

**US Army Military History
Institute**

**DIVISION COMMAND
LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAM**



**EXPERIENCES IN DIVISION COMMAND
1986**

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REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-04

September 1986

FOREWORD

Following pages are thoughtful reflections on command by six seasoned division commanders. Not a "recipe" for success but rather the fruit of years of experience...they represent a valuable point of departure for both practitioners and students of the art of command. "Must" reading for incoming and incumbent commanders.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. W. Riscassi".

ROBERT W. RISCASSI
Lieutenant General, GS
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EXPERIENCES IN DIVISION COMMAND

PREPARATION FOR COMMAND

"I think I would try to read into the wartime missions more carefully than I had before I came into command and try to develop my own implied missions which would lead then, to the particular mission-essential tasks. This would, I think, give you a head start and, depending upon the conditions you saw in that particular unit, would either confirm or, at least, put you on speaking terms with a very important part -- that is, in setting the direction for the division in training. By doing it before, would save you that time. That, plus probably a visit to the NTC, again, if you're a CONUS division -- to see the impact of what that means on task forces as they go out there on a rotating basis -- I think, would put you in good shape."

"What I would have done if I had to do it over again, and I was given a free rein to do it -- you know, the resources and the time away from the existing or current job -- is to get more involved with new equipment fielding. I have found that's been a way of life here in my almost two years. I really was not current on all the ramifications and the impact upon the unit when you field new equipment. I was somewhat naive in that respect. I would have made an effort to visit the National Training Center. I didn't have that opportunity, or at least if I did, I wasn't aware of it and it wasn't pressed upon me. In any event, I didn't make it. I would have become better versed in our doctrine and have made an extensive trip to Fort Leavenworth. That now, I think, is on the agenda for incoming division commanders and assistant division commanders. It wasn't quite formalized at that time, so I missed that. That's a real must, because you get the current doctrine and you get an opportunity to discuss it with many of the instructors and faculty there, and maybe even with some of your contemporaries. I think a good review of the current operational manuals, FM 100-5, 70-100 (The Heavy Division), and the 71 series in general to the battalion and the brigade, whichever is applicable to your particular division.

Although I did spend some time on that, I probably should have spent more. I certainly have spent a lot more time since I've been in command, and I probably could have spent more before that would have served me better. I would have made more of an attempt to contact serving division commanders, particularly those in CONUS here in FORSCOM, to get their ideas on the command and the impact of the training pace. I would have made an attempt to visit and seek out as much information as I could at the Log Center, because logistics plays such a significant role. That was an area that I, myself, was not necessarily that strong in."

"What I wish I had done was to have sat down -- I did with my commanders as soon as I got here, to at least let me think it through -- with a few heavy modernized -- because it is a different world -- battalion, brigade, DISCOM, and DIVARTY commanders -- there aren't many of those creatures around -- to get back into what the problems are as they saw it, versus what the schoolhouse was telling me, because it's a different set of problems."

"I would say that the most difficult problem I discovered -- the thing I didn't really realize before which might be called a surprise -- was how little we know about how to manage time, especially at the noncommissioned officer and company grade level. Even us senior guys probably have a lot of things to learn about how to manage time. This post, I don't think, is any different from most posts and the division is not different from other divisions. We have too much to do -- in fact, we're probably overcommitted -- but all of the missions we have are essential and so, therefore, I think we have to find ways to better manage the time."

"I would ask the current serving division commander to send me all of his policies and reqs concerning training. I would study those and then make a commitment that I was going to go execute his system. I would wait at least 60 to 90 days before I changed anything, so I would not be disruptive or a training detractor. The second thing I would do is be sure that I read and understood all the 25 series manuals, because if you don't understand those and your battalion commanders and company commanders do, then you're a training detractor. Then I would spend a couple of days each at Benning, Knox, Sill, maybe the

Air Defense Center, and probably the Log Center, so that I understood the logistics side of the house as far as training problems, etcetera. I also found it helpful to go visit the Training Support Agency at Eustis."

"I believe the three areas that really need a thorough understanding as the installation commander are financial management, the DEH activities and all the things associated with that 'bear,' and contracting."

"I think one of the best things that I did in that regard was going down and spending about a day with the Installation Management Course at Fort Lee."

"I think there are probably two areas I should have looked at. One is in the intelligence area and the division's ability to interface with the corps and other echelons above corps on the intelligence systems. I didn't really understand that as well I should have. The other area, probably in the larger sense, is logistics -- that is, logistics in field operations. We spend an awful lot of time doing that, but I really, probably, should have spent a lot more time coming in. I should have visited the Log Center, for sure, and tied in much closer with them than I did."

"I had to get smart on the equipment. I did that in the pre-command course as much as possible, but I had to do an awful lot of it here in the division after I arrived. The quality of the soldiers was kind of a shock to me. I was amazed at the quality of the soldiers, and this has continued to shock me since I got here -- just how good they really are."

"The biggest surprise was the pace of the activities in CONUS, and how that affected the division and its operations. My experience had been four years in Germany, where I thought the pace was very rapid, both in division and in corps. My impression, albeit a wrong one as it turned out, was that there would be somewhat of a slower pace within CONUS, that there would be peaks and valleys within the division over an annual training cycle, for example. It seems to be mostly at a peak level here, and that surprised me very much."

"I would say that the place where I felt most uncomfortable when I took command was not as the

division commander. It was as the Installation commander. All of that prior experience made it relatively easy to pick up and get into the flow of things of being a division commander. But I had no prior experience in managing an Installation."

"Fort Sill did a super job, because of changes in the organization, updates in the TACFIRE system, and the Battery Computer System (BCS). They put me through all that and the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS), because I knew the division had it and I wanted to get indoctrinated on it in advance. I would recommend that to anyone who's going to assume command."

"There's one area that I'm weak in and that I wish I were much stronger. That's in my ability to speak German. That's one area that, if I had time, I'd like to go out to Monterey and go through the seven or eight-week course with my wife."

"If you haven't been with a unit for a long time, then I think you'd need to understand how to inspect, how to pull a PMCS, and how to go around and check to see if people are doing Q-services correctly."

"I came directly out of one job into another, with a short stop at Fort Leavenworth. I really don't think that that was adequate time; I didn't take the time. If I had it all to do over and I had all the time I needed, I would steep myself in the field manuals about the division, particularly light divisions. I would review FM 100-5. I would go visit all the service schools. I only visited Fort Benning, and I didn't spend enough time there. I spent time at Leavenworth, but didn't spend enough time there, either."

PERSONNEL

"I think I learned that the personnel turbulence in a CONUS division, in some MOSSs, is particularly acute, so that a battalion commander, for example, in his two years of command, is probably going to train two or maybe three battalions. So, he never has that predictability in the system to be able to lean back and rest on his laurels and think that he's got a well-trained battalion, because just about the time that he thinks he had, the bottom falls out and he's hit with massive levies which create the turbulence. Then he's got to begin all over again."

"One thing that we learned was that, when the units had given all the maintenance back to the companies, the Battalion Maintenance Officer (BMO) was not really a critical guy. When I consolidated it all back at battalion, the BMO became the 'big daddy.' We had put the wrong people in that job because he wasn't the 'big daddy,' and we ended up with an awful lot of BMOs getting relieved in a hell of a hurry. Then the battalion commanders found out that, besides their headquarters company commander, the other position that probably had better be an ex-company commander is the battalion maintenance officer, the BMO."

"The area that I think was a bigger problem than equipment was people. When I first took over and looked at equipment issues and people issues, the equipment issues were secondary as far as I was concerned. For example, the personnel shortages in selected MOSSs, such as combat service support, are a hell of a lot bigger problem to the division commander than the shortages of equipment in peacetime. If you have about 65 percent of your helicopter mechanics that you're authorized, then that has more of an impact on equipment problems than the equipment itself. The people problems as relate to the regimental versus the non-regimental, the COHORT versus the non-COHORT -- to me, those are bigger issues than equipment problems. For example, when I came here, the policy was that if you had been regimentally affiliated in Europe, you went to that unit. So, we had two battalions here that were over strength, and we had two other tank battalions who were not regimentally affiliated yet, which were way under strength -- a tremendous imbalance. The same was true in the Infantry. Both

battalions, though, were regimentally affiliated in the Infantry. But one of them had all four COHORT companies and the other had one COHORT and three non-COHORT. So, in the COHORT rifle squads, there were nine soldiers with a leader. In the non-COHORT rifle companies there were four to five soldiers. Those sorts of problems, to me, are greater than equipment issues. The first thing I did is that I said, 'I don't care what the regimental system says, everybody gets a fair share of people.' There was nothing regulatory that said the soldier had to be assigned to his regiment, it said he should be. I said, 'Fine, he should be, but we're not going to do that unless we have enough people non-regimentally affiliated to give like units equal amounts of people.'"

"You know, my turbulence situation isn't any different from anybody else's. But, we average about 12 percent turbulence -- turnover -- every quarter. So, in a four-month period you're going to run 15 percent, and what you've got to do is just go back and do it again. And keep doing it. Be realistic. The simple thing -- I think I've learned -- is just to try and get people to do in peacetime the things they're going to have to do when the war starts. And then, just keep doing them."

"One of the jobs of the division commander is to grade who ought to be around when the war starts. We shouldn't go through a drill after the war starts concerning who can command and who can't."

