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OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES C16954-10
Fort Monroe, Virginia

ATTNG-26 350.05/60(DOCI)(C)(23 Oct 52) 23 October 1952

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information III

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4. Combat information EXTRACTS herein which are applicable to training at the company-battery level also appear in Army Field Forces TRAINING BULLETINS.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

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TAGO 760924 OF
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A B Chatham

1 Incl
Extracts from sources
515 thru 545

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SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corps

DATE: May 1952 Source No 515

(SECRET)

DEFENSE TACTICS. - Due to the development of the recoilless rifle, both sides now have the capability of employing these weapons in direct fire roles against bunkers. It, therefore, becomes more important than ever that combat outposts be employed extensively well beyond the main line of resistance to keep the enemy at "arms-length," in order to maintain the integrity of main line of resistance bunkers.

Due to direct fire weapons and the demonstrated capability of the enemy to employ massed artillery against forward slopes, a re-evaluation needs to be made concerning defense works. Forward slopes should be used as little as possible under the above conditions and tunnels dug from rear to front with small apertures toward the enemy for observation purposes; reverse slope bunkers should be employed with cover sufficient to withstand our own VT fires; machine guns should be sited to cover rear and flank approaches; high ground and observation points should be denied the enemy by the use of VT and high explosive artillery concentrations; and tactical wire should be used to the maximum.

The above is a sound concept for defense.

SOURCE: Command Report - 17th Infantry Regiment

DATE: May 1952 Source No 516

(RESTRICTED)

CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMORED VEST. - Prior to use of the body armor by personnel of this regiment, the men were oriented as to the capabilities of the vest. For example, the vest is excellent in stopping shell fragments, but can not be expected to stop enemy small arms fire. Also in several cases, the vest has deflected enemy 7.62-mm fire resulting in no injury to the wearer. Several of the men from the 17th Infantry wore these vests on patrols, and in one instance, a man from Company I was saved from a possible fatal injury when shell fragments struck the vest without penetrating it. On another occasion, a man from Company A was knocked down by small arms fire striking him in the stomach, but the missile did not penetrate the vest.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That all personnel exposed to enemy fire be equipped with this vest.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 65th Infantry Regiment

DATE: March 1952 Source No 517

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(CONFIDENTIAL)

AN/PRC 10 RADIO. - The advantages of this set are numerous but there are certain recommendations that this unit would advocate. The construction of the hand set is extremely weak. It seems to have been designed for right hand operation which is not the usual case. Also the circuits are so demanding on the battery that the set tends to drift off frequency as the battery is drained. This demands more than the average amount of calibration.

The gang plug to the battery has too much space between it and the lid, allowing it to work loose. It is recommended that a taller plug be used with a rubber bumper to take up the space.

The contact plug on the hand set loses contact when fully seated and regains contact when removed slightly from its base.

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SOURCE: Command Report - Eighth United States Army Korea Armor

DATE: January 1952 Source No 518

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(RESTRICTED)

MINE CLEARING WITH DEMOLITION. - Recently the 3d Engineer Combat Battalion conducted a test in the use of demolitions for mine field clearing. Six standard TMD-8 box mines were placed in a typical Korean road at depths varying from eighteen to thirty inches, covered with damp earth and left in the ground for a day to freeze.

The mined area was covered with a network of demolition blocks. After detonation it was found that all mines under the network of demolition blocks had been detonated or completely crushed and disarmed, but mines two feet outside the network of demolition blocks were not affected.

SOURCE: Command Report - 981st Field Artillery Battalion

DATE: June 1952 Source No 519

(RESTRICTED)

ARTILLERY RAMMER. - In recent months units have been experimenting with a new type rammer for the 155-mm howitzer projectile. These experiments were made because three deficiencies were noted with the conventional bronze star rammer; these deficiences are:

a. The star rammer slips from the base of the projectile and catches in the breech recess.

b. In slipping it mars the recess and it has resulted in the dropping of the projectile.

c. The slipping of the star rammer results in the improper seating of the projectile.

