


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**THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATIONS
OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTABULARY
3 OCTOBER 1945 - 30 JUNE 1947**

**HISTORICAL SUB-SECTION C-3
UNITED STATES CONSTABULARY
1947**

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UNITED STATES CONSTABULARY

THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTABULARY

By

Major James M. Snyder, Cavalry

Historical Sub-Section G-3 - United States Constabulary


1947

PREFATORY NOTE

The preparation of this study was directed by Major General ERNEST N. HARMON, Commanding General, United States Constabulary on 12 June 1946 in order that a record of the problems and lessons involved in the organization, training, and operation of the U.S. Constabulary be available for future study. The present manuscript has been prepared in accordance with this directive.

Work on this study was started during the summer of 1946 by Major Nicholais Harathias, Field Artillery and continued during the last three months of 1946 by Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Ingalls, Field Artillery. These officers collected various documents and made miscellaneous notes which were used by the writer in the preparation of the first three chapters of the study. Writing of the present study was first undertaken in January 1947 by Major James M. Snyder, Cavalry assisted by Mr. Warren Goldman a War Department Civilian who assisted in correcting the text, prepared the appendices, and the footnotes. Clerical assistance was rendered by Staff Sergeant Byron E. Allen, Technician Fourth Grade Donald E. Mitchell, and Corporal Lucy Rose.

Upon completion of the study in September 1947 decision was made to print a limited number of copies in order that it might be made available to interested agencies at the earliest possible date. The study is to be regarded as a manuscript, and as such is subject to final editing and revision. Persons finding errors or important omissions are encouraged to communicate with the Commanding General, United States Constabulary, APO 46, U.S. Army, Attention: G-3 Section, in order that corrections may be made.


JAMES M. SNYDER
Major, Cavalry

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CHAPTER 1

PRELUDE TO THE CONSTABULARY

Genesis of the Constabulary Idea.

With the end of hostilities in Europe on 8 May 1945, the problem of providing a permanent occupational force in Germany arose together with the problems incident to redeploying units to the Pacific Theater both directly and through the United States, as well as the problem of inactivating surplus units in the European Theater. With the defeat of Japan in August 1945 the problems of redeployment ended, and that of demobilization became paramount, demobilization being accelerated by the War Department until the Army was literally falling apart at the seams.

While redeployment and demobilization of the Army were being accomplished, the War Department and the various Theater Headquarters were considering the long term problem of providing for the occupation of the United States Zones in Europe, and of Japan and her possessions. Constant pressure at home for demobilization of the Army was reflected in the Theaters of Operation, by pressure from the War Department looking toward the reduction of the numbers of troops required for occupational purposes and directed the attention of Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater to the problem of providing an effective occupational force with minimum of personnel. At the same time the War Department, and General Mac Arthurs Headquarters in Japan were also giving the matter study.

The idea of employing a super military police organization as an occupational force cannot be credited to any one agency or individual, nor can the origin of the idea be fixed. The three major sources which

Contributed to the idea of a Constabulary force as a means of solving the occupational problem were: the experience of certain tactical units, whose recommendations were based on experience as occupational units, the War Department which was concerned with the general problem of occupation including the US Zone in Europe, as well as Japan and her territories, and the G-2 Section, of Headquarters US Forces, European Theater.

Preliminary Planning for Occupational Duties.

The Fifteenth United States Army undertook a study in November 1944, for the purpose of determining a basis for the troops and organization required for the occupation of the Rhineland. As a result of this study recommendations were made looking to the division of troops into City Garrison and Frontier Command Troops. The Frontier Command Troops were intended for control of personnel moving across the western border of Germany by means of fixed posts, road blocks and motor patrols.¹ On 15 April 1945 the Fifteenth Army directed the establishment of the Frontier Command, which may be regarded as a prototype of the United States Constabulary insofar as its methods of operation were concerned.²

The reorganization of infantry divisions assigned to permanent occupational duties by the inclusion of a small mobile force for the purpose of maintaining security in outlying districts was recommended by Third US Army on 12 July 1945.³ This recommendation was concurred in by 12th Army Group which recommended that a similar reorganization of infantry divisions be accomplished throughout the Theater. No action was taken on this recommendation, but many divisions effected local reorganizations and created mobile organizations for use in the outlying

areas or as reserves which could move to the assistance of the thinly spread occupational troops. These local reorganizations were reflections of the trend in thinking regarding the type of troops required to meet the occupational problem, and represent the solutions arrived at by local commanders.

While redeployment and demobilization were being accomplished the War Department was considering the problem of providing for the long term occupation of the United States Zones in Europe and of Japan and her possessions. On 3 October 1945, General Marshall asked General Eisenhower to comment on a plan for the occupation of Japan, Ryukyus, and Korea which envisioned a super Military Police organization in which the bulk of the force would be native with United States personnel in key positions. This force to be backed up by tactical organizations on the order of Regimental Combat Teams.⁴ The comments of General Eisenhower indicate that he considered the basic proposal of General Marshall applicable to the European Theater, but that in view of the lack of a German governmental structure, quadripartite occupation, shifting populations, displaced persons, and refugees, certain reservations or modifications in its application would have to be made.⁵

Following General Marshall's proposal preliminary plans for a police type method of occupation were prepared by Theater Headquarters, and on 22 December 1945 were forwarded to General Marshall. General Eisenhower was of the opinion that the police type method of occupation offered the most logical, long range solution to the problem of security coverage in Germany and Austria. The general plan was to shift to the police type method of occupation with a Zone Constabulary, supported by a three

division combat reserve, placing the plan in operation gradually and going into full scale operation on 1 July 1946.⁶

It is to be noted that the conception of organizing the major portion of the occupational troops into police type units originated in the War Department. This is made clear by the reply of General Marshall on 9 October 1945 to General Eisenhower's comments on the proposal for a super military police organization for the occupation of Japan, Ryukyus and Korea. This cable is quoted as it makes clear the status of War Department thinking on the subject of the occupational problem.

"The first paragraph of your S-27081 leads me to think that your staff may have the impression that we are trying to impose on you in Europe a plan on the composition and organization of the Occupation Forces for JAPAN, KOREA, and the RYUKYUS prepared by that staff. Such is not the case. The idea originated in the War Department and is under study there."

"W-72310 to MACARTHUR, which was repeated to you, was the first message on the subject. It is not anticipated that a plan could be developed which would apply uniformly to EUROPE and the PACIFIC or possibly even to all parts of the same Theater. MACARTHUR reports a different view for KOREA and the RYUKYUS from that in JAPAN proper."⁷

It is thought probable that the suggestion of General Marshall in his original message to General Mac Arthur, which was repeated to General Eisenhower for comment, was largely responsible for the crystallization of thinking at the Theater level, and resulted in the preparation of specific plans for an occupational force of the Constabulary type.

Plan for Organization of the District Constabularies.

The term "Constabulary" made its first appearance in September 1945 in connection with planning for the reorganization of the occupational forces in the European Theater. The Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 of Theater Headquarters recommended that a Military District Constabulary be constituted in each of the two Military Districts and assigned the mission of complete security coverage.⁸ Considering the reduction in strength of the occupation forces, G-2 recommended that the District Constabularies be composed of cavalry type troops, specially organized and equipped for the task at hand, and able to cope with the multiplicity of new security problems which had arisen. The recommendations of G-2 envisioned separate District Constabularies in the Eastern and Western Military Districts, in the Bremen Enclave, and in the United States Zone in Austria, under the Commanding Generals of each of these four commands.

The plan prepared by G-2 was sent to each of the commanders concerned and to the General Staff sections of Theater Headquarters on 14 September 1945 for comment. The plan proposed by G-2 called for the formation of a District Constabulary in each of the four commands whose functions, organization, equipment, and training would be coordinated by Theater Headquarters. Each of the commands was to form a mobile security force from cavalry type units which would retain their organizational designations but would be referred to operationally as "District Constabulary." These forces were to be assigned the mission of providing security coverage for the entire District or Enclave under which they operated.

Command of the District Constabularies was to be exercised by the commander of the District or Enclave under whose command the Constabulary would have jurisdiction over all security matters within the territorial limits of the District or Enclave. The establishment of the District Constabularies was not to compromise the jurisdiction of local Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments, the Military Police, or the German civil police. The District Constabulary was to give prompt notice of incidents to the appropriate agency, and to take independent action only when no other security agency was immediately available. Operations would be conducted outside the territorial jurisdiction of the particular District Constabulary only when authorized by properly constituted authorities.⁹

The District Constabulary was not intended to assume the normal responsibilities of the Military Police, such as control over military personnel, military traffic, and criminal investigation, nor was it to establish information systems among civilians or military personnel. It was intended as a mobile reserve of tactical troops which would be capable of quick action; provide security coverage by patrolling specified areas; make searches for the apprehension of wanted persons and the recovery of contraband goods; assist the Counter Intelligence Corps in apprehending wanted persons; conduct surveys of counterintelligence interest for the area commander such as checking the efficiency of frontier control; maintain courier, radio and radio link service between Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments or teams and their headquarters; and transport counterintelligence suspects to interrogation centers or internment camps.¹⁰

A mechanized cavalry group was to be used as a District Constabulary in the Eastern Military District, in the Western Military District, and in the United States Zone in Austria, and a mechanized cavalry troop in the Bremen Enclave, and in Berlin District. These units were to have such additional signal equipment as might be available and suitable for the establishment of the radio and other communications necessary for operational purposes. In the interests of uniformity and to increase the prestige of the troops assigned to this duty, the helmet liner with the letters "DC" on the front in yellow, yellow shoulder tabs one inch wide on both shoulders, and a yellow scarf were to be authorized for wear by members of these units.¹¹

District Constabulary units were to receive special training in military government laws and ordinances, the technique of raids and searches, interpretation of documents, denazification processes and related matters. This training program was to be conducted by units and in Counter Intelligence Corps Schools. District Constabulary units were to be deployed to fulfill the requirements of maintaining security on the basis of area responsibility and were to maintain close liaison with local Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments and Teams, military government police, and occupational troop units. The target date for the reorganization of units and the establishment of the District Constabularies was fixed as the period between 1 October and 15 October 1945, with no reorganization to take place prior to 1 October.¹²

Comments on the District Constabulary Plan.

At the Theater level the reaction of G-3, to the plan for District Constabularies indicated that it was thought that the details of the organization of such units should be left to the subordinate commanders. That Theater should prescribe the mission of the force, and that cavalry type troops be used, but that the number of troops to be employed should be left to the decision of subordinate commanders. While G-4 nonconcurred in the plan for special items of uniform because of the lack of material from which they could be manufactured.¹³

Third US Army (Eastern Military District) concurred in the proposal and recommended that the District Constabulary maintain a liaison officer at Headquarters 970th (Theater) Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, but advised that the 2d Cavalry Group with its two squadrons would not be available for conversion into Constabulary units as they were sorely needed for area occupation.¹⁴

Seventh US Army (Western Military District) expressed the belief that the organization of a District Constabulary did not offer the most economical means of accomplishing the security mission as the plan tended to divide area responsibility between the Theater, the Military District, and the occupational unit. That the dissipation of forces likely to result because of the functions assigned to the Constabulary would defeat any practical use of the Constabulary as a reserve, and that the assignment of the only cavalry group on the Seventh US Army Troop List to the proposed mission would necessarily be at the expense of other commitments which had already been reduced to the minimum.¹⁵

United States Forces in Austria expressed the opinion that the establishment of such a roving patrol was unnecessary. That tactical troops were presently employed in the major tasks of guarding prisoners of war, operating static frontier control posts, supervising displaced persons, guarding essential utilities and installations against petty theivery and minor sabotage until such time as the disorganized civil police could become operational. United States Forces in Austria pointed out that steps had been taken to reinforce counter-intelligence agencies by the use of tactical troops as the need arose and concluding that the assignment of a cavalry group for this purpose was not believed warranted.¹⁶

Organization of the District Constabularies.

The directive for the establishment of District Constabularies was redrafted incorporating the comments of the Theater General Staff Sections which were consistent with the basic purpose as well as those comments of other commands which could be incorporated in the final plan. Special items of uniform were abandoned with the exception of the painting of the letters "DC" in yellow letters three inches high on the front of the helmet liner. The revised directive was issued on 31 October directing the establishment of District Constabularies within the United States Zone in Austria, in the Eastern and Western Military Districts, in Berlin District, and in the Bremen Enclave. Reorganization was to be effected by 30 November 1945 but not before 15 November 1945.¹⁷

Seventh US Army designated the 15th Cavalry Group including the 15th and 17th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons as the District Constabulary for the Western Military District, except the Bremen Sub-district which

used one company from the 311th Infantry Regiment reorganized as a Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized), which was placed under the command of the 15th Cavalry Group.¹⁸ Third US Army published its directive on 30 November 1945 establishing a District Constabulary consisting of the 2d and 6th Cavalry Groups, comprising the 2d and 42d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons (Mechanized) and the 6981st Provisional Rifle Company. This force was placed directly under the Commanding General, Third US Army. On 28 November 1945, United States Forces in Austria attached the 4th Cavalry Group, less one troop to the 83d Infantry Division and authorized it to employ this force as a District Constabulary. This group comprised the 4th and 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons (Mechanized), one troop of the 24th Squadron being attached to the Vienna Area Command as a District Constabulary for that area. Berlin District designated the 16th Cavalry Group with a Provisional Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, (Mechanized) consisting of the Reconnaissance Troop, 78th Infantry Division, Antitank Company, 309th Infantry Regiment and the Antitank Company, 310th Infantry Regiment as its District Constabulary. These organizations retained their organizational designations, but were under the command of the 16th Cavalry Group which was in turn under the direct command of the Commanding General, Berlin District.¹⁹

Operation of the District Constabularies.

The detailed missions and methods of operation of the two District Constabularies operating under Third and Seventh Armies varied somewhat. Constabulary units of the Third US Army performed limited patrolling, while retaining a mobile reserve for raids, and search and seizure operations.

The units of Seventh US Army on the other hand conducted patrolling throughout the entire Western Military District, and operated courier services for the Counter Intelligence Corps and the Criminal Investigation Detachments.

In general it was the function of the District Constabulary to support and reinforce, but not to replace, or do the work of, or interfere with other United States and German law enforcing agencies. In emergencies involving the security of the United States forces of occupation it was mandatory for the German police to call on the District Constabularies for assistance. The relationship between the District Constabulary and the military police was one of mutual assistance without overlapping jurisdiction, the Constabulary units confining their activities to matters concerning the German populace.

Special training was given personnel assigned to the District Constabulary units in such subjects as: examination of documents; passes and identification papers; German language and German civil organization and administration, while the training of replacements for these units was conducted in accordance with the mobilization training program for mechanized cavalry.²⁰

The District Constabularies were the forerunners of the police type occupational force and the first known use by a major world power of this method of controlling the population of an occupied country. The operational plans and training programs developed by these units served as a basis for study during the planning period looking toward the formation of the United States Constabulary. The District Constabularies were absorbed by the United States Constabulary on 19 April 1946, but continued to operate as District Constabulary units

under the direction of Headquarters United States Constabulary until the entire United States Constabulary became operational on 1 July 1946.

Initiation of Theater Planning for the United States Constabulary.

The War Department, after considering the views of General Eisenhower concerning the plan for the occupation of Japan and her possessions and its application to the European Theater, directed on 16 October 1945 that more detailed plans be prepared for the operation of a police type occupational force on the assumption that this type of control might be gradually put into effect in Germany and Austria beginning or about 1 July 1946.²¹ Major commanders were notified by General Eisenhower on 24 October 1945 that control of Germany and Austria would eventually be exercised through a United States Constabulary, organized along "state police" lines, operating above the German Police and supported by certain combat units. He stated further that the Constabulary would report to the United States Civil Governor, when that office was established, while the combat units would continue to be under the United States military commander, with a centrally controlled counterintelligence system operating throughout the Theater.²² On the same date, General Eisenhower notified the War Department that the police type occupation appeared to promise the accomplishment of the United States mission in Germany and Austria with the maximum economy in manpower and funds, and that a brief tentative outline plan would be submitted on 1 November 1945 with comparative manpower estimates, to be followed in December by a detailed plan based on a thirty day try-out of the "state police" system by units of the newly created District Constabularies.²³

Estimates of the Constabulary Strength.

Theater Headquarters realized that plans submitted prior to the gaining of operational experience would be subject to revision and with this thought in mind preliminary estimates regarding the strength of the Constabulary were prepared in a conference between the Counter Intelligence Section of the Theater G-2 Division and the Public Safety Section basing estimated patrol requirements on population. A norm that one United States Constable should be provided for each 450 Germans was proposed. On this basis it appeared that a Constabulary having a strength of approximately 38,000 would be needed for the United States Occupied area including Berlin and the Bremen Enclave on the basis of a population estimated at 17,000,000. The G-2 officers considered that a Constabulary unit of 140 men, organized according to the tables of organization for the Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, would be able to patrol a rural area of 225 square miles. The 43,000 square miles in the United States occupied area would on this basis require 192 troops or a total strength of 26,8000. G-2 agreed with the Public Safety Officers that a total strength of about 38,000 would be needed, which would allow sufficient personnel to be employed in administrative, signal, and supply services, and for air reconnaissance. It was thought that two liaison squadrons with a strength of approximately 1,000 men and equipped with 64 planes would be required.

The preliminary Theater plan for the use of a police type occupational force was cabled to the War Department on 1 November 1945.²⁴ This plan stated that the employment of a full scale police type system of control beginning 1 July 1946 would be well timed as the rigors of the first

occupational winter would be behind the occupational forces, and the basic assumption behind the police type system, namely, that the German people would remain relatively quiescent would have had its test. It was emphasized further that the shift from the use of combat units to a police type occupation would coincide with the target date for the civilianizing of the office of Military Government and with the anticipated date by which the capacity of the German and Austrian people to govern themselves would have progressed to the point where only minimum of overall control would be necessary.²⁵

In forwarding its preliminary plan to the War Department, Theater Headquarters pointed out that the only real disadvantage of the police type of occupation was that the number of mobile ground combat units would be so limited as to be incapable of action outside the United States occupation zones if called upon for the strategic support of other allied forces or for the implementation of national policy in other parts of Europe. In accepting and recommending the police type control system, Theater Headquarters assumed that the other United Nations in Europe would cooperate in the maintenance of peace by upholding law and order in their own areas of responsibility and that United States forces would not be expected to perform duties outside the United States Zones of responsibility.²⁶

In projecting the troop basis to 1 July 1946, which was developed mainly for carrying out the mission of upholding law and order in the United States Zones, Theater Headquarters estimated that 363,000 troops would be required if combat units were used for occupational purposes while only 281,000 troops would be required under the police type of

occupation a net saving of 82,000 troop spaces. This reduction in the troop basis based on the use of the police type occupation did not reduce the strength of Air Force units whose mission remained unchanged, the same figures being used for Air Force units under both systems of occupation.²⁷

The tentative plan calling for the police type occupation to become effective in mid 1946, was based on the assumption that Constabulary units would cover a fixed area by patrolling, and because of their high mobility, would be capable of rapid movement to the support of adjacent units and that the activities of the Constabulary units would be coordinated with German local and border police through military government officers at local level, and through normal staff channels at Theater level.²⁸

Supporting combat troops were estimated at three divisions in 1946 which might make the form of two armored and one motorized infantry division under an Army type headquarters. These troops were to be concentrated in regimental or larger strength at strategic locations in the occupied zones so as to be able to reach all parts of the occupied zones in a minimum of time. Static troop requirements subsequent to 1 July 1946 were to be taken from the combat force, but if considerable, it was recommended that, additional ground forces be added to the personnel estimates, which would in turn require some increase in the service force estimate. Air force estimates under either type of occupation were identical as it was assumed that regardless of the type of occupational force used the Air Force mission would remain unchanged.²⁹

Initiation of Constabulary Planning at Theater Level.

A preliminary memorandum was distributed to Staff Sections at Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater on 3 November 1945³⁰ which set forth the tentative estimate of the strength of the Constabulary, outlined the type of training, and duties which it was expected the Constabulary would perform. This memorandum placed the estimated strength of the Constabulary at 38,000, stated that the preferable term was "state Constabulary", indicated that the organization would provide for a highly mobile force organized along the lines of mechanized cavalry squadrons, and regiments trained for police duties. It was indicated that operations of the "Constabulary" units would be closely coordinated with the local German police, through military government detachments, with the resultant requirement that the units be widely deployed throughout Germany and Austria. Estimates indicated service troops would be required for the "Constabulary" in view of the fact that "Constabulary" units, (company size) would be individually located and would require individual attention at depots and distributing points. In addition it was estimated that the "Constabulary" requirement for ordnance and signal service would be above normal in view of the high mobility and wide areas over which operations would be carried out.³¹

The preliminary planning memorandum was followed on 24 November 1945 by a formal directive issued by Theater Headquarters which required the G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, Divisions, the Office of Military Government, and the Theater Signal Officer to proceed with planning for the police type occupation. This directive defined the police type occupation as a method of controlling the population of an occupied territory by means of a "Zone

Constabulary" was prescribed in order that any confusion arising from the use of the term "state" might be avoided.³² A command organization was prescribed whereby the Zone Constabulary and the mobile combat reserve would be placed under a single Army-type headquarters for administration, training and operations. The mobile combat reserve was estimated at that time as three divisions to be concentrated in Southern Germany as regimental combat teams or larger elements and trained to a high state of readiness.³³ The mission of the Zone Constabulary was defined by the planning directive as that of maintaining general security in the United States occupied zones of Germany and Austria by means of an active patrol system in assistance to the military government by conducting routine motorized patrols covering the entire occupied area, operating permanent and temporary road blocks, participating in large scale raids, cooperating with the German police in cases in which it would be required to call in the Zone Constabulary, to back up minor reprisal actions, to act upon requests for action by the Counter Intelligence Corps, and to perform such other duties as might be required in the execution of the mission.³⁴

Total strength of the Zone Constabulary previously estimated as 38,000, would be broken down completely, and the prospective locations and areas of individual units delineated. The general organization of the units was to be along the lines of mechanized cavalry units. The District Constabulary, which had been previously organized was expected to provide practical recommendations for changes in the tables of organization and equipment with particular regard to items of signal, mechanized, and motorized equipment.³⁵

With the date of organization of the Zone Constabulary fixed tentatively as 1 April 1946 and the date of operations as 1 July 1946 it was directed that a training program be planned to include preoperational training during the months of April, May and June 1946, and a plan for continuous training following the commencement of operations. A clear delineation of the duties of the military police, German police, and the Zone Constabulary was to be drawn up. This delineation was to be based on the assumption that in cases involving the security of the occupational forces it would be mandatory for the German police to call on the Zone Constabulary for assistance. Planning agencies were to bear this delineation in mind and to make it conform to military law. Communications were judged to be especially important in view of the concept of the Zone Constabulary as a highly efficient mobile force, and the planning agencies were directed to provide information and to make recommendations looking to the preparation of a detailed plan for communications facilities.³⁶

A detailed plan for the organization of the Zone Constabulary was to be completed by 3 December 1945. Specific planning tasks were assigned to the various staff divisions, within which one officer was to be made responsible in order that the Joint Plans Section could keep itself constantly informed as to the status of the plan and coordinate the activities of the various sections. Tables of Organization and Equipment, and Training were made the responsibility of G-3, while location of units and area coverage were to be projected by the Public Safety Section in cooperation with G-2, and the Office of Military Government. The determination of duties to be performed by the Zone Constabulary was made the responsibility of the Public Safety Section, and the Office of Military Government in cooperation. While preparation of a Communications Plan was made the responsibility of the Office of the Theater Chief Signal Officer.³⁷

The Final Theater Plan.

The work of the staff sections was incorporated into a Theater Plan for the Zone Constabulary, which was reported to the War Department on 22 December 1945.³⁸ The general Theater plan was to shift to the police type method of occupation by a Zone Constabulary supported, by a three division mobile reserve prior to 1 July 1946. By that time it was assumed that the major functions of Theater troops pertaining to displaced persons and surplus property would have been liquidated, that only limited numbers of troops would be required for guarding prisoners of war and in aiding the German government and the populace, and the United States Forces in the European Theater would have no major commitments relative to the implementation of national policy outside the occupied zones of Germany and Austria. The German and Austrian people would remain quiescent and present no great security problem. The command structure of the Theater was to be simplified by the retention of only one Army headquarters to which the mobile reserve of three divisions, supporting troops, and the Zone Constabulary would be assigned. Static ground and service force units would be grouped under separate headquarters located in Bremen, Vienna, Berlin and Frankfurt which would report directly to the Theater Headquarters. The headquarters of the United States Forces in Austria, the United States Naval Forces, Europe, and the United States Air Forces in Europe would continue without change. That the relationship of the Office of Military Government for Germany to Theater Headquarters would remain unchanged until the appointment of a civil governor.³⁹

The Zone Constabulary would be developed as an elite force dependent upon the highest caliber personnel and an efficient communications system for successful operation, with the mission of maintaining general military security and to assist in the accomplishment of the objectives of the military government by means of an active patrol system prepared to take prompt and effective action to forestall and suppress riots, rebellion, and acts prejudicial to the security of the United States occupational forces. This mission was to be carried out by supporting and reinforcing established United States, German, and Austrian law enforcement agencies. In carrying out its mission the Constabulary was not to interfere with, do the work of, or replace any of the established agencies. Cooperation with the German and Austrian civil authorities was to be effected through policies and procedures established by the Military Government.⁴⁰

The Zone Constabulary was to comprise a headquarters, and three brigades at the German Land or State Level, each brigade to include an air reconnaissance squadron, and a varying number of mechanized cavalry groups depending upon the area and population for which the various groups would be responsible. Provision was made for the organization of twelve Constabulary group headquarters to be coordinated with the German civil authorities at such points as might be mutually agreed upon between the Constabulary units and the Land offices of Military Government. Forty-eight Constabulary squadrons were to be allocated to the groups on the basis of population density, area covered, and the security problems within the area to which they

were assigned. These squadrons were to include 92 mechanized reconnaissance troops and forty eight headquarters and service troops. Tables of organization for the squadrons were to follow those of the Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron with the substitution of a reconnaissance troop for the Assault Gun Troop. A reserve was to be assigned to all squadrons and higher unit. In the case of Austria, area coverage was regarded as unnecessary with the result that troop requirements were estimated at one group.⁴¹

Total strength of Constabulary units was based on the original estimate of 38,000 broken down to forty eight operational squadrons, three air squadrons, headquarters and maintenance personnel. This personnel to be trained under the supervision of the Constabulary commander who was to be selected 180 days prior to the operational date. Individual training time was estimated at 90 days with additional time to be added for the purpose of establishing a training center and to prepare instructors to carry out the training program.⁴²

Full use was to be made of the communications equipment of the mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadron. Major headquarters were to be located so as to permit the maximum utilization of existing German civilian communications facilities, so as to minimize the requirements for additional facilities which would have to be provided by the Army. Sufficient Armored Cars M-8 and M-20 were estimated to be available in the Theater to equip the forty eight squadrons and to provide the slight augmentation in the numbers of vehicles required by the modified squadron organization.⁴³

In concluding its recommendations Theater Headquarters estimated that it would be possible for the Constabulary to begin operations on 1 July 1946 employing 38,000 of the 300,000 personnel in the Occupational Troop Basis.⁴⁴

The Question of Using Foreign Nationals in Constabulary Units.

In its initial cable on the subject of the police type occupation the War Department mentioned the possibility of using nationals of the occupied countries under the supervision of United States personnel who would occupy all key positions.⁴⁵ General Eisenhower decided that this idea was impracticable for the European Theater, and so advised the War Department. On 16 October 1945 the War Department directed Theater Headquarters to submit ideas concerning the operation of a police type organization for occupational purposes and to reconsider the possibility of using foreign nationals to replace United States Troops.⁴⁶ On 24 October 1945 Theater Headquarters stated that a careful study of the idea would be made, but that the capacity and willingness of liberated nations to assist the United States in the occupation of Germany was unknown.⁴⁷

After studying the proposal Theater Headquarters came to the conclusion that the employment of foreign nationals in the proposed police force ran counter to the fundamental concept of a highly efficient, homogenous, centrally controlled organization which the Constabulary was intended to be. It was believed that the employment of foreign nationals would result in decreased efficiency, communications problems created by a diversity of languages, and training difficulties. Theater Headquarters recommended that in the event the War Department decided to employ foreign nationals of liberated or other foreign countries that their recruitment be carried on by the foreign governments concerned,

and that they be employed as units or individuals under United States administration and control.⁴⁸

Theater Headquarters expressed the opinion that it was important to bring such foreign nationals under the full control of the United States. That the scale of payment should be settled by negotiation with the foreign governments concerned, but that the foreign nationals should be under United States control as to equipment, training, and operations. Alternatively Theater Headquarters proposed that foreign nationals might be recruited, formed into units, equipped, trained, and paid by their own governments, but that such forces must be under the full control of the United States for operational purposes. As military missions existed only in France, Luxembourg, and Belgium, Theater Headquarters pointed out that it could not present the project to all the governments concerned, and recommended that the matter be tabled until the Zone Constabulary was firmly established and operating smoothly. Pending further instructions from the War Department Theater Headquarters indicated that it would take no steps to present the subject to any European government.⁴⁹

As a result of projected reductions in the Theater Troop Basis the subject of employing foreign nationals was again raised in Theater Headquarters during the month of January 1946. A suggestion that the Constabulary be formed of screened German personnel operating under American officers and non-commissioned officers was made by G-2. The general reaction to this suggestion was that while it might be efficient, the building up of German military force and thinking might result in serious criticism, both in Europe and at home, of the objectives and ethics of the United States. Acceptable possibilities were thought to be the

employment of liberated nationals serving under United States commissioned and non-commissioned officers, or the use of complete regiments or brigades as part of the mobile reserve. As the long range view indicated that the mobile combat reserve would be gradually phased out subsequent to 1 July 1946 it was not though advisable to use foreign manpower in units other than the Zone Constabulary.⁵⁰

Theater Headquarters informed the War Department on 23 January 1946 that it would take no action pending additional instructions, but if the recruiting of liberated nationals was decided upon that they should be limited to those of Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, and Denmark in order that misunderstandings with other powers might be avoided. At the same time Theater Headquarters suggested to the War Department that it be permitted to contact the United States Ministers in the countries mentioned with a view to obtaining reactions on the recruiting of their nationals for service in the Zone Constabulary commencing in the last quarter of 1946, and proposed that some payment might be made to the countries participating in such an agreement. In connection with the payment of nationals of liberated countries it was suggested that individuals be given the pay and some of the privileges of a private in the United States Army, but that no benefits in the form of pension rights, insurance, and other Veterans Administration privileges, or the provisions of the "GI Bill of Rights" be extended to them. It was planned that the provisions of the Articles of War would apply to foreign nationals serving with the United States Forces, except in the case of capital crimes which would be referred to the individuals country of origin. It was anticipated that 10,000 foreign nationals could be absorbed into the Zone Constabulary by 1 January 1947, following

a three months training period, and that an additional 15,000 could be absorbed by 1 July 1947. This prolonged phase in period would have given the Zone Constabulary a reasonable period of operation with United States personnel during which most of its operational problems could be solved.⁵¹

The attention of the War Department was called to the fact that Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater was considering the possibility of using foreign nationals in the occupational forces by an item which appeared in the "Theater Commanders Weekly Staff Conference Notes". As a result the War Department notified Theater Headquarters that the employment by the United States Army of displaced persons, Germans, or other European citizens, might under certain circumstances, run counter to United States policy, and, although the Chief of Staff had directed that a study be made of the use of this type of personnel such employment would have to be examined in the light of United States political policies, and that a statement of policy on this matter was expected from the State Department. Pending receipt of the policy from the State Department the War Department directed that its approval be obtained prior to the implementation of any plans looking toward the employment of European personnel in units under the control of the United States Army.⁵²

On 12 February 1946 the War Department requested Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater, to submit a table showing the estimated Theater strength by quarters from that date until 1 July 1949, and the estimated number of foreign nationals to be employed during the same period as a basis for discussions with the State Department.⁵³ On 5 March 1946, Theater Headquarters advised the War Department that it did not desire to use foreign nationals in the Zone Constabulary, in the belief that the

money would be more profitably spent in creating a dependable force made up exclusively of United States personnel, and in view of the fact that the Zone Constabulary, might be the only security force left after further cuts had been made in the Theater strength. This communication closed the question of employing foreign nationals in the Zone Constabulary and marked the return of Theater Headquarters to its original point of view.⁵⁴

Chapter 2
CONSTABULARY PLANNING AT THE ARMY LEVEL

Initiation of Planning Under Third Army.

With the establishment of an occupational policy for the European Theater as a whole, planning for placing the police type occupation in operation both at the Theater Level and at lower levels was accelerated. Prior to formal approval of the plan for using a police type occupational system by the War Department, Headquarters, European Theater furnished Third US Army with preliminary planning data for the Zone Constabulary. This data was a consolidation of the data which had become available as a result of correspondence between Theater Headquarters and the War Department. It included a statement of the mission and duties of the proposed Zone Constabulary; recommendations as to the type of personnel desired, listed the proposed tables of organization and equipment; made recommendations concerning logistical support; provided a tentative communications plan; and clarified the relationship of the proposed Zone Constabulary to other US Agencies and to the German police organization.

In providing planning data for Third U.S. Army, Headquarters European Theater did not provide all the data which was available at that headquarters. This action was taken deliberately in order that the Constabulary Commander could have the opportunity for developing his own organization. The object of Theater Headquarters was to give the new Constabulary Commander sufficient information to enable him to understand the broad plan of the contemplated organization and to permit him to build his own detailed organization around the framework provided. The following statement taken from the USFET letter to Third U.S. Army indicates the purpose which USFET had in mind:

"Although planning has, in many cases, been further developed here than this data shows, it is felt that a sufficient orientation for the Constabulary Commander and staff is contained herein to enable them to get the broad picture of the contemplated organization. Also as it is the prerogative of the Constabulary Commander to develop his own organization, much detail has purposely been omitted. It is available to the Constabulary Commander should he desire it. All divisions of this headquarters will cooperate."⁵⁵

The data provided for use by Third U.S. Army defined the mission of the Zone Constabulary indicated the types of operations which would be carried out, and the method of operation. In carrying out its mission the Zone Constabulary was to make routine patrols covering the entire sector of U.S. responsibility; operate permanent and temporary roadblocks; to participate in planned raids; to cooperate with established U.S. and German law enforcement agencies; cooperate with the Counter Intelligence Corps; to execute minor reprisal actions; and execute such other duties as might be required in carrying out its mission.⁵⁶

Headquarters U.S. Forces European Theater pointed out that it was generally agreed at that headquarters that the officer and enlisted trooper to be provided for the Zone Constabulary would be high quality personnel, reenlistees so far as possible, and attached to its basic communication a specific recommendation as to the type of enlisted trooper to procure.

The planning data provided Third U.S. Army for the Zone Constabulary was based on the Tables of organization and equipment for the Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron modified by the substitution of a reconnaissance troop for the assault gun troop, Cavalry Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, and Three Constabulary Brigade Headquarters, plus a Constabulary Headquarters on the Corps level.⁵⁷

Theater Headquarters informed Third U.S. Army that it was preparing a mobilization training program for Constabulary units which would cover a period of 13 weeks and that it was preparing a "Troopers Handbook" for use by the individual trooper in the performance of his duties. This handbook to contain all the reference material which the trooper was likely to need under ordinary circumstances. Although Theater Headquarters indicated to Third Army that it was preparing a thirteen week training program and a "Troopers Handbook" these two projects were not undertaken on the Theater level but were prepared by the Constabulary itself. General HARMON took exception to having a training program tailor made for the Constabulary and insisted that he be given a broad general directive and be permitted to work out the details in his own headquarters. In addition Third U.S. Army was informed that a survey was being conducted by Theater Service Forces to determine the availability of equipment required under the proposed tables of organization and equipment, and that action would be initiated by Theater Headquarters to bring into the theater any equipment which was not available within the Theater.⁵⁸

The data furnished by Theater Headquarters stated that headquarters was agreed that supply control should be at Squadron level, but that there were problems of depots, maintenance shops, and the distances thereto which could be solved only when the Theater Service Forces plan for the consolidation of depots, and the location of military communities was known, and which would depend upon the dictates of military necessity in fixing the location of major units.⁵⁹

The tentative communications plan furnished as an inclosure to the basic planning data provided for both wire and radio communications. Re-

liance was to be placed on wire communications using electrical cryptographic devices except in emergencies when radio communications would provide for continuous communications in the event the wire facilities were interrupted, either by sabotage or other types of interference. Emergency power facilities were recommended in the event of commercial power failure and an estimate were included as to the number and type required.

Estimates of personnel for the communications system was based on the assumption that the Army Headquarters and the Zone Constabulary Headquarters would be located together. On this basis it was estimated that a Signal Operation Battalion T/O & E 11-95, a Signal Battalion, T/O & E 11-15, a Signal Construction Company T/O & E 11-27, and a Signal Service Company T/O & E 11-500 would be required. Personnel for these units totalled 93 officers, and 1,813 enlisted men, which were to be utilized in the operation of the combined signal facilities of both the Army Headquarters and the Constabulary Headquarters. This estimate of personnel did not provide for communications at or below the Brigade level. The assumption being made that tables of organization would be developed which would provide organic communication personnel.⁶⁰

The planning data furnished Third U.S. Army by Theater Headquarters was sufficient for the Constabulary Commander and his planning staff to have a broad general idea of what type of organization Theater Headquarters visualized, but was general enough to permit of wide latitude, in the planning of the detailed organization. As the U.S. Army had had so little experience with organizations similar to the proposed Zone Constabulary, Theater Headquarters desired to give the Third U.S. Army planners a free hand in order that the benefit of any original thinking on the subject



Major General Ernest N. Harmon
Organizer and First Commanding
General

might be brought into the open.

Appointment of Zone Constabulary Commander.

On 10 January 1946 following a period of temporary duty in the United States, Major General ERNEST N. HARMON was designated as the Commanding General of the U.S. Zone Constabulary on the recommendation of Lt. General Lucian K. Truscott, Commanding General of the Third U.S. Army.⁶¹ At that time General Harmon was the only assigned member of the U.S. Constabulary. General Harmon immediately appointed a Constabulary Planning Board consisting of Lt. Colonel Gilbert E. Strickler, G-3; Captain James T. Lofgren, Aide de Camp; and Warrant Officer Clarence E. Mottaz, Secretary. These officers were all members of the Staff of XXII Corps which General Harmon had formerly commanded. This planning group first met at Third Army Headquarters at Bad Tolz on 14 January 1946. This group was immediately augmented by Brigadier General Halley G. Maddox, then acting Chief of Staff of Third Army, who became Chief of Staff, Colonel William S. Biddle of the Fifteenth Army Staff, and Colonel C. H. Reed, Commanding Officer of the 2d Cavalry Regiment.⁶²

Constabulary Planning Group Activities.

The Constabulary planning group held conferences for the purpose of perfecting an organizational and operational plan. The group worked out an organization in which the basic unit was the Mechanized Cavalry Squadron, with Light Tank Battalions, and Field Artillery units as a tactical reserve. When this plan was ready General Truscott and General Harmon presented it to the Theater Commander, General McNARNEY, who rejected the proposed organization, stating that he wanted more of a police type organization instead of the proposed "combat type" organization.⁶³

General HARMON then rejoined the planning staff, and directed each member to prepare an organizational plan based upon the desires of the Theater Commander. Upon completion of the plans they were discussed individually, General TRUSCOTT, Commanding General, Third US Army, participating in the discussion. The organization finally proposed by the Constabulary planning group, and approved by General McNARNEY, comprised a Constabulary Headquarters comparable to an Army Corps, three Brigade Headquarters, one located at each of the three Lander capitols, nine Regimental Headquarters, three in each Brigade, at or near each of the nine Regierungsbezirks capitols, and twenty-seven squadrons, three to each regiment located so as to cover one or more Kreise, the basic political sub-division.⁶⁴

The Constabulary Planning Group then drew up proposed T/O's and E's for the Constabulary units. These T/O's and E's were approved by General McNARNEY on 7 February 1946 and flown by Colonel Biddle to the War Department for final approval. General McNARNEY wrote General EISENHOWER separately as follows:

"I have approved the special Tables of Organization and Equipment for the U.S. Zone Constabulary as submitted by the Commanding General, Third U.S. Army, and have initiated action to organize the Constabulary in accordance therewith."

"These tables represent the best efforts of the individuals most familiar with this type unit which our Army has had so little experience. After a period of three to six months of operations with this organization, it will be possible to indicate changes proved necessary by this additional experience."

"In view of the urgent necessity of expediting the organization of the U.S. Zone Constabulary, I would sincerely appreciate expeditious action as may be required by the War Department to clear personnel and equipment requirements."⁶⁵

The Tables of Organization provided for a Constabulary Headquarters of 81 officers, 8 WO's, and 129 enlisted personnel organized as a conventional

corps headquarters, the operation of the headquarters being supported by a Headquarters Troop of 6 officers and 196 enlisted personnel, plus a Medical Detachment of 3 officers and 11 enlisted men.

Special Troops were provided in line with the mission, and the wide deployment of Constabulary units. Emphasis was placed on communications, liaison, and intelligence activities. An entire Signal Squadron being provided to operate and maintain communications between Constabulary Headquarters and its subordinate units. An Air Liaison Squadron having 32 liaison type planes was included in the special troops. As intelligence activities were of primary importance in Constabulary operations the Counter Intelligence, Criminal Investigation, and Intelligence Specialist elements of the Special Troops were made especially strong, totaling 82 officers, 16 warrant officers, and 183 enlisted men.⁶⁶

Three Constabulary Brigades, one in each lander or state, were provided. The Brigade consisted of a Headquarters and Headquarters Troop to which three regiments were attached. Brigade Headquarters were organized on an operational basis with a minimum of administrative functions, administration being placed on the regimental level. Like Constabulary Headquarters the brigade headquarters followed standard Army organizational lines.⁶⁷

Constabulary regiments were organized as operational and administrative units and included regimental special troops consisting of a light tank troop organized in accordance with Armored T/O's and E's. A motorcycle platoon for highway patrol work, and a horse platoon for use in difficult terrain, these platoons being included in the Headquarters Troop. A service troop which provided personnel for administrative work, and for main-

tenance of vehicles and equipment. The regimental organization was adopted as a result of the recommendation of the European Theater General Board which considered the question of regimental organization as opposed to the group organization used during the war, and recommended the readoption of the regimental system.⁶⁸

The operating organization of the Constabulary was the squadron with a Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, three mechanized and two motorized troops. The squadron had a minimum of administrative personnel, these aspects of Constabulary operation as has been previously noted, being largely concentrated at the regimental level. The basic operational unit within the squadron was the troop which had both operational, and administrative functions. Both the mechanized and motorized troops contained an equal number of personnel, but were organized and equipped for entirely different missions. The mechanized troop with its armored cars and $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trucks being intended primarily for patrol type operations, while the motorized troops with its $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks was intended for use in cities and along the border where dismounted patrols and fixed posts would be the primary responsibility.⁶⁹

Plan for Formation and Operation of US Zone Constabulary.

In order that the reorganization of the US Zone could be effected, a conference was held on 4 February 1946 at Third US Army Headquarters in Bad Tolz for the purpose of reaching agreements looking toward the formation of the US Zone Constabulary, the inactivation of Seventh Army Headquarters, and the reorganization of the US Zone in accordance with the general theater plan. This conference was attended by representatives of the major theater commands including: U.S. Forces European Theater; U.S. Forces in Austria; Theater Service Forces; Office of the Military Government; U.S. Zone Con-

stabulary, and representatives of other major commands.⁷⁰

A series of agreements and decisions were reached at this conference which made possible the implimentation of the plan for the reorganization of the US Zone and the formation of the US Zone Constabulary. As a result of this conference the directive for the establishment of the US Zone Constabulary issued by Third Army in fragmentary form as the actual organization took place. In the absence of a directive covering the establishment of the Constabulary, Headquarters US Zone Constabulary (VI Corps) issued a draft of such a directive on 15 February 1946 entitled "The Directive and Policies Covering the Formation and Operati n of the US Zone Constabulary."⁷¹ This draft formed the basis upon which the actual formation and operations of the Constabulary was based until 12 March 1946 when Third US Army published a revised directive under the same title. The provisions of the 12 March directive are summarized here as only minor points of difference are to be found between the two directives.⁷²

The Third US Army directive established the Constabulary for the United States occupied zone of Germany exclusive of the Berlin District, the Bremen Enclave, and the United States Zone in Austria as of 15 February 1946 and designated it as the United States Constabulary. It placed the Constabulary with all its agencies, activities, installations and operations under the Commanding General, United States Constabulary, United States Zone, Germany and defined the Constabulary as an integral part of Third US Army which would issue the directives and missions for the formation, operation, and conduct of the Constabulary.⁷³

Provisions was made for the assumption of operational control over all units earmarked for the Constabulary during the period from 15 February 1946

to 1 April 1946 in the Seventh US Army area, and command of earmarked units in the Third US Army area in accordance with the schedule which had already been set up. On 1 April 1946 all of these units would come under the command of the Commanding General, United States Constabulary.⁷⁴

Organization of the Constabulary was to proceed in accordance with the special tentative tables of organization which had been approved by General McNarney utilizing the troops which had been previously earmarked for the purpose, to comprise a Constabulary Headquarters, 3 Brigade Headquarters, and 9 regiments, plus one separate squadron for use as a school squadron.⁷⁵

The Constabulary was to have the mission of maintaining general military and civil security and to assist in the accomplishment of the objectives of the United States Government in the US Zone in Germany exclusive of the Bremen Enclave or Berlin District, by means of an active patrol system, and to maintain effective military borders encompassing the United States Zone. Particular emphasis was placed on the fact that the Constabulary would support and reinforce, but would not replace, do the work of, or interfere with the established United States and German law enforcement agencies, and that cooperation with the German civil authorities would be effected through procedures and policies to be established in coordination with the United States Military Government.⁷⁶

In order that he might accomplish his mission the Commanding General of the United States Constabulary was given full responsibility for the organization and training of the units which were to comprise the Constabulary as they were released to his operational control or command. Effective 1 June 1946 the Commanding General, United States Constabulary was made responsible for, providing complete Constabulary control for all authorized

ports of entry at the frontiers of the United States Zone in Germany and the processing of persons traveling across the interzonal or international frontiers. In exercising this control the Constabulary was charged with providing the patrols necessary to provide border security, and with assisting the German border police established at authorized ports of entry where such assistance was deemed necessary.⁷⁷

Cooperation with the established US and German law enforcement agencies throughout the zone was enjoined. This cooperation to be facilitated by the maintenance of Constabulary offices at each Lander and Regierungsbezirk seat of government. Constabulary units were to answer calls for troops from both the Military Government and the German Civil authorities in carrying out this policy.⁷⁸

Constabulary was charged with conducting specific operations in the extension of security control, such as convoys of personnel, raids, investigations of a specific nature, search and seizure operations, and provide for continual security patrols throughout the entire area of responsibility. While all the aforementioned types of operations were to be carried out as directed the Constabulary was directed in addition to maintain a reserve for the augmentation of local security agencies, and to effect close liaison with the United States Zone Tactical units and to prepare plans for cooperative action in the event of major emergencies.⁷⁹

While the Constabulary was not to do the work of the Military Police or of the Counter Intelligence Corps it was to perform the duties of Military Police when no Military Police were present and to cooperate and assist the Military Police in the performance of their duties when directed by Third Army or in emergencies upon the request of the Military Police

unit. Cooperation with the Counter Intelligence Corps and the Criminal Investigation Division and the supplementation of the communications facilities of these agencies was also prescribed as a Constabulary function, together with guarding installations, traffic control and such other general police duties as might have to be performed in the execution of the assigned mission.⁸⁰

General Method of Constabulary Operation.

