

U.S. Army Military History Institute

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DIVISION COMMAND LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAM



EXPERIENCES IN DIVISION COMMAND,
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
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FOREWORD

The U.S. Army Military History Institute has been involved in the debriefing of Division Commanders who have recently completed their tenure of command. The intent of the overall effort is to provide information to incoming commanders and to retain an historical perspective of the experiences of senior Army leaders.

This document contains selected quotations from debriefings conducted during the last year. These are thoughtful reflections of eleven division commanders and have been compiled to provide insights that will be helpful to practitioners and students of the art of command.

Included are wide ranging discussions sometimes reflecting different points of view on general subjects. This is not a "cookbook" with recipes for success but a collection of thoughts designed to stimulate thinking about being an effective Division Commander.



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PREPARATION FOR COMMAND

- CREATIVE & CRITICAL THINKING

"You need to have a period of time to reflect and prepare yourself mentally to walk into a group of folks who are wondering what the hell you are all about. I was sort of playing catch up ball, I think, because I hadn't prepared myself psychologically to assume command of the division."

"I think the Army would do well if they would try to give you about a week where you could do some thinking and reading."

- PROFESSIONAL READING

"I would read the manuals again. I don't think you ever get enough of that. I still read them. I keep them on my desk and I will go back through the training manual FM 25-100, the division manual FM 71-100, the key doctrinal manuals and especially FM 100-5, and spend some time on them. I think one has to."

"It is clear that you have to read and understand FM 100-5. You have to understand that and that is the value of going to Leavenworth because you can talk to the guys that wrote it. You also need to read on training in FC 2500 series -- the new training manuals . . . You need to read the manuals on how to train the brigade, division and maneuver battalions: FCs, FMs; that support 100-5. You need to understand all of that so that you understand the most modern terms and have a common understanding with the brigade and battalion commanders on what it means. Rather than list them all, the books and manuals recommended by Leavenworth fit the bill."

"I would have liked to have had the time to study even more thoroughly our basic manuals with regard to doctrine. I think it would have been helpful to me to have visited Fort Rucker and spent three or four days with them on management of flying hours and maintenance."

"It is very difficult to stay current in all aspects of our profession. The division commander must understand all elements of the division that he is responsible for orchestrating and synchronizing, not just those that he was raised in. This is particularly true in the aviation and military intelligence fields because of the many new developments. Doctrine is continually evolving and so much is happening in the school house, new terms, new initiatives and many courses are being taught for general officers on 'How to Fight the Airland Battle.' If you're not spending most of your time reading about your profession, and if you think that you know it all just because of the fact that you had been in that division before, you are going to be overcome by events."

"The one mistake that I made coming into command was not having more time between the job that I left and coming into command." . . . "Now I did have the opportunity to go back to Fort Leavenworth for a one week pre-command course. Still, I just really didn't have sufficient time to do all the reading and to get reacquainted with the latest terminology and terms that were coming out of the Infantry School, Artillery and support schools. If I had to do it over again, I would like to have about two weeks between jobs so that I could do more reading and better prepare myself to take command. It wasn't that I had been away from troops a long time; I had only been away for 15 months. It's a whole new ball game coming in as a division commander and I believe the division commander should be well prepared and well versed on doctrine and the latest terminology coming out of our school systems. I had to learn too much after I was on the job. There was nothing else that I needed to do coming into command."

- **SETTING PRIORITIES**

"The major element that might be categorized as a surprise was the relatively long amount of time that was needed to complete a major activity or project. Despite the fact that some prior assignments and duties that I have had, to include being assistant division commander, I still found after I was in the command for about 60 days that several projects just took more time than I thought they should. As I worked my way through that, I considered whether or not my expectations were too great and I was being too demanding, or whether or not my people had a strong enough sense of urgency. What came out of those thoughts was the reaffirmation of the need for the setting of priorities."

- **PRECOMMAND COURSE ATTENDANCE**

"I think the Army does a good job in preparing division commanders for command primarily because of the tendency we have to put those combat arms officers into command of divisions who have had all the preparation of battalion and brigade command and all the schooling and pre-command courses associated with that. The pre-command course which was tailored for me at Fort Leavenworth was very good, and I used some of the written material from Fort Leavenworth to assist me before I went into command although I actually attended that course after I had been in command several weeks."

"The four or five days at Fort Leavenworth with the general officer pre-command course was just about right. Any longer than that, I think,

would be a waste of time. I don't think I needed to read a lot of books to take over command. I needed just enough time to articulate my vision of where I thought the division needed to go. I really didn't need to talk to anybody else. The question is, were there other people I should have talked to before taking command? It's always nice to be able to talk to people who have just come from a division. Back at Fort Leavenworth I had the opportunity to talk to a previous division commander, command sergeant major and two or three first sergeants. That was helpful because you get a good honest run down of what they thought about the division from where they sat and this was helpful. My biggest problem was just not enough time between assignments. I had to turn off the responsibilities from one assignment and two hours later take command of a division. That is too quick."

- PRECOMMAND VISITS

"I think former commanders would be the people that I would talk to. In addition to former commanders, I would like to talk to some social workers and get a feel for some of the problems that they confront with families that you may have never thought of. They are in the business of dealing with family problems. You are in the business of dealing with family problems." It would have been helpful to have visited probably a division and sat down not necessarily with the division commander but with an assistant division commander for support and just have him bring me up to date on some of the procedures and techniques associated with managing materiel maintenance within the division and making maximum use of the supply system."

"I would want to see as many current division commanders as I could -- two or three, if possible--or division commanders who had just come out of command. I would want to go to the Infantry School and spend about two or three days there talking to the instructors in the advanced and basic courses, talking to the weapons department about their weapons and problems with the weapons, and see, for example, exactly what tactics and doctrine they are teaching. I would also like to do that at the Artillery School. Then, if at all possible, I would like to go to the Logistics Center and spend some time there. So, I guess what I would like to do is spend some time in the school system to better prepare myself to come out here and be tactically and technically proficient in all areas of the division."

- RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

"I could have used much more insight and information on the management of programming and budget execution within the installation. I have reference primarily to the role of the director of resource management, the relationship of the program directors to the DRM, and the mechanisms by which the program budget advisory committee makes assessments on the allocation of resources and more importantly right now the allocation of shortages."

"I think that in the pre-command course, an exercise that engages in a mock PBAC that shows examples of data that can be maintained or techniques that can be used that will permit the installation commander to have laid out for him meaningful information about which he can make

decisions of how to allocate resources among the various activities of the base operations and among the division would be of great help to us."

- **PERSONAL & PERSONNEL RELATIONSHIPS** "I would suggest to prospective division commanders that they think out what they view to be the relationships and the roles of their key people. I have reference to the assistant division commanders, the Chief of Staff, the garrison commander, and the major subordinate commanders within the division. A prospective division commander should have a clear view of what the role of each of those people is and what he expects of them. He should reflect upon the way in which he has seen those roles vary in different divisions. He should try to analyze why in the environment that he has seen those relationships before -- it was done that way and what were the good and bad points in the variation in the roles of relationships. Then upon assuming command, he should very quickly make an assessment of what the roles and relationships he inherits actually are and then determine how he is going to make adjustment if they are off the mark from what he wants."

"Some areas of concern within the Army over time such as travel vouchers and preparation of equipment unit status reports warrant a brief statement of policy by the commander early."

- **ANOTHER "GOOD IDEA"!** "The thing the organization really cannot afford is a commander who wakes up every morning with a new idea and thinks he is going to do something about it. I think that you have to create conditions for your subordinates to operate within their sphere of influence. You must realize they require reaction time for everything to be communicated, settled in, and understood."

- **READINESS REPORTING** "I think I would become pretty familiar with AR 220-1 if I didn't know what it was. I would try to get an assessment of what is reviewed in higher headquarters. I don't mean that as a CYA kind of thing but I think it's sort of nice to know if your bosses are monitoring something, and how you stand."

- **INTELLIGENCE** "I guess the one thing that I was least prepared for in hindsight is the intelligence system; the division and corps intelligence system. Although the CEWI Battalions or MI Battalions have been around, there are no two of them alike; equipment-wise and what you do with them. The corps are not all alike. We have stuff that no one else in the Army has. Corps overseas have things that we don't have here. I should have been better prepared for that because that is certainly a combat multiplier."

- **CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED** "The people to talk to -- I think Leavenworth's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). They have a wealth of information there that they have collected from the NTC and other training assessments that IGs have done. It is certainly a worthwhile operation. During my time at Leavenworth, I spent a good time with CALL because I was looking particularly for the lessons learned that had been published out of the NTC."

- REQUISITIONS

"I think I would study the requisitioning process. We waste more time on: One, not identifying what the problem is; Two, not requisitioning in a timely fashion; and Three, not doing it correctly where you requisition the wrong part and then all of a sudden here comes something that you don't really need or want but you did it wrong."

- MAKING ASSESSMENTS

"Division commanders come in and establish early on several things. Now we've talked about making an assessment of the level of training of a unit but there is something else that should happen. The guy should make this assessment with the full understanding and appreciation that the assessment that he has come up with was developed by his predecessor and the people that are now working for him are doing their best. So, be very careful about coming in and saying, 'This is not too good,' making your people feel that they've been wasting time prior to your arrival. You come in as the great savior that is going to change the whole direction in a couple of days. You could make a lot of enemies and develop a feeling of animosity that you really don't want. Be very careful and deliberate in making your changes on the parade field when you assume command."

"If your predecessor was doing a good job in that, leave it alone. If it is not broken, don't fix it."



