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
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U. S. Army Military History Institute

FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES

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PARTISAN WARFARE
A TREATISE BASED ON COMBAT
EXPERIENCES IN THE BALKANS



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HEADQUARTERS US ARMY, EUROPE

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PARTISAN WARFARE

A TREATISE BASED ON COMBAT EXPERIENCES
IN THE BALKANS

By

Alexander RATCLIFFE, Generalmajor a.D.

Historical Division
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UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE

- 1 -

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Alexander RATCLIFFE
Generalsmajor a.D.
Date of Birth: 17 August 1890
Place of Birth: Munich

RATCLIFFE was educated and trained for service in the administration of Germany's pre-World War I colonies, and in 1910 left Germany to take up agriculture in Tanganyika, then German East Africa. During World War I he served in the German Defense Force there and in 1916 was promoted second lieutenant, in 1920 first lieutenant.

Repatriated to Germany from a British prisoner of war camp in Egypt in 1920, he joined the German police, in which service he had advanced to the rank of lieutenant colonel in the State Police Operations Staff by 1937. In that year he was transferred to the Army, retaining his rank as lieutenant colonel.

During World War II, RATCLIFFE served as an infantry battalion and regimental commander in Belgium and France and various parts of Russia. In 1940 he was promoted colonel and in 1944 Generalmajor.

In March 1944, he was assigned as garrison commander at Orscha, Russia. Finally, after being cut off for three months behind the Russian lines, he was wounded and captured on 6 August 1944. The general was held prisoner by the Russians until November 1949 and was finally repatriated after having spent more than five years in eighteen Soviet camps and prisons.

Prior to his own transfer to the Army, RATCLIFFE played an important role in reorganizing seven police divisions for transfer to the Army.

In addition to his police and military career, RATCLIFFE has been a highly successful writer on military and political subjects.

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C O N T E N T S

	<u>Page</u>
CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND	1
CHAPTER 2. THE PARTISANS.	2
Section I. The Nature of the Partisans.	2
Section II. Partisan Combat Tactics.	11
CHAPTER 3. ANTI-PARTISAN OPERATIONS	27
Section I. The Troops	27
Section II. The Intelligence Service	39
Section III. Security Measures.	45
Section IV. Tactical Measures.	60
Section V. Large-Scale Strategic Measures	80
Section VI. Special Aspects of Guerilla Warfare.	93

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MS / P-142

UNCLASSIFIED

- 1 -

CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND

Partisan warfare is not new. The histories of numerous campaigns describe participation by civilians in the hostilities under various designations, such as guerillas, irregulars, bandits or patriots fighting for liberation. However, while formerly partisan warfare was considered secondary to the operations on the regular fronts, the Russian command during World War II succeeded in making irregular warfare a strategically decisive factor. The following circumstances aided this development:

1. Hitler's policies, which branded the eastern peoples as "subhuman" and thereby incited them to bitter resistance prompted by an aroused spirit of nationalism;
2. The inherent tendency of the Slavic peoples to engage in conspiratory activities and to unite in guerilla groups;
3. The fact that the geographical features of eastern and southeastern Europe were especially favorable for guerilla warfare.

For a long time the German Supreme Command looked upon anti-partisan operations as predominantly police actions of

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MS # P-142

- 2 -

little importance. In its attempts to put down the guerilla bands it employed insufficient forces and improvised means. By thus underestimating a newly-arisen and dangerous opponent, who had to be faced along with the enemy armies, the command contributed to the chaos which after a while ensued behind the lines and ended in disaster.

In view of the enemy's strategic successes scored during guerilla warfare in Russia and the Balkans it is reasonable to assume that in a future conflict partisan warfare will play an even greater part in the plans of the Russian command than during the past war. The mobilization plan for personnel and material will provide for partisan warfare with the same measure of care as for the operations of the regular fighting forces.

Consequently, preparations will have to be made for partisan warfare, which is in keeping with the eastern peoples' conception of war and an element in communistic ideology, no matter whether it is or is not approved by moral standards or military laws.

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- 3 -

CHAPTER 2

THE PARTISANS

I. THE NATURE OF THE PARTISANS

1. Organization. Partisans are armed civilians who, individually or in groups, participate in hostilities, usually behind enemy lines. They do not belong to the regular fighting forces of their country. They organize themselves for combat, unless provisions for their organization have been made in mobilization plans. According to international law this type of warfare is permissible as long as the partisans abide by the rules of the Hague Conventions and even after the country has been evacuated by its own fighting forces and occupied totally by the enemy.

Permanent military organizations are not in keeping with the nature of irregular warfare. Although designations such as company or regiment were used occasionally to mislead the enemy by conveying the impression that larger units and a regular military organization existed, such terms gave no indication of the actual extent and composition of the partisan movement. Bands were organized customarily according to regional origin. As a rule, a band was known by the name of its leader or the area in which it operated. Groups or brigade designations were also used. Subdivision

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MS # P-142

- 4 -

into commandos or battalions was infrequent; instead, specialists such as radio operators, members of demolition and raiding parties, and bodyguards of partisan leaders, were organized usually as elite groups within their respective bands.

When a large number of bands operated within the same area, a partisan headquarters to coordinate the movements and operations of the bands was established.

2. Recruitments. The strength of the units varied considerably, but bands numbering more than a thousand members were rare exceptions.

The partisan forces were recruited from the following elements:

a. Persons earmarked in the mobilization plan for service in guerilla combat (for example political leaders, specialists);

b. Volunteers, women included, prompted by fanaticism or desire for loot; or influenced by poverty and other considerations;

c. Stragglers, escaped prisoners of war, deserters from the local police, and others;

d. Forcibly recruited members of the population.

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MS # P-142

- 5 -

The number of volunteers increased in proportion to the severity of the occupation measures. In Russia our so-called "Eastern Labor Service" drove tens of thousands to join the partisans. On the whole, the influx of partisan volunteers is dependent on the situation and the successes scored by the partisan bands.

3. Leadership. As a rule local communist functionaries held positions of leadership. In the Balkans many officers of the Yugoslav and Greek armies served as partisan leaders. After a while the political functionaries, who had received no military training but were invested with absolute powers, were replaced in increasing numbers by soldiers. Future leadership will probably be assigned in most cases to individuals who have been earmarked in the mobilization plan for employment as leaders and who have become familiar with conditions in the zone of operations in which they will serve.

The tactical qualification of most partisan leaders was limited to ability to lead small units in forest and mountain combat. In this type of action they frequently demonstrated remarkable skill and ingenuity. Most of them were both cunning and personally courageous. In the partisan

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MS # P-142

- 6 -

headquarters officers of the Soviet and Western Allied forces usually shared leadership responsibility.

Conflicting political objectives and personal rivalries among partisan leaders occasionally caused clashes between bands. Such frictions, typical of irregular combat groups, might serve as a starting point in an attempt to bring about the disintegration of a partisan movement.

4. Training. Within the Soviet sphere of influence large groups of young people, male and female, are conscripted for training in partisan warfare. The training includes firing, demolition techniques, the operation of short-wave equipment, parachute jumping and, especially, the proper utilization of terrain for ambush and surprise attacks.

During World War II courses of instruction were organized on occasion for partisan recruits. In general, however, practice took the place of training. The guerillas were usually poor in marksmanship and fire discipline. On the other hand, they proved superior even to the best regular combat elements in the proper utilization of the terrain and in the employment of camouflage measures. Their toughness and acclimatization to mountain conditions adapted them to extraordinary march performances. They were much less

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susceptible than regular troops to the inclemencies of the climate, particularly in winter.

In the future the combat va ue of partisans will have to be rated even more highly than during the last war.

5. Morale. With rare exceptions, the partisans proved to be exceedingly tenacious, completely fearless, uncomplaining fighters. The discipline and cohesion of a band was contingent primarily on its composition and on the personality of its leader. Its combat value increased with an increase in the number of political fanatics who joined it, and decreased with an increase in the number of members pressed into service by force. To maintain discipline all means of terrorisation were used. The leaders usually fought in the foremost lines. Their initiative made even seriously weakened groups hold out despite the hopelessness of a situation; their loss usually resulted in wholesale flight.

The combat tactics of the partisans were characterized by treachery and cruelty. In many cases the desire for loot was a more powerful incentive than political ideology.

With rare exceptions, the rules of civilized warfare were disregarded deliberately.

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UNCLASSIFIED

- 8 -

6. Food Supply. Because of the frugal habits of the people of the Balkans and eastern Europe the partisans' problems of food supply rarely ever became acute. The bands subsisted on whatever the population contributed voluntarily or by force, and on food obtained as booty or by requisition. Sometimes the bands carried herds of cattle along. They set up large supply depots only temporarily, for concentrations of strong forces.

On the other hand, experience has shown that because of problems of food supply, partisans will be able to hold out for long periods only in regions where at least some elements of the population are friendly to them. At times supply difficulties forced guerillas to disband for a while.

7. Clothing. High-ranking partisan leaders and members of elite groups sometimes wore uniforms. Patches were frequently distributed as awards. In general, however, partisans did not wear uniforms or insignia of rank. Except for captured clothing, their attire consisted of the local peasant costume. If a partisan did wear such things as Soviet stars, an arm band, or a red scarf, these things usually disappeared as soon as he was in danger of being taken prisoner. It was therefore frequently difficult to prove that a prisoner belonged to a partisan band.

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NS # P-142

- 9 -

Frequently partisans wore captured uniforms when making raids or committing acts of sabotage.

8. Billeting. The necessity for concealment and the difficulties encountered in having large concentrations of forces live off of the country for any considerable length of time forced the bands to decentralize their activities. During comparatively quiet periods their tactical staffs stayed generally in out-of-the-way forest and mountain villages which were not easily accessible, and in places near the center of their zones of operations. Their forces, split into small detachments, were held in readiness nearby. The majority of the guerillas were distributed over the area dominated by the partisan bands and were assigned reconnaissance, security, or sabotage missions, individually or as teams. The location of hideouts was frequently changed, particularly after raids. Sizeable concentrations were assembled only just before large-scale operations, and then in isolated forests or valleys.

However, periods of bad weather would compel the partisans to establish temporary headquarters in villages which normally would have been used only for provisioning and gathering information. In the trackless, wooded, and swampy areas of the east the guerilla bands frequently established large camps, consisting of huts made of earth or logs, in which thousands

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MS # P-142

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- 10 -

spent the winter, even during severe cold. These camps were cleverly camouflaged against air reconnaissance and were protected by barriers, mines, and sentries at points hours distant from the camp.

9. Pay. Although the partisans as a rule were promised compensation, they rarely received it. Usually captured money was spent for weapons, food, or intelligence. Other loot was distributed among the members of the band.

10. Armament. At first the partisans were equipped with very dissimilar, and in most cases captured, weapons. In the wake of the large-scale German retreats in the east and the collapse of the Italian Army in the Balkans the guerilla bands gained possession of large supplies of weapons, including even artillery and some tanks. However, the conditions prevailing then cannot be considered typical. In future conflicts systematic preparations will be made for procuring weapons and ammunition for partisan warfare and for transporting replacements by air.

In addition to automatic rifles, submachine guns, and hand grenades, mines and explosives were the weapons preferred by the partisans. Frequently when changing positions they would hide large ammunition supplies in secluded buildings.

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- 11 -

11. Medical Service. As a rule the guerilla bands were accompanied by both male and female medical personnel. Seriously wounded individuals were usually hidden and nursed by confidential agents in the large villages. Shortages of medical supplies rarely occurred.

The partisans rarely respected the Red Cross.

II. PARTISAN COMBAT TACTICS

1. Objectives. The strategic objective of the partisans, either by their own choice or as directed by their political and military leaders, was to drive the occupation forces out of the country. To accomplish this they regarded the following as their immediate tasks:

a. Counteracting the political influence of the occupation powers;

b. Preventing the economic exploitation of the occupied area by the enemy;

c. Paralyzing enemy operations by disrupting his supply;

d. Easing the burden of their country's armed forces by tying down enemy forces.

They pursued these aims through continuous activity and through the coordination of their main efforts, with respect

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- 12 -

to time and place, with the strategic objectives of the country's military forces.

In a future war, large-scale cooperation between guerilla bands and airborne troops will have to be expected.

