

U. S. Army Military History Institute

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**US Army Military History  
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**DIVISION COMMAND  
LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAM**



**EXPERIENCES IN DIVISION COMMAND  
1987**

**CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA. 17013-5008**

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REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

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FOREWORD

Following pages are thoughtful reflections by nine commanders recently finishing division command. Not a "recipe" for success but rather the fruit of years of experience . . . they represent a valuable point of departure for both practitioners and students of the art of command. "Must" reading for incoming and incumbent commanders.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert W. Riscassi".

ROBERT W. RISCASSI  
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## EXPERIENCES IN DIVISION COMMAND

### PREPARATION FOR COMMAND

"If I had to do it all over again, I think that I would have isolated time for myself to have done some in-depth reading on the Infantry. I didn't realize until I got there, although I have been an infantryman all my life, but there is a wealth of ignorance out there about the Infantry and about how the Infantry is supposed to operate. I think it is one of those things we all assume we know, and yet when you get right down to it, what is the infantryman supposed to do in this situation? Everyone has a different opinion."

"I would have preferred to have had more language training. I was reasonably proficient in German before I came here. I knew many of the German officers who are now leading the German Army on a first name basis. Obviously, the more that one speaks a language and can understand, particularly in coalition warfare, his neighbors on his left and right flank, the better he is going to do his job."

"I was particularly anxious to visit the Infantry School and the Armor School. My background generally has been Field Artillery, so this gave me an opportunity to update myself not only on equipment items that I had not seen when I was Assistant Division Commander, but also to look into the future and be able to plan better for the integration of new equipment items."

"I think I would spend a little more time, if I were coming to Europe, perhaps with the NATO headquarters getting their perspectives on NATO doctrine. Indeed, if we fight here in Europe, we're going to fight as a coalition army. It's very important that we understand how our neighbors see doctrine for fighting here in Europe."

"I would recommend that a division commander who has not had any installation management experience go to a logistics management course first, at Fort Lee, then spend two or three days at a TRADOC installation and at a CONUS installation where you have a division commander dual-hatted as an installation commander."

"I did have them stick a funnel in my ear in DCSOPS on all the readiness issues before I came down, and I had looked at those issues. I understood what they were. I understood what the philosophy was of trying to bring all the units from C-4 to at least a minimum C-3, and moving equipment around and so on. But I have to tell you that that particular interest was not high on my list as a division commander as far as relating to units being combat ready or not combat ready."

"I would go to the National Training Center every opportunity I had. That is the place where you can see more than anywhere else, and where I learned, really, more than anything else about the training of the division, and looking at where you can see the different weaknesses, or the strengths and weaknesses of the Division. The National Training Center, by virtue of me being free to roam the battlefield, and to be able to look into any facet of the operation with as much detail or depth as I felt I wanted, I thought it was very helpful in training the Division. In fact, after the first NTC rotation, in November of 1985, I was really able to come up with a training strategy and to see what needed to be done in the training environment."

"There's a new command post field circular out, 71-6, which I have made the bible for the Division. I have told them that everything in the Division will be done according to this circular -- all the command posts and so on, so that we have a standardization. The point is, as I went into it and pointed out, in that particular circular it says that in the tank battalion the fire support officer will ride in the loader's hatch of the battalion commander's tank, and will displace the loader, who will then go in the fire support officer's vehicle. We know from three NTC rotations that this doesn't work. It is not a workable system. We're now in the process of looking for one that is. But before we developed it, and rejected it, we had tried it and tested it. So I would say to the Division Commanders coming in, first get into the doctrine and understand it because more than likely your people will have gotten it in school. If you come in without having read it, and try to do a lot of changes without having a full understanding of it, you're going to cause confusion and turbulence."

"I would study the logistical operations on the battlefield, because I found that command and control, intelligence, and logistical operations are generally the places where your maneuver forces are the weakest. You don't usually have any problem with your maneuver forces employing combined arms, tanks, infantry and so on across the battlefield. They understand that well."

". . . I went to a lot of briefings and stuff up at the Pentagon that were just at the wrong level to be of any help."

"For those commanders who are going to divisions where they also double as the installation commander, I would say that preparatory effort particularly in the DEH area, in financial management, and in contracting would be a big assistance to them. These are all areas where I thought I was on shaky ground initially."

"I would counsel prospective division commanders to really be familiar with the 25 series. These are good documents. There is no need to develop your own way to do it."

"The big pitfalls for me, and I think the steepest learning curve, were in the DEH area, in financial management."

"The commander just has to know the business of money. You cannot rely purely on your subalterns. You have to give the guidance on money and you have to know the intricacies of money in order to know how to move it about and how to manage it. Even though you've got technical experts, it is still a commander's responsibility. Civilian personnel is one of the most critical areas we have on an installation within a division such as this. We employ upwards of 3,000 and their morale -- understanding the personnel regulations -- we are always in a constant RIF or changing of the CEL. If you don't understand that, it impacts on the morale of the work force."

". . . We concentrate primarily on the Field Circular 25-100, which incidently, I think is a terrific document. I would recommend to every division commander to get a copy of that early on, and probably even before he goes to division command."

"We have to be very careful how we spend too much time preparing. I've prepared to be a division commander since I was a captain, company commander. We spend a tremendous amount of money, time and other resources sending everyone to these pre-command courses. I've had some of my officers leave here and they are out of pocket in the job that they're supposed to be doing here six months in advance of going to take an aviation command somewhere. If these men and women aren't prepared to go command, and can't get a week or two's instruction, and get it done, then I feel sorry for them."

"While you're preparing yourself, your wife needs to get some attention, too, because they have some big responsibilities in the community, in the division, and so forth. So all of those things that I talked about that I needed to prepare, you ought to do as many of those with your wife as you can so she can also get a feel for it and prepare for it."

## LEADERSHIP

"I think a division commander only does two things that really count. One is to provide the division a sense of direction that has everybody pulling together. And then, secondly, provide the climate that promotes the gaining of those goals. You must provide the motivation and the command climate that encourage and motivate everyone to pull together. If you do that, if you tell the division where its supposed to go, and you create the atmosphere that makes everyone want to go there, you can't fail. I don't know what else a division commander really does that counts."

"At the division level, because it's so diverse and so removed from the soldiers, you have to be careful of perceptions. Rumors and misinformation can get out. Probably once a week I would find something that was being done because somebody thought the CG wanted it done. It was the last thing I wanted done!"

"A division commander who is in the transmit mode all the time is going to end up in trouble."

"The great tendency, when you become a senior leader, is to think that everyone is enamored by your knowledge. They all laugh at your jokes. They all listen politely. They can't help it, they have to. So, you are tempted to think, 'I must really be good. They're all just dying to hear what I say.' That's not true. They want to hear what your policies are, but they're dying to tell you what they think. So, you have to work at that."

"I spend about half of each day in the field. This is not a formal program. I look at what is going on and I go out and look at it and just either pop in on whoever is out there and spend some time with them. Very seldom do I tell them I'm coming. It's not intended to be an 'I got you'; it's intended to be 'I have trust and confidence in you and what you're doing out here. I'm not coming to check up on you; I'm coming to work with you.' I think that is pretty well permeated throughout the command that no one is concerned that the CG is coming. You can have a very dysfunctional effect if the CG goes to the field once every other week for a day and it's all planned out, and he's got an itinerary and everyone is waiting for the CG to come. I try to spend my time with the battalion commanders and I use this as the time to mentor, coach, talk, and make sure that they have my confidence in what they're doing and how to do it. I like to get around a lot of the company commanders -- work with them, talk to them, look at what they're doing. I might spend two or three hours with a single company if they're in a very critical task. I've learned a lot from them."

"The company commander who walks into his orderly room and there is a cigarette butt on the floor, a couple of NCOs sitting around, and he walks by that cigarette butt without doing anything about it -- he has just set a new standard: 'One cigarette butt on the floor is ok.'"

"Telling a command sergeant major that he's running something is wrong. He has absolutely no one else to help him. He has no staff; he has nothing but his driver. He can go look at things and that's what he does; check and help and guide and do those kind of things. But he has no one to work for him. So when we say the command sergeant major's in charge of the individual training program, we've just managed to put that in a category where it is going to fail. Not because of the command sergeant major, but because he doesn't get the assets."

"You have to be very careful what you say, how you say it, the way you say it; because everyone wants to do things which you want. To overcome that, you just keep your mouth shut for a while so that you don't have the Chief of Staff calling and saying, 'green socks tomorrow' type things. Then when you do start laying out guidance, it's been worked with the staff and people have had a chance to input to it and that there is a feeling of 'he's building a team.'"

"There have been some times when I've had to sit down with a commander or have been talking to them in the field where I let it be known that I didn't think they were energized sufficiently or energizing their organizations sufficiently to get on with things. There have been other cases where I've had to talk to them. This is an area you have to be careful -- on military justice where I thought they were slaming people without discretion."

"I think the subordinates who want to know exactly what the priorities are and exactly what I want them to do will never be a successful combat commander to any great measure. There has to be -- and in talking to them -- you find they have a philosophy of command or they are waiting to have everything laid out for them on a little matrix that they can check off and say, 'You told me that was important, I'm doing that now, see,' rather than saying, 'It's important because I know it's important.' The subordinate who at times displays an irrational thought process will never make it in combat. Irrational behavior: 'This is the year of values so, therefore, I'm going to build trust in my unit and I just took the locks off all the doors.'"

"I have not directly relieved any commanders during my time of command. I've had one battalion commander who resigned and that was as a result of a choice I gave him of 'Either join one division or go some place where you can bitch and criticize on someone else's time.' It turned out -- and I didn't know this at

the time because it came early on in my command, I didn't even know anything about the guy and he shows up in the office and writes me letters and all the rest of it. Then I found out after he decided to retire that he had set OR rates in his unit -- it happened to be an aviation battalion -- that were impossible. You can't have 100 percent of your choppers up 100 percent of the time. So he had people working weekends and nights, abusing them as far as trying to get things that weren't there."

"We think the most powerful combat multiplier on the battlefield is leadership."

"In the final analysis, when I task organize a brigade to fight in its general defense plan it ends up with a slice of everything that the Division owns. Because it does end up with a slice, the brigade commander has to have, in essence, about the same depth of technical competence that the Division commander does. So the levels of technical competence are about the same. The planning horizons may be a little longer at division."

"We call the young officer in, assuming he's a company commander, the brigade commander calls him in after he's talked to the battalion commander and both of them interview him and say, 'Captain, here's why you're not making it as a company commander, and here's what you have to do if you're going to lead a company in this division. I'm going to assess you again in 30, 60, and if in 90 days you haven't corrected these shortcomings, we're going to change your job for you.' That's the kind of eyeball to eyeball contact that I expect. I make sure that the objectivity and specificity is there. About half the time we keep the captain aboard."

"I don't think you can separate on and off duty conduct. I don't think you can say, 'Yes, he's had three DWIs, and yes, he beats his wife, and yes, he's doesn't take care of his kids, but he's a good soldier.' I don't think that's true. I think if he does those things, he probably does his soldiering the same way. If you can't take care of your family or your own personal life, I really question if you can be totally effective in taking care of your soldiers."

"Start work at a decent time. Let's serve breakfast from 6:00 to 7:30. You need 90 minutes in the consolidated dining facilities that we have today to get through it. Allow soldiers to eat a decent breakfast and have a decent time to do it, without having to gulp it down and run to the first formation that the first sergeant calls. Start your work call at 8:00 or 8:30. Start that work call at a decent time and have a decent program worked out throughout the day to get the job done, and then stop at a decent time. Now, you can't stop at a decent time if you have four or five meetings a week with the meeting occurring at 1500 in the

afternoon and doesn't get over until 1700, and all of the NCOs in the battalion are waiting with baited breath to get the results of the meeting. The best thing you can do is figure out how you can do things smarter, quicker, better, and in less time. Instead of having five meetings a week, have one. Have it maybe on Tuesday morning at breakfast, have all the key leaders there, and get the job done."

"I think, probably, one of the most difficult things is when you have two years to command you need to come up with your philosophy of command right off the bat. You need to know what your philosophy, guidance, training, and everything is. Put it out to your people and keep it that way, without changing it."

"I guess there is good and bad about announced or unannounced inspections and so we are still going with the announced IG inspection. We're doing it a little bit different, though. When I first got here in the Division we were going down the regular old IG inspection at the battalion level. But now, we inspect from division level to brigade. We take a slice and inspect down through battalion and company. I think it's the responsibility of each successive headquarters to look at that headquarters below them. So, we look at brigades. Now we go look at battalions and companies, but we do it just to see if the brigades have been doing their jobs in looking at battalions, and battalions are doing their jobs in looking at companies, and we teach the same way. The DA IG came down and went through our inspection program and said that it was closer to what the Chief was looking for than anybody, and I think they integrated it into the IG school now. It's working very well for us. There is a degree in which an unannounced inspection also has a good effect. So, we went with the unannounced inspection where we primarily look at maintenance, the chemical; it's all hands on type stuff that we have them go out into. We have them go out into quick reaction drills and things along this line. My purpose, quite frankly, is that division cannot get around to the numbers of companies we have as often as we need to get around to them for unannounced inspections. Since I started the unannounced inspections, brigades and battalions are starting their unannounced inspections, too. That's really what I wanted them to do in the beginning."

