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15 August 1963

REPORT (02)

SUBJECT: 1. [unclear] Serial Num. - Psychological Warfare/Civic Action (V)

See Distribution

1. Attached for your information are the latest "Lessons Learned" from counterinsurgency operations in the Republic of Vietnam.

2. The information contained in "Lessons Learned" is primarily intended for use by US advisors in Vietnam. Lessons may be of value for direct application, or they may simply reinforce existing tactics, techniques, or doctrine.

3. Comments, questions, and requests for changes in distribution should be forwarded to this headquarters, ATTN: OWT Division, USASEC.

FOR THE CHIEF:

*R. E. Cushing*  
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Major, AGC  
Asst AG

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as

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Special (Lessons Learned)

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HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. ARMY SECTION  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP  
APO 143, San Francisco, California

MAGAR-OT (S&A)

17 August 1963

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned Number 30: Psychological Warfare and Civic  
Action Operations (U)

TO: See Distribution

1. INTRODUCTION: This "Lessons Learned" is devoted to Psychological Warfare (Psywar) and civic action activities in counter-insurgency operations in the Republic of Vietnam. As the basis for the document specific operations have been selected to illustrate both successful and unsuccessful techniques tried in South Vietnam. In addition, some general information of the overall psywar/civic action program is included to give the reader a broader view of these activities in this country. To this extent this paper differs from the normal "Lessons Learned" published previously.

2. BACKGROUND:

a. For the past two years psywar and civic action operations have been conducted by the Government of Vietnam military forces through teams sent into the villages and remote areas. These teams may participate with tactical units on "search-and-clear" and "clear-and-hold" missions, or operate independently, without the assistance of tactical units. Both methods of operation may be supported by airborne loud-speaker broadcasts and leaflet drops. These operations are designed to secure areas which previously have been under varying degrees of control of the insurgent Viet Cong. They are particularly important to the success of the strategic hamlet program. The overall mission is to win the support of the civilian population for the government's fight against the rebel forces.

b. Psywar/civic action techniques. Operations differ depending on the amount of enemy resistance and the problems involved in relocating people. In some cases relatively few people are relocated, but in other areas, massive relocation is necessary. The tactical forces search areas to clear them of armed Viet Cong; villagers are moved to sites chosen for strategic hamlets. Civic action teams and the psywar teams work together in the handling of the people.

(1) Trained military psywar teams organize and instruct local teams. The village team usually consists of a local village official as coordinator, a propaganda section, a sports/entertainment section, and a

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newsheets explaining government activities and containing items of general interest to the people.

(3) Independent Psywar/Civic Action Operations: A wide variety of independent psywar/civic action operations were conducted. These consisted of film presentations, propaganda meetings, cultural presentations to the local populace, and loudspeaker broadcasts to Viet Cong units. The psywar/civic action teams were very active, normally spending two days in each hamlet. They conducted children's classes, administered medical treatment, and carried out limited welfare and relief work. Free raffles were used to maintain interest and attract people to the propaganda gatherings. Candy was distributed to children who attended meetings. Sessions were frequently held with the village elders during the team's visit. Cultural performances were very popular in hamlets where adequate security could be established. Performers sang patriotic songs, put on anti-communist skits and plays, and provided the audience with both popular and classical Vietnamese music. Many special loudspeaker operations were carried out against the Viet Cong who frequently reacted to the broadcasts by directing small arms fire toward the source. Inclosures 3 and 4 contain examples of psywar/civic action teams conducting independent operations.

### 3. LESSONS LEARNED:

- a. Face-to-face propaganda is the most effective medium in Vietnam. Mass-media facilities are not developed in Vietnam to such an extent that they can be fully useful in the psywar effort. Leaflet operations were moderately successful, (see inclosure 5 for examples of leaflets produced at the national level) but devices such as hamlet propaganda meetings appear to be much more effective.
- b. Techniques of persuasive speech should be emphasized. Propagandist involved in face-to-face communication must master the techniques of persuasive speech. Stereotyped presentations must be avoided and the speech tailored to coincide with interests of the audience. For example, in a hostile community, the "hard sell" should be avoided and the initial effort should be designed to establish identification with the audience. Message content should be oriented toward local interests and based on accurate and timely intelligence.
- c. Propaganda should consist of other than oratorical speeches. Doctrinaire lectures are of doubtful value. The use of defectors as speakers, on the other hand, has proved to be very effective. In one instance a number of the Viet Cong was captured in an engagement a short distance from a village in which a propaganda meeting was being conducted. He had been wounded and was taken to the village where he was given medical treatment. The Viet Cong soldier publicly thanked the team and said his leaders had misled him about what treatment he would receive if captured. He volunteered to speak to the villagers and his statements had an obvious impact. Although such dramatic instances are rare, defectors and "converted" prisoners are frequently available.

