

EXPERIENCES IN DIVISION COMMAND

1990




DIVISION COMMAND LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAM

May 1991

FOREWORD

This document contains selected quotations from the written debriefings of eight Division Commanders scheduled to complete their tenure of command during the past year. As a result of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, some commanders were extended with their division and were able to provide additional insights into deployment issues. In all, this document represents a collection of their thoughts, compiled to stimulate thinking about what it takes to be an effective division commander and to provide insights helpful to practitioners and students of the art of command. It is not a "cookbook" with recipes for success — but rather, the fruit of years of experience.



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PREPARATION FOR COMMAND

• SURPRISES

"Two surprises. First, the quality of the soldier and leaders have significantly improved over battalion and brigade command. The other piece I was not ready for was the turbulence and the continual retraining challenge that existed, not just at the crew level but all the way through to division staff."

"The most surprising thing that I found was an environment amongst my colonels which was atypical in terms of their understanding of the role of colonels, their understanding of teamwork, their understanding of loyalty, their understanding of the role and mission that they play towards the accomplishments of all the division's missions, and their understanding of a commander's relationship of division commander to brigade command. I had some egocentric self-serving colonels who were ill-prepared to operate with any guidance whatsoever and who went out of their way to be disruptive. I should have assessed that environment up front early on within the first 30 days. I did not do that. It took me six months to figure out precisely what that environment was; and then to try to set it straight, it took even longer. So, if there is a lesson learned about this, you ought to pay attention to that immediately."

"I think my biggest surprise was how much time I had to pay attention to my responsibilities as the post commander, as opposed to the division. I didn't really fully comprehend the responsibilities, having

served as an ADC in a division where I had no division heads and relatively zero installation responsibilities. I didn't realize how much of my time I would devote to base operations instead of the division. That was my biggest single surprise."

"In the German environment the single most surprising factor to me was the role I would have to play in community affairs, both in terms of managing all the communities of our lands and, even beyond the management of the communities, the interchange with the Germans. Number two, the demands on your time in terms of having to meet with both, in terms of professional matters or working matters as well as social. The demands of the community on a division commander in the German environment and in the NATO environment are extraordinary. I had been warned, but nevertheless, I was surprised when I got into the job and found that the demands were even greater than I had anticipated or had been led to believe."

"One thing that did surprise me was the amount of transition that occurred simply because of the difference in styles between the previous commander and myself. Both of us had very common objectives. But I found out after the fact that the way we got to our objectives were different."

"The most surprising thing to me is how long it takes when you want things to occur and to occur correctly. It takes time to get all the way to the bottom. That was very surprising to me. You need to think your way through early on about what few policies that you absolutely need to drive the division in your direction. You need to come to grips with those early on so that when you make those policy changes, they will get throughout the division very quickly. New division commanders must realize that battalion and brigade commanders have many things to do. If you want to affect smooth and long-range change for the Army, you need to come to grips with your policies early."

"The first day I had a meeting with my command sergeant major immediately followed by a meeting with my brigade commanders. I told them that I had not much inkling of what the status of the division was, and that I was going to take 90 days to assess it totally and thoroughly. In the interim period of time, they were to make the assumption that what they had been doing was okay and just continue to do it and they had my total support in that."

● **RECOMMENDED
ACTIONS**

"I spent 15 minutes with the outgoing commander just immediately prior to the change of command ceremony. During that time, he gave me a page and a half of lessons learned that, had he to do it over again, were things that he would have done. I executed every one of those things at the appropriate time and surely within the first 90 days."

"You clearly ought to have an Army SOP standardized transition for division level command. At the division level, one of the real challenges is to reduce the turbulence which comes with just the natural change. The outgoing and the incoming commander probably share the same goals and probably have fundamentally the same focus. You could productively use a 2 or 3-day transition which would facilitate and help soldiers down at the other end and preclude a hemorrhage with people trying to outguess what it is that the new commander is going to do."

"If I have learned anything about commanding a division at this point, it is that I will never again go into a job that has a Chief of Staff and a command sergeant major that I don't take my own people. I will never again accept strangers that I had no idea what they were like because it is not fair to the commander; it is not fair to the unit; and it is not fair to the people."

- **PRE-COMMAND PROGRAMS**

"I think the pre-command courses, at all levels, are good. They are getting better. The one thing that I think at this level that we perhaps lack, and this is being cured over time because we have people who are now being trained at the operational level of war and art, is that the training program ought to revolve about how to train our officers for the operational level of war. Division commanders operate essentially at the tactical level, but they have to think two levels above. I think a focused program for division commanders at the operational level of war would be very valuable."

"All the programs that have been put in place to help you in a pre-command sense are good. They are excellent. We spent an entire day with the Chief of Staff. Unquestionably that was the most valuable thing that I received because we talked about commander's intent and the need to have a clear understanding of commander's intent. That intent has not changed over time. Secondly, we have had opportunities with the Chief to do azimuth checks with him. The division commanders meet once a year at Leavenworth. Those are valuable sessions. I have never had any doubt what the Chief expected."

"I probably should have gone to the Garrison Commander's course. It probably would have been helpful in bringing me up to date on the responsibilities of the installation DEH and the DOL. I felt reasonably, technically competent in the weapon systems of the division although I had to get more knowledgeable on the operations of a CEWI Battalion and its capabilities."

"I think that the preparation provided was as good as it could have been. I really don't believe that there was any part that could have been better except possibly a refresher on the community side, specifically aspects like changes in NAF funding, NAF

reimbursements, and the aspects on resource funding and new rules on the community side."

"If the Army has selected the right people to command the divisions, then it is too damn late to train them. Although some of those little things can be helpful, I did not have the time to devote to doing a lot of extra things to come here. I spent four days in the Pentagon running around there getting briefed by various people, most of which was relatively ineffective to be quite honest. But the 1.5 hours with General Vuono was worth the trip. It was really down to earth, common sense approach to what division command was all about. He had some guidance for us."

"If I had had some time to think and read, it would have been helpful. I did go to the joint war fighters course down at Maxwell Air Force Base. That course is two weeks and it is superb. The best preparation for division command has more to do with the assignments you have had and your own professional development."

"While I don't think the division commander has to know every little thing there is about every piece of equipment, I think you have to have some basic working knowledge about most of the things that you own. If a guy comes in here depending on his background or where he has come from and is not real familiar with some of the equipment, then he ought to go by the schoolhouse and get himself up to speed."

"I would say that the Army's pre-command course system works reasonably well. I think in preparing for division command, there are a couple of things you need to focus on. First of all, FM 100-5's AirLand Battle doctrine. If you understand the doctrine for how you want to fight the division, you understand the current FM 25-100 on how to train, and then you take those two doctrinal documents, coupled with the pre-command courses, as your basis, I think you are about ready to go to command."

● READINESS

"If you are not current on FM 220-1, you might want to read it. The key thing that you have to do though is an assessment. You have to look at what is being said, hear what is being said, and go out and look on the field and see that it is factual."

"I would do essentially what I did do and that is get down with the subordinate guys. The guys who know the readiness of the division are the battalion commanders. It doesn't take long for you to figure it out who has their arms around the readiness issues and who does not."

"I would read the readiness reports so at least I had an appreciation for what had been reported, and not just the last report that had been turned in, to find out whether there was a continual trend in certain

areas that were being highlighted. Then I would wait and have a discussion with the staff and Chief before the first 2715 readiness meeting — not during it."

"Readiness is a complex piece. We are talking about the readiness to execute your wartime mission. Our senior commanders understand their business and can give you sage advice on readiness. I believe the Chief's presentations at PCC and the Chief's presentations to his division commanders are key in giving you guidance and priorities on readiness."

● TRAINING

"If you understand FM 25-100, you have your mission essential task list, and you have had the courage to do the training on those essential tasks, and the battle tasks below them, then it all fits. I am absolutely convinced that the mission essential task list and the identification of the battle tasks below that as laid out in 25-100 will prepare a division commander's training, maintenance, and sustainment programs to get him where he wants to go."

"I read every word of FM 25-100 about five times. I went to the CMTC. I observed the training at the CMTC, not only the training that is done in the maneuver box but also in terms of the simulation training that is done there. I went and watched units fire at Grafenwoehr. I would encourage anybody, any division commander who has the opportunity, to take advantage and observe a BCTP. It was a great preparation for me. I would focus on getting myself to the position where I could see and observe training at the various levels."

"I would encourage a division commander to get out to the NTC and watch every event of a rotation. Go into the 'Star Wars' building and have the OCs [observer/controllers] pull for you the OC take-home packets for some of your units so that you have a feel for what the unit has done. If you read the OC packets, you'll find out very quickly how well disciplined your units are. What I like about the National Training Center is that it is a capstone training event in this Army. I think it is the best training ground that you could use to get yourself ready for division command. Division commanders have to be tactically and technically competent. If you are well versed on what goes on at the NTC, it will drive your training program."

"A division commander must make sure that he understands our doctrine in FM 100-5 which means that he needs to read it. If necessary, he needs to go to Leavenworth to be taught that, or whatever he has to do to be sure that he is comfortable with our AirLand Battle doctrine. He has to be well versed in FM 25-100 on how to train the force and now, FM 25-101, which is not a division commander's book — but you have to understand it because that is what battalions and companies are using to formulate how you implement FM 25-100."

"I would have to get myself real smart on the Apache helicopter. I felt reasonably comfortable about the capabilities of a Cobra Attack Battalion, but I would have to get up to speed on the Apache battalion."

"I was never comfortable with breaching operations. It is probably the toughest mission in mobile warfare. I would spend a lot of time trying to find a better way to do that."

- **PROFESSIONAL READING**

"Last month I probably read more than I have in the past year. You can never know too much about the enemy. Focus on understanding the enemy. Second, we have a number of doctrinal publications that are helpful. I have found the senior leadership manual, FM 22-103, is an awfully good book, probably worth reading several times. Then I would say the FM 100-5, 100-15, 100-15-1, and the 71 series for division level operations."


"They clearly have to read FM 25-100 and 25-101 and believe it. They need to go get the books out relative to the organizations that they will command and refresh themselves on what the doctrine is and how we do business. The problems aren't new. The big issue is, can you find somebody who did it right? Go try and research who the heck has worked that problem and who has done it right and then steal it."

"You need to speak with clarity. Most of us are not as competent as we should be in speaking clearly and precisely. So a mastery of the fundamentals, knowing what it means when you say a passage of lines, or screen, or guard; those terms, in my view, are terms of art in our business and the commander should be an expert in the terms of art in his business."

- **REFLECTIONS**

"The Army ought to force all division commanders to have 30 days prep time. Give them blanket TDY orders for 30 days and say, 'Go do whatever the hell it is that you want to do and get yourself ready.' It would have smoothed the transition for you, and given you the time to collect your thoughts. It would give you time to sit down with your wife beforehand and say, 'How is it that we are going to be able to do all these things', so when you come, you have a team that is all thought out that says, 'Here is how I fit into the Army standard way of doing business.' It would have reduced the trauma of a change of command."

"The synchronization piece at the divisional level is a tough challenge because you are orchestrating lots of things — EW systems, engineers, mobility/counter mobility. I would say that synchronization is, number one, critical to success, and number two, is very complex and very hard to execute. You should spend time thinking, talking to people, understanding the capabilities, response times, and so forth, of all the systems that feed into that."



READINESS

● **REPORTING**

"There was no pressure to upgrade reports. There was emphasis in two areas. One was not shooting ourselves in the foot. If we broke ALO in an area and we broke it by one or two, or whatever it was, then the question was, 'Did we have to do that?' The other aspect was consistency. For example in upgrading, we would get some subjective upgrades. We would discuss why battalion or brigade commander A upgraded when it appeared that exactly the same set of conditions existed in unit B and they didn't. I didn't care whether both upgraded or both didn't upgrade, but I had a problem when one upgraded and one didn't because I didn't know what message they were trying to give."

"I did not find any major shortcomings in the readiness of the division nor did I find a lack of programs and procedures and ways to do things and to monitor that. I pay a fair amount of attention to the USR because I think it is a useful drill to really look at your training and maintenance posture. The commanders outline for me what they really think the unit readiness report is. They ask for help if they need help in some of the resourcing."

"I absolutely refused to submit my subordinates to the battalion commander with the best maintenance record getting to brief how great he was and the lowest maintenance record commander briefing me for an hour on what he was doing to correct his maintenance."

"Prior to the USR, my DMMC and my DISCOM commander put together for me an entire profile of the maintenance posture of the division. I do not focus on units. I focus on systems of equipment and then look within the units to see where the problems are. I do the same thing with training. I review with my ADC-M and my G3 before the USR where we're at on the training path and what we have done that inhibits units from training or what we see looming on the horizon. Then I assemble all my commanders and the post staff and we lay down the USR. I look at the personnel and the training readiness, their reasons, and the way we were reporting to higher as to why we have not been able to achieve C1. Then I look at those systems that are not making either the FORSCOM or the DA standard and I show within the units where those are. At the end of an hour, everybody knows what I think is important, and where the division needs to go."

