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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
 FAR EAST COMMAND

COMMAND REPORT
 DECEMBER
 1950

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS AND FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

25 May 1951

This Command Report, prepared in accordance with instructions contained in Army Regulations 345-105, 3 October 1950, is an over-all coverage, from a headquarters viewpoint, of activities within General Headquarters, Far East Command and United Nations Command zone of responsibility during the period 1-31 December 1950. The report is essentially a summation of information contained in reports submitted by various staff sections of General Headquarters as well as Headquarters, Far East Air Forces and Commander Naval Forces Far East. These reports are appended as annexes to this report.

Classification of this report conforms to the security requirements set forth in Army Regulations 380-5, 15 November 1949. The over-all narrative report and certain of the supporting documents are classified "Top Secret" in order to include pertinent material relating to hostilities in Korea. An expiration date, providing for downgrading or declassification, is held in abeyance.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

DOYLE O. HICKEY
Major General, General Staff Corps
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:



K. B. BUSH
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

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COMMAND REPORT
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
December 1950

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

December 1950 saw United Nations (UN) troops driven completely from northeastern Korea and forced back along the Pyongyang-Seoul axis to the 38th Parallel, where they took up defensive positions facing a menacing enemy buildup, with orders to delay as long as practicable at successive positions. By 26 December all units in Korea were consolidated under direct control of the Eighth US Army.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had expressed concern over the widening gap between Eighth US Army and X US Corps under the UN Command plan for withdrawal of the latter into the Hungnam-Wonsan sector, particularly since the enemy had already demonstrated his ability to operate strong forces in difficult mountainous terrain. It was believed that X Corps should be extricated from exposed positions as soon as possible and that forces on both coasts should be coordinated sufficiently to prevent large enemy elements from passing between or outflanking them. (1)

Commander in Chief, UNC (CINCUNC) replied that the Eighth Army would be compelled to pull back to Seoul in the face of heavy enemy pressure. Development of a defense line across the waist of Korea by joining Eighth Army and X Corps forces was not considered feasible in view of the numerical weakness of UN Forces, the distances involved, the necessity for supplying two parts of the line from ports within each area and the geographical division of the area into two separate

(1) See Ch II, Operations.

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parts by the rugged mountain spine running from north to south. Disposal of numerically inferior UN elements along the approximately 150 mile defense line involved would pave the way for enemy penetration and piecemeal destruction of UN Forces. Such strategy was not considered practicable against the forces of the Chinese Communist Army with its twenty-six divisions already in action, an additional 200,000 troops in rear areas, remnants of the North Korean Army undergoing reorganization and the entire military potential of Communist China ready for action. The potential of the UN combined forces was reduced considerably. Terrain characteristics diminished the effectiveness of UN air efforts to disrupt the enemy supply system. The UN naval potential was reduced greatly, due to enemy concentration inland. Months of endless combat had left UN ground forces mentally fatigued and physically battered. US divisions were considerably understrength, the combat effectiveness of Republic of Korea (ROK) units was negligible and other foreign contingents were so small as to exercise little influence. The Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) were fresh, well organized, trained and equipped and seemingly in excellent combat condition. Unless substantial ground reinforcements were supplied immediately, successive withdrawals faced the command, with steady attrition leading to final destruction. (2)

Directives under which the UNC was operating in Korea were considered completely outmoded. Operations used successfully against the North Korean Army were not applicable against Chinese Communists augmented by Soviet materiel. Political decisions with implementing strategic plans adequate to meet realities were required immediately. During a visit of the Chief of Staff, US Army (CofSA) early in December, CINCUNC stated that if reinforcements were not immediately available the command should be evacuated from Korea as soon as possible, otherwise the most advantageous action was withdrawal in

(2) See Ch II, Operations.

successive stages. CofSA indicated that early reinforcement in strength was not possible. Two medium bombardment groups were to be placed on the alert in the ZI ready for deployment to Guam to be used against China or the USSR in the event such action became necessary. (3)

The 24 November UN Forces drive to clear the enemy out of Korea caught the CCF off balance in the midst of buildup operations, forcing them to a premature launching of counteroffensive operations. This resulted in envelopment and breakthrough of the Eighth Army right flank, necessitating a withdrawal in the direction of Pyongyang, in accordance with previously prepared emergency plans. The enemy apparently was not developed sufficiently in strength to exploit his offensive capabilities against Eighth Army.

X Corps, on the east coast of Korea, was deployed along four lines of attack toward the Manchurian border. Directed to consolidate forces in the Wonsan-Hungnam area following the CCF attack in late November, X Corps units began a fighting withdrawal to the designated sector. Although three of the columns were able to pull back without significant enemy opposition, 1st US Marine Division units in the Choshin Reservoir area, were forced to withdraw under extremely heavy CCF pressure. The Marines were joined by a 7th US Infantry Division task force retreating across the frozen reservoir. All elements reached Hagaru-ri, at the lower end of the Choshin Reservoir, on 4 December and resumed the attack to the south two days later. By 11 December all units were concentrated within the X Corps defensive perimeter on the coastal plain surrounding Hungnam. The 1st Marine Division and attached elements of the 7th Division had fought over sixty miles of narrow icy roads in bitter cold weather against determined opposition by six to eight CCF divisions. Far East Air Forces Marine and Navy aircraft provided effective close support and evacuated wounded personnel, without which the successful withdrawal

(3) Ibid.

of UN elements could not have been accomplished.

The carefully planned amphibious evacuation of X Corps from Hungnam began on 9 December, with removal of all troops from northeast Korea completed on 24 December. During the two-week period, Navy and Marine personnel worked unceasingly in sub-zero temperatures in order to move 193 shiploads of men, material and equipment out of Hungnam to the safety of Pusan. All military personnel were transported without incident; no military equipment was left behind which could be employed by the enemy; the docks and harbor facilities were destroyed following departure of the last ship from the harbor. All X Corps units passed to control of Eighth Army on 26 December.

The stepping up of enemy probing actions at the end of December indicated that he had nearly completed his buildup and was ready to launch an offensive against the center and right flank of the UN line. Guerrilla activity increased with the decrease of their operational areas due to UN withdrawals to the south; activity was heaviest in dispersal areas and along UN main supply routes. The increasing southward movement of thousands of refugees provided ideal cover for guerrilla infiltration of UN lines. (4)

Planes of the Soviet Air Force believed to be in China were either available or would become so prior to an all-out CCF air effort in Korea. Further Soviet aircraft in the Dairen area could be made available for use in Korea and additional aircraft might be supplied from large stocks in air units in the Soviet Far East. Thus the enemy was believed capable of launching an extensive air effort at any time. From available bases in Manchuria the enemy was capable of reaching by air all points in Korea, as well as portions of the two main Japanese islands of Kyushu and Honshu. (5)

UN ground and air forces assigned strength in Korea on 29 December

(4) See Ch III, Intelligence.

(5) Ibid.

was 360,097. Opposed to this were enemy forces in Korea totaling 451,866, with an additional 371,000 grouped along the Manchurian-Korean border, and backed up by approximately 641,000 personnel either en route to or already in Manchuria. Enemy casualties during the period 28 November-27 December reached an estimated 96,615 as compared with UN casualties of 62,857. (6)

Difficulties in logistical support increased concurrently with military reverses in forward areas and the advent of cold weather in Korea. Approximately 10,000 tons of ammunition were lost by Eighth Army during the retrograde movement, primarily as a result of flagrant violations of supply discipline. (7)

Far East Command civil assistance activities in Korea were confined to South Korea and generally limited to the provision of civil relief. The influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing southward aggravated the burden already placed on severely strained relief facilities. (8)

In addition to the shifting tactical situation and severe winter weather conditions in Korea the command was faced with the necessity of identifying UN prisoners of war in the hands of the enemy, shortening the time lag between arrival and listing of available Quartermaster items, improving the graves registration system and accounting for logistical support furnished UN components in Korea by the US Army, as well as numerous other problems. (9)

-
- (6) See Ch III, Intelligence and Ch IV, Personnel.
(7) See Ch V, Logistics.
(8) See Ch VI, Miscellaneous FEC Activities.
(9) See Ch VII, Problems, Solutions, Lessons Learned.

Chapter II

OPERATIONS

During the closing days of November, the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), in overwhelming numbers, had fiercely counterattacked the UN Forces in Korea. In the face of this onslaught, the Eighth US Army, after bitter fighting, was forced to withdraw to the south. At the beginning of December, the Eighth Army occupied positions generally along a line extending from the mouth of the Chongchon River to Kunmori, through the Kaechon area, to the northeast of Sunchon, to Pukchang-ni and Paeksong-ni. Here the UN Forces blocked the enemy advance while effecting their withdrawal to new defensive positions in the vicinity of Sukchon, Sunchon and Sinchang-ni.

1. General

The X US Corps, operating directly under CINUNC, (1) had initiated action to assemble in the Hamhung-Wonsan area. Elements of the corps had carried the UN offensive past Chongjin, less than sixty miles from the northeastern boundary between Korea and the USSR, reached the Korean-Manchurian boundary at Hyasanjin on the Yalu River, passed Yudam-ni on the western side of the Choshin Reservoir, and contacted Eighth Army along the Eighth Army-X Corps boundary west of Wonsan.

In view of the formidable situation confronting the UN Forces in Korea, CINUNC felt that the geographical position of X Corps constituted a threat to the main supply lines of the enemy on the right flank of Eighth Army. The enemy's penetration southward could not be safely accomplished until this threat of X Corps had been contained or nullified. CINUNC considered also that the actual physical combination of Eighth Army and X Corps forces in a


(1) General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. (Also referred to herein as CINCFE).

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Plate 1



UN AND ENEMY SITUATION, 1 DECEMBER 1950

Chapter II

OPERATIONS

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(1) General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. (Also referred to herein as CINCFE).

continuous line across the narrow neck of Korea was quite impractical due to the length of that line, the numerical weakness of the UN Forces, and the logistical problems arising from the mountains dividing such a front from north to south.

It was planned, therefore, to have X Corps contract its position into the Hamhung-Wonsan sector as enemy pressure developed. CINCUNC considered that, while geographically X Corps seemed overly extended, the actual conditions of terrain made it extremely difficult for the enemy to use this factor to his material advantage. (2)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) expressed concern over the plan to withdraw X Corps into the Hamhung-Wonsan sector when enemy pressure developed, as well as over the further anticipated withdrawals by Eighth Army. Referring to previous experience in Korea which indicated that the enemy could operate strong forces through difficult mountainous terrain, the JCS reasoned that the development of a progressively widening gap between UN Forces on the east and west coasts would afford the enemy an opportunity to move considerable forces southward between Eighth Army and X Corps. The JCS felt that the elements of X Corps should be extricated from their exposed positions as soon as practicable and that the forces on the two coasts should be sufficiently coordinated to prevent large enemy forces from passing between them or outflanking either of them. Amplifying a previous message to CINCUNC regarding the mission of the UN Forces in Korea (JCS 97592), the JCS said, "...the entire region northeast of the waist of Korea should be ignored except for strategic and tactical considerations relating to the security of your command." (3)

In his reply to the JCS, (4) CINCUNC presented a full analysis

(2) Rad C 50095 CINCUNC to DA (JCS), 30 Nov 50. (G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50 TS "I" 1396) (Annex 4)

(3) JCS Rad 97772 to CINCPAC, 1 Dec 50. (G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50 TS "I" 1395) (Annex 4)

(4) CINCUNC Rad C 50332 to JCS, 3 Dec 50. (G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50, TS "I" 1412) (Annex 4)

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of the situation confronting the United Nations Command in Korea. He asserted that X Corps was being withdrawn into the Hamhung area as rapidly as possible, but that the Eighth Army situation was becoming increasingly critical. He estimated that Eighth Army would not be able to hold the Pyongyang area and when enemy pressure was exerted, would have to withdraw to the Seoul area. CINCUNC saw no practicability nor benefit in attempting to unite Eighth Army and X Corps; both forces were completely outnumbered and their junction would not only not produce added strength, but actually would jeopardize the free flow of movement arising from two separate logistical lines of naval supply and maneuver.

CINCUNC reiterated his previously stated opinion that the development of a defense line across the waist of Korea was not feasible. The following reasons were given to support this contention: the numerical weakness of the UN Forces and the distance involved; the necessity of supplying the two parts of the line from ports within each area; and the division of the area into two compartments by the rugged mountainous terrain running north and south. Such a defense line would be approximately 150 road miles in length. The disposal along this line of the seven US divisions under CINCUNC's command would require one division to protect a front of approximately twenty miles against greatly superior numbers of enemy whose greatest strength lay in his ability to infiltrate at night through rugged terrain. Such a line with no depth would have little strength and would invite penetration with the resultant envelopment and piecemeal destruction of UN Forces. While such strategy would have been practicable against the relatively weaker North Korean forces, it was impossible against the full forces of the Chinese Communist Army.

CINCUNC did not believe that full comprehension existed of the basic changes wrought by the undisguised entrance of the CCF into the

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conflict. An estimated enemy strength of approximately twenty-six divisions were already in action and an additional 200,000 troops were in rear areas in the process of being committed. In addition, remnants of the North Korean Army were in rear areas being reorganized. Behind this stood the entire military potential of Communist China.

