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Department of army position on parity of standards, allocation, and utilization of negroes.

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# A.W.C.

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1. General. - There are three remaining areas of disagreement pertaining to the problems of induction. These are, parity of standards, allocation and utilization of Negroes.

2. Parity of Standards. - a. Statement of Problem. - The problem of parity of standards involves two questions; first, should the standards for voluntary enlistment be the same as the standards established for induction, and second, should the standards for enlistment and induction be uniform for the three Departments?

b. Mental Standards Established by Congress. - Selective Service legislation established a General Classification Test score of 70 for 21 month enlistees in the Army and provided that the Secretary of Defense could establish such standards as he deemed necessary. It is considered that in the rush of preparing the Senate - House compromise the limitation of the score of 70 to 21 month enlistees was manifestly in error and it was the intention of Congress to set the mental level for induction and enlistment of 18 year olds at GCT 70. Representatives of the three Departments have agreed on this standard for Induction.

c. Present Mental Standards. - The present Air Force mental standards for enlistment are a GCT score of 90. The Navy, using a different test, has a standard equal to about 87 on the Army basis. The Army has been using GCT 80 for new enlistments and score of 70 for specified prior service men who have attained certain educational standards or who have been decorated for valor. Because of the necessity for rapid implementation of the 18 year old program, instructions have already gone to the field establishing GCT 70 for 18 year old enlistments in the Army and GCT 90 for 18 year old enlistments in the Air Force.

d. Physical Standards. - It has been agreed, that for induction the three Departments should accept the physical profile A, B and C as determined by new Department of Army regulations, titled, Physical Standards for Induction and Enlistment. This regulation sets up a system of categorizing physical capacity. Profiles A and B correspond roughly with current general service standards, profile C corresponds roughly with World War II limited service standards with requirements sharply restricted by eliminating all personnel with remedial defects and all questionable cases. Properly handled this action will bring in a relatively small number of profile C's which all Departments can effectively utilize.

e. Evils of Separate Standards. -

- (1) If any Department uses higher standards for enlistment than for induction, inevitably men will be turned down for

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enlistment and later drafted. For example, under the instructions issued for 18 year olds, men falling in the GCT scores from 70 to 90 would be turned down by the Air Forces and later inducted into the Army. Such a result can only lead to serious public and Congressional criticism of the Department of Defense.

- (2) Lack of parity of standards for both enlistment and induction will foster undesirable competition within the Defense establishment and in the eyes of the public to the prejudice of the Army.
- (3) Lack of parity is contrary to the stated objective of the Secretary of Defense for unity in the military establishment.
- (4) Further it will subject eligibles to undue pressures of salesmanship such as occurred in World War II when the Navy was permitted to recruit right up until the actual day of induction.
- (5) Most important, it will be seriously detrimental to the qualitative strength of the Army.

f. Summary of Army's Position. - The Army's position can best be summarized by the following extract from a letter by the Director of Selective Service to the Secretary of Defense.

"The standards established should be uniformly applied to each of the Armed Forces and should not differ in any particular from the standards governing voluntary enlistment. \*\*\*\*\* Failure to establish common standards of induction and separation will subject the Armed Forces and the Selective Service system to justified and unanswerable public and Congressional criticism."

3. Allocation. - a. Statement of Problem. - The question of the basis for allocation of inductees resolves itself into only one immediate problem - what interim system of arbitrary percentage allocation should be adopted?

b. Difficulties Involved in Qualitative Analysis of Departmental Needs. - The Munitions Board Sub-committee has agreed that a complete and unbiased scientific analysis must be made of each Department's requirements for physical capacities and mental abilities and that inductees should then be allocated on the basis of these qualitative needs. It was further agreed that there are no sound techniques for such determination at this time. Nor is such determination possible without exhaustive and time consuming research by a committee of technicians working at Secretary of Defense level.

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c. Agreement on Arbitrary Allocation of Physical Capabilities. -

This inability to allocate personnel on basis of predetermined need resulted in an agreement that physical profiles A, B and C be allocated in direct proportion to the number of men required to bring the Departments to authorized Strength. Agreement on allocation of the mental abilities could not be reached and each Department has proposed a system of arbitrary percentage allocation of mental abilities.

d. The Navy Proposal. - The Navy has proposed an allocation based

on a comparison of the mental capabilities received by the Department of Army and Navy in World War II modified by a further comparison of the pre-war pay-grade structures of the two services. Their proposed percentage distribution is shown on Tab A. It should be noted that the Air Force has been given the same distribution as the Navy although no qualitative analysis has ever been performed to compare Navy and Air jobs nor is any indication given that the Air Force was taken into consideration when the comparisons were made. It is believed, however, that the figures used by Navy in both studies include Air Force strengths. It must be noted that the differences in pay grade structures and percentages of mental abilities received during World War II, which are the basis for the Navy proposal, were not determined by any scientific techniques, were not arrived at on the basis of proven requirements, have no basis in fact, and came into being solely through unilateral department policies.

