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# THE U.S. ARMY TASK FORCE IN LEBANON

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## Foreword

On 18 July 1958, the day before the first Army troops landed in Lebanon, authority was requested to dispatch one military history detachment to the Middle East. Within one week the 11th Military History Detachment, composed of one officer and one enlisted man, was airlifted to Beirut, where it stayed from 27 July to 5 October 1958. While stationed in Lebanon, the detachment assisted in the preparation of command and after-action reports and collected source material for a definitive history of the U.S. Army Task Force that had been instrumental in pacifying the Middle East.

The resulting historical monograph traces developments from the over-all plans and political evolution to the implementation of plans and troop movements from Europe to the Middle East. There follows a detailed account of the experiences of the U.S. Army troops in Lebanon, including an analysis of the problems encountered and their possible causes. Finally, the study describes the withdrawal and summarizes the lessons learned.

Prepared by the staff of the Current History Branch of the USAREUR Historical Division, the monograph is based on U.S. Army records transferred to USAREUR headquarters after the evacuation of Lebanon, the after-action and command reports prepared by all major headquarters in Lebanon, and the source material found in the files of USAREUR staff divisions. A bibliography of the sources used is attached as Appendix B.

Instead of using the system of indicating security classification by paragraph as described in paragraph 58c, AR 380-5, this monograph is classified by the footnotes. That portion of the text from one footnote reference to the next footnote reference carries the same classification as the source document noted in the footnote, unless otherwise indicated. Using this system, one footnote may, and does in many cases, indicate classification for several paragraphs, and similarly, one paragraph, documented by two or more footnotes, may carry two or more security classifications.

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


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# Part I: Background

## CHAPTER 1

## The Political Situation

### 1. The Middle East Doctrine

Acting in response to a personal appeal made in January 1957 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the United States Congress adopted a resolution early in March 1957 that promised both economic and military aid to Middle East nations to assist in the fight against Communism. This so-called Middle East Doctrine pledged the United States to use military forces if the President deemed it necessary to aid any Middle East country requesting assistance in its efforts to resist overt armed aggression by Communist forces.

The Middle East was then, and continued to be, the scene of both open political strife and potential armed conflict, but over a year passed before the Middle East Doctrine was put to test.

During the spring of 1958 there was increased unrest in the Middle East area. On 14 July a bloody revolt in Iraq brought the downfall of the monarchy with the assassination of King Feisal and the prime minister. To bolster the shaky government of the Jordanian King Hussein--the cousin of the assassinated Iraqi king--the United Kingdom sent troops and aircraft to Jordan. At the same time President Eisenhower requested an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council to consider the Middle East problem.

In the face of these developments, and claiming Syrian interference in its internal affairs, the Lebanese Government requested aid from the United States. On 15 July President Eisenhower announced:

> In response to (an) appeal from the Government of Lebanon, the United States has dispatched a contingent of United States forces to Lebanon to protect American lives and by their presence there to encourage the Lebanese Government in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity.(1)

2. The Crisis in Lebanon

After centuries of control by outsiders, Lebanon became a republic in 1920. However, it was still a French mandate until 1943 and became totally independent only in 1946, when the last French troops left the country. The country had suddenly come of age politically without having had time for a gradual social adjustment.[2]

Actually, a feudal system still existed in Lebanon. The remnants of past tribal rule still could be seen in the popularity of such men as former Prime Minister Raschid Karami, who in 1958 led the Tripoli rebels in the first outward signs of a near-revolution. The Karami name was well known. Raschid was considered a traitor and deserter by the loyalist followers of President Chamoun. Yet, he commanded a large following among the Sunni Moslems, who constituted about one-fifth of the Lebanese population. Another tribal leader was Kamal Jumblatt, whose family had commanded Druze tribes for centuries. Both the Syrian Druze and the Jebel Druze would answer to his call.

The political stability of Lebanon was dependent on agreement among various factions who followed leaders, not because of their political principles but because of their family names. A man with the proper background of feudal leadership could by the same token become a political power and even a militarily important figure, since the country had only a small army.[3]

Religion was also a primary factor in Lebanese politics. Before 1952, the year of President Chamoun's inauguration, the balance of Christian-Moslem influence had been fairly even, but thereafter it had tipped slightly in favor of the latter, with a population 45 percent Christian and 55 percent Moslem.

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[1] The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 15, 16 Jul 58. UNCLAS.

[2] Appendix II, to Hq 201st Log Comd Hist & Comd Rept (hereafter cited as Log Comd Rept), 13 Oct-30 Nov 58. CONF (info used OFLUSE).

[3] Ibid., p. 2. CONF (info used OFLUSE).

Since 1949 there had been a sharp division between pro-Western and pan-Arabic influences in Lebanon. Syria, which borders the country, wanted to annex Lebanon because of its seaports and because the countries were once united. (See Map 2.) Many Lebanese supported union with Syria because of hoped-for advantages to both countries. In 1956, moreover, the Suez crisis had helped forge the chain of events of two years later by forcing Lebanese factions to take definite sides. After the crisis had passed, President Gamal Abdel Nasser sought Lebanon as a "natural" addition to his United Arab Republic (U.A.R.). Support for the United Arab Republic mounted, both among the political oppositionists to Chamoun's regime and among those Christians who thought of themselves as Arabs first of all.

Early in 1958 Chamoun attempted to bring about a change in the Lebanese Constitution that would have allowed him to seek a second term in office. The move, apparently prompted by fear of U.A.R. expansion as well as personal ambition,[4] aroused all factions of the opposition but not sufficiently to unite them. Intense religious differences existed in both opposition and loyalist factions.[5] In addition, except for the Shiite tribes under El Assad in southern Lebanon, the opposition had been infiltrated by strong contingents of Syrians and Egyptians and had received military and financial assistance from U.A.R. sources. As a result, the opposition leaders were no longer free agents, and U.A.R. nationals constituted strong fifth columns within the country, prepared to exploit any situation that developed.

During this period of threatened violence, Lebanon had six rebel leaders: Karami in Tripoli, Salaam in Beirut, Jumblatt in the outlying Chouf district, El Assad in southern Lebanon, Saad in Sidon, and Hamade in the Bekka valley. All the major cities in Lebanon had barricaded sections in which the rebels held positions that the loyalist security forces could not penetrate. In Beirut the section was called the Basta; it remained barricaded until President Fuad Chehab took office on 23 September.[6]

By April 1958 the Lebanese situation had become explosive.[7] Reports from Lebanon mentioned the decline of President Chamoun's

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[4] Ibid., pp. 2, 4. CONF (info used OFLUSE).

[5] Hq AMLANFOR After Act Rept (hereafter cited as AMLANFOR Rept), Part III, Commander's Notes p. 1. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals (info used UNCLAS).

[6] Appendix II, to Log Comd Rept, 13 Oct-30 Nov 58, pp. 1, 4. CONF (info used OFLUSE).

[7] DF, USAREUR G2 to CinC, 10 Apr 58, subj: Current Situation in the Middle East (U). AEAGB-IP (STRAT) 274/H5.3. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).






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popularity and forewarned of disorders in the presidential campaign in July. The assassination on 8 May of a prominent left-wing newspaper editor, Nasib Matni, who had been highly critical of Chamoun added to the unrest.[8]

On 9 May the first visible signs of the revolution appeared when a United States Information Service (USIS) library was burned in the city of Tripoli—as was one in Beirut three days later. On 12 May rebel factions called a general strike, and on the same day rioting began in Beirut. Opposition leaders handed the Chamoun administration a resign-immediately ultimatum, but the President's aides refused even to pass the note on to him. Throughout that day the Cairo and Damascus radio stations called on the Lebanese to "revolt against the forces of imperialism and its agents," urging them to go into the streets to fight the Chamoun regime. By that afternoon Lebanese Army troops appeared to be in control of the situation. A curfew forbidding citizens to be on the streets between 8 p.m. and 5 a.m. was put into effect. The Government was apparently preparing to ask Parliament for emergency powers, including those of martial law.[9]

On 13 May the Lebanese Government formally accused Egypt and Syria of massive interference. Conflicting reports asserted that areas of the country were under the control of rebel forces.[10] Still no offical move was made by President Chamoun to seek American aid under the Middle East Doctrine or to ask for United States intervention. On the Syrian frontier, Lebanese guards fought two engagements against infiltrators, which resulted in 13 dead. Several hundred Lebanese youths marched on the American Embassy in Beirut but were turned back by troops. The next night an official U.S. announcement stated that police equipment, including ammunition and tear gas, would be airlifted in an effort to help the Lebanese Government maintain security.[11]

On 15 May a lull began that was to last nearly two weeks before more fighting broke out in Tripoli. The general strike continued, for the rebels had no intention of ceasing their opposition to President Chamoun. Apparently he was trying to bargain with them during this time, but they were not willing to accept anything short of his

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[8](1) Appendix II, to Log Comd Rept, 13 Oct-30 Nov 58, p. 3. CONF (info used OFLUSE). (2) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), May-Jun 58, passim. UNCLAS.

[9]The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), May 58, passim. UNCLAS.

[10]DF, USAREUR G2 to CofS, 15 May 58, subj: Situation in Lebanon, France, and Algeria (C). AEAGB-IP (STRAT) 274/H5.2 GB. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

[11]The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), May 58, passim. UNCLAS.

stepping down from the Presidency. At the same time there was a possibility that U.S. intervention in the Lebanon crisis would bring on a religious war.[12]

3. Lebanon's Appeal to the United Nations

On 21 May Lebanon protested to the Arab League Council against foreign interference in its internal politics. The next day Lebanon turned to the U.N. Security Council for help, charging the United Arab Republic with such interference.[13] While the Lebanese Government took diplomatic action, apathetic Government forces were regrouping in the face of continuous harassment by the rebels. Soviet propaganda began to show more interest in the situation, and U.A.R. broadcasts fomented religious dissension.[14]

President Chamoun persisted in his intention to seek a second term, but his position was considered untenable, since it was apparent that he would have to leave office before a lasting settlement could be achieved. During this precarious period of threatened out-and-out revolution, the Lebanese Army's chief of staff, General Fuad Chehab, who was eventually elected President in July, was recognized as the most desirable potential candidate for the Presidency. He was known to be pro-Western, and, as an Army officer, he maintained a detachment from politics. Although he sincerely did not wish to be President, he was known to oppose Chamoun's bid for a second term. Above all, he was respected and trusted by the Lebanese, both Christian and Moslem, as a man of impeccable character, high ideals, honesty, and fairness. In sharp contrast, it seemed most unlikely that the rebels could unite under any one of their leaders.[15]

In executing the U.N. Security Council resolution of 11 June an observer team was sent to Lebanon. The heaviest fighting of the revolt occurred on 14 June, when the Presidential palace was attacked while Chamoun was holding a cabinet meeting. The Government charged that the attacking rebels were led by Syrian and Palestinian commandoes

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[12](1) DF, USAREUR G2 to CofS, 15 May 58, cited above. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (2) Appendix II, to Log Comd Rept, 13 Oct-30 Nov 58, p. 2. CONF (info used OFLUSE).

[13]The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), May 58, passim. UNCLAS

[14]DF, USAREUR G2 to CinC, 20 May 58, subj: Situation in Lebanon as of 20 May 1958 (U). AEAGB-IP (STRAT) 274/H5.3 GB. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

[15](1) DF, same to same, n.d. [21 May 58], subj: Lebanese Political Situation (U). Same file. CONF (info used UNCLAS). (2) Ltr, Lt Gen P. D. Adams, CG V Corps, to Maj Gen R. M. Osborne, USAREUR SCofS G2, 19 Aug 59. SECRET. V Corps log nr 2531/59.

who had infiltrated into Beirut. The Army repulsed the rebels, but attacks on Beirut's central prison by successive assault waves, using machine guns and grenades, gave evidence of thorough military training and organization.

Ambassador Robert S. McClintock offered to evacuate families of U.S. employees.[16]

An interim report of the U.N. observer team stated that the Lebanese Army apparently controlled only a small section of the frontier with Syria and asked the Security Council to provide more observers. The rebel leaders' attitude was hostile to the activities of the United Nations. On 21 June, for example, a white U.N. jeep carrying observers was fired on along the northeastern frontier.[17] Since U.N. observers alone could not solve the problem of U.A.R. aid to the rebels, the Lebanese Government requested that a U.N. emergency force be sent to seal off Lebanon's borders with Syria. This force, if sent, would be given a fair chance to seal off the borders before the Lebanese Government asked for outside military aid.[18] Even though Syrians were discovered among the rebels captured by the Lebanese Army, the U.N. observers denied that there was any evidence of massive infiltration. At the same time, the observers were unable to gain access to the rebel-held border areas where infiltration was most likely to occur.[19]

On 9 July President Chamoun announced that he would leave office at the end of his term on 23 September. The rebels, however, were not satisfied, declaring that they would continue their opposition until he left office.[20]

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[16](1) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 15, 16 Jun 58. (2) Supplement to Foreign Policy Briefs, Dept of State, 25 Jul 58, pp. 3, 4. Cy in USAREUR Hist Div Docu Sec. Both UNCLAS.

[17](1) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), Jun 58, passim. (2) Dept of State Supp, cited above, p. 4. Both UNCLAS.

[18](1) Dept of State Supp, cited above, p. 4. UNCLAS. (2) DF, USAREUR G2 to CinC, 21 Jun 58, subj: Current Situation in the Middle East (U). AEAGB-IP (STRAT) 274/H5.3 GB. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

[19](1) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 4 Jul 58, p. 1. UNCLAS. (2) Appendix II, to Log Comd Rept, 13 Oct-30 Nov 58, p. 5. CONF (info used OFLUSE). (3) Dept of State Supp, cited above, p. 4. UNCLAS.

[20]The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 10 Jul 58, p. 1. UNCLAS. See also, cmt 2, USAREUR G2 to Hist Div, 4 Jun 59, subj: Review of Draft Monograph "The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon." AEAGB-C1 (SADS) 274/7 GB. UNCLAS.

# CHAPTER 2

## Plans to Invoke the Middle East Doctrine

After World War II, and except for a temporary buildup during the Korean conflict, the United States Army had to assume ever increasing global commitments in support of national policy, with a constantly decreasing force. Contingency planning at the Department of the Army level, therefore, was predicated primarily on the "fire brigade" concept, under which half of the recently created Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) force of 140,000 could be deployed from the United States to an emergency spot anywhere in the world within 30 days, and the other half within 60 days. The difficulty was that this plan did not have the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) necessary to assure the strategic lift capabilities of the other two services.[1]

In contrast, contingency planning at the overseas theater level was a JCS-directed, theater-wide, triservice effort. Thus, the U.S.Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), had developed a joint operations plan for the support of a JCS specified command in the Middle East (SPECOMME), which involved the joint efforts of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, the United States Marine Corps, the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), the Military Sea and Air Transportation Services (MSTS and MATS), and the United States Army, Europe (USAREUR). The USAREUR contribution to this planning effort was its Emergency Plan (EP) 201, governing the movement of Army Task Force (ATF) 201 from Europe to the

[1] H. B. Yoshpe & J. Bykofsky, Lebanon, A Test of Army Contingency Planning (U), (Off of CofT, Washington, D.C., 1958), pp. 3-7, 14, 36. SECRET. A detailed discussion of STRAC's role in the planning for the Lebanon crisis and the problems involved may be found in this work.

Middle East. This plan was coordinated with CINCSPECOMME and CINCUSAFE and approved by USCINCEUR and the Department of the Army.[2]

4. Joint Planning

According to the Middle East Doctrine, the interests of peace and U.S. national policy would require military action in the event of Arab-Israeli hostilities or Communist-inspired aggression against friendly Middle East countries. Under such a contingency the Department of the Army, if required by the situation, would deploy both combat and support elements and furnish logistical support for them from the United States. In addition, the Department would assume resupply responsibility for the USAREUR ATF 201 after E+30 if that force was deployed to the Middle East.

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM), as the JCS specified commander, would exercise operational control over all U.S. forces deployed to the Middle East. In his role as naval commander, he would deploy the Sixth Fleet, including an amphibious task force with Marine Corps battalion landing teams, to the trouble area. In support of this operation, the 2d Marine Air-Ground Task Force would deploy forces from the United States.

CINCUSAFE would organize and deploy an air task force and provide the airlift required for the operation, to include attendant logistical and administrative support. Similarly, MSTS would provide sealift as requested, and MATS would provide airlift augmentation to CINCUSAFE as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[3]

As early as September 1957 the commanding general of ATF 201 had established contact with CINCNELM through a visit to the London headquarters of Admiral James L. Holloway, Jr. This visit was followed in November by a conference of Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives called by CINCNELM to develop a plan for possible airborne operations in the Middle East. The conferees established close working relations. For the first time, moreover, USAFE representatives made a firm commitment of theater airlift capability, consisting of 110 C-119's, or equivalent, to support the projected operation.[4]

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[2](1) Ibid., pp. 16, 37. (2) USAREUR ltr, 26 Feb 58, subj: USAREUR Emergency Plan 201 (Revision of 1 Feb 58) (U). AEAGC-PL 250/18 GC. USAREUR Regis Nr AG 3148. Both SECRET.

[3]USAREUR EP 201, pp. 1-3. SECRET.

[4]Hq, Prov Abn Bde, ATF 201, Comd Rept (hereafter cited as Abn Bde Rept), 15-31 Jul 58. CONF.

In early December 1957 a 3-day war game held at 11th Airborne Division headquarters was attended by representatives of all principal agencies involved in the contingency planning. The purpose of the war game was to examine all aspects of an airborne operation designed to seize an airport and the adjacent populated area. For the first time the logistical requirements to support such an operation were closely analyzed. At the conclusion of the war game the planners drew up a list of requirements to be implemented by the designated agencies having primary interest. From the standpoint of the ATF 201 staff, this war game did more than anything else to place Middle East contingency planning on a firm and practical basis.

