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OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

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ATTNG-26 350.05/63(DOCI)(C)(4 Dec 52)

4 December 1952

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information

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4. Combat information EXTRACTS herein which are applicable to training at the company-battery level also appear in Army Field Forces TRAINING BULLETINS.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

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T. J. Smith

T. J. SMITH
Colonel, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl
Extracts from sources
576 thru 603

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SOURCE: Command Report - 245th Tank Battalion

DATE: July 1952

Source No. 576

(RESTRICTED)

USE OF TANK SEARCHLIGHT. - Additional use of searchlight tanks indicates that when they are used in the defense of fixed outpost positions, they are generally destroyed by preparatory fires of the enemy and are ineffective when they are needed. It is believed that they would be best used in counterattacks, blocking positions and ambushes.

* * *

"I concur in the recommendation that the use of searchlight equipped tanks be limited to counterattacks, blocking positions and ambushes. When used in fixed outpost positions, experience has shown that searchlight equipped tanks are frequently destroyed or disabled by preparatory enemy fire rendering them ineffective for use when needed." (1st Ind, Hq 45th Inf Div, 22 Aug 52 - Maj Gen David L. Ruffner)

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ARMOR EXPERIENCE NECESSARY FOR COMBAT. - Officer replacements have been uniformly lacking in practical tank experience. No tank-experienced officers have been received in this battalion during the period undersigned has commanded it. A very reasonable criteria for tank experience in platoon leaders is at least six months training as a tank platoon leader in a tank company. For company commander a reasonable criteria is at least one year's experience in a tank company including at least six months as a tank company commander. This practical experience is lacking, and is particularly noticeable during marches, maintenance periods and evacuation situations.

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TANK RETRIEVER MODIFICATIONS. - Our operations during the past month have again strongly emphasized the necessity for an armored hatch over the tank retriever ring mount and the desirability of a quick coupling device.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 35th Infantry Regiment

DATE: July 1952

Source No 577

(RESTRICTED)

EFFECT OF RAIN ON POSITIONS. - On the 26th of July 1952, the rain began and from that date until the end of the month a total of 11.83 inches fell in the regimental area. The rain was almost constant for a five day period. The efforts of the regiment were directed toward controlling what would have developed into a disaster in both damage and casualties. Nevertheless, the damage to positions was great. One hundred and two bunkers caved in, seventy-six bunkers were condemned, one thousand five hundred and forty-five yards of communication trenches caved in and four hundred and fifty-five yards of trails were washed out.

SOURCE: Command Report - 25th Infantry Division

DATE: June 1952

Source No 578

(RESTRICTED)

PRISONER CAPTURE METHODS. - Raids to capture prisoners by a platoon or company size unit against an enemy position which consists of a well developed network of trenches and bunkers on ridge tops manned by an alert enemy have proven costly. The friendly losses are out of proportion to the results attained. Raids of this type using preplanned artillery preparations and a coordinated infantry-artillery assault have been executed, as have raids using stealth to get close to the enemy prior to the final assault. Neither plan has proven entirely satisfactory.

A more satisfactory system is to use numerous small ambushes emphasizing stealth in contrast to force. Although, under this method, several days may be required to effect a capture, prisoners or bodies are gotten with sufficient frequency to maintain contact and identification.

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HIGH-ANGLE FIRE. - The nature of terrain and restrictive areas for firing batteries frequently necessitates the emplacement of artillery

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in positions with high minimum elevations. A large percentage of enemy positions are on reverse slopes of precipitous hills or in deep valleys. These factors require the use of high-angle fire for both observed and unobserved missions. At present, two of the division artillery 105-mm battalions are using high-angle fire almost exclusively; and the other battalions, fire high-angle fire over 50% of the time.

Most officers arriving in Korea for assignment to artillery units have inadequate training in the adjustment, fire direction procedure, capabilities, or usefulness of high-angle fire. It is therefore necessary to devote considerable time and effort in the orientation and instruction of all newly assigned officers in the procedure, techniques and use of high-angle fire.

It is recommended that The Artillery School place even greater emphasis and devote more time to the instruction of artillery officers in the use and conduct of high-angle fire.

SOURCE: Command Report - 40th Infantry Division Artillery

DATE: July 1952

Source No 579

(CONFIDENTIAL)

FLAK SUPPRESSION BY ARTILLERY. - The flak suppression plan, outlined in the 40th Division Artillery Command Report for the month of June, was used in conjunction with all air strikes during the period and was successful in reducing the time between the time of impact of the flak suppression rounds and the first run of the attacking aircraft from 6 or 7 minutes to a maximum of slightly more than two minutes. The plan was adopted as standing operating procedure, and published in written form on 18 July with one revision. The original plan directed that the mosquito send the fighter bombers away from the target on a pre-determined course during the fixing of the flak-suppression. It was decided that the timing necessary in turning them back to the target was too complicated, consequently the revised plan directs that the fighter bombers orbit at 8000 feet on the side of the target away from the friendly artillery.

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SOURCE: Command Report IX Corps, Bk I

DATE: June 1952

Source No 580

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FRIENDLY EQUIPMENT IN HANDS OF ENEMY. - In the I Corps sector a group of 12 enemy were observed wearing the recently tested armored vests, and it was presumed that, having captured some of the experimental vests, hostile forces were themselves testing the armor.

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PORTABLE SHOWER UNIT FOR COMPANY SIZE UNITS. - Shower units presently issued are large, costly, and usually located in rear area where there are large troop concentrations. These facilities are normally not readily available to company size units, and men either bathe in streams or construct make-shift showers.

A portable shower unit of four-head size packaged in a kit not larger than a foot-locker with a heating element optional, depending on the theater of operations, will satisfy the bathing needs of a company size unit.

It is recommended that such a shower unit be included in all company T/O&E, to be controlled by regiment for flexibility of use and to relieve the subordinate unit of administrative requirements.

* * *

(RESTRICTED)

INSULATING TAPE FOR WIRE SPLICES. - Insulating tape for wire splices is issued in quantities based on the amount of wire drawn. In a static situation such a basis for issue is not practical, for wire lines remain in place and tape is used for repair of broken lines rather than for the installation of new wire.

It is recommended that a new basis for issue of insulating tape be made, based on the above experience.