In an endeavor to eliminate these deficiencies an experimental rammer was constructed from the rubber cushion found in the metal ammunition containers for 105-mm howitzers. It was found that this rammer eliminated all of the deficiencies noted in the bronze star rammer.

Recommend that a new type rubber rammer be developed for separate loading ammunition.

SOURCE: Command Report - 143d Field Artillery Battalion

DATE: June 1952 Source No 520

(RESTRICTED)

SWITCHBOARD ALLOWANCE IN FA BN. - When switchboard BD-71 or BD-72 is used as an "in lieu of" item for switchboard SB-22/PT, recommend that it be accomplished on a "drop for drop" basis, i.e., two each BD-71 or one each BD-72 for each SB-22/PT.

Recommend that an additional switchboard, BD-72, be allowed a field artillery battalion on T/O&E to handle the many direct lines feeding into fire direction center. This would eliminate the many EE-8 telephones currently fulfilling this requirement.

SOURCE: Command Report - 2d Division Artillery

DATE: June 1952 Source No 521

(RESTRICTED)

LANGUAGE BARRIER WITH ROK FO's. - Constant efforts were made to improve the coordination between the ROK infantry and forward observers and the US FA battalions. Missions from ROK FO's were handled by several different methods in order to speed up the delivery of fire. Some missions were sent directly to the battalion and regimental liaison officers, where they were processed by interpreters and called in to the FDC by telephone. Others came directly to the battalion FDC, where an interpreter was constantly on duty. This latter system proved to be the most effective. But even so the weakness of interpreters in artillery terms and phrases frequently delayed fire and on many occasions the volume of fire delivered was larger than necessary. Training of both forward observers and interpreters has gradually reduced these deficiencies.

SOURCE: Command Report - 25th Infantry Division

DATE: May 1952 Source No 522

(RESTRICTED)

CLEARING FIELDS OF FIRE. - With the advent of summer growing weather, a new hazard to the security of the main line of resistance has developed in the form of heavy foliage on the steep and rugged slopes facing the enemy. The trees and underbrush restrict visibility and aid the enemy in his efforts to work in close to snipe and raid. This problem does not exist on enemy high ground, because his positions have been blasted almost bare by friendly mortar and artillery fire.

To alleviate this situation, efforts have been made in all regiments to clear fields of fire by cutting, by using flame throwers, by pouring gasoline over areas and then igniting, and by pouring gasoline over areas and leaving it to wither the vegetation.

None of these expedients proved satisfactory. Cutting parties were handicapped by the wide and dense mine fields, marked and unmarked,

across the entire Division front, and by the enemy's ability to place accurate mortar and artillery fire on targets of opportunity. All methods of using gasoline required excessive amounts of fuel and produced meager results.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 40th Division Artillery

DATE: June 1952 Source No 523

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(RESTRICTED)

FLAK SUPPRESSION. - A system for more effective flak suppression has been worked out by the FSCC, and has been tested on one occasion, but will require further testing to prove its effectiveness. After the target has been approved for an air strike, a plot of all known and suspect anti-aircraft positions within a radius of four thousand meters of the target center is made by the S2 and a TOT schedule is set up firing all possible artillery pieces at all of the antiaircraft positions simultaneously. When the fighter bombers arrive in the target area, the T6 Mosquito observer, who is to direct the strike, leads them over the target and the artillery marks the target with a smoke round. When the Mosquito is satisfied that all of the fighter pilots have identified the target, he sends them away from it on a course which will clear the trajectories of the artillery pieces, and calls for the flak suppression. Knowing the time of flight of the artillery, he turns the fighters and starts them back toward the target to arrive immediately following the artillery "splash," and they go in while the hostile antiaircraft is still neutralized. All artillery is fired with VT fuze and as a precaution against late rounds arriving after the fighters start in, an "all clear" round of smoke is fired on Division Artillery order when all units have reported "rounds complete." This final smoke round is loaded and ready and should arrive at the target within seconds of the artillery concentration.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 7th Division Artillery