LEADERSHIP

● COMMANDER'S INTENT

"I lay out what my missions are and our METL (Mission Essential Task List) tasks. I've identified seven enabling tasks to the commanders as being the most important. They are the ones that we have to be expert in because they are so critical to our mission accomplishment. I emphasize prioritization of time and resources. I keep hitting those over and over again with every group that I have. I think you have to do that. You have to repeat them and keep a discipline in the system. If I had any advice to commanders, that is it. I believed that coming into the division, so I started with that notion right up front and I have held with it consistently. You have to be consistent."

"Well, as a division commander, I have learned that I have to be very careful about what I put out. The people all the way down to the companies are very eager to do or to change -- whatever I may put out. When I put something out, I have to make sure that it is put out clearly, that there is a purpose for it, that they understand it and that they know why we are doing it. I have made a couple of mistakes by putting out something without thinking it through completely. Before I can stop it, it was halfway done. So I have learned to be very careful. Everybody looks to see what I have to say. They write down what I have to say and they put it to use. If it is not correct, then we have to go back and undo it. It is always traumatic for the units to have to go through and change something they just changed a couple of days before. I continue to learn leadership techniques as a division commander because it is amazing how you can sit up here, put

out something and see the units rapidly respond to it. So I would say that you have to be very careful what you put out."

"I guess I was a little surprised that there are so many people out there who get uncomfortable in a decentralized environment. I don't know if that is because most other people don't operate that way or not. But almost immediately you start getting an awful lot of questions about what you want; when in fact, what you are trying to say is, here are the general things I want, and the direction I want to go, now you go figure out how to make it happen. You set the criteria and establish the procedure by which you are going to accomplish it. I don't know if that is quite leadership, except I have found that I have had to constantly model and repeat my intent and my purpose and my reluctance to give additional guidance. There are a couple of areas that I just simply will stand up and say, 'I'm not going to tell you how to do that. You decide how to do it.'"

- DEALING WITH SUBORDINATES

"At the division level, you are dealing with senior commanders who are already pretty well developed in their leadership techniques, but you still have to motivate them and encourage them. Each one being an individual, you have to deal with them a little differently. Through them, you have to be able to reach down and provide at least some visible role modeling to commanders and soldiers below that. Brigade commanders have to do a similar thing. One of the differences probably is that as a division commander, and particularly on an installation where you are the installation commander, there are some areas over which you have a great deal of authority and responsibility well beyond what a brigade commander has."

"My technique is one of asking questions. It is a kind of Socratic method in the way that I use it probably is to teach as much as I do anything else. I ask questions and follow up answers. If somebody asks me a question, I will go and ask the next question. I look for a commander's confidence and the depth of his knowledge; as you get the surface answer, then you go down to the next layer and see if it gets soft. I guess that is the technique I use. I look at how the commander responds to me. How he acts with me. I look at how he seems to act around his soldiers and how they act around him; the ease with which they work with each other. The commander who is comfortable with his soldiers (and you can tell when soldiers are comfortable around the commander); that tells you something about him. I guess that's probably it. It's terribly subjective, now, but it has worked for me. I have told people, and I can remember my own combat experiences, when I have not listened to my instincts about a commander, I have generally been disappointed. I have determined that I should have listened to them. I pay attention to what my instincts believe; they are generally right."

"There has got to be a degree of latitude allowed to subordinate commanders on how they get things done that permits them to be the person and the leader that they are and to exercise the leadership style with which they are most comfortable."

"I have a very, very strong belief which I have communicated over the years, and it is that a battalion commander's mission in life is not to demonstrate to his company commander that he is the best company commander in his battalion. Likewise, the brigade commander is not to demonstrate to his battalion commander that he is the best battalion commander in the brigade. I just have to take it one step further; the division commander should also not demonstrate to the brigade commander that he is the best brigade commander in the division. Everybody needs their space to operate in. If, even for a moment, one endorses the notion that the only great thoughts are those that come from higher headquarters, we are really in trouble."

"I also think that every once in a while your battalion commanders want to get patted on the back, too. It is human nature that the battalion commander wants to know if he is doing something that is alien to what the division commander wants."

"My principal point would be that I think there are more similarities between command at the division and brigade level from an operational as well as a garrison leadership standpoint than there are differences."

- OPERATING STYLES

"I had a meeting with all the commanders right away. I recommend calling all battalion commanders and all brigade commanders together if for no other purpose than to let them listen to you talk. Just to see what you are saying. I do not think I said a whole hell of a lot that day other than a change in the rating scheme. But at least they were able to see what I look like and hear what I had to say. I think that is important. I would tell a new division commander to get around and see people as quickly as he could. I did not do that very well. I think he is going to quickly recognize that everything he says is going to be taken very literally, very quickly. One of the things that people are going to be asking about as he wanders around the division is what is he changing? What is he like? Any idiosyncrasy that they know will be magnified. He needs to be particularly attuned to that."

"I've talked to all the battalion and brigade commanders, assistant division commanders, and the command sergeant major about leadership. I emphasize the fact that they need to set the best possible personal example in everything that they do. That is one of the real strong things that they need to do as a leader. Second, the battalion and brigade commanders need to establish a strong functional chain of command -- both an officer and a non-commissioned officer chain of command. Sometimes the two come together, but the commander wants to make sure that his chain of command is strong enough that he gets feedback from the lowest level of his unit and that when he puts something out, it works its way down to the lowest level. So I would say, set the example -- set a great personal example -- and then have a good strong chain of command that is responsive to you as a division commander. Those things, coupled with other leadership characteristics that we learn as we grow up to be a commander, will serve you well when you get a command."

"I get all the chaplains and bring them together. I sit them down in a room and I say, 'Okay, fellows, you guide us. I am aware of your confidentiality. I am aware that you are not going to tell me that you know Sam Jones is doing this and whatever. But you need to tell me about the trend. What's going on? What's happening?'" And they tell me. And the next time I talk to my commanders, I address those issues. I might say, 'I'm hearing from some chaplains that when they come to tell you that something is happening, you don't listen. And I want you to listen to them.' I say that to the whole group. I don't say it to just one commander. I say it to all the commanders so they all know it at one time."

"A division commander needs to have, and I do have with my subordinate commanders, an understanding whereby we discuss readiness over and above the context of the unit status report. For example, for some very good reasons, there are often equipments that are exempt from reporting in the USR System, but they are very real considerations of overall readiness. There at least needs to be a dialogue between the division commander and his staff and all of his principal brigade and battalion commanders on that real readiness consideration which deals with what you have and what you don't have as a function of what is required in the operational concept for the division. To a large extent, in evaluating readiness within the division you have to be mindful of the doctrinal TO&E requirement for personnel and equipment because to weigh the true readiness of the subordinate units within the division and the division overall, you must consider all the equipments and all the people that are needed to match the doctrine."

"When they (the division commanders) come into their divisions, right away they need to be seen throughout the division. Especially, they need to be seen doing the physical things that the soldiers have to do. Road march with them, run in their battalion runs, take PT with them, visit them in their barracks, go to the rifle range and shoot with them, and fly in helicopters with them. Spend as much time as you can initially with the soldiers. That is most important for the first one to three months you are a division commander because that sets the tone of how you are going to be as a division commander. Don't come in and get bogged down with paperwork, staff briefings and everything, and then, three months later, make a show of going out to see the soldiers. Try to spend at least half of your time the first two months or so being out with soldiers, doing the same things that they are doing, with pressed fatigues and highly polished boots and all those other things. That would be example-setting activities that you can get involved with that will serve you well as a division commander. I would like to add one thing to that. I found that many senior officers have a hard time talking to soldiers. You don't have to say a lot to soldiers, but if you are standing around and a soldier is there, you just need to take the opportunity to go up and speak to him. Ask him how he is doing, how long he has been here, is he married, where is he from -- use simple questions like that. If you don't do that, you are going to miss something, because soldiers take great pride in the fact that the division commander talked to them today and asked about their family or asked

them where they were from. Too many times, we don't do that. I try very hard to get around and talk to as many soldiers as I can -- just simple soldier talk. You get great feedback sometimes from these soldiers. So, the new division commander should right away establish an atmosphere in which he is able to talk to soldiers and in which the soldiers know they can talk to him, get to know him better and feel better about him."

"Because they should listen to the chaplain to start with. I understand that the chaplain has to deal with a lot of problems, and I also understand that he has a problem with a family as well, but I let him know I want him to be in the field with my soldiers. My whole division knows that if a soldier gets killed the most important thing in that battalion at that moment is to care for the soldier's family. That's it. I don't give a damn what it costs, we will do that."

"You can get anything done if you don't care who gets the credit."

"I like to sit down once a quarter with the brigade commanders and with the ADCs. I don't do it together. I do it separately. We go over his battalion commanders. You see, the Brigade Commander rates, the ADC intermediate rates, and I senior rate. I want all three of us to be in sync or I want us to know that we are not in sync. I want us to know in plenty of time."

"We, the officers, have a tendency to train our enlisted guys when it is convenient for us. When there is not another overriding priority, he can go to school. What can the division commander do about that? For one thing, he can set up a policy on what he expects. My enlisted aide went to PLDC. My driver out here went to PLDC and my aide went to CAS³. Then I can stand up in good conscience and tell all my brigade commanders if I can do it -- you can do it."