"One or two days before the USR meeting, I read every brigade, battalion, and separate company readiness report so I know what that commander is saying when he talks about readiness. That is important because it all has to blend together in what I say to FORSCOM about the division's level of readiness. The only report that really has any visibility is the division USR. When we go to this one-hour USR lay down, I am prepared for what they have reported and where the division is at. There are no other readiness briefings. I try to be visible within the division. I try to travel totally unannounced. I don't tell people where I am going because I don't want a bunch of phony preparation done."

- **FORCE
MODERNIZATION**

"During the course of the year while I was in command, I was faced with the Bradley introduction into the Cavalry and to the three Infantry battalions. The Signal Battalion was a complete workover with MSE. The DIVARTY battalions converted to three by artillery. The Aviation Brigade received OH-58D and EH-60s. The Aviation Brigade was about to stand down the Cobra attack battalion in order to convert to Apaches. We were in a major period of FORCE MOD. That meant that you had to do a lot of 'work arounds' in training and you had to do a lot of work arounds in your mind every month with the USR and decide what to tell the Pentagon as far as your readiness posture was concerned. You see, divisions don't go C5, but battalions do. When you have three battalions that are C5, you have to call a division something less than combat ready."

"I discovered a lot of disconnects between people and equipment as it related to force modernization. I discovered a lot of that through the unit readiness report."

- **INSPECTIONS**

"We have unannounced IG inspections. We do a very rigorous maintenance inspection. Those inspections are traditionally born out to reporting and the actual readiness is all right. They are together."

"There is a pendulum swing in the business of inspections. My predecessor wanted to make sure they didn't feel threatened. Part of that was the elimination of some division level kinds of inspections. I felt that there were some things that the division should be inspecting. The division should be inspecting brigades, and brigades should be inspecting battalions — that wasn't going on. The IG had principally been placed over on the garrison and was inspecting garrison activities. I finally instituted a command inspection program which did that — divisions inspect brigades, brigades inspect battalions, and battalions inspect companies."

- **ASSESSMENT**

"The thrust of one of the little tidbits of advice that General Vuono gave us was, 'Look guys, you have good division commanders out there so be careful about arriving on the scene and making lots of changes. You need to survey all of that and make your own judgments, put your own twist on it a little bit, but you don't need to go into an outfit like a bull in a china shop.'"

"Readiness is a relative term. You can have all of the readiness parameters add up to be C2 but if your signal battalion is not ready to go to war, you are a C3 outfit. Just about every single month that I had to report readiness, one of those kinds of factors would play."

- **HONESTY**

"I didn't see at any time any compulsion on the battalion commander to think he had to be C1. I think that in the honesty and integrity area, as well as the area of readiness reporting there is a match there. Battalion and brigade commanders must be prepared to honestly assess how they are in readiness, uninhibited by influences to be C1."

"There was no problem with reporting whatsoever. It was done honestly and it was done factually."

- **TRAINING**

"It has been hard to maintain training readiness because of the lack of maneuver skills. Our maintenance units do good. Our engineer units do good. My intelligence units do exceptionally well. Air defense does okay. Artillery is extremely good. Maneuver elements need more maneuver training and so my maneuver training is a significant weakness here in Europe."

"My assessment when I came was that we didn't have a clear definition of the standards of what was expected on training. The METL did not have teeth. You could do almost anything you wanted and the guy would rationalize his way to a T or a P. The lack of specificity in the METL left a little to be desired."

"The fund cuts were rather significant. You find that your operating funds were 25 percent less than they were just four years earlier. Yet, there wasn't a mindset adjustment by the commanders as they went through their training management process about how to 'train on the cheap.' Generating excitement in creative training was a better way

of saying 'training on the cheap' — that was what we were trying to do. It was a significant challenge figuring out how to operate and live within the resources provided. Our deployment planning needed a lot of work and our EDRE program needed revision. We did those sorts of things that are done in the 82d. We also did deployment battle books that showed us how to get all the way from garrison through the POMCUS draw to our TAAs in Europe."

"What you want your units to do is flow during the training year through half periods of readiness. I tell them, when you see yourself leaving C2 headed for C3, let me know so that I have the opportunity to shift resources, training areas, or whatever it takes to get you to where you need to be."

- **FOCUS**

"There are always things that need improvement. There were some readiness problems that needed to be worked. I think the best thing a division commander needs to do is make your intent crystal clear."

"Nobody was trying to hide anything. The command climate was good. The philosophy that was in place was good. What I felt that we needed to do most was to execute to standard the training plan and the overall plan for the division. We do not have a 'management plan' in being. So, we did a little work to keep track of certain things. But I wouldn't want to overdo that because I think the statistical business can be a real bust if you start driving that home."

"Readiness in Europe is significantly better than it is in CONUS and it should be because we spend a lot more time and effort on readiness. We have had the priority for a certain number of years. We have the most modernized equipment."



TRAINING

● FOCUS

"There is nothing new in the manner in which one approaches the training problem. It is just field time. It is basics. It is task, condition, and standard. It is after action reviews done the Army way with some substance behind it and then it is retraining. I've tried continuously to exercise power down. I am a strong believer in the fact that you have to decentralize the execution."

"I have tried to look at training the division at three different levels. One, I have tried to look at task force and below. The task force commander has a tremendous responsibility to fight the direct fire fight. And, everybody has to support that. All the combat support and all the combat service support guys have to support him in his effort, but he has to lead and must really understand and know the direct fire fight. I find that to be a weakness in our task force commanders. The task force commander can't take care of every single system on the battlefield and synchronize all of it. He just doesn't have a big enough staff. He doesn't have enough experienced people, and he just can't fight it all. This means that the brigade commander is the guy who has to lead and manage the indirect fire assets that have been allocated to him in support of the task force commander's fight. It is integrated and synchronized, but the brigade commander is a fighter. That is a fighting headquarters, and he just doesn't hand all this off to the task force commander. He has to provide him some genuine killing assistance out there with the

artillery, the air, and the attack helicopters. I see the brigade commander's role tied to the division. The brigade-division link is very, very important because the division pushes them resources. This then means that you have to have brigade and division staffs that are closely entwined and that know one another and understand the commander's intent. The next training level focus is the brigade-division piece. Of course you apply the separate battalions who are very important but who probably don't really get stressed until they are in the field with the division headquarters. The division headquarters must go to the field at least four times a year. They must go in a structured training environment. And to do that, we really need a corps cell and a corps operation plan to drive us so that we can do the technical training at the division level tied to the brigades. That is where the CPX program comes in and becomes an integral part with objectives each time and built around your war plans. In addition to that, I want the division headquarters company to go to the field at least every other month, but I would prefer every single month. I want them to go and just set up, tear down, move, setup and tear down. The third level of training is the operational level. We had three sessions that General Saint led before I even took command which caused us to discuss amongst the division commanders and the corps commanders and the CINC, the business of operational warfare. That was very helpful in understanding commander's intent. Those three levels of training are very important to us. Think about how you are going to train the division, brigade, corps linkage. Then think about how you are going to train yourself in operational art."

"Training your soldiers to the very best level that you can is still the most important thing. It is what they signed up for. That is what 'Be all you could be' proved. The one thing you have to watch is the time. Lord knows we have trained awfully hard this past year. But I haven't heard anybody complain that we've trained too hard. Could we have trained better? Sure. Could we have trained smarter at times? Sure. But we tried to squeeze every bit of time out of this that we could."

"I think the first thing you have to do is remember that the Chief of Staff of the Army has told us, my CINC has told me, my corps commander has reinforced to me from day one, that training is top priority. I have tried to signal to all my people how honest I am and how committed I am to training. The main thing you do is state your priorities very clearly and then make all the things that you do in terms of prioritizing time and resources, support your top priority, which is training."

"Of all the things that we do at battalion level and up, I would tell you synchronization, synchronization, and synchronization. It is hard work to synchronize all the battlefield operating systems."

"First thing I would encourage a division commander is to get out a piece of paper and articulate what you want your assistant division commanders to do. The two ADCs, the division chief of Staff, the division command sergeant major and the CG must sit down once every other week, as a minimum, and talk about what is going on in the division, where the priorities are, and what needs emphasis and what doesn't. So that below the command group of the division, and as the battalion and brigade commanders look up, they see everybody speaking with one voice and not going off in different directions."

"When the division goes to MTA, we set up a division headquarters with all the support structure, whether it is Grafenwoehr or Hohenfels, and a general officer is there all the time, not to look over the shoulders of commanders, but to indicate that this is where the priority of the division is really focused."

"Of all the things that I do, training is the most important. There are a thousand reasons in this Army not to train. But, a commander's sacred honor is to make sure that soldiers are trained."

"We do not have the time nor the resources to do a lot of fancy stuff. So the thing that we have stressed, and it has paid dividends, is to be good in the fundamentals. The fundamentals at the soldier level, the fundamentals at the squad and at the platoon level. If you focus on fundamentals and get strong there, I think you will be successful at every level."

"I give to my commanders, at least a year out, the guidance for the training year. I make training important in three ways. First I resource it — with dollars, with training areas, and with time by taking burdens off the units so they can train. The second thing that I do is in the QTB process. I review the bidding with the battalion and brigade commanders eyeball to eyeball on what they have done; what they said they were going to do and couldn't get done; and what they plan to do next year. The third dimension of that — if you never visit training, you are really saying that training is not important. You must be visible where soldiers are training. I guess there is a fourth one. I expect my brigade commanders to tell me on their OER support form what their objectives and priorities are. And, training had better be way up high on the list."

- **ASSESSMENT**

"FM 25-100 is the method and techniques — battle focus, METL driven training with good, clear, understood standards. Every commander has to take his own mission and synthesize it to the point where he understands it. Every commander has to be able to write out his own METL task. The difficulty is the description in your relative level of efforts. There is a lot of subjectivity between T, P, and U. You have to get into the components of the mission training assessment. You have to assess the technical competence of your leaders so you create leader stakes at battalion level."

"It takes a while to assess your training status. The best way to assess your readiness is to go out and stand on a hilltop at the NTC and watch your troops flounder and see what your strengths and weaknesses are. You can listen to all the training management briefs in the world, but you have to watch them in action to see it really happen. You have to see not just one or two, but a random sample across your division to get your arms around whether or not the division is ready."

"You have to get on the ground and figure out where you are. You can't rely on reports. Then set up some very simple guidelines out there and be tenacious about pursuing those."

"The AAR [After Action Review] process is the best thing we have ever done in terms of training. Our philosophy is that every training event is critiqued, assessed, and feedback provided. If you don't do that, you lose a greater part of the training value of the event."

"Our problem was how to execute to standard. Just doing it doesn't mean you do it to standard. We didn't know how much we could improve. That is the real purpose. The idea is for everybody to meet the standard. The only way that you can do that is to provide decent feedback and then act on it."

- **METL**

"The commander must personally believe in the METL that he has. It has to be his own METL. That METL must also be approved by his boss; you need to give him a brief back or say, 'Boss, here is the mission you have given me. Here is my concept of operations and the way I intend to execute it.' Then, you need the endorsement of that commander. When I give him my semiannual training brief and I articulate my mission, I give him my METL. I give him an assessment of where I am and what I intend to do."

- **PROGRAMS**

"I think the BCTP Program is an outstanding vehicle. People do not pay enough attention to it. The division had been on a quarterly CPX scheme and if it had not been for BCTP they may not have been on a quarterly CPX schedule. It really raised the proficiency of the division and the brigade staffs."

"BCTP was the single most important performance oriented driver of training that we have done. That fit into our program very well. We made it fit in, and we learned a tremendous amount."

"I go back to the training system and the combat training centers. That has really made a difference in our Army, and it is the most powerful driver of enhanced performance in our Army that I've seen in my time. The whole program from the Battle Command Training Program to the combat training centers themselves have just been a remarkable phenomenon."

"Simulation has a great potential in this Army. And, it has already made some differences. The U-COFT [Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer] has been a dramatic difference. I think that SIMNET [Simulation Network] has made a difference and is going to make an even greater difference as we learn. We need to get the task force and brigade commanders more involved."

• **JR LEADERS**

"Every Tuesday morning for five hours in this division if you are not in the field, you do Sergeant's Time. Sergeant's Time is exactly what it says it is. It was an opportunity for NCOs to do things at the beginning of the day, but all of these get at small unit leadership and they get at small unit training and noncommissioned officers. I am talking about E5s and E6s. This is my responsibility so I give those sergeants five hours a week, and I make it happen."

"The biggest reason why soldiers and units do not perform well when they execute an event is because the leadership doesn't know how to do it right in the first place. So, the technique of scheduling events without demanding that the leadership clearly understand how to do the task in the first place is a route to disaster."

"The command sergeant major was very active in checking what was going on with the execution of training by noncommissioned officers and their preparation for it. I do not believe that you divide training by grade. I hold commanders responsible for all training. The execution of some of it may be done by noncommissioned officers. My sergeant major was an extra set of eyes and ears for me to tell me where we had something going wrong. He was a teacher and very active about it."