2. The Important Role of Terrain. The success of partisan actions depends on certain geographic conditions. The countries of central and western Europe are small, densely populated, poor in forests, entirely accessible to motorized troops, and easily controlled from the air. In such terrain isolated acts of sabotage can be carried out behind the enemy lines, but effective partisan operations cannot be conducted for any considerable time.

On the other hand, the large areas of eastern and southeastern Europe, which were sparsely populated and little developed, met all the requirements of partisan warfare. The trackless, wooded, and swampy regions of Russia and the rugged mountains of the Balkans enabled the partisans to employ the evasive tactics for which they were noted. Forests, ravines, and caves protected them against attacks from the air and made it easy for them to assemble and shift their forces without being observed. It was easy for them to block passes and forest paths. During delaying actions the ridges

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NS # P-142

- 13 -

and mountain crests time and again facilitated their resistance and numerous points offered opportunities for enveloping attacks, ambush, raids, and quick disappearances.

In this type of terrain the partisans found their best ally, and they proved to be past masters at adapting combat tactics to terrain.

3. The Intelligence Service. The backbone of all partisan activities was the intelligence service. A well-organized observation and spying system, based on thorough knowledge of the locality and the people, reached throughout the country. Its contacts extended even to the staffs of the occupation forces and the offices of the police and administrative agencies. There were partisan agents among all classes of the population. Women or persons who were employed by the occupation forces as drivers, interpreters, office workers and cleaning personnel were preferred as agents. Members of the population with whom off-duty occupation troops came in contact in their quarters, while making purchases, or in public places of any kind were often in the service of the guerillas. In such contacts women played a particularly important role. Frequently agents of the occupation powers worked for the partisans also. Moreover, spies functioned outside of the village, mostly under the guise of road workers,

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MS # P-142

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- 14 -

herdsmen, peasants, or traders. No military movements escaped their notice.

The agents' findings, transmitted from message centers by couriers, reached the partisan headquarters within an amazingly short time. Frequently relay routes were organized for this purpose. A system of optical and sound signals was established for the transmission of communications -- warning messages especially. Smoke and light signals, open windows, the arrangements of laundry hung up to dry, the wearing of certain clothes, the ringing of church bells, the firing of shots, and the blowing of train whistles, often served as pre-arranged signs. At night the bands used fires set in certain orders, flash lamps, and other light signals to communicate with airplanes or to transmit communications on the ground.

The partisans rarely established wire lines, because of the scarcity of materials and the frequent shifts of location. However, they invariably listened in on the postal telephone network or the military lines. The presence of partisan field cables usually indicated that a partisan headquarters was located in the vicinity.

The partisans operational communication medium was radio. With it they maintained contact with their political and military leaders and exchanged communications between

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MS # P-142

- 15 -

headquarters. Radio sets and operators were flown in. The location of transmitting stations was changed frequently. In general, communications were transmitted in code, but unless the operators were Allied personnel, radio discipline was usually not good. In view of the important role played by radio, it is very likely that mobilization plans, in the future, will make provisions for the procurement of equipment and trained personnel for prospective operational areas.

The task of the partisan intelligence service was facilitated by the centralization of the occupation powers' activities in a comparatively few large places where their movements could be observed easily. This centralization was forced by difficulties in the flow of traffic and the shipment of supplies.

4. Sabotage. The partisans' most frequent tactic was sabotage. In this field they were extraordinarily resourceful and versatile.

Their raids were seldom executed on the spur of the moment, or because of a chance opportunity. As a rule they were carried out according to a plan based upon long observation. The guerillas were intent always on making sure that the risk involved was not disproportionate to the chances

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- 16 -

of success. The deliberate damaging of individual vehicles, arson, and other acts of a similar nature which showed no indication of systematic preparation, were as a rule not attributable directly to organized guerilla activities. In areas where occupation forces were quartered, acts of sabotage were directed chiefly against airfields, railway stations, public utility installations, such as power plants and water works, ammunition and fuel depots, and motor pools. Raids upon headquarters and billets were rare.

In most cases saboteurs used mines or bombs equipped with time fuses and concealed under the most varied disguises. In the countryside the objectives preferably chosen were railways, roads, and telephone lines. Guerilla attacks in particular were made in localities such as wooded regions or deep valleys, extending through closed terrain.

In the sabotage of railways, objectives such as switch towers, bridges, and water towers, whose destruction would result in long traffic jams, were particularly exposed to danger. Tracks were frequently demolished at switch points. Under the rails the partisans placed mines in such a manner that they would not explode until a certain number of axes had passed over them, thus defeating the purpose of the buffer cars in front of the engine. Many times bombs were

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MS # P-142

- 17 -

smuggled into the coal tenders. A step-up in sabotage against railways often went hand in hand with definite strategic objectives at the front.¹

Roads were mined and blocked particularly at bends or winding curves. The mines and obstacles were placed at points which could not be bypassed. In addition to wooden box mines which mine detectors could not locate, cement-cased mines closely resembling ordinary stones and indistinguishable from the rubble on the mountain roads were used. Supporting walls, culverts, or bridges were favorite demolition points. Frequently long stretches of road were blocked by deliberately created landslides. Motor vehicle traffic was often hampered by nails, made to stand upright automatically, strewn in the roads.

Telephone lines were disrupted by reaming out sections of the cable, sawing into the poles, and inserting mines at

¹ During the middle of June 1944, when the Russians were on the point of breaking through the lines of Army Group Center, the Soviet army command, using radio messages and propaganda leaflets, called upon the partisans in the regions of White Russia and the northern Ukraine to launch a large-scale attack, during the night of 20 June, in an effort to disrupt transportation behind the German front. Despite the fact that the German command, after learning of this plan, assigned its forces, literally to the last man, to protect the railway, the partisans, in approximately 2000 individual actions at more than 900 points, succeeded that night -- in some cases after bitter close combat -- in destroying the railway and completely paralyzing all traffic during the decisive days.

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NS # P-142

- 18 -

the points of damage. Many times mines were concealed even in the debris of demolished structures whose prompt restoration was of vital importance to the occupation troops. In Russia mines frequently were attached to the bodies of German soldiers killed in action, or hidden close to seriously wounded troops, thus inflicting casualties upon German troops who came to rescue the wounded. It is to be expected that in future conflicts attempts also will be made to contaminate the drinking water used by occupation troops. In measures of this sort the partisans as a rule acted as the initiators, but left the execution to local individuals who, as employees, had free access to the respective installations or objects.

5. Partisan Raids. Often acts of sabotage were carried out in conjunction with raids. Raids upon railways were aimed particularly at trains carrying supplies and at inadequately guarded leave or hospital trains. On the highways, supply columns, construction troops, trouble shooters, and motor vehicles traveling singly were especially imperiled. Units marching in formation were rarely attacked.

Raids were preceded customarily by careful observation of the locality, the habits of the troops, and the strength and organization of their security forces. Ambushes, for the most part, were laid at defiles, road bends, valleys, dense

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NS # P-142

- 19 -

forests, places where the nature of the terrain subdued the noise of battle, and places where it would be difficult for the attacked troops to deploy for action, or escape.

As a rule partisans attacked at night; in the morning after roads and railways had been searched for mines; or during the last hours of the day, so that in case of failure darkness would make pursuit impossible and there would be no way for systematic countermeasures to be taken the same day.

Experience has shown that as a rule raiding parties followed a routine procedure. They did not occupy their positions until just prior to attacking, so as to prevent observation. After scouts had indicated by signals that the train or the vehicle was approaching, the guerillas opened fire at close range, usually with machine guns, and set off mines that had been placed beforehand. At the same time demolition squads sealed off the point of attack from both sides. Raiding parties equipped with hand grenades, taking advantage of the general confusion, broke up any resistance offered and seized weapons, ammunition, documents, and other loot, for the removal of which carrier detachments were in readiness. Prisoners were taken only in exceptional cases. After setting fire to the vehicles, the guerillas quickly

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MS # P-142

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- 20 -

left the scene of attack, taking along the bodies of their dead comrades. In case of failure they made it a rule to retreat in various directions so as to disperse the pursuing forces. They constantly changed the scene of action and for their operations chose locations as far as possible from the band's hideout.

In several occasions individual vehicles were attacked on the open roads by partisans in German uniforms who signalled them to halt or asked for a lift. Sometimes raids were also made on the headquarters of high-ranking officers; on those occasions also the partisans used German uniforms and captured vehicles.

In a number of cases the partisans succeeded in attacking small detachments of occupation troops from ambush and annihilating them aided by the latter's own guides, who turned out to be members of guerilla bands.

6. Combat in Uninhabited Regions. The concentration of large forces is not in keeping with the nature of guerilla warfare. The partisans rarely employed combat units larger than a company or battalion. Only through the encirclement of large areas was it possible to drive a large number of bands together and to engage thousands of guerillas in battles lasting several days.

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MS # P-142

- 21 -

The partisans did not follow any systematic procedure in combat tactics, but varied them according to the situation, terrain conditions, and the personality of the leader. They were averse to fighting in unfamiliar terrain. Whenever their opponents failed to annihilate them completely, immediately upon withdrawal of the occupation troops they infiltrated the areas just cleared. Their forte was extraordinary mobility and skill in taking advantage of terrain conditions. They moved as a rule at night, and they avoided marching in close formation. They kept clear of inhabited localities and roads, and they usually traveled in widely separated units of from 15 to 20 men. Because they were not burdened with supply of trains and were acclimatized to mountain conditions, they were able, even in the mountains, to cover distances up to 25 kilometers as the crow flies.

As far as possible the partisans avoided combat in the open terrain. They realized that there they were at a disadvantage in armament and numbers and they feared the tactical superiority of the occupation troops. In the rare cases in which the latter succeeded in forcing a band into relatively uncovered terrain and engaging it in battle, the guerilla forces were almost invariably destroyed. However, experience showed that if such situations arose the partisans would usually hide all weapons and insignia before the fighting

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- 22 -

developed and would try to make their escape disguised as refugees, in various directions in order to meet again at points arranged in advance. They preferred to operate in swampy regions, mountains, and extensive forests not easily accessible. Here the terrain enabled them to attack from ambush but prevented the occupation troops from making the most of their superiority in heavy weapons and motor transport.

The bands habitually protected areas in which they had established themselves permanently, by a closely-spaced network of outposts, observers, and spies at points days' distant from partisan headquarters. The approaches to their hideouts and positions were mined, blocked by felled trees, and guarded by sentries with machine guns. The reconnoitering of such partisan-occupied areas was an uncommonly difficult task, for reconnaissance patrols were in constant danger of being cut off or lured into ambush.

As a rule attacking troops encountered tenacious resistance even in the outpost area. The outposts gave way only under strong pressure, withdrawing from one line of resistance to another and at the same time making repeated attempts to strike at the attacking troops on the flanks, to draw them into the cross fire of camouflaged machine guns, or with sudden counterthrust to break through their lines and envelop them.

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- 23 -

For the most part the partisan positions were skillfully based on swamps, ravines, or ridges. In many cases several rows of installations were set one behind the other. As a rule machine guns and mortars were placed on high terrain or in positions which made the delivery of flanking fire possible. The installations consisted of earthwork bunkers, log huts, trenches or machine-gun positions blasted into the rock. Most of them could be detected only at close range. Frequently only protracted individual actions could destroy them.

Partisans are extremely vulnerable to flank attacks. Almost invariably they endeavored to avoid envelopment and in the dark fell back to a rear position. They usually exercised great skill in breaking off action with the enemy while under cover of rear guards.

Whenever partisans decided to abandon a region which had become indefensible their withdrawal, as a rule, was effected in several groups using different roads. If their opponents succeeded in encircling one of the bands, the guerillas would probably steal through the surrounding line during the night or with concentrated force would launch a sudden assault in an attempt to break through. When encircled partisans faced a hopeless situation they generally

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MS # P-142

- 24 -

preferred to fight to the last man rather than to let themselves be captured.

Guerillas are little affected by the mass destruction tactics of modern warfare. They are not worth-while targets for saturation bombings or for the fire of rocket projectors or large-caliber guns. They can be destroyed only by infantry forces in close combat.

