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AIDM-2

D/A Rotation Plan Study

Commandant  
THROUGH: Deputy Commandant

Chairman, Fac Grp II

9 Sept 54

(Col. W. W.  
Harris, 248)

1. Please note at Tab <sup>I</sup>A, C-1 of the Department of the Army plan for Progress Rotation of Combat Arms Units which it is understood has been approved in principle by the Chief of Staff. At Tab <sup>I</sup>B is a list of the still unsolved problem areas connected with this rotation plan.

2. Three copies of this have been received and authority has been obtained from General Westmacaland to utilize it within the Faculty with the understanding that it still represents an uncompleted staff action.

3. Group II is analyzing the rotation plan in conjunction with other members of the Faculty particularly Group III with a view of determining any impact that this plan may have on the present course of instruction. Particularly will this be the case in Manpower, possibly considerations in the Logistics course and courses in Part III pertaining to combat capability of ground troops, redeployment schedules and the like. Upon completion of this study appropriate proposals will be processed through the Faculty Board for your consideration.

Incls  
Tabs <sup>I</sup>A & <sup>I</sup>B  
as shown above

DEVERE ARMSTRONG  
Colonel, Arty.  
Chairman, Faculty Group II

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Tab I

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SUMMARY SHEET

TO: CHIEF OF STAFF

FOR: APPROVAL

Plans & Manpower Branch  
Plans Division, OACofS, G-3  
Lt Col Galvort/56810/daj

FILE: GI 370.5

SUBJECT: A Plan for the Oversea Rotation of Combat Arms Units,

U.S. ARMY MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE

DISCUSSION

1. A proposed plan for the oversea rotation of combat arms units has been developed in "A Study on Unit Rotation", and is inclosed herewith. (Tab "A", a Brief of the Study - Tab "B", the study).

2. This plan provides for the following:

- a. The rotation of divisions, separate regiments and separate battalions of the Combat Arms.
- b. An opportunity for the Regular Army Soldier to remain in the same unit for all, or a substantial portion of his career, if he so desires.
- c. The maintenance of unit integrity <sup>on ?</sup> or termination of the oversea tour and return to CONUS.
- d. The conversion of all training divisions into General Reserve divisions, with all basic training being conducted in the General Reserve.
- e. The capability to meet currently programmed Army force commitments overseas, for NATO, and a Western Hemisphere Reserve.
- f. An increase in Army-wide esprit, pride, and professional competency.
- g. An increase in combat potential, and the maintenance of an Army with a greater oversea deployment capability and a broadened peacetime training base.

RECOMMENDATION

Approval of recommendations, Tab "B".

COORDINATION:

- CAFF - Concur -
- G-2 - Concur -
- G-3 - Concur -
- G-4 - Concur -
- COA - Concur -
- GENPO - Concur -
- GLL - Concur -
- TAG
- PsyWar - Concur -

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2 Incl

- 1. Tab A, Brief of "A Study on Unit Rotation"
- 2. Tab B, "A Study on Unit Rotation" w/Annexes A thru D

ROBERT N. YOUNG  
Major General, GS  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

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Tab A

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A STUDY ON UNIT ROTATION

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PROBLEM

1. To develop an Army system of unit rotation that will
  - a. Produce a career insuring a maximum stabilization of assignments in the same unit, thereby increasing enlistments and reenlistments.
  - b. Increase Army wide combat potential through conditions which will increase unit spirit, loyalty and pride, as well as individual professional competency.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. The structure for unit rotation must not exceed programmed strengths.
3. Under the selective service act, personnel entering the Army without previous training must undergo four months of basic training in the CONUS prior to shipment to an overseas assignment.
4. The strength and deployments of the Army for FY 1957 and the foreseeable future thereafter will be as shown in the MRE Committee Report for FY 1957-58. (1,152,000 - 17 Div).
5. No increase in funds will be authorized for the support of unit rotation.
6. The Active Army will contain approximately 50% R.A., enlisted personnel.
7. Dependent housing for personnel participating in the program will be given a high priority, both in the CONUS and overseas Commands.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

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8. The desirability of some form of unit rotation is generally recognized throughout the Army.

9. This study is confined to the development of unit rotation for the combat arms. When approved, G-1, in coordination with G-3 will examine the feasibility of unit rotation for the technical and administrative units.

10. This plan is for conditions short of General War. It will be adaptable for transition to a replacement program during general war.

11. Policies - Some of the policies considered necessary for unit rotation are listed below:

- a. Housing for dependents of individuals will be given high priority.
- b. A unit will not return to the same overseas command in which the last tour was completed, except in Europe.
- c. Units as a matter of policy will return to the same installation for each CONUS tour.
- d. Units will move with a minimum of organizational equipment.
- e. Units will return to the CONUS on transportation bringing their replacement overseas.
- f. Theater and CONUS Army Commanders must be cautioned against the dissipation of participating units of enlisted personnel to fill miscellaneous vacancies.
- g. Opportunity must be provided for the extension of enlistments to cover the overseas tour of the soldier's unit.
- h. Overseas tours will begin and end on embarkation and departure respectively, at the CONUS port.
- i. Movement from the CONUS or oversea station will be direct to the ship without processing through intermediate activities.

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12. Requirements - It is considered that the following minimum requirements are followed:

- a. The maximum amount of the 2 year selectee's overseas tour must be obtained in overseas service, therefore the length of the overseas tour for a unit will be for 17 months or multiples thereof.
- b. The career as a soldier must appeal to the Regular Army Soldier. If the Army gives primary consideration to the R.A. enlisted man, the welfare of the selectee will be provided for automatically.
- c. The capability must be maintained to meet Army force commitments for NATO and for a Western Hemisphere Reserve.
- d. Unit rotation must be adaptable to transition to some form of unit replacement during a period of general war.

13. Method of Rotation.

- a. This plan is primarily a division rotation plan, but will also rotate separate regiments and battalions of the combat arms. During the period a division is in the process of rotation, one of its RCTs will move every other month, with division headquarters accompanying the second RCT. Except when traveling the division will always have two of its organic RCTs under its control.
- b. Units will move direct from their CONUS or overseas station to the ship without processing through a personnel center at the port or other installation. Unit commanders will be responsible for PCM inspections. This will reduce spacer required in TD processing units and overseas pipeline, and provide experience in moving units overseas.
- c. Units will be filled with selectees for six months training prior to overseas movement. Officers accompanying the unit overseas must

be assigned in time to participate in this 6 month training.

d. Since it is too expensive to rotate units overseas and back each 17 months, the tour has been established at 33 months overseas, and 31 months in the CONUS. (Based on two increments of selectees during an overseas tour). This will require one unit in the CONUS for each like unit overseas. In case additional unit deployments are required overseas, a like number of units will be required in the CONUS.

e. The Army structure required for unit rotation in 24 divisions with no training divisions. (See Annex C, Tab B).

f. All basic training will be conducted in General Reserve units (13 divisions) (See Annex D, Tab B).

g. The implementation of this plan is phased over a period of time so that the initial units rotated are, in effect, test units, therefore necessary adjustments can be made as the plan progresses.

h. A target date for the rotation of the first unit is 1 July 1955. Approval of the plan should be announced not later than 30 September 1954, so that it may be publicized throughout the Army, time will be ample to allow personnel to enlist for participating units, and the preparation of directives, regulations, etc., may be completed.

#### DISCUSSION

14. See paragraph 12 thru 25, Tab "B".

#### CONCLUSIONS

15. Within an Army of 1,152,000 men and overseas deployment is shown in the MRE Committee Report for 1957-1958, unit rotation is feasible, but will require certain policy changes in personnel management, training practices and Army structure.

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16. Unit rotation as proposed herein can be expected to provide improved esprit de corps and morale, a capability to meet current worldwide commitments, a greater D-Day deployment capability and broadened peacetime training base, and a capability of transition to some form of unit rotation during a period of emergency to include general war.

RECOMMENDATIONS

17. The following action is recommended:

a. That the subject plan be approved for dispatch to the major overseas commanders for comment and recommendations.

b. That unit rotation as proposed herein be approved for implementation, subject to recommendations by the Overseas Commanders.

c. That letters and cables addressed to major overseas commanders carrying this plan be signed by the Chief of Staff. (Annex "E"). Further recommend that a DA team of representatives from G-1, G-2 and G-3 hand carry letters to CG USARMC and CG AFHQ, prepared to brief each of these commanders on the plan.