CINCUNC pointed out that the potential of the UN combined forces had been greatly reduced as the conflict became one of the relative effectiveness of opposing ground forces. This nature of the terrain, while serving to aid the enemy's dispersion tactics, tended to diminish the effectiveness of UN air support in canalizing and interrupting the enemy supply system. Together with the limitation imposed by the international boundary, this reduced enormously the normal advantage of a superior air force. The naval potential also had been reduced greatly in effectiveness, mainly because of the enemy's concentration inland. Amphibious maneuver was not practicable and the effective use of naval gunfire for ground support was extremely limited.

Referring to the almost endless combat engaged in by the UN Forces since the beginning of the Korean conflict, CINCUNC reported that as a result these forces were mentally fatigued and physically battered. All US divisions, other than the 1st Marine Division, were approximately 5,000 troops understrength and at no time had they been up to their authorized complements. The combat effectiveness of the ROK Forces was negligible, while the other foreign army contingents were of such small strength as to exercise little influence. The CCF, on the other hand, were fresh, completely organized, well trained and equipped, and seemingly in peak condition for combat operations.

CINCUNC indicated that the small UN Command faced the entire Chinese Communist nation in undeclared war. He advised that unless

substantial ground reinforcements were immediately supplied, the command would be either forced into successive withdrawals with concurrently diminishing powers of resistance, or would be forced to take up beachhead defense positions which could afford little hope for anything beyond a degree of prolonged defense. Steady attrition leading to final destruction could be reasonably contemplated.

It was stressed by CINCUNC that an evaluation of the situation in Korea would have to be viewed on the basis of an entirely new war against an entirely new power under entirely new conditions. He pointed out that the directives under which the UN Forces had been operating against the North Koreans were completely outmoded by events. The relatively small UN Command was faced with the full offensive power of the Chinese Communist nation, augmented by extensive supply of Soviet materiel. The strategic concept of operations which had been used successfully against the North Koreans was not applicable against such power as that held by the Chinese Communists. In a message to the JCS, CINCUNC said: "This calls for political decisions and strategic plans in implementation thereof, adequate fully to meet the realities involved. In this, time is of the essence as every hour sees the enemy power increase and ours decline." (5)

The JCS concurred in CINCUNC's plan to consolidate Eighth Army and X Corps into beachheads, indicating that the preservation of the UN Forces was the primary consideration. (6)

During the first week in December, the Chief of Staff, US Army, (7) visited CINCUNC. In his discussions with CofSA, CINCUNC expressed his basic position that the UN Command, having committed

(5) Ibid.

(6) Rad 97917 JCS to CINCFE, 4 Dec 50. (G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50 TS "I" 1414) (Annex 4)

(7) General J. Lawton Collins.

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itself to the support of the Republic of Korea against North Korean aggression, should not fail to accept the new challenge of Communist China's aggression. He felt that the full power of the UN should be mounted at once to support the relatively small UN force committed, and that directives and strategic plans should be immediately oriented to meet the aggression against the UN Forces. He recommended that if material reinforcement could be provided in a reasonable time, the most advantageous action for the UN Command was withdrawal in successive positions, if necessary, to the Pusan area; if reinforcements were not available, the command should be evacuated as soon as possible.

CofSA indicated that early reinforcement in strength was not possible. With regard to future planning, he stated that it was the probable intention of the JCS eventually to return the entire Eighth Army to Japan and to augment this force with one airborne regimental combat team and possibly one Marine regimental combat team. (8)

As a result of a report by CINCFE to the JCS which stated that "at the present moment the freezing of the Yalu River increasingly opens up avenues of reinforcement and supply which it is impossible for our air potential to interdict," (9) the JCS queried CINCFE as to his need for additional air units and the possibility of their being effectively employed. (10) In this regard, discussions were held with officers on the staffs of CG FFAF and COMNAVFE on the related subjects of bombardment, transport, naval land-based and carrier-based aircraft, availability of bases, air defense of Japan, and probable air requirements in the event of open war with Communist

(8) Office CofS, GHQ FEC, Memo for General Collins, 4 Dec 50.

(G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50 TS "I" 1433) (Annex 4)

(9) Rad C 69953 CINCFE to DA for JCS, 28 Nov 50, G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50 TS J 70. (GHQ FEC/UNC Command Rpt Nov 50, Annex 4)

(10) Rad 97791 DA (JCS) to CINCFE, 1 Dec 50. (TS "A" 733) (G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50) (Annex 4)

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China.

In his reply to the JCS, CINCFE requested two medium bombardment groups while pointing out that the lack of air bases proximate to the battlefield precluded the use of additional land-based fighter-bomber units in the Korean combat zone. He pointed out that the gravity of the situation focused attention on the need for immediately strengthening the garrison in Japan. Ground forces and air and naval units currently available were insufficient to support properly UN efforts in Korea and at the same time defend Japan against air, naval or amphibious attack. To meet this latter threat, CINCFE requested three additional fighter-interceptor, all-weather fighter groups for deployment to the FEC. (11)

In reply to this request, the JCS informed CINCFE that all-weather fighter groups were not available and that the decision on medium bombardment groups was being withheld for a few days. (12)

CINCUNC and CG FEAF (13) continued to evaluate the request for the two medium bombardment groups and came to the conclusion that these groups could be employed profitably in Korea for interdiction and destruction of all towns and villages capable of sheltering or otherwise supporting enemy troops; in event of war with Communist China or the USSR, these groups would be urgently required in the FEC: the gains to be realized in Korea from two more bombardment groups did not warrant the risks involved in bringing them to the FEC because of the enemy's capability of initiating war with a surprise attack against airfields. CINCUNC, therefore, requested that, rather than deploying these groups as originally requested, they be kept on the alert in the ZI, ready for deployment to Guam in the FEC for use against China or the USSR at a time dictated by the

 (11) Rad CX 50496 CINCFE to JCS, 5 Dec 50. (TS "A" 733) (G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50) (Annex 4)

(12) Rad 98171 DA (JCS) to CINCFE, 7 Dec 50. (TS "A" 742) (G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50) (Annex 4)

(13) Lt Gen George E. Stratemeyer.

situation. (14) The JCS concurred in CINCFE's conclusions and notified him that the two medium bombardment groups were being placed on the alert in the ZI as he requested. (15)

On 7 December, CINCUNC transmitted a revised operation plan to the JCS and subordinate commanders. (16) This plan, approved by the JCS, (17) provided for: a withdrawal in successive positions, if necessary, to the Pusan area; Eighth Army to hold the Seoul area for a maximum time consistent with the retention of the capability of withdrawing to the south; an early withdrawal of X Corps from the Hungnam area and junction with Eighth Army, at which time the command of X Corps would pass to Eighth Army. The implementation of this plan was directed by CINCUNC Operation Order No. 5, dated 8 December 1950. (18)

In compliance with Operation Order No. 5, the Commanding General, X Corps, (19) indicated his intention to complete the withdrawal from Hungnam by 25 December and the movement to Pusan two days later. It was estimated that the withdrawal would be orderly, with the enemy being incapable of interference on a large scale by ground, air or submarine. The plan further provided for the complete evacuation of all personnel and organic equipment and the consumption or evacuation of all supplies in the base of Hungnam. Evacuation of the major subordinate units of X Corps was to be accomplished in the following order: 1st Marine Division on 15

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- (14) Rad C 50907 CINCUNC to DA (JCS), 10 Dec 50. (G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50 TS "I" 1459) (Annex 4)
 - (15) Rad 98778 DA (JCS) to CINCFE, 14 Dec 50. (G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50 TS "I" 1491) (Annex 4)
 - (16) Rad CX 50635 CINCFE to CG Eighth Army 7 Dec 50. (G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50 TS "I" 1440) (Annex 4)
 - (17) Rad 98400 DA (JCS) to CINCFE, 9 Dec 50. (G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50 TS "I" 1448) (Annex 4)
 - (18) Rad CX 50801 CINCUNC to CG Eighth Army, CG X Corps, COMNAVFE, CG FEAF, 8 Dec 50. (G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50 TS "A" 744) (Annex 4)
 - (19) Memo to CINCFE, 11 Dec 50; Ltr CG X Corps to CINCUNC, 11 Dec 50; Rad CX 51102 CINCFE to DA, 13 Dec 50. (G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50, TS "I" 1475, TS "I" 1476, TS "A" 753) (Annex 4)

December; 7th US Infantry Division on the 20th; 3d US Infantry Division on the 25th. (20)

The amphibious movement of X Corps from the Hungnam sector to a juncture with the Eighth Army was completed successfully with light casualties and no materiel loss. This operation completed the readjustment of UN ground positions along the Kaesong-Yongyong-Hwachon-Puypyongni defense line made necessary by the entry of the CCF into the war and their build-up operations preparatory to offensive action aimed at the conquest of all of Korea. (21)

At the end of the month, Eighth Army, commanding all ground forces in Korea, had ordered the reconnaissance, selection and organization of a bridgehead line on the north bank of the Han River. (22)

2. Ground (23)

During December, the UN Forces met powerful enemy resistance along their entire front. As a reaction to the Eighth Army advance in the latter part of November, the CCF were forced prematurely to launch a large-scale counteroffensive. This served as clear proof of the Chinese Communist's mounting readiness and full decision to participate in the Korean conflict. It likewise disclosed the massive deployment of the Fourth Chinese Communist Field Army, an important segment of the entire Chinese Communist military strength.

The CCF counteroffensive resulted in the envelopment and breakthrough of the Eighth Army right flank position, which was held by

(20) Maj Gen Edward M. Almond.

(21) Rad C 52453 CINCUNC to DA, UNC Rpt No 12, 1 Jan 51 (G-3 GHQ UNC Opns Rpt 189, 30 Dec 50). (G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50) (Annex 4)

(22) G-3 GHQ UNC Opns Rpt 189, 30 Dec 50. (G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50) (Annex 4)

(23) Unless otherwise cited, the material contained in this section was compiled from the UNC G-3 Daily Opns Rpts for the period 30 Nov-31 Dec 50, and G-3 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Journal Dec 50. (G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt, Dec 50) (Annex 4)

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the II ROK Corps. Despite their initial tenacious resistance, some of the ROK forces were overrun by this formidable array of enemy strength, resulting in an untenable tactical disposition for other units of Eighth Army.

Withdrawal was forced upon Eighth Army by the overwhelming superiority of enemy numbers moving into a position to strike it in the rear in the direction of Pyongyang. These deliberate withdrawal operations, made in accordance with plans previously prepared against any eventuality, were successfully conducted with unbroken cohesion and with all units remaining intact. Once the withdrawal was underway it was continued between successive delaying and defensive positions with no initial interference by the enemy who failed to press aggressively his initial success. The enemy was caught off balance in the midst of his build-up operations and was not yet developed in strength to exploit his penetration. The presence of X Corps on his flank forced him to divide his forces, further weakening his offensive capabilities against Eighth Army.

The X Corps was operating out of the east coast ports of Wonsan and Hamhung in an attack to the Manchurian border. Its units were deployed on four lines of attack: the 1st ROK Corps along the northeastern coast past Chonjin to within 60 miles of the border; the 7th US Infantry Division northward to the border at Hyesanjin; the 1st US Marine Division to the northwest past Yudam-ni on the western side of the Choshin Reservoir; and the 3rd US Infantry Division westward out of Wonsan.

The massive extent of the Chinese Communist attack forced the fighting withdrawal of X Corps southward toward Hamhung. From three of its four lines of advance these operations were effected without serious interference by the enemy. On the fourth, however, a major enemy drive collided against the 1st Marine Division in the Choshin Reservoir area..

On 1 December, Marine units in the Choshin Reservoir area began consolidating their positions preparatory to withdrawing southward. The following day these forces began fighting their way from their positions under heavy CCF onslaughts. While the 1st Marine Regiment, with one battalion at Sindong-ni, one battalion at Koto-ri and one battalion at Hagaru-ri at the south end of the Choshin Reservoir, kept the supply road and route of withdrawal open, the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments withdrew under heavy and continuous enemy pressure from their advanced position at Yudam-ni to the Division base at Hagaru-ri, 11 miles to the south. Meanwhile, a task force consisting of two battalions of the 7th Division operating on the east side of the reservoir was attacked by an overwhelming number of Chinese Communist troops and forced to withdraw across the frozen reservoir to join the Marines at Hagaru-ri.

With all elements to the northward having arrived at Hagaru-ri on 4 December, the 1st Marine Division and attached elements of the 7th Division resumed the attack to the southward on the morning of 6 December. The enemy attempted to block the withdrawal route and brought heavy pressure upon the column from the rear and both flanks. The column, on 7 December, reached the Marine battalion holding the main supply route at Koto-ri. Meanwhile, a special task force from the 3d Division had moved north from the Hamhung area to Sudong-ni, where it relieved the 1st Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment, which in turn attacked north to reopen the road to Koto-ri and assist the withdrawal of other elements of the 1st Marine Division. On 9 December, despite intensive efforts by the Chinese Communists, the leading elements of the withdrawing Marines effected a juncture with this battalion. The following day, the Marines began marching out of the mountains onto the coastal plain to enter the X Corps' defensive perimeter. By nightfall on 11 December, all elements had been withdrawn to that position, completing the concentration of

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X Corps.