DATE: June 1952 Source No 524

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(CONFIDENTIAL)

COUNTERMORTAR SYSTEM. - The disposition and use of enemy mortars remained approximately the same as during the preceding month. However, due to the increased volume of fire falling on patrols, the

Over

countermortar section adopted slightly different tactics to meet the situation. Previously only known or strongly suspected mortar locations were plotted and included in the countermortar programs. Too great reliance was placed on the radar sets and visual sightings by the ground and air observation posts for the protection of patrols advancing into enemy territory. A new system was initiated in which the enemy area surrounding each objective was divided by concentric circles, the radius of each representing the range of known enemy types of mortars. For example, the inner circle represented the maximum distance that 60-mm mortars could be placed from the objective for the weapons to be brought to bear on the area. The next circle indicated the range of 82-mm mortars and the outer circle the range of the 120-mm mortar. This overlay was then given to the photo interpretation section for intensive study. The object being that within the inner circle, areas where these small weapons could be mounted were carefully charted, the second circle located only areas of sufficient size for 82-mm mortars, and the outer circle emplacements capable of housing a 120-mm weapon. In this manner individual fire plans were set up for each patrol, and, by firing VT fuzed ammunition on the locations so charted, maximum suppression was achieved with only a slight increase in ammunition expended.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 10th Field Artillery Battalion

DATE: May 1952 Source No 525

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(RESTRICTED)

MOBILE FDC. - It is recommended that ordnance issue to each field artillery battalion a vehicle specifically designed as a mobile FDC; alternately, it is recommended that ordnance cause to be manufactured, and then issue to field artillery battalions, necessary material and instructions for modification of current T/O&E trucks such as GMC 2-1/2-ton LWB to be used as a mobile FDC. The mobile FDC should be designed to provide sufficient space for normal FDC operation with crew including the S2 section. It is to be stressed that the normal efficiency of a battalion FDC and S2 section operating in a permanent bunker-type installation must not and need not be sacrificed for mobility.

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(RESTRICTED)

ARTILLERY CALIBRATION. - It is recommended that sufficient ordnance calibration teams be detailed to Korea and any future combat zones, so the light artillery, as well as medium and heavy, can be periodically calibrated. The role of light artillery as direct support of infantry, with the inherent requirement of delivering close fires, makes accurate calibration essential. It is recognized that fall of shot calibration can be used and that it can itself be modified by field expedients, but it is believed that ordnance calibration would be of greater value.

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SOURCE: 70th Tank Battalion, (Undated)

Source No 526

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(RESTRICTED)

BATTALION TANK COMPANIES IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF INFANTRY REGIMENTS. - It is recommended that the tank companies of the battalion be placed in direct support of the regiments of the division rather than being attached to these regiments. The attachment of one unit to another automatically renders the unit to which attached responsible for the administrative and logistical support of the attached unit. In actual practice, regardless of whether or not the tank companies are attached or placed in direct support, the tank battalion must administratively and logistically support them. Therefore, the attachment of a tank unit to an infantry regiment, even though specified in orders, can never be an actuality.

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SOURCE: Command Report-I US Corps Artillery

DATE: May 1952

Source No 527

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(CONFIDENTIAL)

VEST, BODY ARMOR. - Nylon body armor vests were introduced to the air section during the month but were found to be uncomfortable when worn under a parachute. It is suggested that a chest protector be incorporated into the parachute harness of the same material; as the parachute itself would protect the back. It is also recommended that the upholstery in the L-19 aircraft be replaced with laminated nylon. This

would not materially affect the weight of the aircraft and would give greater protection to the pilot and observer both physically and psychologically.

