

VN COLL  
MACV  
LL 19  
c.1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
**KIN**

1

UNCLASSIFIED

NOV 15 1967

RECEIVED

HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. ARMY SECTION  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP  
APO 143, San Francisco, California

11 31 Jul 62

12 6p.

~~MACAR OT (OB)~~

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned Number 19 (U)

TO: See Distribution

"This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C., Section 793 and 794. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."

FILE COPY

1. (KC) GENERAL:

a. Operation SUNRISE is a civil-military operation to obtain complete Government control of the ten provinces in the Eastern Region of South Vietnam, (immediately north of Saigon). The operation began in August 1961, as the "Rural Reconstruction Campaign in the Eastern Region of South Vietnam" in response to Presidential instructions to insure security in the three provinces of Tay Ninh, Binh Duong and Phuoc Tuy. Priority has been given to Binh Duong province.

b. In the area of primary interest, Binh Duong Province, the situation was such that the objective could be achieved only through provision of considerable US materiel support. In the Northern half of the province, where the population is more scattered than in the South, it was recognized that control of the people would require regroupment of families into new locations as well as establishment of "strategic hamlets" which could be more easily organized and defended. It was also recognized that an operation of this kind, involving movement of people from VC base areas, would be subject to possible violent VC reaction and that it would require the commitment of troops for a long period of time. This called for detailed coordination and timing, as it involved the support and participation of many agencies, civil and military, US and GVN.

c. Because the problems encountered in the regroupment were characteristic of those that will probably be met elsewhere, this analysis reflects lessons learned during the early phases of the relocation effort in Ben Cat District, Binh Duong Province.

2. (KC) PARTICIPATING UNITS:

Operation began 22 March with 2 battalions 8th Infantry Regiment, 2 Ranger Companies, 1 Recon Company, 1 Psywar Company, 2 Civil Guard Companies,

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED BY  
AUTHORITY OF DOD DIR. 5200.1 R  
BY RAKER ON 15 JAN 91

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING  
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
**KIN**

UNCLASSIFIED

ef

UNCLASSIFIED

MACAR-OT (CB)

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned Number 19 (U)

2 CG Armored Car Platoons, Artillery and logistical support, all under command of CO 5th Infantry Division. In addition, five civic action teams of about 25 persons each, some 80 Civil servants from provincial agencies, medical personnel, public works technicians and laborers were assigned to the operation. Vehicles and equipment were provided for moving people and property, for constructing temporary shelters, clearing land and laying out roads and lots for the strategic hamlets. Since the operation began, three such hamlets have been organized. Although the forces committed have varied from time to time, the same approximate number have been employed throughout.

3. (KC) MISSION:

To eliminate VC control over the people; provide for a selective relocation and physical security of the population; enforce law and order; assist in rehabilitating village administration, economy and security; and assist in consolidating national control within the area of operations by enhancing popular support for the counterinsurgency effort.

4. (KC) CONCEPT:

To establish throughout the province, perimeter security of key strategic hamlets and, to introduce into each of these locations a civic action team for the purpose of rehabilitating the local administration and economy. In the northern part of the province, where the scattered population is most susceptible to VC influence, to regroup as many of these people as possible into selected locations and organize these sites into permanent communities. For those people relocated, to provide food, medical care, emergency individual and community assistance, to include help in building new homes and obtaining free title to a piece of farm land.

5. (KC) RESULTS:

a. In the northern half of the province, approximately 2900 persons have been regrouped into 3 strategic hamlets in which the organization of the security, administration, and economy is well-advanced. In these, and in 12 locations in the province where relocation was unnecessary, US materiel and funds have been used to assist in the physical security of the hamlets, and to furnish emergency assistance to individuals and communities. The operation continues with a fourth relocation effort which started 17 July. Civic Action Teams are operating in each of the 15 hamlets secured in the province of Binh Duong. Approximately the same number of teams are at work in selected locations in the other nine provinces of South Vietnam which are a part of "Operation Sunrise".

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

MAGAR-OT (CB)

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned Number 19 (U)

b. In the entire area of the ten provinces of the Southeastern Region, a total of 80 hamlets have been secured to date during 1962. A total of 49 have been provided US materiel for defense. There are 405 others under construction with a goal of 500 US-supported hamlets by the end of CY 1963.

6. (KC) LESSONS LEARNED:

a. LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR THE "STRATEGIC HAMLET" PROGRAM REQUIRES CLOSE AND CONTINUING ADVISORY EFFORTS. In spite of specific Presidential directives, the required level of support and assistance from responsible GVN agencies, including national ministries, were difficult to obtain and were, in some instances, late and inadequate. Specific problem areas were:

(1) Some government agencies did not plan support of this project as a continuing requirement. Oral agreements were reached on specific amounts or kinds of support, but experience proved that formal arrangements, confirmed in writing, were usually necessary to guarantee them.

(2) Difficulties involved in estimating correctly certain logistical requirements, and in some cases, lack of responsiveness of the civilian chain of command resulted in emergencies being met from limited provincial resources or by recourse to US emergency capabilities. Every effort must be made to place adequate resources in the hands of operating agencies before operations begin. Otherwise, when limited materials on hand are expended, lengthy negotiations may be required before additional support can be generated.

(3) During planning, Advisory follow-up action was often considered unnecessary since responsibility had been assigned to and accepted by high-level agencies. This lack of follow-up resulted in less than adequate support. In such cases, persistence and investigation on the part of the U.S. advisor is justified and necessary in order to provide higher US authority a clear picture of the situation and to justify support. The advisor must approach the project as if he were personally responsible for its execution. Otherwise it may be discovered too late that a counterpart has overlooked important considerations concerning support with which US agencies might have been able to help.

b. BOTH SECURITY OF THE PLAN AND OF THE RELOCATION VILLAGES REQUIRE SPECIAL CONSIDERATION. In an effort to maintain security of the plan,

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
KIN

UNCLASSIFIED

MAGAR-OT (CB)

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned Number 19 (U)

preparations to receive the people were not made at the new hamlet sites before relocation began. In spite of this precaution, the VC knew about the operation well in advance. Therefore, it appears practical in most cases to prepare the reception facilities and new living quarters early and secure them in advance of the operation. This avoids the requirement for temporary shelters for the people relocated and insures that troops are "on site", are familiar with the terrain and will be available for security duty once the relocation has been accomplished.

c. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, PROPERLY EXECUTED, ARE FUNDAMENTAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION. "SUNRISE" has established the following key points:

(1) Planning must provide for a simple but effective plan for psychological operations. The plan should be completed well before the operation begins and it must be integrated with all other parts of the overall program.

(2) Special efforts must be made to inform the people of what is taking place, why it is taking place and what progress is being made. Radios, loudspeakers and movie projection equipment should be available from the beginning. This equipment should provide entertainment as well as information and indoctrination.

(3) Plans must provide active countermeasures to such VC propaganda themes as: "Young men will be taken away to serve in the Army", "people will be injected with germs and rendered sterile" and "the people will be taken from farms and allowed to starve".

(4) Regular Army personnel and their dependents must be informed about the program. The VC have caused some concern among ARVN personnel by directing propaganda at them, saying, for example, that their families and friends are being exploited in connection with the strategic hamlet program.

(5) Constant pressure may be necessary to insure that the Directorate of Information provides support for its provincial representatives. A tendency to provide less than adequate support becomes stronger as the operation continues beyond the initial phases.

d. MEDICAL CARE AND ASSISTANCE TO THOSE RELOCATED PRODUCES GREATEST POSSIBLE REWARDS. Many relocated persons were found to have never had access to medical care. Though medical assistance is one of the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
KIN

UNCLASSIFIED

MAGAR-OT (CB)

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned Number 19 (U)

means of achieving the greatest possible psychological rewards, the support received from the Ministry of Public Health was disappointing and far less than planned and agreed to. During the important initial phase of the operation, medical support provided was almost entirely due to the efforts of provincial rather than National level officials.

e. FUNDING MUST PROVIDE FOR EXPENDITURES WHICH CANNOT BE ANTICIPATED. For example, during the initial phases of Operation Sunrise, many hamlet areas were found to be inaccessible to trucks. Therefore, ox carts had to be hired at VN \$100 per day to help with the movement of household effects. Also, since many able-bodied men initially avoided relocation it was necessary to hire laborers to assist in construction of houses. Where compensation for losses of personal property and possessions during relocation is provided, this must be handled with dispatch and with proper publicity so as to avoid confusion and accusations of bad faith.

f. CIVIC ACTION CADRE MUST BE AVAILABLE, COMPLETELY TRAINED AND IN SUITABLE QUANTITY. These operations cannot succeed without trained civic action cadre. Their training should include observation of actual operations or on-the-job training in fringe areas of secure regions, where relocation can be accomplished without additional security.

g. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY IS HELPFUL IN ESTIMATING NUMBER OF FAMILIES LOCATED IN TARGET AREA. Estimates of the number of families to be relocated, which were made prior to study of aerial photos, were found to be extremely inaccurate.

h. TIMING AND SPEED WITH WHICH THE OPERATION IS EXECUTED ARE FUNDAMENTAL TO SUCCESS. Consideration must be given to the crop cycle in an agrarian economy. It may be necessary to allow a delay in execution to permit crops to be harvested. By using transportation available to the operation, most storable food supplies can be recovered so as to reduce emergency requirements. Movement of the population to relocation areas should be executed rapidly, but not ruthlessly. Delays may permit entire families to evade the relocation effort or may permit infiltration of VC agents during the operation. Also the VC will attempt to influence persons to give false information about the location and activities of family members, especially those who are missing.

i. RELOCATION OPERATIONS SHOULD BE INTEGRATED INTO THE OVERALL SCHEME OF MILITARY OPERATIONS. Since coordinated civil-military operations are basic to ultimate control of the country, they should be integrated with other operational plans and activities of regular military forces.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
KIN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

MAGAR-OT (CB)

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned Number 19 (U)

Also, preparations should be made in advance to provide CG and SDC for local security during the consolidation phase of relocation.


7. (U) The foregoing is for your information and guidance.

s/t H. K. EGGLESTON  
Brigadier General, USA  
Chief

DISTRIBUTION:

Special Distribution  
(Lessons Learned)

A TRUE COPY:

  
JOSEPH GREZAFFI  
LTC, GS  
Doctrine Branch, J343

**KIN**

UNCLASSIFIED