

# **DIVISION COMMAND LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAM**



**EXPERIENCES IN DIVISION COMMAND  
1989**

"Don't be phony. Be yourself. Don't adopt any new style just because you think you are some sort of a special guy. You are just a lucky guy. You are a guy who the Chief of Staff of the Army has thought possesses the characteristics that will allow you to command a good division. Just be open and straight forward. We are all not perfect. Admit your foibles, if you have any, correct your deficiencies, and drive on."



March 1990

### FOREWORD

This document contains selected quotations from the written debriefings of ten Division Commanders who have completed their tenure of command during this last year. It is a collection of their thoughts, compiled to stimulate thinking about what it takes to be an effective division commander and to provide insights helpful to practitioners and students of the art of command. It is not a "cookbook" with recipes for success — but rather, the fruit of years of experience.

PAUL G. CERJAN  
Major General, USA  
Commandant  
U.S. Army War College

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## ***PREPARATION FOR COMMAND***

### **• SURPRISES**

"I think the thing that surprised me the most was the lack of specificity in the long range plans for the division. It is not a function of what the division can do for itself, it's a function of how well the Army can project training plans and participation in exercises like REFORGERS or NTC rotations or corps CPXs and those types of major events. We need to be able to lock in at the division level a training calendar of about three years. We've been unable to do that."

"I think the single biggest surprise that I had was how long it takes to implement the programs from the division level all the way down to the company level. For instance, consider something so simple as what kind of training is to be done. Every training event should conclude with a meaningful after action review. You say that to the assembled company commanders, battalion commanders or brigade commanders. You expect after action reviews to be something that would be implemented and done in a matter of weeks. Yet, you go to do a training inspection after making such announcements or writing policy statements about that sort of thing, and you find out that company commanders in some brigades or battalions alleged that they never heard about the policy or saw it written — or are unaware of how to conduct a good after action review. I would say that communications and the ability to get the word from the division commander or from the division headquarters to the company

commander is something that is absolutely important, yet it takes so long to make it happen."

"I was surprised by two things. One was the level of motivation of the soldiers and the emphasis on training in the division. I had heard about this and was pleasantly surprised to see it with my own eyes. The second was the effort required to effect change in a full size armored division of about 17,000 soldiers that is geographically fractured due to its stationing."

• READINGS

"As far as any particular subjects that I could have been better versed in, I would say, you can never get enough of the budget as to how you handle it, especially, with all the cuts and the constraints. I also don't think we can ever do enough reading on war-fighting. I certainly reviewed FM 100-5 and some of the professional readings that our famous historian, Brigadier General Bill Stofft, said that we should all read — The First Battle, The Killer Angels and some of those manuals. I had been away from divisional type training for several years. To get myself well founded on the principles of training per FM 25-100, I had to read that in some detail. You just can't read that manual. You have to study it to really get the thrust of it."

"I would probably go back and review one more time the AR 220-1 which has been changed a couple of times over the last few years. I believe that our problem in unit status reporting is that the powers to be, and I am talking about Army and JCS level, read that as unit readiness reporting. It is not a Unit Readiness Report. It is a Unit Status Report. It is a snapshot in time of where you are with your unit. If, in fact, you tried to turn that into a unit readiness report, then you are drawing the wrong conclusions, in my opinion. It is perceived to be at higher levels as a readiness report. I think that is a mistake."

"I would spend a little more time in reviewing the literature that existed, the BTMS type literature which has been captured by field manuals like FM 25-2, 3, and 4. They contain a lot of good information on how training should be managed and conducted."

"I would read everything I could about that unit. You need to understand the peculiar unit MTO&Es, the different MOSs, and anything that you can about the war fighting issues of this division."

"I would recommend that all new commanders, whether they be division commanders or not, read and understand three manuals. One is FM 25-100, on training. Everything that is in there is right down the line in accordance with sound training practices. You can't go wrong if you follow that and, beyond just following it, in the development of your training, teach that to your subordinates and require them to follow it. The next is FM 100-5 on operations. The principles in FM 100-5 pertaining to operations are sound, basic

principles that everyone should have a good grasp of. The other one that is a good one is FM 22-103: leadership and command at the senior levels. That is just a good review. There is some good reflective reading in there that one should go back every once in a while and read and just think about, because there are some good lessons and good principles there that one should follow."

- **READINESS**

"I would certainly try to understand the 2715 and would not be lulled into a false sense of security by referring back on my previous experience. There have been enough changes and enough nuances that you really need to understand the system as it is today."

- **LOGISTICS**

"It probably would have been more on the budget management and logistics side of things. While the readiness levels were high, we've found that we have tremendous problems in maintenance and logistics."

"But it's the ability to understand, first of all, the maintenance process, and particularly built around the 2404, the document register, etc. If you don't understand that as a division commander, you should immerse yourself in it as well as FM 100-5. So you can go in and do the sort of top down clarity in terms of guidance of what you expect."

- **FORCE  
INTEGRATION**

"The dynamics of training and the dynamics of force modernization or force integration have been so great that if you wandered away from what divisions were doing and the type of equipment they had, you would be at a terrific deficit. If in fact you desire to be a division commander, you should continually be preparing yourself by staying current on doctrine, on the types of equipment that you have, and on the type of equipment that you anticipate will be in your organization."

"There is no cram course for division commanders. I think you have to assess several areas of your own weaknesses or strengths, and then try to figure out where you need to plug it in. In my case, I tried to strengthen my understanding of the new weapon systems that were coming in and tried to, again, understand the latest doctrine, particularly in the area of FM 25-100 which was in several forms of draft by that time."

- **HIGHER HQ**

"I would visit my higher headquarters. I would talk to the staff and the commanders and determine what problems they perceived with relationships between the commands."

"I think it is important that you talk to the Chief of Staff of the Army. You want to make sure that you are doing what your boss wants you to do."

"The week at Leavenworth was very helpful. The opportunity to talk to former division commanders was beneficial. The Chief of Staff of the Army's round table with all general officers about to go into division command was most helpful. It focused us all on what it is we ought to be doing and where we ought to have our major emphasis."

"I think it is important to talk to people who have commanded. I would say that is important."

"I would be very comfortable with what the Corps expects from subordinate organizations and what I could expect from the Corps. We have been guilty in my opinion in the last few years of driving everything to the Corps plugs. Echelons Above Corps will take care of that particular issue."

## • TRAINING

"I think, probably the best thing that you can do in a heavy division to get ready for command is to go out and spend a rotation at the National Training Center. You don't have to live in the field, although it makes it a lot easier if you can take a cot, set it up out there, and kind of watch and listen. I would spend all 28 days or so out there. I would watch them go through the dust bowl. I would move to the field with them. I'd watch every one of the battles, go to every one of the AARs [After Action Reviews], talk to the OCs [Observer Controllers], and just sit down on some of those hilltops and think about how I would do that, if I were over there as commander, because that's the way you have to think about your training program."

"I think, that early on, I would try to understand all the wartime missions of the division and try to ensure that I clearly understood the mission essential tasks that flow from that wartime mission, and also, the doctrinal issues related to those METL tasks."

"I think the offensive employment of an armored division, especially in Central Europe, is an area to which I would devote time. I believe we need to be able to fight both ways. Sometimes I think there is overemphasis on the defense at the expense of the offense. So, I would look at the offensive employment of an armored division."

"Get in the European environment, the NTC, or if you are going to the Pacific — go and sit in Korea — but get your head into the game. Where am I going to be fighting with these soldiers? That is the essence of what this is all about."

## • REFLECTIONS

"What I needed was time to reflect. I'm not sure what a guy can learn a month or two months before going into division command. I think it's a question of getting your head screwed on right, and reflecting on what you want to tell people and how you want to present it to them. What do you want out of the command? What are your goals?"

How are you going to articulate those goals? How are you going to mobilize the energy of the division to accomplish your goals, the Chief of Staff's goals, or whatever. I think that is something that requires some thought. Too often, people come in without having focused their energy on what they want. That takes time."

"I think what you need to do is to make an assessment. I said early on that I was not going to make major changes. I was going to look around for 30 days; so everyone carry on, and let me make an assessment of where we are. So, in those 30 days I went around to every command, every community, looked in motor pools, looked in billets, looked at a lot of soldiers, talked to a lot of soldiers and leaders, and tried to get a feel for the division before I tried to make a lot of changes. I would always recommend that you do that 'dipstick', as I call it — check to make sure that you are not coming in there on day one and making a lot of changes."

"You come into command with ideas about some things that need to be done. These help you form hypotheses on the training and leadership vision for the division. You then spend 45 to 60 days doing an assessment to confirm or change these ideas. While doing that assessment, you are busy building a team among the leadership in the division. I think this approach works. It worked for me. I have confirmed this approach for preparing myself by talking to many people about their approach to division command."

"Be careful about your good ideas because the organization is already very busy. If you are going to implement something, establish a new program, you ought to make every effort to remove something from the plate so that there is a proper balance. You ought to make every battalion commander tell you just how they are going to implement the programs that you consider important."

"I reflected on every division commander that I have ever worked for. I tried to list the good points and the bad points. I wanted to make sure that I used those good ideas. I wanted to make sure that I did not do those kinds of things that would send the wrong signal to the subordinate units, especially the soldiers. I talked to other former division commanders whom I respected and who were successful in my opinion. I listened to what they had to say about the kinds of things that brought them success and took note of that. I read books about former division commanders who had been successful and tried to pattern my leadership style and do the things in division command that best suited my temperament and personality based on some of the good ideas that I had learned. I think, on reflection, that I probably should have had more one on one discussions with battalion commanders than I had with the current crop of battalion commanders. I happen to now believe that it is very important to get just the battalion and division commanders in some forum where they can frequently discuss the issues that are either bothering the


battalion commanders or that are going well with the battalion commanders."

"I would tell them to make a list of things that worked for them and things with which they had difficulty in their previous commands. Then, to look at how they would apply those in a division, a much larger and more complex tactical organization."

"When I talked at my change of command ceremony, I told them that my program was built on five tenants — taking care of soldiers, taking care of soldiers' families, leader development, cohesion, and combat readiness. I told them that the subject of cohesion was particularly important to me. I was talking about cohesion not only within the organization, but external as well to include the communities."

- **COMMUNITY  
COMMAND**

"There ought to be some discussions about whether or not they really understand and appreciate how a European community works. What a military community really means in Europe. How they intend to tackle that particular problem of being a community commander as well as a division commander."



## ***READINESS***

"I would say to a prospective new division commander that he ought to get the feel for what kind of procedures are in place throughout the division to give him the information that he needs to be very comfortable with readiness of the division in every level whether it is in the 1, 2, 3, or 4 arena. Above all, I would say that he must place some emphasis on what force modernization is going to do to his readiness and how that is going to impact on his ability to do his war fighting skills."

"To me, the Command Inspection program really is a driver for readiness, because it drives the responsibility in the whole spectrum of combat readiness down to that brigade commander. The division has to provide him the resources: time, money, and facilities. As a battalion commander, especially as a company commander, you can snap your finger, bark and the next day — things are done. The larger the organization, the longer it takes to get something really done down to the lowest level. I think the Command Inspection Program certainly hinged on readiness."


"If you are not careful, the subordinate will interpret your interest as dissatisfaction with the rating assigned and assume that you would rather see a higher rating than lower."

"I think what produces combat readiness are the same programs that produced it years ago and will continue to produce it for years to come. To produce near-term readiness you have to concentrate on first-class, solid training that produces confident, competent leaders, soldiers who are tough, confident in themselves and in their leaders. Units then can take these well trained soldiers and competent leaders, put it all together and train them to fight as part of a larger organization. It takes solid maintenance of the equipment with which you fight and with which you get to the fight. It also takes a feeling among soldiers that they and their families are well taken care of."

"You have to ensure that the cards are laid out on the table and that your subordinates understand that their career is not on the line if there is a problem in their unit beyond their control."

"We are never as good at these as we should be. One is night operations, because we will jump into combat at night for a couple of reasons. One is safety for us. It minimizes the enemy's capability. Second, it allows us to take maximum advantage of the night vision capabilities that we have, and we have quite a few night vision devices right down within the rifle squads. So, you are never as good at night operations as you should be. The next area is NBC training. We place a lot of emphasis on this at the individual level as well as the unit level. It would be very difficult to have to fight in an NBC environment. Many of the leaders at the lower levels do not understand the difficulties and the requirements associated with that, particularly when you get into decontamination of people and vehicles and so on."

"As a division commander of a tactical unit, you must relate not only to the history of your division, but to what your division represents to the United States and to the soldiers in it — that is a fighting organization. You are the commander of a fighting organization. That is what you have to devote your energy to. They have to know that. If they think you are interested in some other stuff, forget it. It has to be your whole being."



## TRAINING

### ● FOCUS

"I also thought I needed to focus on fighting the division as a division. I didn't want the division to be a training cadre for battalion task forces. It had to be capable of fighting as a division. We chose to reinforce the strengths that were at the battalion level in readiness and training. In addition, we focused on fighting the division as a division."