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SYSTEM FOR LOCATING HOSTILE BATTERIES. - During the month of May the 2d Division Artillery refined and further developed the use of all agencies for locating hostile batteries. It is recommended that the details of such a system be incorporated in the courses of instruction at The Artillery School and in appropriate manuals.

When the first hostile round falls, the air OP's are notified by the most expeditious means available (usually a battalion FDC radio) giving the grid square of impact. The air OP immediately checks areas known to have housed enemy pieces in the past. If he sees a piece, he immediately undertakes a fire mission.

In the meantime, all ground OP's are alerted to report sound azimuths and look for signs of smoke or dust from muzzle blast. The counter-mortar radar is also alerted.

Although the AN/TPQ3 radar used in Korea cannot locate artillery pieces, it is capable of getting a "fix" on an artillery projectile in flight. By polar plotting this fix and the point of impact a ray of satisfactory accuracy can be drawn on the hostile battery chart. Occasionally two "fixes" will be obtained on the same projectile. This gives a good ray on the chart.

Infantry counterfire platoons are very helpful in locating hostile batteries, as well as mortars. In the same way, sound bases of the field artillery observation battalion were quite helpful. Frequently, before they had accurately located a hostile piece they had obtained an accurate azimuth but only an approximate range. This azimuth was used on the hostile battery chart.

Narrowly defined suspected areas, taken from the hostile battery chart, which should be a map scale 1:25,000, were given to the air OP's for surveillance. Another method for using the air OP's was to have them fly on an azimuth reported by a ground OP. This particular method in one instance resulted in locating an entire battalion of enemy artillery.

The success of the program depends to a larger measure on the aggressiveness of battalion S-2's in seeking accurate and prompt information from all observers. He must make every effort to coordinate with units to the flank of the division in order to extend the length of the base available for using the intersection method for locating enemy pieces.

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A device used successfully as an extra compass consisted of a board on which was drawn a circle graduated in mils with a mark every one hundred mils. An easily identified terrain feature was also marked on the circle. A wooden arrow pivoted on a nail was used as an indicator. The board could quickly be oriented and the operator only had to point the arrow in the direction of the sound of a hostile gun to obtain a usable sound azimuth. This device was used at battery outposts, which were too numerous to be equipped with normal issue instruments.

SOURCE: Command Report - 45th Infantry Division

DATE: April 1952

Source No 581

(RESTRICTED)

RELIEVING UNIT FILES. - An SOP was established during the period whereby each infantry regiment, separate battalion, separate company, and technical service will maintain "Relieving Unit Files." These files are to contain all the information which might be required by a relieving unit in effecting an orderly, expeditious, efficient, and secure relief.

OCAFF Comment: In a stabilized situation where reliefs are routine this is an excellent practice and of real assistance to the relieving unit. It can be practiced with benefit in the smallest-sized unit.

SOURCE: Command Report - 8th Army EUSAK

DATE: April 1952

Source No 582

(RESTRICTED)

DISCRETIONARY ISSUE OF TELEPHONE TP-9 TO AAA AW (SP) BATTALIONS. - a. Discussion: The subordinate units of an AAA AW (SP) battalion in direct support of a division are frequently spread over a wide area. The wire provided for divisional units is the standard field wire, W-110, capable of transmitting from eleven to seventeen miles. The EE-8 telephone now authorized is not adequate to carry conversations to all the batteries. At times, radio is the only means of communication to the subordinate units. In this connection, administrative matters often tend to interfere with tactical messages. The telephone TP-9 would facilitate wire communications, as wire messages between the battalion headquarters and subordinate units are often routed through the division artillery headquarters.

b. Recommendation: That two telephones, TP-9 be included in the T/O&E of a direct support AAA AW (SP) battalion (44-75N), and the T/O&E of the headquarters battery of such unit (44-76N).

That one telephone be used in the S-2 and S-3 sections; the other to be used in the S-1 and S-4 sections.

That this equipment be issued as discretionary items limited to OCUS WAB TOC, in view of the fact that the present need for TP-9 telephones is not a continuing one.

ISSUE OF TENTAGE TO ARMY AVIATION SECTIONS FOR AIR-CRAFT MAINTENANCE. - a. Discussion: It is required that aircraft maintenance inspections (pre-flight, post-flight, intermediate, major, and special) be performed by units in the field. The maintenance involved is very difficult in extremely cold and wet weather. The present necessity of performing maintenance during the hours of daylight reduces aircraft operating time during the short winter days. A tent, fire-resistant, maintenance, would permit maintenance work on aircraft during the hours of darkness and would provide a dry, protected space for the storage of tools and equipment.

b. Recommendation: That a tent, fire-resistant, maintenance, be made an item of issue to each division, division artillery, or other aviation section authorized a base tool set.

OCAFF Comment: Military characteristics for a two-man aircraft maintenance shelter have been developed. No existing tent or shelter is suitable. A shelter which meets the MC's is being developed, and when found suitable, will be recommended for standardization and issue.

REPLACEMENT OF BULL BLADES BY ANGLE BLADES ON DOZERS. - a. Discussion: From the experience gained by Engineer combat battalions in operations, it is felt that all dozers should be equipped with angle blades. There are very few jobs for which the bull blade is superior to the angle blade. On the other hand, there are many jobs for which the angle blade is far superior to the bull blade. The side hill cut is probably the most common of these typical angle blade jobs. In this theater, over 50 per cent of the length of all roads built has been side hill cut.

b. Recommendation: That all dozers of Engineer combat battalions be equipped with angle blades in place of bull blades now standard equipment.

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ADDITIONAL TYPEWRITER FOR FIELD ARTILLERY SERVICE BATTERIES. - a. Discussion: The addition to the T/O&E of field artillery service batteries of one typewriter, portable with carrying case, for use by the motor maintenance parts clerk would considerably facilitate the operation of the battalion motor maintenance section. The expeditious preparation of the information for requisitions, turn-in slips, and work orders to the battalion supply section requires the use of a typewriter by the motor maintenance parts clerk. Immediate and easy access by the parts clerk to typewriters of the battalion supply section is frequently not the case in normal operations.

b. Recommendation: That one typewriter, portable with carrying case, be added to the T/O&E of the service battery of all field artillery battalions.

