


DIVISION COMMAND LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAM



**EXPERIENCES IN DIVISION COMMAND
1994**

FOREWORD

The Division Command Lessons Learned Program was created to ensure those “lessons learned” by our field commanders are captured for use by current and future leaders. Since inception, the program has provided senior commander insights into our profession by selecting and compiling quotes into an annual collection of thoughts about the art and practice of command. This collection, like its predecessors, contains no “recipes,” but it is a valuable point of departure for both practitioners and students of the art of command.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Paul E. Blackwell", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

PAUL E. BLACKWELL
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations and Plans

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NOTE: The following quotes, selected from Division Command Lessons Learned interviews, have been edited to improve coherence and continuity. Statements of opinion and interpretation have not been changed. Specific references to units, installations, and other distinctive information have been excised.

COMMAND PREPARATION

RECOMMENDATIONS

My advice is to be very, very proficient, very knowledgeable of Army doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

I would tell the division commander you have to read and be a functional expert in FMs [Field Manuals] 25-100 and 101. The most important thing I could tell my replacement is know FMs 25-100 and 25-101 inside, outside -- read them and follow them. The other thing I would say is ensure standards are clear. We redid 350-1 to establish gunnery standards. You need to establish training standards in training. However, you don't need artificial standards, you need the Army standards.

I would do three things. I would go to a BCTP [Battle Command Training Program] War Fighter exercise. I would go to the NTC [National Training Center] and watch a rotation. And I would go to TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command] and get a briefing on the future, what's coming on, what's going on in the Army, what are the winds of change that are following on.

If you are reading this and you've just been designated as a division commander, make it clear to the current division chief of staff and to the sergeant major that you want to retain the option of bringing in someone else. I did that, and they are professional enough to understand that. They should volunteer to leave unless you want them to stay.

I haven't spent probably as much time as I should have really understanding what intelligence systems were all about, how they served the division, and what's going on in that arena. So fairly early in command I went to Fort Huachuca, in fact, went out there with the corps commander and the other division commanders from the corps and spent a bunch of time poking around. That was very helpful because there are a lot of things going on in the intel business that you need to understand as a division commander if you are going to fight your outfit, if you are going to train it, and if you are going to stay up with the force modernization because stuff's moving pretty fast in that arena.

Talk to those guys who have just come out of division command. It's important you read the after action reports on the interviews of the commanders who preceded you in that division you're going to command.

I guess I would say that you have to be very selective in what you focus on in preparing for division command.

REFLECTIONS

The most surprising thing about division command was that I found it initially difficult to just wander around the division, get a feel for what was going on, watch training, and be left alone to do that. Leaders just don't like the division commander to stand around and watch.

In an ideal world, it would be great to notify people 90 to 120 days prior to the time they are going to command a division. I don't mean this as a slam against the personnel system and in no way should it be perceived that way. What I mean is, I think it's very important to have the time prior to assuming command to focus on preparation. In my case, I had about 30 days notification. I would have liked to have had about three or four months. Then I could have done some studying, I could have received the division 350-1, I could have read the appropriate... FMs.

Surprisingly what paid off the best for me were all the other experiences I'd had and was able to call on.

I think one of my biggest challenges as a division commander -- as alluded to earlier -- and as an installation manager, was the wise use of my time.

The single biggest document in preparation to help me was this division command studies program. I received the packet and read it very carefully. I also received the interviews of two division commanders in front of me.

I don't want this to sound egotistical, but there were no surprises. I had been a division chief of staff, brigade commander, and division G3 [Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations]. I tried to stay in touch with my contemporaries and seniors who were in division command, so I don't think there were any surprises.

To me there needs to be dedicated time available for the division commander designee to devote himself to preparation, if at all possible. What I would have done more of if I had that time was personally sit down with more ex-division commanders, particularly those who had just come out of division command.

I had, for whatever reason, the right kind of assignments over the years, and most specifically general officer assignments, that sort of prepared me as adequately as possible for division command. Having served as the ADC [Assistant Division Commander] for support and maneuver..., I had a pretty good feel of the diversity of the requirements associated with command. I don't think there was anything that I would have preferred to have had in terms of prior experience.

What I was not as well prepared to work through were matters related to environmental challenges in inactivating a division and closing an installation; issues connected to property transfer and the federal laws associated with claimants, rights, and opportunities; and problems tied directly to the disposition of government property used by installations and TDA [tables of distribution and allowances] and MTO&E [modified tables of organization and equipment] organizations.

INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT

The most surprising fact actually was and is my responsibility as the installation commander. Even though I had read extensively that installation management was a major responsibility, I didn't appreciate how major it was.

The one area that I lacked expertise in, despite having served as community commander for two communities and being involved a lot in the garrison side, was in the installation operation business. I would have preferred to have gone to the Installation Manager's Course prior to coming to division command. In fact, I think it ought to be mandatory. I find that somewhere between 40 to 50 percent of my time is consumed by the installation.

I wish I had known more about installation management than I did, but the Army has yet to produce an installation management course that is worth a damn. I think there may still be a run being made to fix it, but the installation management course, as currently delivered, doesn't give you what you need to be really smart about installation management. You can go to Fort Lee and go through some installation management training, but basically it's sort of a visiting fireman lecture system where they bring people in to talk about various parts of installation management. What you really need is the Harvard Business School approach where you do case studies and work solutions in small groups to really get into the nuts and bolts around the installation.

I would liked to have gone to Fort Lee and spent time banging around there and learning more about installation management. While I was semi-prepared for installation management, having been a division/installation chief of staff, I would have liked to have received the same sort of academic and practical orientation that I think I could have received in the installation management course.

I would liked to have talked to about half a dozen of those colonels who were running installations, in effect running them for generals like myself.

TRAINING

GUIDANCE/PHILOSOPHY

I have a philosophy of training that's predicated on my NTC background and BCTP experience. I start by laying out the basic propositions of what fighting is all about, and I work backwards into the training for it. What I say about fighting is that only soldiers can win battles. The leadership can lose or set conditions for success, but the leadership itself doesn't win the fight.

I learned something about four months ago which is probably the most important thing I have learned during my whole tenure in this division and in the Army. We say train as you intend to fight. That's an incomplete statement and I finally figured it out. What it really says is, train as you intend to fight, but intend to fight as you trained. What that says is, you've got to make sure that the training process that you go through in preparation for fighting revolves around a common understanding of each other.... There is no battalion that does everything perfectly. The successful commander in employing units knows what the strengths and weaknesses of each battalion are and is able to optimize that. That's one piece of it. The second piece of it is you can't train one way, and the day that you deploy do it another way. I found out when I deployed a battalion task force to Somalia, that a number of people were nondeployables based on personnel deployment guidelines.... I said, "Unacceptable. All of them are going to go. We're going to deploy just as we have trained. Then we will sort it out when we get over there." That's exactly what we did. If you had a PCS [permanent change of station] coming up, that's tough; you're going to Somalia and then we'll figure out what you are going to do. I think we as an Army have to come to grips with that. We cannot destabilize crews as we are rapidly projecting our combat power to a theater of operation. Never can we allow that to happen again.... I just sent them all and then we figured it out. It worked out fine.

We needed a common basis of understanding. We reworked the training systems of the division to a clear focus and a clear compatibility with FM 25-101. So my requirement within six months was to redo the division regulation 350-1, Training Management. That brought it in line with FM 25-101. FM 25-101 became the "Bible of Training Management." We got pretty good during the first year in terms of planning. We have yet to get where we need to be in execution.... The key point in terms of training is to use the training system of the Army.

Don't try to get fancy. Stick with the basics. That's part of your articulation of your training principles.

I used the NTC as the capstone replacement for the ARTEP [Army Training and Evaluation Program] in the division. We've done no EXTEVs [external evaluations], no ARTEPs since I have been here. No ARTEPs at the battalion level and above, or even at company level. The reason we haven't is we don't have enough time; we don't have enough money; and we don't have enough training area to do it.

It's very important that you articulate to the entire division your training guidance after you're in command a comfortable period of time. I would not advise just accepting what has been put out as 350-1 type guidance, having some subordinates work it a little bit, and then re-signing it. I have seen that done and I think that's a disservice. It's a very personal thing for a division commander to develop that training guidance, as we have been teaching in our pre-command courses.