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- d. Techniques of conducting and rallies should be stressed in training. There is a tendency to concentrate on officials when organizing local psywar teams. To produce best results, more emphasis should be placed on getting youth leaders and intellectuals to participate. This latter group of people is especially important in the informal communication network which is the backbone of the opinion-forming process. The effects of the formal mass rally can be kept alive in the personal network which centers on intelligent, articulate individuals. In addition, these opinion-formers should be contacted more frequently by the central psywar team. Periodic training should be conducted to improve their usefulness.
- e. Psywar personnel should be carefully chosen. The bulk of officer corps in the Republic of Vietnam comes from the middle and upper-class families. They are Westernized, urbanized, and have the personality characteristics associated with such culture. Many are originally from North Vietnam and therefore have different speech habits from those of the rural populace. If personnel have a flexible personality and are aware of the problems, they can overcome many of these obstacles to effective communication. Whenever possible, however, propagandists should be selected from the cultural background of target audiences.
- f. Leaflet content should be simple. Short, simple messages should be put on both sides of leaflets. Pictorial sketches are especially effective because many of the peasants are illiterate. Further, the Viet Cong leaders do not permit their soldiers to read propaganda, so the message should be understandable at a glance.
- g. Individual soldiers are effective for dissemination of propaganda. Soldiers should carry leaflets and posters to areas where they are operating. This is more economical and accurate than air drops. These can be directed toward civilians or left where the Viet Cong will find them.
- h. Armed propaganda missions are useful. Some areas are accessible only to military teams with armed escort. ARVN has conducted missions to such areas in isolated instances, but the practice is not widespread. Even though the inhabitants are forced to listen to the propaganda, it can be effective if it avoids the "hard sell", is skillful, and is developed gradually.
- i. Military psywar should concentrate on geographical areas inaccessible to civilian agencies. Both military and civilian information agencies are engaged in some of the same type activities in Vietnam, and sometimes there is duplication of effort. In regions where both civilian and military agencies may be conducting psywar, effective coordination must be maintained and areas of responsibility clearly spelled out. There

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are many geographical areas which are too insecure to permit civilian operations; activity in these locales must be by the military.

J. Prisoners should be treated with kindness and sympathy.

(1) In any war, hatred is generated and there is a tendency for soldiers to be vindictive toward prisoners. In revolutionary war, this tendency is especially marked. Vindictive behavior may give vent to personal animosity, but it does not help to win the war. Reported instances clearly indicate the results obtained by kind and friendly attitudes. In one case a guard gave a cigarette to a prisoner and stated, "I'm sorry that we fight each other because of misunderstanding". This led to an exchange of conversation which elicited valuable intelligence. A second case involved a wounded prisoner who was given government medical treatment. He was so amazed at this behavior that he voluntarily went to a propaganda meeting nearby and gave a speech on how he had been deceived by the Viet Cong.

(2) Treatment of prisoners is a very controversial subject among military personnel. Some leaders advocate harsh treatment not only for revenge, but because they think more prompt intelligence can be derived in this manner. Evidence fails to support this view. Undoubtedly there has been some intelligence gained through the use of threats and physical punishment, but the intelligence gain is offset by the long-term ill feeling created by such behavior. Mistreatment of prisoners is a difficult error to correct, but it deserves continuous emphasis.

k. In "search-and-clear" operations, troops should be firm but courteous and sympathetic to all people.

(1) The success or failure of government control over inhabitants of villages and hamlets depends to a large measure on the attitudes and action of the search force. Each soldier must be impressed with the absolute necessity of presenting to the people a favorable image. The operations must be conducted firmly, systematically, and in a businesslike manner. Courtesy, respect, and sympathy must be shown, regardless of the attitude of the villagers.

(2) A great problem in village search is the troop attitude toward villagers with known rebel sympathies. In many villages nearly every family has been involved in the Viet Cong movement in some capacity. The natural tendency of the troops is to exhibit hatred, contempt, and hostility toward the known enemy. It has been observed that villagers treated with such hostility usually respond in a like manner. On the other hand, if they are treated with objective firmness and friendliness, they often assist in trying to get members of the Viet Cong to transfer

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their allegiance to the government. If shown consideration, even hostile villagers are willing to revise their attitudes toward the government and its forces.