"I would say that you need to fight a division as a division. It has many moving parts. A lot of different things have to come together to focus combat power. You need to provide opportunities for the various parts of the division — combat, combat support, combat service support, to interact and work together. On the other hand, I think you also need to focus on the fundamentals, the basics, at the soldier and smaller unit level. These two, in combination, would be the advice I would give."

"I know that it is popular to put out large formations — the division — to train a battalion to go to the NTC. My experience is that that is wide of the mark. In fact, that does not help the battalion commander or the commanders in their preparation. What they need is detailed, rigorous, standardized training in specific events such as breaching a complex obstacle or movement to contact. They need rigorous after-action reviews. They need tough training with lots of observation, and lots of observers. I think that the bigger the

exercise, the greater the granularity. I guess, that would be my lesson. You don't need lots of money, you don't need lots of training ground to get these guys ready to go."

"I don't think you are ever going to have enough money. So, you come in with your mind set that I have to train the division without really putting them in the field, and then you start looking for ways to do that. You have to focus on training the units that do the fighting. You have to focus on training your staffs that provide for the synchronization and the control of that effort. You have to focus on training leaders. Some of those things you can do concurrently; but for the most part, you have to have different kinds of training programs to train leaders, staffs, and units. You really have to think about how you do that. How do you train a staff? The easy answer is to have a CPX once a quarter. That's kind of the traditional approach, and we do that. But there are a lot of other things that you have to do. Staff training programs start down in the staff sections. You have to have a leadership style and a climate that allows the staff to take some time off to do the kinds of training that they do there, as opposed to doing their day-to-day business of running the installation, the division, and all of the other things. So it's a mind set that you have to come in with."

"I found that we were doing things that were not strictly based on the METL. I found company commanders doing training that was not oriented strictly to the General Defense Plan. As an example, in my opinion, a mechanized company should not be doing rappelling unless that is part of the GDP, or it is a high priority task on the METL. I think there are too many important things to do rather than wasting time doing rappelling, although it may be fun for the soldiers. It is not an essential task that they will have to do in combat that is going to help them save their lives."

"You have to give some clarity about how you see the fight. Then, how do the division staff, the brigade, and the battalion fold in their training plans for the division fights, so it is under the commander's intent. Likewise the division commander, which I did the first day I was there. In fact, the day before I took over, I went up to the GDP and the day after I took over, on a Saturday, I went knocking on the corps commander's door saying, 'Let me be clear on how you intend to fight. I have some concerns and some fuzzy areas I need to square away with you.' There is clarity that you are supporting your corps commander's concept, scheme of maneuver, and then you articulate that so all the pieces fit. I would give that advice to any new division commander, that he looks up as well as down, and what he is putting out is clearly in line with what his corps commander intends to do so that it all fits, because that is how we fight."

"It's not so much technique, I guess, as it is focus. I think the focus on collective training at company level and individual training and

how to ensure that one supports the other are always the main challenges. It is easy to lose that when you get to brigade and division level."

- **TECHNIQUES**

"I think it is a good idea early in command to ask commanders and command sergeants major for their assessments. What do they think is important? Where do they think the training strengths and weaknesses are? This can do two things. First, it can give you a real assessment of the training strengths and weaknesses of the unit. Second, it can help you build a team, as your commanders and command sergeants major will feel a sense of participation in what you are about to do. I think the whole process of METL development, deriving training tasks from the mission as called for in FM 25-100, certainly was useful. I think a combination of my own assessment done in large part by asking my fellow commanders and command sergeants major for their assessments and the METL process pretty well formed the basis for what needed to be done."

"In training you have to do a training assessment of your particular area and of your particular division. I would say a training environment in Europe is different than a training environment in CONUS, is different than a training environment in Korea. So you have to do that training assessment, and that's what I did. Then I laid out some ways to do both training and management, which is a very key piece of being able to then do actual field and live fire training. But you have to understand the process that gets you to the field and so that is what I tried to instill."

"I am not sure that there is a technique to training. It is a whole series of systems that have to come together at the right time and place. I don't think the Army does enough of just sitting around talking about our business. We have, semi-annually, a war fighting seminar where we have all the commanders, key staff and command sergeant majors in a room. We talk about this business. We'll take a scenario of one of our war plans. We will discuss it. I think that is very healthy."

"Probably the best things that have happened to the United States Army are the combat training centers. NTC, CMTC (Combat Maneuver Training Center), BCTP and the related simulations. Those tools are going to train our leaders of the future. Talk to any of the guys who have been through this thing called TCDC (Tactical Commander Developmental Course). It's a simulation at Leavenworth, in the classroom, where the battalion commanders actually sit down inside the building and sweat as they try to fight the battle. It gets them into the thing that I was just talking about — synchronization, the massing of fires, and the massing of maneuver elements."

"I think you must absolutely understand and implement FM 25-100. It is the Army's training system. We have to quit inventing new ways

of doing things. It is a system that I think works superbly when implemented properly. It makes imminent sense and so from company to division, we need to understand and implement it. If we implement it, then our training will be right on."

"My training philosophy is really summed up best in FM 25-100. Relate it to your mission, relate it to paragraph 3A, and then be able to tell me what you are doing today that relates to mission accomplishment. Go all the way from the individual to the collective and the collective square which is putting the entire organization together. If you can't do that, then you are wasting your time and your soldiers' time. The specifics of my training philosophy are found in FM 25-100. I think that's probably one of the best things that the Army has come out with in years."

"You have to ensure that those people in a priority training cycle are shielded from any possible detractors. I accomplish that by being the only one authorized to task a unit in that cycle and I simply refuse to do it. Secondly, I prescribe that in that cycle we will not have any routine appointments. People will not go to other than leadership schools. This is no time to be sending a soldier off to be a PLL clerk. You may not go on routine leaves or passes and have no routine finance appointments. It is easy to implement within a division. It is a little more complex to implement throughout the community. You must, as an example, keep the finance guys from giving one of the soldiers in priority training a routine finance appointment."

"Be very firm and a bit ruthless about who can task subordinate organizations and then go check it. Also check communities who sometimes are the guilty parties in terms of asking for last minute details that divert soldiers from training."

"We use the battle focus process and try to strip away all of the training that is not essential to that process, as is defined in our mission essential task list. Then we try to create an environment where people can look out in the future and schedule the training that is required."

"I think everybody must understand that training and mission readiness and taking care of soldiers and families is the principal focus. Everybody must understand that you are serious about this. The only way subordinates will get in trouble with you is if they think something is more important. Secondly, I believe you have to build a sense of ownership about training in a division. There must be a lot of talk among commanders meetings, conferences, one-on-one, so that you have a common idea and vision about training in the division. Third, I think there needs to be a feeling in the division that commanders need to be out front. They need to be planning, executing, and assessing training. They must be involved, lead from out front, do some of the training themselves, teach some classes, get

into a tank. They have to be involved so their soldiers understand it is more than just lip service."

"When you see a battalion that has the command sergeant major and the noncommissioned officer corps taking the unit to the field and conducting individual task training while the officer leadership of that battalion is conducting some other type of training, then you have an organization that understands what noncommissioned officers are supposed to be accomplishing. The school system trains them well. My comment is, 'Let them do their job.'"

- **MAINTENANCE**

"Any smart commander will know that maintenance is an integral part of mission readiness. It has to be scheduled and treated just like any other training, and the entire chain of command has to be involved in it. It can't be something that just appears on the training schedule. It has to be spelled out as to what you are going to maintain. The officers and NCOs have to be involved to make certain that it is done right. Maintenance starts with operators doing their PMCS checks under the supervision of the first line leader."

"The biggest problem is the failure of commanders to integrate maintenance into their training. What we don't do is take the same approach to planning and preparing for maintenance that we do for training. There are four elements to a good maintenance program. The first is scheduled maintenance. You can figure out how much time you have to spend on scheduled maintenance. You know how many pieces of equipment that you've got. You know how long it takes to run a service. You know how many times a year you have to do it. You can compute that. Second, there is preventive maintenance checks and services. The thing that is probably the least understood in the US Army today is the activities that soldiers perform to make sure that their equipment is ready to operate. We tend to use it as a panacea for maintenance. What I find is that commanders will schedule maintenance activities and then they will put PMCS on their training, and they have no idea what it is that they want their soldiers to do. Even worse than that, the soldiers don't know what their commanders want them to do so they go out and do the same damn thing; whether it needs it or not. If you use the BTMS process, you can figure ahead of time how much time you need to spend in your motor pool, or in your arms room, or with your NBC equipment on PMCS. Third, there is an element of your maintenance program that I call catastrophic maintenance which is simply fixing things that break as a result of your training activities, or as a result of soldier inaptitude, or poor training. You can't really compute how much time you need, but you can guess it based on your optempo. Then there is a maintenance training element that goes with maintenance. You have to train operators how to drive or operate their weapon system. You have to train mechanics how to be mechanics. You have to train leaders how to provide the supervision and leadership that is required. That is also a requirement. If you

take those four elements of the maintenance program and figure out how much time you need, given your optempo, and program those activities in on your training schedule, then I would say that you have a good maintenance program. That was the problem and is still the problem."

"If you are doing superb training, then you should be doing good maintenance. I have never been able to separate maintenance and training because if you are going to train properly, then you also must do maintenance properly. Good maintenance is nothing more than a part of good training. You must allow ample time in your training program so that you can perform good maintenance. That maintenance must be emphasized every time there is a break in training. In other words, you don't stop maintaining because you are out in the field doing good maneuver training. That should all be one and the same. The mentality that you don't do maintenance until you get into a motor pool is flawed in my opinion. You have to teach battalion commanders how to do that. You must tell them and show them the proper ways to do that in the training environment that you have established. Point out good innovative techniques that good battalion commanders are doing to some of the battalion commanders who have not mastered the art of doing proper balancing of maintenance and good training."

- **JR LEADERS**

"The other thing is the relationship between a platoon leader and a platoon sergeant. It is the most difficult relationship to deal with, in my opinion. You have the greatest age disparity basically than any other. First sergeants and company commanders are a little closer in age. Battalion commanders and battalion sergeant majors age difference is not as disparate. You have a young platoon leader there who for the first time has to deal with an NCO. Unless you can nurture that relationship and have a free flow of communications, you are going to have that platoon sergeant training his soldiers, that platoon leader trying to answer to the company commander about training his unit without the rapport and without the linkage that I am talking about at the lowest level."

"The Army way of training for 200 years has been repetition. You don't have to worry about that today. You tell the soldier one time and then the leadership better get out of the way because he'll run over top of you. In fact, they are so smart that the E5, E6 level leaders are the weakest link in our chain — not because they are not hard charging professionals. When we pin those stripes on them, they are the least experienced with time in service, and the least well trained by the institution. Yet, we put them in the most important job which is training our soldiers. It is a real challenge for the E7s, E8s and E9s, in my mind, to make sure that they have trained the 5s and 6s because they are the ones we are holding responsible for training our soldiers. When I look at this, I would advise anybody to take a look at the quality of the E5s and E6s because they can make or break your

reenlistment program. The first line supervisor is the guy who the soldier has to look in the eye every day. He is the guy who gives the soldier time off if he has a personal problem with his family and makes him work overtime if he screws up — that is the guy who is going to make or break your reenlistment program. If you have some E5s and E6s who are not well trained, not confident, not competent, then, that soldier is not going to look up to him. We will have problems in our Army."

"I feel that noncommissioned officers are the policy implementors of the Army. When you allow noncommissioned officers to function as their job description indicates and as taught in the school, then you will find that your organization will run very well."

- **STANDARDS**

"We have tried to make our training as realistic and as close to battlefield standards as we possibly can. The only time that we compromise is for the safety of our people."

"I would tell them that first of all they have to set the atmosphere for training — inculcate the go-to-war attitude and train to battlefield standards. I cannot over-emphasize standards. There are two kinds of standards. There are the overall battlefield standards around which all training is planned. Then there are individual and crew standards. Everybody ought to have a standard."

"Establish high standards and stick by them. Some simple things that sound pretty simplistic but in my opinion, if they work, they will take you far. Prepare every bit of training in the division as if the President is going to visit you tomorrow. That way you should never be ashamed of anything that is going to happen."

- **MANAGEMENT**

"I tried to get out two or three days a week to observe training. I spent almost all the time with them when a unit was at the NTC. So, the short answer to the question is that I am a great believer in management by walking around, and I tried to get out as much as I could. I don't want to kid you. Being a division commander on a CONUS post does not mean that you have unlimited time to be around the motor pool or to be a great guy out in the field. You don't. These are big operations and you have other commitments. I would also tell you that most people don't need to see a two-star general all the time, either. So, you have to balance your own personal desires to be out with them. Let your colonels, lieutenant colonels, and your brigadier generals grow and do things themselves. You assess training, you assess your readiness, and you assess the state of your command by being with them. You can't do it by reading."