"The command sergeant major of each of the units briefs me on the individual training, because we try to emphasize the fact that that's sergeant's business."

"I have told my higher commander, and I feel very strongly about this, that I will tell him the very honest truth about everything that happens, regardless of whether it's good or bad. If I need a dollar to do a job, I'll ask for a dollar, I won't ask for two dollars figuring that he's going to cut me one. I think it's

extremely important to establish that, not only from me, but to establish that throughout the whole staff, and for your lower commands as well as your higher commands. You have to come to grips with that and you have to make sure your staff understands it. That's the way we try to work with Corps and I think it has paid dividends. Now when we talk to them, they believe us. They don't think we have a hidden agenda for any type."

"About every month I bring in about 15 company commanders and we just sit around and talk about various things. And about every month I bring in four or five battalion commanders and we just sit around and talk. Almost every morning I bring in some soldier from a different battalion in the division and we sit here and talk for 10 or 15 minutes."

"Time management at the division level is much more difficult. I don't know if there's anything to this or not, but I do about 20 percent of what I really think I ought to be doing. There are so many other things that I would like to be doing that I don't do that much, so I try to keep a percentage of it, and my Chief tries to keep a percent to see whether I'm doing more or less and we try to balance it off. I think at the division level if you are a centralized person you cause a lot of problems. You can be more centralized at battalion and brigade because the lines of communication are shorter. If you're centralized at division level you have a big problem, and it causes a much bigger problem. I'm a big believer in trying to give guys general guidance and let them run with it the same way they would do in war."

"After the company commander has been there for a period of time, whether it's a month or two months, or whatever, then the leadership is required to go down and give him a inspection. What it does is show him what's important and shows him the proper standards. Plus, it gives him a better feel for where his company is strong and where it's weak. It's a very non threatening type of thing, hopefully -- that's what we're trying to make it. They don't come up and tell me, or anyone else, what the results of that inspection are. I don't want to know what they are. It's totally for that company commander."

"The ADC does not constitute a separate echelon of command between me and my major or subordinate commands."

"Every battalion commander and above that departs the Division I bring in, sit down, and basically ask him two questions. One is: 'What in your opinion is going well in the Division and what is going not so well?' The second question is: 'What am I doing personally that has made the job more difficult, or what have I done to assist you so I need to continue to do that?' In the exit briefing I talk about two percent of the time and he talks 98 percent of the time."

"My only surprise was the reality as a European hand at being in the continental United States in command and having everything right here on one installation; and the time-distance factors to where you can see every brigade and every battalion within an hour. That was something I had to guard myself against because the temptation is to summon everybody, and you have to just pretend that they really do live 25 miles away or else you won't allow brigade and battalion commanders to be in command. Too easy to centralize."

"When I got to brigade, I could see every unit doing something about once a week; and here, if I'm lucky, I can watch every unit doing something about once a quarter. So, you have to manage by systems when you're at the division command level and you have to sample. Anybody who writes in the efficiency reports that they see their battalion commander daily, is kidding the troops. I don't see my battalion commanders daily. I'm lucky to see them once a month. So, I have to look for trends and systemic things. I do know my battalions, obviously, and what their strengths and weaknesses are and I have systems in place, through staff and assistant division commanders, to measure their output, but what you have to do is to exert a great degree of patience when you are a division commander."

"The hard part about it is to make sure your leadership is never oppressive, is never overbearing, and that you're never perceived to be doing anything for your own self-aggrandizement. That is very difficult and I would say that I was never as successful in this as I would like to be. It was something that I continually had to work on for a variety of reasons. You will make mistakes yourself, in timing, of where you are, what you're doing. Your subordinates will sometimes misinterpret what you say or be a little bit too eager to institute things that you do. The toughest leadership challenge is to make sure that you protect or project the image that you want to project, and an honest one, not a store bought image, or something that you've dreamed up or that you're trying to dramatize, but to make sure that you're coming across as you actually are."

"Guys that are worried about themselves try to control everything and pass judgment on everything that happens. They will be good, they won't ever do anything wrong, but they won't ever get real good. A guy that decentralizes believes in his people and they know that they believe in him, his curve will go down. He will be less proficient for a while. Then he'll go up and he'll pass the other one and he will just keep going."

"I don't know anyone who can run a division by himself. The division runs well if you have good people to run it for you and you give them support and confidence that cause them to feel good about themselves. I really got to the point where I developed

people to a point I thought they didn't really need me. It kind of makes you feel bad, but they didn't even really need me around because they did what they had to do and got after it."

"I found out it gets more and more difficult to be a good leader. I hate to use that old cliché of General Abrams', but it's certainly true that the further up the flag pole you go, the more your ass shows. I really did some dumb things. I wasn't a good leader, sometimes lousy. I found out that you're a lot more visible. People look at you a lot more. But I also found out you can still be open and honest with your subordinates. I also found out you can listen to your soldiers and talk to them and still have enough time to get everything else done. The fact is you get a lot more time to get things done if you do listen to them."

"Be real. Don't be a phony. Let your mistakes show if you make them. Don't overreact. Don't let your ego get in your way. Treat people like you would like to be treated and they respond a lot better. Understand that you're not any better than they are."

"I think that division commanders ought to keep it simple and straightforward and general from their level. If you start trying to get too precise at division level, then you find that at each succeeding level below you, people add on until you get down to the point that the company commander can only react to what the higher commanders tell him to do."

"I felt it was important to keep company commanders with their companies, to keep battalion commanders with their battalions. I made a decision to make the cutoff point there. I did load my brigade commanders with a lot of extra things. I made them get involved in the running of the post and the running of our community. But I tried to keep my battalion commanders free of all that and to leave them as the primary trainers. I would leave the company commanders doing their job."

"I guess the thing that was the most striking to me was how a division commander -- people really listen to the division commander and they really want to do what he wants and he has to be very careful what he says because people will tend to overreact. I have had a couple of instances in which I said things like, 'if I could I would do thus and so,' and very well meaning and well intentioned and honest and honorable people have gone and done those things in the name of the division commander because they thought that was what I wanted because I said it. Some of those things have shaded on being improper and unethical and illegal. I did not want that. I did not direct that. I did not say do that. But when it came to light and I got to checking, I found out, 'Well, we thought we were doing what you wanted.' So division commanders have to be very careful. As I said, just to say, 'I want to do this' or 'I would like to do that,' people take

that and as I said, they are well intentioned and well meaning, but if you are not careful, they will get themselves and you into trouble."

"Another technique that I found extremely valuable is the use of the post newspaper. I write a column every week in our post newspaper. I have been surprised at the reaction to it. Again, it's not that I write so well or anything like that. It's that I try to use it to proliferate to the whole community and to project to the whole community the great things that are going on here because again, people get very myopic. The people sitting over here at DEH or DOL don't know the great things that are going on down in the units and the people down in the units don't know what these other people are doing to help them and no one understands what the volunteers are doing. I guess the division commander or the post commander is the only person that really sees the whole thing. So if you don't make an effort to get that out to people, then people go through their whole tour and never know what else is going on. I found all of those techniques, reading materials, bringing in speakers, being seen, the use of the post newspaper, and I also use tapes a lot. In the safety program I found it very effective before a major holiday to make a tape, send it down and tell every unit on the post that they have to show it so that soldiers see the division commander and know that he is in fact involved in safety, interested in safety, and concerned about safety."

"There is nothing wrong with getting tired. People get irritable and lose their temper and all those things are natural. I guess the one thing when I see a commander who comes under pressure and he starts taking his frustrations out on his soldiers it says to my gut anyway, that he's going to do the same thing in combat and I don't think he's going to be as good as someone who doesn't do that -- who gets frustrated, who gets angry, who gets under pressure, who gets tired, who get hungry, but he can still plow down and he can accept the responsibility himself and not take it out on his soldiers."

## PERSONNEL

"Everybody ought to be in on the 'doing' of the decision. An example is the assignment of field grade officers within the division. Most lieutenant colonels were assigned to a specific job like battalion command. We didn't have much to say about where they were assigned. But, for the majors and a few lieutenant colonels, it was totally within our ability to reassign them. In a three year tour we would keep them in a unit 18 months, and then in a division or community staff position for 18 months. We tried to make that rotation in most cases. When I got there that was the policy. It was good policy and I kept it. But, how we implemented it was changed. It was being done by the AG or by an officer from the G-1 shop. He and the division commander did it. Well, it's right that the division commander makes those choices, and I kept that as my prerogative. But, I said, 'Get a board and put every major and lieutenant colonel's name on it. List on the board when they are due to come out of their current job or when their command is up. Then, put down what they're programmed to do next.' We put that board in a visible spot so that anyone in the division could see what the options were. That way he could be a player. He could see what was actually open and what his possibilities were for reassignment. So, as the weeks rolled by, they knew where they stood. And, they could come up on the net. Some of them came to me and said, 'I appreciate your giving me that job, and I understand, but I intend to retire. So, you ought to give that to someone else.' Or, 'That's exactly the job I want, but I know that Colonel So and So is going to command that battalion, and he and I don't get along.' They were players in the decision. They understood it and realized that it was not something being done behind closed doors. You need to create that feeling of openness, total trust and confidence."

"We have a lot of jobs that provide temptation -- clubs and money activities. People who have resources to give, rent, sell, and services. We have to watch those all the time. For whatever the reason, not a few of the people who are attracted to those kinds of jobs are the kinds of people who will fall to temptation. The senior commander needs to recognize that as one of the realities of life and have checks and balances."

"We've had this current division structure, as I remember, since 1962, and we've always had an ADC for support and an ADC for maneuver, sometimes called operations. We don't need that. That is really a meaningless split. First of all, you have a colonel who commands the DISCOM and his job is to support the division. He doesn't need a brigadier stacked on top of him. If he does, you need a new colonel. The division commander is the operator. It's a maneuver division and how it maneuvers is his job, not some

Assistant Division Commander's, so you don't need a guy doing that. The command and control ought to be out of the manual: with a TAC, and that's where the G-3 should stay; a TOC or a main, and that's where the Chief of Staff should be; and a rear, and that's where the DISCOM commander ought to be. The division commander should be wherever he needs to be to run things. That gives him his two ADCs and frees them from the artificial 'one is Ops and one is Support.' Now he has two assistants really to help him. I analyzed and assessed, and I assessed this before I got to the division, that the most difficult thing to do in the battle field that we envision -- a very fluid battle field, one with no front lines, no FLOT really, intermingling of troops, one of maneuver -- one of the most difficult things, if not THE most difficult function, would be synchronization. So, my two ADCs were assistants for synchronization, one internal and one external. The man who had the responsibility for internal synchronization, that was within the boundaries of the division, was free to go anywhere within the boundaries of the division, knowing what it was that we were trying to do, and make sure that things were coordinated, harmonized, and synchronized. Wherever it may be that coordination was of the essence, such as a passage of lines, a key supply or regeneration effort, a major maneuver, or a complex fire support activity, that's where he went to facilitate that. The one who was external dealt with everyone outside of the division -- the units to the right and left, the corps, elements from the Air Force who may be working in our area, units passing through our rear, or whatever it may have been. He was, in essence, a very senior liaison officer. His job was to make sure the corps knew exactly what we were doing and what our status was, and that we knew what it was the corps commander was attempting."

"You don't get much of a gripe with the exception of the Log side, and the MI side, that the TO&E doesn't work in combat, or in the field. There are very few complaints about the TO&E at the NTC. Where you find the complaints on the TO&E is as it relates back to the garrison situation, and how you try to apply it in a pure peacetime environment because of the different requirements you have that you're forced to make. Although, in one regard, for the TO&E I see a couple of very dangerous trends that I think are dangerous for the well being of the officer and the officer corps -- the centralization of the personnel function, the mechanic function, and the feeding function. The battalion, and in some cases the feeding function of the brigade or maybe installation, is creating a class of officers who have never experienced taking care of their soldiers and their equipment at the company level. I'm finding for the first time now, company commanders who don't believe they have a responsibility for the maintenance of their equipment, other than just the superficial care and cleaning, because battalion has the resources. 'If battalion has the resources, battalion is supposed to do it for me.' I see it in

maintenance, I see it personnel administration, and I see it in mess and feeding. We now have a year group or a class of officers who haven't the foggiest idea how to feed a unit, how to plan for rations, how to take care of them for their welfare."