(3) When mistakes are made during search operations, restitution should be prompt. In many cases, nothing more than a sincere apology is necessary. Civilian property damaged or destroyed must be properly compensated for.

l. The civilian population must be carefully prepared for relocation. Psywar should not wait until relocation begins before preparing the populace. The psychological program should begin long before the actual physical operation, in order for the people to understand thoroughly what is happening. This preparation should include an explanation of the purpose of relocation, the method, and what is required of the citizen. Such preparation can be done without compromising security.

m. In relocation operations, plans should provide for contact teams and personnel to operate refugee centers.

(1) There has been some confusion and unfavorable reaction caused by improper handling of relocatees. In some cases the relocation is forced; therefore every means must be used to minimize hostility. Civil affairs contact teams should arrive with the first contingent of troops to assist in alleviating the inherent problems of relocation operations.

(2) In many large-scale operations, there are unexpected refugees. Contingency civil affairs plans should provide facilities to care for these refugees until the civilian authorities can take over. Even in relocation operations where civilian plans do include care for refugees, experience shows that the military force must be prepared to assume this responsibility for short periods.

n. Extensive medical aid to neutral or hostile civilians creates a morale problem for government forces. While their own dependents sometimes lack adequate medical treatment, military personnel see health care being given to less loyal individuals. This may cause a serious morale problem and requires a good information program for troops and their dependents.

o. U.S. medical teams must practice at the local standard of medicine. In most cases, the local standard of medical practice falls far below the U.S. standards. Since the purpose of medical civic action is to build confidence in the Vietnamese government, it is unwise to draw the attention of the people to technical shortcomings of government health agents.

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U.S. medical personnel must avoid techniques that will put local medical personnel in a bad light. This may require taking a back seat to those local practitioners on some occasions. The objective is to enhance the image of the properly constituted authority.

p. G5 activities must be balanced. The G5 is responsible for many activities, including troop information and education, civil affairs, social welfare, dependent care, psychological warfare, and other duties. In many units, the G5 is preoccupied with certain aspects of his responsibilities and correspondingly neglects others. In general, civic actions tend to be conducted at the expense of psychological warfare. Although priorities must be established, care must be taken to avoid neglect of this sort.

q. All psywar/civic action efforts must be coordinated. In order to insure that maximum efficiency is obtained from all agencies in conducting psywar/civic action operations, their efforts must be coordinated at the working level as well as the planning level. Undesirable overlap must be avoided and gaps prevented. A step in the right direction has been taken in Vietnam. In order to develop better cooperation between military and civilian psywar/civic action operations, a psywar staff section has been organized in each province, consisting of 1 officer, 1 NCO, and 1 other EM. A detailed explanation of this organization can be found in inclosure 6.

4. Pictures of psywar activities in the Republic of Vietnam appear in inclosure 7.

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as

/S/

M. ODEN  
Brigadier General, USA  
Chief

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62/2013/6



Anh lính Việt-Công.  
Giờ này, ở quê nhà  
có em bà, Mẹ anh, Cha anh,  
có tổ tông là một đồng-  
chi của anh sao lại có,  
súng kà long, tra  
khẩu, tổng tiền, tiền  
đốt tài sản theo lệnh  
của Đảng.



Anh lính Việt-Công.  
Hãy ngừng lại, buông tay hung thối,  
khát máu, cướp của giết người.

VC SOLDIERS!

At this time, in your remote native village your father or your mother may be subjected to extortion by one of your comrades, upon orders of the Party.

VC SOLDIERS!

Stop staining your hand with blood!

61/4001/A



Anh lính Việt-công  
lòng nào cần sự  
sợ hãi này  
Anh lính Việt-công  
hãy ngưng lại.  
Đón tay bạn mai  
Lương - dân.

VC SOLDIERS!

Why do you wish to do harm to our poor peasants?

VC SOLDIERS!

Stop staining your hands with blood!

The success of the operation was a first, for a rice-growing region, one of the most fertile in the south of the country, had been abandoned. The people had fled from the region of the Mekong, leaving the area in the hands of the Vietnamese military. The success of the operation, for example, have been a first in the area.

To the north, in Tay Hoa, a special team has been selected, consisting of eight members of the 47th Psychological Warfare Company. Commanded by a Captain the team includes one other officer, a medical aidman borrowed from a nearby military unit, and a US advisor.

Arriving in the area, the team first checked into local military headquarters for a thorough briefing on the area, the people, and the psychological situation. The next morning the team moved into the first of the villages. Troops hoisted the flag of the Republic of Vietnam. In the market place a radio-public address system blared out the morning programs of Radio Saigon. Volume was maximum, for the market place was deserted and attention had to be secured (the market was closed that day; it opens only two days a week).

Across from the market place in an abandoned store the medics set up their dispensary, stocked with two United States Operation Mission kits supplied by the provincial public health service. The medics plastered the front of the building with colorful public health posters.