In this action, the 1st Marine Division and attached elements of the 7th Division marched and fought over 60 miles in bitter cold along a narrow, tortuous, ice-covered road against opposition from between six and eight CCF divisions, which suffered staggering losses. Much of the success of this action was due to both FEAF and Navy aircraft, which provided effective close support, performed valuable armed reconnaissance and evacuated the wounded from Hagaru-ri.

By 5 December, Eighth Army had withdrawn to designated delaying positions south of Pyongyang and had destroyed the bridges over the Taedong River. It had completed the difficult maneuver of breaking contact with the enemy and deploying its forces in order to maintain freedom of action; prevent being outflanked on the east, where there were no substantial terrain features on which to anchor a defense line; and provide time for the evacuation of supplies and materiel from Pyongyang and Chinnampo.

The next few days saw the UN Forces in Korea continue on their previously assigned missions. The Eighth Army units withdrew southward toward a defensive position covering the approaches to Seoul and the principal avenues of entry into South Korea; X Corps, meanwhile, assembled its units in the Hamhung-Hungnam area and improved the defenses of its perimeter.

Beginning in mid-December, the enemy became more active against the UN Forces. In the X Corps area, pressure by the CCF increased south of Oro-ri as numerous attacks were launched against UN outposts. Three consecutive days of enemy attack forced some elements of X Corps to withdraw to prepared positions. Northwest of Hamhung, strong attacks were beaten off by X Corps units as enemy pressure continued. Subsequent CCF probing attacks against the perimeter positions west of Hungnam were successfully repelled as air, naval

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and artillery support aided in dispersing the enemy forces.

On 17 December, the big guns of supporting heavy cruisers and destroyers began to establish a ring of steel around the Hungnam defense perimeter. Coordinated with carrier-based air attacks, the Navy ships were able to deliver bombardment against enemy troop concentrations, road junctions and vehicular traffic. As the enemy attacks increased, air, naval and artillery fire poured relentlessly along the Hungnam perimeter, enabling the defending UN ground forces to hold their positions.

The carefully planned amphibious evacuation of X Corps from northeastern Korea began on 9 December, when elements of the 1st Korean Marine Corps began embarking at Wonsan for movement to Pusan. The following day, elements of the 3d ROK Division and the ROK Capitol Division began their movement from Hungnam. The battle-weary 1st Marine Division began embarking on 11 December, as the UN Forces tightened their Hungnam perimeter. On 15 December, I ROK Corps and elements of the ROK Capitol Division began embarking. The 7th Division, elements of which had begun embarking on 14 December, completed the evacuation of Hungnam on 21 December and began the water movement to Pusan. On 20 December, the 3d Division assumed operational control of all X Corps units remaining ashore in the Hungnam area. The division began its embarkation on 22 December and completed it on the 24th after an orderly withdrawal from the hills surrounding the North Korean seaport. This final action brought to a close the successful withdrawal of all UN troops in northeast Korea from the seaport of Hungnam. On 26 December, all units of X Corps passed to control of Eighth Army.

On 20 December, a number of larger enemy units appeared on the Eighth Army front, where action previously had been limited to sporadic patrol clashes. Enemy pressure, primarily in probing attacks, was exercised along the entire front, with the principal activity

in the eastern area. Although the UN Forces were forced to make limited withdrawals in the vicinity of Chunchon, Yonchon and Hwachon, the enemy attacks were contained by counterattacking friendly units. After three days of aggressive enemy pressure in the Hwachon area, about two-thirds of a mile had been penetrated, but the momentum of the enemy attack was arrested by mid-day on 22 December.


By the end of December, following the withdrawal of the Eighth Army from northwest Korea and the redeployment of X Corps from northeast Korea, UN Forces were deployed in defensive positions generally along the 38th Parallel. Here they faced an ominous enemy build-up with orders to delay to the fullest extent possible at successive positions, meanwhile inflicting maximum punishment on the enemy forces and maintaining the full potential of the combat elements of the UN Command.

3. Navy (24)

The southward drive of the CCF against UN Forces in Korea forced an immediate and thorough re-evaluation of the long-range plans of Naval Forces, Far East. As the seriousness of the enemy's latest move became more evident the scope of naval planning became more extensive. It became necessary for NAVFE to plan to assume the responsibility for operations covering an area limited only by the boundaries of the FEO, as compared to the earlier primary concern with only the Korean area and surrounding waters.

UN naval forces operating under NAVFE during the month of December consisted of TF 77, TF 90, TF 95, and TG 96.8. TF 95 comprised TG 95.1 (Korean Blockade Unit No. 1), TG 95.2 (Korean Blockade Unit No. 2), TG 95.6, and TG 95.7. TG 70.1, the USS Missouri with destroyer escorts, operated with TF 77 off the east coast of

 (24) Unless otherwise cited, material contained in this section was compiled from the UNC G-3 Daily Opns Rpts for the period 30 Nov-31 Dec 50 (G-3 GHQ FFC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt, Dec 50), (Annex 4); and COM-NAVFE, Command & Hist Rpt, Dec 50 (Annex 28).



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
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TF 77
 TG 95.2
 TG 95.6


LEGEND

- K ROK Units
 - B British Units
 - P Philippine Units
 - T Turkish Units
 - TH Thailand Units
 - S Security Units
 - N Netherlands Units
 - F French Units
 - G Greek Units
 - C Canadian Units (Pusan area.)
 - NZ New Zealand Units (Pusan)
- (All other blue unit symbols are U.S. units.)

- HL Bomblines
- 50 NK Units
- 50 CCF Units

(The data on this map was reproduced from situation map accompanying G-3 Operations Report No. 190 dated 31 Dec 50.)

SCALE



TG 95.1
 TG 95.69
 TG 96.8

ADV

- 6147 TOT
- 3 RES
- EIGHTH
- XXX IX
- XXX 24
- XXX 1

- XXX FIFTH
- 27FE
- 49FB
- 8RT
- 162RT
- 45RT

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Korea. Ships in these various units were drawn from the countries of France, England, Thailand, Republic of Korea, Canada, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Australia and the United States.

The primary naval action of the month was the support given to the withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division from the Choshin Reservoir area and the successful evacuation of X Corps from the North Korean seaport of Hungnam. Under cover of naval gunfire from warships and carrier-based aircraft, the two week mass movement drew to a close on the afternoon of 24 December when the last of 193 shiploads of men, material and equipment was moved out of Hungnam harbor aboard Navy transports bound for the Pusan area.

The situation was in hand at all times and the evacuation proceeded as planned. The 1st Marine Division embarked first, followed by the I ROK Corps, 7th Infantry Division and 3d Infantry Division in that order. Loading ships day and night for two weeks in freezing temperatures, Navy and Marine personnel moved hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies and equipment aboard the Navy transports, cargo ships, LST's, LSD's and Military Sea Transport Service vessels.

TF 90, in over-all command of the redeployment, handled the actual outloading and transportation of X Corps personnel and equipment. As the gigantic loading operations continued, endless streams of landing craft moved seaward carrying troops, vehicles and supplies to the waiting transports and cargo ships. In these ships were carried 105,000 US and ROK military personnel, 91,000 civilian refugees and 17,500 vehicles, in addition to 350,000 tons of bulk cargo.

The success of the operation was due largely to the contribution made by air units of TF 77, Marine aviation units based ashore and TG 96.8 as they rocketed, bombed and napalmed enemy troop placements. During the period 1 to 24 December, over 6,925 sorties were

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flown by Navy and Marine fighters and attack bombers in close support of the ground forces in the Hungnam area. These daily raids, together with Army artillery fire, kept the enemy well dug in and prevented any large-scale attack on the ever-decreasing perimeter. Utilizing napalm, bombs, rockets and machine-gun fire, the aircraft kept a rain of destruction pouring down on enemy troops, transportation, supply routes and gun positions.

During the final five days of the withdrawal, Navy gunfire and air support intensified as the perimeter compressed more closely around Hungnam. Day and night, cruisers and destroyers of TG 90.8 fired on enemy troop concentrations and supply routes with 8 and 5 inch guns. During the two-week operation, the warships fired a total of 34,000 rounds of 16, 8 and 5-inch ammunition, and 5-inch rockets. The rocket launchers of the LST's threw several hundred of the lethal projectiles at the Communists on two nights before the final evacuation. About 5,000 illuminating projectiles lighted up the enemy positions during the two-week period, enabling gunfire spotters to select targets during the night firing. Over 1,000 rounds of starshells were shot over enemy territory in one night.

All military personnel brought to the Hungnam perimeter were transported without incident to safety in the Pusan area. At the completion of the evacuation there was left behind no military equipment which could be usefully employed by the enemy. With the final embarkation of elements of the 3d US Division, a Navy underwater demolition team blew up the lock area and breakwater of Hungnam harbor. (25)

In other areas, UN naval forces continued to deny enemy surface units movement in any of the waters surrounding Korea. TG 95.1 conducted intensive patrol and blockade operations off the west coast of Korea, while TG 95.2 performed a similar function off the east coast.

(25) GHQ UNC Public Information Office (PIO) Korean Release No. 761,
26 Dec 50. (Annex 20)

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On 5 December, all UN personnel were withdrawn by sea from the west coast port of Chinnampo as ships of TG 95.1 stood by to render naval gunfire support and protective aircraft cover to the evacuation operations by TF 90. On 9 December, after five days of intensive shelling by TG 95.2 the isolated city of Wonsan was successfully evacuated by UN ground forces. Other ships of TF 95 continued throughout the month to patrol Korean and Formosan waters, conducting minesweeping operations and standing ready on call to support UN ground forces by navy shelling or air attack.

Operations by UN Naval Forces during 30 November-29 December resulted in the destruction or damaging of the following enemy targets:

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Tanks	25	14
Trucks	38	36
Miscellaneous vehicles	159	94
Marshalling yards	-	2
Locomotives	2	4
Railroad cars	38	23
Bridges	12	22
Railroad tunnels	1	10
Railroad roundhouse	-	1
Warehouses	107	1
Tractors	6	1
Supply buildings	141	38
Factory buildings	4	-
Enemy occupied villages	4	7
Railroad lines	-	2
Enemy occupied buildings	3,023	1,042
Fuel warehouses	1	-
Ammunition dumps	9	3
Supply dumps	18	6
POL dumps	21	3
Barracks	1	1
Shipyards (small)	-	1
Artillery pieces	15	1
Gun emplacements	13	4
Machine guns	3	-
Mortar positions	11	2
Roadblock emplacements	2	-
Radio stations	1	-
Command Posts	-	3
Observation posts	1	1
Mines	6	-
Horses	258	-
Oxen	11	-
Small water craft	3	-

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4. Air (26)

On the ground, December was a month of strategic withdrawals as UN Forces continued to give ground in the face of the overwhelming hordes of CCF pouring down from the north. In the air, it was a month of vigorous support for the ground forces, continuous bombardment and increasing air combat with more skilled enemy opposition. Medium bombers concentrated on destruction of the enemy's communication centers, supply routes and key bridges in order to hamper troop movements and logistical support. The majority of fighter strikes were concentrated on close support of rear-guard UN Forces withdrawing south under the pressure of the CCF advance.

The retrograde movement of the UN Forces below the 38th Parallel was a planned, strategic re-deployment to more defensible positions. It became necessary, therefore, to abandon and render unusable forward air bases almost before full and effective use could be made of them. Air Force ground crews were compelled to fight the weather while moving and removing equipment and supplies and maintaining aircraft in the air. Air crews on armed reconnaissance and close ground support missions swept over almost every foot of the battle areas. Flying around the clock by using flares for night illumination, these aircraft remained always on call to assist ground troops.

The month began with FEAF aircraft setting a new record for the number of sorties flown in a single day. The total of 893 sorties recorded for 1 December represented an increase of more than 20 percent over 26 November, the previous record day. With the exception of 235 cargo flights, all were combat sorties or sorties flown under combat conditions, including reconnaissance and tactical

(26) Unless otherwise cited, material contained in this section was compiled from the UNC G-3 Daily Opns Rpts for the period 30 Nov-31 Dec 50 and G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Journal, Dec 50, (Annex 4); FEAF Command Rpt 7/Appendices, Dec 50, (Annex 27); and FEAF Command Reference Book, 1 Jan 51 (Annex 27).

control.

During the period 1-9 December, supply and communication facilities, including the marshalling yards at Sinanju, Anju, Kanggye and Huichon, were struck repeatedly. Secondary targets such as Tokchon, Sukchen, Songchon and Sunchon also were attacked with fire and high explosive bombs. On 7 December, at the request of X Corps, B-29's dropped over ninety-six tons of bombs on the three towns of Yudam-ni, Changjin and Sachang-ni in the Choshin Reservoir area in an effort to relieve enemy pressure on the 1st US Marine Division and 7th US Infantry Division at Hararu-ri and Koto-ri. In addition, B-29's accomplished leaflet drops and performed radar photo missions over North Korea.

Operations of UN aircraft under the control of the Fifth Air Force were divided into three categories: maintenance of air superiority in order to contain continued enemy air activity; close support of Eighth Army; and support of the 1st Marine and 7th Infantry Divisions in the Choshin Reservoir area. Maximum air support rendered by friendly aircraft in this sector materially reduced enemy resistance against the UN Forces encircled in the vicinity of Koto-ri. Fighter-bombers, ranging behind the lines in attacks on enemy troop concentrations and supply movements with .50 caliber machine guns, rockets and napalm, inflicted severe enemy casualties. On 5 December, the estimated troops killed by air attacks during the day reached a total of 2,683. Supply centers and buildings known or thought to contain enemy troops were given priority as targets, with sweeps of usable enemy airfields continuing throughout the period. B-26's, attacking day and night on troop concentrations, build-up areas and possible supply dumps, destroyed the enemy's logistical resources and interdicted his resupply efforts.