Early in 1958, as the situation in the Middle East became increasingly critical, an additional contingency plan to support or restore a friendly government was developed in outline form by the CINCNELM staff. This plan was accepted by the ATF 201 commander with only minor changes, since by this time, as a result of the joint planning conferences and war gaming, the CINCNELM staff was well versed in the principles of airborne operations.[5]

5. USAREUR's Responsibilities

Under the February 1958 revision of EP 201, USAREUR's primary mission in a Middle East emergency would be to provide the Army Task Force 201, consisting of two airborne battle groups reinforced with minimum essential combat and service-support elements.[6] The task force was to be so organized as to permit its deployment either in whole or in part, depending on the situation. Its combat strength was to be at least sufficient to permit limited operations for approximately one week, its capability for deployment by air was to be immediate, and its follow-up forces were to permit effective limited operations for an indefinite length of time. Thus, it was to be divided into five basic echelons.

Force ALPHA, composed of 1 reinforced airborne battle group and the task force command group (1,720 personnel), was to be prepared to move from the departure airfield on 12 hours' notice.

Force BRAVO, comprising the second airborne battle group and the advance headquarters of the task force (1,723 personnel), was to move from the departure airfield on 24 hours' notice.

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[5] Ibid. CONF.

[6] USAREUR EP 201, p. 3. SECRET.

Force CHARLIE was to move by sea or air, depending on the situation. In either case, movement to the port of embarkation or from the departure airfield would begin within 120 hours' notice. This force contained the main headquarters, the task force artillery--consisting of 2 airborne batteries of 105-mm howitzers, 1 section of a 762-mm rocket battery, and the headquarters element--an airborne reconnaissance troop, an engineer construction company, the advance party of the task force support command, an evacuation hospital unit, elements of an airborne support group, and an Army Security Agency detachment.

Force DELTA was to move by sea, departing from home stations for the ports on 120 hours' notice. It comprised the seatail of the airborne battle groups, including 2 light truck companies, a section of a 762-mm rocket battery, an engineer construction battalion (-), an antiaircraft artillery (AW) battery, technical-service support units, and a military police unit.

Force ECHO, a 90-mm gun tank battalion, was to move by sea; it was to initiate movement to the port on 98 hours' notice or remain at its home station prepared to move on 48 hours' notice, as directed.[7]

Another USAREUR mission would be to furnish logistical support to the task force until resupply from the United States was established--presumably at E+30--and to continue to furnish emergency resupply and personnel replacements until the Department of the Army was able to furnish such support. The joint staff of CINCSPECOMME was to be furnished 10 officers and 1 enlisted man from USAREUR general and special staff divisions.[8]

6. Specific Planning

a. Responsibilities of USAREUR Subordinate Commands. The U.S. Seventh Army and the U.S. Army Communications Zone, Europe (USACOMZEUR), were to organize and move the elements of ATF 201, to provide them with organic equipment and supplies, and to furnish them logistical support until their departure from Western Europe. They were also to stage all units, personnel, and supplies departing through ports or airfields in their areas of responsibility.

Similarly, the 7th Engineer Brigade was to organize and move the engineer units assigned to the task force; the U.S. Army Port of

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[7] Annex B, Concept of Operations, to USAREUR EP 201, pp. 1-4. SECRET.

[8] (1) USAREUR EP 201, p. 3. SECRET. (2) Appendix 2, CINCSPECOMME Staff Augmentation, to Annex E, Personnel, to USAREUR EP 201. SECRET (info used CONF).

Embarkation, Bremerhaven (USAPEB), was to stage and move all units departing through the port; and the area commands were to assist in processing, dispatching, and transporting elements of the task force proceeding through their areas of responsibility enroute to departure airfields or ports.

All units comprising the task force were to maintain a state of preparedness consistent with the movement timetable outlined above.[9]

b. Over-all Command Functions. The general commanding the task force was to assume command of his units when they closed into the marshaling camps, staging areas, departure airfields, or ports of embarkation in Western Europe. The force would pass to the direct command of CINCUSAREUR upon departure from the aerial and sea ports of embarkation, and to the operational control of CINCSPECOMME upon arrival in the designated staging area in the Middle East--tentatively identified as Adana and/or Iskenderun, Turkey.[10]

c. Operation Plan GRANDIOS. Specific responsibility for providing the combat elements of ATF 201 was delegated to the 24th Infantry Division--formerly the 11th Airborne Division. This division, in turn, developed Operation Plan GRADIOS, which governed its preparations and actions in case of an emergency in the Middle East. Upon notification, the division was to be organized into four functional forces: a task force equivalent to a reinforced airborne brigade and commanded by the assistant division commander; a support force under the division artillery commander; division trains; and the remainder of the division. The task force--compoased of the 187th and 503d Infantry combat teams, Troop C of the 9th Cavalry Regiment, and assigned artillery units--was to be on call for employment in an emergency area. The support force was merely to assume responsibility for operations and coordination of the marshaling and departure activities attendant upon the movement of the task force. The division trains and the remaining units of the division were to provide various types of support to facilitate the movement of the task force.[11]

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[9] USAREUR EP 201, pp. 4-7. SECRET.

[10] Ibid., p. 9. SECRET.

[11] (1) After Action Rept, 24th Inf Div, 5 Nov 58, subj: Operation GRANDIOS, 15-31 July 1958 (U). CONF. In USAREUR G3 Ops Br EP 201 file. (2) 24th Inf Div OPLAN GRANDIOS, 1 Jul 58. CONF.

Part II: The Lebanon Operation

CHAPTER 3

The United States Intervenes

## 7. Implementation of Plans

a. Preparations. With the worsening of the Middle East crisis toward the middle part of May 1958, USAREUR implemented Operation Plan GRANDIOS in all its phases except for the actual dispatch of loaded aircraft to the objective area. After the alert was lifted, intensified rehearsals of marshaling and outloading activities were conducted, and the plan was refined.[1] Generally, these and other activities revealed that USAREUR's EP 201 for the support of CINCSPECOMME was sound. Nevertheless, at a critique held early in June for the purpose of improving the plan[2] several areas of possible improvement were noted. For example, the plan called for Force ALPHA of ATF 201 to deploy at 100-percent strength, while the other elements of the task force, which had to be maintained at 100-percent strength, would deploy at "present for duty" strength, which would never fall below 85 percent under the USAREUR pass and leave policy. However, personnel with critical specialties would have to deploy at 100-percent strength so as not to impair the combat effectiveness of the force, and this could be accomplished only if overstrengths were authorized. In reply to a USAREUR inquiry on this subject, the Department of the Army authorized an

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[1] Opn GRANDIOS After Act Rept, cited above. CONF.

[2] DF, USAREUR ACofS G3 to CofS, 23 Jun 58, subj: USAREUR EP 201 Critique (U). AEAGC-PL 250/18 GC. SECRET.

overstrength in the 11th Airborne--later 24th Infantry--Division so long as the over-all USAREUR strength ceilings were not exceeded.

Another deficiency uncovered in the plan was that personnel reporting to the task force from non-11th Airborne Division units during the May-June pre-alert readiness state were often not fully prepared or equipped. Moreover, certain provisional units that would be assigned to the task force were not then in existence.[3]

A constant handicap during the preparatory phase was the unduly re restrictive interpretation of the need-to-know regulation, which prevented the ATF 201 staff from coordinating fully with assigned non-divisional units, and was later to have an adverse effect upon the executing of the plan.[4]

b. Timing. Long before the President announced the U.S. intervention, preparations had been made for such an eventuality. In addition to the preparatory steps taken by the Army, the U.S. Sixth Fleet, with embarked Marines, was getting ready for action in the Mediterranean. Thus, in the mid-afternoon of 14 July CINCNELM directed the Sixth Fleet Task Force 61 (TF 61) to operate east of 30 degrees east longitude (roughly the position of Alexandria, Egypt, or halfway from Crete to Cyprus), with 1 amphibious squadron remaining within 12 hours' sailing time of Lebanon.[5]

At 2350 hours on the same night the Marines of TF 61 were ordered to land at Beirut at 1500 hours the following afternoon. They landed on schedule and, encountering no opposition, secured the Beirut International Airport within little more than an hour. On 16 July additional Marines landed to secure the Beirut port facilities.[6] (See Map 3.)

Meanwhile, at 0530 hours on 15 July, USCINCEUR had directed USAREUR and USAFE to prepare one battle group and the necessary airlift for deployment to Beirut. Whereas USAREUR had already alerted Force ALPHA two hours earlier, CINCUSAFE directed the 322d Air Division to support the operation. The first aircraft arrived at Fuerstenfeldbruck at 1430 hours 15 July, only one half hour later than expected, and arrivals continued at a rate of some 5 aircraft per hour for the next 6 hours.[7] Flight operations were hampered by thunderstorms, which had

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[3] Ibid. SECRET.

[4] Abn Bde Rept, 15-31 Jul 58. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

[5] Hq 2d Prov Marine Force Comd Diary (hereafter cited as Marine Diary), 1-31 Jul 58. SECRET.

[6] Ibid. SECRET.

[7] Tab E, to memo, Col G. M. McHaney, C/USAREUR G3 Ops Br, to Col D. C. Clayman, Dept ACofS G3, 6 Aug 58, subj: Airlift Operations, TF 201. AEAGC-OP 278/6 GC. SECRET.

[redacted]




[redacted]



AGL (1) 4-59-150-71872

View of Beirut

AGL (1) 6-59-300-71960

delayed the departure of aircraft.[8]

On 16 July USAREUR declared a state of "increased vigilance" throughout the command. While this did not constitute a formal USAREUR alert, the readiness of forces to execute alert and operational plans if so ordered was increased. To this end, alert procedures and current operational plans were reviewed and command posts were maintained on a 24-hour basis by all headquarters down to the battalion level. These actions were taken covertly to avoid alarming dependents and indigenous populations.[9] (These provisions were not lifted until 2 August, by which time the situation had become relatively stable.)[10]

By 16 July Force BRAVO was placed on a 12-hour alert status in garrison.[11] On the next day the airlift of Force CHARLIE began, and Forces DELTA and ECHO assembled and prepared to move to the ports of embarkation.[12] On 8 August, when it became clear that a combat situation would not develop, Force BRAVO was placed on a 48-hour alert, which was lifted one week later.[13]

c. Stateside Support. In the meantime, stateside support of the operation also moved forward. Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, directed MATS to deploy 36 C-124 aircraft to Europe to augment the airlift for the movement of troops to the Middle East. They arrived on 17 July. Fifty percent of the ATF 201 resupply stocks of all types had already been positioned at east coast ports, and instructions were now issued to move the remaining 50 percent to the ports.[14] The Department of the Army also announced that, effective at E+35--with 17 July as E-day--it would assume individual personnel replacement support of the deployed

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[8] Cable SX-5240, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 15 Jul 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[9] Cable SX-5278, USAREUR to subor comds, 16 Jul 58. SECRET.

[10] Cable SX-5829, same to same, 2 Aug 58. SECRET.

[11] Cable SX-5269, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS, 16 Jul 58. SECRET. For details of the movement of forces, see par 9.

[12] Cable DA-945015, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Jul 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. On the same date 2,000 British airborne troops moved into Jordan to bolster that country's government.

[13] Cables SX-5954 & SX-6126, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 8 & 15 Aug 58. SECRET.

[14] Cables DA-944832 & DA-944945, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, et al., 16 & 17 Jul 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

elements of ATF 201.[15] Furthermore, although a final decision had not yet been made, the Department of the Army was considering plans to replace ATF 201 with two battle groups that would be deployed from the United States to Europe.[16]

d. Security. In order to guarantee the security of the EP 201 operations, Seventh Army and USACOMZEUR counterintelligence units, as well as the 66th CIC Group, conducted security checks. Weaknesses were found in only two areas--some insecure telephone lines were used to transmit operational orders, and at first the U.S. and German security forces at the Fuerstenfeldbruck airbase were not coordinated--but these deficiencies were corrected early in the operation. Public and press comment consisted mainly of officially released information, with added inaccuracies based on rumor and speculation. The initial lack of accurate press information on troop strengths, units involved, routing, and final destinations indicated the over-all effectiveness of security measures.[17]

Continuing surveillance revealed no decrease in the efficacy of USAREUR's security measures, although unfriendly agents tried to penetrate USAREUR targets to obtain information. Soviet mission vehicles, for example, cruised the Munich-Augsburg area daily, and as early as 19 July East German intelligence agents, presumably at the direction of the Soviets, were assigned the task of learning the answers to these questions:

(1) Had a general alert been declared?

(2) Were troops confined to their bases?

(3) Were staff personnel working around the clock?

(4) Were there any large troop movements into or out of Bremerhaven?

(5) Were there any incoming or outgoing shipments of atomic or rocket weapons?

(6) Were there any shipments of heavy weapons into or out of Bremerhaven?

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[15] (1) Cable DA-945124, DA from DCSPER to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Jul 58. (2) Incl, to ltr, USAREUR to distr, 19 Jul 58, subj: G4 Journal Extracts, EP 201. AEAGD-PL 250/18 GD. Both SECRET.

[16] Cable DA-945108, DA from DCSOPS to USCINCEUR, 18 Jul 58. SECRET.

[17] DF, ACofS G2 to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Jul 58, subj: Security Status of EP 201 (C). AEAGB-CI (SAIS) 274/7 GB. SECRET.

By the end of July, which is to say throughout the critical period, no significant lapses of security had been noted.[18]

8. Immediate Reactions to the U.S. Intervention

Needless to say, the Soviet Union looked upon the U.S. intervention in Lebanon unfavorably as did most of the Arab nations. Except for complaints about unauthorized American use of airspace,[19] Western governments and the non-Communist press generally approved the move.

In West Germany, for example, the Chancellor, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, immediately expressed approval of the U.S. action. On 18 July, however, the German Government's press chief indicated disappointment over the American failure to give the NATO Allies prior knowledge of the landing. The German press generally echoed this sentiment and also voiced some concern over possible Russian counter moves. Nevertheless, the German official attitude remained favorable. The Foreign Office sought information from USAREUR so that it might show the press that the German Government was being kept fully informed by the United States. However, the necessity for clearance from Washington before releasing information—the result of the high security classification attached to the operation—delayed the passing of information to the Germans for a full week. It was considered desirable that such delays be avoided in any similar operation in the future.[20]

In France the reaction was still more favorable. The Government, the non-Communist press, and the people in general approved and supported the U.S. action. Moreover, the French were highly impressed by the swiftness of the operation, expressing only disappointment that the United States had not taken a similar course during the Suez crisis. On the other hand, the Communist—a strong and legal party in France—intensified their anti-American campaign. The Communist dominated Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), one of France's largest labor unions, demanded that the French national railways stop shipments in

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[18] (1) Cable SX-5626, USAREUR to distr, 25 Jul 58. (2) DF, ACofS G2 to CINCUSAREUR, 28 Jul 58, subj: Security Status of EP 201 (C). AEAGB-CI (SAIS) 274/7 GB. Both SECRET.

[19] For details, see par. 9b.

[20] (1) Cable USAREUR SMC IN 5641, USARMA Bonn to DA for ACSI, 18 Jul 58. UNCLAS. (2) DF, G2 to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Jul 58, subj: Reactions to Employment of U.S. Forces in the Middle East. AEAGB-CI (SAA) 274/47 GB. CONF. (3) Cable SX-5502, USAREUR from Polit Ad to Am Bonn, 22 Jul 58. SECRET. (4) Cable SX-5626, USAREUR to distr, 25 Jul 58. SECRET. (5) Intvw, Mr. B. H. Siemon & Mr. R. Sher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. D. A. Flinn, USAREUR Polit Ad, 3 Nov 58. UNCLAS.

support of the Middle East operation. When the CGT proposed a general strike, the non-Communist labor unions voted against it. The Communists threatened sabotage if their demands were not met, but both French and U.S. security forces were alerted to prevent it.[21]

The situation in Italy was similar to that in France. The Government and non-Communist press supported the U.S. action, and the Premier, Amintore Fanfani, expressed full support of the American landings in Lebanon. The Italian Communist party and the entire left-wing press attacked the United States vehemently. In defiance of a Government ban on all public gatherings, street rallies and demonstrations were instigated by Communists in Rome, Naples, Bologna, and Leghorn. A general strike and a number of shorter, temporary work stoppages were also called by the Communist labor unions in the Leghorn area. No such incidents, however, occurred at Verona and Vicenza, the two other areas with major U.S. troop concentrations in Italy.[22]

Apparently the Russians had directed the Italian Communist party to activate military sabotage cells, with POL supplies and military aircraft flying out of Italy to the Middle East as their principal targets;[23] no cases of sabotage were reported.

9. ATF 201 Moves to Lebanon

a. Organization, Routes, and Methods.

(1) Force ALPHA. Force ALPHA, composed of the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry, and elements of the task force headquarters, began movement to the Fuerstenfeldbruck airbase on 15 July at 1400 hours, closing there by 1900 hours.[24] With Support Force Speidel providing marshaling and departure airfield support, these tasks proceeded generally as planned. Outloading of Force ALPHA began at 1700 and continued as planned for the first 18 aircraft. Loading plans for subsequent aircraft were revised to provide for balanced

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[21](1) DF, G2 to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Jul 58, cited above. CONF. (2) Cable AEAZAID-C-58-218, USACOMZEUR Adv Sec to USA Gen Depot Kaiserslautern, et al., 23 Jul 58. CONF. (3) Cable SX-5626, cited above. SECRET. No acts of sabotage were known to have taken place.

[22](1) DF, G2 to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Jul 58, cited above. CONF. (2) Cable SX-5626, cited above. SECRET. (3) Cable P-0802, USASETAF from AESE-NBI-CI to CINCUSAREUR for G2, 24 Jul 58. CONF.

[23]Cable USAREUR SMC IN 7490, CINCUSAFE ADVCN to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Jul 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[24]For a complete station list of ATF 201 forces, the composition of units, and their home stations, see Appendix A.

crossloading. Since Force ALPHA had to be prepared for airdrop as well as airlanding operations, the loading plans were based on airdrop requirements.

The outloading of Force ALPHA was completed on 16 July at 0800 hours. Due to bad weather the takeoff of the first aircraft for Adana was delayed until 0817 hours. The command group departed at 0944, and all elements of the force cleared by 2248 hours on 16 July. Altogether, 60 aircraft were required—11 C-124, 30 C-130, and 19 C-119—to outload 1,517 personnel and 354.45 short tons of cargo.