Troops spread out into the village, armed with buckets of black paint and brushes. They painted over the Viet Cong posters and slogans on the walls of houses and public buildings. The stage was set.

In the advisor's words, this is what happened.

"Members of the team scattered throughout the village, portable public address systems slung across their shoulders. Over and over they explained in a few sentences why they were there: 'This is a visit from your government. Movies tonight. Free medical treatment in the market place. We are to have a lottery. You can win prizes.'

"At first they talked only to closed doors. Not a soul around. Then a few children timidly appeared. We were ready for them, with 700 pieces of sugar candy, to be passed out, one by one. Soon a small army of children followed us. We scattered leaflets as we went -- putting them on doorsteps and along the paths leading through the village. Slowly, people came out of their houses. We talked to them, assured them, telling them what we were doing."

"Few came to the dispensary during the morning. But by late afternoon the place was crowded. We got 300 patients the first day. The next day we got hundreds more, many of them from surrounding hamlets."

"The entire population of the village is supplied by United States military services. When they come they bring all sorts of 'Victrola' records, and they bring them to the village. There are a lot of records. The records of people who are wearing shirts on the streets of Hanoi are real records. It didn't seem as if the Dolc piano had every record already provided by all the military bands. It seems to come from a 'Victrola'."

"The commander said the government is trying to do the rural areas."

"While walking through the village I saw a report that the perimeter guards had picked up an 18-year old Viet Cong trying to slip into the village under orders to find out what was going on. The commander, who is a natural psychologist, went to work on him -- questioning him, scolding him, breaking him down. He really disturbed the young man."

"The young man was taken out and put before the crowd and told to start talking. He described life in the Viet Cong hideout. Said he was forced to join the Viet Cong. In a few minutes he was speaking faster and he wept. They began to stir. They began to murmur. Then they started getting to their feet. Soon they were shouting: 'DOWN WITH THE VIET CONG! DOWN WITH THE VIET CONG! DOWN WITH THE VIET CONG! Over and over. The waves of sound of their chant roared out of the market place and into the night. We were astounded, and I think the Viet Cong, out there in the darkness, must have been also."

"The next day we picked out the ten poorest families in the Village and presented each with a household kit; an aluminum tea kettle, cooking pot, and meat platter. Next time we will bring rice, two kilos per family."

"We had sort of a raffle. The leaflets we had distributed in the village were folded and stapled. Four of them contained a special mark -- a number. The holders of the winning leaflets got kitchen utensils. Next time we won't use a number system, we'll put a special sentence into four of the messages. That way they will have to read the message to see if it contains the winning sentence."

"One woman had gotten two leaflets and had given one unopened to a friend. It turned out that the friend's leaflet was a winner. The first woman was so angry that we had to give her ten piasters consolation prize. That seemed to placate her."

"After the raffle we announced that we had pictures of President Dien for anyone who would come forward and request them. This set off a near riot -- people shoving and pushing, grabbing the pictures out of our hands. Apparently we had set off the acquisitive spirit."

"The commander, who is very good with children, set up a children's class in hand-washing and teeth-brushing. He lectured for a little while,

then he asked me... I don't know.

"On your... which was... a job... would the... to avoid the..."

"The... of rice plants... the spot... spread further than any other single thing that we did in three days of work."

"One of our objectives was to force a Viet Cong reaction. We met it the second night. The Viet Cong started firing... up at the edge of the village to broadcast... (the theme being... divisive one) attempting to drive a wedge between the Viet Cong and their leaders."

"Total cost of the venture: about 15 American dollars."

"I think that the important lesson to be learned from this is that to make a psychological impact on the villagers you must have an integrated operation. No one thing we did would have meant much. But put together it meant a great deal. The whole is more than a sum of the parts."

## ACTIVITY

- (2) ...
- (3) ...
- (4) ...
- (5) ...
- (6) ...

... at approximately 0730 the next morning ... in ... interspersed with brief ... news ... This coincided with ... This occurred at 0730, at which time the ... provided ... to report the operations.

2. Results. The results of this type operation vary widely ... various factors, such as political climate in the area and quality of village leadership. Attendance ranges from 200-1000. In some instances the people are very attentive; in other instances, they are not. Since no public opinion polling is done, the only way to evaluate results is to observe the reaction of the people.

3. Advisory analysis. The selection and training of local personnel must be improved. The local speakers are not effective as a general rule. Their speeches are read in a perfunctory manner. The content of the speeches is predominantly "anti-VC", even in hostile areas. The basic principles of persuasive speech are violated in most cases. The "hard sell, anti-VC" theme is presented in every instance regardless of the local political climate. In most cases there has been no special attention given to "opinion moulders" - to the key people in the communication process. There is very little audience participation, except in the case of sporting events.