"One thing we've done in the division is that we've established a stress management team that's chaired by the Chief of Staff when necessary, and when not necessary, chaired by the Division Surgeon. It includes the Surgeon, the Psychiatrist, the AG, the Provost Marshal, the G-1, the SJA, and the chain of command that's involved. Anytime that anybody suspects that somebody is getting close to a crisis point that may result in suicide or bodily injury, or if there's a gesture or a suicide attempt, the team meets and advises the chain of command. The success rate of that team has been unbelievable -- a 100 percent success rate to date. Also, in the division I personally monitor all the suicide gesture and suicide attempt cases. We try first to defuse the problem and find a solution, then to return the soldier or family member to good health. Or if, in fact, the military is not

the right profession for them, we try to quickly help them medically and mentally correct their problem and then transition on to whatever it is they should be doing. Being a soldier is mentally and physically tough, so we have to evaluate that in the cases that are worked. But, whatever you do, you have to move quickly. You have to be professional, caring and managing it at high priority, or a situation can disappear off the scope and turn into a tragedy very quickly. Another thing that we've done is that anytime there is a suicide, we do a psychological autopsy to determine, if we can, any lessons learned from that. We've learned a lot of things that have been useful, and there has been dramatic improvement in our ability to deal with stress. But it has come from having a formal program, a formal team, a high priority, a committed and caring chain of command, and from educating the soldiers to be involved themselves."

ETHICS

"I say, 'How many stainless steel thermos bottles have we bought, and how many pocket calculators? Has every officer in the battalion equipped himself with a thermos bottle at government expense? Is every sergeant's child over in the school with an SSSC pocket calculator?' It's an ethical thing. You know everybody says that a stainless steel thermos bottle goes with the job -- this kind of thing. Well, I think that you've got to, in an everyday kind of way, look at the opportunities to bring these deviations of good conduct to people's attention. What I try to get across to the officers, either when I'm disciplining them or in any other way, is the fact that the generic Army officer has to be perceived by the soldier as being good -- a good man."

"If you're going to say that a commander is responsible for everything his unit does or fails to do, you're encouraging unethical behavior, because it is impossible for him to keep all of those things right, trying to prevent something from going wrong. Now, the fact that he's responsible for policing up the battlefield and correcting deviations is fine. But, if you have unrealistic expectations of your people -- if you put unrealistic pressures on them -- then you're going to have problems with the ethical behavior of your people, because you start bumping up against their survival instinct. And people's characters change under duress, if you're not careful. So, I think that it has an awful lot to do with the way in which you run your organization -- be it a company, a brigade, a battalion, or whatever it is. That's worth a lot of thought and consideration by not only the division commanders but by others, too."

"We find on occasion people are succumbing to the temptations of their offices or their positions, either by such things as claiming TDY money when it's not deserved -- areas like that are abuse of the public trust and confidence that people have in them. So, it's a reminder, I guess, of AR 600-50. There are a couple of applicable ARs. But, whereas that had sort of been paid lip service to before, we have found that it's a good reminder to do that periodically -- at least on an annual, if not a more frequent, basis -- just to remind people about the pitfalls, and that

they've got to be careful about their personal affairs as well as their official affairs. Accountability of property, disposal of excess property -- those kinds of things are just ripe for temptation and for people to try to get over with, trying to make a profit either on a personal or a collective basis."

"I didn't go out and make any great profound statements about ethics. It's woven through all of the policy letters that are in place. The only one that I made clear -- almost too strong a statement, but I don't think it was too strong -- is I said there was no room to negotiate one's integrity. Anyone who violates their integrity will be dealt with severely, and I will do my damndest to get them eliminated from the service. To the best of my knowledge, I have followed through on every one of those cases where an officer violated his integrity or used drugs, and they are out of the service. To me, that is something that is not negotiable. The other one is that we've got to require leaders to be role models. The Chief of Staff, again, is right on target about that. You can't have an officer or an NCO who does one thing on his own time and then tries to discipline somebody else for doing that. I have dealt very severely with violators. Thank God I have given very few Article 15s to officers since I've been here, probably less than 10 in two years. But, every one of those officers who got an Article 15 knew he got an Article 15 -- it wasn't any slap on the wrist. I think that's important -- the word gets around that if you get an Article 15 from the CG you're going to know that you were punished."

"My first luncheon -- I have a luncheon each month with lieutenants and with sergeants, separately. I asked the lieutenants to tell me what they considered to be the biggest problem in this division. And the very first day I sat down, the word I got -- it blew my mind -- was, 'Sir, you put so much emphasis on OR rates that we feel obligated to lie about what we're doing on controlled substitution.' so I looked into it, and there was, in fact, a belief that I saw the OR rate of the division by the hour. So, I got all the officers together and, in fact, got all the senior NCOs together, and emphasized to them that the only reason that we watched the OR rate is for training; that it's to make sure we've got enough vehicles to train soldiers -- plus to make sure the the supply system is working -- and for no other reason; that I don't get

the OR rate except once a week here in the division; and that I do not expect them to maintain a high OR rate because the supply won't support it. We've got a FAD that won't support it. I would like to see us maintain a 90 percent operation, but what I wanted to emphasize to them -- and this is the point the lieutenant made to me . . . You know, it was crystal clear when this lieutenant said, 'Sir, I'll give you an example of what we have to do. I've got three vehicles that are down, and my company commander comes in on Friday and says, 'I don't want all three vehicles down all weekend because that's two days of down time.' So I know I've got to take this component off of this vehicle for controlled substitution, then I've got a choice. I can work my soldiers all weekend taking these parts off and transferring them over there, or I can just say I did it. Then, if we have to go to war, I'll do it.' You went through this -- we all did, years ago. So, I got the commanders together and I said, 'I want you to know this, as a rule in the division, you will not control substitute just for the statistics. You will control substitute if you are going to go to the field to do some training and you need more vehicles.' That took a year to get across in the division, and I've got a sneaking suspicion that even today, if I went down, I would find some units are control substituting on paper just so that we look good on the statistics. That, to me, was an ethical problem that bothered me. Here was a lieutenant who was very honest and forthright and who honest-to-god believed that the division commander was putting the thumb on him saying, 'You've got to control substitute these parts so that we look good, numbers-wise.'"

"Many people may not personally subscribe to a leader's off-duty behavior, but they say, 'Well, the good far outweighs the bad, and I would go to war with him and follow him to the death.' The problem is that you can't run an Army that way, because in battle, you don't have time to get to know them. The company commander gets killed and Captain Smith walks up. Nobody knows Captain Smith; they don't know anything -- is he a good man, bad man, or whatever. Yet, Smith is going to get them up off the ground to charge machine guns. Now, if they inherently believe that captains are good, honest, competent guys who would, under no circumstances, capriciously waste their lives, they'll probably get up off the ground and charge the machine guns. But, if their experience in dealing with

officers is, 'Hey, you've got to consider each one of these guys separately, because they're all different. You know, some of them are good, and some of them are bad. Some of them always tell you the truth, but some of them lie. Some of them are honest, but some of them are deceitful' -- then, we're in big trouble. That's the importance of ethics in the Army."

"I tell my commanders that if they're doing something they don't want to read about in the newspapers, they better not do it."

"I had one not too long ago where a sergeant had left the unit about a year before. Something had happened and his EER had been lost. So, they had a late EER. The regular rater and endorser -- the rater was there but the endorser was gone, and a lieutenant wrote an endorsement. I didn't know why, and I asked him why. He thought that it was important for the sergeant that that report had to get in. I thought it was more important that he demonstrate his integrity. We can always fix reports, but if there's something I won't tolerate, it's integrity problems."

"You know a tough call sometimes comes up in Article 15s for DWIs to outstanding company commanders. But, you can't have two sets of standards."

"When you require a commander to reply by endorsement, there may be a perception that you don't have confidence in him. So, we've tried to minimize those kinds of requirements. We've tried to demonstrate that not only do we have the standards, but we have the trust that goes with it, unless somebody demonstrates that they haven't honored that. It has to be a system which not only establishes standards but also demonstrates to people that those are the accepted standards, and you accept what they say and what they do as being ethical. That's a two-way street. It's easy to put a standard out, but it's more difficult to demonstrate that you expect that standard as a normal way of doing business and set the example."

"Every division should have a formal Fraud, Waste and Abuse program that has checks and balances and has some type of inspection program that provides feedback."

FIELD OPERATIONS

"There's a need to get out to the field as much as possible with the division headquarters and with all the headquarters to try to exercise the staffs in the field, even in the CPX mode, as much as possible."