"I tell the company commanders and new officers -- I go in with a stack of books usually under my arm and that is the kind of an attention getter. I don't do anything with them until the end. At the end, I talk about reading and the responsibility that we have as professionals. We have to study our profession. I think that is one thing that makes it a profession. There is a body of knowledge and it grows and we all share it. There are methods by which it is shared. Some of it is in a formal kind of a disciplined way through the reading of the manuals, and others are through periodicals. I talk about that, yes. You have got to study it, read it and re-read it, to where you understand what the hell you are doing."

- ROLE OF ADC

"Who are your people that will execute for you? You need to spell out in spades publicly what their authority is. Everybody needs to know that. I published this letter as a term of reference and I spelled out in it what my ADCs, the garrison commander, the chief of staff are responsible for so when you see that ADC walking down the road, you'll know his authority. When he speaks, how high do I jump? You have to lay that all out. A lot of time, you take this hot colonel, promote him to brigadier, make him an

assistant and you restrain him. You don't get the maximum use out of that guy's talent. A division commander should never compete with his ADCs. That comes back to who gets the credit? He was good enough to go from 0-1 to 0-7. He must have something on the ball. Use all his energy and his good ideas for the betterment of the unit and just spell out what you want him to be responsible for and then give him guidance."

- CHALLENGES

"Almost every officer in our units goes to the NTC in the course of the year or goes to an exercise like REFORGER. It is certainly how they handle that stress and that physical requirement, if that is a good indicator of success and potential. Likewise, we almost lose an officer per rotation who can't cope. He just couldn't handle it. That is within battalions primarily. Of course, we don't relieve people who haven't had the opportunity to train, but if they have had the opportunity to train and all of their peers can do it and they can't handle it--sorry, that is all"

"I have a policy that you take no derogatory action on E-7 or above without clearing it through me. Now the purpose for that is, not that I don't trust your judgment, but you can have a company commander as the battalion commander, and you just reach the end of the rope with him. In your judgment, this guy needs to go. You may just get angry to the extent that you are working out of anger rather than logic. When you say to me, 'I want to relieve this guy,' I would say, 'Now what did you go through? Have you done this, this, this, and this? What have you done to correct all of that?' You see, you walk in here to me and all of a sudden you feel like you are on trial. I'm not talking to you about what a dodo this guy is that you want to fire. I want to find out have you done everything that you are supposed to do in the role of battalion commander to develop and give this subordinate commander adequate leadership and training. Have you done it all? You may determine that you have not so let us try that. When it all goes away and we come to the recommendation line, you say, 'I recommend that he be relieved and I want to do it right now and I agree with you.' I will say, 'All right, you relieve him.' I do that because I want it to be a joint action. I told you there was no 'them' or 'they' here. We are going to relieve him."

"Did you ever have a bad ass division commander? You stayed out of his way and anything he found out about you, he had to find it out much to your chagrin. You have to be careful. You've got two stars on there and a car with red lights and a plate and a belt with a big buckle. You look like a Christmas tree walking around the place so you don't have to be bad. You have to be accessible. You have got to be proficient. You have to be ready to put your shoulder to any type of problem that the unit may be having that you have it within your power to correct. All of that will establish the climate and the atmosphere. If you establish a good climate and a good personal example, then your problems with ethics will go down."

- INDIVIDUAL SKILLS

"You have to listen a lot. You have to have technical competence, particularly as you go higher, because you are synchronizing and you don't

personally lead the young soldiers, you lead the O-6s and the O-5s which is obviously easier than trying to be a company commander again. You have to know what you are doing when you put it all together, even in a CPX. I would say that I learned technical competence. It is the key to successful leadership. If you don't know what you are doing then no matter how much they like you, you are going to get all messed up."

"I was down in the tank park one day and there was a blade tank. They had the blade up. There was a young fellow up in front of that thing with his legs sticking out from under that thing being all he could be and I said, 'Holy Smokes, if that blade falls, that is going to cut him right in two.' I didn't like that at all but what I hated worse was there were two captains and several NCOs in the area. They were zooming around, taking care of business. I said, 'Do you see that guy over there?' 'Yes Sir, I see him.' 'Why don't you go over there and get him out from under there?' That is part of the leadership that I need. I am the division safety officer. That means that if I am the division safety officer, then you, Mr. Battalion Commander, are the Battalion Safety Officer; and you, Mr. Captain, are the Company Safety Officer."



DOCTRINE

- UNDERSTANDING DOCTRINE

"I found fairly early after assuming command of the division that I had a lot of field grade leaders who did not have a great degree of understanding of Airland battle. In a way, that is not all that surprising because I think Airland battle doctrine, unlike some of the doctrinal material that we have had in prior years in the Army, doesn't lend itself to quick study, memory and then rote recitation. Airland battle doctrine really demands the very best of insightful thought and analysis, intelligent estimates, and it demands a great deal in the way of technical knowledge of the Army, other services, and maneuver and firepower capabilities."

"There is a disconnect today in the Army between what we are capable of doing and what doctrine says that we should be able to do especially in seeing deep. I had a platoon sergeant talk to me about the squad striking deep, that's no joke. So his understanding of doctrine was weak. That's another good subject for NCO and officer professional development, to understand what doctrine is. I can't think of any other more important specifics than a thorough understanding of doctrine by all. While I may sometimes joke about whatever we are calling it this week, we need to be sure that we all understand what we are calling it this week. We need to insure that everyone understands the doctrinal terms to avoid confusion within our profession."

"Well, he (the division commander) needs to understand the Army's doctrine and he needs to have a vision of how that doctrine would be applied to his division. In the case of this particular division, he has to be

prepared to have a vision of how he would deviate from this doctrine in order to fight the division the way it is organized and the way it is equipped. That application is just not going to be cut and dry. He has to be prepared to make those deviations from normal doctrine that have to be made in order to accommodate what he has to fight with."

"I think I was weak on synchronizing everything that was available to a division and my understanding about all of the assets used in intelligence gathering. How you deal with air support. How you deal with adjacent units. I've been here now for 19 months and I find it necessary to bone up on all of that so you won't be asking the wrong question or trying to do the wrong thing at the wrong time."

"Another area of doctrine that gave us some concern is not so much the lack of doctrine but what we viewed to be a side connect between the logistics doctrine for our division and the logistics units that are in the field during peacetime with which the unit can train."

"I will tell you that a doctrinal issue might come up at any time in any setting, as a professional discussion between a leader and his men. The phrase 'We will do this doctrinally,' or whatever, comes up all the time and in discussions at all levels."

- VOIDS


"Probably the most troublesome has been in aviation brigade doctrine and doctrine for the division-level attack helicopter battalion. That is the Apache Battalion as opposed to the Cobra Battalion. Doctrine was published about the same time that we formed the brigade and deployed the battalion. Therefore, we are trying to learn it as we field it, particularly, in the case where the brigade integrates it into the division. As you recall, we started with the brigade saying that it was a maneuver brigade. Some people called it the 4th Brigade as they fielded it. Then, a way down stream the Chief of Staff of the Army made the decision that it was not a maneuver brigade and changed the way the people were developing the doctrine and experimenting with the doctrine to see what would work. We have a lot of learning to do there."

"How deep is deep in the division Airland Battle is an area that is in need of some thought. For different divisions or differently equipped divisions, how deep is deep may vary. Whether you have Apaches or Cobras makes a difference. If you have MLRS or if you don't have MLRS makes a difference. That is the one area that I have had to study the hardest and think through. How deep can I acquire targets and attack targets."

- GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

"One of the seven areas that is critical to our mission accomplishment has to do with tactical road marches. I don't think the Army had really good doctrine on how to execute those. We have some general things and some technical stuff that get into the transportation arena, military police operations, and convoy procedures. But we did not have a good approach, in my view, to how that is supposed to operate."

"But the fact is, if you are a two brigade division in CONUS, there is a strong potential that should you be deployed in an emergency, you are going to deploy and function as a two brigade division. The Army doesn't really address that anywhere in its doctrine."



ORGANIZATION

- CHANGES

It is very tempting to want to make a lot of modifications to units, but I have felt that I have neither had the charter nor the time to play too much with what the organizations are."

"I have tried very hard not to modify and deviate from the way that the division is organized. It was organized as a light infantry division and I feel responsible to keep it that way and to try to make it work the way it is. So, I have not modified or made any temporary changes within the division. Having said that, the division support command is short on people -- people that I think we need. So, I think very soon, we will have to make some modifications there."

- KNOWLEDGE

"Let me tell you what surprised me the most about the TO&E. I was continually amazed at how many people didn't know their own TO&E. That sort of distressed me. I was in a tank park recently with three company commanders of a great tank battalion, I asked each of them what the TO&E was of a tank company. I was the only guy who knew. Then, in my parochialism, I asked an infantry platoon leader. He didn't know what his TO&E was either. Now, honestly, we do change them. There are changes coming up all the time, but I think that everybody needs to understand the TO&E. First of all, you need to know what is there and what is functioning."

"When (a new division commander) looks and sees the top 10 MOSs in his division on the readiness report, he will notice that he is missing the

76s and the 94s and the 63s and the 88s and the 45s and all those fellows in critical MOSs. He will find that for every one of those guys who are in short supply that there are 11s and 19s and 13s and 16s doing those jobs. That means that his infantry squads and his tank crews are going to be manned at a much lesser level than he wants them to be. A study of his TO&E is absolutely essential to know what is going on in his division."