7. Fighting for Towns and Villages. In raiding un-garrisoned villages the partisans usually aimed at requisitioning food, seizing cattle, and occasionally obtaining recruits by compulsion. Not infrequently the bands were tempted also to raid weakly-manned and inadequately protected strong points. Such attacks were made almost always in the early morning hours when, as experience has shown, sentries are less vigilant. As a rule the villages were surrounded and the telephone wires cut just before the attack. On many occasions the partisans, in striking at weakly garrisoned villages, confined themselves to sudden concentrations of machine gun or mortar fire without attempting a penetration.

In Russia the partisans generally avoided fighting for inhabited localities. Frequently, Russian villages are located in terrain which provide little cover, and their flimsily-constructed buildings are not suited for defense. Only in

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RS # P-142

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- 25 -

forest villages did guerilla bands occasionally offer stiff resistance, and usually to gain time for the transfer of supplies stored there.

In the Balkans, on the other hand, the defense of mountain villages was facilitated by the solid stone structure of their buildings and their frequently strategic location. Whenever partisans withdrew to such villages it could reasonably be assumed that they had constructed fortifications in preparation for the villages' defense. Because the buildings in such villages were widely scattered, it was often possible to establish flanking strong points in separate groups of farmsteads.

In general the partisans ventured to engage in house-to-house fighting only if the destruction of the village in question was not likely to affect them adversely. In most cases they avoided encirclement, leaving behind a population whose participation in the fighting was difficult to prove.

Partisan attacks on large localities held by occupation troops were rare. Some were made in the east, in joint action with the attacking Soviet Army and very close to the front. At such times it became evident that the partisans had been infiltrating into the respective towns for days. As soon as the Germans began their withdrawal, the partisans swiftly attacked from ambush; fired from concealed positions

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MS # P-142

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- 26 -

in cellars, on roofs, and in courtyards; set fires, detonated demolition charges, and attempted to create confusion in every possible way. Repulsing such raids usually entailed heavy losses and required strong forces and heavy weapons.

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CHAPTER 3

ANTI-PARTISAN OPERATIONS

I. THE TROOPS

1. The Command. Units engaged in fighting partisans face enemy forces who are fanatical, who are always ready to attack, and whose numerical inferiority is offset by their knowledge of the country, their mobility, and the support of elements of the population. Because of their mobility and skill in withdrawal, guerilla bands are able to decide whether, when, and where they want to fight. The occupation troops, on the other hand, are usually not familiar with the country. They know nothing about the terrain. They have little contact with the people and frequently do not understand their language. In combat with guerillas they usually cannot take full advantage of their superiority in numbers and heavy weapons, and in forest and mountain terrain they are rarely able to make the most of the mobility afforded them by motorization.

In partisan warfare no established fronts exist. Therein lies the danger of dispersing forces over vast areas difficult to control, for firm, centralized command is the principal prerequisite for mastering the situation.

As soon as there are indications of systematic partisan activities, a "chief of anti-partisan action" should be entrusted with all problems pertaining thereto. To his headquarters should be assigned -- in addition to the staffs generally required for operations and supply -- officers who are familiar with the country and the language, to be in charge of intelligence analysis, construction of strong points and roads, transportation, and communication services. For operations in the Balkans mountain warfare experts should also be assigned.

2. Manpower Requirements. The strength of forces required for anti-partisan operations is contingent on the size of the area to be protected, the number of objectives to be guarded, their distance from headquarters, the extent of the railways and roads, and the nature and degree of danger to which they may be exposed. Repeatedly the commitment of forces too weak or not qualified has resulted in serious setbacks.

Partisans seldom operate within the immediate vicinity of the front, but when the front-line forces have to fight against them, they will employ infantry and engineer troops primarily and, wherever the terrain permits, motorcycle and mobile units also. All members of rear and supply services,

who are the most frequently attacked, must be trained to defend themselves against guerilla raids instantaneously and aggressively. They must be armed adequately and be led by firm, forceful officers. When this was not the case panic and losses which might have been avoided frequently resulted.

In the communications zone replacement units, supply troops, and other elements stationed there should be responsible for guarding adjacent objectives, such as supply depots, railway stations, and bridges, in addition to protecting their areas. Such missions are purely defensive. It is inadvisable to employ units of this type, whose combat value is limited, for offensive action. Because of their lack of experience in mountain and forest combat, their use in anti-partisan operations will invariably lead to excessively high losses and often result in failure, strengthening the fighting spirit of the partisans.

Anti-partisan operations require the commitment of experienced combat troops equipped, trained, and organized in keeping with the nature of the mission. In extensive forest regions light infantry units of the Jaeger type have proven particularly effective. The mountainous Balkans can be kept under control only if mountain troops are employed throughout their extent.

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MS # P-142

UNCLASSIFIED

- 50 -

In operations to restore order in partisan-infested regions a sharp distinction between security missions and offensive actions is not always possible. In such areas combat troops, as far as their strength permits, should not only execute the regular combat missions but should also be responsible for manning the strong points and the security missions pertaining thereto.

Wherever prevailing conditions necessitate the employment for security missions of units with limited combat efficiency, a uniform over-all command for all troops engaged in anti-partisan actions is an absolute necessity. The danger that members of such security detachments may be tempted to become passive -- because of the predominantly defensive character of their functions -- must be obviated.

3. Organization. Troops employed for anti-partisan operations are organized into tactical groups, consisting chiefly of infantry forces, and placed under regimental commanders. In view of the nature of partisan warfare, the battalion is the largest tactical unit which can be controlled by the usual methods. The number of battalions belonging to one tactical group varies according to the respective assignment.

On the whole, heavy infantry weapons are equal to all demands of partisan warfare. In most cases the partisan-infested

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terrain makes it difficult to take along artillery. Moreover, worthwhile targets for artillery are rare. In the Balkans the mountain troops were accompanied by some of their mountain batteries loaded on pack animals. It might be advisable, for strategic operations, to assign several light motorized batteries to the "chief of the anti-partisan action."

In guerilla warfare the protection of roads and railways requires as high a degree of mobility as the conduct of large-scale operations. If fully motorized units are not available each tactical group should have at its disposal at least sufficient motor transport columns for several battalions. The protection of roads requires motorcycle forces. Furthermore, the tactical groups should include engineer units, for the construction of strong points and mine sweeping, and signal troops -- particularly radio companies.

For operations in difficult terrain the organization of "combat detachments" proved successful. They were able to operate for a limited period without the main body of their trains. Customarily they took along a few local vehicles, and in the mountains they used pack animals to transport ammunition and wounded troops.

The assignment of supply and transportation troops and medical units to the tactical groups should be directed by

the "chief of anti-partisan action" in accordance with local conditions.

4. Special Formations.

a. In the Balkans as well as in Russia special anti-partisan detachments were used with remarkable success. They were composed of battle-tryed young soldiers, particularly well qualified physically and specially trained for partisan warfare. These detachments were employed in platoon or company strength for reconnaissance operations or were assigned independent combat missions. Their tactics were adapted to those of the partisans. They used cunning and treachery when expedient, and their favorite methods of combat were raids and attacks from ambush.

Because these special units are difficult to replace their commitment requires careful thought. The inclusion of indigenous volunteers is desirable, but calls for special caution.

b. In addition units of the following types should be assigned to the "chief of anti-partisan action": Armored battalions for road and convoy protection; armored railway trolleys and trains provided with repair and hoisting equipment; searchlight platoons for employment at strong points and for road protection; construction troops for restoring

~~RESTRICTED~~ UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NS # P-142

- 33 -

disrupted communications; military police detachments for supervising of the population; personnel for courts-martial.

5. Indigenous Units. Anti-partisan detachments composed of indigenous personnel have the advantage of a thorough knowledge of partisan combat methods, the terrain, and the language of the country. They are less dependent on supply shipments and more mobile than regular troops. They can render useful service, particularly for reconnaissance in force and in combat patrol actions. On the other hand absolute certainty of their trustworthiness is rarely possible.

These units, which should be commanded by highly experienced officers familiar with the country, should include military cadre personnel, and will have to be organized chiefly on the basis of political considerations. Experience has shown that the employment of political factionists will tend to increase the already intense bitterness and savagery of partisan warfare.

The organization of militia forces for the protection of the population against compulsory recruitment and plundering by the guerillas, as well as the employment of volunteers for police duties and for safeguarding roads and railways, will have to be based entirely on the local and political situation. Such organizations are worthless without weapons

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even though once they are armed, they may easily become a menace.

Extreme caution must be exercised in the employment of other auxiliary personnel from the population -- particularly interpreters, guides, or agents -- because of the close relationship between partisans and other inhabitants.

6. Training. The training of commanders and troops for the peculiarities of guerilla warfare is the chief prerequisite for success in conducting it. In partisan warfare, even more than in operations on established fronts, every subordinate commander and every enlisted man must be able to act independently. The needed self-reliance can be gained only through training and experience.

Troops newly earmarked for anti-partisan action, even if they are combat-experienced, should be made familiar with the special technique of guerilla warfare by employment in minor engagements before assignment to large-scale operations.

The most serious difficulties encountered by the troops arise usually from terrain conditions. Combat in extensive forests, and to an even greater extent in mountains, calls for a high degree of physical proficiency. Many times the terrain makes it impossible for train vehicles to be taken along; as a result the troops are forced to carry everything

they may require for subsistence and combat during a limited period. They must be taught to endure hardship, to acquire frugal habits and to cover great distances, through long systematic training and marches made with full pack in trackless terrain. In the Balkans, troops not accustomed to mountain warfare proved hopelessly inferior to the partisans.

In the partisan-infested terrain orientation is particularly difficult. Careful training in the use of compass and map is required together with practice in determining directions by the stars in order to find one's way and maintain contact at night in forest and mountain regions. The ability to move noiselessly, to encircle the enemy, and to search rarely-frequented terrain for hidden partisans calls for a special technique, which must be practiced.

In mountains and forests the enemy is encountered usually at very close range. Therefore, training for anti-partisan action should place chief emphasis on close combat and particularly on the ability to employ weapons with lightning speed.

The training program should include also skiing, camouflage in snow-covered areas, the construction of igloos, and all characteristic aspects of winter and mountain combat.

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NS / P-142

- 36 -

Mines are the partisans' favorite weapons. All troops should therefore receive training in procedures in mine-infested terrain, and in the technique of mine-clearing.

The training of officers, including high-ranking commanders, must be predicated upon the assumption that in any future conflict partisan warfare will play an important part. Special emphasis should be placed on the constant danger to which supply routes in the East are exposed, the necessity of security measures, the strength of forces required, and the special tactical aspects of guerilla warfare.

Troop training manuals should lay sufficient stress upon the problems of anti-partisan operations. The rear and supply services can be protected from losses or panic if all soldiers are prepared to face a partisan raid as they would meet a surprise air attack. Every large-scale training maneuver should present tactical situations for this purpose.

7. Armament, Equipment, and Supplies.

a. Weapons. Anti-partisan warfare is conducted with regular infantry weapons. These most important for close combat are submachine guns, hand grenades, automatic pistols, and sharp-edged blades.

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Special situations, however, may call for antitank and mountain guns. Heavy projectors and 20-mm flak guns are particularly suitable for strong points. In house-to-house fighting, flame throwers have been employed successfully.

The safeguarding of roads and the protection of convoys require wheeled tanks and armored reconnaissance cars. The protection of railway lines necessitates the use of armored trolleys and may even require the employment of armored railway trains.

b. Equipment. Ample engineer equipment for the removal of obstacles must be provided, together with searchlights for the protection of roads and railways and the encirclement of guerilla bands.

The use of smoke munitions can facilitate the advance of troops in forest and street fighting. It is particularly important that they be equipped with all types of signal pistol ammunition because frequently light and smoke signals will be their only means of communication. Moreover, they should be supplied with sufficient radio equipment, such as radiotelephone and portable radio sets.

Mountain equipment is an absolute necessity in mountainous regions. For large-scale operations pack trains

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MS # F-142

- 38 -

and carrier companies will usually have to be employed. Pack trains are organic parts of mountain units, but carrier companies will have to be improvised. If they are to be made up from the indigenous population, their organization and operation must be carefully supervised.