Psywar operations in conjunction with civil affairs operations are more effective. The psywar teams should remain a minimum of three days in a hamlet. This would permit inserting propaganda with "anti-VC" themes at a slower pace.

There is a wide variance in the personal characteristics of psywar personnel. In the many cases they are from urban areas and have been Westernized to the degree that they are unable to obtain rapport with the villagers.



- 1. Bị các Mặt trận giải phóng dân tộc bắt ép, khống chế, bắt ủng hộ hoặc giao nộp lương thực, tài sản, bắt đi làm công nhân, thợ mỏ, làm công nhân nông trường.
- 2. Bị các Mặt trận giải phóng dân tộc bắt ép đi làm công nhân, thợ mỏ, làm công nhân nông trường, bắt đi làm công nhân vận tải, bắt đi làm công nhân xây dựng, bắt đi làm công nhân vận tải, bắt đi làm công nhân vận tải, bắt đi làm công nhân vận tải.
- 3. Bị các Mặt trận giải phóng dân tộc bắt ép đi làm công nhân, thợ mỏ, làm công nhân nông trường, bắt đi làm công nhân vận tải, bắt đi làm công nhân xây dựng, bắt đi làm công nhân vận tải, bắt đi làm công nhân vận tải.
- 4. Bị các Mặt trận giải phóng dân tộc bắt ép đi làm công nhân, thợ mỏ, làm công nhân nông trường, bắt đi làm công nhân vận tải, bắt đi làm công nhân xây dựng, bắt đi làm công nhân vận tải, bắt đi làm công nhân vận tải.
- 5. Không được hưởng một chút quyền lợi gì ngoài việc quanh quẩn bị bắt đi làm công nhân, thợ mỏ, làm công nhân nông trường, bắt đi làm công nhân vận tải, bắt đi làm công nhân xây dựng, bắt đi làm công nhân vận tải, bắt đi làm công nhân vận tải.

[REDACTED]

LIFE OF OUR POPULATION OUTSIDE THE STRATEGIC HAMLET.

- 1. People are often disturbed, oppressed & terrorized by the so-called Liberation Front. The SLF troops compel our people to give them rice, food, and money and force our people to participate in political manifestations, to destroy communication roads and to carry their wounded soldiers.
- 2. Lives and property of our people are menaced by the so-called Liberation Troops, and yet you may be hit by random shots when ARVN units mop up the Communists Bandits.
- 3. You do not get any assistance from the SLF camps and yet you live under their permanent pressure. Your family's life becomes then more untenable and more miserable.
- 4. You must endure a hard life and the communist bandits never stop their coercion and looting.
- 5. You never get any social assistance but constant pressure and looting by the communist bandits; furthermore youths are forced into their army to act as their shields.



1. Được bảo vệ về an ninh, không sợ bị cướp bóc, cướp phá nhiều cũng không sợ bị tước đoạt ruộng đất, không bị bắt, không bị bắt buộc học, giáo dục tại trường ở xa, không phải đi xa để học.
2. Nhanh chóng được hưởng lợi pháp luật, được bảo vệ không cho bị cướp bóc, giăm, cầm trái phép.
3. Được chính quyền quốc gia bồi thường, cho vay tiền, cho thuê nhà để canh tác, chăn nuôi, buôn bán, làm con được hưởng lợi quyền tự do như tự do đi lại, tự do tin ngưỡng, tự do làm ăn, sinh sống.
4. Được hưởng các tiện nghi tối thiểu về Ấp Chiến lược như: trường có phòng phát triển nhà vệ sinh, kỹ nhi viên, trường học, quán chợ v.v.
5. Được khen thưởng, và hưởng quyền lợi tùy theo công lao của mình đóng góp cho Ấp chiến lược, xây dựng sự đoàn kết và tiến bộ cho đồng bào trong Ấp.

**TOÀN DÂN TỰ NGUYỆN XÂY DỰNG ẤP CHIẾN LƯỢC**

**LIFE OF OUR PEOPLE IN THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS.**

1. You can work in peace, no one can disturb you; the communist bandits cannot coerce nor loot you, thanks to the close defense system of the strategic hamlets.
2. Your lives and property are guaranteed by laws; you do not fear illegal arrest and imprisonment.
3. The government will assist you in granting you agricultural credit with very light interest to enable you to raise cattle, to conduct agricultural work or to do business. And yet you are given all rights, such as, freedom of movement, of religion and of free enterprise.
4. You are given the maximum facilities possible; there is a dispensary, maternity clinic, day nursery, school and market in every strategic hamlet.
5. You are respected and given all the credit for your contribution to the defense of the strategic hamlets, to the edification of unity and progress in the strategic hamlet.

