

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY SECTION
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP, VIETNAM
Saigon, Vietnam

MAGAR-OT (OP)

23 April 1962

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned Number 8

TO: See Distribution

1. GENERAL: A heliborne operation, "CA CHEP", was conducted in the AN GIANG Province, 33rd DTA, III CTZ on 15 March 1962.
2. PARTICIPATING UNITS: The units which participated in the operation were a Regimental CP, Ranger Co, Recon Co, and an Infantry Battalion and Ranger Co in reserve supported by a U.S. Helicopter Co, 1 HU-1A, 1 L-19, 1 H-34, 2 AD-6, and 1 LCU.
3. MISSION: The mission of the operation was to kill or capture all VC and destroy all VC installations.
4. CONCEPT: The concept of the operation was to land by H-21, one Ranger Company and the Recon Co on opposite sides of a river that bisects the village PHU HOI and then move SE along the river. The Infantry Battalion on board the LCU and the Ranger Company at LONG XUYEN airstrip were to be in reserve and ready to move on order. The AD6's were to be on strip alert, and the L-19 was to be used for aerial reconnaissance and a spotter for close air support.
5. RESULTS: The results of the operation were considered to be only partially successful with 5 VC KIA, 70 suspects captured, and small quantities of enemy materiel captured or destroyed.
6. LESSONS LEARNED:
 - a. EFFECTIVE AIR TO GROUND COMMUNICATIONS CAN GREATLY INFLUENCE GROUND ACTIONS. The communications between ground units and aircraft were excellent. This was demonstrated by effective close air support after the ground units had marked their position by smoke upon request from the aircraft.
 - b. FAULTY INFORMATION ON VC ACTIVITIES CAN LEAD TO EXPENDING AN UNNECESSARY COMBAT EFFORT. The information received on VC activities in the area was extremely faulty, and there was no apparent effort to make a confirmation. Further, the area was known to be more under the influence of HOA than VC.

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

MAGAR-OT (OP)

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned Number 8

c. PROPER PRIOR COORDINATION MUST BE EFFECTED BETWEEN ALL CONCERNED PERSONNEL: The lack of coordination between commanders and U. S. Advisory personnel was very evident when the helicopters to be used in the operation arrived 0845 hours at the loading zone. This was 45 minutes earlier than the time of 0930 hours requested by the U.S. Senior Advisor and approximately two hours and forty five minutes before the ARVN scheduled take-off time of 1130 hours.

7. The foregoing is for your information and guidance.

DISTRIBUTION:

"B"

Less: Comptroller Div
MAP Div
Hq Comd
Trans Br
Civ Pers
USARYIS Spt Gp

PLUS: CINCPAC (3)
USARPAC (3)
CINCPACFLT (3)
PACAF (3)
C/S MACV (8)

H. K. EGGLESTON
H. K. EGGLESTON
Brigadier General, USA
Acting Chief

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED