

U. S. Army Military History Institute

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**DIVISION COMMAND
LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAM**

EXPERIENCES IN DIVISION COMMAND

1985

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[LETTERHEAD]

There is much truth in the elder Moltke's statement that "the military commander is the fate of the nation." Certainly the destiny of the United States has been shaped in some measure by the command abilities of Washington, Grant and other American military commanders. I know of nothing more important in the Army than command and it was with this knowledge that we began to collect the experiences of some of our division commanders.

What follows is a selection of quotes from division commanders who were interviewed in the spring of 1985. The quotes may prove helpful in your preparation for command or in the exercise of that vital function. While there is much that can be learned about command, it is an endeavor that is highly dependent on the personality of the individual commander. What works for one officer may not work for another. Consider and reflect on these experiences carefully. We have the best soldiers in the world. They deserve commanders of the same caliber.

(DRAFT COVER LETTER. RECOMMEND SIGNATURE BY DCSOPS DAS, VCSA OR CSA.)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Division Command Lessons Learned program of 1985 involved interviews with four serving division commanders and questionnaire responses of one active duty ex-division commander as well as a retired ex-division commander. The selected quotes represent experiences in command and may be of use to prospective commanders. The quotes do not represent Department of Army approved practices or recommendations for the conduct of command.

A review of all of the respondents comments reflected an air of confidence in divisional combat readiness, a belief in the value of the National Training Center and the benefits that can be obtained by working with various TRADOC elements. Some of the respondents recommend a better grasp of installation management and community activities prior to assuming command. Additionally, some commanders evidence concern with the training of division headquarters troops and DISCOM units. The respondents have also provided a few tips and cautions for prospective commanders in the personal exercise of command.

The 1985 respondents provided the results of their experiences in dealing with family action and professional ethics issues. There are concerns and practical tips on anti-armor doctrine and organization. Finally, there appears to be high praise for the quality of our soldiers from their commanders.

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EXPERIENCES IN DIVISION COMMAND

COMMAND PREPARATION

"I would spend some time reading manuals, then I would make a trip to Leavenworth and probably sit down with some of the doctrine writers."

"My major failure was an inability to get to the National Training Center before I took command."

"I would have benefitted by spending more time with serving division commanders."

"I should have spent more time studying the V Corps and VII Corps GDPs."

"I think that if I had a free month I would go to Fort Eustis and make sure that I understood exactly what was available through that system. Everyday we find some new benefit, some new item of support available through Fort Eustis that I personally was not aware of before. Then I eagerly get the information distributed throughout the division so that we can line up the support. I think that I would spend time at the Infantry School, the Artillery School, and the Armor School and perhaps also the Air Defense and Engineer Schools. I would want to make sure I had a clear understanding of what lieutenants were being taught and what I would expect lieutenants to know when they arrived in the division."

"The thing that I did not do was to focus sufficiently on the role of the Installation. Who does its support work? Where it sends things to have them refurbished,

where it goes for support. I should have known a great deal more about what the installation does to support soldiers. Now one way to do this is asking the right questions during a visit prior to taking command, at the various places that do in fact provide support to the installation. To some extent visits to higher headquarters provide some insights, but they don't really provide the depth of knowledge that you need when you are in trouble and you have got to get support in a hurry."

"I would have benefitted from a more careful study of the Army's financial management system at the corps level and higher. I would have been able to establish the division's internal financial management and resource allocation system sooner."

"I think I would have asked for more information and probably even a minicourse in installation management. I did not know at the time that I would end up managing 21 separate installations spread over a very large area. Not having an adequate installation staff, I found myself deeply involved in an awful lot of installation planning."

"I needed more discussions on fiscal, JAG, medical and administrative constraints, how to make value assessments of fiscal matters, public relations, local priorities; and key criteria of higher commanders."

"I think prospective division commanders should read the 7 and 71 Series, How to Fight Manuals that deal with the infantry and armor battalions and the cav squadron and the 6 Series Manuals that deal with the artillery battalions. It doesn't take long to do this. All of the books can be quickly gathered and the essential parts covered in a couple of days. Quite frankly, I did that before I came into the division and it proved to be extremely helpful to me in dealing with my battalion commanders early on when there was doubt or uncertainty expressed about the new doctrine. I had a working knowledge of it and a familiarity with it that permitted me to engage in a positive way in those conversations from the outset."

"The one area that I was particularly weak in and schooled myself in as quickly as possible was the new developments in tank gunnery."

"I really did not know as much as I should have known about the use of the TOW or anti-tank doctrine. With respect to the tactical deployment, I would say that General DePuy was probably right: It will be 10 years before we are able to use the new Infantry Fighting Vehicles. I include the ITV in that. Further, I did not know as much as I should know about the training of machine gunners."

"I did not feel comfortable with maintenance as much as I did with tactics. It caused me to do some homework myself in getting up to speed. I spent an awful lot of nights reading manuals to make sure that I would demonstrate a level of proficiency in the maintenance area."

"I reread portions of the Patton papers, General Harmon's book, General Truscott's book, Guederian's Panzer Battles, the Rommel papers, and Rommel's World War I book, Infantry Attacks. I found all of these useful. I further looked very carefully at 71-2 on heavy task forces, ARTEP 71-2, and the various manuals on brigade and division level operations."

"I would suggest to new division commanders that they marshall their thoughts and think through what they want to convey to their people very carefully because whatever they convey will be picked up and acted upon with great alacrity. If you don't mean it, you best not say it."

ORGANIZATION

"The whole Division 86 organization was designed to take the burden off company commanders so that they could concentrate on the fight. Sustaining that fight is so important though. Maintenance is such an important part of that in the Heavy Division that we here habitually send the company maintenance team to the company even though they are assigned to the Headquarters Company. Further we have consolidated ITV's with the TOWs from each of the line companies into one anti-tank company. That permits us to see that those individuals manning it are proficient and trained and then of course the ITV's are attached back as required."