Special vehicles, in addition to the regular mine detectors, may be needed to clear the main roads of indiscriminately-laid mines. A good vehicle for this purpose is a fast sweeping-machine with a strong rotating broom attached to a pole, approximately 5 meters long, in front of the armored driver's seat. Moreover, the bottom of the driver's seat in any vehicle used for road work in partisan-infested terrain should be protected by armor plate.

Maps for large-scale operations in mountains and forests will usually have to be supplemented with aerial photographs. The point-designation grid map is the most widely used means of orientation.

c. Clothing. To the usual clothing issue camouflage suits, camouflage nets, and parkas for winter wear should be added. Suitable footwear will be extremely important.

d. Provisioning. Troops should be provided with special concentrated food of high caloric content, which can be eaten either raw or cooked, so that the forces can be independent of field kitchens for a stipulated time.

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II. THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

The intelligence service is responsible for the procurement of data needed to conduct anti-partisan operations, as well as for counter-intelligence activities. Satisfactory results depend on tight organization and particularly the avoidance of controversies between military and civilian agencies over authority. Intelligence service calls for political insight as well as technical training. It should be centrally controlled by a well-qualified individual on the staff of the "chief of anti-partisan action."

1. Procurement of Information

a. The conduct of tactical ground reconnaissance is more difficult against partisans than against an established front. Guerilla bands are distributed over large areas; they frequently change the location of their headquarters, and they are warned by their agents, who are indigenous, whenever enemy reconnaissance patrols make their appearance. The employment of anti-partisan detachments for reconnaissance in force has proven successful, particularly when they have been composed of indigenous volunteers.

b. Air reconnaissance is satisfactory in exceptional cases only. Partisans avoid the concentration of large units; they usually march at night, and they are

expert at hiding in the terrain and protecting themselves against detection from the air. But well-camouflaged observation posts, from which the traffic in important sectors is kept under surveillance for long periods of time, will prove helpful in detecting movements of guerilla bands.

c. The evaluation of captured documents, information obtained through counterintelligence, and prisoners' statements calls for reliable interpreters with military training. Statements of prisoners who belong to the fanatical communist intelligentsia can rarely be considered trustworthy. On the other hand, guerillas of low mentality will occasionally give useful information if they are treated well and if their interrogation is conducted skillfully. For this reason partisan leaders should be separated immediately from the rest of the prisoners, to prevent them from influencing the others.

d. Our radio communication intelligence was facilitated frequently by the poor radio discipline of the guerillas. By intercepting messages transmitted in the clear, by listening in, with the aid of captured code keys, on partisan radio communications, and by locating their radio stations, we often found it possible to determine the extent of their organization and the location of their headquarters.

e. Partisans will generally be superior to the occupation forces in conducting undercover activities within their own country. Nevertheless local political trends may provide occupation forces with opportunities to improve their intelligence service. Frequently it is possible also for occupation forces to obtain information from elements of the population who are being terrorized by the guerilla bands.

Reliable agents are difficult to find because of the people's fear of partisan revenge. On the other hand there is great danger that partisan spies will infiltrate the intelligence service of the occupying forces. It is therefore important that the tasks assigned to an agent be limited and that no agent shall ever learn more about the organization of the intelligence service than his specific duties require.

It is easier for agents of occupation forces to operate in large towns than in the country. In rural areas they have to be procured from among the partisans themselves, and as a rule their activities are short-lived.

Where there is political rivalry between leaders of guerilla bands, access to valuable sources of information may be obtained sometimes by promising large sums of money, supplies of weapons, and other rewards in return for services rendered.

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NS # P-142

- 42 -

Success in such efforts requires diplomatic skill and a thorough knowledge of the enemy's internal affairs.

f. Any items of information from the populace should be confirmed several times and by separate messages before it is used as a basis for decisions. Confirmed and unconfirmed reports, distribution and movements of partisan forces, the presumable location of their headquarters, and all other pertinent data should be entered on a map showing the partisan situation. This map should be checked daily.

2. Countermeasures Against Partisan Espionage. Partisans will be hampered in their espionage activities if steps are taken to keep the partisans and the rest of the population apart as far as possible, and if the troops, moreover, have very little contact with the local inhabitants. To the extent that the partisans are isolated, they will be deprived of their chief sources of supply, recruitment, and information. Complete isolation through the evacuation of large areas will be possible only in exceptional cases. Consequently, in regions where the presence of partisans is suspected, the population must be kept under constant surveillance. All inhabitants must be furnished with fingerprinted identity cards and be required to carry them at all times. Frequent checkups must be conducted in towns and

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UNCLASSIFIED

MS # P-142

- 43 -

villages as well as on roads and railways. In the supervision of the population duplication of effort by civilian and military agencies should be avoided.

Well-conceived police raids may succeed in seizing partisan communication centers, transmitting stations, and weapons dumps; at the least they will impede and harass partisan espionage operations. Searches are conducted best between midnight and daybreak and should be carried out in association with agents familiar with local conditions and people.

To cut off the partisans' receipt of supplies by air the approximate air drop area must be ascertained. The forces will have to determine, through night flyers or agents, the method of communication between the planes and the recipients of the dropped supplies. If the troops manage to seize the drop point and to keep it in operation, the partisan planes may continue their aerial deliveries unawares.

Any identified partisan observation posts should be captured by surprise encirclement and mined if the terrain is suitable.

In towns, such sites as parking lots, which can be observed from the hills, should be screened from sight as much as possible. Regular schedules for security measures,

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MS # P-142

- 44 -

the flow of cross-country traffic, and the performance of daily duties which may be observed by the population should be avoided.

No tactical symbols should be used, either for marking road signs or identifying quarters or vehicles. Officers should use standard army vehicles without headquarters flags.

All maps and orders, as well as all private and official documents, should be protected against being stolen or copied. Titles and covers should be changed frequently.

In forests and mountains the functioning of telephones and radios is often handicapped by terrain conditions and atmospheric disturbances. Troops must not fall, on that account, into the error of incautiously transmitting messages in the clear.

Troops engaged in operations should carry no mark of identification other than their identification tags.

Official relations between troops and the populace must be confined to an absolute minimum, and off-duty contact between soldiers and inhabitants must be prevented, as far as possible, by segregation.

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NS # P-142

- 45 -

UNCLASSIFIED

III. SECURITY MEASURES

1. Fundamentals. During anti-partisan operations the danger of dissipating the forces must be guarded against with special care. In addition to taking security measures for the protection of roads and railways, the occupation forces will have to comply with requests from both civilian and military occupation authorities for the safeguarding of all sorts of objects, and at the same time heed appeals for help which come from local inhabitants who are being terrorized by the partisans and which, for tactical and political reasons, should not be ignored.

In keeping with the axiom that whoever tries to protect everything protects nothing, every responsible commander, before assigning forces to any security missions, will have to check and decide in each individual case whether protection is absolutely necessary. It is more advisable to risk temporary imperilment, or even the loss of an objective or a region, than to have occupation forces so reduced in strength that they will give the partisans an incentive to launch surprise attacks and thus score easy victories.

The commander should be guided always by the principle of having available the largest possible number of mobile forces, for taking offensive action against the guerillas;

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MS # P-142

UNCLASSIFIED

- 46 -

otherwise the guerillas will quickly seize the initiative. Frequently it will be sufficient for the commander to advise these seeking assistance to protect themselves and to aid them in organizing their defense.

The employment of troops should be determined according to an order of priority for all security missions. This priority schedul should list the several objectives according to the degree of their emperilment and the strength of forces required for their protection. Details should be entered on a map, which should be kept up to date.

2. Protection of Towns and Villages. In the allocation of protective forces to inhabited localities precedence should be given to localities of vital importance to the occupation forces from tactical considerations or because they are used as administrative centers or for purposes of communication. In most cases, safeguarding such localities calls for defensive measures. As far as possible, these measures should be carried out, as additional duties, by supply, replacement, and other rear service units stationed in the respective localities. For this purpose these troops should be organized into emergency alert units, provided with the necessary weapons, and trained through practice alerts. A well-defined chain of command should be established and a energetic post commander

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UNCLASSIFIED

MS # P-142

- 47 -

placed in charge. It would not be advisable, in partisan-infested regions, to assign such a post to an officer lacking either in initiative or combat experience.

In general a distinction should be made between internal and external security measures. Internal security includes the safeguarding of military installations and the supervision of the local population. This necessitates the location of command posts and quartering of troops in strict segregation from the population. Supply dumps, communication centers, parking lots, and similar installations should be established in areas from which the inhabitants have been evacuated and should be fenced in and guarded by sentries. External security includes protection against surprise attacks and the supervision of all ingoing and outgoing traffic.

Because of the manpower and materiel required, the construction of continuous defensive installations around a locality will rarely be possible, and in most cases it will be unnecessary. On the other hand, positions for infantry troops and heavy weapons must be established, observation towers erected and road obstacles set up at strategic points in the terrain. In manning the various installations it will be advisable for several alert phases to be instituted and for a certain number of heavy weapons to be kept always ready in

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~~RESTRICTED~~ UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

MS # P-142

- 48 -

firing position. It will be absolutely essential for a motorized tactical reserve, assigned to the post commander, to be available at all times, even though small in number.

Monitoring the population can be carried out more effectively through frequent surprise raids than through the establishment of permanent control points, which can easily be evaded.

3. Safeguarding of Objectives. As soon as troops have occupied a locality, sites such as power and water works, railway stations, and airfields, which require special protection, because of their vital importance, must be ascertained. Any decision with regard to the strength of forces required should be based on an estimate of the enemy situation as well as on the size and location of the respective objectives. If necessary, in large installations security measures have to be limited to protection of the most important areas. In many cases a patrol of the installation and the surrounding area, together with inspections at irregular intervals, will be sufficient. The question of whether or not employees of the establishments themselves should be used as guards will have to be settled in accordance with the local and political situation. A constant and thorough check of identification papers will be necessary.

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Where particularly vulnerable objectives in isolated locations are threatened by imminent danger, preliminary measures should be taken for their defense and they should be occupied by a permanent force equipped with heavy weapons. In such a case importance should be attached to establishing a large outpost area, with obstacles and machine gun emplacements echeloned in depth and taking full advantage of all commanding positions and possibilities for flanking fire. The installation should be provided with searchlights, telephone, radio, and signal equipment and stocked with approximately two-weeks supply of food and drinking water.

The commanding officer should be given a clear-cut mission.

4. Protection of Roads and Railways. In eastern theaters of war the safeguarding of supply routes is one of the chief problems confronting the military leadership. Finding a solution is particularly important in regions which offer little chance for withdrawals on parallel roads. In partisan territory the protection of communication channels usually involves an extremely difficult, long-drawn-out, and costly struggle. It requires considerable flexibility of command and it taxes the preserverance of troops.

The establishment of a system of strong points is basic in safeguarding roads and railways and restoring order in

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in partisan-infested regions. Strong points usually consist of groups of buildings prepared for defense. Whenever it is impossible to find suitable structures in tactically expedient locations the necessary installations will have to be built.

The distance between strong points should be determined according to the terrain, the nature of the objectives to be protected, the length and number of roads and railways, and the degree of their vulnerability. In open terrain which can be traversed by vehicles and kept under observation from the air, it will be sufficient usually to establish the strong points far apart, but in extensive forest regions and rugged mountain terrain a closely-spaced network of strong points will be required.

Strong points serve these purposes:

- a. They provide immediate protection for large objectives, such as bridges, tunnels, and for such tactically important stretches of road as passes, serpentine curves, and intersection of main roads.
- b. They restore order in as wide an area of the country as possible.
- c. They guard railways and roads both sides of strong points.

Every strong point should be assigned an area of responsibility. Troops occupying the strong point should be

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UNCLASSIFIED

MS # P-142

- 51 -

thoroughly familiar with the neighboring terrain. Usually several strong points will be combined into control districts in charge of battalion commanders.

For the execution of its mission a strong point should depend only on the forces occupying it. It should be able to hold out against attacks by enemy forces superior in strength until relief can arrive. A strong point should therefore be located with that consideration in view. The site chosen should be strategic and as far as possible in the center of the area of responsibility, so that objectives in need of immediate protection, such as bridges or passes, will be either within the strong point zone or can be covered by fire from the strong point, even at night. The installation should be prepared for all-round defense, and should therefore command an extensive view of the terrain in all directions. If necessary, observation towers should be constructed.