"I was surprised about three units within the TO&E. First of all, I was appalled that the Engineer battalion was so small. The Engineer battalion for a light infantry division is just too small to support the division. My second surprise was the Signal battalion. It had been reduced by 50 percent, but still had its old equipment and still had the same mission. My third surprise was the division support command, which had been reduced from about 2000 personnel to 1100 and still had the same mission. Those three surprises gave me three challenges. We have learned to live with it. We are still developing techniques and SOPs that will enhance our capability. But the Engineer battalion remains the biggest disappointment. It does not have the capability to support this division. I think that the division has to continue to press to make the division Engineer battalion a more capable battalion. I think we have to press to make the Signal battalion a more capable battalion. We can live with the Infantry battalions and the Artillery battalions the way they are. But for the Signal and the Engineer battalions, the division needs to continue to push to increase the size of those units and give them more capability."

- STRUCTURE

"The TO&E of the tank company is broken. Sixty-two men can't run those fourteen tanks. The MECH company needs another Bradley just like the tank company has an extra tank running around. We do not doctrinally, or TO&E wise, have all our Fire Integration Support Team guys in the right place. There are some hidden things down there. I would tell the next division commander to get very interested in how his FIST guys interface with the maneuver fellow. I would tell him that he will find if he is not careful that the FIST fellows are non-existent on the front line. Example. The FIST team that is going to a tank company has four people in it. The FIST Chief rides around with the tank company commander. He is supposed to. The one who goes to a MECH company has ten people in it. Four to run around with the company commander somewhere and then six guys who are supposed to go out with the platoon. Because AOE has cut the TO&E down to the bare bones, the first place that the artillerymen go to find people to fill necessary jobs, e.g., the supply rooms, drivers, etc., is that 13 foxtrot on the FIST team. If you are not careful, they will be siphoned away from their principal job, which is what I have found a number of times."

"A new division commander will find out for instance that there are five vehicles for the three generals in the division and only three drivers. He is going to find out that there are real problems with MKTs (Mobile Kitchen Trailers) which provide support for his units. He is going to find out that the cooks are gone. Hopefully we will get them back. He needs to know that the tank company only has 62 fellows and that in the supply

room he has an assistant supply sergeant who is also the armorer and the truck driver all the same guy. There is no company clerk, and the first sergeant is supposed to drive his own truck. He needs to be aware of that so he will not be overly surprised when he finds the 19K bonus baby working in an arms room."

"The forward support battalion is inadequately manned to accomplish the normal command control functions and also serve as a headquarters for rear area security."

"First of all, the current divisional cavalry is in my view the wrong organization for the division cavalry squadron. I think we need tanks in the cav squadron and another ground troop."

"We have taken the cooks out and issued T-rations and now we don't have the capability in battalions to feed an A-ration in the field."

"The other thing that we have which is kind of bothersome and don't really have an answer for yet is the OH58D helicopters. They have artillery lieutenants as observers and aviators as pilots. The observers are assigned to DIVARTY while the aviators are assigned to the aviation brigade. Those airplanes have such a capability that they need to train more than with just the DIVARTY. They need to train with the Cav Squadron, with the MI Battalion, and with the attack helicopter squadron battalion of the aviation brigade. In order to coordinate that training, we made the aviation brigade responsible for the training of all the aspects of the OH-58D platoon including artillery. That is not an organizational issue as much as a doctrinal issue, but it is the kind of thing you find when you field new organizations."

"We have had great success with the new equipment training teams that the Army sends out to introduce new equipment and to train our trainers. After they leave, we establish a program with a point of contact for the training of that new equipment. We keep this point of contact and a small cell in operation until everybody has received the new equipment, all the trainers are trained and we no longer have any problem with it. We established this training cell ourselves. I put a small cell together under the responsibility of the unit for the introduction of all new equipment. They stay right with it until all the new equipment is on board and all the people are trained in how to use and maintain it."

● EQUIPMENT

"The FIST needs a vehicle similar to the one that the commander is in. He needs something that doesn't give a signature, is able to keep up and provides him the same armor protection so he is able to go right along with the commander."



TRAINING

- FOCUS

"You have got to constantly remind yourself and your subordinates, when you are talking training, about what your mission is. Otherwise, it is easy to slip out of your intent here and start doing things, if not counterproductive, which are not helpful to your true mission. I think it starts with mission. I am an absolute believer in the Army's training process, FM 25-100."

"I tell my commanders, and they may have come to believe that it is a cliché because I repeat it so often, that good units may not be the best in any one thing in an organization, but they are never the worst in anything. That is the point. You have got to ensure that you are not the worst. You have got to work the things that aren't good and shove them up and then sustain the others."

"I believe very strongly that the focus has got to be on small units. Another thing I frequently say, and repeat myself to my subordinate commanders, is that I believe that probably at least 75 percent of your training ought to be at platoon level or below; 90 percent of it at company level or below. I am not hung up on those percentages. But, my point, when I say that to the commanders, is that I know it is a hell of a lot more than 50 percent. That's what I am getting at. That is where they ought to keep their focus and not worry about or wring their hands about the fact that they don't have their battalions out as a battalion, or their brigades out as a brigade very often. You can do most of that in CPXs, STAFFEX's, and so forth without having to have the soldiers out. But most of your training ought to get focused at the platoon level, and you have got to set your objectives that way. If you do, you'll have a good unit."

"I established training as our number one priority. Now, of course, the Army has declared this the Year of Training. Then I stated to my commanders in my training guidance that the training should be well planned -- which is very difficult to do -- but training has to be well planned. Then there has to be preparation time for training -- and sometimes we leave that step out. Then the training has to be supervised

by the chain of command and the leaders and the commanders at all levels. Then, as all of that is taking place, you have to go back and evaluate the training to see where the shortfalls are. In every single case, I think, when you evaluate training you'll find that there is something you need to do better or something else that you need to do, also. So I tried to emphasize that. Train hard, train realistically using the METL, plan it well, prepare for it, supervise it properly, evaluate, and go back and do it again. The only other thing I required of the training planning was that the companies, the battalions and the troops have their weekly training meetings, just as BTMS teaches. That way, everybody in the company has an opportunity to provide input to training planning."

- JUNIOR LEADER TRAINING

"One of the things that I have really worked hard on has been junior leader training. We devote five hours a week. One morning, Wednesday morning, out of every week is dedicated and given to the first line leader. It is his time. The sergeant's time. We call it Team Training. But the focus is on training of the team in the collective skills essential to the smallest team that has a function on the battlefield. The requirement is for the leader of that team to teach it. He gets them together and we have some pretty strict rules about excusals. We have worked hard, and I think we have been fairly successful at eliminating the distractors. There are no hospital appointments, there are no dental appointments, finance appointments, appointments with CIF or any of those things. None of those things get scheduled for Wednesday morning."

"Most of the training distractors really occur down inside the units. The commanders don't really necessarily believe that, because changes they make are good changes. Changes that somebody above them make are bad changes."

- TRAINING MANAGEMENT

"I have gone to a red, green, amber cycle which is organized around the way we are going to fight. We have taken the brigade structure and the habitually associated support units that work with each brigade and put them on the same cycle. So that the first brigade with its normally supporting engineer company, air defense battery, artillery battalion, signal platoon, and so on; all of that, is in the green cycle together. All of it is in the red or support cycle together. This, I think, eases the problem for the brigade commander and for tactical combined arms training. It does, I must admit, make it a little tougher on those separate battalion commanders because they find their battalion is split most of the training year working with the different brigades. But, in the past it was the brigade that had to scramble to coordinate with its supporting units to get them all together."

"My experience reaffirms with me that the battalion training management system now addressed in our training management documents coming out of Training and Doctrine Command are precisely on target."

"If you can cause the commanders at each echelon to study and come to understand the Army's training management documents on how to train, that has just a superb payoff for you."

"I found that you need quarterly training briefings, where we sit down with the brigade and battalion commanders, and their staffs, company and slice element commanders to talk about training. We called it the Battalion Training Briefing that I received quarterly. That way I can look and see what they have planned, what their goals and objectives are for the next quarter. I can see where they have been, where they are, and where they are going, and I can provide additional training guidance. We spend about two hours talking about training of that particular task force. When that is all over, there is no doubt in anybody's mind what we are trying to accomplish in training."

"If I have to have meetings, I will most often have them with my staff people. Where I need commanders' views I find other ways to get them than having to meet on a frequent basis. Because I am able to avoid tying the brigade and battalion commanders up in non-training matters, they are free to spend a lot of time with the company and battery commanders in teaching them and raising their level of training."

"There is no way on God's green earth I could get those TRQ17s or TACJAMs and all those fellows squirreled around. There is no way that I can get down there and do the detailed training of that battalion the way the MI Battalion commander can. But I expect him to do that. Now if I expect him to do that, why don't I expect my infantrymen and tankers to do the same. Should I go down and teach them how to run a rifle range? Hell, no."

- TRAINING TECHNIQUES

"One of the greatest incentives to good training I have found has been the use of the emergency deployment readiness exercise. They do great things in causing all of the leadership within the division and all the units to attach a sense of urgency to many activities which might otherwise routinely not be done as well. We have been very pleased at what the EDRE system has done for us with an attitude of readiness as well as substantive readiness."

"Whatever you do, do it to standard rather than just hitting it a lick or just getting the box checked or just doing it because it is something that needs to be done. First, in order to train to standard, we have to teach the standards -- and the standards have to be understood."

"Don't take anything for granted. All the way from my division staff to the driver not being really qualified to drive off post. We had a battalion recently, that only had three drivers in the whole outfit who had ever driven off the highway."

"I think in training, as well as in everything else, you should create a climate that these fellows recognize as non-threatening and that you really want them to go out and try to train their outfits. I have not yet met a fellow

that runs one of these outfits who did not want to have the best highly professional outfit he could have. There is probably not one in the whole United States Army who is not trying to do his damndest to train his outfit properly."