"I had many surprises about the equipment that we do not have on hand. The TO&E is meaningless if you don't have the equipment to equip your soldiers. We are very good in this division at making do with what we have. We also often find ourselves having to reorganize and switch equipment back and forth or borrow it from the National Guard. We have good working relationships with them."

"I won't say we don't pay attention to the TO&Es because we do. But because of the equipment shortages, all the stateside divisions are short of equipment because of prepositioning, I organize as necessary to get the job done and worry about the DMMC keeping up with the property."

"I found it necessary to assign all of the Improved TOW vehicles, the M901 vehicles, in the Infantry battalions to the Echo Company, to the anti-tank company with the exception of the three in the scout platoon. As you know the Infantry battalion under the J Series TO&E and under the Army of Excellence MTO&E has 23 M901 vehicles assigned to it. By the MTO&E, each rifle company has two for a total of eight. The anti-tank company has 12 organized into three platoons of four each, and the scout platoon has three. I left the three in the scout platoon and assigned all 20 of the remaining ITVs to

the anti-tank company, to Echo Company. We did that for three reasons. First is the training of the ITV crewmen, the 11 H's can be accomplished to a higher level of efficiency under that single commander. Secondly the maintenance is better controlled and handled under that Echo Company Commander; and third, employment is improved because four platoons are available. That permits us to support each rifle company if we need or to hold ITVs out for the employment in a general support role or a separate role. This also enhances the flexibility of the battalion commander in employing his total force."

TRAINING

"You must recognize that there are different time, dollar, personnel and equipment constraints in 126 different companies/batteries in your division."

"I learned first-hand and quickly that divisional troops, that is those units not in the brigades, were very difficult to train, mainly because they depend on having a large portion of the division in the field to train realistically."

"Get Involvement of both ADCs, the Chief of Staff, 3 Bde Cdrs, DISCOM and DIVARTY Cdrs for central planning. Battalion commanders must be in on decision-making at least monthly."

"Time is clearly critical. We de-emphasized ceremonies; we focused on field training. I cut the guard post by 50 percent. I abolished requirements for individuals to have medics on ranges. I want lieutenants in charge of ranges or sergeants to make the decision whether they need medics. We cut the number of SDs across the post down to under 80. These are the kinds of things we do so that more people can get to training."

"We instituted a four week lock-in program where all outside tasking must be known to the commander at least four weeks in advance so that when he plans, he can in fact, conduct the training. We found through surveys and personal interviews that one of the most disturbing things to company commanders was a lot of unprogrammed events just happening at the last minute that detract, takes away time and of course, reduce the number of soldiers available for the training. Right now what we've done is that if someone comes up with a tasking in less than four weeks it must be cleared by one of the assistant division commanders before that tasking will be honored. It's amazing how many of those last minute taskings disappear."

"I felt a need early on to know more about how combat support and combat service support units trained. This included learning their special problems and, most particularly, how to judge their state of training."

"Despite what you can read in Service publications and from what you will hear from proud commanders, training techniques are fairly standard throughout our Army. TRADOC has done a very good job in this respect and so have senior commanders. The difference comes in how these techniques are applied. Soldiers must know their mission and understand how today's training is preparing them to be ready for that. The Division commander can improve training in many ways, but two of the most important are; connect training to mission; and, do not accept substandard training. If the commander sees poor training and does not say anything, that standard then becomes acceptable in the eyes of his subordinates."

"We have a five week lock-in period for training schedules like most CONUS divisions have. Changes to those schedules must be approved by the Chief of Staff or myself. You get some late taskings that come into a division that absolutely must be filled but at least the company commander knows that somebody in the command group made the determination we are going to fill that because it's an absolute necessity. Funeral details are one, a short notice type visitor another, but we protect the lock-in period."

"I am sure the methods we used to reduce training detractors are the same ones used by others throughout the Army. What is useful, and I do recommend, is that the chain of command make frequent checks to see if the methods and procedures are being followed. Often, though well conceived and well written, they are disregarded."

"You need to be with your units at SQT, ARTEP, major exercises, and in field gunnery, ...but, there is no set formula."

"Personal evaluation is most important. I visit training whenever I can and I demand that my subordinates are out there also. There is a need for independent evaluation by outsiders."

"All of my visits are unannounced to the field and that gives me an opportunity to get a very good feel for the planning and the conduct and how effective the training is. The same thing for my assistant division commanders. In addition to that we do unannounced readiness exercises that involve rolling units out to local dispersal areas. It involves moving units to the range to fire their individual and crew served weapons. It involves taking the Army physical readiness test unannounced. It goes into all of the areas that are important in a division as outlined in the battle tasks. I believe that is a very effective way of maintaining a good feel for the status of readiness in the division."

"There is a group of people who normally are the orphans. I refer of course to the divisional troops. Those five or six battalions who report theoretically, directly to the division headquarters. In an operation like this, one where the training is being done by the brigades, brigade commanders sometimes have an instinct to operate like feudal barons particularly if they are given room to stand and the authority I give them to train. They expect everybody else to keep up. Well, I hold the orphans or the divisional troops responsible for not just supporting those barons but also training their own units so I've had to insure that they are protected. I've put them under my Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver and I've also insisted that the barons in the division avoid short fused taskings on those who they call on for support."

"If we think that the breach of a complex obstacle is very important and critical to the mission of that brigade, then that brigade commander will form a squad with the brigade commander being the squad leader and battalion commanders the squad members. They will actually go out on the obstacle breach course and go through it and set the standard and make sure that they know how to do it because this is a critical task that must be done. We follow that procedure right down through the battalions and the companies down to the platoon and to the squad members."