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Tab B

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First Draft  
17 June 1954

A STUDY ON UNIT ROTATION

PROBLEM

1. To develop an Army system of unit rotation that will:
  - a. Produce conditions of service in the Army to insure a career of maximum stabilization of personnel in TO&E units and thereby increase enlistments and reenlistments.
  - b. Create unit and Army esprit, loyalty and pride of units which will increase the combat potential of the Army and instill in the individual soldier a jealous realization of self-esteem and professional competency.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. Unit rotation must be accomplished within programmed Army personnel strengths.
3. There will be no change in the law requiring personnel entering the Army without previous training to undergo four months of basic training in the CONUS prior to shipment to an oversea assignment.
4. The strength of the Army and oversea deployments for the foreseeable future will level off at 1,152,000 individuals and 17 divisions as shown in the MRE Committee Report for FY 1957-58.
5. No increase in funds will be authorized for the support of unit rotation.
6. The Active Army at a strength of 1,152,000 will contain approximately 50% Regular Army enlisted personnel.
7. Housing for dependents will be given a high priority, both overseas and in the CONUS.

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FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

8. General

a. Many plans for unit rotation have been proposed in Service publications, in the form of recommendations or suggestions to the Department of the Army, and in student studies prepared at the higher Army Schools. Portions of these studies have been useful in the development of the plan proposed herein; however, in general, these plans do not preserve TO&E unit integrity. They are limited to one type of unit or arm; are in fact an expansion of packet replacement plans to company and battalion size with the packet being broken up by the time the oversea tour is completed; are not based on realistic Army strengths or deployments; or are patterned in concept, but do not include details, after some foreign Army system of unit rotation which is not compatible with U.S. deployments, CONUS population distribution, and the habits and temperament of the average U.S. citizen of military age. This study will present a plan to preserve the identity and continuity of TO&E units at division level and lower, and will not rotate regiments and other units from one division to the other.

b. This study will be confined to the development of a unit rotation plan for the combat arms during a period of peace or conditions short of general war. No attempt will be made initially to include units from the Technical and Administrative Services, except those organic to divisions. When a unit rotation plan is approved for the combat arms, it will be used by G-1 in coordination with G-4 as a basis to develop a unit rotation plan for the Technical Services. G-1 will examine the feasibility of unit rotation in the Administrative Services.

c. This study will not propose a plan for combat rotation and unit replacement or rotation during conditions of general war. It will be adaptable

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for transition to a replacement program during general war.

d. The desirability of some form of unit rotation in the Army is evidenced by the widespread receipt at DA of recommended plans for unit rotation, and documents pointing out deficiencies and problems created by the present system of individual replacement and rotation. An example is at Annex "A".

e. The current individual replacement system has had the effect of reducing the individual soldier to the same status as a piece of equipment which is moved from place to place according to his MOS wherever a blank file exists. This practice has produced many adverse conditions in the Army, some of which have:

(1) Rendered a career as a soldier to be exceedingly unattractive to the young American of the caliber needed by the Army. As a result the Army has experienced a rapid turnover of personnel because of the necessity to maintain a large portion of its strength through Selective Service.

(2) Required a large personnel pipeline.

(3) Required the maintenance of a large training base expensive in money and manpower, and lacking combat potential.

(4) Lowered Army and unit esprit and pride, with a resultant adverse effect on combat efficiency.

(5) Created a general decline in discipline and the production of qualified leaders. The conduct of our prisoners of war in Korea provide an example of this condition.

(6) Created uncertainties and instability in service families to such a degree that experienced noncommissioned officers and trained technicians have separated themselves from the Service.

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f. Unit rotation is practiced by a number of Armies in other countries throughout the world. It has been reported that unit rotation in the armies of Great Britain and Canada has produced a much more satisfactory unit stability than individual rotation as currently practiced in the U.S. Army. A brief summary of the British rotation system is included as Annex "B".

g. Certain facilities and activities, normally expected to be available in the Army, are considered necessary in a successful unit rotation plan, some of which are listed below:

- (1) Dependent housing which must be given high priority in both the CONUS and overseas.
- (2) Educational facilities for dependent children.
- (3) Adequate post exchanges, commissaries and recreational facilities.

#### 9. Policies.

Some of the policies considered necessary to implement unit rotation are listed below:

a. Housing and travel overseas for the dependents of individuals participating in this plan will be given high priority. Furthermore, the tour for dependents should be of sufficient length as to preclude excessive travel costs.

b. A unit will not return to the same oversea command in which its last tour was completed, except for some instances in Europe. For example, constant assignment of the same units should not be made to certain of the less desirable theaters, such as Alaska and Okinawa.

c. Units will as a matter of policy return to the same installation for each CONUS tour.

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d. Units will be moved overseas and returned with a minimum of organizational equipment, such as clothing and small arms.

e. Units being replaced overseas will return to the CONUS on the transportation bringing its replacement overseas.

f. Theater and CONUS Army commanders must be advised that it will be the DA policy to refrain from the dissipation of participating units of enlisted personnel to fill miscellaneous vacancies.

g. The CONUS tour must be for a duration of at least 18 months.

h. Opportunity must be provided for a soldier to extend his enlistment to cover the period of his service overseas with his unit.

i. The oversea tour will begin at the time of embarkation at the CONUS port and terminate at the time of debarkation at the CONUS port.

j. Participating units will move directly from their CONUS or oversea station to the ship without processing through intermediate activities.

10. Requirements.

It is considered that unit rotation must meet the following requirements:

a. Unit rotation must be accomplished within the currently programmed strength of the Army. Where the maintenance of oversea personnel requirements demand the use of selectees, it is necessary that the maximum amount of their two years of service be in an oversea status. In this plan it is considered that the maximum oversea tour that can be expected of a two-year selectee is 17 months. It is, therefore, necessary, in order to prevent a loss in the effective utilization of manpower, to gear the length of oversea tours to the 17-month oversea tour of the selectee, or multiples thereof.

b. The plan must incorporate features which will provide a Regular Army career that will appeal to a high percentage of the enlisted personnel

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entering the Army. An Army which gives primary consideration to the welfare of its permanent personnel will, contrary to some opinions, be one which will have greater appeal to the selectee. If the selectee enters the Service and is assigned to an organization in which the RA personnel are disgruntled because of the feeling that they cannot depend on the Army to furnish any degree of security, are uncertain as to future assignments, are subjected to financial hardship because of frequent moves and because of withdrawal of the so-called fringe benefits, are required to be separated from their families over long periods of time during which no hostilities exist; and are professionally incompetent; certainly he cannot be expected to enlist unless he feels he is unable to find other means of making a living. In order to retain career soldiers in the Army, and to obtain first enlistments by high caliber personnel, it is considered that unit rotation must be accompanied by provisions as follows:

(1) Department of the Army policies must be established which give the soldier reasonable certainty of his future in the Army during peacetime, or in the Army during periods of limited hostilities. He must know that if he so desires, he may spend all or a substantial part of his career in the same unit. Also, he must know that if he remains in the same unit, that each CONUS tour will normally be at the same station.

(2) The tour of duty in the CONUS must be for a term of sufficient length that soldiers and their families will feel that they are not severing all ties with the United States. Yet, it must not be so long that it exceeds the overseas tour, with a resultant requirement for excessive Army strengths required to maintain overseas commitments. The tour overseas should be of sufficient length to preclude excessive cost in the movement of military personnel and their dependents, and to assure the maintenance of the effectiveness of all commands.

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c. The capability must be maintained to meet Army force commitments for NATO and for a Western Hemisphere Reserve.

d. Unit rotation should be adaptable to a transition to some form of unit replacement during a period of general war.

#### 11. Method of Rotation

a. Unit rotation as proposed herein is designed primarily to provide for the rotation of divisions, but will also rotate combat arms separate TO&E regiments and separate TO&E battalions. Within division structure, the basic unit in phasing overseas and back to the States will be the RCT. An RCT will rotate every other month, with the division headquarters moving with the second RCT. Except while in a travel status, the division headquarters will always have two of its organic RCT's under its control. The longest period an RCT will be detached from its parent division (except in the Caribbean, Alaska and Okinawa) will be two months. In nondivisional units, rotation will be by the smallest color-bearing unit, i.e., separate regiments and battalions, which are administratively self-sustaining. Advanced parties will precede all unit movements, arrange details for the turn-over of responsibilities, facilities, and property. Direct communication between participating commanders will be authorized.

b. Under the foregoing arrangement it will take two divisions approximately five months to exchange locations with each other overseas and in the CONUS. It appears that this length of time will be required, at least initially, to turn over property, to maintain continuity in the oversea tactical situation, and to allow for any unforeseen disruption of schedules. After unit rotation is under way, experience factors have been obtained and the desires of oversea commanders expressed, it may be possible to reduce this period to something less than five months.