You need to thoroughly articulate verbally, and in writing, what you consider the unit mission\division mission to be. You need to articulate what your vision is of the division as it proceeds the next two to five years.

Stick to the basics; keep it simple. The less complicated and the more clear you are in expressing what you expect in the area of training and the more consistent it is with Army doctrine, the more successful you're going to be.

Philosophically my focus is that the key to success in a division is to put trained platoons on the battlefield and synchronize that effort at battalion and brigade. That being the case, then the focus is training.

The best guidance to your subordinates would be freedom to fail at training. We should be training to learn; we are training to grow. You may have new people, new facilities, new equipment, new environment, new weapons maybe, people who don't understand tactics, techniques, and procedures as thoroughly as they should. So with good preparation, you take them out and train them hard, and if it doesn't work out the way it is supposed to, that's all right. We learn from it.

There's a tremendous value in putting out paper products; they are good references to be sure. But very often they are not always read, and they don't always get distributed to the lowest level. So when you sit eye to eye with first sergeants, sergeants major, captains, and lieutenant colonels -- in other words, your commanders, your key players in those organizations -- you can clear the air on a particular subject.

ASSESSMENT

When you give them guidance, make sure they understand it. Then you have to check. Not so much on the brigade commanders. My experience is that they understand, but when you go down and see a battalion or company, and you do your sampling (your field time when you go out there and try to see how it is going, or you get feedback from your ADCs), you may be surprised to find what battalions are focusing on.

Get on the ground everyday for some period of time and watch somebody in your division training.

TECHNIQUES

The training technique that I most favor is high resolution lane training. High resolution means the chain of command is involved in the lane training. It's done by the chain of command.... The key to the lane training methodology is the leader preparation upfront, then rigorous attention to crawl-walk-run, and then the AARs [after action reviews].

When I arrived at the division and looked at how they were training, what I decided was that the method (lane training), what this division calls an eight-step training model, is probably the best way that I know of to go about training units for combat. It focuses on making sure the leaders know their job before you get involved in training soldiers. That, in fact, is the wrong way to think about it, I've come to believe. In fact, what we need to do is probably spend about 80 percent of our time planning and preparing for training, and then about 20 percent of our time on high quality, short duration, high intensity execution where the leaders know what they're doing; you get all the right resources out there; you focus on the process; you do it again if it's done wrong; and you do very high quality AARs that involve everybody. When you do, you don't have bored soldiers and they don't lose confidence in our leaders because the leaders know what they are doing. And the product is far superior.

What we're focused on is acquisition of skills at the small unit collective level and at the individual level in a semi-controlled learning environment, so that if those skills are not acquired, it's readily apparent and you can go back and reacquire the skills.

I undercut multi-echelon training. I'm not a believer in multi-echelon training as axiomatic within battalions. I do believe it is possible to train the division staff without impacting on crews and platoons. In that sense, yes, you can do multi-echelon training, but I think too much can be made of this concept,

because a quarterback can't coach the football team and play on it at the same time. You have to have the coach out there watching. Too often in the Army we take the multi-echelon training to the extreme that we don't have the chain of command present to really set the standards for the training or to do the teaching. I undercut multi-echelon training somewhat in the battalions. I told them to focus, slow down, set a reasonable standard of what they are looking for, and then work.

I believe the technique which is most effective for training a division is to focus on platoons and companies, and use a system that front-end loads a lot of time into planning and preparation, especially into training leaders. Any other way to do it is wasteful, because if you put soldiers on the ground with leaders who are not well trained and where we haven't thought out the training, we spend too much time flailing around. We don't accomplish very much, and we waste a lot of resources.

It's my experience that the requirement for training dollars seldom is as high as people believe it to be. In particular, the benefits of high-level exercises in the field are much overstated, so I was very confident in my battalions going to NTC without any battalion-level maneuver at home station.

The other thing is a commander's conference. In a period of dwindling resources some may feel taking the leadership of the division and incoming commanders of the division away... for two or three days is an expense you can't afford. I will tell you it's an expense that you can't not afford, because I think it is very important that you set the focus, the tone, and the direction of what's going on and have this time to reflect and to sort of reblue or refocus.

We need to do a better job of managing crews. It's not something the Army has to do, it is something I have to do. I'm pretty comfortable where we've gotten in managing crews. I've now changed the DRB [Division Ready Brigade] briefing as a result of what I learned in Somalia, so I get a formalized briefing by crew of every crew that's within the division ready brigade and their status. We know that they are going to be there for the duration of the DRB because we built it that way to start with. It's a management program and a very difficult problem. We have to work through it.

DIVISION COMMAND AND CONTROL

I think you have to train three areas in the division command and control. I think you ought to work the physical setup of command posts and command vehicles. I think you have to work the staff coordination and processes, and I think you have to work the commander's decision-making processes.

I think what I would tell my successor would be, you need to stay on a CPX [command post exercise] program that gets you to the field on a quarterly basis and continues to work the warfighting skills, the command and staff process, and interaction between the echelons of command.

We got the division headquarters to the field. The chief [Chief of Staff] was religious in doing what we call TOCXs [Tactical Operations Center Exercises], getting the TOCs [Tactical Operations Centers] out, making sure the guys still knew how to put the camouflage nets up, setting the vehicles where they were supposed to be, hooking the comms up, and those things.

DISTRACTORS

A lot of this turmoil is being done by the lower units. I sound terrible when I say that, though I found it to be the case also when I was a battalion commander. I can't add any illuminating comments other than I think the battle cry of "training distractors" has become institutionalized now.

You have to get your IG [Inspector General] looking at the training distractors. You have to take perhaps some special look-see inspections with the IG.

You have to get on the installation side of the house and ask them to tell you what they think the training distractors are.

I think that every time I looked hard at any level from battalion commander up, most training distractors are generated at the lowest level. Any survey that is done on training distractors that I am aware of always finds that the majority of the distractors are created at the battalion level or below as opposed to above.

We never think about our own stuff as distractors. It's the guy above us that's providing the distractors.

DOCTRINE

PREPARATION

I think if he has not recently been to NTC, he needs to get out to NTC. He needs to get out to JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center]. He needs to spend time at Fort Leavenworth talking to the right people out there.

I found it necessary to study on a continuous basis. I keep the manuals out, get into some kind of discussion with somebody, end that discussion, come back in here at some later date, pull the manual out, go back and read what the manual says about a particular part of the doctrine, think about it, and see if I understand it, and just stay in it. I don't think you can ignore that. I think the Army has a reasonable warfighting doctrine, and, generally speaking, I think that everybody sort of understands it.

You must truly understand the task, conditions, and standards associated with the METL [Mission Essential Task List] for those organizations. In other words, you really do need to understand what you are asking squads and platoons or sections and detachments to do.... It's fine for the senior commander to understand the broader issues, and of course, that's critical. But for him to truly understand the readiness and capability of his organization, he must understand what is taking place when he gives the order at the top for soldiers at the bottom and what they are trying to accomplish.

One of the things I do is before I do a division level operations order, I tend to go back and look over the manuals again and just make sure I covered the necessary guidance, and so forth, in the field manuals. FM 71-100: Division Operations in particular. I think that's appropriate.

TEACHING/INSTRUCTING

I think the BCTP seminars are really effective. That's a great leveling experience. You get your staff there and you've got the "gurus of doctrine." They talk and everybody either questions or concedes, but you go away with a common understanding.

I think it is always necessary for doctrine to be taught by somebody in your organization, whether it's the kind of thing we're doing this morning -- a brown bag lunch where key members of the team talk about the offense or the defense -- or whether it's standing on a hill somewhere talking with a platoon leader about how he fights his platoon. That has always got to be going on.

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

I think we have a good doctrine for fighting a heavy division as a part of a corps or independently.

I think the Army has lost its perspective on the types of infantry that are currently in the inventory. I think Army leaders and most soldiers are very clear on what mechanized infantry does. But the subject of the light infantry, ranger infantry, parachute infantry, and air assault infantry have melded together and people do not recognize distinctive properties, capabilities, and vulnerabilities that these four distinctive infantries possess.

As I look at the challenges for the Army of the future, the humanitarian piece and "operations other than war," that is where I see the doctrinal dilemma. We do not have a clearly articulated base line or point of departure for how we do operations other than war, and should operations other than war be a METL task, and so forth. I personally say it should not be. But I think there are some doctrinal voids that we need to deal with in that area.