CHANGES TO AR 260-10 AND SR 600-60-1. - a. Discussion: It is essential, both from the consideration of the recorded history of a unit and from the esprit de corps of its personnel, that the provisions of par 12, AR 260-10 pertaining to organizational colors and par 17, SR 600-60-1 pertaining to distinctive unit insignia be modified so as to place Engineer groups on the same basis as Engineer regiments.

It is true that the group type of unit was the outgrowth of the rage for flexibility in World War II. The bulk of the Engineer groups, however, actually performed as regiments with very limited change of units. At present, practically every large Engineer unit is organized as a group, but operates as a regiment, with continuity of subordinate units and integration of administration and operations. The group is generally as large, or larger, than a regiment; consequently, there are more personnel whose sense of "belonging to a unit" should be strengthened.

The time for recognizing this situation is long overdue. Engineer regiments appear to be units of the past, at least on paper. Their traditions, colors, and heritage, in many instances, have descended upon mere battalions; others have disappeared into archives. Where these regiments continue as numbered groups, nothing perpetuates them except a three by four diagonal white and red woolen bunting with inscribed Arabic numerals. (See par 12, AR 206-10.)

An Engineer group in Korea at present is an excellent example. This unit (previously designated as a regiment) was inactive from after World War I to 1940 at which time it was reactivated. In the midst of the active .

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Italian campaign in 1945, it was redesignated as an Engineer combat group. The group continued its active status ever since, and was stationed at a post in the zone of the interior from the end of World War II until its coming to Korea in 1950.

There seems no logical reason why this unit, and others with similar histories, should not retain all of the traditions, honors, records, and colors of the regiments as once designated. The only bar to such continuity lies in a short paragraph in AR 260-10. A minor deletion would result in applicable units gaining an unlimited measure of pride and spirit.

b. Recommendation: That the provisions of par 12, AR 260-10 pertaining to organizational colors and par 17, SR 600-60-1 pertaining to distinctive insignia be modified so as to place Engineer groups on the same basis as Engineer regiments.

INCREASE OF CAPACITY OF AIR COMPRESSORS. - a. Discussion: The present capacity of air compressors is insufficient.

b. Recommendation: That the capacity of air compressors be increased to 210 CFM.

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTION ON GENERAL PURPOSE VEHICLE OPERATION AND DRIVER MAINTENANCE. - a. Discussion: Experience has shown that personnel do not possess sufficient general knowledge of the operation and driver maintenance of general purpose vehicles.

b. Recommendation: That basic training of all recruits include additional instruction on general purpose vehicle operation and driver maintenance.

SOURCE: Command Report - 17th FA Bn

DATE: July 1952

Source No 583

(RESTRICTED)

CONSTRUCTION OF BUNKERS. - The battalion's intensive ditching and drainage program, begun in June, proved eminently successful, enabling the unit to withstand the severe rains late in July with no flooding of

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positions or damage to equipment. In spite of heavy construction, however a number of bunkers were weakened by the rain and had to be abandoned. This was primarily due to use of sandbags to support the weight of the bunker roof. Bunkers are being rebuilt wherever necessary by using heavy posts as supporting members. It was learned that without exception no structural member in a construction should rest on a sand bag - vertical posts must be used.

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CLEANING BRUSH FOR 8-IN HOW. - The standard 8-inch howitzer bore cleaning brush is not large enough to clean the powder chamber of the howitzer satisfactorily. It is recommended that a cleaning brush eight and one-half inches in diameter be developed for this purpose.

SOURCE: Command Report - 82d Armored Field Artillery

DATE: July 1952

Source No 584

(RESTRICTED)

BOMBING OF ENEMY OP BY L-19. - On 13 July 1952, one of the 92d L-19's equipped with two bomb racks with two 100 lb bombs, bombed an enemy OP with considerable damage.

OCAFF Comment: Bomb racks are standard equipment for L-19 aircraft and are intended primarily for resupply, wire laying, flare dropping, and similar missions. Bombing is possible, but involves a calculated risk, usually not justifiable for the unarmed and unarmored Army aircraft.

SOURCE: Command Report - 5th Inf Regt

DATE: July 1952

Source No 585

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ENEMY TACTICS. - In the defensive employment of his mortars, the enemy twice demonstrated a distinctive pattern. Two night raids conducted against his positions by elements of the 2d Battalion resulted in

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almost identical reactions. The enemy withheld his small arms fire until our forces were on the verge of over-running his positions. He then placed an intense concentration of 82-mm mortar fire on his own trenches and bunkers. His infantry firing from the protection of the heavily covered bunkers, was not particularly endangered.

SOURCE: Command Report - 40th Inf Div, ACOFS, G-1

DATE: March 1952

Source No 586

(RESTRICTED)

RETURNEE TREATMENT. - Attempts are being made at the present time to dispel the attitude currently held apparently in all replacement elements with which this division has had contact i. e., an attitude that individuals being processed for outshipment deserve nothing and hence are to be herded as groups of cattle. It is believed that these people who have made many sacrifices and served under fire and in many cases carry the scars of battle should be treated with honor and decency and be provided with those comforts that are and can be made available. It is inconceivable that personnel should be given less.

SOURCE: Command Report -45th Inf Div, ACOFS, G-2

DATE: April 1952

Source No 587

(RESTRICTED)

SECURITY PROCEDURES IN COMBAT. - Throughout the division, as well as in the section, the handling and preparation of classified material for transmission continued to be a problem. Lack of envelopes made it impossible to comply with the provision of AR 380-5 to the effect that material classified higher than RESTRICTED must be double-enveloped for transmission. There is a tremendous amount of classified material in circulation all the time in a combat situation. For this reason and in the interests of supply economy, a radical modification of AR 380-5 to meet the realities of operations in the field is deemed to be in order.

A lot of time had to be devoted to processing requests from officer replacements for clearance for access to classified material. A great amount of material and information handled in the field is classified SECRET. It is recommended that a NAC should be run on every officer

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in the army and SECRET clearances granted. This would save a lot of effort in the field. Further, no one who is a security risk should be an officer in the army.