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c. This type of overseas movement can be made direct from the unit CONUS or overseas station, to the ship without processing by a personnel center at the port or at other intermediate points. The unit commander will be responsible for training his unit to perform its overseas mission and for meeting POM requirements, with the realization that the thoroughness and quality of the training and POM in the CONUS will be reflected in the performance of his unit under a new command overseas. Movement from overseas station will also be made direct to the ship returning to the CONUS. The advantages in this arrangement will be reflected in a reduced requirement for TD personnel spaces in personnel processing installations, a reduction of ineffective time required for travel, and in greater disciplinary control during movement. In addition, all personnel will gain experience in movement from one theater to the other.

d. Personnel moving overseas and returning to the CONUS will remain assigned to their units, therefore, will not be carried in the personnel pipeline. The mid-cycle overseas replacement packet and selectees returning to the CONUS for release from the Service, and replacements for and returnees from overseas units not participating in the unit rotation will continue to be carried as pipeline personnel.

e. Officers accompanying a unit overseas must be assigned to that unit 6 months prior to departure from the CONUS. This will enable the same officers accompanying the unit to participate in the 6-month period of training each unit receives prior to departure from the CONUS.

f. The term of service, world-wide, has in the main been established at 33 months overseas and 31 months in the CONUS. It is considered too expensive to rotate units overseas each 17 months (the length of the selectees'

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tour overseas), therefore, the 33-month overseas tour is based on two increments of selectees per unit tour, one month being deducted for travel of the second group of selectees. It does not appear reasonable that unit rotation will appeal to the average soldier unless the length of the CONUS tour approximates that of the overseas tour. The CONUS tour has been established at 31 months, or the same as that overseas less two months for travel. By the time this plan has been fully implemented Army-wide it is expected that dependent housing will be available in all overseas areas; therefore, the tour will be the same world-wide.

g. A definite balance must be maintained between units overseas and those in the CONUS. When a unit completes its overseas tour, it must be relieved by a like unit in the CONUS which is eligible for overseas service. The number of units overseas and the length of tour both overseas and in the CONUS are factors which determine the number of units required in CONUS stations. The number of like units required overseas and in the CONUS, and the length of their respective tours bears a mathematical relationship as follows:

$$\frac{\text{Length of tour CONUS} \neq 2 \text{ months}}{\text{Number of units in the CONUS}} = \frac{\text{Length of tour overseas}}{\text{Number of like units overseas}}$$

For example, under this plan 11 infantry divisions are deployed overseas, and the tour is 33 months overseas and 31 months in the CONUS.

$$\frac{31 \neq 2}{x} = \frac{33}{11}$$

$$\frac{33}{x} = \frac{33}{11}$$

$$33x = 363$$

x = 11 infantry divisions required in the CONUS.

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h. If the Army is required to increase the number of units overseas by reason of limited hostilities or for other reasons, a corresponding increase in the number of units in the CONUS must be made in accordance with the formula shown in subparagraph g above.

i. This plan contemplated an Army of 24 TO&E divisions, with no training divisions. To provide these 24 divisions, 6 additional infantry divisions will be required in the CONUS. These divisions can be obtained by returning one infantry division from Europe to be replaced by an airborne division and converting all training divisions into TO&E divisions to be a part of the General Reserve. The forces required for unit rotation are shown in Annex "C".

j. All basic individual training will be conducted in the General Reserve combat units. Units serving on a tour in the CONUS will be engaged in one or a possible combination of no more than two of the following activities: (See Annex "D")

- (1) Conducting 8-week basic training of selectees for the Technical and Administrative Services.
- (2) Conducting 16-week basic training of selectees to be assigned:
  - (a) To the unit conducting the training.
  - (b) To TD units or TO&E units not participating in unit rotation, or to OCS, specialists schools, etc.
- (3) Training selectees for 6 months to be assigned as a packet to a specified oversea unit to replace selectees being returned to the CONUS for release from the service.
- (4) Maintaining combat readiness as a D/30-day force.
- (5) Maintaining combat readiness to perform a mission as a Western Hemisphere Reserve.

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k. The implementation of this plan will be phased so that all units will not rotate immediately. For example, division rotations in Europe will begin approximately 6 months apart. The division stationed in Hawaii (the last to be included in rotation) will not rotate to the CONUS until 38 months after the date of implementation of unit rotation. Rotation of divisions in two different oversea theaters will not occur simultaneously until 6 months after the plan is initiated. Under this arrangement the first units to rotate will, in effect, be test units, providing experience factors for the rotation of subsequent units, and establishing the feasibility of the plan. It will be possible, therefore, to make adjustments necessary as unit rotation progresses. (Annex "D")

1. A target date for the rotation of the first unit is 1 July 1955. This would require the filling of the initial participating units by 1 January 1955 for 6 months' training prior to oversea movement. Announcement of the approved plan should not be later than 30 September 1954, so that it may be publicized throughout the Army, and to allow personnel to reenlist for units scheduled to participate. This timing will also allow an ample period for the preparation of directives, regulations, etc., under which unit rotation will operate.

#### DISCUSSION

12. Objective analysis of the foregoing indicates that unit rotation of divisions is possible. Its implementation will require certain changes in current personnel management policies, in training procedures, and in the structure of the Army. The amount of benefit the Army would derive from unit rotation appears to outweigh by far the disadvantages and inconveniences caused during the transition period.

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13. Greater flexibility would be realized under unit rotation as proposed herein, with an increase in the Army's division deployment capability in case of war, and a broadening of its peacetime training base. This is evidenced by its accomplishment of the following:

a. It maintains currently programmed oversea deployments.

b. It provides a tactical division headquarters in the Caribbean, and in Alaska, giving a greater capability for expansion of forces should such action be required.

c. It maintains in the CONUS:

(1) One airborne division as Western Hemisphere Reserve.

(2) Two infantry divisions and one armored division as a D/30-day force.

(3) In addition to the above, seven TO&E divisions (3 armored and 4 infantry) in varying stages of combat readiness. Each of these divisions would have an estimated 45% to 50% of its T/O in trained Regular Army personnel, with the balance of selectees undergoing training in various stages of the basic training cycle. These seven divisions will all possess, in varying degrees, a capability of being deployed for a combat mission whereas if they were performing a sole mission of a replacement center they would, for all practical purposes, have no combat capability within themselves.

d. Except for D/30-day divisions and the Western Hemisphere Reserve division, the training base would consist of the entire General Reserve. (7 divisions - 5 separate regiments and 63 separate battalions). One separate regiment would be available for a full-time mission as a replacement training center in order to retain RTC know-how which will be needed for guidance in case of full mobilization. In case of full mobilization this

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General Reserve would be capable of handling an initial expanded training load and later attaining an early combat readiness after normal component units could take over the details of basic training.

14. The stabilization of personnel assignments in units, as appears possible in this plan, would certainly produce a more efficient and competent combat soldier, along with a higher standard of performance among units.

a. It would be expected that personnel would remain for an extended period in the same unit with a resultant production of highly qualified noncommissioned officers and skilled technicians. These experienced soldiers would be more effective trainers of recruits assigned to the unit and would undoubtedly exert a considerable influence in the direction of favorable acceptance of Army service by the selectee.

b. The foregoing conditions should increase the prestige of noncommissioned officers, and strengthen the respect for authority and discipline, with a noticeable improved unit effectiveness whether in peace or war.

c. Under unit cohesion, individual motivation and unit team work in the accomplishment of a unit mission, in combat or otherwise, will intensify. Over a period of time soldiers will develop extraordinary loyalties to their leaders, their company, and to their unit. This is particularly true in cases where assignments are stabilized for an extended period of time and loyalties must not be transitory in nature. Where these intense loyalties are developed each individual becomes motivated to fight as a team and to maintain the proud name of his unit to a far greater degree than if the background history, the traditions, and past experience of his outfit, and its membership is a matter of indifference.

d. This plan will contribute to the stabilization of officer assignments, particularly in the company grades. As a general rule newly

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commissioned second lieutenants of the combat arms serve a majority of their first 5 or 6 years in troop units, but under the individual replacement system this service is divided among several units. Under unit rotation it will be possible for many officers to remain assigned to the same division or regiment during all or a major portion of their service in the company grades. Due to the small number of field grade officer spaces in combat units, and the desirability of affording as many field grade officers as possible the opportunity of receiving training with troops, it will be necessary to change field grade officer assignments more frequently than company grades. In any event, unit rotation will permit a greater degree of stabilization in all officer grades, inasmuch as it will provide a long range basis for career planning and will increase the number of spaces for officer assignments to General Reserve TO&E units.

15. Certain features of unit rotation can be expected to produce personnel and monetary savings in the Army by reason of the following:

- a. Reduction in the size of the personnel pipeline,
- b. Reduction of the load on personnel processing installations by direct shipment from unit stations to the ship for oversea movement and return.
- c. Lengthening of the CONUS and world-wide oversea tours of Regular Army personnel with a resultant decrease in the frequency of individual changes in assignment and travel.
- d. Increase the reenlistment rate, followed by a reduction in the requirements for basic training of newly inducted personnel.

16. The transfer of unit equipment in place from one unit to the other each time a unit rotates will require careful planning and coordination.

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Difficulties will undoubtedly arise initially, however, as experience is gained, the long term effects of this practice should result in improved maintenance and supply accountability. The realization by unit commanders that they must turn over and account for all of their property in good condition at a given time will provide a strong incentive to stay constantly abreast of the supply and maintenance situation in their commands.