The first aircraft, a C-119, arrived at Adana on 17 July at 0200 hours, and 16 hours later the entire force had closed at that base. A stopover at Adana was required because the situation in the objective area was obscure, and essential elements of information regarding the airfield and nearby area at Beirut were lacking. Accordingly, early on 18 July an advance planning group left for Beirut, where its members established contact with the Lebanese authorities. When information from U.S. forces and State Department officials indicated that an airlanding was feasible and operationally safe,[25] it began early on 19 July[26] and proceeded smoothly and without incident. Nineteen hours later Force ALPHA had closed at Beirut International Airport utilizing 65 aircraft.[27]

According to CINCSPECOMME's directive, operations at the Beirut airfield were to be coordinated by the Commander, American Air Forces (COMAMAIRFOR), who was to establish contact with local officials for this purpose. Upon arrival at Beirut the Army troops were to constitute SPECOMME's reserve and were to deploy southeast of the airfield in an assembly area having a 2-mile radius.[28]

(2) Force BRAVO. This force remained on 12-hour alert for airlift to destination upon request from CINCSPECOMME.[29] A portion of its equipment was in hangar at Fuerstenfeldbruck and rigged for

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[25] Incl 4, to Abn Bde Rept, 15-31 Jul 58. CONF.

[26] Cable SX-5455, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS for Pachler, 20 Jul 58. SECRET.

[27] Memo, Lt Col J. D. Bird, Trans Div Tfc Br, to Brig Gen F. D. Atkinson, USAREUR Trans Off, 30 Sep 58. CONF. In Trans Div Tfc Br.

[28] Cable USAREUR SMC IN 5440, CINCSPECOMME to COMAMAIRFOR, et al., 18 Jul 58. SECRET.

[29] Cable DA-945190, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR 21 Jul 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.



Arrival of Force Alpha at the Beirut Airport



3d Medium Tank Battalion Motor Pool at Beirut Airport

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heavy drop in case the force was called to execute an airborne assault.[30] In the operation Force BRAVO was held in reserve. It would have required airlift of 1,606 personnel, 584.4 short tons of equipment, and 86.5 short tons of heavy drop equipment. If lifted by C-130 aircraft--each capable of carrying 24,000 pounds allowable cargo load as used for Force ALPHA--80 such planes would have been needed for the airdrop and 67 additional for airlanding operations.[31]

(3) Force CHARLIE. Force CHARLIE, including the task force headquarters (-) and elements of brigade troops, moved to Fuerstenfeldbruck on the afternoon of 17 July. Not only was its marshaling disrupted by a violent thunderstorm, but outloading operations proceeded very slowly because of a shortage of aircraft and because cargo airlift was given a higher priority. In addition, changes in movement orders for the several units of the force caused modifications in loading plans. The first aircraft did not depart for Adana until 0600 hours on 19 July. Elements of the force were also outloaded from the Rhein-Main, Chateauroux, and Evreux airbases. Since Force CHARLIE was to be airlanded, maximum use was made of available airlift capacity.[32] According to an eyewitness report of 21 July, the loading proceeded smoothly under the supervision of Support Force Speidel, the timing being governed only by the turnaround of aircraft. CHARLIE elements bivouacked near the airstrip, preparing vehicles and equipment for air movement. Aircraft arriving at Fuerstenfeldbruck spent about one hour on the ground for loading and checking.[33] By midday on 22 July, 63 aircraft had departed; 25 additional ones left within the next 17 hours.[34] Of the 1,690 men outloaded, 1,028 left from Fuerstenfeldbruck, 615 from Rhein-Main, and 47 from the 2 airfields in France. The total cargo airlifted was 2,136.4 tons, with 1,224.2 outloaded at Fuerstenfeldbruck, 828.2 at Rhein-Main, and small tonnages at the other fields.

All aircraft carrying Force CHARLIE flew a circuitous route, generally from Augsburg via Stuttgart to Marseilles (refueling stop), parallel to the southwest coast of Italy, across Sicily, and north of Crete to Adana, with a total elapsed time of 12 hours. Altogether, 110 aircraft were sent to Adana, and the rest of the force, less sea

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[30] Memo, Col K. Conner, C/USAREUR G3 Plans & Plcy Br, to ACofS G3, 24 Jul 58, subj: Report of Liaison Visit to Beirut, Lebanon, by Col Karl Conner, G3 Div, Hq USAREUR (U) (sic). AEAGC-PL. SECRET.

[31] Tabs A & B, to memo, Col McHaney to Col Clayman, 6 Aug 58, cited above. SECRET.

[32] Incl 4, to Abn Bde Rept, 15-31 Jul 58. CONF.

[33] Memo, Col Conner, 24 Jul 58, cited above. SECRET.

[34] Memo, Col Bird to Gen Atkinson, cited above. CONF.

lift, closed at Beirut--in both cases without incident. A small detachment of vehicles and guard personnel was sent to Bremerhaven for movement to Beirut by sea, beginning 23 July.[35]

Movement of Force CHARLIE from Adana to Beirut was initiated on 20 July. By the evening of that day 22 percent of the cargo and 16 percent of the troop packets were estimated to have unloaded at Beirut. The resupply of both the ALPHA and CHARLIE forces, requiring a total of 198 aircraft, moved simultaneously. Except for 10 C-119's and 3 C-124's, which were retained at Adana for shuttle operations to Beirut and any other contingencies that might arise,[36] all aircraft that had moved Force ALPHA returned to Europe to shuttle Force CHARLIE and the resupply. Force CHARLIE closed at Beirut on the evening of 24 July.[37]

(4) Force DELTA. Force DELTA shipped out in several increments. It consisted principally of units stationed in Germany, which left through the Bremerhaven port of embarkation on 26 July; 900 additional troops stationed in France were shipped from La Pallice on 27 July. The force debarked at Beirut from 3 to 5 August.[38]

(5) Force ECHO. This force moved to Bremerhaven on 19 July, closing there two days later. It consisted of the 3d Medium Tank Battalion (Patton), 35th Armor, which had been conducting its annual training test at Baumholder when it was alerted on 16 July. Returning to its home station the next day, it moved to Bremerhaven in 2 increments, comprising 4 rail movements of tracklaying equipment and 1 road movement of wheeled vehicles.[39]

On 21 July, while the battalion closed at the Bremerhaven staging area, CINCUSAREUR received a cable from Beirut asking that only one tank company of Force ECHO be shipped and that the rest of the battalion be held at Bremerhaven.[40] Force ECHO was already loading according to plan. Moreover, the suggested change would disrupt the tactical integrity of the battalion, since the effectiveness of both the element remaining in Germany and that departing for the objective area would be greatly reduced. The units remaining in Germany would be unable to

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[35] Incl 4, to Abn Bde Rept, 15-31 Jul 58. CONF.

[36] Cable DA-945148, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Jul 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[37] Memo, Col Bird to Gen Atkinson, cited above. CONF.

[38] Cable DA-945600, DA from DCSOPS to USCONARC, et al., 28 Jul 58. SECRET.

[39] Incl 11, to Abn Bde Rept, 15-31 Jul 58. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

[40] Cable USAREUR SMC IN 6131, CINCSPECOMME to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Jul 58. SECRET.

maintain their equipment properly since the battalion's maintenance capability would have to move with the company proceeding to Beirut. When the remainder of the battalion equipment and personnel was called forward, a delay of 72 hours would be required for loading it. After 26 July water transport, with a 72-hour delay, could be guaranteed for cargo only; personnel would have to be moved by water or air, depending on availability at the time of the forward call. Finally, the Bremerhaven port of embarkation had no facilities for holding the remainder of the battalion for more than a few days. In view of these considerations, USAREUR recommended that the entire battalion be shipped according to the original plan and that, if necessary, elements of the battalion not required for immediate employment in the objective area be maintained aboard ship as a floating reserve.[41] Pending CINCSPECOMME's answer to the above recommendations, the loading of Force ECHO was temporarily suspended, but if no answer was forthcoming by 1800 hours on 22 July, one reinforced tank company was to be loaded and dispatched.[42]

The outcome was that on 22 July Force ECHO was restored to its original size, and the entire tank battalion began to embark.[43]

Personnel departed on 23 July, while the vehicles loaded aboard the USNS Comet left one day later. Equipment to accompany troops (TAT) and small-arms ammunition accompanied the personnel. The aggregate strength of the battalion was 717--38 officers, 4 warrant officers, and 675 enlisted men.[44] It arrived at Beirut on 3 August 1958.[45]

(6) The Honest John Battery. According to EP 201, an Honest John battery with 2 launchers and 8 rocket motors was to be part of Force CHARLIE. However, on 22 July the battery was deleted from CHARLIE and added to DELTA.[46] Four days later it was decided that political considerations would make the unloading of the Honest John battery in the objective area inadvisable.[47] By that time the

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[41] Cable SX-5481, USAREUR to CINCSPECOMME, 21 Jul 58. SECRET.

[42] Cable SX-5497, same to same, 22 Jul 58. SECRET.

[43] Cable USAREUR SMC IN 7093, CINCSPECOMME to CNO pass JCS, 22 Jul 58. CONF.

[44] Cable SX-5577, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS for Pachler, 24 Jul 58. CONF.

[45] Cable (DTG 032131Z), CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 3 Aug 58. CONF.

[46] Cable DA-945261, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Jul 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[47] Cable DA-945576, DA from Taylor to CINCUSAREUR for Hodes, 26 Jul 58. SECRET.

personnel of the battery were enroute to Beirut, but the equipment was unloaded[48] and held at the Bremerhaven port of embarkation. The personnel debarked at Beirut on 3 August and returned to Germany by C-124 aircraft on the following day. However, the 24th Infantry Division was given the mission of maintaining one launcher platoon on 12-hour alert status for movement by air or water.[49]

b. Overflight and Landing Problems. A time lag in securing permission to fly over or land in certain countries caused difficulties.

(1) Switzerland. The unauthorized overflight of two U.S. C-124 aircraft enroute from Sembach, Germany, to Athens, Greece, on 16 July resulted in a formal protest to Washington by the Swiss Government, on the ground that such flights jeopardized that country's neutrality status. Thereafter, requests for overflight clearance would have to be submitted at least four days in advance of the proposed flight. The same was true of landings in Switzerland proper. Emergency flights carrying medical supplies or evacuating sick would still be authorized on shorter notice.[50]

(2) Austria. On 18 July the Austrian Government indicated that, until further notice, no diplomatic clearance for overflight of its territory by military aircraft would be granted. This information was disseminated to all units.[51] Effective the next day, the Austrian Defense Ministry declared the airspace over Austria west of 13 degrees east longitude to be closed above 5,000 meters and restricted below that altitude. Only scheduled airliners were allowed overflight after having obtained clearance from the Austrian Ministry of Defense.[52]

(3) Italy. On 18 July the U.S. Ambassador in Rome was informed that current plans called for no troops from the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (USASETAF) to be sent to the Middle East, but that certain supplies and aircraft would move through Italy. This information was to be transmitted to the Italian Government with an

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[48] Cable SX-5654, USAREUR to USAPEB, 27 Jul 58. SECRET.

[49] (1) DF, USAREUR G3 to CofS, 1 Aug 58, subj: D Battery, 34th Artillery, w/cmt 2, SGS to G3, 4 Aug 58. AEAGC-OP 250/34 GC. SECRET.
(2) Cable X-3-8-10, COMAMLANFOR to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Aug 58. UNCLAS.

[50] Cable C-42, USAIRA Bern to CINCUSAFE ADVON personal for Gen Everest, 17 Jul 58. CONF.

[51] Cable U-421, USAIRA Vienna to USCINCEUR, et al., 18 Jul 58. UNCLAs.

[52] Cable USAREUR SMC IN 5745, USAIRA Vienna to USAFE, et al., 19 Jul 58. UNCLAS.

expression of appreciation for its cooperation in expediting customs clearances and other formalities.[53]

(4) Greece. The estimated time of arrival at Adana, Turkey, for C-124 and C-130 aircraft had to be moved back two hours because Greece would not permit them to fly over its territory.[54] However, on 19 July the Greek Government apparently changed its stand on overflight rights made two days earlier. If landings could be made with the greatest discretion, without publicity, and preferably by night, the Government was willing to grant urgent requests for clearance, but at least one day's notice would be necessary for any clearance requested.[55]

(5) Syria. Before the initial task force element (ALPHA) moved from Adana to Beirut, the ATF 201 staff, at the direction of Admiral Holloway, restudied the possibilities of making an airborne assault on the Tripoli airfield. This plan was dropped because of difficulties anticipated by the U.S. Air Force in avoiding overflight of Syrian territory, which was only three miles from the airfield.[56]

(6) Turkey. The Turkish Foreign Office complained on 4 August that its Government had not been given any advance notice of U.S. intentions to land 130 engineer troops and supplies at Iskenderun, a restricted military area.[57] This incident, however, was quickly resolved, and a week later the Turkish Government authorized the landing of additional engineer and transportation personnel at Iskenderun to establish a supply depot to support Army troops in Lebanon.[58] Toward the end of July the Turkish Foreign Office had agreed to an extension of the Adana facilities to permit stockpiling of ammunition and moderate quantities of other military equipment, such as tanks, artillery, and aircraft. No immediate action was taken to preposition a 10-day supply reserve at Adana, however; the required supplies were shipped directly from USASETAF to Beirut.[59]

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[53] Cable SX-5386, CINCUSAREUR to USASETAF for Fischer, 18 Jul 58. SECRET.

[54] Memo, Col K. Conner, 16 Jul 58, subj: Telecon, 1210 hours, 16 Jul 58 (U) (sic). AEAGC-PL. SECRET.

[55] Cable EC-9-3788, USCINCEUR to USAFE, 20 Jul 58. SECRET.

[56] Memo, Col Conner, 24 Jul 58, cited above. SECRET.

[57] Cable 72, Am Emb Ankara to Beirut for Adm Holloway, 4 Aug 58. SECRET.

[58] Cable DA-916388, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, et al., 11 Aug 58. SECRET.

[59] Cable EC-9-3889, USCINCEUR to CINCSPECOMME, 26 Jul 58. SECRET.

c. Delays in Arrival at the Objective Area.

(1) Air Traffic Problem. When CINCSPECOMME requested that resupply and Force CHARLIE move to the objective area in accordance with the timing in USAREUR EP 201, USAFE replied that 6 C-124's loading at Fuerstenfeldbruck and 4 C-124's loaded at Rhein-Main could not be dispatched because of air traffic problems in the objective area. No additional aircraft could be dispatched from any departure airfield, with either resupply or Force CHARLIE personnel aboard, until CINCSPECOMME could assure that air traffic conditions at arrival fields had improved.[60] CINCSPECOMME thereupon requested that Force CHARLIE be held at Adana until ALPHA had closed at Beirut. Thereafter, CHARLIE could move at COMAMAIRFOR's discretion.[61]

The slow rate of the air deployment of Force CHARLIE was not caused by any failure on the part of the Air Force. As previously mentioned, a large part of Force CHARLIE was supposed to have been lifted from Europe on turnaround aircraft of Force ALPHA, but on order of CINCSPECOMME these aircraft were held at Adana, with Force ALPHA, for two days while Force CHARLIE stood by at departure airfields. CINCSPECOMME then simultaneously ordered both forces into Beirut--ALPHA from Adana and CHARLIE from Europe.[62] At this point the airfield at Adana was so jammed that the airlift of Force CHARLIE had to be scheduled to prevent the presence of more than 10 aircraft at Adana at any one time.[63] Moreover, the airfield at Beirut soon became so congested with Force ALPHA that Force CHARLIE could not be completely lifted until turnaround aircraft became available and the Beirut airfield was cleared. Even if more aircraft had been furnished, the forces could not have been moved any faster than the capability of the airfield in the objective area permitted.[64]

(2) Traffic Congestion at the International Airport. Between 15 and 27 July air traffic at the International Airport at Beirut became so congested that COMAMAIRFOR was asked to provide qualified base operations personnel to assist in maintaining air traffic control. The Beirut control tower operations personnel were unable to handle the sudden influx of air traffic caused by the

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[60] Cable SX-5424, CINCUSAREUR to ATF 201 for Gray, 18 Jul 58. SECRET.

[61] Cable USAREUR SMC IN 5751, CINCSPECOMME to COMAMAIRFOR, et al., 18 Jul 58. CONF.

[62] Memo, Col Bird to Gen Atkinson, cited above. CONF.

[63] Cable DA-945190, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Jul 58. SECRET.

[64] Memo, Col Bird to Gen Atkinson, cited above. CONF.

superimposition of military on civilian operations.[65]

Moreover, USAFE considered the airport's only all-weather runway to be unsafe and chose not to use it because of the possibility of collision with the rigged heavy-drop equipment that was stored on it. There was no more appropriate place to store this equipment than near the airfield. However, the weather remained excellent throughout the operation--as could be expected during the summer months in that area--and neither civil nor military air traffic was seriously hampered. Military and civil air traffic on the remaining runway often interfered with each other, and frequent military pedestrian and vehicular traffic interfered with both. Early in August, after an alternate road by-passing the runway had been constructed, the use of the runway for vehicular and pedestrian traffic was halted.[66]

(3) Lack of Storage Facilities. During July the unloading of cargo at the port of Beirut was hampered by the lack of storage facilities.[67]

(4) Insufficient Military Vehicles at Objective Area. In an operation of the Lebanon type it would have been desirable for equipment to arrive with personnel. Initially there were not sufficient military vehicles to offload both the personnel and equipment arriving by sea. Civilian trucks and buses were therefore rented for this purpose.[68]

d. Sea and Airlift Deficiencies.

(1) The Importance of Advance Information. While both sea- and airlift were considered as excellent in general, the deployment of the USAREUR forces could have been facilitated if firm

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[65](1) Cable CG-X-2-8-3, COMAMLANFOR to COMAMAIRFOR, 2 Aug 58. CONF. (2) AMLANFOR Rept, Part I, Chronology. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[66](1) Memo, CINCSPECOMME J4 to distr, 11 Sep 58, subj: Logistic Conference to be held 22 September (project recap), Proposed Agenda Items for (sic). SECRET (info used UNCLAS). In USAREUR AG Hq AMLANFOR files, docu nr 1466. (2) Intvw, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Capt C. F. Hockeborn, CO, 11th Mil Hist Det, 2 Feb 59. UNCLAS. (3) Cmt 2, USAREUR G4 to Hist Div, 11 Jun 59, subj: Review of Draft Monograph "The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon" (U). AEAGD-PS 250/17 GD. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

[67]Cable DA-945237, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Jul 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[68]Ltr, AMLANFOR to CINCSPECOMME, 15 Oct 58, subj: Experience Data Pertaining to Sea and Air Movements. ALFJD 280/U5.2. CONF. In USAREUR AG Hq AMLANFOR file.