The strong point should be provided with shellproof shelters, trenches, machine-gun emplacements, and positions for heavy weapons. It should be protected by deep wire entanglements and mines and supplied with telephone, radio, and signal equipment and mine detectors. It should be equipped with numerous machine guns, medium and heavy mortars, and 20 mm flak. A sufficient number of searchlights is of special importance.

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UNCLASSIFIED

MS # P-142

- 52 -

Enough ammunition and food for at least two weeks should be stored in the strong point. The supply of drinking water requires careful attention, particularly in mountainous regions.

An all-round field of fire should be created by levelling the ground and clearing it of all growth. Lanes through mine fields and wire obstacles must be shifted frequently. Obstacles made of trees and branches will be of little value. All activities within the strong point should be screened against observation. Wooden structures should be covered with earth, especially in summer, to protect them from being set on fire.

Troops occupying the strong point should be in a position to dispatch strong patrols for action. Their minimum strength, therefore, should be that of a platoon reinforced by heavy weapons. In any event it will be more expedient to establish a few strong points properly constructed and adequately manned than to allow the enemy to seize the initiative because of inadequate forces in defense.

The personality of the commanding officer is of decisive importance. His post requires an enterprising spirit and the exercise of initiative. As a rule the command of a strong point should be entrusted only to an officer who has had combat experience.

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UNCLASSIFIED

- 53 -

NS # P-142

Usually partisans will not make a direct attack on a strong point that is properly constructed and under the command of resolute officers. Instead they will attempt to mine, blow up, or launch surprise attacks on roads and railways in the intermediate terrain. These attempts will have to be counteracted through the mobility of the troops occupying the strong point and the intensification of surveillance.

The strong points will have to send patrols into action at irregular intervals; in the daytime their number should not be less than four men and at night they should be at squad strength. If the terrain permits, use can be made of bicycles, motor vehicles, and railroad handcars. During the night especially it is important for patrols to be frequently stationed in ambush and to keep railway lines under observation. Marching patrols are generally of little value. As a rule patrols should move in widely extended line or column and should employ leap-frog tactics for the sake of protective fire. It may be advisable for a patrol not to interfere, for a while, with a partisan demolition squad sneaking up on a strong point, so as to become acquainted with its method of operation, which changes frequently. If such is the plan, fire should be opened only if there is danger that the squad may escape.

UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED

MS # P-142

- 54 -

At daybreak, troops covered by protective fire should search roads and railways for any mines the partisans may have laid during the preceding night.

The timing of patrols should be synchronized with that of patrols from adjacent strong points. The effectiveness of the patrol system will be increased if their operations are supplemented by motorized major patrols. These major patrols should be dispatched by the several sector command headquarters. The minimum strength of each should be that of a platoon and as far as possible they should be provided with armored reconnaissance cars, machine guns, searchlights, and 20-mm flak mounted on trucks. The assignment of radio cars to these major patrols enables them to be dispatched quickly to any point exposed to danger.

An expedient measure in the management of strong point garrisons and sector reserves is for them to be organized in such a manner that one third of the forces will be engaged in patrol and guard duties and another third will be in a rest area, while the remainders hold themselves in readiness for immediate employment. The groups should be rotated at 24-hour intervals.

The relief of the entire garrison of a strong point at time is unwise, because it prevents the transmittal of experiences to the succeeding garrison.

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MS # P-142

- 55 -

The safeguarding of roads and railways will be facilitated by cutting down all growth and levelling fifty meters of the terrain on either side of the stretch to be defended. The effectiveness of such protection within these sectors and particularly in the vicinity of bridges, narrow passages, and telegraph poles, may be increased through the use of S-mines detonated by pull igniters, wire entanglements, and such simple warning devices as empty tin cans or trip wire. However, barriers will be of no avail if they are not guarded.

In areas particularly exposed to danger the occupation forces may have to establish closed zones which civilians may not enter after dark except at the risk of being shot at without warning. The population should be apprised of such restrictions.

In the mountains any normally minor road defect can cause traffic to be at a standstill for days. The major patrols should therefore be provided with emergency equipment for the removal of obstacles. Motorized engineer or construction troops assigned to the various sector commands should be available for making major repairs.

The employment of low-altitude fighter bombers or helicopters which maintain radio contact with the strong points

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MS / P-142

- 56 -

and sector commands has proven an effective aid in the safeguarding of roads and railways and at the same time keeping watch over chains of hills parallel with the roads and railways. Planes have been used also for aerial deliveries of ammunition, food, and medical supplies to strong points. In the future, helicopters especially will be valuable for protecting supply routes. They must be equipped with searchlights, and low-altitude planes must be armor-plated.

In regions where forests and mountains run parallel to highways and railroads for long stretches it may become necessary, as a last security resort, to clear the surrounding terrain systematically, using strong forces.

5. March Movements in Partisan Territory. Columns marching in formation will rarely be attacked by partisans if the troops observe appropriate tactical principles. However, they may suffer delays or losses because of mined roads and railways, especially when difficult terrain, as in mountains, swamps, or dense forests or the hostile attitude of the population makes withdrawal difficult. Should it become necessary to use a road or railway section on which mines are suspected but cannot be searched out in advance, it will be advisable to send one truck or railway car, loaded with earth, ahead. The bottom of the driver's seat or of the

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ES # P-142

- 57 -

trolley used to push the railway car should be protected with armor plating.

In the protection of marching or resting troops against attacks by partisans, general tactical principles apply. Supply columns and vehicles travelling singly are particularly vulnerable to surprise attacks. On certain routes driving at night, except for patrols, may have to be banned, and during the day vehicles may have to travel in convoys.

For protection, two armored reconnaissance cars and several motorcycle riflemen should usually drive in advance of a convoy. They should reconnoiter the march route and promptly take up strategic positions in the terrain (at intersections, passes or fringes of forests, or on elevated ground). The distance between these forces and the convoy will depend on the prevailing situation and the terrain. If the distances are too great the advance elements will be in danger of being cut off from the rest of the column by road demolitions. A number of motorcycle riflemen should travel in the intervening space. As a rule, armored reconnaissance cars and wheeled tanks should move by pairs.

On particularly exposed stretches of road it may be necessary for the machine gun to advance by leapfrog movements in order to protect the flanks of the columns. When traversing

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UNCLASSIFIED

NS # P-142

- 58 -

dangerous areas the column should advance by phases so as to give the security forces sufficient time to search the terrain and establish commanding positions. If the terrain is suspected, irregular machine-gun fire should be used to draw quickly the fire of any partisans who may be hidden. Delays must be risked; lost time can probably be made up on safe stretches of road.

The rate of march of a convoy depends on the speed at which the slowest vehicle travels. In general the distance between vehicles should be one meter for each kilometer of the rate per hour at which they are moving. On the whole the distance will be determined by terrain and visibility.

The column commander, accompanied by motorcycle messengers, should ride immediately behind the security elements. Large convoys will require sub-commanders, responsible for ten vehicles.

Armored reconnaissance cars should bring up the rear of the convoy. Passengers in all vehicles should keep their weapons ready to be fired. Doors of vehicles should remain open and back flaps of trucks should be down. Machine guns, mounted on trucks and ready for action, should be distributed along the entire length of the column. The convoy must maintain constant radio contact with the nearest strong points.

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UNCLASSIFIED

MS / D-142

- 59 -

If a suspicious locality cannot be bypassed, the troops will have to pass through it, on foot if necessary, covered by the armored reconnaissance cars. They will have to advance, perhaps by rushes, close to the front of the buildings. The vehicles should follow in open order.

If a vehicle column is attacked by partisans, fire should be returned immediately without waiting for orders, and the vehicles should come to a halt. Subsequent action will be determined by circumstances. As a rule, an immediate counter-attack should be launched.

Railway transports should be secured by guards equipped with machine guns and riding on locomotives or tenders protected by sandbags. Guards on supply transports and all personnel on leave and hospital trains should be equipped with small arms and hand grenades. Before starting out and during stops the transport commander should make sure that the security forces are ready for action and should order the stage of alert to be maintained. Whistle signals, to notify troops to leave the train and take up positions on one or the other side of the rail, should be arranged beforehand. All directions should be simple; elaborately worded orders tend to create confusion. A clearly-defined chain of command should be established prior to departure. The safety of the train

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UNCLASSIFIED

MS # P-142

UNCLASSIFIED

- 60 -

or the convoy frequently will depend on the resoluteness and tactical training of the transport commander.

IV. TACTICAL MEASURES

1. Basic Rules. The safety of partisan-infested regions cannot be achieved merely by defensive security measures or by driving the partisans out from time to time. Complete victory requires an attack upon the enemy in his hiding places and ultimately his annihilation. The measures employed are classified, schematically, as

- a) Immediate actions,
- b) Small-scale tactical actions,
- c) Large-scale strategic actions.

They differ in planning, extent of the area involved, and strength of forces employed.

The conduct of operations should be adapted to the peculiarities of partisan tactics. In certain respects, therefore, it will have to deviate from the line of action usually followed in combat against regular military forces. Frontal attacks, break-throughs, and envelopments will rarely be completely successful, in view of the partisans' flank attacks and their reluctance to engage in battle. As a rule, encirclement will be the only possible means of dealing this

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MS / P-142

- 61 -

uncommonly versatile enemy a crushing blow. The prerequisites for the success of such an operation are secrecy of preparations, rapid initial movement, a methodical line of action, and firm command.

The tactical principles of small-scale and large-scale operations are essentially the same. The various measures will be discussed in detail below merely because partisan warfare involves special situations not covered by the general rules of infantry combat.

2. Immediate Actions. In most cases actions of this kind are set in motion by surprise attacks or acts of sabotage on the part of guerilla bands, and the resulting missions are assigned to strong point garrisons, major patrols, and sector reserves respectively. Their success is determined by the rate of speed at which the troops surround the area in which the presence of partisans is suspected.

As soon as a partisan raid has been reported all troops available within a radius of approximately twenty kilometers should be notified. The locally responsible sector commander, who as a rule assumes control, will determine their respective assignments. Any major patrols in the field will be ordered by radio to move to the combat area. If required by the

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UNCLASSIFIED

IS # P-142

- 62 -

situation, additional forces, medical personnel, and towing equipment will be dispatched.

The troops should approach the point of attack in full battle formation. If the partisans engage in battle the troops should launch a flanking attack. Superior guerilla forces should be contained by a frontal attack until a sufficiently large number of troops can be moved up to carry out the envelopment. If the partisans have withdrawn or are in process of disengaging they should be pursued by battle reconnaissance parties without delay. The point of attack should be secured before any salvage operations are undertaken. Reserves should be held available for action.

Frequently, information about the whereabouts of the guerilla forces and knowledge of their habits will enable a commander to dispatch troops for their encirclement without waiting for reconnaissance findings. Such findings, however, may be obtained by air reconnaissance.

If the partisans try to split pursuing troops, by withdrawing in various directions, the commander will have to decide which of the enemy forces he considers most important for envelopment. Hesitation or scattering of forces will result in failure.

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The encirclement will be carried out generally in two phases: the assembly for action and the establishment of the enveloping line. The latter will be the point of departure for the attack. Occasionally, special situations, peculiarities of the terrain, and unforeseen enemy tactics will make it necessary to deviate from the customary procedure. Experience has proven, however, that it is advisable to adhere as much as possible to a certain regularity of action. Otherwise, in difficult forest and mountain terrain, the entire operation may very easily break up into a number of uncoordinated actions.

As a rule the assembly areas are assigned to the troops by radio. The areas will have to be reached by motor transport, sometimes over long detours. Immediately upon detrucking the troops, moving concentrically in developed formation, should advance to the enveloping line and establish contact.

The enveloping line should be chosen in such a manner that it can easily be identified in the terrain through roads, streams, or forest fringes and can be located with certainty even in the dark or despite poor visibility. Sector boundaries and unit boundaries should also be easily recognizable; if possible they should run outside of wooded areas.

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MS # P-142

UNCLASSIFIED

- 64 -

The attack should be launched from the enveloping line, at a time either pre-arranged or ordered by radio. Staggered timing of attacks by various units may disconcert the enemy.

The troop commander should establish his post at a point where he will be able to command the widest possible view of the area being encircled and be able to control the movements of his troops. He should have radio telephone, light signals, and messengers at his service.