17. The relief of units overseas by another unit from the CONUS should provide training to Army units at large in the relief techniques such as are constantly required in combat. While this relief will not be conducted under combat conditions, it will require essentially the same planning and coordination, and should provide valuable experience for such an operation against an enemy. In addition world-wide training and experience factors will be obtained by the railroads, Military Sea Transport Service, Transportation Corps, and posts, camps and stations in the movement and processing of large units.

18. Should the Army be required to engage in general war, the expense in personnel and equipment will be too great to maintain the number of units required in the CONUS to continue unit rotation. Several methods of providing replacements for oversea units have been proposed in studies by agencies such as Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, the Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College. In most of these plans, some type of packet shipment is proposed, with CONUS replacement training centers designated to support particular oversea units. This concept appears to merit desirable consideration for a condition of general war and can be implemented with unit rotation in effect on D-Day. It would be easier to provide packets containing a balance of personnel grades and skills from TO&E division than

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from a training division. It is pointed out however, that the matter of wartime replacement and rotation should be a matter of separate study, therefore, is not developed herein.

19. In recent years there has been a widespread feeling among young men of the nation that nothing good exists about the Army. This feeling has caused a considerable number of enlistments in other Services as a means of avoiding the draft into the Army. Others have been inducted into the Army with the feeling that "they wouldn't like it, even if it were good", have gone through their two years of service with this attitude, and have been discharged to spread this gospel in the civil community. As a result, the prestige and popularity of the U.S. Army has suffered in the eyes of the American public. Under this plan of unit rotation, where a man knows from the time he starts his basic training that he is to be a member of a certain unit, the majority of our selectees will develop a unit spirit, pride and loyalty characteristically American. These loyalties are natural in the average American. His home community, school, church, and boyhood clubs all stress group progress and welfare through cooperation, team work and collective effort, and demonstrated loyalty under all conditions. Certainly unit rotation would exploit these natural human assets to a greater degree than does individual rotation.

20. The balance of units in the CONUS to those overseas (see par 9g and h) may appear at first glance to be one which would require an excess number of personnel. During conditions short of general war, the replacement training center type of support for oversea units may appear more economical. Even if this were true the RTC system provides little strategic reserve capability. A ceiling must not be placed on the Army which will prohibit a large enough

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CONUS combat unit structure to support oversea commitments. This, coupled with limitations placed on selectees serving for a maximum of only two years, could in case of limited hostilities be disastrous, particularly should general war or another emergency involving limited hostilities occur.

#### CONCLUSIONS

21. Unit rotation within personnel strength of 1,152,000 and oversea deployments shown in the MRE Committee Report for FY 1957-58 is feasible, however, certain policy changes will be required with respect to personnel management, training, and Army structure.

22. Unit rotation as outlined herein can be expected to create conditions that will improve unit and Army-wide esprit, pride and individual professional competency, with a resultant stabilization of personnel and increase in combat potential.

23. The unit rotation plan as developed herein is adaptable to a transition to some form of unit replacement during a period of emergency to include general war.

24. Unit rotation as proposed herein will maintain an Army with a greater oversea deployment capability and at the same time will broaden the peacetime training and mobilization base. It will also maintain deployed oversea forces at a higher combat potential for a war involving the use of atomic weapons.

25. Under unit rotation the capability will be maintained to meet Army force commitments for NATO and for a Western Hemisphere Reserve.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

26. The following action is recommended:

a. That the subject plan be approved for dispatch to the major oversea commanders for comment and recommendations.

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b. That letters addressed to major oversea commanders carrying this plan be signed by the Chief of Staff. (Tab E). Further recommend that this letter be handcarried by a DA team of representatives from G-1, G-3 and G-4 to CINCUSAREUR and CINCAFFE, prepared to brief each of those commanders on the plan.

ANNEX "A"

TO

A STUDY ON UNIT ROTATION

OFFICE OF THE ADVISOR, 49TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
CAL HQ Center, 2295 Webster Street, P O Box 356  
Alameda, California

3 May 1954

General Matthew B. Ridgway  
Chief of Staff, US Army  
Department of the Army  
Washington, 25, D. C.

Dear General:

Enclosed is a copy of a letter prepared by Major Wyatt L. Mitchell, a member of General Curtis D. O'Sullivan's 49th National Guard Infantry Division, which I help advise. I understand you may have seen its interesting content on soldiers' reasons for leaving the Army.

This office had recommended to General O'Sullivan that division officers such as Major Mitchell spend time at Camp Stoneman to present the opportunities in joining the National Guard to soldiers being processed there for separation. The plan was put into effect with worthwhile results.

Visiting Camp Stoneman later we saw that the Division's representative also had an unusual opportunity, during his interviews, to pick up the basic reasons soldiers might express for leaving the service or their ideas on how it might be a more attractive place in which to serve. We thought, as did General O'Sullivan, that General Wyman would be interested in these ideas.

This information looks very valuable to me and confirms in my mind a lot of things I have been thinking. The reasons expressed here were shown to the fine master sergeants and sergeants first class on the job with me and they think, as I do, that most of them hit the nail on the head. They do not agree, however, with the thought of reinstatement of written examinations for promotion. They feel that career soldiers do not worry quite as much about these things as short-timers do but admit that career soldiers are adversely effected by these deficiencies.

Looking over these opinions I remember that our military leaders have been trying to tell us young officers for a number of years how to avoid the mistakes shown here and now these soldiers are telling us the same things, which clinches it. I am circulating these opinions, with my chief's concurrence, among our people for the lesson they contain.

It is interesting to see that they are not saying that they are leaving the Army because it is too tough but because it is not tough enough, in the right way. It isn't the chow, or the uniforms, or the pay, or the danger, or the hard work or the bright attractions of civilian life. They

joined the Army, voluntarily or otherwise with the intent of soldiering and being led with firm and fair military discipline and they ought to have been permitted to do the one and get the other.

I know the present commander of Stoneman well as I relieved him here when I came to California as a regular army advisor, while he went to Korea and did, I believe, a fine job as Deputy Civil Assistance Officer for General Van Fleet. He is one of the most conscientious officers I have ever known in my comparatively short service and has always worked hard at keeping up standards and morale.

I didn't think those troops looked as badly as described by Major Mitchell. But its true that they don't look or feel as they should. I realize that Stoneman's main effort is to move them out as rapidly as possible. At the same time, General, I don't believe these changes in the appearance and thinking of these dissatisfied separatees came about in the short time they were at Camp Stoneman.

I think it began the day they left the 5th RCT and the XVI Corps and the Third Division and the ties of unit and command were broken. And it grew in the division and other replacement units and in the depots, such as Sasebo. And, more quickly, aboard ship.

In February of 1952 I was the executive officer aboard the MSTIS General John Pope and brought over four thousand troops and hundreds of officers home from Sasebo and Korea. In far too many cases the only non-commissioned officers with sufficient self-discipline were the first three graders and they did the corporals' and privates' work because they were reluctant to tell them to do the jobs required. And the bulk of the officers aboard enjoyed the trip and were most hesitant when required to assume their responsibilities with strange sergeants. And by the time they got to Camp Stoneman too many of the John Pope's troops were thinking like these men.

As a young rifle company commander in 1945, I brought a packet of troops home from Antwerp, Belgium to Camp Atterbury, Indiana. And it was the same story. Yet in 1944 I took my own rifle company from Mississippi through Kilmer, England, France, Belgium and Germany and none of this happened.

So the principle cause or causes is not Camp Stoneman or Sasebo or Antwerp but is rather the individual rotation system, as opposed to the unit rotation system, and this is an inherent evil of that system.

I guess that we can't have the unit rotation system at this time so the only positive thing we can do with what we have is to face this condition and alleviate or cure it. My idea of the cure is to emphasize the training of our officers of company and field grade in soldiers' thinking in general and the disciplined, orderly, intelligent movement of packet-type troops in particular. And I think this thing is of vital importance and needs sharp attention.

As the General well knows, we are losing serious numbers of our long term first three graders. And from talking to those leaving and the ones that almost did in this area, I find that the bulk of them made up their minds slowly and progressively somewhere between climbing aboard the troop ship overseas and the end of a long wait in personnel centers on this side waiting for reassignment. Waiting for reassignment in large groups without duties to perform or duties not commensurate with their grades.

This is a low level slant, sir, but here I am on the spot in question, with no axes to grind and worried about it too, as I know you must be. I hope I am in order in unofficially sending you my thoughts and that you can use a grass-roots opinion. I know that this opinion is the joint opinion of the great majority of your foot-soldier officers in my general age and grade bracket that are known to me.

Also is enclosed Major Benigan's arresting clipping from the last Army Times. A different facet of the same problem but it looks to me like these two go hand in hand.

I have said "vo" occasionally in this letter as my present chief, who relieved me as division advisor several months ago, thinks along these lines and the pronoun "I" is not a very becoming one. He is Colonel Irving Landfield, a grand soldier, Class of 1931, who took an infantry battalion through Europe in World War II and commanded the 5th Cavalry Regiment under you in Korea and was a running mate of Colonel Dan Gilmer with the 7th Cavalry Regiment. Later he saw you occasionally while with the IWI Corps in Japan and is, I know, like myself, an admirer and exponent of your methods of operation and expressed beliefs.