"I sat right in the M-577 with the brigade commander and literally operated the division command net for him, and he was on the brigade command net talking to his battalion commanders. I could hear the conversations between him and his battalion commanders, and it gave me a tremendous feel for the battle and the intensity. When things started to bog down, I'd say, 'Rich, do you think that you're going to make it or not, because if not I want to get old John over here moving.' He'll say, 'Sir, let me take one more try at it.' So, then we'd go ahead, and meanwhile, I'd alert John. And it cut down 50 percent of my communications requirement, because I was right there with the commander. Since then, I've gotten a little more sophisticated about this. On the TO&E I'm authorized three M-113s, and I've rigged them all so that they're uniform, and I've placed one at each brigade headquarters. The brigade commander is free to use that track with the radios on it, or whatever, when I'm not there. When I go there, I take a major out of G-3, I take my aide-de-camp, I take the division master gunner, and they're my little operations cell. Then we go swooping in by helicopter because you've got to get there quickly, get up to the brigade command post, and jump in the M-113. I have the advantage of the proximity to the brigade commander, and if I need to get forward from there, I've got the M-113 to do that. But I think the bottom line is that it's just as critical for a division commander to have that sort of feel for the battle that we expect of a brigade commander or a battalion commander. Now, it's fairly easy to do an offensive operation because you know who's going to make the main attack in the division so you can position yourself with the brigade that's going to make the main attack at the outset of the battle. Defensively, I tend to operate at the DTAC until such a time as I get a feel of how the battle's developing,

and where the critical point is going to be. Then I go to the brigade which is going to be making that effort. That's the system we use for running the division in the field. All the green tab guys operate on FM Secure. Multi-channel is the staff officers' means of communication. Now, it's interesting -- once we got the commanders all up on FM Secure, the hot loops disappeared, and we were able to substantially improve the communications that were available to the staff officers to get all the coordination done. At division level, you synchronize the battle by enabling staff officers to carry out all the coordination necessary to make the commander's concept work. It gives us a distinct advantage in terms of the speed of reaction by operating that way. Of course, when I would talk over the division command net, everybody else was monitoring and getting information straight from the horse's mouth as opposed to when you're dealing on multi-channel. That's my view about controlling the division."

"I believe that the division commander has also got to go well forward on the battlefield so that he can see what's going on, and I believe that he's got to exercise command and control through FM communications. Now, the reason I feel this way is because I think that when you look at the worst case -- which would be a war in Central Europe -- we're going to be tremendously outnumbered. The enemy is going to employ enormous amounts of artillery against us. I think it's going to be critical, if we're going to succeed, that we're able to grasp the opportunities when they arise and quickly exploit those opportunities so that we can get the initiative in the battle."

"I think that the key aspect that a division commander needs to be aware of is battalion task force tactical operations and the synchronization that the battalion task force commander has got to be able to do. The division commander has got to be very much more aware of the time involved in getting assets to the battalion; of the artillery and getting it positioned; of the helicopters that you're going to send them and how much lead time they need. You've got to be very much aware of the amount of planning time that's required for a battalion commander to come up with a good plan, and therefore, how do you back away from that to give the brigade commander adequate time and your staff the right amount of time -- this sort of thing. I think the one-third/two-third rule is wrong."

For every hour you take at division, you'd better leave about four at the battalion."

"The turbulence and the lack of field craft knowledge that some of our headquarters people have. If those skills are not exercised on an almost constant basis, it's quickly lost. It shouldn't be any surprise, but it always seems to surprise us when that happens. The brigade and battalions have that same problem to a lesser degree, but they are also in the field a lot more often to take advantage of more opportunities than the division headquarters."

"The way I operate is I put the G-3 and the ADC for operations at the DTAC. I'd probably have the G-3 running the day shift at DTAC and the ADC doing the night shift at the DTAC. Then I'll work day or night, depending upon what needs to be done. But, I wouldn't count on it -- I would have nobody depend upon me to be at the DTAC to run the battle because, chances are, I'm going to be at a brigade or somewhere between the brigade and the battalion, or something like that."

"I require -- and I think there are a lot of advantages to this -- that whenever a brigade goes to the field, the slice has to go with it. Everyone who normally is associated or affiliated with that brigade has to go with it. I think that's a tremendous learning experience. But unfortunately, some people who are important to the division never get trained as a result. The main support battalion of the DISCOM never can go. It can go to the field, but it can't perform its job. That's why the division has to go to the field at least once a year. I would say it has to go for no less than 20 days, and I don't know if you can afford it much over 30 days."

"I would say that in a light division, the combined arms team is absolutely essential and critical, then I would emphasize that field training exercises be brigade size or larger, if possible. Get the division headquarters in the field at least once a quarter. Force the division to have more roll-outs and operate in the field more. Also work more with our sister services; this would be my advice. Make sure that the division CP can function correctly and give it a chance to exercise at least quarterly."

INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT

"I probably gave the installation 50 to 60 percent of my time -- I don't keep track of it -- maybe even more than that. I established a system of quarterly meetings with each directorate on the installation where I would go sit down and they would have to review their objectives and their goals and how well we were working toward those -- what were the problems areas, where they needed my help. Then I got a quality DPC in here to provide the leadership on a day-to-day basis to manage that staff. I'm not being critical of the installation staff. We have a superb civilian work force; we have some very dedicated people. But, we did not have the right people in the leadership positions, in all cases, to provide that quality staff the right leadership and guidance. So, it has been a constant struggle to make further improvements and try to execute the very, very good programs that the Chief of Staff of the Army has laid out as far as family, quality of life, and all. I don't think we're any different from any other installation."

"I decided the only way you're going to make an impact on the installation is that all the people on the installation staff had to understand that they were just as important to me as any brigade or battalion commander. In fact, I went out of my way and in some cases I exaggerated that to where they were more important. In the case of the DPCA, I've said all along and still firmly believe, that the DPCA is more important to me than any single battalion commander on this post. He has more impact on quality of life, readiness, family cohesiveness -- all of those things you want to talk about. That guy is the key player."

"Of my personal time, 70 percent is spent working on installation matters and 30 percent on division matters."

"You've got to make sure that no fences are built to separate the installation from the division and that there is a total team effort in solving problems and working together -- that it's not 'we and they,' but 'us,' in solving problems. I think one of the key things is to make sure that there's somebody in charge at every critical function. There's always the danger that nobody's in charge and that there's not an

Integration of effort. There are a lot of stovepipes built where people may be duplicating or not assisting in supporting each other. The key is to be a team that communicates well, understand priorities, and works together. It's important that there's a family atmosphere at the installation and that, whenever there's a problem, everybody puts their shoulders to it and works together to solve it. All those things are easy to say, but they're difficult to execute. But, it's worth the effort to make them happen that way. Otherwise, our families, our soldiers, and our units all suffer if we don't have that synergistic effort to make things happen. That's going to be even more true as resources get tighter in the future."

TRAINING

"I got all the platoon leaders together and told them, 'I know what you all say, 'Jeez, if I can't have my whole platoon, I can't train 'em.' But you're never going to have your whole platoon in combat, so you're going to have to learn how to do it.' They just kind of shake their heads, but I think they'll learn it. It's just difficult. It's more difficult but, damn it, I'd rather they learn than to say, 'I will snap off all the detractors so that everyday you've got your whole platoon.' Because then we go to war, and they'll say, 'Where's my platoon?' or 'No, I can't do it because I don't have everybody doing it exactly the way I thought they would do it.'"

"We now ARTEP battalion staffs about six weeks prior to an external ARTEP evaluation of that battalion. That commander and his staff are required to demonstrate proficiency on orders drills. We will put them in their TOC. It doesn't have to be way out in the woods; it can be on a parade ground. But they have to work from the facility that they work in in the field, and the brigade commander will give the battalion commander a warning order and an order to conduct a tactical road march. Then, we will evaluate that battalion staff on how they go about preparing their order and the quality of the product. We'll do the same thing for a deliberate attack, etc., so that we are sure that the battalion commander and his staff know how to do troop leading and orders drills before we take the unit out there and let them 'muck around.' Then, there are about six weeks there in which we can go back and do additional training to be sure that the staff is up to speed. I just think it's a great idea that pays big dividends, because that's one of our weaknesses. It's not that staffs are bad; they can't get enough training opportunities. So we're trying to force that."

"The first thing is that I would insist upon a division CPX every quarter, with every headquarters from the division through the battalion having to play. There are all kinds of demands on time and it's so easy to say, 'Well, we just can't do a CPX that quarter because . . .'. My response to that every time is, 'You find a place for the division CPX and then we'll work everything else around it.' With the demands on time, you have to insist on having that CPX if you're going

to have trained people. Then second, I'd say you have to make the division and brigade staffs spend time each month working on their staff METL and force them to get away from addressing just the garrison-related problems that consume them. Make them take time to practice their tactical tasks."

"The problem, still, is that 65 to 70 percent of the training detractors are created right within the battalion. In some cases, they don't even realize they're training detractors. My favorite story is -- and every once in a while I say this to the first sergeants. I say, 'First Sergeant, what would you say if I called you up tomorrow morning and told you I wanted three guys to come up and paint the CG's office today?' He said, 'Oh, that would be a training detractor, sir. You shouldn't do that.' I say, 'I agree. I shouldn't do that. But, what is the difference between that and you walking out at morning formation and saying, 'First platoon, give me one soldier; second platoon, one soldier; and third platoon, one soldier; and all three of them report to the supply sergeant to paint the supply room today'? You're just as much a training detractor as I would have been.' Then they understand that. So, we have some education to do there."

"We have instituted a fairly credible professional reading program. We've spent some time, effort, and dollars on buying the professional books to increase commanders' and key staff officers' professional libraries. We hold training seminars at the division level as well as at the other unit levels to discuss the war-fighting techniques. After each NTC rotation, we have a large, full day of an after-action review, conducted by the brigade and the task forces that were out at the NTC. It's done back here for edification and assistance in training everybody on the lessons learned."