**THE ENTIRE POPULATION VOLUNTEERS IN THE  
CONSTRUCTION OF STRATEGIC HAMLETS**

TO OUR FRIENDS WHO ARE AMONG THE VC'S RANKS.

Surely you don't want to live here? Because you are leading a very miserable life, you don't eat enough, you lack clothes and money to buy daily necessities. While the high ranking cadres have plenty of food and clothes and much money to spend foolishly. Their first words-of-mouth are about virtue and revolutionary spirit which are designed to deceive you, to take advantage of you and to exploit you.

Surely you don't want to live here? Because of the jungles and unhealthy climate, the very breeding place of malaria; those unlucky friends of yours who catch the disease and don't have any medicine to get rid of it, will become chronically ill and will never be healed.

Surely you don't want to live here? Because the VC's promises are only sugary words, they have never kept. Here you only see the commanding officers who falsely call your service, service for the party. Therefore if you are killed by snipers or by disease and your corpse left in the jungles or buried hurriedly under unknown graves, you have made an unnecessary sacrifice for the commanding echelons, those bloodthirsty and dishonest people who conceal themselves under the label of the party to commit numberless atrocities.

Then, why are you still hesitating to quit this area and to return home for a better and peaceful life? It's the VC's policy to be lenient and the government is ready to welcome you, the exiled sons who want to return to the just cause. Shouldn't we head of the stubborn commanding officers, take away weapons and documents and report yourselves to the territorial military and civilian authorities.

Come on! Make a quick decision to start another life. Your fatherland and your family are awaiting you.

Các bạn đang ở trong hàng ngũ VC

Chắc bạn không thích sống nơi đây?

Vì cuộc sống của bạn đang rất khổ cực, thiếu ăn, thiếu mặc, không đủ ăn, không đủ mặc, không đủ tiền để mua sắm hàng hóa để sinh sống. Trong khi đó những cán bộ cấp cao của bọn họ lại có đầy đủ thức ăn, quần áo, tiền bạc để tiêu xài. Những lời nói đầu tiên của họ là về đức hạnh và tinh thần cách mạng, những lời nói này được thiết kế để lừa dối bạn, để lợi dụng bạn và để bóc lột bạn.

Chắc bạn không thích sống nơi đây?

Vì rừng rậm và khí hậu nóng ẩm là nơi sinh sản của bệnh sốt rét, bệnh sốt rét là căn bệnh nguy hiểm, những người bạn của bạn mắc bệnh này mà không có thuốc để chữa trị, sẽ trở nên mãn tính và sẽ không bao giờ được chữa khỏi.

Chắc bạn không thích sống nơi đây?

Vì họ đã hứa với bạn những điều mà họ không bao giờ làm được, họ chỉ nói những lời ngọt ngào để lừa dối bạn, để lợi dụng bạn và để bóc lột bạn. Vì vậy nếu bạn bị giết chết bởi súng đạn hay bệnh tật, hoặc nếu bạn bị bệnh tật và thiêu táng dưới những ngôi mộ không rõ tên, thì bạn đã làm một sự hy sinh không cần thiết cho những tầng lớp lãnh đạo, những người máu lạnh và không chính nghĩa.

Vậy thì tại sao bạn vẫn còn chần chừ? Vì chính sách của chúng ta là khoan hồng và chính phủ sẵn sàng chào đón bạn, những người con trai của quê hương muốn quay trở lại quê hương. Chúng ta không nên đầu hàng những chỉ huy cứng đầu, những người đã lấy danh nghĩa của Đảng để che giấu những tội ác của họ.

Hãy bỏ vũ khí và tài liệu của bạn ngay lập tức và báo cáo với các cơ quan địa phương để được hưởng sự khoan hồng. Những người chỉ huy cứng đầu, những người không chính nghĩa, hãy để lại vũ khí và tài liệu của họ, hãy đầu hàng chính quyền địa phương và báo cáo với các cơ quan địa phương để được hưởng sự khoan hồng.

YÊU CẦU CHO TỔ QUỐC VÀ GIA ĐÌNH



— Các bạn chết đay là chết cho ai? Hỡi những xác không tên, những nấm mồ vô chủ. Chết mà danh bia muốn thuộc thì chết vậy mới đáng chết! Chết vì nghe theo lời đường mật của cón đờ khát máu đội lốt giải phóng, chết vì bị dụ dỗ thân làm bia đỡ đạn cho bọn đờ tề cộng sản, thì tại chết ấy chúng hóa ra vô bổ và nhục nhã lắm sao?