Insofar as the distribution of grades within the three Departments is concerned, the Navy presumption is that the pre-war and post-war grade structures are based on job evaluation techniques. This is not true. No job analysis or job evaluation techniques have ever been applied to compare Army, Navy, and Air jobs. Such analysis as has been performed by the Department of the Army indicates that a great disparity has existed. The Department of the Army is currently engaged in re-writing all Tables of Organization and Equipment to upgrade all jobs in accordance with the skills, knowledge and responsibility inherent in the jobs. As soon as this is accomplished the percentages of personnel in each of the seven pay grades will approximate the Navy spread of grades.

Insofar as the allocation of mental abilities in World War II is concerned, throughout the war, Army authorities sought every possible means to correct the disproportionate percentages of higher mental abilities received by the Navy. This could not be accomplished for various reasons:

- (1) Until late in the war the Navy received all its men by volunteer enlistment.
- (2) They could enlist personnel up to the time of actual induction.

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- (3) Men designated to be drafted could be screened by Navy recruiters and were so screened just before induction.
- (4) The Navy then held out many inducements to enlist in the Navy. These inducements could not be met by the Army.
- (5) Candidates for officer training in the Navy could go direct from civil life to officer schools while in the Army they were drafted, went through basic training and competed for selection to attend officer candidate schools. For the up-and-coming civilian soon to be drafted the Navy proposition looked the best - as it was.
- (6) Finally, the selective enlistment of 17 year olds permitted the Navy to select out the cream, in large measure, before they reached draft age.

With all of the above policies in effect it becomes apparent why, without any proven requirement, the Navy received such a high proportion of higher mental abilities.

e. The Air Force Proposal. The Air Force has proposed an allocation based on establishing a minimum mental profile group for each Air Force job and then comparing Air Force jobs with Army jobs for which the Air Force also established on some unknown basis a minimum mental profile. Their proposed percentage distribution is shown on Tab B. It should be noted that the Navy has been given the same distribution as the Air Force although no qualitative analysis has ever been performed to compare Navy and Air jobs. Nor is any indication given that the Navy was taken into consideration when the comparisons were made.

The techniques used in establishing a minimum mental profile group for each Air Force job and for those peculiar to the Army is unknown. The whole concept of placement in "a minimum mental profile group" is a questionable basis for any scheme of allotment. A really sound study of this kind could not be made on evidence now available and my technicians inform me such a study might take several years to complete.

It is a fact that in almost all jobs in the military establishment it is essential to have a spread of mental abilities. Lack of specific detail as to how the Air Force performed such a study in two weeks precludes further comment on their proposal.

f. Falsity of Navy-Air Presumption That They Need Greater Proportion of Higher Mental Abilities. A presumption is made that the Navy and Air Force have a higher percentage of so called technical jobs and therefore require a greater percentage of higher mental abilities. This is fallacious in the

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extreme. Not only does the Army have a high percentage of technical and administrative jobs but World War II proved that higher mental abilities are required of the combat soldier than are required of many technical and administrative personnel. Operating frequently in semi-isolation, the combat soldier's responsibility for independent action necessitates not only a high degree of mental alertness but an ability to plan rapidly and accurately. Battle studies performed by British psychologists at the end of the War show that in addition to many other qualities, the Infantry needed a higher average degree of intelligence than any other service. I am convinced that when a scientific appraisal of the requirements of the three Departments is made it will be found that the Army needs a greater percentage of the higher mental capabilities than do either of the other services.

g. Inability of Army to Obtain Higher Mental Abilities. The present serious trend with respect to the intake of mental abilities in the Army is illustrated by Tab C. The average AGCT of the intake from February 1946 until February 1948 is shown by the line marked Total (white and colored). Beginning in July 1947 this average AGCT dropped sharply and has continued to drop so that in February 1948 the average of the intake was only 89. It will be noticed that in October 1947 the Air Forces raised their standard to 90, while the Army maintained its standard of 80 and its special standards of 70 and 60 for restricted groups. Further illustrating the Army's problem, in May of 1948 it was indicated that, as of December 1948, the Army would be short approximately 90,000 school trained specialists. This shortage is directly attributable to the inability of the Army to obtain men with the necessary mental ability.