"There are all kinds of people out there who work very, very hard to make training work, but that they can't make it happen without the active assistance of division. That active assistance must, in fact, come from shielding those units that need to do their training, giving

them the resources to train with, then forcing them to go out and train."

"Then, I think, you have to have a policy that everybody goes to the field. Nobody remains in the rear except maybe one man to answer the telephone. That can be a man who is on profile or the supply sergeant. The unit commander and the first sergeant need to be in the field, with everybody else. Then the leaders have to be actively involved. They have to be involved in the planning of the training so that you utilize every available minute for training. It has to be multi-echelon training, so that staffs and the medical section are receiving training at the same time that the infantry squad is receiving training. The leaders have to be out there leading by example. There is another important point I would like to make on that. The division commander and brigade commanders have to do everything possible to eliminate training distractors so that subordinates can get out in the field and function as they are supposed to, with all their people."

"In caring for the soldiers, some commanders misinterpret what caring can really be about. As an example, good hard training properly thought out and not wasting soldiers' time should be the upper most thing in every commander's mind; not just to go and spend four days in the field and not accomplish very much where the soldiers are riding around in the back of an M113 or a Bradley, or just bumping around in the tank and not getting much out of it. There must be a very good plan where every soldier believes and feels that he is getting the kind of training that he joined the Army for. That has a lot to do with caring."

"If you are going to have a recovery exercise, then everybody ought to be in that motor pool from the battalion commander on down. Company commanders ought to be visible. First sergeants ought to be visible. There ought to be a well thought-out plan for recovery just as there was a well thought-out plan for the training so that the soldiers know exactly what they are supposed to do, what time they should arrive and finish. We should adhere to those policies. If we could do eight hours of excellent training, eight hours of good hard situational, hands on training a day — our Army would be untouchable. We will spend 14 to 16 hours a day in most of our military organizations thinking that we are working hard, and there are a lot of individuals working hard. Company commanders will say that they put in 16 to 18 hours. First sergeants say that they put in 16 to 18 hours. Many of the battalion commanders will work ungodly hours. Then there are 40 to 50 percent of the battalion who will only give us three or four hours of good work per day. The goal is to get everyone in the organization to work a good eight hours and then we wouldn't have to put in those ungodly hours by the company commanders, first sergeants, platoon sergeants and some mechanics. That is a challenge for every commander."



## ***FIELD OPERATIONS***

- **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

"Good communications. The inability to push the press-to-talk button and to be assured that everyone heard the command when it went out over the FM Command Net or when it went out over the PCM call. That is the single, hardest, most difficult problem that I found as a division commander — the ability to communicate with everyone that you want to communicate with most of the time."

"When we go to the field with this division, the distances involved makes communication a challenge. We are spread over an area that most of the time a corps size unit would be spread over. I am saying that our distances are not limited by terrain feature. We move across the battlefield at 90 knots — not like our light infantry friend at two-and-a-half miles per hour — and not like our mech and armor friend that moves at 30 or 40 miles per hour. To be able to think and move at that speed takes communications that we just aren't authorized organically in this division. I'd say that the challenge is in communicating down to the levels that we need to."

"Sometimes we have to revert to courier which is almost like carrier pigeon days. To make sure that we get the information in the proper place and time, we have to use every means available. We remote our radios. We set up repeaters to double the range of the FM. We put up aerial relays. We do everything that the imagination will allow us to extend the ranges of our communication. Another thing that we

have to deal with here is AOE. It has stripped us to the bone. We don't have the robustness in a lot of areas that allow us to operate 24 hours-a-day."

"I think the communications equipment that we had in the division at that time — the VRC-12, which is relatively old equipment — was a problem. We certainly didn't have the new mobile subscriber. We didn't have the new stuff. We had the old stuff. It was a sometime thing to have good secure communications with the brigade commanders on the battlefield. I think the most limiting factor was the command and control equipment."

"That (the single most limiting factor in exercising effective command in the field) would be our current communication equipment and the lack of its range and survivability as well as the fact that it would give us away. An awful lot of it, even though secure, is multi-directional and when you press the microphone, you give away your location and so the other guy when he sees, even if he can't read it, five or six different frequencies coming out of one point, he knows it's some sort of command post. We would be targeted very quickly with what we have right now."

"I would say that the toughest thing was the inability to rapidly reproduce orders and graphics and inefficiency in dissemination of them to subordinate commanders over the current communications latch-up in the division. The first thing we tried to do was keep things simple. Additionally, we tried to create a team in the organization through much team building and talking about warfighting so everybody on the team understood how everybody else thought. That reduces the need for a lot of communications. So, you keep the orders short. Fragos work. A nod here and a couple of words there and people know what you expect. I think there is a great value to team building, because it reduces the volume of things that have to go out. Where we did need written communications we used matrix type orders. They seemed to work well. They can be read easily and quickly. We tried to use a lot of visual graphics. We bought some high speed FAX machines so we could transmit them and found this very helpful."

"I guess, it's communications capability and communications capacity. I'm not really sure that I can define it any better than that. It comes around on two or three different levels. This is an ill-equipped division in the first place where you're short huge portions of our FM communications to the point that down in the DISCOM, where we are the shortest, I'm not sure that we could control everything. I know that we could not control everything that we would have to control in the DISCOM in order to sustain the division, simply because we don't have the communication packages and equipment to do that. That's on account of a material shortage, that is not doctrinal."

"One of the real challenges for the division commander is to establish a common perception of the battle. Do you and your commanders have a common perception of the battle? That's very difficult to do with the kind of equipment — communications, command and control equipment — that I was using as a division commander. You can get a simple message through. 'I'm moving to such and such'. But I'll tell you, when you get into the more sophisticated aspects of the battle, you are not able to communicate very easily with the command and control equipment that we had."

- **PRACTICE**

"It is absolutely essential to practice command and control and practice it frequently. It in no way requires the whole division to be out in the field. You can and should do that with frequent CPXs. The thing that keeps you from doing it as often as you want is time and other competing demands. So, you have to discipline yourself. Money is really not an issue for CPXs."

"I'd say practice it as frequently as you can. I would tell him that it is not expensive in money or anything, only time. You must do it. You cannot possibly let six months go by without going to the field and expect to have any kind of combat ready command and control system. People change, thought processes atrophy, and all of that. Commanding and controlling at division or brigade is a skill that needs to be continually practiced. I personally think that the longest you can go is a quarter. If I had my way, I would do it more frequently, but the minimum that I will accept is once a quarter for a division. This is not often enough, however, for a brigade."

"You should practice field operations all the time. The way that you disseminate orders, the sense of teamwork you build, the effort you put forth to keep a lot of chatter among your commanders, and that you command the division through commanders in garrison all contribute to making field operations a lot easier. A commander must work at this all the time."

- **COMMITMENT**

"The temptation is always there to postpone, cancel or move it. The minute you do, you are on a slippery slope. Put it on there and then hold your own feet to the fire just like you hold company commanders responsible to do what is on their training schedule."

"I guess the easiest way is to just make a firm commitment that you are going to go to the field and work out of the field. If you think that the garrison is your home, then that is where you will spend most of your time. If you say to yourself, I am going to run my division from the field and go out there and do it, it will work. But it is not an easy issue."

"I would tell him to get to the field as much as you can and live there. You have a 24-hour-a-day environment and that is when your subordinates fully understand your commander's intent."

"I would tell him to move to the field more often, to include the headquarters, and displace while there. It takes a lot of time and effort to move the main CP. The last time we did, it took a long time. It is just a matter of practice. The assault CP can move very quickly. We practice it every time we go to the field. It is more difficult because of the amount of communication."

"I would tell him that we have two or three units that really are suffering as a result of that training void, and one is the main support battalion down in the DISCOM. You really can't provide them a meaningful field training experience, if the division is not out in the field demanding the support and the back-up support that they are to give. I would tell him that you have to train around that, and you use CPXs and simulation in order to do it. You go looking for things like REFORGER and JRXs so that you can get an opportunity and the money to go out and put the division in the field."

"You have to be very clear in your own mind what it is that you are trying to accomplish. What is your mission? What is the objective? Then you have to be able to think your way through how you can mass the combat power of your division toward the achievement of the objective. Keep it simple. Think of these three principles of war: objective, mass, and simplicity. Think about what those three words mean to you. Then think about how you are going to translate those three words to your staff and your commanders so they can accomplish what you want to accomplish — the mission of the division."

- **IMAGINATION**

"You are never going to get everything you want. We have some commanders at every level who think that unless they have a huge box in order to conduct tank maneuvers that you can't train a tank battalion. We have some commanders that think if you don't have all this time that you need in preparation, you can't train the unit to fight. What you really need is to say in your estimate what is it in field operations that I do have? I mean, what do I have in the local training areas? What do I have in the maneuver rights area? What is my density at the major training areas? Why am I going on a REFORGER or some other Caravan Guard or some other exercise? Then maximize the time that you have in the field, and you do that by doing good preparatory work in simulation, in preparation in ARTBASS [Army Training Battle Simulation System], in getting your units prepared so that when they go to the field, they are not learning out there from square one. They have already done some preparatory work and that's what we try to do. So, imagination is the key. That leader or that commander who can think through and use some imagination in his training and innovation is the one that, I think, is going to have excited motivated soldiers."



## ***PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT***

"I think if you as a commander are committed to this, you have to lead by example. You have to conduct your own leader development classes and staff rides. You have to be involved in the assignment of officers. You must ensure officers get the opportunity for schooling so there is a balance between unit execution of leader development, the institutional piece of it, and each officer's own self-development. If one of the commanders proposed staff rides to various battlefields in Central Europe, we resourced them at division level. This enabled our officers the opportunity to go and better themselves professionally.

"Every month at the readiness review — what most people know as the 2715 — I took about five hours. I talked about readiness indicators in the first hour or hour-and-a-half. Then we got into warfighting. I called it team training — my team, that is, the brigade commanders, the LNOs, the brigade 3s, the key members of the division staff. We talked about warfighting. I had some people in. At one time, General Starry came in. That was my professional development for them.


"We are growing noncommissioned officers through our institution that are more confident than any I have seen in many years."

"I have felt all my life that the preponderance of professional development, both in the officer and the noncommissioned officer side, needed to deal much more with war fighting issues. Specifically, those sorts of leader tasks and leader issues that help leaders, officers and noncommissioned officers, to execute their wartime mission in the unit that they are assigned to. The first priority of professional development ought to be, and I have worked very hard to slowly turn us in that direction, to teach those things that leaders need to know to be in a better position to take their units to war."

"I found that, when we had professional development seminars where 60 or 70 guys would be in a room with one speaker, about 50 percent of them were sleeping."

"We're including all NCOs who have immediate leadership responsibilities, have two or three or four or five or six or seven soldiers working directly for them like a squad leader or a section chief. We are telling them, 'You guys now are responsible for your soldiers' PT test score and their physical conditioning. You're responsible for ensuring that they meet height and weight standards. You're responsible for ensuring that they pass the SQT test. You're responsible for ensuring that they qualify with their individual weapon. You're responsible for ensuring that they pass their Common Task Test, and you're responsible for the POM requirements, ID cards, dog tags, et cetera, those kinds of requirements.' I want them to be responsible for ensuring that all of the soldiers who work for them, who have privately owned vehicles, one, have a current license; two, have the vehicle currently inspected; and three, have insurance and those kinds of things. They will be rated on their efficiency report specifically on how their soldiers do. That's how we are handling noncommissioned officer professional development. I've also told the sergeants major that you are responsible for training first sergeants and platoon sergeants, so that they can train their junior noncommissioned officers to do all of this."

"I give the same kind of guidance to officer professional development that I did for noncommissioned officer professional development, but there is a different approach to business here. It's a multi-layer approach. First, I have what I call the commanding general's OPD group. It is battalion and brigade commanders, installation directors, the staff principals on the division staff. We've had kind of a multi-tiered approach to this business. We've had classroom work where we talked about doctrine. We've used some historical examples to talk about AirLand Battle doctrine. We have a regular get-together where we go out and make sure that everybody understands the basic weapons of the division. For example, we had a session out on the range, imported some people here from Fort Benning who talked about marksmanship training, and then we shot."



## ***DOCTRINE***

- **STAYING  
CURRENT**

"I think you have to continually study doctrine. You have to find out what is the latest doctrine coming out of the schools. You must study it yourself. You must understand it, and then you must ensure that your subordinates understand it. You have to be totally aware of what is coming out of the various schools to ensure that you are up to speed. You can't wait and assume that you are going to find out about things. You have to be very proactive. Find out what is going on in the doctrinal community, understand it, study it, and teach it."