* * *

HELICOPTERS. - The need for Army aircraft in 1st FA Obsn Bn, helicopters in particular, was never more positively shown than during this month when survey parties ran connecting schemes across mountainous terrain at the expense of days of reconnaissance and climbing mine-covered hills. A helicopter would have performed the job with a saving of hundreds of man hours and less danger to personnel. Officers and men of every battery, and battalion headquarters experienced great difficulty obtaining Army aircraft for reconnaissance, emergency administrative flights, and long distance liaison flights. In many cases trips by jeep of hundreds of miles were made for brief liaison visits or coordinated visits with other detached sections of the battalion.

It is recommended that strong consideration be given to the requirements of an observation battalion for light type aircraft; in particular, helicopters for survey work.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 12th Field Artillery Battalion

DATE: June 1952 Source No 528

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(RESTRICTED)

OFFICER TRAINING. - Inexperience and lack of training of officers was the most critical deficiency. While most officers are school trained, they need more on-the-job training before being placed in combat units. Officer schools are being conducted by battalion in survey, forward observation, and duties of the executive officer.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 38th Field Artillery Battalion

DATE: May 1952 Source No 529

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(RESTRICTED)

LANGUAGE BARRIER IN SUPPORT OF ROK UNITS. - The main difficulties, when supporting ROK units, stemmed from the language barrier. This caused delays in the exchange of information, orders, and the delivery of artillery fires.

It is recommended that cellular units of ROK interpreters, trained in artillery conduct of fire, be organized. One such unit could be attached to a direct support field artillery battalion, upon receiving the D/S mission.

A cellular unit is suggested: T/O - One officer - ten enlisted men.

Assignments:

One officer - Commander of unit
Two enlisted men - Battalion Fire Direction
Six enlisted men - Two to each Battalion Liaison section
Two enlisted men - Utility

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**SOURCE:** Command Report - X Corps Artillery

**DATE:** May 1952 Source No 530

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(RESTRICTED)

CORPS REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL PILOT. - An extended unseasonal period of good weather and the need for aerial surveillance from sunrise to sunset necessitated an extensive revision of the aerial surveillance schedules. This schedule was being published at the end of the period. The need for aircraft maintenance, the limitations on the number of combat hours to be flown by each pilot, and the inadequate number of planes and pilots available presented a considerable problem. The revised surveillance schedule is expected to offer a partial solution to this problem. It is recommended that additional pilots and aircraft be made available to a Corps Artillery when the assigned aircraft do not provide adequate surveillance.

It is further recommended that an additional pilot be assigned to each Corps Artillery Battalion in order to effect maximum utilization of aircraft, and yet comply with recommendations concerning the number of combat hours flown per pilot per month.

SOURCE: Command Report - 981st Field Artillery Battalion

DATE: May 1952 Source No 531

(RESTRICTED)

DEFICIENCIES IN FIELD KITCHEN EQUIPMENT. - An investigation of a fire that occurred in this organization disclosed the need for a detailed inspection of all fire units for Field Ranges, M1937. This inspection disclosed the following deficiencies:

a. All filler caps engage only two and one quarter or fewer of the threads, although there are in excess of six threads available in each cap. Because of the soft composition (brass) of the filler caps the useable threads are easily stripped, thus rendering the fire unit unsafe to use.

b. In threading the filler pipes, the pipes have become tapered further decreasing the engaging thread surfaces.

c. Many filler caps have structural flaws and cracks.

d. Fire units returned to using organizations have had solder used in repairing or sealing pipe connections. The use of solder is a dangerous practice because these pipes are in close proximity to the extreme heat from the unit and could easily soften and blow under 40 to 50 pounds operating pressure.

e. $CO_2$ fire extinguishers smaller than five pounds are not sufficient to fight a gasoline fire in the confines of a mess tent; and further, that extinguishers of this size have the valve frozen open while operating and the $CO_2$ is exhausted with one application, necessitating refilling immediately. This often means doing without fire protection for a period of time because the servicing of fire extinguishers is a slow process in the field.