Specific geographical areas were to be assigned to Constabulary units which would in general parallel the German political boundaries. Within these geographic subdivisions of the United States Zone control would be exercised by the conduct of patrol operations. These security patrols would operate at irregular intervals and on irregular schedules, by occupying key or strategic localities, and by maintaining close and direct contact with local troops, installations, law enforcement agencies, investigations agencies, and offices of the United States Military and the German civil Government. The use of fixed stations and the disposition of forces was to be held to the minimum in an effort to retain the maximum mobility of Constabulary units.⁸¹

Cooperation With the Military Government.

In order that the maximum degree of coordination and cooperation with the United States Military Government could be obtained the three Constabulary Brigade Headquarters were to be established at the three Lander capitols of Bavaria, Wurttemberg-Baden, and Greater Hesse, and liaison with the Military Government maintained by the Brigade staffs. Constabulary Regimental Headquarters were to be located at or near each Regierungsbezirk capitol. In this connection it was directed that while close liaison would be maintained, orders for operation of Constabulary units in cooperation with



Security Was Maintained
By Means of Patrols

the Military Government would come through command channels, except in emergencies. When German police requested the assistance of US Troops in quelling disturbances any local commander was authorized and directed to lend all possible assistance, reporting the action taken to Third US Army Headquarters through command channels.⁸²

Cooperation with Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments.

Within the Theater Counter intelligence agencies operated at three levels, Theater, Army and within the Constabulary itself. The primary duty of these agencies being the under cover investigation of persons and activities which threatened the security of the occupational forces or the policies of the United States Government in the occupied areas. Cooperation between the three levels of counter intelligence activity was to be effected through command channels and through contacts between the Counter Intelligence Detachments themselves. Constabulary counter intelligence personnel were to cooperate in the execution of planned raids, seizure operations, the maintenance of liaison, and in joint actions with higher counter intelligence agencies. Constabulary communications facilities were to be made available to counter intelligence personnel in augmentation of counter intelligence communication facilities. In addition Constabulary was to cooperate with the higher counter intelligence agencies by providing transportation for arrestees.⁸³

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments assigned to the Constabulary were to have as their primary mission the security of installations under Constabulary control. They were to assist Constabulary units in search and seizure operations by interrogation, screening, and expert advice regarding security suspects. In order to prevent uncoordinated counter intelligence activity

evidence which the Constabulary detachments might uncover regarding subversive activity or organizations and movements would be reported through intelligence channels. The Constabulary detachments were not to follow up these leads except upon the direction of Third US Army Headquarters in order to prevent interference with theater or other regional counter intelligence operations.⁸⁴

Cooperation with the Military Police.

The primary duties of the Constabulary were those concerned with the overall policing of the German people in contrast to those of the Military Police who were concerned with policing the Army and personnel subject to military law. While the duties of the two agencies could be separated on paper it was evident from the beginning that the Constabulary would have frequent contact with the Military Police in the execution of its mission. The Constabulary would support and reinforce the Military Police without performing their duties, except where no Military Police were available.⁸⁵ Of particular importance in its relations with the Military Police was cooperation with the Criminal Investigation Division which performed the same functions with regard to US Personnel as the Counter Intelligence Corps did with respect to the personnel of other nations. The Constabulary was to cooperate in exchanging information, assist in raids and arrests, and in the making of investigations by the Criminal Investigation Division of the Military Police. This cooperation was to be effected normally through command channels, except that the Commanding General of the US Constabulary was empowered to make the necessary provisions for emergency cooperation, and directed to instruct the Constabulary in the methods of operation which would be employed in conjunction with cooperative action with the Criminal Investigation Division.⁸⁶

Jurisdiction of the Constabulary.

The United States Constabulary was to have jurisdiction over all US and Allied Military personnel and Civilians serving with the United States Forces, except those which were specifically exempted by directives of higher headquarters. Its authority was to extend to all acts and duties necessary to insure the US Zone in Germany as prescribed by the Rules of Land Warfare as defined in FM 27-15 for an occupying power, as modified by the directives of the Theater Commander. This authority was to be exercised in accordance with the principles prescribed by FM 19-15 "Domestic Disturbances." It was not to take original jurisdiction in cases which were properly the function of the German Land, or Stadt Kreis Police, Border Police, Railway Police, or Forestry Police, until requested by the appropriate agency to reinforce their action. No action was to be taken under the orders or instructions of counter intelligence agents or offices, cooperation with this agency being effected through command channels.⁸⁷

Courts-Martial Jurisdiction.

The Courts-Martial jurisdiction given to the Constabulary was that normally given to a military command of its size. Courts-martial appointed by the Constabulary were to have jurisdiction over cases involving Constabulary personnel and personnel residing at posts, camps, and stations commanded by Constabulary Officers. Constabulary Courts-Martial were not to exercise jurisdiction over cases involving other personnel, but would turn such personnel over to their own units together with all available supporting evidence.⁸⁸

Conduct of Training.

During the period from 15 February to 1 June 1946, training and reorganization were to constitute the primary duties of the Constabulary units.

In addition to training, the Cavalry units performing the duties of District Constabularies were to continue these duties in their assigned areas. A Constabulary School was to be placed in operation for the general purpose of training unit instructors, particularly in duties peculiar to the Constabulary, such as, police operation, cooperation with Military Government, German Civil Police, Counter Intelligence Corps, Criminal Investigation Division, and in such other subjects as the Commanding General might deem necessary.⁸⁹

Continual training was to be conducted to provide efficient operation and to set a high standard of discipline and general all around efficiency in Constabulary Duties, the operation and handling of weapons, vehicles, and communications. A special effort was to be made to rotate units from the field in order to reorient personnel as to the latest development in their duties, and to prevent the long term occupancy of areas which would tend to develop irregular practices, and to maintain a high standard of discipline and efficiency.⁹⁰

Military Communities and Home Stations.

Military Communities were to be assigned to the Constabulary in order that dependents of Constabulary personnel who might come into the Theater could be properly housed and provided for. These communities were in general to constitute the home stations of the various Constabulary units from which field operations would be conducted.⁹¹

General Constabulary Responsibilities.

The US Constabulary had either direct responsibility for the action taken or responsibility for cooperation in practically every activity affecting the US Occupational Zone. The successful operation of the Constabulary was to depend on efficiency, a high state of training and discipline,

wide contacts with all other law enforcement agencies, and a spirit of cooperation. Provision was made by Theater Headquarters and by Third Army so that cooperation with other law enforcement agencies, and troop units would function smoothly through normal command channels. Constabulary was charged with making emergency and local arrangements to insure prompt cooperation with other law enforcement agencies and to see that action was not delayed by the absence of written instructions or orders.⁹²

Other Planning Staff Activities.

In addition to planning the general organization of the Constabulary together with accompanying tables of organization and equipment, the Constabulary planning staff studied and prepared plans for many other phases of Constabulary activity. Cadre requirements for both officer and enlisted personnel were considered. A training program for cadres was outlined and made available on 15 February 1946. Estimates of officer and enlisted personnel requirements were made. Units upon which the Constabulary organizations was to be built were designated. Transfer of personnel between these units was effected in coordination with Third and Seventh Armies in order to make a cadre available for all units. Organization of the Constabulary School at Sonthofen for the purpose of training officers and enlisted men in the duties peculiar to the Constabulary was projected. Selection of a location for the Constabulary Command Post was considered and Bamberg, Germany chosen as the location for which the activities of the Constabulary would be directed.

The Cadre Training Program.

The personnel situation in units earmarked for the Constabulary was such that the transfer of personnel between units was necessary in order

that a training cadre could be made available for all units. Personnel to bring these units to cadre strength came from a variety of sources. In most instances personnel was available in other Constabulary units and an effort was made to give each unit the benefit of experienced personnel.⁹³

The cadre training program applied to all Constabulary units except the Constabulary units under Berlin District, and United States Forces in Austria. The initial cadre training program was published 15 February 1946 under the title, "Training of Constabulary Cadres". The objective of this program would be capable of conducting an eight week training program for filler reinforcements. Additional objectives of maintaining efficient combat and service teams, a high degree of military security, readiness to quell civilian disturbances, and the achievement of high standards of discipline and smartness of appearance were prescribed as the ultimate goal.⁹⁴

Regimental commanders were made responsible for the execution and supervision of the program and were charged with taking positive action to insure its successful completion. Training was to be initiated by individual units as soon as cadres were assigned and to continue for a period of one month whenever possible. In the case of units whose cadres were not assigned until after 1 March training was to be completed by 1 April 1946. Prior to the actual commencement of training personnel was to be adjusted within units so that each organization would have at least a minimum cadre for training purposes.⁹⁵

Cadre training was to consist of military subjects, specialized Constabulary training being deferred until the eight week filler reinforcement training program was inaugurated. Cadre personnel was divided into four categories for purposes of the training program, including: staff section personnel; household personnel, specialist personnel; and operating personnel,

Training of staff section personnel was to be conducted on an on-the-job basis. Household personnel were to be trained by on-the-job instruction, attendance at unit schools, and by the attendance of a small percentage of personnel at specialist schools. Specialist personnel were to receive on-the-job training plus the attendance of as many specialists as possible at specialist schools conducted by the Army or by Theater. Operational personnel were to receive on-the-job training, attend unit officer and non-commissioned officer schools, and receive instruction from instructional teams furnished by District Constabulary Units, the 2d, 6th and 15th Cavalry Groups.

The instructional teams were to be large enough to provide simultaneous instruction for three squadrons. Six percent of the training time for operating personnel was to be devoted to subjects taught by the training teams which included: Material and Equipment Peculiar to Constabulary Forces; Characteristics and Familiarization Firing, 81 MM Mortar; Tank and Armored Car Weapons; Road Marches; Stowage, Voice Radio Procedure; Tactics of a Mechanized Section; Tactics of a Tank and Motorized Section; Employment of Riot Formations; Tank and Armored Car Driving; and other subjects which might be mutually agreed upon between the instructional team and the unit commander.⁹⁶

The decision to use instructional teams from units of the District Constabularies was based on the fact that these units were the only units which had had any experience at all in operations which were similar to those which the Constabulary would be expected to carry out. In order that the experience which these units had had could be made available to all Constabulary units, the instructional teams were organized and utilized in the training of the initial cadres for all other Constabulary units.⁹⁷

The Constabulary School.

One of the first activities of the Constabulary Planning Staff was to provide for the establishment of a school to train officers and enlisted men in subjects peculiar to Constabulary operation. On 15 January 1946 action looking toward the establishment of such a school was taken, and on the following day the 2nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron relieved the 3rd Battalion, 14th Infantry and assumed control of the school plant of the former Adolf Hitler Schule located at Sonthofen in the Uppen Allgau region of Bavaria. The 2nd Cavalry Squadron began immediately to prepare the school plant for early operation. In the meantime Colonel Harold G. Holt had been selected as Commandant of the new Constabulary School.⁹⁸

Perhaps the best insight into what was to be expected of the Constabulary School is furnished by the graduation address delivered by General Harmon to the first graduating class on 30 March 1946, quoted in part, as follows:⁹⁹

"The graduation today of the first graduating class to attend the Constabulary School is a definite landmark in the progress of the development of the United States Constabulary. The organization of the school, the development of the courses of instruction, the assembly of the instructors and students were all accomplished under the most difficult situation and in a very short period of time. It is an outstanding achievement and one of which I am very proud and in which all you people who took part and worked so hard can have great satisfaction."

"The Constabulary School is more than a place of instruction. It is a cradle, so to speak, in which we hope to establish the character, the esprit de corps, high standards of personal conduct, and appearance of the Constabulary."

"As most of the subjects taught here are entirely new to the soldier and the normal training of the soldiers, it was felt necessary to obtain as quickly as possible the maximum number of graduates to act as instructors to their units and to spread the Constabulary standards we expect to strive



General Harmon Addresses
The First Graduating Class
of The US Constabulary School

for more quality in the results of instruction by lengthening the courses and also provide new subjects of instruction."

"The Constabulary School serves as a library and a source of material for the training of all units. As time goes on we expect the School to be a laboratory, so to speak, for the development of the Constabulary doctrines and methods of employment will be disseminated throughout the command as a whole. A soldier is forever a teacher. "When the teacher has taught well, the learner can perform." The graduates of the school should remember the technique of teaching as taught here and should try to apply it when teaching their own schools or instructing the men in their units."

"Hold on to what you have acquired here and when you go out to your units and meet the reinforcements who are now pouring in, carry on the instructions and standards you have acquired. I know you will perform well. I wish you Godspeed, and the best of luck."

Logistical Support of the Zone Constabulary.

In addition to preparing the organization and operational plans for the Zone Constabulary the Third US Army Constabulary Planning Group planned for logistical support of the Zone Constabulary. These planning activities were carried out during the period 14 January to 15 February 1946 as were the other activities of the Planning Group. The basic decision around which the plan for the logistical support of Constabulary units was based was that service units would not be attached or assigned to Constabulary units but Constabulary units would receive support from Service units located in their area as would any other unit which might be so located. This decision was based on the fact that Constabulary units would not operate beyond the United States Zones, and in the event of an emergency including the commitment of Constabulary units as a tactical force certain service units could be prepared to move on 48 hours notice to any point within the US Zones with the specific mission of Constabulary support.¹⁰⁰

Medical support for Constabulary units was to be provided under normal conditions by Medical Detachments which were provided by the recommended Tables of Organization. In the event of an emergency Constabulary casualties would be cared for by fixed hospitals located throughout the Zone. In the event of sustained action in any part of the zone, reinforcement of the fixed medical installations taking care of Constabulary needs would be accomplished by the transfer of personnel from installations which were not involved. Within the brigades it was recommended that the number of ambulances per squadron be increased from two to four as the medical company had been eliminated from the brigade organization. This recommendation was disapproved by Theater Headquarters upon submission of the tables of organization and equipment.¹⁰¹

Ordnance support was to be provided under normal operating conditions by units throughout the US Zone. It was anticipated that about one third of these units would be mobile units including, three medium maintenance companies, one heavy maintenance company, and one depot company, which in the event of an emergency requiring the movement of Constabulary units would move to their support under the control of Third US Army. No attachment of ordnance units to the Constabulary was contemplated as it was felt that adequate support could be provided in the normal manner by the Ordnance units in the vicinity of Constabulary units.¹⁰²

Quartermaster, Engineer, and Transportation support were to be provided by Third US Army. Quartermaster support would be provided through normal quartermaster installations and channels, while engineer support would be rendered by the engineer units under Army control. Third Army was to maintain a pool of six light truck companies in addition to the normal


truck pool which would be available for Constabulary support in an emergency.¹⁰³

The general logistical plan for the support of Constabulary units did not differ in its essentials from that of any other unit in the theater, except for special provisions, in the event of emergencies requiring the movement of Constabulary units or the commitment of these units as a tactical force.¹⁰⁴

Planning the Constabulary Communications Network.

The establishment of an efficient and reliable communications system received early attention by planners on the theater level and was even considered on the War Department level, the War Department having cabled theater headquarters to the effect that early attention should be given to considering the amount of fixed, telephone, telegraph, and radio equipment which would be required as steps were being taken to dispose of this type of equipment in order to alleviate the existing shortage in the United States, and that requirements would have to be made known at an early date if the equipment was to be made available. The advance planning data furnished Third Army upon which to base detailed planning for the Constabulary contained a tentative plan for a communications network which formed the basis for the network finally established.¹⁰⁵

The tables of organization for the Constabulary provided for communications equipment necessary for tactical control from Constabulary Headquarters down to and including the reconnaissance sections of mechanized platoons. In addition provision was made for utilization of existing German civilian telephone facilities in providing for four telephone circuits from Brigades to Regiments. Regimental communications officers were directed on 15 February 1946 to survey the communications requirements of Squadrons and Troops within their regiments, and request the allocation of circuits to these units.¹⁰⁶



Constabulary Depended Upon an
Efficient Communications
System

Provision was initially made for the operation of radio link communications to provide additional voice and teletype channels from Constabulary Headquarters to Brigades and Regiments, with additional mobile communications equipment held in reserve for use in emergencies or, when the normal equipment was out of order, had been sabotaged, or could not carry the traffic.¹⁰⁷

The Constabulary as an Elite Force.

From the very beginning the application of the super military police type of occupation was to depend on the use of the highest type of personnel it would be possible to obtain. In his original message on the subject General Marshall suggested that special enlistments in high non-commissioned grades might provide inducement for enlistment of the desired type of personnel, and that legislation might be needed for the implementation of such a plan. The preliminary plan submitted to the War Department by Headquarters U.S. Forces, European Theater was based on the premise that Zone Constabulary would be, an elite force, dependent upon the highest caliber personnel and an efficient communications network. It was agreed at Theater level that the individual trooper and officer should be of the highest caliber, enlisted personnel to be reenlistees so far as possible. With this objective in mind the qualifications of the individual Constabulary trooper were drawn on a very high plane and are quoted to make available to the Constabulary when its organization was undertaken.

QUALIFICATIONS OF THE CONSTABULARY TROOPER¹⁰⁸

Physical: Soldierly bearing; height not less than 5 feet, 7 inches; weight not less than 140 pounds, stripped; good vision without glasses; well knit, good muscular coordination, strong, erect, well proportioned; hard, tough, enduring, quick reactions.

Mental and Nervous: Intelligence, Class I & II; stable mentality; good judgement and tact; alert, observant.

Moral: Excellent character; personal honesty; loyal; cooperative; conscientious; adaptable.

It was noted at the time the above qualifications were drawn up that the application of these standards might result in a preponderance of high strung individuals, while there was a definite place in police work for the cautious, steady man, who is often long on judgement, reasoning power, and tact.

In its cable of 10 January 1946 approving the police type of occupation for the European Theater, the War Department again called attention to the use of individuals of higher type for Constabulary duties, stating that: "Consideration should be given to eventual development of special tables of organization and equipment for Constabulary units to utilize a greater percentage of higher grades and ratings in the upper brackets to encourage enlistments of higher type individuals."¹⁰⁹ That the question of providing a high type of personnel for the Constabulary was constantly held in mind by the Theater planning agencies is indicated by the letter forwarding the proposed tables of organization and equipment to the War Department which stated:

"Due to the special type of mission of the Constabulary enlisted men will more frequently than not be called upon to operate in small groups without officer supervision, and at extended distances from headquarters. For this reason an unusually large number of non-commissioned officers will be necessary to provide grades and ratings sufficiently high to attract the best type of enlisted personnel."¹¹⁰

In line with this statement typical examples of non-commissioned grades provided were: Master Sergeants, Chiefs of sections of brigade, regimental, and squadron staff sections; Technical Sergeants, all platoon sergeants, assistant communications sergeants and message center chiefs of brigades, regiments, and squadrons, communications motor, mess and supply sergeants of troops; Staff Sergeants, tank commanders, section leaders of sections within platoons, and similar command positions, and certain chiefs of sections in regimental and squadron staffs; Sergeants, squad leaders within sections of platoons, troop clerks, and troop assistant supply sergeants; Corporals, buglers and agents liaison; Technicians Grade 3, senior radio operators, radio repairman, teletype operators, mechanics, draftsmen and clerks; Technicians Grade 4, Junior radio and teletype operators, middle group mechanics, junior clerks, drivers of tank recovery vehicles, wrecking trucks, and general officers sedans, and all cooks; Technicians Grade 5, motor vehicle drivers not included as Technicians Grade 4, and all enlisted men not provided with higher grades, except basics; Privates First Class, In general enlisted ratings averaged one grade higher than in normal units.¹¹¹

The Constabulary Uniform.

Providing a suitable uniform for the Constabulary presented a rather complicated problem in that the Constabulary was both a military and a police force. The three factors which were considered in selecting a uniform for the Constabulary were; the uniform would have to be attractive in keeping with the ideal of the Constabulary as an elite force; the uniform would have to be distinctive and readily distinguishable from that worn by other troops; and finally it should depart as little as possible



A Distinctive Uniform Was Provided

from that worn by the Army in general. With these factors in mind General Harmon recommended that the uniform of the Constabulary follow the standard Army uniform with the addition of special insignia and equipment which would make it attractive, and distinctive.¹¹²

With the idea of making the uniform attractive, General Harmon recommended that parachutists boots or two buckle cavalry boots with the smooth side of the leather out be provided in order that footwear could be given a high polish, that the service coat be substituted for the ETO type jacket, and that the service cap with visor be substituted for the overseas or garrison type cap. For on duty wear General Harmon recommended a leather belt on the order of a Sam Browne belt with a shoulder strap over the left shoulder, equipped with leather magazine pockets, leather first aid pouch, and leather frogs to hold the pistol holster, and first aid packet, and that the helmet liner circled with a one half inch stripe of blue flanked on each side by one half inch yellow stripes with the distinctive shoulder sleeve insignia of the Constabulary painted on the front be worn while on duty.¹¹³

A distinctive shoulder sleeve insignia was designed by General Harmon using the colors of the infantry, artillery and cavalry which had originally been combined in the shoulder sleeve insignia of Armored units. The insignia designed by General Harmon comprised a disc of gold, two and one half inches in diameter, bordered with blue, with the letter "C" in blue superimposed upon the gold background, pierced with a bolt of lightning in red from upper right to lower left. It was originally planned to wear the Constabulary insignia on the right shoulder with the Third Army insignia on the left, this plan was not found to be practicable and was later modified to provide for the wearing of the Constabulary insignia

on the left shoulder and deletion of the Third Army insignia.¹¹⁴

On 4 February 1946 General Harmon forwarded his recommendations concerning the Constabulary uniform expressing the opinion that the uniform recommended would present a distinctive appearance, particularly with the leather belt, should strap, and patch, and at the same time would not depart radically from the standard equipment worn by American officers and soldiers.¹¹⁵

Units Earmarked for Inclusion in the Constabulary.

In selecting units for inclusion in the Zone Constabulary two factors were considered, first units were selected which had had some experience in the type of operations contemplated namely the Cavalry groups and those units which had had experience in mechanized and motorized operations. For this reason the units of the 1st and 4th Armored Divisions, and Tank and Anti Aircraft units were selected. These units had all had extensive war-time experience in mobile operations which would prove to be of great value in building the esprit de corps of the new organization.

The individual units and their eventual Constabulary designations are indicated below:

CONSTABULARY UNITS¹¹⁶

<u>Original Designation</u>	<u>Constabulary Designation</u>
Hq & Hq Co. VI Corps	Hq & Hq Troop, US Constabulary.
Hq & Hq Co. 4th Armored Division	Hq & Hq Troop, 1st Constabulary Brigade.
Hq & Hq Co. Combat Command "A", 4th Armored Division	Hq & Hq Troop, 2nd Constabulary Brigade.
Hq & Hq Co. Combat Command "B", 4th Armored Division	Hq & Hq Troop, 3rd Constabulary Brigade

1ST CONSTABULARY REGIMENT

Hq & Hq Co. 11th Armored Group	Hq & Hq Troop, 1st Constabulary Regiment
11th Armored Infantry Battalion. 1st Armored Division	11th Constabulary Squadron
6th Armored Infantry Battalion. 1st Armored Division	12th Constabulary Squadron
91st Armored Field Artillery Battalion. 1st Armored Division	91st Constabulary Squadron

2ND CONSTABULARY REGIMENT

Hq & Hq Troop, 2nd Cavalry Group (Mechanized)	Hq & Hq Troop, 2nd Constabulary Regiment
2nd Mechanized Cavalry Squadron (Separate)	2nd Constabulary Squadron
42nd Mechanized Cavalry Squadron (Separate)	42nd Constabulary Squadron
66th Armored Field Artillery Battalion. 4th Armored Division	66th Constabulary Squadron

3RD CONSTABULARY REGIMENT

Hq & Hq Co. Combat Command "A", 1st Armored Division	Hq & Hq Troop 3rd Constabulary Regiment
37th Tank Battalion 4th Armored Division	37th Constabulary Squadron
68th Armored Field Artillery Battalion. 1st Armored Division	68th Constabulary Squadron
81st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized) 1st Armored Division	81st Constabulary Squadron

5TH CONSTABULARY REGIMENT

Hq & Hq Co. 6th Tank Destroyer Group	Hq & Hq Troop 5th Constabulary Regiment
8th Tank Battalion 4th Armored Division	8th Constabulary Squadron

35th Tank Battalion
4th Armored Division

35th Constabulary Squadron

474th Anti Aircraft Automatic
Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled)

74th Constabulary Squadron

6TH CONSTABULARY REGIMENT

Hq & Hq Troop, 6th Cavalry
Group (Mechanized)

Hq & Hq Troop 6th Const-
abulary Regiment

6th Mechanized Cavalry
Squadron (Separate)

6th Constabulary Squadron

53rd Armored Infantry Battalion
4th Armored Division

53rd Constabulary Squadron

10TH CONSTABULARY REGIMENT

Hq & Hq Col 10th
Armored Group

Hq & Hq Troop, 10th Const-
abulary Regiment

13th Tank Battalion
1st Armored Division

13th Constabulary Squadron

4th Tank Battalion
1st Armored Division

72nd Constabulary Squadron

771st Tank Battalion

71st Constabulary Squadron

11TH CONSTABULARY REGIMENT

Hq & Hq Troop, 11th Cavalry
Group (Mechanized)

Hq & Hq Troop, 11th Const-
abulary Regiment

25th Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance
Squadron 4th Armored Division

25th Constabulary Squadron

94th Armored Field Artillery
Battalion 4th Armored Division

94th Constabulary Squadron

51st Armored Infantry Battalion
4th Armored Division

51st Constabulary Squadron

14 TH CONSTABULARY REGIMENT

Hq & Hq Troop, 14th Cavalry
Group (Mechanized)

Hq & Hq Troop, 14th Const-
abulary Regiment

10th Armored Infantry Battalion
4th Armored Division

10th Constabulary Squadron

22nd Armored Field Artillery
Battalion 4th Armored Division

22nd Constabulary Squadron

27th Armored Field Artillery
Battalion 1st Armored Division

27th Constabulary Squadron

15TH CONSTABULARY REGIMENT

Hq & Hq Troop, 15th Cavalry
Group (Mechanized)

Hq & Hq Troop, 15th Const-
abulary Regiment

15th Cavalry Reconnaissance
Squadron (Separate)

15th Constabulary Squadron

1st Tank Battalion
1st Armored Division

1st Constabulary Squadron

14th Armored Infantry Battalion
1st Armored Division

14th Constabulary Squadron

SPECIAL TROOPS US CONSTABULARY

97th Signal Battalion

97th Constabulary Signal
Squadron

465th Anti Aircraft Automatic
Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled)

Constabulary School Squadron

Chapter 3
Establishment of the United States Constabulary

The U.S. Constabulary on 15 February 1946.

On 15 February 1946 the United States Constabulary consisted of a plan and a headquarters. Between this date and 1 July 1946 the task of securing personnel, deploying, reorganizing, equipping, indoctrinating and the training the Constabulary was accomplished despite a critical personnel situation, housing, and equipment difficulties.

It was not until 13 April that the final plan for the training of the Constabulary was fully known. On this date Constabulary Headquarters received the Theater reorganization plan and learned from it that on-the-job training for the Constabulary would begin on 1 June.¹¹⁷ This meant that all units would have to be in final locations by that date, manned, trained, organized, and equipped for operational training. As finally evolved, the plan for the organization of the Constabulary resolved itself into three rather distinct phases. During the phase from 15 February to 1 April, the units to comprise the Constabulary came under Constabulary control and conducted individual training, looking toward the provision of a cadre which would be capable of conducting the training of reinforcements as the units were brought to full strength. The second phase from 1 April to 30 May, was a period during which units were moved to their final locations and conducted unit training. The third period from 1 June to 30 June was utilized for operational, on-the-job, training. While the above phases are distinguishable there were many exceptions to this pattern, resulting from certain Cavalry units having to carry on concurrent operations as District Constabulary and the inability of higher headquarters to release units from their static

commitments as scheduled. In addition the factor of changing redeploy-
 m
 ment criteria handicapped the training program as unit commanders could
 never be sure just what the morrow would bring with regard to personnel
 losses, or reinforcements to replace the losses. In general, the work of
 establishing the Constabulary was conducted in accordance with prior plans,
 but there were many difficulties and problems which had to be solved in the
 process.

Bringing Units Earmarked for the Constabulary Under Control.

Units earmarked for the Constabulary were brought under command or
 operational control in accordance with a schedule which had been agreed
 upon between the Constabulary Planning Group, and the Commanding Generals
 of Third and Seventh United States Armies. The following table compares
 the original schedule agreed upon with the actual dates when the units came
 under operational control or command:118

UNITS BROUGHT UNDER CONSTABULARY CONTROL OR COMMAND


<u>Original Unit</u>	<u>Constabulary Unit</u>	<u>Planned Date</u>	<u>Actual Date</u>
Hq VI Corps	Hq US Constabulary	10 Feb 1946	10 Feb 1946
85th QM Car Pl	85th CON Car Pl	15 Feb 1946	15 Feb 1946
114th AGF Band	114th CON Band	15 Feb 1946	15 Feb 1946
14th AI Bn	14th CON Squadron	15 Feb 1946	15 Feb 1946
10th Armd Gp	10th CON Regiment	15 Feb 1946	15 Feb 1946
13th Tank Bn	13th CON Squadron	15 Feb 1946	15 Feb 1946
465th AAA Bn	CON School Squadron	15 Feb 1946	14 Feb 1946
11th Armd Gp	1st CON Regiment	15 Feb 1946	15 Feb 1946
6th CAV Gp	6th CON Regiment	10-20 Feb 1946	1 Apr 1946
2d Cav Gp	2d CON Regiment	10-20 Feb 1946	1 Apr 1946
28th Cav Sq	28th CON Squadron	10-20 Feb 1946	1 Apr 1946
42d Cav Sq	42d CON Squadron	10-20 Feb 1946	1 Apr 1946
820th MP Co	820th CON MP Co	10-20 Feb 1946	18 Feb 1946
6th Air Ln Sq		10-20 Feb 1946	
11th Cav Gp	11th CON Regiment	20-25 Feb 1946	20 Feb 1946
25th Cav Sq	25th CON Squadron	20-25 Feb 1946	20 Feb 1946
51st AI Bn	51st CON Squadron	20-25 Feb 1946	20 Feb 1946
66th AFA Bn	66th CON Squadron	20-25 Feb 1946	20 Feb 1946
14th Cav Gp	14th CON Regiment	25 Feb 1946	25 Feb 1946

<u>Original Unit</u>	<u>Constabulary Unit</u>	<u>Planned Date</u>	<u>Actual Date</u>
10th AI Bn	10th CON Squadron	25 Feb 1946	25 Feb 1946
22d AFA Bn	22d CON Squadron	25 Feb 1946	25 Feb 1946
94th AFA Bn	94th CON Squadron	25 Feb 1946	25 Feb 1946
15th Cav Gp	15th CON Regiment	25 Feb - 5 Mar 1946	1 Apr 1946
4th Tank Bn	72d CON Squadron	25 Feb - 5 Mar 1946	25 Feb 1946
11th AI Bn	11th CON Squadron	25 Feb - 5 Mar 1946	25 Feb 1946
15th Cav Sq	15th CON Squadron	25 Feb - 5 Mar 1946	1 Apr 1946
771st Tank Bn	71st CON Squadron	25 Feb - 5 Mar 1946	25 Apr 1946
Hq 4th Armd Div	Hq 1st CON Brigade	5 - 10 Mar 1946	5 Mar 1946
Hq CCB 4th Armd Div	Hq 3d CON Brigade	5 - 10 Mar 1946	5 Mar 1946
5th TD Gp	5th CON Regiment	5 - 10 Mar 1946	5 Mar 1946
8th Tank Bn	8th CON Squadron	5 - 10 Mar 1946	5 Mar 1946
35th Tank Bn	35th CON Squadron	5 - 10 Mar 1946	5 Mar 1946
53d AI Bn	53d CON Squadron	5 - 10 Mar 1946	28 Feb 1946
Hq CCA 4th Armd Div	2d CON Brigade	10 Mar 1946	10 Mar 1946
37th Tank Bn	37th CON Squadron	10 Mar 1946	10 Mar 1946
97th Signal Bn	97th CON Signal Bn	10 Mar 1946	10 Mar 1946
2d Cav Sq	2d CON Squadron	15 Mar 1946	1 Apr 1946
Hq CCA 1st Armd Div	3d CON Regiment	20 Mar 1946	20 Mar 1946
1st Tank Bn	1st CON Squadron	20 Mar 1946	20 Mar 1946
6th AI Bn	12th CON Squadron	20 Mar 1946	20 Mar 1946
27th AFA Bn	27th CON Squadron	20 Mar 1946	20 Mar 1946
68th AFA Bn	68th CON Squadron	20 Mar 1946	20 Mar 1946
91st AFA Bn	91st CON Squadron	20 Mar 1946	20 Mar 1946
474th AAA Bn	74th CON Squadron	20 Mar 1946	20 Mar 1946
81st Cav Sq	81st CON Squadron	20 Mar 1946	20 Mar 1946

Movement of Units to Final Locations.

The matter of moving units to the final locations which had been selected for them was a difficult matter. Many of the more desirable locations were occupied by other troops, by displaced persons, prisoners of war, and other miscellaneous classes of personnel. In some instances extensive repairs had to be accomplished before the installations could be considered useable. The daily staff conference notes of the Chief of Staff indicate that the problem of providing proper accommodations was a pressing one and that it received much attention from General HARMON. On 26 March, G-3 reported to the Commanding General that: "We have third priority in Hanau, which means we don't get in there.¹¹⁹ Army has ordered UNRRA to

leave Wetzlar by 1 April." On 27 March G-3 commented: "We may get Eschwege for billeting. Hanau and Hersfeld we may have partly. We received information from Army Engineer that we would get Deggendorf or maybe Landshut, but the 35th Tank Battalion is in there which may cause some trouble. In Schongau there are 3500 PW's, civilian detainees, DP's etc., but there is room for 800 or 900 personnel. They would have to be scattered over the locality since there is no room for that many in one place."¹²⁰ The staff conference notes for 28 March contain the following comments: "At Wetzlar they are trying to push UNRRA along, but they do not think they will move the DP's until 5 April. They are having trouble in getting the 3511th Ordnance Company out, but Army has promised to help move them. At Coburg they want the 6th Cavalry Group to go ahead and say just what houses they want and let Army know. There is a lot of talk of getting people out of Bamberg but there is no action."¹²¹ On 4 April the following comments appear: "The only change in the housing situation is that we finally have Schweitzingen. It looks like we are going to get into Wildeflechen. We are still going to get Kaufbeuren. The Commanding General told Colonel Dewey he had to impress those people that we must stop playing around on this housing situation."¹²² On 8 April G-3 noted: "The latest information on billets at Marburg is that there is a battalion of Infantry there. As soon as they complete their mission they will move to Kassel, and we can occupy their billets. They believe they will move about the middle of April. Kaufbeuren has been allocated to the 9th Division. However, Colonel Adieu, G-3 Army, states this has not been closed, that it is only a plan."¹²³ On 9 April it was noted: "In Wetzlar the kaserne has been cleared of DP's, but information from the Engineers states that due to necessary repairs, CCA 1st



Housing Was Not Always
Available and Some Units Lived
In Improvised Camps for a Time

Armored Division will not be able to move in for a period of a month. In Karlsruhe, a kaserne has been cleared for the 1st Tank Battalion, but the earliest move into that will be the first of May due to necessary repairs."¹²⁴ On 15 April G-3 noted: "Kaufburen has been definitely allocated to the 9th Division." and so the problem of providing suitable accommodations went.¹²⁵ By degrees the situation was cleared up. By 1 July 1946 all units except the 22d Constabulary Squadron were in their final locations.

Personnel Problems During the Organizational and Training Period.

Prior to coming under the command or operational control of the Constabulary, units were cleared of high score personnel. This action was taken in the hope of preventing an excessive turnover of personnel and to forestall interference with the organization and training of units. In actuality, many of the units were only paper organizations or were depleted to the point of ineffectiveness at the time they were earmarked for the Constabulary. Before the Cadre Training Program could be put into operation on 1 March 1946, it was necessary to transfer 1048 enlisted personnel from inactivated units or Constabulary units which were better off, to units which lacked sufficient personnel for a cadre. Three Constabulary units, the 11th Armored Group, the 14th Cavalry Group, and the 11th Cavalry Group, came to the Constabulary as paper units, making necessary the transfer of a complete cadre. Eight other units were depleted below cadre strength and required additional personnel to bring them to cadre strength.

An understanding of the personnel problems experienced by Constabulary units can best be gained by an examination of personnel turnover occurring in typical units during the period from January to July 1946. The turnover in two squadrons is cited as being typical of the situation which existed throughout the Constabulary. The following table illustrates the situation

in two typical units:

EXAMPLES OF PERSONNEL TURNOVER IN
CONSTABULARY UNITS

13th Constabulary Squadron¹²⁶

Month	Net Increase		Net Decrease		Strength	
	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM
1 January					35	743
January	7	2	11	125	31	619
February	8	8	19	134	20	493
March	3	203	1	28	22	668
April	15	24	7	36	30	656
May	4	99	4	72	30	683
June	5	146	13	150	22	679
1 July					22	679
TOTAL	42	482	55	545		

94th Constabulary Squadron¹²⁷

Month	Net Increase		Net Decrease		Strength	
	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM
1 January					39	518
January	0	0	0	202	39	316
February	1	1	16	86	24	231
March	8	153	4	6	28	378
April	6	549	4	19	30	908
May	0	000	5	44	25	864
June	0	102	5	84	20	882
1 July					20	882
TOTAL	15	805	34	441		

The foregoing figures, while not complete, are indicative of the tremendous problem of personnel turnover which faced the Constabulary during its formative stages. If we assume that all losses were among men who were present on 1 January 1946 in the 13th Squadron, only 198 of these men were still present on 1 July, and all the officers present on 1 January had been redeployed, as well as 13 of those reporting subsequent to 1 January. If the same assumption is made with regard to the 94th Squadron, only 77 of the enlisted men present on 1 January were present on 1 July. It is of course impossible to show exactly what did happen with regard to personnel so far as the numbers of men actually remaining with the units throughout the formative period, as records are not available, but even a cursory examination of the figures

cited indicates that the turnover was excessive, and that it could be expected to interfere seriously with any organizational or training program. Any objective consideration of the problems faced by the Constabulary during the formative period must necessarily be considered against the background of the personnel problem which had to be faced.

Another facet of the personnel problem was the inability of the Army to provide the Constabulary with reinforcements of the type which had been visualized by the original planners. In general, the original planners had contemplated a force composed of personnel meeting the physical and mental standards of officer candidates. That is all personnel were to be of Class I or II which meant a minimum AGCT test score of 110. Provision of this type of personnel proved impracticable, and the Constabulary received reinforcements of average quality, including the normal spread from the lowest to the highest type. The result was that the Constabulary was not an elite force with respect to the type of personnel provided. The only provision ever made to provide personnel of higher than average type was the authority to screen reinforcements of Class V personnel, to transfer out all illiterate and non-English speaking personnel, and undersirables.¹²⁸

At Constabulary Headquarters the personnel problem during the organizational and training period is reflected in the Constabulary Commanders Daily Conference Notes. On 22 March G-1 reported: "The original plan for personnel adjustment provided for the Constabulary to reach 75% of its T/O strength in officers and enlisted men by 31 March will not be fulfilled. Neither sufficient officers nor enlisted men will be available to reach this objective. The sources for assignment of officers available to the Third and Seventh Armies are almost exhausted. There are practically no officer replacements

arriving in the Theater from the United States. Indications are that we will not reach 75% of T/O by 31 March. To date 2700 enlisted reinforcements have been received and allocated to Constabulary units. It is expected that 7,100 more reinforcements will be received by 31 March, making a total of 9,800 reinforcements. If 9,800 reinforcements are received we will still be short 1361 of 75% of T/O."¹²⁹ On 5 April General HARMON commented: "The Constabulary is behind schedule because of certain shortages of equipment and personnel, and because we have not been able to move units into their final locations. Equipment is beginning to come in now and more will be received during the next two weeks than during the past two months. Apparently there is very little that can be done about the personnel situation that isn't already being done."¹³⁰ On 17 June General HARMON noted: "At present we are confronted with the worst personnel situation that we have had to face. Some improvement can be expected in six weeks to two months. On 5 July we will receive 50 officers from tactical units to be inactivated and a hundred or so at the end of July. In the early future we expect 350 to be released to us from Western Base Section. 4,300 enlisted replacements are in the offering during July from inactivated units, Western Base Section and from the reinforcement system. A large number of this personnel will be Regular Army."¹³¹

The Cadre Training Program.

During the first phase, the assigned goal was the initial organization and individual training of Constabulary units to include a cadre of trained personnel for administration and supply, and a nucleus of officer and enlisted personnel trained to conduct an eight week training program for filer reinforcements. This program applied to all Constabulary units except the Special Troops.¹³²

The provisions of the cadre training program are indicative of the personnel and organizational problems against which it was projected. The program provided for four weeks of training to be conducted in four, five and one half day weeks of 44 hours. Training was initiated by unit commanders as soon as cadres were assigned. An exception was made in the case of units starting the program after 1 March by requiring that the training be completed prior to 1 April. Unit commanders were enjoined to adjust personnel within their commands so as to provide a minimum cadre for all organizations. This training program consisted of essentially military subjects, training in subjects peculiar to the Constabulary being deferred until commencement of the unit training program.¹³³

For the purposes of the training program, personnel were divided into four categories, including: staff section personnel; household personnel; specialist personnel; and operating personnel. Training of staff section personnel was conducted on an on-the-job basis. Household personnel were trained either on-the-job, or by attendance at unit schools. Certain specialists among household personnel were trained with a corresponding unit outside the Constabulary by mutual arrangement or by attendance at a Theater or Army school. Specialist personnel such as armorers, radio operators and mechanics were trained on-the-job, with a trained individual occupying the same position, in unit schools or at Army and Theater schools. Operating personnel, including such personnel as motorcycle, horse, tank, motorized platoon, and section leaders received on-the-job training, attended unit officer and non-commissioned officers schools, and received instruction given by special instructional teams from the 2d, 6th, and 15th Cavalry Groups. These instructional teams, selected and trained for the task, gave instruction in: Con-

stabulary material and equipment, characteristics and familiarization firing with the 81-mm Mortar, tank and armored car weapons, road marches, vehicle stowage, voice radio procedure and the use of the vehicular interphone, team tactics of a mechanized section, team tactics of tank and motorized personnel, employment of riot duty formations, tank and armored car driving, and any additional subjects which might be mutually agreed upon between the team and unit commanders. The size of instructional teams was such as to permit simultaneous instruction for three squadrons. The utilization of instructional teams from District Constabularies stemmed from the fact that they were the only units who had previous operational experience that might be fitted into the pattern of operations contemplated by Constabulary. In addition to the instruction listed above, unit officer and non-commissioned officers schools were conducted during the four week period to insure proficiency in basic military subjects of an administrative nature. Quotas were allocated to the Theater Intelligence School, the Ordnance Technical School, the Provost Marshal School, the Quartermaster Catering School, the Signal School, the Medical Specialist School, and the Auto and Tank Mechanics School, for the training of a limited number of specialists.¹³⁴

As might be expected of the first training program of a new organization the results left much to be desired, but were judged to be satisfactory for those units which were able to complete the entire program. Reference to the table, indicating when various units came under Constabulary control, will indicate those units which were unable to complete the program because of lack of time. It may be said that the program did succeed in giving the units comprising the Constabulary an orientation in the equipment they would use, and a general refresher in basic military subjects. The results ob-

tained were later nullified to some extent by the redeployment and personnel problem, but it was a step in the right direction and paved the way for more effective training as time went on.¹³⁵

The Constabulary Unit Training Program.

