterfire locations.

It is standard operating procedure for our artillery to fire on all counterfire plots within capabilities with at least a battery volley of light artillery.

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Counterfire plots that "tie in" with known enemy positions frequently are fired upon by a battalion volley, or more. Counterfire plots that are in very close to the front lines are given to the infantry mortars to fire; however, this is the case only infrequently. The majority of counterfire plots are the result of enemy artillery fire rather than active mortar positions, whereas the artillery's countermortar radar picks up only active mortars.

It is not recommended that the T/O&E be changed to incorporate the counterfire platoon as a part of the artillery organization. Rather, it is recommended that the relationship and degree of cooperation between the artillery and the counterfire platoon be fostered to the highest degree for maximum efficiency and effectiveness. It is believed that this coordination can be implemented by having the counterfire plotting central located at the direct support artillery battalion fire direction center whenever and wherever feasible.

(RESTRICTED)

ARTILLERY PROTECTION FOR AIRCRAFT. - High performance aircraft operating in close support of infantry are subjected to heavy ground fire from the enemy. The necessity for low level reconnaissance flights and fighter strikes has resulted in frequent losses of friendly aircraft to ever increasing enemy small arms and antiaircraft fire. The artillery has attempted to minimize these losses by firing flak suppression in the area where fighters will strike. Flak suppression programs are standard operating procedure in the 25th Division Artillery, and though the results of these suppressive fires are not clearly ascertained, they no doubt reduce the amount of enemy antiaircraft fire, at least temporarily.

It is presently necessary to give artillery clearance for areas where low level flights will be made, either for reconnaissance or for a strike. These prohibitions on artillery firing are restrictive and frequent, and though maximum coordination is effected between the S3 and G3 Air on restricting areas for aircraft clearance, nevertheless the continuity of artillery missions is continually interrupted with resultant loss of effect, and both air and ground suffer from it.

It is believed that both ground and air would benefit by allowing artillery to continue firing in and around areas where high performance aircraft will operate. The chance of airplanes being hit by artillery fire would be infinitesimal, particularly with the restriction which would be placed on high angle and the firing of variable time fuzed shell. The few losses of aircraft to friendly artillery would be negligible compared to the losses from heavy

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3

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4

enemy ground fire now incurred. Continuation of artillery fires in areas where aircraft would operate should be of considerable value in curtailing the enemy's ability to fire small arms and antiaircraft weapons from positions in the open.

It is recommended that a revision be made in the standing operating procedures requiring artillery to cease firing in areas where aircraft will operate at low levels. Allowing artillery to continue firing in areas where aircraft fly at low levels will benefit all concerned and deny the enemy their present freedom to inflict heavy losses to our aircraft.

(OCAFF Comments: It is believed the CVT fuze now under development will increase the safety of aircraft operating in vicinity of areas under artillery fire.)

SOURCE: Command Report - 55th QM Base Depot

DATE: February 1952

Source No 493

(RESTRICTED)

PACKAGING OF SUPPLIES. - It has been conclusively proven here that commercial-type packing cannot withstand the multiple-handling involved over the distances the items travel. Crates containing cabbage, lemons, and oranges are examples of inferior quality of packaging due to the use of commercial-type packing. The broken and crushed crates, resulting from rough handling and the use of roller conveyors, have created a tremendous repack problem in this operation of the depot. Wet weather, in particular, weakens any commercial-type carton. It is strongly recommended that no items be shipped in commercial packages.