The AGCT composition of the draft population which came to the Army (including Air) during World War II as compared with the composition of the Army's intake during the past year is shown on Tab D. It will be noted that the present intake is bringing us fewer above-average mentalities and more in the lower categories. Although the numbers in Grade V (the lowest grade) are smaller now than during World War II, it should be pointed out that all of the V's plus approximately half of the large number of IV's are actually below the Army's current standards, and are evidence of our desperate and vigorous efforts to meet quotas through recruiting.

Actually, the figures should be just the reverse. Total mobilization in both men and material is never very selective or efficient, but makes up in quantity what it lacks in quality. A peace time Army, however, is essentially a cadre Army, and cannot afford the luxury of inefficient and marginally satisfactory manpower. The dangerous unbalance of the present Army, with its shortage of school trainables and potential leaders would be terribly aggravated by adoption of any allocation system which does not give the Army a fair share of the above average mental levels.

It is believed that if a world-wide census of physical and mental abilities were taken it would be demonstrated beyond any shadow of a doubt that the qualitative position of the Army today is highly precarious.

Despite the serious qualitative deficiencies which exist in the Army today, we have not asked that an allocation of the mental abilities be made to correct this situation but only that from here on the Army receive its equitable proportion of the available physical and mental abilities.

Like the Navy and Air Force, we too would like to have higher standards. We fought hard before the Congress to maintain our recent standard of GCT 80. Notwithstanding we strongly feel that in the light of the world situation today the Army, and the Navy, and the Air Forces should accept their equitable share of the lesser qualified. The Army should not have to suffer under an excess load of marginally trainables because the Navy and Air Forces are in the fortunate position of being able to select at will. The spread of jobs in the three Departments is highly comparable to the spread in civilian life. The military establishment must absorb its proportionate share across the board of the people holding these civilian jobs. The Army cannot do this by itself.

h. Necessity for Cumulative Qualitative Accounting of Enlistments.

In the meetings of the sub-committee, the Army has urged in line with its position on parity of standards and equitable allocation, that each Department be required to maintain an accumulative accounting of the mental and physical capabilities it receives through recruitment in order that at such time that the Navy and Air Force must draw more heavily upon induction that they take the mental and physical capabilities which they have not taken through recruitment. It has been pointed out repeatedly that while initially such a requirement would, in the eyes of the Navy and Air Force, favor the Army, in the final analysis it would act as insurance for the Navy and Air Force in the event they are unable to obtain from recruitment the higher capabilities they need. The Navy and Air Force would not concur in this proposal.

i. Summary. To summarize, there is no established method for determining the mental needs of the three Departments. The Human Resources Committee of the Research and Development Board in their Report No. HR 32/1 titled "Research and Development in Human Resources in the Military Establishment" states in paragraph 4.4.4 that among the main deficiencies and commissions in the area of Human Resources is the lack of adequate military occupational and organizational analysis. I quote from this paragraph: "Job requirements usually are set by rule-of-thumb, empirical methods and no effort is made to validate them by experimental check against actual performance. And among the three services markedly different standards have sometimes existed for essentially the same job." It is believed that if this Committee were asked for their opinion as to the validity of the techniques used in arriving at the Navy and Air Force proposals the Army's position as to the invalidity of these proposals would be substantiated.

It is recognized that for some time to come the Army will receive the bulk if not all of the inductees. Notwithstanding, the problem of allocation must be faced now so that all Departments may properly plan for the maximum utilization of the personnel it will eventually receive, particularly if we must mobilize.

As an interim measure, until a scientific unbiased appraisal can be accomplished, it is my contention that the only impartial solution is arbitrary allocation of each of the 12 physical and mental categories proportionate to the numbers of men needed to bring the Departments to authorized strengths.

4. Acceptance of Negroes.

a. Statement of Problem. The question as to the acceptance of Negroes amounts to whether or not each Department should be required to maintain the same fixed percentage of Negroes in its total authorized strength.

b. Army Contention. In the discussions at Munitions Board level it has been the contention of the Army that each Department should be required to maintain, whether by induction or enlistment, approximately 10% of its total authorized strength in Negroes, or such other per cent as the Secretary of Defense may direct in the light of present Negro strength and actual input during induction.

