

EXPERIENCES IN DIVISION COMMAND 1991



DIVISION COMMAND LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAM

FOREWORD

This document contains selected quotations from the written debriefings of fourteen Division Commanders who completed their tenure of command during the past year. Some of these commanders led their divisions in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and thus were able to provide additional warfighting insights. In all, this document represents a collection of their thoughts, compiled to stimulate thinking about what it takes to be an effective division commander and to provide insights helpful to practitioners and students of the art of command. It is not a "cookbook" with recipes for success — but rather, the fruit of years of experience.


A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'William A. Stofft', written in a cursive style.

WILLIAM A. STOFFT
Major General, USA
Commandant
U.S. Army War College

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
PREPARATION FOR COMMAND	1
Surprises	
Pre-Command Programs	
Installation	
Training	
Synchronization	
Reflections	
READINESS	5
Reporting	
Focus	
TRAINING	7
Focus	
Assessment	
Programs	
Techniques	
QTB	
METL	
Standards	
Distractors	
Roundout Brigade	
FIELD OPERATIONS	13
Combat Power	
Commander's Intent	
Communications	
Command and Control	
TOC	
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT	17
Techniques	
Schools	
NCOPD	
DOCTRINE	19
Strengths	
Voids	
Study & Teach	
Changes	

ORGANIZATION	23
Structure	
Cavalry	
Air Defense	
Aviation	
EQUIPMENT	27
Fielding New Equipment	
Modernization	
Maintenance	
LEADERSHIP	31
Techniques	
Patience	
Trust	
Consistency	
Instruction	
Combat Success	
Loyalty	
ETHICS	35
Personal Philosophy	
Climate	
FAMILY ACTION	37
Challenges	
Family Action Plans	
Outreach	
Support	
INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT	39
Preparation	
Schooling	
Career Fields	
Resource Management	
Planning	
Community Impact	



PREPARATION FOR COMMAND

● SURPRISES

The single most surprising thing about command was that although my predecessor and I had radically different styles, the end result we were seeking was remarkably similar.

I was somewhat surprised by the amount of installation matters that I personally had to get involved with as the division commander. A lot of my time is eaten up with installation matters, which I must say is absolutely vital because it affects, not only readiness, per se, in its purest form, but it also readiness in terms of family satisfaction.

I think what surprised me more than anything else was the lack of real understanding on the part of commanders as far as what standards meant. That went from training discipline to caring for soldiers.

I think the thing that surprised me the most about division command was that I spent so much time away from the division. I never dreamed this would happen. During my command tour, I spent exactly as much time away as I did in command. That has a tremendous impact on how you do command as well as the authority that you give to your subordinates and the detail that you have to develop for certain programs because you are gone so much of the time. There are certain duties and responsibilities and one of them is the board system. It is important. But it is still a detractor.

If there were any surprises in taking the division I guess the surprise I found was the need to turn back up the tempo on training and get guys refocused on the important issues of unit training. It just reinforced that what people really do is what the boss emphasizes.

The single most surprising thing was the tremendous amount of talent that we have. It goes beyond battalion and brigade commanders to captains, company commanders, and lieutenants. That comes principally out of the training they receive in pre-commissioning. On the other hand, what I have gotten in the middle grade noncommissioned officers has not met my expectations. In many instances our young soldiers, who have been here for 2 and 3 years in terms of light infantry skills, are much more current than some of noncommissioned officer leaders. We are not getting that kind of prepared noncommissioned officer leader right out of the pipeline.

- **PRE-COMMAND PROGRAMS**

I don't really think there is a whole bunch to be done in preparing for command. I was very appreciative of the support that I got from Benning, Knox, and Leavenworth. I spent 3 days at those schools. I sent back channels to the two commanding generals and asked them to put together a battalion/brigade/division overview and then some very narrow substantive reviews for me — mortar platoons, scout platoons; things like that. I designed my own pre-command course.

One of the people who I talked to was the COSCOM commander. He had insights about the division that I would never have gotten from my own people.

I think that it would be good to bring a division commander into the pre-command course — a serving division commander. Don't have him speak, but have him sit down in the room with no one else there— we don't need any faculty or note takers — and just let the guys going into command ask questions.

I wish that I had known more about financial management before becoming a division commander and how the system works in USAREUR and how USAREUR interfaces with the department. The course that I took as a brigadier general did not provide the necessary level of instruction to manage finances at the division. As a result, I had to trust almost solely my resource manager and my internal audit people without much depth on how to check and what it was that they were doing. I would have liked to have had a short course on financial management at the division level.

- **INSTALLATION**

If I have to pick one thing out, I would fight like heck to get down to Fort Lee before taking over a division, and learn a little bit more about installation management.

You have to organize yourself for combat in this installation management business, because if you are not careful, it will consume

all of your time, because you don't understand what the hell you are doing or you are not giving good guidance to your subordinates as you carry it out.

We spend enough time at Leavenworth studying and dissecting FM 25-100 and 25-101, which are the key documents that you need to have in your head before you take command. The installation piece is what you are not equipped.

● TRAINING

I would go to Knox and Benning. You don't want a canned briefing. You want to sit down with the real thinkers and go through the tactics of it all at battalion, brigade, and division all over again and to get recertified on the basic piece of equipment. I wanted to and had the opportunity to get on a tank again to get on a Bradley. I had a mortar platoon laid out and did a live fire.

Things that put you in the best stead is truly understanding the Army's training methodology, training philosophy and doctrine, understanding the equipment that you have, and having a focus that you develop on how you are going to execute your own command philosophy.

I would go see any major exercise. I might go look at a BCTP that was in operation if I could get into that. I would spent time at the CTCs and the NTC, CNTC or JRTC. I would talk to a corps commander, not the one that I was going to serve with, but other corps commanders who were available.

It would behoove any new commander, whether he be at brigade or division level, to get well versed on the current doctrine and training. He should know what training devices, simulations, and things are available that will augment him and help him train a unit better.

I read FM 25-100 probably six or eight times and underlined it. I would certainly make myself intimately familiar with FMs 100-5 and 25-101, all the bibles of doctrine and training.

I might have leveraged more time to spend at the National Training Center prior to coming into division command. I might have become more actively involved in the BCTP process as it applied to division. I might have talked to some corps commanders, which I did not do, to find out their perspective of how the division should operate.

● SYNCHRONIZATION

I spent a lot of my energy learning about artillery and fire support. I spent a lot of my time studying and dialoguing with aviators about the importance of attack helicopter battalions. The point I am trying to get to is the synchronization piece. I felt very comfortable with my ability to get the maneuver units to the right place at the right time on the battlefield. But that is only one component of combat power and the focusing of all the combat power — the combat aviation, the

fire support, the artillery — I had to learn a lot of that as division commander. I should have learned more about logistics. But, the biggest one was the intelligence area. That was the area where I felt like I was an absolute novice. I had all of these systems within that battalion and I was a novice in the capabilities of those systems — the total intel system. I was a novice in my understanding of how those division systems link with the corps systems. There ought to be a module that we send ADCs and division commanders to at the Intel School at Fort Huachuca where we make them more familiar with the systems and with the organization.

I would study all the elements of the division and the synchronization it takes to bring them together at the right time and the right place. That is a weak way of saying that I would study our intel systems and become more knowledgeable in employing those systems.

● REFLECTIONS


I would tell anybody that has the opportunity, go sit down with General Cavazos, General Grange, or General Robert W. Sennewald. I would talk about a myriad of things — fundamentals of leadership, taking care of soldiers. They can also give you some great insights into warfighting.

I personally was not prepared as well as I could have been specifically in some of the unique CEWI equipment, some of the unique MSE items and some of the equipment in the aviation brigade.

I'd keep reading. I think you need to do that and I think you also need to sit down and think about what it is you want to accomplish in terms of your own professional development. I certainly would read Slim's book, *Defeat Into Victory*, because it's a great and honest book about strengths and weaknesses of himself and his organizations as he got ready to fight in China, Burma, and India, and it was a very, very good book on leadership.

General Vonno had all the new division commanders together and spent a day with us, telling us where he wanted us to go and the things he wanted us to do. That's very important to hear from your senior leaders. If I ever get a chance again, I will try to do that very thing with subordinate commanders. And I think you've got to remember that you can't just say it once. You have to continue to repeat it and you have to live it, too.