Beginning on 1 April 1946 the Constabulary began its unit training program with the objectives of: (1) Training of all Constabulary units, other than the District Constabulary, so as to permit on-the-job training during the period 1-30 June 1946, preparatory to assuming full Constabulary responsibilities on 1 July 1946. (2) Training of District Constabulary units to attain the highest standards of performance of Constabulary duties. (3) Achievement by individuals of the highest standards of discipline, appearance, and professional qualification for assigned duty and, by all organizations, the ability to operate as a unit on Constabulary missions. (4) Development of a high esprit de corps in keeping with the establishment of the Constabulary as an elite body of soldierly. (5) Development of leaders and their indoctrination.¹³⁶

The eight week training period, from 1 April to 31 May 1946, was designed to prepare the Constabulary for its mission of on-the-job training to commence on 1 June. As there were great differences in the state of training of individual units, regimental commanders were left free to prescribe the allocation of time to subjects in order that the program might reflect the needs of the various units. In general, the program prescribed that the training of the individual in basic subjects would be stressed during the first four weeks, while during the second four weeks emphasis would be placed on those subjects peculiar to the Constabulary.¹³⁷

The preparation of master schedules was left to the regimental commander who were authorized to further delegate this authority to squadrons.

In the event that the regimental commander did delegate the authority to prepare master schedules to squadrons, he was required to establish the priority and time allotment to the various subjects comprising the program. With the exception of the District Constabulary units all Constabulary units conducted the individual training prescribed. District Constabulary units conducted training in subjects where proficiency had not yet been attained and utilized each mission performed by them as a training period. Administrative and operational specialists received on-the-job training, attended unit, and Theater or Third US Army Schools within the quotas allocated.¹³⁸

Individual training conducted during the first four weeks included training in Policies, Directives. Authority of the US Constabulary; Military Courtesy; Military Discipline; Articles of War; Dismounted Drill and Ceremonies; Military Sanitation and First Aid; Organization of the Army of Occupation and the US Constabulary; Chemical Warfare Training; Signal Communication; Use of Trooper's Handbook; Motor Vehicle Operation; First Echelon Maintenance; Care and Cleaning of Weapons, Equipment, and Vehicles; Familiarization Firing of all Weapons; Grenades, Fragmentation and Chemical; Antitank, Anti-personnel Mines, and Booby Traps; Physical Training; Inspections; Information, and Education; Rules of Land Warfare; Unarmed Defense; Personal Conduct and Bearing; Supply Discipline; Leadership, and Responsibilities of the N.C.O. and officer. Intelligence Training including: Search and Seizure Operations; Interior Guard Duty; including Guard Mount; Safeguarding Military Information; Organization and Responsibilities of Military Government; Organization and Responsibilities of German Police; Aerial Photographs, Map Substitutes, and Map Reading; Methods of Observation; Written Messages and Reports; Scouting and Patrolling; Uniform, Rank of

Allied Military, and Civilian Personnel; Use of Compass; Identity Documents and Passes; Identification of Foreign Armies; Intelligence Agencies; Organization and Responsibilities of German Government; Functions of CID and Military Police; Functions of CIC, Security of Information; Counter Sabotage; Status of PW's, DP's, and CI's; Functions of UNRRA; Border Security; Black Market; German Political Parties; Intelligence Reports; Organization of S-2 Section, and the S-2 Journal.¹³⁹

Operational Personnel received additional individual and collective training above that generally required, to include: Duties of a Policeman, comprising of making arrests, searching of prisoners, controlling of traffic, authentic passes and permits, riot duty, scene of a crime, conducting searches, obtaining evidence, recording statements and confessions, enforcement of law and order, operation of check points, road blocks, and railroad blocks, and elementary German words and phrases. In addition to being capable of performing the strictly military duties of a squad, crew or team, operational personnel were required to attain proficiency in: Riot duty, quelling of mobs, military traffic, military escorts, convoy work, search seizure operations, raids, border control work, and suppressing uprisings at DP, PW or CI camps.¹⁴⁰

Constabulary squads, crews, and teams including: Tank crews, horse squads, motorcycle squads, armored car crews, motorized sections and air sections received training designed to make them proficient as units. An example of the type of training completed is furnished by the armored car crews, which were required to become proficient in: Nomenclature and functioning; bore sighting; vehicle loading; ammunition stowage; target speed estimation; driving; radio and telephone procedure; sensing fire; command,

cross country movement; scouting and patrolling; squad drill; exercises involving the crew on Constabulary missions, and first echelon maintenance of vehicles and equipment.¹⁴¹

Officers and non-commissioned officers schools were conducted three nights each week during the eight week period. These schools covered such subjects as: Leadership, methods of inspection; company administration; responsibilities of officers and N.C.O.'s, search and seizure operations; security of information and installations; methods of instruction; administration of military justice; preparation of training programs and schedules; voice and command drill; use of intelligence specialists; preparation of messages and reports; and interpretation of aerial photographs and map substitutes. In addition to the night school unit schools were conducted at regimental or squadron level in auto mechanics, motorcycle mechanics, radio operation, and in any other subjects which the commander might deem necessary. Quotas to the Constabulary School, and to Third US Army and Theater Schools were allocated to the units for the training of certain types of specialists.¹⁴²

The unit training program culminated in a series of small unit field exercises, involving units up to and including troop size. These unit exercises were designed so that the units participating were required to perform missions which were normal to Constabulary operations, including; raids, border control, sealing off a part of a city, operation of check points, control of riots or disturbances at DP, PW, or CI camps.¹⁴³

In evaluating the results of the unit training program Constabulary training officers were of the opinion that the results obtained were superior to those resulting from the preceding cadre training program, but that the results did not meet the standards which had been set for the Constabulary. Failure to obtain the desired standards was attributed to: the new-

ness of the Constabulary organization, the shortage of officers trained in operations of the Constabulary type, the tremendous personnel turnover occurring during the training period, and the lack in some instances, of the best type of training facilities.¹⁴⁴

The Pre-Operational Training Period, 1 to 30 June 1946.

The pre-operational training period had as its objective the final preparation of Constabulary units for assumption of operational responsibilities beginning on 1 July 1946. This training program applied to all Constabulary units including the District Constabularies. These units including the 2d, 6th, 15th 28th, and 42d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons were directed to training in those subjects in which proficiency had not yet been attained in addition to performing operational duties. In setting forth this program for Constabulary units, great stress was placed on practical exercises, demonstrations, and on-the-job training. Theoretical instruction was held to the minimum and a realistic approach urged upon all units.¹⁴⁵

Those aspects of the training such as military courtesy, discipline, morale, and esprit de corps, were emphasized throughout the program as it was felt that these subjects were possessed of an intrinsic value in the development of any elite force. In order that subordinate commanders, particularly junior officers and non-commissioned officers, might receive a thorough indoctrination regarding their responsibility for discipline, operational proficiency, training, physical condition, welfare and other matters pertaining to their commands, the training directive called for a scrupulous adherence to the chain of command. A high standard of performance was required in each assigned subject before the course was considered successfully completed.¹⁴⁶

A training week of 44 hours including 4 hours night training was prescribed with the provision that it might be extended if the training mission required. In addition to the conduct of training, Constabulary units were directed to continue their preparations for the assumption of operational responsibilities, including the construction of permanent and movable barriers, preparation of signs, instruction in the construction of Nissen huts, surveying of lines of communications within unit areas, reconnaissance of operational areas, and the maintenance of contact with units to be relieved.¹⁴⁷

In addition to pre-operational training, provision was made for the training of reinforcements received after 1 June. Decision was made to conduct this training in detachments at the squadron or regimental level, prior to the assignment of reinforcements to troops. Within these detachments reinforcements were given intensive training in basic military and police subjects, generally in conformity with the training received by other Constabulary personnel during the unit training period.¹⁴⁸

As a means of providing practical instruction in the mechanics of Constabulary operations practical exercises were conducted in the vicinity of unit kasernes or billets beginning on 10 June 1946. This training included exercises in: Patrolling, both mounted and dismounted; traffic control; action at the scene of a crime, disorder, or accident; use of the Troopers Notebook; use of US Constabulary police forms and records; use of authentic passes; search and seizure operations; operation of check points, road blocks, and railroad blocks; operation of border control points; organization and operation of Troop Command Posts; quelling of disturbances, and map reading.¹⁴⁹

Training in intelligence subjects was stressed, and individuals who failed to achieve an adequate standard of proficiency, whether due to belated assignment or other reasons, were provided with supplementary courses of instruction. Intelligence specialists received intensive training in their specialities through the medium of on-the-job training. A minimum of 15 hours instruction in basic medical subjects was conducted for units engaged in training operations as distinguished from the District Constabulary units. In recognition of operational needs the training program provided the trainee with a thorough orientation in the location, methods of operation, responsibilities, and functions of German police agencies in the area assigned to each Constabulary unit.¹⁵⁰

The maximum use of qualified mechanics in the establishment of an on-the-job training program was directed. The use of training aides such as condemned engines, was urged. Special schools at the regimental level were established for training aircraft and engine mechanics. Schools in the keeping of aircraft forms and records, were held weekly for pilots, in such subjects as: tuning of aircraft radios, radio procedure, radio aids to navigation available on the continent. The preparation of Air Sections for early operation was accelerated by training, including patrolling, radio delays, photographic missions, and column control in coordination with individual units.¹⁵¹

The result of the pre-operational training program were judged to be excellent. Constabulary training officials were of the opinion that the program had accomplished its purpose and that it was a marked improvement over the training conducted during the cadre, and unit training periods. It had been hampered somewhat by the problems of personnel turnover and

the assignment of considerable numbers of reinforcements during the month of June but despite these difficulties the units had reached a state of readiness for operations.¹⁵²

Logistical Difficulties Encountered.

The major difficulties that hindered supply to the Constabulary were due to the depots being unable to supply the required items. In most instances the desired items were in the theater but could not be located because of inaccurate depot records. The redeployment situation had hit depots and supply bases extremely hard leaving only a few experienced personnel for operation. As a result it was found necessary in practically all branches of supply to go into the depots and assist depot personnel in physically locating the desired items which the stock records often showed to be non-existent. Much time and effort was wasted by units making excessively long hauls, even back to the liberated countries to draw supplies and equipment from depots only to find on arrival that the equipment was not available because of inaccurate records.¹⁵³

The greatest problem with regard to ordnance items was that of conditioning and maintaining the automotive equipment of the Constabulary. This problem resulted from the fact that the equipment was drawn from Ordnance collecting points in the condition in which it had been turned in. This condition varied from fair to poor. Ordnance units, designated by Third US Army to support the Constabulary, had been demoralized by redeployment and were ineffectual in providing the necessary support. Theater stocks of automotive parts were tied up by the consolidation of depots, performed in great haste, and unavailable through lack of inventory or the personnel to perform the inventory, and effect the issue.¹⁵⁴

As a result of the previously mentioned conditions, and the necessity for preparing vehicles for operation and then maintaining them, unofficial authority was obtained to establish 3d echelon shops. Nine such shops were established, and manned almost completely by German civilians. These shops, although they did not make Constabulary self sufficient, were of great assistance in maintaining automotive equipment. Shortages of personnel, especially trained personnel, within the units resulted in unsatisfactory performance of 1st and 2d echelon maintenance, and contributed greatly to the maintenance problem within the Constabulary. The requirement for spare parts was considerably higher than necessary, due to poor maintenance, and was further aggravated by the youth of the trooper and his lack of experience in handling motor vehicles.¹⁵⁵

Special items of clothing and equipment were authorized the Constabulary trooper, These were the coat, service; the golden silk scarf; belts leather EM, with shoulder straps and pocket magazine, leather EM, and pouch, 1st aid packet, leather, EM; and boots leather, laced, legging top, modified. Approval for these items of equipment was received in April of 1946. With the exception of the service coat, the golden silk scarf, and the cap service, supply of this equipment was delayed until early in 1947.¹⁵⁶

The procurement of construction material was extremely difficult during the pre-operational period. To remedy this situation the Constabulary engineer enlisted the cooperation of the Third United States Army and their Area Engineer Supply Officers in releasing critical materials, and in transferring materials from one area to another, thus increasing the flow of materials to the most critical points. The procurement of fire fighting equipment was extremely difficult. Certain types of fire fighting equipment was not present in the theater and had to be shipped from the United States, result-

ing in a time lag between the time the equipment was requisitioned and its issue. The problem of providing a supply of potable water for all units was a difficult one and is still unsolved in some stances. The provision of adequate road maintenance and snow clearance to allow the Constabulary to remain mobile, and to permit the supply of widely dispersed units was a problem which has received attention from the first. The housing problem and the provision of adequate recreational facilities in a war devastated country was a difficult one. Many of the Kasernes and other installation occupied by Constabulary units were in poor condition when occupied and required thorough renovation, and the construction of additional facilities. When Kasernes were in good condition it was still necessary to make additions and changes in order to bring them to the U.S. standards, which are considerably higher than those of the former German Army.¹⁵⁷

Summary of Problems Encountered.

In general, it may be said that the United States Constabulary was established amid the confusion of the demobilization period and that its establishment was accomplished amid the same problems which complicated the demobilization of the Army. These problems were largely those of personnel, which came about as a result of rapidly changing demobilization criteria, the demobilization of units and the amalgamation of miscellaneous personnel in the remaining units, and a shortage of officers in the company grades, and the problems of morale which resulted from adverse publicity received by the Army during this period.

Supply difficulties resulted from the confusion which reigned in the depots throughout the European Theater where personnel problems had made the keeping of accurate inventories impossible with the result that, although

in almost every instance the desired materials were available, a major effort was necessary in order to locate them and make them available for use.

The problem of training the Constabulary prior to assumption of operational responsibilities on 1 July 1946, was made most difficult by the factors of a heavy personnel turnover during the training period, and the lack of experience with operations of the Constabulary type. Of these two factors, the factor of personnel turnover was by far of the greater importance.

Another problem which must be considered, was the inability of the Army to make available the superior type of personnel which the Constabulary planners had deemed necessary, if the Constabulary were to become an elite force. The result was, that any claim Constabulary might have to the status of an elite force was achieved through superior training, hard work, discipline, and the insistence of General HARMON on setting the highest standards during the formative period.

Chapter 4


THE UNITED STATES CONSTABULARY SCHOOL

Planning the Constabulary School.

The plant of the United States Constabulary School can be traced to 15 January 1937 when Adolph Hitler in direct implementation of the Nazi Educational program, authorized the construction of the Adolf Hitler Schule, at Ordensburg, Sonthofen. Deep in the southermost mountains of Bavaria, Sonthofen escaped the punishing Allied air raids with the exception of a few bombs dropped in the locality during the closing months of the war. The plant of the Adolf Hitler Schule which, had been dedicated to the political education of German youth along the lines of the Nazi ideology, was re-dedicated to the task of training the members of the newly formed United States Constabulary in the methodology of policing the United States Zone in Europe.

In April 1945 the Second Moroccan Division of the French Army entered the city of Sonthofen and raised the tricolor over the Town Hall. Two months later elements of the 80th Infantry Division relieved the French forces and initiated US occupation of the area. Various other American units occupied the area as the occupational forces were regrouped, redeployed and inactivated.

The first group of instructors for the school were assembled at Bad Tolz on 23 January 1946 where General Harmon outlined to them the mission of the school, the subjects to be taught, the standards which would have to be maintained, the problems which were likely to be encountered during its formative stages. On the same day the initial group of instructors under the command of Colonel Holt departed for Sonthofen to begin the initial



The Plant of The
Constabulary School Was Originally
A Hitler Youth School

work of organization, preparation of curricula, and tables of organization. This group was joined on 13 February by Colonel Henry C. Newton who became assistant commandant and director of training. Colonel Newton had been assigned to the school because of his experience as a civilian educator and as director of training, of the Armored School at Fort Knox, Kentucky. His educational experience was an important influence in assuring the early success of the school.¹⁵⁸

Preliminary work on the tables of organization for the School Squadron was completed on 28 January and hand carried by Colonel Holt to Third United States Army Headquarters. Preparation of the tables of organization had been prefaced on the assumption that the school would offer four week basic and communications courses for officers and enlisted men until 30 June 1946 when additional courses would be added. The preliminary tables of organization provided for a School Squadron comprising a Headquarters and Service Troop; and Instructors Troop; a Demonstration Troop, a Guard and MP Troop; a Medical Detachment, and a Band. The School Squadron aggregated 122 officers, 6 warrant officers and 820 enlisted men.¹⁵⁹

On 12 February 1946 the 465th Anti-Aircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion, Self-Propelled, arrived at Sonthofen and relieved the 2d Cavalry Squadron as School Troops and was reorganized in accordance with the tentative tables of organization.¹⁶⁰

The curriculum of the school was organized by grouping related subjects under six departments: the Department of Geopolitics; the Department of Police; the Department of Tactics; the Department of Motor Transport; the Department of General Instruction; and the Communications Department.

The Original Course of Instruction.

In determining the curriculum of the Constabulary School, emphasis was laid upon those subjects believed to be essential to the operation of a mobile occupational police force, but not a part of the normal training of the soldier. This curriculum was intended to provide the soldier with instruction in such subjects as: Tactics to include; riot duty, raids and searches, guard and care of prisoners, mounted patrols, employment of air liaison sections, security, and the use of Constabulary weapons. Police training, including: duties, responsibilities and jurisdiction of the Constabulary trooper, technique and mechanics of arrest, operations of a Constabulary command post, elements of crime, laws of arrest, rules of evidence, interrogations, confessions and statements, court room demeanor and giving testimony, collection and preservation of evidence, passes and permits, traffic control and accidents, and border control. Geopolitical training to include; German psychology and background, German political parties, international relations, organization, functioning and relationship of the Constabulary to other military agencies. General instruction to include: self--defense, map reading, report writing, geography of Germany. Motor instruction to include: maintenance, driver selection and training, and records, reports and dispatching. Communications training included: radio and wire nets, message center operation, voice radio procedure, signal security, and preventive maintenance of equipment.

In addition to the basic course a communications course was established for officers and enlisted men. This course included 37 hours of instruction in general communications subject, 99 hours in radio operation



Constabulary School Mess

and related subjects; 9 hours in wire communications, 4 hours in tactics, 8 hours in police subjects, and 13 hours in geopolitics, plus 6 hours instruction reserved for subjects assigned by the Assistant Commandant.¹⁶¹

The first class to enter the Constabulary School reported at 0900, 4 March 1946, for opening exercises held in the Post Theater. The Commandant, Colonel Holt introduced, Lt. Gen. Lucien H. Truscott, Commanding General of the Third United States Army and General Harmon, Commanding General of the Constabulary who addressed the class. A total of 129 officers and 403 enlisted men reported for the first class of whom 125 officers, and 388 enlisted men graduated.

The original course of instruction represented the best judgement of those responsible for Constabulary operations at the time. It was at best an educated guess as to anticipated training requirements. Modifications of this course were made as operational experience demonstrated the need and additional specialist courses were added as required. Courses which duplicated those taught in other Theater schools were eliminated wherever possible and a continuous effort made to keep the Constabulary School abreast operational needs of the Constabulary.¹⁶²

Changes in the Basic Course of Instruction.

Changes in the basic course occurred following the graduation of the first class. These changes were based on the operational experience of the District Constabularies and a reevaluation of anticipated needs. An examination of the course of study indicates that beginning with the second course on 1 April 1946, greater emphasis was placed on police subjects, motor maintenance, and on leadership, drill, and training methods. The intensity of instruction was increased with the beginning of Course II,



Courses At The Constabulary
School Included Practical Work
As Well As Theory

thirty additional hours of instruction being added to bring the total for the four week course to 176 where it remained. With Course II the enlisted mens course and the officers course were separated and a differentiation made in the number of hours devoted to specific subjects on the basis of the varying needs of the two classes of personnel. In comparing the enlisted course with the officers course the greatest difference is to be found in the greater emphasis placed on the minutiae of police work for enlisted men, with a correspondingly lesser emphasis on tactical subjects, while the officers course emphasized tactical subjects and reduced the emphasis on police work.¹⁶³ A constant effort was made to keep the material taught current and in line with the operational practices of first the District Constabularies and later of the US Constabulary. The result of this procedure was that, the number of hours in a given subject might remain relatively constant, the material presented differed from that taught a few months before. A casual examination of statistical material concerning the courses taught leads to the erroneous conclusion that the material changed little throughout the existence of the Constabulary School. Such is not the case. The following table indicates various types of subjects:

BREAKDOWN OF HOURS TAUGHT IN THE BASIC COURSE
US CONSTABULARY SCHOOL

<u>Course No.</u>		<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>VI</u>	<u>VII</u>	<u>VIII</u>	<u>IX</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>XI</u>	<u>XII</u>
Tactics & Weapons	(O)	43	41	41	35	36	36	38	38	35	36	33	33
	(EM)	43	30	30	34	28	28	33	38	25	30	24	24
Geopolitics	(O)	23	16	16	21	18	18	18	18	18	20	20	20
	(EM)	23	22	22	16	14	14	18	14	19	16	16	16

Course No.		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XII
Police Subjects	(O)	12	28	28	52	48	48	50	48	60	61	60	60
	(EM)	12	37	37	52	62	62	57	60	70	69	67	67
Motors	(O)	2	9	9	12	20	20	18	20	8	16	16	16
	(EM)	2	9	9	12	20	20	18	20	12	20	20	20
Communications	(O)	8	8	8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(EM)	8	8	8	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
General Subjects	(O)	32	28	28	22	26	26	25	23	21	19	29	29
	(EM)	32	32	32	28	30	30	28	30	27	28	39	39
Leadership, Discipline & Training Methods	(O)	16	46	46	26	28	28	27	29	34	24	18	18
	(EM)	16	38	38	27	22	22	22	24	23	13	10	10
Total Hours	(O)	136	176	176	176	176	176	176	176	176	176	176	176
	(EM)	136	176	176	176	176	176	176	176	176	176	176	176

Note: The classification of subjects given does not necessarily follow the terminology or departmental organization of the Constabulary School, but is based on the terminology originally used. It is continued throughout the table for purposes of comparison.

Specialist Courses Offered by the Constabulary School.

The first course to be offered was the four week Communications Course initiated concurrently with the Basic Course. This course continued through Classes I to VIII. The final course ended on 23 November 1946.¹⁶⁴ A total of 30 officers, and 681 enlisted men were graduated from the course. This course was discontinued because it was a duplication of courses taught by the Theater Signal School at Ansbach, and because of the necessity for reducing the number of personnel required for instructional purposes. One other reason which influenced the decision to discontinue this course was the exceptionally fine training facilities of the Theater Signal School. As originally set up the Communications Course consisted of 40 hours of general communications training, 6 hours of wire communications training, 103 hours of radio and radio operations training, 10 hours of instruction in Geopolitics, 2 hours of tactical instruction, and 14 hours of instruction in leadership, discipline and training methods, a total

of 176 hours instruction for the four week course. The breakdown of the hours of instruction did not change materially during the period the course was included in the curriculum.

An Intelligence Course of four weeks duration was opened concurrently with Basic Course II on 1 April 1946.¹⁶⁵ This course was added to the curriculum because of the need for trained intelligence personnel throughout the Constabulary. It consisted of 27 hours instruction in tactics, 14 hours of Geopolitics, 5 hours of motors, 6 hours of communications, 18 hours of police subjects, 50 hours of intelligence subjects, 20 hours of general subjects, and 36 hours of instruction in leadership, discipline, and training methods. This course was dropped from the curriculum at the end of Course II as it was a duplication of similar courses taught at the Theater Intelligence School. A total of 90 enlisted men were graduated.

The US Constabulary School conducted a total of ten Field Grade Officers Orientation Courses during the period 10 March 1946 to 28 March 1947.¹⁶⁶ These courses consisted of subjects extracted from the Basic Course to enable officers to get an overall conception of the curriculum of the school. The course consisted of 35 hours of instruction drawn from all departments of the school. A total of 293 Field Grade Officers including Brigadier General Hobart R. Gay, Commanding General of the 2d Constabulary Brigade graduated from this course.

Two peculiarly distinct Constabulary Courses were established at the school on 15 July 1946. These courses were the "Desk and Records Course", and the "Special Investigators Course."¹⁶⁷ These courses were outgrowths of the increasing importance of the police phase of Constabulary operations and the need for specially trained personnel to carry on certain phases of

this work. The Desk and Records Course included 16 hours in tactics, 18 hours in Geopolitics, 36 hours in general subjects, 85 hours in police subjects, and 21 hours of leadership, discipline, and training methods. This course, like the Desk and Records course, totalled 176 hours of instruction for the four week period. A total of 820 enlisted men have been graduated from the Desk and Records and 951 enlisted men from the Special Investigators Course.

A special Provost Marshal Course was conducted from 13 to 18 January 1947.¹⁶⁸ This course attended by Provost Marshals of all Regiments and Squadrons and an officer from the Provost Marshals Section of Headquarters US Constabulary, was an orientation course in police work and was conducted by the Public Safety Department. It served to provide the Provost Marshals of the various units with a common orientation in the methods employed in carrying on this type of work in the Constabulary.

The Third United States Army Aircraft and Engine Mechanics School was transferred to the Constabulary School from Bad Reichenhall complete with personnel and equipment on 1 January 1947. The personnel and equipment were added to the Department of Motor Transport and on 4 January the first course at the Constabulary School was started.¹⁶⁹ The course which had formerly consisted of five weeks instruction totalling 264 hours was lengthened to seven weeks duration, thus increasing instruction to 308 hours. This course differed from most other courses taught at the school in that it operated on a command wide basis, quotas being allocated to units throughout the command. The first two courses conducted by this section of the Motors Department graduated 55 Aircraft and Engine Mechanics. The course consists of 86 hours instruction in General Aircraft subjects,

132 hours instruction in aircraft power plants, 84 hours in fuselage and fabric repair, and 6 hours of instruction in non aircraft subjects.

Consolidation with the 7719 Theater School (Special).

A conference was held at Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater on 3 January 1947, looking to the consolidation of the Military Police School at Brake, the 7719 Theater School (Third US Army School Center) (Special) at Seckenheim, and the Constabulary School at Sonthofen.¹⁷⁰ Theater headquarters was interested in this matter from the standpoint of saving troop spaces by the elimination of duplicating administrative personnel. Constabulary interest in this consolidation was based on two premises: first, the Commanding General was interested in obtaining the Loretto Kaserne, located at Seckenheim for the headquarters of the 15th Constabulary Regiment and its Special Troops, which were inadequately quartered at Weinheim, and, secondly, in obtaining the Seckenheim Administrative Course for the Constabulary School.

Consolidation of the 7719 Theater School (Special) was effected on 20 January, when the school was transferred to Sonthofen. This school retained its separate identity and continued to function as a Theater or Command School. Upon transfer of the school to Sonthofen the course was reduced from three weeks to two weeks by the elimination of such subjects as disciplinary drill and physical training, which General Harmon felt could be taught on the Company level. Two courses in Company Administration were taught by this school, beginning on 10 February and 24 February respectively.¹⁷¹ These courses consisted of: twelve hours of general Company Administration, 10 hours of instructional methods, 23 hours of instruction in administration and supply, 12 hours of motor maintenance

instruction, 6 hours of Military Justice, 14 hours of weapons instruction, and 11 hours of non-departmental instruction. A total of 51 officers and 166 enlisted men were graduated from these two courses.

With the consolidation of the 7719 Theater School, (Special) and the Constabulary School on 20 January 1947, the Constabulary School began to lose its identity as a school whose mission was primarily that of training Constabulary personnel and began to take on the character of a Theater school. A special two week Administrative and Supply course designed to train instructors to conduct administrative schools in the various posts in the Zone was conducted beginning on 17 March, and attended by 68 officers, and 127 enlisted men.¹⁷² This course placed emphasis on methods of instruction in an effort to prepare the personnel in attendance to return to their organizations and instruct in similar subjects.

Following the conclusion of the Special Administrative and Supply Course, preparations were made to conduct an Officers Supplemental Training Course for officers serving in the Theater whose training had been interrupted by the war. This course was required by the War Department and was instituted as a two week course on 26 May 1947 and repeated again beginning on 9 June 1947. Beginning on 30 June 1947, this course was expanded to four weeks.¹⁷³

A Theater wide Non-Commissioned Officers Course designed to train non-commissioned officers and potential non-commissioned officers in their basic duties was instituted on 30 June 1947. Emphasis was placed on basic subjects, supply, and administration, although no attempt was made to qualify students as supply or administrative specialists. On the same date a Constabulary Enlisted Men's Advanced Course was instituted. This

course, which incorporated features of the former Desk and Records Course and the Investigators Course, was of four weeks duration and replaced these courses.¹⁷⁴

On 30 June 1947 the Constabulary School was teaching five courses. Two of these were Constabulary courses, the enlisted men's Basic Course, and the enlisted men's Advanced Course. Three courses, the officers Supplemental Training Course, the Non-commissioned Officers Course, and the Liaison Aircraft Engine Mechanics Course, were on a Theater wide basis, and included quotas of 373 students compared to quotas of 388 allocated to Constabulary courses. All of these courses were of four weeks duration, with the exception of the Aircraft Engine Mechanics Course which was of seven weeks duration.

Departmental Organization of the Constabulary School.

In organizing the Constabulary School an effort was made to provide a functional organization. All matters pertaining to instruction were placed in the Academic Division, which was organized into a headquarters, six instructional departments, and a student squadron.¹⁷⁵ The headquarters of the Academic Division was established to supervise and coordinate the activities of the Academic departments and the student squadron. The Academic Division was under the supervision of the Assistant Commandant. A training aids department was established under the Academic Division to serve the needs of the instructional departments.¹⁷⁶ This department greatly facilitated the task of the instructor in presenting the various courses of instructions. Over 1000 charts, graphs, and other schematic training aids were constructed by this department. In addition the training aids department operated the training film library, and projection and public address equipment.

The Department of Tactics was organized under the Academic Division for the purpose of presenting a well balanced course in tactical operations.¹⁷⁷ In the early days of the school the department director was faced with the problem of selecting and developing a course of study applicable to the needs of the Constabulary without the benefit of previous operational experience. A course of instruction embodying both normal military operations dealing with both Motorized Infantry and Mechanized Cavalry tactics, and Constabulary operations was evolved. The material presented to the first classes was tentative and designed to stimulate an interchange of ideas between the instructor and the student. With the passing of time the Department of Tactics revised its course of study in accordance with the operational experience of units in the field. A significant change was the exclusion of elementary tactics in order that the student might be provided with more instruction in specific Constabulary functions such as Border control, raids and searches, and a wider comprehension of the scope and nature of Constabulary operations. Demonstrations and practical work were appreciably increased so as to afford a more realistic approach to the subject of tactics. A weapons section was organized within the tactics department which gave instruction in the mechanical training, and range firing of the pistol, submachine gun, light machine gun, and M-1 rifle.¹⁷⁸ Every student attending the Constabulary School fired the pistol and observed demonstrations in the firing of tank cannon, armored car cannon, and the 57mm recoilless rifle. In September 1946, a reallocation of subjects effecting all departments resulted in the addition of map reading and intelligence subjects to those taught by the tactics departments.¹⁷⁹

These new subjects were stressed by the Tactics Department because of their importance in Constabulary operations. To aid in the presentation of intelligence subjects a control room was constructed modeled after the one maintained by Constabulary Headquarters.¹⁸⁰ This room provided an up to date picture of intelligence developments and Constabulary operations throughout the US Zone.

Since its inception the Department of Motor Transport has had the primary function of instructing officers, and enlisted personnel in first echelon motor maintenance.¹⁸¹ In contrast to other classes of subjects, motor maintenance was taught with a minimum of theory and a maximum of demonstrations and practical application. In general, students received instruction in the nomenclature and functioning of vehicles, followed by practical instruction designed to familiarize them with preventive maintenance. The motor maintenance course included instruction in fuel and electrical systems, systematic trouble shooting and emergency roadside repairs. Practical work was provided by undertaking the repair and servicing of deadlined vehicles from the Constabulary School Squadron Motor Pool.

On 1 January 1947, the course of instruction of the Third US Army Aircraft and Engine Mechanics School was added to the Department of Motors with the transfer of this school from Bad Reichenhall.¹⁸² This course of seven weeks duration follows the same principles of instruction which have been used in the teaching of motor vehicle maintenance.

The Department of Public Safety.

The Department of Public Safety, originally designated the Police Section, was responsible for all instruction in police work.¹⁸³ In the initial curriculum the Department was assigned thirty eight hours instruction.

From this beginning the department grew until it was the largest single department in the school. The growth of the Department of Public Safety resulted from the fact that the greatest single operational task performed by the Constabulary was police work. From the thirty-eight hours instruction initially provided the curriculum was built up until 68 hours instruction was provided in the Officers Basic Course, 82 hours in the Enlisted Mens Basic Course, 105 hours in the Desk and Records Course, and 107 hours in the Investigators Course. In addition to instructional duties the personnel of the Department wrote the courses for the Desk and Records Course and the Investigators Course, designed a special course for the Provost Marshals of the Constabulary, assisted in revising the Troopers Handbook, and in the simplification of Police Report Forms.

The Department of Geopolitics was created to provide the student with a knowledge of the historical, geographical, and psychological background of the German people and nation.¹⁸⁴ Possession of this knowledge was prerequisite to an appreciation by the trooper of his place and responsibility as a member of the occupation forces. Instruction included such subjects as, American Democracy, American Foreign Policy, International Relations, United Nations, German Geography, German History, German Courts, Laws, and Civil Government, Military Government, and the relation of the trooper to the German populace.

Because of the newness of the subject of Geopolitics to the American curriculum, difficulty resulted from the dearth of textbooks dealing with the subject. It thus became necessary for the department to prepare its own textbooks. Through the collective efforts of Dr. Richard H. Auer, formerly of the University of Virginia faculty, and Dr. John B. Whitten formerly of the Princeton University faculty, courses in German, History

International Relations, the Potsdam Conference, and the United Nations, were involved and included in the course of study.

A communications Department was established with the initial organization of the school and was continued until 23 November 1946 when the Communications course was eliminated from the curriculum of the school.¹⁸⁵

A Department of General Subjects was also established at the time of original organization.¹⁸⁶ This department continued until depleted below effective strength. Effective 20 September 1946 the subjects taught by this department were transferred to other departments. Unarmed Defense subjects were transferred to the Department of Public Safety. Intelligence subjects and Map Reading were transferred to the Department of Tactics, and key German words and phrases instruction to the Department of Geopolitics.

Effective 1 February 1947, the Department of Weapons was established.¹⁸⁷ Personnel transferred to the new Department included three officer instructors, a supply officer, ten enlisted assistant instructors, a German secretary, and two German laborers. This department was charged with presenting a logical and uniform method of instruction in weapons with the objective of improving individual and group marksmanship, developing competent instructors, and promoting the safe handling of firearms. The course presented by the Weapons Department included 16 hours of instruction for basic course officers, eight hours for enlisted students in the Basic, Desk and Records, and Investigators Courses, and 14 hours for all students in the Administrative Course. A range suitable for firing the M-1 Rifle at 200 yards was constructed and added to the training facilities

The administrative device employed by the school to handle the students was the Student Squadron.¹⁸⁸ Incoming students were assigned to the Student Squadron for purposes of control, administration and discipline. The Squadron was organized into a headquarters consisting of the Squadron Commander, Squadron Executive, Sergeant Major, clerks and orderlies. In addition to the permanent personnel a squadron staff composed of student officers assisted the Squadron Commander. Troops were organized under student officers and non-commissioned officers. Each troop was headed by a faculty advisor who assisted the Squadron Commander in the execution of inspections and in administration.

The only tactical organization of the Constabulary School Squadron, the Demonstration and Guard Troop, encountered a number of difficulties in the fulfillment of its role.¹⁸⁹ In order to promote greater efficiency, personnel chosen for Interior Guard Duty were detached from the troop and assigned to the Provost Marshal. This action permitted the troops to concentrate on the mission of conducting tactical demonstrations. Upon the assignment of a Labor Service Company (Polish Guard) in December 1946 the Provost Marshal was able to release a considerable portion of the guard detachment to the Troop thus increasing its effectiveness as a demonstration unit.

Changes in Constabulary School Command.

A change in the command of the Constabulary School occurred on 17 April 1946, when Colonel John J. Binns, FA, succeeded Colonel Harold G. Holt, Cav, as commandant. Colonel Holt became the Commanding Officer of the 15th Constabulary Regiment stationed at Weinheim near Heidelberg, Germany. Colonel Holt continued in this assignment until rotated to the Zone of the

Interior during July 1947. Colonel Binns continued as Constabulary School Commandant until 23 June 1947 when he returned to the Zone of the Interior for duty with the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department. Colonel Binns was succeeded by Colonel Theodore Buechler, FA, former Commanding Officer of the 14th Constabulary Regiment.

Problems Faced by the Constabulary School.

From the very beginning the Constabulary School was faced with the problem of securing all types of supplies over a long and tortuous supply line, the nearest supply depot being located 110 miles from Sonthofen. In the early stages of organization all categories of supplies were at a premium and a rigorous economy of means became the order of the day. Railroad facilities were in a disorganized state and motor transportation was severely curtailed by the poor condition of roads throughout the area. In many instances, supplies, particularly those used in making training aids, had to be obtained from supply depots in remote parts of the zone which resulted in considerable delay in initiating the school program. Corrective measures were vigorously pushed, and, with the establishment of truck served Class I, II, III, and IV supply points in Sonthofen, a noticeable improvement in the supply situation occurred.

The procurement of training aids posed a number of difficulties for the school. The need for firing ranges, for both practice and demonstration firing, was solved by remodeling a Wehrmacht small arms range, and by clearing two areas for large caliber and long range firing.¹⁹⁰ Equipment for the establishment of a motor and radio shop was obtained only after great difficulty.¹⁹¹ Certain materials which could not be procured through normal requisitions were made available only as a result of the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the faculty.¹⁹²

One of the most difficult problems which the school encountered was that of obtaining qualified instructors. The selection of instructors was based on a consideration of the individuals military background, and his experience in educational fields. Many instructors did not have sufficient background or instructional experience at Army Service Schools. In an effort to make up for these deficiencies, all instructors were carefully oriented and given a course in instructional methods prior to the arrival of the first class. The Academic Division conducted a series of Instructors Courses to improve the technique of certain individuals. The staff of the Assistant Commandant conducted inspections of the various classes as a means of improving teaching methods.¹⁹³

With the acceleration of redeployment during the early months of its existence, the Constabulary School faced a shortage was so acute in the Department of General Subjects that it was necessary to reallocate the subjects taught by this department to other departments.¹⁹⁴ The heavy drain of redeployment increased the load on the remaining instructors and made it difficult to stabilize instruction. The peak of the redeployment drain was reached in June 1946 when large numbers of personnel were redeployed which resulted in lowering the standard of instruction. Replacements for the losses occurring in June came in slowly with the result that considerable time elapsed before the previously high standards of instruction could again be reached.

While the school facilities were in the main complete, they were far from adequate. A construction program was initiated to make up the principal deficiencies. Included in the construction program was the building of a motor shop, the remodeling of a stable into a shelter for a weapons section, and the establishment of a rifle and pistol range.

In addition to the construction of instructional facilities, much construction and many repairs had to be completed before the normal operations of a post could be carried on. Included in this category was the repair of roads, surfacing of the school quadrangle, the complete renovation of the schools heating system, laying down of an airstrip, parking lot and the construction of air craft hangers .¹⁹⁵

In the initial phase of the schools operation medical care for the school personnel was provided by the Medical Detachment of the School Squadron. On 15 March 1946, the 3d Platoon 58th Field Hospital commenced operation of a small hospital. With the inactivation of the 58th Field Hospital in October 1946, the Medical Detachment of the School was enlarged and redesignated the Constabulary School Dispensary. The School Dispensary functioned as a small hospital of 100 beds, providing medical care for the school, community units, and the dependents residing in the vicinity.¹⁹⁶

A Womens Army Corps detachment was established at the School in September 1946 as a means of alleviating the critical shortage of administrative personnel. This detachment numbering four officers and sixty enlisted women was assigned to the various sections of the headquarters and the Academic Division where shortages were most critical.¹⁹⁷

With the initiation of planning for the transportation of dependents of Military Personnel to the Theater, the groundwork for the establishment of a Military Community was laid.¹⁹⁸ A community office was established as a section of the Headquarters and surveys were undertaken for the purpose of locating suitable housing facilities for thirty families. The town of Obertsdorf, a nearby winter resort, was selected as the community

site. A commissary, Post Exchange and dispensary were established in Obertsdorf and began operations on 20 July 1946. Obertsdorf is located eight miles from the school with the result that arrangements had to be made for the transportation of Personnel between their quarters and the school. Night and day bus service was established initially, and supplemented later by a morning and evening train. The train was particularly important in view of the quartering of the WAC detachment in Obertsdorf. By the end of 1946 seventy dependent families had taken up residence in the community.¹⁹⁹

As the community grew the Community Headquarters was expanded and its scope of activities broadened to include all the functions of a normal military post, community supply, post exchange, finance, utilities, civilian personnel, courts and claims, communications and accommodations were added to its responsibilities.²⁰⁰ In August 1946, rail served Class I, II, III, IV supply points were established in Sonthofen which resulted in greatly improved service as compared with the truck served supply points which had serviced the school in its early days.²⁰¹

Chapter 5

OPERATIONAL TRAINING

General Provision.

The objective of the operational training program was that of sustaining individuals and units at the peak of efficiency. This training program constituted the primary training criteria for all Constabulary units during the first year of operation. In order to insure the permanence of high standards, it was directed that all units upon completion of operational duty would undergo retraining for the purpose of mental and physical rehabilitation, reindoctrination in discipline, deportment, smartness of appearance, and soldierly bearing. Particular stress was placed on military courtesy, discipline, morale, and the development of an "esprit de corps". These aspects of military training were considered of primary importance in the development of an elite force.²⁰²

To further the development and training of small unit leaders, a strict observance of the chain of command was directed. The delegation of responsibility was modeled on a pyramidal basis, such responsibility being placed on successive leaders, officers, non-commissioned officers and acting non-commissioned officers. All personnel in the chain of command were made responsible for all matters within their units such as operations, discipline, training, and security.²⁰³

A period of two weeks following a months operational duty, or a period of eighteen days following forty-five days of operational duty was prescribed for purposes of rehabilitation and training. The Constabulary Training Program covered a six month period and was based on the assumption that each troop would have from six to eight weeks

available for training during this period. Training was divided into four different phases, individual, unit, test, and review. Phases were run in consecutive order and commenced with the first period subsequent to 1 July 1946 when the troop was not on operational duty. To provide for contingencies that might arise, it was directed that units who did not complete an entire phase within the period of time allotted for rehabilitation and training would ~~presume~~ resume this phase at the next training and rehabilitation period. 204

The training program was based on a six day week. Under normal circumstances no training was conducted on holidays or Wednesday and Saturday afternoons. In the main, Constabulary training was composed of practical exercises, demonstrations, and on-the-job training. Classroom work was reduced to a minimum and the importance of a realistic approach to subject matter emphasized. The predominant theme of the training program was the practical application of basic military and police training to meet the troopers' needs. Recognizing the certainty of change, planners of the training program directed that the operational experience of Constabulary units in the field be carefully studied so that the lessons learned might be utilized during subsequent training periods. 205

Phase 1.

During the individual training phase Constabulary personnel were to receive instruction in: interior Guard duty, map reading and the use of the compass, on day and night patrols to the extent necessary to insure proficiency under adverse conditions, cover and concealment, camouflage,

scouting and patrolling, hasty fortifications, military courtesy and discipline, organization of the Army, and of the Army of Occupation, safeguarding military information, and basic medical training.²⁰⁶

Phase II.

Phase II provided for the conduct of refresher training in police subjects for individuals performing police duty. Subjects included in this training were: Traffic Control, Technique of Arrests, Searches, and Guarding Prisoners, Mounted Patrolling, Operation of Check Points, Authorized Passes and Permits, Searches and Seizures, Action at the Scene of a Crime, US Constabulary Police Forms and Records, Operation of a Police Station and Processing Prisoners, Riot Control, including use of chemicals, Unarmed Defense, and Map Reading. Other personnel received specialized training in the performance of their primary duties.²⁰⁷

Training in Constabulary Subjects.

In addition to police training units were required to complete the study of certain subjects peculiar to the Constabulary, by 1 January 1947. These included: Our Occupation Mission, Function of the US Constabulary, Organization and Operation of Military Government (including MG laws and courts, and changes as they occurred), German Civil Organization and Administration (including German Criminal Codes and Courts, and changes as they occurred), Geography of the Occupied territory, Customs, Attitudes, and Psychology of the people of Occupied Countries, Constabulary Relations with MG military Police, German Civil Police, CIC, and CID, Economics (sufficient coverage of this science to afford knowledge of conditions and laws in German that affected the performance of the occupational mission), and Security Control Training.²⁰⁸

All individuals who had not completed record or familiarization firing with individual weapons in the previous period were required to complete a program of weapons training. Personnel manning crew served weapons and all members of combat vehicle crews received instruction in the nomenclature, functioning, and technique of fire of their crew served, or combat vehicular weapon, and fired a familiarization course. Dismounted marches of gradually increased length were conducted. Tactics, techniques, and combat functions of the small units were stressed.²⁰⁹

To insure a high degree of efficiency in first echelon motor maintenance motor parks and stables were conducted under the supervision of an officer for a period of one hour each day. All personnel were instructed in the necessity for the care and conservation of clothing, equipment and supplies. Courses in the use of prescribed forms and procedures were conducted for personnel involved in the handling of public property and funds.²¹⁰

Constabulary units received instruction in the employment of organic aircraft for tactical operations. This course of instruction covered such aspects of tactical operations as patrols, radio relays, photographic missions, column control, liaison and the picking up and dropping of messages. Provision was made for the instruction of special units by limiting instruction to conferences. For all other units the instruction consisted of conferences, demonstrations, and practical exercises.²¹¹

Reinforcement Training.