"I think what we did in establishing what I call 'go to war days' -- in which one day a month I required the division staff and the brigade and battalion staffs to do nothing but talk about and discuss issues related to their wartime mission -- has helped us. That was the one day that they were to forget about all garrison activities."

"The competition is all with the OPFOR at the NTC. And every unit then comes back feeling, 'Hey, we really took those cats on,' or 'Hey, we've got a lot of work to do.' Because of that, we have a lot of seminars in the division. After the gunnery program is over, we get all the tank guys together and we sit down and whoever just completed the gunnery program does a little 'show and tell' -- 'Here's the way in which I was trained; here's the kinds of training aids I used; here was the program I followed; and here were the results. If I were going to do it over again, here's the way in which I'd do it.' Then everybody starts sharing ideas in terms of ways they did things and how they solved some of the problems that they had. So, that's a good, healthy thing. We do the same after our NTC rotations. We get together, maybe take a whole day, and talk about various offensive, defensive, and support operations. This is all designed to share knowledge of how you win at the NCT."

"Basically, we think every tank crew has got to be able to kill between 1500 and 2000 meters, because it's at those ranges where we have a significant advantage over Soviet tanks and then we try to identify those crews that have exceptional ability -- I like to call them sniper crews -- that will engage beyond 2000 meters. In fact, our plan to use the U-COFT (Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer) for training tankers is just that -- to find that part on the matrix where you can qualify all crews up to the point where they can consistently hit targets at 1500 to 2000 meters, and then those exceptional crews who will train through the rest of the matrix, to identify those long-range killers that we want."

"I say you've got to set your training goal, and in our case, we picked win at the NTC because we felt that if we could do that, we could go whip Russians any day."

"I told the 1st Brigade commander, who is an Infantry officer, to get the Infantry battalion commanders together in this division and take a look at what we need to do to get an infantry battalion combat ready for NTC and then sustain it. All of the ARTEP missions, all of the gunnery requirements, all of the other sorts of requirements, and then find out how long it will take to get ready. How many times you've got to do it, how often you've got to do it to sustain readiness. Then, after they did that, we added in

those things you need in a wartime mission. I turned to the 3rd Brigade commander, an Armor guy, and I told him to get all the Armor battalion commanders together and do the same thing. I turned to the 2nd Brigade commander, who had just come back from the National Training Center, and told him to deal with this as a battalion task force, not as an Infantry battalion and not a tank battalion, but as a combined arms task force to win at the NTC. So, the effect of this whole thing was that we ended up with a division training model with some variations. In the case of the 1st and 3rd Brigades, I constrained their plans to fit the available training days, which was about 180 days, and then took the 2nd Brigade model, which was a pure win at NTC. So, we ended up with something very similar to the win at NTC training model. We felt that was about 95 percent congruent to winning in war. But, in the process of that, I also became convinced that vesting all of that authority in the brigade commander was exactly right, because that's exactly the way we were going to fight.

"We emphasized tank gunnery, Bushmaster gunnery, and some artillery gunnery, but we failed to appreciate the M-60 machine gun, the M-16 rifle, and the LAW. Those weapon systems are still critical. So, we began a program wherein -- and I hope that any future commander would do this -- there is not such thing as an administrative range, that all ranges have to be fired under full tactical conditions. As you well know, having been on these ranges, on a tank range, for example, they've always got a little platform with a roof on it for ammunition. I told my battalion commanders, 'You will never use that, because you will upload the ammunition tactically on the assembly area, move it tactically to the range, then you'll move tactically to the range. The only time you'll become administrative is when you go in for your after-action review.'"

"We did a couple of things to try to reinforce officer professional development. I put in a couple of rules that really violated the training management system approach. But, I did it to bring emphasis on the problem. The rules were that every month the battalion commander would have a minimum of nine hours of officer professional development training devoted to technical and tactical subjects that made his officers more proficient in the unit's METL tasks and other

garrison-type duties that officers have to perform. I picked nine hours because I wanted it to be a significant enough number of hours so that the commander really understood that it was important. I said that the battalion commander must take all of his officers away from the battalion when he's doing the OPD training. He did not have to do nine hours consecutively. He could spread it out over the course of the month however he wanted. But the officers had to leave the battalion. He could not leave any officers back to 'watch' the battalion while the rest of them were off training. And, the battalion commander had to be personally involved in that program. Then, I established a similar rule for NCOPD, except I said there would be six hours. I did not say NCOs would go away from the battalion, because as we all know, that's mission impossible, but what I did say was that we have to find a way where the noncommissioned officers do not have to do their six hours of NCOPD at 0500 or at 2000. There ought to be a way that we can run the program without it becoming something that the NCOs dread. That NCOPD also was to be focused on technical and tactical proficiency as related to their METL. There have been various techniques applied to put that into place. I don't know that any one stands out, but I think a lot of people have NCOPD at 1600 for an hour and a half or two hours per week. One technique that I told them that I would support but would not direct was during the garrison weeks to turn all of the specialists-4 and below loose to take care of personal affairs. A soldier has to get his hair cut; he has to take 'mama' to the commissary; he has to go to the clothing sales store, and all those things that soldiers nickle and dime their sergeants to death about all week. Isolate that to one afternoon and hold the soldier accountable. If he comes back the next morning and he didn't get his hair cut, then he gets disciplined accordingly. Then, while the soldiers are off taking care of their personal affairs, the NCOs have that four hours to do NCOPD, prepare for future training, and so forth. I think that has a lot of merit, but I never did direct it; nor would I direct it if I were starting over."

"My maneuver units were pretty good at the one-day war, but they had never, in my opinion, thought through the problem of how you get the bullets, the beans, the fuel, and the parts forward tactically and to the vehicle that needs it tactically. We found, for

example, too many units that were spending excessive amounts of time -- well, not excessive amounts of time, but excessive emphasis -- on refueling administratively. You'd find tank companies parked hub-to-hub, being refueled by 5,000 gallon tankers. That's not the way you should train the soldiers. So, we've incorporated, trying to make sure that the maneuvering company, battery, and troop commanders understand that the combat service support is as essential as the maneuvering, firepower and shock action. That was part of the move part of the equation."

"I've tightened up what an officer and NCO must accomplish before he's placed in charge of soldiers. Before they are allowed to stand in front of their soldiers or issue any orders, they must pass the PT test; they must pass the Common Tasks Test, including the officers; and they must demonstrate proficiency on PMCS checks of assigned vehicles. I think that will pay us big dividends because they will be competent when they walk in front of their soldiers. A related thing to that that we've had in the place as part of officer professional development since the day I got here is that every officer must pass the Common Tasks Test, the same as the soldiers, and that includes me. I took and passed my CTT like the PFCs had to. I also required the master sergeants and the sergeants major to pass the CTT. The Army policy says only grades E1 through E6 have to take this CTT. Well, those CTT are survival tasks, as you know, and it makes no sense to me to have soldiers who are going to survive on the battlefield and their leaders don't know how to do those things. So, I just made CTT mandatory."

"What we found, based on our NTC experience, is that the battalion commander, the company commanders, and the platoon leaders get all their subordinates together and they issue an order. And we find that, even for administrative orders here to clean the motor pool, they say, 'Here's what we're going to do.' Everybody has a pencil; they write it down, and they all nod. He says, 'You all understand?' They say, 'We understand,' then they leave. If you were to give every one of those subordinates an exam on what the boss really intended for them to do, they would each have a different view. What I'm trying to emphasize to the leaders is how you communicate and how to make damn sure that when they talk to their subordinates after

they've communicated the order, the subordinate can spit back what the heck you want done. I think that's probably one of the biggest steps we've made in the area of training."

"I made a policy that when half the battalions were at Graf, for example, the division headquarters went. I take the division headquarters to Graf; I take the division headquarters to Hohenfels. I'm just trying to demonstrate that that's what our business is all about."

"The system in the Division was that brigades were running battalion ARTEPS and our brigades were generally running their own. I just changed it and said we'd do ARTEPS two levels up and Division would run battalion ARTEPS. So, I rewrote the ARTEPS and then started running them. I was the senior evaluator."

"You sit down and work out your mission essential tasks list of all the missions that a unit needs to be able to do in order to accomplish its war plan. Then, they become the ARTEP events. What drives the training program is generally the ARTEP events. If they know you're going to come down there and look at them, they'll train up on those things. It's a very simple system, a very simple cycle."

"One of the things I want people to see in peacetime is 100 combat vehicles bearing down on them in attack array. So, we used two battalions of OPFOR. Not all the time, but when the OPFOR was attacking in an ARTEP, we took two tank battalions -- a tank battalion and a mech battalion -- on about a two kilometer front. If you haven't seen it, it's a neat sight to watch 70 or 80 vehicles coming hub-to-hub out of the smoke at about 2000 meters bearing down on you. We tried to do everything full-up MILES, so that when you stopped a vehicle it was killed."

"We would take scout platoons from battalions that weren't involved in the ARTEP and put them on each flank, so that the battalion had somebody on the ground to make flank coordination with them. Now, occasionally you get a hard-charging task force commander and he doesn't want to give ground or something and the scout platoons on his flanks are pulling back. We'd let that go for awhile, then we'd

just take an OPFOR Force and bring it around and attack him in the rear because at that point in time, he's got an open flank."

