

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VN COLL
MACV
LL 11
c.1

HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY SECTION
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP, VIETNAM
Saigon, Vietnam

11
5 May 1962

MAGAR-OT (OP)

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned Number 11 [u].8

12 3 p.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED BY

TO: See Distribution

AUTHORITY OF DOD DIR. 5200.1 R

BY BAKERS ON 15 NOV 91

1. GENERAL: Operation "TIGER HUNT" was conducted in an area approximately 40 km northwest of DALAT on the boundary of DARLAC-TUYEN DUC and QUANG DUC Provinces, 23rd DTA, II CTZ, during the period 12 Apr - 27 Apr 1962.

2. PARTICIPATING UNITS: The units participating in the operation were two Inf Regt Hqs, three Inf Bns, one Separate Ranger company, a Division Recon Company, Military Sector Forces of DARLAC, TUYEN DUC and QUANG DUC, two H-21 helicopters, and two B-26 aircraft, all under operational control of 23d Division.

3. MISSION: The mission was to kill or capture VC personnel and destroy VC logistical and training installations.

4. CONCEPT: The concept of the operation was to utilize three Bn (+) size forces converging from North to South. Provincial units of the above three provinces were to operate in areas adjacent to the primary zone of operation by establishing ambush sites and attacking known or suspected VC installations. Preplanned strikes were scheduled by VNAF on suspected VC concentrations in support of the initial attack. Helicopters were to be used for resupply, medical evacuation, aerial reconnaissance, and liaison. AD-6's were on call at PLEIKU.

5. RESULTS: The operation was considered partially successful with VC losses of 10 KIA and 3 captured; 8 weapons and a large quantity of documents confiscated; several logistical and training bases destroyed; and large amounts of supplies captured.

6. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. SUSTAINED ANTI-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS CAN SEIZE CONTROL OF AN AREA FROM THE VC. Friendly forces conducted sustained operations over a period of 15 days and succeeded in seizing control of the area.

DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

MAGAR-OT (OP)

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned Number 11

This was largely due to the fact that the operational area was of appropriate size for the participating units. However, it must be realized that control of the area was temporary in nature, and that sufficient local forces must be made available to maintain permanent control of an area after the withdrawal of regular units. (See T&T Paper, Part II, Pages 17 and 18).

b. STAYBACK PATROLS CAN BE USED TO GOOD ADVANTAGE. The majority of VC casualties were caused by stayback patrols during the last few days of the operation. The stayback patrols ambushed small groups of the VC returning to an area after the departure of friendly forces. (See T&T Paper, Chapter VII, F1).

c. STEALTH MUST BE USED TO GAIN SURPRISE WHEN MOVING THROUGH DENSELY VEGETATED AREAS. The movement of individuals through dense underbrush and bamboo was exceptionally noisy in some instances. This provided the VC with an indication of direction, and allowed them sufficient time to withdraw from the area. (See T&T Paper, Chapter IV, F2).

d. SMALL UNIT LEADERS AND FORWARD OBSERVER PERSONNEL MUST KNOW THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR DIRECTING SUPPORTING FIRES. Mortar fire was occasionally untimely and inaccurate because some small unit leaders and forward observer personnel were not familiar with proper fire direction procedures. In fact, a few forward observers were at the gun positions instead of at the ambush site. (See T&T Paper, Chapter VI, D1).

e. CIVIC ACTION TEAMS MUST BE AVAILABLE FOR OPERATIONS INVOLVING CIVILIANS. One entire village of approximately 160 civilians requested resettlement outside the VC controlled area. However, action on the request was greatly delayed because Civic Action Teams were not available and no prior planning had been made for resettlement of civilians. Most of the civilians in the village were later evacuated to DALAT. (See T&T Paper, Chapter IV, D6-12).

f. HELICOPTER LANDING ZONES MUST BE RECONNOITERED FOR OBSTACLES PRIOR TO AN OPERATION. Suitable helicopter landing zones in mountainous terrain are very scarce and can be denied to heliborne forces with little effort by the construction of obstacles. However, prior reconnaissance can detect any such obstacles. In this area of operations, the VC had

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

MAGAR-OT (OP)
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned Number 11

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

constructed obstacles of long sharpened stakes on the majority of the landing zones.

7. The foregoing is for your information and guidance.

DISTRIBUTION:


"B"

Less: Comptroller Div
MAP Div
HQ Comd
Trans Br
Civ Pers
USARYIS Spt Gp

s/t H. K. EGGLESTON
Brigadier General, USA
Acting Chief

Plus: CINCPAC (3)
USARPAC (3)
CINCPACFLT (3)
PACAF (3)
C/S MACV (8)

A TRUE COPY:


JOSEPH GREZAFFI
LTC, GS
Doctrine Branch, J343

[REDACTED] UNCLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE SECTION
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP, VIETNAM
Saigon, Vietnam

MAGAR-OT (OP)

5 May 1962

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned Number 11.