It is the opinion of the Army that the nation will insist that Negroes bear a proportionate share of the defense burden. This means that at this time approximately 10% of the services must be Negroes. Figures available as of 31 March 1948 indicate the Army Negro strength was approximately 12%, the Air Force 8%, the Navy 5%, the Marines 2%. If the Negro populating in the ARWAF units is included in the Army figures and the Marine per cent is included in the Navy figures the approximate strengths would be as follows:

Army	12.7%
Air Force	6.7
Navy	4.5

Indications are that the per cent of Negroes in the Army is increasing and that in the Air Forces and Navy it is decreasing. Estimated figures obtained from the Bureau of Census indicate that the ratio of Negro and white in the induction age group is approximately 1 to 8 or a percentage of approximately 12.5.

If the Navy and Air Forces by use of higher enlistment standards or other strategems have less than 10% Negroes then either the white population will bear an undue burden or the Army's share will be increased far above 10%.

The Negro presents a difficult training problem. Not only does it take a great deal longer to train Negroes but more training cadre are required than are necessary for training white troops. Already faced with a staggering training problem with insufficient trained cadre the Army cannot afford the burden of training 100% of the Negro input. It is further believed that any action which keeps the Navy and Air Forces Negro strength below 10% is direct discrimination against the Negro race.

#### 5. CONCLUSION.

To sum up, the Army's position on the three major unresolved areas is:

- a. Parity of standards - Parity is essential in order to avoid public and Congressional criticism, to prevent undesirable competition, to provide unity in the military establishment, and to prevent seriously prejudicing the qualitative strength of the Army.
- b. Allocation - There is no scientific information available to determine departmental qualitative needs. When such is available, allocation should be on that basis. Air and Navy proposals are based on highly fallacious reasoning, are essentially aimed at maintaining the "status quo," and can dangerously impair the Army. Arbitrary allocation of physical capabilities is agreed upon.
- c. Negroes - The Defense establishment must follow to the letter the non-discriminating directive of the Congress. This is not possible unless each Department accepts its proportionate share of Negroes.

#### 6. RECOMMENDATIONS.

The Army most urgently recommends:

- a. That the standard for acceptance of both inductees and enlistees for the three Departments be General Classification Test Score 70 and that each Department be required to accept by enlistment equitable proportions of each of the mental groups. That physical standards include A, B, and C physical profiles.
- b. That until such time as the three Department's qualitative needs can be determined that inductees be allocated in terms of physical and mental capabilities in direct proportion to the number of men each Department is authorized to accept. That in accordance therewith each Department be required to maintain cumulative records of the physical and mental capabilities of new enlistees and to accept by induction the necessary numbers of men in those categories needed to give an equitable distribution.
- c. That each Department be required to maintain a Negro strength of approximately 10% of its total authorized strength whether by induction or enlistment or such other uniform per cent as the Secretary of Defense may direct on the basis of changing situations.

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\* FURTHER AMPLIFICATION OF  
DEPARTMENT OF ARMY POSITION ON PARITY  
OF STANDARDS, ALLOCATION, AND  
UTILIZATION OF NEGROES

A.W.C.  
Archives Section

1. Introduction

Since my presentation on 23 July an attempt has been made by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and myself to resolve these differences. No agreement could be reached on the matter of parity of standards or utilization of Negroes. Although agreement was reached on a subsidiary issue relating to the cumulative reporting of mental and physical capabilities, the basic problem of allocation of mental abilities was not resolved.

2. Parity of Standards

a. Navy Analysis of Manpower Pool. Since my presentation the Navy has analyzed the manpower pool available during the 2 years beginning 30 June 48 and has indicated:

- (1) That there are sufficient men to meet the needs of all three services without going below GCT 90.
- (2) That parity of standards would ruin the Navy and Air Force without helping the Army much.
- (3) That the Army will receive approximately 56% of the availables in Group I, II, and III, whereas it should receive only some 44 to 51% based on its relative strength.

b. Army Answer to Navy Contentions.- While on a quantitative basis all needs can be met for all the services without going below 90, over a 2 year period, there will be serious if not insurmountable obstacles in applying the breakdown by states and counties. After all, there are limits to the availables in any particular spot. While GCT's are smoothly distributed on a nation-wide basis we know that locally there are severe inequalities, such as in poorer areas. While there may be sufficient men in the available manpower pool over a two year period to meet all requirements without going below GCT 90 the operations of the Selective Service System and the necessity of bringing the Army to its authorized strength in fiscal year 1949 make it mandatory to utilize 100% of the availables in each age group working downward. We will get all men in age 25, 24 and so on down. Further, it is apparent that the majority of deferments for occupational and educational reasons will be in the higher GCT groups making it essential to exhaust 100% of the availables in the lower GCT groups.