FEAF Combat Cargo Command operations centered around the evacuation and drop missions performed in direct logistical support of

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the 1st Marine Division and 7th Infantry Division forces in the vicinity of the Choshin Reservoir. A total of 4,681 battle and weather casualties were evacuated from the frozen Hararu-ri and Koto-ri airstrips between 1 and 6 December, when the Marines withdrew to Koto-ri. Between 26 November, when the first airdrop was made, and 9 December, when the operation was completed, 1,734 tons of supplies were airdropped or flown in to the embattled UN troops, often under minimum flying weather conditions. On 7 December, for the first time in combat airlift operations, the component parts of an 8-span, 16-ton bridge were successfully airdropped by 100-foot parachutes to the outnumbered UN troops in the area immediately south of Koto-ri. Of a more routine nature were the airlift operations involving the movement of troops and supplies within Japan into Korea and between all airfields in Korea remaining in UN control.

The following week saw the initiation of a new interdiction plan for medium bombers. On 15 December, the complete destruction of all enemy communications facilities was begun as FEAF Bomber Command stepped up the tempo of mass bombing. The new interdiction plan included the normal targets---bridges, key tunnels, marshaling yards and communications centers along the enemy's main supply routes. A departure from previous periods, however, was the division of the Korean Peninsula into zones. The concept of the plan was to destroy completely all types of communications facilities within one zone before moving to the zone of next highest priority.

During the period 10-16 December, FEAF Bomber Command attacks were concentrated on installations in and around Sinanju, Pyongyang, Kangge and Sunchon. The enemy was denied the use of two airfields which had reverted to his control when, on 10 December, the fields at Pyongyang and Kangge were bombed into unserviceability. On 11

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and 12 December, Sinanju was bombed with a total of 238 tons of delayed action bombs.

Ever-increasing enemy air activity and decreasing ground contact between UN and enemy troops resulted in a decline in close ground support and an increase in counter-air missions flown by fighters and fighter bombers of the Fifth Air Force. The total of counter-air sorties increased from 151 during the preceding period to 268, while close support sorties hit a low of four on 11 December. Although the number of armed reconnaissance sorties decreased from 904 to 755, this number continued to reflect the principal missions of Fifth Air Force fighters.

F-84 Thunderjets (which first entered the fight on 6 December), F-80's and F-51's scoured North Korean skies, seeking out and destroying enemy troops, supplies, vehicles, railroad rolling stock and other targets of opportunity. Enemy tanks were discovered in quantity for the first time since 7 December, and ensuing attacks resulted in ten destroyed on the 13th and fourteen destroyed or damaged on 14 December in the marshalling yards at Pyongyang. The toll of enemy troops killed in a seven-day period mounted to a new estimated high of 19,730.

Light bombers continued to strike at enemy supply centers, communication lines and troop areas by day and to carry out harassing attacks during the nighttime. On 15 December, Night Intruder B-26's initiated in the Pyongyang and Sinanju-Anju areas the practice of dropping an average of one 100-pound fragmentation cluster approximately every ten minutes against light targets or enemy personnel.

As UN Forces stabilized their battle lines during the period 17-23 December, medium bombers concentrated on the destruction of the enemy's lines of communication. Primary and secondary targets included highway and railroad bridges, marshalling yards, resupply

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and communication centers, military storage areas, tunnels and rail lines leading from the international border into Korea. FEAF bombers utilized both radar and visual bombing techniques with good to excellent results on the majority of targets attacked. In the largest raid of the period, on 21 December, FEAF Bomber Command struck in force with forty-eight B-29's against railroad bridges, tunnels and military storage areas at Kujang-dong and the marshalling yards at Wonsan with 349 tons of 2,000, 1,000 and 500-pound bombs.

Due to front-line ground inactivity, close support was limited and the majority of UN fighter aircraft were employed in armed reconnaissance with attacks on targets of opportunity. Efforts were concentrated on enemy lines of communication and supply facilities as pilot reports continued to indicate heavy enemy movements southward to the 38th Parallel.

The focus of attention during this period was on enemy aerial activity as larger formations of enemy MIG-15's began to appear. Largely responsible for the aerial combat successes achieved during this period was the introduction of F-86 Sabre jets into aerial combat. In their first engagement on 17 December, the F-86's destroyed one MIG-15. On 22 December, US jet aircraft scored their most impressive victory to that date over the Soviet-built MIG-15's being used by the enemy in limited operations near the Yalu River boundary. Twice within five hours increasingly aggressive enemy pilots attacked F-86's flying combat air patrols in the Sinuiju area. In the first encounter, more than eight MIG-15's made a surprise attack on eight F-86's and succeeded in destroying one friendly aircraft. Later that day more than fifteen MIG-15's attacked eight F-86's. In the ensuing aerial battle, six of the enemy jets were destroyed and one damaged with no damage suffered by the friendly planes.

There was a marked decrease in the volume of cargo flown into

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Korea during this period due mainly to the reduced requirements of UN Forces in the zone of operations. On 17 December, the air evacuation phase of the withdrawal from the Hamhung area was completed after a four-day accelerated effort. During this time, a total of 2,501 tons of cargo, 1,644 evacuees and 3,891 passengers, including about 1,600 ROK Marines and advance elements of the 3d and 7th Infantry Divisions, were airlifted out of the area. On this same date, Yonpo Airfield was abandoned after serving its purpose as a base for the evacuation of casualties.

Search and Rescue activities were highlighted on 23 December when SAR aircraft participated in an emergency rescue of isolated UN troops from behind enemy lines. An SAR detachment based at Yongdungpo Airfield in Seoul was advised that a group of escaped or bypassed UN military personnel had been sighted approximately eight miles behind the enemy forward positions. Three helicopters were immediately alerted and dispatched to the area. Flying a total of twelve sorties, these aircraft succeeded in evacuating safely the entire group of thirty-six men into friendly hands. From the initial alert until completion of the mission, the total time elapsed was slightly more than three hours.

With UN ground forces under the constant threat of an impending offensive and with the increase in front-line enemy activity during the last week in December, medium bombers concentrated their efforts on the destruction of the enemy's main supply routes and lines of communication. Supply centers, warehouse areas, railroad bridges, military storage areas, marshalling yards and industrial areas were among the primary and secondary targets attacked. Employing forty-two B-29's, FEAF Bomber Command on 24 December unloaded 324 tons of general purpose bombs on the supply and communication center of Kosanjin and on the principal supply routes and storage areas adjacent to the front-line activity.

The build-up of enemy forces along the 38th Parallel likewise caused UN fighter aircraft and light bombers to continue their round-the-clock activities in support of friendly ground forces. The majority of close support, armed reconnaissance and night intruder missions were flown in the areas bordering the 38th Parallel. Vehicle convoys, enemy-occupied houses and buildings and troop concentrations were subjected to intense pounding from the air.

The emphasis previously placed on armed reconnaissance by UN air forces continued during the final week of December. UN fighter pilots exploited to the fullest the tremendous firepower of their aircraft by hitting targets of opportunity after completing attacks on predetermined targets. From 17 December to the end of the month, armed reconnaissance sorties averaged more than 150 daily. During the period 24-31 December, 1,109 armed reconnaissance sorties were flown, the largest number so far during any week of the Korean campaign.

Enemy aerial activity remained at a high level with the MIG-15 pilots showed marked aggressiveness and skillful tactical maneuvering. Although the Fifth Air Force F-86 Sabre jets continued their search for enemy aircraft, they were unable to repeat the performance of their earlier major encounter of 22 December. F-80 Shooting Stars, however, were more fortunate. On 28 December a flight of three F-80's engaged more than fifteen MIG-15's. Within a space of ten minutes, the three F-80's accounted for one MIG-15 destroyed and two damaged with no damage to the friendly aircraft.

The largest all-jet aerial engagement of the Korean War was fought on 30 December, when F-86's were attacked on two separate occasions. In the first encounter, four F-86's on combat air patrol were attacked by eight MIG-15's. The result was one enemy plane destroyed and one damaged without damage to the friendly aircraft.

The second engagement occurred in the Sinuiju area when sixteen F-86's were attacked by thirty-six MIG-15 jet fighters. In the ensuing battle, during which the enemy attacked in four waves, two enemy planes were damaged but the friendly aircraft returned unscathed.

Air operations during December continued on a large scale despite below normal weather in all parts of Korea. The central sector particularly experienced a much greater than normal number of days with overcast, low clouds and precipitation. Visual bombing from high or medium levels was not possible on more than half of the days in December. Temperatures were much lower in December than in the preceding month. Ground operations, including aircraft maintenance, were hampered by sub-freezing temperatures most of the time. Particularly bitter sub-zero weather was frequently experienced in the central and northern mountain areas.

At the beginning of December, the FEAF bomb line in Korea had extended from a point about forty miles north of Pyongyang to the extreme northeast shoulder of the peninsula above Chongjin. By 31 December, the bomb line had receded and stretched from the west coast twenty-five miles northwest of Seoul to the east coast, roughly parallel to but averaging ten miles below the 38th Parallel.

The total FEAF effort for December added up to 18,967 sorties flown, of which 3,569 were close support; 7,654, interdiction; and 5,428, cargo. During the course of operations, 9,776,700 rounds of .50-caliber ammunition and 25,810 rockets were fired. Total bomb and napalm expenditures stood at 7,531 tons and 2,274 tons respectively. Combat Cargo Command transports carried 15,654 tons of essential military equipment and supplies, 16,261 passengers, and 28,004 air evacuees.

During the month of December the following destruction and

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damaged on the enemy was inflicted by FEAF aircraft:

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Aircraft	12	14
Tanks	76	77
Field guns	73	81
Buildings	5,396	5,743
Trucks	5	7
Other vehicles	921	766
Locomotives	37	46
Railroad cars	223	573
Troops	36,960	-
Railroad Tunnels	3	19
Bridges	9	64
Barges	24	28
Warehouses	19	29
Oil storage tanks	2	1

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Chapter III

INTELLIGENCE

1. Ground

The period 1 through 20 December marked the complete disengagement of Eighth US Army from contact with the enemy and movement toward defensive positions covering Seoul and the main avenues of entry into South Korea. Following this withdrawal as rapidly as possible the enemy traveled 80 to 100 miles in a formation of four to six CCF Armies in line at an average of four to five miles daily.

Starting 18 December and continuing through 24 December the enemy probed the entire Eighth Army defensive front. The pattern used by the enemy suggested a screening and counter-reconnaissance force along the entire front, furnished by a number of rehabilitated NK divisions with a possible corps organization from west to east of the I, V and II NKA Corps. Behind this screen CCF units deployed with armies abreast in slow forward movement. (1)

Extremely heavy enemy pressure continued against X US Corps elements in the Hungnam-Choshin Reservoir area until the UN evacuation on 24 December. At the beginning of the month enemy action cut the Corps supply line northward. After the supply line was restored, and although he suffered heavy casualties, the enemy maintained a continual harassing action in attempting to isolate X Corps elements. After US 1st Marine and 7th Infantry Division elements had closed in the Hungnam area on 12 December enemy action consisted of constant attempts to probe, harass and attack shrinking UN defensive positions, paying an extremely high price in casualties from UN ground and artillery fire and air and naval bombardment.

During the last six days of the month the enemy continued

(1) G-2 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt (S) Dec 50, Ch I, Summary of Enemy Intelligence, Sec 1, General Enemy Operations. (Annex 3)

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probing UN positions, with all indications pointing to an extensive buildup of forces in preparation for an all-out attack. Considerable movement and repositioning of enemy forces occurred during this period. At the end of the month the enemy stepped up his probing action, indicating that his buildup was nearing completion. Every indication pointed to the opening of an enemy offensive against the center and right flank of the UN line. (2)

No armored opposition was encountered by UN ground force units during December. Enemy armor observed by UN air elements ranged in location from as far north as the Choshin Reservoir to as far south as Kaesong with the heaviest concentration sighted in the area extending from Chungwa south to Sariwon. There were no indications that this armor was manned by other than North Korean personnel; it appeared that the NKA was able to maintain a steady flow of replacement personnel for armored units, with training possibly conducted in Manchuria. (3) Enemy artillery apparently was being husbanded for use on special occasions, with its use further hampered by ammunition supply problems. (4)

Although mounted Chinese troops were reported in Korea in sizes varying from platoon to regiment, these elements actually were never engaged by UN Forces in a frontal attack. Generally they employed true cavalry tactics of reconnaissance in force, flank attacks or liquidation of outlying or isolated positions. (5)

There were no indications that the enemy made extensive preparations before undertaking an offensive operation beyond seizing the opportunity of a lull in combat to build up his forces and supplies. There was little evidence that he prepared for an attack by exhaustive intelligence research or intensive reconnaissance. Immediately

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- (2) Ibid.
 - (3) Ibid, Sec 2 b, Armor.
 - (4) Ibid, Sec 2 c, Artillery.
 - (5) Ibid, Sec 2 d, Cavalry.