Companies should be deployed on a broad front, with platoons and squads advancing abreast of each other. Battle reconnaissance should be carried out from 200 to 300 meters ahead of the front. The heavy weapons should support the attack, advancing in leap-frog movements, or should follow and await instructions of the battalion commander. The inclusion of some heavy weapons far forward, where they will be readily available for delivering direct fire, will be advisable.

The squads should attack either distributed in depth in combat patrol formation or in widely extended line, depending on the terrain. In general a squad may be assigned a frontage of up to 100 meters, and a company up to 800 meters.

Contact between squads and platoons will have to be maintained through observation, light and smoke signals, or messengers. At first it will not be possible to close all gaps

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3 # P-142

UNCLASSIFIED

- 65 -

between squads, so some of the partisans may be able to hide and wait for the attack to pass. But all sections within the enveloping ring must be taken under fire from both sides at all times, in order to prevent the enemy from escaping; and reserves should follow closely wherever the terrain is likely to offer the partisans a chance to attempt a breakthrough. It is particularly important that the boundary positions between the various units be made secure.

When the encirclement has been completed, speed is no longer of greatest importance. Instead, the accurate timing and proper coordination of the advance are prime factors in deciding the outcome of the operation. Undue haste should be avoided. Movements of individual tactical groups should be coordinated constantly by having them advance in phase lines. Stops should be made so that the troops will be given a chance to catch up, to become oriented, and to bring up the heavy weapons. Whenever a halt is made the troops should be ordered to stand by as a protection against surprise attacks, the possibility of which should always be taken into account. The advance should not be continued until all units have established contact and the combat reconnaissance parties have moved far enough forward. Arrangements should be made for light signals to be used, wherever radio telephones cannot

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UNCLASSIFIED

MS # P-142

UNCLASSIFIED

- 66 -

be, to report readiness to set out again. In mountains breakdowns are frequent.

As a rule the units will be given their march orders in accordance with the point designation map. Maintaining the correct course requires constant checking with the prismatic compass.

Special precautions should be taken when moving through deep valleys whose course follows the direction of attack. In such cases troops are exposed to the danger of enemy surprise fire from the hills paralleling the valleys. It will not be feasible to bypass such valleys because the enemy may use them as escape routes. In most cases it will be advisable first to advance on the hills bordering the valley and, after these hills are secured, to continue the advance in the valley.

In certain terrain it may be expedient to halt some portions of the encircling forces right at the start, or while the advance is in progress, and to narrow the encircled area from one side only.

As soon as battle contact has been established it will be possible to ascertain and to what extent the encirclement has been a success.

Troops always should be prepared for partisans to make attempts to break out of the encirclement through a sudden

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UNCLASSIFIED

MS # P-142

UNCLASSIFIED

-67-

assault launched with concentrated force at some favorable point in the terrain. Such intentions must be recognized in time. As soon as there are indications that an escape may be attempted, the troops in the front sector in question should halt their attack and assume defensive positions, distributed as much in depth as terrain conditions and the strength of available forces will allow. The heavy weapons should then place concentrated fire ahead of the danger point. If possible, reserves should be held ready for action in a second line. Machine guns should be so placed behind the line of encirclement that they can sweep with flanking fire, from positions in the rear, all likely routes of escape, such as valleys, ravines, and forest fringes.

In difficult terrain complete success in preventing the enemy from breaking out will not always be possible. In most cases the outcome will be determined during a few decisive moments. The foresight and flexibility of the command and the prompt and resolute action and initiative of combat-experienced NCO's will determine whether or not such attempts at escape will end in a rout of the guerilla bands, the loss of their supplies and weapons and therefore a partial victory, at least.

If the enemy decides to assume the defensive the pocket of resistance should be narrowed and softened up by concentric

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MS # P-142

UNCLASSIFIED

- 68 -

artillery preparation. The bombing of mountainous terrain, because of its fragmentation effect, which is considerable, may break the enemy's fighting spirit.

Many times the troops will find suddenly themselves directly in front of camouflaged partisan installations. The employment of screening smoke may facilitate attack on flanking and heavily fortified positions.

Frequently, the last phase of a systematically conducted action will consist of hand-to-hand fighting. Until this comes to an end the combat area should remain encircled. After the enemy's last resistance has been broken, the terrain through which the attacking troops have passed should be searched for hidden partisan forces.

3. Small-Scale Tactical Actions. These differ from immediate actions only in the planning and in the occasions that give rise to them. They are like immediate actions in tactical execution.

Small-scale tactical actions are commonplace. Although ordered by higher headquarters, they are generally prepared and carried out independently by companies or tactical groups as part of their over-all security mission. Efforts should be made to execute them in systematic succession, thereby giving the partisans no rest and depriving them of the initiative.

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As a rule a tactical measure is undertaken on the basis of a confirmed report to the effect that a guerilla band has established itself in a certain area. Because the partisans have a very alert intelligence service it is frequently impossible, despite all precautions, completely to conceal all preparations for large-scale actions. For that reason operations carried out by smaller forces that strike suddenly hold out promise for at least local victories.

Care should be taken that reconnaissance operations do not jeopardize chances of taking the enemy by surprise. It may therefore be advisable to plan merely from maps, aerial photographs, and data furnished by reliable inhabitants familiar with local conditions. It is particularly important to obtain exact information about the whereabouts of partisan headquarters.

All possible means of deception should be utilized in order to mislead the enemy with regard to the objectives and the timing of actions.

a. Encirclement. This measure offers the best chance for annihilating at least some elements of the guerilla forces. The details of its execution have been discussed under "Immediate Measures." As far as possible, troops should be brought up at night and the encirclement completed by early morning.

While the pocket is being narrowed it will be necessary, as long as the situation is still obscure, to hold strong forces in reserve.

b. Break-through. Frequently, the forces available will not be sufficient for carrying out an envelopment and concentric attack. In that case a properly-executed break-through, aimed at destroying the partisan headquarters, may offer prospect of success. The prerequisites are sufficient striking power, the ability to take the enemy by surprise, and thorough knowledge of the terrain. Time should not be wasted in fire duels; instead, troops should advance in irresistible force, distributed in depth, in spearhead formation. The commander's place should be far to the front. The protection of flanks and rear should be assigned to previously-earmarked support parties. Anti-partisan detachments have proven particularly effective for actions of this kind.

Immediately after the breach has been achieved, the troops must surround and comb the largest possible area.

c. Traps. In some cases anti-partisan detachments have succeeded in luring guerilla bands into a trap and annihilating them. Because of the wariness of the partisans, such an action requires special experience and in many cases

weeks of preparation. Any attempt to use the same device will be doomed to failure.

4. Pursuit. The pursuit of guerilla bands that have been driven from their hiding places or have broken out of encirclement poses special problems. The vast extent of the terrain, which is usually broken by mountain ranges or forests, and the marching capabilities of the partisans, make the maintenance of contact with the withdrawing enemy forces difficult. The manpower and time required will preclude a thorough ferreting-out of the innumerable hiding places established by the partisans in ravines and wooded side valley. Moreover the bands, when routed, will usually re-assemble not long afterward in the rear of the pursuing troops.

Often it will be more effective for motorized troops, instead of following in immediate pursuit, to outrun the fleeing guerillas, in a wide sweep, and to block their advance at a suitable point. However, even this procedure will be completely successful only in those rare cases in which the troops have exact information about the direction of escape. As a rule the bands will have split up and will have succeeded in losing themselves in the terrain.

4. Fighting for Towns and Villages. Localities occupied by partisans should be attacked from the flanks. If the enemy does not give way to this pressure the troops should encircle the locality. While the heavy weapons are taking the locality under concentrated fire, approach roads and particularly dangerous installations should be reconnoitered. The troops should assemble for action organized as assault detachments and support parties. In most cases the attack should be launched from several directions simultaneously so as to split the defending forces.

In combat for inhabited localities the principal danger is that the fighting is likely to disintegrate into uncoordinated actions. This danger must be avoided through firm command, clear-cut combat missions, and limited objectives. The initial target should be projecting sections of the locality or isolated groups of buildings from which flanking fire may be expected. All approaches should be brought under control. The next objective, in small localities, should be a prominent point, like a church or market place; if possible, centrally located. In pursuing the objective the attacking troops must not allow themselves to be diverted from their courses. Any pockets of resistance still intact should be encircled by elements following the attacking troops.

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MS # P-142

- 73 -

Troops fighting in large towns should make it a rule to advance in phases and with flanks and rear covered. Each new phase of attack must be preceded by re-assembly for action and by fire preparation.

The assault detachments will have to advance on both sides of the road, keeping close to the buildings and providing each other with fire support. The supporting weapons should sweep the road with fire. Machine guns should be emplaced on the buildings, in commanding positions. Should it be impossible to deliver fire while the troops are advancing in a rush, this move must be preceded by fire concentration.

Many times the capture of tenaciously defended groups of buildings is achieved best through surprise raids and diversionary attacks. Usually, troops executing the penetration will have to advance across courtyards, gardens, and roofs and through cellars, directing their attack against the enemy's flanks and rear. During such actions the field of fire will be closely restricted. As a rule the troops will engage in close combat.

Submachine guns and hand grenades are the principal weapons used. Flame throwers and assault guns, as well as smoke screens, may support the infantry attack.

~~RESTRICTED~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~ UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

MS # P-142

- 74 -

Reserves, ready for action, should be held outside of the locality under attack. The commanders of such reserves will have to carry out reconnaissance so as to keep informed at all times about the course of battle, which usually is difficult to follow, and the opportunities for employment of the reserves.

A wide encirclement of the locality should prevent the partisans from making their escape.

After the locality has been captured, thorough and repeated searches for concealed partisans and weapons must be made. The inhabitants should be kept under observation until the part they have played in the battle can be determined.

5. Combat at Night. Partisans will generally avoid fighting in the dark. They prefer to launch surprise attacks during the closing hours of the day. However, they generally use the night for sabotage activities and for marching.

Partisans who have been encircled will frequently endeavor to hold out until nightfall and then attempt to break out. In view of the expertness with which the partisans negotiate even the most difficult terrain, it will be impossible, even when troops practice the utmost vigilance, to prevent them from suddenly overrunning the encircling forces. If the troops do not succeed in completing their mission by nightfall,

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MS # P-142

- 75 -

they will probably not succeed in that particular mission.

Night actions against partisans offer prospect of success only if they are executed by highly experienced troops, such as anti-partisan detachments. As a rule these actions will be closely circumscribed and in the nature of raids like those aimed to the destruction of small guerilla bands. Care should be taken that reconnaissance is carried out in such a manner that the enemy will not become aware of the troops' intentions. However, thorough knowledge of the terrain is essential.

Partisan reconnaissance patrols and outposts are most active usually at night. The advancing troops should employ the simplest tactics. The commander should lead the way. Reserves must be kept close at hand. Utmost silence must be observed. Rattling of weapons or equipment must be prevented. The troops must not show any lights; they must even avoid using dimmed flashlights for studying the map. As far as possible, partisan reconnaissance patrols should be allowed to pass. No shots should be fired prior to penetration of the enemy lines, except in cases of utmost emergency. The battle must be fought at closest range.

Before launching tactical actions it will be advisable to use the nighttime for moving the troops into assembly positions in order to make sure that their movements are not

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UNCLASSIFIED

MS # P-142

- 76 -

observed by enemy scouts, as well as to enable them to avail themselves of the entire day following for the execution of their mission. However, the enemy must not be aroused.

Even in large-scale actions requiring several days, efforts should be made to complete certain phases by nightfall. Troops in the forward lines should be ordered to halt in the open terrain where they will have an adequate field of fire. Security detachments should be posted immediately ahead of the front line; then the troops should dig in. Arrangements will have to be made for the artillery and heavy weapons to deliver barrage fire in areas immediately in front of friendly positions. The outpost area should be lit up by parachute flares throughout the night.

6. Combat in Forest Regions. The extensive woodlands in the east, which resemble primeval forests and are frequently swampy, and the particularly wooded mountain regions of the Balkans, give the partisans a feeling of security and facilitate their fighting from ambush.

As a rule the guerilla bands, by falling back, will endeavor to lure advancing troops deeper into the forest and attack them there, at pre-arranged points, in the flanks or in the rear. Because the partisans are not hampered by terrain conditions, it is dangerous, to count even on a forest swamp as barrier.