Airborne Equipment Temporarily Stored off Runway

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information as to the number, type, and load limits of aircraft had become available during the planning phase. Such information would have made possible the preparation of firm movement and loading tables. Moreover, advance information on aircraft turnaround times would have permitted efficient scheduling and movement of units to departure airfields.

(2) Types of Aircraft. If more C-130 aircraft had been used, the deployment of the ground forces would have been expedited.

(3) Flexibility of Loading Plans and Schedules. The plans and schedules for outloading troops by air should have been flexible enough to compensate for unpredictable flying schedules and aircraft load variations.[69]

10. Landing and Deployment of Forces

a. The Marines. On the afternoon of 15 July the first wave of a Marine battalion ladning team (BLT) went ashore at RED Beach (Map 3). Encountering no resistance, the Marines moved quickly inland and by 1600 hours had secured the Beirut International Airport. Commercial air traffic was halted during the initial phase of the landing but was resumed by 1820 hours. On the next day a second BLT landed over RED Beach, moved to the airport, and relieved the first landing team, which was then relocated to the port area, where it assumed responsibility for the port facilities and nearby beaches.[70]

On 18 July the first elements of a third BLT came ashore at YELLOW Beach. This unit secured the northeast flank of the 2d Provisional Marine Force, including the northern approaches to the city, and the defense of YELLOW Beach. On the same day the first elements of the fourth landing team, which was airlifted from the United States, began arriving at Beirut International Airport. These troops were transferred to temporary billets on the U.S.S. Chilton, lying at anchor off YELLOW Beach, where they constituted a reserve force and augmented the shore party at YELLOW Beach until the unloading operations were completed on 24 July. On that day the fourth BLT disembarked and moved into an assembly area two miles east of the city. By 26 July the Marine forces deployed in and around Beirut consisted of four battalion landing teams and a logistical support group, totaling 5,670 officers and men.[71]

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[69] Ltr, USAREUR CofS to DCSOPS, 21 Nov 58, subj: Lessons Learned from the Lebanon Operation (U). AEAGC-PL 250/18 GC. SECRET (info used CONF).

[70] Marine Diary, 1-31 Jul, 1-31 Aug 58. SECRET.

[71] Ibid. SECRET.

b. Army Task Force 201. Upon their arrival on 19 July, the parachutists of Force ALPHA--consisting of the task force headquarters element and the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry--left their heavy equipment, still rigged for possible airborne operations, on one of the two runways and moved into the nearby olive grove, where they established their bivouac area. Force CHARLIE--composed of the main headquarters, the task force artillery, reconnaissance and engineer elements, and an evacuation hospital-- had virtually completed offloading operations by 25 July. Its personnel joined Force ALPHA in the olive grove and formed the nucleus of the 201st Logistical Command, which began to function on a limited basis.[72]

In early August Forces DELTA and ECHO debarked and moved to bivouac areas near the airport. They were composed of the service-support elements and the 3d Medium Tank Battalion, respectively, and totaled 5,111 officers and men. Including these 2 forces, the Army elements in Lebanon totaled 8,509 officers and men, out of a total ground forces strength of 13,740.[73]

11. The Lebanese Reaction to the Landing of U.S. Forces

President Chamoun and his cabinet had issued a unanimous call for U.S. intervention, but the attitude of the Lebanese Army to the landing of U.S. troops was not known. General Chehab had opposed such intervention, indicating that he would not be responsible for the conduct of the Lebanese security forces. He and his officers were not willing to admit that the situation required the landing of U.S. forces, and it was learned later that they were bitter because they had been given no advance notice. On 16 July, when General Chehab learned that the landings were under way, he requested that U.S. forces not occupy the port area, but he was overruled by President Chamoun.[74]

On the day of the American landings, Lebanese tanks deployed at the head of the street leading from the airfield to the harbor area,

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[72](1) AMLANFOR Rept, Part I. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Cable DA-945300, DCSOPS to distr, 23 Jul 58. CONF. (3) Cable USAREUR SMC IN 8622, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 25 Jul 58. CONF.

[73](1) AMLANFOR Rept, Part I. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Cmt 2, G4 to Hist Div, 11 Jun 59, cited above. CONF.

[74](1) Cable USAREUR SMC IN 5736, CINCUSAFE to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Jul 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Cable CX-258, USARMA Beirut to DA for ACSI, 24 Jul 58. CONF.

apparently without orders from General Chehab. Admiral Holloway met Ambassador McClintock ashore, and the two persuaded General Chehab to accompany them, in the Ambassador's car, to lead the column of Marines past the tanks. After General Chehab dispatched a Lebanese officer to escort the Marines, the car, followed by the Marine column, passed the tanks without incident. General Chehab departed, and Admiral Holloway personally led the column to the harbor area for deployment according to the operation plan. This action had a persuasive effect upon the Lebanese, who then left the scene under the direction of the senior staff officers believed responsible for the deployment of tanks.[75] The British military attache in Beirut later reported that five Lebanese Air Force Vampire jets had refused Army orders to oppose the landings because the orders had not been issued by their own command. Relations between the Lebanese Army and U.S. Marines were satisfactory but strained.[76]

After the landing President Chamoun ordered the Lebanese Army to give the U.S. forces complete cooperation and to allow them free circulation throughout Beirut. However, General Chehab and his staff continued to prepare criteria for the regulation of American troop movements and positions. The U.S. forces were cheered repeatedly by the Lebanese people, and finally General Chehab remarked that the events of the first day had promoted U.S. and Lebanese friendship and military cooperation.[77]

The prompt U.S. landing apparently averted a coup d 'etat directed by several colonels who, not expecting the U.S. forces to arrive before 16 or 17 July, had planned to arrest President Chamoun and install General Chehab as President on the 15th. The outlying area commanders had been opposed to such action and willing to move against the staff to prevent it. After the U.S. forces had landed, General Chehab agreed to use his influence to prevent the coup. Thus, the speedy employment of the U.S. forces in overwhelming strength caused the internal factions to pause and reconsider their plans.[78]

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[75] Cable USAREUR SMC IN 4954, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 16 Jul 58. SECRET.

[76] Cable CX-248, USARMA Beirut to DA for ACSI, 18 Jul 58. CONF.

[77] Cable SMC IN 4954, cited above. SECRET.

[78] (1) Cable CX-245, USARMA Beirut to DA for ACSI, 16 Jul 58. (2) Cable IAI-P&P-15604A, CINCUSAFE ADVON to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Jul 58. Both SECRET. (3) Cable DA-945190, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Jul 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

General Chehab believed that an undercurrent of defection that might break out at any time permeated his Army, but that he could hold it together if the U.S. forces were confined to small areas.[79]

President Chamoun doubted the loyalty of the Army to him until certain disloyal officers were removed from office. He believed that the reduction of the Basta quarter in Beirut and the employment of U.S. forces along the Syrian border would eliminate the rebellion, and he told the U.S. Ambassador that he had requested General Chehab to clear out the Basta area.[80]

According to Colonel Salem, removing the rebels from the Basta area would be not only very difficult for his limited forces but unwise, because countless babies and old women would be killed.[81] General Chehab, in turn, considered President Chamoun's request as a subterfuge to bring about a purge of the officer corps. He refused to clean out the rebel strongholds or to dismiss the officers. Thus, his relationship with the President during this period was a form of polite but studied insubordination.[82] He promised that his Army would cooperate, but he remained reluctant to take decisive military action. His reluctance was understandable, since he would need opposition support in the coming presidential election. He seemed willing to cooperate with the U.S. forces only as long as they did not become involved in what he considered to be the Lebanese Army's mission.[83] As a result, U.S. forces were restricted in their movement and use of weapons.[84]

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[79] Cable CX-246, USARMA Beirut to DA, 17 Jul 58. CONF.

[80] (1) Cable SX-5479, USAREUR G2 to USACOMZEUR, 21 Jul 58. SECRET. (2) Cable DA-945288, DA from ACSI to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Jul 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (3) Cable DA-945300, cited above. SECRET.

[81] Cable CX-258, cited above. CONF.

[82] (1) Cable DA-945375, DA from ACSI to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Jul 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) DF, ACofS G2 to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Aug 58, subj: Probable Developments in Lebanon (U). AEAGB-IP (GB 88-0031) 274/H5. SECRET. (3) Appendix II, to Log Comd Rept, 13 Oct-30 Nov 58. CONF (info used OFLUSE).

[83] Cable USAREUR SMC IN 6923, CINCSPECOMME to ONI, 22 Jul 58. SECRET.

[84] Cable DA-945224, DA from ACSI to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Jul 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.



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Tank in Partial Defilade near Beirut Beach

# CHAPTER 4

## Activities and Problems in the Objective Area

### 12. Political Developments After the Presidential Election

On 31 July General Chehab was elected President by the Lebanon Chamber of Deputies with a substantial second-ballot majority. President Chamoun had boycotted the election, but, since he refused to resign, the rebels continued their activities. It then became apparent that Chamoun and his followers would not cooperate with General Chehab's administration when it took office.[1] During August General Chehab conferred with the opposition leaders often. Both President Chamoun and he felt that the U.S. forces could now be reduced because the situation had improved. However, General Chehab was in no hurry to press for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces, since he wanted to use the issue as a bargaining point with the rebels.[2]

On 22 August an American soldier was shot by a rebel while unarmed and on pass. A Lebanese soldier on duty nearby took no action against the rebel. Upon receiving a formal U.S. protest, General Chehab promised that the rebel would be arrested and that the roadblock from which he had fired would be destroyed.[3] That afternoon Lebanese tanks knocked down the roadblock without

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[1] DF, ACofS G2 to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Aug 58, cited above. SECRET.

[2] (1) Cable DA-946464, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Aug 58. (2) DF, G2 to CINCUSAREUR, 15 Aug 58, subj: Situation in the Middle East (U). AEAGB-IP (STRAT) 274/H5.3 GB. Both SECRET.

[3] Cable ALFCG-X-24-8-4, COMAMLANFOR to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Aug 58. SECRET.

encountering any rebel opposition. As soon as they left the scene a crowd of civilians gathered, and the roadblock was rebuilt within the hour.

Acts of terrorism, violent loyalist-opposition battles in the Akkar and Bekka districts, and intermittent firing in various districts of Beirut continued during August. Members of the Majjada Party, Syrians, and security force defectors wanted to continue the revolt because they were dedicated to Nasser and Arab nationalism. The rebel leaders, moreover, talked themselves into such irrevocable positions regarding President Chamoun's tenure of office that they could not find a way to cease opposition without loss of prestige. Jumblatt and Salaam wanted to maintain the closed areas and quiet their followers without disbanding them, but they were having difficulty.[4] Salaam, fearing that the Basta would be reduced if the rebels provoked the U.S. forces, ordered his men not to fire without prior approval.[5]

On 1 September Jumblatt, Karami, and Salaam discussed the candidates for the new cabinet. Their only decision was that Karami should be the new premier.[6] Meanwhile, U.A.R. elements had begun to evacuate Lebanon. In a significant move, on the night of 2 September 240 Syrian military personnel departed from the Basta area for Syria under the protection of the Lebanese Army.[7]

13. Joint Command Problems

a. Initial Command Organization. The first elements of ATF 201 to arrive in Lebanon were placed in the CINCSPECOMME reserve. On 19 July Brig. Gen. Sidney S. Wade, who commanded the 2d Provisional Marine Force, was designated as Commander, American Land Forces (COMAMLANFOR), while Brig. Gen. David W. Gray, commanding general of ATF 201, was designated Commander, United States Army Troops Assigned (COMUSATA). General Wade's headquarters was aboard the U.S.S. Pocono, while General Gray's staff operated out of Beirut International Airport; they were to coordinate their operations. USAREUR EP 201 had not provided for a joint land forces headquarters. However, as the U.S. Army task force elements began to arrive, administrative and logistical responsibilities taxed the ATF 201

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[4]Cable DA-946375, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Aug 58. CONF.

[5]Cable CX-283, USARMA Beirut to DA, 2 Aug 58. SECRET.

[6]Cable ALFJB-X-4-9-1, COMAMLANFOR to CINCSPECOMME, 4 Sep 58. CONF.

[7]Cable DA-947661, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Sep 58. SECRET.

headquarters--essentially a tactical staff organization--beyond its capabilities.[8]

b. Establishment of AMLANFOR Headquarters. To meet this situation CINCSPECOMME recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a joint land forces headquarters, commanded by a senior general officer, be established ashore in Lebanon. This recommendation was approved, and Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, then commander of Northern Area Command in the U.S. zone of responsibility in Germany, was designated COMAMLANFOR. CINCSPECOMME retained over-all command, as well as the responsibility for military and policy decisions, while COMAMLANFOR was charged with all joint and combined aspects of land forces operations and support planning in the area. General Wade became Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Troops Assigned (COMUSMARCORTA), under the operational control of COMAMLANFOR.[9]

General Adams, accompanied only by his personal staff, proceeded to Lebanon without delay. He arrived at Beirut on 24 July and two days later assumed command of the American Land Forces, with headquarters at the American School in Beirut. Advance elements of COMAMAIRFOR moved concurrently from Adana, Turkey, to the immediate vicinity of the new headquarters in Beirut. Since there was no time to obtain additional personnel from Germany or the United States, General Adams decided that his staff would have to be composed of personnel already in Lebanon. The simplest solution would have been to merge the ATF 201 staff with that of AMLANFOR. This plan, however, was rejected for administrative reasons and because an operational staff would be required to control the Army combat elements in the event of hostilities. By having two staffs, the identity of each headquarters was retained, with commander and staff serving in dual capacities, depending upon the nature of the functions that were to be performed. AMLANFOR was a command headquarters that formulated policy and conducted operations by decentralizing execution to its three subordinate commands: the 24th Airborne Brigade, the provisional Marine brigade and the 201st Logistical Command. Technical and administrative staff advice and assistance when needed were obtained through the assignment of appropriate personnel from technical and administrative branches to the J-1 and J-4 Sections respectively. The personnel involved were organic to the sections to which they were assigned;

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[8](1) AMLANFOR Rept, Parts I & III. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Ltr, USAREUR CofS to DCSOPS, 21 Nov 58, cited above. SECRET.

[9]Cables DA-945322 & DA-945593, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 23 & 27 Jul 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

they provided staff advice on branch material matters relating to their respective branches and were action officers otherwise.[10]

c. Composition of the Joint Staff. The 31 officers and 108 enlisted men transferred from the ATF 201 headquarters formed the nucleus of the AMLANFOR staff, while the remaining 15 officers and 42 enlisted men of the ATF 201 staff were assigned to the 24th Airborne Brigade headquarters.[11] General Adams wanted proportionate representation of Army and Marine officers on his staff, but the Marine contribution--eight officers and some clerical personnel--was below the actual troop strength ratio. To satisfy General Adams' desire to obtain a thoroughly integrated joint staff, the Marine element provided an officer as his chief of staff.[12]

To fill the specialization requirements that his subordinate commands were unable to meet, General Adams requested that USAREUR provide personnel for some of the special staff divisions. In cases where technical or administrative advice was needed in excess of that available in the joint staff, the 201st Logistical Command provided appropriate assistance. This procedure worked well and permitted a significant saving of technical and administrative manpower.[13]

d. Liaison with the Lebanese Army. On 21 July Generals Wade and Gray had agreed with General Chehab to exchange liaison officers and to establish joint Lebanese-American patrols in Beirut. The Americans would also move platoon-size units through the city in order to accustom the population to the U.S. troops. However, General Chehab refused to accept American assistance in dealing with the rebels in the Basta quarter.[14]

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[10](1) Abn Bde Rept, 15-31 Jul 58. CONF. (2) AMLANFOR Rept, Parts I & III. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (3) Ltr, Gen Adams to Gen Osborne, 19 Aug 59, cited above. SECRET.

[11]Cable X-30-7-8, COMAMLANFOR to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Jul 58. SECRET.

[12]AMLANFOR Rept, Part III. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[13](1) Cable USAREUR SMC IN 8554, COMAMLANFOR from Adams to CINCUSAREUR for Hodes, 28 Jul 58. (2) Ltr, Gen Adams to Gen Osborne, 19 Aug 59, cited above. Both SECRET.

[14](1) Marine Diary, 1-31 Jul 58. SECRET. (2) AMLANFOR Rept, Part I. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

AMLANFOR headquarters also assumed the liaison responsibility between CINCSPECOMME and the Lebanese Army. General Chehab assigned Colonel Yusuf Simaan, a 1958 graduate of the U.S. Army Command and Staff College, to COMAMLANFOR for that purpose.[15]

e. Adequacy of Command Arrangements. USAREUR's responsibility for the Army units transferred to the operational control of CINCSPECOMME was often in doubt. During the early phase of the operation, in particular, many questions had to be referred to higher headquarters. For instance, USAREUR's responsibility for furnishing certain supply items to CINCSPECOMME was not clear. Such questions would not have arisen if the Middle East plans had specifically delineated USAREUR's authority and commitments.[16]

14. Supplementary Plans Developed in the Objective Area

a. Close Air Support. In the early phase of the Lebanon operations the lack of proper communications equipment prevented the Army elements from being integrated with the Navy-Marine air control system; thus, the air support request system of the ground forces was generally inadequate. The temporary absence of a common request system, together with the other communications deficiencies (analyzed in greater detail in paragraph 18) made it doubtful whether effective close-in air support of combat operations could have been provided initially.

These deficiencies were caused partly by a failure of higher headquarters to resolve the interservice air request procedures and ground liaison systems during the planning period. The air reconnaissance effort during the first two weeks of the U.S. Army task force's participation in the operation was also inadequate. CINCSPECOMME therefore conferred on 4 August with representatives of his subordinate headquarters concerning coordination of standard air-ground procedures. Effective procedures for air strike and reconnaissance requests, for air defense, and for coordinating ground force artillery and naval gunfire with air strikes were then established. Agreements were also reached on standard panel codes and target and front line markings.[17]

b. Plan CYCLONE. AMLANFOR headquarters developed this plan for crushing the rebel strongholds in the Basta quarter, if necessary.