We must get a handle on how we are going to deal with the environmental issues, not only the contamination of the environment today and in the future, but how are we going to go about orchestrating the mitigation to include dollars to pay for past sins.



READINESS

Readiness is kind of a three-legged stool. It is training, sustaining, and the quality of life.

● REPORTING

The division was more ready than it was reporting itself. By and large, the USR over the years has tended to exaggerate the problems. It doesn't get at the real readiness issues.

I think readiness reporting was accurate as I saw it. However, the POMCUS mind-set wherein soldiers believe that they would never have to fight with their own equipment, did not cause that feeling of ownership and the belief that it needed to be maintained. The soldier, the leader, or the vehicle commander need to maintain it at 10-20 standards and be prepared to take that equipment to fight.

The thing I learned is that there is no routine measurement of readiness.

Material readiness was very good, with high operational readiness rates in all the systems. Training was a mixed bag. Some of the units were well-trained and in a high state of training proficiency, others much less so. That was a mixed bag across the division.

Commanders knew that the ADC was going to hold their feet to the fire but they had to report at the end to me.

- **FOCUS**

Develop some kind of a system that keeps you abreast of what your equipment readiness is, know where you are in terms of modernization and what you have and what is coming. Make sure that it doesn't disfunctionalize your training program, and make sure you understand the peculiarities of your own repair part system.

Maintenance is training and training means maintenance. Meld it together as one and do not separate it. Without the two, you just cannot be warfighting ready.

My biggest concern was the readiness posture of the division's aging fleet and our ability to get it to a warfighting standard and go off to war with it. The ability to sustain the division with the old deuce and a half and all 5-tons was a great concern.

I think I probably waited a little too long to get back into the RDF business. If I had to do it again, I would have moved in the first month to get back into the EDRE business a little quicker than we did.

First of all, what I didn't do was go in there and try to change everything as soon as I walked in the door. But as I could see things that weren't what I felt was either productive or doing them the right way, I made the changes.

One of the biggest challenges that I had in my entire command was to make sure that the brigade commander was truly a brigade commander.

One of the important jobs of being a CG is making your case so that the higher headquarters, and those that resource you and provide the things you need, understand your situation.

The point I tried to make very clear with my commanders was what my expectations were when we went to the CMTCs or when we went to Grafenwoehr. We were prepared to be there. We had done the preparatory training so that the operations at those centers would be optimized. In other words, we wouldn't have to go there and do basic stuff we should have been doing at home.



TRAINING

• FOCUS

You need to decide what those things are that are important to you as far as training is concerned. It is helpful if you know what they are before you take command. You need to codify those things in a published command training guidance document that is published as quickly after you take command as you can. The faster you can get that on the street, the better off you are.

A new division commander has to figure out early on what he wants to accomplish, what he wants to do to get the division ready to warfight. His responsibility is two levels down. Look at that battalion commander and look at that battalion and get it ready to go to war.

We went to the BCTP Seminar kind of late. You need to do that in the first 60 days of command, if you can. It is such a good team building exercise. BCTP is probably the most important time the division commander has in his training program.

You need to stress basic skills. A helpful way to train the division is to have integrating exercises—multi-echelon training for more than just one unit. You need to train how you are going to fight. A brigade task force needs its signal, MI, artillery, aviation and combat service support integrated in all phases of its training. A key element is to

leave enough time to reinforce your basic findings. Having AARs on every aspect of the training event is also very helpful.

Train smart with linkage. You should not waste time in major exercises. You should do pieces of those major exercises and get your command team and senior staff guys around and let them see how those pieces are fitting.

There is nothing like command involvement. Every battalion commander should have a voice in how he wants to train his unit as long as he is staying by the standards in FM 25-100 and 101 and using those as a guide.

You must be the trainer of the division. If we are going to talk about training being the most important thing in your division, then you must make sure that you show that and you are physically out to those training events, that you are into coaching, teaching, and mentoring your brigade commanders and your battalion commanders in the different things that you have learned, either through knowledge of experience or knowledge of the current doctrine. You have to be personally involved and you have to know your job. You have to be technically and tactically smart yourself and you have to insure you spend some time insuring that you have the right skills to do that. There is no substitute for being out in the training, coaching, mentoring, and teaching — those can't just be buzz words, they have to be action words.

I gave different guidance for different levels of commanders. I tried to have a philosophy that said, "Brigade commanders, you need to be very tough on training standards and safety and you need to push yourself to teach." For battalion commanders it was a more centralized approach. It said, "Treat your company commanders properly in terms of the way you communicate with them."

● ASSESSMENT

The person who ought to be out there evaluating, in a general sense, the performance of the battalion commanders, is the division commander. The higher you go, you'll find there are all kinds of things that will draw you away from being at the training events. But I will tell you, you ought to resist them with all your energies and be away from your training as little as absolutely essential.

I felt like the best way that I could get a feel for how proficient my units were was in extended field operations. You have to look at your units over a sustained period of time. That's why deployments for things like gunnery were very valuable to me, deployments most of all to the training centers.

CMTC is dynamite. In Europe CMTC is a division commander's training device; he uses it to train his battalions and brigades.

Most division commanders are going to be people that were schooled in maneuvers. They are going to understand that piece very well. But the intel, the other elements of combat power that you have to focus—air, artillery, all of those things — I would tell them that they need to find every opportunity to put themselves through the rigors of making decisions about how you employ all of that stuff. The BCTP, for example, is a good opportunity to do that. I would say you ought to look for the opportunities to do it on the ground as well.

● PROGRAMS

The Combat Training Centers have really allowed us to take a hard look at ourselves and try to improve. The fact is that most of our people want to be measured against the best standard we can put together and if you don't just run around firing everybody because they don't meet the standard every time and you begin to get the attitude in the Army that, by God, the next time I come back here I'm going to do better and this really is important stuff.

I am a great believer in the training centers. They hone our commander's skills and they make all of us better. I haven't seen anything that's driven training in such a powerfully positive direction since I've been in the Army, no system, no book, no general.

SIMNET and the Conduct of Fire Trainers absolutely had an impact on our performance in the Gulf, particularly in terms of crew proficiency and accuracy when it comes to gunnery. Simulation is the way of future training, particularly for realism.

The staff training that we did I think gave us a certain amount of agility in our ability to put together a concept to understand the various facets of the division and understanding the organization of the division and how it could best meet its potential in combat.

● TECHNIQUES

If training is really first priority, you must do more than say that — you have to demonstrate it. When we went to Grafenwoehr or Hohenfels, we took and set up a Division Command Post. The policy in the division was that there would be one or more general officers from the division there all the time. We all rode with the maneuver battalions in the maneuver box for CMTC and we rode with the opposing force. We really spent day and night on the ranges when we were shooting at Grafenwoehr so that the soldiers, the young leaders of the division and very clearly the battalion commanders, understood that training was really a very, very important priority. If training is a priority, you better underscore it with your own personal presence there and your own involvement in after action reviews.

Over the last 15 years, we have created a body of literature and doctrine that works. Majors understand it, so if we continue to use these tools, we'll stay pretty well trained when combined with the NTC, the JRTC, and JOTC. One thing I would add though is a master training calendar. You have to get at planning peacetime training out

24 months for major training events that require dollars, transportation assets, POL and ammunition.

I think that the planning of training and the resourcing of training must be done at the division level. Then the brigades and the battalions are into the quality execution portion of the FM 25-100 and 25-101 training methodology. CTC methodology training is appropriate in everything that you do. One, you are training your leaders first. Two, you train at the small unit level first using the building block approach. You AAR everything you do. Then if you have time, and time is the most critical resource at the division level, you do it again. But the fact of the matter is you have to train to standard. Don't establish your own standards, but use the Army standard. Use the FM 25-100/101 methodology and ensure that your execution is quality.

Let me comment on the four separate battalions in the division — air defense, engineers, signal, and MI. The best way to train them is in the context of the brigade battle task force, which means that the brigade element that is going to fight its maneuver battalions with its slice, including the artillery battalion which is traditionally associated with it, train together. For collective events, that is what we do. That also means the FSB. The bottom line is that you train your slice elements through the brigade battle task force.

We focused at the platoon level. We trained up to platoon before we ever started thinking about doing anything in a collective fashion.

One of the big faults that I have is that I will try and pack too much into too little time. I found that when I do that, I can't hit the standards that I want to hit. Far better off doing fewer things well.