"The half life of anything that you have done is about 90 days. Although you may have done something to standard, or even exceptionally well, 90 days ago, because of all the factors of turbulence and just simple moving around of key folks and everything else, you may no longer be up to standard -- you need to go out and test yourself."

- UNIT TRAINING

"What I have been concerned about is the training of the platoons and companies because they are the building blocks that cause us to win or lose. When my outfit is in the field, I like to get on a tank or get with an infantry squad, or go out with an artillery section, or whatever, and stay with them for a while and ride with them. I have caused a lot of grief sometimes but I learn what is going on."

- TRAINING CHALLENGES


"If you go to Fort Benning, Georgia, or to the other divisions in the Army and start talking to the Bradley people, it will not take you long before they start talking about Table VIII. I will tell you that just as I think tankers are dumb when they are mesmerized by Table VIII, the infantry is making a mistake if Bradley Table VIII gunnery is emphasized at the expense of the other infantry tasks. When the cavalry regimental commander asks me for an infantry battalion to reinforce the covering force, he is not asking me for Bradley Bushmaster gunners. He is asking me for a little fellow who wears blue cord on his greens who is able to do things that are associated with the infantryman's mission. What I am seeing and I am concerned about is a syndrome that says how many guys are you going to qualify on Table VIII with your Bushmaster? By the way, what is the dismounted element going to do? Well sir, they are going to have to be the range guards or the guards for the ammo dump. We don't want to have a squad course because safety-wise we can't do it properly. I have never once heard a Bradley briefing where they talked to me about the TOW. Never. Some people do not cross attach those guys below company level. I have had rifle company commanders, I should say rifle Bradley Company Commanders, talk to me about having his Bradleys up forward after I just told him that I didn't think that it is a very good light tank. The Army has agreed that it is the world's worst light tank."

"I don't think you can demand excellence from a unit if you don't give them everything that is required to achieve the goal that they have been given. After you do that, then you can demand it. Whenever I find a unit that is not doing it, then I can come back and I ask, 'What am I doing that is preventing this individual from bringing that unit up to that level of proficiency that we expect?'"

"You can fall into a trap of training to be successful at the National Training Center on an ARTEP, or training to be successful on a

REFORGER. If you train for the standard, then it will hold true regardless of where you are or what you are doing."

"The biggest violator of unprogrammed requirements is the battalion commander. If you look at what he is doing, it is not on his training schedule, it's all right. Why are you doing it? It's his idea. He came up with that. Fifty percent of all of those. Very seldom do you come up with an unprogrammed requirement from division because I've got a five week lock in program there."



FIELD OPERATIONS

● TASK FORCE OPERATIONS

"When he puts the division in the field, it has to be well planned. You have to establish objectives for what you want to accomplish in the field. Everybody has to understand what the mission and objectives are, and the support side of the house has to be completely on board. Then I would tell him to go out and set up. There will be some mistakes made, but you need to stay in the field long enough to shake them all out. You can't just put the division in the field for three days and then come home. You need to stay out and stress the system for seven to ten days. That way, when you return from the field, you will have learned a lot, you will have corrected many of the deficiencies, and you will be in much better shape for the next time you deploy."

"It is important to get the whole division out. Not because of the division commander's desires. Every commander wants to take his unit out whether it be a platoon leader or corps commander. Division commanders want to do the same thing. It is important to get them all out; not just to exercise the signal nodes but particularly for the integration of the slice elements throughout the division, and to exercise the logisticians. They probably have the greatest challenge on the battlefield: resupply, rearm, refit, fix forward, medical evacuation, all those kinds of systems. You can't really exercise them unless everyone is deployed."

"It is difficult to get the entire division out; in fact, I have never had the entire division in the field. The problem with that is not time, so much as it is space. There is not enough maneuver space at Fort blank for me to do that. It is difficult to put a whole brigade out, although we are able to do that. A brigade eats it up. What I do is work at the CPXs. We are pretty tough on making sure that we get to the field on a CPX at least once a quarter and take the division out. We just did that this week. We finished it up yesterday. There were probably only three or four of us that felt that we needed to do that. Nobody else wanted to do it. I understood why, but you have to insist, because those skills will age so quickly with the turnover of people as well as the normal decay if you are not exercising the skills. You have got to do it. I can't get the entire division out. I understand that. I am not wringing my hands about it."

"AGs don't want to take all those records and go running all around the countryside. Dentists are very hesitant about dental work in the field. But, every time I send a brigade to the field, that support slice goes. If you have to do some dental work out there, you do that dental work out there. It keeps your equipment up. One, you know the status of your equipment. Do you have it or don't you have it? Does it work? Can the person use it in the field? Are your generators working? You can get bogged down in the day to day operations of running a division to the extent where you say, 'Well, hell, I just can't afford to go to the field right now.' You put it off. Once you start to put it off, then it gets easier and easier to put off."

"What I have been able to do thus far in this division has been largely limited to using First Battle BC map exercises and command post exercises, then borrowing off the lessons learned of those people that have thus far been able to use the various training centers. In the coming year, my division will have elements participate within these training centers and I think they will help us really wrench up our capability to operate in the field. Those would be the things that I would think my successor would want to latch on to in order to take maximum advantage of any field training exercise or any rotation at a major training center."

"I think we have been fortunate in recent years with respect to our ability to resource our field exercises and as our operational tempo is reduced and we see less resources clearly we are going to have to be even more imaginative in honing our operational skills."

"I am determined that the cavalry squadron cannot fight with a single ground cavalry troop. I am determined that routinely, it will operate with a tank company and a scout platoon attached to it, and we train to do that."

- **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

"The single biggest problem in exercising command and control, I think, is the lack of a system that provides throughout the battlefield a common data base about the status on the battlefield. Our command and control system in the division is manual. It probably hasn't changed since World War II. It is grease pencil and acetate; maps on a map board; radio communication links. We have better communications today; some new,

more secure communication systems, and so on. But, the command and control process hasn't changed. That is still coming from voice analog primarily into a CP where someone transcribes it, and therefore has all of the potential for mistakes and misunderstandings, misplotting; accuracy is the width of a grease pencil, and all that business. If you go from the first brigade to the second brigade you may have a different view of the battlefield. I would say that is our single biggest problem, but it is not unique to me. That is an Army problem that has got to be solved. We have got to find a way to provide a common view of the battlefield. The commander, no matter where he goes, should be able to tap into it."

"I think the most serious problem that we always have when you put the division in the field is communications. You have to be able to communicate with each supporting commander and you have to task the Signal personnel and the Signal battalion, to develop ways that will allow you to talk to subordinates. We have been able to do that because we go to the field twice a year as a division in a CPX mode and we stress the system by placing the headquarters of the battalions and the brigades out at the appropriate distances that we think we would be spread out in a mid to high-intensity conflict."

"Every time we put divisional headquarters in the field, I form a division rear and a RAOC is a part of that, and the same people come in to do that. It is run by my Assistant Division Commander for Support and operates at the Division Rear. His principal deputy for the RAOC is my division provost marshal. The ADC(s) runs that."

"Another area, I am not sure this is so much doctrine as it is organization to support the doctrine, but that is rear area operations. The Army's system is to handle that with rear area operation centers, the RAOCs, that are in the USAR and which would come to the divisions. The problem is that they don't exist. At least ours does not exist at this time. I hope that when it is organized, it would maintain a level of readiness such that it could deploy with the division, because if it doesn't the function still has to be accomplished. Routinely, I take out of my hide the capability to run rear area battle operations."

"Another thing that is important to learn is that a division doesn't work by itself. If you go on a division CPX or FTX, you really need corps support because you need the corps nodes to tie into. You can't decide where you are going to locate your CP and your COMMO without regard to where your corps is."

"The CEWI and Signal Battalion, while they can be evaluated as a unit in their operation without fully fielding the division, it can't be done nearly as well as you can when you field the entire division."

"The Cav Squadron was stretched so thin that if they had the long range reconnaissance company they would have been used in the screen. They would have been used for the Cav Squadron command. If I leave them in

the MI Battalion, the MI Battalion always works for the division commander. That company in the MI Battalion is always a divisional asset even though he is in the MI Battalion under the MI Battalion's umbrella. Because of the mission of the MI Battalion, that company is always at the ready disposal of the division command. The guy who wrote the doctrine was correct."

"I think the divisional Cav Squadron should be a separate unit reporting to the CG like it used to be instead of it going into that 4th Brigade. My Cav Squadron, the eyes and ears of the division, has an intermediate commander which forces you to treat it one way in garrison and another way in the field. When the Cav Squadron goes to the field, they report straight to me. In garrison, they are in the 4th Brigade. Doctrinally, I think it should be brought back out and put in as a separate battalion like it used to be. The ADA Battalion, the Signal Battalion, the MI Battalion, the Engineer Battalion and that Cav Squadron used to be back out there too."

"The current CEOI (Communications Electronics Operating Instructions), is a combat multiplier for the other side. It is bulky and cumbersome. If you had to replace a corps level CEOI because it had been compromised you would have to bring out three vans to do it. Much less try to figure out how to do it. I think its a bit crazy, doctrinally, to have some fellow at NSA tell me I have to use a call sign like Whiskey 6 Delta 43 on a secure net."

- FTX vs CPX

"There is a lot of difference between a CPX that is conducted indoors and trying to find a guy in the middle of the night stuck by the side of the road where you are exercising everything from land navigation to technical competence and the job has to be done. Certainly the CPXs and the discussions of the war counsel are essential in understanding the commanders intent. Indeed, exercise them to see how they make out war-game wise. The division is only going to be good if those things really are practiced. You can only practice if the division goes out."