\* Presented by General Bradley to  
War Council 3 August 1948

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The argument for using men below 90 does not, however, hinge on merely the fact that there are enough men above 90 to do the job.

That the influx of perhaps 50,000 Grade IV men into either the Navy or Air Force would ruin them seems laboring this point too far. The argument that these men cannot be valuably utilized means that no jobs for them exist. This is patently untrue in any big organization. What is happening is that better men than are required are holding down these lower positions. As for "not helping the Army much", the fact is that the Army already has its full share of such marginal men and is only not desirous of increasing its load.

On the final Navy contention -- that the Army is getting too large a share of the best input, the 44 to 50% which the Navy indicated would be the Army's share of the mental groups I, II and III, is a figure based on relative strengths. This is an incorrect basis. The only correct basis is that of actual gains to bring each of the services to strength. On this basis the Army should receive 64% of the higher mental capabilities, since 64% of all gains will go to the Army.

Under the Navy proposal the Army will receive only 56% of those coming in who are grade I, II, or III. This is 81,000 men less than the Army should receive of these men if it received even its fair share. Actually the Army should obtain a greater share of the top intelligence levels because it is starting off with a lower percentage of these in the first place.

I believe the above comments answer the points which the Navy has raised. I particularly, however, want to point out that while today the manpower pool may appear to be a Horn of Plenty, tomorrow it may well be nothing but a leaky rain barrel. Any one of several things - for example, pressure by industry for further deferments - could very well emasculate this pool.

c. Air Force Proposal.-General Vandenberg has proposed that the three Departments get together in a strong concerted action to get legislation passed by Congress to raise the Army mental standards to that being used by the Air Forces.

d. Army's Contention.- Our recent experience in attempting to maintain our old standard of 80 before Congress has demonstrated most strongly that the Congress would never go along with such a proposal. On the contrary, it is our opinion that it is not only possible but probable that as the result of criticism by the public of the higher standards existing in the Navy and Air

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Force that the Congress will investigate the matter of standards with the end result that Navy and Air Force standards might well be lowered to the Army level.

It should be carefully noted that, while in its discussion with the Congress the desire of the Army for maintaining its former standards was strongly expressed, the most important reason for the Army's fight was to prevent Congress from lowering or wiping out our standards with a view to increasing recruitment and not having Selective Service. The basic reason for our fight was that we had not been getting a proper spread of GCT levels but instead had been getting large numbers of marginally trainables in the area near the cut-off point of 80; that further reductions, if made for the sole purpose of recruiting, would result only in greater numbers of lower mental capabilities with no increase in the desperately needed higher mental groups.

Certainly in a peace time cadre military establishment it is essential that the highest mental and physical standards are obtained. Our expanding military establishment, however, is hardly a peace time proposition. Instead it is a partial mobilization which tomorrow or next month or next year could lead into full mobilization. There exists in civilian life a certain spread of mental capabilities. The nation's economy is based on this spread. It is our opinion that with a 2 million man military establishment this country cannot afford to put only cream into the military. On the contrary we must accept a greater share of the lesser qualified. Within the present Army standards we are convinced that there are sufficient positions in the three Departments for each to take its equitable share of the men falling in the 70 to 90 mental level. Not only are the positions available but we feel that it is essential that the military establishment locate those positions now and place the lesser qualified individuals in them. Our military establishment must learn immediately how to use lesser qualified personnel. The experience which can be gained in the next year in so doing could very well turn out to be invaluable if later we were forced to full-out mobilization.

In my opinion the Navy and Air Forces, despite the Navy stand on the present manpower pool, have not been able to refute the evils I have pointed out which result from separate standards. Men will be turned down by the Navy and Air Forces and later inducted by the Army; undesirable competition to the prejudice of the Army will result; and eligibles will be subjected to undue pressures of salesmanship. Further, not only are separate standards contrary to the Secretary of Defense's objective of unity in the military establishment but, most important, they will perpetuate and increase the present serious qualitative inequity in the Army.