"I now have three advanced military schooling program guys out of Leavenworth -- the two-year guys. They've been here during a period from six to 18 months. One came the first year I was here and the other two arrived last year. Those guys stand out. They're exceptional officers before they go into that program, but it's very obvious in watching those people that the extra year has taught them to think; has given them a grasp of doctrine and the specifics of our profession far beyond that which some of their very exceptional peers have. The impact they have on the officer corps in particular is on a par, in my view, with the NTC and CAS<sup>2</sup>. They have been a real stimulus to their peers, to their subordinates, and to their superiors in what I would term a renewed interest, an emphasis in the specifics of the profession. The people who are exposed to those guys on a daily basis will talk to you in terms of historical examples in their own professional reading to a much greater degree than the officers who don't see or come into contact with those guys everyday. In and of itself, I would tell you that it merits whatever resources are required to expand that program to whatever the full-up number is -- 96 or so. The more you have of those people around, by osmosis you have a tremendous contribution to understanding doctrine, historical perspectives, problem solving, a whole plethora of things. That's a good program."

"Every community feels that they deserve their own commissary, PX, movie, bowling alley, child care, and clubs, and rightfully so. But, you can't give it to everyone. Unfortunately, the community jobs are not sought after like battalion and brigade commander are sought after. You have to be very careful about getting quality people to put into the communities. I have made a major effort to push quality into the communities because they really save you a lot of problems. The other thing is that when we had the end strength capped here in Europe, the numbers of soldiers and sailors and everyone who could be here, we looked at all of those positions that were not wartime positions here in the community and made them civilians. Then they put a cap on the number of civilians that we could have, and said we had to go with contracts. Then they cut the contract dollars. So it was a 'Catch 22' and the communities today have few green suiters in them which gives you less flexibility. It's a very tough job."

"Quite candidly the running of the community is tougher during these times than the Division. In the Division I have good people, selected people. I have great equipment; all new equipment. I have plenty of money to train them. In the community I don't have the number of people I need. It's not the

same quality. I'm short on money, base ops money is much shorter than P-2 mission money. There equipment is pretty much all old. Plus, they're working out of buildings that we took over 30 years ago, and they're trying to maintain them, work out of them, and do with buildings that are over 30 years old. That's a tough job. The key to it is get you some good people in there. It's too big for you to do it yourself. If you try to do it yourself it will consume your whole time."

## ETHICS

"AUSA works very well here for soldiers, but I said, 'No arm twisting.' Then I found we had a few cases of arm twisting and I used that as an example, not by unit, not by name. But I said I made sure the individuals who felt that they had their arms twisted got their dues back. I said, 'We're not going to do anything of that nature.' I've got a problem now in the community with some of the utilities, by some of our soldiers in bad debt -- about \$80,000 worth. I'm using that as an example to commanders that we have to keep driving home -- let's do what is right and paying just debts is one of those. I think we deal here more with the real than the theoretical, as far as ethical decisions and ethical actions are concerned."

"I would say, don't do the dumb kind of things that we've grown up with that because people to be forced into cheating. (1) A lot of data -- displays at conferences that pit statistics, one against the other, and then hammer people who are low on statistics -- I would say that that ricochets. You throw the rock in the pond here at division level and by the time it gets down to the troops, it's a big wave. So don't use those kinds of things, and I don't. (2) If you set the standard in maintenance, for example, as -10/-20, then provide the resources to maintain those standards; but you can't expect them to get there if you don't provide the resources. So your standards have to be resourced. (3) I think we have to make sure that everyone understands where they are going, what they're doing, how they're getting there, and you have to reinforce their effort by touching it personally and not depending or relying on third-hand reports. The critical things have to be looked at personally. I think that reinforces ethics, it reinforces the honesty of the system, and people can tell you where they've got problems and you're not looking at it through a third set of eyes."

"You have to be very careful at the pressure that you put on an individual. If you do it in the wrong ways they will maybe go and not be ethical. One thing that I have done, I'm not a numbers guy; I don't like numbers and I don't like percentages. I've never carried cards around in my pockets with numbers on them. Some people you see will have a pack of cards like that and they have every percent and every number in the world. First of all, my bosses haven't asked me for them, so I haven't had to do that, which I appreciate. I believe it's dangerous to do it that way. You don't manage by numbers. Then I don't think the little guys out there are going to be compelled to try to do dumb things just to get numbers."

"I wanted people to understand that some things I would not tolerate under any circumstances were lying, cheating, or

stealing. I just made that the standard. I briefed every incoming battalion and brigade commander. I briefed all of my officers. I went around and I had OPDs, went down to battalion level and brigade level and every time I had an opportunity I made sure that everyone understood that I would tolerate honest mistakes, I would tolerate errors in judgment, I would tolerate people making bad decisions if they were trying, but that anytime I felt that someone knowingly made a conscious decision to do that which he knew was wrong, I wouldn't tolerate it and that they would be punished for it openly. I've tried to live up to that. When infractions were brought to my attention by officers or senior NCOs, the deciding line was, 'Did they knowingly make a decision to do that which they knew was wrong.' If I determined that, then I took what I considered appropriate action. If it was simply a mistake, I tried to make it a learning experience."

"When I first got there I found that we had just written a regulation, the DCSLOG of the Army had written it, on what an officer had to do to run the mess hall. It was a dumb reg. I got hold of the DCSLOG of the Army and he agreed it was a dumb reg and they changed it. But, it had probably been done by some bureaucrat in the headquarters who had never checked with the field. It has been passed on down by every headquarters until it got to the division. I refused to let our people comply with it. I told them that we weren't going to do it."

"You either have integrity or you don't. You can't be a little dishonest. Officers need to know flat out that they are going to be held to that standard."

"I have not stood on the podium and preached or given ethics as a formal class. That, like the other areas, has to be woven into your actions and policies, just your normal day to day way of doing business."

"I suppose you can say that ethics is the right thing to do. You can get off on an ethical kick that can be very oppressive if you're not careful. Especially if you start putting ethics in any kind of a box that makes you superior to someone else because you have it and they don't."

"I had to relieve a commander over an ethical issue. I didn't want to. It hurt me worse than it did him. Of course, there was no way around it because he had compromised his ability to command."

". . . Set the example. We can't expect our soldiers to be anything more than we are, and if we believe that values are important to developing ethical content that will promote the kind of solid Army that we want, then we have to set the example."

"It's your everyday actions that count. Actions speak a heck of a lot louder than words. I'm not sure I know how you teach those things. You have to present the right example and handle yourself in the proper way as far as raising heck at someone or taking actions to reward good ethics. Don't do things that indicate to them that bad ethics are good."

"We have integrity issues from time to time, but I think at the outset I made it clear as part of this 90 day examination of one another that we went through when I first arrived, that I would not tolerate questions of integrity. If an officer lied, cheated, or stole he would not continue to be a member of this outfit. That's a ditto for NCOs. I told them at the beginning, 'Guys, I'm not going to lop your head off if you make a mistake. I'm not going to lop your head off if you make two mistakes. If you make three mistakes in the same problem, I'm going to think that maybe you're dumb and you'll never learn, and maybe you ought to do something else for business. But you have to know, now, and you have to understand that although we're going to have tough standards, I know that soldiers make errors. Soldiers screw up and so do I. Therefore, we're not going to have a 'zero defect' division. Mistakes are going to be tolerated as long as the individual shows that he's trying to improve himself, and indeed, is marching towards that end. For that reason, you don't have to lie to me. You don't have to cheat. And, you damn well better not steal.'"

"Some divisions tell people that if you change your training schedule three months out you have to get permission from someone on high. I think they're kidding themselves. If I can lock that thing in 30 days out, I think I'm lucky as I can be. I don't try to kid myself on that. I do try to keep it locked in 30 days out, but further than that is next to impossible. What really causes some problems is if you're not careful you'll do things that cause integrity problems. That you really don't want to do."

## FIELD OPERATIONS

"I want the battallions moving every six to eight hours, brigades every 12 to 18 hours -- we move the division at least every 24."

"Once a month the division CP goes to the field and sets up."

"I guess the war fighters would say, 'Well, I'm going to be up front and I'm going to be all those kinds of things.' I'm not necessarily in agreement with that. I have to position myself where I can have greatest access to the critical things I need to know to make decisions on and be in a position where I can make those decisions. So I have to have access to my Intel business; I have to have access to my operational input; I have to have access to my combat service support and combat support. So I spend some time in my TAC forward. I spend some time in my main CP, and of course, I get down to my brigades. I've got to remember that if I'm fighting three or four brigades and I get myself tied around the axle with one brigade and I'm fighting his fight for him, then I ought to be doing one of two things -- getting a new brigade commander or realizing that I'm only one fourth of value. So I maintain the flexibility to go where I think I should be and where I can make decisions and do things. But I always keep it in mind -- am I in contact? Am I able to get what I need to know to make decisions? And a division does not need a dead division commander."

". . . A light division is very different. We do everything at night where other divisions kind of hunker down at night and things settle down. A light division is like an ant hill. In the daytime you see it and it's just there and there doesn't look like there is much going on and then at night it's like someone walked up and kicked the ant hill and everything is going on."

"I sleep on the ground. There are no cots in my division anywhere. My CP is very small and very austere. I do not have a CG's mess. There is no need to have one because I don't have any way to cook anything anyway. It's all MREs and tray packs so the 'CG's mess' is wherever the CG sits down to eat. Life as a division commander in a light infantry division is very different than life around a division CP in the field that I had grown up with and it comes as quite a shock to people when they come to visit my CP. Because it's almost like visiting in a brigade or a battalion CP in other divisions. So he has to get used to field operations. The light division commander has to accept the fact that it is very decentralized. He does not have that instantaneous control that we like to think we have in other divisions because people are out doing their thing all over the terrain. You just have to hope like hell that they (1) know what they're suppose to do and (2) that they're doing it."

"I know that this flies in the face of a lot of people who advocate simulation, but I've had one division exercise a year now, for the last two years. I can't begin to tell you how much positive feedback I get from the unit commanders and the staff, and how much I personally get watching these operations go. In simulations, I realize they are getting better as time goes on, but simulations still don't give you the decision making problems that occur when the supply convoy gets lost; that occur when the radios get wet and don't work; when the ammunition shows up at the wrong place or the point man in the column of the lead task force gets lost and so does the task force, and it all has to be reoriented again, and brought back in. For the past two years on the division exercise we have had horrible weather. We've had to fight through some of the most severe rains that we have ever seen in this area. The roads have become absolute quagmires. Everything has slowed down to a snail's pace or has speeded up in areas which we never did figure that they would. All of this was given to staff, commanders, and the soldiers; the problems of coping. You don't get that kind of coping out of pure simulations."

"I issued my Chief of Staff the following directive. I said, 'In my absence, without being able to contact me, you can do anything to implement the plan, except change priority of fire and commit the Reserve -- those you must contact me on.'"

"The first guy I want to talk to is my G-4, to give me our support status. Then I can talk to the G-3. If you can't support the operation, it's not going to work."

"At this particular time I split my G-3 section three ways, the TAC, the TOC, and the rear. We are capable now, by improvising our communications into three essential support nodes, of being able to both communicate and command and control the Division, and fight at any one of three locations."

". . . We move the DTAC every 24 hours. The DTOC, the main headquarters, we move every 36 to 48 hours. On our last field problem, in the seven days we moved it four times. I've never seen a division CP that was capable of moving like that. We kept communications and had no problems with it. Most divisions that I've been in in the past go to one location and are afraid to move because of the communications. I'm very proud that this division was able to do that. It took a lot of training, though."

"Some believe that you can't do realistic training and have safe training at the same time. That's just absolute garbage. When we go to war we don't want to kill our own people either. So I think you can do it safely, and I was very happy on our last field problem. We took 14,000 guys out there, 4,000 vehicles, and ran them around for a week and a half and didn't lose anyone. That

doesn't just happen. Commanders work their tails off in doing things along that particular line."

"With regard to the whole structure for fighting in the rear, our doctrine is not clear. In fact, the doctrine intentionally leaves it a little flexible. I restructured a division rear, created one; because I thought that we needed the three command posts that the doctrine tells us to have. You can't just ad hoc it. You can't say, 'Well, we'll have one when we go to the field.' People have to work together and have to train together, or you don't really have anything. So, we established one back there under the Provost Marshal. We created a division rear out of our hide. Then, we focused on the GTAC itself. I found that when we went to the field that people in TAC, who were the ones who primarily controlled the current operations of the division, spent their first day introducing themselves to each other. 'Hi, I'm Joe and I'm in G-4. I'm Dick, and I'm in G-2,' and so on, because back in garrison they all worked in their own building, but when we would go to the field, G-2 would send three people, G-3 would send three people, and G-4 would send some, and all these guys would go out and scratch their heads for awhile. 'Well, what do we do in the TAC? How do we work it?' So, I set up an area in the division headquarters that we called the GTAC. We took three large rooms, side by side with connecting doors, and we camouflaged it, put up nets and so forth, and that was the GTAC. They were there from all the staff sections. People who would be in the field together, worked everyday in garrison side by side. So, when we went to the field, anytime we pulled the trigger and took off, there were these guys who had desks side by side. The G-2 section and G-3 section found themselves working at field desks, and working in DTAC, side by side. Now, they already knew each other. When I told the staff what we were going to do, everyone said, 'Oh, that will disrupt our garrison operations. That will cause inefficiency. We will now have to run all over to coordinate things.' I just told them, 'Fine, we'll take some peacetime degradation to get a wartime improvement.' We did it! I forced it. I thought we probably would be more effective in the field. I found, which was a very pleasant surprise, that our peacetime efficiency became better."

## INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT

"If you go around our clubs, you will see as you enter, a purpose statement for that club. Those purpose statements were done with a great deal of thought. I chopped on them finally, but it took about three months to really get the things narrowed down. That's just exactly what we are going to do is what's in those purpose statements, no more, no less. We've done the same with a number of our other functions in the NAF area."

"My guidance to the staff is that your biggest area to obligate is the family housing. I wanted 50 percent of our budget in family housing obligated by the end of the first quarter; 75 percent by the end of the second quarter; and 95 percent by the end of the third quarter. We didn't quite make it, but at the same time that we do this, I have a system where we develop a number of 'on the shelf' projects so that when it comes to the end of the year and there are monies left over, we do pretty well in the so-called 'end of year monies'. Like last year, about four million or four and a half million dollars worth became available. We bought out about everything we had in our first 50 priorities. But, yes, there are problems in obligation and I'll tell you why. We have managers for all these different line items and they're pure bean counters. They like to draw a line that starts on the first day of the fiscal year and that line hits 99.9 percent on the last day of the fiscal year. That's fine for a bean counter, but it isn't necessarily the way to go operationally. That's why you have to understand money and what you're looking at and 'straight-line' doesn't mean that it's 'right-lined'."

"Our officer's club was 'deep red' because they used to have the MPs sitting out to make sure no one went away drunk. Well that isn't how you take care of people who get drunk at the club. You take care of them with their own contemporaries. Social activity is just number one. That's very important, very critical."

"I put together an inspection team made up of my G-5 and some people from my staff, the state health inspector, and some people from AUSA. They inspect and they have a set of standards they go by -- to inspect the trailer parks. Those who fail to meet the standards are given a list of their deficiencies and a period of time to fix them up. Then we go back and the threat is 'off limits'. I have put one off limits, but it's been a more positive result in that trailer park owners have come to us, even before the inspection, and asked for the standards and they've gone out and fixed their parks up. So we've had a great improvement there in all but one of the trailer parks and that one is about to go bankrupt here anyway."

"I have seen colleagues of mine, smart people, good people, caring people, who came into a division and concentrated on the training, readiness, division, maintenance, and all the division activities and said, 'The community will run itself.' It may, but there is such a synergism between how the community runs, in terms of morale, spirit, and sense of well being that the families have, and the readiness and the attitudes and spirit of the division. If you haven't done it, you don't know it. The worst mistake that a person can make is to go into the division and turn his back on that. I think most division commanders are smart enough to catch on. But, if you wait most of your first year before you catch on, then all you have time to do is catch up. You can't get ahead."

"All of us were very comfortable and were all experts in a division, but the Army hasn't grown many installation managers. I think all of us should admit to at least a degree of uncomfortableness when we started playing on that side of the house. I would suspect other division commanders would tell you that they spend at least 50 percent of their time on the installation side of the house. I think the amount of time that I spend is probably closer to 90 percent."

"Early on, I think, for a division commander that is also an installation commander, he has to make himself visible to the civilian work force which is a considerable portion of that installation side of the house. It pays dividends. I would counsel the division commander and I'd vote to be sensitive to and aware of the communications between the post leadership and the civilian work force side of the house. I think that's extremely important in this age with the amount of contracting out and commercial activities studies and that type of thing that's going on. I don't think the Army as a whole is as sensitive to their civilian work force as perhaps they should be . . ."

"I watch visitors come through here -- the Army's leadership. They will, on the drop of a pin accept your invitation to talk to NCOs or talk to soldiers, but it's hard to get them to devote the time to talk to civilians."

"Every division commander will probably tell you that he sits down and has lunch periodically with lieutenants, sergeants, or something like that. I started doing it with civilians early on, five or six at a time. For the first year and a half I couldn't write fast enough. The last three luncheons we had we didn't have a single thing to discuss, except the weather and that kind of stuff."

"The installation, more than the division, tends to feel the manpower squeezes because even though we say we need installations for mobilization and we need to maintain our readiness at the installation level to take care of soldiers and so on, the

Installation still takes it in the shorts when budget squeezes come. We protect the line units, or the TO&Es, at the expense of the installation."

"One of the things that I instituted here after about six months in command was requiring my installation side of the house to give me a quarterly management review, just like I required the line units to do in the training field. For the installation side, each of the directors would have to brief me on what their goals were for the next quarter, then how they were going to achieve them, and what they needed from me in order to do it, if anything. Then, at the next quarter they would tell me how well they satisfied those goals, and if they didn't why they didn't, and where the problem was. As an example, I told them that the problem might well be me. Maybe I didn't give them enough resources or maybe I gave them some conflicting guidance in midstream, and they needed to tell me that. We needed to know that. Immediately they would take it as a defensive thing, 'I didn't meet the goals,' and it was very difficult initially to get this idea of free exchange and candor back and forth. I tried to do that by not railing against them, or not criticizing them when they didn't meet their goals unless it was something out of just pure stupidity or mismanagement. We have that now pretty well institutionalized, and I hear the goals every other quarter. The garrison commander hears them in the quarter that I don't."

". . . There are some areas like libraries and sports programs for our youngsters where I'm never going to be self-sufficient. So I have to make enough money in other areas to cover the known losers. We're doing that now."

"I would say get familiar with all the recent Army publications, regulations and directives on the standard installation organization. That has some bearing on what you're doing. If you follow that thing to the 'I' as it's written, then you at the division commander level are the integrator between the installation and the garrison, not your chief or not the garrison commander. I would suspect that there are very few installation commanders who are doing that to the degree to which the regulation says. But there are a lot of little idiosyncrasies in that thing and if you've been away from a CONUS installation for a while it merits your attention early on, so that you have an understanding and a familiarity with them."

"I would recommend to the division commander, if your installation commander has not been to the installation management course, that he go."

"The largest problem I had was that we found out in the Morale and Welfare Fund we were almost a million dollars in debt and nobody knew anything about it. We had a little lady in tennis shoes

writing checks against nothing. So we were in deep debt to be quite honest with you. That was the biggest problem that I inherited here. I won't go into great detail, but fortunately we had a sports shop and a couple of other fast food restaurants that I was able to make a deal with AAFES to buy me out, which gave me some cash flow. We were able to solve the problem. That was the biggest problem I had when I first came here."

"Now, I probably don't spend 15 or 20 percent of my time with the community. Previously it would have been more about 50 percent. But that extra 30 or 35 percent that I did spend with the community, now I'm able to spend out with the units."

## TRAINING

"There's a manual out now. I believe TRADOC published it in August of 1985. This manual tells a division how to train. We have never had that before. We have never had a standard doctrinal approach to training a division. It is very well done. I can't think of a better way to manage, plan and conduct training than to follow the way it's laid out in that manual."

"If the division commander doesn't set priorities, he's forfeiting his major command decision. The most important decision he'll make as a division commander is what his people will do and what they won't do. If he fails to do that, it'll be done, because at some point you meet a commander in the chain of command who has to execute. It flows on down and if you don't find a commander with guts somewhere, it will stop with the company commander. It can't flow downhill any farther. If no one else has set priorities, the company commander is the man who finally gets told that he has ten things to do but only enough time to do five. If no one else has told him what the important five are, since he has to do it, he'll choose which five he will do. So, if you fail to set priorities, you're forfeiting your ability to influence where the division is going, and you're forfeiting it to the least experienced commander in the chain of command."

"I watched some of my battalion commanders get ready for tank gunnery -- other things too, but I'll just use tank gunnery as an example -- and their training program was to have three repetitions of the SQT, two repetitions of some other event, and fire at night four times, and so forth. They had summoned the 'three' and said, 'Well, you have to learn to fire at night, you have to do the dry run, you have to do this to exercise,' and so forth, 'and, if you do it this many times, you ought to be prepared.' Well, that's not necessarily so. What they missed was that you have to train to a standard, not train to a number of repetitions. Some people can go in and do it once and meet the standard, while other people would need to do it 10 times to meet the standard. If all you're doing as you go through your training is checking off blocks, then you feel good because you have checks in all those blanks, but that doesn't do anything but make the S-3 feel good. It doesn't say that the crew has mastered that skill."

"We took a period, one day a week, Wednesday, for five hours. We said, 'That's Iron Time Training.' That time is devoted to the squad leader for training his squad or his tank crew, or whatever, and nothing else will take precedence. There will be no hospital appointments, there will be no details, no sick call, and no 'go to finance to check your pay records.' There will be nothing at that time. We laid it out into quarters and there were 13 Wednesdays in a quarter. There were times when we couldn't do it,

but we planned for those ahead of time. For example, maybe the whole battalion would be in the field, or at Grafenwohr during tank gunnery work, or maybe a national holiday, or REFORGER. So, on the average, in a quarter we would have eight to ten Wednesdays when you were in garrison, doing training, and those Wednesdays were sacred. It was the job of every leader to protect that squad leader against poachers. We had to explain to them what poachers were. Anybody who has been out west knows what a poacher is, but we described to them what a poacher was. Then we asked them who the poacher was, and the poacher was the company commander, the first sergeant, or the division commander. The poachers were us, the leaders. So, we put ourselves in the position of protecting those squad leaders from us."

"A cav squadron commander found a way to integrate COPPERHEAD live firing with his maneuver. By maneuvering adjacent to Grafenwohr and having the rounds actually impacting, offset from where he was maneuvering, in the impact area of Grafenwohr. But, he was still able to tie together all pieces of the systems -- the laser designator, the firing battery, the missile, the maneuver force, the opposing force, all of those tied together with the communications link -- and exercise and stress that whole system."

"First of all, find an anvil. You have to have something that shapes people and forces them to focus. Going to the National Training Center is an anvil. People know that they are going and they know that they and their units will have to be ready to perform. So, they will prepare for it. Going out on something like REFORGER, where you have another unit against you and you have evaluators and umpires, that's an anvil. But, you have to have something that forces people to prepare for, think for, plan for, and train for an evaluated event. Whether the evaluation is an umpire with a clipboard, or MILES devices, or a large force-on-force maneuver, there has to be something that puts realism into it."

"The National Training Center is one part of that and it's probably the best training we have and that is good. But the fault therein, in my opinion, is that in training for the National Training Center, the only people who were receiving high caliber, intensive training were those who were preparing to go to the National Training Center, and that's only about 3,500 people we send out there out of the division installation contingent of approximately 15,000."

"What we initiated was what we call 'P1-P2'. These are 14 day periods, back to back, and we aligned at the brigade task force level so that we can train up on a P1 period -- we can go as high as a brigade task force. However, most of our focus is at the company team level and some at the battalion task force level. During P1 the only things authorized outside of being with the

unit are emergency leave and emergency appointments. We're not dumb about this. If a person lives in Samoa, and we do have some, and they're going on leave and they're paying a good hunk of money to fly there, we'll let them go 30 days. I set a standard of 85 percent of assigned strength, speaking at the company level, 'boots on the ground' during P1. Most of the units exceed that by 10-12 percent. All the other things -- the dental appointments; the annual dental checks; the physicals; the medical appointments, unless they are emergencies; courts martial; members of the court martial boards, we have two boards of panels; urinalysis; Panarex, AIDS testing, BSEP, advanced NCO, college training -- that's all done during P2."

"This division, not unlike many others, for the gunnery training on tanks was centralized at division level with the TGAT, Tank Gunnery Assistance Team. Very inefficient, it took a lot of people, failed to orient on the real intended outcome, and that's training tank crews. It was more process oriented. Very early in my command, I disbanded the TGAT and gave the guidance that the company commander was responsible for the gunnery proficiency of his company. And so when you go to any of the gunnery ranges where they are qualifying -- whether it be Table VIII, being the big one -- it will be the company commander there and he'll be doing it. Initially, and this was kind of disappointing to me, but I think we set the record straight on it -- initially people told me that we can't do that because we can't trust the company commanders to be honest. Well, that kind of hit me right in the gut. If we have developed a climate where we can't trust our company commanders, then we've got to change something. So it didn't take long for me to convince the colonels and lieutenant colonels that those captains can do it and they're doing it tremendously; and now tank gunnery is no big thing. They will stop and qualify the crews that need qualification, either going to another training area or on the way back. It's not a big thing. What do we have out of it? A great deal more efficiency of our assets and time."