We need more work at the low end of the spectrum -- peacekeeping, peace enforcement. It's become a growth industry now and we are catching up. There was a woeful shortcoming. You'd see it in JRTC.

I still think the Army has a problem with light infantry doctrine.

I will say that we need to continually practice the combined Army training concept with the light infantry. JRTC is important, and I'm glad to see that it is refocusing now on PKO [peacekeeping operations] type operations and on contingency operations.

ROLE OF DIVISION COMMANDER

As a division commander, be a player in this doctrine development thing through battle labs or whatever it may be, but it is important that you be in the game.

Be involved with your branch school. Develop a personal relationship with the branch chief of infantry, armor, field artillery, whatever it may be.

I think the division commander needs to keep his head in the doctrinal business on a continuous basis, read the manuals, think about it, and have a professional development program in the division that gets at that. I think typically how you do that is to focus on your division or corps BCTP, and that focuses you on the doctrinal issues that you need to be working in the division, keeps your head in the game, and keeps you current.

ORGANIZATION

PREPARATION

Become extremely familiar with the organization of your division, the equipment, the organization of your unit, the equipment within that unit and how that equipment and organization and the most precious resource on the battlefield -- people -- all interact together to accomplish the mission.

You have to get the TO&E [table(s) of organization and equipment] out, and you have to go to school and understand the organization of your division inside and out. That's not easy if you are not currently in that division.... I think one of your primary focus items needs to be -- when you get into command and you go around and you talk to brigade commanders and separate battalion commanders -- to understand how they are organized, equipped, and manned....

TO&E ISSUES/CHALLENGES

I would say if you have TO&E problems, then go through the MTOE process, don't start doing BMM [borrowed military manpower] or TDD [troop division duty] positions in order to fix something. If it's broken, fix the system in terms of going in with the recommended MTOE change.

Too many of my battalions of a similar nature have different MTOEs and that causes us problems. It generates a lot of lateral transfers. There is a fixed cycle; the fixed cycle is slow and outdated, and in some cases it just gives you a lot of erroneous information.

If there was a surprise in the TO&E business, it was the fact that all over the Army there is a lot of ad hoc force modernization and adjustment of organizations going on that impacts on the division. As an example, some time ago Europe decided to do away with the Echo companies, take them out of the structure. When you do that, you break the MOS [military occupation specialty] and you cause ripple effects across the whole Army.

What I would say is, commanders tend to like to beef up the headquarters company and you ought not let them do that. You need to keep the infantrymen and the tankers and the artillerymen in the platoons and in the squads and in the crews where they belong, because they are the people who do the fighting on the battle field. I've said, "No headquarters company at battalion level will exceed 105 percent strength."

The only real modification issue that came up during my command and tenure was very basic, and that was, as we went down in strength, we saw rifle squad strength come down. Some of the commanders wanted to formally zero out the squads or formally zero out platoons, and I denied that.

AVIATION

In our desire to form an aviation brigade, we cheated around the edges of that TO&E. We have a very austere maintenance structure and then under-filled it because the Army does not have enough aviation maintenance people. So you are operating right on the margin in terms of being able to keep airplanes flying. The aviation community has gone after that and supposedly is going to fix it. They are supposed to beef the structure up, eventually get an aviation support battalion, which is probably a good idea and that will fix it, but it was tough in 1993. These are two places where TO&Es, I think, are really in bad shape in the heavy divisions.

I stood up an aviation support battalion. We are starting to -- and I think the approval has been completed now -- finalize the organization of a support battalion in the aviation brigade. Each maneuver brigade has a forward support battalion -- you need the same kind of capability with the aviation brigade. It works.

If you are trying to build an air ground team in your divisional cavalry you have Cobra helicopters and OH-58 Charlies, and you don't have any night capability. So you have an air capability but you only have it there in the daylight. That's a problem, not a surprise, but it sure is a problem.

ENGINEER

The engineer brigade's TO&E is broken because when you build a new organization, what always happens is, you start getting into trade-offs. You want the organization, you can't afford all its spaces, so you start cheating around the edges of it to make it happen. If you look at an engineer brigade, you are going to find that in spaces. The idea of having an engineer battalion that you can line up with each of your maneuver brigades is a great idea. The idea of having a small engineer brigade headquarters that will focus on that effort is a great idea. The price for putting that organization together is, for example, in a battalion which probably has the greatest variety of heavy equipment in the division, you have no BMO [Battalion Maintenance Officer]. The maintenance structure of that engineer brigade and battalion is broken, absolutely broken. The lack of a BMO is a classic example. You have nobody down there focusing on the

maintenance effort in the engineer battalions. I think that TO&E is in bad shape and needs an Army-level fix.

INTELLIGENCE

One of the major deficiencies in the light infantry unit is to "see deep." Every brigade commander -- to include myself when I was a brigade commander -- wanted to have his own HUMINT [human intelligence] collectors out there in the battlefield. I support it 100 percent, but we can't afford it.

CAVALRY

If you don't have tanks in the cavalry, you probably have to task organize to put them in the cavalry for many missions. Therefore, it makes sense to have them there by TO&E rather than have to take them away from one of your other organizations to put into the division cavalry.

Getting a cavalry squadron with tanks in it is wonderful.

INSTALLATION/DIVISION STAFF REALIGNMENT

I have just realigned the division and installation staffs. The reasons are rapid deployment and force projection. I have to be able to unplug the division from the installation, and leave no tentacles that append this division to the installation. At the same time, I have to leave... a capability to continue to do post, camp, and station functions and become a regional mobilization site for Reserve and National Guard follow-on forces.... So I took the garrison commander and made him the commander of headquarters command, gave him O6-level command authority to include special court, etc., and stood him up as the commander of headquarters command with his own staff, a TDA organization of about 30 people. I put under him the law enforcement command, and those other organizations that become post, camp, and station activities when we deploy.

EQUIPMENT

PREPARATION

My feeling would be to immediately, upon assumption of command, ask logistics assistance representatives and division G4 [Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics] reps, to profile for you recurring problems that they had experienced with major items of equipment. This will make you aware of where your problems have been and whether they have been reconciled.

MODERNIZATION/FIELDING NEW EQUIPMENT

The right way to field new equipment is total package fielding. The Army knows that. It just doesn't do that all the time. You have to spend personnel resources to have somebody in the G3 shop watching force modernization, building the plans for hand-off, fielding, and all that. That's probably the most important thing. Pay the people resource bill to have somebody in charge of that system. If you do that, then you can keep track of it. If you don't do that, you can lose visibility pretty fast, and all of a sudden have some big fielding issue pop up on the screen as a 10-meter target when you would like to be able to address it at 300 meters.

We had a little glitch in our total modernization effort until we put one guy in charge. Nothing new, put someone in charge of everything. The older you get and the more senior you get, the more you realize that if you don't put somebody in charge, it won't happen regardless of how much you want it to happen. It will happen because you designate someone to make it happen. In my case, I pinned the tail on the ADC-S [Assistant Division Commander-Support] and he started conducting IPRs [In Progress Reviews].

If you have old stuff, and the Army says you ought to have new stuff, then you have to fight to get the new stuff.

Everything I know about digitizing, everything that I've seen in it, I think is absolutely on the right track. Moving information around the battlefield rapidly, being able to connect up all the different sensors, whether they're people or overhead satellite platforms, or whatever, and getting that data rapidly to commanders are absolutely on the right track.

I don't like the cascading of materiel sets downward. What I'll tell you is that Department of the Army grossly underestimates the degree of difficulty of the cascades.

I haven't found anything that's any particular problem in introducing the new equipment. It's getting rid of the old equipment that's so hard. And what's most successful in terms of getting rid of the old equipment is to have the unit that is going to take it on hand and examining the equipment on a daily basis, signing for that piece of equipment on a daily basis, and then just a full time focus on doing the work.

MAINTENANCE

You have to get out and walk around the division, because the information about the materiel issues doesn't come to you in reports. You have to talk to people when you first come in. Then when you identify a problem, you have to put someone on it to bird dog it, either a commander or ADC. And it can be done.

The most significant maintenance-related concern, I would say, was the aviation maintenance posture. I didn't understand this initially, but it took about three months in the division for me to recognize that we weren't meeting the Army's maintenance standards for mechanics' utilization.