You really have to lead the division. You have to be out front in charge in everything you do and training management is no exception. I personally taught FM 25-101 to all of my brigade and battalion commanders. Then I required them to teach it to their subordinates and I would be present when they did. I wanted everybody in the division to know that was the Bible this division was going to follow.

- **QTB**

I spent a lot of time with the quarterly training briefings and I had my subordinate units also spend a lot of time in making sure that they had done the proper things in preparation for the quarterly training briefs. I had the battalion commander brief, then the battalion command sergeant major would brief the individual training for the unit, which incorporated sergeants time which I feel is a very key and essential thing to our training in today's Army. I also picked at random, one company commander out of each battalion to give a company level briefing. I went one step further because at the next training briefing they had to brief me on the prior 90 days of what

they in fact did accomplish. Anything they did not accomplish had to be highlighted by the battalion commander as to why.

You have to trust in your noncommissioned officers and you have to trust your subordinates. The only way to do it is to run very thorough quarterly training briefs to make sure they are in sync with what your guidance is.

- **METL**

I can't think of anything that has come down the road that has affected the Army more and has made such a impact as FMs 25-100 and 25-101. You have to make those the Bible. Then you have to concentrate on the basics. The METL process then becomes a very, very key part of all of that. Understanding what you are all about, what the mission of that organization is, and planning things to accomplish that METL and focusing on that, are important. I found that every couple of months or so, you have to another look at your METL, you have to ask yourself what you are all about, reconfirm that METL, or change it if required. I've also required what I call a METL genealogy to be developed so that you can track from the division METL all the way down to individual training for each of those METL tasks which are collective, leader, and individual task associated with all throughout that entire METL task.

- **STANDARDS**

FM 25-100 and 101 has absolutely got to be internalized by you and everyone else. I have made a requirement that part of the in-processing, before you can say you are a member of the this division, all leaders, from top to bottom, must be validated in 25-100 and 25-101. You go before a board of your peers and commanders and you are put through the validation process. Until you get that stamp that you are qualified, you are not a full-fledged member of this division. You go study and learn those two manuals.

Leader training is probably the most important piece of training in the division. I do not want leaders, whether they are sergeants or generals, to do anything with their subordinates until they have been certified competent in the task.

The key to executing to standard is the company training meeting, or the platoon training meeting. Because that is where it all comes together in terms of the details of laying out what resources are required to cause this thing to happen.

We manage training a lot better than we execute training. There is a big difference. There is a difference in giving the good quarterly training briefing and saying the right thing and getting out on the ground and having 95 percent of your people present for training. If you don't have 95 percent of your people for training, then you are wasting your time.

We had essentially a check ride for noncommissioned officers. There was a very candid assessment of where they stood in terms of their proficiency with the system or with the organization that they were going to be leading in. Then we tried to give them the preparation that would bring them up to standard before we put them in a leadership role.

- **DISTRACTORS**

If you have properly scheduled support of various activities, then they are not training distractors. The people who I have seen in trouble, colleagues who I thought got into difficulty with training distractors, were those who scheduled every single minute of every single day and provided no slack opportunities. As a result, as part of my quarterly training brief, each battalion commander must identify three, not less than three and no more than five, slack days.

The implementation division-wide and corps-wide of FM 25-100, red/green/amber cycle, so you know when you are in a green cycle, you can collectively train and you are not going to have any taskings, has great impact on training distractors and on training planning.

You have to involve the entire post. Everybody has to be involved—dental, clinic, hospital, SJA, AG, Finance — everybody has to understand that training is the number one priority. If you are in the training cycle, the only time you can be excused for training is for an emergency. There will not be appointments. As a division commander, you have to stand up and be counted with higher headquarters when you are tasked within that 6-week period.

Most of your distractions occur internal to the organization. It does not occur because of some external short-notice tasking, but more frequently because the unit commander or the noncommissioned officer leader has not prepared for the training, or because the first sergeant decides that it is more important to get the grass cut today than it is to go to the antitank range. But, after having said that, there clearly are distractors that occur. We tried to implement as aggressively as we could the tenets of FM 25-100, to make them work.

- **ROUNDOUT BRIGADE**

Having a roundout brigade will take about 25% of your time. The management of that unit and your coordination with the State AG, the policies for personnel assignment, resourcing, training, standards, personnel, equipment, maintenance, services and so forth are a major issue that need constant attention. There is a roundout council that is chaired by the Chief of Staff that meets monthly to make sure that all of that stuff is on track, keeps the visibility up. But the division commander had better be deeply involved in the orchestration of that roundout brigade training and the policies that are governing it.



FIELD OPERATIONS

• COMBAT POWER

To an incoming division commander, the single most limiting factor in exercising effective command in the field might be your own imagination and understanding of the power of the force. If you put it together the right way, if you trained it, if you maintained the equipment and understand and employ our doctrine, the capability of the division is awesome.

Synchronization is an area where our training has paid off magnificently — our ability to apply combat power in a rapid manner, and that is cumulative, by the way. By that I mean the logistics build-up, the positioning of things, all of that has a role to play in the application of combat power.

• COMMANDER'S INTENT

Initially the single most limiting factor was my ability to express my intent to my commanders. It is the essence of all field operations. The G3 can't do it for you. It wasn't the fact that I couldn't express the intent. It was trying to coordinate it so that you had the right people at the right place so that you plan far enough ahead so that you can do these rock drills and rehearsals. Again, it is one of these things where you can't let the G3 drive you into a course of action.

The single most limiting factor was my personal ability to provide clear, accurate, precise, commander planning guidance and the

articulation of the commander's intent for division operations. That is a skill that takes hours and hours of work. There is a tape that is made by a retired lieutenant colonel, Robinson. It is easy to get it from TCDC people at Fort Leavenworth. I watch it and I review it every time I get ready to go into some kind of an exercise and that has helped me tremendously in the stating of the guidance and the development of my intent. If you can't do that, your planners and your headquarters and your subordinate commanders are going to go through hours of grief in trying to understand what it is that you want them to do. If you have a way that you can say things that make sense so that they can translate that, you can save hours of their time. If you can't, it is absolute chaos and you don't know it.

Commander's presence is important and you have to take the lead. You have to be able to articulate your thoughts and concepts clearly, concisely, and in terms that your commanders understand. Nobody else can do that for you, you have to be able to do that yourself. You have to be able to look them in the eye and tell them what you want them to do and get them to clearly grasp it, as well as call them on the radio, or send them a piece of paper and they get the same essence as you would looking them in the eye. Get those skills down to such a level that you can communicate with them and they can get your intent clearly using any mode that is available.

It's the issue of intent and how you convey that and all the different measures that you take to get that done. You practice by getting your CPs in the field if you can't get the whole division, and you can't very often. By running your communications at least every month in some sort of an exercise, getting your people so that they can move the TOC, set it up, tear it down, move it again at night, reset it up under adverse weather conditions, and practice that before you ever exercise other aspects of command and control.

- **COMMUNICATIONS
EQUIPMENT**

Communications was the biggest problem we had from a command and control perspective. Our comms right now are totally inadequate for the demands of the large formations on a battlefield where you are going to have rapid movement of forces. We worked through that in Southwest Asia. Because we were moving, FM comms did not give us the ranges we needed. We had TACSAT communications as long as I was in a helicopter. MSE would help us a lot, but MSE does not address the communications needs essentially from the D-TOC forward, or your battlefield communications needed from your division commanders to corps commanders, or even from division commanders to brigade commanders.

If I were king, I would have the single channel tactical satellite down with my brigade commanders. MSE provides very effective command and control but that has to be tied into multi-channel tactical satellite.

- **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

You must get yourself organized and determine what your role is going to be as a division commander. Division commanders can't be everywhere so how is he going to organize the command and control within the division while in the field? What is the role of the ADC? What is the role of the Chief of Staff? What role does the CG play? Everybody plays it differently, but you need to understand that clearly before you go to the field. If you don't, you are not going to be able to effectively command a division in the field.

The computer age is upon us. The advantages that one gets utilizing computers is just phenomenal and a new division commander needs to get some understanding of what computers can do for you and then use it because it does make a difference.

Know your organization. You have to know your organization in order to synchronize it. You have to know the capabilities, as well as the weaknesses of the organization.

Where should the CG be to effectively command a division? From my experience he needs to be everywhere. You need to let the ADC-M fight the close battle. You need to let the ADC-S fight the rear battle and you need to resource it and rely on it. You need to be the guy who is fighting the future battle, fighting the deep battle, and keeping the division properly resourced.