"We have three month long basketball seasons. We will then have one season a month of soccer and volleyball. Then we'll hit three softball seasons; then we'll have three flag football seasons. Plus we have a huge number of individual sports -- everything from triathlon to biathlons and boxing. You name it, we've got it. At the end of each season, in the team sports, my added sports program cost me near \$250,000 to operate. And if it was the last \$250,000 they had in P2, I would still operate it. We give big trophies for the battalion champion. At the end of the short season, all the battalion champions come together for a post-division playoff, single elimination, random draw. There we give big team trophies and individual trophies to the top three teams. Individual sports -- we give trophies in there also. Big payoff. For a lot of troops, it's the first time they have been

on a winner that they can identify with. They love those trophies, they love the participation. It's one of the greatest ways we have to build team work and pride. It has to be done at the company level. That's where they associate with themselves and that's where they associate with the unit."

"I'm convinced that the only way we ever have great training is when we put a nine man squad together, doing meaningful tasks that accomplish their squad objectives, under the leadership of a squad leader with both E-5s there, present for duty, assisting him in the performance of both guiding that squad and evaluating how well it's doing. If we bring that squad down to four or five men, we invariably train at half pace, we train clumsily, and we're doomed to be less effective than we should be."

"We started very early trying to educate the garrison and the installation side of the house -- the dentists, the doctors, and all those other people who have a requirement to see soldiers -- that we were running what amounts to an X, Y schedule. When we're in side X of that fence, we're looking to get a minimum of 85 percent present for training, for the full training period, and we don't want any appointments for the doctor, or dentist, or finance appointments, any of those other things that occur. This is not for an extended period, it may be a week or 10 day period followed by a 'Y' period which is a week or 10 days. The Army does an awful lot of 'birth months' and periodic things. The COHORT package tells you that, 'Hey, they're going to be together for three years, let's do the whole battalion and get it out of the way in one day.' So, rather than the first sergeant having to worry about dental appointments for 12 months, he worries about it for a two day period and then forgets it, unless it's an emergency or something like that. Whenever possible we've gone to that type of thing. That's helped."

"When I came here, soldiers were digging bunkers, and sandbagging above the ground two and three feet. That's passe. We dig in now and we dig in deep, but the top of that bunker is no more than six to eight inches off the ground and it's well camouflaged. In other words, there's a low silhouette. Enemy Infantry can't see it from 35 to 40 meters away when they walk in on it. We do not use chain saws and things of this nature to cut down large trees to go on top of those bunkers. What we've chosen to do -- like the NVA who cut down small saplings, because they grow by the billions and they're not worth a damn for anything -- our soldiers just use their machetes and axes to cut those saplings down and put them on top of their fighting positions. Then they take two layers of half filled sandbags and put on that and cover it up with dirt, and camouflage it. This does away with the chain saws and any need for heavy engineer items."

"I think a key thing in the training area is that you have to be out there. If you're really interested in training people, then you have to be out there observing them train. Otherwise, they won't think you're serious about it being important. So, I guess, if I had to say one thing, it's that you have to be out there with them."

"We do our worst training in the local training areas. Unfortunately, you spend 70 percent of your time in the local training areas. So, that's really where your sustainment training or train up comes and that's where you have to put the emphasis because there are so many more distractors when you're back here in this particular environment. But, for lack of a better term, my philosophy, as I mentioned earlier, has been, 'You have to have the basics right.' If your basics aren't right, then nothing else will come. If you don't have the individual soldier trained and knowing what he's doing, then I don't think anything else is going to come."

"When I got here, the training guidance from the Division was very thick. You have probably seen those things before. When I looked at it, all it was, really, was duplication of a lot of other manuals and a lot of other things. So I did away with it. All I did was put a cover sheet on the top of FM 350-1 that comes out of USAREUR 350-1 which states the requirements and guidance for training. I thought that was sufficient."

"With the large number of vehicles we have, almost everybody has to be a driver. We had to set up a driver's training in each community area. The schools were just not training the numbers of drivers that we needed. For instance, it's fixed now, but there used to be a fuel tank and pump guy, the guy who dispensed the fuel. They went to school to learn how to do that, but he didn't go to driver's training, even though he had to drive the same truck. That's just a little disconnection. Now, they fixed that one, but there are a whole bunch of them out there just like that. Almost everyone has to be a driver, so we've had to go to having a Drivers' Training Academy in each of the communities and that has probably paid more dividends than any one thing that we've done. It's cut our accident rate down tremendously. I think it's helped our maintenance because we also teach maintenance."

"I don't believe in CTT once a year. I don't believe in soldiers peaking for CTT once a year. I tell them they need to do it every quarter. If you're going to sustain your proficiency in CTT, you have to have them every quarter. Most of the units are doing pretty well on that now, where they do it on a quarterly basis, rather than on a yearly basis."

"FC 25-100, the book on training, is probably the most helpful document that's ever been written. We all understand what this

is, of course. This is the book on what the 8th Infantry Division used to call 'Cardinal Point' and multi-echelon training. It tells you how to set up a division master training calendar so that you can train your brigades at the same time the sergeants major are training the squads, and it works."

"It's not like people sitting down in the old days. Two hours off the platform for every hour on the platform. You don't have to spend two hours off the platform anymore. The standard is there, the man's soldier's manual is there, tasks and conditions are there. The training system has grown up."

"When you're looking at the training of a division you need first to make your presence felt evolutionary as opposed to revolutionary. Nothing hurts a division worse than turbulence and sudden changes in direction."

"I took the first 100 days and 100 nights to evaluate the division. I didn't make any changes to the major programs at that time until after I had done this analysis. Then I called the division leadership together to include the brigade and battalion commanders along with the staff. I outlined where I wanted to go in the Division, where I saw that we should move. I think the most important thing for training, is first to get the people to training. I'm convinced now, after 19 to 20 months in this job that we know how to plan our training very well and that's not a problem. BTMS works and FM 25-100 works, people understand it; that system is there, it's in place, and it's well thought out. The problem that you still have is getting soldiers to training; to the right place at the right time and in the correct numbers to be able to do the job that you would expect them to do."

"I made PT mandatory on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. I made it mandatory that no installation offices would take appointments prior to 8:30 in the morning on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. Now that was tough. That required rigorous, uncompromising, ruthless emphasis and enforcement, and it still does. You still find people who want to circumvent the system, usually for good reason. They want to kick someone out early to get ready for something, and if you're going to reduce those kinds of distractors, you just have to make sure that your guidance is explicitly followed with no exceptions. That means in some cases having to write letters of concerns, letters of admonishment, or just flat verbal reprimands to people when they transgress that system. The next thing to reduce turbulence here and to reduce the training detractors is during the prime readiness training period, again, we allowed no appointments, no hospital appointments, no leaves, and no schools unless it was off post NCOES. So the only exception that I would tolerate when the unit went into the prime readiness cycle was emergency; that was

basically it. There were no appointments, nothing else while they were in the field."

"I had an eighteen month calendar that I have dated every six months with respect to training and the resource of training. So that meant the longest that thing had stuff sort of figured was 18 months, the shortest was a year. But I think if you're not months ahead of significant issues as division commander, then you're behind."

## ORGANIZATION

"I find that we really don't have a sufficient recon and cavalry capability within the division, or even within the unit, to employ the combat power and the mobility that we have. What I'm looking at is dedicating one company in each mech battalion, leaving it in the battalion, to greater intensify its training and efforts in a reconnaissance mode. And as we continue to increase the lethality of our weapon systems, the judicious use of these assets is going to depend on intelligence; and the greatest intelligence you get on the battlefield from brigade level down, really division; but certainly the battalion commander fights with what he sees and what he finds. There aren't too many satellite reports that are going to get to him in the right place. So, what we need, what I looked at, is about one-third of the force being employed in reconnaissance and security operations."

". . . I have asked my 4th Brigade commander to send a liaison, just like the artillery liaison people to each of the major brigades or MSC commands. He has done this, and, of course, he's taken it out of his hide because it's not authorized to do that. But what this has done is raise the sensitivity -- everything that the unit does now, you have a guy there that says, 'Think Aviation!' My MSCs tell me that it's working much better now, not only aviation as far as the gunships and the attack battalions are concerned but the Blackhawk as well. As a matter of fact, I'm putting a lot of emphasis on combat service support for resupply of the Blackhawk. As I mentioned yesterday, we don't have many infantry anymore. Unless we are augmented with say a light brigade or something like that from the States, then we aren't going to be doing that many air assaults. Of course the Blackhawk is a very valuable bird, and, therefore, we are doing a lot of training in combat service support right now. When we have units, for instance, at Graf or Hohenfels, we lift the stuff out of DISCOM back here and airlift it up into the area to get the training on hooking it up and the loads and so forth. By putting these people with the brigades, it had caused them to think and, therefore, the brigades are better integrating the use of all the air supplies we have into their operations. That was the purpose of it."

"All the maintenance and mess and everything are at brigade level in a light division. A number of senior officers are worried that that means we're going to raise a generation of people who are not going to have any education in maintenance or mess or that type thing until they get to be a brigade commander. And that danger exists. I acknowledge that. But I just feel so strongly that in a light division you have to keep battalion and company commanders focused on war fighting and let the brigade commander worry about those other things. Somehow, and I've not been able to sort out

exactly how it happened, but somehow the messes got put back down at battalion level and I'm bringing them back up to brigade level before I leave. But I would urge any of my successors or any other light division commanders to be very careful about putting all of that administrative type thing down to the battalion commander. I think battalion commanders in light divisions have got to be freed of that as much as they possibly can and focus strictly on war fighting."

"I would suspect it's true on all the COHORT units. You see squad leaders who are completely comfortable with their soldiers' ability. You see an interesting thing. You see the squad leaders devoting their time and attention as they move, not to the soldier, but to the other squad leaders. That's tough to describe, but I attribute it to the fact that those squad leaders, as I said, know their soldiers, know what their soldiers are going to do. It's an interesting phenomenon. I've never seen it before until I became close to the COHORTs."

"I think a commander has to be very sensitive to the fact that the COHORT unit is a very unforgiving leadership environment for particularly the junior NCO. His leadership mistakes don't leave. His tactical errors don't walk out the door as part of the 25 percent turnover. His professional competence stays with him. His reputation is not weakened or leavened by soldiers leaving. He has really got to know his business. You can't fake it in front of those soldiers. If you have to replace an NCO who because of promotion, or schooling, or something like that, when he walks out the door, you have to be very careful what you do to prepare his replacement to walk into that group who have been together for one, two, or three years. The first week or ten days are absolutely critical to that E6's ability or reputation."

"In many ways, I would tell you that it is easier to live with the shortfall in our organization, or structure, than it is to change it. I think the Army as a whole, and division commanders, ought to be a little bit careful about radical structural changes. That's my personal feeling."

"I have to tell you, the most troubling place for me right now is in the MI community. The MI battalion has a TO&E that must have been designed by a mad man! The doctrine to implement that is still in doubt and unclear."

"I'd like to see a MI battalion TO&E that puts all the things in the right place. Right now A Company has some equipment that's supposed to be in C Company, and C Company has some equipment that's supposed to be in A Company, and then headquarters is formed when everyone tried to figure out where to put things and couldn't, so they formed a headquarters company. I think the concept of company mechanics with a battalion motor officer who is

only an advisor is fatally flawed. It doesn't work in garrison, and it doesn't work in the field. We have to jerry-rig it. We have to go ahead and ad hoc it in order to make the system work. The doctrine and concept for using the TACJAMs is incomplete. THE TACJAM system is fine except the vehicle that it's mounted on now, the old 548, is not going to be the prime mover, so we understand. Yet, that's all we have, so we're working it doctrinally. We're working a doctrine and a system that may never come to pass. That's very frustrating on the part of the young MI officers who see they really do not have a war fighting capability, even though they claim and are told that they have it."

"I did not like the cav squadron wrapped up in the Aviation Brigade. But since it's there, we're trying to use it the way we think the doctrine is coming out that it's intended to be used. I'm giving it a fair shake, and I'm giving it a good ring out, but the problem I have with the Cavalry organization is the emphasis on the air over the ground. In my view Cavalry is reconnaissance; that's their primary mission, to find the enemy and maintain contact with it. To do that, I need an all weather day-night capability. While I'm all in favor of Army Aviation, as it is now we still don't have a 100 percent, all weather, day-night capability with our helicopter fleet. That means, in terms of bad weather, high winds, or reduced visibility that I have to rely on my ground troop to get me the information I need. Now, because of the roundout status, I only have one ground troop. If I went to war tomorrow I would have one ground troop that I could count on to give me reconnaissance 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The NTC has shown time and time again the problems you have with trying to depend on aircraft to do the job for you, because they just can't fly all the time."