I would say that you have to continue to work excess; maybe not so much Class VII anymore. I sort of have that about whipped in terms of major pieces of equipment. You have to watch the excess in terms of Class I and lateral transfers which will continue to eat your lunch. You have to make sure that with your MTOE changes people don't have things they aren't authorized.

I think that you have to have a compliance inspection system. I talked about issuing guidance and having a system to follow up. We are doing that now. I have a one-day, no notice, compliance inspection on vehicle maintenance. There are four parts to it; operator PMCS [preventive maintenance checks and services] abilities, personnel supervisor abilities, tool accountability, and training program.... My predecessor had one, but it had gone into suspended animation because of a shortage of personnel. So I didn't pick it back up until I saw that we had a need for it. I sharpened the focus.... Units still probably see it as threatening if they fail, but we had to do something on what was clearly a major shortcoming.

ENGINEER

In the engineer brigade, we have major problems with the AVLB [Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge] and CEV [Combat Engineer Vehicle] -- old equipment, low-density, old chassis, not compatible, not common to the other tracked chassis in the division. We don't have all that we are supposed to have, and we are having a hell of a time maintaining them based on the age of

the fleet and the maintainers that we have in that organization.

We have to do some things to get rid of the CEV, which I don't use anymore. We have to replace that with a M-1 Breacher. We have to make the M9 ACE [armed combat earthmover] more reliable. I don't know if it's a training problem or what, but we struggle a lot with keeping M9 ACE operational.

AVIATION

With the loss of the 58 Delta, and the fact that we have Cobras and 58 Charlies, we have the cavalry squadron without any night eyes in the air. That's a problem for us.

NIGHT VISION EQUIPMENT

We fielded HMMWVs [high mobility, multi-purpose wheeled vehicle] into scout platoons in our tank and Bradley battalions and turned in the Bradleys. That has been a matter of some debate around the Army. The problem right now is that we don't have the thermal imagery, so you have a scout out there who has lost the ability to see at night that you had with the Bradley. That is an equipment concern. UAS-11 [Universal Acquisition System] is the thermal viewer. It is out there in the future somewhere, but not in the immediate future. So we are struggling with how to let our scouts see at night at ranges that they used to be able to when they had the Bradley.

READINESS

PREPARATION

I think it's important -- consistent with my previous comments -- that you understand the big picture. So you need to sit down with the Chief, and he'll do that with you. You need to talk to the Vice Chief. You need to talk to the DCSOPS [Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans]. You need to go in to DCSOPS and talk to the readiness people and understand what's going on in today's environment as the Army competes with the other services for resources so that you can be supportive.

ASSESSMENTS

The first time I looked at the division USR [unit status report] and then had a chance to walk around a little bit to get a feel for it, I think it was an accurate reflection of where the division was in terms of readiness.

Probably the most honest appreciation for readiness issues could best be gained by a battalion commander, brigade commander, or division commander going to the NTC or the JRTC and just watching what the units do, and then sitting through a series of after action critiques at the squad, platoon, company, and battalion levels.

The readiness was fine. The division had had the highest operational readiness of any heavy division for seven or eight months. It has continued on now for the last 18 months. I think the programs were in place and I would have expected that....

REPORTING

First of all, you do have to put a lot of attention into your USRs. They are read. They are important to the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the USR has to be personally tooled by the division commander.

I believe that there probably is a fairly honest appreciation at battalion level for the real readiness posture of the organization. There is an inclination, I think, to believe that we are able to do more to a higher standard than is actually the case.

I don't think that the business of assessing readiness as trained, practiced, and untrained is well understood. There is a tremendous amount of subjectivity associated with a unit commander placing T, P, or U during a quarterly training brief or during a personal assessment.

The division had equipment shortages. The division developed personnel shortages due to decisions beyond our control and really beyond the Department of the Army's control. So a lot of my time and attention was devoted to telling the readiness story at Headquarters Department of the Army, at DCSOPS, AMC [Army Materiel Command], with the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army to ensure that they were not relying on our USR.

ISSUES/CHALLENGES

In terms of training the round-up brigade.... Hang on for a FORSCOM [Forces Command] summer and expect that you will have a readiness degradation of your own forces during the summertime period. I am now well over 100 units that I have to provide TAM [The Assessment Model], or in some cases, 1-R related training and evaluation. Those numbers of units impact on my own unit training programs.... I am already making composite teams, taking my staff, taking people I have available in the installation, and integrating them into packages so I can meet the numbers that we have. It is totally out of control.

I think the Army has to come to terms with the real impact of force modernization. Modernization issues are antithetical to good training because what often happens is that you cannot forecast the arrival of the items that are going to be presented for modernization.

The one maintenance issue I was most conscious of when I took command was aviation maintenance. I knew it was in tough shape across the Army, and I found it in tough shape here. Not because people weren't working hard, but because we were very, very short, and continue to be short, of aviation maintenance people.

I told the aviation brigade commander that he had the absolute authority to stand down if he believed he needed to stand down to stay safe. In other words, not to put anything in the air that he was not sure was safe to fly. I also told him that he needed to have, as opposed to be chasing the DA [Department of the Army] standard for OR [operational readiness] rate, in his head a sort of a computation that says, if I only get 50 percent of the people that I'm supposed to have in the maintenance arena, then what's a reasonable OR rate for me to be pursuing? So he just wasn't beating his head against the wall in terms of what could be done with the number of people resources he had.

The depot level repairable business changed how maintenance is done. It became one of more diagnostics and fixing and repairing than it was swapping out. This depot level repairable business is big bucks, \$51 million in 1994 for the division. It is complicated in terms of maintenance support with the drawdown of civilian strength and the reduction of base operations funding at

the installation level. At the time we brought about the depot level repairable business, we also started under-funding base operations at the installation level. I understand why. Therefore, I had to work very hard to ensure that my DOL [Directorate of Logistics] was capable of doing the diagnostics and repair of components rather than sending them back to depot. We operate on margin right now in terms of our capability. The DOL does not have the people they need in order to do their job. Same thing is true with the DEH [Directorate of Engineering and Housing].

You have to watch the ASL [authorized stockage list]. You have to take a hard look at your funding for the FY [Fiscal Year] relative to your authorized stockage levels. Over the last 18 to 20 months, we have gone from standardized PLL [Prescribed Load List] to demand supported PLL. That's the right thing to do.... The ASL is also demand supported right now; however, you are building ASLs -- I'm not talking iron mountains -- associated with deployments.... What you have to do is to get back the other piece of that, the credits that you can generate.

DEPLOYMENTS/FORCE PROJECTION

We needed to do some work in terms of clearly packaging our rapid deployment capability, making sure that everything within the community and installation supported that capability, and then we needed to go forth and articulate what we offered to the Army in terms of that ability.

FIELD OPERATIONS

ISSUES

The limiting factor in effective field command has been hardware. We have a great communication system in MSE [mobile subscriber equipment]. We have a great FM [frequency modulated] system now with SINCGARS [single-channel ground and radio system], but we are dragging around a MCS [maneuver control system] on the battlefield that is archaic. It's hard to train on, it's too big, and too cumbersome. But the Army hasn't been able to deliver on its long-term promise to give us some kind of system that we can talk with each other on the battlefield echelon to echelon, exchange graphics, exchange text, work the command and staff process, and fight the battle.

SIMULATION/CPX/FTX BALANCE

There is a lot of time where your equipment and soldiers are either deploying or preparing to deploy. You have to balance that against field training at the division level. I think when you have division directed exercises that it's almost counterproductive if you aren't careful.

It's an awesome experience to put a mechanized division on a table top which will extend 110 kilometers long by over 30 kilometers wide. I'm not sure you have to do that to exercise command and control. It appears to me that the CPX piece works very well.

I have no desire to maneuver or to put in the field anything above a brigade level in terms of full-up, and I have no desire to maneuver anything more than a battalion at this installation. Because when you go to the NTC or when you go wherever, I think you can make all of the parts come together. It's the echelonment of training.

I can, through simulations, maximize and optimize simulations to train battalion staffs, to train brigade commanders and brigade staffs, to train division commanders and division staffs. I can integrate that maneuver training at company level with simulations training at battalion and above. It works at the National Training Center.