"If you wanted a mine field, you had to lay it. If they ran out of mines, I told them to use sandbags. You could take a sandbag or take a shovelful of dirt where you're going to lay the mine and put it in a sandbag. You fold it over -- it takes about the same amount of time as it takes to put in a mine."

"My guidance to anybody would be to look at your war plan first of all. Where is your GDP? If you're in CONUS you've got a different one than you've got in Europe. But, you've got certain tasks that you've got to accomplish when the war starts wherever you are. Then, list all the tasks associated with doing your wartime mission. Then, make sure you have a training program that hits every one of those and hits them again."

"Nobody can task in the division inside the four-week lock-in unless it's approved by the chief of staff or myself. I further said that any changes in the training schedule in the last two weeks before execution had to be approved by the brigade commander or the ADC. I have battalion commanders who don't particularly like that, but I say, "Well, you know, I just want to know that if you've got to change it that close to the bell, that you've thought it through. And, I'm assuming that when you go to the brigade commander you'll go to him with very good reasons and that he'll understand and say, 'Sure.'"

"I've got another program in which Armor and Infantry lieutenants spend time with Artillery batteries in the field on ARTEPs, and Engineer companies. I'm trying to get a cross-fertilization among those officers as to what these units do."

"We try to make sure that we don't correct poor management by making soldiers work a lot of extra hours. We try not to let our soldiers pay the price for poor management. So, the key is planning and preparation, so that training time is used efficiently."

"We've brought in outside teams, for instance, an intelligence gathering team that told us how well we

used our commo gear. That was a tough lesson to have to learn. But, a technique that we should not miss is the opportunity to bring others in to see how well we are doing and give us an honest assessment, externally."

"Safety is not only for peace; it's just as important in wartime. We all know that many soldiers didn't come home from a war because we got careless about safety. Safety in my book, has to be proactive in the prevention, the risk assessment, the education, the teaching, the knowing, the sixth sense to be on guard. It has to be a very high priority. Then, when a tragedy does occur, we've got to be honest enough to go in and look for the root causes and do our best to eliminate any future recurrences. If there's dereliction, then we have to deal with that, and hold those accountable. Many of us share that accountability, and that is never easy to accept. But, safety is something that has to be paramount all the time, and that's a big part of caring. It's my honest opinion, after almost 20 months in command, that you do not have to have unsafe training to have realistic training. I believe you can have safe training -- demanding, professional, realistic training -- and not at the expense of doing things that are unsafe."

ORGANIZATION

"We've attempted to stay away from making changes to existing TO&Es or organizations. I guess the place where it's most visible that we have modified it a little -- and I haven't done it, but I've condoned it; I've left it to the battalion commanders -- is in the battalion maintenance platoon, now in the headquarters company of the Infantry and Armor battalion. It's supposed to work from there. I have left that to the battalion commanders. Some of them keep it consolidated; some of them attach the teams back to the companies where they're going to work. I have not interfered with that."

"I would suggest to any new division commander that the first place he goes to look is the CIF. It probably has a problem. The second place he should go to look is his Class IX warehouse. I would do that whether I was the installation manager or not, if I was a brand-new division commander. The third place he needs to check is property books. Property books are a continual problem, and sorting out what's installation property and what's TO&E property. They're in a state of uproar because of the constant turbulence due to changes, MTO&E changes, and our inability to look beyond the next change."

DOCTRINE

"I think that a division commander has to know FM 100-5 as a foundation document for all of our doctrine. And, once he's done that, I think that if he should go to the after-action reviews of ARTEPs or at the National Training Center; if he'll read the thought-provoking articles in pubs like Military Review or the Infantry Journal, I think he'll be well pooped up on doctrine. I think occasional seminars with his commanders will serve to keep him current on doctrine. I'm not a big believer in sitting down with books and reading your way through them, because it's an inefficient way. It takes too much time, and I think you can get the critical elements of doctrine more quickly out in the field with the units."

"I believe doctrine is being made everyday at the NTC because you've got a tremendous evaluation process out there and they will be the first people to discover the weaknesses in our current tactical doctrine. And, they pass those on in the form of after-action reviews to all the units. So, I think you're ahead of published doctrine if you're actively involved in the NTC."

"I don't think the logistics doctrine has caught up with the maneuver doctrine in air/land battle either. You know, we've got a situation where we've increased our logistics demands as we've modernized. I've got four battalions of M-1s now. I keep telling people, 'Don't talk to me about air/land battle at the company commander and battalion commander level. You just worry about attacking and moving into contact, and I'll worry about the overall scheme of what you're doing.' I don't think all the doctrine is in sync yet, but I don't worry about that. I've got a division; it's got resources; I pretty much understand how I'm going to employ my division."

"I would say that a new division commander ought to steep himself in all the division manuals that he can find, in all the air/land battle doctrine manuals that he can find, and really study. There's a great deal of change that has occurred, and change is taking place right now. I would say, also, to study the low intensity and how you would transition from the low to mid to high. I just don't think you can learn too much."

"I think that studying the operational art would be something that would be very useful to a division commander. I think the opportunity to read some of the great books about doctrine and warfare would broaden your vision and your horizons. I just don't think there's too much study, or too much growth, or too much participation in this arena."

LEADERSHIP

"Learn you've got to establish priorities; you're not going to be able to do everything that you want to do. There's not enough time or resources to do that, so you've got to very specific and establish, I think, priorities and set realistic goals -- goals that one can attain without lowering standards. If you can do that, you're well on your way to being somewhat of a success, because the technique and the execution of those can be done by the people that we've got. There's no doubt about it; we've got very talented people in the Army at all levels. What they're looking for is guidance and direction. Then, let them have the reins and the slack and go after it. That's what I've learned again."

"Don't think that you know it all. Trust your people until you have reason to make the changes."

"It's very easy to sit up here and make decisions. But, as you well know and I think every commander has found, every decision has more than one impact, and part of the job is to make sure you don't make a decision that impacts on things you don't even realize it's going to impact on. Somehow, you've got to make sure before you make a decision, that you aren't hurting five things while you're helping one thing. None of us are very good at that; I know I'm not. But I ask my commanders to question every decision I make, because I don't know but that I may say, 'We're going to do this,' and be screwing up one of my units by saying it -- not that I'll change it, because I may say, 'I don't give a shit; I still want to do it.' But I want them to understand that they owe that to the division, to me, and to the Army -- to speak up if we do something that's a little screwy."

"In many cases the young platoon leaders I talked to -- they weren't all platoon leaders, some were execs and in other jobs -- would say, 'What do you do, General, if the NCO doesn't do the job?' I said, 'Then you shitcan them.' They'd say, 'That means we'd have to shitcan them all.' I said, 'Then you've got a problem of, do the NCOs understand what they're supposed to do? For so long the officers have been doing the job for them that they think the only job they've got to do is help at formation, and then they go drink coffee."

You've got to teach them what the job is and make them do the job.' That's what we're trying to do."

"I turned the whole EFMB test and training of medics in the division over to the sergeants and told the officers to get out of the doggone thing. And, the sergeants did a good job. I think that the command sergeants major, the master sergeants, the first sergeants and all, are really confident here in the division and on the whole post, because they've been given a lot of significant challenges, and they've done a great job. Our SQT scores are up 10 or 15 points over what they were about a year ago. In every area where we've given them a responsibility to doing something, they haven't disappointed us. I think that at those levels they're feeling pretty comfortable, and they don't hesitate to take on new responsibilities. That confidence has probably slopped over a little bit into the sergeants first class. I think turbulence is too great at the staff sergeant and sergeant level to get as good a result."

"You know we say that the commander is responsible for everything his unit does and fails to do. I think that is one of the greatest evils we've got in the system. I know it's true, and I know it's essential. But, a lot of bad things happen in the exercise of leadership because officers believe that they're being held accountable for everything that happens in that unit or fails to happen in that unit when, as a matter of fact, we know damn good and well that there are a lot of things that go on -- even at battalion level -- that the commander can't influence at the time. He may be able to go back and correct it later, but he can't keep it from going wrong the first time. But, if he really believes that, and if he really thinks that his score on keeping the meal card register straight is just as important as being able to breach complex obstacles in the desert, then we're going to have a big problem. We're not going to get the delegation of authority; we're not going to get the decentralization; we're not going to get the power down; we're not going to get the kinds of things that we're really looking for from our commanders. I think we've got to deal with that in a very direct and positive way. I try to deal with it philosophically when I talk to the officers and when I bring new commanders on board. I tell them that I want them to operate in areas which require judgment, that we hired them because of their judgment. The reason

they were command selected and the other guy wasn't is that, over time, they have demonstrated -- because of the ability to solve problems and accomplish missions -- that they had good judgment. If that's the reason why we selected them, then doesn't it just make sense that they deal in areas that require their judgment and experience? I tell them that maintaining the meal card register doesn't. The PAC NCO ought to take care of that. Keeping the registered mail separated from the regular mail doesn't. Somebody else should do that. The real trick is to get everybody else to do their job -- get the S-1 to do his job, get the FMO to do his job, and you influence all of those areas that require judgment."