SOURCE: Command Report - 59th Ordnance Group

DATE: May 1952

Source No 494

(RESTRICTED)

DEFECTS IN L-20 AIRCRAFT. - The following unsatisfactory conditions have been discovered on the L-20 aircraft since their arrival in Korea:

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- a. Aircraft have had brake trouble; i. e., losing of brake clips.
- b. Tail wheel shimmy.
- c. Engines starter clutch slipping, and in some instances clutch grabbing, caused by installation of worn units.
- d. Rudder stops on aft end of fuselage bending badly.
- e. Rudder locks will not stay in position in gusty winds.
- f. Excessive side play in the attachment fitting, top tail wheel oleo strut to the fuselage.
- g. Door locks are a source of trouble as they are manufactured of too light material.
- h. Door latches are not substantial enough to withstand hard and extensive usage.
- i. Valve clearance too large on the engine.
- j. Red datum line used for measuring extension of tail oleo strut peels off.
- k. Caps for bomb shackle cannon plugs mounted in the wings are mission.
- l. Static ground wires break off.
- m. Each inspection panel on the wing is secured by mounting screws of different size and length. This condition necessitates carrying too much stock.
- n. Front inner cylinder baffles are mounted too tight and too high up the cylinder fins. Mounting brackets crack and rub on the cylinder. Baffle mounting brackets should be mounted at least three fins down from the barrel head.
- o. Carburetor heat scoop mounted between the top cylinders breaks loose from mounting brackets. Bracket material is not heavy enough to withstand engine vibrations.

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5

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6

SOURCE: Command Report - 72d Tank Battalion

DATE: May 1952

Source No 495

(RESTRICTED)

GUNNERY TRAINING. - Our training program fitted in nicely with the combat mission on the line. The lessons learned while in contact with the enemy were restudied by the companies, faults were corrected, and training was instituted to take care of any weaknesses noticed while on line. We found that gunnery is of paramount importance and so it was stressed above all.

The use of the 1000-inch range is recommended highly. The men not only enjoy this type firing, but receive much valuable training in all phases of gunnery. Training on a moving target range is also recommended. Much success has been attained by our units in tracking beer cans floating down a stream. Competition is fostered in this type training and the benefits are immense.

SOURCE: Command Report - 7th Infantry Division

DATE: April 1952

Source No 496

(RESTRICTED)

FINANCE RECOMMENDATIONS. - Recommend that a more detailed orientation on the matters of personal finance be given at the POE's to all personnel, officer and enlisted, who are on orders for Korea. This orientation should stress:

- a. The complete lack of need for money in Korea except for a few dollars a month for PX supplies;
- b. The whole scope of allotments, with emphasis placed on increasing both the amount and the number of allotments;
- c. The fact that accrued pay may be allowed to remain on the military pay record and may be drawn partially or in full at any time.

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It is recommended that action be taken to change the curricula of personnel schools to include more thorough indoctrination of persons being schooled in personnel matters in the finance allotment system.

All finance personnel assigned to a foreign theater should be either graduates of the Army Finance School or individuals who have a minimum of two years experience in army finance work.

More machinery in the nature of adding machines, typewriters, money listers, etc, should be initially assigned to each infantry division finance office in the field. The minimum requirements for a division finance office in the field should be as follows:

Adding machines	20
Typewriters	16
Computers & money listers	4
Addressograph machines	4
Graphotype machine	1

A study should be made for the purpose of setting up a more accurate locator service. Many documents are forwarded to this station as long as six months subsequent to the evacuation of personnel for medical reasons or through normal rotation channels to the CONUS.

It is recommended that, instead of the system now in use under paragraph 175, SR 35-2000-1, Notice of Exception be forwarded directly to the subject serviceman's station rather than the present system of relying on the forwarding of DD Form 118. This would cut down on paper work and additional correspondence. The time element involved between receiving a charge or a credit and the recording of such on the military pay record would be substantially reduced.

Service schools for officers should stress more realistically the responsibilities and duties of class A agents under AR 35-320 and paragraph 163, SR 35-2000-...

Action should be taken to insure that all ports of embarkation carefully service all military pay records prior to the serviceman's departure from the CONUS.

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7
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The military pay record should be surveyed with the aim of having it operate on a yearly basis rather than a twice-yearly basis.

SOURCE: Command Report - 7th Infantry Division Artillery

DATE: April 1952

Source No 497

(CONFIDENTIAL)

DEFENSE AGAINST ENEMY MORTARS. - Enemy mortars continue to inflict a large percentage of the friendly casualties sustained. This weapon is still one of the most difficult targets to locate and destroy or even neutralize. Present methods of detection are unsatisfactory. Recommend that every effort be made to expedite the development of improved radar sets to be used for this purpose.