It is recommended that:

a. A $CO_2$ fire extinguisher with a trigger type discharge mechanism and a capacity of greater than five pounds be made a T/O&E item for all field kitchens.

b. An asbestos type blanket be authorized for each field kitchen to aid in putting out fires on personnel.

c. A study be made of fire units with the object of redesigning them or eliminating the fire hazard now present in the filler plugs and the pipe connections.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 1343d Engineer Combat Battalion

DATE: April 1952 Source No 532

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(RESTRICTED)

DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF ROADS. - The most important lesson learned was that the teachings of the Army School System are sound. The problems encountered were solved by judicious application of the principles taught.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 13th Engineer Combat Battalion

DATE: April 1952 Source No 533

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(RESTRICTED)

105 CFM AIR COMPRESSOR. - This Battalion finds that the 105 CFM air compressor is unsuitable for performing the desired mission. In this theatre, a compressor is needed with a higher capacity in order to operate more tools simultaneously. At the present time, with shaped charges and other demolitions very critical, much black powder is being used in blasting rock. This necessitates drilling, and with the 105 CFM compressor this is a very time consuming job, thus delaying completion of projects. One solution would be to double the capacity of the present air compressor to 210 CFM with provision for additional pneumatic tools.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 3d Engineer (C) Battalion

DATE: May 1952 Source No 534

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(RESTRICTED)

SHORTAGE OF SPARE PARTS FOR ENGINEER EQUIPMENT. - The lack of spare parts for nonstandard or experimental engineer equipment continues to be a major problem.

SOURCE: Command Report - 13th Engineer (C) Battalion

DATE: March 1952 Source No 535

(RESTRICTED)

GENERATORS. - Generators continue to be a problem. If they are to be used in the field for lights and power they should be designed for long hours of continuous usage. The 1-1/2 and 3-Kilowatt generators now issued are not satisfactory for this use. It is recommended that the engine used to drive the generators be of a standard military design in order to help relieve the already critical parts supply problem.

SOURCE: Command Report - 7th Infantry Regiment

DATE: May 1952 Source No 536

(CONFIDENTIAL)

COMMUNICATIONS.

Discussion: The number of wire miles for a regimental type installation one, i.e., lines originating from regiment, is approximately 120 to 150 miles. The present basic load of wire is not sufficient to adequately handle this amount of installation.

Recommendation: That the basic load of wire be doubled at all echelons within the regiment.

Discussion: The total number of AN/PRC-10 radios within the infantry regiment is 95, of this number 6 to 15 are out of order for a 3-to 5-day period awaiting replacement of parts or components. As 95 radios is the barest minimum for effective combat efficiency, it is felt that steps should be taken to provide the regiment with sufficient equipment to provide a "float" for repair purposes.

Recommendations:

a. That the regiment be furnished at least 10 additional AN/PRC-10 radios;

b. That running spares and repair equipment be furnished for this equipment at the regimental level.

SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corps Armor

DATE: March 1952 Source No 537

(RESTRICTED)

SKID FOR EVACUATING DISABLED TANKS. - To facilitate the recovery of tanks disabled by enemy mines, the 245th Tank Battalion built a metal skid. The purpose of the skid was to replace the one tank track which had been broken and thrown off the tank due to an enemy mine. The skid was built of 3/8" armor or boiler plate. The skid is 20" wide and 16' 10" long. A railroad rail was welded along the center of the metal skid. The rail served not only to strengthen the skid but also to serve as a center guide for the tank road wheels when the road wheels on the side of the tank with track off was pulled onto the skid. The front of the skid was bent upward like the nose of a ski. A hole was cut through the rail at a point directly under the tank drive sprocket hub. Another hole was cut through the rail directly beneath the idler wheel. Through these holes were passed chains which were then wrapped around the idler wheel and drive sprocket hub respectively. The chains served to hold the tank on the skid. To the front of the skid was fastened a large link so that a towing cable could be attached to the skid during towing operations.

Several methods of towing were tried using an M32 tank. The best method employed a tow cable connection from the skid to the M32 towing shackle on the same side as the skid; the M32 winch cable was also attached to the towing shackle on the other side of the disabled tank. With this hook-up the M32 tank had no trouble pulling an M4A3E8 tank.