All incoming replacements to the US Constabulary, except certain qualified specialists, were assigned to regiments in hundred man groups to facilitate training. The distribution of newly arrived replacements to the

various regiments was effected through a priority system which stipulated that regiments with the lowest assigned strength would have first priority on replacements. Each group of one hundred replacements were required to complete a four week 176 hour training program as a unit before being broken up and assigned to operational duties. In order to standardize the training of replacements, regiments were directed to establish Reinforcement Training Detachments at stations occupied by regimental headquarters or at squadrons, stations within the regiment. With the exception of certain specialists, reinforcements assigned to brigade headquarters received their initial training with regimental training groups. Upon completion of their training period, trainees were returned to the brigade headquarters. 212

REINFORCEMENT TRAINING PROGRAM. 213

	1st week	2d week	Hours per week		Total Hours
			3d week	4th week	
1. Organization of the Army of Occupation	1				1
2. Organization, Functioning, and Policies of US Constabulary	2				2
3. Organization, Functioning, Responsibilities of supporting Agencies (MG, CIC, CID, German Police)	2				2
4. Military Courtesy and Discipline	1	1			2
5. Articles of War	1				1
6. Dismounted Drill	2	2	2	2	8
7. Ceremonies					
8. Inspections	2	2	2	2	8
9. Orientation	2	2	2	2	8

	<u>1st</u> <u>week</u>	<u>2d</u> <u>week</u>	<u>3d</u> <u>week</u>	<u>4th</u> <u>week</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Hours</u>
10. Basic Medical Subjects, (First Aid, personal hygiene sanitation)	4	3			7
11. Calisthenics	3	3	3	3	12
12. Organized Athletics	2	2	2	2	8
13. Care and Cleaning of Clothing and Equipment	2	2	2	2	8
14. Map Reading				3	3
15. German Language	2	2	2	2	8
16. Unarmed Defense	1	1	1	1	5
17. Interior Guard	4				4
18. Preliminary Marksmanship Training					12
Rifle, Cal. .30, M-1	4				(4)
Pistol, Cal. .45		4			(4)
SMG, Cal. .45			4		(4)
19. Familiarization Firing					24
Rifle, Cal. .30, M-1	8				(8)
Pistol, Cal. .45-		8			(8)
SMG, Cal. .45			8		(8)
20. Police Training					(50)
Traffic Control		6			(6)
Technique of Arrests, Searching and Guarding Prisoners		4			(4)
Scene of a Crime				3	(3)
Raids, Searches, and Seizures				4	(4)
Use of US Constabulary Police Force Pertinent to Trooper			3		(3)
Dismounted Police Patrols				4	(4)
Motorized Police Patrols				5	(5)
Passes and Permits			4		(4)
Cordons, Check Points and Roadblocks			4		(4)
Riot Control and Quelling Disturbances, including use of Chemicals				8	(8)
Chapter I and III Troopers Handbook		3			(3)
Use of Troopers Handbook		2			(2)

	<u>1st</u> <u>week</u>	<u>2d</u> <u>week</u>	<u>3d</u> <u>week</u>	<u>4th</u> <u>week</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Hours</u>
21. Gas Mask Drill	<u>1</u>				<u>(1)</u>
22. Radio-Telephone Procedure			<u>2</u>		<u>(2)</u>
TOTAL	<u>44</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>176</u>

In order to insure the maximum of proficiency in the study of prescribed subjects, it was directed that an evaluation be made of the previous training of all reinforcements prior to their assignment to the Constabulary. When it was determined that a high standard of proficiency had been attained in a particular subject field, training time was shortened and applied to other subjects. Dismounted Drill and Calisthenics were limited to one half hour period per day. Reinforcement Detachments participated in Regimental or Squadron ceremonies as separate units. The training of reinforcements in map reading was such as to enable the trainee to operate over a road net. The Theater Commander believed that a workable knowledge of the German language by military personnel engaged in Occupational duties would prove of value in the performance of occupation missions. In furtherance of this policy language schools were established at troop level by 1 June 1946. These classes were scheduled so as not to interfere with the conduct of operations, or the performance of operational duties. Teaching methods were left to the discretion of the unit commander concerned. Constabulary Headquarters recommended that classes be conducted daily and that attendance be limited to 20 students. In the absence of qualified language instructors, units were authorized to engage one German civilian instructor per troop. Troop commanders were authorized to exceed the minimum of 44 training hours per week whenever it was deemed necessary to the success of the training program.²¹⁴



Specialists Were Trained
At Theater And Army Schools
Such as the Theater Signal School.

The following limitations on administrative and training cadres for each Reinforcement Training Detachment were imposed:²¹⁵

- 1 - Captain (Detachment Commander)
- 1 - Lieutenant (Executive Officer)
- 2 - Lieutenants (Platoon Leaders)
- 8 - Enlisted Men (1st Sergeant, clerk typist, 6 section leaders)

It was directed that all qualified specialists in critical supply be assigned to units as rapidly as they became available, where they received a thorough orientation on the organizations, missions, and functions of the Army of Occupation, the US Constabulary, CIC, CID, and Military Government. Upon completion of the orientation program specialist personnel were assigned to troop duty.²¹⁶

Specialist Training.

Provision was made for the training of various types of specialists in Constabulary operations by attendance at the US Constabulary School, Theater and Army Schools. The training of communication personnel was dependent upon a number of factors such as the percentage of trained personnel within a unit at the outset of operations, the number of skilled personnel lost to the organization and the number of untrained replacements absorbed by the unit. The difficulties of the above mentioned problem were accorded full recognition when a guide covering proper procedure methods was published and made available to all units. Refresher training of communications personnel was based upon the premises that: All technical specialists, whether in a fixed plant or in the field periodically required formal schooling; voice radio operators must pursue refresher courses including operating prowords, message writing, phonetic alphabet and radio net operation in order to overcome faulty habits and operating technique; key radio operators (CW) must periodically be given classroom instruction in procedure, prosigns, operating

signals, frequency adjustment, and security rules. They must also have periodic code table work to overcome faulty and careless habits acquired in actual operation; Code and Message Center clerks require practice in use of M209 converter and refresher courses in message center procedure; Radio repairmen will be required to review pertinent technical manuals relative to the radio sets authorized in their particular echelon and do practical work by performing 1st and 2d echelon repair, inspecting, and testing on all radio sets in the unit. Communications personnel were required to be familiar with the organization of the Constabulary communications system and were reoriented periodically on the wire and radio nets as set forth in Radio Net Diagram published by Constabulary Headquarters. Medical Aid personnel were required to undertake sufficient training to insure efficient administration of first aid in garrison and in the field to casualties resulting from operations. The employment of trained air mechanics in the on-the-job training of mechanics helpers was directed in order that the latter group might receive the highest type of instruction. The use of training aids, such as condemned engines, was urged and special schools created at regimental level to train additional airplane and engine mechanics.²¹⁷

Unit Specialists Schools.

For the purpose of training continuous wave radio operators and automotive mechanics, unit schools were operated at squadron or regimental level. The training of a sufficient number of specialists to meet T/O and E requirements was the immediate objective of unit schools. Upon completion of the initial phase of school training, unit schools were directed to have in training a minimum of 10% of T/O and E requirements. This procedure was

instituted in order that Constabulary might be able to replace specialists lost through normal attrition and, in the instance of radio operators, to provide a communications background for personnel to be trained as radio repairmen. Officer and non-commissioned officer schools were conducted for a minimum of two (2) hours during each training week for the purpose of instruction in the performance of duties and missions appropriate to their particular units.²¹⁸

Changes in the Program.

On 12 July 1946, the weekly Troop Information Program was reduced to one hour per week. This hour of instruction was based on, and conducted in accordance with, current USFET Information and Educational Bulletins. In the case of units operating isolated outposts completion of the training was deferred until the unit returned to the camp area for rehabilitation and training.²¹⁹

It was directed at this time that all units, undertake refresher training and such other additional training as might be required to correct deficiencies noted during periods of operational duty. Service type units received three hours basic and/or tactical training and two hours technical training each week in addition to on-the-job training received in the performance of normal duties.²²⁰

To insure adequate instruction for officers and non-commissioned officers a number of modifications in the original training directive were put into effect on 5 August 1946. A certificate of Proficiency was awarded to personnel successfully completing their course of study in prescribed subjects. Standards of proficiency in such subject fields were determined by written and practical, or practical examinations conducted by the commanders concerned.

The issuance of certificates to officers of units assigned or attached to brigades was conducted by either brigade or regimental commanders concerned. Brigade commanders were authorized to delegate the awarding of certificates to non-commissioned officers to squadron or special troops commanders. To provide for officers and non-commissioned officers in units not assigned or attached to brigades, unit commanders were empowered to award certificates of proficiency to individuals successfully completing prescribed courses of study. Recipients were not required to attend courses listed on their certificates. Officers and non-commissioned Officer Schools were conducted in: Organization and operation of desk and records sections; use of US Constabulary Police Reports Forms, and Records (particular emphasis placed on "Serious Incident Report" and US Constabulary Report #5); Passes and Permits, including use of Third US Army Identification and Pass Guide; security Memorandum Number 2, Headquarters, Third US Army, dated 1 May 1946; Liaison and cooperation with other agencies (MG, CIC, CID, etc.); Operations (Searches and seizures, border control posts, patrolling, quelling of disturbances, etc.); Disposition of arrestees; Leadership and responsibilities of officers and non-commissioned officers; Military Justice (differentiate between punishment for delinquencies and felonies; emphasize rigid and prompt disciplinary action); VD Control; Methods of Instruction; and Company Administration. 221

Obstacles Encountered in Executing the Training Program.

The average strength of the Constabulary was approximately 26,500 enlisted men during the twelve month period beginning on 1 July 1946. During this period approximately 53,000 enlisted men came and went, or an average of 4,500 per month, of this number 2,600 were lost and 1,900 were replacements, an average turnover of approximately 12 percent per month. This

meant in general that 10 percent of the command was constantly undergoing the four week reinforcement training program, 12,300 were performing operational duties and 12,300 were engaged in training and rehabilitation. On the basis of these figures the average enlisted man remained with Constabulary approximately eight months. During this time he received the four week reinforcement training program, spent four and one half months on operational duties, and the remaining two and one half months in training and rehabilitation. The maximum amount of training which it was possible for him to receive covered a period of three and one half months from which had to be deducted, time spent on special duties to which he might be assigned. It was generally believed that the maximum training which the individual could possibly have received was closer to two months than the three and one half months he could theoretically have undergone. That these factors served to reduce the effectiveness of the training program is illustrated by the remark of General Harmon on 15 February 1947. "A year ago we had about 24,000 men, today we have approximately the same number who are, perhaps a little better trained than the men we had a year ago."²²²

The most successful phase of Constabulary training was the reinforcement training program requiring four full weeks of training for all reinforcements prior to the assignment of reinforcements to operational duties. General Harmon and General Burress made a point of insuring that this program was conducted as planned, and that no other duties were permitted to interfere, with its execution. This program insured that all reinforcements had a basic background in Constabulary methods of operations in addition, to the basic training received in the Zone of the Interior.²²³

In evaluating the training program it is necessary to keep in mind the factors which prevented the full realization of its potentialities. When these factors are considered it can generally be said that the training program probably accomplished all that could reasonably have been expected under the circumstances.²²⁴

Chapter 6

CONSTABULARY PERSONNEL PROBLEMS

The Provision of Personnel.

From the very beginning difficulties were encountered in maintaining the strength of the Constabulary. This difficulty did not differ materially from the problems which other Army units experienced during the same period, but in the light of the Constabulary mission, and the standards which had been established, it was perhaps more significant. This problem had two aspects, the first and most important being that of securing reinforcements in sufficient numbers to maintain the Constabulary at or near its authorized strength, and the second being that of excessive turnover which tended to lower the standards of training and efficiency of Constabulary units.²²⁵

The table of organization strength of the Constabulary was fixed at 1837 officers, 93 warrant officers, and 29,825 enlisted men. By the time Constabulary became operational on 1 July 1946 its strength had reached 1433 officers, 77 percent of T/O, 50 warrant officers, 71 percent of T/O, and 29,437 enlisted men or 95 percent of T/O. With regard to enlisted men 23,818 had joined the organization during the months of March, April, May and June. Thus when Constabulary became operational approximately 77 percent of its enlisted personnel had been with the organization less than four months. Following 1 July 1946, the turnover among Constabulary personnel continued to be high with the result that at least 10 percent of the troop strength was constantly undergoing the four week reinforcement training program. The excessively high turnover made it difficult to indoctrinate the Constabulary trooper with the unit pride and esprit de corps which were so essential in a unit of the Constabulary type.²²⁶

The following tables indicate the personnel status of the Constabulary during its first year of operations. The turnover indicated is derived by adding the number of reinforcements received during the month to the strength as of the first day of the month and subtracting the strength as of the last day of the month thus obtaining the losses. These figures do not include individuals transferring into the Constabulary through other than reinforcement channels. The result is that the turnover indicated is somewhat less than the actual turnover. Despite this limitation the figures do indicate the tremendous problem faced by Constabulary in maintaining its strength and state of training.²²⁷

TURNOVER AMONG ENLISTED MEN ASSIGNED TO
THE US CONSTABULARY **228**

Month and Year	Strength	Losses	Gains	T/O Strength
30 June 1946	29437	6581	6221	30917
31 July 1946	31730	1439	3732	30917
31 August 1946	32245	179	694	30917
30 September 1946	30005	3431	1191	30917
31 October 1946	28954	3216	2165	30917
30 November 1946	28795	675	516	30917
31 December 1946	27771	1240	216	30917
31 January 1947	24397	2978	396	30917
29 February 1947	23793	1708	1104	30917
31 March 1947	23067	3775	3049	30185
30 April 1947	23182	2409	2524	30185
31 May 1947	22274	1840	932	30185
30 June 1947	21468	853	47	29022
		30324	22787	

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TURNOVER AMONG OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO
THE US CONSTABULARY


Month and Year	Strength	Losses	Gains	T/O Strength
30 June 1946	1433	334	64	1863
31 July 1946	1494	66	127	1863
31 August 1946	1945	90	541	1871
30 September 1946	2023	21	99	1871
31 October 1946	2025	82	90	1871
30 November 1946	2070	45	90	1871
31 December 1946	1868	304	102	1871
31 January 1947	1973	50	155	1871
28 February 1947	1955	63	45	1871
31 March 1947	1989	142	108	1996
30 April 1947	1993	62	66	1996
31 May 1947	1944	104	51	1996
30 June 1947	1906	108	70	1735
		1471	1608	

Turnover among Constabulary personnel averaged approximately 18 percent per month during the first year of operation. This meant in general that the average stay of an individual was approximately eight months. In this time, if a reinforcement, he received the four week reinforcement training program and performed operational duties or trained for the remaining seven months. Generally speaking, of the seven remaining months four and one half were spent on operational duties and two and one half in training, and rehabilitation. The net result was that Constabulary usually obtained only four and one half months service on an operational status from the average enlisted man during the first year of operations.²³⁰

The statement that the average individual remained with the Constabulary for only eight months does not take into consideration the officers and enlisted men who remained throughout the period and on whose shoulders rested the responsibility for maintaining the state of training, and setting a standard for the short timers. Coupled with the problem of operating an efficient organization despite a high turnover rate was the problem of obtaining personnel in sufficient numbers to meet Constabulary requirements. In this respect the situation became so critical during the first three months of 1947, that it was found necessary to inactivate the Light Tank Troop of each Regiment and make the fifth or "E" troop of each Squadron inoperational. Indications from headquarters at this time were that Constabulary would be maintained at 92 percent of T/O beginning on 1 April 1947. That these hopes were over optimistic is evidenced in the fact that by 1 July 1947 the personnel situation had deteriorated to such a point that efforts were made to bring the T/O into line with the personnel available, rather than to provide personnel for the existing T/O. This situation did not apply to Constabulary alone but was to be found throughout the European Command.²³¹

The Problem of Quality.

Because of the nature of the duties performed by the Constabulary trooper it was important that he have the intelligence necessary to prepare detailed factual reports of crimes and incidents, be able to interpret Military Government and Military Law, know the rules of evidence, and be possessed of discerning judgement. Operating in a country where black market activities offered a lucrative return, it was imperative that he possess the strength of character to resist such temptations, that he be highly disciplined and possessed of a high sense of duty. Constabulary planners had visualized an elite force,



Character Was Considered Important
Because Constabulary Personnel
Were Often Subject to Temptation.

composed of high quality personnel which would in general have the qualifications of officer candidates.²³²

During the organizational and training phase it became evident that the provision of such personnel would be impossible and that the Constabulary would have to operate with personnel of average quality insofar as intelligence was concerned. From the standpoint of character it was evident that men with records of crime, involving moral turpitude or who were likely to succumb to temptation, could not be used effectively in a force charged with enforcing law and the maintenance of order.²³³

As a result Constabulary's request for some means to eliminate the obviously unfit, a Theater Placement Board was established. This board was charged with the responsibility of assigning men in order that the maximum benefit might be derived from the individuals prior training, aptitudes, and potential abilities. Similar boards were established at Squadron, Regimental, and in Constabulary Headquarters for the purpose of finding assignments within the command for individuals who were misassigned. The Theater Board did not enter into the situation until all efforts to find an assignment within the command had failed. When this occurred the proceedings of the Constabulary Boards were forwarded to the Theater Board which usually took favorable action if the individual had been tried in two or more assignments and when the findings indicated that a conscientious effort had been made to utilize his services in the command. The Theater Board was not constituted to accomplish the elimination of disciplinary cases, but confined its efforts to the proper placement of individual soldiers in an appropriate duty assignment. A total of 77 soldiers were transferred from the Constabulary as a result of the action of the Theater Placement Board.²³⁴

While the Theater Placement Board was a step in the right direction, its scope of action was too limited to solve the problem of eliminating soldiers with criminal records, illiterates, non-English speaking, and men of low intelligence, and to prevent the further assignment of similar types as reinforcements. As a result a request was made to Third US Army for authority to transfer all men classified as AGCT Class V, illiterates, and non-English speaking personnel from the Constabulary. Authority to accomplish these transfers was granted on 10 May 1946 which resulted in the elimination of 1186 men during the months of May, June, July, August, and September 1946. These transfers served to raise morale among the remaining men, and tended to make the individual trooper feel that he was part of a select group. At the same time, instructions were issued by Third US Army which prohibited the further assignment of men in AGCT Class V.²³⁵

In August 1946, authority was received from the War Department which liberalized the separation of enlisted men who came under the provisions of AR 615-368 and AR 615-369. Immediate, aggressive and continued action was taken to insure the removal of as many undesirables as possible under this authority and by 1 July 1947, approximately 600 undesirables were eliminated.²³⁶

On 19 October 1946, the war Department granted additional authority to eliminate Company Grade Officers with efficiency indices below 35, and Field Grade Officers whose efficiency indices were below 40. This authority did not apply to Regular Army Officers with the result that a total of 62 officers of the civilian components were returned to the Zone of the Interior for separation or reassignment. On the same date the War Department granted authority for the elimination of officers and enlisted men who were inapt, who could not profitably absorb further military training, or who could not make the proper adjustment to group living. A total of 90 officers and

enlisted men were returned to the Zone of the Interior as a result of this authority.²³⁷

A survey of the manner of performance of restored general prisoners was conducted to determine the advisability of requesting their elimination from the Constabulary. Due to the fact that only a small number of restored prisoners were assigned, and the majority of whom were in assignments which did not bring them into official contact with the German population, it was decided to request that no more restored prisoners be assigned as it was believed that normal attrition would eventually eliminate those already assigned. This request was not favorably considered by Third US Army.²³⁸

Third US Army established certain minimum qualifications for the assignment of enlisted men to Military Police units. The qualifications established that Military Policemen should have a minimum AGCT score of 60 and no record of conviction by courts martial involving crimes of moral turpitude or the more serious aspects of Article of War 96. A letter was sent to Third US Army requesting that these minimum qualifications apply to Constabulary personnel as well. In making this request it was pointed out that the Constabulary Trooper was required to deal with Military Personnel and German and other Civilians and that his responsibilities were equally as great if not greater than that of a Military Policeman.²³⁹

The efforts made toward eliminating undesirable personnel and to establish definite qualifications for personnel assigned to the Constabulary served to raise the quality of personnel somewhat, but did not come near achieving a force composed of the type of personnel which have been visualized for the Constabulary. In general it can be said that any credit which the Constabulary may be given for achieving the status of an elite force was due

to the hard work and high standards of training which were set for it and not to the assignment of specially selected personnel.²⁴⁰

Securing Courts Martial Jurisdiction.

Considerable delay occurred in securing General Courts Martial Jurisdiction with the result that approximately 50 cases piled up during the months of March and April 1946 due to lack of jurisdiction. With the formal activation of Constabulary on 20 May 1946 this matter was cleared and the cases were brought to trial. Due to the wide deployment of Constabulary units, General Courts Martial were established at each Brigade Headquarters and at Constabulary Headquarters. Subsequently a fifth General Court was established at the Constabulary School.²⁴¹

When Constabulary Headquarters became the successor to Headquarters Third US Army on 15 February 1947 the Courts Martial Jurisdiction of the Commanding General was extended to include that which had formerly been under Third US Army. This in substance meant that the US Constabulary exercised Courts Martial Jurisdiction over a territory extending roughly from Paris, France to the Czechoslovakian border. This extension of the Courts Martial Jurisdiction made it necessary to augment the Judge Advocate Generals Section in order to handle the increased work load.²⁴²

Administrative Matters and Their Handling.

Considerable study was given to the location of unit personnel sections. Decision was made to locate personnel sections with the squadrons, based on the assumption that the closer the personnel records could be kept to the troops the more accurate they would be, and in addition this location would make them readily available to the troop commander. This decision was later revised to permit regimental commanders to exercise discretion and locate the personnel at either the squadron or regiment.²⁴³

All matters involving discipline, promotion and similar matters have been handled through command channels. Routine administrative matters were handled directly with regiments thus relieving the Brigade S-1 of a considerable burden in processing correspondence.²⁴⁴

A thorough overhauling of the system of publications was undertaken in December 1946, and a standardized procedure set up to insure that directives from the headquarters were in the proper form. This system which became effective on 1 January 1947 provided for the following types of publications:²⁴⁵

Staff Memorandums - Containing permanent or semi-permanent instructions pertaining to Constabulary Headquarters only.

Staff Bulletins - Containing matter that is either directive or informative and temporary in nature, pertaining to Constabulary Headquarters only. Also matter of an unofficial nature.

Circulars - Contain permanent or semi-permanent instructions.

Bulletins - Contain official directives of temporary duration, republication of directives of higher headquarters, and informative matters.

Operational Directive - Contains the basic, general policy under which the US Constabulary operates, and outlines the general mission of the US Constabulary. One operational directive will remain in effect for a considerable length of time.

Operations Memoranda - Contains detailed instructions for carrying out the mission of the US Constabulary. They will supplement or augment the Operational Directive with the view of later being incorporated in a new Operational Directive.

Operations Instructions - Contains detailed instructions for carrying out a particular task. Operations Instructions are issued in lieu of Field Orders normally issued in combat and will usually pertain to a specific unit.

The Training Program - Outlines the policies and general instructions for the conduct of training, and is applicable to all units. One Training Program will remain in effect over a considerable period of time.

Training Memoranda - Contains detailed instructions for the conduct of a specific type of training. It may or may not apply to all units and will normally cover a relatively short period of time.

Intelligence Summary - Published weekly.

Civilian Personnel Bulletins - Contain directives and policies of permanent or semi-permanent nature pertaining to civilian employees.

Letters Originating at Higher Headquarters - Are indorsed to units or their contents incorporated into an appropriate directive of another type by Constabulary Headquarters.

Letters Originating at Constabulary Headquarters - Will be written when their subject matter pertains to one unit or to a very limited number of units.

S Standing Operating Procedures.

In addition to providing for the use of the system of publications outlined provision was made that as new policies or directives were formulated all previous instructions on the same subject would either be rescinded or incorporated in the new directive. This system resulted in a better system of filing in the units and facilitated reference. It precluded the confusion occasioned by the publication of a letter, the letter

amended by a bulletin, further amended by a TTX and perhaps even additional instructions being issued by telephone.²⁴⁶

Effect of the Personnel Situation on Morale.

In speaking of the personnel situation at the Constabulary Commanders Conference held in Heidelberg on 1 March 1947, General Harmon stated that the Constabulary was in a very bad way, with regard to enlisted personnel at that time. A total of 1400 reinforcements had been obtained from surplus Third US Army during the previous two months. A drop in morale among Constabulary personnel had been noted during January and February which was attributed to large personnel losses for which replacements were not supplied. With respect to officers and warrant officers the personnel situation was regarded as satisfactory, with the exception of the disproportionate numbers of officers in the grades of Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel. This unbalanced grade distribution resulted in an actual shortage of officers in the grades of Captain and Lieutenant.²⁴⁷

Personnel Problems Incident to Assuming the Functions of Third US Army.

With the movement of Constabulary Headquarters on 15 February 1947 and the assumption of the residual duties of Third US Army a number of new personnel problems were encountered. These problems were the result of the transition of Constabulary Headquarters from a tactical headquarters to the status of both a tactical and administrative headquarters with responsibility for the Military Posts located in Wuerttemberg-Baden and Greater Hesse.²⁴⁸

On 15 February the Headquarters of the First, Second and Third Military Districts were provisionally activated, using the Headquarters of the 1st Infantry Division Artillery, the 1st Infantry Division, and the 26th Infantry Regiment as the basis upon which to organize the new District

Headquarters. Constabulary provided personnel for these headquarters as a part of its function of closing out Third US Army Headquarters and was preparing to divorce itself from the Districts on 15 March when they were to become operational. Surplus personnel from Third US Army Headquarters were used in three ways. First, approximately fifty percent of the strength of Constabulary Headquarters was to be made up of personnel from Third US Army Headquarters. This personnel was to be used to replace all Company grade officers who had been assigned to the Headquarters. This personnel was to be assigned to troop units in order to increase the numbers of officers on duty with troop units. Secondly, a portion of the personnel of Headquarters Third US Army was to be retained until the residual functions of Third US Army had been closed out and the new District Headquarters became operational. Thirdly, personnel above that required in Constabulary Headquarters and for temporary augmentation would be transferred to the Districts and Posts in order to bring them to an operating level with regard to personnel. An initial augmentation of 105 officers was authorized which was to be eliminated when the Districts became operational on 15 March and Constabulary resumed its former mission.²⁴⁹

On 3 March C-1 noted that implementation of the augmentation of the headquarters was almost complete, that there would be 97 rather than 105 officers added in the augmentation and that an effort would be made to reduce the number. On 17 March information was received to the effect that the headquarters of the Military Districts would be eliminated and that Constabulary Headquarters would function as the headquarters of the Second Military District (Wuerttemberg Baden and Greater Hesse), with the 1st Infantry Division Headquarters performing the same functions for the First Military District (Bavaria). This decision meant that many of the functions

which had been transferred to the provisional district headquarters would have to be taken back by Constabulary Headquarters and that additional personnel would have to be provided to carry on the additional work. This action resulted in the reduction of the augmentation of the headquarters to 76 officers instead of the elimination of the 105 spaces provided. By 31 March Constabulary Headquarters had reached its authorized strength with the exception of six officers who were returning to the Headquarters from the former District Headquarters. On this date the headquarters was authorized 139 officers by T/O plus 76 officers in augmentation, 274 enlisted men by T/O plus an augmentation of 105 making a total of 215 officers and 379 enlisted men.²⁵⁰

Provision of Personnel for the Military Posts.

A net shortage of 69 officers existed in the Military Posts of Second District on 7 March. This shortage existed in officers of the services, 20 Chaplains, 7 Transportation Corps Officers, 12 supply officers, 9 Engineer Officers and 10 Ordnance Officers being required to bring the Post to strength. With the exception of officers of this category personnel requirements of the posts were met. An effort was made to prevent units from assigning the less desirable to Military Posts. By 31 March 1947 they were at approximately T/O strength with the exception of the specialists such as Engineers, Ordnance Officers and Chaplains. The shortage of specialists was gradually alleviated by by 1 April 1947 had been eliminated. In setting up the Military Post organization a large number of Air Corps Officers were assigned to the various posts as the Air Force share of the Post Overhead. The following table indicates the numbers of such officers assigned and the posts to which they were assigned.²⁵¹

Munich	39	Fulda	35
Nurnburg	29	Kaufbeuren	5
Bad Tolz	20	Regensburg	10
Bamberg	16	Augsburg	20
Darmstadt	10	Heidelberg	20
Kassel	20	Giessen	15

Measures Taken to Improve Troop Morale.

In August 1946 a request was made to Third US Army requesting that permission be granted to permit military personnel to bring one German guest to War Department motion picture shows. It was believed that this action was highly desirable from a morale standpoint in that it would permit the soldier to offer his guest wholesome entertainment and would tend to decrease the consumption of liquor and have a beneficial effect on the venereal disease rate. This request was not favorably considered in view of the nature of the War Department contracts with the motion picture industry. Authority to take German guests to Army motion picturees was finally forthcoming early in July of 1947.²⁵²

Third US Army directed that a system of social passes be tried out for the admission of German guests to American clubs. In order to secure a social pass a German had to have a sponsor who made application for a social pass for the individual. The individual seeking a pass was then screened to determine whether the requirements for the issuance of the pass had been met. In general these requirements were that the individual be free from communicable disease, at least 18 years of age, have no known Nazi tendencies, and of reasonably good appearance. This system was put into effect in all clubs on 1 October 1946. It resulted in eliminating much of the undesirable element of German society from American clubs and encouraged the better strata of society to associate with American Soldiers.²⁵³

In November 1946 emphasis was placed on anew program to establish suitable day rooms for each unit. It was felt that this type of recreational facility would be more in demand during the winter months, that it would tend to deemphasize the club type of recreation with its accompanying consumption of liquor, and have a favorable effect on the venereal disease rate. The first objective was one day room per Kaserne to be followed by one day room per troop. This program was vigorously prosecuted with the result that practically all dayrooms had reached acceptable standards by 1 July 1947²⁵⁴

Arrangements were made in November 1946 for the provision of 16 MM motion pictures for small detachments in operational outposts who were too far from established theaters to make use of their facilities. These pictures proved to be a morale booster and served to make the trooper on outposts feel that his interests were being considered. At the same time "Jeep Shows" were organized and took to the road for visits of Constabulary units. These shows which took their name from the fact that they were small shows never numbering more than six entertainers and an enlisted man who was responsible for the welfare and conduct of the entertainers. These shows visited outlying Constabulary Troops, Platoons and outposts to the exclusion of larger units having other forms of entertainment available. At first nine of these shows were used. The number of shows was gradually reduced with the consolidation of troops in Kasernes until only three shows were on the road. Effective 1 July 1947 they were discontinued in accordance with the consolidation of troops to take place during that month.²⁵⁵

Constabulary units received quotas to the Theater Rest Centers in proportion to the Constabulary strength. These quotas enabled personnel on leave to go to a place away from their unit with good recreational facilities at minimum cost. In addition to rest center facilities organized tours of neighboring countries have been utilized as well as individual trips for recreational recreational purposes.²⁵⁶

Constabulary personnel problems generally grew out of three factors over which Constabulary itself had little if any control. These were, (1) the failure of higher authority to provide the type of personnel which had been visualized for the Constabulary and upon which its status as an elite force was to be based. (2) The failure of higher authority to provide personnel in the numbers necessary for the best accomplishment of the Constabulary mission. (3) Failure to provide personnel whose service in the Constabulary would be of sufficient length to derive the greatest amount from the training necessary to prepare them for their duties.²⁵⁷

In order to compensate for the failure of higher authority to provide personnel as had been anticipated every effort was made by Constabulary to alleviate the situation to the greatest possible extent. The Theater Placement Board was utilized to eliminate men who could not be utilized in Constabulary assignments. Immediate, aggressive and continuing action was taken to eliminate undesirable officers and enlisted men under existing authority from the War Department. Authority to prevent the assignment of Class V personnel was requested and obtained, and an effort made to obtain authority to apply Military Police personnel standards to Constabulary personnel assignment policies. A continual study of the assignment of key personnel was made in order to make the optimum use of the personnel available.

In addition a recruiting campaign was made in an effort to secure the reinlistment or the extension of enlistments of as large a number of enlisted personnel as possible. The net result of all these efforts was to improve the quality of assigned personnel somewhat, and to provide additional personnel in small numbers but the results fell far short of the standards and numbers of personnel which had been planned for the Constabulary.²⁵⁸ The failure of higher authority to provide the necessary numbers of personnel, of the quality originally visualized has been the greatest single problem with which the Constabulary has had to contend. It has resulted in the availability of personnel dictating policies and resulted in a number of reductions in the T/O strength including, the inactivation of all light tank elements, the decision to make one troop in each of the 27 Constabulary Squadrons inoperational, and on 1 July 1947 the reorganization of the entire Constabulary withing a troop ceiling of 18,000. These measures were taken to bring the T/O more generally into consonance with the personnel available. Despite these reductions in T/O strength, the mission has remained unchanged with the result that the mission has had to be accomplished by a steadily decreasing force.²⁵⁹

Chapter 7
CONSTABULARY OPERATIONS


Constabulary Becomes Operational.

On 1 July 1946 Constabulary became operational and assumed responsibility for the execution of the mission of maintaining general military and civil security, and assisting in the accomplishment of the objectives of the United States Government in the United States Zone in Germany, exclusive of Berlin District and the Bremen Enclave. The execution of this mission was accomplished by the operation of an active patrol system, supported by reserves held in readiness to take prompt and effective action to forestall and suppress riots, rebellion and acts prejudicial to the security of the United States Occupation forces, and the policies of the United States Government. In addition to the operation of a patrol system Constabulary was charged with maintaining effective control of the borders.²⁶⁰

Conduct of Patrols.

In general the Constabulary employed vehicular patrols in carrying out its mission. These patrols normally consisted of a section of a mechanized platoon which at full strength included an M-8 Armored Car and three 1/4 Ton Trucks manned by crews aggregating thirteen enlisted men. The crew of the Armored Car consisted of a Staff Sergeant who commanded the Section and the Armored Car, a Technician Third Grade, Radio Operator, an assistant Radio Operator and Gunner, and a Technician Fourth Grade, Driver. The crew of each of the 1/4 Ton Trucks included a Sergeant, Patrol Vehicle Commander, a Technician Fifth Grade, Rifleman-Patrolman, and a Technician Fifth Grade, Driver. In addition to the Constabulary personnel the patrol usually included an English speaking German Policeman.²⁶¹

CONSTABULARY MECZ PATROL



The Armament of this patrol included two Cal. .30 Light Machine Guns, 4 Thompson Sub-Machine Guns, 9 Rifles, and 13 Pistols, plus the vehicular armament of the Armored Car including a 37MM Turret Mounted Cannon, and a Co-Axial Machine Gun. The .50 Caliber Machine Gun which was a part of the wartime armament of the Armored Car was not included in the armament of Constabulary vehicles. Radio equipment in the Armored Car included both a Code and Voice radio. The Code radio was netted with a similar radio at platoon headquarters and the voice radio with another radio installed in one of the 1/4 Ton Trucks. This arrangement enabled the patrol to split up into two smaller patrols and still maintain communication between the two elements.²⁶²

Vehicular patrols were instructed to be alert for indications of subversive activities and sabotage at bridges, power plants, and supply installations. To observe the conduct of Germans, Allied Nationals, Displaced Persons, and U.S. Military Personnel for noncompliance with Military law and Military Government Laws. Particular emphasis was placed on the Military Appearance and conduct of Personnel comprising patrols in order that the German population might be impressed with the military bearing and business like manner in which the patrol conducted its operations.²⁶³

Patrols were required to visit Counter Intelligence Corps Regional and Sub-Regional Headquarters within their area of responsibility daily in order to exchange information and transmit communications. German Police Headquarters, Commissariat Headquarters, Stellar Headquarters, and other German installations of importance were visited every three days in order to insure compliance with Military Government directives and to ver



Horse, Motorcycle and Foot
Patrols Were Employed If
The Situation Demanded



ify that adequate communications facilities existed for use in an emergency.²⁶⁴

Based on the operation of patrols of the type described the United States Zone was divided into Three Brigade Areas, nine Regimental areas and 27 Squadron Areas, which were in turn divided into two or three Troop areas depending on the responsibilities of the Squadron concerned. The troop areas were in turn divided into Platoon areas, which were covered by patrols of the type previously described. The net result of this system was that the United States Zone was covered by a completely coordinated system of patrols. In addition to the operation of the normal vehicular patrols, Horse Patrols were used in areas where the use of vehicles was impracticable and in populated centers. Dismounted patrols were employed on the borders and in populated centers, and air patrols used to supplement the area patrol systems and to expedite the transmission of communications.²⁶⁵

Constabulary Area Security Responsibilities.

In general the U.S. Constabulary was responsible for the security of the United States Zone. Certain exceptions were made to this general rule in order to avoid duplicating and conflicting responsibilities. The principal exception was in the case of Military Communities where the Community Commander was charged with the maintenance of law and order. In some cases the Military Community Commander was also a Constabulary Commander in which case the Constabulary units were responsible. Constabulary Commanders were charged with the apprehension of wanted persons, their detention and transport to the place of detention or internment. In the event either a Community Commander or a Constabulary Commander desired the arrest of a person residing in the area of responsibility of the other, a request was made to


the authority having arresting jurisdiction requesting the apprehension of the wanted individual.²⁶⁶

Brigade Commanders were responsible for the overall security and maintenance of law and order with respect to the Military Communities and other special areas and installations within their areas. This responsibility was discharged by furnishing assistance in the event of an emergency or upon request of the commander of the installation. Arrangements were made with the commanders of these installations and areas for the movement of Constabulary patrols in the accomplishment of the Constabulary mission. Within these areas Constabulary units were prohibited from taking action in cases of improper uniform, speeding and allied traffic law infractions, establishing road blocks, and check points. The responsibility for the area security of these installations rested with the commander concerned. In general these areas included the Restricted Area of Headquarters USFET in and around Frankfurt, Wiesbaden and Nurnburg-Furth Enclave, the Heidelberg Area Command, and Military Communities other than Constabulary Communities.²⁶⁷

Frontier Security and Interzonal Boundary Control.

Constabulary units assumed control of the Borders of the U.S. Zone in accordance with plans approved by Constabulary Headquarters. Control posts were established at all authorized frontier crossing points and designated points of entry on the interzonal boundary to provide control at these points and to process the travel of personnel utilizing the crossings.²⁶⁸

On the Russian interzonal, Czechoslovakian (Russian Zone), and Austrian Frontier, crossing points were manned by half sections which meant that six or seven Constabulary troopers were on duty at each point. Provision was



Border Control Was An
Important Constabulary Duty

made for reinforcement by the Platoon reserve within one half hour and by the Troop reserve within two hours in the event of an emergency. Along these borders the territory within one kilometer of the border was patrolled by Constabulary troops and by unarmed German Police. Along the French Zone boundary, the British Zone Boundary and between the U.S. Zones in Austria and Germany, two man sentry posts were established at Constabulary crossing points to handle Allied National and U.S. personnel crossing the borders. Armed German Border police under Constabulary supervision handled the border crossers of German nationality. Along these borders armed German Border police patrolled along the border to prevent unauthorized crossings. Provision was made for the reinforcement of a sentry post by the remainder of the section in fifteen minutes, by the platoon in one half hour and by two troops from the Squadron in two hours plus travel time from the Kaserne. An effort was made to provide all crossing points with interpreters in the language of the principal nationality using the crossing points. This procedure was emphasized particularly along the Russian zonal boundaries and the Czechoslovakian border. In addition to the actual manning of the border crossing points all roads leading to the borders of the U.S. Zone were intensively patrolled and where indicated, patrolling was conducted off the roads in an effort to insure complete coverage and prevent illegal crossing.²⁶⁹

Maintenance of Reserves and Rotation Policy.

In order that troops could have a period of rehabilitation after performing operational duties be retrained or training deficiencies corrected, troops were rotated after one month and given a minimum of two weeks training. While undergoing this training these troops constituted the Squadron

reserve consisting of not less than two troops. Squadron reserves were required to be able to move as an effective force within two hours of the receipt of orders. In addition to the Squadron reserve operational troops maintained a reserve as did operational platoons in order that the platoon could reinforce the patrol (section), and the troop the platoon. Employment of any reserve was immediately reported to the next higher commander in order that the commander could be in readiness to reinforce his lower units if the occasion demanded.²⁷⁰

During the period from 1 to 15 July 1946, continuous inspections of all units, patrol activities, and training were conducted. These inspections were made for the purpose of maintaining close supervision over operations and to gain information looking toward changes in operational procedures and methods. These inspections indicated that many of the border control posts were not in suitable locations, and many persons who had crossed the interzonal boundaries or frontiers were apprehended by roving patrols in rear areas. As a result of these inspections, instructions were issued effective 15 August 1946 modifying the system of border control and the conduct of interior patrols. The new directive changed the plan for the border control from one of static posts to a system of roving patrols operating parallel to the borders and for several kilometers in depth. Agreements were reached with the occupational forces in adjoining zones concerning crossing points and the number of such points reduced. Of particular importance was the conference held at Gustengen during July between General HARMON and the Commanding General of the Eighth Russian Army which resulted in agreement on the locations of authorized crossing points, provided for the physical marking of the border between the two zones, and for the ex-



Continuous Inspections Were Made Of
Personnel, And Equipment



change of apprehended border crossers. This conference resulted in materially improving the conditions which had existed with respect to border control along the Russian Zonal frontiers.²⁷¹

At the time the United States Constabulary became operational the problem of controlling the movement of persons traveling on international trains had to be solved. Many passengers were not properly documented to enter or to leave the United States Zone. This problem was solved by the appointment of specially selected personnel to board the train at the point of entry and ride through to the point of departure from the zone. These troopers checked the documentation of any person attempting to board or dismount from the train while enroute through the US Zone. This method was originally applied to the Orient Express and to the London-Switzerland leave train, and was later extended to include other trains traveling the zone.

Initially indigenous civilians were not cognizant of the regulations governing border crossing nor were they aware of the methods of Constabulary operation. In addition the method of obtaining authority to cross the border was relatively difficult for the average person. This situation was corrected when familiarity with the method of border control became generally known and by making the obtaining of authority to cross the border a simple procedure.²⁷²

The major problems encountered by the Constabulary in connection with area security were those concerning the displaced person, the refugee, the persecutee and the colored US Soldier. The number of incidents involving these classes of persons were out of proportion to their numbers and were concentrated in the vicinity of camps and other localities where they might

be living. In December 1946 instructions were issued to conduct periodic checks of personnel entering and leaving displaced persons camps considered to be a potential source of disturbance or a haven for wanted persons. These checks were made by establishing check points near the exits to the camps but outside the camp area checking all persons entering or leaving the camp. These check points served as a deterrent to the lawless activities of this type of personnel and the number of incidents decreased noticeably in the vicinity of camps which were checked but remained high in unchecked camps.²⁷³

Recommended Revision of Tables of Organization.

In accordance with War Department instructions directing the Constabulary to prepare new Tables of Organization and Equipment based on operational experience units were directed to make studies and submit recommendations looking to new Tables which would be in line with operational needs. During the month of October 1946 conferences were held by all units from Squadron to Headquarters U.S. Constabulary. Recommendations were made based on the assumption that the area security mission of the Constabulary would remain unchanged, and that the new tables would be prepared primarily for the execution of this mission. Tactical and combat requirements were given only minor consideration, and the execution of border control duties was minimized in developing the new tables as this mission would gradually pass to the German police. On 5 November the revised Tables were forwarded to the War Department. The new tables recommended decreasing the number of line troops in the Squadron from five to four and increasing the overall strength of the troop from 160 to 185. This revision served to increase the proportion of personnel in the field in comparison with overhead. One standare Constabulary troop was proposed instead of three mechanized and two motorized

troops. Experience had shown that it was necessary to equip the motorized troops as mechanized units in order for them to perform their mission.²⁷⁴

As the police phase of Constabulary operations continued to increase in importance, provost marshal sections were included in all units down to and including the troop. In view of the wide deployment of Constabulary units maintenance and personnel sections were eliminated from the regiment and included in the Squadron. At the regimental level the Headquarters Troop and Service Troop were combined to form a single Headquarters and Service Troop. This resulted in a saving in personnel by eliminating the overhead of one troop. A horse troop at the brigade level was recommended so that it might be activated if operational requirements demanded.²⁷⁵

Operational requirements had demonstrated that the communications platoon of the Brigade Headquarters Troop was inadequate and that the brigade headquarters although intended to be an operational headquarters had been required to assume certain administrative functions. In line with the assumption of these administrative duties, Inspector General, Judge Advocate, Ordnance, Public Relations, and Provost Marshal sections were added to the brigade headquarters. At Constabulary Headquarters experience indicated that the Corps Headquarters, organization was inadequate as Constabulary Headquarters had assumed responsibility for many functions which were not normally performed by a Corps Headquarters. In order to correct the deficiencies it was recommended that, Control and Statistics, Public Relations, Army Exchange Service, Recruiting, Visitors Bureau, and Secretary of the General Staff sections be added to the headquarters tables. Corresponding increases in the Constabulary Headquarters Troop were recommended in order that this organization could service the expanded headquarters.²⁷⁶

Changes in equipment were generally along the line of reduction in types of vehicles and weapons. The 1 1/2 ton truck and the Tank Retriever M-32 were eliminated and vehicular types reduced to the M-24 Light Tank, the M-8 Armored Car, the 1/4 ton truck, the 3/4 ton truck, and the 2 1/2 ton truck. Individual weapons were reduced to three types, the Pistol caliber .45; the rifle, caliber .30, and the sub-machine gun, caliber .45, M-1A1.²⁷⁷

In general the proposed Tables of Organization and Equipment called for an overall increase of 307 officers, a decrease of 195 enlisted men, and a reduction of 719 vehicles, 1442 radios, and 7,071 weapons. The new tables represented operational experience and the problem of making maximum use of the limited number of personnel available. The recommended T/O reduced the overhead of the lower units and placed a greater proportion of personnel in operational positions, in short they were tailor made to fit the Constabulary mission.²⁷⁸

Modifications of Operational Plans.