"We have found that it requires constant emphasis to get the headquarters personnel, some of the combat service support folks, and shift workers out to train. When we find deficiencies in SQT or CTT, it's usually those folks. We maintain rosters to make sure that 100 percent of the billets that are present for duty attend, and that you do make-ups. Staff personnel and supervisors of shift workers are responsible for making sure that those service members attend one of the scheduled sessions. We have a moral obligation to make sure that those people are trained, that their weapons are zeroed, and that they know how to don a protective mask and do all the other things to survive on the battlefield."

"Knox has a series of crew cuts that include failure of the crew tactically as well. We helped drive those cuts into Tank Gunnery Table 8."

"Let me first speak to joint operations. We worked hard to improve our operations with the Air Force and included them whenever we could. I believe all our hard work and well intentioned efforts were probably counterproductive. Our Air Support exercises were unrealistic whether in CONUS, in Europe, or at the NTC. We were basically untrained on how TACAIR would have to be used in combat in Europe. And, so were the stateside Air Force units that supported us. As for "combined" operations, if you are using the JCS terminology for operations with forces from Allied Nations, I also consider that we were poorly equipped to fight in this manner. That, however, is almost unavoidable if you are stationed in CONUS, far from any allies. Two or three weeks of REFORGER exercise every third year is simply not enough to provide sufficient opportunity for "combined" training. Now if you were asking about combined operations in the sense of integrating the various units and weapons systems of the Division, I also have what I consider bad news. I learned something in my first extended visit to the National Training Center that I never realized. My Artillery, which was modern and always did well on ARTEP's, couldn't shoot in a timely manner; my Intelligence Battalion, one of the oldest and individually best trained in the Army, provided almost no intelligence and never knew when to DF or Jam; and

my attack helicopters had great difficulty in getting to the target area when needed. I am certain that, in the above aspects, we were in the same boat as every other Division in the Army. Only the Instrumented and trainer Intensive National Training Center can provide this information. We couldn't fire the Artillery in front of the troops. It always went the other way to the impact area. We had no way of knowing whether it would be timely or not. What we found was that our Artillery communications were so poor, we simply couldn't deliver with precision or timeliness. Much the same was true for our Intelligence Battalion, with a lot of fault due to old equipment, and to our attack helicopters. I assure you we made stringent efforts to correct these deficiencies after our first visit to the NTC and, I believe we had a high degree of success. The point is, if we had not had the sophisticated atmosphere of the NTC, we would have complacently gone on as we had before not realizing we would be unable to put together these vital combat and combat support elements."

"The National Training Center, in my view, has been fully validated as a result of my command experiences."

"I personally wrote my intent for every operation that we had including every Field Order. I personally wrote the mission statement and I personally wrote the concept. The rest of it the staff did. The subordinate commanders do not have to guess at what the commander's intent is. That more than anything else brought tremendous cohesion and common understanding to our efforts. I recommend we incorporate intent in the 5 paragraph Field Order and teach it as a technique simply because it works. I picked that up incidently by studying the German campaign for World War II in their retreat before the Soviet Offensive of 1944-45. You found repeatedly that the German commanders were very specific in stating intent and very broad in granting authority and latitude to subordinate commanders to employ their forces to accomplish that intent."

"We use a green/amber/red approach so that a green unit is full up for training, an amber unit is in a garrison training mode where they will emphasize academic training and their maintenance programs. The red unit will be the post support, guard detail unit. That works extremely well for us."

"It did not take very long to figure out what the problem was. The division directives were just that -- directives. They were quite specific, extremely detailed and gave very little room for the company commander, battery commander, troop commander to determine what his training needs were. I published a letter entitled simply "My Philosophy of Training." I emphasized in this letter the necessity for the bottoms up program. By that I mean that every squad leader and platoon sergeant in the division and every platoon leader in the division must evaluate as honestly and as clearly as they can the requirements for training in their outfit. They must then sit down with the company commander and lay out what they believe to be the training requirements. In such a process the company commander devises a training program for his unit over time, hopefully working at least one quarter ahead, a minimum of four weeks ahead for lock-in, and he presents that program to his battalion commander. The battalion commanders have been around the track a few more times than the company commanders so they take these very ambitious programs (typically a company commander will want to do two or three times as much as can be done in a given period of time) and put them into a workable-doable package which he then presents to the brigade commander. The brigade commander applies his judgment and his knowledge, determines the resources that he can allocate to this proposed training program for the battalion, devises a rotation scheme so that he can not only train but take care of his other requirements as well, garrison requirements and guard, etc., and then once a quarter I go around and sit down with the brigade commanders because I want to see everything that the unit is doing. You must have ownership of the training program at the company and battalion level. It must be their program. It must be what they have designed. I don't think you've ever seen anyone polishing a rental automobile, have you? But you see guys shining the oldest jalopy in the world if it's theirs. They own it."

"The After Action Review is perhaps the most important part of any training event. An After Action Review is not a critique, it is instead a discussion of what the goals and objectives of the training event were, what actually happened, and an opportunity for every soldier who participated in this activity to speak and to give his view of what happened. It's also an opportunity for those who planned and conducted the training to make sure that every soldier understands what was supposed to happen and the purpose of each order and command and action that took place. Given the opportunity to witness a training event or to visit the AAR, I would probably in most cases select the AAR because you can sense immediately the degree of rapport between leaders and led and you can sense immediately the extent to which soldiers are willing to talk and participate."

"I have a requirement that units maintain themselves so that 90 percent of the personnel, E-7 and below are licensed to drive tactical vehicles in their units."