Hope these additional thoughts, though nothing new, can be of some small assistance in considering one more of your many problems.

Last fall I attended the National Guard Convention in San Diego and saw and listened to Secretary Stevens as he addressed the convention. Now I'm watching him on television and the tremendous directness, simplicity and integrity of that gentleman is as clear now as it was in San Diego and in a long haul, this way of his and yours must be or become apparent to everyone.

Respectfully,

/s/ JOHN D. AUSTIN  
Lt Colonel Inf

HEADQUARTERS, 160TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION  
California National Guard  
1620 Lindbergh Street  
Stockton, California

2 March 1958

SUBJECT: Results of Interviewing Transferees to Army Reserve to Fulfill Reserve Obligation under subsection 4 (d) (3) UMRS Act.

TO: Commanding General  
49th Infantry Division  
Post Office Box 356  
Alameda, California

1. During your recent visit to this unit, 23 February 1958, in the course of conversation, you requested the results of the un-official questioning of enlisted personnel regarding their reasons for not reenlisting in the Army. These personnel, for the most part, acquired a statutory reserve obligation of eight (8) years upon enlistment or induction, and having served approximately twenty-three (23) months on active duty, were being transferred to the Army Reserve to fulfill their remaining military obligation, as required by subsection 4 (d) (3) UMRS Act.

2. During the course of an interview at the Transfer Center, Camp Stoneman, California, basically to acquaint transferees with the ramifications of the Reserve Components, certain individuals were questioned, with the following results:

a. Due to the laxity of military courtesy and discipline, enlisted men and officers are not taking pride in uniform, unit and/or self.

b. Officers and key non-commissioned officers are too free to state their opinions and grievances in front of the men, thus causing mistrust and disbelief in leaders. They are often times "time serving", doing as little as they can get by with.

c. Men are ordered to perform duties without any explanation as to why the duty is to be performed, or without sufficient explanation to insure that they understand what is to be done.

d. Unit commanders and non-commissioned officers have been relieved of too much of their prerogatives and/or responsibilities. This undoubtedly is due to the fact that they hesitate or neglect to accept responsibilities. As a result NCO's are not receiving responsibilities commensurate with their grade and unit commanders do not uphold or back up orders issued by NCO's. Responsibilities are not being delegated down the chain of command.

- e. Self-discipline is lacking at all grade levels.
- f. Military discipline has become synonymous with punishment.
- g. The relationship among officers and men is one of "self-interest", not one of comradeship and helpfulness. This has been brought about largely as a result of fraternization between officers and men, which has tended to create "buddies", thus allowing favoritism to flourish; therefore, officers do not gain the respect of their men.
- h. There is not enough segregation of the third three-graders - they tend to feel as though they are being treated as children.
- i. Enlisted men and officers should not wear the same uniform, except in combat, this is normal duty and dress uniforms.
- j. Continuous and repeated changes in policy at all levels is too frequent and at many times outrageous.
- k. Housing for dependents in Zone of Interior is not sufficient and in many instances not adequate.
- l. Promotions - length of service is often not considered - young, un-trained or un-qualified men are being promoted over older NCO's. The opinion was expressed that it would be better if written NCO examinations were required for promotion, as well as the establishment of a time in grade policy.
- m. Inductees and enlistees are bitter toward the military service and definitely want to be separated from any military duty as soon as possible. This is largely due to the operation of the Selective Service Boards in the various communities, too many favorites are not being inducted for some trivial reason or another.

3. The above results were obtained from a group of over three-hundred (300) men interviewed and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the undersigned.

4. However, from personal observation it was noted that there was little or no semblance of uniformity, as many different combinations of uniforms were being worn, mostly incorrectly, also torn and worn out clothing was quite apparent, no insignia of rank, or if it was worn, in many cases it was merely pinned on, boots needed polishing and some wore low cuts with civilian socks. In general the men were in need of shave and hair cuts, uniforms needed cleaning and general body cleanliness was sub-standard. Thus indicating a definite lack of pride in uniform, appearance and self.

/s/ WYATT L. MITCHELL  
 Maj, ARMY, CAL HQ  
 Executive

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ANNEX "B"

TO

A STUDY OF UNIT ROTATION

A SUMMARY OF THE UNIT ROTATION PROGRAM IN THE  
UNITED KINGDOM

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UNIT REPLACEMENT SYSTEM

1. Basically the U.K. system is applied only to "teeth area" units that have a standard organization as fighting troops. We apply it to all such units of the Royal Armoured Corps and Infantry and to certain units of the Royal Artillery - e.g., Field Regiments and Divisional Light Anti-Aircraft Regiments - but not to semi-static Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiments. We are at present considering its application to the Royal Engineers. We do not normally consider its application to formations.

2. Organization is a Division, Brigade, etc: a unit is a Regiment or Battalion).

3. The aim of the U.K. system is to keep the Regular element together as a team in the unit throughout its overseas tour.

4. The units round on a rota system with a limit of 3 years' overseas, which is the length of an individual overseas tour. The time spent on Home Service - i.e., in the United Kingdom or Europe - varies and is dependent upon the ratio of units at Home to Overseas. For example, we now have 7 units of the Royal Armoured Corps Overseas and 21 units at Home in Europe and therefore a unit spends nine years on Home Service for every three years spent Overseas. On the other hand we have at present 42 Infantry Battalions overseas and 43 on Home Service, of which 28 are in Europe, with the result that an Infantry Battalion rarely sees the shores of the United Kingdom except in transit.

5. One of the more important snags that the War Office comes up against is that of the inevitable gaps in various theaters whilst reliefs are going on. These gaps are, wherever possible, created in the United Kingdom, but with our resources so stretched today we are often forced to accept them in Overseas theaters which, you will appreciate, has repercussions from the point of view of operational efficiency. (I assume that the United States Army could offset all reliefs direct from the States, where such gaps could more readily be accepted).

6. Although the War Office relieves overseas units as a whole every three years, these units do contain a proportion of National Servicemen and others whose terms of engagement do not extend throughout the overseas tour of their unit, with the result that this proportion of men must normally be replaced. Movement however is reduced to a minimum by sending units Overseas with a slight initial increase to normal establishment and also by allowing them to run down within certain limits during the last few months of their 3-year tour.

7. War Office policy is to bring back everyone serving with the unit at the end of its tour, irrespective of the time an individual has been overseas.

8. The present U.K. system of unit reliefs has only been working since 1962 and was introduced in order to meet the pressing need for greater stability within units. The system is very popular with units; it leads to greater efficiency and is of considerable benefit to morale.

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8. Financiers have been inclined to oppose this scheme as being uneconomical, but the only thing that is open to criticism is the fact that a number of individuals do not complete their full overseas tour. However, figures do not at present show any increase in movement in those Arms which are on the 3-year tour. War Office are determined to keep it going and to adjust it if necessary as the lessons emerge.

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ANNEX C  
TO  
A STUDY ON UNIT ROTATION

FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR UNIT ROTATION

1. An inclosure hereto shows a comparison of the Army major unit structure programmed for FY 1957 (as contained in the Army Mid-Range Estimate Committee Report for 1957), and the Army structure required to implement unit rotation. Units scheduled for inactivation between 1 July 1955 (FY 1956) and 1 July 1956 (FY 1957) have not been included in this rotation plan inasmuch as they will require no replacement overseas at the time of their inactivation.

2. The number of units which must be maintained overseas is the governing factor in determining the number of combat units required for the support of unit rotation. Since the overseas and CONUS tours are basically the same in length, the same number of TO&E units must be maintained in the CONUS as like units deployed overseas. Accordingly, the proposed structure has been adjusted as indicated in red figures on inclosure 1, and as discussed in paragraphs that follow.