DIVISION COMMAND AND CONTROL

I would say at division level be doctrinally correct in the use of your CP [command post]. You'll find that rear CP, main CP, and TAC [tactical] CP of this division are straight out of the Leavenworth doctrinal manuals in terms of the organization. I totally redesigned the command post to be doctrinally correct. I have an assault CP that isn't doctrinally correct because the Army hasn't come to grips with the need for an assault CP, but it is a valid need. I have an air command post which is a UH-60 with a console. I would say, go study them, look at how you may need -- since command is personal -- to fine-tune, but don't get away from the doctrinal base of your main, your rear, and your TAC. I think that's very important.

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

FOCUS/PHILOSOPHY

I think that most of the learning by subordinates comes through watching how their superiors operate, through good solid leadership on the job, through listening to their sergeants, and learning from soldiers.

The most important job a commander has is the training and development of his subordinates. I believe that. That briefs good and sounds good, but I truly believe that. I have tried to work several things. I think it is my job to make my brigade commanders, my ADCs, and my primary staff, winners and successful people. The same thing applies to my battalion commanders. The technique I try to use, first of all, is frequent discussions. Every time we talk about something, there is an aspect of professional development associated with that.... I run a warfighter seminar for my MSC [major subordinate command (O-6 level command)] and separate battalion commanders on a quarterly basis. We review doctrine, starting with the decision-making process, then we go on to the METL analysis process, the mission analysis, the whole process. Then we go into maneuver operations, we go into air defense, we go into fire support, we go into aviation operations. I get together with the MSC commanders and we talk once every two weeks. We get together and spend from two to four hours based on what we have to talk about.

I used the NTC as our warfighting point of focus and brought people out to NTC, starting with my brigade commanders, so that I was able to pass on to them the experiences of the current unit at NTC and my own experiences and thoughts. We used that as our warfighting laboratory in the division, and then the insights we gained there we brought back down to the lower echelons.

TECHNIQUES

Communications is the essence of this business. I have tried to use as many different ways to communicate as I can think of. One is the old management by wandering around, just being at the motor pool, and talking. I try to have company commander luncheons, battalion commander luncheons. I try to get into company training meetings or into battalion training meetings, as well as the quarterly training briefings. They are formatted to provide me information and draw out from people where they are and whether or not they have training management overload. But the issue here is that communications is the key to success in a big organization like this. How's it flowing down? How's it flowing up? If communications is all one way, if it is a good

idea a minute from the division commander, that's unhealthy; that's dysfunctional. And if it's all the other way, if there's a lot of stuff coming up off the bottom without some sort of filter, and there is no sort of vision being applied or general philosophy being applied from the top, that isn't real healthy either.

COUNSELING

Something we don't do very well in our Army is OER [Officer Evaluation Report] counseling. We say we have this -1 [OER support form] and everybody gets counseled. But go find the battalion commander that has been counseled by his brigade commander on a quarterly basis with his -1, there aren't half a dozen of them in this division. I can tell you that it doesn't happen. I can tell you it doesn't happen at company commander level and that's a shortfall. What I have tried to do is make it happen by starting it at division level.

LEADER TRAINING/DEVELOPMENT

Maybe the most important thing is trying to convince battalion commanders to suppress their appetite. Battalion commanders believe they can get more done in the time available than they can really get done. They are constantly putting more on their plate than they can get accomplished.

What I have told the brigade commander's key subordinates is that I want them to have a system that identifies what the critical tasks are for a leader to know in their particular organization, whether he is a sergeant or a lieutenant -- specifically talking about the young sergeants and lieutenants, but it really applies to everybody -- what the key critical tasks that a leader needs to know, and early in a guy's tour identify whether he knows them or not and get him on the path to be competent in those critical skills. The one we started with is maintenance PMCS [Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services]. The easy example is, does every leader know how to do the PMCS on every piece of equipment that he is responsible for? If the answer is, "No," let's get at that and fix it so we don't have leaders who are wandering out there in charge of stuff... that they really don't know how to do the basic preventive maintenance checks and service on.

I instituted a program of quarterly tactical tutorials that I was personally involved in with my brigade and battalion commanders. But quite frankly, I found them to be of limited value.

Leader certification programs, in my experience, are things that are easy to write and brief, but normally they die of their own weight. So don't make the system so complicated that you can't execute it. Keep it simple. Keep it to the basics, but then keep assessing so that junior leaders do the key things that they are supposed to do.

FAMILY ACTIONS

PREPARATION

I would tell them to get involved in this thing upfront. It is critical to the success of your command.

FAMILY SUPPORT GROUPS

The only thing I would caution new division commanders about would be to watch that the family support group system doesn't become a monster. I tell all my new battalion commanders to remember what family support group is supposed to be. The essence of it is a communications network to link a family with a problem with the right agency in the absence of a soldier. That's the essence of family support. It is not a system designed to allow the battalion commander's wife to fix everybody's problems.

I tell them that it's your program as a commander, not your wife's, God bless them. If she wants to be totally involved, that's great; but if she just wants to step back, that's OK. She ought to be an advisor. If she wants to be totally disconnected from it, that is her right. It is a commander's system.

I know there is a divergence of opinion in the Army on this, but I believe you have to have a framework for a family support group. There have to be some activities in that group, or when crisis comes, it won't work. It cannot spring forth full-blown with people who don't know each other in a crisis. You have to have built a bond of trust in the community and in the family support group prior to crisis in order for it to be most effective, particularly in the case of the crises that we have now that are dragging on, on-going, and are more or less steady state.

I think training for the family support group coordinator or the family support group leader is extremely important. It doesn't have to be the chain of command's, the commander's wife, the sergeant's major wife, or the first sergeant's wife, who is the leader of the family support group.

ISSUES/CHALLENGES

The biggest problem we have within the Army family now is that we have developed rising expectations on the part of our soldiers. There are a lot of reasons for it. Whatever they are, soldiers and families expect so much from the Army during this period of

shrinking resources. For many reasons, they have come to demand those and feel it is their absolute right to have those things.

Within families, we have a subset that is very demanding, that group being the single parent. He or she, particularly "she" because she often has the child, really expects special considerations.

TECHNIQUES

My message here is to use a forum, such as the Army Family Action Plan. Take the time, set that day aside, sit in on the seminars, and then take the out brief. Don't send your chief of staff, don't send your subalterns; you go, and get it firsthand. They will give it to you. That spouse will stand up and give it to you right between the running lights. If you can, don't ask the DPCA [Director of Personnel and Community Activities] to stand up and answer it. Don't have the DPW [Directorate of Public Works], don't have the garrison commander -- you answer it head-on. It will pay off. Obviously, don't go unprepared.

The chain of command is not real happy on the whole with the "Dial-A Boss," but I need to have something as an outlet, plus it gives me a tremendous sense of what's going on in the division and garrison. It's the disgruntled soldiers that often call, but I learn a lot of things.

ASSESSMENTS

Do an assessment by talking to the chaplains, by talking to the family advocacy persons on post, and by talking to the mental health people at the installation medical facility.

Make a very, very special dedicated effort very early on in your command tenure to learn as much as you can through dialogue, through participation, through listening on what's going on out there in this area.

LEADERSHIP

PHILOSOPHY/CLIMATE

I think the most important aspect is the requirement to reinforce, by word and deed, for all subordinates to see, the right and proper things to do all the time, on and off duty, under supervision or not. There is plenty of opportunity for people to rationalize and take the easy/wrong rather than the tougher/right in many, many small ways each day. By setting high standards and compelling compliance for those high standards, be they Army policies or be they regulations, or state laws, or checking soldiers before they go to the field or ensuring that convoy discipline is maintained. If the senior leader is going to reinforce and stiffen those policies and procedures and make clear to everyone that this is the way we do business, he has got to continually reinforce it by doing the right thing, behaving properly himself, and taking appropriate action for those who do not live up to the standards or live by the rules.

I think obviously there is an enhanced requirement for vision at the division level, the capacity to look further out, to identify the major patterns of activity that will move the division to where the division commander believes he wants to take it over the two years that lay before him.

The pre-command course for battalion and brigade commanders spends a lot of time talking about command philosophy and how you need to develop it, write it, and articulate it, and all that stuff; and guys do that. I've seen more than one division commander who, for whatever reason, decided he didn't need to specifically articulate a command philosophy when he arrived in a division. That is a mistake.

Writing a command philosophy and bringing the right group of people together and saying guys, "Here's what I think is important," and laying that out for them, and then continuing to preach that to new key senior guys like battalion commanders and above, is essential for a division commander.