SOURCE: Command Report - Eighth United States Army Korea

DATE: March 1952

Source No 588

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NAPALM ROCKET HEADS. - During March EUSAK Chemical personnel experimented with several types of napalm rocket heads. A 2.25-inch aerial rocket, fired from an inverted monorail, was used as the propellant force for the napalm heads. Varying results were obtained, with the latest tested 3.5-gallon head giving the most consistent results. The fuse and firing chain has been consistently good throughout. The consensus of observers is that with precise construction a balanced napalm rocket head of this size with a 300-1000 yard range could be attained which would give consistent and accurate results. Such a rocket, light enough in weight to be fired from forward positions in rugged terrain is very much desired in this theater.

SOURCE: Command Report - 38th FA Bn

DATE: July 1952

Source No 589

(RESTRICTED)

GRID TARGETS. - The present target grid being used by this battalion is considered to be larger than necessary for the great majority of missions fired. The disadvantage of the larger size is that missions being fired by two different observers in the same target area are difficult to handle on one firing chart. The overlapping target grids cause difficulty in plotting shifts. It is only in extremely rare cases that the observer shifts more than 750 to 1000 yards from initial data. It is recommended that a target grid of diameter of 2000 yards be used or that the present target grid be made of transparent material.

SOURCE: Command Report - 82d AAA AW Bn(SP)

DATE: July 1952

Source No 590

(RESTRICTED)

INDIRECT FIRE WITH M16. - a. Two platoons of the battalion were employed in close support of the infantry regiments. Each platoon has tracks both in direct and indirect-fire positions. The infantry has requested the majority of fire missions to be fired from the indirect-fire positions. Indirect-fire missions have been executed at varying ranges up to 7,200 yards which is rated as the maximum horizontal range of the caliber .50 machine gun. On one occasion at this range some 8,000 to 10,000 rounds were fired on an enemy held ridge, and the infantry reported that the fire covered the desired area and was effective. There is no standard or approved method for delivering indirect fire from the M16 mount. No means is provided to lay the piece either in azimuth or in elevation. The battalion commander, and staff have designed a system of indirect fire and improvised the necessary range deflection fans and other equipment for a platoon Fire Direction Center. An improvised azimuth scale has been painted on the base of the M45 turret so that deflections can be set. Only five gunners quadrants are issued to a self-propelled battalion and for effective indirect fire each fire unit must have quadrant to set elevation. Machine-gun clinometers, which are in reality small gunners quadrants, were borrowed from the supported infantry regiments so that each fire unit had the means to set elevation accurately. The system as designed by the battalion commander has proven to be entirely satisfactory. There are, however, a few small details to be ironed out. As a result of experience during this report period it has been determined that effective fire can be delivered from the M16 using indirect-fire methods.

b. During the present operation one platoon has been placed in direct support of each of the front line infantry regiments. The battery commanders and the platoon leaders have established a close liaison with supported infantry units to insure that proper supporting fires are provided. However, it is believed that it would be more satisfactory to have fire units with the infantry in an attached status. There would be closer coordination and better teamwork. Many of the problems of supply, mess and ammunition would be more satisfactorily solved. In the close support role since the fires are for the infantry and are a part of the infantry fire plan, it is believed that the infantry should have control. This attached status is mutually beneficial to the infantry and the antiaircraft automatic weapons.

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c. Recommendations:

(1) It is recommended that a standard, uniform method of indirect fire be established for the M16's. The mounts should have an azimuth scale for deflection settings, and the necessary quadrants should be issued for setting elevation.

(2) It is further recommended that fire units whose mission it is to support infantry elements be attached and not placed in direct support.

OCAFF Comment: Reference recommendation contained in par 1, see comment under Source No 602.

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M39'S FOR EVACUATION. - M39's, armored utility vehicle, have been used extensively in battlefield evacuation of the wounded. These vehicles were requested for operation in the sector of the 23d Infantry Regiment. Three to four M39's, with crews, have operated on a daily 24-hour schedule. Although their primary mission has been battlefield evacuation, they have been used to carry necessary items of equipment and personnel to places which are otherwise inaccessible or difficult to reach.

SOURCE: Command Report - 7th Div Arty

DATE: May 1952

Source No 591

(CONFIDENTIAL)

INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL. - At the present time the artillery battalion S-2 section consists of the S-2 and one Master Sergeant. The driver for the S-3 is furnished by the survey section. It is recommended that one Corporal be authorized as an assistant to the intelligence Sergeant, and one Private First Class as a full-time driver for the S-2. During combat operations, it is often necessary for the section to function long hours. Furthermore, with one noncommissioned officer in the section, it would suffer greatly in the event of the loss of the intelligence Sergeant without an adequately trained assistant to assume his duties. The need for a full-time driver is justified due to the extensive travel necessary to be performed by the S-2 in the proper performance of his duties. The present practice of using a driver from the survey section is detrimental to the efficiency of that section.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 37th FA Bn

DATE: July 1952

Source No 592

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RECOMMENDATIONS.

- a. That artillery always precede infantry into position during relief regardless of any sacrifice of security.
- b. That an extreme effort be made not to change radio frequencies during a relief unless it is absolutely necessary.
- c. That consideration be given to the training of additional field artillery communications officers.
- d. That a study be made of the device called "Jeep-a-Trench", used in civilian life to place water pipes below frost-line. This device operates on power take-off of 1/4-ton vehicle. This would greatly aid in digging trench to lay underground telephone cables.

SOURCE: Command Report - 40th Infantry Division

DATE: June 1952

Source No 593

(RESTRICTED)
BULLDOZER FOR ORDNANCE. - Movement into the new area pointed up a definite need for bulldozers of the D-4 or D-6 size for preparation of the storage and shop areas required for efficient operation. It is strongly recommended that a D-4 or D-6 bulldozer be added to the T/O&E equipment of the division Ordnance maintenance company.

* * *

(RESTRICTED)
METHODS OF TAKING PRISONERS. - In order to maintain the flow of information, as required by IX Corps TWX, 10 June 1952, planning was instituted at all levels for company raiding operations with the primary objective of seizing Prisoners of War, each regiment undertaking the execution of one such raid every third night. Raids were planned in detail by regimental S-2 and S-3 sections and coordinated by G3 to include

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diversionary activity to be conducted by adjacent regiments and artillery. In all cases the operations were conducted without prior artillery preparation, to take advantage of the element of surprise insofar as possible.