"I was tactically inhibited, doctrinally inhibited in the deployment of a division in certain areas, certain times, because of a lack of human intelligence. The new organization for the CEWI battalion, the MI battalion as you know, is very technologically important in its equipment. But it doesn't work very good and we don't have it all, but the scouts are gone from the battalions. The cavalrymen are gone except for the helicopters. Occasionally you can find yourself blind. Now, we trained a lot of Infantry to do all that for us."

"There's a cost associated with any reorganization or change in the structure no matter how small it is. There are costs associated with readiness. There's a learning curve associated with anything, whether you're just changing the organization of a squad, or deciding to put a weapons squad into an infantry platoon, or whether you're looking at some much greater organizational training. I think there's also a bow wave associated with any change, no matter how small, when it deals with such things as doctrine, command, and control, maintenance,

and all that stuff. An awfully lot of times the cost of those three things are not worth the minor change or increase in efficiency you get by tweaking the system."

"Unless we keep our organizational structures reasonably consistent, there's no way for you and I to judge assessments from any part of the globe that might tell us when we have things wrong, because they might be using a different data base than someone else. My point in all this is that we have to work hard to stay with our existing organizations and to change them with the schoolhouse playing along."

"We were the first ones, I guess, who organized an Aviation Brigade as our fourth brigade. They talked early on about maneuver, that is a maneuver brigade. I was very much against that, but I tried it in my GUP area and found out that as a maneuver brigade, in the true sense of the maneuver brigade, it does not have the capability to do that because the brigade is not structured to do it, and the division is not structured to support it. You don't have a forward support battalion, per se, to support it. You don't have your artillery liaison officers and equipment to support it. You don't have hard command posts; they're all in vans. You don't have that to support it. Interestingly enough, you don't even have an ALO authorized for your fourth brigade, even though the coordination between it and the others is very essential. So we tried to use it strictly as a maneuver brigade over a long period of time, and had tank units and infantry units, but it didn't work. The division couldn't support it, and the support structure couldn't support it. So I said at one time, 'Gee, it can't be a maneuver brigade.' Well, I've changed my mind a little bit now, because I think it can be a maneuver brigade for short periods of time, for specific missions. For instance, on our last field problem we had an enemy penetration in our area, so we gave our aviation two tank battalions -- it was actually a CAV squadron which is theirs in peacetime anyway -- the CAV to screen the flank, and a tank battalion to close off the loop. It would have to be after they crossed the river to close off their exit out of there, and use the helicopter battalions in mass -- two battalions at a time -- in the kill zone, which I think is exactly the way to use them. I've grown to believe that we're wrong to piecemeal our helicopters. We must use them in mass, at least at the battalion level."

They have two companies there -- the Blackhawk company and a general support company -- that don't have a battalion headquarters. You have the two Cobra battalions and then two separate companies, one a Blackhawk company and one a general support company for command and control and so forth. I have just gone and out of my hide, developed a task force. In peacetime you don't have to do that, but in wartime when you have a brigade

commander and he's out there fighting, say two massed battalions of the Cobras, and, at the same time, the Blackhawk Company Commander is doing an air assault and is maybe conducting the combat services support mission -- resupply of some type -- then you have the command and control people or your utility helicopters going in another direction. Those two young captains have no staff at all. I don't think they have the ability to coordinate all of that by themselves. That's the reason we went to a task force, which I took out of my hide. I took some people off the brigade staff and put a battalion type headquarters down there."

". . . In a heavy division, we really don't have a lot of infantry. Out of the 18,500 men we only have about 1,000+ infantry in the division. We have some shortages in the combat support and combat service support areas, and those are areas you have to put someone in. Those things have to be done peacetime, war, or whenever. You end up divvying your infantrymen out of the back end of your Bradleys to those types of jobs. So you end up having maybe two squads in a platoon, if you're lucky. Most of the infantry that we have now, because of that, is only capable of close in security, and very few operations. If you had all the people at the exact right place in the back end, then maybe you would have a little bit more. Even if you had them all in there, you would only have 1,000 or so. If you leave one of the guys in the back to load the TOW, which you have to do, that cuts you another guy. So the bottom line is that we are extremely short on infantrymen in the heavy division."

"The Force Structure business is probably another area where a division commander, if he's not comfortable with it, ought to spend some time and get familiar with at least the basics. My view is that the living TO&E business doesn't work, and if it is working there has to be a better way to do it. It's hard for me to believe that when I organize a battalion initially at 50 percent strength to get it started, as I incrementally want to increase that strength I need a set of documents. I need a document to bring that thing on line at 50 percent. When I want to plus that thing up by 10 percent in order to accommodate the support required for one more battalion or one more brigade, I need another document, and ad infinitum. Hence, there is a tremendous amount of work and effort by a significant number of officers and civilians who have to go in and constantly get ready for the next MOC window. As opposed to saying, 'Here's your TO&E, activate at 50 percent strength, and when you're ready, use the same document to go to 60 percent.' To me, it's hard to fathom why we have ourselves in that crunch."

## DOCTRINE

"Doctrine is a problem for the light division. As we sit here today there isn't any except from the Infantry school. It's beginning to come but right now you can't go anywhere and find the doctrine for how you employ attack helicopters in the light Infantry division. You can't go anywhere and find it written down how to employ the engineer battalion in a light Infantry division. You can't go anywhere and find out what is the doctrine of jointness between the United States Air Force and the Army in a light Infantry division. Now people say, 'Well, it's the same in all divisions.' No it is not because we fight differently and our organization is different and our equipment is different. So doctrinally, in most cases, it has been trial and error. Benning has been the most forthcoming and probably rightfully so because it is a light Infantry division. We now have the manuals from squad to platoon to company to brigade level from Benning. But in most of the other branches we still don't have doctrine for light Infantry."

"I guess, if I have concerns about doctrine, it centers around the logistics side of the house and the logistical doctrine. I don't think that has kept pace with the tactical doctrine. Part of that is the gap between equipment associated with AOE and some procedures and the reduction in strengths. Part of it is that I don't think it's been looked at and tested to the same degree that some of the tactical side of the house does. I am still not comfortable with some logistic specifics."

"Aviation doctrine is still new and being experimented with. We're trying to work our way through that. Some Cavalry doctrine still is in question as to what the true role of Cavalry is, especially now that you have an air army; you have primarily an Air Cavalry squadron. In a roundout unit it's primarily Air Cavalry because you're two and one. That causes you to see some doctrinal deficiencies. In the DISCOM side of the house now with the FSBs, which I think is a fine concept and is working very well, we still have some doctrinal voids as to what to do with the MSB. It's too big, it's a monster to try to command in garrison, it's a monster to try to command in the field! While the Log Center is wrestling with that, we still haven't seen the proper doctrine for the maintenance battalion. We are, right now, I think, devoid of medical doctrine. We used to have a medical guru in the Division and that was, of course, the Medical Battalion Commander who was a doctor. The Division Surgeon can't do that role. The Division Surgeon is a staff officer, and he cannot be promulgating and coming up with the doctrinal expertise that's necessary to coordinate all the medical aspects of the Division, and I see that very much as a doctrinal void, especially if we go into war."

"I think there is a doctrinal problem right now in the division that has to do with the division commander being a bit blind from 500 meters to 3,000."

"My generation of officers and their understanding of the operational level of war, and their understanding of the Air Land Battle, our doctrine, is lacking. We are essentially ignorant. We didn't have it in our schooling. We never practiced it as battalion commanders or brigade commanders. It is fundamentally different. The majors who are coming out of Leavenworth and the young lieutenant colonels now know it."

"People did not know what the Air Land Battle doctrine meant. They could mouth the buzz words, but they didn't have an understanding of it. That's not surprising, because it probably takes, for an institution as large as the Army, when you get a totally different approach to doctrine the way Air Land battle was, seven years for it to infiltrate throughout the officer corps. That's seven years for the old fuds who are not going to learn anything new to move off the scene, and that's seven years for the others to go through the school system, be taught it, and practice it in the field, then go back to the school system and think about it again. That cycle takes about seven years."

". . . There are some lapses between what we're doing in the field today and what the schoolhouses have been able to pick up on. This goes to the two Cav squadron, for example. It goes to the employment of Army Aviation under the brigade concept, where there is little doctrine. It goes to the employment of the long range reconnaissance detachment. It goes to the employment of the chemical platoon. All of these things are right now doctrinally bankrupt. But the schoolhouses are working on getting that doctrine out in the field, and I feel confident that they will. I think that until that happens, what we need to do in the field is develop a general consensus in the region we're in, or if it's an Army wide problem, throughout the Army try to move in that direction and provide the schoolhouses as much feedback as we possibly can."

"We have a good feeling about the sensitivity of the schoolhouse to what's happening in the field. The problem is that there's about a two year time delay back there between the time that things get fed back in and you ultimately see them in hard copy. That may lead some to conclude that the schoolhouses are not responsive."

"In the past our feeding systems have been set up to take the food to the soldiers. Now, under the area field feeding concept, the soldier has to go back and find the food. I'm afraid that some of our soldiers may end up, on some occasions, looking for food rather than it finding them."

"I also mentioned to you the doctrinal concept of throughputting supplies all the way through the corps, bypassing the Division Support Area, and then going directly into the forward brigades. All I have to say is that we have to be good to do that. When they find your unit up in that forward area along the front line of troops, those corps resupply guys have to be good reading maps and getting down clogged roads. Can they come all the way through and get to the brigade support area somewhere along the forward line of troops in the middle of the night? I can tell you that if it's brought to the division support area by the corps, our division units, properly augmented with transportation, can probably get it out better and at the appropriate time, because we know more precisely where our units are and what they're doing. Maybe this whole throughput concept will work itself out. Throughput sounds easy, but when you try to execute it on the ground at night, in the middle of a rain storm, and that type of thing, and the forward line of troops need these vital supplies badly, it might not pan out to be as easy as the word throughput sounds."

"We teach in our schools -- and to some degree in every division -- that our Air Defense Artillery are primarily for shooting down aircraft. That's right. But who's to say if the division commander is given the mission to take a town or city that he can't mass those VULCAN gun assets to assist in taking that town? We don't think about that enough, but that's a concept. It's a flexible way of doing business. It's the same way with artillery. Artillerymen begin to shutter a little bit if you talk about taking them out of the indirect fire role and putting them in the direct fire role. So we need to teach flexibility in the utilization of weapons systems. The M60 machine gun is a great weapon, a suppressor of fires, and it has a lot of punch out to 800-900 meters. But if you have your stuff together in one bag in your division it can also be a tremendous antiaircraft weapon. We don't think about that enough. How we can employ them in the antiaircraft role? The NVA were experts at it. They took their German machine guns and built a simple tripod and they laced us more times than we'd like to talk about. They were innovative and creative, and they were very flexible in the utilization of their weapons. We need to pay some attention to that."

"When I went out to Leavenworth they briefed me on the operational concept of war. They showed examples of where brigades and divisions were doing deep battle. I thought about that an awful lot and I'll just have to tell you that the way they were talking about doing deep battle, a division cannot do it when you're talking about going many kilometers back behind the enemy lines and things of that sort. As you know, the FLOT will never be just straight; it will probably have some dips in it. It's not going to be a static line out there. Let's say that this is the line, here. Here's the enemy, and here's the friendly guys, okay? For

a friendly guy to go like this and get out of his front line troops but into his support, ADA, and artillery, for a division, that to me is deep battle. I don't think a division has the capability of going this way for many kilometers. As a matter of fact, I'm of the belief that the first place you really have a true operational concept of war is at the Army Group level here in Europe. If Corps has only one division as a counterattack division, I don't think they have the capability, either. If you have a corps in reserve, then a corps can do that. I think that's probably the lowest level that it can be done. I don't believe I can do it at division level. I really don't believe I can. The other thing is the employment of attack helicopters. We're also talking that they can go behind the enemy's lines for 100 'klicks' or so, and pull off raids and things. I won't allow mine to do that. I will rarely ever let mine go across the FLOT because I don't think they'll be able to survive. I know they won't if they don't have massive Air Force support and synchronize it with the Air Force and the electronic warfare and all of that."

". . . My philosophy of using Air Defense is much different than the doctrine as written. I don't have enough Air Defense to put Air Defense up with each of my front line units. I have taken it away from front line units and have put it back with Artillery, CPs and my combat service support -- Artillery, command and control, and combat service support. The reason I've done this is that I don't consider fixed wing jets coming up and bombing my front line units -- my tankers and Bradleys. If they do I hope that's what they do, because they have much bigger, high payoff targets, and if they start putting hard bombs against tanks and use their fixed wing jets like that, they're not very smart. They're going to use those in the back trying to hit nuclear Air Defense, CPs, Artillery and things like that. By the way, they have us so outnumbered in Artillery that we have to keep our Artillery intact to survive; we're really going to be hurting. So, I'm doing it a little bit different. The doctrine says you put them up front. I'm not doing it. I've brought them back. My people and I are convinced that that's a better utilization."