(OCAFF Comment: It is believed the new AN/MPO-10 will fulfill the requirements outlined.)

SOURCE: Command Report - 21st AAA AW Battalion (SP)

DATE: April 1952

Source No 498

(RESTRICTED)

AIDS TO INDIRECT FIRING FOR QUAD 50's. - This battalion has experimented successfully with a number of aids to indirect firing for Quad 50's. These include the adoption of azimuth and elevation scales for laying the guns, the checking of the correctness of azimuth and elevation by the use of the aiming circle and gunners quadrant, and the improvisation of a panoramic sight for the same purpose. We also found that speed and accuracy in adjusting fire can be obtained easier when platoon commanders have acted as forward observers. The question of the effect of indirect fire of Quad 50's remains a speculative one. Since H&I fire is accomplished at nighttime, results cannot be observed. We must continue to depend on PW interrogation for our only measure of effectiveness. This information is generally nonexistent, and, even if available, is not always reliable.

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It is recommended that;

a. The AA&GM Branch of The Artillery School conduct experiments with Quad 50 indirect firing to determine its effectiveness on area targets at ranges between 5000 yards and 6500 yards, using API or incendiary ammunition.

b. All platoon leaders have some forward observers experience in adjusting artillery fire.

c. That any future AA materiel always be constructed with methods of setting and reading azimuths and elevations.

(OCAFF Comment: All Quad 50, M16's, are being modified to provide azimuth and elevation scale for ground firing.)

SOURCE: Command Report - 90th Field Artillery Battalion

DATE: April 1952

Source No 499

(RESTRICTED)

ZEROING INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS. - Due to the difficulty of marking and scoring the improvised targets on the two-hundred-yard carbine range, the zeroing of individual weapons was a time-consuming procedure. This problem has been solved by having each man fire five rounds at a range of twelve and one-half yards on a one-inch bull's-eye. The setting thus obtained is very nearly correct for two hundred yards. This method is resulting in large savings in time and ammunition.

(OCAFF Comment: See Department of the Army Training Circular 19, 1952.)

SOURCE: Command Report - 724th Trans Railway Operations Battalion

DATE: March 1952

Source No 500

(RESTRICTED)

STANDARDIZATION OF STATION RECORDS. - Standard operating procedures for maintaining records at stations and the handling of train

Over

9

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10

consists have been set up in order to have a uniform method at each station. This will permit the efficient replacement or rotation of personnel between stations and eliminate delays in delivery of shipments and possibility of pilferage.

Recommendations. - Recommend that the Transportation School study the problem and publish a manual prescribing a uniform system for record-keeping by stations to include courses for MOS 3069 and MOS 3047 at the Transportation School.

SOURCE: Command Report - Tokyo Engineer Works Ordnance Shops, 8231 AU

DATE: April 1952

Source No 501

(RESTRICTED)

SHORTAGE OF SPARE PARTS. - Many parts have been in short supply, due to inability to procure either from the CONUS or from local sources. Cylinder sleeves have been critically short, so that a backlog of over 1000 engine blocks to be sleeved has been generated.

Steps are being taken to meet this problem chiefly by the development of indigenous sources of supply, and new and improved reclamation procedures.

The receipt of substandard parts from the CONUS is causing considerable concern to this installation. Although the proportion of unsatisfactory parts is low compared to the total number of parts used, it is great enough to cause serious problems in the supply of component parts to the assembly lines. On a number of occasions a presumed "normal" supply of parts in the warehouse has turned into a serious shortage when uncrated and found to be defective. This situation has implications beyond causing production difficulties. These are the use of government funds to procure unsatisfactory parts, the cost of shipment from the CONUS and the use of valuable cargo space to transport them to the Far East.