~~RESTRICTED~~ UNCLASSIFIED

MS # P-142

- 77 -

Usually troops advancing in forest regions will be able to move only on foot, carrying light weapons and portable equipment. Command, integration of units, and orientation will be difficult. The heavy weapons will be unable to establish observation posts or, usually, to follow the foot troops. In many cases high-angle fire, the most effective aid in forest combat, will have to be dispersed with.

Troops engaged in forest combat should be deeply echeloned, to protect their flanks and rear. Squads, moving in single file, should advance at short intervals. Small wooded sections should first be swept with machine-gun fire and then crossed immediately if they cannot be bypassed. In vast woodlands, protruding sections must be seized first in order that the danger of enemy flanking fire may be eliminated. Troops must advance in phases so as to make it possible at all times to re-establish contact, check intelligence data, and reorganize. Accordingly, missions should be closely defined.

Advancing in forests requires much more time than moving in open terrain. Rarely will it be possible to cover more than one kilometer per hour.

Search parties should follow behind the advance lines, especially while moving through dense underbrush. They must take special care to watch out for snipers in trees.

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UNCLASSIFIED

NS # P-142

- 78 -

7. Thorough Combing of the Terrain. It happens frequently that after a partisan surprise attack the troops immediately available will not be sufficient to encircle the region where the partisans are probably located. In such cases usually the only remaining possibility will be to comb at least the immediate vicinity of the scene of attack. It may be advisable to emplace machine guns at suitable points in the terrain and to try to drive the partisans into their line of fire. To this end the troops should comb the terrain organized as combat patrols, moving within call of each other. Reserves should follow in a second wave, advancing in the gaps left by the forward line. The partisans' knowledge of the terrain and their mobility in it will make it unlikely that this attempt will succeed. Indeed, special care will have to be exercised lest the search parties fall into an ambush. If a combat patrol encounters partisan forces, it should halt and the patrols immediately on its left and right should wheel in for an encircling movement.

Combing an area will be particularly effective when the troops, in the course of an operation, have succeeded in encircling a guerilla band. After the encirclement has been tightened, scouts should search the rear area for all likely

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MS # P-142

- 79 -

partisan hiding places, concentrating most of all, on forests, on dense underbrush and high tree tops and, in mountainous regions, on ravines, caves, and crevices.

After the fighting has come to an end, the terrain through which the troops have passed should be combed once more by troops who are organized in a number of successive lines and who, if necessary, will move back and forth several times. For this search extensive forest areas should be divided into several sectors. The search parties should be preceded by a thin line of scouts who will drive out hidden partisans and protect the advancing troops against ambushes and mines. Squads constituting the tactical reserves should follow the search lines in close formation and at short intervals. The tempo of the advance be governed by the rate of speed of the elements that must pass through the most difficult terrain. It is not likely that troops who make a thorough search will be able to cover more than two kilometers per hour. Sectors in which the search has been completed should be cordoned off. In extensive areas radio telephone contact with the wings of the search lines will be advisable.

Before the troops proceed to comb localities or urban districts it will be necessary by rerouting traffic to seal off the area to be searched. The checking of passes and

similar measures should be conducted at points some distance away from the cordon lines, so as to forestall sudden attacks. Reserves (combat patrols) should be brought forward in phases. The cooperation of inhabitants familiar with local conditions may facilitate operations.

Barriers should not be lifted too quickly. Experience has shown frequently that after a search is thought to have been completed partisans will incautiously leave their hiding places.

V. LARGE-SCALE STRATEGIC MEASURES

1. General Factors. Past experience has shown that tactical measures generally are not sufficiently effective to clear a large area of partisans for any considerable length of time. The units employed, ranging in strength from a company to a regiment, are not able to encircle a large enough area. Even with the exercise of the utmost caution, an encirclement of the enemy is achieved only in exceptional cases.

Only large-scale operations can preclude such failures. The enveloping ring of encirclement will have to be large enough to include the smaller areas in which the dislodged guerilla bands are engaged in local withdrawals and shifts.

Operations conducted on a large scale call for the employment of forces in strength, usually several divisions, and take a long

time. They will be worth while only if they are likely to result in the annihilation of large numbers of the enemy forces. Small-scale tactical measures will be absolutely necessary for objectives of the moment, even though they frequently fail to achieve immediate success.

During World War II several large-scale operations were conducted with varying success in Russia as well as in the Balkans, against guerilla bands totalling several thousand men. These actions became necessary when partisan attacks launched from the depth of forests and mountainous regions threatened to cut the supply routes to the front.

2. Planning.

a. Intelligence. Adequate intelligence is a prerequisite for the planning of a strategic operation. The intelligence service should be responsible for procuring the needed data. These data may be verified and supplemented by air reconnaissance. Because the location of headquarters, the strength of forces, and the organization of the bands change almost constantly, all intelligence data must be reviewed and corrected continually, right down to the start of the operation.

b. Extent of the Zone of Operation. In order to prevent the partisans from escaping from the zone of operations before the encirclement is completed, the troops advancing in

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MS # P-142

- 82 -

motorized march must arrive in their assembly areas suddenly and simultaneously. As a result, the extent of the zone of operations will be determined by the road network as well as by the tactical grouping of the enemy.

c. Troop Requirements. The strength of forces should be commensurate with the extent of the encircled area. It should be large enough to develop of an outer line of encirclement without large gaps, and to provide strategic reserves from the very outset.

d. Offensive Strategy. Tactical operations are usually carried out in two phases, assembly and encirclement. But because of the size of the area involved, large-scale strategic operations must usually be conducted in several phases, as described below, to assure the tightness of the encircling line:

(1) The first phase is arrival in the assembly areas. The roads connecting these areas will serve as the security ring to frustrate any attempts at aiding the encircled partisans from the outside. The security ring will constitute the boundary of the zone of operations. During the action this ring of roads will be the route for the movement of strategic reserves as well as the base of operations of supply services. Any tactical disadvantages arising from the location of the line will have to be accepted, for the sake of ultimate strategic success.

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(2) Immediately upon arrival in the several assembly areas the troops, making a concentric advance, should establish contact with each other in an outer line of encirclement. Usually this line will be developed a few kilometers closer to the enemy than the security ring, and should be established in clearly recognizable terrain sectors.

(3) The troops will continue the advance, and by tightening the encirclement and narrowing the enemy outpost area, they will form an inner line of encirclement.

(4) Terrain conditions and enemy tactics may necessitate the establishment of phase lines between the outer and inner line of encirclement.

(5) The inner line of encirclement should serve as the tactical line of departure for the attack. The attack, as a rule, will likewise be executed in phases.

e. Development of the Point of Main Effort. As a general rule partisans rarely offer tenacious resistance, but in most cases they will sooner or later attempt to break out of the encirclement. Frequently a careful study of geographical conditions, the supply, and the political situation beyond the zone of operations will make fairly accurate conclusions with regard to the likely direction of their withdrawal possible. Efforts should be made to force the partisans away from the

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NS # P-142

UNCLASSIFIED

- 84 -

directions in which it is presumed they will try to break out by manipulating the movements of flanking groups in such a way that the partisans' sensitivity to flank attack may be exploited. Seldom, therefore, will systematic tightening of the encirclement by concentric advance consequently be carried out, especially if the opportunity arises to drive the guerillas against a front, such as a river or mountain slope, which constitutes a strong natural defensive position.

Because of the partisans' extraordinary mobility it will be difficult to anticipate their line of action. In many cases, therefore, the point of main effort will develop only during the attack. It will be necessary for the command to keep mobile reserves available at all times so as to be able to effect a quick shift of the point of main effort.

f. Time Schedule. Forest and mountain terrain tend to slow up all movements, especially when heavy weapons are being brought forward. When estimating the time required for marching, combat, and supply during anti-partisan operations, a considerable margin of safety must be allowed. In particular it should be borne in mind that for purposes of command, and in order that troops may rest movements must be halted at night, at least for short periods. Assigning too ambitious a daily objective will compel the troops to advance

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MS # P-142

with undue haste and endanger the cohesion of the encirclement, in difficult terrain, which is characteristic in partisan warfare, troops cannot be expected to cover more than ten to twelve kilometers a day.

5. Weather. Weather conditions will affect the conduct of operations to a greater degree in the mountains than in level terrain. Sudden periods of bad weather, resulting in swollen mountain streams, are likely to upset all time schedules. On the other hand a heavy, steady rain may be useful for screening purposes, although it is likely to increase hardships.

Snow-covered terrain facilitated observation, for friend and foe alike, but makes it difficult for the partisans to hide. Heavy snowfalls and fog for days on end may stop all operations in mountainous regions.

Generally, large-scale operations are conducted best during periods in which bright, long days and clear nights prevail. It will be advisable to consult with mountaineering and weather experts when planning such actions.

3. Preparatory Measures. Careful preparations will have to be made to provide for all contingencies which can be anticipated with reasonable certainty. As little as possible should be left to chance.

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MS # P-142

UNCLASSIFIED

- 26 -

a. Secrecy. The initial arrangements should be confined to a few officers. Subsequently unit commanders should be briefed, by means of map exercises, on the contemplated mode of procedure. The troops should learn nothing about their missions until they are alerted. Attempts should be made to conceal the significance of the stockpiling necessitated by the operation, by creating the impression that there will be movement in a direction actually opposite to that actually intended. The transmittal of fictitious radio and wire communications, the work of agents, and the spreading of rumors among the troops and the population will serve to mislead the partisan intelligence service.

b. Reconnaissance and Intelligence Operations. Information concerning the prospective zone of operations should be gathered cautiously by means of radio direction-finding and air reconnaissance. In order to conceal the purpose of these activities they should be extended to areas not involved. Ground reconnaissance should not be increased. It is especially important that information about road conditions in the partisan territory be obtained. In most cases this can be done only by agents. Any obstacle likely to disrupt traffic on the roads, if not discovered in time, may jeopardize the success of the entire operation.

~~RESTRICTED~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~ UNCLASSIFIED

MS # P-142

UNCLASSIFIED

- 87 -

c. Motor Vehicles. To maintain the surprise element, transportation facilities and ample fuel must be provided. The likelihood of the loss of motor vehicles through the action of mines, particularly during assembly movements, should be taken into account.

d. Air Forces. Arrangements should be made for the employment of fighter bombers and close reconnaissance planes equipped to maintain radio telephone contact with the ground forces. Helicopters should be available for command, observation, and tactical missions. They can also play an important part in the delivery of supplies.

4. Assembly for Action. The operation will be set in motion, usually at night, by means of a code signal.

a. All civilian traffic moving in the direction of the zone of operations must be blocked.

The road safety service, assigned to motorized engineer units, will be charged with protecting the bridges and approach roads to the assembly areas against mines and rock slides. The roads will have to be kept in good repair -- by utilizing construction troops, if necessary -- throughout the operation.

The traffic control service will be responsible for insuring the uninterrupted flow of traffic through defiles and the movement of returning vehicles.

UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED

NS # P-142

- 88 -

Orders issued should clearly define the spheres and zones of responsibility of the several organs of the road safety and traffic control services respectively.

b. The troops, organized as tactical groups, will be dispatched to the several assembly areas in accordance with a loading and transportation table. Units arriving first must secure the area in all directions and send reconnaissance parties into the zone of operations.

5. Development of the Outer Line of Encirclement. The movement of troops to the assembly areas should be timed in such a manner that they will be able to take up their positions and complete the outer line of encirclement the same day. The wings of the tactical groups must not be allowed to overlap as the advance continues.

By nightfall the troops should be ready for defensive action in this line. A close net of outposts should be placed directly ahead of the front. At first it will be sufficient to earmark one company per regiment for use as tactical reserves, but the tightening of the encirclement will make it necessary for these reserves to be increased to one company per battalion.

The outer security ring thus established in the rear of the troops should be maintained throughout the operation. It should

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~~RESTRICTED~~ UNCLASSIFIED

MS # P-142

UNCLASSIFIED

- 89 -

be divided into sectors held by tactical groups, each sector in charge of a commanding officer.