During the first year of Constabulary operations seven different operational plans were placed in effect and plans made for an eighth operational plan which became effective on 7 July 1947. The first plan which was placed in effect on 1 July 1946 was based on the operational experience of the District Constabularies and pre-operational Constabulary experience. This plan continued in effect until 15 August 1946 when it was modified to provide more complete area coverage by a wider deployment of small units. Under this small plan Constabulary units were deployed in every small town in the Zone and area coverage was very complete, and patrolling was carried on without regard to the incidence of crime and subversive activity. The wide deployment of small units resulted in a loss of control over these units and a deterioration in discipline due to the inexperience of junior officers and

non-commissioned officers commanding the many detachments.²⁷⁹

Effective 20 September 1946 a third operational plan was placed in effect in an attempt to correct the deficiencies of previous plans. This plan eliminated all small detachments which could not be justified and resulted in the reestablishment of adequate control. In addition it took into consideration the imminence of winter and eliminated patrolling on secondary roads which would be closed by the advent of inclement weather.²⁸⁰

In accordance with the economy drive Constabulary was directed to reduce the consumption of gasoline for forty percent. It was decided that operational gasoline representing fifteen percent of Constabulary consumption would be reduced by fifty percent. This directive was received on 27 November. Accordingly plans were prepared for a more economical method of patrolling which would not impair operational efficiency. The plan prepared eliminated "shows of force" with the exception of critical cities. Visits to towns under 5,000 in population were reduced to one visit per week, towns between 5,000 and 25,000 to two visits per week, and towns over 25,000 were visited daily. Towns along patrol routes continued to be visited each time the patrol passed through. By this time sufficient data had been accumulated to enable Constabulary to make a more intelligent approach to the problem of patrolling. Studies of crimes and serious incidents indicated that the majority of such incidents and crimes occurred between 1800 and 2400 hours. The new operational plan took this fact into consideration by doubling the number of patrols during these hours, reducing patrols during the hours between 0700 and 1800 to the minimum, and making no change in patrols conducted during the hours between 2400 and 0700.²⁸¹

The plans prepared in accordance with the economy directive were placed in effect on 2 January 1947 and were judged to be eminently successful in

view of the fact that no increase in crime or serious incidents occurred during the months of January and February. Despite the success of the reduced program, General HARMON directed that patrolling be increased twenty percent effective 1 March 1947, in view of the increasingly critical food situation and the advent of warmer weather which permitted the population to range further from their homes and camps. In increasing patrolling particular emphasis was placed on areas with high crime and security violation rates, and an effort made to anticipate areas where increases in these rates could be expected. Particular emphasis was given to cities and surrounding areas which had reported the highest percentages of serious incidents during January. These included: Kassel, Hanau, Wetzlar, Gelnhausen, Mannheim, Karlsruhe, Munich, Freising, Pfaffenhofen, Garmisch, Augsburg, Regensburg, Weiden, Passau, Bamberg, Bayreuth, Stuttgart, Hall Schweinfurt, and Kitzingen.²⁸²

A planning directive was issued on 18 April which directed the preparation of new operational plans which were placed in effect on 5 May 1947. The new plans drastically reduced patrols in rural and other areas which were relatively free of incidents. Check point patrols in general replaced routine patrols. These patrols were patrols dispatched along a designated route for the purpose of establishing check points at predetermined locations for definite periods of time. When traveling between check points the patrol conducted normal patrolling activities. Units were consolidated into troop and platoon sized units with the exception of border posts which were not affected. Locations of operational troops of each squadron were in close proximity to areas having high incident rates, centers of population, large concentrations of U.S. Troops, or troublesome Displaced Persons Camps.²⁸³

Measures designed to regroup and consolidate the Constabulary were instituted early in April 1947. The Commander in Chief, European Command directed that a study be made looking toward the consolidation of the Constabulary in Regimental size units. This directive was based on the assumptions that: When consolidated in kasernes regimental spirit could be better developed, necessary patrolling could be conducted from the kasernes, better control could be exercised by concentrating troops, and the need for Constabulary patrolling was about over. Based on these premises a study was conducted by the Director of the Plans, Operations, and Training Division, of Headquarters, European Command to determine the practicability of consolidating the Constabulary in units of regimental size throughout the U.S. Zone. In presenting this study which was concurred in by Constabulary it was recommended that the proposed consolidation of Constabulary units into regimental size kasernes areas was not desirable and that any consolidation should be limited to squadron strength. This recommendation was based on the following conclusions: ²⁸⁴

"From the point of view of enhancing military training, facilitating supply, administration and command, the proposed consolidation is desirable.

However, due to the important disadvantages; such as, lack of proper security throughout the area, lack of proper support for Military Government, present status of German police and their equipment, etc., the proposed consolidation of Constabulary units into regimental kaserne areas is impracticable.

The U.S. Constabulary is now located in kasernes of squadron or slightly larger size, and is therefore consolidated to the maximum extent possible.

The German police cannot now assume the security responsibility placed upon the Commanding General, U.S. Constabulary. At a future time when the German police have been granted power over persecutees, have increased in numbers and are more suitably equipped, the U.S. Constabulary can, and should, decrease its patrol and border security operations."

As a result of this study a directive was issued effective on 21 May which further consolidated the Constabulary into squadron size kaserne areas, permitted the German police to operate more independently and the Constabulary in function in more of a supervisory capacity by spot checking activities, and placed Constabulary in the position of a reserve with greater ability to concentrate troops at trouble spots. The Constabulary mission remained unchanged under the new plan and greater emphasis was placed on aggressive intelligence activities. Personal liaison by commanders and staff officers was substituted for many of the patrol visits. Check point patrols were made increasingly important as a means of affording contact with the general public, and patrols in rural or other areas free from incidents were greatly reduced. Border control measures continued in accordance with previous operational plans.²⁸⁵

Organizational Changes.

In January 1947 the Constabulary personnel problem became more critical as a result of lack of reinforcements and because of the general reduction in Theater strength. Constabulary was required to yield approximately 1200 troops spaces as its share of the Theater reduction. These spaces were obtained by inactivating all the light tank elements of the Constabulary and by certain other minor adjustments in the tables of organization which were made effective on 28 February 1947. As the personnel situation was critical it was necessary to make the maximum percentage of personnel available for operational duties. As a result decision was made to make all "E" troops in-operational on 1 March 1947 which resulted in eliminating the overhead of one troop and in making additional officers available for duty with the remaining troops. This decision was made in view of the recommendation that

the new tables of Organization and Equipment provide only four operational troops. Making the "E" troops in-operational was thus in line with the recommended tables and would simply ^{if} reorganization when and if they were approved by the War Department.²⁸⁶

Constabulary's Part in the Theater Reorganization.

The reorganization of the United States Forces, European Theater, entailed the elimination of the Headquarters of Third United States Army and the transfer of its functions to three Military Districts and the Military Posts under the jurisdiction of the Districts by 15 March 1947, the phasing out of Western Base Section by 1 April 1947 and the transfer of its functions to Theater Headquarters and the Military Districts, and a similar phasing out of Continental Base Section by 1 May 1947. The Constabulary was to continue to exercise its security mission in support of Military Government and would be unaffected by the reorganization with the exception that the headquarters would be moved to Heidelberg on 15 February 1947 where it would take over the residual duties of Third Army, phasing out these functions by 15 March 1947, and resuming its normal functions on that date.²⁸⁷

Like many plans the theater reorganization plan did not materialize. On 10 January General HARMON assumed command of Third U.S. Army and on 14 and 17 January the Constabulary G's were designated at the G's of Third Army in addition to their Constabulary duties in order that the phasing out of Third Army could be accomplished with the minimum of confusion. On 14 February 1947 Third U.S. Army announced the Commanding Generals of the Three Military Districts. During the period of reorganization from 15 February to 15 March the Military Districts became operational using the Headquarters of the 26th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division; Headquarters Division

Artillery, 1st Infantry Division; and the Headquarters of the 1st Infantry Division, respectively as headquarters around which the District Headquarters were organized.²⁸⁸

Plans for the reorganization in line with the theater plan were carried forward and on 15 February the three Military Districts and the Military Posts into which the Districts had been divided were established. On 17 February a TWX was received from Theater Headquarters directing that the Commanding General, Constabulary, assume responsibility for performing the functions which were to have been performed by the Headquarters of the First and Second Military Districts. This meant in substance that Constabulary Headquarters assumed responsibility for the functions which had been transferred from Third Army to the Districts and that arrangements would have to be made for releasing the units of the 1st Infantry Division which had been utilized in the establishment of these headquarters. It marked the transition of Constabulary Headquarters from a purely tactical organization to one having both tactical and administrative responsibilities.²⁸⁹

On 21 February, Military Districts were redesignated by Constabulary Headquarters. Land Bavaria was redesignated the First Military District and responsibility for its administration assigned to the 1st Infantry Division. Lands Wurttemberg-Baden and Greater Hesse were designated the Second Military District and came under the control of Headquarters U.S. Constabulary. In order to make the Headquarters of the 1st Infantry Division and Constabulary operative as District Headquarters, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachments were organized for the First and Second Military Districts. In the case of the Second Military District this organization was a purely paper unit, the staff sections of Constabulary Headquarters handled District affairs in the normal course of events. The principal




Major General William R. Schmidt
Deputy Commanding General
US Constabulary
21 Feb. 1947 - 22 May 1947

function of the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Second Military District was that of giving the Commanding General, Constabulary, General Courts-Martial Jurisdiction over the Military Posts in the Second District²⁹⁰

The reorganization of the theater and the establishment of the Military Districts and Military Posts, while imposing an additional burden on Constabulary Headquarters, was not without its advantages from the Constabulary point of view. As previously organized the senior unit commander whose unit was stationed in a Military Community acted as Community Commander in addition to his other duties. This system had resulted in some Constabulary units having static responsibilities which diverted personnel from the execution of the primary Constabulary mission. Under the new organization these functions were entirely divorced from Constabulary units, who assumed the status of lodgers in the Military Posts, with no responsibilities beyond performing the Constabulary mission.²⁹¹

The period of reorganization was one of considerable confusion, due to the change in plans after the original plan had been placed in effect. Personnel problems were paramount during the reorganization due to the paucity of officer personnel of the services. In order to handle District affairs at Constabulary Headquarters in the most expeditious manner, Major General WILLIAM R. SCHMIDT was appointed Deputy Commanding General, Constabulary on 21 February 1947 with primary responsibility for matters pertaining to the Second Military District and its Military Posts. He returned to the ZI on 27 May 1947 being succeeded on 23 May 1947 by Brigadier General PHILIP E. GALLAGHER.²⁹²

With the assumption of responsibility for displaced persons in the Second Military District, and the transfer of the 7750 Displaced Persons Operating Group to theater control a G-5 Section was established in Con-



Brigadier General Philip W. Bellamy
Deputy Commanding General
US Constabulary
23 May 1947

stabulary Headquarters on 15 March 1947. The G-5 Section became the coordinating agency for the S-5 Sections of the Military Posts of the Second District, with responsibility for activities in connection with displaced persons. Lieutenant Colonel Samuel L. Morrow Jr., was announced as the Assistant Chief of Staff G-5 on 21 March 1947.²⁸³

Survey for Concentration of a Constabulary Regiment.

A survey of possible locations for the concentration of one complete Constabulary Regiment in a reserve position was completed on 12 June and recommendations forwarded to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, European Command, over the signature of the Commanding General, U.S. Constabulary.

Constabulary recommended the selection of the Kaufbeuren Air Base or the Augsburg area in the order named, and gave complete reasons for the selection. Kaufbeuren possessed adequate space in one kaserne, mess and shop facilities, and was in an excellent state of repair. No immediate construction was necessary, dependent accommodations were available, and occupancy within sixty days was possible. Outstanding disadvantages to this location was the necessity of moving the present Station Complement unit and the 156th Army Air Corps Squadron.²⁹⁴

Augsburg had sufficient space in three adjacent kasernes, and adequate mess and shop facilities were available. Recreation facilities were present and the general state of repair was good, with no major construction necessary. The Station Complement Unit, the 7708 War Crimes Group, and the 115th Station Hospital would have to be moved to make the concentration in the Augsburg area possible. The city of Augsburg itself was partially destroyed and therefore was not considered to be an attractive place to concentrate a large number of troops. Dependent housing depended on the

7708 War Crimes Group and the 115th Station Hospital. Constabulary also surveyed and made adverse recommendations on the following locations: Lechfeld-Landsberg, Stuttgart (Reiter, Mohringen, Boblingen Kasernes), Bamberg, and Neuiberg Air Base.²⁹⁵

Plans for Re- organization in Accordance with Reduced Troop Strength.

In accordance with a EUCOM directive plans were prepared and submitted on 27 May 1947 for a re-organization of the US Constabulary under a troop ceiling of 18,000. The plan submitted was based on the proposed Tables of Organization which had been recommended to the War Department. In general the new plan provided for a force comprising: A Constabulary Headquarters, two Constabulary Brigade Headquarters, and five Constabulary Regiments, elimination of light tank elements, re-organization of the Constabulary School on a reduced scale, provision of ordnance support by EUCOM, and provision of intelligence coverages of the Zone by EUCOM. Upon approval of this plan instructions to establish the policy on US Constabulary operations during the re-grouping and adjustment period from on or about 1 July 1947 to on or about 1 August 1947 (or such termination date as was announced) were issued on 25 June 1947, to insure the continuity and efficiency of Constabulary operations during the re-grouping period, and to delineate the operational responsibilities of commanders. In general, Constabulary operations during the re-grouping period were based on the following premises:²⁹⁶

The 1st Constabulary Brigade would be responsible for Lands Greater Hesse and Wuerttemberg-Baden, with two regiments totalling six Squadrons. The 2d Constabulary Brigade would be responsible for Land Bavaria with three Regiments totalling ten squadrons plus one light tank troop. The 2d Brigade Commander was directed to take

cognizance of the fact that one operational troop of the 10 Constabulary Regiment would be assigned to the Constabulary as School Troops.

The mission of the Constabulary remained unchanged, and the areas of responsibility were assigned. The Constabulary squadrons remained consolidated in squadron kasernes as before, and the directive stressed that efficiency of operational units would not be lowered by the transfer of personnel, disposition of equipment and the movement of dependents. Command or staff liaison was directed to be employed rather than patrol visits to law enforcement agencies, and "shows of force" became increasingly important.²⁹⁷

The operational plan directed that Headquarters and Headquarters Troop 3d Constabulary Brigade become in-operational on 1 July 1947. On that date the re-grouping became effective and patrols consisted of a minimum of two vehicles with appropriate weapons which were used to cover troopers while operating check points or other fixed points in the open. Commanders were instructed to immediately draw up new plans based on the following: Constabulary Regimental and Squadron Commanders, their appropriate staff officers or troop commanders would contact the following units at least once a week and would personally visit these units in an operational capacity at least once a month:²⁹⁸

Regional and sub-regional CIC Headquarters.

CID Headquarters.

Post or other unit S-2s.

Post or other unit Provost Marshals.

Military Government.

German Police Headquarters as follows:

a - Border Police Headquarters.

b - Rural Police and Land Kreis Commissariat.

c - City Police Headquarters.

Troop Commanders, Troop Executive Officers, Platoon Leaders or Platoon Sergeants would personally visit once each week the following law enforcement agencies located in their assigned areas:

Military Government.
Sub-regional CIC.
German Police Headquarters.

Patrols would visit the following at least once weekly and more often as the situation demanded:

Concentration of US Troops.
Troublesome Displaced Persons Camps.
High Incident Areas.
Population Centers of 20,000 or more.

Patrols would visit at least twice monthly population centers of 10,000 to 20,000. All other assigned areas not specifically mentioned were to be visited once monthly, to include all Displaced Persons Camps. Each squadron would conduct one show of force of approximately troop size, including armored cars, within each two week period. Vehicular check points and speed traps would be operated and subsequent changes thereto. One lettered troop intact would be held in squadron reserve as a highly mobile, striking force. Regimental commanders were authorized to employ three lettered operational troops per squadron where necessary. Rotation would be effected as previously instructed and border control would continue as at present. Horse platoons were to be employed as the Brigade Commander might direct.²⁹⁹

Large Scale Constabulary Operations.

The most spectacular operations conducted by the Constabulary were the large scale operations conducted by units of Troop or larger size. These operations, which were highly publicized were of several types, and included: Search and check operations, shows of force, zone wide checks, and operations conducted in conjunction with allied troops. Large scale operations were directed against, the German population, displaced persons, and in some instances against other U.S. Troops. Large scale operations were generally the culmination of weeks intelligence work and were carefully planned and coordinated in order to achieve the maximum results. While each operation

could be regarded as a distinct and adequate understanding can be obtained from studying typical examples of the various types. The following paragraphs are devoted to accounts of typical examples.³⁰⁰

Combined Operations in Conjunction with Allied Troops (Operation Scotch).

As a result of the activities of U.S. and French intelligence agencies it was noticed that certain towns and areas on both sides of the U.S. - French Zonal Boundary were being used for black market, unauthorized border crossings, and illegal interzonal traffic in various commodities. A combined operation titled "Operation Scotch" was planned for 22 November 1946.³⁰¹

In the U.S. Zone the 72nd Constabulary with Special Troops of the 10th Constabulary Regiment attached under the command of Lt. Col. Arthur L. West Jr., established a moving cordon, searching the towns of Hubben, Erkenbrechtweiler, and Neufen, plus abandoned quarries and a castle in the vicinity.³⁰²


Employing a Light Tank Troop, Motorcycle Platoon, Horse Platoon and L-5 planes in addition to the troops of the Squadron an area of 18 square miles was searched. All roads were covered by patrols traveling between road blocks and check points. Mountainous territory inaccessible to vehicles was covered by the Horse Platoon. Air observation of movement of persons and vehicles moving into and out of the area was provided by the Air Sections. The entire operation was closely coordinated by means of radio communications from the Command Post of the Task Force commander. On the French side of the Rhine, French Tank, Motorized, and Motorcycle troops conducted a similar operations under the title of operation "Per-nod".³⁰³

This combined operation resulted in the apprehension of a number of suspicious characters, illegal border crossers, the confiscation of large quantities of cigarettes, cloth, unauthorized weapons, and a quantity of illegal liquor. Following the completion of the operation Colonel F.W. Drury Commanding Officer of the 10th Constabulary Regiment reviewed the French Gendarmerie at the invitation of Colonel J.R. Finelli the French commander. Following the review the Constabulary commanders and staff joined the French Officers for a luncheon at Reutlingen in the French Zone. This operation is a good example of the type of cooperation which Constabulary units endeavored to affect with the forces of the occupying powers.³⁰⁴

Operations in Control of Black Market Activities.

Displaced persons who were not subject to the authority of the German police were often engaged in various nefarious activities including black market. When it became known that activities centered in one of the camps where displaced persons lived the Constabulary was often called upon to stage a search and check operation in an effort to apprehend the offenders and confiscate the contraband. Operation "Camel" which is a typical example of such operations was planned and staged on 25 November 1946. The troops participating in this operation included the 820th Constabulary Military Police Troop. Elements of the 10th, 13th, and 27th Constabulary Squadrons under the Major Evans of the 10th Regiment, totalling 676 officers and men.³⁰⁵

At 0440 hours members of the 27th Squadron under the command of Captain McCarthy surrounded the Ulana Kaserne a Polish Displaced Persons Camp where black market and other nefarious activities were believed to be conducted.



Operation Camel Netted
Drugs Worth \$52,120.00

Military Police and Constabulary Troopers entered the Kaserne and occupied the entrances and exits from all floors in each building in the Kaserne as well as the entrances and exits to each building. This prevented movement of persons from floor to floor within the buildings and movement from building to building. Other troopers conducted a room to room search for evidence of black market activity and contraband. A small worn suitcase hidden on the roof of one of the buildings was discovered and upon investigation found to contain morphine, codine and pennicillin worth \$52,120.00. Quantities of U.S. Army clothing, rifle ammunition, knives and a small quantity of black powder were confiscated. A total of 114 persons were detained for investigation of whom 84 were held in arrest.³⁰⁶

Operations Directed Against U.S. and Allied Personnel.

A typical operation in which Constabulary Troops participated was operation "Traveler" which was directed toward the apprehension of AWOL U.S. Military and Civilian personnel and allied civilian personnel, for the purpose of returning them to proper control. This operation commenced at reveille on 27 March 1947 and continued for a period of 48 hours. During this period both Constabulary and Post troops were engaged in checking identity of all personnel by establishing check points at the entrances of all messes, clubs, theaters, Post Exchanges, railway stations, border crossings, and in communities where troops were not stationed.³⁰⁷

Constabulary commanders were directed to prepare complete plans to support Post Commanders during the period of the operation to include; the establishment of check points, increasing patrolling, and the doubling of patrols in the vicinity of population centers. Well qualified persons were detailed to identify and determine the status of persons checked.


Persons who could not establish their status were detained until identification could be made.³⁰⁸

Plans for this operation were made a matter of standard operating procedure for both Posts and Constabulary units in order that a simple message to place the plan in operation would be all that was necessary to repeat the operation. As a result of this action 27 U.S. AMOL's were apprehended by the Constabulary throughout the U.S. Zone, including one murderer. In the Second Military District, U.S. Personnel apprehended included; 2 officers, 42 enlisted men, 1 U.S. WD Civilian, and 43 Allied Civilians. Due to the element of surprise, operations of this type proved to be of particular value in the apprehension of escaped military prisoners and in the general rounding up of unauthorized personnel throughout the zone and were repeated without warning from time to time.³⁰⁹

Shows of Force.

The operations conducted by the Constabulary for the specific purpose of impressing the German populace with the fact that the United States maintained an Army in Germany and that it was an effective force, were known as "Shows of Force". These operations were usually conducted in centers of population which had the highest rates of security violations and serious incidents.³¹⁰

These operations were nothing more than street parades in which mounted Constabulary units with loaded weapons, armored cars and tanks passed through the city in complete readiness for action. Whenever possible Tank Troops were employed as they were the most impressive units in the Constabulary organization. While the German public was conscious of the existence of the Constabulary by the continual movement of patrols throughout the zone they



Shows Of Force Reminded
The Germans That Constabulary
Was Ready For Action

usually saw only a few men and vehicles at any one time, which sometimes led to the assumption that the force was widely dispersed and could not be effectively concentrated. Shows of Force corrected this tendency in German thinking. In addition these operations served to instill in the trooper a greater sense of pride in his unit and off set the inability of units, to stage ceremonies due to wide deployment.³¹¹

Change of Constabulary Commanders.

Constabulary Troopers paid their final tribute to Major General ERNEST N. HARMON at an impressive ceremony, 1 May 1947, on the Parade Grounds. General HARMON, who organized the Constabulary, turned over his command to Major General WITHERS A. BURRESS, formerly Director of Intelligence in the European Command and wartime Commanding General of the 100th Infantry Division. General BURRESS said, as he accepted his new assignment as commander of the U.S. Constabulary:

"I fully realize the responsibilities that lie ahead. During its short lifetime the Constabulary has come to occupy a position in military history of which every American can be proud. It has demonstrated to the world that military men can administer justice fairly, impartially, with great dignity, and with good manners. The success it has attained, and the high regard in which it is held by our people at home as well as by men of other nations, is due to the splendid spirit and great devotion to duty of all those men who have served with the Constabulary since its first days.

I have been in position to observe closely the magnificent spirit of the Constabulary and the high standards that have been set and maintained in spite of crippling personnel losses and many other hardships. I know that success could not have been attained without the full cooperation of every good soldier, regardless of rank,

Those high standards of conduct and efficiency must be maintained. With the decrease of the over-all strength of the military forces in the Theater, the efficiency of the individual becomes more and more important. As the American-trained German police take over more and more of the duties heretofore



Major General Wilber E. Burress Successor To
Major General Ernest N. Harmon as Command of General
US Constabulary

performed by the troopers, some changes in procedure will be made. However, our mission remains the same and our responsibilities are not lessened. Ours is a vital and important role in the affairs of today. We must and shall attain all objectives set for us in the best American manner.

I am certain that I speak for all of the Constabulary when I say that we owe an everlasting debt of gratitude to General HARMON, founder and father of this fine organization, whose broad military experience, tireless energy, and brilliant leadership are responsible for the high standards of efficiency that have come to be recognized as typical in the Constabulary. He carries with him our best wishes for his health and happiness."

The review was attended by Military and Military Government leaders in the US Occupation Zone including General LUCIUS D. CLAY, Commander-in-Chief, European Command, Lieutenant General C. H. HUEBNER, Deputy Commander, Honorable Robert D. Murphy, US Political Advisor to Germany from Berlin; Laurence A. Steinhardt of the US Embassy at Prague, Czechoslovakia; and Governor Sumner Sewell of Wurtemberg-Baden.

Chapter 8

CONSTABULARY OPERATIONAL SERVICES

Logistical Support of the US Constabulary.

In view of the large stocks of wartime equipment and supplies on hand in the theater, little difficulty was anticipated by Constabulary planners in equipping and supplying the Constabulary. This conclusion seemed a logical one at the time but failed to take into consideration the chaotic conditions which had developed in the supply depots as a result of the accelerated redeployment of the Army. It was foreseen that some difficulty would be encountered in providing Constabulary with adequate housing facilities, but the general feeling in this connection was that the difficulty would be overcome in time. The story of equipping and supplying the Constabulary is one of expedients necessitated by the lack of accurate records in supply depots and the necessity for procuring numerous miscellaneous items from captured enemy sources and other sources which became available.

In considering the equipment situation prior to the Constabulary becoming operational on 1 July 1946, it is necessary to point out that the normal approach to such a problem almost never brought the desired results whereupon use of expedients became the order of the day. Expeditors, searches, and personal visits to depots had to be resorted to before the equipment and supplies became available in sufficient quantities.³¹²

Constabulary Housing and Utilities.

On 15 February 1946 none of the units which had been earmarked for the Constabulary were in the locations contemplated by Constabulary planners. Selection of facilities for these troops was limited by operational

considerations, and the theater directive requiring Constabulary units to be housed in military type installations. In many instances such installations were not available in the desired locations since they were occupied by other troops or by displaced persons. There was also a general lack of information regarding the location, condition, and capacity of these installations which contributed considerably to the difficulty of planning a housing program.³¹³

Planning was initiated by an advance party from the VI Corps Engineer Section which preceded the section to Bamberg. This party in conjunction with G-3 worked with the Third US Army Real Estate Section in locating and planning for the acquisition of properties required. The development of this plan depended upon close coordination with Third US Army, the three Infantry Divisional Accommodations Section, and through Third US Army with UNRRA which handled accommodations for displaced persons. As no informational file was available, field reconnaissance and liaison with other agencies was resorted to in obtaining information upon which to formulate a plan. By 1 May 1946 final locations for all units had been selected and by 1 July 1946 all but one unit had occupied the facilities designated.³¹⁴

Most of the military type installations in the Zone had been damaged during the course of the war with the result that extensive repairs and renovation was necessary before occupancy was possible. The dearth of construction materials in Germany, the ban against importation of materials from the Zone of the Interior, and the limitations imposed by Military Government upon procurement from indigenous sources were outstanding factors in delaying the renovation and construction necessary to bring the



A typical Marine
constabulary units were
based in military
type installations

facilities to standards required by the Army. In all cases a limited amount of construction had to be undertaken to bring the German military installations to the standards prescribed for the US Army as German standards, in general, were somewhat lower.³¹⁵

The scope of action of the Constabulary Engineer Section was limited by lack of purchasing and contracting authority, lack of organic or attached Engineer Troops, and the lack of authority to requisition and draw materials from Engineer Depots. It was necessary as a result of these restrictions to operate through liaison with Third US Army and Area Engineers in order to accomplish required construction. The task of expediting construction for Constabulary units was a major problem as the units referred all construction difficulties to the Engineer Section. Progress in construction was disappointing and many delays occurred as a result of the zone wide shortage of materials, the re-deployment of Engineer Troops, lack of Engineer trained reinforcements, lack of Engineer officers, and the increase in standards above that required by the Wehrmacht. The difficulties encountered in carrying out these various projects is reflected in the fact that the renovation of the Panzer Kaserne in Schweinfurt, started in April 1946, was not completed until early in 1947. A total of 22 separate construction projects were carried out in bringing Constabulary housing to acceptable standards.³¹⁶

The provision of adequate supplies of hot and cold water for the troops posed a major problem as many of the water systems upon which the various installations were dependent had been seriously damaged or were contaminated. Working in close coordination with the Constabulary Surgeon the Engineer Section made a continuous effort to improve the water system and to increase the amount of water available. In some

instances it was necessary to drill additional wells, connect them and install pumping systems. In other cases the problem could be solved by the installation of chlorinating equipment. In one location it was necessary to undertake the drilling and connecting of 15 wells. The construction of a pumping station and the laying of 4000 meters of piping. As a general rule efforts were directed to bringing the city water systems which supplied the installations to acceptable standards, thus providing water for the troops. 317

Special Engineer Projects.

Establishment of the Constabulary necessitated a number of special construction projects for operational purposes. It was necessary to construct landing strips, hangers and other buildings to serve the needs of the Air Sections of all units to include squadrons, and to provide suitable facilities for all border crossing points including operations huts, barriers and signs. The construction of a total of 31 all weather landing strips to serve Constabulary units was undertaken. A total of 2,250,000 square feet of pierced steel plank was laid for runways, taxi strips, parking areas, and hardstands, thirty two hangers and twenty one standardized Nissen operations huts erected. A total of 1700 border signs, 95 moveable barriers, 351 fixed barriers, 65 flagpoles, and 65 Nissen huts were constructed or erected. As a result of the shortage of suitable prefabricated huts and the dearth of materials, arrangements were made through the Third US Army Engineer and the Theater Engineer for the dismantling and removal of 285 Nissen huts from Camp Top Hat, Antwerp, Belgium. These huts were transported to the zone and utilized for border control posts, for airstrip installation, and as ammunition storage huts. 318



Construction of Air Installations
Was A Major Task

An intimate knowledge of all major roads was necessary for the successful execution of the Constabulary mission. The gathering of such information was instituted prior to 1 July 1946 and carried on through all phases of Constabulary operations. All main and secondary roads in the Zone were surveyed and classified, snow removal requirements prepared and forwarded to Third US Army. Road information was kept up to date and made available to units.³¹⁹

Engineer intelligence files covering road conditions, stream crossings, airfield locations, Engineer Troop Locations, bridge data, location of fire fighting equipment, community locations, area engineer locations and troop locations, electrical systems of key cities, status of city water chlorination, detailed plans of Constabulary airstrips, plans of all major cities and towns, and plans of kasernes and other military installations throughout the US Zone were established and brought up to date. This data was made available to staff sections and units for whatever use might be required.³²⁰

Reorganization of Engineer Section.

On 15 February 1947 the Engineer Section was reorganized upon receipt of information that the section would be required to take over the duties formerly performed by the Third US Army Engineer Section with respect to the Second Military District, Württemberg Baden and Greater Hesse. The reorganization provided for a Control sub-section, handling real estate, fire fighting and prevention, office management, correspondence and filing, personnel, and section transportation. A supply sub-section was established handling, engineer supply, map supply, purchasing and contracting, engineering maintenance, and fuel supply. An Operations and Intelligence sub-

section, handling engineering and drafting, processing work requests, establishing priorities, progress reporting, liaison with Military Government, operations and training of troop units, command maintenance and reproduction completed the section organization.³²¹

Progress on Engineer Projects.

Engineer operations during the winter of 1946-1947 were hampered by cold weather and progress slowed or halted on many construction projects. Beginning in March 1947 warmer weather permitted more progress on construction projects. Progress on the higher priority engineer projects was satisfactory during June 1947, but it was impossible to give satisfactory Engineer service to lower priority projects such as the Enlisted Mens Club in Marburg, and the Post Exchange in Giessen. This condition was due to the fact construction policies were not entirely consistent. On the one hand EUCOM emphatically disapproved work on non-essential projects, while various EUCOM agencies rendered unfavorable reports on the lack of progress on the very same projects. The greatest bottle neck in all Engineer work during June 1947 was the lack of skilled labor and the shortage of indigenous supervisory personnel with the will to work without US supervision. There was a great tendency on the part of contractors to "stretch out their jobs". The contractors realized that the number of US supervisory personnel available was insufficient to enforce efficient work and took advantage of the situation. The only apparent solution to this problem appeared to be devising some sort of lump sum type of contract.³²²

Demolition of German Military Installations.

The demolition project taken over from Third US Army on 15 February 1947 can best be described as lagging and haphazard at that time. As a consequence it was necessary to advise EUCOM of the situation and request



Destruction of German
Military Installations
Was Accomplished

an extension of the target date. The project was assigned to the 559th Engineer Service Battalion as its primary mission. During May 1947 seven German Survey and Demolition teams, composed of 12 men each were assigned to the project to supplement the personnel of the 559th Engineer Battalion. By the end of June 1947, 1529 installations had been located of which number 244 had been destroyed. Certificates were on hand for the retention of 519 installations and 766 installations were yet to be destroyed. A total of five officers, 20 teams of 5 indigenous personnel each, 20 two and one half ton trucks and five 1/4 ton trucks were engaged in the project. Each of the twenty teams was capable of destroying five installations per day, with the result that all known installations were destroyed by 1 August 1947.³²³

Maintenance of Vehicles and Equipment.

When the Constabulary was established the bulk of the vehicles and weapons with which it was equipped were drawn from Ordnance Collecting Points. The condition of this equipment turned in by units which were being rapidly redeployed varied from fair to poor and had to be brought to first class condition by the drawing units. Maintenance was complicated by various factors. During the period between 15 February and 1 July 1946, Ordnance units designated to support the Constabulary had been demoralized by redeployment and lacked experienced personnel with the result that they were generally ineffective in providing the required maintenance. Theater stocks of automotive spare parts were tied up by the consolidation of depots and the lack of inventory or the personnel to perform the inventory. As a result of these conditions and the necessity for preparing vehicles and equipment for operations and maintainint it "unofficial" authority

was secured to establish Constabulary third echelon shops. One Ordnance Company at 30 percent of strength was assigned to the Constabulary and utilized to establish nine maintenance shops, manned almost exclusively by German civilians. These shops were placed in operation during July and August 1946 and although they did not make the Constabulary self sufficient with respect to maintenance, they were of great assistance in preparing and maintaining the automotive equipment of Constabulary. These shops which operated under the control of the Ordnance Section of Constabulary Headquarters were transferred from the Control of Ordnance to the Regiments which they supported on 1 March 1947. These shops located at Bayreuth, Schweinfurt, Freising, Boblingen, Schongau, Mannheim, Wetzlar, Fritzlar, and Regensburg were transferred to the Regiments in order to provide each regiment with a large second echelon maintenance shop. This transfer of the Constabulary third echelon maintenance shops was made possible by the assignment of three Ordnance Medium Maintenance Companies (Tank) to the Constabulary. These companies provided third echelon maintenance and Ordnance supply for Constabulary units. These units were located and became operational as indicated in the table below.³²⁴

LOCATION OF ORDNANCE MEDIUM MAINTENANCE COMPANIES (TANK)³²⁵

<u>Company</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Operational Date</u>	<u>Units Supplied</u>
531st	Buchenwald	1 May 1947	6th Con Regt 14th Con Regt 94th Con Regt
533d	Munich	1 March 1947	11th Con Regt (-94th Sqdn) 2d Con Regt 5th Con Regt Hq 2d Con Brig
Det 533d	Schongau	1 March 1947	Con School

<u>Company</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Operational Date</u>	<u>Units Supplied</u>
85th	Mannheim	1 April 1947	10th Con Regt 15th Con Regt Hq US Con 97th Con Sig Sq Hq 1st Con Brig Hq 3d Con Brig
Platoon 531st	Alsfield	1 May 1947	1st Con Regt 3d Con Regt

Changes in Ordnance Responsibilities and Supply Procedures.

Prior to taking over the Ordnance functions formerly performed by the Ordnance Section of Third US Army on 15 February 1947, Constabulary Ordnance supply had been direct from Depots to the using units. This system was continued with respect to Constabulary units until the assignment of the three Ordnance Maintenance Companies which acted as Ordnance supply agencies for the units they served, each maintenance company drawing ordnance supplies direct from the depots. This system was ideal from the Constabulary point of view, provided the required supplies were available in the depots.

Shortages of spare parts have hampered the Constabulary maintenance program continuously since its establishment. The first relief came in October 1946 with the arrival of 1000 tons of spare parts in the Theater. The Constabulary deadline reached an all time high in November 1946 of 848 vehicles which was the inevitable result of the continual shortage of spare parts. With the distribution of the parts which had arrived in October the situation began to gradually improve. Difficulties in Ordnance supply included the issuance of batteries with the wrong kind of acid, inability to obtain engines, and issuance of the wrong type of batteries for specific vehicles. Another incident which serves to illustrate the problems which were faced was the hiring away of one regiments' German mechanics by the Army Exchange Service by offer of higher wages.³²⁶

Shortly after becoming operational on 1 July 1946 authority was requested and secured from Third US Army to procure 800 winterization kits for 1/4 ton trucks used for messenger service. A contract was entered into with a German firm near Ulm for the manufacture of the kits. Due to a lack of safety glass and plexiglass completion of the contract was delayed and it was not until December 1946 that the last of the 800 kits were in the hands of the troops.³²⁷

With the assumption of the responsibilities for Ordnance activities in the Second Military District on 15 February 1947, attention was directed toward improving ordnance maintenance facilities in the Military Posts of the Second District, establishing sound relationship between supported units and supporting ordnance units, establishing production control measures in shops, and determining the volume of equipment to be maintained under the new organization. Emphasis was placed on improving first and second echelon maintenance in units by means of Command Inspection Teams, operating out of Constabulary Headquarters. As a result of these inspections most units were rated unsatisfactory, the predominant deficiencies resulting from inadequate command supervision of first echelon services, and lack of second echelon preventive maintenance services. A program was initiated to bring all vehicles up to proper standards of appearance in April 1947, by repainting, cleaning, washing, straightening of fenders, tail gates, bumpers, and similar parts. By 1 July 1947, five thousand five hundred vehicles in the District had been repainted, under this program.³²⁸

Constabulary Quartermaster Supply.

Constabulary planners envisioned the Constabulary as an elite force set apart from other troops by distinctive equipment and uniform. The task of securing this equipment and clothing fell to the Quartermaster section of

Constabulary Headquarters and was the greatest single problem which had to be solved, in supplying quartermaster items. In addition to the provision of special items of clothing and equipment, the Constabulary was the only unit in the Theater which included horses in its table of organization with the result that the provision of equipment and forage for these animals was an entirely new supply problem.³²⁹

Until June 1946 all forage for Constabulary horses was procured locally. As a result of the exhaustion of local forage sources, a shortage developed during June 1946. All units were instructed to turn in to remount depots all recreational horses on hand and by 1 July the units had reached the point where only T/O horses were on hand. During July 1946 the forage situation improved with the shipment of from 60 to 90 days supply to all Constabulary units.³³⁰

The Constabulary shoulder insignia was approved by the War Department in March 1946. In order to provide the troops with this insignia at the earliest possible date the Theater Quartermaster let a contract to a German firm in the British Zone. Procurement from this source was limited and did not meet the requirements of Constabulary. Small shipments were received in April and by the end of May sufficient insignia had been received to issue two to each Constabulary Trooper. No further shipments were received from this source and it was not until August that shipments from the Zone of the Interior began to arrive. With the arrival of shipments totalling 258,000 each individual was issued the full complement of seven patches per man. **331**

Due to the very cold weather, Constabulary requested authority on 27 January 1947 to have 333 horse covers manufactured for the use of the Regimental horse platoons. Authority to procure the covers was received

immediately and sample covers furnished the 56th Quartermaster Sub-Base Depot in Bamberg. Models were made from salvaged German blankets and from salvaged shelter halves. It was decided that the covers made from shelter halves would best fit the needs of the Horse Platoons. Sufficient quantities to fully supply each of the Horse Platoons were manufactured and distribution made during the month of February 1947.³³²

Beginning on 1 January 1947 a reduction in the gasoline allocation became effective. This reduction in the allocation of gasoline used the consumption during the month of October 1946 reduced by 40 percent as a yardstick upon which allocations of gasoline were based. This reduction resulted in the implementation of previous plans to reduce the consumption of operational gasoline by fifty percent. In order to achieve the forty percent reduction, it was necessary to reduce the consumption of administrative gasoline, as operational gasoline represented only fifteen percent of Constabulary consumption. The February 1947 allocation represented a twenty percent reduction of the January 1947 allocation, with a further reduction of four percent of the February allocation taking effect on 1 March. Effective 1 March the operational gasoline of Constabulary was increased twenty percent in order to implement the increase in patrolling which General Harmon had ordered. On 12 March 1947 a one percent increase in gasoline allocations earmarked for use in GYA activities was received. Since that date monthly allocations of one percent of the basic gasoline allocation have been earmarked for this purpose.³³³

Procurement of the distinctive golden silk scarf was arranged with the Theater Quartermaster who provided the material, and arranged for the manufacture by a Bamberg Clothing factory. By 1 March 1946 thirteen

thousand scarves were completed and issued to the troops. By October 1946 manufacture had progressed to the point where two scarves could be issued to each individual. In order to provide a reserve supply permission was obtained from the Theater Quartermaster to manufacture a third scarf for each individual. Due to a critical shortage of dyes and coal manufacture of the additional scarves was halted late in November. Manufacture was resumed in April 1947 and the project completed.³³⁴

The provision of the distinctive leather equipment for the Constabulary was subject to many delays. Approval for the issuance of this equipment was obtained in April 1946 and requisition on the Zone of the Interior made immediately by the Theater Quartermaster. The first shipment of this equipment was received in November and the initial issue started. Completion of the issue of this equipment was delayed until February 1947. A similar situation existed with respect to the modified boots which were to be issued to the Constabulary. These boots were not received until September 1946, had to be modified before they could be issued. By 1 January 1947 a total of 24,000 boots had been modified and issued to enlisted men or stored.³³⁵

During July 1946 Constabulary requested that various items of special winter clothing be authorized for issue to Constabulary personnel. These items consisted of the Cap, field, pile, OD; Jacket, Combat, winter; Trousers, Combat; Mittens, field, trigger fingers, with insert; Overcoat, Parka type, pile lined; and Trousers, field, OD. By 1 November 1946 only 60 percent of the required clothing had been made available, by 1 January 1947, ninety percent had been issued, and it was not until early in February 1947 that complete issues of this clothing were in the hands of the troops.³³⁶

A program was initiated in July 1946 to establish a 30 day celler supply and a 60 day reserve of coal in each military community and in Constabulary units in order to maintain coal stocks of as long a period of time as possible. These stocks were rapidly used up and Military Communities did not receive sufficient shipments of coal to meet their daily needs. During September and October allocations of wood were made to supplement the inadequate coal supply, and in line with the policy of using wood as a substitute for coal, a wood hauling program was initiated to transport wood from the forests to the communities and units.³³⁷

Constabulary initiated ~~planning~~^S during the month of February for the establishment of military communities. Under the provisions of the theater plan, ten communities were placed under the command of Constabulary units. Five of these communities operated Quartermaster supply points. By June 1946, Class I supply points were in operation, sales to dependent families, class "B" messes, and community snack bars. The months of July and August were devoted to planning the establishment of a thirty day supply of Class II and Class IV supplies in the communities designated as supply centers. Because of the shortage of storage space in some communities, lack of personnel and transportation, a number of supply points did not become operational until 1 October. In addition to the Class I, II, and IV supply points each community established Class III points handling POL products and solid fuels.³³⁸

Establishment of Communications.