"I think it is very important to get out in writing what you want the division sergeant major to do. I charge mine to be the master trainer of individual training in the division. I charge him to watch PLDC. I charge him to watch BNOG. He watches the NCO Academy. I charge him to watch Sergeant's Training every Thursday morning. If you are going to build a professional noncommissioned officer corps, you have to charge them with standards. And the command sergeant majors are the standard setters and the standard enforcers of noncommissioned officer and the junior enlisted grades. That is sergeants business. It works pretty well if you just hand them the responsibility."

"Another thing we have done that has paid extremely large dividends for us is the focus on the role of the noncommissioned officer's training. You have to hold the noncommissioned officer accountable. We have emphasized the Sergeant Morales Program because what it takes to succeed in the Sergeant Morales selection process is conducive to preparing a sergeant to do his or her role in training soldiers."

• TECHNIQUES

"What I did was stabilize the day. I started working training distractors. Using the PT formation as a means of conveying my concept of the start of the whole day. If the first sergeant, the company, the battalion, can't account for it's people at PT in the morning, can't assure that 90 percent are turned out at PT in the morning, we should give up on accomplishing that the rest of the day because it gets increasingly worse."

"Above all, commanders have to be there at training or it just flat won't get executed to standard."

"Multi-echelon training is absolutely essential. If you are going to maintain training at every level, you have to aggressively train in a multi-echelon approach."

"I do not do unannounced rollouts. I do not do unannounced AGIs. I did not do unannounced command inspections. That is a battalion commander's business. A battalion commander evaluates platoons. Brigade commanders look and evaluate companies. The division looks and evaluates battalions and brigades. Before we go to the NTC, we run all our battalions through what we call a 'gauntlet.' It is nothing more than a battalion level, 72-120 hour ARTEP. It is evaluated by the division. The focus is on capturing the weaknesses and doing a good after action review."

"I had my IG twice a month go down to a battalion and report into them at 6:20 in the morning to do a personnel accountability. He would account for every soldier. Then we would hold an after action review at 1530 in the afternoon. Once a week we notify a company that we are going to do a PT rollout the next morning and we give that company a PT test to make sure that their tasks, conditions, and standards are being done correctly. The ADC overwatches that and I go down and take the test with them periodically. Then we have an after action review that afternoon. And again, we are looking at numbers and the condition of the troops. If you can set the day correctly at the beginning, the rest of it is going to go that much better for soldiers. By 1630-1700 in the afternoon, the soldier is gone."

"Once a month the command sergeant major and I talk to all the new leaders in the division. New leaders being all commissioned officers, all warrant officers, all master sergeants, and above. I talk to them about a lot of things but I emphasize training. I talk about the priorities. I talk about tasks, conditions and standards. It is more a philosophical notion of what training is and why it is important. I will do executive seminars with my separate battalion commanders and my brigade commanders. I think you need to examine and adjust your METL about once a year. METL is a dynamic thing, and you may go through this drill and you may not change it. But you need to sit down with your commanders and go through all of that. There are only two subjects of discussion and that is how to fight and how

to train. I had this seminar with my commanders once a month. I also sit down with my battalion commanders once a month for lunch. I will talk about a wide range of issues with the battalion commanders. It is not all training. It allows me to develop a relationship with the battalion commanders that I believe has to do with trust. Your subordinates have to feel that they can make mistakes and it is not the end of the world."

"We followed General DePuy's notion that for every military operation there is a concept phase, a planning phase, and an execution phase. On the concept phase we worked to ensure that all those who would be executing the mission understood the commander's intent, understood the concept of operations, and could articulate back what they thought was expected of them. The vehicle for doing this in training is the QTB. So we spend a lot of time up front on ensuring that the concept and the intent were properly set. Once that was done then the rest of the operation was primarily in a decentralized operation. Performance evaluation was based upon the degree to which the commanders could perform to a given standard which we had all developed in concert. I would say a centralized concept, decentralized execution, and to build consensus among the executing commanders on what they ought to be doing, giving them also an opportunity to share the development and standards so they could agree as to what it meant to be T and what it meant to be P. When the commander gave me his assessment, he spoke with definition, he spoke with specificity, and there wasn't a question about what he meant."

● **"BOBTAIL"
DIVISION**

"We were a two brigade division. We did indeed do red, amber, and green cycles. We just had to incorporate the DISCOM and the aviation brigade the best we could while at the same time trying to be red, amber, and green by brigade slice. Actually, we created red, amber, green, and black cycles. If you were in black cycle, you were really training. Other people called that NTC train-up."

"We use a red, green, and amber cycle. This has been extremely difficult in a two brigade division. You can't have a guy red; a guy amber; and a guy green because there are only two brigades. So, our forward brigades are either red or green. The DISCOM is always amber. If the 1st Brigade is green, then the artillery battalion, the air defense battery, and the support battalion of the DISCOM are green with them. One of the precious resources a commander needs is time. You have to get a system together to provide them with the time in which they are unobstructed from taskings, TDYs, and the host of things that go on in this Army of ours."

"I do not think that you can accept higher levels of readiness out of Reserve components based upon training 39 days out of a year. They absolutely require and must have active Army support if they are going to do well at company and beyond levels of training. Units that

have roundout brigades put an inordinate amount of resources on them to allow them to do well."

- **QTB**

"Your training is event driven. So what you do is take the task to train, put those into the program to train them during those 'events'. You maximize the tasks that you have to train based upon your greatest training opportunities. Everything from guard, to details, to visitors are all discussed at each quarterly training brief."

"I go to the separate battalions and they brief me individually. Incidentally, I do that with my DENTAC and with my MEDDAC. I do that with every active Army unit on this post."

- **DETRACTORS**

"You have to be absolutely ruthless about this 5-week lock-in. I tell the battalion commanders, 'Look guys, when you get something that disrupts your lock-in period, throw the damn thing in the trash can. That is my guidance to you. If somebody doesn't like it and it is really important, I will probably hear about it, but just throw it in the trash can.' You really have to be hard-nosed about that thing."

"I require the division staff to give 45 days notice prior to a tasking. There are exceptions because sometimes I get fed things from higher headquarters that I don't have 45 days. Detractors are tough nuts to crack because they are there, and they are very real. But again, I simply say that the best way I know to get rid of detractors is to resource that guy who is green, give him the time and the resources to do the training, and put the detractors over on the red guy so that the green guy can train. That is the only way that I know how to skin that apple."

"I am not sure where the training detractors are generated. I can tell you that we have an iron fence around the division on the 45-day rule. Nothing goes down to the brigades with less than 45-days notice without my signature. The Chief can't do that. The ADCs can't do that. The G3 can't do that. I go down and ask the company commander about that and he is jerked from left to right. I don't know who the culprit is. Some distractors can become training opportunities. I am convinced that Bruce Clarke was correct. The unit needs about two good days of training a week. Most of what we do is not training. Most of what we do is activities."

"My experience tells me that the greatest detractors to training don't come from above. They come from inside the battalions, from the first sergeant, from the command sergeant major, from somebody who at the last minute needs to get something done and he says, 'Okay, all training is off, we are going to put up tents.' Or all training is off, we are going to support whatever."



FIELD OPERATIONS

- **TIME
MANAGEMENT**

"The most limiting factor is getting there. It is amazing to me how one's office tends to suck you in if you are not careful. I have worked the time management of getting to the field very, very hard and I am still less successful than what I would like to be. That is compounded by the fact that you don't have division exercises any more. So, you have to work the CPX tail, the TOCEX, the staff battle drills, and all those kinds of things to get the staff thinking as one. The number one guy you have to get inside your head from the warfighting perspective is your G3 plans officer."

- **MANEUVER
SPACE**

"I had problems having the unit perform in a field environment because of constraints. The problem with the National Training Center and the CMTC is that they are too small. You are limited to size of forces. You don't learn how to maneuver large formations and deal with those problems."

"The single most limiting factor is maneuver space. There is absolutely no substitute for field training. There are things that complement it, but we don't want to go down this road of thinking under the guise of better evaluation and constraint of funds and saving money that we are going to reduce field training. Not only do you have to do a lot of field training, you had better make sure that in that field training you have a whole lot of live fire exercises. That is not

to say that we can't do simulations to complement field training but it is a complement and it will never be a substitute for it."

- **COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT**

"I think communications is the biggest challenge — your ability to communicate. We are working with communications equipment that is just absolutely too fragile and too inadequate, far too inadequate to meet the needs of the modern forces that can operate at the tempo and speed at which our heavy forces are capable."

"In the heavy division, my greatest frustration in exercising effective command is the lack of communications. There is an absolute crisis need for MSE [Multiple Subscriber Equipment] in the Army today. If you look at the heavy divisions, none of us are filled beyond, I would guess, 60 to 70 percent on radios with secure devices. We like MCS [Maneuver Control System], but with the shortage of radios, it ties up an FM net to operate it. You are short secure devices — that ties up non-secure devices. When you walk through the dimensions of communications, you find that PCM has outlived its usefulness and MCS is the way to go."

"Communications is always a challenge. With MSE, more so than with PCM, you have to have your signal officer standing next to your G3 when you are starting your plan. You have to have FM at the forward line of troops. Surprisingly, the small extension node of MSE which goes with the brigade TOC can break down and set up just as fast as the TOC can. So it is no longer the thing that holds you up. The problem is that while you are moving, neither one is in position and you have about a 30 minute lag from the stop of the TOC till you are back in. Thirty minutes of the fight may be the end of the fight. So FM becomes just as critical. You have to be as knowledgeable as your signal guy as to how the system works or he could take you out of business. "

"Our FM communications are just very inadequate. I think MSE is a big help, but there are some limitations there. The one thing that MSE does for us, it allows you to communicate from the front end of the division all the way to the back end of the division and to work those logistics problems much more effectively than we have been able to work them in the past. It is a help but not the total solution. We still need the SINGARS desperately."

- **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

"Communicating clearly what it is that you want people to do is the toughest problem. Knowing clearly what your boss wants you to do and what you then want to do. Just because I am a division commander doesn't mean that I have perfect knowledge or that I have all the skills necessary to issue the orders that will get the mission accomplished."

"On the subject of commander's intent, I do not believe it will get you where you need to be. I think your commander's intent must be

given eyeball to eyeball with your commanders by you personally, and once you give your commander's intent, you must translate it to a concept of operations in which one can articulate how you want the battle to be executed and how synchronization will occur inside the context of your intent."

"The commander needs to be at the decisive place at the decisive time. Said in another way, D-MAIN is probably not where you should command and control from nor can you assume that D-MAIN has better information than someplace else. So if the decisive point was down in the 1st Brigade, you would very often find that 1st Brigade Commander at his TAC and me in his MAIN."

"The hardest thing for a division to do is to try to articulate with adequate warning time to subordinates how to execute what is to be done in the next 24-48 hours. It is extremely difficult to read that. The more warning that you give them, the better they will execute their actions and orders. You need to lead the brigade commanders in terms of where you are going with at least 8-10 hours notice. This 'push to talk' business will work for about 24 hours. If you do not give the division the lead time it needs to prepare for combat, by the end of about 72 hours you are going to grind to a stop because you will not have the fuel in place to do what you want, you will have shot all your artillery munitions, your MLRS will be out, and your supply system will be a mess. You will have maintenance guys running all over the battlefield policing up what you have lost."

- TOC

"The Chief standardizes the main. The ADC-M standardizes the Division Operations Center and the brigade and battalion commanders standardize their TOCs. All this work that we are putting on a standard CP is a waste of effort. We have been trying to standardize CPs since I was a second lieutenant. It didn't work then, and it hasn't worked in the last 27 years. Let the commanders in the field figure that out. My CP is a direct result of trying to execute the doctrine written in FM 100-5. The reason the division main is as big as it is because of the things that we are taught in our doctrine about IPB synchronization. You can't synchronize with small pockets of people sitting around under pine trees with hand grenades in their pockets. It requires your intelligence collection effort, and your targeting cell within your artillery. I think we are wasting an inordinate amount of time trying to standardize CPs."

"Early on in one's division command during a CPX, you really have to pay attention to what goes on at the Division Main. At least for the first CPX, I would give up on going out to units. I would park myself at the D-MAIN and get through that in about a week's time. Once you feel comfortable with that, then the D-MAIN is the worst place to be. I found I needed to be out with the brigades talking to the commanders, talking to the cavalry squadron commander, and those kind of things so you could always cross wire."

• **FOCUS**

"Do everything as close as possible to the actual warfighting business. Take every opportunity that you can to train and at the same time recognize that all of this is predicated upon a very sound maintenance system. There is a balance there, but it has been my experience at going to the field using the equipment and having a solid maintenance system, you will do just as well as if everybody sits in the motor pool and looks at that crap every day."