I would just underscore that the division commander, just like a battalion commander, needs to walk in with his cue cards or whatever it is and say, "Troops, here's what's important. Here's why we exist. Here's how we are going to go about business. Here are the three key things that set my hair on fire," or whatever it is.

The division commander, before he takes over, should be shaped and formed through his experiences such that he has a vision of the command, a vision that is not only how a division fights but also what a division feels like.

I haven't changed my command philosophy from the time I was a battalion commander to now in terms of what's important, what I think you have to focus on, and how I go about doing it. So I think there is a lot of continuity as you move from level to level as far as leadership and leadership techniques.

The point I'm making is in my mind the philosophy of leadership is to clearly articulate standards, having articulated the standards, then you give people the latitude to execute within those standards. We call it the commander's intent today. Then you supervise and that's where I say my greatest failing, my ability to properly be out and in amongst the units and visit with the soldiers.

I validated the concept of having a positive command climate in which subordinates are coached by their seniors, in which those who are above them in the chain of command truly understand what they have to do, and in which individuals do not compete directly against each other.

TEAMWORK

My experience in the division and everything I have done in the division has been conditioned by some bad experiences I had as a battalion commander and good experiences as a brigade commander. What I have tried to do with this division most of all, and I guess this is the leadership area, is to bring out the best in my subordinates in a teamwork context, and in an atmosphere and climate of positive reinforcement and teamwork that was as free as possible from comparative assessment and evaluation.... I have tried very hard to create an atmosphere of teamwork. I saw the opposite atmosphere, and I wholeheartedly oppose it. It was an atmosphere of competition, mistrust, and suspicion apparently driven by OER rating profiles.

I hooked into General [Gordon R.] Sullivan's comment when he was at DCSOPS about a division being a team of teams. I think that is absolutely right on. In trying to work that idea, my little homily is that talent is important, but teamwork is more important; making battalion commanders and company commanders understand that they have a team, and they are also part of other teams, and they all have to work together.

My team at division level are the colonels and the senior sergeants major, and they are doing this stuff for the second and third time. They are jumping through some pretty narrow wickets to get to where they are in the Army. They have been successful before. I am a decentralized guy; I am not a big-time centralized person. I don't have to know everything that is going on. I don't keep a big book of every statistic in the world on the division. But that said, I think I operate in a

more decentralization working way with the brigade commanders than I did working with battalion commanders. I think you can at this level sort of assess the team you've got, give them very general guidelines, and rely on them to move within those guidelines to do what you want done. If you don't, you get into their business. I think a division commander has to spend a lot of time just sort of sitting on the sidelines watching and listening to what's going on, letting the colonels run their outfits. I think the division commander needs to spend a significant amount of time making the battalion commanders feel comfortable in the environment.

DEVELOPING SUBORDINATES

I think being a division commander is about being ready to go to war, but it's also about bringing out the best in your subordinates. And how do you unleash their creative talents, their enthusiasm? How do you stoke their good judgement and encourage them to develop and trust their own subordinates and pass it downward? To me that's what the art of command is all about.

Generally speaking, I think you can establish a pattern of leadership based on how you act, and that's how you teach guys what's important. I think just living it is the way you pass that on.

I found when I was out that it was far more important for me, as a division commander, to pat people on the back and to recognize their hard work and their accomplishments than it was to run some sort of an assessment.

I think it's important for me to make battalion and brigade commanders know what I think is important, to know what the standards are. As long as I can do that, they respond to that. I start out with the assumption when a guy walks in here, salutes, and reports as a new battalion commander, that he has come through an education and socialization process that means he probably thinks pretty close to the way I think anyway. And that has proven to be the case. I haven't had any leaders at that level that I've discovered have a widely different view of standards than I do and that have had to go through some major retraining process. I think you do leadership instruction at this level by osmosis. You are, in fact, a role model. The blotters come in every morning, and if you go ape shit every morning over the pretty serious stuff that happens -- people shooting at each other and other nasty stuff that happens in a 12,500 person community or 15,000, 16,000, or 20,000 person community -- how you deal with that is part of leadership instruction.

At my level, I have learned patience to allow my subordinates to grow. I've learned that from some great commanders in my past. Let your subordinates learn from experience. You can make an assessment if it's going to penalize the republic. If it is not, allow the commander to grow on the job. You can talk it over after the fact and offer counsel and encouragement.

Being a division commander is about being ready to go to war, but it's also about bringing out the best in your subordinates. And how do you unleash their creative talents, their enthusiasm? How do you stoke their good judgment and encourage them to develop and trust their own subordinates and pass it downward? To me that's what the art of command is all about.

Protect the time and responsibilities and authorities of your subordinates. Do everything you can to empower them, which means not only holding them responsible, but ensuring they understand what their authority is to resolve problems and make decisions. Do the corrections in private; do the teaching in private so that in public they can be highly effective, highly supportable commanders.

Battalion commanders are by nature conservative, although they are probably doing the job that is the best one they will ever have in the Army. They're success-oriented, and they know that if they are successful as battalion commanders, a bunch of good things will probably happen to them -- going to the War College, etc. If they are not successful as battalion commanders, they can see the end coming. What that all does to them as a group is make them conservative. They don't want to do anything that risks failure. The guy who talked to me... said, "You need to sort of bump them along towards taking a little more risk in terms of how to do business, because if you are going to go to war, they're going to need to take some risks." I think that's true.

TECHNIQUES

When you look at the leadership techniques with MSC commanders, what I believe I do is articulate the standards and expectations so that commanders know these are the training requirements, these are the readiness requirements, these are the standards. Having articulated the standards and expectations of the command, I allow the commanders the latitude to command their units. I am very careful about not superimposing my style on the style of my brigade, and even my battalion commanders. I like for them to have the latitude to command.

I think what the division commander does is spend some time just sort of wandering around, talking to battalion commanders, either as a group or one-on-one, making them feel like he thinks they

are doing OK, and that it's sort of a low-threat environment that, yes, things will get screwed up. Yes, you will screw things up as a battalion commander, but it's OK. If you're moving in the general direction, you're alright. It is pretty easy for a division commander, almost unintentionally, to get guys hyper. I suspect that people who set their hair on fire don't appreciate the magnifying effect it has. It's one thing for the company commander to run around yelling and screaming, but when a division commander runs around yelling and screaming, boy, that really gets everybody upset.

I made it clear to the brigade commanders that the battalion commanders work for me. I assigned those battalion commanders to brigade commanders. When we went to war I could just as easily take that battalion away from that brigade and assign it to another brigade. But they really worked for me in the final analysis. I entrusted them during normal peacetime operations to the brigade commanders for their development, for their employment, and I held them responsible for that. But I didn't want any of them to get their nose bent out of shape or feel threatened in any way if I dealt one-on-one with the battalion commander on occasion.

I spent a lot of time talking to new battalion and brigade commanders about the fact that they are sort of islands of stability in a world of instability right now, and how important that is in all areas, training being one, but other areas as well. There is so much turbulence in the Army right now that battalion and brigade commanders, especially battalion commanders, have really got to project calm and stability to their battalions and the idea that it is going to be OK.

I think a division command sergeant major is only effective if he has an impact at the company, troop, and battery level, at the first sergeant level.

Every two weeks I get together with the MSCs, separate battalion commanders, the principal staff, my SJA [Staff Judge Advocate], my IG, my chief of staff, and my two ADCs. The idea is to get together and hash things over, free flowing discussion and open communications. The point I'm making is, I believe that the senior leaders of the division are the board of directors of the division. Before I make a decision I will afford the commanders present the opportunity to comment. They may not get their solution, but they've at least had an opportunity to be a participant in the decision-making process.... To me, that has paid tremendous dividends over the past year. I don't get decision briefs in my office, I don't get decision papers sent to me, I get it done in front of the MSC commanders.

One difference between leadership techniques and methods at division and those at brigade level is that at the division level I have assistant division commanders. Assistant division commanders, I think, have been very useful to me. I use them not as an echelon in the chain of command, but as special assistants that I can give particular problems to. They have areas that they work on my behalf and they represent me in those areas.