Bạn ơi!

Bạn còn chần chờ gì nữa mà không quay về với Tổ-quốc, với dân-tộc?

Bạn ơi! Về đay, về với hàng ngũ Quốc-gia chống cộng. Nhân dân, Quân đội, gia đình đang chờ đón các bạn.

### ALL FOR OUR BELOVED COUNTRY!

What is the sense of this death? The poor unknown corpses and graves? A good death deserves to be known everywhere. To die for the sweet words of the bloodthirsty gangs who conceal themselves under the Liberation's label and to die when acting as shields for the communist manslaughterers, then it means an unnecessary and shameful death.

Dear friend,

Do not hesitate anymore to return to your fatherland and your people!

Dear friend,

Come here and join the nationalist ranks to fight against the communists.

The people, the army and your family are waiting you.

# CÀM NANG

cho cán binh VC quy về  
phục nghĩa

## 1 - Tình hình hợp làm tiên

Nếu bạn bị bao vây, bị suy yếu, hoặc bị thiếu thực phẩm, thiết bị của Quân-Đội VNCH tấn công:

Bạn hãy hạ súng cấp chỉ huy của bạn (nếu có cơ hội thuận tiện), bỏ vũ khí xuống đất nằm ngửa (để tránh bị bắn lén), đưa 2 tay lên trời, dùng 1 mảnh vải trắng hoặc giấy trắng vẩy mạnh để chúng rõ thiện chí của bạn muốn quay về với Chính nghĩa.

Bạn sẽ được Quân-Đội VNCH tiếp đón nồng hậu và giúp đỡ bạn trở về nguyên quán an hưởng hạnh phúc gia đình, và, nếu bạn muốn, bạn sẽ được Chính-phủ VNCH trọng dụng tùy theo tài năng của bạn.

BẠN OH! HÃY VỀ MÀ ĐOÀN TỤ VỚI GIA ĐÌNH

## IF YOUR MORALE IS COMPLETELY SHAKEN.

If, through personal experiences, you feel that the VC's truculent plots are to push you into the combat areas to die instead of them...

If you feel disgusted (with what you are doing), for lack of food, clothes, medicines and love...

If you suffer anxiety due to the pitiful living condition of your wives & children; your parents are left unattended, due to your absence...

If you feel that the acts of the VC are meaningless and cursed by our population; if you recognize that the VC's invasion and subversion are a hopeless war without any escape and which will surely fail pitifully...

Then take advantage of your sorties on missions to return to the just cause and the GVN. This energetic act will help you start a new life within the national community, a valuable life along with the personalistic ideal and in accordance with your skill.

Dear friends, why are you hesitating to return to the nation, to the population?



## ĐIỀU ĐẶC BIỆT LƯU Ý BẠN

Các tội phạm về chiến tranh của bạn sẽ được chính phủ hoàn toàn ân xá.

Đối với các tội thường phạm, nếu có, bạn sẽ được hưởng đặc ân lập công chuộc tội và trường hợp giảm khinh.

Bạn hãy noi gương Thiếu Tá TRẦN NAM TÂY, bị danh QUỐC DÂN Tiểu Đoàn Trưởng Tiểu Đoàn 65, Trung Đoàn I (Việt Cộng) đã quy về phục nghĩa và tinh thần Chính quyền VNCH tại Quảng Tín ngày 12 tháng 2 năm 1963.

BẠN CŨI HÃY CƯƠNG QUYẾT VỀ LẬP  
LẠI CUỘC ĐỜI

WE ESPECIALLY CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO THIS

You will be granted complete forgiveness for your war offenses.

Concerning ordinary offenses, if there are any, extenuating circumstances will be considered and you will be given the opportunity to accomplish high feats to make amends.

Follow the example of former VC's major, Mr Tran Nam Tay, alias Quoc Dan, Commander of Bn 65, 1st Regt who has returned to the just cause and has reported to the SVN authorities at Quang Tin Province, on 12 February 1963.

Dear friends, be determined to start a new life!

In order to provide territorial peace and stability, the Government will provide social and economic development programs in the rural areas.

The Government is committed to the development of the rural areas and the control of the rural areas. This is done in cooperation with the local authorities and the national government. The Government will provide technical assistance and training to the rural population.

Working for the social and economic development of the rural areas:

- 1. Agricultural Program
- 2. Rural Extension Program
- 3. Rural Health Program

1. The rural extension program - consists of: 1. officer, the team leader, who is responsible for overall supervision of the activities.

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The team conducts liaison with civilian and military agencies in the territory concerning psychic activity.

2. The civic activities team consists of: 1. officer, the team leader who is also public security officer, and assists in determining strategic hamlet policy concerning defense organization, security, and fire prevention in districts and hamlets.