An analysis of the operations conducted indicated that the results obtained were not in keeping with the hazards involved. In order to insure the contact necessary, raiding parties were forced to probe more deeply into enemy territory than was feasible with this size force and sustained casualties incongruous with the resulting information. In an attempt to lessen the number of casualties and still obtain the desired results, two solutions were presented: (1) the mounting of limited objective attacks in sufficient force to enable the attacking force to hold the positions gained for twenty-four hours or more, eliminating the necessity for hasty withdrawal and the resulting casualties; or (2) the accomplishment of the mission by small, carefully selected and trained groups employing stealth. Both schemes were studied and plans were produced for battalion sized, limited objective attacks and for the formation and training of volunteer raiding forces. The division was alerted for relief by the 2d ROK Division before these plans were implemented.

SOURCE: Command Report - 14th Infantry Regiment

DATE: July 1952

Source No 594

(RESTRICTED)

PLASTIC MESS TRAYS. - Reports on plastic mess trays indicate they are desirable but will have a high replacement factor as compared to meat cans.

SOURCE: Command Report - 27th Infantry Regiment

DATE: July 1952

Source No 595

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PLASTIC MESS TRAY. - The entire regiment continued the experimental use of the new plastic mess trays with the majority of reports indicating preference over the meat can.

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SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corps Artillery

DATE: July 1952

Source No 596

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REQUEST FOR LARGER DOZER THAN D-4 BULLDOZER. - Operations in the past few months and particularly during the rainy season have re-emphasized the need of a larger type bulldozer in the corps artillery battalions. The D-4 bulldozer, which would ordinarily be satisfactory under normal conditions, does not have the power to perform work that is required in the difficult terrain encountered here in Korea. Due to the heavier work required and the continuous use of the D-4 bulldozer by the units, the maintenance problem has increased tremendously. Breakdowns have caused delay in work and a decrease in the efficiency of the units. It is strongly recommended that each medium and heavy artillery battalion be authorized a larger bulldozer in place of the D-4 bulldozers that are presently issued.

SOURCE: Command Report - 8th Army (EUSAK), Sec I

DATE: May 1952

Source No 597

(RESTRICTED)

BULK AUTHORIZATION UNITS FOR LOGISTICAL COMMANDS. - It has been found that every logistical command, regardless of theater, has experienced and will continue to experience peculiar operating conditions. It is practically impossible for planners of troops bases to foresee with any degree of accuracy the multiplicity of responsibilities continually being placed on logistical commands. The commander of a logistical command should be given an organization of sufficient flexibility to allow the exercise of control commensurate with responsibilities. A bulk authorization, in addition to T/O&E and T/D units, would be highly desirable and should provide the required flexibility. For proper supervision, control of bulk authorization spaces should be retained by the army commander, and be utilized for the logistical support in consonance with the over-all Army mission.

Recommendation: That, in addition to T/O&E and T/D units, the composition of each technical service attached to a logistical command include a bulk authorization unit amounting in strength to 10 per cent of the total personnel required to perform the mission of that service.

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That such 10 per cent bulk authorization consist of both officer and enlisted personnel possessing grades and ratings in proportions representative of the general experience of the technical service concerned.

That the bulk personnel be assigned for administration to a single general service unit of the technical service concerned.

That the Army commander should retain control of bulk authorization spaces (in order to augment existing units or to form provisional units) and utilize them for logistical command support consistent with the over-all Army mission.

SOURCE: Command Report - 3d Div Arty

DATE: June 1952

Source No 598

(RESTRICTED)

ARMY AIRCRAFT - AIR FORCE COMMUNICATION. - It is recommended that a VHF channel be assigned to the division artillery aircraft to enable the Army aircraft to contact the Air Force Mosquito plane or any fighter aircraft in the air in the absence of a Mosquito plane. Often Army aircraft must be used to point out targets or pass on intelligence to an Air Force plane in the air. The relaying of information through fire support control center has led to loss of valuable time and to possible confusion in passing information through another agency. If this VHF frequency were assigned to the Army aircraft, it would be beneficial to the Air Force as well as the Army by a saving of aircraft fuel, reducing the time of exposure to enemy flak, and making air strikes more immediate.

OCAFF Comment: Army aircraft assigned tactical units in overseas theaters are equipped with crystals to operate on the established combat scene of action frequency (SR 105-150-10)(2 Feb 51). Utilization of this frequency permits direct communication between Army aircraft and Air Force Mosquito and fighter aircraft.

SOURCE: Command Report - 180th Infantry Regiment

DATE: June 1952

Source No 599

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SQUAD TRAINING. - It is apparent that rifle squads need more training in order to more highly perfect them as fighting units. It is felt

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too large a percentage of time is spent on platoon and company training at the expense of the training of smaller units. After a squad is well-trained it takes very little time to weld the platoon into a fighting unit. If the squad is brought to a high degree of efficiency before platoon training is begun, the platoon training will be more effective and will be accomplished in a much shorter time.

OCAFF Comment: Leaders must be impressed with their responsibility for constant supervision of actions of their unit in all training exercises. The fact that a platoon or company exercise is being conducted does not change the requirement or lessen the responsibility of the squad leader for the proper employment of his unit or for the proper actions of individual soldiers in the unit. Where a training deficiency is found to exist the leader is afforded an excellent opportunity to correct errors in any unit training exercise. The training program must be appropriately balanced to attain the objective of a trained fighting team.

SOURCE: Command Report - 3d AAA AW Bn(SP)

DATE: May 1952

Source No 600

(RESTRICTED)

40-MM, HE, MARK II AMMUNITION FOR AAA BATTALION. - Recommend that units of this type be issued 40-mm, HE Mark II ammo with 6,000 yard tracer burn-out element, the issue to comprise 43 per cent of total basic load with the balance made up of the standard type (3,800 yard burn-out) presently issued. This stock would amount to 160 rounds per M19 to be used for infantry support and assault fire missions, one of the principal methods of employment of antiaircraft artillery organic to the infantry division. This recommendation is based upon the following reasons:

a. Increased depth of coverage. Ground targets up to 6,000 yards could be engaged effectively.

b. Avoid harassment of front line troops. At present, targets of opportunity are engaged from firing positions on the MLR to get the maximum benefit of the 3,800 yard limitation. The presence of these weapons in their midst has proved harassing to front line troops because of the threat of being caught in return fire. The use of longer range ammo would permit emplacement of weapons to the rear of front line elements without sacrificing the ability to engage targets of opportunity on the enemy MLR.