COUNSELING

I am a big believer in instincts. I think when you get to a battalion command, your instincts are probably pretty good. I think instinctively you can very quickly assess the people and how they are going to respond to pressure. You get fooled every once in a while, but I don't think very often. I haven't been fooled very often. I've read subordinates in terms of how they are going to react to stress, and that deals with how they are going to do in combat. But sometimes it is difficult. It's like the officer who would say, "This guy's a middle-third guy; this guy's a two-block guy." And he comes in and says, "How come I'm not a one-block guy? What have I failed to do?" The answer is, "You haven't failed to do anything. It's 20 or 30 years' experience that causes me instinctively to know that you are a two-block guy and maybe you haven't succeeded as much as somebody else," which is an unsatisfactory answer to a guy who comes in and asks, "How come I'm not a one-block guy?" But in most cases, it's absolutely right. It's an instinctive read of potential and performances, as opposed to, "Well, you didn't paint the sidewalk this color, and you didn't cut the grass, and your gunnery scores are low," and some of that stuff. You have an instinctive feel for a guy, then you go watch him in training, and you either confirm or deny your instincts.

Part of my mission, I think, is to make my subordinates successful. I think that is a very serious responsibility of the division commander -- to achieve success for his subordinates and to identify those few who have probably optimized their potential of where they should be and have reached the upper limit of their potential. Those are rare.

The more I'm in this business, the less confidence I have in programs and policies, and the more emphasis I think we need to put in giving our subordinates time, leading by personal example, articulating standards, having the wherewithal to insist in a healthy way that these standards be met, rewarding those who do well and having the guts to emplace sanctions and take action against those who don't do well, which includes additional training and counselling and all the techniques that we have. The lower down you can operate your system, the better you'll be.

CHALLENGES/CONCERNS

The one thing that surprised me was how hard it was for me to just wander around and have people leave me alone and let me watch what was going on. There are too many guys around that are not comfortable doing that.

I found that the brigade commanders were not really forthcoming in communications with me as a new division commander in the main.

Vertical communication -- up and down the chain of command. The ability for subordinates to feel that they could talk to me personally, they could talk openly at meetings, and they could question a policy. When I said, "Any questions, any discussion?" I was hoping for "Sir, I would like to propose" or "Have you considered?" I really wanted to get that flow. I didn't sense it was as active as it could be. I was pretty confident I could transmit easily, but I wasn't sure I was getting the feedback.

Obviously you cannot have a unit that has a false expectation, because it will be continually frustrated and disappointed in themselves. A reflection of this was a focus on what we didn't have and a focus on what we couldn't do as opposed to a positive and enthusiastic, but a realistic -- not a "sophomoric schoolboy" kind of thing enthusiasm -- approach on what our capabilities were given what we had available to us because we were in the queue to go to war.

What became clear to me was that at company level we were not real good at listening and communicating up and down between soldiers and their leaders.

Simply put -- company commanders, first sergeants, battalion commanders, sergeants major, all need to listen to soldiers when they have problems.

Don't expect too much from your subordinates in the way of honesty. If you do, you will be misled. They will not tell you the hard, cold truth without your asking, in many cases, because to do so will create animosities and problems within your command, and maybe for them. And you probably don't want them to lay it all out in black and white. So be sensitive to the nuances and look for what's not said as well as for what is said.

In my particular case, I saw a great lack of initiative on the part of the commanders to go forth and do what they thought they ought to do. In other words, what I saw were commanders who were a little tenuous in terms of waiting for additional guidance before acting. My approach was one of, "It's your unit, go forth and command it and I'll articulate the standard to you." To me, it was waiting for me to tell them things that I had no intention

of telling them. I'm not sure what that's a reflection of except trying to figure me out. When I said to go forth and do what you want to, as long as you do it well, that was an overstatement. But to say to go forth and train according to standard and expectation, the result was very heartening.

PERSONAL LESSONS

Remember, everything that you do is magnified when you are a division commander so be careful. If your style is emotional, it will be magnified. Just understand that. If you are a hair on fire kind of guy, it really gets magnified at this level.

Communication is the essence of leadership, especially at this level. You can get isolated either because of this business of being a celebrity and wanting to guide your every minute, or because you've got meetings and things to do and places to go, and all of a sudden you are isolated from the people in your organization. You have to guard against that.

Remain self-assured even when you may suffer some personal disappointments. I learned that people are capable of doing some grand and glorious things. People are also capable of doing just some absolutely dumb, stupid, dastardly deeds. Don't be naive. Don't be too idealistic.

I guess a lot of your learning is reaffirmation of things that you've been through before, that is, expect surprises, be flexible. About the time you think you have the answer to something, here comes a surprise. Don't get confident; trust your instincts. I learned that in combat. Those of us who fought at the small unit level, remember, you're in charge. You may have your entire team that says, "Boss, we have to do this, that, and the other. Here's our recommendation." Unanimous support. "We have to go left on this." And you're going to sit back and you're going to think about it. Don't feel rushed. And you're going to say, "Hey guys, that's a damn good recommendation. All your advantages and disadvantages, your conclusions are all sound in logic, but I'm sorry, we're not going to go left; we're going to go right, because it's the right way to go." You are in charge and you ultimately are responsible for making the decisions.

The Army is just so full, and your division is going to be so full, of great people doing great things, not for themselves, but because they believe in this profession we call soldiering. They're good people with good hearts who are trying to do what is right, and they are looking just for a pat on the back, and "Hey, good job. Thank you very much."

Mike Malone's leadership book is still very helpful. Read that.
[Small Unit Leadership: A Commonsense Approach, Dandridge M.
(Mike) Malone, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982.]

You've got to be an advocate for your division in your interaction with the CINC [Commander in Chief], in this case, and with your Corps commander, with your Army commander, with Headquarters DA, and be able to articulate through letters, phone calls, and personal visits, to include walking the halls, at times, in the Pentagon. Articulate what your requirements are without overstating them, because remember, you are going to go to war with what you've got.

I think the biggest thing that I try to do with leadership is to get the right balance between standards and style. In other words, I do believe in high standards, but I don't want the leaders in the division to be a bunch of flaming assholes who exhibit negative leadership, because I think you have to build up a reservoir of trust and confidence in your leadership.

ETHICS

PREPARATION

Make sure you understand what the Army regulations are on this. Understand what your senior commanders are saying. Make sure what your senior commanders are saying. Make sure that your IG, your SJA, and your subordinate commanders are all tuned to it, and when an allegation comes up for perception, don't let anybody blow it off. Jump on it 100 percent.

CLIMATE/COMMAND PHILOSOPHY

You have to tell people what you think is important, what your standards are, what your uncompromising standards are, and you have to take the bad news well. If you don't take bad news well, there is going to be somebody out there that is going to try to cover something up because they are just afraid to tell you. Or you have to have some outlet for that. If you don't take bad news well, there had better be somebody who's connected to you, like your chief or ADC, who can take that bad news, who guys will go to. And he can give it to you, and you can do whatever you want with it.

I don't think I spent any time on ethics. The assumption is that the Army officer corps in 1992-1993, generally speaking, has a common view of ethics. I think the assumption is right. You have people that are on the fringes of that common view, and you sort of bounce them back in line, or you use them as examples if you have to move them out to reinforce whatever ethical azimuth you are on.

I haven't seen any wild patterns of variations in standards of ethics that caused me to wring my hands about the division. The kind of feedback I get from battalion and brigade commanders and sergeants major tells me that, generally speaking, everybody's moving within the band of excellence on that stuff.

You really do in this ethical area need to be careful of what you say. Be careful what you write. Be careful what you say in your speeches when you're talking to your officers and NCOs [non-commissioned officers], because in this area, they're going to believe you.

You can believe, and it could be fact, that you have a command climate in your division, or in your brigade, or in your battalion, that is free of fear, and you don't see any pressure being applied. I mean you work hard at that.... Yet you're going to have two or three battalion commanders who really are competitive and feel they are in competition with their buddies, and they are going to act that way.

When someone lies, cheats, or steals, you handle them; those are easy ones. It's the gray area where I think you set the tone and the climate; when you adjudicate those issues that appear gray, but you say it is not gray, rather it is a breach of trust.

I think the officer and NCO corps, because of the faith we have in them and in the system, have to be held to the highest ethical standards. Thus, when they fall short, they have to accept the consequences. I've had some cases where I have had to act, and I think some folks have been chagrined, if not shocked, by the severity of my decision.