Make sure that somebody like the Chief of Staff has the power to do just about whatever needs to be done in the division in your absence. Many times you are drawn away to corps and other places and you may not be physically in contact with the division and stuff needs to be done. They need not be waiting for your decision. If something is obvious and it has to be done, he needs to have the power to be able to execute the detail. You need to give him that.

Make sure as you go into some of these CPXs and other exercises that you are thinking very clearly about who you want awake and who you want to sleep at various times. That ain't an automatic. You will wind up with all the wrong people awake at the wrong time and all of sudden you are going to be flat on your ass because you won't have the continuity of operations and you are going to realize all of a sudden that there ain't anybody else there that can take it for you. What you don't want to do is get sick. One of the ways to avoid that is that you have been provided with a van in which there is a bunk and a shower and a heater. Use it. When you do have a chance to get some rest, very quietly go in that thing and go to bed. Three or four hours in that van will make a lot of difference in your ability to articulate clearly to the division what you want from them.

- **TOC**

You ought to keep your TOCs small, your CPs small but functional, and you must address every function including feeding and sleeping which are functions that need to be performed on site. I prohibit it in

the TOCs and TACs, but there has to be provisions. Tired men take fight and officers make dumb decisions when they are exhausted. As division commander you must be fresh and rested and able to apply your intellect, and it doesn't work when you are tired; all you do is frustrate the staffs and your subordinate commanders. You are not the G3. If you have a holistic and balanced approach then you have a lot of things to do.

We have a pretty good standard in the Army right now for a division in the field. You have three command posts. You normally wind up with a TAC that is run by an ADC and a rear that is run by an ADC and a main that is run by the Chief of Staff and from which you, the division commander, basically function. What you have to figure out is how you are going to play in it. You are the division commander and you need to not constantly surprise people with how it is you want to command the division in the field.

First thing that the CG needs to do is make sure that he gets his command post out in the field on a frequent basis, because those skills are so perishable, the people that work in those CPs need to go out, just setting up the operations alone, setting up the TOC, breaking them down, moving them. There is an art to all that and a skill that has to be continually worked on. At the same time it develops teamwork within the TOC and you are developing the skills of radio operators and all sorts of things.

Make sure you have a very good helicopter crew. Guys at night who are NVG proficient who can get you in and out of tight spots. Tight spots not in terms of danger, but in terms of landing zones and are very good navigators because you don't have time to screw around at night boring holes in the sky. Choose that helicopter crew, the crew chief, the PIC and the co-pilot. Your life depends on him because you spend a lot of time in that helicopter, but they need to be able to almost instinctively get you wherever you need to go at low level fast on the battlefield at night. Make sure your aide is an expert map reader. You don't have time to worry about how to get from one place to another.



PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

• TECHNIQUES

We have a very elaborate system of MAPXs, order drills, and command post exercises. Some run by division, others run by brigade or by battalion. We have to go through periodically, and quarterly in my judgment, some exercises in which the we work the same issues together and we end up understanding each of our functional focus.

It goes back to an early leadership manual, setting the example reinforces professional development: technical, tactical proficiency at all command levels reinforces professional development.

We went off post twice a year and did our warfighting, in terms of discussing it, at the division level to include bringing in the Special Forces group so that we had the integration of the echelons above division as well. We went to off-sites where we would work a scenario and have the various major unit commanders — the colonel level commanders with their battalion commanders — put on various parts of the program. We worked it hard, usually through a 2-night, 3-day kind of a thing. We would bring in very senior speakers for the dinner affairs and then end the thing by bringing the wives over from the post by bus and having some kind of a cookout or a social affair that night. It was a great tool to focus on.

We spent a lot of time on certifying both our officers and our noncommissioned officers. There were certain gates which they had

to go through before they were considered certified. We spend an awful lot of time in preparing our leaders before we ever turn them loose on their subordinates. We trained the leader and then after he started his training program, we rehearsed and rehearsed and then we did it for real. That is a part of professional development. When I say certify, I am talking about testing through either written form or hands-on that you can accomplish this task and do it to standard.

You need a prescribed format. For instance, every other week I run a system where many of the field grade officers in the Headquarters, staff officers and special staff officers, examine a subject. On alternating Thursdays, there is staff officer training which is the production of orders. Once a quarter, I do a systems review which is one of the battlefield operating systems and a complete layout of that in the division and how that hooks into the corps. I have a series of guest speakers that we bring in to talk to us about warfighting.

We had a number of a senior leaders seminar sessions where we really focused on the synchronization of combat power at the brigade commander level and the division commander level. For example, we all agreed that certainly the aviation brigade commander knew a lot about Apaches and how to fight helicopters, but the rest of us had a lot to learn. Artillery the same thing. All of us needed to know more about how to deploy artillery, the importance of the counterfire fight, the importance of massing fires.

- **SCHOOLS**


The first thing a commander must do is to ensure that his or her soldiers leverage the institutions for PLDC, BNOC, ANOC, CAS3, motor officer courses, and those courses that in some cases are a requisite and in other cases are beneficial. Secondly, we have noncommissioned officer development programs which are generally conducted at the battalion level and officer professional development programs conducted at the battalion and brigade levels where the focus, directed by the division, is a focus in warfighting.

- **NCOPD**

You have to watch this business of OPDs and NCOPDs. Often times they are not well thought out. You have to go down and make sure they are doing it to the standard that you have established and make it work. But it has to start at the top and work its way down.

NCO professional development, in my experience over recent years, has been sorely lacking. We really tried to get very strong NCO professional development programs that were focused on warfighting, training soldiers to fight, training small units to fight, and getting away from the trite things we had done in the past.

The command sergeant major has what we call a master's program. There are about 12 to 18 different areas run by the division G3 with proponents. That program cuts across the division in all specialties in all the combat, combat support, and combat service support.



DOCTRINE

● STRENGTHS

The bottom line is that we have a superb doctrine in AirLand Battle which is first rate. It takes our enormous technological advantage over any other army in the world and capitalizes on it instead of capitalizing on brute strength. Our doctrine was so effective and widely understood that it was more important to us in the DESERT STORM victory than was the Bradley, the Apache, and the tank. If I had to give up one of the two, I would have kept the doctrine.

Doctrine is in pretty good shape. I found that when I thought I had objected to a certain piece of doctrine, then I didn't know the doctrine and that I had picked up something through hearsay, but I hadn't taken the time to sit down and study the doctrine to see what it was telling me. I also found that I had forgotten a lot of doctrine and it is very important to review that with great frequency.

I had to make sure that I understood what we had as the written word and that everybody else in the division understood that, too. Once we all got on common ground and understood what doctrine really says about a certain subject, we decided that there isn't anything wrong with this. It's the tactics, techniques, and procedures that you can wicker, refine and change a little bit. But the doctrine is in pretty darn good shape.

- **VOIDS**

I didn't feel that the Army in general knew how to fight the division. We lost the understanding of how to fight the division collectively in its entity and what it could bring to the battlefield. It was lost in the schools.

We had some major disagreements on should you go to forward support battalions or should you stay in the set S&T Battalion/Maintenance Battalion/Medical Battalion role.

Our mobilization doctrine is lousy.

We need to spend some time on our doctrine with regard to support. Would we be better off going back to an organization like we had 25 years ago when we had corps that were purely and simply warfighting headquarters? Your Field Army was your next supporting headquarters above division level, so that all the corps did was prioritize the support and the actual flow of support came from the Army level down to the division level. There are probably a lot of areas is the support field that we ought to relook. But from the warfighting perspective, I think we are sound.

A light division needs to have 3 infantry brigades in order to be effective. The Heavy/Light Doctrine has not been figured out yet. I especially mean a LID with a heavy Corps. I think we need to work on the doctrine and how we are going to use it.

The one thing we can do better is learn more in our doctrine. For example, the whole business of direct fire command and control is the Task Force Commander's job. It's a terribly important job. It takes most of his time, and we ought to be able to write about it better and to have some better standards within our doctrine for that.

- **STUDY & TEACH**

You have to be able to internalize the doctrine, you have to understand the lexicon of the doctrine, you have to have a commonality of understanding within the organization that you are going to fight so that everybody is operating off the same sheet of music. Sometimes doctrine is like the Bible. A lot of people can read the same passage and get different meanings. What you want to have is a common view or at least have the discussions to get closer to the common view so you can operate in a common way. You have that synchronization that is so necessary.