With the closing of VI Corps headquarters at Esslingen and the movement of this unit to Bamberg on 10 February 1946, the Signal Section consisting of an officer, a non-commissioned officer, and a clerk became avail-

able to the new Signal Officer, Colonel W.K. Dudley, formerly Signal Officer of XXIII Corps. This staff undertook the mission of planning and supervision the installation of communications within the headquarters, the establishing of communications with subordinate units, planning, coordinating and supervising the training of communications personnel for the Constabulary.³³⁹

On 4 February 1946 the 97th Signal Battalion relieved the 65th Signal Battalion and assumed operational responsibility for communications at La Garde Kaserne, in Bamberg which was to be the Command Post of Constabulary Headquarters and which was shared initially with the headquarters of XV Corps, a unit scheduled for inactivation. Within this kaserne the XV Corps had six positions of German F-36 switchboard to serve its needs. From this switchboard the Constabulary operated its TC-2 switching equipment as a branch switchboard or exchange. This arrangement was regarded as temporary and plans were made to provide an adequate and modern method of telephone switching to meet the expanding needs of the headquarters.³⁴⁰

During the month of March 1946 the six positions of F-36 switchboard were taken over from the inactivated XV Corps. This equipment was regarded as a temporary solution to the problem of telephone communication and work initiated on the acquisition and installation of a modern telephone exchange in Bamberg. A 600 line Luftwaffe dial system and trunk switchboard was obtained and the installation of this system in the Bamberg Reichpost Building begun. Telephone trunks from the Headquarters to all Brigades and from the Brigades to Regiments were made operational. Below the Regiments the telephone network spread from Regiment to Squadron, from Squadron to Troop, and from Troop to Flahoons and outposts.³⁴¹

The installation of the 500 lines of the dial system was completed and in operation by the end of May 1946. Work was immediately begun on the expansion of this system by another 100 lines. This system provided twelve first selectors per hundred lines which was apparently adequate for German needs but insufficient for Constabulary purposes. Additional first selectors were found to be unavailable and Third U.S. Army was requested to have them manufactured. In the meantime to lighten the load on each group of first selectors, subscribers were equally distributed among each group of 100 members and no group of 100 numbers was permitted to be filled.³⁴²

During the month of March 1946 radio nets were outlined, frequencies requested from Third U.S. Army, and preparation of Signal Operations Instructions begun with a view to providing radio communication within the month. At the same time a survey was made of the U.S. Zone for the purpose of establishing a Very High Frequency radio-telephone system to supplement the Constabulary wire system and to provide an added measure of communications security. In July 1946 Very High Frequency links were established from Constabulary Headquarters to brigades, and from brigades to regiments. At Bamberg the Very High Frequency radio antennae were located at Altenberg Castle on the highest of the hills surrounding the city. From Altenberg's tower, Very High Frequency transmission started on its way to all brigades, regiments, and some squadrons. To reach Altenberg, voice circuits left the Constabulary telephone switchboard located in the Reichpost building and passed through the Carrier Bays CF-1 and CF-2B which were connected with spiral-four lines on poles supported by a stranded messenger to the Very High Frequency radio transmitter located at Altenberg, a distance of three miles. This system enabled several voice and/or radio conversations to be carried on

simultaneously. The result was that an officer might pick up his telephone and dial one of the subordinate units without knowing whether he carried on the conversation by radio or by wire unless for security reasons he requested radio communication. In most cases the quality of transmission attained by the Very High Frequency radio-telephone was superior to wire communications.³⁴³

Continuous Wave radio was developed to carry a portion of the Constabulary message traffic load. At Constabulary Headquarters a "Radio City" was constructed on another of the high hills surrounding Bamberg. Platforms were built to hold the five SCR-399 radios and their HQ-17 Shelters. Radio antennae masts were made from tall tree trunks and stepped on the fringes of "Radio City". A special high wattage commercial circuit was constructed to provide power, and for emergency use 7 1/2 Kilowatt PE-95 engine driven generators were installed and maintained on a stand-by basis. Shelters for the operating personnel were constructed and the entire installation surrounded by barbed wire. This installation was connected with the Radio Operating Room located in Constabulary Headquarters by a five mile long spiral-four, messenger supported, pole line, which enabled the transmitters located in "Radio City" to be keyed directly from the radio operating room.³⁴⁴

At Constabulary Headquarters to provide the staff with a rapid means of communication with their corresponding numbers in subordinate units the Special Purpose Net was established. This net consisted of thirteen voice operated SCR-399 radio sets, one located at "Radio City" and one at each Brigade and Regiment. Each transmitter was remoted to a control room located in the headquarters of the unit. At Constabulary Headquarters AN/TTQ-1 operating boards were employed to provide conference call facilities. This



General Harmon Uses The Control Room To
Explain Constabulary Organization
To Editors of US Newspapers

net handled a variety of traffic ranging from the explanation of AG directives to flash Provost Marshal messages and was particularly useful in that it enabled an officer to talk with the staff officers of all Regiments and Brigades at the same time.³⁴⁵

The various Radio command nets within the Constabulary developed to the point of 24 hour a day operation and a radio monitoring station was established to enforce proper operating procedure, and radio discipline. Reports of violations were forwarded to subordinate units for corrective action. The use of this monitoring station did much to raise the standards of operation throughout the Constabulary.³⁴⁶

The Constabulary Control Room.

At Constabulary Headquarters a control room was constructed into which every available means of electrical communications terminated. This room with its maps and charts, telephone, radio, teletype, and the special purpose radio net enabled the Commanding General to have instant communication with his widely deployed units and gave the close control so essential in a unit of the Constabulary type. In addition it provided an up to the minute picture of the situation of Constabulary Troops on which the Commanding General could base his decisions.³⁴⁷

Providing the Commanding General with Communications.

The Constabulary Commander, General HARMON, spent a large proportion of his time making personal inspections of Constabulary units utilizing a special train. To meet the General's communications needs special telephone connections to the train were provided at key stop-over points. To supplement wire telephone communication, an SCR-399 radio set was installed in the General's train and an electrically shielded room constructed to house the equipment and operator. To power the set from the 220-volt direct current

available on the train, a motor-generator set was provided with a specially constructed gear box to enable the motor to drive the generator at the correct speed. The train's transmitting antennae presented a problem in that the greatest part of the German railway system is covered by an exceptionally low catenary system. This precluded the construction of a horizontal antennae and required the design and construction of a vertical antennae that could be raised and lowered quickly. When this installation was complete the General's train was included in the Constabulary Command Net, giving him communications with his headquarters from any rail served point within the U.S. Zone. 348

Signal Equipment Difficulties.

By the end of March 1946 plans were being made for the installation of radio sets in armored patrol vehicles. Theater depot authorities reported that both the 500 series frequency modulated radios (SCR-508 and 528), authorized for installation in armored vehicles, were not available in the Theater in the quantities required. Inquires were made through Ordnance channels to determine the availability of these radio sets in armored vehicles turned into Ordnance depots by redeployed units. Here again the answer was - "unavailable". It seemed incredible that the thousands of radios present in this Theater during the war could have been returned to the Zone of Interior. Accordingly a depot search was instituted in an effort to locate these radios. This search was made by Lt. Col. Foss, The Signal Section Executive. The search bore fruit in that 13,000 vehicles, located at the Nuernberg Ordnance Depot, were found to contain an almost complete quota of wartime radio equipment. This information was communicated to Theater authorities and permission obtained to use these radios. Because of a lack

of trained personnel Signal depots were in no position to install radios in vehicles. To solve this problem, plans were made for the installations of all radios by Constabulary personnel.³⁴⁹

The Signal Officer sent the radio Officer, Captain Harry Margolies and 20 enlisted men from the 97th Signal Squadron to the Nuernberg Ordnance Depot to remove radio sets from old armored vehicles, test, repair and install them in Constabulary vehicles. A goal of 15 installations per day was set. Because the few trained men available to the 97th Constabulary Signal Squadron were needed to operate communications equipment for Constabulary Headquarters, it was necessary to give each installer "on-the-job" training so that he could satisfactorily perform his mission. A complete Signal supply point, under an NCO, was established at the depot. This was necessary in order to insure that each vehicle received not only the basic radio components, but also the multitude of accessories that make up each Radio set. By the end of April 1946 assembly line systems, for the removal of radio sets from old armored vehicles, for the test and repair of these radios, and for the installation in Constabulary vehicles, were established. Installation figures reached ten per day. During May installations at the Nuernberg Ordnance Depot reached the 15 per day goal, and an additional installation point was established at the Mannheim Signal Depot. This obviated the necessity for long trans-zonal trips by providing an installation point in both the eastern and western portions of the U.S. Zone. At the Mannheim Depot one NCO, 4 enlisted men and four German technicians were employed to expedite the installation of radios. Upon completion of this organization, the installation system was turned over to an officer of Continental Base Section who supervised its operation.³⁵⁰

To meet the requirement for a signal repair organization for Constabulary, nine signal repair teams were organized within the 97th Constabulary Signal Squadron. These teams were deployed throughout the zone to enable them to serve the Constabulary most efficiently. One team was attached to each Regimental area, serving the Regiment and its subordinate units. Other Constabulary units used the services of the nearest team.³⁵¹

Action Taken as a Result of Operational Experience.

Constabulary patrols, after approximately four (4) months of operation with the Frequency Modulated Radio Set, SCR-528 mounted in 1/4 ton trucks proved this radio inadequate in range, and effected by terrain features, and a search was made to find a radio set that would meet their needs. It was decided that the Amplitude Modulated Radio Set, SCR-694 with a voice range of 15 miles would best serve this purpose. A quantity of these radios were obtained and issued to five Constabulary Squadrons for test. Each Squadron was directed to install the radios and employ them on patrols. At the end of the testing period reports were received from the squadrons regarding the operating efficiency of the radio and the mechanical difficulties experienced. In all cases the operating radius of the radio was satisfactory, but the mountings were inadequate. An improvised mounting, employing Shock Mount FT-250, was devised and adopted. Signal repair teams of the 97th Constabulary Signal Squadron completed their installation.³⁵²

Problems Brought About by the Movement of Constabulary Headquarters.

During the month of February 1947 the problem of moving the Headquarters of Constabulary from Bamberg to Heidelberg and maintaining uninterrupted communications had to be solved. Fortunately the communications facilities of Headquarters Third U.S. Army were well established and the only

changes necessary were the rerouting of long distance lines and movement of telephones in accordance with the headquarters organization. Movement of the Constabulary Control Room and "Radio City" to Heidelberg were completed by 0800 15 February and operations resumed. Third U.S. Army radio stations were closed out and their functions taken over by Constabulary stations. Operation of the Third Army Signal Center was transferred to Constabulary on 15 March and the Signal Center at Bamberg closed simultaneously. New motor messenger schedules were set up and began operation from Heidelberg. ³⁵³

Personnel of the Third Army and Constabulary Signal Sections were consolidated to form a new Constabulary Signal Section while surplus personnel being used to form Signal Detachments for the Military Districts and Posts. Turn Back of Communications to the German Economy.

A directive was received from LUCOM on 26 April 1947 directing the reduction of telephonic communications facilities provided by the Army. This directive resulted in the return of all long distance and local plan facilities to the Reich Post. All non-military or semi-military organizations which had been provided with free communications facilities were required to buy this service from the German Reich Post beginning on 1 July 1947. Allocation of long distance lines were reduced by seventy-six percent. Signal Corps personnel assigned to Constabulary Headquarters were reduced by forty percent on 1 January 1947. ³⁵⁴

This directive resulted in changing the telephonic communications of Constabulary Headquarters from a system operating as a part of the German system to an independent system operated by Constabulary personnel. In order to effect the change over a separate dial switchboard was installed and

placed in operation on 1 August 1947, which operated independently of the Reich Post system. This board was tied in with the Heidelberg Reichpost system so that communications with other units was possible. A considerable deterioration in the quality of telephonic communications has occurred since turning the system over to the Reichpost, and greater dependence must be placed on radio communications.³⁵⁵

These sections are attached to the Posts for administrative purposes but operate under the technical supervision of the Signal Section of Constabulary Headquarters.³⁵⁶

Chapter 9
CONSTABULARY MEDICAL SUPPORT

The Mission of the Medical Department in supporting the U.S. Constabulary was comparable to that of any unit furnishing first echelon medical support to operational troops. Since the Constabulary had no organic medical battalions, unit dispensaries evacuated directly to the nearest hospital installations, using organic ambulances. The routine procedure was for the dispensary operated by Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, U.S. Constabulary, to render medical support to Constabulary Headquarters and Special Troops; the Brigade Headquarters and troops attached to Brigade Headquarters; the regimental medical section to operate a dispensary, support regimental troops; and furnish a squadron medical sections consisting of one medical officer and eighteen enlisted men, to support each squadron.³⁵⁶ Many new medical problems arose due to the widespread deployment of troops. Many platoon-sized units were continually separated from parent units for prolonged periods of time, and required medical coverage and evacuation. It became apparent soon after activation that certain medical problems should receive priority. It was decided, in view of the wide deployment of Constabulary, that the primary objective was to make the medical aid man as self-reliant as possible and to emphasize first aid training for all troops.³⁵⁷

Elimination of Medical Department Personnel from the Constabulary.

Effective 1 June 1947 all Medical Detachments and medical personnel were deleted from the T/O of the Constabulary. This action resulted from the shortages of medical personnel which had plagued the Constabulary and other units during the period from beginning 1 July 1946. As a result of



First Aid Training Was Emphasized

this directive all Medical Department personnel were transferred to the Military Posts. In order to provide the Constabulary with medical support a bulk allotment of 43 officers and 318 enlisted personnel was secured and reallocated to the units. In effecting the reassignment and allocation of personnel to the units an effort was made to return to the units personnel which had formerly served with them and were thoroughly familiar with their medical situation. In general it was possible to provide each brigade with a medical officer, each regiment with four medical officers, and Constabulary Headquarters with eight medical officers for duty in the medical section. This allocation of personnel fell far short of that provided by the original T/O and was substantially less than had been on duty with the Constabulary. This action changed the basic medical organization of the Constabulary and placed Constabulary Medical support on a parity with that of the units assigned to Military Posts.³⁵⁸

Training of Other than Medical Department Personnel.

The period prior to 1 May 1946, was devoted mainly to reorganization and equipping all Constabulary units according to the tentative tables of organization. 1 May 1946 to 1 July 1946 was a period of intensive training prior to becoming operational. Training directives for this period required such medical training as was necessary to attain the standards of proficiency outlined in Circular 43, War Department, 9 February 1946.³⁵⁹ To insure that each commander would have a copy of this circular available, it was reproduced in its entirety and distributed to subordinate units as an inclosure to the training directive. To assist line officers in the conduct of this training, conference notes on basic medical subjects for fifteen hours of training were hurriedly prepared when it became apparent that the

medical officers would be able to train line troops, in addition to their other duties. After 1 July 1946, it became evident that the tables of organization for medical detachments did not provide adequate personnel to operate prophylactic stations for detachments located at a distance from the squadron kaserne.³⁶⁰ In order to obviate any rise in venereal disease rate due to lack of prophylactic facilities, a minimum of eight (8) men per troop in addition to Medical Department personnel, were training in the administration of venereal prophylaxis to personnel in isolated outposts. This course of instruction was given by medical officers. Instruction of any kind was more of a problem than ever before due to the great dispersion of troops. To counteract the losses of trained men, resulting from redeployment, three first aid instructors were obtained from the American Red Cross.

One representative was placed in each brigade area to train approximately twenty-five instructors every two weeks, and provide one instructor for each platoon. Redeployment soon depleted the units providing the first quotas and left them without qualified first aid instructors. Personnel to attend the 2d course of instruction were much better selected, from the standpoint of ability and the period of time the individual would remain with his unit after the completion of the course. Venereal Disease instruction during the entire period received as much attention as expected. Classes were held at least twice each month, and in some units, as frequently as twice each week.³⁶¹

Training of Medical Department Personnel.

Prior to 1 July 1946, medical personnel received on-the-job training in their own dispensary, and were given training generally along the lines outlined in Instructors Guide MTP 8-101. Only one copy of this publication

was available so outlines of the detailed programs were reproduced and forwarded to subordinate units. On assignment to Constabulary medical units, most enlisted men assigned before 1 July had received no prior basic medical training. As the date for the Constabulary to become operational arrived, the best trained men were placed with the units on outposts, while newly assigned and less trained men were retained in the dispensary for further training and guidance.³⁶² After 1 July 1946, most enlisted replacements were transferred from inactivated medical units and, although better trained than a recruit from the United States, the average was far short of the medical soldier of medical units during the war. After July 1946, the dispersion of personnel to provide for an aid man with as many outposts as possible, the operation of aid stations, and evacuation of patients reduced detachments to a status where very little more than on-the-job training could be conducted. A considerable number of enlisted personnel attended various technical service schools at fixed medical installations in the zone. Courses were of eight to twelve weeks duration. This absence created a considerable problem for some units since there was great need for enlisted men in the units due to inadequate tables of organization. These courses were supposed to be conducted along the same lines as courses in hospitals in the Zone of Interior. Judging from reports received at this headquarters, units felt that sending personnel to these courses usually resulted in disappointment because students frequently returned without having had a single hour of organized instruction. Literature available consisted of a limited supply of field manuals, technical bulletins, and personal textbooks. Appropriate field manuals to use in training were requested since current literature for medical and dental officers was not author-

ized for the Constabulary.³⁶³

Equipment, Supplies and Transportation.

Generally, the overall supply setup proved to be satisfactory. Some changes, mainly concerned with mobile dental equipment, substituting ambulances for 1/4 ton trucks, adding of laboratory equipment, are discussed elsewhere. These changes were recommended in the recently submitted T/E, and it is believed will further improve this phase of medical services.

It was necessary to procure a mobile dental operating truck for each Constabulary regiment due to the wide dispersion of troops and the fact that the tables of organization provided only two dentists per regiment. This equipment permitted the dental officer to reach all units.

The poor mechanical condition of ambulances occasioned Constabulary considerable difficulty. Due to great distances to the nearest fixed hospitals, most of the ambulances were in operation a large part of the time. The T/E provided for only nine ambulances per Constabulary regiment. Due to the great dispersion of troops, transportation of patients in open vehicles was mandatory because ambulances were not available. Request was included in the recommended T/E to provide 18 ambulances per regiment.

During the early period of activation, medical supplies were obtained directly from medical supply depots at Furth and Weinheim, Germany, by each dispensary. After closure of the Weinheim Depot this plan was changed and fixed hospitals served as supply agencies for the Medical Supply Depot. For a period of approximately one month, because of the rapid transition and because the hospitals servicing the dispensaries had no opportunity to build up sufficient stocks, dispensary surgeons experienced some difficulty in obtaining supplies. These shortages were only temporary and substitut-

es proved adequate until the desired items could be obtained.³⁶⁴

Buildings.

The buildings used for administrative and housing purposes consisted for the most part of a well laid out system of barracks formerly used by the German army. These kaserne areas were generally located on the outskirts of fairly large towns, and cities, which vary in size according to their former importance and are comparable to some of the permanent posts in the United States.³⁶⁵

The buildings were three to four story in height, sturdily constructed, and of a permanent nature. The barracks varied in type but seemed to follow a set plan in all Kasernes. Latrine facilities originally provided were adequate as were shower and washing facilities. Since being vacated by the original tenants and before being used by Constabulary some of them had been used by Constabulary some of them had been used for a variety of purposes and were in a very poor state of repair. In some cases operational necessity made it imperative that the barracks be occupied before repair work could be finished. The most important features reflecting on the health and morale of troops were the scarcities of electrical power and equipment, water pressure in many areas was low and water had to be hand carried for washing purposes and the flushing of latrines. In many instances the low water pressure forced the closing of latrines and shower rooms and contributed the high rate of incidence of scabies.

The above conditions improved considerably during the last six months of 1946. Inspections conducted by General HARMON and his staff provided a constant check on the work being accomplished provided a means of determining the most urgent cases which were given priority in order to alleviate

the serious sanitary hazards as quickly as possible.³⁶⁶

All men were given a minimum of fifty square feet of floor space in their quarters. In general wash rooms and latrines were located on each floor. In areas where the water supply was adequate there were no difficulties in maintaining a fairly high level of sanitation and personal hygiene, although the periodic cutting of hot water to save fuel discouraged daily bathing. The furnishings of the barracks were scanty and provided the barest essentials for personal comfort. Scarcity of light fixtures and electricity added considerably to the low morale in a few units. Unit Commanders were quick to realize this and, due mainly to individual effort, the barracks gradually became more livable.³⁶⁷

Water Supply.

At the time Constabulary became operational no unit occupied an area in which the municipal water supply met Army standards. All water supplied troops was from an Engineer water point or was chlorinated by the lister bag method. A program to survey water supply in larger towns was initiated by Third U.S. Army. The Constabulary Surgeon expanded this program to include all areas occupied by Constabulary troops and added studies of sewage and waste disposal, and epidemic logical history in order to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion as to the best method of providing potable water. In accord with this program thirty-four municipalities, were surveyed by Sanitary Engineers from the Medical Section. These surveys, with recommendations for equipment necessary to provide potable water, were forwarded to higher headquarters. The recommendations contained in these surveys were used by the Corps of Engineers as a basis for requisitioning equipment.³⁶⁸

The source of the majority of water supplies were shallow wells, springs, and collecting galleries. With few exceptions, the water was not filtered and received only aeration as treatment. The chemical properties varied with the location but generally was high in iron and carbonates producing a hard of palatable water with a high chlorine demand. Chlorinators were not generally used on German water supplies and when used were used only on supplies which are polluted, or in danger of pollution. Pumps and mains were generally in need of repair and where the municipality suffered war damage, many sections were cut off completely. Reservoirs proved satisfactory. Another item which aggravated the water shortage was the increase of population in cities and towns of from twenty to seventy-five percent. This overtaxed the supplies that in normal times were barely adequate. In some cases where the shortage was acute, the Engineers provided equipment for additional wells.³⁶⁹

These surveys revealed that in all cases chlorinators were needed. The history of potability, according to German bacteriological examinations, was good. In accordance with the requirements outlined in current directives, a program of examination by Army Medical Laboratories was started in anticipation of the time when these systems would be submitted for approval. Epidemiological histories of some of the towns revealed a need for caution in the surveys due to the high prevalence of water borne diseases. There were many minor outbreaks of typhoid-paratyphoid reported by unit surgeons. Three epidemics in the vicinity of Lichtenfels, Hof, and Vaihingen/ Enz areas persisted over a period of 3 to 4 months. The causes of these epidemics were never determined by German or Military Government authorities. Natural conditions favor the spread of this disease through the water systems because of lack of treatment and chlorination of the supplies, the low standards of hygiene among the indigenous population, and the methods of

sewage disposal. The epidemics noted above were thoroughly investigated by the Medical Section but through delays caused by poor liaison between Military Government and tactical units there was no direct way of assisting German authorities in their program, or making available necessary supplies and equipment to trace the start of the infection, and provide means to prevent a recurrence.³⁷⁰

The bulk of the equipment necessary to bring these water systems up to standard was requisitioned by the engineers. The work of installation progressed slowly. Fourteen systems were approved during the first month of the year. The delays in the installation of chlorinators and the request for a resurvey were the main delaying factors.

Water discipline was difficult to maintain due to the availability of water in billets and public places. Taps were marked "unpotable water" throughout all military installations but reliance on this method was doubtful, particularly among new recruits and dependents, whose training appeared to have been neglected on Army sanitation as practised in a foreign theater.³⁷¹

Personal Hygiene.

The facilities for personal hygiene did not become good until January 1947. During the first few months of operations conditions varied according to the state of repair of the various Kasernes. Men billeted in quarters such as these had little opportunity for personal cleanliness. These conditions were of short duration and were tolerated only because of operational necessity. Squadron surgeons were constantly in touch with the situation and no direct sanitary hazards resulted.³⁷²

At troop level the situation was much the same but was relieved somewhat by duty rotation. The Kasernes or buildings occupied by a troop were

much smaller and consequently much easier to bring to a livable standard. The general health of the command remained excellent and the standard of personal hygiene showed a continued increase as evidenced by the steady decrease in the rate of skin infections and the present high morale of the troops. The minimum requirements for sanitary facilities in Constabulary units follows:

Showers	-	Six (6) per one hundred men
Lavatories	-	Twelve (12) per one hundred men
Urinals	-	Six (6) per one hundre men
Latrines	-	Eight (8) per one hundred men

The same standards were followed in stockades as closely as possible. Stockades were inspected weekly by Medical Department Officers to insure that military personnel were segregated from displaced persons, indigenous civilians, and others who have been interned in an Army stockade, and to see that a reasonable level of sanitation is maintained regardless of the nationality of the prisoners. All prisoners other than military personnel, who were confined in large groups, were given a physical inspection by a medical officer to preclude the possibility of an epidemic of serious illness among them.³⁷³

Food and Messing, Sewage and Waste Disposal, Insect Control.

The "A" type ration was used except when depots substituted "B" ration items or troop movements required the use of "C", "10-in-1" or "K" rations. The ration in general proved to be adequate. Careful planning on the part of Mess Sergeants was necessary, particularly with regards to bread. Another item which affected the adequacy of the ration was the high rate of spoilage of fresh vegetables and fruit received by some units. Frozen beef and chicken was received by some units in a deteriorated condition which was be-

lieved to be due to delay in transit. All incidents of food spoilage were referred to higher headquarters and appears to have been corrected as the spoilage situation noted is now normal.³⁷⁴ Directives were issued regarding the preparation of food, rendering of fats, and inspections made to insure that the issue ration was utilized to provide the highest possible nutritive and calorie value. The incidence of food spoilage mentioned above affected troop size units more than the larger units as troops were broken down into operational groups, each group having its own mess. This rendered normal breakdown and normal ration distribution impossible. Shortages of transportation required that rations be issued less frequently than desirable with the result that food in fair condition at issue point was sometimes spoiled when it reached the troops, as the kinks in operations ironed out, this condition was corrected. The quartermaster changed their method of buying local produce from buying at source to buying on delivery, which assured that produce was in good condition when delivered to the depot, and eliminated the forced issue of partially spoiled crates of fruits and vegetables. During the winter of 1946-47 large quantities of potatoes were frozen in transit.³⁷⁵

Mess sanitation presented one of the most difficult problems faced by medical inspectors due to the transition from a combat to a garrison status. Numerous directives on mess management, food preparation, garbage disposal, and other subjects allied with mess sanitation, were prepared by the Medical Section. The problem was further aggravated by lack of equipment, refrigeration, screening, etc. Competent personnel for the operation of messes were difficult to find due to redeployment. Meal schedules had to be worked into the operational plan. All of these factors were taken into consideration and each inspection was designed to progressively improve each mess.³⁷⁶

Wherever possible messes were inspected by a medical inspector on a weekly basis with special attention to food preparation. Due to lack of refrigeration in many units, a special directive on left over foods was issued. Despite preventive measures a small outbreak of food poisoning occurred involving approximately thirty men from a 400 man mess.³⁷⁷

Messes were consolidated whenever possible in order to conserve food and manpower. The cafeteria style serving was used in all of the large enlisted messes. A theater program for food conservation was organized during November 1946. This program consisted of a work sheet for cooks outlining the preparation of meals and the amount of usable left-overs to be utilized in the following meal as well as a system of plate waste control in which individual plate waste was measured in Number 10 cans, and segregated for animal consumption. The cooks work sheets were used to advantage as they were of value to the medical inspector in determining the adequacy of the meal and what use was made of left-overs. Cooking in the majority of messes, was accomplished on the Army field range. The efficiency of this for all types of cooking has proven itself, and it is used by cooks, in preference to stoves which were permanent part of the kitchens. The majority of the equipment was government issue. Where sufficient hot water was not available for dish washing, immersion type heaters were used in GI cans. The use of Mikroklene for sterilization of dishes was discontinued and only in a few instances was any other agent except boiling water used. The use of vegetable bins and racks were recommended by unit surgeons and were installed in all of the larger messes.³⁷⁸

Refrigeration was one of the major problems in mess sanitation. Very few mechanical refrigerators were available, and as meats were issued for

a three to four day period, close supervision was necessary to prevent spoilage. Ice boxes were used to the fullest extent, but were not entirely satisfactory. By 1 January 1947 American manufactured mechanical refrigerators were secured. Where proper current was available, these were put in operation. In many cases the current rating was different and even though the motors were wired for the voltage available, other electrical parts would not stand up under the current load and burned out in a short time.³⁷⁹

Indigenous civilians working directly for the Army had their own messes. These messes fed the noon day meal of the Prisoner of war ration. Inspections of these messes revealed that the complete ration was not being issued. The issue was on a six day basis but without making substitution for items not available. Since no menu was issued a check by the mess sergeant was impossible. Food intended for a six day period had to be stretched in order to provide a semblance of a meal for the last three days. Many complaints were received and a thorough investigation made, and the conditions noted corrected. Meals were then prepared in accordance with the prisoner of war menu. The standards of mess sanitation and food preparation were comparable to Army standards. The medical inspection of civilian messes were on the same schedule as Army messes.³⁸⁰

Sewage and Waste Disposal.

The disposal of sewage has not presented any problem. In most cases municipal sewage systems are adequate. Septic tanks and pit latrines were utilized where needed. Water shortages did not seriously affect the flushing of sewer lines. War Damage to trunks was either repaired or the flow diverted through an alternate line. The method of treatment varied but in

most cases the treatment was unsatisfactory or non-existent. The effluent was dumped into the nearest stream which created a sanitation hazard, particularly where there was no treatment. Many streams used as swimming areas were placed off limits for this reason. In villages, where out houses were used and human excrement is used for fertilizer, the excrement is sterilized only in the presence of an epidemic. Where there was a treatment plant, undigested sludge was also used for this purpose. Generally speaking, collection of sewage was satisfactory, but the treatment was not and represented one of the gravest sanitary hazards.³⁸¹

In the beginning of Constabulary's operation the collection and disposal of garbage was barely satisfactory, necessitating preparation of a special directive by the surgeon and constant work for the medical inspectors. GI cans without lids were set on the ground outside of kitchens and boxes, and other containers used as garbage cans. Garbage collectors dumped the garbage into wagons or trucks, spilling food scraps on the ground. At the kitchens, garbage was not being separated and in some cases garbage was dumped in the open.³⁸²

Insect and Rodent Control.

The control of mosquitos and insects, other than flies and roaches, presented no difficulty. Flies represented the greatest problem. Natural breeding places were eliminated as much as possible by the strict supervision of garbage and waste disposal in areas under military control. Where German civilians were living in close proximity Kasernes, the problem was difficult to control. Shortages of screening for mess halls and kitchens made the use of insecticides and fly strips imperative. These methods, combined with strict supervision of fly breeding areas, greatly reduced the quantity of flies and eliminated much of the hazard.³⁸³

Rodent control was exercised and there was one case where it was necessary to fumigate with Sulphur-dioxide. This was done by a firm of German specialists under medical department supervision, and the results were satisfactory. A directive issued by Theater, required the appointment of a rodent control officer in each unit to work in conjunction with medical department officers. Previous directives issued by the Surgeon, this headquarters, outlined the procedure to be followed in the event of an infestation.³⁸⁴

Venereal Disease Control.

From the date of activation venereal disease control was a major problem. The venereal disease rates among the German civilians were increasing and a proportionate increase was contemplated among Constabulary troops.

In May 1946, Constabulary set out on a vigorous venereal disease control program. Venereal Disease Control Boards were set up from this headquarters to squadron levels with the objective of decreasing the venereal disease rate. The purpose of these boards was to make an extensive survey of the conditions affecting the spread of venereal disease, make recommendations, and take action for the correction of unfavorable situations and conditions. Each board met at least once a month. A summary of each board meeting of subordinate units was forwarded to this headquarters so that any recommendations, corrective action, or followup procedures necessary could be expedited. All units designated non-commissioned officers to assist in control measures.

One of the great problems in venereal disease control was apprehension of VD contacts. Special emphasis was constantly placed on this program. Once suspects and contacts were apprehended, it was important to insure

that all cases were treated at civilian venereal disease centers, and that proper and extensive follow-up care was carried out.³⁸⁵

All possible measures were taken to further an educational program on the prevention of venereal diseases. Sex morality lectures were conducted at monthly and weekly intervals by the unit commanders, surgeons, and chaplains. Movies were also shown in conjunction with the lecture. In many instances civilian venereal diseased patients were used to demonstrate the consequences of venereal disease.³⁸⁶

Prophylactic stations and individual prophylactic equipment was made available to Constabulary personnel. All prophylactic stations were well marked, conveniently located, and operated by trained personnel. Frequent inspections of these prophylactic stations insured maximum benefit from each station.

All persons contracting a venereal disease received careful treatment and follow-up study. Unit commanders vigorously enforced the 21-day medical quarantine. Every effort was made to insure that venereal disease contacts were apprehended by taking the soldier contracting the disease on a search for the contact. In no instance was a venereal disease case considered closed until the contact was apprehended and treated. Throughout the Constabulary German police aided in the control of transient personnel and in the apprehension of venereal disease contacts.³⁸⁷

Clubs were closely supervised throughout the year. Liquor was rationed so as to avoid overindulgence. Each soldier was checked each night on returning from pass, and, if intoxicated, received prophylaxis before returning to his quarters. Every effort was made to find evidence of venereal disease by conducting pre-reveille checks by unit medical officers.

All American and German civilian food handlers were checked for evidence of venereal disease once each month, and more often if indicated. Supervised recreational facilities were increased to the maximum in an effort to satisfy each soldier's constructive recreational desires. The Commanding General instituted a program designed to provide adequate recreational facilities in each kaserne in an effort to encourage soldiers to remain in the Kaserne, and decrease the number going to town and becoming associated with women.

In July 1946, plates of a VD brochure published originally by the 7th U.S. Army, subject: "This War is Never Won", were procured for reprinting. The book consisted of pictures and discussion of venereal diseases. A section of the book was devoted to the proper procedure in administering prophylaxis. The book was reproduced and published in August by this headquarters. Four thousand copies were made available to Constabulary troops. They were distributed to reach each man in Constabulary. Many of the units required that each man in their command read this book by roster.³⁸⁸

One of the large factors that added to the difficulties of VD control was the fact that troop-sized units were constantly changing from one location to another in their operational duties. Because of this constant changing, troop-sized units were continually being moved into new areas where venereal disease carriers were unknown. This situation was less intense in its effects on the VD rate now than it was six months ago as most of the areas were repeatedly occupied and known carriers apprehended.³⁸⁹

The highest venereal disease rate since activation of Constabulary was reported in July, 1946 with a rate of 191 per thousand per annum. Since this date the rate has shown a steady downward trend.

INCIDENCE OF VENEREAL DISEASE

<u>Month</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Rate per 1000 per Annum</u>
July	1946	190.72
August	1946	156.28
September	1946	156.14
October	1946	143.00
November	1946	132.00
December	1946	136.00
January	1947	165.96
February	1947	154.40
March	1947	156.00
April	1947	154.40
May	1947	141.70
June	1947	144.40

In general the venereal rate of Constabulary units was comparable to that of other white troops in the theater, usually a little lower, but not significantly enough to warrant a distinction. In comparison with the venereal rate of colored troops the Constabulary rate was very low, the venereal disease rate among colored troops in some cases exceeding 1000 per 1000 per annum.

The venereal disease control program received continued attention. Although much progress was made since activation in the control of venereal disease, it presented a major problems.³⁹⁰

Medical, Surgical, X-Ray, and Laboratory Service.

Medical, and Surgical service in the Constabulary was carried out entirely by unit dispensaries. Unit dispensaries rendered medical service for minor ailments, emergency treatment, and evacuated patients to the nearest U.S. Army Hospital for further diagnosis and treatment. In many instances the unit dispensaries incorporated a small sick bay into their units, rendering convenient service for quarters cases. Unit dispensaries found the majority of work to consist of treating venereal diseases, scabies, minor lacerations and abrasions, and mild upper respiratory infec-

tions. Under present directives the dispensaries are permitted to treat gonorrhoea, new, acute, and the first recurrence of a case of gonorrhoea, otherwise, it is necessary to evacuate these patients to a U.S. Army Hospital.³⁹¹

X-ray facilities within the Constabulary were limited. The majority of the X-ray work necessitated sending the patient to the nearest station or general hospital. A few of the unit dispensaries have X-ray facilities in a limited way, and confined their work to chest X-ray and X-rays of extremities in fracture cases. The Constabulary School Dispensary had excellent X-ray facilities and was able to perform almost any type of X-ray work.³⁹²

Until November 1946, it was found necessary by most unit dispensaries to send routine laboratory work to the nearest hospital for completion. This involved several difficulties, the chief one of which was time consumed before receiving results of the examinations. In November, all unit dispensaries began doing routine laboratory studies, alleviating almost entirely the necessity of sending any laboratory studies to hospitals. Unit dispensaries of the Constabulary were able to perform routine laboratory studies such as urines, blood counts, and microscopic examinations. All dark field examinations and serological tests were sent to adjoining hospitals for completion.³⁹³

Care of Dependents.

Medical service for dependents of Constabulary Communities were initially furnished by the nearest Constabulary Unit Dispensary. There were a few exceptions to this rule, especially when numbered General Dispensaries of U.S. Army Hospitals were in close proximity to the community area. When dependents were cared for in unit dispensaries, the medical officer of the Constabulary unit was responsible for the medical service. Specific hours

were set aside for dependents sick call, and emergency services were given at any time.³⁸⁵

In some instances, Military Community medical services were augmented by establishing ten bed unit dispensaries in the community areas. The communities that were given authority to establish these ten bed units were: Wetzlar, Weiden, Regensburg, Freising, and Kassel. Each community was adequately furnished with evacuation facilities to the nearest U.S. Army Hospital. Ambulances were furnished either by the Constabulary Unit Dispensary, or by ambulances from the Military Community.³⁹⁵

In all units Standing Operating Procedures were established, in cooperation with adjoining hospitals, in caring for obstetrical patients. Prenatal visits were arranged through the medical officer of the community, and ambulance services were provided for both prenatal visits, and evacuation of the patient to the nearest station or general hospital for delivery.³⁹⁶

In the majority of instances Constabulary medical units were rendering medical services to the dependents of Constabulary troops. In some communities, there were large numbers of dependents from units other than those of Constabulary. In all cases medical services adequate for Constabulary troops were adequate for Constabulary dependents. In communities or satellites commanded by Constabulary Commanders where large numbers of other than Constabulary troops were present, medical service organic to Constabulary units was inadequate and had to be supplemented with personnel and equipment from other than Constabulary sources. In these cases, an additional burden was placed on Constabulary medical units and it was necessary to pool all medical officers in certain communities to provide and maintain

medical service to Military Community areas.³⁹⁷

Nursing.

Army nurses were utilized in only one installation in Constabulary, the Constabulary School Dispensary. Previous to 9 September 1946 this personnel, four in number, was carried by the 3d platoon of the 58th Field Hospital. When the 58th Field Hospital was inactivated, in September, these nurses were placed on detached service to the newly designated Constabulary School Dispensary from Continental Base Section. German civilian nurses were utilized in unit dispensaries when Army female personnel are examined and treated by Constabulary medical units.³⁹⁸

Dental Service.

The Constabulary, including troops attached for medical service, averaged approximately 30,000 troops during the twelve months from 1 May 1946 to 31 December 1946. With the Constabulary table of organization calling for only two dental officers per regiment this required each dental officer in the regiment to provide dental service for communities under Constabulary jurisdiction, in addition to servicing other newly assigned troops which were found to require extensive treatment. This was probably due to the short period of training received in the United States, which did not give dental officers sufficient time to accomplish required dental work prior to overseas shipment.³⁹⁹

Due to an shortage of dental officers, little more than treatment of emergencies was initially accomplished. Only eight dental officers were assigned to the U.S. Constabulary as of 1 June 1946. These officers were placed where their services could be utilized to the greatest advantage. A few months later, Constabulary was assigned several Naval dental officers which relieved the acute shortage somewhat.⁴⁰⁰

Upon assignment of a dental corps officer, a dental survey of all personnel in each regiment was started. About seventy-five percent of the troops were surveyed. Many difficulties were encountered in the survey because of the wide dispersal of troops and operational patrols. It was also found difficult to conduct a dental survey of small attached units such as those assigned to the communities, water supply points, pro platoons, and other small detachments. With the Constabulary troops the continuous survey system proved very successful. This continuous survey system was set up in each regiment whereby, in cooperation with the medical officer, each newly assigned soldier was given a medical examination and a dental survey within twenty-four hours after reporting to a Constabulary unit. Redeployees and personnel transferred were dropped from the dental roster. With this method a constant check of the progress in each regiment was available and the Regimental Dental Surgeon had accurate information on the dental status of the unit.⁴⁰¹

Redeployment of dental officers and troops proved to be a major problem. Dentists who had organized their routine and system of work and who had become accustomed to army procedure were redeployed and were replaced by new men who in turn had to go through the same period of readjustment before the full benefit of their services were realized. Redeployment of the troops constituted a problem due to two factors; one, personnel scheduled for early redeployment were more eager to have dental work accomplished and reported voluntarily to the clinic, secondly, when this dental work was completed on the soldier scheduled to be redeployed, he was almost immediately replaced by a dental Class I, II, III, soldier requiring extensive treatment, as mentioned above. Thus, it was difficult to maintain a current status with the dental work.⁴⁰²

Many minor problems were encountered, such as obtaining running water for dental clinics due to the lack of pipe, and obtaining transformers to enable the U.S. Army 110 volt, dental units, to use the German 220 volt electrical system. Difficulty was experienced in the operation of the mobile dental operating units. Many of these units had been in use during the war and were in bad mechanical condition, necessitating frequent and extensive repairs. Also, during the winter months, due to a coal and power shortage, there were frequent and long interruptions of the electrical service which necessitated the use of the foot engine during the periods when the power was off. This slowed up the work and was never as satisfactory as an electric motor. ⁴⁰³

Under the proposed Table of Organization the U.S. Constabulary had a total of thirty-six dental officers. This provided one dental officer for each squadron and materially improved the dental service by reducing the number of men for whom each dental officer was responsible to approximately 1,000 instead of 1,500 scattered over a large area. There were two mobile dental trucks in each regiment which enabled dental officers to reach troops dispersed over a large area. ⁴⁰⁴

Veterinary Service.

The table of organization for veterinary personnel provided four officers and fifteen enlisted personnel for the entire Constabulary. Each brigade medical detachment was authorized one officer, and five enlisted men, three of whom were veterinary technicians. The medical detachment of Constabulary Headquarters was authorized one officer and no enlisted technician. In order to provide full time veterinary personnel for the regiments, it was necessary to attach a veterinary technician to each regiment. The principal

duty of this technician was to provide veterinary service to the thirty horses of each regimental horse platoon.⁴⁰⁵

Food Inspection.

The veterinary service was responsible for investigating the sanitary conditions of both animal, and non-animal, food products; the sanitary conditions, storage, handling, and food conservation in the Class I supply points, bakeries, commissaries, and ice cream establishments. It was impossible for the four Veterinary officers to inspect as frequently as desired, and to maintain records for all the establishments within their areas. No meat and dairy reports, were rendered until the month of November. Approximately one month was needed for the Brigade Veterinarians to collect the necessary information used in preparation of these reports. At the end of December 1946 the service was only responsible for the nine Constabulary communities and centrally located plants necessary to furnish ice cream. The responsibility for these establishments was placed under the control of the community commanders.⁴⁰⁶

Food losses were above normal during the summer months, due to rough handling, improper loading of freight cars, poor refrigeration, and old stock held over since the war. Small quantities of fresh meat was condemned usually due usually to poor refrigeration within the commissaries. Spoilage in fresh fruits, vegetables, and eggs, was caused by transportation difficulties. During the summer months much spoilage was due to the lack of refrigerator cars, while during the winter freezing occurred while food was in transit. The spoiled products that were unfit for use were destroyed. Products that were unsuitable for troop issue were recommended to be turned over to Military Government and used either for human or animal food.



Constabulary Was The Only Unit In The
European Command That Included
Horses

Animals.

The Tables of Organization for the U.S. Constabulary initially provided for thirty horses in each of the nine regiments until late 1946 when each regiment was authorized seven additional horses. It was the duty of the Brigade Veterinary service to investigate the sanitary conditions of the animals and make recommendations as to animal management insofar as they concerned the health and efficiency of the animals. The sick and injured animals were treated in the stables and at outposts by enlisted Veterinary Technicians who were on temporary duty with the regimental headquarters troops. The treatments were outlined by the Veterinarians and supervised periodically by frequent trips and telephone conversations to the stables. All Animals were Mallein tested and immunized against tetanus.⁴⁰⁷

No Sick and Wounded Reports were rendered from the Constabulary until the month of November. All the diseases were noncommunicable in nature and only three deaths occurred, one tetanus, one hemoglobinuria, and one fetal dystocia.⁴⁰⁸

Most of the stables were enclosed buildings and were satisfactory in regard to location, surroundings, construction, drainage, and ventilation. The ration consisted of ten pounds of grain and fourteen pounds of hay. Wheat straw was used for bedding when available. Salt was available only in limited quantities and in granulated form. Due to the shortage of army horsehoers and necessary equipment, German blacksmiths were used in most regiments. Methods of shoeing were satisfactory but were improved when trained Army horsehoers were used.⁴⁰⁹

Animal management was while satisfactory left much to be desired. Lack of equipment, redeployment, inexperienced and untrained personnel, accounted for all the problems. In the early days of Constabulary operations,

hay and grain was fed on the ground, animals were watered from local civilian watering troughs, stable personnel feeding animals without any regards as to the ration allowances, no prophylactic measures were instituted against hemoglobinuria, and the animals were not groomed daily. Brigade Veterinarians made frequent visits and instructed stable personnel in animal management. Considerable improvement was made in methods of animal management, and all animals showed an increase in weight and condition.⁴¹⁰

Scabies.

When Constabulary was activated, the scabies rate, on cases treated in quarters and in hospitals was 62.81 per thousand per annum. This rate which was considered excessive was attributed to movement of troops into new billets in Kaserne areas which had previously been occupied, in many instances, by other than U.S. personnel. Lack of facilities for personal hygiene, lack of adequate water supplies, and low water pressures.⁴¹¹ These difficulties prevented the maintenance of high standards of personal hygiene. Unit commanders made every effort to correct the situation but were unable to make much progress as inadequate water pressures prevailed even after plumbing repairs had been made. In some instances booster pumps were placed in main water lines leading into the Kasernes, but the problem of sufficient water in many areas remained during the summer months.⁴¹² In September, the scabies rate reached 89.61 per thousand per annum. As a result of this increase the Constabulary Surgeon made a special inspection trip and conferred with each medical officer regarding the problem of scabies control. Control measures were brought to the attention of all unit commanders and a vigorous program was launched.⁴¹³

Frequent and careful inspections were made in all units and emphasis placed on skin inspections during monthly physical examinations. Every effort was made to maintain adequate bathing facilities and adequate supplies of hot water. Transient billets were carefully inspected to assure frequent laundering and dry cleaning of bed linens and blankets.⁴¹⁴

Great emphasis was placed on early recognition and treatment. Quarter-master Methyl Bromide decontamination chambers were installed in Mannheim and Bamberg, Augsburg, Munich, and Giessen. Unit commanders were held responsible for the decontamination of all soldiers' clothing and bedding as soon as the diagnosis of scabies was made. Materials were taken to decontamination units on 48 hours notice, and returned to units within 20 hours.⁴¹⁵

Benzyl-Benzoate was most effective in the treatment of scabies especially when detailed instruction was given to each infected person as to the proper method of medication.⁴¹⁶

As a result of this program the scabies rate was reduced. Even though the rate of scabies treated on a quarters and hospital status had fallen, many mild cases developed in Constabulary units which were carried on a duty status.⁴¹⁷

Injuries.

Injuries, both major and minor, were a cause of great concern throughout the year. In May, when Constabulary was activated, there were three hundred and forty persons brought to Constabulary dispensaries suffering from injuries. The most frequent cause being vehicle accidents, or carelessness with firearms.⁴¹⁸ In July, when Constabulary became operational, thousands of miles were covered each week by vehicular patrols. As a re-

sult, the rate increased rising in August until almost four hundred persons were treated for injuries in unit dispensaries, or were transferred to hospitals for further definitive treatment.⁴¹⁹ The Commanding General, on routine inspection, throughout the Constabulary, spoke at length concerning the need for each trooper to exercise precaution in order that unnecessary accidents could be avoided.⁴²⁰ That this campaign was effective is indicated by the fact that injuries dropped to 139 during the month of December and continued to decline until June 1947 when only 48 injuries were recorded.⁴²¹

General Trends in Constabulary Medical Support.