DOCTRINE

"You have got to make your task forces and teams learn doctrine and use doctrine. It is important that the SOPs that are in use at those levels reflect current doctrine. It is also important that doctrine be reflected in the SOP for the division."

"I think (1) you need to read it, (2) you need to understand it, (3) you need to challenge it because you'll find that it must stand the tests within your officer professional development classes. You need to open up a dialogue with Fort Leavenworth if you don't agree with something and have them come back and explain it deeper than what may be in a given manual."

"It is very important that you understand the doctrinal literature that is driving the Army. So if you were not rooted in that, I think one would have to go back and spend some time reading."

"I see my role personally as being an evaluator of doctrine, a developer of doctrine; for giving guidance where we have no doctrine. The TOW is an example of where we didn't know enough. When we initially found out that there was no guidance on TOW section gunnery, we developed our own. We found a couple draft publications from Benning that we refined. This is the kind of thing that is necessary."

"When the division commander talks doctrine with his leaders, they become more interested and aware. If he doesn't then they will concentrate on other things. More so than in most areas, the division commander sets the parameters of how active the division is in studying doctrine and training to implement it."

"I found the National Training Center to be my best asset in determining which units were doctrinally correct in their operations. To extend this benefit, I adopted the NTC method for all ARTEPS. We also attempted to train our evaluators in doctrine, but never reached the level or expertise of the NTC."

"I encouraged all the Division to participate in developing doctrine. We had an Armor Committee, headed by a Brigade commander; an Infantry Committee, also headed by a Brigade commander; our division artillery commander had his own Artillery Committee; and, our DISCOM Commander held monthly doctrine meetings on various areas of his command. The purpose of all these groups was to affect doctrine by dealing directly with the appropriate TRADOC schools. One of the most successful of these groups was the DISCOM group, which had a significant impact on Class IX automation. A further technique to affect doctrine is to volunteer to be a test bed for troop tests. While some oppose this as a detractor from training, I always found them to be positive. The most positive aspect is that, through the test, the division can affect the results. I did this by submitting an independent report on each of these tests. These reports, incidentally, did not always agree with that done by the major command evaluation team."

ETHICS

"My goal is not to appear to be good but to work to be good and to have the candor to talk about where we are at."

"We have to be very, very conscious of asking folks to do things. Sometimes we might say, 'Do this, I don't care how you get it done, get it done.' I don't do that anymore."

"If I tell folks to do things, I say check it out and come back before you do it. Then I can ask the appropriate questions, is it legal and all these kinds of things because there are times that folks do things that are not correct, that's not right because they think that you want it done. I would say that a good place to start is right with your personal staff. You really have to get your personal staff in early on and explain it to them in detail so that they all understand if I ask you to do something and it is not correct, then I want you to come back and tell me that it is not correct, it is not legal, and we won't get it done -- I understand that."

"I expect people to tell me the truth. We value Mike Malone's four items of professionalism: competence, courage, candor, and commitment."

"You must explain to the junior NCOs and officers the meaning of the wrong, self serving interpretation of regulations and the unethical spreading of rumors."

"We need to set clear cut examples and we need clearly to define standards about what is expected. I think that setting standards for the kind of behavior that we expect of soldiers, both on and off duty, is something that we all need to do. We must get rid of people who don't measure up as expeditiously as possible."

"Lay out very clear guidance early on so that everyone understands the priorities. Establish a climate where subordinates can operate and feel comfortable, that they can use initiative and if they make a mistake that they are not going to be fired -- that is operational mistakes, I'm not talking about moral and ethical kinds of things here because we should not tolerate those kinds of mistakes."

"I talk in the initial officer orientation about what I expect of officers in ethical behavior. I remind them that I reserve the right to punish all officers, and talk about one or two failures. I tell them the need for them to set the example, both in enforcing the laws against the use of drugs and the abuse of alcohol. I also from time to time, participate in seminars. I usually use combat examples to show the effects of unethical behavior. I would also note that I don't believe in great policies or pronouncements every time somebody is guilty of unethical or unacceptable behavior. We use rifle shots and justice I hope, is done."

"I've had to remind commanders and leaders about endorsing unbecoming conduct. I think that in some cases we find lenient leaders or commanders that attempted to let someone by with something that is serious. And they don't want to take appropriate action. Even though those individuals practice very high standards themselves, they get close to people and the closer you get to where the rubber touches the road is where you find more and more of that very lenient action."

"We had a goals and objectives session with the commanders, staff and command sergeant majors. In that forum the first thing that I addressed was a consensus from all of the commanders, staff and command sergeant majors, on a set of values. We developed a set of values that talked to loyalty and integrity and a long list of things, team work, team effort, those kinds of things, that really pretty much nailed down all of the ethical standards that we'd operate by. Then I received a commitment from each one of those in the room. Each year we get a new set of commanders we go back through and revalidate or change as appropriate. That's how we established the ethical climate."

"I have dealt with an ethics situation that included a relief of a battalion commander. So that's about it, you set the standards, you live it by example, and make sure everyone understands what it is. If someone gets out of line, get the facts and if the facts support it then you take action and that's what I've done."

"I discovered there was a certain amount of unethical behavior in the division, particularly with respect to the handling of the MILES equipment. The cheating was being done essentially by soldiers. I asked the Sergeant Major of the division at our goals conference to develop a book on standards. This book attempts to tell my soldiers what a good soldier is across the span of his or her behavior both on and off duty. I believe we've made a great deal of progress there in terms of putting this book in the hands of every newcomer. I believe also that we need a continuing dialogue with both our soldiers, our noncommissioned officers and with our younger leaders so that there are some commonly accepted norms of behavior."