"The days of division FTXs may not be completely over, but it is hard to do them."



LOGISTICS

- **SHORTCOMINGS**

"An area that bothers me as a CONUS Division with a European mission and with a POMCUS set in Germany, is that my equipment in CONUS is not entirely matched in POMCUS."

"Let me tell you where my complaints are. We were not the first division to receive the M-1. We found that the problems we encountered happened at just about the same period to our predecessors. Example, the intank fuel pump developed problems. About six months after transition they started going out on us. The M-1 tank has two of these fuel pumps, but can be operated with only one. Now I am not a tanker. I don't claim to be. I understand a little bit about them. One of them takes longer to get out than the other one. I do know that it is supposed to have two. I do know that the units in front of us all started having it go bad at the end of six months and ours started going bad at six months also. We couldn't get replacements and it became a big problem in the division. At one time, we had something like 60 or 70 tanks running around with only one intank fuel pump because the system still did not have that under control. Today, we still have tanks in our division with only one intank fuel pump. That is dumb. The logistic systems did not work."

- **INTEGRATION OF NEW EQUIPMENT**

"I think the HEMMT fuelers and ammunition cargo carriers have improved my capability to handle those two classes of supply by double what I had before. The onboard crane of the cargo carriers and the high speed pumps on the fuelers are great. The Army bought a good system."

"We took a former battalion commander and made him the M-1 fielding coordinator for the division. His function was to see to it that the total package was coming together and work out the time lines and identify the

problems early. Then we held monthly IPRs, to go through and identify the problem areas, decide who is going to fix them and what we are going to do about them. I think you have to do that. I think you have to make the commitment to it and to see to it that when the equipment has been fielded, you have got a trained crew to handle the equipment and maintain it; where you have parts and you have manuals; you have a system in place that has accepted the equipment into the division and you are able to handle it effectively. That is the lesson that I learned there and the lesson that I would pass on."

- MAINTENANCE

"Those of us who command divisions are not normally from the maintenance background really. It behooves us to understand what those kids are doing to get our stuff done, and that they have peculiar problems that you have to understand. They are doing a great job and they want to do the job right. We can do things to help them do their job if we are smart. For instance, when you have a roll out, unless it is absolutely necessary, don't make those kids from the maintenance battalions who are already understructured, load all their test gear and equipment and get ready to roll only to be told to take it back down again. You have now spent one whole day loading up a damn maintenance battalion and putting it back down again. You have lost a day's work and at the same time, honked off a whole raft of soldiers who will say things like 'Yes, caring is big around here -- tell me about it.' You need to roll your men from time to time, but do it advisably."

"What I have done is place a great deal of emphasis on maintenance. Within 90 days after he takes command, I require each battalion commander to brief me on his maintenance program. I go down and he personally briefs me on every aspect of his program. Incidentally, I don't want his XO, the motor officer, or the maintenance tech briefing me; I want the battalion commander to brief me on every aspect of his maintenance program. Then I walk through every arms room, every supply room, every NBC room, every commo and the motor pool. By then, I get a warm fuzzy feeling or a feeling of despair if I don't see what I think we need. That is my walk through -- we call it a BMB (Battalion Maintenance Briefing). Following this walk through, the unit is subject to a command maintenance inspection. This inspection is a detailed inspection of the entire maintenance and supply programs in the battalion. The program has been successful because it has forced the battalion commanders to develop a maintenance program. It has forced them to stay right on top of it and in 22 months we have only had three battalions receive an unsatisfactory rating. They were re-inspected and did very well. So the maintenance program within the division is good because I have forced the battalion and the brigade commanders into establishing a maintenance program and maintaining a high standard by my personally walking through every aspect of their maintenance areas and programs with every battalion commander at least once and many of them twice."


"You have to force the battalion commander and the brigade commander to develop a program of maintenance and a program of taking care of their

equipment. I would tell them to push that. I would have my assistant division commander for support involved on a daily basis with equipment-related issues and I would have the G-3 involved with recommending or requesting changes to MTOE document concerning equipment. Not much more can be done."

"Do you realize, we don't put enough emphasis on training our TAMMS clerks. We have these romantic guys -- the infantry guy, the tanker and the attack helicopter pilot. They are romantic because they go out and do what they are supposed to do in meeting the enemy. You just kind of take your TAMMS clerk off the 'Hey you roster' and put him down there. So you get the wrong thing and you say, 'Well, who did this?'"

- PREVENTIVE
MAINTENANCE CHECKS
AND SYSTEMS

"So, I would tell you that probably one of the single areas that I have tried to focus on since I have been here (and I had this belief going into the division, so it has not changed) is that driver and operator PMCS, and first line leader supervision of PMCS, are first off probably one of our problems in the maintenance business. It is the single area where you can make the greatest impact if you can correct it. I try to focus at that level."



PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

"I instituted some OPD classes at the divisional level, which focused on key combat multipliers. They were for the entire division. For example, we did one on river crossings. We did another one on obstacle breaching. Both of these happened to be among the seven critical tasks that I have identified as being ones in which the division needs to be expert. We held classes and demonstrations in the field for a half day or so where all the divisional officers came, and we demonstrated the procedures and the processes associated with breaching complex obstacles. We did a similar one as I said on river crossing, which included a TEWT. We did one on survivability positions. That was for both officers and NCOs to set the standards; how you put them in; to determine the length of time that it would take for planning purposes. We came up with some standards. I did that on the OPD particularly and to a lesser extent, perhaps, on the NCOPD."

"We have developed a series of senior officer tactical seminars - - we call them SOTS. Those bring in the battalion commanders, the brigade commanders and as many company commanders as we can. We have great long discussions and demonstrations on such things as river crossing techniques, rear area and air assault operations, communications support to an infantry division and such broad subjects as that."

"The doctrine is also briefed. I have an opportunity to give my views on the doctrine and how we would visualize doing things here in division. We have found that to be a great way to increase our professional development of our leaders. Another thing that we have done, whenever

we can, is to have a staff ride. We will do that . . . each year and we will go out and we will walk through a particular battle. We took all day and walked through it in great detail and I think that is a good technique..."

"In our training management quarterly briefing, normally the brigade and battalion commander will brief me on the OPD and the command sergeant major will brief me on the NCOPD. I think the true test of both of those programs is in the quality of the material that is presented in those monthly and weekly presentations. We have gone a step further as having some other units with regard to our noncommissioned officers with a diagnostic test that is administered upon their arrival within the division. If they do not perform to an acceptable level in that diagnostic test, they attend a senior leader refresher course that is run by our noncommissioned officer academy."

"For officers we have both a Company Commander's Course and a course that we are putting together now for new lieutenants arriving in the unit. I think that those are proper augmentations to the Officer Professional Development that is taking place in our school system."

"I'm big on using historical examples and on officers understanding the mistakes that have happened in the past so that we don't repeat them in the future. When I first got to the division I used the 106th Division and the Golan Heights as OPD subjects. I picked the 106th because we don't like to talk about our defeats."

"The battalion and company commanders don't have the time to prepare elaborate OPDs. The train just moves too fast. The division staff, however, has the experience, technical capability and the wherewithal administratively to prepare good OPDs. I thought that if we prepared and packaged them in an interesting way they could be sent down to the battalions and we could make money. I always wanted my G-2 to put together things on the Soviets that were interesting. For example, the battle of Kursk. The key is to grab the interest of people so that they not only do it because the old man wants them to do it but because they are interested in knowing what happened."

"In the case of officers, in addition to the normal professional development lecture that the brigade and battalion commanders did, we undertook a multi-tiered certification system where battalions and brigades administered tests to the officers, particularly to the new officers, as they came in and progressed through their unit level learning. In addition, we have a distinguished leader program which is a very difficult test patterned after what we think the military qualification test will be once it is published. That requires not only book knowledge but also hands on training. For example, in order to complete the course, one of the things an officer would have to do would be to complete the post level 40 hour TAMS/PLL course. It is a multi-tiered process. The NCOs have a similar system."



ETHICS

- PERSONAL PHILOSOPHY

"One of the points on my philosophy is 'integrity is not negotiable.' I comment on that in every one of those groups to make the point. I simply tell everybody that that is the most important thing and I will never intentionally have a policy or issue instructions that would intentionally put them into a position where they would have to choose between their principles and what they perceive I want. They need to know that up front; that I would never do that and if ever they feel they are in that position, then they know the answer, because I didn't do that intentionally. They have got to let me know; and let their commanders know."

"I don't believe I can overemphasize the division commander's role in setting the proper example for ethics and integrity."

"It is the old story of if you cannot stand bad news, you are not going to get much of it, and if you do not get much of it, you are going to be kept in the dark. That will be detrimental to everybody."

"We should not tolerate someone playing around with somebody else's wife, or fraternizing with someone in his own chain of command, or in a way that brings discredit to the uniform. The more senior the person involved the more sure you have to be that that standard is upheld. And you have to tell your staff, "Do not allow me to do anything illegal." I mean that. It is like the aide sending a helicopter after a beer glass -- do

not let that happen. If I am going to do something illegal, let me know. You may want to do something illegal sometime. I would tell my subordinates so that they feel more comfortable, that I will not say something about them to their superior that I didn't say to them first. If I have a problem with someone, I will address it to them. That is also ethics."