"What is terribly important for division commanders is that he, his staff, and subordinate commanders be on the same wave length. It might seem obvious, but my experience has been that that is an area requiring constant work and reinforcement. I have a system where, at least once a month, I get together with those key players in an informal setting and talk doctrinal issues for part of a day. Whether that's talking our way through a river crossing or discussing how one deals with a dirty battlefield or rehashing rear area operations, it doesn't matter. Early on in these sessions I found that even with the simplest of terms we did not all have the same understanding. It became absolutely essential that we spend the first few sessions talking about what I really meant when I said something, and what they really meant when they reported something to me. You not only have to read and constantly study doctrine yourself, but you also need to do it with your principle assistants with whom you are going to

fight the next war. I think that you can only do this if you structure situations where you encourage open discussion and debate and where you don't penalize disagreements, but rather, encourage them and lead them on to solutions. You don't gain that by dog and pony kind of MAPXs, where you are much more mesmerized by how neatly the tape is on the board or how well you used the pointer. You just need to roll up your sleeves and talk, debate and argue."

"I would recommend he go back and review it. He should refresh his memory by rereading FM 100-5. A technique we tried to adopt in the division was to use our Leadership Days to construct some battle vignettes that illustrated some particular aspect of doctrine as it applied to the division's ability to fight as a division. Fire support and aviation were two we did. Decisionmaking is another. You can do this by using a technique we borrowed from the second year course at Fort Leavenworth. It worked pretty well for us."

"I would tell him to make sure you are current, because there have been a lot of changes. There have been doctrinal changes and they are significant changes. What really has changed are the tactical techniques of implementing that doctrine. We have a new language now as opposed to 1980. It is both a written and a verbal kind of a thing. If you look at graphics in 1988 and compare them to the graphics that brigade and battalion commanders were using in 1980, there is very little similarity. The principles are still the same, but the application of those principles are different. We've got a new language, particularly, in the combat service support area."

"I think the leader has to talk and teach doctrine. It is a good way to convince yourself that you know it and can articulate it."

"One of the things that has really changed in the Army, at least the heavy Army, is the focus at brigade. The focus on brigade operations out at the NTC has identified weaknesses in brigade staffs and brigade commanders. We had a brigade that went through the NTC a little over a year ago. The brigade commander was almost incompetent. I say incompetent, but I really shouldn't say incompetent. He was not current. He was also out-of-date doctrinally."

"I think every time you have professional development classes, or war fighting seminars, or just any time we are talking about our business, then that is a way of coaching or mentoring. I think teaching about the way we fight, is doctrine. As far as giving a class on what doctrine is and how it evolves, I am not sure that is necessary. I have not done that. When I talk about how we integrate and how we fight the division — then people start to take notice."

"I think we need to go beyond the battlefield operating systems and talk about the elements of combat power that are in our doctrine. Specific elements about which we should talk are fire power,

maneuver, protection, and leadership. We also need to talk about decisionmaking, tactics, the effect of surprise, and the intangibles of motivation and training levels of the organization. Another area that is not so much change, but may be more a maturation of our doctrine is to be able to focus combat power deep in the employment of attack aviation, fires, and intelligence. We worked on this a good bit, but I think there is more work that needs to be done."

- **EMPLOYING DOCTRINE**

"The main doctrine, I think, is solid. We were working on how to see if we could really make it work. For example, can a division function effectively with the complexity of things and as spread out as they are? Could we really run a deep battle, close battle, and a rear battle? Having thought it through, having structured it, and having executed it on REFORGER and in the BCTP process, I would say that the professionalism of our commanders and staff is such that, yes, we can execute it. Some questions remain: How long could we sustain that kind of professional performance as combat continued, and as we had losses, as leaders and others either were wounded or killed or left the division and new untrained people came in? To what degree would we still be able to execute all those aspects of deep, close and rear battle?"

"I like our doctrine. The only troublesome area I found was what seems to be a tendency these days to overemphasize the 7 battlefield operating systems. I think there is a tendency to believe that battlefield operating systems somehow unlock all the secrets of the calculus of battle when we all know different. They are certainly a great analytical tool for looking at operations, but they are not the sole determinate of success or failure in battle."

"I think the doctrine is sound. I think the training and the doctrine, the Airland Battle doctrine is sound. It is the application of that doctrine that sometimes I have a little gas with. It's trying to understand that fighting a division is different than fighting a task force at the NTC. I think we need to somehow understand that. I think Airland Battle is superb, and I would urge people to reread in great detail FM 100-5 as well as FM 25-100. Have them read, doctrinally, what it says about Airland Battle imperatives. We are hung up on the battle operating systems, and I agree with the battle operating systems, but that is a sort of process mechanistic approach to make sure you are covering all the bases. The art of our business is in the imperatives. I mean whoever wrote those imperatives should get a gold star, but I don't hear enough about them. That is the dynamics, that is the art, that is the leader to use the terms of to press the fight. Identify, sustain, shift the main attack, and focus combat power, all of those things are the imperatives of Airland Battle. I think that is what we should be teaching at the War College, and that is what we should be focusing on, not just the battle operating system. If you can get future division commanders to truly understand that the art of our profession is in those imperatives, and how do you then

train a division to be able to have agility, to anticipate what's going on, to really take risks, and to read the battlefield as well as see it, we will go a long way in developing the sort of leader that can operate."

"When doctrine was established, basic doctrine, we had no helicopters. Now we have 119 helicopters to include the Apache, which gives us a deep attack capability. So one of the things that we have been working on for the last year is to how most effectively to employ this system to get maximum advantage and capability from it."

"It is difficult to synchronize the assets of a division on the ground. That is not an easy task. Anybody who thinks it is, hasn't done it. For instance, it is easy to say that I am going to put my indirect fire deep, in a relative sense. It may not be very deep in terms of miles, distance or space, but I am going to put it out. But, when the battle is joined, the tendency is to put your indirect fire on the contact that you are involved with. That could be infantry in the wire and relatively close. So, you say, 'Okay, we'll fire deep.' But, the fact of the matter is that the artillery is firing into the wire in front of A Company and it is not going deep. The reason it's not going deep is because people think they are going to get killed. You see that at the NTC. It is tough to get everything synchronized as the doctrine would suggest that you should do. That is not an easy task. It's a time-space thing, everything may be involved at 8:45 at this place, but at 8:50 this may be the wrong place. Moving it — helicopters, artillery, maneuver forces — getting it all synchronized into some other part of the battlefield ain't easy."



## ***ORGANIZATION***

- **TO&E**

"I had not done my homework properly on the TO&Es of our units. I had to do some learning that I should have done before coming. I urge my successor to do better. It is not just a casual glance at the TO&Es, but you really have to spend some time studying them before they sink in."

"I think you have to be very cognizant of what is in the organization. Sometimes we pay lip service to that. You have to learn how to think small. Most people come from high level positions of great responsibility, with mega dollar budgets. Right now, you need to get down and find out how many pieces of test diagnostic equipment are in an infantry battalion, or an armor battalion, or any other organization. You have to take the time to understand the impact the TO&Es are having on your organization. With the complexity and the size of a division, that is very difficult to do. If you are going to have an impact on it, you have to understand what your organization is all about."

"He has to understand his TO&E and the capabilities and the limitations before he fights. If he feels that his TO&E is not adequate to support the mission that he has been given, then he has to set about to change it. But he has to understand his TO&E."

"I would say that the division (TO&E) is in fairly decent shape. I would keep an eye on the aviation though. I would keep the provisional battalion for the combat support company. I would try to do something provisionally about the tanks in the division cavalry squadron. One thing we did was to form a wheel scout platoon in a tank battalion with HMMWV. I think this needs a continuing look, especially in a matured theater like this one where we might want to go to more stealth with our scouts at the battalion level with them mounted in vehicles other than Bradleys. I think this is worth a continuing look."

"My philosophy was that I had an organization — good people like General Richardson and General Vuono had put that organization together — and I was going to train them to fight. If some things fell out on the side, then I needed to tell the system they were broken. And I did. But, essentially, what you see is what you get."

- **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

"For example, the role of the aviation brigade in a two-brigade division like we are here. I use that brigade headquarters as a maneuver brigade headquarters."

"Our cavalry squadron had just reorganized. I don't think that two ground troops and two air troops are adequate for the wide range of missions of reconnaissance and security we give to our division cavalry squadron. However, I did not alter the organization. There was already a provisional battalion for the two combat support aviation companies in the 4th Brigade. That certainly needs to be done. We kept that and worked it. It seemed to work okay except that we had to take it 'out of hide.' Then, there is the question about where the I Company, the Aviation Maintenance company, should belong, to the 4th Brigade or the DISCOM. I left it with the DISCOM which is where it was when I got there. That continues to be a controversial issue."

"I think what he has to do is look at the mission that you have been given and then see if the organization supports it. If it doesn't, then you have to go through the process. Although it is laborious, it is time consuming. We need to get on with fixing the documentation. I'll give you an example. I understand this year that the documentation is rolling. It has been rolling for over a year now to put the Long Range Surveillance Detachment under the CEWI battalion. I'm telling you, nobody in the Army operates that way. The CEWI battalion has no way to insert the LRSD or extract it. People that are ideally suited to do that is the Cav. So, I have placed them underneath the Cavalry. Why should we have a document saying one thing when in reality, we fight another way?"

"We have habitually attached a tank battalion to the Cav squadron, for example, for most of the missions."

"The aviation brigade was the big surprise in terms of the need for provisional battalion headquarters and where is the right place to put I Company."

"The Division's LRSD, which was made organic to the CEWI Battalion, I put under the Cav for training and employment purposes. I still left the G2 and the CEWI Battalion commander responsible for its employment. I did it that way because the CEWI Battalion does not have the capability to insert, resupply or get it out. He does not own the helicopters. It is working just fine. Even though the TO&E has never been changed to reflect that, that is the way in my judgment it has to remain for this division."

"I learned very quickly that it is very difficult to change the direction of a large organization, just 15 degrees."

"I think that any division commander who thinks that he can make a course correction or change and have it implemented fully in under six months is absolutely pipe-dreaming."

- **LIMITATIONS**

"This is where they really drop us to our knees in the Army of Excellence. We have in each lift battalion, 45 Blackhawks. The Blackhawk has a lot of sophisticated electronic gear such as computers and all of that. AOE stripped out the electrician of that unit. We have no electricians to troubleshoot to find out what is wrong. We have to rely on higher echelon maintenance. That is a mistake. In the Apache battalion, which is even more sophisticated with more electronic gear and computers, we are authorized one. We have one of a kind tool in the Blackhawk Battalion and other aircraft battalions. We have one of a kind test set. Any time you have one of a kind, you do not have 24-hour capability."

"We still have some problems that will require some additional spaces to fix, and there are no additional spaces available right now. For example, the aviation brigade is so thin and lacks depth in certain critical areas to the point where you have only one man who can do a job. Well, this limits your capability to split that brigade and have it operate from two different field sites."

"The aviation problems we had as I was bringing in Apache was also some great concern because again of the sustainability. I would like to get it to where we have a red and gold team, or a blue and a gold team, if you want to call it that. We have another set of pilots so you can fight day and night. These are fabulous machines. Our force structure has to give the full advantage of the equipment and the leaders that we have. I felt that we could get much more capability if we have the right force structure to handle it. But being a realist, I know the bill payer is around. What I would like to see is they take full advantage as we go to a smaller Army. Hopefully, we will take

full advantage of the capability we have in both the quality of our soldiers and leaders, and the quality of our equipment."


"I think that the AOE structure is not robust enough to support us, if we ever have to go to war, but I can't modify it."

"I would say that if I were king for a day, I honestly believe that we need to relook at some of our division TO&Es so that we add some robustness to them so that we can give them a 24-hour capability and give them enough people to do that job. If that means reducing the force structure, then so be it. We ought to reduce the force structure."

"The forward support battalion of the combat service support arena just was not well. We are trying to figure out how can we get that more robust because the combat service support, the logistical piece of the war fight, is every bit as important as the maneuver piece. You have to pay attention to it. I think we were not paying as good attention to the organization of the forward support battalion as we should be. I was also concerned about the thinness of my tank and Bradley units. We were giving them a Cadillac vehicle, and I don't think we were giving them a robust organization. So, the idea of fighting day and night, which was what I told them we were going to do, you needed more crews. You needed some robustness."

"There is just not enough robustness in the organization for you to go out and take maximum advantage of your night capability."

"You learn what your strengths and weaknesses are, then just move out. Guys going into division command in the future are going to have very challenging times. The division commander is going to have to take what he is given and be able to fight it."



## ***EQUIPMENT***

- **FIELDING NEW EQUIPMENT**

"Total Army fielding is a farce. The one station fielding concept of the Apache at Fort Hood, Texas, was a great concept. It was great training, but AMC has yet to be able to fill the unit as the one station fielding plan calls for. That unit falls in on a unit set of equipment filled to 100 percent, all the crews and the aircraft. When he arrives back at home station trained to ARTEP standards, it is full up. That has not happened and it is not programmed to happen because they don't have the equipment. To say, 'That is the Army policy and the way we are going to do it' and then not be able to produce, lacks credibility. I was maintaining C2 with the old equipment. I get the new equipment and my readiness drops to C4 because of the lack of organic equipment necessary to make DEPMEDS (Deployable Medical System) work. I can just keep on going on the systems that come in that are supposed to be total fielded systems. ROWPUs [Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit] — the water purification units — I have eight brand new ROWPUs with no ASL/PLL for another year. Again, when young soldiers hear us talk about Total Army Fielding, we lose credibility when the equipment arrives without all the parts and pieces. Here it is. It's a farce."