3. a. It will be noted that the inclosure shows under the programmed columns, regiments and RCT's deployed overseas as follows:

Okinawa - 1 Inf RCT  
Alaska - 2 Inf RCT's  
Canal Zone - 1 Inf RCT  
Puerto Rico - 1 Inf RCT  
Europe - 3 Armored Cav Regts  
Japan - 1 Airborne RCT

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b. The foregoing units must be included in the unit rotation plan or else the plan will be carried out on a piece meal basis with resultant adverse effects in these units. If RCTs in Alaska, Okinawa and the Caribbean are to be rotated, either new RCTs in the CONUS must be activated, with which they will rotate back and forth continuously to the same overseas area, or RCTs in TO&E divisions must be used to meet these oversea requirements. Since these areas in question are not considered among the most desirable locations for oversea service (except Panama) the RCTs in Alaska and Okinawa are organized into 1 division, and two RCTs serving in Caribbean and the one school troop RCT at Fort Benning are organized into another division. While overseas the division headquarters would be located in the Canal Zone and in Alaska and could assume the responsibilities of Hq USARCARIB and USARAL, respectively, thus reducing TD space requirements in those theaters. While overseas in these areas the division would have some of their RCTs detached, however, this would be for only one tour, as subsequent oversea tours would be to other commands.

c. The RCT in Berlin will become a part of the division minus 1 RCT stationed in Austria and will join it during its CONUS tour.

d. The only airborne RCT stationed overseas is in Japan, consequently, it will rotate continuously to and from this location.

e. Three armored cavalry regiments with three supporting infantry, tank and artillery battalions each are located in Europe. The CONUS balance of artillery and tank battalions will allow rotation,

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however, only two armored cavalry regiments and one armored infantry battalion exist in the CONUS. This imbalance will require the activation of one (1) armored cavalry regiment and two (2) armored infantry battalions. Personnel savings which result from the reduction in the size of the pipeline and the number of transients, a reduced requirement for personnel processing activities and a reduction of overhead at training centers, will make the activation of these units possible.

f. One (1) infantry regiment will remain in being in the CONUS (possibly the 5th Regiment). This unit will be used as an infantry training center, maintaining the technique, know-how, and training programs for use in case of mobilization.

4. In order to improve the balance of infantry divisions overseas to the number in the CONUS, one (1) airborne division will be deployed to Europe and one (1) infantry division returned to the CONUS. This will result in infantry divisions as follows:

CONUS		4
Overseas -		
Europe	3	
Austria, Berlin	1	
AFPE	2	
Alaska, Okinawa	1	
CARIB	1	
Hawaii	<u>1</u>	
Total		9

The balance of four (4) divisions in the CONUS to nine (9) divisions overseas indicates a requirement for five (5) additional infantry divisions

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in the CONUS. These divisions are obtained by activating the five (5) CONUS training divisions into TO&E General Reserve type divisions. All basic training would be done in the General Reserve, which is scheduled in detail in Annex D.

5. Since units are to be phased into unit rotation over a period of time (see Annex D), activations referred to herein will not all be accomplished at the time the plan is initiated but phased throughout the transition to unit rotation as requirements occur. The estimated activation schedule follows:

<u>Unit Division</u>	<u>Activate</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>Move Overseas</u>
I TngDiv 1/	R-6 months 2/	D/30 Force at R-Day	R/13 months
1 Tng Div	R-Day	D/30 Force at R/6 mo.	R/24 months
2 Carib RCTs and Sch Trs	R/10 months	D/30 Force at R/18 mo.	
1 TngDiv	R/10 months	Training at 3/12 mos.	R/18 months
2 TngDiv	R/16 months	Training at 3/18 mo.	R/24 months
Alaska-- Okinawa RCTs	R/25 months	Training overseas packets at R/29 months	
<u>REGIMENTS</u>			
1 ACR	R/14 months	Training at 3/15 mo.	R/22 months
<u>INFANTRY BATTALIONS</u>			
1 AIB	R/5 months	Training at 3/7 mo.	R/13 months
1 AIB	R/16 months	Training at 3/18 mo.	R/24 months

NOTE: 1/ This requirement could be met by one of the existing infantry divisions scheduled for inactivation in FY 1957, and a training division inactivated instead of being converted into a TO&E unit.

2/ R-Day is the day the first unit departs the CONUS under this plan.

6. The foregoing activation schedule indicates that the replacement training capacity would be phased into the General Reserve over a 16-month period, providing a basis for maintaining individual replacement requirements during the transition period. Until unit rotation is fully in effect, special provisions could be made in the oversea areas to provide no CONUS replacements for units with only six (6) months service remaining overseas. When divisions are rotated to the CONUS for the first time, selective service personnel and Regular Army personnel who do not desire to remain with the unit may be retained in the theater to fill existing vacancies. The personnel who enlist for the unit will return to the CONUS, regardless of their service remaining in the current oversea tour.

7. Army strengths for all practical purposes will not be changed in oversea theaters as a result of unit rotation. In the CONUS the total strength will remain essentially the same, however, the General Reserve will increase to an estimated strength of 470,000 with 130,000 trainees included.

8. It is estimated that there will be a savings in transient personnel in the neighborhood of 15-20,000. As these savings accrue these spaces may be converted to structure, possibly an additional RCT or Division. Further savings may develop as experience is gained in implementing the plan.

Inclosure:  
Comparison - Force Structure.

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INCLOSURE

TO

ANNEX C

A COMPARISON OF FORCE STRUCTURE PROGRAMMED  
IN THE MRE COMMITTEE REPORT FOR FY 1957 AND  
FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIRED FOR UNIT ROTATION

NOTES:

- 1/ RCTs in Caribbean, Canal Zone and School Troops organized into a division with headquarters in Canal Zone. RCTs in Alaska and Okinawa organized into a division with headquarters in Alaska.
- 2/ Will not participate in unit rotation.
- 3/ Will rotate overseas to both FA Gun Bns 155mm S.P. and FA Bns 8 in. How. S.P.
- 4/ Division with headquarters in Austria organized from RCT in Berlin and 2 RCTs in Austria.

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COMPARISON

FORCE STRUCTURE PROGRAMS IN THE NEW COMMITTEE REPORT FOR  
FY 1957 AND WHICH PROGRAMS WERE DELETED FOR UNIT MOUNTAIN  
END STRIKE/PH 1, 15, 1957

UNITS	TOTAL		CONUS		OVERSEAS		USAFPE		USAREUR		USFA		USARPAC		CANAL ZONE		P. RICO		RESERVE
	Prog.	Rot.	Prog.	Rot.	Prog.	Rot.	Prog.	Rot.	Prog.	Rot.	Prog.	Rot.	Prog.	Rot.	Prog.	Rot.	Prog.	Rot.	
<b>DIVISIONS</b>	22	24	23	23 1/3	9	10	2 1/3	2	2 1/3	5	5 1/3	1 1/3	1 1/3	1	1	1 1/3	1 1/3	1 1/3	1 1/3
Inf	10	10	1	2 1/3	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Armd	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Abn	2	2	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tng	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>RGTS &amp; RCT's</b>	16	10	6	6	10	4	2	1	4	3					1	0	1	0	2
Inf	9	1	3	1	6	0	1 1/3	0	1 1/3	0					1 1/3	0	1 1/3	0	1 1/3
Armd	5	6	2	3	3	3			3	3									
Abn	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1											
Tng	0	1	0	1	0	0													
<b>OTHER COMBAT UNITS</b>																			
Inf Bns <sup>2/</sup>	1	1	1	1	0	0													
Armd Inf Bns	4	6	1	3	3	3			3	3									
Armd Inf Co <sup>2/</sup>	1	1	1	1	0	0													
Tank Bns	7	7	4	4	3	3			3	3									
Tank Bns, H <sup>2/</sup>	1	1	1	1	0	0													
Ron Bns	2	2	0	0	2	2					1	1			1	1	1		
Tank Co-90mm <sup>2/</sup>	1	1	1	1	0	0													
Tank Co-76mm <sup>2/</sup>	3	3	0	0	3	3													
Tank Plat-90mm <sup>2/</sup>	1	1	1	1	0	0													
FA Bns (See P.2)	75	75	40	40	35	35	8	8	27	27									
AAA Bns	188	188	155	155	33	33													
Engr C. Bns	33	33	19	19	14	14	3	3	11	11									

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COMPARISON  
FORCE STRUCTURE PROGRAMS IN THE JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT FOR  
FY 1957 AND FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS FOR UNIT ROTATION  
AND STRENGTH 1,352,000

	TOTAL		CONUS		OVERSEAS		USAFCE		USAREUR		USFA		USARPAC		CANAL ZONE		P. RTCO		USARAT	
	Prog.	Rot.	Prog.	Rot.	Prog.	Rot.	Prog.	Rot.	Prog.	Rot.	Prog.	Rot.	Prog.	Rot.	Prog.	Rot.	Prog.	Rot.	Prog.	Rot.
	22	24	13	13 1/3	9	10 2/3	2	2 1/3	5	5 1/3	11 1/3	11 1/3	1	1		1 1/2		1 1/2		1 1/2
	11	10	5	5 1/3	0	0 2/3	2	2	4	3 1/3	11 1/3	11 1/3	1	1		1 1/2		1 1/2		1 1/2
	4	4	1	1	1	1		2 1/3	1	1										
	2	2	2	1	0	1				1										
	5	0	5	0	0	0														
	16	10	6	6	10	4	2	1	4	3					1 1/2	0	1 1/2	0	2	0
	9	1	3	1	6	0	1	0	1 1/2	0					1 1/2	0	1 1/2	0	2 1/2	0
	5	5	2	3	3	3			2	3										
	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1												
	0	1	0	1	0	0														
TS																				
TS	1	2	1	1	0	0														
TS	4	6	1	3	3	3			3	3										
TS	1	1	1	1	0	0														
TS	7	7	4	4	3	3			3	3										
TS	1	1	1	1	0	0														
TS	2	2	0	0	2	2					1	1				1	1	1		
TS	1	1	1	1	0	0														
TS	3	3	0	0	3	3														
TS	1	1	1	1	0	0														
TS (Total)	75	75	40	40	35	35	8	8	27	27										
TS	188	188	155	155	33	33														
TS	33	33	19	19	14	14	3	3	11	11										