"You can say what you want but the fear of failure, the fear of getting a quietus put on your career at the last minute will cause you to say things you really didn't want to say. Here again, I try to put the onus on myself. I want to have an atmosphere that will allow you to tell me the truth without the fear that you just don't get hanged, embalmed and buried all in one easy motion. Understanding, I'm not going to like it but your fear is not to the extent that you will violate your ethical code. I figure that if I provide that atmosphere, and you are still unethical; then we really don't need you in the officer corps."

- ETHICAL ISSUES

"I did have an incident that occurred fairly early with regard to ethics on the part of more than one of my subordinates, and I did act quickly and properly and I think it had a desired effect and did not result in any unjust treatment on the part of the individuals. Example and proper action in the enforcement of ethical practices are the two key principles for the division commander."

"A young captain was told by his battalion exec on his second day on the job to go get some guidons for the batteries. 'The last S-4 I gave that job to couldn't do it, let's see if you can do it.' So, the poor guy went down to see where the guidons were made, and it turns out that they had been on order for a long time. He had been told that, it turns out that they hadn't been, but he had been told that. So because this is the way it has been done in a number of units, I found out, he goes over to the alteration shop and he sees that guy. That guy says, 'Oh, yes, we do that all the time. I'll fix you some guidons. You just go get the battery supply sergeant and have a bunch of fellows sign the alteration slips,' the ones where soldiers have patches sewn on because they are authorized to have four patches each sewn on. 'If you bring enough of those over here, by God, I'll give you the guidons. Have them next week.' So sure enough he did that. One battery sergeant took it up. Battery commander signed the things. Well, one battery supply sergeant blew the whistle as he should have. There was a big investigation, you know, 18 reams of 15-6 about to crucify this young captain. I did have a little discussion with that young kid. Now the guidons are all taken care of, all paid for, the batteries all got them and all that good stuff. We aren't doing that one anymore. But you see the system put that on that captain. Well, I talked to that young guy, the battalion S-4. He's a good kid. He made an error. He will never ever make that error again."

"If you question a subordinate on why he is C-2 instead of C-1 in training, in such a manner which might cause that subordinate to say, 'Next month I will be C-1. To hell with it, if that is what the old man wants, then that's what we will be,' and it will permeate the ranks. This division may be C-1 on paper, but I'll be a son-of-a-gun, we can't find our way off the post. If


you lead your subordinates to believe that you do not trust them then you are going to set up an ethical situation where they will give you what you want rather than the truth. The staff and the commanders will tell you what you want to hear. Whether that is the truth or fiction is up to you."

- COMMAND ENVIRONMENT

"Relax and recognize that we cannot accomplish everything all the time. Cause positive things to happen that make things better. If you rather beat folks up, they will perceive that the boss cannot stand this set of circumstances and feel obligated to somehow or other cause it to appear different than it really is."

"If you pay an awful lot of attention to something and want something to happen it will probably happen. At least on paper. It may not happen in reality. It may happen because something is going on in the motor pool that sergeants and lieutenants are scratching their heads over. Cursing the division commander, because he was perceived to have wanted that, and in actuality all he did was make some comment on the rating scheme. And up the chain it comes. And then all kinds of substitutions are happening, or false reports are being given."

"In the seminars we have with company commanders and battalion commanders, I have tried to make sure that they know they can give me and their leaders bad news without fear. We have gone through some leadership and ethical discussions as part of OPD; not with all of the officers at one time. There are almost 1,000 officers in a division."



PERSONNEL

● PERSONNEL SYSTEM

"We have a centralized personnel system that provides you the people, trained in the various MOSs and in the various grades. It is very difficult to make changes in that. It is a frustrating area. It seems that I probably spend more time sending messages, letters, or talking with people from MILPERCEN or the FORSCOM DCSPER or J-1 now trying to get help in areas where I am short critical MOSs or critical grades within the division. We can cross level, and we do try and keep it as equitable as we can within the division. But that is a tough area."

"That is a tough one. I have not solved that. It becomes just a constant battle and my observation is that every other division commander is battling just as hard. The system kind of shifts back and forth depending upon who is in the worst hurt at any particular time, and then there is an honest attempt to help. I think everybody tries to help the system, but I think that the personnel system has some serious problems."

"I think the selection process for battalion commanders is good. It has been my experience that 98 percent of the guys want to do well. They want to be on a winning team."

- AWARDS

"I think that the division commander's awards policy is going to be one of great interest to people and I think they are going to be very interested in his rating profile. They are going to be interested in his award system. He needs to address how he is going to do that. I, for one, am the kind of guy that believes in the Army Achievement Medal particularly if something needs to go on a soldier's chest in a situation where he knows he has done something that deserves it and the people around him know he has done something to deserve it. I think he needs to do special kinds of things to recognize deserving persons."

"Each soldier needs to have his exit from his unit marked in some way that demonstrates that people thank him for what he did. Whether that means giving him a coin, a certificate or a reward or whatever but it needs to be accomplished. I would suggest that a breakfast with the battalion commander for the departing soldiers is a good way to go."

- REGIMENTAL SYSTEM

"COHORT is a great program. It works. The regimental system also has a lot of utility. The problem with COHORT though, when you reach a point where you have a large number of COHORT units, certainly when more than half are COHORT, you have a significant disparity between the haves and the have nots. The COHORT units are protected in their structure. They are pretty close to being 100 percent or more in personal fill. When they are initially filled, there are more than that to account for a certain amount of attrition. When MILPERCEN (TAPA) looks at you and certain critical MOSs, they look at you in the aggregate and they say, 'Well, you are at 102 percent in your IIBs.' But I say, 'Yes, I am at 108 percent in the COHORT units.' I have five COHORT Rifle Companies and three non-COHORT units. So if I am at 108 percent in my COHORT units and 102 overall, that tells you automatically that my non-COHORT units run around 91, 92 percent. That is true. Then it gets further exacerbated if you are short, across the board, in certain technical MOSs. If you are short 76Y in infantry companies, you fill it with IIBs. That is one more that falls out; the same with your PLL Clerk, or TAMMS clerk whoever it may be. That is the other side of COHORT. My position is, when you reach that kind of a point, you really have to go COHORT to the entire outfit in order to try to protect them."

"I think the regimental system is a positive system. COHORT is as well, at the company level and below. But I don't think it helps much above company, and those units that are non-COHORT have problems if you are not filled to your authorized strengths."

"The regimental system is broken. So is COHORT, a tank size COHORT is broken. It personally distressed me that the regiments in my division, and I didn't serve in any of them, the (blank) and (blank) Armored and (blank) Infantry regiments are being redesignated. I would say that an outfit that is only 47 years old still has its history walking around through its veterans and needs to build on that. When you take that tie away from the past, in the absence of a real true rotation between units of like designation, we have done something that we need to relook."

- PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT

"I am the assignment officer for all field grade officers and for all E8s and E9s. I place them. I personally make all of the assignments on that."

"I would recommend to a division commander that he do his own officer management at the field grade level and charge the brigade commanders to do it for the company grade."



FAMILY ACTION

- SCHOOLS

"I do need to be involved in community planning and resource allocations. I need to know what goes on in the schools. The schools get more folks upset in a community just like they do in Falls Church, Virginia. I need to be involved in those kinds of things. I think a fellow should want to do that, not because he doesn't want to play with his division in the field; that is really what I want to do first. But, when I take that division to the field, I want to have a relatively good feeling that their families are being treated properly and they are getting resourced as well as they can and I have some kind of impact on what is going on back there."

- CONCERNS

"A new division commander that hasn't been to Europe in a while needs to be alert to everything that impacts on the family."

"You have to protect, I think, the programs that are most important to families. If there is something that has been reemphasized to me it is that job satisfaction and programs have a lot more to do with the soldier's performance, as measured by their morale, attitude, and reenlistment, than a lot of people believe. It is a readiness issue. One ought to keep that in mind. You just can't cut family programs in order to finance your training programs."

"The principal challenge where family issues are concerned that I and my subordinate commanders and staff have been and are confronted with is that of the expectations of programs for families on the installation as opposed to the resourcing that I have available with which to meet those expectations."

- FAMILY CARE PLANS

"I will tell you that I think that you ought to look at the sole parents and family care plans too. Family care plans are broken. Family care plans for sole parents and dual parents are not anywhere near reflective of what would actually happen if we went to war. We are working on that. I think every division in the Army is."

- DEALING WITH FAMILY PROBLEMS

"I think the greatest challenge was establishing a family support system at battalion and company level. How we attacked that was we set up a course of instruction that lasted one day. We brought in wives of company commanders and first sergeants or if they weren't married then a designated representative, if you will, and started giving formal instructions on what was available on post to help the people in their unit; how to set up a communication system so that the married people in the unit know how to get help; and what help is available to them on post. That has really been well received. We worked hard at that and kept track of who in each company was qualified in this course. The psychiatrist comes in and gives them a little bit on stress management. ACS explains the ACS program. A lot of literature is passed out. The biggest thing that it gets volunteers in each company who are willing to go out and work with the people of the company, so there is a friendly face or person to call."

"The division needs to provide the resources and the support to the wives of these battalion commanders, command sergeant majors, company commanders' wives and first sergeants so that they can get involved. Now I agree that wives don't get paid and they are not in the Army, but with 59 percent of our soldiers married and their families are here, if the wives don't get involved, these young families suffer. So I would tell them to check on the battalion family support programs to make sure that they are in existence; that the division has a family support program within the division; and that a family resource center is available to assist the battalions as they do their family support programs. There must be a way of taking care of the family when the unit is deployed. I think it is all part of readiness because a soldier will perform much better if he knows his family is being taken care of while he is gone."