Difficulty is experienced as a result of receiving boxes of material which are incorrectly marked as to nomenclature or quantity. Incorrect markings have resulted in production difficulties by causing parts shortages, and at the same time have created a problem in maintaining correct stock-card balances.

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SOURCE: Command Report - IX Corps, Part 3, Book II

DATE: January 1952

Source No 502

(RESTRICTED)

RECOVERY OF DAMAGED ARMORED VEHICLES. - One noteworthy method of towing arrangement for recovering a vehicle has been tested by one armored unit and has decreased the time of preparation for evacuation to 30 seconds and requires the employment of only one man. The special equipment required for this arrangement consists of approximately fifteen feet of chain, of one inch stock, links of which are large enough to go over the towing shackles, and a towing shackle welded to the center of the front armor plate, approximately at the same elevation as the top of the track. The heavy chain is generally carried by attaching the two ends to the standard towing shackles on the front of the tank and looping the center of the chain over the tank as described above. This arrangement may be used to hook onto the front or rear of a damaged tank, depending on the requirements of the situation.

SOURCE: Command Report - QM Petroleum Operation Group

DATE: May 1952

Source No 503

(RESTRICTED)

GASOLINE DRUMS - CLEANING COSTS. - A novel method of lessening drum cleaning costs was instituted with a saving of approximately 35¢ per drum filled without cleaning. Previously, returned empty drums were sent to the contractor for cleaning and reconditioning. Many of these drums, already clean inside, could have been immediately reused without cleaning except for the uncertainty regarding liquid-tight integrity of each drum. In order to avoid the necessity of spending money on drum cleaning when it was not absolutely necessary, a method of testing clean drums for leaks was developed. A set of immersion tanks was designed and constructed at a cost of approximately \$250.00. In the bath several drums at one time can be immersed and tested. Bubbles appear if there are any leaks. Clean drums processed this way and found to be sound are earmarked for reuse without further processing. Approximately 700 drums can be processed in one 8-hour shift. It is anticipated that half will be found suitable for refilling without cleaning, effecting a saving of \$125.00 per 8-hour shift worked.

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12

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SOURCE: Command Report - 27th Infantry Regiment

DATE: May 1952

Source No 504

(RESTRICTED)

REPLACEMENT TRAINING DEFICIENCY. - Replacements were found to be deficient in the operation of the 50 Cal. MG and the MIC Sniper Rifle.

SOURCE: Command Report - 25th Medical Battalion

DATE: May 1952

Source No 505

(RESTRICTED)

IMPROPERLY TRAINED REPLACEMENTS. - Very little orientation has been necessary for the EM replacements being assigned to ambulance and clearing companies. However, considerable difficulty has been encountered in Headquarters Company where many men have been given supply MOS's for which they are untrained and unqualified, and consequently have been malassigned. The motor section has had difficulty in obtaining school-trained mechanics, parts men, and vehicle drivers.

SOURCE: Command Report - 223rd Infantry Regiment

DATE: May 1952

Source No 506

(RESTRICTED)

REPLACEMENTS. - Replacements received have not been of a high enough caliber to assume duties without considerable training and indoctrination. In order to give this training and indoctrination it has become necessary to augment existing T/O&E. Adequate officer replacements have been received. Warrant officers are still in great demand and are apparently unavailable. A major problem is reclassification of replacements who do not have a profile that meets the basic requirements of SR 615-25-15. Reclassification and reprofiling boards have been set up and will be functioning to try to eliminate malassignments.

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A major problem arose in officer assignments. As phase out and rotation relieved captains and majors, junior officers must be assigned their jobs. Replacements coming in with required rank must be placed in the position commensurate to their rank, displacing the junior officer. This constant shuffling requires an enormous amount of paper work and sometimes leads to temporary confusion in assignments and records. It became necessary to set up an assignment processing form and an SOP to cope with the problem.