"You can work the piece part of commanding and by that you can work CPXs. You can use simulation to drive them. You can use planning drills and map exercises. We worked through the real details of how to go execute a fight. There are a lot vehicles to work that without going out in the field with a whole unit. In fact, if you haven't worked that before at a fairly proficient level, you shouldn't bring the troops out. My only bias is that sometime you better. That is only a simulation of what it is really like. All that doesn't happen they way they computerize it."

"Stress fundamentals. Do the things that you do well and train to move units efficiently and swiftly. Keep it simple. The higher you go the more complex it becomes. Make your subordinate maneuver commanders keenly aware of the importance of fire support. Emphasize that with a vengeance. If you don't use it well, you are going to lose on the battlefield."

"Think about how you are going to articulate your intent and your concepts to your subordinates. The commander has to state his intent of what he wants done on the battlefield and the subordinates have to understand it. He has to translate it to a concept of operations that takes the staff, as well as the commanders, through the way he wants the battle to flow and how he wants his intent accomplished. If the commander doesn't shape how synchronization will occur inside his concept, it will probably not occur."

• **DEPLOYMENT**

"You must have a deployment plan. For Southwest Asia, we did not have a plan. However, we did have a plan to depart from and to develop a more detailed plan as to how to get the division out of here. That plan had been rehearsed. That plan had been walked through and I am sitting here watching it unfold before me today and I can't believe how smooth it is going. The TPFDL is an absolute nightmare if you don't plan carefully how you are going to leave. The key thing that I would say to a division commander who faces a deployment criteria — if you look at the 82d — things just don't happen by accident. They have a plan. They have a contingency plan that is well done. It has been practiced and rehearsed over and over again. Probably there is not another division in the Army, anywhere in the world, that could do it as well as they do it. The reason is they practice. That probably makes the difference. If your METL says deploy, the first thing you better do is call for the plan."



PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

● TECHNIQUES

"I put a lot of emphasis on professional development because it was my judgment that I had to train the leaders for tomorrow's Army. We had programs at battalion, company, brigade, and division level. I took the division away from administrative kind of stuff and put them into tactical kind of stuff in the field at all echelons. I put together at the division level for my leaders, down through and including battalion commanders and battalion command sergeants major, a grouping of professional development sessions. About every other month or so, we get together some place and do something that is related to readiness. Every other month I meet with the battalion commanders — and just the battalion commanders."

"My view, at division level, was to try to cross-fertilize everybody at the lieutenant colonel and above level by talking about division systems that they didn't deal with on a daily basis. We had an entire day on the fire support system because I wasn't satisfied with the responsiveness of artillery that I saw at the National Training Center. You would be amazed at how many infantry and other maneuver battalion commanders don't have the foggiest idea what goes through the TACFIRE system, and why they can't get instant fire support. So, there was a mutual understanding and appreciation. That was what I was trying to create at the division level. It was those kinds of things that were devoted at the division level. I told my brigade

commanders that I expected them to do similar sorts of things at brigade OPDs to cross-fertilize."

"We lay out a large map, put the graphics down, and move the enemy throughout the sector and make sure that the commanders understand the intent on how the battle is to occur. Present are the brigade commanders and the separate battalion commanders and your division staff. This is the greatest opportunity for officer and noncommissioned officer professional development that will ever occur by the division commander as he takes the time to stand around with his commanders and talk about how the battle will be fought. The division commander must learn to listen. Inside the heads of the staff and the commanders you will find there will be adjustments to the plans that make sense and need to be done. It is a great opportunity to develop your people to understand how to execute your intent and your concept. It is a great opportunity to get feedback on how they are reading the way you want the warfighting battle to flow as it is executed. It is a very effective technique. For the young majors of the division staff gathered around the map boards watching what is going on is the greatest development of those people that you could ever do."

"The division had a good professional development program. The NCOs have check rides. The officers have a number of leader certification courses that they run. A good leader certification program and in some units a good reading program that was ongoing. Some battalion commanders had book reports. Most had monthly OPD sessions of one form or another. Most of that I left to battalion and brigade commanders to execute."

"I talk to the leaders in the division once a month about leader training. What I have tried to point out is that in the Army you have professional development courses for both officers and NCOs, then you have practical experience in the units, you learn from that, and then I have tried to emphasize their own obligation to read and study their profession."

"We had been going down to the battlefield operating systems one by one. I started that out early on where I taught a couple of classes myself. Then I started tasking it to my brigade commanders. And, this is a commander's session. Eighty percent of it is done by commanders and occasionally we have the staff brief us on something or other. But it is all tactics related."

"After the readiness brief, we take a break, come back and spend the next hour and a half at an officer professional development session on warfighting. The battalion commanders teach classes on battlefield synchronization. Brigade commanders have taught sessions on the synchronization of close air support in the direct battle. I have brought in guest lecturers."

"Most professional officers are motivated to read, to study their profession. Here in Europe you have the opportunity to do some superb training because of the World War II battlefields and the relevance of those World War II battles to how we train today and how we think about war today. We do a lot of staff rides. We encourage and pay for those."

- **NCOPD**

"The noncommissioned officer's place is where we have had to put the greatest emphasis on professional development and where you have the biggest payoff. We have tried to make the professional development programs for our noncommissioned officers war fighting related. We have focused on training soldiers, on knowing the doctrine that training alludes to, FM25-101, and the soldier's skills — the fighting skills — that are needed at the small unit level have become our emphasis in professional development. We are trying to bring the noncommissioned officers' professional development programs up on a par with the officers' programs and I feel good about that. It is paying dividends."

"The biggest problem we had in training with noncommissioned officers was prep time. We have a program called Sergeants Time. Sergeants Time is a five-hour block once a week, standardized across this corps where soldiers can't be at appointments. For five hours they are under the direct supervision of their immediate noncommissioned officer who is supposed to train them. The objective is to train them on things they don't know already. Why don't they know it already? It is often because they have never been taught how to do something right and that often gets back to the fact that the first line noncommissioned officer leader doesn't know how to do it right either. So when does he prepare for a five-hour block of instruction? If you don't give him any time, then he is going to look like an ass which was never the intent of the program. So a lot of the noncommissioned officer development program was looking at those tasks that their subordinates didn't understand and teaching the leaders how to teach that."

- **SCHOOLING**

"We have a two-week course and run it once a quarter. If you are going to command at the captain level or be a first sergeant in this division, you must go to this course. That is a professional development course for a leader. It is very specific about what goes on here. I kick the course off, and then it is taught by the division staff. Of all the training we do, the most important training is leader training."

"Going to CAS3 is not an option in this division. It is a matter of when you are going — not if you are going. We watch very carefully our PLDC, our BNOC, and our ANCO load. The philosophy on PLDC is very simple. Sergeants go before promotable specialists. Promotable specialists go before specialist. All promotable specialists and above will go to PLDC. You have to force the chain

of command to send their soldiers to PLDC. Likewise on BNOC — staff sergeants go before sergeants. We ruthlessly enforce. We also have structured officer and NCO professional development programs in the division which are conducted by the brigades and the battalions. The command sergeants major of the division universally demanded that we have an NCO certification program. It is hard work, but it is all self-development because a noncommissioned officer has to do it on his own to be certified. After we'd done it for a year, both the officers and the NCOs thought it was the greatest thing we'd ever done."

- **ASSIGNMENTS**


"I worked the assignment process for officers very carefully. Lieutenants must serve at least 12 months as a platoon leader. Captains are to serve one year on the staff and then go on to company commander. The first claim for majors in the division are the battalions. If lieutenants don't serve as platoon leaders, they probably won't be good company commanders. I like to use captains on my staff for a year and then put them into company command because that gives them a three-year tour. Company commanders must be advanced course graduates — no exceptions! I believe that it is so important now for majors to be a brigade operations officer or one of the two positions within a battalion. If they don't do that, they will not command a battalion. As the Army shrinks, they may not be lieutenant colonels if they don't do that."

"We probably ought to be asking people why don't we have a training program for Chiefs of Staff at divisions? Why don't we look to training the G3s and so on. I think we better look hard at how we train our staffs and what kind of people we are putting in the staffs. Being a brigade commander is not good preparation for being the Chief of Staff for the division. I think being a primary division staff officer is much better preparation. There has to be a balance there. We'd like to see guys who do both. That doesn't always happen that way because we have so many other requirements."

"My primary concern was to lay out a leader development program so that the operational assignments of field grade officers would be meaningful and reasonable within the division. I didn't find any coherent scheme for interviewing, assessing an individual's potential, assessing his needs, or assessing the units needs. It took some time to get that established where I felt that both the individual and the unit was being properly served."

- **OERs**

"I am on my second go-round on OERs. I am convinced that you need to have two profiles for division commanders and probably corps commanders. One is for commanders and one is for noncommanders, and you don't mix them. A commander who gets a two block still ought to be ahead of a guy sitting on a staff, for example, who gets even a one block, maybe."



DOCTRINE

"I was reasonably satisfied with the combat service support doctrine although we were significantly underresourced in haul capacity. Somehow I felt comfortable that the Army, before deploying me, would fix my truck problems."

"I think AirLand Battle Doctrine will work. It requires a definite joint orientation particularly by ground commanders, because we can't exist and live without our joint brethren. And in this theater, it requires that same sort of relationship with our allies."

● COMMAND AND CONTROL

"The problems you find are either the lack of understanding of the doctrine at various levels or, while it may be clear, is hard to bring to bear on the field. The challenge is to make happen on the ground what we talk about in our doctrinal literature. We talk very glibly about synchronization. Synchronization is very, very tough to accomplish. We all understand the importance of focusing combat power, of synchronizing combat power. To make all of that happen in reality is very tough."

"Doctrinally, synchronization, requires an intense and difficult effort to coordinate and execute. I believe that the doctrine is correct because if you don't do that, you trade the lives of your soldiers for

what you failed to synchronize. Synchronization is big. I believe it is one of the toughest pieces of the doctrine that we have."

"All of our how to fight manuals are adequate. Just like we had good how to train manuals I think we have good how to fight manuals. I have a little bit of a disagreement with Fort Rucker on command relationship kinds of things. There is a lot of emphasis on the attack helicopter doctrinally being employed by the division commander or being employed by the brigade commander. More often than not that doesn't work. I think most of our aviation assets need to be employed at a lower level, not at a higher level."

"I think the doctrine is very sound; it is the implementation which may cause problems. For example, the division of labor between the TAC and the MAIN and the rear CPs can be done, but it requires a herculean amount of effort to do it."

- VOIDS

"How do you fight a two maneuver brigade division? You don't find that in manuals anywhere. Us roundout divisions had notions that the aviation brigade would be a third maneuver brigade until our roundout brigade arrived. They were never structured to do that sort of thing."

"You have to really think about how you fight a two-brigade division. That says nothing about my confidence in the roundout brigade. It has never been the Army's intent for them to deploy with the division, which means that the division is going to fight a two-brigade division for a period of time. There isn't any doctrine for that so you have to think about it."

"I have had some trouble executing the doctrine as it is laid out in a two brigade division versus a three brigade division. We call the 4th Brigade a 'maneuver' brigade, but, it is not a maneuver brigade; it doesn't have the resources, the tracked mobility, nor the armor protection to be a maneuver brigade. Our cavalry squadron, consisting of two ground and two air units, has immense difficulty in generating the resources to do the security and reconnaissance mission that doctrine requires to be done. Executing the doctrine with a two brigade division with a cavalry squadron which is not organized the way the doctrine wants it to be organized, and the organization of the 4th Aviation Brigade has caused me a great deal of difficulty. I am not sure that the doctrine was written for a two brigade division. I am not sure that the doctrine was written for a cavalry squadron the way it is today. And, it is significantly difficult to execute the missions with one Apache Battalion when our structure originally was to have two Apache Battalions in a division."

"The place where we should devote the most is in brigade operations. We pin the rose on the brigade commander and hold him responsible

for integrating the combined arms team, but yet, we probably give him the poorest doctrinal guidance."

"If we are talking doctrine, I had no problem with the Army's doctrine. If we are talking tactics, techniques, and procedures, often we don't have any. You get cases where the doctrine is sound, the principles under which you are going to operate are sound, but when an individual turns to me and says, 'How do I do this?' and you open the book, you have a heck of a time finding out how to do that."

● PREPARATION

"If you are not up to speed on that stuff, you have to start heavy duty reading. You have to read 100-5 cover to cover at least three times. You have to read your division manual 71-100, and then you have to read the brigade and task force manuals. I am one of those believers that you have to think and plan two levels down. You have to really know what your battalions are capable of doing at division level. You can't draw brigade boundaries unless you can envision how you would put battalions on the ground. You really have to be up to speed on task force, brigade and division operations. I would definitely go to the Joint Warfighting School at Maxwell Air Force Base. That should be mandatory for every new division commander."

"I would go down to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and have the king of battle people make me absolutely current and totally comfortable with all the artillery doctrine. I say that because of my assessment of results coming out of NTC, my assessment of the status of the field artillery in the division, and my assessment of the fact that we are losing more field artillery lieutenants than we ought to."