Read it as much as you can. Get the latest book. Figure out where the Army is headed. The best advice I can give anybody is that you have to read what is there.

You have to know the doctrine. The school systems certainly teach that. As you get into your warfighting sessions in your division, the division commander has to provide that mature understanding of doctrine, and it is helpful to occasionally get into those doctrinal

discussions with your senior leaders — your battalion and brigade commanders — to put some of the tactical rubs or the tactical disagreements in context with the doctrine.

We brought people down from the schools. We had the Air Defenders come in and we had the schools come in on this warfighters and talk to us. The aviation. We would have the battalion commander or the brigade commander get up and talk about doctrinal employment of the attack battalion. The school would have a member from the school there and they would reinforce what he had said or bring out the doctrinal change of some such.

You should not assume that all your subordinates understand the doctrine of whatever it is that you are getting ready to approach or whatever your training program is. It is always worthwhile to review the published guidance on whatever task you are about to undertake prior to getting into it. To blindly assume that the lieutenant, captain, and major all understand FM 17-1 clearly, is probably to realize an uneven performance as a result. You can't remember all of that. It is too broad.

Every opportunity you have, you must study doctrine. You can't get away from it, it's a way of life. The guy who doesn't is only one level deep. You have to get 10 levels deep. You have to be able to understand it in order to teach it. Commanders are teachers of doctrine. To be a teacher you have to understand the inner workings of the doctrine of what you are teaching.

It is not just a matter of sitting down and reading doctrine, but it is a matter of first doing the reading, doing your own thinking about it, and then sitting around with other very knowledgeable people and doing a lot of seminar type of dialogue. I've learned a lot from colonels and lieutenant colonels and majors, even while I was a division commander, through those types of sessions. We always need to study our profession.

During the rehearsal process and the backbrief process, you are not only training the mission but you are also reinforcing doctrine and reinforcing unit level TTP. There is a requirement to teach it — not in the context of classroom instruction, but in a context of after action reviews, rehearsals, and back briefs. When you see it in the context of coaching and mentoring, it is in the process of every training event that you do. The corps commander does the same thing to me, which is part of his charge.

You have to teach doctrine all the time. You go to AARs, you start off with the doctrine. What was the doctrinal base? What was the tactic, technique, and procedure about that we just did? Did we follow it? If we deviated, why did we deviate and what caused us to

deviate? So every opportunity you get, you have to be able to get into the doctrinal base. Commanders have to lead from the front.

You learn very quickly when you go back to Leavenworth for the BCTP seminar that you really don't know as much about doctrine as you thought you did.

Your teaching process never stops. At every level you should be involved in teaching doctrine. It is a continuation thing and you have to remind people to read, you have to remind them that this is very important, and I don't think you can take that for granted. That's our business, that's our trade. Therefore, you have to continue to stay on that. Teaching is the absolute.

I think it is important that you get young officers to thinking about doctrine at the higher levels so that they better understand how their particular piece of the action fits in the overall scheme of things. I always felt like, as a division commander, that was part of my responsibility to take a piece of that time and do some teaching. I think a very important role the division commander or assistant division commander or brigade commander plays — is teaching subordinates.

• CHANGES

I haven't tried to change doctrine, but the whole thing of close air support needs a relook. I personally believe that my own close air support was there with my Apaches. I think we have arrived with the Apache where the Marines have been for a number of years. That is, we have, organic to our divisions and corps, the close air support that we need, and use of Air Force air is better capitalized on deeper, in zones where you avoid great potential for fratricide, and focus the Air Force energies deeper into the enemy's formation, which is obviously an important part of the fight. So I think there is a change I see emerging out of necessity.

I haven't tried to change doctrine, I tried to fill some of the voids. I've tried to get a fix on doctrine where light infantry deployment is concerned. I still think the institution is trying to get a fix. I have not tried to change doctrine. In fact, I have been so busy trying to meet the standards for fighting it, that I haven't had any original thoughts.

Certainly at the joint level we're going to have to think through the business of Joint Air Coordination. We certainly do need a coherent plan for air space control that can be agreed upon by all the services, whose one point is killing the enemy and everything that supports that. I think we absolutely need to really stretch ourselves in that arena to figure out where the problems lie in joint war fighting. Put together a task force, a joint task force, and put it in the field and then electronically run it through the gamut. In other words, what I'm talking about is a battle command training program at the joint level.



ORGANIZATION

● STRUCTURE

I formed three provisional battalions that are a conglomerate of separate companies. They are not OPMS designated. One is in the aviation brigade and has the four separate companies in the brigade. The one in DIVARTY has four separate batteries. There is also a provisional battalion in troop brigade that has the sixteen separate companies and detachments in the brigade.

I have taken and built the long-range fire targeting cell in the D MAIN and when we do cross border operations with our 4th Brigade and our Apaches they pull in an operation cell that sits right there where all the intel comes in and where all the targeting is done so that the SEAD and the clearance of the air lanes and the transit routes are all done right there.

If I had the authority to do so, I would up-gun my DIVARTY from a MLRS battery to a MLRS battalion. I would make it a matter of both doctrinal change and organizational change to have habitual artillery brigade support behind every division, one artillery brigade supporting every division as a minimum.

Within the heavy divisions we certainly need heavy equipment transporters. I think the Army has already made the decision that we are going to go to the HET companies within divisions.

External to the division, I think, we need to do something about our ability to evacuate wounded. I can't articulate what organizational changes need to be made to fix that problem, but I can tell you that I am convinced that had we had large numbers of casualties on the battlefields in Southwest Asia, the evacuation system would have been inadequate in a major way. Between the evacuation hospitals, where there was clearly great medical capability, and the front lines, the evacuation system was frighteningly inadequate and something we need to fix.

The thing that surprised me more than anything, not as a division commander but as an assistant division commander, was the great, great responsibilities we give to very junior people on the support side of the house. I think this is an organizational change that we need to make. More NCO leadership and a little more robustness in our forward support battalions.

I insist, as our commanders go into operations and exercises and CPXs, that they really take a hard look at the structure. If they find something is not tweaked right after doing the after action review and analysis, then they must document it and go out and try to fix it. Part of our obligation is to provide that input because we are here and operate with those structures all the time.

I think we need to look at some of the structure within the division arena. If I were going into command today, I would push tanks in the cav squadrons because I think that is where they belong, and I would take a hard look at LRSDs in divisions. I am not sure if we can effectively use them. I don't know how you get them out there.

There is a move of foot to disestablish the LRSD and I would fight to keep it. There are a number of people who think it needs to exist in the cavalry squadron. I think that is probably a better place for it.

I believe someone needs to look at the MP force structure. I don't believe there's enough military police in the division. I don't believe there's enough in the Army, in fact. Also, the Air Defense battalion is not configured to protect the rear area. It is time for another review of our force structure with respect to doctrine. Doctrine has moved along and made some changes. The force structure hasn't gone along with it.

Our doctrine says that the ADC-S will man a rear battle cell in the division rear area and fight the rear battle. The only problem is it doesn't give any of the people to do it with. So we have to pull them out of the division staff and other places because you've got to have fire support, intelligence, engineers, Army aviation. You've got to have the whole thing back there to fight the rear battle. But, we know the force structure for the TOE does not identify who is going to make up the cell.

I am not suggesting that we do away with all the divisions in the National Guard, but I would suggest that if you are going to address the need for an artillery brigade behind every division, then you need more artillery within your corps. I would lean very heavily toward converting some of that maneuver structure to artillery. In our reserve components I would lean less toward divisions than I would toward other combat units like artillery.

I am convinced that you could take three or four experienced heavy division commanders, or light division commanders for that matter, put them in a room, unconstrained, then tell them they can not grow their division, you have to stay the same. You could walk away in 2 or 3 days with a far better division design than we have today if you didn't constrain them from trading off infantry spaces, for example, for cav spaces or intel spaces for aviation spaces. You see, it's the proponents that kill us.

The Light Infantry Division is deficient in several areas—mobility (not enough transportation assets), firepower, ammo handling capability, POL/H2O handling capability, and engineer. We do not have enough organic mobility within the division to move anything but 2 battalions of infantry if we use all our aviation asset and DS trucks in DISCOM. If the corps truck company was always available and would deploy and train with the division, I think that might be OK. Without a dedicated corps transportation company, we need more truck assets in the division. We are also short on firepower. We need to replace the 105 artillery with towed 155 and also include the added requirements of heavy ammo lift capability, both in CSS and organic within the artillery units.