When the U.S. Constabulary became operational on 1 July 1946 the problem of medical support was similar to that of troops on maneuvers or simulated combat. The wide deployment of troops complicated medical support and required a broad program of first aid training for line personnel and the dispersion of medical personnel to provide service for all troops. Throughout the year there was a steady trend toward consolidation of Constabulary troops which progressively made the problem of medical support simpler until by 30 June 1947 medical support was being performed on a basis comparable with that of a peacetime military post in the Zone of Interior. This fact is further emphasized by the deletion of organic medical department personnel from the T/O and the allocation of smaller numbers of such personnel on a bulk allotment basis.

Chapter 10
INTELLIGENCE - SECURITY - LAW AND ORDER

Constabulary Responsibilities.

The US Constabulary was charged with maintaining general military and civil security in the US Zone and military control of the borders encompassing it. These responsibilities were discharged by means of an active patrol system covering the zone, and a border control system which operated certain fixed border crossing points and conducted patrols in depth behind the frontiers. Constabulary did not exercise the powers of Military Police, except in their absence, and was not originally regarded as being responsible for the policing of US troops. As the operating security agency in the US Zone, Constabulary depended upon an efficient liaison system with other agencies in the zone which included: Military Government, Military Police, Counter Intelligence Corps, Criminal Investigation Division, and the German Police.⁴²² In order to insure the maximum efficiency of this liaison system, Third US Army directed that a monthly conference be held by representatives of all agencies concerned. The first such conference was held at Constabulary Headquarters, in Bamberg on 30 July 1946. These conferences provided the capstone of the liaison system which reached down through brigades, regiments, squadrons, troops, and culminated in the visits of Constabulary patrols to these agencies in the field.⁴²³

A similar situation existed with respect to Border Control except that in this case, liaison had to be effected with the representatives of other Allied powers controlling the various frontiers encompassing the zone. Cooperation between French and British authorities was all that could be desired and problems in connection with the frontiers were worked out to the mutual satisfaction of all concerned. Relations with the Soviet Union re-

garding border control was an entirely different matter and presented a problem which was never satisfactorily solved. Agreements were difficult to reach, delays were frequent, and once an agreement was reached, implementation on the part of the Soviet authorities was often delayed for long periods. ^{at times,} ~~due, apparently, to administrative friction in Soviet channels of communications.~~ 424

The Constabulary mission was performed among a suspicious, disillusioned, and needy population, faced with food, fuel and clothing shortages, plagued by an extensive black market, and susceptible to any rumor which might offer hope for betterment. As a result of years of Nazi propaganda, they hated the Jew, the Displaced Person, and those Germans who had been forcibly repatriated to the homeland. In addition, activities of the Communist dominated political parties using every means to extend pro-Soviet influence, to create unrest, to discredit the US occupational policies, and to attack unsympathetic German officials, contributed to the general feeling of insecurity and unrest prevailing among the population, and added to the difficulties of maintaining security and an orderly populace. 425

Maintaining Order Among Displaced Persons.

The problem of regulating the activities of the Displaced Persons and policing the Displaced Persons Camps fell to the Constabulary as the Zone security agency. While the Displaced Persons population was in the main law abiding and orderly, there appeared to be a minority, far out of proportion to their numbers who were responsible for crimes of violence against the indigenous population and black market activities. That this was the case is indicated by the fact that firearms were employed in thirty-three percent of the crimes committed by Displaced Persons. 426 An example of the



Results of a Raid on a
Displaced Persons Camp

problem faced by Constabulary in this connection is provided by the Displaced Persons Camp located at Flossenburg which was the center of a reign of vandalism and terror. UNRRA and Military Government requested that Constabulary raid the camp and seize illegal weapons which were believed to be present. In August 1946 a total of ten Constabulary officers and 395 enlisted men participated in this raid which resulted in uncovering black market activities in meat, seizure of considerable quantities of illegal currency, quantities of US property, six pistols, and the apprehension of an individual suspected of murder. Seventeen persons were arrested, including the camp commander who was arrested for assisting the prisoners by altering or destroying evidence.⁴²⁷

another example of police action against displaced persons occurred on 26 November 1946, when 676 Constabulary officers and enlisted men made a surprise raid on the Ulina Kaserne Displaced Persons Camp in Bamberg. In the course of the raid 250 persons were screened, 114 detained for further interrogation, and 84 eventually turned over to Military Government for trial. Four cases of Counter Intelligence interest were turned over to the CIC. Interpreters for Polish, German, Jewish, Hungarian, French and Czechoslovakian languages were employed during the raid. As a result of the raid, \$45,000.00 worth of morphine, codeine, and penicillin, plus GI clothing, live ammunition and a small amount of black powder were discovered. The operation was tactically sound and well executed. The participating troops did their jobs with coordination and dispatch, and effective liaison was established with the UNRRA Director of the camp and two members of the American Joint Distribution Committee.⁴²⁸

During January 1947, the cold weather kept most Displaced Persons Activities centered around the immediate vicinity of the camps. Displaced Persons at the Marnau Camp were reluctant to move during the cold weather and staged seven large demonstrations to protest against their movement to another location. Polish Displaced Persons at the Wildflecken Camp held a mass meeting to oppose screening, attacked a Polish official, displayed posters hostile to the United States and to UNRRA, and threatened violence if screening continued. In both of these cases Constabulary troops were called upon to restore order.

An example of the participation of Constabulary troops in the reestablishment of order in a Displaced Persons Camp occurred during the month of January 1947 at the Nulberg Kaserne in Ellwangen. There were approximately 3000 Polish Ukrainians in this camp, seven hundred and fifty-seven of which had been found ineligible for Displaced Persons Care as a result of screening. On the night of 25 February, a list of four hundred thirty-six persons, who were to be evicted on the 28th February was published. On 26 February at 1000 hours a small riot took place. One platoon of "C" Troop, 71st Constabulary Squadron was dispatched to quell the riot.⁴²⁹

As a result of operational experience by Constabulary units in the field a more effective method of controlling Displaced Persons was evolved, and placed in effect in December 1946. This method replaced raids to a great extent. The new method consisted of establishing a series of check points in concealed positions surrounding the Displaced Persons Camp and checking all persons entering or leaving the camp. This system of control proved successful as the number of serious incidents involving Displaced Persons dropped in the vicinity of checked camps and remained on a high level in the

vicinity of unchecked camps. This procedure enabled Constabulary to check camps more frequently and did not disrupt the routine of the camps as did search and seizure operations.⁴³⁰

Constabulary's preoccupation with the problem of policing the Displaced Persons population of the zone resulted from the fact that there was no other agency to perform this function. The space devoted to the task of law enforcement among the DP's should not be interpreted to mean that this group of people were on the whole less law abiding than the indigenous population, although there was a minority who were responsible for more than their share of serious incidents, black market and subversive activities. Every effort was made to enforce the law with decency, fairness, justice, and understanding until arrangements for the resettlement, emigration, or repatriation of displaced persons were made.⁴³¹

Subversive Activities and Sabotage.

Subversive activities and sabotage took many forms including the possession of Nazi insignia and literature, efforts at keeping Nazi organizations alive, threatening letters, painting swastikas on walls or streets, assaults against Germans who fraternized with US troops, placing obstacles in roads, impersonating US personnel, illegal possession of radio communications equipment, arson, membership in the Edelweiss Piraten, wire cutting, circulation of rumors, and assaults against US personnel. During the first year of Constabulary operations, subversive incidents remained on a relatively stable plane and did not fluctuate sufficiently to indicate a trend, although the potential sources for such incidents was regarded as having increased in view of the time and opportunities which had been afforded for organization of such activities.

The following selected incidents are typical of the subversive activities encountered and are presented as examples in order to better illustrate the problem faced by the Constabulary.⁴³²

"Of fifty three road markers showing the location of the 15th Constabulary Squadron in the HEIDELBERG-MANNHEIM-SCHWETZINGEN area. twenty-four have been destroyed during the period 25-28 June 1946. During the period 29 June to 2 July 1946, 17 more signs were removed."

"28 August 1946. Markt Oberdorf. A raid on the Schnitzer Printing Shop resulted in finding Nazi literature, 45 Red Books, "Deutschland im Kampf", one DAF certificate, 12 meters of OD cloth, German stamps, 8 meters of grey cloth, one sword, one box various press literature, personal documents and record book. Members of the shop under arrest."

"21 September 1946. Hundsbach. Small arms firing had been heard intermittently in the vicinity of this town, thought to be that of hunters. A search was made by Troopers and German Police. Ten German civilians were arrested on the charge of "Suspicion of possessing illegal weapons." All are being held by Military Government. CIC and 10th Constabulary Squadron Provost Marshal are investigating."

"13 October 1946. Klein-Bardorf. Two telephone poles were found across the road at about 23 00 hours. 27th Constabulary Squadron could not obtain any information at the time."

"9 November 1946. Munich. During the evening unknown persons placed wreaths at the site of Feldherrn-Helle and Ehrenthempel. The wreaths carried ribbons with the words "And still you have conquered". 9 November 1946. "The 9th of November was the day of Nazi celebration of the "Putsch" in 1923 and the celebrations centered around these two places."

"5 December 1946. Wetzlar. A letter written on the 13th of September 1946 was found on the doorstep of a German civilian residence by a female occupant of the house. The text: "You are a very filthy creature. An American whore as you won't be found so quickly again. Don't flatter yourself by thinking you are pretty. When one looks at your rouged up puss, one thinks they are seeing a worn out cow. Your sunken eyes and the rings around them tell of many nights awake. First you had Italians and now you whore around with the Americans. You should not wonder yourself if one of these days you should find your head shorn. The German boys hate you, and I as one of them would like to tear you to pieces. You miserable pig, I hope that you have VD". (signed) PG known yet unknown. On the back of the page the following was written: "Just like yourself the following girls are also hated (five names) "Erika Kraus and Isa Schmitt are not as big pigs. We know them all".

"9 January. Coburg. The editor of the Neue Presse received a package containing five rounds of German ammunition wrapped in a subversive letter and a copy of his news article title: "The Cannon King." The following words were typed "As a Christmas present for Mischlowski, he can shoot himself with this if he still has a little love for his fatherland." This letter was signed by a Dr. Sagillac and investigation revealed his name is unknown in Lichtenfels although when the lettering of the name is reversed it read Calligas which has been heard of before in Lichtenfels.

"1 February 1947, Nurnberg. The Spruchkammer on Karl Kruger Strasse was bombed. Bomb was thrown into the shop on ground floor directly beneath the office of the president of the German Landesgericht which is at present trying Von Papen. No one was injured. Building partially destroyed."

"5 March 1947. Hauzenberg. "A" Troop, 51st Constabulary Squadron reported that 174 feet of telephone wire were removed between the Officers quarters and the Command Post by unknown person or persons."

"25 April 1947. Mittenwald. a patrol from the 2nd Constabulary Squadron noticed on the facade of the Karwendel Hotel, Jewish quarters, and just above the door, a sign or display reading "Down with the British Occupation of Palestine. We demand the liquidation of all Jewish Camps - the shame of the 20th Century - as we greet the Fighter of Zion for freedom." The UNRRA Director denied knowledge of the sign but had the placard promptly removed by representatives of the hotel."

"19 May 1947. Furthinwald. A train, destination France and coming from Czechoslovakia, was given a routine spot check by "A" Troop, 25th Constabulary Squadron. Manifest declared all cars empty but check revealed one car sealed, which aroused suspicions. Seal was broken and car found to contain large amounts of communistic propaganda printed in Polish. Train allowed to proceed to France less the one car which was later released."

"15 June 1947. Elbgrund. A tax assessor approached Constabulary patrol and told them that he, the burgermeister and a cattle dealer, had been chased off the farm of a man named Young, when they attempted to collect a cow that was a tax assessment. The patrol arrested the farmer. At the time of the arrest he stated that he had always been a Nazi and would always be one, that the party was not dead and that it would never die. On questioning by the Provost Marshal of the 37th Constabulary Squadron he stated he had made the statements but did not mean them the way the witnesses took them. He was turned over to the Military Government in Limburg who released the man."

Black Market Activity.

The basic cause of black market activity was the inability of the average

German, or Displaced Person to obtain the things they desired through legal channels. The currency was regarded as practically valueless and under ordinary circumstances would not procure scarce items. The seller of such items demanded either food, cigarettes, or other scarce items in exchange. Generally the motive for engaging in the black market was to raise the standard of living above that which it was possible to maintain through legitimate means. Participation in the black market was almost universal and differed among individuals only in the degree. Three distinct groups of people can be distinguished in considering the black market. These were the Germans interested in improving their standard of living or in obtaining the materials necessary to carry on their business. The Displaced Persons or Germans who dealt in black market commodities for the purpose of personal gain, as a means of acquiring the funds necessary to provide them with documents required for emigration or to acquire jewels and other items of stable value which could be safely held until a stable economy was established. Allied personnel who provided much of the media of exchange, including cigarettes, coffee, and other scarce items of food were primarily interested in obtaining paintings, jewelry, novelties, cameras, and similar items, or in having services performed which could be paid for in the relatively inexpensive items which constituted the black market media of exchange. From an economic point of view the black market was a normal condition which was to be expected in any economy lacking sufficient goods to satisfy normal demands and measures taken to combat it could only be regarded as deterrents. The real cure in a stable currency and sufficient goods to satisfy the demands of the population was lacking.⁴³³

Constabulary's concern with black market activities was in the role of a

law enforcing agency and was consequently largely concerned with the elimination of as much of the traffic as possible and in apprehending participants, particularly those engaged in large scale activities.

Black market prices although exorbitant have generally been rather stable, increasing approximately thirty percent during the year beginning 1 July 1946. The following table of prices is indicative of the general value of commodities on the market: ⁴³⁴

<u>BLACK MARKET PRICES</u>		<u>June 1947</u>
Pound of Coffee - - - - -		300-400RM
Pound of Tea - - - - -		300
Pound of Butter - - - - -		200-240
Carton of Cigarettes - - - - -		800
German Food Ration Card - - - - -		350
US Army Raincoat - - - - -		250-350
Pair of US Army Shoes - - - - -		725
Pair of American Ladies Shoes - - - - -		675
American Dollar (Currency) - - - - -		180-200
American Dollar (Script) - - - - -		100-120
Swiss Franc - - - - -		48-55
100 Pounds of Coal - - - - -		80-90
Motor Cars - - - - -		20000-30000
Diamonds: .25 Carat - - - - -		4000
.75 Carat - - - - -		23000
1.00 Carat - - - - -		30000
2.00 Carat - - - - -		65000
Leica III Camera 1.2 Lens - - - - -		45000
Pound of Pork - - - - -		45
Pound of Beef - - - - -		15
Dozen of Eggs - - - - -		60-85
Bottle of German Wine - - - - -		250-300
Bottle of German Schnapps - - - - -		400-450
Bar of Chocolate - - - - -		40-45
Bar of Soap - - - - -		35-40
Pound of Wheat Flour - - - - -		4-5
Five Gallons of Gasoline - - - - -		250

When the above prices are compared with the salaries received by the Average German which vary between 200 and 300 reichmarks per month, it becomes apparent that the average German could not hope to live off the black market unless he had an illegitimate source of income. Black market operators them-

selves realized only ten percent on their transactions as the knowledge of prices was so widespread that there was little for profiteering on a large scale.

Constabulary contact with the black market in the role of a law enforcement agency is best illustrated by incidents which have been taken from reports of operations conducted throughout the year and which may be considered typical.⁴³⁵

"18 July 1946. Gmund. Two Germans arrested when attempting to sell 150 pounds of meat and 50 pounds of flour on the black market. Turned over to German police."

"27 August 1946. Fussen. German civilian was arrested; had in his possession: 24 packs of cigarettes, 2 cans of coffee, 15 vials of 606 syphilis medicine (Salvasen), 2 vials distilled water (15 to 20 cc each) and one bottle of bismogerel (Fosse). Man claims he got goods in PW camp. Investigated by Military Government."

"17 September 1946. Bheinhausen. Two German civilians were arrested when large amounts of wheat, peas, and cabbage were discovered hidden in a false bottom in their truck. Men had been previously arrested for the same offense, and sentenced to 14 days imprisonment. Turned over to Military Government."

"4 October 1946. Karlsruhe. A letter from a prisoner suspected of black market dealings and under observation in the city jail, was intercepted, which led to a large list of suspects. These suspects were questioned and large amounts of goods were found in the possession of some of them. The total number of persons arrested were sixteen and the approximate value of goods was 1 1/2 to 3 million marks. The German Black Market Branch was informed and advised to check these persons for further possible black market goods of German nature which could not be recognized and seized by Constabulary investigators. All prisoners are now confined in the city jail in Karlsruhe, and investigation by the German Criminal Police continues."

"15 November 1946. Hammerau. It was discovered that Ernst Lange, a German, an employee of the Steel Works in Hammerau, had taken five tons of nail wire from the Anna Huetten plant. He turned this over to a nail factory at Arlen, where it was made into nails, these nails he then exchanged for various rationed items, which were sold by Adolf Petrowicz, German, on the black market. Men arrested and turned over to German Police who are investigating."

"22 December 1946. Teisendorf. Stefan Negauer and Tobor Geres, Jewish Displaced Persons from Rosenheim DPCamp #169, were apprehended by Land Police for possession of three bottles of penicillin, 100,000 units per bottle, one bottle claimed to be Spanish fly, 32 bottles of

calcium hypochloride, large quantities of GI clothing and nine uncensored letters. Letters forwarded to CIC. 66th Constabulary Squadron Provost Marshal investigating."

"7 January 1947. Markbistart. Troopers on patrol arrested a colored US soldier for selling American food supplies on the black market. The colored soldier had a truck load of food than he was going to trade for dishes with a German. He stated that the food had been stolen from the 95th MI Depot. Investigation by SIS, 53rd Constabulary Squadron disclosed that a large group was involved."

"18 February 1947. Wasserburg. US Soldier on guard at billets of "E" Troop, 42nd Constabulary Squadron attempted to awaken who was to relieve him and failing to do so pulled the guard himself. When a second attempt to awaken the soldier was made at 0700 hours he was discovered to be dead. Dr. G.V. Bary, German Civilian, pronounced death due to alcoholic poisoning from schnapps obtained from German policemen Hammer. Hammer was apprehended and is being held."

"30 March 1947. Daufen. Fleischmann, Polish Jew suspected of black market activities, was apprehended during spot check of his home by "C" Troop, 42nd Constabulary Squadron who found the following: four bars of soap, one wristwatch, one pair of Air Corps Gloves, 138RM, 9000 Allied Marks, two pounds of coffee, fifty pounds lard, and one leather brief case. Articles and Fleischmann turned over to Military Government."

"21 April 1947. Mannheim. Two German males and one female were apprehended for sale of cognac to soldiers. Investigation revealed script currency and PX goods were used as a medium of exchange. The script in turn reached a contact man from Lampertheim Displaced Persons Camp who exchanged German marks for the script. Contact man unknown."

"21 May 1947. Freising. On an informant report, Jerocolinski and Kaczouko, Jewish, were apprehended in their apartment by 42nd Constabulary Squadron for black market dealings. Following items, obtained through illegal sources, were confiscated: 50,000 RM, \$1.00 in US silver, \$31.50 in US script, large amount of dresses, quantity of dress material, GI soap and toilet soap. Men tried by Military Government and sentenced to six months imprisonment. Soap turned over to GYA.

"18 June 1947. Witzenhausen. A German civilian was arrested for being in the American Zone illegally from the Russian Zone. At the time of his arrest he was headed for the Russian Zone on a bicycle. He had in his possession six watches and material for women's dresses. He was turned over to MG in Witzenhausen."

Judging from the Numbers of individuals apprehended there was little variations in the extent of black market activities during the year beginning 1 July 1946. With a placing of a ban on the importation of cigarettes on 26 May 1947, a tendency toward the use of other commodities such as coffee as a

medium of exchange was noted. As a deterrent to the black market the ban on cigarette imports was ineffective; it did perhaps reduce the participation of allied personnel by eliminating their sources of supply for one of the principal medial of exchange. Efforts to combat the black market were partially successful in that the activities of Constabulary and other law enforcement agencies discouraged participation, particularly on the part of US and Allied military and civilian personnel. That these efforts had any great effect on the extent of black market activities or on the participation of the indigenous population is to be doubted, as the indigenous population simply regarded the black market as another source for commodities and did not regard participation as a moral issue.⁴³⁶

Disorders Among US Troops.

The conduct of US Troops in the occupied zone was a matter of great concern to occupation authorities during the year beginning 1 July 1946. In general, the rate of serious incidents involving Constabulary troops was somewhat higher than that of other troops in the theater. These figures were not, however, regarded as presenting an accurate picture of the overall situation. Constabulary from the very nature of its organization had a much better reporting system than other units in the theater. This served to make the Constabulary rate appear higher when compared with other US troops.⁴³⁷ There were certain recognizable trends in US troops disorders during the year, which were worthy of note. Due to control measures the number of serious incidents in which illegal firearms were used by troops steadily decreased until the use of such arms became rare by the end of the year. Studies showed that the number of incidents in which soldiers of low intelligence were involved were out of proportion to their numbers, as was the number of incidents involving very young soldiers. An effective preventive measure was the consolidation

of troops into larger units which tended to reduce the rate of incidents.

The type of incidents in which US personnel were involved is best illustrated by examples. The incidents which are cited are regarded as representative of the general types occurring throughout the period, but should not be interpreted to mean that the incidents occurred in proportion to those cited. ⁴³⁸

~~"4 July 1946. Hohenbrunn. At 2330 on 3 July, approximately 150 colored soldiers of the 657 Ordnance Ammunition Company staged an uprising in their billet area, broke into the arms storage room, picked up weapons loaded vehicles and attempted to leave area and clean up on White MPs who had stopped their vehicle earlier in the evening. Successfully stopped by commanding officer and some non-coms."~~

"28 August 1946. Stuttgart. Constabulary CIC apprehended a Trooper of the 71st Constabulary Squadron, who had been AWOL for nine days and a German girl with whom he had been living. Soldier turned over to unit and girl to Military Government."

~~"10 September 1946. Erlangen. A Constabulary trooper was caught in the act of attempted rape of a girl whose screams attracted the attention of another soldier."~~

"31 October 1946. Herzogenaurach. Forty women were arrested and jailed in a Constabulary raid. Later a group of colored soldiers, including two MPs armed with weapons, intimidated the Burgermeister and Police officials and released the girls."

"29 December 1946. Munich. US Soldier kicked Margarethe Fischer and struck Margarethe Horche, German females, injuring them slightly, while two other soldiers stood by and did nothing."

"25 December 1946. Boeblingen. Two unidentified drunken US Soldiers and two drunken Displaced Persons assaulted a German and then assaulted 3 Polish refugees in the Railroad station. Disturbance spread to Polish DP Camp number 506. Military Government requested aid from 72nd Constabulary Squadron in case of a major disturbance. 1st Platoon, "A" Troop was dispatched to the scene but found the camp quiet. The two DPs were arrested and turned over to Military Government."

"15 January 1947. Munich. Three German civilians on the way home and riding bicycles, were assaulted and threatened by unknown US soldiers."

"15 February 1947. Fritzlar. A soldier from the 601st Tactical Radar Station when leaving the station noticed a jeep parked beside the road and four soldiers standing near shooting into the field with their pistols. When he approached within 125 yards they started firing at him, forcing him to hit the ground. When he tried to find out what they were

doing they jumped into the jeep painted with Constabulary striping and drove away. The soldier stated he was too far away to record the bumper markings."

"31 March 1947. Weisbaden. At approximately 0015 hours a trooper attempted to enter a German apartment house. Finding the door locked, the trooper began to kick on the door and call to someone to let him in. A German policeman living on the third floor was awakened and asked the trooper to leave. The trooper began throwing rocks at the policeman. Coming downstairs the policeman persuaded the trooper to accompany him to the 979 LP Station. On the way the policeman was attacked by the trooper. The policeman fired one shot into the air and in a few minutes an LP patrol arrived. The trooper was arrested and turned over to his Commanding Officer for disciplinary action. The trooper was under the influence of liquor obtained from an unknown German civilian."

"29 April 1947. Frankfurt. A US soldier started a fight with a zoo keeper who tried to prevent the soldier from handing a broken bottle to an ape and attempted to climb into the ape's cage. The soldier was arrested and turned over to MPs in Frankfurt."

"19-23 May 1947. There were twenty-nine troop disorders during the period principally assaults on German civilians."

~~"10 June 1947. Munich, (Freimann suburb). German police stated that a number of women of ill reputation have established living quarters in an abandoned bunker within the vicinity of a US colored troop compound. These women were supplied with foodstuffs and protected by members of the colored unit who resented and threatened the German police for interfering with the activities of these women, thereby hampering the duties and security of the German police. A raid was initiated by combined military and German police with positive results, but has resulted in promoting bitter feeling between colored troops and German police."~~

Involvement of Constabulary Personnel in Disorders.

The involvement of personnel in crimes, offenses and serious incidents throughout the year beginning 1 July 1946 did not present a favorable situation. Available figures indicate that there was a gradual increase in the rate of participation throughout year. A portion of the increase was attributed to increased efficiency in the reporting system although it was probable that this factor did not entirely offset the indicated increase. An analysis of the involvement of personnel indicated that teen age soldiers were responsible for more than their proportionate share of troop misconduct,

and that soldiers of low mentality are disproportionately involved. The tabulated results of this survey follow:⁴³⁹

ANALYSIS OF CRIMES BY AGE OF OFFENDERS

Age of Offender	Percent of Theater Strength	Percent of Total Incidents	Percent of crimes against persons	Percent of Total Crimes against property	Percent of Total Incidents
18-20	41	57	54	60	58
21-25	30	27	30	25	26
26-30	14	8	7	10	8
31-35	8	6	7	5	5
36-40	4	2	2	0	3
41-Over	1	0	0	0	0
Percent	100	100	100	100	100

ANALYSIS OF CRIMES BY AGCT SCORE OF OFFENDERS

AGCT Score	Percent of Theater Strength	Percent of Total Incidents	Percent of crimes against persons	Percent of Total Crimes against Property	Percent of Total Incidents
Class I 130 Over	3	2	2	0	3
Class II 110-129	19	21	14	35	14
Class III 90-109	32	20	29	5	26
Class IV 60-89	38	53	52	55	53
Class V 59 & Below	5	4	3	5	4
Unclassified	3	0	0	0	0
Percent	100	100	100	100	100

The rate of involvement of Constabulary personnel in Crimes, Serious, Incidents, and Offenses during the year beginning 1 July 1946 was as follows:⁴⁴⁰

RATE OF INVOLVEMENT OF CONSTABULARY PERSONNEL
IN CRIMES, OFFENSES AND SERIOUS INCIDENTS PER 1000

<u>Month</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Rate Per 1000 Troops</u>
July	1946	1.29
August	1946	1.91
September	1946	1.90
October	1946	1.90
November	1946	1.88
December	1946	2.80
January	1947	1.73
February	1947	2.47
March	1947	2.88
April	1947	2.82
May	1947	2.59
June	1947	3.68

Average		2.32

Disorders Among the Indigenous Population.

Generally speaking, disorders among the indigenous population were relatively few. Such disorders as did occur were usually motivated by a desire to obtain additional food and other necessities of life. This trend was reflected in the fact that most offenses had to do with the black market or with illegal attempts to cross frontiers. Resentment toward Displaced Persons was evidenced by the numbers of incidents in which Germans and DPs were involved. Intelligence reports for the period 18 to 22 November 1946, were indicative of the security situation with respect to the German population and are quoted as follows:⁴⁴¹

"Office of Military Government, Bavaria reported a number of cases of Fragebogen falsification by German officials. Generally these persons attempt to conceal party membership or avoid classification as an automatic arrestee in an attempt to retain their positions as Military Government officials." "An increase in trips to rural areas and towns in an effort to trade for foodstuffs known to be hoarded by farmers was noted. 1st Constabulary Brigade reported a growing feeling of apprehension among the civil populace. General unsettled conditions exist; scarcities of all kinds of goods, fear of losing living quarters due to the growing influx of refugees, the approaching winter months, and lack of faith in their present currency, all contribute to this condition. Two minor disturbances occurred in the 2nd Constabulary Brigade area,

one, a near riot caused by a large crowd of civilians at the Munich Dependents Coal Dump, and the other a general free for all involving US troops, BPs, and German civilians in a Cafe."

By April 1947, civilian disorders had risen slightly. Black Market activity robbery, and larceny constituted the major portion of illegal activities. The potential for disorders in the form of strikes and demonstrations for increased food rations had risen. Increased food shortages, plus imagined impunity, plus KPD activity, plus large numbers of idle youth, contained the potential for serious disorders which it was believed might develop about May Day, if they developed at all. The situation generally remained unchanged and May Day passed without incident. The growing seriousness of the food situation was highlighted by the Armed robbery of a US Army Officers mess for the purpose of obtaining food.

During May and June 1947, the practice of the urban and drifting population of preying on the growing crops of farmers became prevalent on a Zone wide basis. As the German police were insufficient in numbers to control this situation, farmers banded together to form vigilante groups for the purpose of guarding their fields. The Bavarians continued to express bitter resentment against the curtailment of beer production. Finer points of this complaint were that only black marketeers were getting beer, that beer was only available in night clubs, and that, therefore the only equitable solution would be to produce beer in limited quantities on a ration basis. This argument naturally received little sympathy from occupation authorities.

By the end of the year it appeared that the German people were becoming over indoctrinated so far as their rights were concerned, and tended to lose sight of the fact that they had been members of a society which had inflicted extreme hardships on the entire world. This fact is borne out by a report from Giessen, recounting the objection of an employee of the EUCOM QM Depot to subjection to search when leaving the depot, who stated that Germans had rights and could not be

searched by anyone. When this complaint is compared with the monthly pilferage of US installations in the Zone running well over \$100,000.00, the justification for searching employees could hardly be questioned.

Consolidation of Constabulary units during May of 1947 did not appear to effect the security situation, although reports indicated an increase in petty crime in the areas which had been vacated. Reports up to 30 June 1947, were still inconclusive as to whether or not the Consolidation of troops would be exploited by subversive elements and agitators in order to further their anti-occupational designs.⁴⁴²

Circulation of Rumors.

Circulation of rumors among the indigenous population served to indicate something about the mental attitude of the German people. A number of these rumors concerned the Constabulary and the reactions of the Germans to it and to their own situation as an occupied country. Examples of rumors concerning the Constabulary are quoted in chronological order to give some idea as to the content. The following are typical examples:⁴⁴³

July 1946: "Augsburg. The city will be raided on 4 July by units of the 5th Constabulary Regiment, the CIC and the 9th Infantry Division."

July 1946: "Mainfranken. Constabulary will start a summer offensive against the Russians."

July 1946: "Heidelberg. A German civilian spectator of a "Show of force" in Heidelberg reports the following. "Constabulary Corps was holding a practice road march in strength for a proposed push into the Russian sector."

August 1946: "Pegnitz. The recent "show of force" by Constabulary troopers was really a maneuver in preparation for the coming conflict with the Russians."

August 1946: "According to the German populace in order to qualify for a Constabulary assignment a soldier must first be a gangster. They alleged that when the officers lose control of these troops a reign of terror will result."

August 1946: "Konigshofen. With the change in the Constabulary operating plan on 15 August, civilians along the border said the Americans were preparing to leave Germany for good."

August 1946: "Augsburg. All trooper of the Constabulary in Augsburg and vicinity will move to Fuessen, because the Americans don't like to live near bomb ruins."

October 1946: "Hammelburg. Some of the Civilian Internees in Lager Hammelburg are going to be allowed to join the Constabulary."

October 1946: "Aschaffenburg. The Constabulary is the American SS."

October 1946: "Weiden. The "shows of force" in the vicinity were practice movements for the coming war."

October 1946: "Aschaffenburg. Constabulary Troopers are well disciplined on post but not on pass and not always on patrol."

October 1946: "Schweinfurt. The 27th Constabulary Squadron is moving to Wurzburg in the near future because so much occurs in Wurzburg."

October 1946: "Schweinfurt. At approximately 2000 hours 13 October an announcement came from AFN for all men of the 14th Constabulary Regiment to report to their billets immediately."

October 1946: "Stuttgart. The notice by the US Constabulary in the local newspapers that all American men from 18 to 47 have to report for registration is regarded as a preparation for war."

October 1946: "Oberstdorf. The US Constabulary had been stopping cars at check points by shooting at tires."

October 1946: "Selbitz. A unit of the Constabulary will be placed here."

October 1946: "Elsenfeld. US Constabulary will leave Germany 1 January 1947".

November 1946: "Schwabach. The 57th Constabulary Squadron is going to take over control of the Furth-Nurnberg Enclave now that the trials are finished."

December 1946: "Bamberg. Headquarters US Constabulary is going to move to Heidelberg before the end of February."

December 1946: "Augsburg. About 1000 Constabulary Troopers will soon conduct a raid here."

December 1946: "Lauterbach. Russians attacked Constabulary in the vicinity of Vacha on 8 December 1946, but were thrown back. Third Con-

stabulary Regiment responded by sending 48 tanks to the border." (Note: It is believed this rumor was spread by colored troops, and coincides with a road march made in the area by a light tank troop.)

December 1946: "Neuberg. Potatoes are being collected in the Landkreis with the help of Constabulary trucks, and being sent to the United States for the people who are starving because of the strikes and inflations."

January 1947: "Gersthofen. When the Constabulary leaves Gablingen Air Base, DPs will be moved in."

January 1947: "Kitzingen. The Constabulary will fold up within a year due to inefficient operations."

January 1947: "A force of 25,000 Russian soldiers consisting of Infantry and Armored Troops, have moved up within 58 kilometers of the 81st Constabulary Squadron's border. The exact point is unknown."

January 1947: "Eamberg. There will be some drastic changes in personnel on the consolidation of Headquarters of TUSA and the US Constabulary upon the move to Heidelberg."

February 1947: "LK Lohr. The Constabulary is decreasing and will break up in June."

February 1947: "LK Bayreuth. Coincident with the change in the zonal administrative areas and the moving of the 6th Regiment, the rumor has started that the occupation zone would also be changed and that Russian soldiers were moving in to occupy the vacated Regimental area. The present Russian-American border was to be moved at least 50 miles south of its present position."

March 1947: "Fussen. Three crack infantry divisions are to replace the Constabulary."

March 1947: "The Americans have moved their Constabulary Headquarters to Heidelberg because they want to be far from the Russian Border when war comes against Russia in the near future."

April 1947: "Bad Reichenhall Constabulary and other US Occupation forces were alerted on 24 March to prepare for war."

April 1947: "Waidhause. Constabulary will be discontinued or withdrawn. (9th Constabulary Squadron is of the opinion this rumor has been started and given impetus by the fact that, in the exchange of troops on the border, groups of one platoon or less have been relieving units of much greater strength.)

April 1947: "Regensburg. The Constabulary forces, now greatly understrength, will further be reduced by the elimination of two troops per squadron. The 25th Squadron will be deactivated and all remaining per-

sonnel will be distributed among the other squadrons of the regiment."

April 1947: "Weiden. At several places throughout the Zone, the Constabulary is mistreating Jewish DPs. (94th Squadron reports that this rumor is causing considerable elation.)

May 1947: "Coburg. Constabulary troops are preparing to leave Coburg so that infantry troops may take up strategic positions in preparation for the coming war."

May 1947: "Mannheim. Constabulary is training SS men at the Kaserne in Schwetzingen."

June 1947: "Regensburg. The Constabulary will be deactivated in July and that three Infantry Divisions will come here to take the place of the Constabulary. These divisions are the 3d Division, 2d Inf Division and the 82nd Airborne Division."

June 1947: "Darmstadt. The Constabulary will be dissolved on 1 July 1947."

June 1947: "Augsburg. Constabulary Headquarters will soon move to Augsburg because Heidelberg is to be returned completely to the Germans."

June 1947: "Coburg. The 6th Constabulary Regiment is going to consolidate in Heidelberg."

June 1947: "Coburg. The 6th Constabulary Regiment is going to consolidate in Bamberg. By fall the Constabulary will be dissolved."

June 1947: "LK Marburg. All Regiments are gathering their squadrons like a hen gathers her chicks; the hawk would sooner have it that way, because one swoop and more damage can be done."

Political Activity.

Politics were relegated to a position of secondary importance in the minds of the German populace when compared to the more pressing personal problems of providing food, fuel, and clothing. Military Government for Greater Hesse, in compiling statistics of an election, the lowest turnout registered in any one city. Paradoxically enough, voting in the country and smaller communities averaged a 10% higher turnout of eligible voters than was recorded in the cities. One reason for this is to be found in the fact that the people in outlying communities, as contrasted to those within urban centers, were generally better

provided with the necessities of life and had more time to devote to the consideration of political issues.⁴⁴⁴

Of the various political leaders to emerge on the political scene, only Doctor Schumacher, head of the Social Democratic Party for Western Germany, was able to arouse the phlegmatic thinking of the German populace. A former German Army officer accounted for Schumacher's popularity by saying: "I do not care to vote for any party, because a party means nothing to me. But here is a man whom I can see, to whom I can listen, and whose past I can check. If I could vote for him personally, I would do it now." Another reason for the popularity of Dr. Schumacher in the German mind is to be found in his critical evaluation of occupation policies and his statement, "Total victory means total responsibility." While utterly fallacious from an objective view point, this phrase coined by Schumacher struck a responsive chord in German thinking, which aided his popularity in the minds of a rather credulous people.⁴⁴⁵

In the political field the activities of the Communist parties continued to hold the center of the stage. The primary aim of these parties was to affect a merger in order that the Communists could present a united workers front in the four occupied zones. Activities of the Communists in the past were extensive, with their efforts directed to the dissemination of propaganda, the exploitation of disaffected groups, and adverse criticism of officials holding political offices. The KPD and the SED continued to make merger plans in spite of the fact that Military Government had not approved the formation of an American Zone SED. United States Forces found themselves between two fires as to subversive activities. It is the states policy of the Communist to discredit the government in power; at the same time the Nazis are discontented, hate the Communists, and the Occupation Forces. Hence, it

is entirely possible that each faction will indulge in subversion and attempt to lay the blame at the door of the other. ⁴⁴⁶

As a result of serious food shortages throughout the zone, a serious theft and pilferage situation developed in the transportation of supplies by railroad. With the specter of famine hovering over a devastated Reich, food supplies, whether shipped by rail or road, became primary objectives of lawless elements throughout the Zone. Pilferage in Mannheim was on a major scale and positive action was taken to curtail it as much as possible. A report that \$1,500,000 worth of supplies had been pilfered from Mannheim during 1946 could not be substantiated. It was known, however, that approximately \$192,000 in goods were pilfered during 1946, and that up until May 1947, \$200,000 in goods had been stolen from supply installations in Mannheim. This figure did not include losses totalling approximately \$958,000 for 1946 and \$68,000 up until May 1947, for supplies pilfered in transit. ⁴⁴⁷

Vigorous action was taken to reduce the pilferage loss, including the placement of critical areas "off limits" and the augmentation of Military Police patrols by German civilian police and Polish civilian guards. A Constabulary guard was placed in Mannheim in March 1947 to assist in the anti-pilferage program. Consolidation of troops was effected and will be further effected when two additional kasernes have been rehabilitated. Supply installations intensified their methods for detecting and reporting pilferage, and security conferences were held each Friday for Sub-Post Commanders. Crowded conditions existed in both Karlsruhe and Mannheim. The Karlsruhe situation was eased somewhat when the 7748th Field Intelligence Agency Technical was disbanded. The city of Mannheim was considered to be overcrowded with two types of installations contributing to this condition, namely sup-

ply installations and displaced persons camps. Additional reasons for excess pilferage included unsatisfactory indigenous German guards, and the lack of sufficient shakedown personnel, to include matrons, at exit gates.⁴⁴⁸

The critical food shortage assumed a position of paramount importance in the eyes of the German people. The public remained divided in its opinion as to the advisability of resorting to strikes or demonstrations to indicate their dissatisfaction with the food situation. Some, believing that Germany would only sink deeper by work stoppages, and in addition lose the good will of the occupying powers, are firmly against strikes or other demonstrations as a solution to the problem. Others are of the opinion that strikes and demonstrations will have a favorable effect in that they will induce America to increase food shipments into Germany. Undercurrents, agitation, and debate continue in the working class and although they may not take any action, the balance between the pro-strike elements and anti-strike elements is extremely fine.⁴⁴⁹

There were indications that the German was taking advantage of one principle of democracy, at least - that of freedom of speech. Reticence as to complaints and opinions, strikingly evident shortly after the war, could no longer be considered a trait of the Germans, particularly in their own politics. A general belief exists that economic reconstruction should precede political indoctrination of Germany as it is not considered likely that Germans will accept a form of government associated with adverse economic conditions.⁴⁵⁰

Chapter 11
PEOPLE IN THE U.S. ZONE

Any attempt to discuss the occupation of the U.S. Zone in Germany by U.S. Forces, or the operation of the Constabulary as a part of these forces, must be projected against the economic, political, sociological, geographical, and historical background of the people inhabiting the zone. The following discussions are an attempt to summarize the attitudes of the German population, and the Displaced Persons toward the occupational authorities, the economic situation, and the various ideologies with which they are confronted.

The mood of the population, during the winter months of 1947 was resigned but somewhat hopeful. The Germans, even when they sat in the midst of winter in their unheated homes over their potato meals, had not appeared to have lost hope altogether. Spring would come soon, the rivers would become passable again, the United States would help, industry would be revived, and suffering finally would end. Spring did come, but the blue skies and the green meadows were not sufficient to compensate the people from their hunger. Resignation slowly gave way to an ugly mood and bitter resentment. The Germans, as they tightened their belts, saw only a hopeless future full of hunger and despair.⁴⁵¹

The German Population.

Critical food shortages remained the most serious aspect of the economic situation and the attitude of the population was one of bitterness, hopelessness and despair. Although no immediate alleviation of the food situation was seen by the Germans, no acts of violence or serious disturbances were reported in the U.S. Zone of Occupation during the year beginning 1

July 1946. Refusal of Military Government in Bremerhaven to allow a demonstration in protest of the food situation, was accepted resentfully by the workers who felt there was no just cause in prohibiting a demonstration directed against officials of the German food administration. Only two minor, temporary work stoppages at factories in Stuttgart occurred, however the potentiality existed for more serious demonstrations. With the advent of the summer of 1947 and subsequent ripening of crops, night pilferages from the fields registered a steady increase and led to the organization of vigilante committees to protect the crops. Although the general feeling of the German people was one of depression, radio and press notices of arriving food cargoes from the United States had a decided effect in counteracting the restlessness of the populace. The following composite report is representative of the situation:

The Day Office Frankfurt stated that food stocks had fallen to a very low level and that the average German could obtain only about fifty percent of the food allotted him on his ration card. The Military Government announcement that additional supplementary food would not be available for three or four weeks caused persistent talk and shisper campaigns of hunger strikes and demonstrations. Although the official daily ration was set at 1550 calories, in Landkreis Stadtsteinach the average daily meal consumption was alleged to be approximately 650 per person. In Berlin, complaints were received daily that the daily ration was actually less at the present time than during any previous ration period. Farmers in all areas were besieged by city dwellers who sought part of the farmers hoarded food to supplement their rations. The farmers were not interested in trading their products for clothing, cigarettes and chocolate, but were demanding nails, seed, and building

materials. The receipt of American seed potatoes by German farmers was gratefully welcomed but the majority of Germans continued to regard American shipments of food as a right rather than a gesture on the part of the American Government. Secondary causes for the low morale and pessimism was the black market economy, international turmoil, retention of German Prisoners of War by certain allied powers, and denazification procedures.⁴⁵²

On 25 April 1947, Dr. Sticler, CDU Landrat of Kreis Fulda, said in a speech: "The people are comparing the present situation with the 30 year war. Never before has the question been raised by the survivors of a war whether life was still worth living or whether one could dare to bring children into this world. The words of the Lords Prayer, "Give us this day our daily bread", for the first time held real meaning for most people!" American observers and German investigators reported that conversations, regardless of what subject initially was discussed, wherever the conversation was started, regardless of the social standing or the position of the respondents, all finally ended with a discussion of the food problem."⁴⁵³

Conflicting Newspaper Reports.

Contradictory press reports, conflicting statements by responsible officials, all served to increase the feeling of hopelessness. Those who cared to read the papers found little comfort. The Military Government sponsored Neue Zeitung of 21 April, in an article entitled, "Less Bread and Fat", told the German people what to expect. Other news only served to increase the apprehension. Minister President Stock stated at a recent press conference that the next two weeks would be the worst and that from the beginning of May the population would have to rely on American aid exclusively. Reassuring statements followed. On 21 April 1947, Dr. Hermann Dietrich, Bizonal

Food Chief, stated in a radio address that there was no cause for worry. Hesses Food Office Chief, Dr. Dietz, in a press conference on 23 April, attempted to reassure the population that the news that there would be only 4,000 grams of bread available in the 101st ration period was wrong. The effect of these utterances was practically nil. A Dana report quoted Dr. Dietz as having stated in the same radio address: "For the time being only 6,000 grams of bread will be issued in the 101st ration period." The Frankfurter Rundschau of 22 April, in addition to this Dana dispatch, quoted a report from the US Zone Food and Agriculture Board to the effect that 10,000 grams of bread would be distributed in the coming ration period. The Neue Zeitung of 21 April had previously carried a report which indicated that only 4,000 grams of bread would be called up. Clearly, little comfort could be derived from a reading of the papers. If anything, the conflicting stories created a "nothing has changed you can't believe what you read in the papers" attitude."454

Casting about for scapegoats, expellees and the urban population tended to burden the farmer with a goodly share of the blame. Charges of exploitation, of the desire to grow rich on the city dwellers plight, of cooperating with black marketeers and traffickers rather than doing his civic duty for the general welfare, were heard everywhere. Not even the proposal of labor conscription ofr agricultural work assuaged the disgruntled urbanites, many of whom bitterly commented that this measure would only increase the privileged group of "self suppliers". The draftees would eat more than they would, or could produce.