(RESTRICTED)

HEAVY MORTAR COMPANY. - Two recommendations for a change in the T/O&E were considered of primary importance. First, a revision to designate three forward observer teams with each platoon so that a team could be assigned to each line company; Korean terrain affords only limited observation. Second, increase the number of SCR 610 radios so that each forward observer, each platoon, fire direction center and the company commander would have one available; SCR 300 radios have been found inadequate in the present situation.

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RAID ON ENEMY BUNKERS AND FORTIFICATIONS. - On 7 May the I&R platoon conducted a night raid on enemy bunkers and fortifications in front of the right battalion. Three six-man squads were utilized in the encounter with two being used to isolate the position and prevent the enemy from interfering with the mission while the third was successfully completing the destruction of five bunkers on the reverse slope of the hill.

SOURCE: Command Report - IX Corps, Book I

DATE: April 1952

Source No 507

(RESTRICTED)

ARMY AIRCRAFT - OPERATIONAL AVERAGE. - The operational level of L-19's and L-17's remained close to March figures in a cross-section check of records, with averages of 81% and 60% respectively. Helicopters dropped sharply, however, from an operational level of 75% to one of 60%, a decrease rendered less significant by consideration of the small number of such aircraft involved in the calculations. The operational average of the three types combined was 76%. During a large number of the days in

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Over
13

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14

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which aircraft were out of commission they were awaiting parts, particularly in the case of the L-17's and helicopters. Hydraulic systems gave most trouble in the L-17's, and engine mounts and brake assemblies in the L-19's, shortage of these latter parts keeping two of the planes grounded for more than three weeks.

(RESTRICTED)

ENEMY ARTILLERY. - Constant improvement in hostile artillery technique was indicated by the increased effectiveness of fire and tendency to mass fires of as many as 12 pieces quickly when renumerative targets were offered. Missions were principally against friendly OP's, patrols or other targets where observation was possible, and often originated from enemy self-propelled gun units observed in action. However, during the middle of the month hostile artillery fired a number of counterbattery missions and indicated the capability of delivering fire up to 10,000 meters behind friendly lines.

SOURCE: Command Report - 64th Tank Battalion (Medium)

DATE: March 1952

Source No 508

(RESTRICTED)

SOLDIERS' DEPOSIT. - Although Soldiers' Deposit is intended as a readily available and easy means of saving and is operated solely for the soldier, recommend reconsideration of greater latitude so that the soldier may use Soldiers' Deposit and know that he may withdraw his money upon presentation of legitimate reasons for so doing, rather than be compelled to await discharge or an emergency.

SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corps, Cml & Ln

DATE: March 1952

Source No 509

(CONFIDENTIAL)

X-200 NAPALM LAND MINE. - The X-200 napalm land mine is made from salvaged 5-gallon oil cans. A burster well is provided to protect the burster. The burster is obtained from the AN()47 bomb filled with black powder and two strands of primacord. The burster and wells are manufactured by the 92d and 95th Chemical Service Companies in Korea. A standard

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engineer pull or trip type firing device with a No 8 detonator is required for firing, although the mine can be electrically detonated. This mine is used in draws, ravines, or critical approaches into friendly lines. Its detonation causes casualties and produces back lighting effects. Approximately 800 were issued within the corps during the month and over 11,000 have been drawn by units within the corps since the item became available. The 1st ROK Division gave credit to this mine as assisting in stopping an attack of battalion size in their area. Three dead, badly burned enemy bodies were found in the barbed wire after the action.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

FLAME THROWER. - A lightweight, 2-gallon, portable flame thrower was developed under the supervision of the I Corps Chemical Officer by the 92d Chemical Service Company. This item consists essentially of a standard tank from the M2A1 or M2A2 portable flame thrower, a standard pressure regulator, a standard flame gun assembly from the M2A1 flame thrower, the standard frame, and an air bottle obtained from the Air Force 3-man life raft. Average range obtained with this flame thrower is about 30 yards but ranges up to 40 yards have been achieved. Total weight filled is 40 lbs. This item was examined and tested by the 3d and 45th Infantry Divisions and found favor with them. There is sufficient fuel for one good burst of flame and it is anticipated that the shortage of fuel from the standard flame thrower will be made up by carrying several more of the lightweight flame throwers in each unit.

SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corps, Armor

DATE: March 1952

Source No 510

(RESTRICTED)

MECHANICS FOR M46 TANKS. - For the last two or three months, units equipped with M46 tanks were not receiving mechanics who were trained to repair these tanks. This necessitated mechanic training programs, primarily on-the-job training, in the units.

EUSAK Army officer arranged for army ordnance to conduct an M46 tank mechanic school in Seoul which will consist of a two-weeks course. Each tank battalion will receive a quota of two mechanics per course and each tank company will receive a quota of one mechanic per course.

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Over

15

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16

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RECOVERY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. - It is recommended that all corps units, when planning armored operations, include in their plans sufficient recovery personnel and equipment to recover disabled vehicles immediately after they have become immobilized. This will expedite battlefield recovery and should cut down on the number of vehicles abandoned in front of our battle positions. Vehicles that are not recovered immediately after they have become immobilized have been zeroed in by enemy artillery which consequently makes the recovery task more difficult and dangerous.

SOURCE: Command Report - 224th Infantry Regiment

DATE: May 1952

Source No 511

(RESTRICTED)

CONTAINERS FOR .30 CALIBER MG AMMUNITION. - During the month the regiment has been drawing .30 caliber machine-gun ammunition packed 1500 rounds to the container. This pack is unsatisfactory for this terrain as it cannot be carried into positions without being broken down into smaller containers. Ammunition should be kept in the original container until the time of expenditure.

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(RESTRICTED)

PERCENTAGE OF WP FOR 4.2" MORTAR. - During the month of May the percentage of white phosphorus for 4.2" mortar in the ammunition supply rate went from 40 per cent to 70 per cent white phosphorus. This percentage is out of proportion to the actual needs of the regiment based on past consumption. Twenty per cent white phosphorus is recommended.

SOURCE: Command Report - 56th Amphibious Tank & Tractor Battalion

DATE: March 1952

Source No 512

(RESTRICTED)

AMPHIBIOUS RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS. - The first 30-day training period at Okinawa revealed the need for an experienced and trained amphibious reconnaissance team from this battalion. A small team of several enlisted

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men and two officers was quickly organized for reef reconnaissance, life-saving work and salvage work. In addition, another team was established to survey possible landing beaches. Both teams were highly successful despite the lack of necessary equipment. As a result three officers and twenty-five enlisted men with swimming experience underwent an intensive reconditioning period and training program. Further training of the teams is being carried on and will continue through the summer months to determine their value for possible incorporation in an amphibious T/O&E.

SOURCE: Command Report - 1st Field Observation Battalion

DATE: May 1952

Source No 513

(RESTRICTED)

RECOMMENDATIONS. - Recommend that in the training of flash and sound personnel more attention be paid to their use as intelligence sources with particular attention being paid to firing observed (target grid type) missions, sending in completed intelligence reports, and forwarding shell-reps and crater analysis reports.

Recommend that strong consideration be given to the requirements of an observation battalion for light type aircraft in particular for helicopters for survey work.

There is an urgent need for at least two additional observation batteries to be assigned to this theater to assist in giving more coverage to offset the increased build-up of enemy artillery.

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BATTALION WIRE NET MAINTAINED. - The battalion, to fulfill its mission, has to maintain 752 miles of wire net.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 143 Field Artillery Battalion

DATE: May 1952

Source No 514

(RESTRICTED)

COUNTERMORTAR RADAR SECTION FOR FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION. - Shell reports received from both artillery and infantry observers are inaccurate, and quite often lack azimuth and identification of the type of round. This problem is being overcome by sending artillery and infantry personnel to a division artillery shell reporting school, and by concurrent, on-the-job training. The lack of a countermortar radar section limits our ability to locate enemy mortar positions.

It is recommended that both artillery and infantry personnel receive additional training in shell reporting and crater analysis, and that the countermortar radar section be equipped and placed in operation in the battalion.

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