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### 3. Allocation

On the matter of allocation, as a result of our meeting last Friday, it was agreed that the three Departments would keep cumulative records of the mental and physical capabilities received, whether by induction or enlistment. It was not agreed that these cumulative records would later be used as the basis for correcting any qualitative inequities that develop between now and the time either the Navy or the Air begin accepting inductees. It was mentioned that it might be well to defer any decision as to the basis for allocation until such time as the Navy and Air Forces must induct. It is my position that this decision must be made now. If such a decision is put off until such time as we are launched into full mobilization and a war, the resultant decision could very easily either never be made or be a pragmatic one such as the many made during World War II. In either event it could well leave the Army, as it was left in World War II, holding the proverbial bag. I need not recount here the details of the long struggle the ground arms went through in World War II to obtain its share of the better qualified. I want only to make the point that the Army does not want to be in that position again.

I assume from the statement made by General Vandenberg at our last meeting that the Air Forces were quite unhappy about submitting a scheme for the allocation of mental capabilities, that the Air Forces now realize the futility of such a scheme in the light of our lack of any overall scientific analysis and comparison of the Army-Navy-Air Force jobs. I believe I amply demonstrated at my first presentation that the Navy proposal has no justification.

During the course of our most recent discussions, Admiral Sprague and General Edwards inferred that the Navy and Air Forces have greater need for the higher mental capabilities because of the complicated technical nature of their ships and aircraft and because of their needs for such personnel as weather and radar men. These are old arguments, often recounted by the Navy and Air Forces. I say again that there is no basis for such statements. I am confident that at such time as an overall unbiased analysis is made of the military establishment requirements that the requirements of the Army for the higher mental capabilities will be demonstrated to be at least as great, if not greater, than those of the Navy and Air Forces.

### 4. Negroes

At our conference Admiral Sprague stated that fixed percentage of Negroes would seriously damage the Navy and expressed the thought that

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the Navy would prefer to continue accepting Negroes on its present selective qualitative basis. General Edwards indicated that he felt the Air Forces would reach a strength of 10% Negroes as they opened up additional air fields and that they could reach that strength while maintaining their mental standard of GCT 90. I personally doubt that with such a standard the Air Forces can maintain a Negro strength of 10%. If they do reach it and maintain it, it obviously will be done at the expense of the Army which will have to accept by induction those Negroes falling within the scores of 70 to 90. I still maintain - and I feel that, in the light of the President's recent stand on Negroes, the Army's position is even stronger - that the three Departments must maintain the same fixed percentage of Negroes.

Conclusion and Recommendations.

It is my firm opinion that the Navy and Air Forces have not been able to challenge and, further, that they cannot challenge the facts I have set forth on the three unresolved areas of disagreement. I again strongly urge that the Army's recommendations, which are as follows, be approved:

a. That the standard for acceptance for both inductees and enlistees for the three Departments be General Classification Test Score 70 and that each Department be required to accept by enlistment equitable proportions of each of the mental groups. That physical standards include A, B, and C physical profiles.

b. That until such time as the three Department's qualitative needs can be determined that inductees be allocated in terms of physical and mental capabilities in direct proportion to the number of men each department is authorized to accept. That in accordance therewith each department be required to maintain cumulative records of the physical and mental capabilities of new enlistees and to accept by induction the necessary numbers of men in those categories needed to give an equitable distribution.

c. That each department be required to maintain a Negro strength of approximately 10% of its total authorized strength whether by induction or enlistment or such other uniform percent as the Secretary of Defense may direct on the basis of changing situations.

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
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# PROPOSED AIR FORCE DISTRIBUTION OF MENTAL ABILITIES

PERCENT SHARE OF EACH GROUP

MENTAL PROFILE  
GROUP

I II III IV



-LEGEND-


ARMY [white box]

NAVY [diagonal lines]

AIR FORCE [cross-hatch]

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# MONTHLY AVERAGE OF AGCT SCORES



LEGEND  
White  
Colored  
Total

\* Air Forces not included

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
# COMPARISON OF AGCT DISTRIBUTIONS

## FOR WORLD WAR II ARMY (INCLUDING AIR) AND PRESENT ARMY INTAKE

WORLD WAR II (N=9,757,000)

PRESENT ARMY INTAKE (N=135,906)

AGCT GRADE	I	II	III	IV	V
AGCT SCORE RANGE	130 AND ABOVE	110 TO 130	90 TO 110	60 TO 90	BELOW 60



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# PROPOSED NAVY DISTRIBUTION OF MENTAL ABILITIES

PERCENT SHARE OF EACH GROUP

— LEGEND —  
ARMY — [diagonal lines]  
NAVY — [dotted]  
AIR FORCE — [horizontal lines]