"I believe the force integration approach the Army uses is fairly sound. New equipment training teams are needed for dramatic changes like the M1 tank, Bradley, MLRS and Apache. I believe you have to hold many IPRs and have a good continuity on issues to

ensure staffs are working. Many of the not so highly visible issues, but nonetheless, important ones, get lost. Visibility must be maintained on all issues to make sure that the staff serves the organization by closing all the doors on all the issues. One additional challenge we had was the restationing of the 1st Brigade while introducing new equipment. That is a significant challenge. I would advise any new division commander going to a division where restationing is about to happen to get himself personally involved early on."

"We introduced quite a bit of new equipment in the division. I would be hard-nosed if I were division commander. I tried to be hard-nosed. I would be even more so if I had to do it over again on NET (New Equipment Training). I think with NET it is absolutely essential that the whole team is there. I would say as you bring in, as you modernize new equipment, and if you bring in Bradleys, or tanks, or helicopters, or whatever, insist on having the full-up team there to go through training together as a team. It builds cohesion. They are trained the right way, and your maintenance problems are less as they go out to train after they get the equipment. I would take great pride in that. The other thing I did on fielding, I had the Chief of Staff and ADC-S chair a group called the Force Integration Organization so that we weren't just looking at a piece of equipment coming in, we were looking at manuals, we were looking at housing if there was going to be a shift where they are going. We were looking at the manning of that force and where it was coming, so it wasn't just the tank coming in, but all the pieces that go with it. I wanted it all there by the E-date. That is a thing that a division staff could do to help the commander. I mean the commander is opening that new box and seeing a new tank in there and is going yah-ha, this is great. But I think in the end what he wants is all the OVM, all the right equipment that it is supposed to have, all the people. We would do organization integration, back off 6 to 12 months from the time of E-date and track it. That was very helpful within the division."

"We have learned in this division, and I think we do it very well, that we look upon the fielding system as much more than just fielding new equipment, but also all the associated people, training, facilities, documentation, supportability issues that go with it. I refuse to talk with my staff about something as simple as an M-16A2 coming on board without getting a full brief on all the other issues that go with it. I think it is a mind set and we absolutely have to do that. In most cases where we have insisted upon it, we have done well. In those cases where we haven't, we find ourselves with a weapon in hand, but with ammunition still coming six months later or it not fitting into the arms rack."

"Getting way out in front of the (equipment) transition through quarterly training briefings; through IPRs during which I had every member of the team — the DIO, the post transportation officer and

all the people involved, civilian and military. We tried to get out in front of it in all of the categories — personnel, the master gunners for the Bradley, and so forth and so on, the clerks and mechanics. We tried to get enough visibility on it, so that we were managing the turbulence."

"Number one, it is imperative that you get the best people that you possibly can in your force modernization office. If you don't have good people who understand the problems associated with bringing on new equipment, how that process should be integrated into your training procedures and training plans, when certain brigades and certain battalions should be in the queue for receiving the equipment based on when they are going to major training areas to participating in major training events — you can have an absolute nightmare on your hands. We put the best possible people that we could into the force modernization office. We also had frequent IPRs to determine where we stood, to make sure that everything was on track. We insisted that battalion commanders as well as brigade commanders and their subordinates knew exactly when equipment was scheduled to arrive. They had to understand the impact on training events, how it was going to change the way they ought to do business and whether it had to do with training or whether it had to do with the general defense plan. We try our damndest to make sure that all of those things are coordinated and dove-tailed so that we don't have significant problems that crop up."

"The thing that a division commander has to understand is that you have to do the best you can with what you have, recognizing the fact that this whole Army is in a transition. There are some haves and have nots."

- ACQUISITION

"Our problem, in my opinion, is in the acquisition world of the Army; all divisions are lumped together as either light or heavy. So, what we are led to believe is that what is good for one light division is good for all. Therefore, whatever piece of equipment that the light gets, then the \_\_\_\_\_ gets. Well, the acquisition people say, 'Hey, No. We have this for the Army. What is good for one is good for all.' That is wrong in my mind."

"AVSCOM is buying parts for me today that I am going to use two years from now. You can see that the likelihood of two years from now needing the part that I ordered today, and not another one, is probably 50-50."

"Take the whole issue of reconstitution. How often do we come to grips with it, even in exercises? In exercises, equipment doesn't get destroyed at the rate it gets destroyed in wartime nor does it get taxed as much. Additionally, an exercise never lasts long enough for us to tear up that equipment, etc. Those are the things that you often have to study and try to understand on your own and you must work with

your logisticians and your operations guys. This is a very good subject to discuss with your leadership during informal get-togethers."

"My biggest equipment concern because of my past experience was the maneuver control system. We still had a rather archaic command and control system. We needed to be able to use existing automation equipment to speed decision making on the battlefield."

"You can really increase your credibility with the soldiers by doing something good for the soldiers — to solve a maintenance problem or to solve a supply problem. I visited a howitzer battery during an external evaluation. As usual, I asked the soldiers if they had any problems. Most of them said no. I did get to a supply sergeant and asked him if he had any problems. He said, 'Yes.' He couldn't get any bows for his ammunition trailers. I said, 'Bows don't seem to be a big problem. We ought to be able to get you some bows.' He made a comment, 'Sir, if you could get us some bows, we would be real happy and we guarantee you that we could outshoot any other battery.' I accepted that challenge. I told him that I would have the bows to him within 24 hours. I came back. I made those bows available to him. It took some extraordinary work, but I gave the DISCOM Commander a challenge. I told him that I would make my helicopter available or a UH60 helicopter available if he needed it, to make sure that whoever was going to deliver those bows to that individual delivered them in less than 24 hours time. I also told the battery commander that I expected that battery to outfire any of the batteries in that battalion. I delivered the bows in less than 18 hours and the battery did win the firing competition. I don't know whether it was all based on the fact that I had given them some bows for the ammunition trailers. I would tell you that the battery now thinks that I am the greatest hero in the world because every time I go and visit them, they say, 'Here is the guy who brought us the bows.' I say, 'Here are the guys who won the competition in gunnery.' I have a great relationship with that battery."

- **MAINTENANCE**

"Overall, I think our biggest concern was the apparent fragile nature of the maintenance support for our IEW (intelligence electronic warfare) system."

"Maintenance was very high on my list, because I think that is a combat multiplier that we need to have on the battlefield. We developed something focusing on unit level maintenance. What it really did was force or insist on the first line leader getting involved in maintenance. We tested it in one of the battalions and sixty days later they thought it was the greatest thing since sliced bread, because it made the first line supervisor sign the 2404, not just the driver. It forced the lieutenant to really worry about his four tanks and to say, 'Where are the parts? What's on order?' You have the company commander into requisitioning things, and all of a sudden we are

saving big time dollars, because we are not double and triple ordering and a check is made that you didn't need the whole \$198 item. All you needed was the \$1.98 little screw that goes on it. We found it much more efficient, our maintenance got better, maintenance awareness got better, and readiness got better."

"It is a combination of both because some of this equipment has to be maintained by contracts. Our mechanics are only capable of pulling out the black boxes. Much of it has to do with where the contract is located. As an example, my military intelligence battalion is forward stationed in \_\_\_\_\_ and if it wants to get contract maintenance done, it has to drive all the way to \_\_\_\_\_ in some cases to get that done. I submit to you that driving from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_, which is a three hour ride, to talk to contractors is not the best way to maintain equipment, as compared to a place like Fort Hood, Texas, where the individual can go see the contractor less than 15 minutes away."

"You should use every expert available to them to get to the source. If it is a systemic problem, then weigh through command channels to get the attention that it needs. We have the LAO [Logistics Assistance Officer] which is the AMC rep here that has civilian experts in each area of maintenance. You need to capitalize on those guys because they are a wealth of knowledge. They can work with the units and they can open doors and help you solve problems. We can't do without them. I would say, get in bed with LAO and all the reps that he has. Make sure that those guys don't just sit back and drink coffee waiting for the unit to call and ask them a question. They must show initiative and get down there where the weapon is. They go out to the training area, so when a problem pops up, they are there and can help. They will then be part of the solution and not part of the problem."

"Don't turn everything over the G4, the ADC for Support, and the DISCOM commander. Get involved yourself. I would recommend the division commander chair the MMR (maintenance management review) at least twice a year."

"My biggest concern was that some of our equipment is becoming too complex, but not in terms of how soldiers operate it. I think we have mastered most of it and they are doing extremely well. But, being able to maintain it is a struggle. We are keeping up very high readiness levels, but the cost, I think, to us and the Army is high. Many of the LRU's [line replaceable units], little circuit cards that go into everything, present a challenge. Some pieces of equipment like the Bradley have literally 30-40 of these fragile items. When the cards malfunction, they have to be replaced. Some of them are so highly complicated that they have to go somewhere back here in the States to the factory sources for repair. Then, immediately, the vehicle is down for a long time. It may be down for 30 days or more."

"I knew that, ultimately, we would be tested only through extensive usage of the equipment under simulated combat conditions."

"My major concern after arriving here and reviewing the maintenance status was to insure I properly interpreted all the pertinent statistics. So my biggest concern was to make sure that I would not be fooled by the rosy indicators that I found."

"Excess is a cancer on the system. I found as I did this walk around the first 30 days, bins and bins of excess. It is created in many ways. Modernization and new equipment fielding create excess, and to me carelessness on the part of our requisitioning process and we rat hole this stuff. I would say that you have to come up hard-nosed on excess. Then you have to go around, get dirty, and scrounge around in motor pools. You have to take it on, and you have to take it on early."

"I think the Army has helped at least here in Europe by providing some incentives to turn the excess Class IX in, either as return credits in terms of P-2 mission money or to have a centralized pool of this equipment so that units can draw it without cost. I think the first thing is to have some incentive to turn in the Class IX. Secondly, you must ensure that whatever Class IX is kept, is only kept for a certain period of time and is used to supplement the ASL in the organization. You must ensure that the DISCOM commander and your ADC for Support keep a close eye on it."

"I think that a commander of a mechanized division has to decide right up front that his equipment is important to him. The way you demonstrate that is by being in the motor pool. The way you demonstrate that is by knowing what your equipment is and by leaning up on the tank and getting on it."



## ***LEADERSHIP***

### **• TECHNIQUES**

"I am not sure that there is that much difference in techniques. Leadership can be applied at any level. The difference, I guess, is that you have to have a little more patience because it takes an awful long time to change the direction of a large organization. When you put something out, you have to sit back and wait. You can't expect instantaneous results. When you put something out, you have to be very careful in what you say. As it then goes down, it's like that old game they play called 'Gossip.' You have a line of people and you whisper something in the first ear. What comes out at the end is nowhere near what was said. When a division commander says, 'I want to do this,' he may mean something, but by the time it gets down to the company commander, it is really screwed up. You have to be very careful. Once you give a directive or an order, back up and be patient. But, you also must then keep testing the water as it goes down to make sure that everybody is focused in the right direction."

"I think being a good listener is very important. The higher up we go sometimes the less we listen. I would say do a lot of listening. I learned that and I am still learning it. I think you need to be able to have that quality. That is probably the best quality that a senior leader can have."

"If you want subordinates to trust you, you have to trust them. The more a senior leader can show that, by not being afraid to let others do things for which they have been trained to do, even though it may not be 100 percent the way he would do it, the more he will be surprised how well everything keeps getting done."

"If there is one word that I would etch on everyone's forehead, it would be 'clarity'. Be clear in what it is you want your unit to do, so you prevent false starts, you prevent half-stepping that which you think through. Make it clear, and make sure your subordinates and your staff make it clear what you want."

"Make sure that people understand you. You have to be visible. You have to be seen. You have to be talked to. You have to be available, so people truly understand what you want. Then you have to use every technique that you possibly can — be it television, TV tapes, meetings, written documentation or the post newspaper — to ensure that people understand how you think and what you want. I guarantee that they will respond to you."

"Don't underestimate your instincts. You have developed good instincts over the years, and if you come into a unit, or go into motor pools, and you see soldiers that don't look like soldiers, or motor pools that are in disarray, don't second guess yourself. You have to understand that there may be some problems there."

"I would say just be yourself and get out there with the troops. Just do your job in such a way that your subordinates and your troops have confidence in you. Another thing I would say, though, is don't become a victim of your in-box. You have to be out all over the division all the time. You need the most visibility that you can get so that your troops know you. I'm not talking about through ceremonies or things like that. I'm talking about being down in the mud with them, experiencing the hardships that they are experiencing, so on and so forth, because if they see you, they know that everything is all right."