"I think the whole concept of power down is something that has got to become institutionalized in the Army. My definition of power down is, 'Don't do anything at your level that a subordinate can do adequately or as well.' If he can, then give it to him to do, then get the hell out of it and go back to work on areas where you are the only one who can do them or can do them better than everybody else. I think that's the biggest problem that we've got in the Army. We've got a bunch of high achievers who are in command who feel that every little nit-picking thing that goes on within the life of the battalion is being personally charged against his account, and that he's got to get down in there. So, if somebody nips him a little bit over the fact that the registered mail is all screwed up, then, by God, you see him with green eye shades and his sleeves rolled up in the middle of the PAC trying to sort this thing out -- and everybody else standing around there watching. I think that's a big problem. I think another big problem is that you can't get the officers to leave the sergeants' business to the sergeants. They'll all say, philosophically, 'Yes, this is sergeants' business, and that's sergeants' business.' But, you know, I'll go around and say, 'What's sergeants' business in your firm?' The battalion commander will say, 'Well, taking care of the clothing, equipment, and soldiers is sergeants' business.' Yet, if I say, 'I'm going to come down and take a look at the TA-50 in your outfit,' every lieutenant colonel on this post will have his head in a waterproof bag looking for pinholes of light. It's sergeants' business until it becomes important. When it's important, it's no longer sergeants' business. I swear to God, I think that officers would go down and

clean grease traps if the division commander or the corps commander said, 'I'm going to come down and check grease traps.' I think that's a fundamental problem that we've got to overcome. I think it's the reason why the sergeants don't do the job that we expect them to do. They have trouble realizing that it's only their business when it's not important, but that as soon as the outcome of a thing becomes important, then it's somebody else's business."

"I think the biggest difference in leadership at division level and at brigade level is that it's harder at division level to correct a misperception because of your lack of access to people frequently enough to know their perceptions and whether those perceptions are right or wrong. Secondly, your access may not be frequent enough so that they get to know you well enough to read between the lines, know your character, and this sort of thing. Therefore, your ability to influence things in a personal sort of way is much less. Consequently, you really have to make sure that your programs, in fact, reflect your policy -- that is, if you're talking about the welfare of the soldier, your program had better reflect concern for the welfare of the soldier. If you're talking winning at NTC, then your garrison and your programs had better facilitate winning at NTC. I think it's absolutely critical in the leading business to make sure that that happens. I think that's the biggest difference between division and brigade. The brigade commander is working at the operational end of things all the time. If he says something and it appears that there's an inconsistency, or he doesn't get the result that he's looking for or the reaction, he's tuned in for immediate feedback and he gets in there with his own personality and is able to do things."

"I've had, I think, five Article 15s given to lieutenants for coming up positive on urinalysis tests. The reaction by the lieutenant is, 'My God, you never told me that I would be tested.' It just blew my mind when I had them in here. Then, fortunately, they all decided to submit their resignations from the Army."

"I don't believe you can do everything at a high level of excellence all the time. So, I tell the commanders, 'Get in the middle; just get in the middle.' So, if it's OERs on time, EERs on time, meal cards squared away, etc., I just say, 'Get in the middle.' We

publish a quarterly review and analysis, and it lists everybody and tons of data. I say, 'You know, if you're below the standard' -- they all know what the standard is, what good is -- 'go look for somebody who's better and find out how they're doing it, then you copy it and get on board. So, I think that keeps a lot of things from becoming distractors."

"I tell the commanders, 'You work in areas that require judgment. Most of these things -- SIDPERS error rates, etc. -- require no judgment at all. They require knowing what the requirement is, and having the discipline to get the staff officer, or the PAC NCO, or the supply sergeant, or whoever it is, to do his job so that it doesn't become a detractor. If it gets bad enough, it will become a detractor. If the troops aren't getting paid, you'd better pay attention to it. If the troops aren't getting fed, you'd better pay attention to it. If the troops aren't getting out, you'd better pay attention to it. But, if you're paying a lot of attention to that kind of stuff, somebody isn't doing his job. You know, you're either so screwed up in terms of organization, or probably discipline, that you're always going to be distracted. You'll never know what the priority is, because you'll always just be reacting to disaster."

"I guess I'd say to stress again the trust and confidence that you have people -- that you come in with the impression that soldiers and leaders at all levels want to do the right thing, that they are not trying to do other than the right thing -- that's a particular tone-setter right there -- that you trust them, that you expect them to learn, that you expect things to be done as you have directed, and that if nobody comes back and tells you otherwise, the assumption is that it is being done. Again, there's some risk-taking there, but I think that part of the job is to encourage that risk-taking, to be able to underwrite those mistakes. If you yourself practice that, then it's going to be that much easier for your subordinates to do the same thing."

"There were no leadership problems that I could see within the division. The leadership problems were on the installation side. That's where all my challenges were to my leadership abilities. It was in motivating and organizing the people to do a good job in all cases

on the installation staff. The command selection system is good; it sends you good people."

"I don't try to standardize method around here. I encourage battalion commanders to go out and experiment on anything. All I want them to do is share the lessons learned, the good and the bad, with their peers when they get through."

"I had very firm convictions about what I wanted the ADCs to do for me, what I wanted the Command Sergeant Major to do, and the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Post Commander. So, I wrote in draft before I arrived, a letter of instruction to each ADC, to the Sergeant Major, to the Deputy Post Commander, and to the Chief of Staff. I said, 'Here are your responsibilities,' and then after I discussed those with them and we modified them as we saw fit, I published those and made distribution down to battalion level, so that every battalion commander on this post knew exactly what each ADC was responsible for doing and what authority the Command Sergeant Major had. I think that paid big dividends, and it's a technique that I would recommend."

"You can't be lazy, but you don't want to be hyperactive, either. You know, the last thing a division needs is a bright, hyperactive division commander; nor do they need a stupid, lazy one, either. You've got to get somewhere in the middle of that whole thing and provide calm, steady direction."

"I know the kinds of leaders battalion commanders are going to have to be on the battlefield to succeed. So, there are certain things I just rule out for them. I say, 'You are not going to operate out of your command post. You are not going to have the S-3 issue the orders to the battalion. You will be clearly the guy who's driving the train during field operations.' I say it for a very positive and very clear reason: In the heat of battle, when everybody's scared to death, the Russians are coming, that's the time when soldiers need to hear the battalion commander's voice -- calm, steady, and firm, coming across the radio. So, it's not a question of can the S-3 do it as well. I say there are imperatives on the battlefield. So, I don't care how you manage your maintenance program, and I don't care how you get the meal card register right, but I damn sure care how you lead the battalion in

battle. I want it to be personal; I want it to be visible; and I want it to be a reassuring and inspirational kind of leadership. So, if you aren't that way by inclination, then you start developing those skills in your day-to-day training, so that you get that way. I feel very strongly about it, and I like to see it manifested in the way in which they go about their business."

"I think the thing that's become clear to me most is that you must be consistent in your policies and decisions. If you go to the 1st Brigade and you say 'X' and you go to the 2nd Brigade and you say 'Y', then you've got big problems. So, the thing that I've personally learned is that you've got to be consistent in what you say and how you do things."

"Clearly state your policies so that there is no doubt about where you want people to go. The technique that I use for that is that I have what I call the 'CG Policy Letter Book.' It's not a very thick book, but it's got the things in there that I want people to understand that we're going to do our best to do correctly. The other thing I'd say is don't change your personal style in the way you do business. If it was good enough to get you to where you are today, then it ought to be good enough to serve you as a division commander. The last thing is, be sure you give subordinates -- not only in what you say but by your actions -- the opportunity to learn from their mistakes."

"I think that throughout the Army we've got to put a lot of emphasis on the officer corps to determine what it is we want the sergeants to do, to empower them to do it, then get the hell out of their way, and hold them accountable for doing it to standard. I think that if we all do that, it will become a habit, and we'll have a damned good NCO corps."

"When I get the battalion commanders in, I talk to them about such things as wanting them to operate in areas that require judgment. I tell them not to ORSA the job. You know, not everything requires a critical path and a detailed way of doing it. A lot of times, going up and staring a company commander right in the eye and saying, 'John, if you ever do that again . . .' is adequate. He'll understand. You don't rewrite the SOP for how you get the 2404 from the crewmen to the motor

sergeant. Half the time, it's just saying, 'Do it,' and you'll get it done. So, don't study a problem to death. I say don't OE the job, either. We don't have to go to some lakeside resort and all sit around holding hands to decide what are goals and objectives of the organization. Most of the goals and objectives are patently obvious. I mean, they are either written into regulations, they are acceptable standards in business practice, they are warehouse denial rates, they are zero balances, they are three percent deviations from the basic daily food allowance -- all kinds of things. So, it's more a question of researching to find out what good is, and then, having the discipline and holding people accountable to get it done. That will take care of about 98 percent of the things that we have to do in the Army. So, those are what I'd call my leadership classes."