This skid method of recovering tanks with one track broken by enemy mines is much faster than trying to repair the tank on the battlefield. Also, the use of the skid prevents additional damage to the suspension system on the side of the tank where the track is broken.

SOURCE: Command Report - 40th Division Artillery

DATE: May 1952 Source No 538

(RESTRICTED)

NEED FOR TRAINED NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS. - As has been previously pointed out there is an ever increasing need for trained

noncommissioned officers. This need has been partially met by moving trained personnel within the units. These in turn will be lost within the next two months, and while some of these losses can be replaced by intensive training at unit level, critical specialists must come from the pipeline if combat efficiency is to continue at a high level. A small percentage of the replacements received during the month were school trained and highly capable; however, the great majority were basics with no unit training.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 213th Field Artillery Battalion

DATE: April 1952 Source No 539

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(RESTRICTED)

PLASTIC GRID SHEET FOR FA. - It is recommended that the plastic grid sheet as advocated by The Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, be adopted as a standard item of issue to field artillery battalions. This plastic grid sheet has been utilized in combat in place of the paper grid sheet and has proven to be more durable, accurate and lends itself to easy cleaning.

* * *

(RESTRICTED)

GENERATORS. - It is strongly recommended that field artillery battalions be authorized a minimum of six generators type PE 210 rather than only five as are now authorized by pertinent T/O&E's. Experience has proven the PE 210 to be a critical piece of equipment, essential to the maintenance of continued operation of radio equipment, particularly in a static situation. It is further recommended that consideration be given to the procurement of a generator to replace the PE 210 in that the current models of the PE 210 have been found to be temperamental in operation, requiring constant attention and frequent overhaul.

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(RESTRICTED)

ENGINEER SUPPORT. - It is recommended that separate field artillery battalions and corps artillery units be provided with engineer support comparable to that rendered divisional artillery units by organic divisional engineers.



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(RESTRICTED)

ENGINEER EXPENDABLE SUPPLIES. - It is strongly recommended that engineer expendable supplies include plotting needles in conformity to specifications prescribed by The Artillery School. Issue cycle of these items should be at least each 30 days.

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(RESTRICTED)

BATTERIES. - It is recommended that field artillery battalions be authorized a minimum of four additional 6-volt storage (wet cell) batteries in addition to the number currently authorized by pertinent T/O&E's.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 955th Field Artillery Battalion

DATE: April 1952 Source No 540

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(RESTRICTED)

SPECIAL ALLOWANCE OF ONE D7 BULLDOZER PER FIRING BATTERY. - The present Special Allowance of one D4 bulldozer per battalion is inadequate in this type of terrain and this type of employment of field artillery battalion (155-mm how).

Twenty-five days of continuous use of a D4 bulldozer are required in the rough moving of dirt necessary to properly prepare position of the headquarters battery and three firing batteries of a 155-mm howitzer battalion. This does not include time for leveling of position area, construction of roads, or improvement of drainage which is very necessary in preparation of howitzer positions of any permanency.

Rocky soil, frozen ground, and hilly terrain encountered in this theater precludes the use of a D4 bulldozer without frequent mechanical difficulties.

Therefore, it is recommended that a D7 bulldozer with a lowboy for transport be placed on special allowance per firing battery, or that a high-speed bulldozer of approximately the same capacity as the D7 be placed on special allowance per firing battery, when a field artillery battalion (155-mm how) is engaged in a defensive operation.

SOURCE: Command Report - IX Corps, Book II, Part 3

DATE: February 1952 Source No 541

(RESTRICTED)

PERSONNEL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POSTAL UNIT (TYPE F).

a. The distance involved in serving troops through the Army Postal Unit as well as the number of troops served, influences the number of persons needed to effectively receive and dispatch mail.

b. In a nonstable situation where troops are constantly being shifted, the length of time required for approval of another type postal unit makes it advisable to resolve the problem by other means.

c. It is suggested that a plan be implemented to provide a flexible scale for the T/O&E within the specified type of postal unit to permit the increase or decrease of personnel without undue delay in order to maintain expeditious and efficient postal service.

d. This problem is illustrated by the operation of the 11th APU (Type F).