"Talk to experienced commanders. Talk to those who have a reputation for dealing with things in a straightforward doctrinal matter. It seems to me that we have a problem with language in the Army. We don't use precise terminology. We don't even use doctrinal terms. I make the guys get the book out and when they are writing an order, they use the terms in that manual."

"What you need to think about as you go into command, is how you are going to train your division to execute your doctrine. How you are going to force in your training, the preparations to do those very complex things that are articulated in our doctrinal literature."

● STUDY & TEACH

"I have done a lot of teaching of doctrine. I have some of my other people teach it as well. With your turnover of people, it is a iterative thing. You just get the one team trained and with their change over you have to start all over again."

"I've been studying doctrine all my life."

"Absolutely, you have to study doctrine, and you have to study it the whole time. You not only have to study it, but you have to dialogue

with those people who have recently been through the schools and who are familiar with the most current doctrine. I think the best guys you have available to you to help you work that process are your two-year SAMS [School for Advanced Military Studies] graduates. I spend a lot of time talking with them."

- **DOCTRINE CHANGES**

"I have made no deliberate effort to change any doctrine. My focus is on the execution of the doctrine."

"I think it is wrong to try to invent a lot of new things and to experiment with the division. That is why we have a place called TRADOC. If I have something that I think is wrong, it is my obligation to feed that back to TRADOC. Fundamentally, unless you just know it is flat wrong, you are obligated to train your people in the doctrine of the U.S. Army. The Chief made that point very emphatically with his division commanders."

"I didn't change doctrine. There were some tactical techniques that I probably have emphasized that might be a little different than the book."

"Some of the doctrinal ideas that we have kicked around, I think we in our division have reached some pretty firm conclusions. We have tried to understand our doctrine, and we have tried to see what works best within the doctrinal framework, but, we just live and work and try to take what the Army is giving us or the joint doctrine has given us and operate within that framework."

"I have not tried to change doctrine. I fed back to the school system some tactics, techniques, and procedures and have complained when I did not know how to do it right and couldn't figure out exactly how to do it right, and the school system apparently couldn't tell me either. In fact, in some new equipment that is being fielded, there is a question as to whether or not we should accept it if the Army can't tell anybody what you are supposed to do with it when you get it."

"No, I have not tried to change doctrine. I think a division commander should not do that as a matter of fact. I think the doctrine and how to fight is so solid that you can fit it to most any task organization and most any terrain and you can explain it in standard Army doctrinal terms. The Army has good how to fight, good how to train, good doctrine, good procedures, we ought to stick to it. We only ought to deviate from that under some very unusual circumstances. If the division commander doesn't like it, then he needs to come up on the net with a better idea."

"I have not wallowed around trying to change the existing doctrine. What I am trying to do is figure out how to execute what I have because I think our doctrine is executable. I think it is proper."



ORGANIZATION

• STRUCTURE

"TRADOC is a great part of our Army. It has great, dedicated people but it is a bureaucracy, and the one thing that you have is the branch biases represented by those schools. Our ability to structure the forces is hamstrung because of all of these parochial interests and we are suffering as an institution because of it."

"The standard organizational structure that was developed to build installation staffs was built by well intentioned people that had different kinds of resources than we have today. The Army cannot afford SIO. The resources are simply not there in BASOPs to support the SIO structure, particularly in the DPCA and the DEH arenas. We have gone through some major reorganizations of installation TDA, trying to remove a lot of civilian positions. We simply cannot afford deputies. We have program chiefs and we have the boss who is the program director. The resources, both in civilian strength and dollars, are not there to pay the SIO organization. The DPCA is so robust with positions that it is absolutely beyond the ability of the installation commander to resource. There is too much overhead."

"I believe you could take four or five of the heavy division commanders in the Army today, put them in a room, give them a week, and say, 'Redesign the heavy division to give me the robustness that you need for sustained operations, but you can't have anymore personnel to do it with. You can't have anymore structure spaces to

do it with.' And you would come out of that room five or six days later with a much better design for a heavy force than we have today working through the TRADOC system."

"I think the Army of Excellence, and at least the heavy force, has caused us to short cut ourselves in some very bad places, and we may pay for this. When we looked at the tank battalions and the cavalry squadrons and the missions they were supposed to perform and how they were supposed to be supported, we came up with some problem areas. We are so close to the margin in a tank battalion that if you are not at about 100 percent, you have a real fall off. The tank battalion in the H Series was lean. It is even leaner now."

● INFANTRY

"We had to do away with our ECHO Companies in our infantry battalions, not because we didn't feel a need for the ECHO Companies, but because we found that we never had enough infantrymen to do the job that we needed to do in terms of providing dismount capabilities so that we could put a sufficient amount of infantrymen in the backs of our Bradleys."

"I get frustrated with the number of dismounted infantry. You look at a Bradley Battalion within an infantry division today — and I think we can put about 300 dismounted infantry on the battlefield. That's it. That is not a lot of dismounted infantry. The Bradley consumes three to four men just to man it. Then you are short. I think the answer is that as you build the structure, you need to be more balanced."

● CAVALRY

"We have traditionally put a tank company with the Cav squadron on operations because we have found that the current cavalry squadron is inadequate to do many of the missions that it has to do in combat operations. The Army needs to go ahead and put the tanks back into the Cav squadron at the division level. I think, virtually every armor leader in the Army agrees with that. We just need to resource it."

"As we move to a parity environment, the cavalry function becomes even more critical and if I do not put tanks in my division cavalry squadron, I have to take a tank battalion out and place it with that squadron. For a mech division putting tanks in the division cavalry squadron saves me one tank battalion. That is my number one organizational deficiency. Second organizational deficiency that exists is the lack of brigade scouts. He needs some scouts in addition to those task force scouts that are used in order to avoid surprises to him and his battalion commanders. Task force scouts guard against surprises during an engagement. Brigade scouts must guard against surprises during the battle and the brigade commander needs that."

"My cavalry squadron had tanks in it but only two ground troops. I couldn't resource the third although they needed one. We had taken action to fix that."

- **MILITARY INTELLIGENCE**

"The organization of the CEWI battalion is wrong. We need to take all those assets in the MI Battalion that have to do with finding, fixing, and jamming, and all that and task organize that battalion like we have DISCOM. We need forward support companies that have a conventional relationship with brigades just like all other combat support and combat service support units. We have the LRSD in the wrong unit; we have it in the MI Battalion and it should be in the Cavalry Squadron."

- **AVIATION**

"The aviation brigade has a major organizational glitch in it. If you look through all the separate companies in the aviation brigade, it makes no sense. So we have formed a provisional aviation battalion inside the 4th Brigade that is the battalion headquarters for all the general support aviation of the division. All I can tell you is that maintenance, discipline, law and order, promotions, reenlistments and all the things that it takes to build cohesive team units are happening in the provisional battalion that would be beyond the control of a single commander with all those separate companies within the brigade."

"Like everybody, we have an aviation task force. That combines the separate companies of the aviation brigade and puts some leadership on top of it to integrate it and coordinate it. We took that out of our hide. I find that everybody has done that."

"We are building an aviation support battalion on the cheap. The Army needs to get on about the business of deciding to go with the aviation support battalion for the aviation brigade, to resource it and get it into the structure. For the most part it is being taken out of hide. It is an essential ingredient and we need to get on and resource it."

The avionics company belongs to the division support command. It forces the DISCOM commander to get himself into avionics maintenance just like he does automotive maintenance."

- **ENGINEER**

"The Army needs to get inside the Engineer Battalion and look very carefully to see how it is organized. If we get into breaching and doing those kinds of things — the Engineer Battalion becomes very, very important."

- **CHEMICAL**

"The chemical company is probably best vested in the division support command. In this division, it was in DIVARTY. It will work in either DISCOM or DIVARTY. I put it into DIVARTY because of the span and control. If you look at the DISCOM commander's span of control, he is spread all out over the division. The CSS piece in a division is very fragile, not robust and doesn't have the mobility needed to move the logistic support required in a heavy division. We are manned on the cutting edge of being very fragile. I think as you look at PLL, supply clerks, the forward support battalions, and the

DISCOM itself, you quickly become aware that it is very austere the way we are manning CSS."

"I toyed with the peacetime command and control of the division chemical company. It was under DIVARTY and I thought of maybe moving it to DISCOM, but I did not do that."

- **SUSTAINMENT**

"We have shortchanged ourselves in the support business. You can be as innovative as hell, but you have to remember that you have to operate 24 hours a day. You are fooling yourself if you think you can do this stuff 24 hours a day with just the people you have. It is the sustainment piece that I am talking about."


"I agree with simplicity. It is a great principle. Simplicity in how we operate the system is great, but you have to have the wherewithal to support and the sophistication level enough to fix them. And that requires some sophisticated gear."

"I am concerned about making sure that we can repair the stuff and turn it around very quickly. You have to do battle damage assessment and repair. That requires supporters well forward. As we look to the future, we better watch what we are doing because we are talking about changing the way the Army fights by taking the division away and making it a command and control headquarters. Maybe that's not smart. I have never found anything to become more responsive to me, the subordinate commander, by moving it to higher headquarters.

- **TO&E**

"By the time you get to division command, there is nothing you can do about the TO&E except comment and hopefully it will help the next guy."

Don't screw with the forward support battalions. Don't screw with the main support battalion. It isn't broken, don't fix it. We have the headquarters company fixed in the mech task forces. We fixed the division cavalry squadron. I would say the rest of the TO&Es are okay. One of the cautions I would give is that TO&Es are built by guys who are part of a guild and they are sometimes far removed from what you need to fight with. Just because an item is on the TO&E doesn't mean you have to have it for your mission or you don't have to have it for your fight. Every little change that comes to your TO&E, before you go out and spend big bucks to buy it, I would say challenge it and make sure you need it. If you do, go get it. If you don't, don't buy it. That has saved us about \$7 million this past year."



EQUIPMENT

● FIELDING NEW EQUIPMENT

"I didn't have any major concerns, except in these disconnects associated with force modernization, when you look at the total fielding of these things and some of your test equipment. If you are going to receive new things, you had best sit down and really put somebody through a bean count drill on all the widgets and gadgets that go with that, otherwise they may not be coming in. Some of them are definitely war stoppers."

"When I took over the division, we had several modernization actions that were going on. It changes the organization. It becomes the driver of your whole training schedule."

"I wanted to see us upgrade the artillery fleet because the Bradley and the Abrams outrun the artillery too often."

"The concept of NET teams, of push packages on spares, and of added dollars to accommodate 'more expensive to operate' systems probably worked very well if you were the first guy to get the new systems. If you got modernized by a trickle-down — the way we are about to modernize the Reserve Components — that is a different story altogether. You have to go out and seek your own attention if you are a trickle-down Mod guy. Don't bother calling FORSCOM for more dollars, because there isn't any."

"The NET concept that the Army adopted several years ago to field equipment is right. What we have to do in the units is to focus to make sure the right people are made available at the right time for the training."

"The introduction of new equipment was almost a painless operation in every case. The Army has done a magnificent job of putting together these fielding teams with people who know what they are doing. The other thing is you treat it as a major mission for the unit. You have the whole chain of leadership, the whole chain of command involved. It is the primary mission for the organization while they are going through it so you don't distract them with other things."

"We had a force modernization shop that worked equipment and organizations and worked it as a special staff element. It was important enough that we had a SAMS graduate run it."

"You have to make sure the hand tools and the sub-components come with the gear. You have the ASL backup that comes with it, and you have the PLL fill that comes with it. Civilian manpower provides continuity in the force integration business. If you don't have a force mod office or a force integration office to handle the new equipment fielding, I think you are going to have some hiccups."

"Attention to detail is the key on the fielding piece. Start it early, work the whole problem — families, dogs, snakes, pets, all those damn things. Work the whole set of problems and it will go fairly smooth."

● MAINTENANCE

"To support an aggressive energetic training program in a heavy force, you absolutely must have a quality maintenance program — or you can't train. The one thing you learn at the NTC is that what you lose that day won't be prepared to fight the battle the next day. If you don't watch tracks, gun tube and breach life during the training year, and you get one of these kinds of deployments, you go through a crisis to upgrade yourself. Good maintenance is needed so that you can support an aggressive training program. Additionally, you need to continue to focus on the shortages of authorized equipment. You resolve the maintenance program with command emphasis. You have to be visible with wherever your priorities are. The only way that you can work the shortage of equipment is to continue to report through your 27-15 and hope that the Army will help you."

"The Army has pushed 10-20 standards of maintenance. That is an enviable objective. All our equipment in the Army ought to be maintained at 10-20 standards. However, as a matter of practical reality, those who espouse that philosophy don't provide you the Class IX dollars to allow you to maintain the 10-20 standards. The Army ought to say that any time a division transfers equipment outside the division, it should go at 10-20 standards. We ought to

find a way to get the equipment to that level. But within the division, I would hang with the fully mission capable status. It is absolutely cost prohibitive to run around and keep every piece of equipment in the division at 10-20 standards. As a matter of reality, resources are not there."