"If I were a commander who said 'Everybody needs to maintain 100 percent of this,' then that puts the unit commander and soldier in a position where he must operate in a grey area. It places him in a compromising position. You ought to do away with that type of statistic."

"My goal is to have equipment that is operationally ready to use that can fight. In terms of how well we are doing, I measure myself against the equipment that other people of similar type units are able to keep operating. Otherwise, I believe we encourage making soldiers work too long in the wrong direction for the wrong kinds of reasons. We may be introducing behavior or incentives for unethical reporting."

"One of the things I decided early on to do was to mail every officer in the division a copy of the Armed Forces Officer with a personal letter on that publication from me urging them to read it. I sent a personal copy to every officer scheduled to join the division and I found throughout my career that the Armed Forces Officer captures some of the basic tenets of what it means to be an officer."

"I initiated a program whereby once a month every commander in the division that makes a report under the readiness reporting system writes a cover letter to me. I personally read that letter from every battalion commander and every separate company commander in the division so that every month I read five letters from colonels, I read 25 letters from lieutenant colonels, I read something like 13 letters from separate companies. I annotate those papers with marginal notes about unit performance. About 75 or 80 percent of my comments are positive and congratulatory. Those programs that have fallen behind or where there is a problem reflected I ask a question or issue instructions with some encouragement to get better. Since the entire staff and the entire division in the division materiel management center and the entire DISCOM knows that I read those every month there is a tremendous urge to make sure that our supply system and our reporting system concerning the supply system, our repair parts system, and our work system, direct support system, are functioning accurately and directly and if they aren't, then I will mail some 37 or 38 invitations that it's not -- every month. That takes a lot of time and I usually do that on a weekend and there has been more than once when I'd spend all day Saturday and all day Sunday reading those letters and making personal comments back to every battalion commander. It permits the battalion commander who feels for whatever reason, that the numbers don't tell the right story, that the calculations do not discuss the actual troop combat readiness to tell me his side. He has the opportunity to lay out clearly, as clearly as he can write, what his readiness condition is. I've found that when I used to go down to the company/battalion level, that more of the discussion on ethics and morality turned quickly to the readiness reporting system and I don't find that so much any more. I find a far better understanding of the readiness reporting system -- for an example, the readiness ratings on training. Some of

our younger commanders labor under the misconception that a C-1 in training means that you're perfect and of course the common denominator for training readiness ratings is time. How much time does it take to have to get it to an ARTEP 1 level of training? If that time is two weeks or less then it's a C-1 rating. Having been caught in a position where you require two weeks of training is not perfection. Having trained a unit from the ground up and entered combat with it I can tell you that you'll never get to the point where you think you're really ready to go. An understanding of this system and an opportunity to discuss this system I think has been very helpful."

FAMILY ISSUES

"It is important to accomplish the mission, but you must plan things to see that soldiers get some time to spend with their family. I try carefully to set priorities and cut out non-essential missions. I do insist that missions be accomplished but I am very careful we know what those essential missions are."

"You must get correct information to families, there are many different and easily misunderstood nuances of what is policy and what is not."

"Use TV, radio, and newspapers. Make sure your chain of command understands your family orientation."

"To the soldier, a significant problem is who to go to if you need help? Where it is and how it can help are very, very important. We take this information for granted because we have been nurtured in the Army and forget that somebody new to the Army may not actually know what an ACS is, or what a Child Care Center is, or what a Family Practice is. We have newcomer orientations focused on the families at the battalion level where the battalion commander and his wife will talk to the new soldiers and their wives on the various things that are available to them. We have a brochure that we hand out to E-4s and lower. It is called Thumbody Cares and it focuses on what that young spouse can count on from the installation."

"The average young soldier arriving at the division is out of pocket. If he brings his family with him, he'll need more than \$900 to get set up. Well what we've done is, we've gone out and negotiated with the people who require up front deposits. We've had success with the phone company. We've had success with the electric company. We are currently working with local water authorities and the propane gas company. I am also concerned of course about the size of the deposit which

soldiers have to put down on trailers. We are working on that one. We introduced programs down there for young mothers. More importantly I sent my bus service off post. I felt that I could provide off post service. This means that my bus ridership has increased about 60 percent because of individuals with one car or women needing to get to hospital appointments. We also have worked with the Armed Forces YMCA to get a vehicle because I can't use the government vehicle to go to the more distant trailer parks and either bring women in from there or take recreational programs out to them but we are only scratching the surface."

"Many trailer park owners are quite respectable businessmen but others don't take checks and insist on cash up front. They charge excessive amounts of money if you are one day late with the rent and some other things that aren't very attractive. With respect to shaping up the trailer parks, I instituted a visitation program. One of my well led battalions already had a visitation program where leaders went down and visited the soldiers who lived in some of these places. I decreed that every 90 days a first line leader be it a noncommissioned officer or officer, visit every soldier who lives off post who is in his unit. There is no way that I can make soldiers invite people in, but it lets us go down and look at them and the individuals get checklists from my DEH housing so I've got an independent evaluation going on by a lot of eyeballs down there. In addition, there is a good legal code that nobody bothers to comply with in the outlying areas that sets standards landlords are supposed to reach. So, once I get this data back, my housing office works quietly with these people to do something about some of the discrepancies that I've talked about. More of them are taking checks, more of them are letting soldiers put their own security devices on their trailers when they have to go off and leave their wives. On one occasion I put one of the trailer courts off limits and we just drove that individual, who was not responsive, out of business."

"My wife testified before the State Education Commission twice and she also has attended the school board meetings on important issues."