(1) Authorized strength.....1 officer - 14 enlisted men

(2) Present strength.....1 officer - 21 enlisted men

(3) The 7 EM overstrength is required by establishing a forward echelon 32 miles from the main branch to serve 25 units. The maintenance of this subunit saves these troops 64 miles travel, enables quicker mail service, and saves time, manhours, and equipment of the units being served.

(4) Recommend that a flexible T/O&E be published, based on distance of units served from APU plus the number of troops served. This type of T/O&E would be more practical in a combat situation and provide for better utilization of personnel.

SOURCE: Command Report - 19th Engineer Combat Group

DATE: April 1952 Source No 542

(RESTRICTED)

ENEMY MINE TACTICS. - One new method of booby-trapping the Russian wooden box mine, TMD-B, was discovered and successfully neutralized. In one instance, the TMD-B mines were laid two deep with the upper mine level with the surface of the ground. Under the lower box mine a shu-mine, PMD-7, was placed in an inverted position. A wire was connected from the safety pin of the MUV fuse of the shu-mine to a nail in the upper box mine. The booby trap was set so that a direct pull in removing the upper box mine would pull the safety pin from the shu-mine fuse and cause the strike to be released and the entire group of mines to be detonated. It is considered significant that only one such booby trapped set of mines was located in this field. This project was successfully completed without casualties.

SOURCE: Command Report - 1st Cavalry Division

DATE: May 1951 Source No 543

(RESTRICTED)

INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS. - Soldiers are far from satisfied that we have the best individual arm. The carbine lacks range and power (hitting power), and the M1 is heavy and sensitive to weather and dirt. Infantrymen are divided over the merits of the semiautomatic weapon versus the single-loader. Obviously we have a problem that is tied up not only with the weapons, but in the psychology of our training. There is considerable feeling that all training needs more stress on accuracy in firing, use of the battlesight at variable ranges, and small unit musketry. Experience has also shown that the bayonet is far from obsolete. It is not so much the ability to use it skillfully, but the determination to close with it. No one has much stomach for a bayonet attack, including the fanatically indoctrinated enemy in Korea.

SOURCE: Command Report - WAC Battalion, Headquarters and Service Command Far East Command

DATE: April 1952 Source No 544

(RESTRICTED)

WAC REPLACEMENTS. - Replacements from the continental United States have included former members of this command who were rotated for discharge. At the time some of the enlisted women departed for the continental United States, low character and efficiency ratings were included in their 201 files with recommendations that they not be re-enlisted in the service for certain cogent reasons.

Conclusions are that upon return to the continental United States for discharge, a few undesirable women expressed their desires to remain in the service and were re-enlisted. They then volunteered for second tours in the Far East Command.

Recommend that prior to shipment of any enlisted woman formerly assigned to the Far East Command who has completed less than one year's subsequent service in the continental United States, the application be forwarded to this command for comment, recommendations, or concurrence.

SOURCE: Command Report - 40th Infantry Division

DATE: March 1952 Source No 545

(RESTRICTED)

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS TO IDENTIFY TARGETS. - It is apparent that the biggest problem encountered in the conduct of air strikes is in the actual direction of the fighters on the target. It has been found that the use of aerial photographs in "mosquito" conducted strikes provides an excellent means of identification of the desired target to the mosquito aircraft since both the Forward Air Controller and mosquito pilot are in effect looking at the same ground.

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(RESTRICTED)

USE OF SCOUT DOGS WITH PATROLS. - The use of dogs on patrols offers increased security without hampering activity. Best results are obtained when dogs work with members of patrol at least two days prior to actual patrol. Some ambush patrols experienced difficulty due to nervousness when the enforced inactivity necessarily exceeded 3 hours.

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