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prior to an attack, however, the enemy's preliminary reconnaissance was persistent and effective. Typically, the CCF moved up in a body to the attack until they came within small arms range of the defended UN position. Then small groups of five or six men moved forward until they drew fire. These small groups apparently were unarmed since they rarely replied to UN fire directed at them. When these decoys had succeeded in drawing fire, thereby disclosing UN defensive positions, they faded back. From five to twenty minutes later the main CCF attack would begin, generally down the same avenues of approach used by the probing groups.

The enemy communicated during an attack or on defense by using bells, bugles, horns, whistles or other noisemakers; the most commonly employed was the bugle. These noisemakers proved to be effective psychological weapons since UN soldiers testified that their effects were extremely demoralizing.

The enemy generally hit UN Forces when they were on the move, applying the theory that a moving force is less able to defend itself than one that is stationary. Historically, this doctrine, necessitating continual harassment, has been followed by the CCF to the extent of permitting a defending force an avenue of escape in order to keep it on the move. The Chinese theory is that "a cornered rat will fight fiercely; whereas, if it is provided a limited avenue of escape and kept on the move, it can be gradually worn down with only slight loss to the attacking force." This theory is of probable significance in light of the early and mid-December action around the Choshin Reservoir and the UN withdrawal into the Hungnam Perimeter.

On defense the enemy's best weapon appeared to be his ability to conceal his position. Sizeable groups of the enemy would appear, seemingly out of the ground, in areas where previous extensive aerial reconnaissance or probing in force had failed to uncover a hostile

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presence. This concealment, coupled in the case of the NKA with an extensive knowledge of the terrain, and in the case of both CCF and NKA with a willingness to discard uniforms and dress as local civilians, made the destruction of enemy units quite difficult. (6)

CCF weapons appeared to be a general mixture of Japanese World War II items plus those of Chinese, US, German, Swiss, Danish, Belgian and other origins. It was believed that the complete series of weapons of the former Japanese Kwantung Army and the Chinese Nationalist Army were in the hands of the CCF. More Soviet weapons were expected to appear, including weapons of the World War II Soviet Infantry Division, plus the T-34 tank and various AAA weapons. (7)

2. Guerrilla

Guerrilla activity reportedly was heaviest along UN main supply routes and in dispersal areas. Strength of guerrilla forces ranged as high as 2,000. Activities included attacks on troop convoys, against ROK Army, Navy and Police elements and raids on UN command posts, on villages and police boxes. It appeared that this activity became more aggressive as the operational area of the guerrillas was diminished due to the UN withdrawals southward.

A number of corollary values to the enemy can be expected from guerrilla units. These units have been reorganized, retrained and may possibly have succeeded in building up moderate supplies of ammunition and equipment. They probably have been successful in establishing a widespread spy net throughout their areas of operation and undoubtedly have developed a thorough knowledge of the countryside. This thorough knowledge of the terrain makes the guerrilla bands invaluable to the enemy.

Main guerrilla bodies reported by the end of the month lay

 (6) Ibid, Sec 3 g, Tactics, Offensive/Defensive.

(7) Ibid, Sec 3, Weapons.

roughly astride, or in close proximity to the major routes of rail and motor supply between UN front-line areas and the port of Pusan. It quite conceivably could be the mission of these units to cooperate with regular enemy forces in an attempt to bottle up the UN Forces in the Seoul-Inchon area or to render the passage southward most difficult.

The large refugee movement generally flowing southward provided guerrilla units with an ideal medium for semi-protected and possibly undetected movement. The presence of large numbers of refugees on the roads during the month proved invaluable to the enemy in general infiltration of UN positions. In many cases, accelerated guerrilla activities broke out immediately after large numbers of refugees had entered a UN area. Either the refugees had carried arms and ammunition through the UN lines to the guerrilla forces or the enemy, screened by the throngs of fleeing civilians, had managed to move whole units into the UN rear. Indications pointed to the use of both of these methods. (8)

3. Air

Most enemy air activity during the month consisted of action against UN air elements. In this air-to-air action the enemy concentrated principally on attacks against UN jet aircraft and medium bombers. Probable reasons for this concentration were: these UN aircraft were the most numerous of the types entering areas of probable enemy contact; the enemy might be using his aircraft as a means of determining US-UN air capabilities and tactics for future reference, rather than as an effective weapon of warfare.

It was estimated that the approximately 250 planes of the Soviet Air Forces believed to be in China were either available to the enemy or would become available prior to an all-out CCF air effort in Korea. Including these planes, the enemy was considered to have

 (8) Ibid, Sec 2 f, Guerrillas.

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approximately 650 combat aircraft available. In addition, 400-500 Soviet aircraft in the Soviet-controlled Dairen area could be made available for use in Korea and additional aircraft might be supplied from the large stocks in air units in the Soviet Far East. Using these aircraft and employing air facilities in Korea, China, Manchuria and Siberia, the enemy was believed capable of launching an extensive air effort at any time. Such an offensive probably would precede or coincide with a major ground offensive. By effective utilization of his maximum sortie capabilities the enemy could divert a considerable portion of the UN air effort from ground support operations, hinder UN airlift to Korea, attack UN shipping and installations near Kyushu and southern Honshu and give possibly effective air support to his ground operations. From present bases in Manchuria the enemy could reach by air all points in Korea, the northern part of Kyushu and the southern part of Honshu. (9)

4. Psychological Warfare

Psychological warfare activities during the month appeared to be Chinese and Korean language broadcasts primarily beamed to Communist indigenous listeners. No evidence was discovered of a Communist loudspeaker operation or enemy leaflet drop designed to reduce the UN soldier's will to resist. Perhaps the lack of this type of warfare, normally a primary Communist tactic, was occasioned by the lack of equipment or the difficulty in transporting the equipment under constant UN aerial attack.

Propaganda handbills were posted or distributed by enemy guerrillas. Although some radio broadcasts from Peking, Khabarovsk and Pyongyang were aimed at influencing UN Forces and undermining their will to resist, most of them were directed at securing support for the Communist effort and ideology among the citizens of both Communist-occupied areas and those areas still under UN control. Some of

(9) Ibid, See 2 a, Air.

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the more important themes used included exhortations to Korean civilians to take up arms against capitalistic invaders, discussions of "good treatment" accorded UN PW's, general "hate the US" campaigns and discussions of the rehabilitation and unification of Korea by the Communists. The description of the alleged good treatment accorded UN PW's probably had the most potentially disrupting effect on UN troops. An example of this type of broadcast emanated from Peking early in the month: "the humanitarian and lenient treatment of US PW's by the Chinese People's Volunteer troops will create an immense psychological influence on the mass opinion of the UN." PW statements of "gratitude" to their Chinese captors were included in the broadcast. (10)

5. Personnel

As of 28 December enemy forces in Korea totaled 451,866, including 278,569 CCF and 173,297 NKA troops. In addition some 371,000 troops, consisting of the bulk of the First CCF Field Army and remnants of the Third CCF Field Army, were grouped along the Manchurian-Korean border. This gave the enemy a total of 822,866 troops immediately available. Backing up this impressive manpower supply were some 641,000 personnel either en route to or in Manchuria. Thus the enemy had an over-all total of 1,463,866 troops either committed in Korea or in position to be committed rapidly as his discretion. (11)

An analysis of past CCF replacement policies, particularly in the campaign against the Chinese Nationalist Army, indicated that when replacement and re-equipment was warranted entire units ranging in size up to a division were sometimes withdrawn from the battle area. Current CCF policy seemed to be insertion of blocks of replacements varying in size from 200 to 400 men into CCF divisions chewed

 (10) Ibid, Sec 2 g, Psychological Warfare Elements.

(11) Ibid, Sec 3 c, Order of Battle.

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up in the Korean fighting. In the face of overwhelming UN air superiority the CCF probably considered the pouring of replacements into those units already in the field more advantageous than attempting to shift large bodies of troops. (12)

During the period 28 November through 27 December the enemy suffered an estimated 96,615 casualties. Of this total, 85,195 occurred as the direct result of battle injuries, 11,446 as the result of non-battle injuries or sickness and 1,537 were captured by UN Forces. Most of the casualties inflicted on the enemy by Eighth US Army occurred through 12 December; from 12 to 24 December the greatest number of casualties occurred in X Corps zone during the withdrawal from the Choshin Reservoir and evacuation of Hungnam. (13)

Since morale is a personnel factor pegged to success in combat and the enemy succeeded in many of his combat objectives during the month, it would be safe to assume that morale was generally high. The individual soldier could realize that his armies were moving south at a rapid rate against what he believed to be one of the two great military powers in the world. The fact that his armies were able to throw back a predominantly US attack and force these units back in disorder, without the aid of air power, tanks or artillery, undoubtedly imparted a tremendous lift to the morale of the individual Communist soldier. (14)

 (12) Ibid, Sec 3 d, Reinforcements.

(13) Ibid, Sec 3 a, Casualties. All totals are estimates, with the exception of PW figures. Included are prorated estimates of casualties inflicted by UN air action.

(14) Ibid, Sec 3 b, Morale.

Chapter IV

PERSONNEL

The FEC personnel shortage, chiefly in the enlisted grades, was reduced to approximately 50,000 during December. The shortage of officers, primarily medical and warrant, comprised 5 percent of the manpower deficiency. The arrival of 20,905 enlisted personnel from the zone of interior (ZI) during the month brought actual US strength in FEC up to 21,600 officers and 213,000 enlisted personnel. (1)

The shortage of warrant officer personnel was expected to be alleviated considerably by temporary appointments as warrant officers of qualified master sergeants in FEC under the authority stipulated in AR 610, 17 November 1950. (2) Requirements for medical officers continued to grow more serious as the incidence of psychiatric conditions, infectious hepatitis, venereal disease, cold injuries and battle casualties increased. (3)

Replacements received during December, on the other hand, were approximately 10 percent less than the 23,000 enlisted personnel estimated for shipment from the ZI. DA authorized shipment of 28,235 enlisted personnel, including 840 Puerto Ricans, to FEC for the month of December. Enlisted shipments of 16,000 scheduled for January would be barely sufficient to meet casualties and other losses. Of the 12,165 (combat) and 17,424 (service) enlisted replacements on hand and received in December, 11,041 (combat) and 16,210 (service) were assigned against reported losses resulting from battle casualties and other non-battle injuries. (4)

Highest UN ground and air forces assigned strength in Korea for

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- (1) G-1 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 2)
 - (2) AG Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 6)
 - (3) Med Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 17)
 - (4) G-1 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 2)

the period 29 November through 29 December was 360,097 reached on 29 December. (5) Of this strength, ground forces totals were as follows: 177,727 US; 144,746 ROK (including 16,596 serving with US forces); 12,287 UK; 1,238 Filipino; 4,150 Turkish; 1,117 Thai; 627 Dutch; 1,007 French; 840 Greek; and 1,256 Canadian. Air Forces personnel in Korea totaled 15,102 for the same day. During the month infantry battalions from France, Greece and Canada were assigned to UN Forces in Korea. (6)

Reported casualties for the period 29 November through 29 December 1950 were as follows: (7)

	KIA	TIA	MIA	TOTAL	NB(8)	TOTAL
US						
Army	300	1,633	5,036	6,969	5,228	12,197
Marine	398	2,303	276	2,977	1,500	4,477
Navy	3	154	6	163	15	178
Air Force	14	7	49	70	6	76
Total	715	4,097	5,367	10,179	6,749	16,928
ROK	1,425	20,765	19,730	41,915	2,652	44,567
UK	7	4	4	15	211	226
Phil			6	6	158	164
Turk	85	238	630	953	19	972
Total	1,517	21,007	20,370	42,889	3,040	45,929
Grand Total	2,232	25,104	25,737	53,068	9,789	62,857

Rapid changes in the tactical situation in Korea necessitated makeshift reassignments of some of the replacement units arriving from the ZI. The 52d Chemical Technical Intelligence Detachment, en route to FEC, was scheduled for assignment to Japan Logistical Command (JLC), attached to 10th Chemical Service Company, instead of X Corps. This assignment would continue training preparatory to future use in the combat zone in addition to organizing and training a radiological monitoring team from personnel within the unit. (9)

(5) Forces of the following sixteen member nations, UNC, were participating in or supporting military operations in Korea as of 25 December 1950: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, India, Korea, The Netherlands, New Zealand, The Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.

(6) Information compiled from UNC G-3 Opns Rpts for the period 30 Nov-30 Dec 50. (G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50) (Annex 4)

(7) Ibid.

(8) Explanation of abbreviations: KIA, killed in action; TIA, wounded in action; MIA, Missing in action; NB, non-battle.