"There can still be an overstructured, exceedingly formal approach to wives' groups that does not have an orientational and positive goal that provides support and assistance in the community but rather tends to perpetrate social customs and procedures associated with white glove teas. You have to understand too, that about 30 percent of the wives were employed outside the home in one way or the other and this means that a lot of the wives' groups to be effective have meetings in the evenings as opposed to the mid afternoon or mid morning. It also means many of these wives who are employed are able to contribute far more than people not participating in employment outside the home. So we found, my wife and I, that we have to be flexible in terms of when we meet with and how we deal with these women but by and large, they have been very positive and very successful."

"Don't put incompetent officers or NCOs in ACS or other programs which serve the family."

"There are still some leaders in the Army, primarily senior noncommissioned officers, who believe that if the Army wanted you to have a wife they would have issued you one and they are not very supportive, or sympathetic or understanding to the young soldier with a wife who's pregnant, who needs medical care, or who cannot drive. It sometimes gets right to the point where we have to just correct the NCO's perception very directly. I can honestly say I have not found a single case of that attitude on the part of company, battery, or troop commanders or on the part of battalion commanders. They are very supportive and very helpful."

"One caution on wives' groups. While a commander should encourage them, he should not become involved in any internal disputes that arise. I found things always worked out better within these groups without any assistance or advice from me. My Chief of Staff soon learned not to bother to bring any problems of this nature to my level."

LEADERSHIP

"Your own listening skills need to be refined."

"I don't believe I was tough enough on those who would not make good combat leaders. I should have been quicker to relieve officers for incompetence."

"The quality to not over-react is absolutely essential for a division commander. First reports are often wrong and a division commander needs to discipline himself to have understanding and trust of his chain of command and the time involved to get the right answers."

"The climate of command is more difficult to establish at division. The tendency is for battalion and company commanders to react immediately to division guidance. You need to think out orders and the direction it will take the division over the next two years. The guidance I gave was that battalions had to plan ahead for three months, brigades six months and division one to two years. That included dollar expenditures and planning."

"I have lunches with selected company commanders once a month. I don't give orders down there. I listen to what they have to say. The only time I'll ever give an order that doesn't go through the chain is if the system isn't working and I've got to do something to save lives or alternatively preserve government property, et cetera."

"BE HUMBLE, nobody is perfect."

"A division commander needs to be ready to take the blame for many things his staff and his subordinates will do. Hopefully his higher commanders will also be understanding that subordinates are trying but not always perfect. If not, the division commander must grin and bear it. It goes with the territory."

"The commander is really responsible for everything his unit does or fails to do, and that's just a fact and I would say that that's the thing that stayed with me most more than anything else."

"I produced simple, easily understood one-page standards for training, maintenance, and care of soldiers."

"I keep being astonished by commanders not realizing they must set high standards."

"Sometime ago a lieutenant general whom I respected was commanding the corps. I was going up to take command of a brigade in his corps. He told me that he had not been demanding enough of his soldiers. He had not set his standards high. I think that I have confirmed his view on the importance of standards. We've got to have standards for performance that are understood and that we demand be implemented. Real care for the soldier means that we make him trained to the standard that will let him survive in war and come home to those he loves."

"One ought to be very, very careful how you display statistics in relationship to like type units or to one another because that can cause an inordinate amount of resources to be focused in a myopic way on something that should not take that much of an effort."

"The most rewarding part of division command is in developing the next generation of Army leaders."

"The first thing you have to do is to establish who is knowledgeable to conduct professional development classes. It is important to get battalion commanders to recognize that the most proficient company commander in that battalion is the battalion commander himself because he has successfully commanded previously. Therefore, it is his duty to coach and to train the company commander. Similarly the brigade commander is, and ought to be, the best battalion commander because he has been carefully selected and he has demonstrated that he can command at task force level. Likewise, it is my duty as I see it to train the O-6 commanders in the division or coach them in terms of getting the division fit to fight."

"People often ask me what you have to do around here to get relieved? The answer to that is we don't have a zero defects environment here. We all have a number of things to learn. I make mistakes. I expect other people to make mistakes, but not repeatedly."

"How do you certify leaders early on in those very core or critical things that they must demonstrate proficiency in as they deal with the young soldiers? We administer a test early on, it is written and there are some core things that are hands on that they are required to do and if they do not demonstrate a proficiency there then they receive instruction through the professional development program and some of it of course is self study. They have to do some of these things themselves on their own time depending on what it is."

"A lot of our professional development program is really keyed to leadership. I believe and I think most of my commanders now are sensitive to it but we find leaders that are not sensitive to taking care of soldiers. They don't know how to take care of soldiers. It may shock folks sometimes but I've watched and I've talked to junior leaders and I am convinced that some don't know how to take care of their groups. We have tried to develop some situations in our professional development program that will illustrate through case studies. 'Here is a situation and how you go about doing it.'"

"We have used the guest speaker program quite frequently, tapping on the expertise of the various visitors that we get. They speak to our officers and our noncommissioned officers in separate forums. That shares his experiences."

"I've been blessed with subordinate commanders at brigade and battalion level who have had the gumption to tell me when they thought I was wrong and I have been willing by and large to listen to them and to reevaluate programs before we march people off in the wrong direction."

"Leadership by my definition is the ability to get willing cooperation and earnest effort by subordinates to accomplish a common task. If we accept that definition then we have to also accept that there are many different ways to motivate. Many times in the division I have stated that there are only three things that I expect of leaders in the division. First, the individual must be proficient. He must be technically and tactically proficient. He must know his job. If you do not know what you are doing, soldiers will immediately pick that up and react accordingly. Secondly, the individual leader must be able to motivate people. That means the brigade commander must be able to motivate battalion commanders and the battalion commander must be able to motivate company commanders and platoon leaders must be able to motivate every man in that platoon. So the second attribute is the ability to motivate. Third, the leader must stand for what is right. He must be morally and ethically upright. He must be willing to live in a glass house and to set the proper example and he must insist on the same from the subordinate leaders."