"I've read most all the manuals. I think that you ought to follow that doctrine as closely as possible, and if you're not going to follow it, then you ought to write to the school that wrote it and tell them about it. Just following along and ignoring what they say, I think is unprofessional quite frankly."

"Standardized things save time. It would be just wonderful if kids could come from the States and come over here and everything would be loaded the same way, and they would jump in on a gun and everything's in the same location where it was in the States. I think we need to standardize all of those loading plans, our drills, and anything else that we can standardize, we ought to do it. I think it's unprofessional not to go by those standards."

## EQUIPMENT

"I had my last meeting with separate battalion commanders for breakfast; I was to leave in a couple of weeks. We were talking about our 'war on the bureaucrats.' Had we won, lost, or held our own? One of them said, 'Well, we sure haven't won.' He mentioned that there had been a TO&E change for his unit that required a weapon be turned in. Actually, it was a signal battalion and the TO&E change required him to turn in two bayonets. Not a big deal, but bayonets are counted as weapons. Now, weapons were turned in at a point of the other side of Germany, about a five hour drive away. He said, 'I have to send a sergeant and those two bayonets over to this place and have them coded, then I have to bring them back and turn them in through the system.' I told him to put the two bayonets on my desk and that I would call the bureaucrat who had told him what we had to do. Well, I got that sorted out. That was dumb! No one should ever have told us to do something like that. If it was a howitzer, or a .50 caliber machine gun, or something like that, well, maybe we have to handle weapons like that. But two bayonets? Things like that cause people to do dumb things, like drop them into a lake or something."

". . . The HMMWV is a brute. It's a five-quarter ton truck, not a one-quarter ton truck. Its unit of replacement is one HMMWV for every two quarter-tons and one one-quarter trailer. You can put a squad on a HMMWV. You can put chemical smoke generators on HMMWVs. You can put command and control in the HMMWVs, and TOW/Mark 19 on HMMWVs. So, this division probably has every variant of the HMMWV in it, and it has just really passed all tests. It's a superb vehicle."

"We held the line and said that we would not accept any vehicle that did not meet Army standards, and we did not. There were some vehicles that we did not accept. I felt this was important for two reasons. First off, my soldiers could not be led to believe or perceive that they were getting second class equipment that was not completely functional. That, in turn, would bring about a perception in their minds that they were second class citizens, and I wasn't going to have that. We have to be cautious about this transfer of equipment even though some of it is relatively new. It, in turn, must be in first class condition when it is transferred. We worked hard at that to include having a number of teams go to various locations to ensure that these standards were maintained."

". . . One of the things I found when I came down here was that we had tremendous excesses in the Division. I mean over 17,000 or 18,000 lines. It has taken considerable effort. It was caused by changes to TO&Es, by modernization, by requisitioning things that were the wrong thing in the beginning, and all those things. So

we've had a very intensive program to try to overcome that. We're still out there and we still have around 6,000 that we're trying to get rid of. But because of all the energy that was expended doing that, the Division hadn't trained that much."

"I find that we do a great job at bringing in the new equipment, but not so good about planning for the displacement of that equipment. We've had an intensive program for the last 18 months to eat up the excesses and we've been very ugly about it with our commanders. I've come across many commanders who want to keep this, that, or the other and my policy is first of all, twice a year we'll look at what they want to keep as excess. If one unit asks for it, and if one unit gets to keep it, we have to look at all like type units and find out why all of them shouldn't have it. If we let any of them keep it on a temporary basis, we have to go in with a change to the TO&E."

"Appearance is important because it's pride. I'll have to tell you one thing that I've done that wasn't very popular. When I came here, almost every jeep or every other two or three trucks had built up like dog houses on the back of the jeep, or like built up trucks with plywood and so forth. It had gotten to the point where just about everybody in the Division had something built up. A lot of them were being used as sleeping vans and things of that sort. I'll tell you the way it came to my attention. I was driving down the road one day en route to somewhere and I passed one of my convoys which happened to be a maintenance outfit. They had all these built ups and it looked like heck. I was embarrassed! So I started looking into it and it seems that all these built ups and everything always had locks on them, too. Anytime you have something behind a lock you better look at it. I started going around looking at this and a lot of times nobody could find the keys. So we started taking lock cutters with us. Almost 98 percent of the material that I found in the trailers was wet, mildewed, rusty, or something. It was in a bad state of maintenance and nobody knew what it was. Then when you look at the bottom of the trailers they were all rusted out because most people had put rubber mats down there and that was holding in the water. Recently, about six months ago, I put out the orders that the only built ups that I would allow are PLL tool trucks, and that's it. Everything else had to go. I got all kinds of reasons why people couldn't do that, and what they found out was that it's very easy to work and we've gotten used to it. Now, recently we're going to a standard for built ups. One of the biggest reasons that I did it was, first of all, people didn't know what was in there and it was rotten material, but it was also a safety hazard. If you look at the built ups and look out the back of the jeep, you couldn't even see out the rear window. The trailers and so forth were so top heavy with those built ups that they could turn over very easily. It was a safety hazard as well as looking like hell. So we tore them all off. Just recently

we've had units come in with how they can build them for the PLL tool trucks, only underneath the canvas. One unit with smart young guys figured out a way to build it below the canvas and it will do everything that the old big, unsafe, bulky ones would do. Now we're going to where all PLL trucks will be under canvas and we'll have no built up trucks any more."

## PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

"Someone made me aware of a little book by Lieutenant Colonel McDonald by the name of Platoon Leader that I read and I thought it was a super book for young platoon leaders. So I found the money somewhere and I bought a copy for every platoon leader in the division and issued it to them and told them it was required reading. We tried to make available enough copies of books that I think are good for our people to really know, things like English's Infantry book and Rommel's On Infantry. We tried to get those and proliferate them throughout the division. And we developed our own little reading list for junior officers so that they would start learning, thinking, and talking about infantry. Then I borrowed another idea that I had seen in another division one time and I have invited in speakers. Not a lot, but I guess over a two year period we have had maybe ten. I have full officer calls in the main post theater. I tried to expose them not only to people who are very pro-light infantry, but I have also exposed them to some people who are not pro-light infantry. We heard from speakers with some real misgivings about light infantry. Because I think that we owe it to junior officers to make them think and to have a challenge and to know that there are very legitimate questions about what we're doing."

"That was part of the officer professional development class. I personally taught doctrine and saw to it that it was implemented and taught by the chain through the division."

"The professional development of the noncommissioned officer corps and the junior leader in particular, is in my view a program that cannot be run at division level. It has to be centered down at the battalion or brigade level. It can't be done in a classroom environment, you have to get your hands dirty in doing it. I view that as one of the principle tasks of most colonel and lieutenant colonels, and sergeants major and first sergeants. It has to be done down at the bottom level. You can't do it at the top level."

"I always like to have leader seminars where you have a chance to talk informally and grow in that concept. I used the technique of reproducing certain key articles, recommending or purchasing books, and providing them to the major subordinate commanders, the ADCs, and the Chief of Staff. Then we would meet and discuss the implications of the books and reading materials. In that way, in an informal basis, I was able to get across many of the things that I wanted to do. As an example, we studied the battle of Trafalgar for commander's intent -- Nelson's intent to his ship's captains, and their understanding of what he wanted was the key factor in being able to beat the French fleet. The technique that Nelson had of being able to triple his firepower because he trained his gunners to fire three times faster than was the norm

for the day, allowed him to triple the amount of ammunition fired in his broadsides. That's no different than us trying to make sure that we can load and fire our tank rounds faster. When you can do that, when you get your opening times down and your accuracy, then again you can make one or two of your tanks worth three or four of the enemy's. Those are the kinds of things that we discussed."

"I found a very obscure book on Patton that had a whole bunch of his leadership quotes and traits in it. We studied that. I issued that out to everybody and we read it. We have studied leadership in most of the things we do."

"The doctrinal seminars we teach about every other month are used, not so much to teach doctrine, but to make sure that everyone understands it so that we are all talking from the same base, from the same language. Of course we ensure that the new people coming in understand this. But, our major thrust is so that we can standardize."

"We have a leadership program in the Division that requires every NCO and every officer to be certified in their unit as soon as they arrive. That certification process normally takes 90 days, but some don't do it in 90 days. As a matter of fact, about 30 percent of the noncommissioned officers and about 20 percent of the officers do not certify in 90 days. They have to go back and repeat certain phases of the certification process. Obviously there are some rewards to that. The Cavalry has the award of the spurs. Some units award green tabs. Other units have other symbols that they use to connote successful completion of these certification programs."

"I found that attendance at formal officer and NCO professional development classes, in many instances, was poor. We found that having remedial training on Saturday morning has immensely improved attendance during the week."

"Simultaneously with a commanders' conference we always have an OPD session. Sometimes we'll have two. For example, in some instances we'll have a guest speaker come in and talk to us about ITEP, or we'll have a guest speaker come in and talk to us about the effectiveness of dual purpose ICM munitions, or we'll have someone come in and talk to us about the effectiveness of our Armor vs-a-vs the Soviet Armor, but usually it's a very needy and short OPD class that lasts anywhere from 15 to 30 minutes on a given subject of immediate interest to all commanders there. We do that at every commanders' conference."

"Most of my company sized commanders have an officer training program in place to include formal examinations, and these are those Saturday morning and after hours training programs where the

captain grabs a hold of his lieutenants, and that's the kind of school I went through. Every Thursday night, the troop commander and the three lieutenants sat down and talked about things."

## READINESS

"Our readiness picture, in our experience, is being driven more by equipment than it is by training or any of the other aspects of running it."

"The Division had done very well in maintenance. In some areas I found that we were doing what I considered to be some dumb things in order to make our figures look good, like something called controlled substitution: you know what that is. So, I told the guys to quit doing that. Even if it goes down two or three points I don't want them to do that, because soldiers don't understand. I just think that's a bad way of trying to do your maintenance. The figures were high, the maintenance was pretty good, but the basics were still weak -- PMCSs, quarterlies, and those things were still not done, so we had to put some emphasis on that."

"My opinion of readiness reporting is that when I got here, everyone -- almost every battalion that I had -- was reporting 'I' on their readiness report. I disagreed with that. As a matter of fact, for your maneuver elements -- your Armor, Bradleys, Infantry, and so forth -- I do not think you can ever get to a 'I' level and sustain that level here in Europe. We are exceptionally good at gunnery. We have the best ranges, even better than they have in the States. We're really good at gunnery! We are not as good in maneuver, because of the constraints that we're under over here. So, unless you can put all of that together in one bag, and support it properly, I don't think you can ever say that you're a 'I'. Today, after two years of fairly intensive training, all of my maneuver battalions report "II" or lower, and I think that's about right."

"The area where we're hurting the worst in the Division from a readiness point of view is in the combat service support area. We still don't have the equipment, the vehicles, some of the test equipment, and things like that that we need to sustain operations. We can do fine in peacetime. I think we could do fine for a short period of time in a war, but for sustained operations, I think, it would give us some problems."

"I don't know this as a fact, but I am told that we're one of the few divisions in the Army that doesn't report 'Is' for battalions and for the Division. I've reported a II ever since I've been here. Battalions have reported IIs and IIIs. I don't fuss at that. I have no problem. All I do is ask them what I can do to help them. I went through an experience when I was a brigade commander. Every month the Division Commander brought all the brigade and battalion commanders to the division. Everyone gave a briefing, and each one had a big stack of slides. This day lasted about six or seven hours long every month, and it was show and

tell. Everything that could lend itself to a figure or number was put on a chart. What happened was, guys managed by numbers. They managed just to get good numbers. They had good numbers, but their units weren't worth a damn. So I said that I wouldn't do that, because you do dumb things to get numbers. I got a call from Corps one day and they said, 'You have more vehicles over 90 days down than the other divisions.' I said, 'So?' They said, 'Well, we're a little bit concerned about it.' I said, 'Let me tell you what I can do guys, tomorrow I can reduce the number of vehicles over 90 days down to zero -- tomorrow!' He said, 'Oh really? How do you do that?' I said, 'Very simple, you take the parts you need off another vehicle that hasn't been down and you put it on the vehicle that's been down for 90 days and the other vehicle's down for one day. You can do that forever and have none down for 90 days, but you'll also have a piss poor maintenance program.'"

## MAINTENANCE

"The other aspect of maintenance that was not in my philosophy was going to the field and running the hell out of the equipment and dragging it home; and then spending a month trying to get it running again. That's not how we fight; that breeds poor discipline in the leadership, so we just kind of change that a little bit, and that is we maintain all the way. I don't allow anything to be hauled or dragged back out of the field. Everything has to come in on its own power even if they have to stay out there a couple extra days to fix it."

"The integrity of the system; by that I mean, if the soldier/sergeant really goes after it and does it all right, and then some place behind that it breaks down and he doesn't get the parts -- parts don't flow or whatever, someone else is making decisions or they're not processing -- it doesn't take that young soldier long to realize or to think, 'Well, hell, nobody gives a damn, if I'm not getting my parts, why the hell should I be filling out these 2404s everyday or every week or whatever. I'll use the same one I did last time because I haven't gotten any of those parts either.'"