(9) Chem Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 10)

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The 3d CID Detachment, originally intended for Korea, arrived in December and was assigned to JLC. (10) Limitation of civil assistance activities to South Korea affected the personnel requirements and assignments for this purpose. Of the eighty-two UN civilian personnel requested, twenty-one arrived and were utilized to supervise and coordinate civil assistance activities in Korea. Three of the five military government units (95th MG Group and 28th and 29th MG Companies), which arrived in Japan during December, were awaiting equipment before assignment to Korea. The other two units (38th MG Group and 408th MG Company) were held at the POE in California pending further clarification of the tactical situation in Korea. Continued manpower shortages hampered Engineer, Chemical and Signal Corps units supporting the UN effort in Korea. Units reaching the theater usually were not fully manned, trained or equipped. Both the 556th and 557th Engineer Technical Intelligence Teams (Combat) which arrived in Japan during December were subsequently equipped by JLC and scheduled for water transportation to Korea early in January. (11)

The formation of an Engineer Searchlight Company (reduced strength) by JLC for assignment to Eighth Army, to be used in battlefield illumination as a defense against enemy night infiltration and for other miscellaneous tasks, was needed urgently. (12) A plan was in the formative stage to activate a chemical service company capable of gas warfare support on a 50 percent basis. (13) Increasing requirements for cryptographic personnel made it almost impossible to depend on ZI sources for such specialists. (14) Reorganization of Quartermaster Corps units, currently organized under Reduction Tables, under appropriate full T/O&E was initiated to meet a

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- (10) FM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 19)
 - (11) Eng Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 13)
 - (12) Ibid.
 - (13) Chem Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 10)
 - (14) Sign Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 23)

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 serious shortage of the units in Korea. (15)

A decision was made to evacuate the remains of US personnel to Japan from UN cemeteries in Korea. Maps of the cemeteries established during the northward advance beyond the 38th Parallel were prepared for later identification; reinterment of remains from cemeteries south of the Parallel was started. (16) This program required the establishment of facilities and organization of units to provide for the receipt of the remains and their necessary preparation prior to shipment to the ZI. Space for this was secured at Camp Kokura and Moji in Japan. A zone headquarters, Army Graves Registration Service (AGRS) (8204th Army Unit) and Field Operation Section (8205th Army Unit) were activated to provide essential personnel for the operation. DA notified FEC that the 148th QM Graves Registration Company and Detachment 9, 9135th TSU, JLC, QM Central Identification would be moved to FEC. The shortage of specialists in graves registration work was alleviated further by employment of DA civilians and Japanese technicians and by reassignment of military specialists. (17) Remains of UN personnel, exclusive of US, were removed to a central cemetery at Pusan as requested. (18)

As a result of the withdrawal of X Corps from northeastern Korea and the contracting area of operations of Eighth Army, requirements for service units to support those commands were altered considerably. Action was initiated to determine the new requirements of Eighth Army in order to reassign units in the theater and assign those units arriving from the ZI. DA cancelled all outstanding requests for units at the end of December, which reduced technical service strengths requested from ZI: cancelled -- 31,191; on hand and requested -- 121,029; balance -- 89,838. Requirements for addi--

 (15) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 21)

(16) G-1 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 2)

(17) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 21)

(18) G-1 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 2)

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tional essential technical service units were being studied. (19)

Under a continuing plan for training replacements, new programs were initiated in an effort to meet specialized manpower requirements. The Signal School Division of the Eta Jima School Command, established 4 December, proved of such great assistance in overcoming the shortage of well-trained Signal Corps personnel that a similar establishment was considered essential for the training of additional cryptographic specialists within FEC, to meet urgent heavy requirements impossible to obtain from ZI sources. (20)

Interior management was affected by the continuing need for a round-the-clock seven day work week in some sections and at least a double shift in others. The inequities among sections and even among divisions or branches within sections as to hours of operation created morale problems. Although the policy was to utilize civilian personnel wherever possible in lieu of enlisted personnel, efforts were under way in many sections to substitute military personnel, due to the overtime involved and non-availability of civilian personnel in the number required. The projected arrival of WAC's was expected to alleviate the situation somewhat. (21)

An increase in the authorized civilian personnel manning levels to 4,275 and a decrease in the number of employees on duty to 3,736 during December indicated the continuation of trends reported in November with regard to recruitment and strength. Forty-six locally hired personnel were employed as against eighty-five voluntary separations during the month. (22)

WAC strength in FEC as of 31 December was as follows:

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Total</u>
GHQ	54	1	299	354
JLC	79	3	568	650
Eighth Army	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	134	4	867	1,005

- (19) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 5)
- (20) Sig Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 23)
- (21) G-1 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 2)
- (22) Civ Pers Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 11)

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The Southwestern Provisional MAC Detachment was activated at Osaka, Japan, with a strength of fifty-five enlisted women and one officer. Approximately 50 percent of the enlisted women were utilized at Osaka Army Hospital and the remainder assigned to various sections through Headquarters, Southwestern Command. (23)

The uncertainty of future military operations in Korea prompted the transfer of all PW's from inclosures at Pyongyang and Inchon to the Pusan area where five separate PW inclosures were established. In addition to the 6,900 sick and wounded PW's hospitalized, there were more than 85,000 PW's in three stockades, among which were many sick persons requiring daily care. These PW's had to be suitably clothed, sheltered and provided with adequate food. (24)

Perhaps the most effective morale booster was the initiation of the long-planned program of rest and recuperation during the last two days of December. Designed to give Korea combat personnel five days of rest in Japan, the program was limited to two hundred per day entering and leaving Japan with an over-all limitation of 1,200 personnel in Japan at any one time. Billeting and other administrative details were handled by Headquarters and Service Command. In Tokyo a hotel was converted to a leave center for enlisted personnel and spaces provided in billets for returning combat officers of all branches of service. (25) "Operation Santa Claus", a remote control Christmas shopping project for UN troops in Korea, aggregated a total of 4,962 orders amounting to a total of \$107,000. (26) Completion and coverage of this project was attained through maximum efforts of all sections concerned; a movie short was made in Japan and Korea for release in the US and on television. (27)

Projected shipments of civilian personnel such as hostesses,

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- (23) G-1 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 2)
 - (24) Ibid; Med Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 17)
 - (25) HQ & Serv Cnd GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 14)
 - (26) Sp Serv Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 24)
 - (27) Pub Inf Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 20)

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librarians and Red Cross personnel were reduced to the absolute minimum and in some instances completely stopped. Shipments of Special Services supplies and equipment were screened for elimination of all but the most essential items. (28) Since the tactical situation in Korea made inadvisable the scheduling of celebrity type entertainment units for FEC, fifty special 16-mm Christmas greeting trailers were provided for use on Christmas Day in forward areas. (29) Contributions and donations for the welfare of combat forces from organizations in the US, consisting of cash, beer, cigars and gift packages were accepted.

Continued activity of the USAFI unit at Headquarters 2d Logistical Command, resulted in a surprisingly large volume of new enrollments; a regional testing center was opened to take care of this increase and to relieve the mobile unit for use in other areas. The USAFI enrollment figure was approximately five times greater than that of any previous month of the year. Much of this increase was attributed to enlisted reserve personnel who found in USAFI an opportunity to continue their interrupted education. Authority was granted from the Department of Defense to liberalize the disenrollment policy with respect to personnel whose progress in USAFI was interrupted by the Korean operation. The University of California Extension Course increased by 18 percent; five additional UC instructors were requested for further implementation of the program. (30)

Every effort was made to distribute copies of the "Stars and Stripes" to troops in combat areas as fast as possible. Publication of a weekly news map, containing stories and photographs of significant news events of the previous week, was initiated during the month. (31) To acquaint the families and friends of servicemen with

(28) G-1 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 2)

(29) Sp Serv Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 24)

(30) Troop Inf & Ed Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 26)

(31) Ibid.

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combat activities, interview-type shows were recorded for Christmas radio programs over hometown stations in the US. A special program of this nature was prepared for the Cleveland area, built up around the first recalled reserve units from the area to reach FEC. Native language recordings prepared by a Turkish officer in Korea covering activities of the Turkish Brigade were forwarded to Ankara for release. (32)

The Decorations and Awards Board, established to insure expeditious handling of the increased volume of recommendations for decorations and awards, processed eighty-one cases during December. (33)

(32) Pub Inf Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 20)
(33) AG Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 6)

Chapter V

LOGISTICS

Military reverses in the forward areas plus the advent of cold weather and consequent increase in requirements, made logistical support increasingly difficult. Every effort was made to supply all possible items to troops in Korea as well as supplying certain items for use of personnel traveling to and from Korea. Issue of critically short standard Arctic Clothing and Equipment items was rigidly controlled to assure careful handling and utilization. (1) Clothing from stocks in Japan, salvage clothing and clothing collected from personnel returning from Korea were utilized to relieve the strain on limited supply. (2)

A survey was conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of Quartermaster wet-cold weather clothing by interviewing patients who had been hospitalized as a result of frostbite. The result showed that the clothing and equipment furnished was adequate in both design and the amount and that troops had received intensive training and indoctrination in its use. The tactical situation prevailing during the period, however, prevented proper use and maintenance. Under almost constant pressure by enemy forces troops had little or no opportunity to dry clothing which had become wet by excessive perspiration or by wading streams. (3)

A DA policy change necessitated revision of the FEC plan for provision of protective clothing. Impregnating chemicals and equipment were to be stockpiled rather than the clothing itself, as originally planned. Since the special clothing required to implement the original plan was not available, (4) normal stocks of clothing

 (1) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 21)
 (2) Ibid.
 (3) Ibid.
 (4) Ibid.

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in FEC depots and in the hands of troops were to be impregnated when the need arose.

Authorized levels on most of the major items of ammunition were reached with the exception of 3.5- and 4.5- inch rocket, 4.2- inch mortar and illuminating shells for both the 60- and 81-mm mortars. A requisition of 5,000 rounds each of 105-mm Howitzer HE-P and 90-mm Tank Heat ammunition for possible use against very heavy armor was made. The offloading of ammunition afloat in Japanese harbors continued with an estimated completion date of 1 February 1951. It was necessary to open several additional storage facilities to accommodate this ammunition. (5) Approximately 10,000 tons of ammunition were lost by the Eighth Army during the retrograde movement. All possible major items on hand in Japan were placed on priority shipment to 2d or 3d Logistical Commands in order to replace Eighth Army losses at the earliest possible time. (6)

The increased need for fortification material, particularly sandbags and barbed wire, was met from stocks on hand in Korea and by local procurement in Japan. (7) Since the original allocation of approximately 100,000 mountain-type sleeping bags did not meet urgent requirements in Korea, a subsequent DA allocation of 89,000 was shipped to Pusan. (8)

Outside assistance was dispatched to X Corps for the evacuation of wounded from the Choshin area, in place of the requested helicopters. Although the need was urgent the supply situation of this item in FEC did not warrant immediate delivery. In an effort to make the maximum number of fixed and rotary wing aircraft serviceable, DA was requested to expedite critical spare parts as well as assigning aircraft technical representatives to this headquarters

- (5) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 5)
- (6) Ord Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 18)
- (7) Eng Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 13)
- (8) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 21)

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instead of Far East Air Materiel Command as it was believed an arrangement of this nature would permit maximum utilization of this personnel in maintenance, repair and erection of aircraft. (9)

A need in Korea and other areas in the Far East for a vehicle capable of negotiating narrow winding roads became a serious problem. A recommendation was made to DA that a small vehicle, with the characteristics of the jeep, but with a cargo capacity of approximately two and one-half tons, be developed and that contracts be let for commercial production of these vehicles for immediate and future use. The small cubic capacity of the cargo body of the 2½-ton truck, employed almost exclusively for movement on highways in Korea, limited the use of this vehicle. FEC recommended that DA establish a priority and design a new truck with the characteristics of the 2½-ton truck, plus a body with a greater cubic capacity, capable of handling a minimum of five short tons. (10)

The JIC request for a strategic equipment reserve for two infantry divisions was not favorably considered by DA. DA initiated action to make an automatic shipment to FEC of equipment for an infantry division to cover losses sustained in combat during the latter part of November and the first part of December. (11)

The value of procurement from local resources within a theater was demonstrated throughout the Korean campaign. Since locally manufactured batteries proved generally of good quality and durability, plans were made to capitalize on Japanese capabilities in producing cold weather batteries. The possibility of producing several other items in Japan, to reduce the amount of resupply from ZI as well as shipping space required to transport material to the theater, was under study. Local procurement action was initiated for: 500 pouches, to be utilized in the memorial activities of Eighth Army and in

 (9) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 5)

(10) Trans Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 25)

(11) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 5)

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repatriation program; 2,500 wooden boxes for transportation and storage of repatriation cases; and 100,00 inflatable pads for insulation of sleeping bags or blankets. Action was also initiated to obtain some 400,000 yards of duck held by the Japanese Government to be locally made into tents and tarpaulins required for covering supplies stored in the open. (12)

During December, it was learned that the Japan Food Industry Company was unable to meet the production schedule on their current contract for ROKA combat rations. JIC was authorized to make necessary additional procurement to meet the delivery schedule of 700,000 rations per month. (13) Veterinary inspection of the rations was conducted during manufacture, packaging and assembly of the component items to assure acceptable sanitary conditions and compliance with contract requirements. Inspection and procurement in Japan was initiated for an additional 2,100,000 rations. Following delivery of the initial experimental order for 120 porkless Turkish combat rations, locally procured and packed, an order was placed for 50,000 additional rations. (14) The menu served to PW's was prepared by Eighth Army from food furnished by the ROK. In the event that necessary ration items were not available from ROK supplies, they were to be obtained from Civil Affairs. Grain and fish allowances in the diet were increased in December following a report that PW's were receiving insufficient protein. (15)

Information received from the DA revealed that subsistence supply capabilities in the ZI were strained to the limit and the theater was asked not to increase by thirty days the B ration level in Japan. DA proposed as an alternative that any emergency need for rations would be met from the ZI within thirty days from receipt of

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- (12) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 21)
 - (13) Ibid.
 - (14) Med Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 17)
 - (15) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 21)

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the requisitions; DA was informed that our levels were considered inadequate to meet the continuous demand for balanced B rations in the face of consumption and loss experience at higher than normal peacetime rates, and were also inadequate to guard against expected additional losses, delays and disruptions of supply lines. Present levels provided a lower safety factor than peacetime levels in Japan, and the emergency supply action proposed by the DA would not substitute for adequate stocks in Japan. The theater request for a sixty day level with fifteen days of increase to be supplied immediately was approved by DA. (16)

A summary of recent changes in ration factors was transmitted to the DA as a justification for the increased requisitions for items of subsistence. An increased allowance of yeast and shortening was later granted by the DA. All changes, including the caloric supplement, were approved with the exception of yeast and shortening. In an effort to avoid purchasing unpopular brands and to minimize stocks on hand, it was decided that all ration supplement packs required for troops in Korea would be assembled locally. (17)

Every effort was made to reduce the time lag in handling the logistical supply. Improved processing of documents as well as a daily express freight service from the Tokyo-Yokohama area to the port of Sasebo were introduced following the outbreak of hostilities. During December the western terminal was moved from Sasebo to Moji in order to shorten the over-all time required for the movement of freight to Korea. (18) The burden on port facilities in Japan was increased by the rerouting of many Engineer items en route to Korea and the evacuation of supplies such as lumber, rails and cross ties from Inchon to Japan. (19)

(16) Ibid.