"As a brigade commander, partly because the times were different and probably because I was not as capable as I should have been, I found it necessary to be far more specific in my instructions to subordinates than I have while in the division. At division level, I have found that the brigade commanders and separate battalion commanders have a level of experience and expertise in their field that permits them to accomplish our stated

goals and stated objectives and my intent without detailed guidance. I find I spend a lot of time with subordinate commanders explaining and encouraging as opposed to directing. I find that their reaction is quite positive."

"The greatest deficiency I personally perceive in myself is sometimes a lack of patience. Sometimes I see a problem or think I see a problem very clearly and I see one or more solutions very clearly and I'm impatient with those who do not share that vision. I have learned a great deal about how to deal with that, how to handle that as a division commander. I have learned that I can structure my thought process so that my impatience is lessened and the opportunity to pass a great deal of latitude to subordinate commanders has increased. One of the techniques that I used to accomplish that, this thought process, is to ask a few well placed questions that elicits the information that causes an individual to begin to see things the way I do. I've used that technique with some success. Sometimes in the course of events in the division there are areas when people get up-tight and concerned and there has to be open communication. I go where the problem is. I personally go and sit down with and talk with the individual that I perceive to be having a problem. I might say that's not only with subordinate commanders, commanders within the division, but also adjacent commanders or higher level staff. I get with them personally by telephone or preferably face to face and sit down and try to sort out the problem so that it doesn't grow and there's good understanding about what the intent is and what we are trying to accomplish so that we can bring all the positive energy to bear, so that we can solve the problem and not pick at each other."

"It's amazing how much more amenable and pliable and flexible a battalion commander is after he's had some difficulty."

"I constantly emphasize that we should not be in the mode of 'here comes the general, therefore we've got to do so and so.' I do not like the briefing NCOs and charts and white wash and chairs. Most of the things that can be conveyed to me can be conveyed off a clipboard at the most."

"If we concentrate all of our time on training per se and we ignore the personnel systems that support our people, then our people will pay a terrible price for that."

"People programs are sometimes confused with attitudes or personal feelings about soldiers. It is very easy to find officers and noncommissioned officers who are attached to their soldiers and have a warm, good feeling about soldiers -- and I think that's essential. Such a feeling is essential to effective leadership in the American Army. But there must be some substance beyond this general feeling and that substance must permit us to deal effectively with the systems that impact on our soldiers. We no longer have the soldier's record in the First Sergeant's desk. The soldier's records now are embodied in the SITPERS system and in the JUMPS automated pay system. Further, our soldiers are effected by the Military Personnel Center. We must understand that system and know that system if we are to properly support our soldiers."

"It's important to recognize those who put it on the line for law and order and doing the kinds of things that are hard to do because it takes guts to stand up and be counted."

"One of the things we have here is to use a survey that is given in conjunction with IG inspections. It surveys the climate of leadership at the company level. Representative samples of E-1s through E-4s are surveyed and also E-5s and E-6s are given different questionnaires which establish what they think about the leadership at company, battery and troop level. That feedback is provided only to the company commander and to me. Recently, we have provided the best and the worse responses to the battalion commander."

"'Gotcha' is a religion -- you know 'I've come to your range and you don't have the ambulance.' The technique I'm trying to use is you decide whether you need the ambulance but be prepared to defend why you have it or why you don't have it. Don't expect to be saved because you followed this or that checklist. All these things contribute to the elimination of 'gotcha!'"

EQUIPMENT

"Learn from your division support command commander. Spend a week at DISCOM early on in your tour learning how soldiers are trying to comply with complicated administrative procedures."

"I'm a great believer in new equipment training teams and drill preparation and in not starting new equipment training or taking new equipment until you have got the support packages, until you have got all the things you are supposed to have to include doctrine and manuals on how to use it. I would also say that if you are introducing new equipment for the first time, one's got to be prepared for teething troubles and one has also got to be prepared to deal with visitors from Congressional Staffs and from the Press; most of whom are hostile. I would also note that it is important not just to have plans as we have here to introduce systems. We have got plans to introduce systems of new equipment. One also has got to have a system for bringing the pieces of new equipment you have got together from a force integration perspective. This has got to be addressed systematically. That is why I consider force integration or modernization whichever you prefer to call it, chain of command business. You can't delegate this down to a staff section. We have got the Infantry Committee, the Armor Committee, the Logistics Committee. Of course, I look to the Brigade and the DISCOM commanders to run each one of these things but, when it comes time to introduce new equipment, the buck stops here. Recently I turned down TACFIRE when it became clear that they had no spare parts, they had no PLL. Had I chosen to take TACFIRE the best estimates we had were within six months we would only be 30 percent operational with respect to that gear. I believe in TACFIRE having seen it used most effectively. We are not going to take it until we can get it and keep it operational."

"When one considers equipment, there are two factors to keep in mind, use and maintenance. If troops don't know how to use equipment, one of two things happen. They damage it or they don't use it. I found a great

amount of equipment (e.g., mine detectors, flame throwers, radars) which were not used or, if used, not integrated with any combat training. Every commander can find equipment in his unit that is underutilized. He should either train his troops to use these items or take steps to remove the item from the TO&E."

"We have introduced the STAYICE. This is a new piece of test equipment. We test a vehicle when it comes in. You don't just pull the engine and go through by rote. It tests compression, it tests generating capacity, it tests the power the engine has so that the crew doesn't go entirely through a scheduled service and we blow the engine afterwards. It also trouble shoots various other aspects of the automotive system. It can be used on tanks and APCs. We insist that our mechanics use it."