6. Establishment of the Inner Line of Encirclement.

In rugged forest or mountain terrain an envelopment without gaps will be virtually impossible. Therefore the advance from the outer line of encirclement must be made as quickly as possible, in order to narrow the pocket still more. For that purpose the battalions will have to be committed side by side, each holding one company in reserve. Heavy weapons should be assigned by platoons to the companies or kept close by, at the disposal of the battalion commander. This measure will enable each battalion to hold a frontage of up to 2½ kilometers.

For strategic operations it will be advisable to use artillery support primarily for defensive fronts on which increasing pressure is likely to be exerted when the guerilla bands are driven closer and closer together. Only in exceptional cases will it be possible to deliver preparation fire prior to attacking. Frequently, however, combat situations will arise where immediate direct fire will produce good results although artillery fire from positions some distance away cannot be delivered with sufficient promptness and efficacy. It will

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Therefore be practicable, particularly in the mountains, to place some guns with the units in the line farthest forward. During battle contact large forces will of necessity be concentrated at focal points, and therefore contact between units will be in danger of being lost. This is most likely to happen when partisans must to be driven out of villages or permanent-type positions. The movements of troops not directly participating in actions should be halted until it is possible for the advance to continue in unbroken line.

The inner line of encirclement serves as the line of departure for the attack. It will have to be so developed that attempts of partisans to break out at night, while the troops are regrouping, can be repelled. In view of the fact that the partisans are wont to launch sudden attacks, prompt aid by reserves may be counted upon only if the enemy's escape intentions and directions are recognized early enough. Terrain features will often provide clues. It may be expedient to train machine guns and searchlights, echeloned far in the rear, likely channels of escape.

The attack should begin at daybreak. The method of operation has been discussed in detail in the section on "Tactical Measures."

7. Command and Command Facilities. After the command posts of the higher level commanders have been established initially near the security ring, they should if possible not be moved forward more than one after the course of the operation has become more or less discernible. Frequent shifting of positions will make the maintenance of reliable channels of communication difficult. The various command posts should be identified by inconspicuous markings and they should be secured by headquarters guards.

As a rule, contact between the operations staff and the divisions and between the latter and the tactical groups will be maintained by wire and radio. In addition the attachment of one assistant staff officer of the operation staff to each tactical group has proved successful. This officer should have his own radio channels, and it should be his mission to keep the command informed at all times about development at the tactical group and to apprise the latter regularly of the over-all situation. However, during combat in partisan territory it will be necessary to anticipate frequent disruption of these connections. Many times, and particularly in mountainous terrain, the exchange of radio communications will be hampered by mountain ridges and atmospheric disturbances. Motorcycle messengers cannot be employed

~~RESTRICTED~~ UNCLASSIFIED

NS # F-142

UNCLASSIFIED

- 92 -

everywhere. For lower level commands messengers on foot will continue to be the most dependable means of communication, although they will be too slow for higher level command purposes. Therefore the headquarters controlling the operation, as well as the division commanders, will frequently find helicopters to be the only means of gaining an insight into the combat situation and coordinating troop movements. By maintaining radiotelephone contact and having orders and intelligence data dropped from planes, the commanders will be able exercise direct control over events.

Landing fields and message-dropping points should be established in the vicinity of the division command post and, if possible, near the command posts of the tactical groups as well.

8. Supply Services. The procurement of supplies for large-scale operations requires advance planning. In general no special difficulties will be encountered in moving supplies by motor columns as far as the lines of departure within the security ring. From that point on, the question of how close to the area of encirclement the supply vehicles can go, in following the troops, will have to be decided by terrain reconnaissance. In most cases it will be necessary sooner or later to transfer the supplies to light local vehicles,

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UNCLASSIFIED

NS # P-142

- 93 -

and in the mountains to use pack animals or carrier columns. Because of their limited capacities these means of transportation should be used primarily for moving ammunition, evacuating wounded troops, and, frequently, delivering drinking water. Engineer troops should build roads for the pack animals and carriers if necessary.

Because of the severe physical strain which the troops must endure and the impossibility of moving up field kitchens, arrangement will have to be made during combat periods to issue foodstuffs of high calorie content.

In partisan warfare the care of the wounded is primarily a problem of transportation. Helicopters will play a special part, particularly in mountainous regions. First-aid stations, supply routes, and transports of all kinds will require special protection.

VI. SPECIAL ASPECTS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

1. Arms Employed. The peculiarities of the enemy's tactics will make anti-partisan actions almost exclusively the mission of the infantry. This arm can use its motorization to best advantage in safeguarding roads and enveloping large areas. For the most part, however, it will have to conduct operations on foot and, moreover, will frequently have to get

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~~RESTRICTED~~
UNCLASSIFIED

MS P-142

UNCLASSIFIED

- 94 -

along without combat trains. Heavy machine guns and mortars will be its principal supporting weapons. In rare instances during combat in inhabited localities, assault guns have been used in support. The employment of armored and anti-tank units against guerillas, who as a rule do not have such weapons at their disposal, will scarcely be worth-while.

Motorcycle riflemen and mobile units will be utilized for the safeguarding of roads, for convoy duties, and for strategic envelopments. In most cases they will not be able to infiltrate the partisan strongholds.

In trackless forest and mountain regions the artillery, with the exception of mountain guns transported on pack animals, will usually have great difficulty in following the infantry. The establishment of adequate observation posts will be difficult. Moreover, worth-while objectives will be rare. In most cases the firing positions will be too far distant for taking transient targets under prompt and effective fire. On the other hand, guns placed with the foremost elements -- provided the terrain makes this possible -- will occasionally be in a position to deliver highly effective direct fire. The artillery will play a considerably more important role in developing defensive fronts during strategic operations.

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UNCLASSIFIED

MS # P-142

- 95 -

In some cases the air force will be able to participate in partisan combat by taking the enemy under fire and dropping fragmentation bombs. Planes, flying over the terrain during the day, at low altitude and slow speed, will render valuable assistance in protecting roads and railways. Air reconnaissance may supplement intelligence data. although the partisans as a rule manage to avoid observation from the air by moving almost exclusively at night.

In any future partisan warfare helicopters will play a role, the importance of which can hardly be overestimated. Because of the peculiarities of this kind of combat the smaller types of helicopters will be indispensable and ideal aids in command, communication, and observation. Employment of the larger types for tactical missions will in many cases influence the battle decisively.

Engineer support of infantry operations will be an absolute necessity. The engineers' mission will consist chiefly of mine clearance, removal of obstacles, and construction of strong points. In swampy forests and mountain regions the movement of heavy weapons and the transportation of supplies will frequently necessitate the construction of corduroy roads and pathways for carriers and pack animals.

Signal troops will concentrate their efforts on the establishment and maintenance of reliable radio channels.

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~~RESTRICTED~~ UNCLASSIFIED

MS # P-142

UNCLASSIFIED

- 96 -

This assignment is particularly important because wire communications are highly susceptible to disruption through sabotage.

Medical personnel participating in partisan warfare will be frequently compelled to use arms in defending themselves and the wounded in their care.

2. The Treatment of Prisoners. According to international law, civilians have the right to take up arms in the defense of their country, either on their own initiative or at the request of their governments, without being considered members of the regular armed forces. The legality of partisan warfare is thus established.

As long as partisans live up to the terms of the Hague Conventions (Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land) they are entitled to the same treatment by the enemy as are members of the regular armed forces. This is particularly true if they are captured. Even the temporary discarding of weapons and insignia after the fighting does not deprive them to this privilege.

The regulations in question stipulate that these combatants must be under the command of a chief responsible for their actions; must wear specific insignia recognizable from a distance; must carry their weapons openly; and must observe the laws and customs of warfare.

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NS # P-142

UNCLASSIFIED

- 97 -

Captured partisans will frequently be convicted or justifiably suspected of having violated the rules of warfare. In such cases the prisoners are entitled to a regular trial conducted in accordance with the regulations concerning appeal and confirmation of the judgment.

Any orders stipulating that no prisoners shall be taken or that guerillas who have surrendered shall be arbitrarily executed are unlawful.

The immediate isolation of captured political and military partisan leaders, to keep them from influencing other imprisoned guerillas, is advisable. Good treatment, in addition to skillful interrogation methods, will frequently, elicit valuable information.

3. Measures With Respect to the Population. In combat between regular fighting forces, specific distinction is made generally between combatants and members of the population who take no part in the fighting. There is no such differentiation in guerilla warfare. In fact, partisan tactics are based upon the opponents' difficulty in distinguishing between guerillas and non-participants.

Partisans will be aided invariably by the active or passive support of some elements of the population. The guerilla supply services, intelligence network, and recruiting depend

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UNCLASSIFIED

NS # P-142

UNCLASSIFIED

- 98 -

on this assistance primarily. Where the inhabitants refuse to cooperate with the guerillas they cannot long operate.

The foregoing factors necessitate, during partisan combat, certain steps which affect the population as a whole. The nature and scope of such actions will be such as military necessity dictates and international law permits. Even within these limits, however, it must be borne in mind that ill-advised or excessively harsh collective measures may serve to drive elements of the population hitherto loyal or neutral to join the partisan ranks.

Punishment should not be inflicted in a arbitrary manner but should be imposed by the proper authorities through orderly procedure.

a. Evacuation. As a rule attempts through political propaganda, to stop the population from aiding the partisans will be futile. Even threatening them with punishment will achieve only partial success at best. The most effective means of isolating the partisans will be the temporary evacuation of other inhabitants from the gerilla zone of operations.

A measure of this kind can be undertaken only if regions not infested by partisans offer facilities for quartering and provisioning the evacuees. In the thinly-populated areas

UNCLASSIFIED

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NS # P-142

- 99 -

of eastern and southeastern Europe it usually will be feasible, with good organization, to effect resettlements for a limited time.

The voluntary cooperation of the inhabitants is essential. It can be brought about, to a certain extent, through skillful propaganda and political measures and through practical assistance, on the part of the occupation powers, in transportation, food supply, and other problems. It should be emphasized, to the populace, that the temporary evacuation of the area is necessary for their protection against heavy casualties during the forthcoming battles. In principle resettlement is voluntary. Anyone remaining in partisan territory, however, will do so at his own peril, and if suspected of partisan sympathies will be subject to severe punishment.

If possible, the receiving areas should be placed under the protection of the International Red Cross.

The evacuation measure should remain in force at least until the completion of strategic operations launched in partisan terrain. Premature returns should be prevented by closing off the area in question and keeping under surveillance.

b. Curfews and Restricted Areas. The prohibition of night traffic outside of towns and villages may become necessary. As a rule, certain zones, such as railways:

UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED

- 100 -

SS # 7-142

installations, bridges, and patrol beats alongside the roads, will have to be closed off permanently.

c. Clearance of Certain Sections. To hamper espionage activities, in all quartering areas as complete as possible a separation of troops from the population will be advisable. The sections in which occupation forces are billeted must be cleared of the local inhabitants.

d. The Red Cross. Whenever, in distress areas, the provisioning of the population is handled by international charitable organizations, such as the Red Cross, care should be taken that this aid does not extend to regions infested by partisans who will be certain to benefit from it, though indirectly.

e. Identifications. By making it mandatory for every inhabitant to carry an identification card, bearing finger prints, at all times, it may be possible at least to some extent, to hamper the operation of the partisan intelligence service. Orders should be issued requiring anyone leaving his place of residence to have a pass. The wandering-about of itinerant traders, herdsmen, and farm laborers should be strictly prohibited.

One central authority should be responsible for issuing and checking identification papers, and period of validity of such papers should be limited.

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MS # P-142

UNCLASSIFIED

- 101 -

f. Reprisals. The legality, under international law, of reprisals -- such as the devastation of localities outside of actual combat areas, the destruction of supplies, and the seizure of cattle -- is a matter of controversy. In practice, such measures taken during partisan warfare rarely achieve the desired effect. As a rule the opposing side will retaliate with more severe cruelties.

g. Hostages. International agreements concluded in 1949, made the seizure of hostages unlawful.

4. Instruction of Troops and Populace. The inhabitants should be informed promptly of all measures affecting them, as well as all prohibitory decrees and the penalties for violations.

Commanders and units should be briefed, prior to their commitment in anti-partisan actions, by competent persons who furnish them with clear-cut information concerning the most important principles of warfare and international law.

(signed) Ratcliffe

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