"I would tell them to remember what got them there, and that was, I would hope, caring for soldiers and families. I would tell them to keep their sense of humor. I think soldiers and leaders respond to that. No matter how tense the situation, they have to have respect and confidence in their commander. If you are uptight at the time, that's what you are going to have — an uptight division. You have to know how to relax, and you have to have your leaders relax because that will permeate throughout the division. Don't be afraid to make decisions."

"What I would tell them to do is to sit down and think about their stewardship and think about the essence of that stewardship. What are you going to accomplish during your stewardship of that division? Then to think about the techniques that you are going to use to accomplish your goals."

"Once decisions are set in motion either tactically, in the community, or otherwise, they are difficult to retract and change. You have to be relatively sure when you commit yourself to making a decision,

because of the wider impact. Additionally, it is more difficult to effect change. There is a much more institutional inertia in a division than you would find at the brigade level."

## ● CHALLENGES

"Leadership at the two-star level is a very, very complex subject area. I am disassociating myself now from the post side of the house. At the two-star level, you have to be there and not be there. The challenge is to articulate a concept, to get them moving, and to have them feel your presence so that they will execute — as they think you want them to execute — without oppressive or slavish adherence to procedures."

"I think the leadership challenge is what I alluded to a while ago when I talked about the E5 and E6 NCO. We have said, 'The burden is on you. You train the soldier.' Yet, he is the least experienced and the least trained as far as institutional training is concerned. We can't just back off and say, 'The system screwed that up.' We have to make sure that 7s, 8s and 9s train the 5s and 6s. We do not let that weak link in the chain screw up the strength that we have in the quality of our NCO corps over all and in our young soldiers and leading officers."

"The basic leadership principles are there. Again, if I had to put my finger on a weak link, it would be the relationship between the platoon leader and the platoon sergeant. As long as we have an Army, that is something we have to deal with. The lieutenant has been brought up to give instructions and to direct soldiers to do things. He and his company commander have a relationship. If a crusty E7 platoon sergeant is to train that platoon leader, it will take a unique rapport. I'm not sure that we have that in all cases. The capabilities are there. The E7 is certainly capable of training that platoon leader if he will listen, but I think some of our platoon leaders believe that they are there to transmit and not listen. There is always going to be a weak link in the leadership chain in that relationship."

"I think that is part of the leadership challenge, that NCOs as well as officers have to be able to identify substandard performers. I don't mean crooks and gangsters. I am talking about those who can't measure up — then eliminate them before war starts."

"I am fond of saying that there is a very great difference between the leadership challenges faced by the battalion commander and those by the brigade commander. If nothing else, the battalion commander deals with company commanders who are a different generation and who speak a different language. You are never quite sure whether they really understand what you are saying and their experience is so much more limited. In that respect, the brigade commander has it infinitely easier because he, in turn, is talking essentially to his contemporaries. They might be two or three years younger, but they are the same generation and they speak the same language. Each one

of them has already passed the test of fire and has been found to be a super guy."

"I think you find the true nature of the man when he is hungry, when he feels sick, when he is tired and when things all go wrong. Then you find out whether he is that oak standing in the storm who will guide his unit in combat to success or whether he is going to be the first guy blown over."

"What I look at, that has always been a separator for me, is how a commander reacts to adversity. We have built so many overachievers in this business in our selection process that by the time they get to be brigade or division commander, or ADCs, or make general officers, they are so used to success that when they have a set back, there is a tendency to point fingers elsewhere rather than say I screwed it up. As a division commander, I wasn't afraid to say I screwed it up. I think we need to get that inculcated into our leaders and not worry whether they are going to get a two block, or a three block, or something else on their report, but savor the moment they are in command, then do what they think is right and take some risks. If they screwed it up, say they screwed it up. But how a leader reacts to adversity is to me a very important thing."

"A good indicator would be a subordinate leader's reaction under stress and to what degree he can maintain his cool and keep his balance and to what degree, even under failure situations, he would be able to stand up and not pass them down on his subordinates."

"I have had company commanders and battalion commanders who were violating everything that I stand for in taking care of soldiers. Individuals who worked longer than was necessary in my opinion, kept soldiers at work when it was totally unnecessary. Individuals who always put their version of the mission before their soldiers and their family members. In some cases, it has to be done. I realize that, but in some cases it does not have to be done. As an example, I had an officer who I had to take out of command because one of the things that he did, among others, was not to notify a soldier that he had an emergency. He neglected to tell the soldier that his grandmother had died because he felt that the mission was more important. That is just not the right way to do business. We have had many officers, in spite of the kinds of things that I stand for, who have said and done things on their own accord totally different — or used selected neglect. They had to be counseled or reprimanded for doing something that in my opinion was dumb."

"One of the largest problems that I am confronted with as a division commander is identifying company commanders who are poor leaders, getting battalion commanders to acknowledge that they are poor leaders, moving them on and getting them out of the leadership business. There is a great propensity on the part of many officers, as

well as some noncommissioned officers, to hang in there with the individual and to hold on and try to work with him thinking that you may change the individual and it will get better. That will work in some cases. My experience is that it rarely works. If the gut feeling is that the individual is a poor leader then we ought to do everything we possibly can to get him out of command as rapidly as we can."

"What I have learned most since I have been in this position is that no matter how hard you try to set the proper example, and to do the proper things, there will always be some people who will be unhappy, who will interpret things the wrong way and who will be hell doing what they want to do on their own regardless of whether or not it makes good sense."

• CLIMATE

"You have to create the environment where your subordinates can do their job by eliminating distractors and other things that demand their time. They have to know where they stand with you. They have to know that they can make mistakes and that we learn through our mistakes. There has to be a positive environment. It cannot be a threat environment."

"You have a married Army. You have family problems that were not there 10 or 15 years ago. I think you have to couch what you say when you talk soldier and leadership today — you are actually leading families. If the family is unhappy, then the soldier is unhappy; and you don't have an effective soldier."

"I happen to believe that units are successful in war, if in peace they grow up in a climate that fosters initiative, where they feel comfortable operating under mission type orders, and where they feel free of any fear to report bad news."

"The only way you can instill that kind of a climate is through action. You can't just talk about it. It is something that takes time because people need to learn they have the freedom to experiment and to do the right things for their soldiers and unit."

"It is also important to be aware of the forgotten dimension — the civilian leadership. You need to understand them because, normally, the greatest percentage of your soldiers live in the civilian community. If you don't understand the interactions that occur there and exert some leadership in that environment, you will find in the final analysis that your soldiers will suffer. I would say that interaction between senior officers — the cooperative nature that is required both in the military and in the civilian leadership — is probably the thing that I learned most while a division commander."

"Make sure that everybody understands what your leadership style is. One of the things that really makes brigade and senior commanders uncomfortable is a climate of uncertainty. You need to go in and talk

to your subordinates about how you propose to build. What kind of climate do you want to set up? You might be a very centralized person. I don't think you can be very successful on the battlefield if you are a centralized person as division commander. But, if that is the way that you are, then you better set up a system out there that is going to survive in your absence."

- FOCUS

"I would talk to them about patience and decentralization. It is very difficult for us commanders to give up our company command experience. The company commander is the last time that you can put your arms around, you can feel and touch and you can do everything. You can personally drive a company. There are people at the brigade that still want to do that type of micro management. But, you very quickly fall behind the power curve, in my mind, because you just can't grasp all that is going on down there if you try to do it all yourself. Let's carry it one step further. There are division commanders that want to do that same type of thing. I just think you have to take a step back and take a look at the organization and look at all the expertise you've got at every level to do their thing."

"I feel that, at the division level, the commander focuses on the command climate and on being able to maintain balance. Brigade commanders to some extent have to do the same thing."

"I wish I had more time than I do to read. You have to read a little bit every night or sometime during the day. I think that's a point that needs to be made. It has to do, I guess, with OPD, but it really has to do with leadership. I tell all my commanders, 'One of the things that we pay you for is proposing. Just sit back, think about what it is that you want your unit to do, and where you want it to be 6, 12, 18 months down the road. You've got to set aside time to do that. That can't be a haphazard kind of an operation.'"

"My main concern was that I and my senior staff project the continuity in leadership rather than a change when I came in."

"I guess at division level, you have to ensure that all of the colonels that work for you are working together for a common goal. I've been in organizations where colonels wanted to look good and they looked good at the expense of their fellow commanders. I won't tolerate this and I explained it to all the O5 and O6 commanders. I am convinced that, in our organizations and our Army today, if we can't work together, we will die separately."

"Every time I saw one who did not meet the standards that we all accept as the prerequisite for being a good commander, it was a direct result of the commander not understanding his organization and not taking the time to be with his people, to listen to them, to understand their needs and desires, and to ensure that his commander's intent was transmitted to them. If you do that, the soldiers will make you

look good because they are proud of a good commander. They want to tell people about a good commander. You can walk into an organization and when soldiers start telling you how good their boss is, you will know that you are in a good organization."

"We are obligated as leaders to train our subordinates. I would say that these seminars that I hold would be leadership instruction. In my judgment it is my responsibility to train brigade commanders. It is the brigade commander's responsibility to train and mature battalion commanders. It is the battalion commander's responsibility to train company commanders, and company commander's responsibility to train lieutenants."

- **TIME  
MANAGEMENT**

"You find, that unless you are a superb manager of your own time, you will be eaten up by minutia or that you will concentrate on things that don't give you the greatest good. Perhaps the largest sin we all commit is that when we identify a problem, we don't immediately solve it. As a division commander, you just don't have time to solve that problem over and over again. So if there is a difference, it is in time. If you thought as a brigade commander that you were strapped for it, as a division commander, you sure as hell are. You must not allow time management to be turned over to your aide or your secretary because, as well meaning as they all are, I'd rather turn over my money to them than my time."

- **COUNSELING**

"I would be ecstatic if I could get every person to counsel officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers the way that counseling was intended to happen. All too often when you pull the counseling statements on individuals and look at the new NCOER and you look at those little blocks that are supposed to be checked as to when counseling took place, you find that they really haven't taken place or there has been some incorrect date put in there by the superior. You ask the individual what kind of counseling took place on that date and it was so perfunctory that the individual does not even remember that it took place. The American public and the U.S. Army has a great problem with being able to sit down and tell a subordinate just how they feel about that person and what that person is doing right or wrong. Not only are we finding that counseling is not being done the way it should be done at the officer level, I don't think it is being done the way it should be done at the NCO level. In many cases, what superiors construe as counseling is considered to be a butchering or a kick in the shins by the individual who is on the receiving end of it. If somehow we could break the mold of the inability of people to sit down and discuss, in a candid discussion with their subordinates, just what they are doing right and what they are doing wrong and how they really feel about it — I think we could make some giant leaps forward in the officer's role of the NCOER evaluation. It just doesn't happen."

- **TEAM BUILDING**

"At division level, and particularly at a one division post, a lot of time and effort goes into team building. Who is the division commander's team? Who constitutes that team? You have to be able to define that. It is a command group. It is the division staff and the principals. It is the brigade commanders. It is the separate battalion commanders. To a degree, it is even the battalion commanders down in the brigades. You have to spend a lot of time on team building. You have to build a cohesive motivated team, all of whom share the same vision of where you want your unit to go. That has been the single most difficult leadership task that I have had down here. The reason that it is difficult is because you are dealing with a group of people who are very motivated."

"There is one other thing that I have done as a division commander that I would recommend to other division commanders. Each year I have had a management conference where we go out somewhere and get away for about four days. I take my division staff principals and the command group — chief of staff and both ADCs — take all commanders down to battalion level and all sergeants major, and take the major subordinate chaplains. You can do this thing anyway you want to. I get up and give them my state of the union on the division. I identify the mission, the training guidance that we receive from the corps commander, and the task that we have to be able to execute. Then I give my assessment of where we stand in the whole division — training, maintenance, personnel readiness and all of that — and where it is I think we have to go to in the forthcoming year. I stress the major things that we have to tackle. Then I break them down into seminar groups and work them about six hours a day. The rest of time they can have recreational activities and do whatever they want to. Then on the third day we bring the wives out at noon. We work them about two hours that first afternoon, then let them do recreational activities with their husbands the rest of that afternoon. That night we have a social function together. For half the next day we wrap it all up. Then we get up and brief on what we have agreed to: the strengths of division, this is what needs to be fixed, and this is what we need to focus on for the next year. Then the wives report out on the strengths and weaknesses in their area; they focus mainly on family support issues. From all that we write up a formal after-action report and make up a matrix of actions to be accomplished and assign what staff agency has proponency and a suspense date for each. I have found that that is worth its weight in gold as far as team building, making everybody feel that they are an integral part of the team. Everybody gets to say what is on their mind and everybody feels then that they have that say in shaping which way it is that the division ought to go for the next year. I find that there is more readiness value in this management conference, when you are talking in terms of mission readiness and taking care of your people, than there is in probably three EDREs. I would recommend that to any new division commander."