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[15] Cables DA-945322, CONF; and SMC IN 8554, SECRET. Both cited above.

[16] Ltr, USAREUR CofS to DCSOPS, 21 Nov 58, cited above. SECRET (info used CONF).

[17] AMLANFOR Rept, Part I; Part II, Sec III. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

Two task forces, designated CYCLONE ALPHA and CYCLONE BRAVO and composed of medium tank and infantry units of reinforced platoon strength, were placed on a 24-hour alert in the forward assembly areas. On order, these forces were to move out to secure the lines of communication, remove hostile roadblocks or strongpoints, and protect U.S. personnel and property in Beirut. Army aircraft were to provide command reconnaissance, intelligence, and aerial relay of radio communications. The CYCLONE forces remained on an alert status and contributed to the security of the U.S. forces until they were disbanded in early October during the retraction phase.[18]

c. Plans for Airborne Training. Since many airborne-qualified personnel assigned to the 24th Airborne Brigade had not had an opportunity to jump for 90 days or more, a program of airborne refresher training was needed. In early August a brigade headquarters staff study established that airborne training jumps in the area would be feasible. A suitable drop zone was located just north of the Beirut International Airport, and a troop-carrier flight schedule that would not interfere with the traffic at the airfield was worked out with the local authorities. The plan called for a two-phase program. Phase I would provide for the proficiency jump training essential to retaining jump status for pay purposes, while Phase II was to consist of company-size drops conducted as part of airborne tactical training. Since Air Force troop-carrier aircraft were not initially available, seven Army aircraft were to be used for Phase I.[19]

The plan was approved by COMAMLANFOR and was carried out successfully.[20]

d. The NODEX Proposal. Late in August 1958, when planning for the eventual withdrawal, the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, proposed that the outloading of ATF 201 be conducted as an over-the-beach operation, using personnel and equipment that would normally participate in the annual NODEX training exercise in France. In reply USACOMZEUR pointed out that the time and expense involved in moving the necessary personnel and equipment from France to Lebanon would outweigh any potential local economies. Moreover, any further

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[18] (1) Ibid., Part I. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Abn Bde Rept, Sep 58. CONF.

[19] (1) Abn Bde Repts, Aug & Sep 58. CONF. (2) AMLANFOR Rept, Part I. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[20] For its implementation, see par. 16.

temporary reduction of USACOMZEUR's strength was inadvisable.[21] No further action was taken on the proposal.

15. Operations

AMLANFOR headquarters was assigned the following five general military objectives:

First, to assure the security of the U.S. forces operating ashore and establish a firm operational base to enable these forces, if necessary, to conduct military operations.

Second, to be prepared to protect American lives and property in Lebanon.

Third, to defend Beirut from both external and internal attack. AMLANFOR headquarters was to organize "shows of force" as visible and convincing deterrents to rash action on the part of the rebels.

Fourth, to offer a training assistance program to the Lebanese Army.

Fifth, to support the legal government and to be strictly impartial toward the factions outside the government.

The assigned objectives and the failure of the rebellion to spread beyond the confines of the Basta quarter largely determined the nature of AMLANFOR's military operations.[22]

a. Show-of-Force Operations. A show of force with psychological overtones was achieved by public demonstrations of AMLANFOR's combat capabilities, staged both for training purposes and as a part of the military assistance program for the Lebanese Army. Strong combat outposts were also maintained against chronic sources of rebel harassment, and tank-infantry patrols were dispatched to areas of disturbances. The AMLANFOR perimeter was so disposed as to secure Beirut against attack either from within or without the beachhead. The over-all effect of these actions was to create and maintain an atmosphere of relative stability.[23]

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[21](1) Cable AOC-1069, COMAMAIRFOR to USACOMZEUR, 23 Aug 58. SECRET. (2) Cable AEZOT 8-1521, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Aug 58. CONF.

[22]AMLANFOR Rept, Part III. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[23]Ibid. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.



Patrol Vehicles Prior to Departure.



40-mm Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun in Defensive Position at Roadblock DENVER.

M-48 Tank Position at Roadblock CHICAGO

As the date of the presidential election--31 July--drew near, all show-of-force activities ceased. Necessary military activities were performed without unnecessary display to avoid incidents between U.S. forces and the Lebanese factions.[24]

b. Relief of Marines by Army Units. On 20 July the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry, began relieving the Marine BLT at the International Airport. By 1 August it had taken over the mission of securing the southern sector, including RED Beach and the high ground dominating the airport. Three companies of paratroops were deployed in forward positions, one company secured the airport, and one was held in reserve in the olive grove. As the units of the battle group moved out of the olive grove, the 3d Medium Tank Battalion (Force ECHO), which had just arrived on 3 August, moved into the bivouac area. On 12 August two tank companies of this battalion relieved the battle group at the airport. By virtue of these moves the Army units were deployed to provide security for those sectors of the city and surrounding countryside situated south of the Damascus Road, including the landing beaches south of Beirut and the airport. The Marine force was responsible for the security of Beirut, the lines of communication, and the routes of approach north and northeast of the city, including the high ground to the east of YELLOW Beach.[25]

c. Countering Rebel Activities. During the first three weeks of August, U.S. land forces were subjected to increasing harassment from Basta-based rebels. After several vehicles had been hit by rebel small-arms fire and an American soldier on pass had been wounded by a rebel gunman, General Adams lodged a vigorous protest with General Chehab and threatened to take action against the offending roadblocks if the Lebanese Army was unable to control the situation. Steps were immediately taken to resume show-of-force tactics by staging a series of armored troop movements near the rebel-held section of the city. The 24th Airborne Brigade prepared plans for reducing rebel roadblocks in the Basta area if the harassment continued. The plans called for buttoned-up tanks to move in on the roadblocks and break them up. Infantry, following the tanks in personnel carriers, would then put out local security, enabling a bulldozer to complete the operation. As soon as this was accomplished, the force would withdraw and return to its base. This concept was later modified to include the participation of snipers, landed by helicopters on nearby rooftops or hills,

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[24]Cable 38-58/S, COMAMLANFOR to subor comds, 29 Jul 58. SECRET.

[25](1) Marine Diary, 1-31 Jul, 1-31 Aug 58. SECRET. (2) AMLANFOR Rept, Part I. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

to provide cover for the operation. These plans were rehearsed as training exercises, but never implemented.[26]

d. Establishment of Army Roadblocks. Rebel harassment was finally halted on 24 August by the establishment of tank-infantry roadblocks covering both the American supply routes and the main avenues of approach leading into the rebel-held Basta area. These roadblocks were designated ATLANTA, CHICAGO, and SEATTLE. A fourth position, designated DENVER, was established on 27 August in the vicinity of a prominent road junction, the so-called Watermelon Circle. This latter force consisted of 3 M48 tanks, 1 of which mounted a searchlight, and 2 M42 carriers with twin 40-mm weapons. It was prepared to reinforce any of the first three roadblocks on call.[27]

After the election of General Chehab to the Presidency, rebel activity in the Basta quarter virtually ceased. On 21 September, therefore, the roadblocks were replaced by three motorized patrols. Each patrol consisted of four 1/4-ton vehicles: 1 serving as command vehicle, 1 mounting a 106-mm recoiless rifle, and 2 being armed with a .50-caliber machinegun each. These patrols were to provide security for U.S. personnel and equipment operating on the main supply routes (MSR) in and around the city. However, after the inauguration of the new President on 23 September, followers of former President Chamoun began a series of demonstrations, culminating in mob violence along the main supply routes. Although no U.S. vehicles were molested, COMAMLANFOR ordered the 24th Airborne Brigade to reestablish the four roadblock positions. In addition, a fifth position, RENO, was established at the entrance to the American University. Two flying columns, each composed of 1 platoon of M48 tanks and 2 rifle squads and designated CYCLONE ALPHA and CYCLONE BRAVO, respectively, were also organized by the 24th Airborne Brigade. One column proceeded to the dock area, and the second to an alert position southwest of the city. Two of the roving patrols went into static positions prepared to check minor disturbances in the southwest sector, while the Marine force established strong points in its area.[28]

16. Training

Early in August a 5-week training program was prepared for all 24th Airborne Brigade units, and instruction was scheduled to begin

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[26](1) Memo for rec, Maj Gen P. D. Adams, COMAMLANFOR, 24 Aug 58. SECRET. In USAREUR AG Hq AMLANFOR file, docu nr 511-58/S. (2) Abn Bde Rept, Aug 58. CONF.

[27]AMLANFOR Rept, Part I. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[28](1) Ibid. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Abn Bde Rept, Sep 58, pp. 1-2. CONF.

on 1 September. A high state of combat readiness was to be achieved by emphasizing individual and small unit training, physical fitness, and training in individual and crew-served weapons. Also included were advanced individual subjects for which the Expert Infantry Badge requirements were to be used as criteria.

Possible range sites were surveyed and requisitioned so that by the end of August progress toward obtaining them for the weapons firing program had been made. One of the problems encountered was that live firing range facilities belonging to the Lebanese Army were limited to a single known-distance range with 9 firing points, 1 pistol range with 10 firing points, and a beach firing range southwest of the International Airport. The use of these ranges had to be coordinated with the Lebanese Army. Since locally available supplies were insufficient to equip the planned new ranges, an officer flew to USAREUR headquarters and arranged for air shipment of necessary targets, target cloth, and numerous other supplies to equip five ranges.[29]

The local procurement of materials for constructing training aids for squad and platoon problems was virtually impossible, since lumber was especially scarce. As a partial solution, crude mock-up houses were constructed for simulated street fighting, and streets were laid out with engineer tape and barbed wire. Areas suitable for squad and platoon exercises were also scarce, because the regions east and south of Beirut were densely populated. The difficulty of controlling Lebanese civilians made firing in other than approved ranges impossible. This problem was partially solved by firing only blank ammunition, artillery simulators, and M80 firecrackers, and by properly marking demolition pits.[30]

Airborne training jumps were conducted at Drop Zone SAHARA, located off the north end of the airport and east of the Mediterranean shore. The area was 1,587 yards long by 877 yards wide. Because of the strong off-shore winds, the most suitable time for parachuting was in the early morning before 0730 hours.[31]

The 24th Airborne Brigade began jump training on 27 August and made 132 successful jumps in 2 days. After a temporary suspension, training resumed during the period 8 through 24 September, when company-size airborne exercises were conducted. These exercises were based on the type of mission that would have been executed to seize the International Airport in July if airlanding of troops had not been possible.

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[29]Incl 3, to Abn Bde Rept, Aug 58. CONF.

[30]Ibid. CONF.

[31]SITREP, AMLANFOR J3, 23-29 Aug 58. CONF. In USAREUR AG Hq AMLANFOR file.

Three C-130 aircraft were used; 2,471 officers and men participated.[32]

At that time COMAMLANFOR expressed the wish to exchange with USAREUR opened parachutes for packed ones. When the Seventh Army and 24th Infantry Division were consulted on this matter, they did not concur because ATF 201 had a parachute packing capability of 125 per day. USAREUR therefore refused to pack parachutes for training jumps in Lebanon or to repair damaged chutes. On the other hand, USAREUR was willing to provide packed parachutes to the task force if an emergency mission found the Army units in Lebanon with theirs unpacked.[33]

17. Military Training Assistance to the Lebanese Army

At the beginning of August the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry, prepared a 40-hour training course in attacks on fortified positions and combat in cities for selected officers and noncommissioned officers of the Lebanese Army.[34] However, the Lebanese Army considered the program too ambitious and indicated that no personnel could be spared for training at that time. The Lebanese preferred in general to observe some of the highlights of the American training, such as firing demonstrations and attacks on fortified positions.[35] Thus, on 26 August, when the 24th Airborne Brigade demonstrated tactics and techniques for the reduction of a roadblock by using tank-infantry teams at WHITE Beach, the demonstration was witnessed by 15 Lebanese Army officers as well as by Generals Adams and Gray.[36] On 3 September about 100 Lebanese Army personnel observed a helicopter assault demonstrated by a reinforced infantry platoon. A week later 2 airborne infantry platoons, in conjunction with 1 reinforced Marine company, conducted a joint helicopter-amphibious landing assault on J'Bail Beach at Byblos, Lebanon,[37] for the benefit of 20 senior Lebanese Army and Navy officers, who observed the

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[32]Cable (DTG 242001Z) (SITREP 74), CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 24 Sep 58. CONF.

[33]DF, USAREUR ACofS G3 to CofS, subj: Supply of Parachutes to TF 201 for Training Jumps (U). AEAGC-OP 250/H5.3 GC. CONF.

[34]SITREP 17-58, Hq ATF 201, 5 Aug 58. CONF. In USAREUR AG Hq AMLANFOR file.

[35]Cable DA-946375, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR et al., 9 Aug 58. SECRET.

[36]Cable ALFJC-X-27-8-2, AMLANFOR to CINCSPECOMME, 27 Aug 58. CONF.

[37](1) SITREP, AMLANFOR J3, period 300001 Aug to 052400 Sep 58. (2) OpO Sup 52-58 (J'Bail), to CTF 61 Op O 50-57, 8 Sep 58. AMLANFOR docu nr 772-58-C. Both CONF.

exercise from ships or helicopters. Approximately 5,000 Lebanese civilians watched on J'Bail Beach.[38]

On 12 September one company of the 24th Airborne Brigade demonstrated the organization, equipment, formations, and small unit tactics of an airborne infantry company.[39]

During the evening of 1 October, and at the request of General Chehan, U.S. Army and Air Force elements conducted a firepower demonstration, incorporating close air support, about 10 miles south of Beirut. The exercise, witnessed by Lebanese Army personnel and thousands of civilians, included the firing of howitzers, 90- and 40-mm guns, mortars, recoiless rifles, and machineguns, while aircraft dropped napalm bombs, fired guns and rockets, and demonstrated "sonic boom."[40]

In September the 3d Medium Tank Battalion trained 56 Lebanese officers and noncommissioned officers at the Lebanese Army Tank Barracks, Beirut. The courses covered communications, weapons, principles of tank gunnery, driver training, and crew-type maintenance of the M41 tank. The course was successful in spite of language difficulties, a shortage of training aids, and restricted maneuver areas. At a final review on 20 September the Lebanese graduates were presented diplomas by General Adams. The Lebanese Army officially commended the U.S. school cadre on their instruction and commented on the improvement in the skill of Lebanese tankers.[41]

A 2-week heavy equipment and maintenance course conducted by an engineer construction battalion graduated 22 Lebanese Army construction equipment operators on 4 October. In addition, rear detachment personnel of an ordnance company conducted a clutch and brake adjustment school for Lebanese Army personnel on 13 and 14 October.[42]

These activities provided instruction for the military personnel of a friendly country, perfected the combat readiness of U.S. troops, and contributed to the reputation of the U.S. Army.[43]

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[38](1) Cable DA-947974, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Sep 58. UNCLAS. (2) SITREP 53-58, 24th Abn Bde G3, 10 Sep 58. CONF. In USAREUR AG Hq AMLANFOR file.

[39]SITREP, Hq AMLANFOR, 6-12 Sep 58. CONF. In USAREUR Hist Div Docu Sec.

[40]Cable (DTG 021223Z), CINCSPECOMME to CINCUSAREUR, 2 Oct 58. CONF.

[41]Abn Bde Rept, Sep 58, p. 3. CONF.

[42]Log Comd Rept, 13 Oct-30 Nov 58, pp. 21-28. CONF.

[43]Abn Bde Rept, Sep 58. CONF.

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Tank Crews Receive Training Instructions

18. Communications

a. Organization. Had the establishment of a joint headquarters such as AMLANFOR been foreseen, a signal operations company would have been included in the plan's original troop list. Actually the organic signal detachment of the airborne brigade and the 585th Signal Company (Support) were available for maintaining communications, but neither unit had the personnel and equipment for providing staff officers or tactical communications support to a joint headquarters. Despite these difficulties, adequate communications were established within 48 hours after AMLANFOR headquarters was activated, by converting the ATF 201 tactical communications net into a system capable of supporting the joint headquarters. At the end of July USAREUR was asked to earmark a signal operations company for immediate movement to Lebanon in the event of hostilities. Meanwhile, all signal elements in Lebanon were attached to the 585th Signal Company, which was then given the mission of supporting both AMLANFOR and the 201st Logistical Command headquarters. This proved to be an adequate solution. USAREUR provided additional personnel and equipment on a requisition basis.[44]

b. Personnel. The signal personnel originally assigned to ATF 201 were not trained to install the equipment required for a joint command headquarters. The cryptographic personnel provided by Seventh Army and the 17th Signal Operations Battalion were trained in NATO and U.S. Army signal procedures, but not in ACAN or joint command communications procedures. These deficiencies were overcome by requisitioning supplementary personnel from USAREUR, which in turn produced a critical shortage of cryptographic technicians in Europe.[45]

c. Equipment. The limited signal maintenance and repair facilities were greatly taxed when major items of signal equipment arrived in Lebanon in nonserviceable condition. Since the PE-95 power units were outdated, and spare parts were not available through normal Army channels, parts either had to be fabricated or purchased locally. Eventually USAREUR provided supplementary equipment to set up the headquarters communications net on an emergency basis. The procurement of the essential joint communications documents and publications required to support the Lebanon operation was also time-consuming.[46] Differences in

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[44](1) Cable X-31-7-6, COMAMLANFOR to CINCUSAREUR, 31 Jul 58. CONF. (2) AMLANFOR Rept, Part II, Sec III & IV. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[45]See note above. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[46]Cable (DTG 281126Z), CINCSPECOMME to CINCUSAREUR, 28 Jul 58. SECRET.

communications equipment caused some difficulties in traffic control of Army and Navy aircraft. Army aircraft assigned to ATF 201 were equipped with VHF radios, and some of them also had ARC-44 sets. Marine helicopters, on the other hand, relied solely upon UHF sets and had no ARC-44's. It was therefore recommended that aircraft organic to ground elements of a task force be equipped with ARC-44 sets.[47]

d. Traffic Problems. During the initial period of the Lebanon operation all teletype traffic from headquarters USACOMZEUR to Beirut was relayed through CINCSPECOMME rear headquarters in London. This relay operation, involving off-line encryption and decryption, was unsatisfactory because of long delays in the transmission of messages. However, when this traffic was handled through on-line channels between Heidelberg and Asmara, the message handling time was reduced by approximately 65 percent.[48]

Since the necessity of monitoring the activated frequencies for essential communications to support the Lebanon operation was not recognized in Western Europe, difficulties were encountered in obtaining clear radio frequencies from the Middle East. This situation forced USAREUR headquarters to preempt various high frequency channels in order to maintain communications between Heidelberg and Lebanon. Current frequency clearance and protection policies established by USEUCOM with the major Western European nations were thus endangered.