The Army owes the nation a heavy force punch. We need to have heavy divisions and corps as proven in Desert Storm. We need strategic mobile forces, some with a forced entry capability like the 82nd Airborne. In the desert, we saw a need for an air assault capability like the 101st Airborne. We need to keep our heavy forces. There is also a role for Light Infantry Divisions in the new force structure. However, there is a mission for 1 or 2 LIDs, no more than 2 LIDs because we can't afford it. The Army of 1995 also needs to have 3 brigades for each division. We need to round-up those units instead of round-out. We need to keep 5 heavy divisions in CONUS and we need 3 reinforcing corps—2 active duty and 1 in the reserves. LIDs need to be rapidly mobile and have a strategic capability. We need to increase mobility and sustainability and improved firepower. We need to be able to do sustained combat with the LIDs.

● CAVALRY

We have to fix the cav squadron. We have broken the cavalry so badly that it is nonfunctional. You have to get two more ground cavalry troops. You have to get tanks back in the cavalry. We have to get the reserve component troop on active duty to give you a total of three on the ground.

Our Cav TO&E absolutely stinks out loud. We must have a three-ground troop armored cav squadron in the division and we need more single channel pack SAT radios.

We are in two configurations of scout platoons. One is a wheeled scout platoon in HMMWVs and the other is the Bradley scout platoon. I need to get that sorted out. The scouts are key on the battlefield.

All of our scout platoons are equipped with Bradleys. That was a conscious decision. I turned in all the HMMWVs because I couldn't standardize the organization. I was not going to have a nonstandard operation.

I think most commanders have felt for a long time that we had made a mistake when we took the tanks out of the cav squadron. My own personal feeling is the cav squadron should be the same in the division as it is in a regiment, and we clearly need tanks in both of those cavalry organizations.


- **AIR DEFENSE**

I felt I was lacking a battery air defense. I had 15 Stinger squads for the division forward. Plus I felt I needed a battery of air defense to train with on a daily basis so everybody's head was into air defense, what it meant, and what it can do for you, because it is an essential element on the battlefield. That's probably an area that, if I had the opportunity to change, I would have forward deployed an air defense battery with this outfit.

- **AVIATION**

Every heavy division in the Army should have two Apache battalions in the aviation brigade. What I would do is make that an organizational change that would cut across the entire Army — at least in the heavy divisions.

Take a very hard look at the aviation support battalion and make sure that every mechanic, every soldier in that support battalion is, in fact, doing the job that he's supposed to be doing. That all the mechanics in the aviation unit are, in fact, doing those mechanical duties as opposed to being detailed off within the organization to do something else because you are woefully inadequate in that capability within your unit. To a point, if you don't watch it carefully, you can become unsafe. You can overwork. I have found aviation mechanics in my division being overworked, working nights and weekends, when clearly there was no requirement for anyone else in the division to do that. They were doing that merely to keep up with the workload of taking care of their helicopters. That can lead to morale and fatigue problems, and it can lead, ultimately, to serious safety problems.



EQUIPMENT

● FIELDING NEW EQUIPMENT

Once you start to field a new piece of equipment, it is just absolute that you have the fielding team come and have the training before you get the equipment on board. You have to be knowledgeable of how to operate with it or the next thing you have is broken equipment probably by something dumb that has caused it, and you don't have anybody knowledgeable to fix it or know how to order the parts.

Absolutely insist on total package fielding. Don't let somebody talk you into taking a shortfall of your PLL or special tools and equipment. I've allowed myself to be talked into that a couple of times.

I think NET is probably the best thing the Army has ever done. You have to have new equipment training. It depends on the equipment. If it is GPS, it is a 15 minute class. If it is the Bradley, it is a 2 month new equipment training. But, you have to study the doctrine first. You have to take it, obviously, beyond the discreet unit in which you are fielding. For example, if you are fielding a Bradley versus a M113, that obviously has operational connotations for a lot of other people besides just infantrymen. You have to also teach your artillerymen and your aviators about the Bradley so there is an understanding across the organization, not just within the discreet unit where the equipment is being fielded.

• MODERNIZATION

My major concern was the lack of equipment that was available in the Army to aid me to be able to fight at night. TACFOR is one example that has been around for a few years. We did not have them in the light division so all of our training at night was unaided. We have the old Cobra that can't fight at night. I don't have the Apache.

We had tank battalions where we had M1A1 tanks but we didn't have a tank retriever that was capable of dealing not only with retrieving M1 tanks, but certainly even towing them.

The 5,000 gallon tankers we had in the main support battalion were not up to the riggers of demand of the battlefield that we found ourselves on in Southwest Asia. Probably not up to the battlefield requirements in Central Europe. We need to get rid of those 5,000 gallon tankers and replace them with HEMTT type vehicles.

I'd get rid of the Cobras — wash the Cobras out of the system as quickly as possible and replace them with armed OH-58 Deltas in the cav squadrons. They are only a daytime system and all they fire are TOWs. I would replace them with unarmed OH-58Ds, quite frankly, because of the night capability.

We need the artillery to be able to keep up with the Bradley/Abrams team. MLRS can do that and that's the way we used MLRS. We used it farther forward than you'd normally think of using it doctrinally and we used it as our immediate weapon to give a little depth to the battle field and to provide immediate fire so we could keep the cannon artillery unloaded and keep it moving because it was slower.

We need GPS. I wouldn't buy a vehicle without it. It is absolutely indispensable and it needs to be in the hands of all leaders down to platoon level.

We absolutely need in our Army an armored gun system that is capable of direct support of ground maneuver forces, and specifically light forces. And we need the multi-purpose light helicopter. We need more of the global positioning satellite systems and we need to continue to enhance our anti-tank capability. We need a manned portable anti-tank capability. We ought to be able to put in the hands of our soldiers something to kill tanks with.

We found ourselves lacking in terms of haul capability and lacking in terms of burying material — mines and things that would be needed in the defense especially.

My surprise was more equipment oriented than organizational. When I went to the division, we were a real mix. I was really set back by that. We had the M1 tank, but we had the 113 plus the Bradley. Yet, we were fielding the AH-64 and we had been modernized except for the Bradley. I found that to be overwhelming. Here we had an active

division that still had the 113, yet, we had reserve component units that were equipped with the Bradley and the M1. The Active Army should not be in that kind of a position.

We have to provide a heaved up HMMWV that affords a certain modicum of protection against small arms. Then we have to provide optics and a self defense system.

The engineers have been the bane of our existence in the heavy division for years and years. Until we get reliable engineer equipment fielded to our Engineer Battalions we are going to continue to have parts problems and headaches. If we were a construction firm, we would go broke.

The biggest concern I had was with the aging of equipment in the Engineer battalion. What I found was a good battalion with good people but struggling with their equipment — everything from bulldozers to river bridges. The equipment within the engineer battalion was my biggest maintenance concern.

● MAINTENANCE

Depot-level Repairable is a maintenance concern that is going to have a very big impact. It is going to be a big problem for a division, especially if it is not adequately funded. That is where we buy at division level all those repairables. I would tell the new division commander coming in, "You better get on top of that. You better understand that because it is going to eat your lunch." He is going to find himself out of money so fast and will be severely criticized for not understanding the program and not managing it correctly.

My main concern in terms of maintenance was aviation methods. I had to devote a lot of attention to aviation maintenance to get it up to standard. That was my main focus because that was the life blood of the light brigade. There are good programs out there. I just reemphasize though, that all those programs must be led by the division commander. You have to take the time and do it.

Maintenance has to be a team effort and everyone has to understand that. As a battalion commander gets up and briefs the vehicle that is over 60 or over 90 days and why's it down — first of all you want to know what has that commander done for himself to get that vehicle off deadline. If the battalion commander has not talked on a daily basis to the support battalion commander then he has not done what he should have done. He should be interested in his maintenance, he should pick up the phone and call his brother down there that's the support battalion guy and they ought to be working as a team.

I found though that it was very important for me personally to get down to the motor pool and to show that one, that I had knowledge of maintenance; and two, that I had very strong interest in

maintenance. Third, I felt that maintenance was training. I emphasized those three things.