(17) Ibid.

(18) Trans Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 25)

(19) Eng Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 13)

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Supply of air type items, responsibility for which was assigned to QM for the Army aircraft program and for air cargo drop, was assigned JLC, including requirements, requisitioning, storage and distribution of required items. This procedure was installed because operational demands dictated a central responsible agency. (20)

The DA was requested to ship a sufficient quantity of radio sets, AN/GRC-3 through 8, to FEC to equip at least one infantry division in FEC prior to equipping a corps in the ZI. These radio sets were designated during deployment as a "Family of Radio Sets" to provide ground and vehicular frequency-modulated voice communication equipment for use by all combat arms in forward areas. (21)

The FEC Engineer desired advance notice from DA covering shipments of specific items, as well as early dispatch of related technical literature and test questionnaires. Ninety adaptors for mounting the sniper scope on 3.5 inch rocket launchers were ordered airlifted from the ZI for delivery to 2d Logistical Command as requested by Eighth Army and X Corps. (22)

In an effort to meet emergency hospitalization requirements, a study of available installations was made to determine the suitability of facilities in Japan for rehabilitation as hospitals. DA authorized the expenditure of Military Construction Army Funds for a total of 5,150 General Hospital bed spaces at the cost of \$1,660,000 and convalescent beds at \$54,000. (23)

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Although a considerable amount of medical supplies was retained by the GHQ Medical Section through a carefully planned conservation program, sudden and marked changes in tactical situations necessitated immediate shipments of large quantities of medical supplies from ZI to alleviate shortages suffered in Korea. Many items on

- (20) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 21)
- (21) Sig Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 23)
- (22) Eng Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 13)
- (23) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 5)

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hand in the depot considered sub-standard and unfit for use during peacetime proved to be lifesavers. Dressing material of all types was particularly valuable due to the shortage of cotton goods in Korea. In December all materials necessary for medical operations in Japan and Korea were requisitioned from the ZI. Material for Korea was delivered directly to the theater insofar as practicable; JLC maintained a reserve to be supplied to Korea on demand. Supplies were received in adequate quantities for all medical purposes. (24)

With the world-wide deficiency and confiscation by the US Government of current aviation gas (AVGAS) production, the oil companies servicing airlines and chartered aircraft at Haneda Air Base in Tokyo found themselves without sufficient products to meet their obligations. In support of the Korean chartered airlift DA authorized the loan of ten million barrels of aviation gas to assist local oil companies. Since local oil company resupply had broken down, the parent companies made inquiry of DA as to the possibility of developing procedures for purchase from the US Government of AVGAS at Haneda Air Base in Japan and the servicing of aircraft with such AVGAS. Although sale of the AVGAS was disapproved no objection was interposed to a service contract and US Government AVGAS was pumped into chartered aircraft with local oil company equipment. (25)

At a meeting attended by representatives of British Commonwealth Occupation Forces (BCOF), FEAF, JLC, GHQ Comptroller and G-4 (GHQ) Petroleum Section, a reciprocal refueling agreement between US Occupation Forces and BCOF was discussed. It was concluded that CINCPAC and BCOF would initiate separate and concurrent actions to obtain guidance and advice from higher authorities with regard to the issuance of all classes of products to UN Forces so that new

(24) Med Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 17)

(25) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 5)

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agreement could be drawn up covering issue of aviation, ground and marine products as well as handling transportation and other charges incurred. (26)

(26) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 5)

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Chapter VI

MISCELLANEOUS FEC ACTIVITIES

Certain miscellaneous activities under FEC control, not considered as having an immediate bearing on military operations in the forward areas, nevertheless were significant in the over-all scheme. These included, in part, civil relief in Korea, problems concerning the Ryukyus Islands and various administrative activities connected with the immediate organization of GHQ.

Following the Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean war and consequent withdrawal of UN Forces south of the 38th Parallel, responsibility for the conduct of civil affairs activities in Korea was limited largely to coordination of civil assistance activities in South Korea. Planning for activities in North Korea, such as the reorientation and reeducation program, was suspended. In the implementation of responsibility for the conduct of civil assistance activities in South Korea, supervision was continued through staff activities within UNC, analysis of periodic reports and staff visits to units in the field. (1)

Civil assistance activities within UNC were concerned primarily with provision of civil relief. During December offers of Italian and Norwegian Red Cross Field Hospitals for welfare and humanitarian work were accepted and formation in the ZI of the "American Relief Committee for Korea" to coordinate efforts of agencies and individuals desiring to make contributions toward relief in Korea, was endorsed. Channels of access were provided for the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) into various military and civilian agencies, such as the US Department of State and International Committee of the Red Cross, and logistic support

(1) G-1 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 2)

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 was established for UNCURK personnel. (2)

Numerous revisions in the civil relief program in Korea was required following the UN withdrawal. The southward trek of hundreds of thousands of refugees increased the relief load, more than counterbalancing the actual loss of areas claiming relief. Refugees away from their homes, their farms and their work became totally dependent upon relief supplies furnished by the Army. (3) Eighth Army informed CINCFE of revised requirements for supplies and priority of shipment during the months of December 1950 and January 1951, requesting suspension of all shipment of relief supplies except those listed by Eighth Army. Excluding civilian type supplies for construction or rehabilitation of civilian facilities to further military operations, the request was approved. DA was advised that all requirements for North Korea had been frozen and was requested to suspend procurement action for such purposes. (4)

A DA policy change restricted authority of CINCFE with respect to the Korean Economic Aid Program within the UNC zone of responsibility. Under this policy CINCFE was not authorized to procure in FEC or issue military stocks without DA authorization in each instance. Inasmuch as this policy would seriously curtail military operations and since considerable confusion existed as to the intent of DA with respect to the Korean Economic Aid Program, FEC proposed certain modifications of the policy. DA also advised CINCFE to encourage the Japanese Government and other Japanese agencies desiring to contribute to the relief and rehabilitation of Korea, as a means of improving Japanese-Korean relations; contributions were to be limited to goods rather than personnel. Plans were formulated to obtain lists of proposed contributions from the several Japanese ministries. (5)

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- (2) Ibid.
 - (3) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 21)
 - (4) G-4 Sec. GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 5)
 - (5) Ibid.

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Deliveries of civilian relief engineer supplies were adjusted to meet receiving and distributing capabilities of such supplies in Korea. This included expediting deliveries of coal and Japanese type hand tools, deferring procurement of lumber and rescheduling deliveries of cement. (6) Of the total of \$58,572,191 worth of civilian type supplies procured with DA funds as of 31 December 1950, \$13,027,937 worth were delivered in Korea. Of the total of \$13,026.90 offered as contributions from UN member nations, including American relief agencies, \$7,534.30 was delivered or enroute to Korea. (7) JLC was instructed to plan a transfer of existing contracts from current military appropriations to a new appropriation of \$100,000,000 which the Budget Bureau had requested from Congress for civil relief in Korea. (8)

The month of December marked the completion of many months of work on a revised directive for civil administration of the Ryukyus Islands, culminating in a letter of instruction to the Deputy Governor of the Ryukyus outlining the objectives to be attained and delegating certain authority to him. Transfer of functions relative to the Ryukyus Student Program from Civil Affairs Section to the Ryukyus Civil Administration Section was planned to become effective on or about 1 January 1951. Many problems connected with the implementation of the new directive remained, chief among which was the establishment of a sound economic and financial structure in the Ryukyus. (9) In response to a DA request for information as to the desirability of instructing the Ryukyus Government to comply with a directive authorizing extension of Japanese fishing limits southward, FEC replied that it was both expensive and impractical; the need for separate agreements with respect to the Ryukyus was indicated. (10)

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- (6) Eng Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 13)
 - (7) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 5)
 - (8) Off of Com Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 12)
 - (9) Ryukyus CA Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 22)
 - (10) Ibid.

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Close coordination was effected with FEAF and JLC to provide the maximum possible support for Air Force Project OK-29 on Okinawa. The construction schedules for this project were moved forward approximately sixty days, requiring that additional equipment be furnished with minimum delay. The Korean situation permitted filling outstanding Engineer equipment requisitions for this project without detriment to other priority claimants, although Ordnance and Quartermaster equipment required could not be furnished by JLC. In addition, items of Engineer equipment originally allotted to the Air Forces and scheduled for shipment to MARBO were diverted to RYCOM for this project. Action was taken to effect priority repair of certain items unavailable in RYCOM and urgently needed for the project. Spare parts required to remove OK-29 equipment from deadline were screened to determine the availability for supply. (11)

A RYCOM proposal for collection of non-ferrous scrap, including considerable quantities of cartridge brass, in the possession of natives was under study. The basic proposal contemplated recapture of this scrap by purchase from native collectors rather than confiscation; the contractors were to be compensated by receiving title to a percentage of the scrap collected. (12) RYCOM was directed to complete a State Department contract for removal of some 100 vessels in scrap and salvage condition in Ryukyuan waters. Ferrous and non-ferrous metal scrap resulting from the operation was to be shipped to the ZI for use in the domestic economy. (13)

Disposition of excess Engineer equipment in MARBO, PHILCOM and RYCOM continued, with shipment of selected items to pertinent commands and distribution of excess lists to major commands for screening. In addition to providing much needed supplies from a readily available source, the program avoided possible overstocking through

 (11) Eng Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 13)

(12) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 21)

(13) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 5)

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requisitions from the ZI. Excess unserviceable equipment, particularly critical items, was moved to Japan to minimize shortages of critically needed spare parts for repair and rehabilitation of equipment. (14) Shipment of all unserviceable Signal equipment from the Ryukyus to Japan was expedited. (15)

Captured enemy material such as smoke pots with Russian markings, Russian flame-thrower guns and steel drums with Russian markings were forwarded to the ZI for further chemical analysis. A small stock of radioactive sand discovered in North Korea was also sent back to the ZI for chemical and spectrographic analysis. An investigation of the 95 percent destroyed Hungnam Explosives Plant revealed that most of its principal products -- dynamite, detonators, time fuses, ammonium nitrate and smokeless powder -- were shipped to Communist China. The greater portion of gold, silver, copper and lead produced at the Hungnam Metals Refinery was shipped to the USSR. (16)

Signal Section published a procedure for handling enemy material of intelligence value; such material was to be selected by intelligence units in the field and shipped to Yokohama Signal Depot for further analysis and evaluation. (17) In accordance with a DA policy to furnish Allied nations with sample items of captured enemy equipment for analysis, some Soviet radio equipment was turned over to the British for intelligence purposes. (18) A preliminary report on the Soviet aircraft receiver, RSE-BM-1, indicated that it probably was intended for use in air-to-air communication, air-to-ground communication and possibly as an air monitor station. (19)

Geological survey activities continued. Negotiations were under way with a Philippine survey company to accomplish all ground

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- (14) Eng Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 13)
 - (15) Sig Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 23)
 - (16) Chem Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 10)
 - (17) Sig Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 23)
 - (18) Ibid.
 - (19) Ibid.

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control necessary for large-scale mapping within a specified area; the number of Filipino survey technicians was increased to augment military personnel engaged in the program. Ground control operations were completed in the Marianas and initiated in the Bonins. Work remaining to be accomplished on Hokkaido and Northern Honshu was suspended for the winter. Final plans were being formulated for initiation of a survey project in the Caroline Islands late in January 1951. The Chinese Department of Surveys continued making check profiles on Formosa under a contract arrangement. (20)

Through careful planning and close sympathetic supervision at all levels, "Project Bluewood," providing for the return to the ZI of dependents of personnel killed or missing in action in Korea, continued to function effectively. By the end of 1950 a total of 165 families had been returned to the US under this program. (21)

FEC recommended to DA that a uniform policy of coordinated travel for dependents with medical and dental personnel be established. Under the current system, there was no coordinated travel of dependents with medical and dental personnel of the Army although Air Force, civilian employee doctors and dentists and public health officers serving with the armed forces were allowed to bring dependents with them when traveling to Japan. (22)

At the beginning of 1950 there were some 14,300 dependents families present in Japan and 13,700 housing units available. At the end of 1950 approximately 12,600 families of Occupation personnel were in Japan; available family housing units numbered approximately 15,300. The first reduction in numbers of families took place during the month following the close of the school year in mid June. Between mid July and September the effects of suspension of dependent

- (20) Eng Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 13)
(21) G-1 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff SSec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 2)
(22) Ibid.