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c. Permit the development of indirect-fire techniques. By utilization of the increased range, gun sites with a "piece mask" defilade may be selected from which weapons may be fired indirectly using an OP for control. The maximum ordinate of the trajectory increases sizeably between 3,800 and 6,000 yards range, thereby reducing the problem of flattened trajectory in developing these techniques.

OCAFF Comment: Though a 6000 yard tracer may be desirable, it is not essential. The DA is now taking action to reduce the types of ammunition being produced and under development. A 6000 yard tracer requires a new round of ammunition, which cannot be justified in light of DA action towards reduction. Furthermore, replacement of the 3800 yard tracer with the recommended tracer is not acceptable from the AA viewpoint because of the range limitation for AA engagements.

SOURCE: Command Report - IX Corps

DATE: May 1952

Source No 601

(RESTRICTED)

PROBLEM OF CHEVRONS CREATED BY CLOTHING EXCHANGE.

The practice of clothing exchange in forward combat areas has become common and is the accepted solution to the problem of providing clean clothing to the troops. One shortcoming of the clothing exchange system is the necessity for the removing and sewing on of enlisted men's chevrons of rank. There is a noticeable lack of initiative on the part of combat soldiers to keep on hand the requisite needles, thread, and replacement chevrons to accomplish the sewing of their chevrons after each clothing exchange. The few soldiers that attempt the job often obtain results that are not conducive to high military standards of appearance.

Some soldiers have solved this difficulty by painting the chevrons on their caps. This is contrary to good military practice as the markings are not uniform, obviously makeshift, and unbecoming in appearance. Hand-made metal devices are being fashioned and worn by the troops; miniature metal insignia are being manufactured by indigenous personnel for local sale.

It is believed that a realistic attitude should be taken toward this problem and immediate action be initiated to provide metal or plastic cap

chevron devices. Cost consciousness dictates the move from the standpoint of the savings that can be effected by using a metal or plastic cap piece in lieu of the numerous cloth chevrons needed for replacement necessitated by "clothing exchange."

It is estimated that the cost of the cap insignia made from metal or plastic with clutch fasteners would be less than the cost of two sets of cloth chevrons.

Recommend that enlisted men be furnished metal or plastic cap insignia designating rank, to be worn while on duty in combat areas.

OCAFF Comment: OCAFF has recommended to The Quartermaster General the adoption of a cap insignia of rank.

SOURCE: Command Report - 145th AAA AW Bn(SP)

DATE: June 1952

Source No 602

(RESTRICTED)

LIGHT AA RECOMMENDATION.

a. That the AA&GM Branch, The Artillery School evolve and teach a standard method of indirect fire for the M16.

b. That each firing battery be issued a barrel gauge for their own machine-gun barrels. This would permit determination on the spot whether or not barrels are safe for overhead fire. It would eliminate much handling of barrels. The threads on the barrel are subject to damage in handling.

c. That a mitten be issued that is capable of withstanding greater temperature than the present asbestos mitten now issued for the purpose of changing hot barrels.

OCAFF Comment: Reference par 1, change 1 to FM 44-2, now being processed for publication, includes the indirect fire procedure for AAA AW weapons.

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SOURCE: Letter, Hq I Corps to Chief, AFF

DATE: 19 June 1952

Source No 603

(SECRET)
DEFENSE AGAINST MASS ATTACK

GENERAL

This paper is a listing and brief explanation of the lessons learned in Korea regarding defenses against the Soviet type mass attack as executed by the Chinese Communist Forces and the North Korean Army. These lessons are believed to be timely and important to all levels of command in the Army because the Korean experience is the first in which American forces have ever dealt with such attacks, and, what is more important, in any future combat with communist forces anywhere similar actions undoubtedly will be encountered over and over. The narrative record of the "Communist Fifth Phase Offensive, April 1951," assembled and published by I US Corps, contains the facts from which most of these lessons are drawn. It will be noted that nothing new or radical is suggested here as a solution to the problem, but rather, that once the characteristics of the mass attacks are understood and well known defensive tactics are applied, common sense and a cool head are all that is needed to defeat such attacks.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MASS ATTACK

It is obvious that the communist high command clearly recognizes the validity of the ancient military principle of mass, and that in Korea it has been executed in terms of men rather than firepower only because manpower has been abundant while firepower has been relatively weak. In Korea, the communists have learned through bitter experience that not only are human mass attacks unlikely to succeed against a modern army, but also that even they cannot afford the tremendous expenditure of manpower that such attacks require. They are working desperately to modernize their armies, both Soviet and Chinese, in order to avoid reliance mainly upon numbers of men, and we may be assured that when they do succeed they will still understand the use of mass as a principle and will translate it into firepower and armored shock forces. This study deals only with the "human sea" use of mass.

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The mass attack is executed on a large scale. The attack against the I US Corps in April 1951 was executed by a total of eight CCF Armies and one North Korean Corps - 26 enemy divisions - on a 65 mile front. At the point of the main effort, there were two army groups in column.

The troops are assembled in rear of the line of contact, but within less than 24 hours marching distance. The concentration is effected at the latest possible time in order to increase the chances of gaining surprise. The units then march rapidly into contact in close formations using every possible route. On 22d of April 1951, air observers on the corps front reported enemy columns coming down "every road, path, and ridge line, two, three, and four abreast, as far as the eye can see."

Once movement is begun, the attack is pressed forward with complete disregard for losses. The idea is to pour humanity against our defenses faster than it is possible to destroy it. Although the carnage in such an attack is appalling, the method is effective if the attacker is willing to pay the price. One Soviet general, when asked after World War II, the secret of his offensive success, is reported to have said, in substance, "I simply expend one or more second or third class armies against the point where the breakthrough is desired until it is overrun. Then I send in a first class army to exploit the break and win the battle."