## ***ETHICS***

- **PERSONAL  
PHILOSOPHY**

"I believe 'by example' is the way that you permeate ethics through an organization. I try to maintain the example that anybody else could look at and follow."

"We should never lose our focus on ethics, but I think the ethical climate may not be any better. It is different than it used to be. We don't have the same kind of problems."

"First and foremost, by example. I think we all must do that as leaders. Secondly, by relationship with our subordinates. Every day there are opportunities and temptations whether to take the harder right instead of the easier wrong. They sneak up on you in the most unlikely places and at the most unlikely times. You have to constantly be aware of them. There are people looking at you and measuring you. Whatever you do, take the harder right."

"The first thing you have to do is be very vocal about the fact that you will not tolerate unethical behavior. As far as I am concerned, anyone who lies in his dealings with his fellow soldiers or subordinates should be done away with. You can't afford that because peoples lives depend on your behavior in combat. There cannot be the least bit of misunderstanding on how you feel on this issue. As far as I am concerned, that is an uncompromising issue."

"When you are the division commander, you set the standard. You make sure that people adhere to it, or they leave."

"The privates have no choice. Congress made it so that their lives are entrusted to us. They have to look upon us as the perfect examples of leadership, uncompromising of principles of ethics. They have to know that in combat when their lives are on the line and when some are going to die, that we are going to do the best that we can to lead them and to take care of them. Anything that degrades or causes an officer or NCO to lose respect even though it really can't be quantified, that is where you have to draw the line."

"Again, that is part of the leadership business. You have to talk about it. You have to demonstrate by every action in it that there are ethical absolutes that you just have to do. There are no short cuts in the ethics business."

"I made it crystal clear to everyone who was in any kind of authority whether it was noncommissioned officer or officer that I would not tolerate anything that was unethical."

"It is always difficult when you start talking in terms of how we look at success. There is a very fine line between ambition, backbiting, or undercutting the guy next to you just to look good. You want to have aggressive and ambitious leaders. There is nothing wrong with that, but it has to be balanced, not for the good of the individual, but for the good of the team, good of the family. The brigade, the battalion, the company, the platoon, the crew, that's where you want to put the emphasis rather than on the individual because we fight as teams. It is a very difficult question to get around because you don't want to lose the aggressiveness, and I don't want people to be passive. There is some competitiveness but it is healthy competitiveness. The leader sort of gauges that. He sets the tone and the temperament. If he is just trying to look good to corps or look good to the Army, that is one thing. If he wants to really try to be good, he is measuring himself."

## • ENVIRONMENT

"Again, nothing that they don't know already, but you live in a glass house. You are fooling yourself, if you think there isn't some disgruntled person somewhere in finance that looks at your TDY voucher twice as hard as anyone else's. If you are in a big hurry and you run home real quick in a sedan instead of your own car, it is going to get noticed. Off the cuff comments that can be misinterpreted, will come back to haunt you. You are never on your own and never out of that glass house. If you think Caesar's wife had to be beyond reproach; so do you."

"I think it is important right at the 'get go' that everybody understands where you stand on this. I think you have to talk about it. You have to make sure those who are close to you, your aide, drivers, enlisted

aide, secretary, and your own personal staff, understand how you feel about use of government transportation, money, and so forth. In your own personal conduct, both in reality and perception, you must maintain a firm ethical base. I think the combination of talking about it, setting the example, and backing it up with actions will help early on to establish an ethical climate within the organization. Finally, you need to look for the trial period that will certainly come and establish the climate you desire during this period."

"A division commander comes with a set of baggage. He must be constantly aware that there are all kinds of people who want to do certain things for him to make his life easier. If he allows some unethical thing to happen, he has just compromised his own integrity as well as his own ethical behavior."

"It goes back to the quality of the soldiers in our Army and the values in which they bring with them. I will tell anybody that the Army is only a reflection of the society in which we live. If society gives us a bunch of misfits, then we have an Army that reflects that. In the last three or four years, they have given us solid outstanding law abiding citizens, and we have a quality force to show for that. The people who get out will be outstanding citizens also."

"In some instances, you have to ensure that the ethical axis or the understanding of ethical behavior is shared by all of the members in your command — which may or may not be the case. Just because you possess a certain ethical standard doesn't mean that everybody else does. You have to be cautious about that. You have to keep that in the back of your mind when you are dealing with somebody to understand why they take certain courses of action."

"I think you must be on constant watch to ensure you are not putting your subordinates in an ethical crunch. You have to be careful with readiness reporting and candid comments by subordinates."

"I guess, the thing that still is sort of an impediment to all of us is that we are all operating under such a mountain of regulations. While enjoying command and doing everything that we can to comply with as much as a person can digest, one exists with a feeling that we're not complying with some things, because there is just such a mountain of all of that stuff. For the subordinate commanders we have gone through a very extensive review of each area of their responsibilities and to list all of the references. When we did that, we found that in some areas we had 12-13 pages of references, just listings. So, in each area of responsibility we wrote a discussion paragraph saying, 'Here is the important thing in that area.' Then we would list about one page of critical standards. So, in our command inspections instead of looking from A to Z for compliance in those areas, we would look at what the spirit of all of that requires us to do. Our command inspection, incidently, is done by me, my ADCs, and the


Division staff. We go through a brigade and take a slice of part of one battalion down to company level and we look at different things, different areas of responsibility. We do it in such a way that the inspected unit and its leaders have a chance during the AAR to come back to us and say, 'Okay, that really makes sense,' or, 'your boss needs to get back with the Army hierarchy and tell them that we just can't do this thing', or 'it doesn't make sense,' or whatever. It has been a living process in our division now for about four years. The division pamphlet 20-1 is where we consolidated all these critical responsibilities for our commanders."

- **ISSUES**

"We tell company commanders that they will do ten percent inventories and then we keep them so busy that they, in their own minds, are often faced with the problem of either not doing a ten percent inventory or fudging it. They can fudge by letting the supply sergeant sign and then certifying that the inventory was conducted or even worse, having the supply sergeant conduct the inventory with the company commander signing that he himself had done it. The ammunition system in the Army is absolutely and totally designed to make training more difficult. The design is only for the purpose of ensuring accountability. The poor battalion and company commanders struggle to get training areas to come together with ammunition and time on the training schedule. Often the only way they can get there is by fudging, that is, by getting ammunition and certifying its been used. In actuality, they are holding it for a long time, because the training area desired has just been cancelled and another one will not be available for a week — those kind of things. I think we all need to ensure that we remove these institutional barriers wherever we find them, although some of them, like the stupid ammunition system, defy most division commanders. This is a system built somewhere up in the clouds that makes it very difficult."

"With ten percent inventories, my solution is and continues to be, to make absolutely certain that every company commander understands that it is far better to indicate that he failed to conduct the inventory but that he will make it up when he can, rather than falsify a record. To do that, you must make sure that you don't heap a penalty on him for failing to do the ten percent inventory. There are others, such as change of command inventories. How much time do you give those involved? If you give them the proper time, they can do it, but if you don't, they start fudging."

"One of the things that saddens me more than anything else about my job is to look at the number of commissioned officers from all walks of life, from all sources of commissions, and having to deal with them under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for some of their unethical behavior."



## ***FAMILY ACTION ISSUES***

### **● SUPPORT PROGRAMS**

"Watch what any reduction of dollars or programs may do to the morale of the families and soldiers and continue to remember that family support is part and parcel of readiness. It closely impacts on the morale of our soldiers and their peace of mind, especially, when they are training in the field or being committed to contingencies."

"Insist on providing the best quality of life that you could for your soldiers and their families. Try everything that is humanly possible to get the family members to get on board with what your programs are and why you are doing certain things, because I truly believe that an informed family member is a much better family member and is much more willing to endure the hardships of all of the things that are mentioned if they understand the reason why. Don't take your soldiers for granted and neglect the family members because we enlist the soldier, but we reenlist the family members. If we want good people, we have to show them that we care about them and we have to provide them the best quality of life that we can."

"We have all these nice programs on the books that say, 'We have to take care of families.' I have to take training dollars and other dollars that should go to do other things to subsidize that to take care of our soldiers and their families."

"The morale of the soldier's family is what makes or breaks that soldier as far as his daily performance, as well as making the Army a career. I would say that you should hone in on the medical support and on the other family oriented programs for the young soldier. If you can make those programs viable and supportive, you are going to make a happy soldier."

"I would ask whoever replaces me to work very hard to ensure that we do not go back on our commitments to families. I say that because it requires a willingness to put resources against commitments, and as resources become scarcer, the temptation grows to cut family programs to maintain training. While I recognize that, I will tell you that we do not always keep a healthy balance. It will turn around on us and will bite us. The majority of this Army is married and, if it does not perceive that we care deeply about their families, they will stop caring deeply about us."

"Then every person coming in here regardless of grade has got a sponsor — particularly the married people — and that sponsor gets them all settled and so on and so forth. They are from the same unit, and that sponsor is in that telephone tree so that she feels comfortable. That sponsor is the first acquaintance that she makes, so that she feels comfortable with calling that sponsor for whatever needs she may have, particularly during the early stages in the assignment."

"It is because of these factors, that we put so much stock in our family support group. They do need someone to talk to, and someone to lean on and to shore them up. This is not just an organization that meets periodically. Commanders really work at this. They will have family support days, for example, at least once or twice a month. They will have an all-ranks supper occasionally. They will do it in conjunction, say, with an organization day. They bring all the families in and the wives may even run PT with them in the morning. Then they let them clean up and go out to the field with their husbands and do that day what their husbands are doing in training. If they are shooting the M-16 rifle, they will let them shoot it. If they are shooting an artillery piece, they will let them load it and pull the lanyard, so they get a better feel for what their husbands do. They will take them down in the afternoon to the 34-foot tower and let those that want to jump out of the tower — and you would be surprised how many will! They then give them a certificate that they have made a successful jump from the 34-foot tower and award them an honorary set of wings. Then they conclude the day with a supper — roast beef and lobster or something that they have saved up for by virtue of being in the field or whatever."

"Spend time with your DPCA, your G1, your commanders, talking about your family support plans. If you are going somewhere like the NTC or REFORGER, make sure that there is a disaster plan."

• CHALLENGES

"The degree of satisfaction that you can generate in the families has a direct impact on how well you train, how well you retain good soldiers, and all of the good things that you are looking for. You have to pay a lot of attention to it. You need to be, particularly, sensitive to family abuse, either spouse or children, by either of the parents. You need to be, particularly, attentive to family issues that come up in the housing areas. Children, particularly teenagers, are prone to violence. Vandalism can be very disruptive down there. You have to really stay on top of that. You cannot allow those kids to disrupt quality of life. You have to watch the housing areas, in general, for a lot of things. You have to make sure that wives and families are comfortable down there, so that they feel secure, that you have adequate MP patrols, and that you respond to perceived and real threats quickly. You better come with an increased level of sensitivity, or you are going to have problems in the long run."

"Those are the three challenges. How do you get information to family members? How do you deal with wives of your senior leaders? And how do you handle the physical impact of families on the installation facilities?"

"I am utterly amazed at child abuse that is happening in our military families. As I look back over the last 21 months, that not only shocks me, but has really been a burr in my saddle as to how to solve that. On one hand, it is so personal in that it is a soldier's family and the way he deals with them; but, on the other, it is a serious type of crime. I guess the numbers and the seriousness of those type of acts probably got to me as much as anything else in the command. We are not just talking about the lower enlisted or the lesser educated. We are talking about NCOs and, in some cases, an officer. To me, that is a character flaw that we can't have in combat."

"You had 18 year old soldiers married to 16 year old girls living in trailer parks. I think that was the most troublesome to me. I was troubled by the nature of our profession and the separation inherent between children and fathers. The children tended to be on post, I guess, but the guys were separated from them. That is somewhat troublesome, but there wasn't much I could do about it."

"I don't have any authority over wives. You have to come to grips with that."

"But some of them live in conditions that are less than satisfactory. So it is a matter of insisting that the chain of command be aware of where their soldiers live on post and that they worry about that kind of problem. One way I got visibility for this was to do something that I used quite successfully in Europe and that was to periodically include family issues as part of our quarterly training briefs. Any forum is acceptable that requires commanders, once in a while, to

focus on family issues and report out to me their various programs in that area."

## • COMMUNICATIONS

I think the insistence on planning training and reducing distractors is important. We ought to be unpredictable to our enemy. We shouldn't be unpredictable to our families and to our soldiers in terms of planned training. Although we worked on this all the time, I am not sure we were totally successful. Another technique we found helpful was the Family Action Forum. We met over a 2-day period. The first day was for single or unaccompanied soldiers. The second day was for the broader range of family issues from young people, teens, to adults. So, it is really a matter of listening and then causing staff follow-ups so there is creditability to the forum. People expect when they raise issues, that somebody is going to do something about them."