"What I had to do over the course of this year, while watching resources decline, was to put many more soldiers into borrowed military manpower. The numbers of people devoted to full time post support while they are in the red cycle increased under my watch. You have to ask yourself, shall I use soldiers to cut grass or buy tank tracks? In this case, I needed tank tracks."

"We did have some problems in terms of spending too much money for Class IX because we were double requisitioning. I found that we were probably receiving about 90 percent of what we were paying for. We were probably buying 20-25 percent more than we needed because of the inefficiency in the requisitioning process. We have worked that aggressively and the key is teaching people how to use the system. The battalion executive officers have to be the guys who are checking the work of the PLL clerks every day. We declared war on excess, and have worked it continuously. What we have done to make that a program as an incentive for battalion commanders is the returns go back to the units. If the unit is aggressive in turning in excess, they get the refund."

"The operational readiness of our Apache is very good. That was my biggest concern and my concern is far less now than it was several months ago because the Apaches are demonstrating good reliability."

"The most frustrating thing that I have undergone is trying to keep aviation maintained at 75 percent. The aviation commanders absolutely have to get into the mind-set of phasing their aircraft properly in order to build a proper bank time that allows them to sustain a 75 percent OR rate."

"I required a certification program in the division that from top down everybody had to demonstrate the complete PMCS for the vehicle which he or she commanded. We required that every maintenance supervisor be certified on the test equipment his subordinate had to use. The issue is that people don't do things to standard because they don't know how to do it. We ran the logistic readiness reviews every month where they went through item by item and did not limit it to the maintenance report but looked at the distribution of mechanics, training of mechanics, training of supervisors, use of school quotas, and all those kind of things so we had a healthy maintenance program within the resources that we had."

"You have to look very carefully at the items in your division float. We use a criteria that says that if you don't have two float transactions

on a piece of equipment in a 12-month period, you ought to really look at whether you keep that in a float or not. There is no magic place about where you keep your float. But, you have to keep your float operational. If you can't do that, you ought to dispose of it because it is a drain on your resources and manpower. Within the communications area, you need to keep all the float possible because that supports an aggressive CLSP program."

"Make sure that you have the battalion commanders and battalion XO's with their head in the game of what you are requisitioning. The guys who write your checks, and spend the division's dollars are the Specialist Four PLL clerks. They are good people doing good work but they need good supervision. So I would have a very aggressive program for training PLL clerks. I would have a very aggressive program for monitoring the system in place to monitor how your Class IX dollars are being spent. I would be a tyrant about excess and keeping your excess down to the bare minimum."

- **EXCESS**

"After my assessment, I found out that I had too much. So, we declared war on excess. This stuff you accumulated that had to do with guys not being supply conscious. We hit that ruthlessly. It was done in a positive fashion through checks and supply routes, through the command inspection program, through constant talking with battalion commanders, and then through reports out. It has been a painful exercise to go through. The reason supply sergeants hoard things is that they don't have any confidence in the supply system. You have to make sure that works."

"We had a lot of excess parts laying around. Our PLL, by and large, was in pretty good shape. The zero balance of all of that was in pretty good shape. But the ASL was sorely lacking. When you have a small ASL and your demand satisfaction is not what it ought to be, they start hoarding stuff. And that breeds excess."

- **GUIDANCE**

"Find out where the hell you are. Go out there and get your nose into the motor pool, assess the status of your training of your mechanics, and all those kinds of things. There isn't anything new in maintenance. It is commander's interest and tenacity."

"We continuously emphasize PMCS. We continuously emphasize good service programs, scheduled on the training schedule, supervised by the chain of command, supported by your battalion maintenance sections, and everybody present for duty when you do it."

"Get involved. If you are not willing to spend the time to dig through it, then don't be surprised about what is going on. Go down to the motor pool. Go look at the manual for your mechanics before you go so when the mechanic tells you it is not leaking, you can immediately show him where it is."



LEADERSHIP

● TECHNIQUES

"I think the biggest difference in leadership between the brigade and the division is recognizing who you are trying to influence and accepting the difficulty to get to your subordinates. At the division level, your audience are battalion and brigade commanders. It is not down at the soldier level any more and it is not even down at the company commander level. Your opportunity to see everybody is less than you would like and less than they would like. So you really have to watch your time and do things to facilitate communication and contact with your subordinates."

"You have to be even more aware and focus on the areas that you think are the most important. The battalion commander is going to place his emphasis where you show up and the things that you truly emphasize. If you are over centralized in your command philosophy, you can do some things very, very well. But you will not have a balanced organization which can train and maintain in a very disciplined manner. I will also tell you that you probably create, if you are not careful, a level of competition amongst units that is very, very unhealthy. Read *Tiger Jack* by Hanson Baldwin about General John S. Wood. It is a great book and it says very succinctly that competition among military commanders on military tasks is absolutely counterproductive. I hate some of the things that I have been through over time pitting me against other commanders because you have destroyed the team and you absolutely do not enhance anybody's performance. I am not saying don't be accountable. If everybody meets the standard, everybody gets an attaboy. If nobody

meets a standard, then shame on all of us. You work your guys against fixed standards."

"You have to be totally honest in everything that you say and do. You may screw it up, but you better be honest about it. If you screw it up just say so. Then they will just laugh at you a little bit, and that's not always bad either."

"Don't worry about what your superiors think of you. Concern yourself with what your subordinates think of you because if you are taking good care of them, they are going to take better care of you than you deserve. You have to be honest and open. Then establish the best personal relationship with all of your subordinates that you can, especially your brigade and battalion commanders. And, do not be partial. We are all in this together; we are going to experience the same shortages, share the same fame and the same hardships. We are going to go through the same frustrations together, and then we are going to share the same successes and all the personal and professional satisfaction that comes with being a commander."

"I try to follow a warfighting approach in leadership at the division level. It is a terrible mistake when a division commander micromanages a division. That will not work in war. Warfighting is done decentrally with the conveyance of a commander's intent and concept to the next level of command who translates that into suborders for battalions and companies. I think it is a terrible mistake to use a certain leadership style as a division commander in peacetime versus that which you would use in wartime. If you respect the trust and confidence of your subordinates and convey to them mission type orders with a little bit of how you want it done, they will get it done and you will find that the ship will turn just a little quicker than if you try to micromanage it."

● **TIME
MANAGEMENT**

"Division command is just a ball. You are busy. There are days when you have more to do than you'd like. Your worst enemy is the calendar so your biggest challenge is time management. Anybody coming in to be a division commander ought to just relax and go do their job. They should enjoy it and recognize that they have a lot of work to do if they are going to provide the guidance and direction that they owe their subordinates. If they are willing to go do that, stand back because the subordinates will pass them."

"There is more to be done than the commander can get to. How does the commander sort out what is important versus what is urgent? How does the commander enforce sleep discipline, rest discipline upon himself in the field knowing that the first skills to decay are conceptual skills, second, cognitive skills, and third, the physical skills. The commander's paid mainly for his ability to make decisions which require conceptual skills not cognitive or physical skills."

"The higher up you go, the more you better trust your subordinates; the more you better have a decentralized environment. You don't have the time to go around and check everything yourself. That does not mean that the division commander should not be at the critical place at the critical time to impart his own personal guidance when it's required. A division commander, particularly one who is a garrison commander as well, has a constant fight about whether or not he should be cutting the ribbon at the library or out on a tank range. What is the critical place at the critical time? Don't forget that the librarian is a pretty important part of your family. So, you best weigh those decisions carefully."

"The higher up you go, the more time it takes to get something done. So if you are making a major shift in anything, you better give yourself the major part of three or four quarters to get that done. That is why it is so important up front to determine what it is that you want to do. Then set it, and don't change it. Just stay right with it throughout the duration."

"If you are going to influence the division and shift it, focus it differently than the guy who preceded you, you better understand it is going to take some time to do that. You need to understand the people dynamics. Just because you are the division commander doesn't mean that you are still not the new guy on the block. You have to build your own team. It takes time to do that. It takes time to pull together the brigade commanders and the staff and to get them focused the way you want them to focus as an organization. That does not come quickly. It is fraught with frustration. It was six months before I was comfortable that I really was guiding this division and moving it the way I wanted it to go and had everybody on the same azimuth."

● **COMMANDER'S
INTENT**

"At the division level the guys that you lead and influence directly are colonels or lieutenant colonels. They are almost 100 percent superb people. The most important thing that you need to do as a division commander is make sure that those commanders understand your intent. You need to make sure that they know if they don't have a clear understanding of your intent, that they have ready access to you at any time day or night to talk about that, because they are going to do what you want them to do. Be crystal clear in what your intent is. Be consistent. We don't need to be jerking people around. What is important today ought to be important tomorrow and important the next day. We don't need a new set of priorities. "

"Brigade commanders need to know what is expected of them, what resources they can count on, and what you expect from them. If you can make that clear to them, you don't have to sit on their backs. They do very well and execute it."

● **CHALLENGES**

"I made the assumption that loyalty was an automatic thing — that when you stepped into a job, loyalty up was equal to loyalty down. I've found that it was not automatic whatsoever. I had a few who thought you had to earn it. Once I recognized what the issue was, I really started to work it. A lot of that is teaching. A lot of it is role modeling. But you have a few guys that it doesn't make a damn bit of difference what you do."

"The most significant thing that I found when I initially assumed command was a lack of understanding that a leader is a leader 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and any place, in any uniform. Leaders were setting less than perfect examples and leaders were involved in incidences themselves where they had no right to be. Wherever you have soldiers, you need leader presence."

"I was interested in having a division with a set of agreed upon common objectives that would cause us to be even better than we had been in the past. Those objectives were achieved against standards and not against each other. I therefore was interested in the articulation of standards. Because of that I was more centralized in my approach than my predecessor. For those subordinates who served under both of us, I had a difficult time explaining to them or convincing them that I was not trying to standardize how you achieve the objective, but that I was trying to establish the standards. I had some initial leadership challenges because some people reacted to the change in style as to taking away some of their rights and freedom. I tried to convince them that I thought they had plenty of opportunity for demonstrating their initiative in achieving the standards plus I was not trying to establish any of the standards in isolation. They could all play in the decisionmaking process."

● **TEAM BUILDING**

"The thing that I have continuously told our guys is you know we have to be a team. We have to pull together as a team because an organization is as strong as its weakest link. There is no room in an organization for guys who are not team players. You have to create an environment where teamwork is rewarded, not where individuals are rewarded for their own personal achievements."

"You probably better put more time towards consensus building with your colonels than what your instinct might tell you. I have a council of colonels I pull together maybe once or twice a month or when I have something to deal with. We just have lunch together up in the headquarters and talk about anything that is on their minds. We air everything out, and then we go. I've found that most helpful towards execution of what needs to be done."

● **WOMEN IN
THE ARMY**

"I think bringing women into the Army has been healthy for the Army because it is a dimension of equal opportunity that we have come to grips with. The women who are in the Army are doing quite well. Don't spend a lot of time worrying about why women are in the Army."

I think you are wasting your time trying to wrestle with it. Rigidly enforce where women can be used in the division. If the Army authorizes them in a place, use them. I think we have to play by the rules. Don't treat them any differently than any other soldier; treat them with dignity and respect. I challenge them to do what they can do, and they do fine. The drawback that you see with females is the pregnancy deployment criteria. I am leaving back 55 MOS qualified and trained soldiers because they are pregnant. That is a deployment issue you have to contend with. It does impact on your deployment because those are 55 soldiers who will not be present on the desert floor to work in their MOS when we arrive because they are clearly nondeployable. That is an issue that you don't necessarily face with the male force. But maybe that is the price we have to accept to be where we are today."

"My primary concern was to lay out a leader development program so that the operational assignments of field grade officers would be meaningful and reasonable within the division. I didn't find any coherent scheme for interviewing, assessing an individual's potential, assessing his needs, or assessing the units needs. It took some time to get that established where I felt that both the individual and the unit was being properly served."

- **TEACHING AND COUNSELING**

"I have taught FM 23-103. I've done that myself. You set the standard and then you hold people accountable for what they do. All you need is one or two disruptive colonels and you really have some interesting challenges ahead of you."

"I think General Myers, General Wickham, and General Vuono's emphasis on empowering your subordinates, the concepts from the book, *In Search of Excellence*, and footlocker counseling were the notions I prescribed. I think just about everybody has the message, the noncommissioned officers as well."

"We have had sessions on what is the difference between training and testing. What is the impact of testing soldiers before you have trained them? That is a strong belief of mine that you do not allow soldiers to demonstrate failure. You teach them before you put them in a posture where they believe they are being tested."

"If you develop a good open, honest relationship with your subordinates, then you are almost always in a teaching or counseling mode. Everything you do is a form of counseling and a form of teaching and mentoring and a form of setting the right example."