1. Public Health Program - provides advice and guidance to local authorities for strategic hamlets concerning rural health and disease prevention.

1. Agricultural Social Welfare Program - provides guidance to local authorities for strategic hamlets concerning organization of civic groups, information activities, establishing schools, and obtaining teachers, and books.

1. Farming/Community Development Program - provides guidance to local authorities for strategic hamlets concerning land development, crop production, farming, use of fertilizers, seeds, animal breeding, road improvement, and drainage.

... activities may be used for emergency relief and evacuation.

3. The ... team consists of: 1. Officer, the team leader, who assists the sector ... in Chi ... officers, and may serve as a member of the ... Chi ... Reception Center. He coordinates with civilian and military agencies on Chi ... matters, and expedites paywar support benefits obtained from returns.

1. ... responsible for internal administration, cross-... and he also operates sound equipment (loudspeaker, movies, recorders), and makes leaflets and posters.

1. ... used for liaison activities and acts for WFO in his absence.

The team directly supervises the Chi ... center through the sector commander and conducts all information program for military and civilians in the province and the Chi ... program.


... (1) ... as the ... of ... of ... (2) ... of ... (3) ... of ... (4) ... of ... (5) ... of ... (6) ... of ... (7) ... of ... (8) ... of ... (9) ... of ... (10) ... of ... (11) ... of ... (12) ... of ... (13) ... of ... (14) ... of ... (15) ... of ... (16) ... of ... (17) ... of ... (18) ... of ... (19) ... of ... (20) ... of ... (21) ... of ... (22) ... of ... (23) ... of ... (24) ... of ... (25) ... of ... (26) ... of ... (27) ... of ... (28) ... of ... (29) ... of ... (30) ... of ... (31) ... of ... (32) ... of ... (33) ... of ... (34) ... of ... (35) ... of ... (36) ... of ... (37) ... of ... (38) ... of ... (39) ... of ... (40) ... of ... (41) ... of ... (42) ... of ... (43) ... of ... (44) ... of ... (45) ... of ... (46) ... of ... (47) ... of ... (48) ... of ... (49) ... of ... (50) ... of ... (51) ... of ... (52) ... of ... (53) ... of ... (54) ... of ... (55) ... of ... (56) ... of ... (57) ... of ... (58) ... of ... (59) ... of ... (60) ... of ... (61) ... of ... (62) ... of ... (63) ... of ... (64) ... of ... (65) ... of ... (66) ... of ... (67) ... of ... (68) ... of ... (69) ... of ... (70) ... of ... (71) ... of ... (72) ... of ... (73) ... of ... (74) ... of ... (75) ... of ... (76) ... of ... (77) ... of ... (78) ... of ... (79) ... of ... (80) ... of ... (81) ... of ... (82) ... of ... (83) ... of ... (84) ... of ... (85) ... of ... (86) ... of ... (87) ... of ... (88) ... of ... (89) ... of ... (90) ... of ... (91) ... of ... (92) ... of ... (93) ... of ... (94) ... of ... (95) ... of ... (96) ... of ... (97) ... of ... (98) ... of ... (99) ... of ... (100) ... of ...



A PSYWAR TEAM PREPARES FOR AN OPERATION.



PSYWAR TEAM IN SUPPORT OF A COMBAT OPERATION



A PSYWAR TEAM BROADCASTS A SURRENDER APPEAL



TROOP ENTERTAINMENT: A PART OF THE PSYWAR MISSION.



PROPAGANDA DISEMINATED BY AIR SUPPORTING GROUND  
PSYWAR/CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM



1950-1951 - 1952 - 1953 - 1954 - 1955 - 1956 - 1957 - 1958 - 1959 - 1960 - 1961 - 1962 - 1963 - 1964 - 1965 - 1966 - 1967 - 1968 - 1969 - 1970 - 1971 - 1972 - 1973 - 1974 - 1975 - 1976 - 1977 - 1978 - 1979 - 1980 - 1981 - 1982 - 1983 - 1984 - 1985 - 1986 - 1987 - 1988 - 1989 - 1990 - 1991 - 1992 - 1993 - 1994 - 1995 - 1996 - 1997 - 1998 - 1999 - 2000 - 2001 - 2002 - 2003 - 2004 - 2005 - 2006 - 2007 - 2008 - 2009 - 2010 - 2011 - 2012 - 2013 - 2014 - 2015 - 2016 - 2017 - 2018 - 2019 - 2020 - 2021 - 2022 - 2023 - 2024 - 2025



INFORMATION DISSEMINATION WITHIN STRATEGIC HAMLET