But the farmer was not the only butt of irate criticism. The German administration came in for its share of negative comment. Administrative in-

eptness, stupidity, mismanagement and corruption were the epithets most frequently applied to the Germans. But the most disturbing trend was the increasing inclination of the population to put the blame squarely on the shoulders of the occupation authorities. Here the range of epithets was wider. Not only were the occupation powers accused of mismanagement and errors in administrative judgement, but they were also accused of a policy which with outwardly conciliatory statements, promises of aid and assurance of goodwill and friendship, in reality aimed at the complete destruction of the German people. This alleged policy of annihilation was often attributed to a lust for revenge.

Certainly such policy was mainly ascribed to Germany's Continental neighbors, but to an increasing extent the Anglo-Saxon powers were accused of following suit. The Anglo-Saxon powers were not often accused of being motivated by a lust for revenge or the desire for security. They were charged with attempting to eliminate an efficient competitor from the world markets. In the eyes of many Germans the motives of revenge and security appeared more brutal, but on the otherhand, more understandable, the motive of eliminating a competitor although it seemed less vindictive, appeared more vicious.⁴⁵⁵

To say that only "fools and knaves" would utter such statements is to ignore the real situation. People with a wide intellectual horizon and a balanced enough view to objectively assess conditions were few and far between in an amorphous mass which by tradition, by a 12 year conditioning process to empty verbal symbols of Nazism, and by the very fact of their empty stomachs, were not inclined to adopt objective views. All ICD outposts reported that conversations indicated a popular disbelief in the existence of shortages in other countries, or, for that matter, in the entire world.

The housewife, the worker, the small artisan, argued that neither the world nor the fields had become smaller, on the contrary, millions of people had died, there ought to be a surplus of food! Germans usually commented caustically on American promises of aid and tended to discount the news of arrival of large food shipments in the North German ports. The man on the street added up the newspaper announcements of food shipments, and the fact that the transportation bottleneck had been unsnarled. They pointed to their empty shelves and the unused portions of their ration tickets. "Where, then, is the food?" they asked of the occupation authorities, "And why aren't we permitted to import food from our former suppliers who surely must be anxious to export again?" Bitter comments were also heard about what the Germans claim is the inclination of the United States to disregard their promises. "Haven't responsible American leaders assured us that the food situation would improve?" "How can we believe in American goodwill if none of the promises are being kept?" This feeling of bitterness was increased by the widespread conviction that the Americans failed to deliver because of a sheer "inhuman neglect" to share their "unlimited supplies". In short, the Germans were inclined to pass over their own responsibilities and to forget the underlying causes for the food shortages. They were prone to place the whole responsibility with the Americans who, "as the occupying power, had assumed the moral and economic responsibility for Germany's fate".⁴⁵⁶

Political Aspects.

Activities of the various political parties in the United States Zone led to a number of incidents and situations containing security significance. The militant KPD, Communist Party, carried on vociferous attacks upon the policies of the western powers and initiated attempts to establish the Socialists Unity Party, in the American Zone of Occupation. Determined efforts of

Socialist Party, to nullify these activities were in evidence throughout the zone. There were some indications that the SPD accepted former Nazis in order to strengthen the anti-communist elements within the party.

The primary development in anti-Communist activities of the SPD was the zone wide "PW aid program" which agitated against the lack of proper communications between Soviet-held prisoners and their families and for the return of these PW's to Germany. SPD speakers were quoting figures taken from a Soviet licensed statistical journal to prove that the number of PW's still in the USSR must be between two and three million men. The program spotlighted this weakness in the KPD/SED position and strengthened the SPD's position with the working class.⁴⁵⁷

The extremely active KPD dominated the political scene. In addition to renewed activities for setting up the Soviet controlled SED on a legal status in the US Zone, there were further indications that the German Communists were attempting to overcome the democratic influence in Germany. Two reports indicated a possible split in the Communist party in the United States Zone; specifically, some Communists resented the Soviet dictatorship of the party and favored a German form of Communism. The main activity of the Social Democrats apparently was directed toward counteracting the efforts of the KPD. Many political developments were centered around control of the German Trade Unions.

Steadily increasing tension was noted between the pro-Moscow Communists and the so-called German Nationalists Communists in the Marburg area. Many of the Communists, particularly the old KPD members, criticized and even rejected Soviet policies and control. These older members wished to have an independent communism adapted to German customs and conditions rather than

a forced domination by the Soviet policies and control. These older members wished to have an independent communism adapted to German customs and conditions rather than a forced domination by the Soviets. They severely criticized conditions in the Soviet Zone, the deportation of German manpower to the USSR, the treatment of refugees and of German PW's, and the loss of Eastern German territories. At a meeting of the KPD in Weilheim, there was evidence of much friction between these members who favor a Soviet-controlled KPD and those who want the KPD to remain independent.⁴⁵⁸

The KPD agitated over the food situation in the US Zone. An example of this Communist propaganda was the Badische Volksecho, the Communist weekly published in Mannheim, which on 15 May 1947 printed the following headlines for articles; "Hunger in all Streets", "The Saboteurs of the Food Amnesty in the West", "Abolish the Bureaucratic Food Administration", and "Growing Indignation of the Workers". At a KPD meeting in Murnberg, the speaker made charges of chaotic conditions prevailing in the Western Zones, where "reactionary elements" are holding influential government administrative positions, whereas the Soviet zone had become self-sufficient with a favorable food situation because large land holdings were distributed among the small farmers who had greatly increased agricultural production. In Berlin, the SED has propagandized against the CAREE packages, which were termed "practically nothing but cardboard".⁴⁵⁹

It was reported from Landau in May 1947 that the local KPD had ordered its members and their wives to join the newly organized German Free Trade Union for the purpose of securing greater influence in the Union. In the Mannheim and Heidelberg areas, the KPD carried on a vigorous recruiting program among youth groups. The young Communist members were continually urged by their leaders to infiltrate the youth movements and to disseminate Com-

minist propaganda. The KPD in Juelshofen and Fuessen reportedly conducted extensive Communist propagandizing among refugees, who were solicited to sign a circular letter requesting a KPD inspired "Law for the Final Solution of the Refugee Problem in Bavaria."⁴⁶⁰

Criticism of the American occupation authorities became sharper. CDU deputy Stieler repeated the phrase coined by SPD leader Schumacher that "total victory meant total responsibility." He accused the United States of destroying 100,900 hundred weights of potatoes to maintain the US price structure and the authorities in the Eastern Zone of Germany of using two million hundred weights of potatoes in the production of spirits.

German leaders, with the exception of the Communists, were fearful that the continued food shortages might further the causes of Communism in the Western zones. Many observers cited the election results in the British Zone as a clear example of the apathy of the people. Kassel LDP chairman Catta said: "The low election participation is really a demonstration against the misery and the state of hopelessness everywhere." These leaders were not looking into the future with hopeful eyes. Minister of Labor Arndgen (CDU) predicted that should the next winter not be better than the last "we all shall hang." Most political leaders felt that a recovery of Germany was basically a question of production and that this question could not be solved without further "support" from the United States. Should the situation not improve, anything was likely to happen. Said one of the most progressive political leaders: "An apathetic and hopeless people could easily fall prey to the arguments of radical leaders offering solutions."⁴⁶¹


German Youth Activities.

During the demilitarization period the Allied Control Council directed that; sports and military athletic organizations be dissolved by 1 January

1946, prohibited the conduct and development of all military athletics in educational institutions, and prohibited all youth activities above the level of the Land Kreis. On 1 April 1946, the Office of Military Government initiated a new youth activity program. Active encouragement was to be given to the formation of voluntary groups of young people for cultural, religious, and recreational purposes. This program had as its objective the constructive use of leisure time and the successful development of democracy in terms of ideas, initiative, responsibility, and the practice of democratic procedures. Activities of a military nature were definitely prohibited while no uniforms or emblems were to be worn without the approval of the Land Office of Military Government.¹⁶² On 15 April 1946, General MCNARNEY, European Theater Commander, expressed the desire that the program be extended by all practical means. He specified that the Youth Committees would be placed under the supervision of the Education Section, Internal Affairs Division, of the Offices of the directors of Military Lander, and each Land Office was directed to obtain the services of two individuals, either officers or civilians, to assist German officials and Youth Committees. Major commands were directed to assign a mature, qualified officer whose sole duty would be to establish and maintain liaison with the Education Section of the Land or Lander Offices of the Military Government and to assist them and the Youth Committee in the organization and activities of the youth groups. Local commanders were directed to survey existing athletic and recreational facilities in their areas with a view toward making these facilities available to the youth groups on a part time basis. They were encouraged to take an active part in assisting the German Youth Committees working in their areas, even to the extent of using qualified military personnel to participate in the program in order to demonstrate the application of the highest demo-



Transportation —



Equipment —



And Personnel ---



Combined to Make GIA a Success

cratic ideals to German Youth.⁴⁶³

During the Summer Session of the Theater Athletic School, held in Stuttgart in June 1946, demonstrations of games, coaching methods, and actual participation in athletic contests were afforded German youths by the school faculty. This activity was conducted in the late afternoon several times a week. The enthusiastic response of German youth and sports leaders to this program clearly indicated the desirability of sponsoring similar schools throughout the US Zone with recommendations from General McNARNEY that all youth activities within a major command be coordinated by the Senior Commander present.⁴⁶⁴

On 6 August 1946, Major General ERNEST N. HARMON directed that all Constabulary Commanders of Brigades, Regiments, and Squadrons take immediate steps to organize athletic schools or clinics for German children. It was recommended that those sports for which there was adequate Class X and surplus equipment available, such as softball and volleyball, be emphasized. General HARMON also indicated that every effort should be made to select personnel interested in, and capable of conducting this program.⁴⁶⁵

Headquarters, United States Constabulary, on 8 August 1946 issued instructions as to the number and grade of personnel to be assigned to the German Youth Activity program. Brigades were to provide one full-time field officer and at least two full-time non-commissioned officers. At regimental level one officer was to be designated as GYA Officer in addition to his other duties while one senior non-commissioned officer would serve as a full time assistant. Squadrons and troops were to be represented by full-time non-commissioned officers with one officer in the squadron as GYA Officer in addition to his other duties. At a conference of Brigade, and Regimental

GYA officers, means and methods of carrying out instructions of higher headquarters in regard to GYA programs, and in the rendition of reports, were discussed at great length. Conferences were held on regimental level for troop and squadron GYA personnel during the period 3-5 September 1946.⁴⁶⁶

In order to facilitate compliance with current directives within the commands, Constabulary Headquarters published a directive on 11 September 1946, giving instructions on the implementation of the GYA program, stating specific requirements and duties of unit commanders, GYA officers, and GYA non-commissioned officers. GYA personnel were directed to maintain liaison with their respective Military Government Youth Representatives and to meet with the Kreis Youth Committees in order to acquaint these local Youth Committees with the available Army assistance. Each troop was directed to establish and conduct a sports clinic if there was not one in operation in their respective area. Youth Centers were to be established in as many towns as possible. Each squadron was to have at least one Youth Center operating by the end of September. All squadrons were directed to establish a tent camp in order to facilitate the GYA activity in the area. Local School Principals were to be contacted in order to obtain their cooperation and assistance in regard to out-of-school activities and sport classes held inside the school buildings. The success of the GYA program depended largely upon the action and wholesome participation of the individual soldier. Every effort was put forth to publicize the GYA.⁴⁶⁷

GYA Activities Among Constabulary Units.

The problem of promoting the German Youth Activities program was aggressively carried out by the various Constabulary units. Despite the many problems which arose results were generally noteworthy primarily as a result of active participation by Constabulary troopers and personnel assigned as GYA

representatives.

For the most part, assigned personnel were screened in an effort to obtain suitable and qualified personnel who would not be lost through early re-deployment. Field grade officers and non-commissioned officers were assigned on brigade and regimental levels as full time GYA representatives. An officer and a non-commissioned officer were assigned to full time duty in each squadron, while troops employed a full time non-commissioned officer and officers participated on a part time basis.⁴⁶⁸

A number of major and general problems were incurred which served as a deterrent to planning and progress in GYA activities. These problems included: The securing of appropriate and interested personnel who were not preoccupied with other duties. Replacement by more capable personnel and considerable efforts through I & E lectures, posters, and personnel contacts aided no little in overcoming the above mentioned difficulties; A lack of supplies hampered the execution of the GYA program. Considerable SSO equipment was used by youth clubs, troop sponsored athletic clinics, youth centers, and informal gatherings. All equipment that could be issued was placed at the disposal of GYA personnel and was rotated among the various activities in order to provide all groups with sufficient facilities; The greatest difficulty to the efficient operation of the GYA was the non-availability of transportation for the full time use of GYA personnel at regimental, squadron, and troop level. Pending any authorization for transportation of GYA personnel, a USFET directive provided for the utilization of government motor vehicles in connection with the implementation of the program, provided such use did not conflict unduly with military requirements; Additional general problems were met by constant and close liaison with Military Government in establishing

better youth committees, providing indoor locations for winter activities, and exerting all possible effort in directing the use of small contributions of food and clothing for children. Accomplishments were reflected in the number of groups or clubs and clinics formed and the number of youths who actively participated in the various Kinderfests, athletic schools, tent camps, and youth centers.⁴⁶⁹

It was found that in order to successfully carry out the program of Army assistance to GYA, material things and actions had to be used as leverage to pave the way for reeducating the German Youth in the ideals of democracy. Reconstruction materials, athletic equipment, films, books, housing, and transportation were required in order that centers of influence might be established. The mission of Constabulary personnel required assistance, direction, and interest to keep the program active and effective.

The German Youth Program gained impetus during October 1946. In teaching democracy to German youths, the Constabulary trooper proved the sincerity of American policy. During October a total of 329,750 German youths participated in and benefited from the program. Through the cooperation of the Theater Special Service, progress was made in handicraft activities for German youth.⁴⁷⁰

Following a policy of positive action in bringing Army assistance to German Youth, forums, youth centers, boy and Girl scout organizations, athletic facilities, Christmas parties, and transportation to activities were the main techniques developed. American women were encouraged to participate in the Youth Program and for the most part their response was very gratifying. German Youth Activities were stressed through the troop information programs at all levels. A stumbling block to the program was to be

found in rapid redeployment, and the lack of mature non-commissioned officers. To solve this problem, increased efforts were made to interest qualified personnel in participating on a part time or voluntary basis and to encourage squadron and troop commanders to make this type of personnel available.⁴⁷¹

A training school was proposed as a material aid in preparing assigned personnel for more efficient and effective execution of the program. Shortage of transportation facilities, conservation of coal, gasoline, and electricity retarded winter activities, but as many youth centers with maximum attendance as possible were maintained. Christmas parties for German youth proved to be distinct success. Because of a reduction in the number of sports clinics and kinderfests, it was noted that troop interest declined proportionately. It was expected at this time that interest in the GYA program would revive with the advent of spring. It was learned that the Germans must help themselves as much as possible during the winter months in maintaining constructive Youth Programs.⁴⁷²

GYA Conference at Assmanshausen.

A conference was held at Assmanshausen 15-17 April 1947 by Military Government for Greater Hesse, and attended by both Germans and Americans. Its purpose was to improve the functioning of the Kreis Youth Committees and to clarify the summer camp program. The main result attained was a better understanding of the aims, abilities, and limitations of the German Youth Program. A very important and far reaching development announced at the conference was the change in Military Government Regulations which changed the scope of the youth program from the 10-18 year youth to the 16-25 year olds. This change allowed political parties to sponsor and finance youth groups, although they were not "to dominate" these groups.⁴⁷³

It was estimated by Military Government officials that the change in age limits would make an additional 650,000 youths available to the GYA Program. Constabulary facilities for implementing the GYA were inadequate before this change was announced and it was expected that they would be further strained by the addition of the 10-25 year group.

The financing and sponsoring of youth groups by political parties introduced politics into some youth organizations. Constabulary regarded this as being highly undesirable as the purpose of the GYA was to assist German youth without regard to race, religion, or political belief, and every effort had been made to avoid controversial discussions, particularly those involving political subjects.

A EUCOM directive issued 8 April 1947, defined and clarified responsibility for German Youth Activities under the military district and post organizations. Commanders of all units were responsible for the conduct of programs of Army Assistance to German Youth Activities in their respective units. Commanders of Operational Commands (US Constabulary and US Air Forces in Europe) were charged with the responsibility for efficiency, effectiveness, and completeness of the program for Army Assistance to German Youth Activities within their districts, and post commanders were charged with a similar responsibility within their posts.⁴⁷⁴

Establishment of Civic Centers.

A directive requiring the establishment of civic centers in all posts and sub-posts of the second Military District was issued on 23 April 1947. Immediate action was required since Military Government had established a deadline of 1 May 1947, after which no more real estate was to be requisitioned from the Germany economy. It was required that the civic centers be

established on an ambitious scale, and provide facilities for both boys and girls, have adequate athletic facilities, and be suitable to house such civic activities as the town cares to have. This requirement for civic centers marked a significant advance in the GYA program. It was a definite bid for the cooperation of German adults in the program. It was intended or designed to draw into the civic program not only German parents but also outstanding German business men and civic leaders.⁴⁷⁵

The first two "Civic Centers" in the US Zone were dedicated 3 June 1947 in Fulda and Heidelberg,

In Heidelberg, when the former enlisted PX building was officially turned over to the boys and girls, Brig. Gen. PHILLIP E. GALLAGHER, deputy commander of the Second Military District, made the chief address. He told the gathering of Americans and Germans: "The dedication of the Heidelberg Civic Center marks an important advance in the desire of the US Army and Military Government to cooperate with German parents, school officials, and civic leaders in improving the welfare of the youth of Germany." He emphasized the fact that "this is not an Army or American program. It is an effort on the part of the Army and American people to cooperate with and assist these people of the German nation who truly desire that the children and youth of their land be given an opportunity to develop under influence that will lead to a happier and freer life for themselves and building of a nation which respects and protects the rights of all its neighbors."⁴⁷⁶

In order to disseminate information received from EUCOM and to issue instructions on dancing in GYA installations, a directive covering the following was issued 28 April 1947 in Circular 91. Instructions from EUCOM required that Army Assistance to German Youth camp projects be as extensive as possible without jeopardizing the occupational mission. No Army unit was

permitted to sponsor a full time camping project unless assurance was given in writing by Military Government officials that such a camp was considered to be necessary in addition to the program planned by the local youth committee. LUCOM directed that in order to assure full utilization of captured enemy material a statement in writing of a Military Government officer to the effect that the required supplies were not available from CEM stocks must accompany all requirements for Army supplies to be used in the GYA program. Because of adverse comments by Germans on the dancing programs sponsored by GYA, a circular was published prohibiting all dancing under auspices of GYA unless such events were organized, attended, and supervised by GYA officials, German parents were invited to each dance so held.⁴⁷⁷

In a conference designed to further coordinate Army assistance to GYA, approximately 60 GYA officers from all posts in the Second Military District and from each Constabulary unit in the U.S. Zone down to squadron level, as well as Military Government officials from the three landers, Bavaria, Hesse, and Wurttemberg-Baden, met on 13 June 1947, at Heidelberg Civic Center. The conference was held for the purpose of discussing directives governing the GYA program, orientation of GYA officers, and to observe the GYA facilities of the Heidelberg Military Post.⁴⁷⁸

The Problem of Displaced Persons.

The Displaced Persons population of the US Zone Totalled 364,741 on 1 July 1946 and decreased to 324,526 by 30 June 1947. The task of maintaining law and order among these people fell to the Constabulary as the German police exercised no jurisdiction over them. These unfortunate people posed a problem which the Constabulary in the role of a law enforcement agency attempted to meet with understanding and sympathy while at the same time maintain-

ing firmness concerning lawless activities on the part of an active minority. Large numbers of displaced persons could not be repatriated to their homelands for political reasons and continued to live in Germany until plans to resettle them in other countries could be made. Although the majority of displaced persons were in Germany as a result of the activities of German War leaders their presence was resented by the indigenous population because a portion of their food had to be supplied by the German economy and because of nationalistic sentiment.⁴⁷⁹

With the exception of the Jews, the Poles were the most numerous group, they were hated by the indigenous population, and were generally opposed to the current Polish government. Their efforts were largely directed toward emigration to other countries where opportunities for resettlement could be found. They attempted to solve their problems along peaceful lines and have generally presented no problems, except in connection with efforts to repatriate them to Poland.⁴⁸⁰

The Balts, including the Lithuanians, Letts, and Estonians were almost unanimous in their opposition to repatriation to their homelands. This is traced to the fact that these three nations were overrun by the Soviet Union prior to the war between the Soviets and Germany, and they hoped to regain lost sovereignty. Many of these people helped Germany in Her war against the Soviet with the hope that Germany would restore their national existence.⁴⁸¹

The Ukrainians and the Anti-Soviet Russians presented a peculiar problem in that they place US Authorities in the position of harboring the enemies of a friendly government. These people were thoroughly divided by racial, political, and religious antagonisms and there was little indication of cohesive action on their part. Their activities were aimed at finding emigra-

tion opportunities abroad, and in this prusuit were aided by remmnants of the Russian Orthodox Clergy.⁴⁸²

The Rumanians, Hungarians, and Czechoslovakians living on a displaced Persons status presented a problem in that they were all opposed to the present government of their homelands. The Hungarians generally fled before the Red Army's advance through Hungary and appeared to prefer internment in Germany to residence in a Soviet dominated homeland. This group was generally quiescent, realizing that they were former enemies of the Allies and had no claim on their bounty. The Rumanians were also opposed to the curren regime in their homeland and resisted efforts at repatriation. Czechoslovakian displaced persons were generally opposed to the Soviet oriented government in their homeland and bent their efforts toward organizing Slovaks and Sudetten Germans in opposition to the present government with the promise that success would result in the restoration of the property of the Sudettens and readmission into Czechoslovakia.⁴⁸³

The Jews of course presented a many sided problem. Hated by the Germans, and returning this hate in full, no opportunity existed for the absorption of these people into German economy. Many of them desired to emigrate to Palestine and exerted every effort toward illegal means of accomplsihing their mission. Efforts to resettle them in other nations were sometimes opposed by the Jews themselves, thus resulting in an impasse. The problem of the Jewish Displaced Persons was the most critical problem of the kind with which Constabulary had to contend in the role of a law enforcing agency.⁴⁸⁴

Prior to movement of Constabulary Headquarters to Heidelberg on 15 February 1947, the Constabulary had had no responsibility for the administration of the affairs of the Displaced Persons residing in the United States Zone. When the US Constabulary assumed the residual duties of Third United

States Army it also assumed the Third Army responsibility for Displaced Persons. The former G-5 Section of Third Army was reorganized as the 7750th Displaced Persons Operating Group under the command of the Third Army G-5, Brigadier General ROBINSON E. DUFF. This organization operated under the supervision of Constabulary Headquarters from 15 February to 15 March 1947, when it became a theater agency directly responsible to G-5 of European Command. On 15 March a G-5 Section was established in Constabulary Headquarters headed by Lieutenant Colonel Smauel L. Morrow Jr., who was announced as G-5 on 21 March 1947. The G-5 Section of Constabulary was established for the primary purpose of administering Displaced Persons affairs in the Second Military District for which Constabulary Headquarters was the coordinating headquarters. In addition, the G-5 Section served in an advisory capacity to the Commanding General on G-5 matters which concerned the Constabulary throughout the United States Zone.⁴⁸⁵

Plans for the Manufacture of Clothing by Displaced Persons.

During the second half of February plans were drawn up in conjunction with UNRRA for the supply and operation of in-camp manufacturing clothing. This survey was submitted to UNRRA and then to the 7750th Displaced Persons Operating Group for approval.

After the project had been approved, material was issued to the camp to make supplies. The finished samples were returned to the 7750th Displaced Persons Operating Group for inspection as to the workmanship on the garment and suggestions for improvement. Upon approval of the samples, a fifteen day supply of material was issued to the camp. Every two weeks the finished product was turned into the Special Projects Class II and IV Depot, and additional material issued, based on the number of finished articles turned in.⁴⁸⁶

Statement of Constabulary Policy.

Following the use of Constabulary troops in the investigation of a serious crime which occurred in a Landsberg Displaced Persons Camp on or about 13 December 1946, allegations were made that several Jewish displaced persons were mistreated during the course of the investigation. These allegations were reflected in the press and several questions raised as to the relationship between the Constabulary, UNRRA, and Displaced Persons. These allegations resulted in General HARMON issuing a statement on 7 January 1947, making the policy of the US Constabulary clear, with respect to all persons, races, and creeds. It is as follows:⁴⁸⁷

"The Constabulary has a primary mission of furnishing the overall security of the American Zone in Germany and of assisting all established law enforcing agencies in preserving law and order. The Constabulary carries out this mission by a system of established stations, patrolling, and contacts with Military Government and all law enforcing agencies. The Constabulary has the authority to enter any Displaced Persons Camp in pursuit of persons alleged to have committed a serious criminal act."

"The Constabulary also may conduct certain search and seizure operations within any Displaced Persons Camp, under certain regulations prescribed by higher authority. The number of such large scale operations is kept to a minimum and one is only made after careful consideration of all factors in the case and on determination that the results obtained will be commensurate with the difficulty of making the raid and of harassing and upsetting the routine life of the inmates of the Displaced Persons Camp. Relatively few such large scale raids have been made during the 6 months period since the Constabulary has become operational."

"It is the policy of the Constabulary that all raids, seizures, arrests, and interrogations shall be accomplished with justice, decency, and fairness. In every case of alleged brutality and mistreatment, a thorough investigation is made and when such improper conduct has been found to exist, the wrongdoers are subjected to disciplinary action. On the otherhand, it is my policy to thoroughly back up my officers and men when they have executed their duty in a proper manner and to assure that they are not subjected to intimidation on account of seniority of military rank or other pressure."

"As Commanding General of the Constabulary, I know of no opposition on the part of the UNRRA as an organization or of Displaced Persons toward Constabulary, except in the case of certain individuals who are suspected of crime. Whenever investigation shows that such is the case, charges will be brought before courts set up in the Theater competent to act of the case."

"Constabulary troops are continually being oriented and instructed in the proper handling of their difficult mission, the personal integrity of the trooper and the strict performance of the mission with justice is continually being stressed. The Constabulary will continue to carry on its mission without any prejudice to any particular race, color, or creed, without regard to whether its activities are correctly or incorrectly reported, and will continue to endeavor to warrant the respect of all types of people who have to be handled in the performance of its mission by upholding all proper action and promptly punishing any action which is found to be improper after a thorough and impartial investigation."

This statement of policy by General HARMON was designed to make clear to all concerned that the Constabulary played no favorites in the execution of its mission, that it would hold to the line and let the chips fall wherever they might, without any regards to any repercussions in the press.

That the care and treatment given Displaced Persons was good is an acknowledged fact, notwithstanding the complaints and comments of the various groups from time to time that they were being mistreated or discriminated against. The various repatriation and resettlement programs gave thousands the opportunity to return to their homeland or to start life anew in countries that were eager for new manpower resources. The "Sixty Day Food Program" for Polish repatriates and the opportunity for work in Belgium are but examples of the positive action taken to relieve the plight of these victims of Nazism, and thousands of Poles who elected to remain in Germany served with Labor Service Companies under US supervision.⁴⁸⁸

Many who were not entitled to preferential treatment as Displaced Persons sought to take advantage of benefits during the early days when the natural confusion accompanying any such large operation was rampant. These imposters

were weeded out by a screening process which was carried on through all phases of Displaced Persons work. With the passing of UNRRA, the advent of IRO (International Refugee Organization), one era of the DP problem was brought to a successful conclusion.⁴⁸⁹

Change in Policy in Care of Displaced Persons.

During April, Headquarters European Command made an important policy change in the care of Displaced Persons. Effective 21 April, admission to United Nations Displaced Persons Centers was denied to all persons who entered the US Zone of Germany or the US Sector of Berlin after that date, and the only exceptions being those which were specifically directed by Headquarters European Command.⁴⁹⁰

The new policy further provided that United Nations Displaced Persons, or those who had DP status, who on 21 April 1947 were resident outside of assembly centers in the US Zone of Germany or the US sector of Berlin could not be admitted to assembly centers. Exceptions were made where there was evidence of extreme hardship due to disease, injury or other similar factors, or inability of hourly wage earners to secure adequate employment, or where the person concerned was accepted for repatriation or resettlement, had received their exit permits, and were otherwise cleared and were awaiting only transportation for out shipment. Where hardship existed due to disease, injury, or other similar factors, or in cases where an hourly wage earner was not able to secure adequate employment, such persons were admitted to Displaced Persons Assembly Centers when they were otherwise eligible for treatment and when local German welfare agencies were not able to provide care at a level at least equal to that given Germans in similar circumstances.

United Nations Displaced Persons employed in guard and labor service

companies were considered to be in assembly centers, When releases without prejudice, and otherwise eligible for care, they were transferred to assembly centers, while unaccompanied children discovered in the US Zone after the effective date of the order were reported to Headquarters European Command for decision as to disposition. Persons already resident in approved assembly centers prior to 21 April 1947 were not affected by the change in policy.⁴⁹¹

When the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) phased out on 30 June 1947, it was necessary to formulate and start in operation a plan to take over and operate Displaced Persons Camps, for which personnel was lacking. The final plan, as recommended by the Constabulary G-5 Section, called for supplementation of Post S-5 Sections with a total of eight officers and 171 enlisted men. At the end of May the enlisted personnel had been made available, and an agreement reached between G-5 and G-1 for the latter to procure officer personnel in the event that IRO funds for personnel were lacking.⁴⁹²

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Chapter 9

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FOOTNOTES

Chapter 11

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TOTAL PATROLS AND TOTAL MILES

MONTH	Jul 1946	Aug 1946	Sep 1946	Oct 1946	Nov 1946	Dec 1946	Jan 1947	Feb 1947	Mar 1947	Apr 1947	May 1947	Jun 1947	TOTAL
TYPE:													
FOOT - Number	2,122	9,273	8,662	6,081	5,829	5,623	5,256	4,244	4,984	4,889	1,287	522	21,182
Miles Traveled	12,811	74,785	56,680	40,584	59,248	36,762	31,743	29,493	18,266	25,202	5,816	2,192	393,582
HORSE - Number	335	838	1,007	1,467	1,111	770	919	496	571	613	741	556	9,424
Miles Traveled	6,899	10,142	22,408	17,349	15,081	6,079	8,400	6,829	7,204	8,324	8,877	6,663	124,255
VEHICULAR - Number	16,944	23,144	23,132	23,770	20,213	16,542	12,955	7,950	11,984	12,389	6,413	3,730	176,166
Miles Traveled	934,147	1,056,907	1,109,345	926,046	849,886	733,444	481,128	293,653	490,265	530,153	340,947	259,528	8,005,473
MOTORCYCLE - Number	000	1,456	1,742	390	502	360	198	92	393	365	412	463	6,373
Miles Traveled	000	46,100	101,981	33,951	33,275	15,582	5,786	5,325	22,622	28,222	41,188	37,213	371,245
TOTAL PATROLS BY MONTH	19,401	34,711	34,543	28,708	27,655	23,295	19,328	12,782	17,932	18,256	8,853	5,271	250,755
TOTAL MILES BY MONTH	953,857	1,187,934	1,290,414	1,017,930	957,490	791,867	527,057	335,300	533,357	591,901	396,828	305,208	8,894,555

Appendix I

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NUMBER OF INTERIOR PATROLS
AND MILES TRAVELED

TYPE:	Jul 1946	Aug 1946	Sep 1946	Oct 1946	Nov 1946	Dec 1946	Jan 1947	Feb 1947	Mar 1947	Apr 1947	May 1947	Jun 1947	TOTAL
FOOT - Number Miles Traveled	720 1,890	1,205 7,035	903 4,924	828 4,301	765 3,014	1,386 8,643	1,679 8,840	1,358 7,001	2,378 12,306	2,633 15,884	666 3,035	222 1,571	14,770 78,324
HORSE - Number Miles Traveled	50 900	000 000	19 200	000 000	000 000	000 000	000 000	000 000	000 000	16 214	72 720	0000 0000	157 2,034
VEHICULAR - Number Miles Traveled	11,517 767,642	13,835 928,578	15,789 84,296	13,135 680,438	12,203 585,966	11,872 549,833	8,252 321,402	5,045 205,033	8,228 37,503	7,982 37,445	4,742 27,050	2,866 233,022	115,506 6,199,815
MOTORCYCLE - Number Miles Traveled	000 000	1,456 46,100	1,742 101,981	389 33,951	373 16,050	360 15,582	198 5,786	92 5,325	393 22,622	365 28,222	412 41,188	463 37,213	6,243 354,020
TOTAL PATROLS BY MONTH	12,287	16,496	18,453	14,402	13,241	13,618	10,129	6,495	10,989	10,996	5,892	3,551	136,649
TOTAL MILES BY MONTH	770,632	981,713	981,401	713,690	606,570	574,028	346,028	217,389	406,178	441,765	317,993	271,806	6,634,193

NUMBER OF BORDER PATROLS
AND MILES TRAVELED

	Jul 1946	Aug 1946	Sep 1946	Oct 1946	Nov 1946	Dec 1946	Jan 1947	Feb 1947	Mar 1947	Apr 1947	May 1947	Jun 1947	TOTAL
TYPE:													
FOOT - Number	1,402	8,068	7,759	5,235	5,064	4,237	3,577	2,886	2,606	2,256	621	300	44,011
Miles Traveled	10921	67,750	51,756	36,283	56,324	28,119	22,903	22,492	5,860	9,818	2,781	621	315,758
HORSE - Number	285	828	988	1,467	1,111	770	719	496	571	597	669	556	9,057
Miles Traveled	5,999	10,142	22,208	17,349	15,081	6,079	8,400	6,829	7,204	8,110	8,157	6,663	122,221
VEHICULAR - Number	5,427	9,309	7,343	7,585	8,010	4,670	4,703	2,905	3,766	4,407	1,671	1,327	61,123
Miles Traveled	166,305	128,329	235,049	215,608	262,290	183,611	149,726	88,590	119,015	132,708	67,897	63,743	1,842,871
MOTORCYCLE - Number	000	000	000	000	129	000	000	000	000	000	000	000	129
Miles Traveled	000	000	000	000	17,225	000	000	000	000	000	000	000	17,225
TOTAL PATROLS BY MONTH	7,114	18,205	16,090	14,287	14,314	9,677	8,999	6,287	6,943	7,260	2,961	2,183	114,320
TOTAL MILES BY MONTH	190,339	206,221	309,013	299,240	370,920	217,839	181,029	117,911	132,179	150,636	78,835	71,027	2,305,189

Appendix 3.

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ESTABLISHMENT OF ROAD BLOCKS.

MONTH	Jul 1946	Aug 1946	Sep 1946	Oct 1946	Nov 1946	Dec 1946	Jan 1947	Feb 1947	Mar 1947	Apr 1947	May 1947	Jun 1947	TOTAL
Number of Road Blocks Established	11,665	13,003	14,281	16,013	15,966	14,611	1,342	8,585	12,475	11,127	9,669	6,453	135,122
Number of Speed Traps Operated	517	1,755	1,406	1,137	770	633	310	411	498	1,352	1,145	546	10,480
Mobile Summary Court Martial:													
Number of Traffic Cases Tried	000	924	1,422	765	801	654	306	262	610	743	522	247	7,256
Number of Cases Referred to C.O.	000	270	685	174	282	255	186	146	647	1,554	1,283	495	5,977
Number of Cases Referred to M.G.	000	381	1,335	894	660	861	234	204	463	1,000	862	343	7,287

Appendix 4.

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CHECK AND SEARCH OPERATIONS

	Jul 1946	Aug 1946	Sep 1946	Oct 1946	Nov 1946	Dec 1946	Jan 1947	Feb 1947	Mar 1947	Apr 1947	May 1947	Jun 1947	TOTAL
Description of Operations:													
Number of Operations	11	11	13	13	10	8	3	1	1	1	0	0	77
Number of Troops Used	639	1,403	1,674	2,127	4,743	2,518	232	29	215	572	0	0	14,157
Number of Arrests Made	104	237	348	342	232	60	5	1	73	48	0	0	1,500

Appendix 5.

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U.S. CONSTABULARY AIR OPERATIONS

	May 1946	Jun 1946	Jul 1946	Aug 1946	Sep 1946	Oct 1946	Nov 1946	Dec 1946
Number of Hours Flown	2,629	2,115	2,155	2,560	3,000	2,089	2,090	1,034
Administrative Missions	993	902	1,106	2,398	2,275	1,200	650	
Training Missions	335	521	598	247	300	350	400	210
Courier Missions	200	89	198	188	175	210	200	65
Total Missions	1,548	1,512	1,902	2,833	2,750	1,760	1,800	925
Gallons of Gasoline Used or Provided Trans- ient Aircraft	27,615	28,134	30,220	32,148	34,500	42,776	42,776	21,500
Number of Pilots as of Last Day of Month	73	55	71	83	104	109	106	106
Number of Mechanics as of Last Day of Month	58	53	76	80	86	99	91	91
Number of L-5's Assigned	73	94	97	96	104	111	111	111
Number of C-45's Assigned	000	000	000	000	000	000	2	2
Number of Accidents	1	2	1	0	2	0	0	0

Appendix 6. (con't next
page)

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U.S. CONSTABULARY AIR OPERATIONS (CON'T)

MONTH	Jan 1947	Feb 1947	Mar 1947	Apr 1947	May 1947	Jun 1947	TOTAL
Number of Hours Flown	1,547	1,410	2,005	3,427	4,061	3,710	17,682
Administrative Missions	1,000	770	1,000	000	000	000	13,494
Training Missions	277	235	400	000	000	000	3,893
Courier Missions	35	95	200	000	000	000	1,655
Total Missions	1,312	1,100	1,600	000	000	000	19,042
Gallons of Gasoline Used or Provided Trans- ient Aircraft	36,919	32,645	28,290	000	35,297	34,014	426,834
Number of Pilots as of Last Day of Month	114	119	134	134	133	129	
Number of Mechanics as of Last Day of Month	89	101	84	89	104	105	
Number of L-5's Assigned	126	142	139	143	143	143	
Number of C-45's Assigned	2	2	2	2	2	2	
Number of Accidents	1	1	1	0	0	1	10

Appendix 6.

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MINOR DELINQUENCIES AND TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS

	Jul 1946	Aug 1946	Sep 1946	Oct 1946	Nov 1946	Dec 1946	Jan 1947	Feb 1947	Mar 1947	Apr 1947	May 1947	Jun 1947	TOTAL
Constabulary Troops	639						445	516	864	688	956	529	
Other Troops	2,592	4,494	5,688	3,523	3,205	2,148	1,171	1,680	2,583	1,450	2,473	1,874	37,848
Displaced Persons	513	946	847	591	1,299	1,592	151	353	380	1,513	522	255	9,462
German Civilians	3,528	5,644	4,967	4,399	6,114	5,449	2,129	2,127	5,083	7,590	3,419	1,922	52,371
Total Offenders Military & Civilian	7,272	11,084	11,502	8,513	10,618	9,489	3,396	4,706	9,410	11,241	7,370	4,580	99,681

Appendix 7.

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Appendix 8.

CRIMES, OFFENSES AND SERIOUS INCIDENTS

	Jul 1946	Aug 1946	Sep 1946	Oct 1946	Nov 1946	Dec 1946	Jan 1947	Feb 1947	Mar 1947	Apr 1947	May 1947	Jun 1947	TOTAL
Constabulary Troops	68	126	135	141	149	169	131	155	126	148	108	134	1,590
Other Troops	53	88	88	134	145	158	143	239	216	214	245	204	1,927
Allied Civilians	6	7	10	10	5	14	10	4	5	6	3	8	88
German Civilians	23	52	64	183	99	115	154	58	70	29	30	51	933
Displaced Persons	15	39	79	298	94	53	63	63	78	93	38	51	974
Unknown	42	119	204	538	348	206	255	245	275	272	161	97	2,812
Total Offenders, Military & Civilian	212	431	531	1,354	840	720	761	764	770	762	485	639	3,319

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TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS BY PERSONNEL INVOLVED

	Jul 1946	Aug 1946	Sep 1946	Oct 1946	Nov 1946	Dec 1946	Jan 1947	Feb 1947	Mar 1947	Apr 1947	May 1947	Jun 1947	TOTAL
1 U.S. Military	132	130	122	167	170	150	105	130	115	163	117	74	1,575
2 U.S. Military and Civilians	108	138	32	204	203	224	182	207	138	140	101	88	1,765
TOTALS	240	268	154	371	373	374	287	337	253	303	218	162	3,340

Accidents listed under 1 include those involving military vehicles and military personnel only. Those listed under 2 involve both military personnel and/or vehicles, all types of civilian personnel and/or vehicles.

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TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS - NON-FATAL

MONTH	Jul 1946	Aug 1946	Sep 1946	Oct 1946	Nov 1946	Dec 1946	Jan 1947	Feb 1947	Mar 1947	Apr 1947	May 1947	Jun 1947	TOTAL
U.S. Military	197	244	233	306	539	377	295	321	225	281	204	134	1,460

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DEATHS RESULTING FROM TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS

	Jul 1946	Aug 1946	Sep 1946	Oct 1946	Nov 1946	Dec 1946	Jan 1947	Feb 1947	Mar 1947	Apr 1947	May 1947	Jun 1947	TOTAL
U.S. Military	16	24	18	10	11	9	6	8	6	6	8	6	128
Civilian	27	57	48	50	41	33	27	25	30	27	17	30	417
TOTAL	43	81	66	60	55	47	33	33	36	33	25	36	545

Appendix 11.

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SERIOUS INJURIES

	Jul 1946	Aug 1946	Sep 1946	Oct 1946	Nov 1946	Dec 1946	Jan 1947	Feb 1947	Mar 1947	Apr 1947	May 1947	Jun 1947	TOTAL
U.S. Military	20	44	22	20	24	6	7	6	24	58	40	74	345
Civilian	9	18	19	47	30	17	20	33	43	73	47	88	449
TOTAL	29	62	41	67	54	23	27	39	72	131	87	162	794

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Appendix 12.

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DEATHS BY TYPE OF INCIDENT U.S. PERSONNEL

	Jul 1946	Aug 1946	Sep 1946	Oct 1946	Nov 1946	Dec 1946	Jan 1947	Feb 1947	Mar 1947	Apr 1947	May 1947	Jun 1947	TOTAL
Suicide	1	3	1	0	0	0	2	1	2	2	2	2	16
Manslaughter	12	0	0	3	3	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	20
Murder	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	5
Accidental	11	9	9	2	1	6	3	4	2	3	3	5	58
Traffic	16	24	18	10	11	9	6	8	6	6	8	6	128
TOTAL	41	37	28	16	15	16	11	13	11	11	14	14	227

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DEATHS BY TYPE OF INCIDENT-CIVILIAN

	Jul 1946	Aug 1946	Sep 1946	Oct 1946	Nov 1946	Dec 1946	Jan 1947	Feb 1947	Mar 1947	Apr 1947	May 1947	Jun 1947	TOTAL
Suicide	5	8	9	15	11	9	13	0	4	4	2	5	85
Manslaughter	2	13	10	9	16	3	5	7	3	3	0	4	75
Murder	3	15	23	15	27	10	13	7	16	14	4	6	153
Accidental	6	9	9	13	10	9	13	0	4	0	0	7	80
Traffic	27	57	48	50	41	38	27	25	30	27	17	30	417
TOTAL	43	102	99	102	105	69	71	39	57	48	23	52	810

Appendix 14.

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
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
TURNOVER AMONG ENLISTED MEN
ASSIGNED TO THE U.S. CONSTABULARY

<u>Month and Year</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Losses</u>	<u>Gains</u>	<u>T/O Strength</u>
30 June 1946	29437	6581	6221	30917
31 July 1946	31730	1439	3732	30917
31 August 1946	32245	179	694	30917
30 September 1946	30005	3431	1191	30917
31 October 1946	28954	3216	2165	30917
30 November 1946	28795	675	516	30917
31 December 1946	27771	1240	216	30917
31 January 1947	24397	2978	396	30917
28 February 1947	23793	1708	1104	30917
31 March 1947	23067	3775	3049	30185
30 April 1947	23182	2409	2524	30185
31 May 1947	22274	1840	932	30185
30 June 1947	21468	853	47	29022
		30324	22787	


Appendix 15.

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





ORGANIZATION OF US CONSTABULARY HEADQUARTERS



CONSTABULARY BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS




CONSTABULARY REGIMENTAL ORGANIZATION



CONSTABULARY SQUADRON ORGANIZATION

SQUADRON HEADQUARTERS



Aggregate:
Hq & Hq Troop
12 Off
85 EM

Mechanized Troops:
15 Off
465 EM


Motorized Troops:
10 Off
310 EM

TOTAL: 37 Off & 770 EM

CONSTABULARY MECHANIZED TROOP

AGGREGATE STRENGTH:

5 Off
 155 EM
 10 Cars Armored M-8
 2 Tks 2 1/2 Ton
 3 Tks 1 1/2 Ton
 33 Tks 1/4 Ton
 20 LMG Cal. .30
 68 SMG Cal. .45
 160 Pistols Cal. .45
 86 Rifles Cal. .30 M-1



CONSTABULARY MOTORIZED TROOP

AGGREGATE STRENGTH:

- 5 Off
- 155 EM
- 1 Car Armored M-8
- 2 Tks 2 1/2 Ton
- 12 Tks 1 1/2 Ton
- 9 Tks 1/4 Ton
- 11 LMG Cal. .30
- 80 SMG Cal. .45
- 3 81MM Mortars
- 160 Pistols Cal. .45
- 74 Rifles Cal. .30 M-1
- 3 Rifles 57MM Recoilless