Also, the large increase in USAREUR traffic during the emergency phase of the operation almost overloaded the command's communications system. However, USAREUR was able to handle the traffic without minimizing it.[49]

e. The Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC). The establishment of AMLANFOR headquarters also created a requirement for a joint fire support coordination center. As in the case of the joint headquarters proper, the FSCC at AMLANFOR was organized by transferring needed personnel and available equipment from the 24th Airborne Brigade and from the 2d Provisional Marine Force. Solving the equipment problem entirely, however, was not so simple. In the early phase of the operation the shortage of communications equipment, attributed to the fact that earlier contingency planning had not contemplated an FSCC at the AMLANFOR level, affected the air and naval gunfire capabilities to such a degree that any fire support required during this period would have been largely ineffective. However, the needed equipment was requested, and by

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[47]Ltr, USAREUR CofS to DCSOPS, 21 Nov 58, cited above. SECRET.

[48]AMLANFOR Rept, Part II, Sec III. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[49]Ltr, USAREUR CofS to DCSOPS, 21 Nov 58, cited above. SECRET.

26 July the fire support coordinating center was operational.[50] By mid-August the artillery communications system was completed with the arrival of VHF radio equipment and the establishment of direct wire contact with the fire direction centers of the Army and Marine artillery groups. It was not until 29 August, however, that the radio equipment for the air liaison and naval gunfire liaison was received, making the FSCC operationally effective in the event of hostilities.[51]

19. Logistical Support

a. Prestocks and Resupplies. Within the framework of over-all preparations for the implementation of EP 201, USAREUR recommended in November 1957 that class I, III, and V supplies be prestocked at suitable locations. When this recommendation was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of the Army directed USAREUR to establish an operational project for replenishing theater reserve stocks.[52] This project, ARMY-EUCOM-GEN-1-58, called for items to be prestocked in the Middle East area itself as well as in USASETAF and Seventh Army facilities. Initial issue and resupply items for Forces ALPHA and BRAVO were to be prestocked in USACOMZEUR installations, which were also to prepack and segregate 20 days of resupply requirements for the entire task force.[53] However, since no agreements concerning the establishment of stocks had been reached by July 1958, no supplies had been prestocked in the objective area before the implementation of EP 201.[54]

With no prestocks available at Adana, Turkey, initial resupply for the deployed units of the Army task force had to be sent from Europe. This did not present a major problem, however, for the tactical units that began arriving in Beirut on 19 July brought with them 6 days of supplies plus sufficient gasoline to operate each vehicle for 300 miles. Aerial resupply of class I, III, and V items for 5 days began arriving on 21 July, and at the same time the first shipload of resupply was prepared for dispatch from USASETAF. The ship

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[50]Cable DA-945590, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 26 Jul 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[51](1) Comd Rept 1-31 Aug 58, AMLANFOR FSCC to J3, 6 Sep 58. UNCLAS. In USAREUR Hist Div Docu Sec. (2) AMLANFOR Rept, Part II, Sec III. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[52]Cable DA-935951, DA from DCSLOG/F4 to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Jan 58. SECRET.

[53]USAREUR ltr, 13 May 58, subj: Class IV Project in Support of EP 201 (U). AEAGD-RR 250/18 AG (AG-AO). SECRET.

[54]Cable MLP-A-37634, CINCUSAFE to CINCSPECOMME, 24 Jul 58. SECRET.

arrived at Beirut on 26 July with 10 days of supplies.[55]

Automatic resupply for ATF 201 had been ordered at the beginning of the operation. Implementation of the plans showed that the resupply program would have been adequate to sustain the task force in combat. However, since Force BRAVO was not deployed and a combat situation did not develop, excesses in certain categories of supplies quickly developed.[56] By 24 July--five days after the first Army troops landed in Lebanon--the storage problem was becoming critical because of the very limited space available to the U.S. forces and the expected arrival of resupply shipments in Beirut.[57]

The logistical plans also had to be changed because there was no expenditure of class V supplies and because automotive gasoline was available locally. With the consumption of these items far below expectation, automatic resupply could not continue, since no more than a 30-day supply level could be stored in Beirut. At the same time, stockage levels had to be in consonnance with the order-shipping time lag, which for shipments from the United States to Lebanon was estimated at 45 days. Adding a 15-day safety level, this meant that supplies for 60 days had to be kept readily available to the troops in Lebanon.

CINCSPECOMME therefore recommended that a 30-day level of all classes of supplies be maintained both at Beirut and in the Adana-Iskenderun area. He requested that only class I, II, and IV items of the USACOMZEUR air resupply (SPURWHEEL) be sent to Beirut and that all other classes be canceled. The entire USACOMZEUR first sea resupply (FERRYBOAT) should be shipped to Beirut, but of the second sea shipment (OAKTREE) only class I, II, and IV items should be sent to Beirut; class III, IIIA and V items should go to the Adana area. Class I items of the first resupply shipment from the United States should go to Beirut and all other classes to Adana.[58]

CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE approved these recommendations, and on 29 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the positioning of

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[55] AMLANFOR Rept, Part II, Sec IV, p. 1. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[56] Ibid., pp. 1, 5. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[57] Incl, to ltr, USAREUR to distr, 29 Jul 58, subj: G4 Journal Extracts, EP 201. AEAGD-PL 250/18 GD. SECRET.

[58] Cable USAREUR SMC IN 7611, CINCSPECOMME to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Jul 58. SECRET.

stocks at Adana.[59] In the meantime, the Turkish Foreign Office had already agreed to an extension of the facilities at Adana to accommodate stockpiles of ammunition and moderate quantities of other military equipment.[60] However, over 3,500 short tons of the OAKTREE shipment had already been diverted to USASETAF. Placing these stocks in Italy served the double purpose of relieving the Beirut port facilities and keeping the supplies in a relatively forward position.[61]

Actual preparations for establishing a supply storage area at the Adana airbase were made early in August. A subcommand of the 201st Logistical Command, composed of a medium truck company, an engineer construction company, and a small command detachment, was to move from Beirut to Adana. USCINCEUR directed the use of open storage to the extent practicable and the rental of private warehouse space in the Adana-Iskenderun area for temporary storage of class I, II, and IV items. The stocks could be transferred to the Adana airbase upon the completion of the construction of temporary covered storage facilities. The supplies thus stored in Turkey would amount to a 30-day level of all classes of supplies for a force of 10,000 men.[62] The logistical subcommand, comprising 387 personnel, left Beirut on 9 August and reached Iskenderun the next day.[63]

By the middle of the month, however, the continuing low rate of consumption and the need to hold stocks at Beirut to a minimum to avoid complications in the impending withdrawal, led COMAMLANFOR to revise the supply levels once more. CINCSPECOMME recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that only a 15-day level of stocks be maintained at Beirut.[64] This recommendation was approved, and a stock level of 45 days was authorized for all classes of supplies at Adana and Beirut combined.[65] About one week later, however, representatives of USAREUR, SPECOMME, AMLANFOR, and the 201st Logistical Command agreed to decrease the stockage level again--this time at Adana. The 15-day level of all

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[59](1) Cable SX-5662, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 28 Jul 58. (2) Cable JCS-945715, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, 29 Jul 58. Both SECRET.

[60]Cable EC-9-3889, USCINCEUR to CINCSPECOMME, 26 Jul 58. SECRET.

[61](1) Cable SX-5569, USAREUR to USASETAF, 24 Jul 58. (2) USAREUR G4 Jnl, Daily Log, 25 Jul 58, p. 1; 26 Jul 58, p. 2. (3) Cable P-0817, USASETAF to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Jul 58. All SECRET.

[62](1) Cable X-4-8-3, 201 Log Comd A to USCINCEUR Contact Off, Ankara, 4 Aug 58. (2) Cable SX-5958, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 8 Aug 58. Both SECRET.

[63]Cables DA-946375 & DA-946388, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, et al., 9 & 11 Aug 58. SECRET.

[64]Cable (DTG 130911Z), CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 13 Aug 58. SECRET.

[65]Cable JCS-946512, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, 13 Aug 58. SECRET.

View of the Port of Beirut

AGL (1) 6-59-300-71960

classes of supplies would be retained at Beirut, but the quantities at Adana were to be reduced to a 20-day level for class III and V supplies and to a 10-day level for class I, II, and IV items, supplemented by a 10-day level of all classes of supply positioned in Italy. Accordingly, the first resupply shipment from the United States was diverted to Leghorn, Italy. EP 201 stocks positioned in Italy thus amounted to a 25-day supply of class II and IV, a 15-day supply of class III, and a 12½-day supply of class V items.[66]

USAREUR had meanwhile reconsidered the question of over-all resupply responsibilities. According to original plans, after E+45 (1 September 1958) resupply for ATF 201 was to be solely a Department of the Army responsibility, except in emergency situations. Actual consumption, however, was much lower than anticipated. Moreover, USAREUR could furnish more timely resupply because the order-shipping time was shorter than from the United States. USAREUR resupply would also be more manageable through staff visits and rapid interchange of information. USAREUR therefore recommended that it resume the resupply responsibility after the fourth shipment from the United States, which was due in Beirut around 10 October. The Department of the Army, however, proposed that USAREUR assume this responsibility after the second shipment, expected on 8 September. USAREUR, through USACOMZEUR, was prepared to do this. The first USACOMZEUR shipment would replace the canceled shipment from the United States that was scheduled to arrive on 10 October. The Department of the Army was satisfied with this arrangement and announced that its second resupply shipment, departing New York on 21 August, would be the last.[67]

b. Local Procurement. The procurement section of the ATF 201 Support Command--later redesignated the 201st Logistical Command--began functioning on 20 July. Because he had no assistants, the procurement officer also assumed contracting functions. He procured locally the supplies and services urgently required by the Army forces and conducted negotiations for real estate. He was handicapped by lack of the appropriate forms, regulations, and directives. Moreover, although USAREUR had authorized local procurement up to a maximum of

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[66] (1) AMLANFOR Rept, Part II, Sec IV, p. 6. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Cable SX-6164, USAREUR to DA, COMAMLANFOR, 19 Aug 58. (3) Cable X-22-8-6, COMAMLANFOR from Westphalinger to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Aug 58. (4) Cable SX-6287, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 25 Aug 58. All SECRET.

[67] (1) Cable SX-6106, USAREUR to DA for DCSLOG, 15 Aug 58. (2) Cable DA-946693, DA to COMAMLANFOR, CINCUSAREUR, 16 Aug 58. (3) Cable SX-6164, USAREUR to DA, 19 Aug 58. (4) Cable SX-6219, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 21 Aug 58. (5) Cable DA-946953, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Aug 58. All SECRET.

$25,000 per contract, the amount of the fiscal appropriation was unknown and no fiscal officer was available to provide fund certification.

Nevertheless, certain urgent requirements[68] made it necessary that procurement begin immediately. Asked for assistance, the U.S. Embassy established a liaison procurement section on 22 July to effect contact with prospective vendors. Without proper forms, verbal orders for supplies and services had to be relied upon during the first days. Similarly, agreements for the occupancy of needed real estate were largely verbal.[69]

Early in August USAREUR furnished forms and regulations, and a contract specialist from USAREUR headquarters was sent on temporary duty to Lebanon to assist in developing proper procedures.[70] Also, a fiscal officer was assigned to the AMLANFOR J4, and $800,000 was made available for local procurement. The staff of the permanent procurement section was increased to 3 officers and 2 enlisted men, with a temporary detail of 2 officers and 9 enlisted men to assist in clearing up the heavy backlog of work engendered by the need to formalize earlier procurement actions. To facilitate routine procurement while this backlog was being removed, the procurement officer established an imprest fund for small non-repetitive purchases. He also created charge accounts for agencies whose numerous small requirements would normally have created a heavy administrative work load. Finally, he established open-end, requirement-type contracts for agencies whose support transactions involved high dollar costs. By 31 August all major contracts had either been signed or were in the final stages of preparation.[71] Twelve days later all earlier procurement actions had been formalized, and some of the detailed personnel were released. Thereafter procurement was largely of a routine nature.[72]

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[68] These included expendable office supplies, fresh fruit and vegetables, coffee, brooms and mops, soap, embalming service, lumber, nails and hardware, crushed stone, paint, engineer spare parts, service of a bucket crane and operator, medical laboratory service (furnished by the American Hospital, Beirut), drugs and medicines, motor and rail transportation, stevedoring service, and minor items of signal, ordnance, and chemical supply. CONF.

[69] (1) Log Comd Rept, 15-31 Jul 58. CONF. (2) Cable SC-38196, USAREUR to DA, 29 Jul 58. UNCLAS.

[70] Memo, ACofS, G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 11 Aug 58, subj: Supervision of Procurement, TF 201. CONF. In G3 Ops Br EP 201 file.

[71] Log Comd Rept, 1-31 Aug 58, pp. 11, 16-17. CONF.

[72] Ibid., 1-14 Sep 58, p. 11; 1-12 Oct 58, p. 11. CONF.

c. Cross-Service Support. With minor modifications, cross-service support in the objective area was to be governed by the responsibilities and procedures prevailing in Europe at the time that emergency plans were executed.[73]

The Army furnished the Marines with complete hospital and evacuation service, some medical supplies and preventive-medicine spraying items. It furnished no chemical or ordnance support to the other services, but Army engineers provided water support to the Navy, Marines, and Air Force, assisted in the construction of screened-in latrines, and furnished equipment support--including 20 crane-days, 3 grader-days, and 8 D-7 bulldozer-days--to the Marines. Army transportation support consisted of the use of 2½-ton trucks--282 truck-days to the Marines, 122 truck-days to the Navy, and 24 truck-days to the Air Force--plus 3 reefer-van-days' support to the Marines. Quartermaster support consisted of granting the Marines the use of 200 square meters of rented commercial cold storage space. The Marines also received Army signal support that included the use of 18 commercial communications circuits and the loan of three 16-mm movie projectors. The Navy used 2 commercial circuits and borrowed 500 feet of 5-pair cable.[74]

d. Permanent Prestocks at Adana. To provide some covered storage at Adana, two 40 x 100-foot prefabricated buildings were sent from Leghorn on 3 September for erection by the engineer construction company. These buildings were to house the class I, II, and IV permanent prestocks and provide office space for the storage dump security personnel.[75] Supplies were already arriving, and, although the mixed nature of the cargoes hampered unloading, the last shipment was discharged at the airbase on 8 September and placed in storage the following day. A week later construction of the storage area perimeter road was almost completed, access roads were being prepared, and a row of triple concertina wire was in place around the perimeter of the entire storage area.

By 12 October all construction--including fences, ditches, roads, and the two prefabricated warehouses--was complete. Almost 4,900 short tons of supplies, consisting mainly of class III and ordnance

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[73] Annex D, Logistics, to USAREUR EP 201, pp. 3, 9-10. SECRET.

[74] (1) Cable X-18-9-2, COMAMLANFOR to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Sep 58. (2) Cable X-30-9-3, same to DA, 30 Sep 58. Both CONF.

[75] Cable SX-6456, USAREUR to COMAMLANFOR for 201 Log Comd, 3 Sep 58. SECRET.

class V items, were in storage.[76]

With their mission accomplished, the ATF 201 personnel at Adana were withdrawn and replaced by a security detachment of 1 officer and 21 enlisted men furnished by USACOMZEUR on a temporary duty basis. Some stocks from Beirut were moved to the Adana storage area during the retraction phase, so that by the end of October 1958 the permanent prestocks had grown to approximately 7,000 tons, chiefly class III (2,400 tons) and ordnance class V (3,750 tons). In addition, 27 vehicles of various types were in storage at the airbase. However, the stocks in Turkey were not well balanced in terms of their intended use--the support of future Army task force operations. Thus, minor adjustments to guarantee the responsiveness of the stockpile were being considered.[77]

e. Significant Logistical Problems in the Objective Area. Probably the most serious logistical problem during the landing phase was the shortage of transportation support. Since no aerial port personnel and truck companies were available, the airborne combat units themselves unloaded the incoming aircraft and transferred the cargo to borrowed Lebanese Army vehicles. Later, the organic vehicles of the units that began to arrive were diverted to moving supplies and clearing the airfield. When water port activities reached their peak during the period 1-20 August, a similar problem developed. This time commercial trucks and busses were used to clear the port area until sufficient U.S. vehicles became available. Not only was the initial staff of 2 officers and 7 enlisted men sent to Beirut to organize port operations too small, but great difficulty was encountered in hiring stevedores and in contracting for needed port services.

The discharge of cargo from the ships of the seatail was complicated by improper loading. Organic equipment of a unit was frequently spread over several ships rather than concentrated in one. As a consequence, units were delayed in attaining a state of operational readiness. In addition, the capability of the roll-on, roll-off ship USNS Comet for rapid discharge was lost through improper loading. Passageways were blocked, and vehicles had to be lifted out of the ship instead of being driven off.

Unloading was slow until a platoon of the 533d Transportation Truck Company arrived with the last elements of Force CHARLIE. No doubt the unloading and clearing operations would have been facilitated if transportation personnel and vehicles had been included

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[76] Log Comd Rept, 1-14 Sep 58, p. 35; 1-12 Oct 58, p. 37. CONF.

[77] (1) Cable SX-7530, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 5 Nov 58. CONF.
(2) Cable AEZLG-8-2191, USACOMZEUR to DA, 12 Dec 58. SECRET.

in Force ALPHA.[78] The task force, however, was organized primarily for a combat situation in which the emphasis would have been on airdrop rather than port operations.