"I found that my junior lieutenants -- by questioning an awful lot of people, even people a little higher up the chain -- did not really understand the duties and responsibilities of an NCO. I got quite a wide array of answers to my question of, 'What the hell is an NCO supposed to do? What is he like?' I recall one day they said, 'Well, he's like the foreman on a shop project.' So, I now talk to and give every officer who joins the division an FM 22-600-20, the Duties and Roles of the Noncommissioned Officer. We talk about that, because when I found that my officers didn't know what the NCO was supposed to do, then I went down and talked to the NCOs, primarily the E-6s, but in some cases the E-7s. What I got from them was that the 'Officers won't let me do my job.' In some cases, I don't think that was true. I think that they didn't want to do the job, and the officer didn't force them to do the job. But, we set up some programs and had some I had inherited from my predecessor -- he had set them up very well. For example, NCOs run all the ranges. Officers are not required to be there; they're not supposed to be there unless they're shooting. They shoot on the range just like all the rest of the soldiers. Now, when you get up to big tank ranges and things like that, the officers have to run them; they're very complex. But I think the biggest leadership shortfall within the division -- I've found this to be true not only in this division but in our Army, and it extends back to the 'shake and bake' days in Vietnam -- was the lack of trust and understanding of the role and duties of the noncommissioned officer.

What I've been trying to do is to somehow raise the esteem, prestige, authority, and responsibility of the NCO so that he or she knows that they are fully responsible for the individual training of the individual soldier -- SQT skills, common training task skills, combat skills, and the training of their squad/crew/team/section. If they can do that, and do it well, then it's a lot easier to put the platoons, companies, and battalions together."

"I'm sure I'm as guilty as everyone else is of this -- we tend to say, 'I don't think he's going to work out because he doesn't do it the way I do.' We tend to do that. But I've found some of the guys are quiet, while on the other hand -- hell, I have a brigade commander here who, jeez, I'd swear he carried a sword everywhere he went; he was just that type of guy. Yet, he did a super job. I wouldn't want to work for him, because that's just not my technique, and I had to back off a hell of a lot with him because I wanted to say, 'I don't want you doing that.' But the results were fine, so I said that if he can get the results he does then how he does it -- as long as he's not screwing with my soldiers -- is okay."

"I had each company commander -- there were 11 of them in there -- take a blank sheet of paper, write the five highest priorities in the division, and send them up to me. Then I read them, because I wanted to see what they really think the priorities are."

"I tell all the company commanders and battalion commanders -- I want your lieutenants 20 years from now to talk about their first unit the way I talk about my first unit. A new officer can't choose his first unit; very rarely can he do so. He's just kind of a victim of where we put him. But what we teach him and how we treat him in his first unit -- I'm talking again about professional development -- has a tremendous bearing, I think, on what happens to him in his career. I was in a very good first unit, and I've always been very thankful for that."

"I have luncheons once a month with about seven battalion commanders. Again, we go around the table. We also have overnights with wives; we do that a couple of days every six months. At that point in time, we break down into seminars and go through all the goals and objectives and see if we hit the mark."

And, if we didn't hit the mark, why didn't we? Should we change it? Should we change the goals or the objectives? Should we devote more resources and do away with another one? Everybody gets to input. I just remind everybody that I own 51 percent of the stock. But I want to make sure they all get their opportunity to input."

"I want leaders at all levels to be present in training at the toughest and most critical period -- night, bad weather, PT, and critical training events. Soldiers willingly execute their orders when they know their efforts are being observed by their leaders and the leaders will share their hardships. The sense of equality in sharing hardships is an essential element of a cohesive fighting force. Mutual confidence is built in peacetime."

FAMILY ACTION ISSUES

"The company commander and the first sergeant visit every soldier's off-post quarters within 30 days of a soldier signing a lease. They can't go in unless they're invited in; that's part of the rules. But, that's just to make sure the soldier isn't getting ripped off."

"If you asked what sort of advice I would give to a new division commander who hasn't had much experience in installation management, it is that one of the really critical things you need to do is to bring into harmony three different views or interests that always exist on an installation. They're all three legitimate. They're absolutely legitimate, and you have to deal with, accommodate, and harmonize those three things. One is the garrison staff's interest in economy, productivity, and efficiency. Those are legitimate concerns -- you can't waste energy; you must operate the hours of facilities in a reasonable way, etc. Then you've got to accommodate the legitimate interests of the division's commanders and staff, which is readiness -- to get the unit ready to accomplish its wartime mission, training, and those sorts of things. But then, you've got a third one, and that is the beneficiary of all of the goods and services of the installation. That includes the families of the soldiers. It includes the soldier on his off-duty time. It includes the retired community. Now, what do they want? They want a quality life; they want reasonable prices; they want a wide range of things to do; they want a bargain; they want good medical care. Now, they're all legitimate and you just can't say, 'Well, by golly, I'm going to have the most combat-ready division in the Army,' and let the roads deteriorate, or shut down the ballparks at night from Youth Activities because you're going to win the energy award this year. You've got to harmonize those three viewpoints. Now, this directly relates to this business of family actions, because they have legitimate concerns. If I run out and train soldiers 22 weeks a year, taking them away from their families, then I'd better be doing something to take care of that family or I'm not going to keep the soldiers around."

"I have people say I'm a sidewalk freak. I think sidewalks are a sign of civilization. I'm a tree

freak, too. I'm planting trees on every corner. You'll see them, little trees this high, growing up all over the place. Why? It's a sign of civilization; it gives you a sense of well-being. And, the post isn't trashy. I think it's important. People say, 'My trucks are parked on gravel in the motor pool. Why are you building sidewalks?' I say, 'We'll get around to your gravelled parking lot one of these days. Don't worry about it.' But, I don't want Mama walking over to the Child Development Center with her three little kids knee-deep, wading through the mud over there. If you're going to make super highways out of your motor pools and have Mama walking through the mud, you are not going to have an Army very long."

"I have taken battalion and brigade commanders' wives and have encouraged them to be participants. When I came I said, 'OK, I want all of you battalion and brigade commanders' wives to be active players in the division process.' So, if we get ready to come up with a new policy or a new program that impacts on families, the installation staff has to go to the senior wives as a group and say, 'What do you think about this?' So, they get input into that the same as any other staff section."

"One of the policies I've got is that nobody can change the operating hours of anything on this post without my approval. You can't suddenly close for inventory or shift hours from morning to afternoon or vice versa without letting me know about it. You can't change the price on anything without getting my approval -- now not prices in the commissary or PX; they change all the time -- but the prices for things like ski-lift tickets, rental fees on tents, or the cost of a lane in bowling, and this sort of thing. That simple little policy really keeps track of a hell of a lot of things. You know, AAFES wanted to raise the price of haircuts and -- wouldn't you know it -- they were going to do it the month after the pay raise. So, what does the soldier say? 'What a ripoff!' So, I say, 'If you've got to raise them, you convince me. And, even if you convince me, you'd better wait four or five months after the pay raise, so that the soldier doesn't see it as being a synchronized ripoff.'"

"We've had some very good success with what I call quality of life surveys. To make up a survey, I get the hospital to give me 10 questions of things they

want feedback on -- about the emergency room, the appointment system, etcetera. I get the PX to give me 10 questions and other activities on post, then we mail that survey out to family members and get feedback as to how they perceive the type support. Those things, I think, have paid some dividends. Sometimes we don't like the answers we hear, but at least we know how they look at it."

"Ensure that every family member of every one of your soldiers knows precisely what is available to them in the way of family care and that they feel an integral part of the division, every one of them. Now, you can say that, but, God, it's hard to do it. So, we developed a program to (One) make sure that we welcomed the families properly. We do that once a month in the theater. We determine beforehand that every soldier who arrives with a family gets that day off, and he has to be there. Now, whether or not his family members can be there is up to him. But I've asked all my first sergeants to call that young stud in and tell him, 'You've got to have your wife there, if at all possible, and your kids.' We provide free babysitting care for all the kids while they're there; one mess hall is designated for that."

"What I've said is that the Family Action Council has access to anybody or anything on this installation. In other words, if they want to know why the hospital is doing something, then the MEDDAC commander will go down and explain it to them. If they want to know something about dental care, the dental commander will go down and deal with it. If they want to make recommendations with regard to anything that's going on on post, I'm the only person who can tell them no. Nobody else can! If they want to have benches in the playground so Mama can sit down while she watches the kid, the Engineer can go build benches, but he can't tell them no."

"I think the biggest I've got, and I've still got it, is trying to get people to understand that the Army and the profession is a full-time business. I've got company commanders, some of them I think, who don't quite understand that they're responsible for families and not just soldiers, that their domain encompasses everything that has to do with their soldiers. If we have a leadership shortfall in the division, I think it's too much at the junior level of the old business

of, 'That's not a big deal. If the Army wanted you to have a wife, they would have issued you one.'"

"The recurring thing that keeps coming up on all the surveys, though, is wives' complaints that the husband doesn't have enough time with the family. We've tried to fix that by having standard hours and these kinds of things. The other problem I've got is making sure that my low-level commanders understand that they've got a responsibility for their soldiers. Occasionally, I'll find some who haven't talked to wives."

"You know, I haven't sorted this one out yet. I get more family domestic problems the longer soldiers stay in garrison. I'm not sure why, but I watch the chaplains' statistics and the family counselling and so on, and the longer we're back from the field, the more problems can occur."

"You know, I used to work for a boss who said that if you cheat on your wife, you cheat on me. If a guy treats his family that way, he'll treat his soldiers that way. I happen to believe that. If a guy can't take care of his family, I question how we could ever expect him to take care of soldiers."