"One of the problems with the young enlisted men is they do not go home and brief their wives on their missions. That's another reason that I have started including all of the wives coming in with replacements in my orientation, so that I tell them right up front. I tell them what the readiness requirements are as they apply to their situation. I tell them about wills, emergency data cards, powers of attorney. I tell them that he is in a combat unit and the only reason that we exist is to protect the interests of the United States and that we could be gone on two hours notice. So we do the best we can in trying to spread the word in that regard."

"The first issue, if it can really be defined as an issue, is just general knowledge on the part of family members of what services are available, what services they are entitled to have, what they can do to help themselves, and how they go about doing that. That is an information problem. It is a problem in two or three different ways. One is to get the soldiers to take the information home and explain it to the families."

"One of the things that I felt that worked best for family members was to send a newsletter home with the pay voucher."

"It was just very difficult to get the word out to those soldiers. We've tried through family outreach programs, through bringing the family into the battalions and having family nights in the dining facility at reduced prices to get them interested. We've given them some time off to bring their families in to hear why we were going to be in Graffenwoehr over Thanksgiving. Why it was necessary to do that. Why it was necessary to deploy to Hohenfels for ARTEPS that we couldn't do in the local training area and so forth. I would tell you that if you could get 50 to 60 percent of the people present, you will have accomplished a great feat. For whatever reason, there is always that 20 to 30 percent who never come, who don't want to be involved but will be the first ones to complain."

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- **COMMUNICATIONS**


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## ***INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT***

### **• COMMUNITY IMPACT**

"I think the biggest challenge was to create a sense of ownership among everybody, all the citizens, that lived there. This includes policies and the way that we spend our money, both appropriated and non-appropriated funds. There needed to be a sense that it was everybody's hometown, a sense of ownership, and what happened or didn't happen was everybody's responsibility rather than just a few."

"I think what you have to do on the community side is tell them where they fit. We did a METL for the community just like we did for the division."

"I guess the Director of Engineering and Housing probably has the toughest job of anybody on the installation side because you can't make 5,154 sets of government quarters 'murphy' proof so that you don't have plumbing or electrical problems or those types of things. I would say that family support, morale from the family side — the DEH has a greater impact than any other one thing."

"The one that had the most impact on the division — I don't believe in lines. I've stood in enough lines in the Army that I don't like to waste my time or the soldiers' time. I had the IG look at customer relations. Any time there was more than six or eight standing in line then somebody was doing something about that to sort that out. That was to even include the hospital. There had been a couple of

comments made about the hospital relating to getting appointments. I had the IG go look at the hospital. The first thing that happened was that the Health Service's Command raised up and said, 'You can't do that, because MEDDAC works for Health Services Command.' I told health service command, 'As long as any unit is on this post, he is subject to me and my IG. I was not looking at the technical skill of medical doctors. I understand that is yours. What I am looking at is customer service. That is certainly my business.' Although it originally had a negative impact on the doctors at the hospital, in the last year it has paid big time dividends. What we have found out was that a young family member of a soldier to get an appointment to see a doctor had to go through six people. He had to call, go and wait. All these people were at the GS3 and 4 level. Depending on what kind of night they had the night before, they were pleasant or unpleasant. I found out that not only were these GS3s and 4s holding customers hostage; they were holding the doctors hostage. If they didn't feel like getting that person in to see the doctor, they didn't necessarily get to see the doctor. It very quickly became obvious that there was a perceived problem with the customers going to the hospital. We took some action to change that. I told the hospital commander over there that the GS3s and 4s are a dime a dozen. We would fire them until we got somebody who was happy and wanted a job and did it the way we wanted it done. There have been zero complaints in the last twelve months. What started off as a little bit of 'them and us,' the doctors right now will tell you that it turned out to be the best thing that ever happened. I did that same type of thing in all the other sections: the exchange, the clothing sales, and the gas station — everywhere. Those people knew that I was interested in what they did to serve the soldier and their family."

"My advice to a new division commander would be to spend as much time with them as you spend with your brigade commanders. You need to put your arm around them and make them a part of the team. They being the Red Cross Director, the DIO, the DPCA, the Director of the Museum, the guy or woman who runs the commissary — those people are important to you and your organization. If you don't spend the time with them, you are shorting your soldiers and your organization."

"Spending time with the staff, going around and visiting all the different parts of the community, just like I was doing in the division, was very hard and time consuming on me as a commander but very, very important. I tried to get more people involved in the action. I elevated the major's program, for example. These were volunteers that had given of their time. We gave them a desk, an office, and I think a van, and they worked their butts off trying to get the word out. We gave them a lot of visibility. I made them my VIPs. I invited them to events. I made a big show, a big concern about mayors, and the feedback was tremendous. That was the way to get the word out. We had a community newspaper that we started to explain things. So

communications of the commander's intent and what it is that we are trying to do is very important. Then we had a vision. As I told you in the division, you need to have a vision and in the community we had a vision. I got everyone, from the educational side, to recreation, to community services, to the PX and commissaries, medical, all of them, where is it that we want it to be?"

"One of the main ones is security around our installations and away from them. In the woods we have ammunition storage areas and other small supply areas throughout the division. But, primarily, the ammunition storage areas need continuous oversight within \_\_\_\_."

"How do you improve the living quarters of single soldiers living on post? How do you improve the quality of life for that soldier in the day rooms, laundry rooms and so forth? Like it or not, the answer really lies in self help."

"As an example, in the law enforcement and security area, we were very successful with foot mounted patrols at \_\_\_\_\_. These made people feel comfortable on the installation because the cop on the beat was there and he went through your neighborhood."

"We tried to schedule meetings every 6 months for the three principal communities to talk about issues of common concern and share some good ideas. We tried to reach out to a variety of interests throughout the community. We tried to improve the information flow and sense of responsiveness and feedback to members of the community through family action forums, spouse orientations, town hall meetings, and just generally walking around and talking to people about their concerns."

"From the standpoint of being both a community commander and a division commander, it is imperative that you strike the proper balance as to how much time you are going to devote to your community. You can have one of the best deputy community commanders in the world. You can have dedicated people who are working on your community staff who are doing everything that they possibly can to do what is right, but if you aren't willing to invest some time — and I mean a lot of time — to improving the community relations with the local population, whether it is in the mayor's office, in the county commissioner's office, in the local population, or taking the time to be interviewed by the local press and responding to complaints that are made to the various newspaper editors and so forth — you don't take time to do that, in my opinion, you are setting yourself up for a severe downfall."

"Fifty percent (time spent on installation duties) in one form or another. I would say 50-50. In my mind, it was all tied in. It was all a part of my job as the division/post commander. Everything that I did was related to the other."

- **UNDERSTANDING  
THE SYSTEM**

"They certainly have to understand the Standard Installation Organization [SIO] so they can understand what the garrison commander is responsible for versus the division and the chief of staff. They have to work at it. There is no clean delineation that says, 'This is his and this is his.' You have a working relationship there at the garrison side. I told the garrison side when I first got here that we have to operate efficiently because every dollar that I have to spend on the installation side, is a dollar that we have to take away from the training of the division. The training of the division is the top priority."

"I would just recommend that they get as much as they can from the Excellent Installations and Model Installation Programs that exist right now from DOD down. They have an awful lot of good ideas. Also, I would tell them to read some of the recent GAO reports."

"I think the Installation Management Course is a good course, and I think you need to do that. I would say what you need to do is talk to some deputy community commanders. If you are back at a course somewhere, there are always some excommunity commanders around; get some ideas. Then there are some very good publications. Master planning boards, you have to understand them. I think what we should have as our goal is how can we leave a better installation or a better community after we leave — not just doing it for the time we are there, but building it for the future. Things like master planning boards, visions about where you are going are important. I think you need to institutionalize things for the future and not just for your watch."

"I think there is an installation manager's course at Fort Lee or one of those places. I think that could be very helpful. They certainly need to know a little bit about the medical business. They need to know a little bit about each of the functional areas — the DIO, the DEH, what the engineers are up against in the environment and with the maintenance and repair of facilities. Infrastructure kinds of things and installation planning."

"When I was at the War College, there was an elective course taught that had to do with installation management. At that time, I was on my way to Germany to command a sub-installation so I took the course. It consisted of readings and discussions about all the functional areas that dealt with the community. I have since then had the opportunity to be the community commander of \_\_\_\_\_, which is probably as good a challenge as you could have in the community area. That course I took at Carlisle Barracks was of invaluable help. The only area where I needed more information and where I would urge anyone going to a position with installation responsibilities is to understand the funding issue. It is a very complex issue and the more time you devote to getting a thorough understanding, the less time you will have to waste once on the job. If there is one other area, it

is civilian personnel. Installations consist essentially of civilian personnel. To truly do justice to those employees and to maximize the output of the community, you must understand the personnel management system. And that is a far cry from just knowing that you have a civilian secretary."

"I think it is important that you understand your civilian personnel. The technique that I used was to call together a meeting of GS12s and above that worked for me. We had a work force of about 2500 personnel — keeping in mind that I ran both \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_. Because of the density of people, with some 3500 at \_\_\_\_\_ and 15,000 at \_\_\_\_\_, each had their own little staff. I think it is important that you call together your civilian leadership and explain to them that you are a division commander, but you are also a concerned business man who has an installation responsibility. They need to understand what they are doing and how they can support you in both capacities.

I am firmly convinced that, if they understand that, they will be very supportive. The very fact that you take the time to talk to them is very important and I can assure you that they appreciate it. I would say that one of the great actions that you should initially take is to talk with your civilian leadership and let them know that you care about them."

"There was an excellent installation management course at Fort Lee. Based upon your background, I think you just need to take a look at that POI, select the things that you are weak in, and go to that course. Not only do they provide you with doctrinal material to read, but they focus in on what is going on at the installation that you are going to command. That, to me, is the answer to that question. Go to Fort Lee. They do a great job. Let them work with you."

"It depends on the guy coming in. If he doesn't understand how you get your money to pay for all of the things that you have to pay for, what you have to do to project the requirement, how to manage those dollars, how to move it where you can from one pot to another, then you should go back and take a short crash course in that business because you are going to be behind the power curve. That is the first thing. It is fiscal management. Secondly, you have to understand civilian personnel business. You have to understand enough so that you can talk intelligently to your CPO or to the guy who runs the CPO for you, your garrison commander. If you don't understand the ins and outs of that business, you can get really frustrated in your efforts to try to manage your civilian work force. You need to know a little bit about the facilities engineering business. These are all stove-pipe organizations that I am talking about now. That is probably the biggest inhibitor to efficient management that we have down here."

"First thing I would have them do is to arrange a seminar and set up some case studies with other division commanders who have the same kinds of problems. I felt that I was fortunate having spent as much

time as I did in Europe to understand what the problems are. If a division commander comes to replace me who has little or no experience in installation management, has not been in Europe to understand the uniqueness of what happens to sub-communities here then he is going to be in for a rude awakening."

- **BUDGET  
CONSTRAINTS**

"The constraints that are placed on an installation manager by the way that the Army handles money, for example, puts you in a position where you have to do dumb things. We need an approach that says to an installation commander, 'This is the amount of money that we are going to give you to run your installation. Now take that money and go out there and do it. These are the things that you have to do.' Don't tell me how much money I can spend on family housing and then constrain me in other ways. Don't tell me how much money I can spend on base operations and then constrain me so that I can't do everything that I have to do. Don't tell me to contract out services and then not give me enough money to pay for the contracts. It is a very frustrating environment."

"It has forced us in this community to be very innovative in the kinds of money making activities that we need to do in order to generate funds, for use by nonappropriated funds activities. I somehow have to force my organizations to operate on a business level; I now have to go out and make some money in some of these activities in order to keep them as a vital organization. I surveyed the entire community to make sure that we were confident that we were keeping the most active activities in a nonappropriated fund arena that we had. I looked at the use factors and if the facilities were not used frequently or if the hours were not proper, I closed them. In other words if I open at nine o'clock in the morning and the activity didn't pick up until two o'clock in the afternoon, then I closed down that facility from nine to two. I only opened up when it appeared that we had the most activity in the facilities which created some cost savings in the area of personnel. Instead of opening at nine and staying open until nine at night, we would possibly only open at noon and close at eight or nine when the activity dropped off."

- **ENVIRONMENT**

"I think this area is going to drive a division commander to his knees and maybe even bring the U.S. Army to its knees. If we are not protectors of that environment, we are going to be pulled up short. The division/post commander must pay attention to that. Oil spills, any new construction, your cleaning plants — how has the cleaning solvent been disposed of? I'm telling you, some of these things are really serious. You can get yourself in big trouble. The Army has a big bill to pay in some of these areas. How are you treating the land that you have? The post commander has to be into that."

"It is all summed up in the PATCH — in the history of the 1st Infantry Division, the 25th Infantry Division, the 101st, or whatever it is. The philosophy that this is a fighting organization. If you can't create that, then you are going to have a hard time leading those guys in battle. That is really why you are getting whatever entitlements you have. You are the steward of that division — the being and the people in it. It is not yours. It is the American people's."