"Leading is teaching. A fundamental responsibility as a leader is to teach. I find that teaching company commanders, teaching fire support officers, teaching maintenance officers, teaching support operations officers, teaching battalion commanders at QTBs, all of that in my view, is a continuous process and I would say that it has

not stopped. I am in the process of probably teaching my third battle staff. You never get through teaching."

- **COMBAT SUCCESS OR FAILURE**

"You show me a commander who has centralized, and I will show you one who will fail in combat. You show me a guy who is decentralized, who powers down — he may not on any one given day look as good as the centralized guy, but in the long haul, he is head over heels above him. You have to watch that, particularly as you go to an Army now that is going to have reduced opportunities for command at battalion and brigade level. If we are not careful, the institution is going to migrate to the centralist who is going to be so afraid to be bold and innovative that he is going to do it all himself. He'll kill the initiative of his subordinates and he will put the combat readiness of the Army at risk."

"You can get a lot of subjective indicators. The easiest one, which also gets to performance, is the CMTC or the National Training Center. You can watch a commander under stress and watch his reaction and interaction with his subordinates. You can find some who have not developed their full potential yet. By that I mean the outcome may not be what they wanted or you wanted, but it is not a leadership problem. They just haven't worked it long enough. There are others who you can tell that they don't trust their subordinates. They are unwilling to let their subordinates succeed. They are uptight. They are not top block guys."

"You have to watch him in a stressful tactical situation. You need to look at two key things. What kind of relationship does he have with his subordinates? It goes back to this trust, respect, and confidence thing. Is that a good relationship? Are all those guys pulling in the same direction? The answer to that question needs to be 'yes.' Then, technically and tactically, does he have a good sense and does he have a good intuition about what is happening to him."

"There is a high probability that if a battalion commander starts at NTC, it will be an absolute disaster. But, by the time he comes out of the last fight and into the dust bowl, he's a hero. I say I am developing a leader; I've got a synchronizer; and I have a well trained battalion commander. If I have a battalion commander who starts off poor and stays poor all the way, or shows no improvement, or even starts off marginal and stays marginal, then he probably will not be successful in combat. He is not adapting to the tempo of warfighting. If a battalion commander can do well at the NTC, he'll do well in battle. Doing well means that he and his battalion continue to improve and become more proficient every day at the NTC. The NTC is a strain on your leadership ability; it is a real stress. But, most guys enjoy it and do well."

- **PERSONAL LESSONS**

"Set the standard. Stress the basics and hold firm to what you say. Always be an optimist. Leadership is fun."

"I learned that it is a big job, particularly when you have a garrison as well. You have to have trust in your subordinates that they are doing whatever they are supposed to be doing."

"General Wickham used to quote General Abrams that 'The higher up the flagpole you go, the more your fanny shows.' I have lost my temper a couple of times and I regret that. That is not always the best example. You have to establish an atmosphere where it is okay to tell the boss that maybe his wardrobe is short or maybe he doesn't have any clothes on at all. That is hard to do. I'll also tell you that I think the higher you go, the less opportunity you have to spot a phony."

"It doesn't get any different the higher up you go. The leadership challenges are there regardless. You deal with your leadership requirements differently at various levels. The vast majority of the officers, the noncommissioned officers, and the soldiers want to do what is right. If you can create an environment where the priorities are clear, where your goals and objectives are well defined and understood, if you can, and I think this is important, reward those who deserve to be rewarded, and be very aggressive and very conscientious about that and hold people accountable who do not come up to the standard, then leadership becomes simpler and easier. Leading soldiers today is a real pleasure and very rewarding."

"Lieutenant General Tom Kelly, used to have a great phrase. He said, 'The leader is never the equal of no man.' There isn't hardly a day goes by that I don't find instances where that is correct. It makes you feel very humble when you stop and think about what is going on out there and how much is being done in a very disciplined manner by men and women who don't get paid very much but who do a wonderful job for the country and most of all for themselves. They have a great self-respect which has resulted. That is the best thing you could give anybody. I think General Cavazos said, 'The one thing that you could give a soldier is his self-respect.' If you can try to give that every day, then you are going a long way."

"As a division commander, you have to be very careful about showing any kind of partiality especially to the brigade and to the battalion commanders. It has to do with cohesion and team building sorts of things. I think it is probably more important for the division commander than at any other level because you have to create cohesion, directions, and focus and intensity. You don't want to do anything that degrades from that."

- **GUIDANCE**

"Hold to FM 22-103. I'd know that thing and would teach it. I'd be a role model through it. Make sure your guidance is fundamental, sound and understood."

"The decentralized approach is your only alternative unless you want to drive yourself and your subordinates into the ground"

"Be yourself. You got to be a division commander because somebody thought you could do the job. Don't try to change your modus operandi. Do the things you have done before. At the same time you have to be willing to learn. I learned from my people all of the time. I've learned plenty from privates."

"The techniques that got you selected to be a division commander are probably the same techniques you ought to continue to go with."

"If you want to make the division different, and different hopefully is better, you must provide the vision, guidance and direction clearly enough and early enough to allow your subordinates to achieve it. If you will explain to your subordinates what right looks like, and give them the opportunity to demonstrate that, they will, and you ought to have a ball commanding the division."

"Don't try to be somebody else. You can learn from other people and can pick up some techniques from them maybe, but you just have to be yourself. If you try to be a phony, they will figure that out pretty quickly."

"You will find a need for some policy letters. I think policy letters can be overbearing. But those on your philosophy of training, your concept for how you are going to execute training, your philosophy on your maintenance officer management, professional development of leaders, support of NCOs — those kind of policy letters are absolutely essential. Get your policies out early because the chain of command is looking to you to lead the division forward."

"You have an obligation to be straight with your subordinates. Let them know when they are doing well and pat them on the back. Tell guys when their stocks are in good shape and tell the guy when his stock is not in good shape."

"Don't circumvent the chain of command. Use the chain of command, reinforce the chain of command, and be visible about two to three levels below where you are. Don't try to micromanage the division. Figure out what management issues you want to follow. Make the staff produce them for your review; but don't get into the business of micromanaging. If you do, you will circumvent the chain of command and will not be able to successfully execute your warfighting requirements."

"Keep it simple, stick to the basics, make sure the guys understand what you want, get your standards clearly articulated, help the guys understand what you want and they will deliver."



ETHICS

- **PERSONAL PHILOSOPHY**

"Set the standard and have open and free dialogue. If somebody says something that disagrees with you, that is okay. You listen intently to what they have to say and consider it. Reward those who do what is right."

"It is a matter of setting the example. When I came here, I said I wanted to be in an organization with high ethical standards that believed in the principles that go with the Army in terms of courage, candor, commitment, and competence. It was also important to tell the truth as you saw it, recognizing that somebody might not agree with you but also giving them credit for having some experience and thinking that through. It is very important to come in and say that at the beginning and then try to live that and deal with those problems that occur with 'ethical' issues in a straightforward manner."

"The guys who are deviating from you are the margin guys. Put all your energy into the good people."

"The strength of the constitutionally created Army is in the ethical and professional standards of the officer and senior noncommissioned officer corps. That is what makes our Army different from many of the armies in the world. If we begin to negotiate levels of ethics and honesty, then we are selling our soldiers short and down a path of being a mercenary Army. We are honest."

We do have high ethical standards and moral conduct. We play by the rules."

"I think the United States Army has two secret weapons: one is integrity and the other is teamwork. Integrity has to do with a man doing the things that he knows he should be doing. Teamwork is that he will subordinate self-interest in the interest of others. It is those two additional values which should be added to any organizational value set and the organization must adhere to those two if you are to be effective. It is especially critical at brigade and division level."

"First, you are a role model. You can't expect more out of soldiers than what you do yourself. I tell my commanders, chaplains, and doctors that while I do not have a special set of standards for them, I hold them to a more stricter accounting of standards than anyone else. One of the things which we have worked to inculcate is honesty. The ability to not only tell the truth but to report the facts as you perceive them, even when things are going to hell in a handbasket. Now, it is incumbent upon me to not shoot the messenger. You have to be willing to receive the bad news and deal with it without beating up on the guy that is bringing it in."

"Every commander that works for me has to pass an oral examination that has two questions and they must make 100 percent on the exam or they must disassociate themselves from the unit. The first question is a very simple one, it says, 'Can I count on you to be who you are, a person worthy of a special trust and confidence that I must place in you, and can I count on you to do the things you know you ought to do, even when no one is watching, knowing that you never change who you are, where you are, or what you might be doing?' If his answer to that is yes, then the second question is: 'Even after you have done what you know is right, you will sometimes find that things go to hell in a handbasket and when you find that things are all screwed up, can I count on you to report the bad news promptly and accurately as you perceive it to your boss?'"

"We have a term called special trust and confidence. I believe that instills from both tactical and technical competence, and then it stems from integrity, knowing that you can count on that guy to do the things he knows he ought to do even when no one is watching. So if a guy has competence and if a guy has integrity and if he is committed, then I think he is okay."

"It is not giving people lessons on ethics or morals or anything like that, but it is emphasizing to them that there is nothing that you ever want as a leader that should cause them to ever have to do anything that is illegal, unethical, or immoral."

● ENVIRONMENT

"Unfortunately there is not a commonly accepted set of ethics as we all might believe. I am talking about sexual conduct, association with

subordinates, areas where there are rules in the military environment which may not be rules in the civilian environment. We somehow think that all of our subordinates agree, or at least know what those rules are, which is not totally true."

"I think ethics is a day by day consistency of your senior leadership. It is something that ought to be a normal natural kind of process. When you find someone who deviates, you have to deal with it immediately and positively and in a manner that everyone understands that the deviation is not accepted."

"When you see unethical things, you cannot be timid. You have to deal with them swiftly and correctly in positive ways. People have to understand that there is a discipline and a standard associated with ethical things. It is not a zero defect mentality."

"You will find that there are all kinds of guys out there that will tear down buildings to do what you want them to do. The higher you go the more you have to be concerned that people understand unequivocally that there are certain things that you might want as a leader but cannot be accomplished, and people have to feel free to come back and say, 'I can't do that because it is illegal or if we did it, sir, it would be unethical in this regard.' You have to continuously tell your people that. Your military guys are less inclined to go off and do something dumb just because they think you want it, but I have found your civilians will go off and do it. You will find yourself in violation of some regulation because one of those civilian employees wanted to do what the general wanted."

"I believe that in a positive climate of command, when things go wrong, a battalion or brigade commander is beholden to let you know the bad news. I follow that same philosophy on things which reflect discredit on the Army or discredit upon the division. I would encourage a commander to never sweep something under the rug just because it may reflect adversely on the division. Those things happen. I follow an approach that says drag it out in the full light of the day. Very quickly get an investigation done, take it apart, and take the correct action required."

"A guy coming into this environment needs to understand that not 100 percent of your people share the values that we share as a military society in the officer corps. You need to understand that, and you need to make sure that you continuously emphasize that you will not condone nor accept unethical or illegal activities."

"It is necessary for a division commander to make very clear early on what his ethical standards are. I am continually bothered that we do have unethical people and they include officers. If you are as naive as I was about it and therefore don't think it is necessary, in spite of that view, go tell people what you expect ethically so they all know

what the rules are going into the game. Then you must enforce your standards."

"The first thing a division commander has to do is set the example. The man taking division command must understand that everything you do is going to be watched. You have to be very conscious of what you do officially and unofficially, where you go, your department, how much alcohol you consume, et cetera. Secondly, you have to set the rules so that your subordinates are aware of where you stand on the ethical issues. I set the standard we are to keep. Then, when the rules are violated, discipline is enacted."

"In a group of 18-20,000 people, you will get some who will violate whatever rule you have. That doesn't bother me. What bothers me is that people violate the rule because they didn't know it existed. If you are going to be a leader, you have an obligation to make sure they understand what the rules are."

- **ISSUES**

"You have to watch what you do when it comes to things like punishment. You just have to be consistent. Regrettably, every once in a while, we've had to relieve a couple of company commanders. We've had some officers who haven't behaved as they should have and they had to leave. On the other hand, everybody makes mistakes. So you have to look at things in an evenhanded manner."

"Most of the ethical issues are related to sexual relationships either between soldiers or somebody else's wife. The only other area that I would tell people about relates to the receipt of unauthorized money. The finance system is not the world's best. It, in fact, will pay people more money than they are authorized. People need to understand their obligation and not take what they are not due because sooner or later 'Uncle' will come get you."



FAMILY ACTION

● SUPPORT

"I think everybody should understand that we value each member of the command, and that each member of the command includes the family members. We want to work very hard to make sure that the soldiers had time off when they were supposed to have time off. There wasn't any need to hold them. That seemed to help in our relationships with the families."

"Families are an integral component of your command; don't be restrictive of any of these penny pinching regulations about supporting them. I tell my families they claim an inherent right to legitimate support to any activity that is appropriate to keep the family together and I don't have any problems spending P2 mission or BASOPS money to support legitimate family action programs, family activities, or unit activities that strengthen that organization. So don't be timid by what your JAG says about not using the administrative vehicle to take the women on a shopping trip. If you believe it builds teamwork and spirit and esprit, then get on with it. If the scouts need something, get on with it. I think the Army has shorted the families in a sense and that we ought to revise those damn regulations and recognize what the families are contributing and what they are doing, not only for the readiness of the force, but also they are an integral element of deterrence that has been effective for some time."