"I knew they were doing well at the National Training Center. They were doing well on the reserve components. They are doing well on this. They are doing well on that. They were doing well on re-enlistment. They were doing well on this. I said, 'Where are they paying the price? You have to pay the price some place.' I was having some family disturbances. I said, 'I'll tell you where we were paying the price.' We have these guys running down the road at a high rate of speed. He goes home and the kids aggravate him. They are all hollering and the wife is mad because he didn't show up on time so he pops on them. Then you've got a family disturbance. Sometimes it was a habitual thing and sometimes it was an isolated thing. You started to look at incidents with children. I get a report once a week on how many children come in where it appears that that child may have been abused. I think we are paying the price at home. That became my number one obstacle on this post that I wanted to break down. That's when

I went to a command five day week training program. Now I don't know what you are going to do when you get home, but I am going to give you the opportunity to get there. All right, Mr. Commander, Monday to Friday, if you have to do anything else, you and I will talk about it and I will approve it. If I determine that you want to make up a shortfall on the weekend or holiday that you could have done during the week, I won't let you do it."

"I do make it a point to have one of the senior officer wives, one of the senior NCO wives, the DPCA and the garrison commander attend all these meetings. The commander has to understand that he puts a wet blanket on a whole lot of things because you might get a lady in there who is the wife of the Command Sergeant Major of the First Brigade. She doesn't want to come out and say a whole lot of things that are uncomplimentary to the post because she doesn't know what kind of recourse will be directed towards her husband. You have to understand the fact that she is sensitive to that. I don't go to them but I have several responsible representatives attend. If this person over here heard it one way and this person over here heard it a different way, I can say 'Wait a minute here.'"

"You have some special duty personnel up at the ACS building. Who do you send to the ACS building but an SD? Some clown that you don't need and somebody you want to get rid of. Well, who is the first person that a young 18 year old wife sees when she walks into the ACS building? That clown that you wanted to get rid of. It is just a whole Catch-22. I told my brigade commanders, 'I want you to check all of these people coming up to the ACS building and all these other places where they are dealing with the family members and the public and put your stamp of approval on them.' Now I said, 'If you send me a dirt bag, I am going to bring him back to you and I am going to take your driver or I am going to take the guy who is sitting right outside your office. You can either select a good guy to go up there or I will select one for you.'"

"Each housing area has its own mayor, who is elected. I meet with them about once a quarter. They have an opportunity to tell me their problems. We give them some feedback about what is going on. I think that has a lot to do with getting to the families. I wish it would work even better. I wish more people would participate in the kinds of activities the mayors sponsor. Mayors will have town meetings and I wish we had a bigger turnout than we do. You tend to get the same kinds of people who are interested, and they are the best citizens to begin with. But, still, those mayors know the people in their communities. They do get out, the more active ones particularly. They will go door to door and they will work it for you. I think that is helpful. We have cable TV on post; a contract to provide that. There is a channel on there that is available to us so we can make information available. That is helpful."



INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT

- BUDGET LIMITATIONS

"This is a very, very difficult year. Making changes in a budget and budget uncertainty really impact on training. There are certain things that everybody knows are going to get paid because you have no choice. You are going to meet the payroll, and you are going to keep the lights turned on, and you are going to pay the utilities bills and the water bill and all that other business. When you squeeze it all down, basically what you have is some limited dollars for maintenance and repair, some limited dollars for training, and that is it. If you are going to go beyond that, then you have to start affecting the payroll. You do have to draw down on your work force. This is a tough year here I would say. From an installation management point of view, the dollar cuts this year and last year were our biggest problem."

- UNDERSTANDING THE SYSTEM

"The Army has a course they give on installation management. It probably would be well for you, if you couldn't go to the whole course, at least to go spend some time. You need to understand how the Army's appropriation systems works so that you know what is possible. You need to be able to talk the language, at least in general terms of the civilian personnel system and the DEH (Director of Engineering and Housing) and his system. The DEH probably spends about half of your budget. They get a big piece of it anyway; certainly on the BASOPS side. That is probably what I would suggest that you study and pay attention to. You need to know what a commander can, in fact, do and what he can't do."

Where he can make a difference and where it is that he can achieve savings, potentially, so you don't waste your time trying to squeeze it out of areas that aren't squeezable."

"You have to understand the different kind of monies that are available and what your authority and what your limitations are in regard to funding. You have to understand the planning process that goes on in whatever theater you are in as far as how long it takes to get things done. The prioritization process that goes on is important. You certainly have to understand the structure of your community or installation. You have to understand contracting. You have to understand the fact that there are great numbers of civilians out there that, because of the nature of the beast, operate differently. A GS whatever is not at the same beck and call as a staff sergeant. At the same time, that GS whatever is probably just as dedicated in many instances as the staff sergeant. The installation organization has to be understood because there might be a reason that you may want deviation. I have deviated in order to take care of my youth activities program. I will tell you some things you need to get involved in. You need to understand civilian personnel. You will find that you need to get involved with DODDS (Department of Defense Dependent Schools) and be aware of your requirements and responsibilities. You are going to find that they are more than what you think they are. You need to be involved with your hospital commander. You will learn that he is a dedicated professional who is doing his damndest to provide the best medical service. It is not going to do much good to raise hell with him. You need to try and help him as much as possible because he is hamstrung for reasons that you will find out if you don't already know. You need to be very involved with the AAFES (Army/Air Force Exchange System) people."

"I believe the division commander who is responsible for this installation has a great challenge because resources are tightly constrained. It is relatively easy to go out and train a division and bring them to a high state of readiness. To run an installation with a lack of BASOPS funds and with everything in the way of new construction being put back year after year is very, very difficult. The most challenging thing that I believe the division commander will have to do in peacetime is to run the installation as well as command his division. My recommendation is to go out and visit other division commanders who are running installations. Spend time with them, and find out what their problems are and how they have gone about resolving them. I don't think there is any particular school you can go to that is going to tell you how to do this. So, my best advice would be to go out to visit other division commanders who have installation commands and learn from them."

"I was very vulnerable in contracting. The regulation will tell you what you can do and what you can't do in terms of the amounts of money and how to go about entering into a contract and contract administration. This is not very complimentary for use but we had a contract going with a facility here. This contractor was supposed to do X amount of work. Being

the can-do type people that soldiers are, they would look at something and say, 'I need you to do this over here.' The contractor would be glad to do that. 'Oh yes, we would be happy to do that.' Before you knew it, we were about to have a cost overrun which all of a sudden you have to say, 'Stop, we'll have to cut this out to stay within the bounds of my authority.' Contracting and contract administration is something that I would advise any perspective division commander to come up to speed on if he is not already and be on the lookout for a good contract administrator to overlook his contract."

"Visit your ACS people and find out what makes them work. I am involved in Boy Scouts. It is a great program. I have learned much about Boy Scouts in this last year. It is important to go to those things. The guy who gets to be a good commander understands the impact of his person, just as a battalion commander does. His presence means something. The people that have those jobs are crying for attention."

"I think the new commander needs to come up to speed on commissary and PX activities so he'll know how to deal with that and get the best service from his commissary."

"There are three guys that I would tell any installation commander that he needs to get into his hip pocket and almost be on a first name basis with him. One is his JAG: his lawyer. I don't mean in terms of court-martialing people. I mean staying within the law of the state and the country. Also, staying within the regulations of the Army. Two, is your PAO. As battalion commander, you didn't want to be bothered with the PAO. You didn't even speak to the PAO. You ran the PAO off. Your PAO will save you some grief. You need to make sure that he has a good relationship with the people downtown. They will start to develop a relationship with the reporters who will report on that particular installation. The third guy is your IG. I want the IG meetings not only to be for the soldiers but for the family members, the civilian work force and anybody else that comes on this post."

- OPERATING PROCEDURES

"It's a city. You have to do a lot of servicing to the city that you don't have on your TO&A organization. You are just going to have to slip this guy in there and modify your TDA to show that he is performing that job. Now, it becomes your responsibility before you take some fellow and put him in there that he has done everything that is expected of a major from an Army point of view; he's been an S-3, and he's been an XO before you do that."

"You've got to have a program where you check your DUIs on post. You need to know what you can do and what you can't do and have a good program on checking vehicles. You'd be surprised at the number of vehicles that are in operation now that have firearms in them."

"I had a program one day where I was going to check every fourth vehicle. You have a sign at the gate that says that car is subject to search. We blitzed

every fourth vehicle. I collected 13 firearms in 60 minutes one of which was a sawed-off loaded shot gun."

"I set up a little building. That is my retiree headquarters. You know you get one of these old retired brethren who wants to use the telephone. He wants to sit down. He wants to get a cool drink of water. He doesn't have to ask anybody if he can come in. He can just walk in there and get it. I just put up a little building with a sign on it that says, 'All right, retiree, you come right here. This is your building. You just go in there.' Now, is that within the letter of the law? It's not outside the letter of the law."

"But getting the facility engineers to be more responsive to the needs of the people in the barracks, the regular buildings, and the quarters was the biggest single problem that I had."

- **DISTRACTOR**

"I'd say installation takes 50 to 55 percent of my time. You attack a division problem and solve it. An installation problem takes a little bit longer because a lot of the things you do has to be done by contract."

"On an installation, you have got to be concerned about volunteers; ACS, Red Cross and all of that. You don't have enough people for all of that. You have to hit the volunteers. Every time I go to one of these high powered seminars where we get together and talk about the second millennium and all that kind of stuff, we say that we will get volunteers to do that. It is hard to get volunteers. More and more wives are working now. They want to be paid. A lot of the time, it is hard to get qualified volunteers."