PLAN OF DEFENSE

In order to defeat a mass attack, the plan for the defense must be directed toward two major accomplishments: Destruction of the mass and delivery of a counterblow. There are three main phases of the battle. First consists of efforts by all intelligence agencies to locate the mass and the initial destructive measures taken against it before ground contact is made; second is the destruction of the mass at the line of contact, repeated if necessary on successive lines of contact; third is the launching of the counteroffensive in order to exploit the situation to the maximum.

PHASE I - LOCATION AND INITIAL DESTRUCTION

The assembly of a truly great mass of troops is virtually impossible to achieve undetected. The inherent unwieldiness of a large concentration prevents rapid assembly, and its size makes it impossible to hide. All means of intelligence therefore, have a large and easily located target to find and ample time to report it. Usually in Korea, initial intelligence indications of a major enemy offensive begin to appear as much as two to

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three weeks in advance. Actual sightings of the assembling troop column are made from 48 to 72 hours in advance. With our recent rapid development of mass destruction weapons, it becomes more important than ever for theater and Army intelligence to be on the alert for troop build-ups in rear areas. Early location of such targets may allow us to emasculate the power of the amassed strength before it can move to contact. For detailed information as to what is required to accomplish this, and what might have been done from a practical viewpoint, based on actual situations in Korea up to January 1951, see ORO-R-2(FEC) "Tactical Employment of Atomic Weapons," 1 March 1951.

Application of firepower should begin immediately upon observation of these targets. It is at this point that tactical atomic bombs and all means of tactical air attack should be used to the maximum. Atomic artillery can be used profitably on distant massed targets, with conventional artillery taking up the task as the human sea moves in.

In Korea, the technique of using radar controlled bombing against these masses has proven to be highly successful. The B-29 carrying forty 500 pound bombs with VT fuse has been used repeatedly with outstanding success. This method of attack against a massed enemy can be employed from the distant location of the original sightings up to within 1000 yards of our own troops. Such bomb drops have been made at night as close as 600 yards of our own positions. Pressure on the enemy mass should be maintained day and night with every weapon available in an attempt to destroy it before it reaches the main line of resistance. This will always be difficult to achieve, however, because the enemy will take every possible advantage of terrain, weather, and darkness to move in undetected.

PHASE II - CLOSE COMBAT

As the assault of the mass begins, the weight of defensive firepower must reach its maximum. Here the defensive efficiency of the main line of resistance receives its acid test. At points along the line where artillery and mortar defensive fires are properly located and adjusted, where the tactical wire is laid in many bands and along the final protective lines of the automatic weapons, where anti-personnel land mines (to include napalm fougasse mines) are sown thickly, where all types of weapons are positioned to be brought to bear (tanks, recoilless weapons, rocket launchers), where hand grenades are plentiful and handy in the fighting holes, where battlefield illumination is well planned and

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carefully executed, where communications are correctly laid to keep functioning in combat, where commanders are in their observation posts and can see and control the fires, and where the soldiers are well trained, know their business, and are a determined, well-led lot, the human sea may be stopped. Time-on-target concentrations with VT fuse may be brought down on our own position areas when the enemy begins to break through our tactical wire. Friendly troops in fortifications which have proper overhead cover have been found to be quite safe from such fire, while this same fire is extremely effective on the enemy. Our own infantry weapons continue to fire from covered positions while the VT fuse artillery is falling. This technique has broken some very determined local attacks, but has not been used against the large mass to date due to the enemy's reluctance to launch such attacks in recent months.

No defensive line however, was ever perfect or invulnerable at all points. The human sea may be stopped at the strongest points along the line, but the weaker places will inevitably be overrun and the human sea will begin to flow through the cracks in the wall. It is at this stage of the game that the commander has an extremely difficult decision to make. He must keep his units defending on line as long as possible, until the maximum price has been paid by the enemy for possession of the ground, but at the same time, if he keeps them there too long, they will be engulfed - overrun or surrounded by the human sea. In order to make this decision, he must have communications that function under all conditions.

There is a certain school of thought on the subject of defense whose "doctrine" is "defend at all costs at all times." Blind adherence to this idea in the face of a mass attack would be disastrous. The overrunning of our combat units is the whole object of the mass attack. The commander who stubbornly "defends the Alamo" on position is playing into the enemy's hands and will be isolated and defeated piecemeal. Retreating in panic is, of course, even worse. To win the battle, two things must be done. The highest possible cost in losses must be levied from the enemy before the position is abandoned. Then, and then only, contact must be broken, a rapid preplanned and orderly withdrawal must be executed, and a previously prepared defense position to the rear occupied. The defense of the infantry divisions must be flexible in order to retain the integrity of the forces in the face of this juggernaut of humanity. Blocking positions must be planned to limit initial local penetrations, local sharp counterattacks to be launched at critical times by tank-infantry teams must be planned and executed.

The advantage gained by constructing fortified positions to the rear is obvious since there will not be time to do so in the heat of battle. The

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distance from one position to the next is governed mainly by the terrain. Each position must be on the most natural line of defense. However, there is a limit to how far back that position can be located profitably. It should be far enough back to force the enemy to move his supporting artillery, but not so far that our own artillery cannot keep the enemy under continuous fire during the withdrawal. In other words, contact is broken by the infantry with its organic weapons from one defensive position to the next, but is never broken as far as the artillery and close air support fire is concerned. Whether or not attrition on the mass will be sufficient to permit launching of the counteroffensive on the first position, the second position or the fifth or sixth, is dependent upon the equation of many variables, i. e., the efficiency of intelligence in detecting and reporting the mass, the efficiency of communications, the efficiency of our long range killing weapons in reducing it before contact and the efficiency of our infantry defensive positions are balanced against the density and size of the mass, its speed of movement and the strength of its supporting weapons.

If the "fight and roll" defense is well executed, it then becomes inevitable that the surge of the mass will be broken sooner or later. Units will be decimated, command and control channels lost and equipment gone. The mass becomes a straggling, chaotic mixture of the remnants of many broken units. When the Communist Fifth Phase Offensive was broken on Line GOLDEN just north of SEOUL, on the 3d and 4th of May 1951, prisoners from five different CCF Armies were captured in a two kilometer square area.