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UNITS	TOTAL		CONUS		OVERSEAS		USAFPE		USAREUR	
	PREC.	ROT.	PREC.	ROT.	PREC.	ROT.	PREC.	ROT.	PREC.	ROT.
FA Bns	75	75	10	10	35	35	8	8	27	27
How, 155mm, Tow		20		10		10		3		7
How, 155mm, SP (Armd)		1		5		5		1		4
Guns, 155mm, Tow <sup>2/</sup>		7		7						
Guns, 155mm, SP <sup>2/</sup>		11		9		5		1		4
How, 8 in., Tow		10		5		5		1		4
How, 240 in, Tow		3		2		1		1		
How, 105mm, Tow <sup>2/</sup>		2		2						
How, 105mm, SP (Armd)		6		3		3				3
How, 75mm Pack <sup>2/</sup>		1		1						
How, 8 in, SP		4		0		4				4
Oben Bn		4		2		2		1		1
<b>OTHER FA UNITS <sup>2/</sup></b>										
V.H. FA Rkt	8	8	2	2	6	6			6	6
SSM	14	14	5	5	9	9			9	9
Btry, How, 105mm, SP		1		1						
Btry, How, 105mm, Tow		1		1						
Btry, 762mm Rkt		3		3						
Btry, S/Light		2		1		1				1
Plat, S/Light		1		1						

Page 1 of 2 pages

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ANNEX "D"

TO

A STUDY ON UNIT ROTATION

HOW UNIT ROTATION OPERATES

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HOW UNIT ROTATION OPERATES

1. General

a. Attached hereto as inclosures is a series of schedules and charts which show the schedules by which units will rotate, how units in the CONUS support units overseas and the missions assigned to units serving a CONUS tour. The unit designations used in these charts are in most cases arbitrary selections. No attempt has been made to propose a stationing plan, however, it is shown how two units can rotate to the same station for each CONUS tour. The matter of unit designations and stationing in the CONUS is considered to be appropriate for a separate study.

b. Paragraph 11f of the basic study discusses the reasons for the eventual establishment of the world-wide oversea tour at 33 months and the CONUS tour at 31 months. It will be noted in this Annex that initially the tours in the CONUS following duty in the Far East and Alaska are generally for about 25 months. Tours for the first units going to the Far East are as a rule for the duration of 27 months. This exception has been made in order to permit adjustment from the shorter tour currently being served in these areas, and to allow time for the development of housing and other facilities prior to lengthening the oversea tour to 33 months.

c. The schedules herein represent a proposed schedule of events and movements. Variations can be made as to the time the various units are phased into the plan, providing there is always a unit ready in the CONUS to relieve a unit scheduled to return from overseas. It is possible there will be times when the length of both CONUS and oversea tours will need to be varied slightly to meet unforeseen circumstances. This

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practice currently exists in the operation of individual rotation, therefore, moderate variations in tours under unit rotation should not result in appreciable, if any, adverse effects to the Army.

d. In order to eliminate the necessity for individual personnel replacements for units stationed overseas, units departing the CONUS will carry a moderate overstrength to allow for attrition, say 10%, and return if necessary at approximately reduced table strength.

e. This study contemplates the rotation of anti-aircraft battalions, however, because of uncertainty in the timing of unit conversions, no rotation schedule has been included for these units. Inasmuch as 105 AAA battalions are programmed for the CONUS and 33 for overseas, no difficulty is expected in implementing unit rotation for AAA units.

2. Inclosure No. 1 hereto shows a schedule for the rotation of units from CONUS stations to overseas commands and return, and is considered to be self explanatory. It will be noted that shipments have been spaced at as regular intervals as possible with the minimum number of like units moving at one time in any given command so that continuity of operations may be preserved.

3. Inclosure No. 2 shows a series of charts on the rotation of units and how the various Army tasks listed in paragraph 11j, basic study, are assigned.

a. Figure one (1) shows an example of how two divisions exchange stations in the CONUS and support each other overseas. When rotation begins, the 7th Division is in Japan, and schedule to return to the CONUS 15 months later. The 31st Division is scheduled to replace the 7th Division, therefore it must depart from the CONUS port 14 months after rotation begins so the

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7th can be relieved in time to arrive in the CONUS by during the 15th month. For its next overseas tour the 7th Division goes to Europe, and for the third overseas tour beginning at R-Day + 104 months it goes to Hawaii. The 31st Division goes to Europe for its second overseas tour.

b. Each division departing the CONUS is manned by approximately 50% selectees who must arrive back in the CONUS 17 months later for release from the service. Figure 2 shows, by a vertical line drawn at the appropriate mid-term of the overseas tour, when replacements must depart the CONUS to relieve the returning selectees from overseas duty. The number to the right of this vertical line indicates the designation of the CONUS division assigned the responsibility for training these replacements. The selectee replacements for shipment to combat arms units overseas will receive 6 months' training in the States. The period of this training is depicted by a block shaded with diagonal lines during the CONUS tours of the two respective divisions. The number in the block indicates the overseas division to which these trainees will be assigned. For example, the 7th Division will be filled with an overstrength of selectees six months prior to the time replacements must depart the CONUS for the 31st Division. The overstrength will provide for assignment to OCS and technical and highly skilled specialist training at the end of 8 weeks of basic training. The balance of the selectee trainees will be told they are being trained for the 31st Division, will put on the 31st Division patch and be acquainted with the customs, traditions and history of the 31st Division. At the end of a total of six (6) months' training these selectees will be shipped in a packet to the 31st Division and remain with the division until it returns to the CONUS.

c. The block shaded with diagonal lines and covering the last six months of the CONUS tour represents a six-month period when the unit is at

full strength, plus an overstrength to allow for attrition, and is engaged in training the personnel it will take overseas.

d. In figure 2, it will be noted that certain plain white areas remain in the CONUS tours. The time represented by these areas is available for the assignment of other CONUS tasks. Accordingly, as shown in figure 3, the 31st Division is assigned the mission of maintaining a D/30 day ready force status during the periods represented by a block shaded with black dots. During one of the periods from R 7 56, it will be noted that it must also train a packet of replacements for the 14th Division. During the nine-year period for which unit rotation has been scheduled, this occurs once in two other divisions, and can be solved by assigning an overstrength of recruits to the Division to be trained for six (6) months in provisional units or similar means. In the 14th Division, the mission of training a packet of replacements for the 3d Division has been added. The remaining white spaces appearing during the CONUS tour can be used as training time preparatory to taking over a D/30 day force mission, basic training of selectees for 8 weeks or 16 weeks for units not participating in unit rotation or the performance of other missions as required.

4. It has been stated in the basic study (par 11a) that division rotation will be phased by RCTs every other month, the division headquarters moving with the middle RCT. For the sake of simplicity Figures 1, 2 and 3 have not been charted to show RCT phasings but have been based on the times scheduled for the movement of the division headquarters and middle RCT. Figure 4 is a revision of Figure 3 showing an example of phasings by RCT, and which must be used in this detail for accurate planning in the implementation of unit

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rotation. Figure 5 is an expansion of Figure 4 to include the plan of rotation for all participating units.

5. Direct communications will be authorized between commanders of units which rotate with each other. The composition of RCTs relieving each other can be arranged between Commanders concerned, with priority being given to maintaining a high state of combat readiness in the oversea theater. A suggested RCT composition which could be used is as follows:

<u>1st RCT</u>	<u>2d RCT</u>	<u>3d RCT</u>
Sr Officer CG Div Arty	Sr Officer, CG Div	Sr Officer, Asst Div CG
Hq & Hq Btry, Div Arty	Hq, Inf Div	Inf Regt
Inf Regt	Hq Co, Inf Div Div Band	FA Bn (105mm)
FA Bn (105mm)	Inf Regt	Tank Bn FA Bn (155mm)
Engr C Bn	FA Bn (105mm)	AAA Bn
Ord Bn		Repl Co
QM Co	Med Bn	
Signal Co	MP Co Rcn Co	

6. Detailed study of the foregoing reveals the following:
- a. A Western Hemisphere Reserve is maintained.
  - b. A three division force is maintained to fill the Army's D/30 day force mission in case of general war. At the same time these D/30 day forces are being maintained, other divisions are moving overseas in a state of combat readiness while others in the CONUS are virtually ready to move overseas. Those divisions prepared to move overseas, and those enroute overseas, increase the Army's deployment capability, in case of a general war, over and above the three division D/30 day force.