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travel to Japan and return of dependents to the US prior to return of the sponsor were very marked, causing family strength to decrease at the rate of 100 per month. During the last quarter of the year less than 500 families departed Japan. The increase in total available housing resulting from the construction program was offset by the conversion to officer, civilian and enlisted billets and office space of some 400 temporary housing units in the Tokyo area. (23)

Since many personnel wished to return their possessions to the US following the outbreak of hostilities, FEC requested DA to authorize shipment of household goods of Army and Air Force military and civilian personnel prior to return travel of either the sponsor or his dependents. Navy personnel already had this authority. (24)

In as much as the need for change in the radiological defense plan for Tokyo was immediate, pending completion of the unified atomic, biological and chemical defense plan, revision of Operations Order No. 5 was initiated. (25)

Under the DA revision of the system for handling communications between UN Forces participating in operations in Korea and their home governments, Army Command and Administrative Network (ACAN) channels were to be used free of charge, with certain restrictions. ACAN facilities were not to be used when parallel circuits of the various governments were available and in instances where ACAN facilities were inoperable, expenses for refiles were to be charged to the government concerned. (26)

Bulk mail for UN components, other than US, engaged in Korean operations, was handled through the International Exchange Office located at the Seventh Base Post Office in Yokohama, Japan. All

 (23) Ibid.

(24) Trans Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 25)

(25) Chem Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 10)

(26) Sig Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 23)

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maritime, territorial and transmission charges arising from the carriage of mail originating with components of the UNC were chargeable to the appropriate nation when such mail was accepted as "Free Forces Mail" or mail prepared at concessionary rates. Temporary postage rates and international mail routes were established. To improve the service, unscheduled US Air Force and Military Air Transport (MATS) flights to and from Korea were utilized to carry a portion of the mail load. (27)

In a further effort to assist UN member nations in Korea, transportation via MATS and Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) was provided for personnel authorized return to their native countries for emergency leave or reassignment for compassionate reasons when other transportation was unavailable. Financial reimbursements were to be arranged between the governments concerned and the US Government. (28)

Action was suspended indefinitely on conversion of North Korean currency to the ROK won, in view of the tactical situation. Due to the fluctuation of the won to dollar rate, FEC recommended that no per capita limitation of MPC be made in Korea and further that foreign forces (other than US) should not pay troops in won or in parts of won. (29)

Efforts continued in speeding up the processing of film in FEC. FEAF planned a laboratory for processing 16-mm Ansco color film exposed in gun cameras and was studying methods to improve facilities for processing black and white 16-mm motion picture as well as still film. Having completed installation of a still laboratory, NAVFE took over Navy work formerly handled by GHQ Photographic Laboratory. (30)

(27) AG Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 6)
(28) G-1 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 2)
(29) Off of Comp Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 12)
(30) Sig Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 23)

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Under a new policy covering welfare supplies and equipment obtained from appropriated funds, Army, Air Force and Marine Corps requirements were requisitioned separately and supplied from stocks procured from Army, Air Force and Marine Corps funds respectively. Depot stocks on hand in Korea as of 31 December 1950 were to be inventoried and allocated between the three services; Special Services supplies would no longer be issued by one service to another on a nonreimbursable basis. The policy provided that the services could issue supplies to each other provided such supplies could be replenished subsequently. A port credit in the amount of \$2,500,000 for supply of Special Service items for Army units in FEC was established by DA to be allocated between major Army Logistical Commands of FEC. (31)

A "Good Will Book" was presented by the American Bible Society to the Japanese people through the Japanese Bible Society. The book contained signatures of some 39,000 American citizens, including President Truman and state governors. This book was presented to the President of the Japanese Bible Society at a ceremony in Hibiya Hall attended by high-ranking Japanese civic officials, representatives of the Japanese Bible Society, US Army chaplains and the Japanese public. (32)

 (31) Spec Ser Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 24)
 (32) Chaplain Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 9)

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Chapter VII

PROBLEMS, SOLUTIONS, LESSONS

A constantly shifting tactical situation, severe winter weather conditions and continuing personnel and equipment shortages were among the problems which plagued FEC during December.

Various methods were devised to meet critical shortages in specific personnel categories. The Signal School Division of the Eta Jima School Command, established early in December, proved of so much assistance in surmounting the deficiency in well-trained Signal Corps personnel that a similar establishment was considered to train additional cryptographic specialists within the theater. (1) Reorganization of QM units, formerly organized under Reduction Tables, under full T/O&E strength was expected to counteract the serious shortage in QM units in Korea. (2)

DA disapproved the FEC request for establishment of a Chemical Group to be attached to Eighth Army, due to the personnel ceiling for 1951. This Group was to supervise the administration, training and supply of Chemical Corps units en route to FEC as well as other Chemical Corps units currently assigned to JLC. (3)

Careful screening of replacement personnel was mandatory in order to eliminate an unnecessary administrative workload in processing them for assignments. Officer personnel requested to man one Chemical Group Headquarters during December were not requisitioned by grade and MOS as specified in the request but by space alone for January shipment, necessitating additional administrative handling. (4) Enlisted men with an Assistant Chemical Investigator MOS were found to be neither qualified to perform CID duties nor

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- (1) Sig Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 23)
 - (2) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 21)
 - (3) Chem Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 10)
 - (4) Ibid.

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accredited by the Provost Marshal General, requiring assignment to other duties. (5) Of 501 Puerto Rican replacements arriving during December, 120 claimed eligibility for discharge from the Army on the basis of dependents. (6)

A procedure was established whereby Headquarters and Service Command and JLC allocated officers, particularly those of the combat arms, without regard to authorized strengths or position vacancies. This provided a means of assigning officers temporarily surplus to requirements because of grade or MOS, established a reservoir of officer personnel and precluded long delays in the Replacement Training Center. (7)

Under a program for increasing the utilization of battle casualties and personnel not qualified for duty in combat areas, instituted in December, approximately 100 general service enlisted personnel were transferred to the replacement stream to create vacancies for limited service personnel. (8)

The organic AAA battalions could be brought up to full T/O&E strength, as authorized by the DA, only by transferring trained and equipped units from the ZI. One of the problems involved in expansion of skeleton units in infantry divisions by transferring tactical units was the question of unit designation following the transfer. Since this involved an unnecessary administrative workload it was considered unsatisfactory. (9)

Despite preventive measures such as detailed instructions on the prevention and care of cold weather injuries, dispatch of QM teams to the field to supervise the distribution and follow up on instructions, US casualties due to high incidence of cold weather injuries, together with casualties caused by the entry of the

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- (5) PM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 19)
 - (6) G-1 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 21)
 - (7) AG Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 6)
 - (8) Headquarters & Serv Comd Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 14)
 - (9) Antiaircraft Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 7)

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Chinese Communists into the Korean campaign continued to augment the evacuation and hospital load. This load was kept under control by various expedients, such as reduction of theater evacuation from 120 to 130 days, establishment of annexes near hospitals under supervision of hospital staffs, increase in hospital capacity by double-deck beds and air evacuation from clearing stations in Korea direct to Japan when patient condition permitted. (10)

Establishment of neuropsychiatric centers in very forward areas proved surprisingly effective in solving problems connected with the handling of neuropsychiatric patients. The Fourth Field Hospital Center at Ascom City, manned by two psychiatrists, handled between ten and twenty patients daily. The patient load never exceeded the 100 bed capacity of the center. Treatment consisted of physical measures including rest, showers, warmth and food. Superficial psychotherapy was utilized in the form of reassurance, persuasion and catharsis. Pentathol interviews and hypnosis were employed extensively in appropriate cases. Approximately 80 percent of the patients were returned to duty. (11)

Efforts were intensified to identify UN personnel captured by the enemy. The lack of qualified personnel within the Prisoner of War Information Bureau limited the scope of operations seriously. JLC was directed to investigate thoroughly all sources of information within the command leading to identification of UN personnel who might have been captured by the enemy. Other sources available included G-2 interrogation reports, war crimes investigative records, AG casualty records, press dispatches, interviews with liberated UN PW's and attempts to identify UN personnel shown in numerous captured photographs. (12)

Critical shortages of special cold weather clothing and

 (10) Med Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 17)

(11) Med Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 17)

(12) PM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 19)

equipment created a problem in supplying necessary items to personnel sent to Korea on temporary duty. Specific instructions covered issuance of the items and a system for collecting the items from personnel upon their return from Korea was established. Issue of cold weather clothing and equipment was authorized only upon direction by GHQ. (13)

Inspections revealed that Ordnance units in the field were not fully aware of their responsibilities nor the best methods of giving full Ordnance support. Ordnance Technical Training Instructions, based on actual field tests in time of war, were distributed to the units. These instructions dealt with direct supply and maintenance support, heavy Ordnance support, ammunition supply in the field and depot supply and maintenance. A loss of approximately 10,000 tons of ammunition during the retrograde movement of Eighth Army starting in late November was found to be the result of not only large quantities of ammunition being pushed forward for the offensive, but also due to flagrant violations of supply and command discipline. Measures were instituted to rectify this situation. (14)

The elapse of time between unloading of Quartermaster items from ships at Yokohama and reflection of these items as ready for issue on availability listings proved to be a difficult problem. The over-all time lag was approximately nineteen days, including between ten and twelve days for rail transportation, three days covering unloading and processing of receiving documents within the Stock Control Division and eight days within this division from the receipt of the receiving documents to reflection of items on availability listings. Steps were under way to improve document processing thereby reducing the time lag to six days within the depot. The rail transportation unit time lag was dependent upon makeup of

(13) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 21)

(14) Ord Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 18)

trains. (15)

Experience gained during the limited time during which the Army was responsible for civilian relief as well as for military operations in Korea demonstrated that such activities should be considered as essentially military. Lack of coordination among units in the field resulted in duplication of requirements. (16)

Difficulties in radio transmission resulted in a backlog of traffic to the US. The radio circuits to Hawaii and San Francisco were in poor condition during night hours; improvement of these circuits during daylight hours cleared the backlog to the ZI somewhat. Air couriers were utilized to clear up the backlog to Okinawa. Newly established circuits to Asmara and Anchorage fell short of expectation apparently because of poor propagation. (17)

Difficulties continued in graves registration operations. Shortage of trained personnel was being alleviated gradually by employment of civilian and Japanese technicians and by reassignment of military specialists. Essential personnel were to be provided by the newly activated Zone Headquarters and Field Operation Section. Additional graves registration units were scheduled for shipment from the ZI. (18) The shortage of helicopters to recover bodies from difficult and otherwise inaccessible terrain continued. (19)

Problems connected with handling the large group attached to the Bob Hope show demonstrated that such units should be limited and air transportation furnished. The company of sixty-five persons had to be centrally located, necessitating transportation of troops into the area from as far away as fifty miles. Billeting was a further problem in areas other than the large cities. The Al Jolson tour, consisting of two persons, was more easily handled and thus

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- (15) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 21)
 - (16) Eng Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 13)
 - (17) Sig Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 23)
 - (18) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 21)
 - (19) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 5)

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able to contact a larger number of troops. (20)

Since 1946 a major source of employee dissatisfaction was the mandatory deduction from base pay for meals, on the basis of three meals per day. This situation was alleviated to some extent in December 1949 by institution of a partial deduction system on the basis of twelve meals per week. The General Appropriation Act of 1951 (Public Law 759, 81st Congress), 22 September 1950 authorized the furnishing of subsistence to civilian employees on either a cash or payroll deduction basis. Civilian personnel in FEC were placed on a cash subsistence basis, effective 1 December 1950. (21)

Despite frequent and thorough instructions to correspondents in FEC covering voluntary censorship of news items and security of the UN Forces, pursuant to a code established in July 1950, news media continued to carry articles in violation of the code. Accredited correspondents decided at a 14 December conference that the military should set up machinery for definite involuntary censorship. This suggestion resulted in the establishment on 18 December of the Press Advisory Division to assist correspondents on news matters pertaining to the Korean situation. Press stories, radio broadcasts, magazine articles and photography pertaining to military operations, originating in Japan, were to be submitted to this division for clearance prior to transmission. Stories emanating from Korea, transmitted by Army controlled facilities, would be screened for security in Korea under established procedures. (22)

Problems encountered in the accounting and reporting of logistical support furnished by the US Army to UN Forces in support of Korean operations continued to prove most difficult within the combat areas. In order to improve the quality of weekly reports and to facilitate their submission by field commands, a study was made

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- (20) Sp Service Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 24)
 - (21) CPS GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 11)
 - (22) PI Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 20)

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of the current reporting procedure. At a conference with the representatives of the UN member nations receiving logistical support in Korea, it was agreed that certificates signed by the appropriate UN liaison representatives, to the effect that reports of logistical support furnished appearing to be reasonable for reimbursement purposes, would be the most logical approach to solving the problem of supporting reports with acceptable substantiating documents. (23)

(23) Off of Com Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Dec 50. (Annex 12)