PHASE III - THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE

If the battle is to be decisive, when the enemy mass has disintegrated, the situation must be exploited fully. The commander who has been able to hold out a mobile striking force strong in armor during the destruction of the mass finds himself in an excellent position for he can deal a telling blow at his enemy's lowest ebb. For that reason it is of vital importance that the higher commander not commit his reserve unless he is forced to do so in order to save the integrity of his army. The more maneuver room he has, the more likely it will be that he can successfully husband his reserve by trading more space for enemy casualties and by being more deliberate in his reduction of the mass. If he does not have room to maneuver, he may well be overrun in any case.

Unfortunately there was no fresh reserve available in the Eighth Army to exploit the situation in May 1951. Every unit had been strained to the

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utmost before the tide was stemmed. Both infantrymen and artillerymen were exhausted from eight straight days of fighting and marching around the clock. A counteroffensive was mounted eventually but the communists were able to break contact before it began. Several days elapsed before contact was re-established many miles to the north. Had two fresh infantry divisions with their normal complement of tanks been available to spearhead the counteroffensive immediately by cutting deeply into the disorganized and retreating communists, the CCF forces in Korea might well have been destroyed.

SUMMARY

A Soviet type mass attack can be defeated by the organization of a flexible defense on successive lines so located that although infantry units break contact in going from one line to the next, artillery and air pressure is continuous. The defender must have mobility and efficient command control of his forces. He must have maneuvering space in which to conduct his "fight and roll" battle. If it is humanly possible to do so, a fresh mobile reserve of the maximum possible strength should be kept intact and not committed until the momentum of the surging mass is broken.

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Following is letter from Commandant, Army War College, and addendum prepared by Army War College on foregoing study.

ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

AIDW-C 352.01

28 October 1952

SUBJECT: Defense Against Mass Attack

TO: Chief of Army Field Forces
Fort Monroe, Virginia
ATTN: ACofS, G3

1. By letter dated 19 June 1952, the Commanding General, I Corps, forwarded to your headquarters a study entitled "Defense Against Mass Attack." Information copies were sent several service schools, including the Army War College.

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2. The I Corps study was read with interest and studied by the faculty of the Army War College, and an addendum to the study was prepared here, copies of which were forwarded to your office. An additional copy is inclosed.

3. The I Corps study provided an analytical evaluation of Soviet type mass attack techniques based upon the experiences of I Corps. However, in the interest of indoctrinating US Army forces in the best methods of overcoming such techniques on the part of Communist forces, it is believed that consideration should be given to the dissemination of the experiences of other Army units in combating such enemy techniques in Korea. The Army War College addendum to the I Corps study is but one of the accounts of other experiences by US forces in this field which should prove valuable in improving our own tactics and techniques.

1 Incl
Study, "Defense
Against Mass
Attack"

/s/ Edward M. Almond
/t/ EDWARD M. ALMOND
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Commandant

DEFENSE AGAINST MASS ATTACK

ADDENDUM

1. Possible misconceptions in the preceding text are clarified as follows:

a. The frequently used words "mass" and "human sea" strongly imply that the CCF attackers are an uncontrolled herd moving forward without direction or guidance. Such is not the case. Actually, each communist company or battalion has a definite objective and reserves are quickly diverted to take advantage of any local success or breakthrough. What does appear also to be the case, is that the large masses are rigid as to the general direction of effort and the system of supply implies great rigidity of movement.

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b. Logistics considerations play a critical part in the communist ability to continue the momentum of a general attack. Hence, supporting air effort must concentrate on troop concentrations in the battle area, and additionally on forward supply dumps and supply vehicles.

2. The second paragraph, Phase III - The Counteroffensive, states that "A counteroffensive was mounted eventually but the communists were able to break contact before it began." I Corps has been under attack for eight days, from 22 April to 30 April 1951. The above quote refers to the period between 30 April, when the communists broke off their attack against I Corps, and 2 May when I Corps advanced regimental sized patrol bases forward of the main defensive position to regain contact.


Counteraction against the second phase of the CCF spring offensive, launched against the X Corps on 16 May 1951, was significantly different. In the succeeding seven days, the communists employed five CCF armies and two NKPA corps in a supreme effort to destroy the 2d US Infantry Division and the six ROK divisions holding the line from the division right flank eastward to the Sea of Japan. By the second day, the CCF attack attained a major penetration through ROK units, caused the complete collapse of III ROK Corps as an effective fighting force, and necessitated that X Corps take over an additional area of responsibility on the right (east) flank. Notwithstanding this serious set-back, X Corps employed the "fight and roll" type of defense while rebuilding a refused right flank with available forces. By the fourth day, this type defense was combined with a program of limited counterattacks as feasible and as reserves became available, based on the concept that the key road center of Honchon must be held as a mounting area for the subsequent counterattack. See Map 1 (page 31) for the defensive phase of the action.

Although the Chinese continued to gain ground in the eastern portion of the enlarged X Corps sector as late as 23 May, the first 3d Inf Div RCT made available to X Corps from Eighth Army reserve was committed east of the 2d Div Flank on 19 May in a local counterattack that attained its objective. On 20 May, two regiments of the 2d Inf Div initiated local counterattacks to the northeast that gained about 4,000 yards despite strong enemy opposition and the fact that these units had been continuously engaged in bearing the brunt of the previous four days' attack. Additionally, on 20 May the second 3d Inf Div RCT to arrive from Army reserve was committed to a local counterattack that gained 3,000 yards.

By 21 May, the entire 3d Div had arrived in the X Corps zone and was in action, attacking to the north and northeast into the flank of the deep penetration on the eastern portion of the X Corps sector. In the western section, heavy but local attacks by fresh communist troops were stopped and beaten back with heavy enemy casualties. By evening of the 22d of May there was strong evidence that the momentum of the enemy attack had been effectively stopped and that the time to exploit the situation had arrived. Consequently, on 23 May the entire resources of the X Corps, three US Divisions, one airborne RCT (187th) and assorted remnants of ROK regiments, were thrown into a coordinated counter-attack to the north and northeast of Honchon despite the reported exhaustion and disorganization of some units. By dark on the 23d, it was evident that the course of the battle had taken a decisive turn and that the communists were in full flight. See Map 2 (page 32) for the counter-attack phase of the action. The subsequent defeat of the CCF forces was so decisive that no large scale offensive has since been attempted by the communists.

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
MAP 1

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MAP 2

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