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c. In view of the fact that all basic training will be conducted in an expanded General Reserve, the peacetime training base will be broadened. In case of full mobilization this General Reserve will be capable of absorbing an immediately expanded training load and later attaining an early readiness for deployment to an area of hostilities after Reserve component units have taken over the replacement training center mission.

2 Incl

1. Rotation Schedule
2. Tasks for Units in the CONUS, and Units overseas

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INCLOSURE NO. 1

TO

ANNEX "D"

ROTATION SCHEDULE

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ROTATION SCHEDULE

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TYPE/UNIT THEATER MONTH	FA BN 155MM HOW SP (ARMD)				FA BN-155MM GUN SP FA BN-8# HOW SP				FA BN 8 in. HOW TOW				
	EUROPE		AFPE		EUROPE		AFPE		EUROPE		AFPE		
	DEPART CONUS	RETURN TO CONUS	DEPART CONUS	RETURN TO CONUS	DEPART CONUS	RETURN TO CONUS	DEPART CONUS	RETURN TO CONUS	DEPART CONUS	RETURN TO CONUS	DEPART CONUS	RETURN TO CONUS	
R													
1													
2													
3													
4													
5													
6													
7													
8													
9													
10													
11					1	10							
12	1	6											
13									1	6			
14													
15					2	11							
16													
17	2	7						9	14				
18			5	10									
19					3	12				2	7	5	10
20													
21													
22	3	8											
23					4	13				3	8		
24													
25													
26													
27	4	9			5	21 <sup>3/</sup>							
28										4	9		
29													
30													
31					6	22 <sup>3/</sup>							
32													
33													
34													
35					7	23 <sup>3/</sup>							
36													
37													
38													
39					8	24 <sup>3/</sup>							
40													
41													
42													
43					14	1	10	9					
44	10	1	6	5						10	1	6	5
45													
46													
47					11	2							
48													

- NOTES:
- 1/ Arrives in the CONUS 1 Month later.
  - 2/ Airborne Divisions.
  - 3/ Equipped in Europe with Howitzers 8in S.P.
  - 4/ Stationed in Okinawa.
  - 5/ Stationed in Puerto Rico.
  - 6/ Stationed in the Canal Zone.
  - 7/ Serving as School Troops.

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8	3			3		7	2	
9	4			5 <sup>3/</sup>		8	3	
5	10	1	6	9	14	5	10	1
2	7			2	11	2	7	
3	8			3	12	3	8	
4	9			4	13	4	9	
				5	21 <sup>3/</sup>	5		
				6	22 <sup>3/</sup>	6		
				7	23 <sup>3/</sup>	7		
				8	24 <sup>3/</sup>	8		
6	5	10	1	10	9	14	1	6

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INCLOSURE NO. 2  
to  
ANNEX "D"

ACTIVITIES OF CONUS STATIONED UNITS AND UNITS STATIONED OVERSEAS

CONTENTS:

1. Legend
2. Figure 1, Example - How units rotate overseas and return to the CONUS.
3. Figure 2, Example - How selectees are replaced overseas, and periods allocated for training prior to movement overseas.
4. Figure 3, Example - Tasks assigned to units in the CONUS.
5. Figure 4, Example - RCT phasings in division rotation.
6. Figure 5, in 5 pages - Proposed schedule of tasks assigned units in the CONUS, and unit assignments to over-sea commands.

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UNIT	R-DAY	5	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	108	
	MONTH																							



FIGURE 1

NOTE: BOTH DIVISIONS OCCUPY SAME STATION WHEN IN CONUS




FIGURE 2




FIGURE 3






FIGURE 4

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
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LEGEND

	CONUS TOUR -(LARGE BLOCKS DEFINED WITH BORDERING BLACK LINE
	CONDUCTING BASIC TRAINING - 8 OR 16 WEEKS - OR OTHER MISSIONS
	STATIONED IN EUROPE
	WESTERN HEMISPHERE RESERVE
	TRAINING SELECTEE PACKET FOR THE 7TH DIV, REGT OR BN OVERSEAS
	TRAINING SELECTEES TO ACCOMPANY THE UNIT OVERSEAS
	D+ 30 DAY FORCE
	PACKET OF REPLACEMENTS DEPART CONUS - FROM THE 7TH DIV, REGT OR BN
	OCCUPY SAME CONUS STATION

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
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FIGURE 5, IN 5 PAGES

04 100

UNITS	MONTH																						
	5	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	108	
ABN RCTS																							
508 TH																							
187 TH																							
CAY REGTS.																							
2ND																							
3RD																							
6 TH																							
11 TH																							
14 TH																							
15 TH																							
INF BNS(ARMED) - ALL OVERSEAS STATIONS IN EUROPE																							
7 TH																							
4 TH																							
8 TH																							
5 TH																							
9 TH																							
6 TH																							
ARMED FA BNS - 105MM HOW.S.P. - ALL OVERSEAS STATIONS IN EUROPE																							
1ST																							
4TH																							
2ND																							
5TH																							
3RD																							
6TH																							
TANK BNS - 120MM-ALL OVERSEAS STATIONS IN EUROPE																							
1ST																							
5TH																							
2ND																							
6TH																							
3RD																							
7TH																							
4TH																							
FA BNS - 240 IN HOWTOW																							
1ST																							
3RD																							
2ND																							
FA QB																							
1ST																							
3RD																							
2ND																							
4TH																							

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MONTH

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 108

UNITS

F. A. BNS 155 GUN SPI& B IN HOW SP - NOTE: NOS 21 THRU 24 ARE B IN HOW BNS - ALL OVERSEAS EUR EXCEPT AS SHOWN

1 ST	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	108
10 TH	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	108
2 ND	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	108
11 TH	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	108
3 RD	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	108
12 TH	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	108
4 TH	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	108
13 TH	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	108
5 TH	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	108
21 ST	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	108
6 TH	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	108
22 ND	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	108
7 TH	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	108
23 RD	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	108
8 TH	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	108
24 TH	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	108
9 TH	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	108
14 TH	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	108


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UNITS	MONTH																						
	5	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	106	
ENGR G BNS - ALL OVERSEAS STATIONS IN EUROPE EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE INDICATED																							
1ST																							
20TH																							
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21ST																							
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32ND																							
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33RD																							
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17TH																							
18TH																							
19TH																							

NOTE. } N - CANNOT EXCHANGE CONUS STATIONS

Tab II

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PERSONNEL PROBLEM AREAS  
IN  
UNIT ROTATION

The following is a partial list of policies and procedures which may require revision or development in implementing the combat unit rotation system.

1. Combat Replacement System. A combat loss replacement system must be developed which can expand rapidly and function effectively upon the outbreak of hostilities. The machinery and "know how" for individual and packet replacement must be maintained while the unit rotation system is in effect.

2. Individual Replacement System. A concurrent system must be provided to assure a flow of individual replacements into all technical, administrative, and TD units not participating in unit rotation.

3. Levies on General Reserve Units. During the transition stage levies on General Reserve units for Regular Army enlisted men by MOS may be required for participating divisions. The impact of these levies on the effectiveness of General Reserve units must be determined.

4. Civilian Component Duty. Enlisted men presently assigned to civilian component duty are all Regular Army. This duty withholds a disproportionate share (approx. 7,000) of Regular Army NCO's from the program and must be taken into consideration.

5. Twenty Year Stabilization. The policy of stabilizing enlisted personnel with 20 years' service in the CONUS must be reviewed with respect to the effect on unit rotation.

6. Movement Criteria. Criteria must be established to determine retainability in the theater of selectees whose unit is scheduled for return to the ZI.

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7. Extension of Foreign Service. Policy must be determined for Regular Army personnel who desire to extend their foreign service beyond the return date of their unit.

8. Reenlistment Bonus. Reenlistments based on short discharges must be provided for to make Regular Army enlisted men available for oversea shipment with their unit. The policy on reenlistment bonuses may require revision.

9. Voluntary Participation. Transfer of volunteers from non-participating to participating units may require establishment of controls to preserve the integrity of losing units.

10. Classification and Assignment. The role of the division commander must be outlined with respect to classification and assignment prior to outshipment of trainees to other units.

11. Promotion of Enlisted Men. Promotion policy may vary with the phase the unit is in. This policy must provide for promotion authority during periods of overstrength training as well as during periods in which all personnel are permanently assigned.

12. Division Strength. Maximum and minimum strengths must be determined for:

- a. Organization period.
- b. Period of filler training.
- c. Period of packet training.
- d. Pre-shipment period.
- e. WHR assignment period.
- f. Oversea assignment period.

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13. Transfer of Funds. Procedure and policy must be developed for transfer of funds and fund property for officer and NCO open messes.

14. Dependent Travel. A satisfactory method of moving dependents between CONUS and overseas stations is a requirement. Consideration should be given to:

- a. Concurrent travel.
- b. Parallel travel; i.e., mass movement following the unit's departure.
- c. Individual travel.

15. Announcement of Program. Announcement of the program must be drafted in a form which will be clearly understood by military personnel and acceptable to the public.

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