The uneven consumption of supplies made the selective unloading of many resupply ships necessary. None had been loaded in a manner to facilitate selective unloading, and some arrived with inaccurate or incomplete manifests. Thus, many supplies had to be handled twice--unloaded to permit access to needed stocks and then reloaded for shipment to one or another of the prestock areas.[79] However, the actual consumption of supplies was not known at the time of loading, and selective loading could have complicated resupply under combat conditions.

Supplies of quartermaster class I, II, III, and IV items were adequate from the outset. Initially "C" rations were issued, but by July the "B" ration, supplemented by fresh fruit and vegetables, was introduced. By the middle of August shipments of ice cream arrived from Italy by ship, and by the end of that month a thrice-weekly airlift was bringing fresh meat, fish, dairy products, and vegetables from Germany. Thereafter fresh food was served at all meals. Storage was generally good, and cold storage--utilizing refrigerator vans and local commercial cold storage facilities--was considered superior. Bathing, food service, sales store, and bakery facilities were established relatively late but operated well. Laundry operations were hampered by the inexperience of personnel and by some faulty equipment. There were also some minor shortages of class II and IV spare parts.[80]

There were no major engineer problems except for a shortage of repair parts, caused primarily by the use of much nonstandard equipment, and a shortage of water purification chemicals, caused by the deferment of resupply shipments. Chemical support was adequate.

Ordnance supply was sufficient except for shortages of battery electrolyte, oil seals, and spare parts for the 5-ton truck and M48 tank.

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[78](1) AMLANFOR Rept, Part II, Sec IV, Annex G, pp. 1-2. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Tab D, to incl, n.d., subj: Report of Lebanon Operation (hereafter cited as Rept Leb Op), to ltr, USAREUR CofS to DCSOPS, 21 Nov 58, cited above. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

[79]See note above. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[80](1) AMLANFOR Rept, Part II, Sec IV, Annex E, pp. 1-4. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Annex A, to USAREUR Stf Conf Nr 1, Jan 59, p. 11. UNCLAS.

One problem in class V supply concerned riot-control munitions. Although substantial quantities of these munitions accompanied the task force and were not expended, air shipment of 10,000 tear-gas grenades was requested by AMLANFOR headquarters in late July. USAREUR forwarded the stocks available in Europe and requested additional supplies from the United States.[81]

While medical supplies, with the exception of back-pack sprayers and insecticides, were initially adequate, serious shortages of items used in the treatment of heat sickness and enteric conditions soon developed. These deficiencies became more serious with the passage of time, for resupply shipments did not compensate for rapid expenditure. Another problem arose in the shipping of whole blood. Being highly perishable, whole blood shipped to the Middle East in summertime required special packing and expeditious transportation. To prevent a recurrence of the spoilage experienced during the Lebanon operation, it was recommended that future shipments be made by courier.[82]

20. Civil Affairs

a. Over-all Responsibilities. The Department of State directed the U.S. Ambassador in Lebanon to exercise personal supervision over civil affairs and public information activities. CINCSPECOMME, as the senior military representative, retained over-all responsibility for military-political relationships, subject to the policy direction of the Ambassador. The civil affairs officer at SPECOMME headquarters represented the U.S. military forces as liaison agent with the Lebanese authorities and in status of forces negotiations.[83]

b. Liaison with Lebanese Authorities. The presence of U.S. troops in Lebanon created a requirement for the frequent exchange of

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[81](1) AMLANFOR Rept, Part II, Sec IV, p. 6; Annex A, pp. 1-2; Annex D, p. 2. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Cable SX-5656, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS for Pachler, 27 Jul 58. (3) Cable X-29-7-1, AMLANFOR to USACOMZEUR, 29 Jul 58. Both SECRET. (4) Tab D, to Rept Leb Op. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

[82](1) AMLANFOR Rept, Part II, Sec IV, Annex C, pp. 2, 5-6. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Tab D, to Rept Leb Op. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). Signal support problems, caused by the creation of a unified command structure that had not been provided for in the original planning, have been discussed in detail in the section devoted to communications problems.

[83](1) Cable (DTG 312131Z), CINCSPECOMME to COMAMLANFOR, 31 Jul 58. (2) Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Lt Col J. P. Bullion, USAREUR CA Div, 9 Feb 59. Both CONF.

views and information between the executive agents of the U.S. forces and the Lebanese Government. At the suggestion of CINCSPECOMME, two agencies, the Lebanese-American Civil Affairs Commission[84] and the Embassy Liaison Office, were established for this purpose.[85]

(1) The Lebanese-American Civil Affairs Commission. This commission was composed of the Director General of the Lebanese Ministry of the Interior, a representative of the U.S. Ambassador, and the senior civil affairs officer on CINCSPECOMME's staff. The commission also had to function as an operating agency because the U.S. forces were restricted to an administrative posture in a limited area. In the course of time it dealt with such problems as violations of public security, damage claims, use of the public domain, procurement of indigenous labor, community relations, and procurement and monitorship of local resources. It also supplies the U.S. military headquarters with data concerning local political and social problems.

(2) The Embassy Liaison Office. Early in the operation this office was established to maintain daily contact between the U.S. forces and the Lebanese public. It proved to be instrumental also in keeping the U.S. military headquarters and Embassy in close contact, thereby minimizing confusion, eliminating many inconsistencies, and effecting a uniformity of policy. Its staff consisted of 12 Foreign Service Officers, all specialists in Middle-Eastern affairs, and CINCSPECOMME's civil affairs staff officer.[86]

c. Status of Forces Agreement. Shortly after the arrival of the U.S. forces it became evident that a status of forces agreement with the Lebanese Government would be necessary. Therefore, on 18 July CINCSPECOMME recommended to the Ambassador that negotiations be initiated with the Lebanese authorities. With the concurrence of the Ambassador, the SPECOMME civil affairs section established direct liaison with the Lebanese Prime Minister and other Government officials to determine their attitudes regarding an agreement. Their reaction was prompt, enthusiastic, and initially without reservations. An appropriate agreement was soon drafted and State Department approval obtained, followed by an exchange of diplomatic notes between the two Governments. Final agreement was concluded on 6 August, within 23 days of the landing of U.S. forces in Lebanon.[87]

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[84] Initially a committee, it was elevated and formalized at the request of the Lebanese Government through an exchange of diplomatic notes defining its area of interest and authority.

[85] Rept Leb Op. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

[86] Ibid. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

[87] Ltr, USAREUR CofS to DCSOPS, 21 Nov 58, cited above, w/incl, Rept Leb Op. SECRET (info used CONF).

jurisdiction over all persons subject to its military courts, exempted the forces from any form of taxation, and granted them free entry of mail without inspection.[88]

In the opinion of COMAMLANFOR, the Status of Forces Agreement was ineffective, primarily because the Lebanese Government failed to enforce it. Specifically, in the fields of criminal jurisdiction and claims the agreement was held to be so vague and lacking in detail as to be virtually unworkable. COMAMLANFOR therefore recommended that negotiations to remedy these deficiencies be initiated immediately by the Ambassador. Such action, however, was not deemed necessary since the terms expressed in the government-to-government agreement provided ample basis for further negotiations at the operational level.[89]

In the American Ambassador's view, public announcement of the wide concessions granted through the Status of Forces Agreement to the United States by the Republic of Lebanon would open the Lebanese Government to criticism. For this reason he recommended that only a limited press statement be issued in Washington, highlighting only those provisions of interest to the American public. The Secretary of State's reply noted the very favorable terms obtained, and opposed any release of the terms of the Agreement. From CINCSPECOMME's point of view, the broad areas of agreement could serve as a basis for further negotiations on matters of narrower importance between local or regional governmental authorities and subordinate U.S. commands. During the operation several amendments to the original agreement were negotiated. However, the Lebanese refused to assent to modifications. Consequently, the U.S. forces generally had to accomplish their mission within the very broad coverage of the initial agreement.[90]

d. The 201st Logistical Command Civil Affairs Section. Early in the Lebanon operation the AMLANFOR civil affairs officer returned to USAREUR and was not replaced. Enlisted personnel in the AMLANFOR civil affairs section were reassigned elsewhere within the headquarters. The gap thus created was bridged by the SPECOMME civil affairs officer,

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[88] Cable DA-946639, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 15 Aug 58. SECRET.

[89] (1) Ltr, COMAMLANFOR to CINCSPECOMME, 28 Aug 58, subj: Deficiencies in Status of Forces Agreement. In USAREUR AG Hq AMLANFOR file. (2) Ltr, CINCSPECOMME to COMAMLANFOR, 11 Sep 58, subj: Initial Status of Forces Agreement-LEBANON. In USAREUR CA Div Plans Br. Both UNCLAS.

[90] (1) AMLANFOR Rept, Part III. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Col Bullion, 9 Feb 59. CONF.

who maintained close liaison with the 201st Logistical Command Civil Affairs Section, which began functioning on 3 August.[91]

(1) Control of Vendors. One of the first tasks of the new civil affairs section was to deal with the large numbers of Lebanese vendors, barbers, and souvenir and soft drink salesmen entering the bivouac areas. Something had to be done to establish security and sanitation controls over these vendors. In coordination with a representative of the 24th Airborne Brigade, the civil affairs section drew up a control plan and submitted it to Headquarters, AMLANFOR.[92]

This plan--approved and published on 10 September in AMLANFOR Circular 43--assigned responsibility for control of all indigenous personnel within the areas occupied by U.S. Army troops to the 201st Logistical Command civil affairs section. Selective issuance of passes to indigenous vendors was based on a personal history check, a medical examination, and the type of services performed by each applicant. All passes were registered, and infraction of the posted regulations or verbal instructions constituted grounds for pass revocation. In addition to the passes, permits to vend were also required.

In checking local vendors entering the troop areas, Lebanese Army personnel found that some of them had duty-free cigarettes in their possession. The offenders' passes were immediately withdrawn and the cigarettes confiscated. To forestall further incidents of this nature, vendors were given a notice, printed in both Arabic and English, warning them against the purchase of duty-free cigarettes. In addition, a circular concerning the unauthorized possession of American duty-free cigarettes was disseminated among U.S. Army troops. Of the 418 passes issued for entry into the troop-occupied areas, only 8 were revoked for illegal possession of duty-free cigarettes or for undesirable conduct.[93]

(2) Price Control of Soft Drinks. Concurrently with the foregoing actions the civil affairs section also took steps to control the price of soft drinks, which since the arrival of the troops had ranged from a pack of cigarettes to one dollar. The local soft drink distributors were consulted in an effort to regulate the prices, and after official sales points were established and prices fixed at reasonable levels the barter system disappeared.[94]

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[91] Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Col Bullion, 9 Feb 59. CONF.

[92] Log Comd Rept, 1-31 Aug, 22-30 Sep 58. CONF.

[93] Ibid. CONF.

[94] Ibid. CONF.

Local Tradesman Serving Paratrooper

AGL (1) 6-59-150-71961

e. The Occupation of the Olive Groves. As the U.S. Army troops moved into Lebanon they quickly took up bivouac positions in the large olive groves near the villages of Ech Choueifate, Kafer Chima, El Hadeth, Borj el Brajni, and Ouadi Chahrour (Map 3).[95] The presence of military encampments in the groves was expected to hamper the annual harvest, which was to begin in September and continue until late January or early February. Guidance issued by AMLANFOR on 15 August required all commanders to protect crops and civil property and assist crop owners through the local authorities. In coordination with the 201st Logistical Command's civil affairs section, they were to permit assessment of the crop so that the harvest might begin on schedule, thereby keeping loss claims against the United States to a minimum. Local arrangements, announcements, and contracts were to be made solely by AMLANFOR headquarters, and individual landowners would have to submit loss or damage claims in accordance with current regulations.[96]

(1) Harvest Arrangements. The arrangements for harvesting the olive crop in areas occupied by U.S. troops were illustrated by the action taken at the Ech Choueifate olive grove. This was the largest grove in Lebanon, and U.S. forces had occupied approximately 20 percent of the entire grove. As the date for the beginning of the harvest season drew near, a security problem arose because thousands of harvest workers were expected to enter the areas. The 201st Logistical Command headquarters planned to allow only a few local government appraisers to estimate the crop losses in the area. Unit commanders would provide escorts while the appraisers were in the vicinity of troop installations. This plan also took into account the attitudes of the local population, for the women who harvested the olives would refuse to enter the areas occupied by the troops, since the custom of their sect forbade them to work in the presence of foreign men. The landowners, however, were willing to enter the troop-occupied areas and demanded that the United States purchase the entire crop. As a further complication, ownership of the approximately 11,700 trees was divided among 900 landowners, each owning about 12 to 14 trees.[97]

Following a series of conferences between the mayor of Ech Choueifate and representatives from the Embassy and the SPECOMME civil affairs office, a general agreement was reached, differing somewhat from the civil affairs section plan but based on its general features. The landowners would suffer no loss since, when a full crop or portion thereof was lost, a fair compensation not in excess of the real loss would be paid. Every effort would be made

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[95] These bivouac areas were initially occupied without formalizing leases for the properties. UNCLAS.

[96] Log Comd Rept, 1-31 Aug 58. CONF.

[97] Ibid. CONF.

to salvage the largest possible portion of the crop in order to prevent unnecessary waste. However, procedures were to be carried out in such a way as to cause a minimum of inconvenience to the U.S. military and at the same time minimize the possibility of friction between the armed forces and the landowners, most of whom were relatively poor and uneducated and therefore could not be expected to understand the special requirements of U.S. regulations.[98]

(2) Damage Claims Procedures. Together with the local mayors, the 201st Logistical Command's civil affairs section defined the duties of the appraisers and harvesters and established procedures for the protection of the landowners' interests. The village authorities provided the civil affairs section with detailed maps indicating the ownership of the land occupied by the troops in order that the claims commission could arrive at reasonable solutions. All claims for damages to crops would be processed through the offices of the village mayors for presentation to the U.S. claims commission.

Landowners who failed to make a reasonable effort to harvest their crops would not be paid for their losses. However, if the presence of troops actually prevented the landowner from harvesting his crop, the civil affairs section would prepare a certificate that served as a basis for a damage claim. No claims for damages to grounds or property were accepted until the areas had been permanently cleared by the troops.[99]

After ownership of the occupied portions of the groves had been determined, local appraisers were hired to estimate the crop damage. The appraisers were assembled on 28 August and given specific instructions concerning their tasks and the scope of their employment. They were instructed to work with maximum effort in the over-all interests of both the landowners and the U.S. Government. About a week was required to complete the appraisal. The results were then turned over to the claims commission to be used as a basis for adjudicating the claims.[100]

f. Adjudication of Claims. Early in August COMAMLANFOR asked the Department of the Army for authority to appoint foreign claims commissions, pursuant to title 10, U.S. Code, Section 2734 (AR 225-90). The authority was granted, and 2 claims commissions were created--FCC 507, with a membership of 1, and FCC 74, with 3 members. Procedures for processing claims and investigations reports were

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[98] Ibid. CONF.

[99] Ibid. CONF.

[100] (1) Ibid. CONF. (2) AMLANFOR Rept, Part II, Sec IV, p. 14.

established and disseminated to all unit commanders. Until the withdrawal of the forces all claims arising from the activities of the Army and Air Force personnel in Lebanon were adjudicated and paid by these commissions. By 25 October the claims-receiving office in Beirut had received 52 claims, totaling $29,703.59. It had allowed 23 claims, totaling $965.94, and disallowed 6, totaling $544.69.[101]

Since some claims remained to be settled after the withdrawal of the Army elements from Lebanon, COMAMLANFOR requested CINCUSAFE to assume responsibility for their settlement. CINCUSAFE assigned the task to the Foreign Claims Mission, AF 18, Headquarters, TUSLOG. The adjudication of these claims was based upon investigative reports forwarded from Lebanon, since the Air Force had no investigation personnel in Lebanon. After the departure of the last major troop unit from Lebanon, a U.S. Army claims investigation team remained to complete pending investigations.[102]

g. Lessons Learned.

(1) General. The Lebanon operation was not an adequate test of civil affairs/military government capabilities. A more extensive operation in support of U.S. policy in the Middle East would undoubtedly result in much broader contact between the military command and the citizenry of the foreign nation. In that event, the task force commander would need specific policy and guidance, sufficient staff augmentation, and trained civil affairs/military government units to fulfill his national and international commitments. Staff augmentation would be particularly important for the accomplishment of civil affairs responsibilities if the U.S. diplomatic representatives for the national area in question were not available.[103]

(2) Negotiation of a Status of Forces Agreement. Advance preparations for the negotiation of status of forces agreements would

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[101](1) AMLANFOR Rept, Part II, Sec I, Annex E, p. 2. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Log Comd Rept, 13 Oct-30 Nov 58. CONF.

[102](1) AMLANFOR Rept, Part II, Sec I, Annex E. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Cable X-28-9-3, COMAMLANFOR to USCINCEUR, 28 Sep 58. CONF. (3) Cable EC-9-5065, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAFE, 29 Sep 58. CONF. (4) Cable SYA-40344, CINCUSAFE to COMAMLANFOR, 30 Sep 58. CONF. (5) Hq USEUCOM Blue Bat Critique, 2-3 Dec 58. ECJA 381. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). Cy in USAREUR CA Div Plans Br.

[103](1) Hq USEUCOM Blue Bat Critique, cited above. SECRET (info used CONF). (2) Rept Leb Op. SECRET.

Bivouac Area in the Olive Groves

AGL (1) 6-59-150-71961

have been advisable. In an area of potential operation, in which the sovereignty of the country is to be respected, the U.S. Ambassador should be empowered to initiate negotiations immediately with the host government when it is informed of the action to be taken, or upon actual troop landings, whichever is sooner. Any agreement proposed by either the Embassy or the Armed Forces should include both State and Defense Department requirements.