Make sure you have the right kind of visibility. You need a guy coming in, your ADC-S, every few days telling you the way things are going. When you have command maintenance on a training schedule, then you know that you are going to be able to get to the leaders who are controlling things to see what is going on. Backbriefs occasionally in the motor parks on service programs.

Certain battalions were spending far more in terms of dollars for repair parts than like battalions with equipment essentially the same age and with the same amount of use on it. I knew immediately what the problem was. That was where you had battalion commanders or their XO's not spending enough time in the motor pool working with PLL clerks to insure the requisition process was supporting the needs of the organization and was not wasteful.

You have to work in an environment where you feel comfortable that it is an environment where you are going to get ground truth back. If you start pushing for statistics, or other things that would cause people to worry about saying it may not be quite like it ought to be, then I think you have flunked your own test right there. This has to have legitimacy and everybody has to be able to say, "Yes, this is broke, but here is how I am going to fix it," and think their way through how they are going to correct the situation.

I think that the division commander ought to be able to exhibit a knowledge of what maintenance is and be visible. Sometimes it is hard to go down and walk through motor pools and kick the tire, but you have to be able to do that. You have to be able to pick up a 2406 and understand what it says.

If you are going to fly, you have to maintain. If you are going to fight with your tanks and Bradleys, you have to maintain them. Maintenance has got to be a way of life. People say maintenance and training — maintenance is training in a heavy unit. The maintenance emphasis should be just as rigorous, or more so, in the field environment as it is in garrison.

If you want to have a maintenance program you do two things. One, you have a training program for your noncommissioned officers and for your soldiers by those NCOs after they are trained that's continuous with regard to PMCS. The second thing you do, is you have high quality service programs. By high quality I mean where a platoon leader knows that when his tank platoon goes in for semiannual service, that every member of the platoon is there.



LEADERSHIP

• TECHNIQUES

At the division level our great responsibility is to provide conditions that allow success, a command climate that provides openness and provides the ability to make honest mistakes and not be career terminating. At the division level you provide guidance for planning.

There is more in common between being a great company commander and a division commander than there are dissimilarities. The only clear difference is the distance you have to see out in front of you. That gets longer at each level of the chain of command and the techniques by which you implement your concept change and get more complicated. The bottom line is, get a notion of what you are doing, articulate the thing, and get moving.

I hold people accountable for meeting standards. I think it is very important that you measure those things that are important because they set your priorities for you. I think measurements or standards are important. I like to see what the scoreboard says. I want to know what is on the scoreboard. We had certain things that we measured within the division. When I implemented these, it made people very, very nervous.

We don't do enough saying "thank you" to soldiers and leaders for what they do. There's too much of being more critical than positive. You have to take time out to put your arm around a soldier, tell him

what a great job he's doing, and pat him on the back. That is what leadership is all about.

It's great to push power down but then once you push the power down you hold the guy you gave the power to accountable.

I learned that you have to make the tough calls for the Army and you have to have a bigger picture. You have to be able to look a battalion commander in his eye and tell him it ain't happening. Not that you are going to fire him, but that he isn't measuring up.

It is very important for a commander to be visible and accessible. If you are visible and accessible, you will create the kind of command climate that you want to create. By being visible, you have to take time to go down and talk to the soldiers where they are. You have to go down and talk to them where they work — motor pools, firing ranges, et cetera.

There are not many things that you can really influence when you get into larger organizations. You need to decide what they are and then you need to set very clearly that is what you want to do and you need to stay on it. Never waver.

Your ability to be effective is very dependent upon your ability to articulate your priorities and to define your intent.

Be calm, be confident, be tough-minded and tough-skinned, don't shout, and get enough sleep because you will only make yourself look like a fool when you are tired and 18,000 people see you. Don't be afraid to expose yourself to your subordinates. By that I mean, tell them about yourself and what turns you on and what turns you off. Be upfront so they know your idiosyncracies.

If you are doing something for the first time, you better be there. If it is something tough, you better be there and be part of it. If it's important, you better pray. Be sure that your presence is required. You have to know when to do that because sometimes your presence hinders initiative and gets in the way. So you have to know when to pull back also. That causes some trust in your commanders.

Guard your schedule jealously. You decide what goes on it and don't let anybody else screw with it. You decide what is important that you go see as the commander and then delegate the others.

The most significant concern I had was that I daily provided the kind of turned on leadership that those great guys deserved. The challenge was to stay out in front of them and try to turn all of their positiveness into a great package that worked. So the challenge was on me more than what I had to do to fix deficiencies.

- **PATIENCE**

A division commander has to be more patient. Things happen slowly in a division. We just can't turn things around over night; you have to let your commanders have the time to lead and you have to be patient and understand that you are not going to get results immediately and you might not get the right ones the first time.

Patience is number one. Number two is making sure that every subordinate understands your intent.

- **TRUST**

You have to have trust your battalion and company commanders to execute the missions you give them, both in peace and war. In executing those you have to give those commanders a latitude to execute them within the context of the mission requirements. In this octopus called a division, one man called the division commander can't reach out and execute every battalion's mission.

Let the brigade commander command his brigade. You are there to provide the right guidance and make sure the overall programs are executed. You should go down and spot check those things to make sure that whatever your philosophy of training, maintenance, or other items are, that those things get executed properly. The difference is that you have to remember that you are the division commander and you have a lot of great guys that are colonels who can handle the job if you give them the mission and turn them loose to go do it. You have to make sure that you have given them proper guidance.

The hardest things I think I had to do was to keep out of the brigade commander's business. I knew what brigade commanders and battalion commanders were supposed to do. I thought based on previous experience that I knew what division commanders were supposed to do, but then all of a sudden I would find myself getting too involved in the brigade commander's business. You have to stay out of there and let them do their job. You have to give them a mission and resources, and then you have to back off.

You are dealing with brigade commanders who have probably 20 plus years of service — very experienced guys who didn't require a great deal of supervision. Not only very experienced, but the cream of the crop, the best we have to offer. The way you deal with those people is different than the way you deal with company commanders, platoon leaders, or noncommissioned officer leaders. What they required was for you to give them a very clear direction, a very clear set of priorities, and a very clear statement of your intent, and then let them go and execute. I tried to do that.

- **CONSISTENCY**

The best division commander I ever saw or ever worked for gave me his priorities when I went in to be a battalion commander and those priorities never changed, they were consistent. I never had to worry about what was important. I knew what was important and what was important today, was important yesterday, and was going to be

important tomorrow. To be consistent and not be continuously changing your priorities are very key to being an effective leader at the division/corps level.

● **INSTRUCTION**

I find it necessary to provide leadership instruction on a daily basis to everybody I talk to, not because I think they needed it, but because I want to give it to them. I am the most experienced soldier in the division. Leadership techniques and things that have worked and backfired for me, I pass on.

I think the greatest leadership instruction that we provide to our subordinates at all levels is one, setting the tone; two, setting the example; and three, providing the understanding to our subordinate commanders and leaders as to what are the expectations.

● **COMBAT SUCCESS**

Those who do not have a strong moral and ethical background and foundation — those people fail. Those who are in it for themselves, who are not tactically and technically competent, who do not know their stuff and are winging it, who can't manage their own time properly, will fail in combat. The easiest place to find out is at CMTC. The guy who can calmly take a disaster and turn it into something less is the guy who you want. Little people get excited about little things.

There is a little bit of a different style of leadership in combat than there is in peacetime. You can make mistakes and so forth while we are learning in peacetime; but when you go to combat, you cannot be an incompetent leader. You cannot sacrifice the lives of the young people entrusted to you because you don't have the personal guts to correct things or because you don't ensure the standard and so forth.

No commander that I took to the desert disappointed me. The ones that I thought would do well, did very well. The ones that I had concern with struggled. The ones that struggled were the ones that had a difficult time in holding people accountable within their organizations. They were the guys who would accept in training not meeting or barely meeting the standard and not holding subordinates accountable when they didn't meet the standard. The people that performed well at Grafenwoehr, the ones that performed well at CMTC, and the ones that had high training and standards in training, the ones that had tough yet caring discipline in their organizations, they were the people who excelled on the battlefield.

● **LOYALTY**

One of the guys used to say that the greatest form of loyalty is questioning. I think he's right. The fact is that if you don't understand and you don't ask the question, then you're not being loyal to your commander. You're certainly being disloyal to the unit because you don't have clear instructions.