ISSUES/CONCERNS

Young officers are worried about zero defects. But the zero defects that they are worrying about are not ethical zero defects. They worry, "If I screw something up, is it going to reflect on my OER? In this kind of Army, is that going to be the end of my career?" That's the feedback I get on the zero defects business. I have talked about that with the commanders and with young officers where I could. If you take that over into the ethics business, I think there is a zero defects. OK, there are some things that a lieutenant can do, for example, that you might call ethical issues that you might say, "OK, he's a lieutenant, and he just didn't understand." But damn few.... The ethics business is pretty much a zero defects arena. I also think that we have an obligation as leaders, in some cases, to tell our subordinates, "Hey guys, here are some things that aren't going to be forgiven."

There are two or three areas that require a continuous review. There's nothing surprising about either one of them, but what will be surprising is that it happens in your command. That is, instances relating to infidelity and how a commander should handle that both at the officer, noncommissioned officer, and enlisted levels. Problems associated with claims for reimbursement for one thing or another. Problems connected to junior officers willfully signing official government documents to get around bureaucratic red tape. In other words, knowingly falsifying the documents, but believing that in the grand scheme this is necessary and must be done in order to facilitate -- ammunition residue turn-in, for example or reasons why equipment

was damaged or destroyed, or accountability for items of equipment that are not precisely accurate or truthful.

A related issue that has warranted my attention is this issue of personal responsibility and accountability. I find that there is an ethical dimension to this issue, although I don't want to overemphasize it. Officers will quickly step forward and say, "I'm responsible." When you turn to them and say, "Indeed you are and I am also holding you accountable," I find some of them less clear on what that means. It obviously means you accept the consequences. It may be that your efficiency report may not be as good as you would like, or in some cases you may be admonished on the spot. There is a school of thought on the relationship of responsibility and accountability that says if you state, "I'm responsible and I'm sorry" that's good enough. Sometimes it is; sometimes it isn't.

I'd watch for subtle shadings of interpretations by officers and NCOs. I focus on officers and NCOs because they are your leadership.

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY

I didn't pay enough attention to it when I took command. I don't think the Army has paid enough attention to it. I think we have become complacent in the area of equal opportunity and EEO [Equal Employment Opportunity]. But I think the pendulum is now swinging back.

My only advice to a division commander in this area is make darn sure you have an equal opportunity program, that you've resourced that program, and that you have your scouts out to determine where your problems are likely to develop. Pay attention to it.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Do not assume for a moment that there is not sexual harassment in your division. There is. I guarantee it. Is it a major problem? Probably not. Is it a problem to some females in your unit? Absolutely yes.

INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT

PREPARATION

A short course for division commanders is probably worthwhile, even if it's only for two or three days. They need to work some case studies on how to do the essential stuff of managing an installation. In the absence of that, what you do is rely on your instincts. You rely on your instincts about people. Can I trust this guy? Does what he says make sense? You may not always get it right when you do it that way.

I think as the commander goes through the pre-command course, he should request blocks of time for installation management experts to give him the shorthand indicators and key areas to focus on as an installation commander.

Attend the course at Fort Lee. They will do a one-day course for you, or they can make it two days; but as a minimum, attend the one-day course. They sit down and parade through a series of installation management experts in various fields. It is invaluable. I also suggest that if your wife travels with you, they will be delighted to have her sit in there with you.

I would say that the division commanders who are coming into this kind of environment have to understand installation management issues and they have to get up and get involved in installation management with the colonels on the corps and garrison staff, because their ability to accomplish their mission and their soldiers' welfare is at stake.

The more time you spend with your comptroller, the more time you spend with your garrison commander, your DCSRM [Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management], whatever organization it may be, understanding that TDA and being involved in the PBAC [Program Budget Advisory Committee] process, understanding financial management and the linkage between that and your TDA, the better off you'll be.

I think good in-processing is essential; they need to have each of the garrison staff guys come by and brief....

SURPRISES

If you are dual-hatted, you've got to spend the time -- and I hate to say this, but the studies are right -- you are going to spend 50 to 70 percent of your time as a division/installation commander on installation matters.

It's going to be a surprise to them as it was to me just how comprehensive and extensive your responsibilities as an installation commander are. Once you realize you personally can affect the quality of life for your soldiers, then you will see why the requirement for so much of your time spent there is worth it.... You can do all sorts of things to make the post better for your soldiers.

I'll tell you this about installation management responsibilities. It's twice as hard. You have twice as great a difficulty with installation management responsibilities when you are responsible for the performance of your unit on the installation, but you are not responsible for the installation. So I have all the same installation management frustrations and concerns that anybody else does except I am not responsible for the installation.

MANAGEMENT

You have to have a long-term plan. We talk about master planning. What I have tried to work very hard on in the past two years has been a long-term range development plan so that we can ensure that we have the training areas and facilities to include simulations that are appropriate for the division.... That is probably the most important thing that I can do in the community -- to lay out a plan for the future.

ISSUES

In terms of installation management, the concern that I walked into was looking into the face of a civilian RIF [reduction in force], and trying to determine how to reduce the civilian work force, and at the same time protect those goods and services that were essential to the quality of life of programs for soldiers and families....

There was a great lack of confidence in the division leadership from top to bottom in the ability of the installation to care for them and to provide for them. This was a surprise to me. I was taken aback when I had my first luncheon with battalion commanders the second week of assuming division command, and listened for a couple of hours about their perceptions of deficiencies on the installation side in providing services and support to our soldiers.

When you get a new garrison commander, you have to get him trained. So you send him off to an installation management course that's not adequate. What it needs is to be developed around the Harvard Business School case study approach where you get into the weeds on how you do things as an installation

commander. How do you build a budget? How do you solve a problem with fixing your infrastructure? How do you do civilian personnel business? That's what he needs to get into and not some guy lecturing you out of the Pentagon or a guy who is a resource manager at some installation talking about how he is doing business. You have to get your hands on it. We are not doing that well and that needs to be fixed.

I was appalled at the condition of the installation and the facilities and the way we were stacking units in here under the BRAC [Base Realignment and Closure Commission] proceedings without doing investment upfront to take care of the motor pool facilities. When I have a division cavalry squadron that doesn't have a wash rack in the motor pool and doesn't have any indoor bays or only has two indoor bays, then I find it unbelievable.

Your garrison commander can be well-trained, but he will have a difficult time overcoming the bureaucratic sludge that you as a division/installation commander can cut through.

INSTALLATION/DIVISION ISSUES

It took a very concerted effort on everybody's part to solve the problem of the schism, if you will, between the installation and the supporting and the supported units.

If something is not going right, that leader needs to get involved. There is this tremendous reluctance to do that crossing from the TOE to the supporting organization known as the garrison staff. Once we have people talking to each other at the lowest level possible, you've built personal relationships, trust, and confidence that in the main benefitted the soldier and his family.

You have, quite frankly, a quality differential between your installation side and your division side. The compensator is you. One thing I am trying to do is funnel quality officers, after they are branch qualified, into installation management positions to help the quality of life. The impact is that direct. The trick is I have to take care of them because they don't greet this with great enthusiasm.

RESOURCES

The biggest installation facility concern was money. Every installation commander is in a constant battle between paying for the infrastructure to support the installation and providing training money for the division. What the Army, generally speaking, has been doing in the recent past is funding OPTEMPO [Operating Tempo], but taking it out of the infrastructure money

you need to run the installation, and you can't live like that. You can live like that for a little while, but very quickly you start to have problems with some parts of your installation if you don't fund it.

I think we're starting to pay the price for not putting the money back in the infrastructure over the last 15, 20, 30 years in terms of stuff you don't see like sewers, water treatment, and building superstructure.

What you need to understand about the TDA is where are you going to take cuts? What are those things you really need to protect because you are going to take cuts, and we're not finished yet with the downsizing of the Army?

SINGLE SOLDIER INITIATIVES

For about 20 some years in the Army I grew up with the expectation that soldiers unsupervised and not closely controlled would probably do everything except what you expected them to do. I finally figured out about three or four years ago that isn't necessarily true. That is some point in time soldiers need to be given some freedom of expression of their own selves and some capability to do things within the barracks that is not a structured environment. The single soldier initiative program that we have started here did away with standardized room arrangement, we did away with room standby inspections -- not that the chain of command can't inspect the rooms.... Those things, I think, have sort of changed how we live in the barracks here.... I have no intention of losing control of the barracks, I have no intention of letting this get out of hand. But at the same time I want to give the soldier the latitude so that the soldier who lives in the barracks has something akin to the quality of life and those who live in quarters or who live off post.