"We've had chaplains who are very proactive in reaching out to our community, our families, and our soldiers in trying to help them solve problems. They're very active in stress and marriage counselling, in suicide prevention, and whatever. The chaplains bring to the arena a non-threatening kind of assistance. A very important tool to helping families is the chapels and chaplains. I just can't overemphasize the use of this very important tool for a commander."

EQUIPMENT

"You're using your equipment too much to stand down and get the specks of paint off the reflectors. So, what I've done is organize a thing called the COMDET -- the Command Maintenance and Diagnostic Evaluation Team. The ADC-S takes a very high quality, small inspection team -- an ad hoc team that he pulls together each week -- to inspect one unit. When he gets through with his inspection, he gets the battalion commander and his staff -- the brigade commander is excluded; I am excluded; we never know the outcome of that inspection -- and the philosophy is kind of, 'We've brought some experts in; we've taken a quick but detailed look at your maintenance program; and here's what's wrong with it. Now, we aren't going to come back and check. Here's the problem; you go ahead and fix it. If you need help, you come tell us and we'll send the same guys who inspected you down to help you fix it.' And that's it."

"I think there are five critical things to having a decent maintenance program. That is, you've got to pull good services, your scheduled services. You've got to get a PMCS check from the soldier, the operator of the piece of equipment. He's got to tell you what's wrong with that piece of equipment. You've got to have a good TAMMS (The Army Maintenance Management System) operation along with that piece of equipment. You've got to have a good PLL (Prescribed Load List), Spare Parts operation, and you've got to convince your mechanics to use the doggone tools and test equipment that have been fielded for the equipment. The equipment is getting too complex; you can't trouble shoot an M-1 Tank or a Bradley Fighting Vehicle or an MLRS or a damn thing else anymore without using the test equipment. So, those are the foundations of a maintenance system, and that's where I think you've got to put emphasis in your maintenance program. I tell the battalion commanders that I want them to work in areas that require judgment, not in areas that require discipline and adherence to procedures and things. So, I tell my battalion commanders, 'I don't expect to find you wandering around the motor pool a lot. I expect you to get into the motor pool, but I expect you to go in with the precision of a brain surgeon and spend the minimum amount of time to get the maximum return on your investment.'"

"I think that for the Army, the force modernization process has been an enormously successful endeavor -- not because of good planning, but because of the responsiveness of commanders in the logistical side at AMC, in the training side through the TRADOC school system, and then amongst the FORSCOM channel to DA. So, when the problems came up, they were quickly resolved, and the people used good common sense in taking the short cuts, postponing the fielding, altering the concept, or whatever it was to make it work. I think it's in view of the fact that we never stood anybody down to field; we never stopped -- at least in this division -- our rotations at the NTC. We fielded five battalions worth of tanks in one year, went on REFORGER, made three rotations at the NTC, and we didn't alter anything -- either in terms of our training program or equipment. So, I think it's more a matter of positive attitude and applying a lot of common sense to what needs to be done, and of everybody being cooperative and willing to adapt the fielding to the situations that exist on the installation. This has enabled the Army to do an enormously successful job in fielding equipment. I think it's something for a new guy to come in to if he hasn't been intimately involved in this business and he needs to understand the fielding concept."

"The other thing that we did was that we gave the Assistant Division Commander for Support more responsibility in supervising maintenance programs, all the way from the battalion through the DA level to the GS maintenance at installation. He sort of cut across all those lines, and I think that has paid us some dividends."

"Last October I had an executive session for the long-range planning calendar. We went out to 1988 and backward-planned to today (or last fall) trying to build in all the fielding of the M-1 and the M-2 into the National Training Center rotations; the ARTEPS -- when a battalion was due to have an ARTEP; and who was going to run the ROTC summer camp -- which brigade -- each summer. That sort of forward looking has paid dividends over time, and that's part of that training management system. Through that executive session with our colonels, there was some give and take, and in a couple of cases, we just said, 'Sorry, that's the way it's going to be. You're going to run the ROTC summer camp next summer, even though you ran it this summer.'

We've got to do that in order to make the fielding of new equipment flow and not interfere with it.' So, I think those sorts of things have paid dividends in trying to field new equipment."

"I'd say, without question, the most significant, maintenance-related problem was excess parts. We have here an IBM-36 system which is a very good system. What we have done is to put an IBM-36 terminal in every motor pool and that is hard-wired to the DMMC. The software on it gives you the same format as a requisition, so that when a soldier has to fill out a requisition in the field, it's not a foreign document to him. Then, the PLL clerk can sit down in the motor pool, punch up his requisition, transmit it and the MRO is cut and the part is issued if it's on hand, etcetera. It gives him feedback documents. The problem is, it was too good. When I was here in '81 to '83, our percent of requisitions rejected was about, oh I'm going to say, 35 to 40 percent. Our percent of requisitions rejected now is almost zero because it's user friendly, I guess is the correct term. If you punch in some bad data, it says you did a dumb thing and won't take your requisition. So, what was happening in my view -- because it was so good -- was that when the 2404 came in and said we need a widget, there was no checking to see if that widget was in the PLL. There was no checking the deferred 2404 to see if we had ordered the same widget last week. The young soldier would sit down and punch it up on the terminal, so we were getting double, and in some cases triple, requisitions. So, we were generating a lot of excess -- not that people were hoarding or cheating; it was just a problem. The commanders were having trouble getting that excess turned in. You had to fight to get it turned in on time and all. So, we built another idiot-proof thing into the IBM-36 program that now says, when you punch up there, 'You asked for one of these two days ago. Are you sure you want another one?' So, he has to at least think again before he does that. We still have excess equipment, but not nearly as much as we used to generate."

"I'd say, first of all, you've got to have a good system for keeping visibility of potential problems -- that is, some standardized format of briefings at the USR and some standardized system of production control at the installation level of GS maintenance. And, you

need to plan ahead on the force mod issues to be sure that they don't overwhelm you."

"I'll tell you this -- a new commander can spend two hours with a good maintenance sergeant and learn a little bit about document registers, a little bit about the organization and how you operate a tool room, a little bit about TAMMS, a little bit about PMCS, checking it and services -- two hours is about all it's going to take -- and he'll have enough knowledge to be able to go in there and find out if those major systems are working in his outfit. And, he'll serve the function of inspiring the development of technical competence on the part of other people that are supposed to be supervising, and he'll provide that sense of importance to the unit. You'll see that the improvements will spread throughout the unit. I think that's the role of the division commander."

"Work the issues -- don't assume that the equipment's going to be delivered in perfect shape and don't assume that the repair parts are going to follow. Just challenge the system; work with the fielding teams; work with the LAOs and those other representatives; make sure that you keep in constant touch with them via your logistics folks; and just don't assume anything. Keep challenging the dates of delivery so that you don't get surprised. The worst thing you can do is to assume that something's going to be delivered or is going to arrive on time. I think if you get everybody working together you get valid data, otherwise you don't."

"I think a division commander has to worry about the systems in the whole maintenance operation, and he shouldn't be running around there checking cables to see if they're frayed. I go into motor pools, and I'll sit down and go through a document register and talk to a PLL clerk. But, when I'm doing that, my real intention is to embarrass the officers who are standing around there. If they're uncomfortable about taking a corresponding document register out and thumbing through it -- then maybe they ought to get smart. The other reason I do it is that I kind of like to get a feel for just how confident the PLL clerks are, and if nothing else, to show them that his document register is probably as important as the Constitution of the United States, because -- my God -- the division commander's coming down here and looking at it."

"One of the things we established with TRADOC was to make damn certain that we had a thorough understanding of what the NETT team was going to do for each piece of equipment. And I thought they did a great job on the M-1 and the M-2. Then, we had to NETT each new soldier that joined us. Unless he came from a unit that was equipped with the M-1 and M-2, he did not understand. We had a considerable problem with this. We went to MILPERCEN and they resolved it as much as possible, because we were getting an awful lot of NCOs and officers who were coming to this unit who were not going to Knox or Benning to get indoctrinated in the new equipment. So, we had to really continue our internal NETT program for a considerable length of time, and we still have to insure that the NCOs -- especially those who are going to command a crew on one of these new weapons systems -- are brought up to speed before they assume command of one of the squads, sections, or crews."

"Junior officers, lieutenants and noncommissioned officers across the board, are not adequately prepared to do PMCS on the new equipment -- or on the old, in fact. That is one of the major training goals I've got for the division, trying to get these junior officers and NCOs better acquainted with how you do a PMCS, and that they shouldn't do it -- they should oversee it. The schoolhouse isn't doing it, unfortunately. We've found the schoolhouse teaches them a little bit about PMCS, but how we're doing it right now is that it's one of the mandatory subjects in our officer and NCO professional development program. What we're asking the battalion commanders to do is to have the company commanders take the junior leaders down, away from the rest of the soldiers, and get the four platoon leaders -- as if it were a tank crew -- and say, 'You're going to do PMCS, and I'm going to stand here and make sure you do it right.' We found when we did that that we had some company commanders who didn't know how to do it. So, we had to get the maintenance warrants and our IG team to help them. It's getting a little better, but with the turnover and turbulence you've got in NCOs and officers, it's hard to ever be sure that you've got them all trained."

"I don't shoot for perfect; I don't shoot for 10-20 standard; I say meet the DA average in OR rates."

"It is awfully easy to put the priority on tactical training and to neglect the maintaining."