ETHICS

● **PERSONAL PHILOSOPHY**

I think it has to do with not only yourself as the individual setting the example but it is an understanding that honestly and integrity as ethical traits within the unit are nonnegotiable. I think through openness you have to encourage leaders at all levels to tell it like it is and do what is right whether somebody is looking at him or not. I think it is leaders at all levels understanding that they don't compromise integrity and you don't put subordinates into ethical dilemmas where they will.

First of all, I think you have to address the things that are ethical issues. You have to tell them upfront that you are going to make the tough calls. You have to talk about what your moral values are and they ought to be realistic.

I never relieved a guy, ever, for OR rates, regardless of how bad. I never relieved a guy for losing every battle at the CMTC, or even for doing stupid things at the CMTC. I did relieve guys for issues of ethics and morals.

If you have subordinate commanders, or a commander who shoots the messenger every time he opens the door, you will find that they don't tell you very much.

Don't set guys up for failure and then make them lie about it to achieve success. Look for the in-depth quality and reward it — not the shiny whistle. Look for the guy who has had his feet firmly planted on the ground and has a solid ethical foundation and not the guy who is whisking through this particular assignment solely for the purpose of gaining self- gratification and ego fulfillment.

As a commander you must be prepared to hear bad news whether you like it or not, because if you are going to be that way, then you're not always going to get a rosy picture. If you get a rosy picture all the time, then you better look inward, because you've got some problems out there that people are fearful of coming up front with.

Warriors don't lie, cheat or steal. That's something you have to preserve. You have to live it and you have to set the example. You also have to create a climate to maintain that warrior ethic.

● CLIMATE

First of all, the division commander has to set the ethical climate in the division. He cannot use his position to influence situations or people or things or activities going on because if he does that.... Sometimes it is very difficult because people who work around a division commander wants to make things happen for him. They want to make them happen right now. So there are great opportunities for unethical behavior, unintentionally.

You cannot have people working for people that have some sort of fear about their careers or fearful that they cannot be honest about it. You have to set the tone of honesty and trust.

The area where I found the biggest problem with ethical issues was in the community organizations. Be very careful what you tell people you want, because you will get what you ask for, whether it is legal, ethical, or moral. So you have to be careful about what you ask for. In the community and installation area there are people who will just go out there and do it and break laws, rules and regulations right and left to impress you that they can get the job done.

It was more an establishing in the various forum that you worked, a clear understanding of your intent. And, making damn sure that everybody knew, regardless of whether you talked about community issues or division issues, that while we all wanted to be as good as we could be, as professional as we could be, it was never to be at the expense of putting anyone in a dilemma of having to make a decision that was unethical or illegal.



FAMILY ACTION

• CHALLENGES

The greatest challenge I had was to get everybody to understand how important the family is to the soldier. The problem with it is to get commanders, the staff, and everybody involved in family matters and teaching them how important it really is and setting the example by being involved yourself.

How do you resolve the concerns of a deploying division off to war for an uncertain period of time? I think it is resolved through a very strong rear detachment at all levels, led by a lieutenant colonel with involvement down to battalion level and a very strong chain of concern. They were the family support issues that presented the greatest challenge to me. The numbers of issues that bubbled up to us in the desert, and we were there for a long period of time, were minimal. So it did work. It worked very well.

• FAMILY ACTION PLANS

I'd tell people that when they take command they need to give serious attention to the family action plans within their organizations. The one word of warning I would give, is don't try to over structure it because each battalion will have different requirements and different styles affecting those plans. I would not be too prescriptive in how you do it, but just insist that there be plans and instill in the leadership a keen awareness of their responsibilities for taking care of families.

All of those family action plans that were so essential became a reality. We decided to put very good people in our rear detachment at every level — company, battalion and brigade. I kept them small, but I kept them quality. I took an incoming battalion commander who was not scheduled to command for another year and made him the division rear detachment commander — a quality guy who was just a great asset to us.

When you are sitting down preparing your family action plans, it is probably important to have some of the spouses there to insure that you are truly thinking about their needs in a comprehensive way. A lot of things that we would never think about are important to them.

• OUTREACH

My predecessor put together a foundation of an outreach program. You have to go out to them; they are not going to come to you. We found problems that we never even knew existed. It doesn't cost a lot to reach them when you look at the results of that outreach.

Our outreach program was under contract. I set up an organization and staffed it with civilian personnel. I used both appropriated and nonappropriated money. We bought our vans with nonappropriated dollars. We got the total community involved along with the hospital.

• SUPPORT


If we believe that we need to train and prepare for war, we ought to carry the logical extent farther, and say also that we have the responsibility to insure that when we go do that mission, our families are well taken care of. And, that we have plans and programs that attend to those critical needs when we do what they ask soldiers to do periodically — and that's go fight our nations battles.

Family issues cannot be ignored as you are focusing on warfighting. I truly believe that the caring end of commanders responsibility also must focus on our family population. Preparation of families before one of these deployments is critical to success.

Get visible, go talk to groups, wives group. Go out and get involved with the community. Be visible in the PXs and the commissaries, the things that make a difference in peoples lives. Listen to the groups in your community. Especially keep the wives groups informed.

Having a system of good information flow through the chain of command and insuring that the information got out to families correctly is very important. The rumor mill can cause problems that don't even exist.

Unless you make sure that you have a pro-active training system for family support group leaders and that your commanders understand their total responsibility for that, it is going to reach up and bite you about every five minutes.



INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT

● PREPARATION

I was very ill-prepared to be a community commander. I had to rely very heavily on JAG officers to make sure that not only what I did was right and proper in terms of taking care of my soldiers, but, for example, in the contracting arena, was in fact legal and within the guidelines of regulations and other laws. My experience leaves me to one very simple conclusion — we don't prepare people for that business and we need to prepare them for it.

When they go out to Leavenworth to the Pre-command Course, have the Leavenworth guys get experts from the Army to talk to them. Divisions commanders, for example, going out to command a post could sit down with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installation Logistics, Mrs. Livingston, and get her insights. Talk to Major General Hatch, the Chief of Engineers, particularly about the environmental concerns that the Army is facing and what that commander is going to find when he gets out there and about the laws that he is bound to in this area of environment.

I think prospective division commanders must get themselves up to speed in installation management. They have to have a good feel for the environment, not only inside the components of the Army installation, but outside. You have to be proactive on things; know what is going on and find a management tool that lets you know what

is going on. You have to manage those things, some things you manage by exception, but there are some critical things you manage. you yourself as division commander keep your finger on the pulse.

- **SCHOOLING**

The first thing I would do is to send them to the Installation Management Course. I think that is a pretty good course. It gets them off on the right foot. If you are not careful, you can do an awful lot of damage with your own ignorance. So you really need to understand how installations operate and you need to understand it before you take orders if you haven't had that experience.

I believe the course at Ft. Lee is an absolute for all commanders with installation management responsibilities.

- **CAREER FIELDS**

Because the installation business is becoming so sophisticated, we probably need to go to centralized command for deputy post commanders or garrison commanders. Let them stay in the troop business up through the grade of senior captain or major and then start moving them into installation management jobs as majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels and have a separate OPM field above the grade of captain.

- **RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT**

A large concern is simply the dollars and the resourcing to upgrade aging facilities, from motor pools to barracks and swimming pools to theaters. There is a maintenance repair requirement to take care of facilities such as family housing and so forth. You then couple that with Class I environmental requirements that must be paid by law. Some of these bills are enormous. For instance, we had to shut down one of our theaters for almost a year until we could get the asbestos out which cost lots of dollars to do so.

- **PLANNING**

You have to get in on the planning early. When they start the design phases, you have to be in on it. Don't let them produce a 95 percent design of a project and then bring it to you; it's too late. You have to get the community involved. If you are doing an officers club, you need to get a council put together so that they can feel some sense of ownership, that you can get ideas from them that meets the community needs. It gives them a sense of importance and a good feeling about their community.

- **COMMUNITY
IMPACT**

Your impact on the surrounding community is far more than you think initially. Your communications with the leaders of the surrounding community will be extremely tenuous at first. Their antenna will be up trying to understand what you are going to do, because it effects their total existence. They are more concerned about your policies and actions than your soldiers, because it effects their pocketbook and their lifestyle and daily functioning as much, if not more so in many ways, as it does yours. As you deal with that, be very attuned to meeting and listening and as you start to do things, make sure you understand the impact.