"Nobody is required to do volunteer work, but if you like to do it then we are going to venerate that and say, 'Thanks,' and we're going to praise you. If it weren't for the family members in this division, there are so many things that wouldn't get done and so many important things about life that wouldn't happen. The biggest issue was always making sure that the families were taken care of in the absence of the soldiers."

"People here have a tremendous attitude. They bend over backwards to help these families. I have my own little Army Community Service thing here. It is a place for wives to come and visit. They have classes and things like that. I have it under the ACS regulations so we don't have people go to jail. That has been very beneficial. My wife spends a lot of time trying to collect all the commander's wives and do things with them. You can do a lot to develop some cohesion among the wives. I have a family forum that I do once a year. We call together some staff guys and family representatives and go through a two or three-day session to lay out all the issues. From that I will give the staff about a week to work on those. Then we'll get that same group back and give them the answers. Two things happen. Number one, you really answer some questions. There are some real world things that you get done. The second part is that it becomes very therapeutic for the families."

"You best put them as a high priority. If you have happy families, you have happy soldiers with fewer complaints. That is just the way we are supposed to do our job these days, to understand what family support groups mean and how important they are. A commanding general's wife is very important in that regard because she provides him with very valuable feedback. She can also be a conduit of information."

"Families are so important for what they contribute. They contribute a lot more than what we ever give back in finite things. We are blessed with the people who support the Army in ways that none of us could ever imagine. I don't believe any of the services have as much family care and support from families as we do."

"Half of our soldiers are married. Therefore half of them have a concern for the well-being of their families. We consume their time; they expect that someone else is going to make sure that their families are well taken care of. That is our obligation. It is not a conflict. It is a very important activity. It pays dividends if you do it right. There are means for families to go tell you what they are thinking about. You will know at your first town hall meeting how well the community has been."

"My wife and I really emphasize that if you don't want to participate, you don't have to — honest, in social kinds of things. If you want to join in, do it and do it because you want to come and have a good

time and be with the people around you. If you don't want to, no problem. It is quite all right if the spouses work. Sometimes they have to work. My wife has had to work just from a financial standpoint."

- ISSUES

"A third of my time was spent on the quality of life issues with the families. I had heard other commanders say that they spend even more than that. I think it depends on how good your deputy community commander is and his staff. Your obligation is to make sure that you and they have a common vision of where you are planning to go and that the guidance is clear. If they don't know how to get there, then you will provide them with instruction so that they can."

"In Germany today, while we complain about it, the family support systems are superb. One of the things that we don't do well is advertise to our people all the things that we have available to them. We are challenged by lack of child care facilities. That is probably our biggest problem. We are challenged right now by totally inadequate housing for the numbers of people we have in the division who want to bring their families in theater. That has been exacerbated as the walls come down, and we have more and more refugees come into this area, so competition for housing is keen."

"The biggest family issue that I had was child and family abuse. We have great systems set up in the Army. A lot of it is recognizing the symptoms and knowing what systems are available and just plugging your people in. Another issue which is bothersome to me is alcohol abuse. Families to a lesser extent than your soldiers. I am working that by leveraging the squad leader for being totally accountable and responsible for his squad members all the time. Then I am pushing the buddy team and making the whole unit feel responsible. We continue to work it, but I am not comfortable that we have hit the right solution."


"There is more child and spouse abuse than I had anticipated. A lot of it is alcohol related. Our junior leaders don't know how to deal with it."

"Communications is your biggest challenge. Round up representatives from across the post and hear what they have to say; react to it. You'll then get a sensing of where you stand on the family issues. Another great way to do this is to go to your installation advisory council where you have your mayors and your post staff and just let them talk about what is going on in the post. We must pay attention to the family issues. I believe that your retention and reenlistment statistics and success are driven a lot by what you do for the family side of this Army."

"The family issue is a readiness issue and you have to pay some attention to it."

"The handwriting on the wall is that the Army is going to a significantly lower level than what we are today. The pain that will come with that is that you are going to find selective early retirement boards relooking files that have been looked at before. Lieutenant colonels may be mandatorily retired early. You may see a RIF of majors and captains; and you may see the QMP process for the noncommissioned officers go at a much more rapid pace than in the past. The challenge for the commander is trying to explain and convey to the families why this is occurring."

"If we think in the Army today that we can do the jobs that we do without 100 percent participation by our wives and the wives of our subordinates, how naive we are. God bless the Army wives. Ninety-five percent of them do yeoman service, and you never have to ask them. They just do it with a smile because they like taking care of people and they get great satisfaction out of them. The other five percent of them tend to be disruptive. And somewhere along the line, they never quite learned what it was they were forced to do; yet, your hands are tied. Today, the Army wife's role is optional. That is what the institution says. Well the institution speaks with forked tongue. It really doesn't mean that. So, you get yourself into some interesting dilemma's out there. I'll tell you, there isn't anything at the divisional level that can cause you more irritants than a disruptive wife. I don't have the answer on how you deal with that. I don't think the institution prepares the Army wife right for the job that she has, and I don't think that the institution selected the senior leadership right either. How the hell do you select a senior leader to take these responsibilities out there if he comes equipped with a disruptive wife? I don't know the answer to that, but that is what we are doing in some cases."



INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT

- **COMMUNITY SUPPORT**

"If the division commander is dual-hatted as an installation and troop commander, installation management is going to consume 40-50 percent of your time, whether you like it or not. That just comes with the territory. If you don't do that, then you have to accept the shortfall in the care which may not be provided to your soldiers. As a post commander, you are going to get feedback from the junior enlisted force, from the noncommissioned officer corps, and from the ladies who reside on your installation. I am talking about the Officers' Wives Club, the NCO Wives' Club, and the ladies who run the thrift shop. If you don't demonstrate some concern in your installation, you are not making a contribution. If you don't demonstrate some interest in that, you are taking a short sighted view of being called the 'installation commander.'"

"I would just reemphasize that the Army Community of Excellence program is a great opportunity to motivate the garrison side of your house — the civilian work force — to cause improvements to occur. Nobody has ever asked the garrison side to stand up to a standard. There has never been an ARTEP for the garrison. ACOE offers the opportunity for the garrison to strut its stuff. Another thing that I found really outstanding was a monthly civilian awards ceremony. We would do a monthly retirement ceremony at the parade ground. We would then go to the Officer or NCO Club and we would have our monthly civilian awards ceremony. We would also do our safety

awards and you could really see in their eyes how proud they were. I think it contributed to that sense of the importance of the civilian in the total Army family."

"The biggest thing that I found is that even today we still have soldiers who are living in facilities that are not up to standards. I had to make darn sure that a good chunk of our resources were focused on correcting those problems. We have really put a lot of money into upgrades of billets for soldiers. The soldiers appreciate it and it pays off for you, big time, in terms of morale and feelings by the soldiers. We also have totally insufficient child care facilities. We have some excellent facilities but nowhere sufficient in terms of capacity to meet the needs of all our people."

- **RESOURCE MANAGEMENT**

"My frustration continues to be the budgetary resources that are allocated for the support of BASOPS. We are operating on the marginal success level. If we continue the downward trend of resources, we will go beyond the marginally satisfactory level and enter into the crisis management area."

"I was seized with a MWR management problem when I came here because as you looked at the numbers, we were producing a couple million dollars of revenue a year and coming out losing money at the end of the year. Every where you went, you saw inefficiency. You saw poor management. You saw a lack of interest in MWR. We ran a survey of what the soldiers used and what they didn't use. We have shed ourselves of those programs that consume resources but soldiers don't use, such as recreation centers. I closed them and moved those appropriated fund positions to other programs that soldiers do use — like the library. I have resourced those programs. We've taken our NAF and our MWR and we have put the resources into programs that the soldiers use."

"The clubs had been a sink hole to put money into. They were poorly and inefficiently managed. We have kept an enlisted club with bingo and those activities and it makes a lot of money. We closed the noncommissioned officer club that was losing \$200,000 dollars a year. I now have a smaller 'leaders club' in which officers and noncommissioned officers participate. I've also gone to contract management of the club and I am now making money in the club system; those people who want to belong to the club and support it are very happy with the contract arrangement."

"We were trying to be all things to all people and no one is using it. So, what we have done in MWR is get rid of the losers, promote those things that people use, and generate money to put back into the program so that we have better quality programs."

- **CONTRACTS**

"There is one area that warrants some review — going to civilian contracts versus doing it 'in-house.' Keep an open mind about going

contract on your installation. If you negotiate the right contract, and not necessarily go with the lowest bidder, but go with the one that is the most responsive bidder, it will work for you and it will work quite well. The same thing is true with the GSA contract for TMP vehicles."

- **PERFORMANCE STANDARDS**

"We have a set of performance standards for each element of the community activity. Whether it is a CIF, a PX, commissary, or dental facility, we have established performance standards for them. We have established standards of excellence and standards of adequacy. Those standards then become the basis for quarterly review and assessment. All the O6 commanders that command inside my division AO come in and sit with me as a board of directors and every quarter we go over all the functional activities. I found within my communities I had tremendous expertise — pockets of excellence. So we have formed in circles of excellence and those guys meet. They appoint a leader, and then every quarter I have certain circles of excellence report out on good ideas for the troops. I do two off-sights a year with the communities and those are a day and one-half sessions. They have been very productive for us."

- **UNDERSTANDING THE SYSTEM**

"The issue is how do you get things done? How do you work the community budget? How do you work all the nonappropriated fund actions? How do you go make money when they tell you that you are in the red and you will be self-sufficient, but your staff says that because we are a small community, that is impossible. There has to be some course that could make you more comfortable. I worked harder than I think I should have had to work. So I missed something. I don't know what it was. I haven't seen it."

"You need two separate things. For those division commanders who run installations, they need to have a lot of in-depth knowledge about how to do that. For division commanders who are on an installation run by somebody else, it would be beneficial for them to have some kind of instruction that takes them through all the pipelines that go to higher headquarters towards running the installation."

"If I were king for a day, I would offer a career track that provides those who don't get selected to command tactical units, a profession in installation management. I'd command select it at grade O5 and O6. I personally believe that it is time to do that. If you look at the Air Force and how they maintain their installations, you will find that they grow officers who are non-flyers who manage installations. I believe that it is time for the Army to do that also. There are two positions which require close exam. One is the garrison commander and the other is the DPCA [Director of Personnel and Community Activities]. If your DPCA is not performing, move quickly to get a good officer in there. Now you must underwrite that good officer by making sure that after a year or 18 months, you get him back into his track. If you do not do that, you may have career damaged him for a

long time. You also could try to find a quality civilian who will perform as your DPCA — and I have found them to be very scarce but there are some great ones around and I've seen them. If you can get that kind of quality, I would encourage a guy to civilianize that position. If you don't have a quality person running your DPCA, you are in trouble. Your garrison commander is the same. He has a vast span of control across the installation staff. Your garrison commander controls your life blood with your installation staff and making the installation work."

"Before he ever arrives there, he should have the opportunity to be briefed on installation support to his division and have it laid out for him at Fort Leavenworth. I am not sure that even Fort Leavenworth knows what goes on in terms of all these things like the commissary committee. You probably have 50 damn committees that are put together to run a post, most of which are done on a volunteer basis. It would be nice to lay those out and think your way through that even if you are just a major player."

"I think this is a module we really need in our pre-command program for division and brigade commanders coming to Europe. You could put a week's program together to have at Leavenworth, or somewhere, where you address the community structure, the various directorates and missions of those directorates. Also things like, how much money do you generate from nonappropriated fund activities? Where can you spend it, and how long can you have it? How do you flow it? You can learn all that stuff, but it would be neat if you were ahead of the game when you started."

"As good a place as any to go in installation management is down at Fort Lee, Virginia. They have a tailored installation management course that is required attendance for garrison commanders. They offer a full spectrum of installation management. It is about a two-week course and is heavy with guest speakers, to include garrison commanders, resource managers, other DOLs who come in and talk. They can provide you the literature and they have the course that you need if you have not been in installation management." (Ed. note: The course is the Army Installation Management Course, tailored for 05/06/GS12 installation managers. GOMO will schedule a one day overview for General Officers who request it, as part of the Goup program.)

"Get spun up in the resource management arena. If you have not served in Europe before, you are in for quite a welcome because you own the whole community, 24-hours a day, and the community and installation responsibilities in Europe far outstrip those in CONUS."

"We are all products of our experiences. I had believed for a long time that training, maintenance, discipline, and teamwork are kind of the fundamental pillars of any fighting organization. I don't think any of this could occur without discipline, defined as, 'The kind of soldier you want is the one who, in fact, does what he is supposed to do in the absence of his leaders or in the absence of orders.' That sounds simple; but it is not simple."