"Field maintenance in the field -- we still don't have people who think of maintenance in the field. The tendency is, 'It's too much trouble out here, let's put it off till we get back to garrison,' and you can't survive that way anymore. You need constant command interest on the part of the division commander; the ADC, no matter how good he is, can't do it by himself. People have to know that the old man is interested."

"I don't need that brigade commander in the motor pool looking for frayed wires under a hood. I need him to devote this time to exercising the judgment to make the program work."

"I would emphasize operator training and the development of a sense of ownership of the operator of that specific piece of equipment -- whether it's a generator operator, a soldier with his weapon, or a driver with his vehicle -- can pay great dividends to the degree to which you can pull that off. It will give you a great amount of payback."

"So, when I have nothing else to do, I am always normally and usually found in a motor pool somewhere. Most of my commanders understand and have gotten with the motor pool program."

"The biggest problem with maintenance in this division, as with any division, is scheduling services. In most cases, PMCS is being performed. How well it's being performed varies on the amount of supervision and technical training of the driver. But

PMCS is not in all cases going to give you good maintenance. In tracks especially, good maintenance comes from the services. If you have good services you will generally have a good operational vehicle that will meet all the OR standards. The problem that I found is that the services were just not being performed. The IG would tell me this in inspections, I would find it in personal observations, and I would also find it in a number of vehicles that would go out to the field and fail. They would spend a lot of time in the trains areas being fixed or in the motor pool not moving up. So the biggest thing is to educate mechanics and supervisors on the significance of the services."

"You pull services in an Armor unit, a tank unit, and a mech unit by platoon. I found some units that were pulling services by company. That's a nonstarter."

"I would say the second priority in a heavy division is maintenance. I'd like to say that training is first. A lot of our leaders have said training is first, but if you don't have your people in the right frame of mind, and in a heavy division if you don't have your maintenance straight, your basics and everything else, you can't train. If you go out to train and all your vehicles are busted, can you really train on what you want to?"

## FAMILY ACTIONS

"As we look to the future in a crunch on money, the CG has to make some big decisions. You have to make decisions as to whether or not you are going to have a program to continue many of the family support systems, and they are all costly. How much money you are going to spend in addition to what you have in your P2 mission. In some cases you take P2 mission money and support family programs. This past year when we got to the crunch time, around June/July, my guidance was that we would not, in any way, default or reduce our family support programs."

"First, we are not in the social welfare business. We exist as a part of the Department of Defense to be prepared to go to war and win. So all our efforts should be aimed at helping people grow so that they can handle the responsibilities of being a family member and of making a positive contribution or being a contributor to the mission of this organization. When certain people come into service, they're young, they're inexperienced, they have a lack of confidence, but we should look at the programs that will carry them through that period of time and help them become confident and independent and able to be a part of the community on the positive side. I think any programs that we have that don't have that in their direction, I've looked at and said, 'Why do we need those because there are other agencies available to handle social welfare and we, in the Army, are not in that business.' Certainly people have to be helped through periods. But it shouldn't be a program that is designed to keep people on the social welfare end of the family help."

"Child care was probably one of the toughest issues because we didn't have the facilities we needed. Of course, the Vice in the Army really put the hose on that one and we're building a whole new center now. The problem was that every place where we have one now, it wasn't built for that purpose. It's spread out in so many different locations that the overhead is high and you have to charge more than what you would like. You can't keep it open all the hours you would like. That's a tough issue. We're building a brand new one and once that's built it's going to solve a lot of our problems. That was one of the tougher ones. The other was the cutback in medical services, or the perceived cutback. Most all of my places had dispensaries, at least, that stayed open at night. They were manned by medics and PAs and things along that line. Then, of course, when the Army started getting raked over the coals about their lack of good medical care, they closed those dispensaries at night here in Europe. At night after duty hours, if you have a problem, you go to the general hospital. There was a perception that by going to the German hospital the soldier and family actually got better care. They have physicians on duty there, trained people, all the time. So we had an extensive

campaign to try to tell the people that we're not taking something away from them, we're actually giving them something. That was hard. But it's working okay. It was a hard one to get across to everyone that we weren't, in fact, taking benefits away."

"What we've found in some cases is that these young troops will come over here and go out on the economy to get quarters, and in some cases the quarters that they take are not really very nice. The second point is that sometimes they don't really keep them very clean. You find out all kinds of things when you go out there. Sometimes you'll find that there's drug use or child abuse and things like that. So in order to assist the soldier and look after his welfare, we have a requirement for the supervisor of the soldier or the company commander, it will vary, to go out and visit them once every six months. The company commander is required to go once every six months, but the supervisors are required to go once every month. They have to be a little bit careful of how they do that. They don't want to invade someone's privacy, but if they do it the right way, and tell them that they're coming out to see how they're getting along and things like that, then it's helpful. The other thing I'm trying to do is to get supervisors to understand that they're responsible for their people 24 hours a day, not just during duty hours. That's a hard one to get across. Sometimes they feel like they are responsible only during the duty hours, but after duty hours they're not. I use this a lot of times when I'm talking to them, 'If you know on Friday night ole' PFC Joe Doaks always goes down to this bar and drinks, then take his car keys and don't let him have them that night.' What I'm trying to do is impress on them the responsibilities of knowing what he's doing after duty hours, advising him on what he should be doing after duty hours, and then looking after him after duty hours to get across that the Army's a 24 hour a day job, and seven days a week. These are some of the things. Quite honestly, in some cases when we go to these economy quarters, we really find some disasters."

"You and your wife have to be very involved. We get into this thing where the wife doesn't have any official role to play but there are many family action issues in which wives and particularly a division and post commander's wife can get a lot more done than a division commander. People will come to them many times with things that they will never come to the General with. I have found that my wife has been one of my best sounding boards to really find out what the problems are and where I need to put my emphasis."

"I started a master calendar. I started making people plan ahead and at those monthly meetings they had to show their calendars. So, we were communicating and we didn't have two agencies operating in the dark, both planning a major post-wide activity at the same time. We didn't want the NCO Wives having a bake sale in

front of the PX at the same time that the Girl Scouts were selling their cookies. We didn't want to go head to head with the Girl Scouts. I had learned it before as a community commander."

"We picked a time, 1600, and said, 'On Thursday, when you're in garrison, everything stops at 1600.' It flat stopped. That was family time and people left work. On those days we kept the PX, the bank, the commissary, and all the support activities open late. We enforced it ruthlessly. It started with me. We kicked everyone out and we got out ourselves. If the division commander is there, his aide is there, the Chief of Staff is there, the secretary is there, the driver is there, and some staff sections are going to stay because they're nervous about leaving. What we found after about six months when we talked to the company commanders, which surprised me, was that the people who got the most out of that were the company commanders. They could give their people off, but they could never take off. They were hard-charging people. They were young and aggressive, and they wanted to do well. As you recall, you can work 24 hours a day as a company commander and never get everything done. So, whenever they went home, they felt guilty. Sometimes they went home at 8:00, 9:00, or 10:00 at night and didn't feel so bad because they had done all one could expect. But, if they went home on their own at 4:00 to take their kids to a ball game or something, they felt guilty about it. So, I took the guilt trip off of them. They were being ordered to go home. It was their duty to go home and do something with their family. We made it a duty requirement. You have a duty to your family just like you have a duty to your unit, or equipment, or your men. That's the day (Thursday) you go play with your kids, or shop with your wife, or do anything that is family oriented. Now, if you are a bachelor, you all get together with your buddies and cook steaks or something. You all do something, even if it's just getting your laundry done. It was a set time and by enforcing it, it became predictable. People could plan it. We told the families, 'If your husband is not home by 4:15, he's got a girlfriend.' When we announced that my first month in the division, one of the battalion commanders, a tanker, stood up and said, 'What do you do if you have a tank down and it's 10 minutes until four and the new pack rolls into the motor pool? Do you put it in?' I said, 'Well, here's your rule of thumb. There will be times or situations where you feel that you must do something that makes you stay late. Ask yourself this, 'Is this serious enough that I would call my soldiers in to work at 0500 on Sunday morning?' If so, then it is serious enough to stay and do it.'"

"The chain of command and the housing office need the specifics of when the family is going to arrive, what are the ages and sex of the children, bedroom requirements, any handicap or special education requirements, and that type of thing. It has caused us to be much more proactive right from the get go. Most of my

commanders will write the losing commander as soon as the CAP cycle is out and either ask specific questions to the commander, not the soldier, or he will send the sponsorship form to the commander and say, 'Please ensure that it's filled out.' We get about a 60 percent return rate where that thing comes right back with a cover letter from the commander. That does a lot of things. Right away you have very few walk-in sponsors who all of a sudden the guy's on post and nobody knew about it. You grab someone on the 'Hey, you!' detail, and say go sponsor that soldier. It doesn't matter whether or not he's an E-7, or PFC, he has someone identified, chances are, before he leaves his old organization. The COHORTs help considerably in family action programs. To a much greater degree than I've experienced anywhere else, the family action groups and family support groups are a bottom up type of structure, with very little impetus being provided by the chain of command. They are super effective in identifying problems, and in looking out for each other. I've been blessed with extremely proactive chaplains. I think chaplains are really an important resource in soldier care. They can play key roles in stress management, suicide management or prevention, family counseling outreach programs, all those things. They have played an extremely big part in them. There is a link in the family care and family support to AAFES and TSA that a commander should not overlook. They do an awfully lot although they are separate commands; they respond to you on the installation and they can do an awfully lot towards the creation of perceptions that you care -- what their hours are, what they stock, how they service soldiers and families. The only way you're going to get all you need out of them is by keeping them informed of what's going on."

". . . The people in the trenches get rising expectations when they read the Army Times or read some article that says, 'This is going to happen.' Then when it comes down to the installation level, it's left for us to do, for us to manage, and sometimes we can't meet all those expectations that people expect us to meet. The toughest thing for me to do is to maintain the quality of life for the soldier and maintain it amidst all the fiscal and personnel turbulence that you normally find on an installation."

"The soldier here now has to put down no deposits. We even have the apartment, trailer court, and real estate people signed up so that if he goes to the rental clearing house he does not have to put down any money at all. That's been a major thing. Of course, we had to sell the soldier on the fact that he has a financial responsibility and a moral responsibility to take care of his debts, and we had to convince the people on the civilian side of the house, the real estate agents, utilities people and so on, that we would in fact stand by them, and in fact become a collection agency. We used to say that the Army's no longer a

collection agency. We now have become that. We had to do that in order to keep the quality of life for our families going."

"I had one instance here a year ago where my engineer on Christmas day, when wives called and said their stoves were out, instead of calling in a crew or having anticipated that, told them to go next door and cook their dinner. I got personally involved in that. I had to get personally involved in because that's the kind of thing you have to be sensitive to. That can hurt you. That can destroy all your programs. That one instance at Christmas time can overturn all of the positive work you've done for six months."

". . . Everybody takes off on Thursday afternoon at 1600. Interesting, I agonized over doing this because once you do it, you can never go back; you can't change it back. So, I did that and you really don't lose any time. The officers and senior NCOs are the ones who are working anyway. A lot of the guys are just hanging around until the boss leaves. And 1600 is only about an hour or so until they ought to be gone anyway. The way they wait around and everything, and the officers take their paperwork home and work on it anyway, and that's ok if that's what they want to do. But what I did was send a message out to the Division that I was interested. We changed the hours of all the post facilities where they have to stay open at night, and right now Thursday afternoon is like Saturday at the PX and commissary. Everyone comes in and meets their husband. When I have all these groups in to talk about things, everybody loves Family Day. Everybody loves that, and I didn't give up that much. You give up maybe an hour. But the perception out there is, 'By God, somebody really cares.' That has been the biggest seller in the whole business."

"There are 55 percent of this division who are married. That's more than we've ever had in history. This compares with when I first came into the Army to a married content of approximately 20 percent. This increase in family members has brought about a radical change in how we go about supporting ourselves. Think about the increased size of PXs, schools, school buses. Think about cafeterias and churches. Think about clothing in a PX. When I first came into the Army you couldn't buy a bra in a PX. Now we have much of our PX devoted to supporting family members. You could look at the surgeons evolutionary trend line over time. When I first came into the Army, each battalion had a battalion surgeon that was there to sew arms and limbs back on soldiers. Today, most of our doctors are family practitioners. The overwhelming majority of them are. Look at the nature of medical and dental care over time. It's all changed. It's all changing because of the increased family content in the Army."

"I tell them that the first priority has to be people; that's soldiers and families. If you don't have your soldiers and their families in the right frame of mind, nothing else is going to

happen good. That's an oversimplification but that's about what this says. You have to take care of your people from the day you hear they're coming in until after they've already gone."