TO: See Distribution

1. GENERAL: Operation "TIGER HUNT" was conducted in an area approximately 40 km northwest of DALAT on the boundary of DARLAC-TUYEN DUC and QUANG DUC Provinces, 23rd DTA, II CTZ, during the period 12 Apr - 27 Apr 1962.
2. PARTICIPATING UNITS: The units participating in the operation were two Inf Regt Hqs, three Inf Bns, one Separate Ranger company, a Division Recon Company, Military Sector Forces of DARLAC, TUYEN DUC and QUANG DUC, two H-21 helicopters, and two B-26 aircraft, all under operational control of 23d Division.
3. MISSION: The mission was to kill or capture VC personnel and destroy VC logistical and training installations.
4. CONCEPT: The concept of the operation was to utilize three Bn (+) size forces converging from North to South. Provincial units of the above three provinces were to operate in areas adjacent to the primary zone of operation by establishing ambush sites and attacking known or suspected VC installations. Preplanned strikes were scheduled by VNAF on suspected VC concentrations in support of the initial attack. Helicopters were to be used for resupply, medical evacuation, aerial reconnaissance, and liaison. AD-6's were on call at PLEIKU.
5. RESULTS: The operation was considered partially successful with VC losses of 10 KIA and 3 captured; 8 weapons and a large quantity of documents confiscated; several logistical and training bases destroyed; and large amounts of supplies captured.
6. LESSONS LEARNED:
 - a. SUSTAINED ANTI-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS CAN SEIZE CONTROL OF AN AREA FROM THE VC. Friendly forces conducted sustained operations over a period of 15 days and succeeded in seizing control of the area. This was largely due to the fact that the operational area was of appropriate size for the participating units. However, it must be realized that control of the area was temporary in nature, and that sufficient local forces must be made available to maintain permanent control of an area after the withdrawal of regular units. (See T&T Paper, Part II, Pages 17 and 18).

[REDACTED] UNCLASSIFIED

MAGAR-OT (OP)

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned Number 11

UNCLASSIFIED

b. STAYBACK PATROLS CAN BE USED TO GAIN AN ADVANTAGE. The majority of VC casualties were caused by stayback patrols during the last few days of the operation. The stayback patrols ambushed small groups of VC returning to an area after the departure of friendly forces. (See T&T Paper, Chapter VII, F1)

c. STEALTH MUST BE USED TO GAIN SURPRISE WHEN MOVING THROUGH DENSELY VEGETATED AREAS. The movement of individuals through dense underbrush and bamboo was exceptionally noisy in some instances. This provided the VC with an indication of direction, and allowed them sufficient time to withdraw from the area. (See T&T Paper, Chapter IV, F2)

d. SMALL UNIT LEADERS AND FORWARD OBSERVER PERSONNEL MUST KNOW THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR DIRECTING SUPPORTING FIRES. Mortar fire was occasionally untimely and inaccurate because some small unit leaders and forward observer personnel were not familiar with proper fire direction procedures. In fact, a few forward observers were at the gun positions instead of at the ambush site. (See T&T Paper, Chapter VI, D1)

e. CIVIC ACTION TEAMS MUST BE AVAILABLE FOR OPERATIONS INVOLVING CIVILIANS. One entire village of approximately 160 civilians requested resettlement outside the VC controlled area. However, action on the request was greatly delayed because Civic Action Teams were not available and no prior planning had been made for resettlement of civilians. Most of the civilians in the village were later evacuated to DALAT. (See T&T Paper, Chapter IV, D6-12).

f. HELICOPTER LANDING ZONES MUST BE RECONNOITERED FOR OBSTACLES PRIOR TO AN OPERATION. Suitable helicopter landing zones in mountainous terrain are very scarce and can be denied to heliborne forces with little effort by the construction of obstacles. However, prior reconnaissance can detect any such obstacles. In this area of operations, the VC had constructed obstacles of long sharpened stakes on the majority of the landing zones.

7. The foregoing is for your information and guidance.

DISTRIBUTION:

"B"

Less: Comptroller Div
MAP Div
Hq Comd
Trans Br
Civ Pers
USARYIS Spt Gp

Plus: CINCPAC (3)
USARPAC (3)
CINCPACFLT (3)
PACAF (3)
C/S MACV (8)

H. K. Eggleston
H. K. EGGLESTON
Brigadier General, USA
Acting Chief

UNCLASSIFIED