"I insisted that we get our oil samples in and then take immediate action to reduce the turn around time in which we took the mandatory action indicated by the oil sample. I would tell you that I am a great champion of the oil sample."

"We now put the air cleaners back together and band the box so that the crew can't take it apart. This means that the air cleaner works and the seals aren't blown through crew handling, so the engines aren't sucking in dirt and dust."

"My concern has been more of sustainment recently than fielding because I sense a mentality that once this new piece of equipment arrived, the soldiers are trained, and we go out and start training with it that everyone sort of breathes a sign of relief and so we have it and don't think about the flowing of the spares and how long before we have some real spare parts problems or something because we failed to do something right early on. We watch that very, very closely."

"We have found a new equipment fielding board that we have formed in our division chaired by the assistant division commander for support to be a very effective forum of fielding new equipment in a division. In that forum there are a number of proponents that are responsible for all of the systems that have come in and that proponent could be a commander, could be a staff officer depending on what it is and there is a project officer assigned that is an expert that knows everything about that equipment: all of the schedules, the training, the maintenance, the whole bit. Each month that forum meets and once the systems get out, it's briefed quarterly until the equipment is down to six months before arrival and then it is briefed every month and that project officer stands up and talks about every facet of that equipment -- the arrival, the training, the maintenance, the spares, the new equipment training team if one is involved, and the whole bit. We have found that to be very, very useful."

"I guess I would say it was pretty much a disaster with the Q36 and 37 radars. I don't know all of the details that happened early on when those were fielded but I could tell you that we had some serious problems with it and it was a shared thing that we had -- we had some training problems at the unit level, we had some serious supply problems, things were not requisitioned properly, they were not followed up properly. Then there were some problems with the training team allegedly -- it took an awful lot of folks to include the personal involvement of the DARCOM Commander at that time in order to get it back on track. I guess the lesson we learned from that one is when we started to put more emphasis on sustainment than on fielding because from all the information I could get it was fielded very well but then everyone again walked away and it didn't take long before we were in serious trouble in maintaining radars. I'll never forget that one."

"Stop holding on to pieces of equipment that have no value in terms of this division's organization and turn it in so somebody else in the Army can use it."

"If you bring in an item of equipment that is replacing an older piece of equipment, you need to think through -- what added dimension is this going to give us on the battlefield? Then make changes in your training profile or else you will always return it to the lowest common denominator of what they had been doing in the past and extract no efficiencies from it."

"The most significant maintenance problem was making the command understand that wheel vehicle maintenance is as important as tracked vehicle maintenance. There's a degree of reverence associated with track maintenance that is not implicit in wheel maintenance because literally every soldier drives a car."

"It is important to see that what I call the midgets of the world not be able to turn away your vehicle from their shop because you haven't worked off the gigs. It is important that they know if there isn't a deadlining safety deficiency they know they have got to take that vehicle and work on it. It is important that we get leaders back in the motor pools. I cancelled some non productive maintenance meetings that had leaders in meetings talking about charts rather than down in motor pools. When I learned that their XO's spent a meeting the day before or earlier in the week getting all those charts ready so that nobody's ox got gored I cancelled the leader meetings. We went with the XO meetings."

"If anybody had told me as a major general I would be sending messages asking National Inventory Control Point or Depot Commanders for specific parts, I would have said they were crazy. But sometimes I do that."

"I have got to back up guys who are doing the maintenance. A division commander whose focus is on the field has got to do this."

"The first thing that I try to do with the introduction of new equipment is to have a meeting with the people responsible for the fielding to make sure that we understand what they are going to provide to us by way of the equipment itself, repair parts packages, and new equipment training and documentation manuals, TMs, etc. Having done that we then try to find an organization that has fielded the equipment and we go visit them and get the benefit as much as we can of their experience in bringing that equipment into the unit. We try to brief our people in great detail and develop a draft fielding plan within the division. We have a very detailed process for this and established system for it and then that draft fielding plan is floated throughout the division and all affected units have an opportunity to comment on it or to question it. When those comments are in we then get a final version of the fielding plan, that fielding plan is then checked with the agency doing the fielding, responsible for the fielding, and when that final scrub is made it is then published for the division. We have found that that system works extremely well for us and we can truthfully say that we have not had a single glitch in the fielding of any new equipment. One of my intents when I arrived at the division was to take the force modernization office and put the functions of that office back in the general staff system but it did not take long to realize that the pace of modernization, the pace of new equipment coming in, the pace of new doctrinal publications and issues, just would not permit that at this time. But I think that should be done at some point down stream. I would say that that should be probably in about three years after the M1 and M2 family of vehicles have been fielded into the division. Our schedule is such that I believe the force modernization shop could be closed and the functions returned to the general staff sections about that time."

"The biggest equipment problem of the division was the maintenance of equipment. The maintenance program that we developed is referred to as TUEMP or The Unit Element Maintenance Program. What this means quite simply is that every unit whether it be a platoon or a company of the unit element designated by the battalion commander, performs preventive maintenance on a scheduled basis as a unit. I borrowed this from the tankers, of course, where every tank platoon does its

maintenance, its scheduled services, together, and we've found that we've been able to move to the point where about 80 percent of the total maintenance effort is in the preventive maintenance mode which is not only more efficient in that you can plan it and organize it and control the use of repair parts, etc., but also it has cohesion building aspects to it. It works. It really gets the lieutenants and the sergeants involved in the maintenance of the equipment."

"There are plenty of people in the division -- warrant officer technicians and noncommissioned officer technicians who inevitably will know more about the equipment than the division commander. But the division commander must know the systems that provide the equipment and that support the equipment once issued. The division commander must be able through a systematic process to monitor those systems to insure that they are in place and working so that support to the battalion commander is uninterrupted. That's where I focus my effort and my attention."