The Lebanon experience demonstrated that the best time to obtain concessions was as soon as possible after the request for assistance or intervention was received. Prompt negotiation of a status of forces agreement would have eliminated some of the difficulties resulting from adverse reaction to U.S. intervention or stemming directly from the lack of such an agreement. Since the military commander might be required to negotiate a status of forces agreement in the absence of U.S. diplomatic representatives, operations orders should contain civil affairs annexes with sufficient guidance to enable the commander to conduct negotiations.[104]

(3) Civil Affairs Staffing. Initially the staff section responsible for civil affairs was handicapped by having neither a legal officer qualified in international law and claims nor an officer experienced in labor relations assigned to it; later a qualified legal officer was assigned. Even in the limited Lebanon operation the civil affairs section would have been unable to accomplish its mission without the assistance of Foreign Service officers from the Foreign Service Institute's Arabic Studies Center in Beirut. Normally, such personnel would not be available to the armed forces.[105]

(4) Provision of Facilities. It would be desirable for a government considering a request for U.S. intervention to provide the U.S. forces with the necessary billeting and facilities. The Lebanese Government, however, assumed that the troops would locate their own areas, as they did. This procedure placed the troop commander in the position of having to bargain with individual property owners who were often reluctant to release their property. Policy guidance for processing claims was inadequate during the operation, and vacillation in this field bred enmity. The development, in advance, of a well-defined position concerning claims for damages, rentals, and the use of property would have protected U.S. interests and, at the same time, have given adequate consideration to

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[104] Rept Leb Op. SECRET. The U.S. forces in Lebanon were for 23 days without a formal status of forces agreement to regulate their relations with the Lebanese authorities and population.

[105] Ibid. SECRET.

the foreign government and its citizens.[106]

21. Information

a. Organization and Functions. Admiral Holloway's senior press officer, a U.S. Navy Commander, was assisted by a staff including representatives from each of the three services participating in the Lebanon operation. The Army's representative on this staff was an officer from the USAREUR Information Division. In addition, a field grade officer from Seventh Army had been assigned initially to the Army task force staff as the public information officer. This officer was transferred to AMLANFOR headquarters when it was established, leaving the Army task force temporarily without a public information staff. The 201st Logistical Command had no public information personnel, the task being assigned to a staff officer as an additional duty. With the arrival of the Department of Army Signal Corps photo detachment, the public information staff at AMLANFOR headquarters was strengthened. The commander of this detachment became COM-AMLANFOR's public information officer, and the officer who originally had been a member of the Army task force was reassigned to 24th Airborne Brigade headquarters, where he was able to form a public information section. The arrival of additional enlisted personnel and equipment from USAREUR and USACOMZEUR in August enabled the public information sections at both the AMLANFOR and the 24th Airborne Brigade headquarters to operate more effectively. Initially, however, the public information staff assigned to ATF 201 was too small, inadequately equipped--lacking office equipment as well as transportation--and poorly oriented as to its mission in Lebanon.[107]

Since no troop information officer was assigned to the task force, his functions were assumed by the officer in charge of the psychological warfare detachment. This detachment published the Cedar, the primary troop information medium in Lebanon.[108]

b. Joint USIS-Military Information Office. Daily press conferences were held at this office located in the American Embassy. Representatives from the Embassy, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force were present at each conference to report on matters concerning their respective services and to answer any specific questions

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[106](1) Ibid. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (2) Hq USEUCOM Blue Bat Critique, cited above. SECRET.

[107]Intvws, Dr. Fisher with Major C. J. Bennett, USAREUR Info Div, 11 & 12 May 59. UNCLAS.

[108]Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Lt Col J. V. Sherlock, C/USAREUR Info Div Trp Info Br, 12 May 59. UNCLAS.

the correspondents might ask. Since this office was primarily concerned with the over-all military-political situation, the U.S. Army public information representatives had to make special efforts to bring the Army story to the attention of the press and radio representatives and to give them news leads on items of Army interest. Army transportation facilities were provided to take the correspondents on visits to the various Army headquarters and units. News copy obtained during these visits was filed independently by the correspondents without being cleared through the joint information office. However, the newsmen were hampered by an often rigid and somewhat inexperienced Lebanese censorship office, which censored all material containing any references to the Lebanese armed forces or Government.[109]

c. Army Public Information. The arrival of the first Army units was covered by approximately 60 journalists and photographers who were at the airfield as the first troops deplaned. News stories emphasized the background of the units, the composition of the forces, their versatility, their potential, and key individuals in the task force. During the first few weeks of the Lebanon operation more than 20 correspondents and photographers from leading American newspapers were personally escorted, assisted, and given leads and suggestions by public information personnel.[110]

On 1 August the ATF 201 public information effort was greatly amplified with the arrival of the Signal Corps photo detachment from Long Island City, New York. This unit was able to make sound motion pictures in both color and black and white, to transmit wire photos to the United States, and to process and print black and white still pictures locally. Its arrival facilitated public information coverage of the landing of the first shipload of support troops. When the detachment returned to the United States at the end of August, its responsibilities, darkroom equipment, and photo supplies were assigned to the USAREUR Signal Division photo unit.[111]

d. Public Information Effort for Amphibious Training Exercise. To allay the fears of an uninformed population during a planned joint amphibious-helicopter exercise in the vicinity of the coastal village

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[109](1) Ibid. (2) SPECOMME Info Guide for Press, Radio, and TV Reps, 22 Jul 59. In USAREUR Info Div Radio-TV & Sp Proj Sec. Both UNCLAS.

[110]Memo, Maj C. J. Bennett, USAREUR Info Div, 3 Aug 58, subj: Summary and Evaluation of Army Information Program. FF5-3/Memo, Hq SPECOMME. UNCLAS. In file above.

[111]Memo, SPECOMME CINFO to CofS, subj: Report of Activities of Information Section, 1-31 August 1958. UNCLAS. In file above.

Joint Helicopter-Amphibious Exercise at J'Bail Beach near Byblos, Lebanon

AGL (1) 6-59-150-71961

of J'Bail, CINCSPECOMME's public information office planned a careful preparatory information campaign. Two days before the operation the press story was released in Arabic and English to the local and foreign press. Emphasis was placed upon Lebanese armed forces approval of the operation as evidenced by the presence of 20 senior Lebanese officers as observers. One day before the exercise 5,000 copies of a photo map of the exercise, together with an explanation in Arabic, were distributed to the citizens of the J'Bail area. In addition, qualified military briefers, accompanied by interpreters, were placed at selected vantage points along the shore to explain the exercise to the civilian spectators who watched the Marines swarm ashore from their landing craft and the Army paratroopers land in their helicopters. This exercise demonstrated the value of thorough preparation of the civilian population through the public relations media for a passive and even friendly acceptance of a training exercise by foreign troops.[112]

e. Troop Information. As soon as the U.S. Army units were ordered into Lebanon, a USAREUR fact sheet on the crisis and its causes was prepared for distribution to all personnel. The first draft of the fact sheet was completed and ready for staff coordination on 25 July. However, before it could be coordinated and printed, a Department of Defense fact sheet, together with reproduction plates, and written especially for the Middle East crisis, was received at USAREUR headquarters on 28 July. Since the USAREUR Adjutant General was unable to print the sheets promptly, the plates were sent to the Stars and Stripes plant in Darmstadt for processing. On 31 July the printing was completed, and 5,000 copies were shipped by air to Lebanon for distribution to the troops on duty there. A second Department of Defense fact sheet was received from Washington on 10 August, printed in Darmstadt, and shipped to Lebanon 12 days later.[113]

f. Community Relations.

(1) Distribution of Relief Supplies. Late in August 1958 arrangements were made through the U.S. Embassy to donate surplus Army medical supplies valued at approximately $3,500 to the Lebanese Government for distribution. Approximately 8 tons of supplies, principally lime for sanitation purposes and some blankets, were transported by U.S. Army helicopters and trucks to 3 separate regions in Lebanon: The Chouf (inhabited mainly by the Druzes), Beirut, and the Tripoli area. Each package was conspicuously marked "U.S. Army

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[112] Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Maj Bennett, 11 May 59. UNCLAS.

[113] (1) Memo, C/Trp Info Br to C/USAREUR Info Div, 14 Jan 59, subj: Department of Defense Fact Sheets on Middle East Situation. In Trp Info Br. (2) Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Col Sherlock, 11 May 59. Both UNCLAS.

Medical Supply." Although this operation was given public information coverage, the releases to the press were toned down lest groups not receiving such supplies take offense.[114]

(2) Public Behavior of Military Personnel. Despite the fact that Marines, Army paratroopers, airmen, and sailors were crowded together in a very limited leave area in Beirut, with alcoholic beverages plentiful in numerous bars and cafes thronged with Lebanese, there were no serious incidents. The pass procedures of the U.S. armed forces in Lebanon, which required that every individual going on pass to be thoroughly briefed by his commanding officer, was largely responsible for this fine record.[115]

Off-duty misbehavior of military personnel in public places, although of minor proportions, was the most persistent public relations problem faced by the unified command. On 2 August all bars and restaurants in the Beirut area were placed off limits to military personnel bearing arms, unless they were on official business. At the same time, the number of minor incidents was reduced through the vigorous use of courtesy patrols and the continued orientation of personnel in public relations. Greater emphasis was also placed upon defensive driver training and closer control of unit transportation facilities to decrease the number of traffic accidents.[116]

22. Propaganda and Psychological Warfare Efforts

a. Joint Propaganda Efforts. Primary responsibility for the conduct of psychological and ideological warfare operations had been assigned to the U.S. Embassy and the USIS, in accordance with JSCP 1958-59. Propaganda activities were therefore under the control of the Ambassador, with the armed forces providing support upon request. For example, in coordination with the Ambassador, CINCSPECOMME made plans to disseminate a large number of psychological warfare leaflets that had been prestocked in the Adana base. On 21 July two

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[114](1) Cable ALFCG-X-29-8-6. COMAMLANFOR to DA, 29 Aug 58. (2) Cable (DTG 231741Z), CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 23 Aug 58. (3) Cable (DTG 301621Z), same to same, 30 Aug 58. All CONF. (4) Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Maj Bennett, 4 Mar 59. UNCLAS.

[115]Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Maj Bennett, 11 May 59. UNCLAS.

[116](1) Memo, Comdr J. D. Pillsbury, USN, SPECOMME PIO, 16 Aug 58, subj: Public Relations Effect of Misbehavior in Liberty. FT 5-3, 002/JDP/Lr. UNCLAS. In USAREUR CA Div Plans Br. (2) Cable (DTG 012210Z), 1 Aug 58, COMUSMARCORTA to USMARCORTA. CONF. (3) AMLANFOR Rept, Part II, Sec I, Annex D, p. 1. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

C-130 aircraft dropped a million such leaflets over the major population centers. The leaflets explained the reasons for the presence of the U.S. troops and declared that they would depart upon the request of the Lebanese Government. During the next four days this operation was followed by a series of massed flyovers by U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft to demonstrate U.S. strength to the Lebanese.[117]

b. Psychological Warfare. A psychological warfare detachment, consisting of 3 officers and 11 enlisted men, was organized specifically to support ATF 201.[118] The detachment included three mobile loudspeaker teams and was equipped with complete mobile printing facilities.[119] Initially attached to 24th Airborne Brigade headquarters, it came under the operational control of Headquarters, AMLANFOR, upon activation of the latter.

When the detachment arrived in Beirut on 21 July, its commander contacted the Embassy Public Affairs Officer, who asked him to refrain from any psychological or ideological warfare operations directed toward the Lebanese population. Consequently, at no time during the Lebanon operation did the detachment actually engage in psychological warfare activities.[120]

c. The Cedar. The psychological warfare detachment wrote and published a troop newspaper, The Cedar. An editorial office was established in the Embassy, and on 25 July printing began on the presses of the Near East Regional Service Center, which supported all USIS offices throughout the Near East and was well suited to assist the armed forces in their publication efforts. The first edition of The Cedar appeared on 28 July in 7,000 copies; the paper continued to appear daily, Monday through Friday, except holidays,

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[117](1) AMLANFOR Rept, Part II, Sec III, Annex D. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Cable C-143, CINCSPECOMME to COMAMAIRFOR, 20 Jul 58. SECRET. (3) Ltr, Maj W. R. Condos, USEUCOM, to Lt Col D. W. Osgood, USAREUR G3, 25 Sep 58, w/2 incl. CONF. In USAREUR G3 War Plans Sec.

[118]Although no Arabic speaking personnel were included in the detachment, USEUCOM held such personnel on a standby basis for assignment if required. SECRET.

[119]The facilities consisted of two A. B. Dick presses, one of which was so badly damaged in transport as to be unusable for the entire operation. Spare parts were unobtainable in the Middle East or Western Europe. SECRET.

[120](1) AMLANFOR Rept, Part II, Sec III, Annex D, p. 1. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Ltr, Maj Condos to Col Osgood, cited above. CONF.

until 30 September, when printing support was withdrawn. On 1 October the detachment resumed publication of The Cedar as a 4-page, mimeographed newssheet. Two thousand copies were printed daily for troop distribution until the detachment was redeployed.

The Cedar was published as a troop information medium, particularly to promote a better understanding of the native population by U.S. military personnel. The newspaper became the core of the troop information program in Lebanon. Because of strict Government censorship, the few Lebanese who could read English gave credence to the news they read in that paper.[121]

d. Support of Radio Lebanon. On 29 July the USIS in Beirut initiated a series of three ½-hour programs daily in Arabic and English over the small 3-kilowatt transmitter of Radio Lebanon. USIS and Headquarters, AMLANFOR later agreed to boost the power and radius of the program by employing a 10-kilowatt U.S. Army mobile transmitter, but, because of unsettled conditions in Beirut, the booster station did not begin operations until 2 September. When the U.S. forces withdrew, they left the transmitter as a gift to Radio Lebanon.[122]

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[121] See note above. SECRET.

[122] Fonecon, Dr. Fisher with Lt Col S. S. Kale & MSgt W. P. Boff, US Army Elm Am Forces Network Eur. UNCLAS.

Part III: Mission Accomplished

CHAPTER 5

The Withdrawal of Forces

23. Early Considerations

As soon as the USAREUR task force had been deployed to Lebanon, the Department of the Army was requested to provide replacements for the units withdrawn from Europe. USAREUR recommended that ground forces be deployed from the United States to Lebanon and that the USAREUR units there be returned to Europe provided the situation in the Middle East did not deteriorate further. This was considered essential to accomplishing the mission of the U.S. Army in Europe. The Department of the Army agreed to consider this recommendation at the time forces were actually deployed from the United States.[1]

Later in July the U.S. Seventh Army expressed concern over its "critical" losses in combat and combat-support capabilities. The then Seventh Army commander, Lt. Gen. C. D. Eddleman, considered that the crux of the problem lay in the 24th Division's airborne capability. Although the 4-division STRAC force was maintained in the United States for such emergencies as this USAREUR had been called upon to provide the forces because it had the capability. As a result, the military

[1](1) Cable SX-5453, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS for Pachler, 19 Jul 58. SECRET. (2) Cable DA-945380, DA from DCSOPS to CINC-USAREUR, 23 Jul 58. CONF.

potential in Europe had been reduced to meet the needs of another theater.[2] Over 2,200 men of the 24th Division were deployed in Lebanon, reducing the division's infantry strength by 20 percent. (Had Force BRAVO been deployed, the division would have lost 40 percent of its infantry and 30 percent of its total strength.) Had a general alert occurred, the 24th Division would have been brought up to strength with replacements from the 8th Infantry Division, but this would have seriously reduced the reserves immediately available to Seventh Army.[3] Similar conditions were reported by USACOMZEUR.[4]

The major units deployed in Lebanon and their general alert missions in Europe--indicating their importance to USAREUR--were as follows:

187th Airborne Battle Group, Reinforced: To occupy, organize, and defend strong points of resistance in the area of initial contact with the enemy;

3d Medium Tank Battalion, 34th Armored Regiment: To serve as armored element of the V Corps reserve;

Signal Support Company, 379th Signal Battalion: To provide approximately 50 percent of the communications for the Seventh Army logistical support system;

299th Engineer Battalion (C): To provide approximately 25 percent of the obstacle and barrier construction capability in the V Corps sector;

79th Engineer Battalion (C): To provide approximately 35 percent of the POL pipeline construction and repair capability available to USAREUR;

Company C, 801st Engineer Battalion (Heavy Construction): To support USAFE with bomb-damage repair capability;

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[2](1) Cable 5154, Seventh Army cite AETGC-PL to CINCUSAREUR, 31 Jul 58. (2) Incl, ltr, Lt Gen D. C. Eddleman, CG Seventh Army, to Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, 31 Jul 58, to DF, USAREUR SGS to G3, 1 Aug 58, subj: Letter 31 July General Eddleman to General Hodes Re: 24th Infantry Division (U). In G3 Plans & Plcy Br. Both SECRET.

[3]Cmt 2, G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Aug 58, subj: Reduction in USAREUR Combat Capability to Provide Army Forces to SPECOMME. AEAGC-PL. SECRET.

[4]In addition, Force CHARLEY had lost the services of 4 specialists killed and 21 injured in a bus accident at Orleans, France, on 17 July. Replacing these personnel further reduced the number of critically-needed specialists in USACOMZEUR.

Evacuation Hospital, Reinforced: To provide approximately 20 percent of USAREUR's evacuation hospital capacity;

285th Military Police Company: To support noncombatant evacuation operations in Northern Area Command;

78th Transportation Company (Medium): To provide approximately 10 percent of the USACOMZEUR heavy truck support;

570th Terminal Service Company: To provide approximately 50 percent of USAREUR's over-the-beach cargo discharge capability; and

583d Transportation Light Truck Company: To provide approximately 10 percent of the trucking capacity for movement of supplies delivered over the beach.[5]

24. Planning for the Withdrawal

Although the United States Government did not officially announce the decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Lebanon until 8 October,[6] the "retraction" or withdrawal phase was officially considered to be the period from 15 September to 25 October.[7]

The first withdrawal actually took place a month earlier, primarily as a political gesture. Early in August both the incumbent President Chamoun and President-elect Chehab advised the U.S. Ambassador that a token withdrawal of perhaps one Marine battalion landing team would undercut the remaining hard core elements of the Lebanese rebels. Moreover, if such action could be taken before the U.S.S.R. had a chance to exert pressure for a withdrawal at the U.N. General Assembly meeting starting on 13 August, any possible future claim of the Russians that they had forced the withdrawal would be averted.[8]

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[5](1) Memo, Lt Col R. A. Edwards, USAREUR G3 Ops Br, to Maj Gen T. L. Sherburne, ACofS G3, 5 Aug 58, subj: Items for Discussion at Chief of Staff's Conference. AEAGC-OP 250/H5.3 GC. (2) Tab A, to incl, Stf Study, USAREUR G3 Plans & Ploy Br, n.d., subj: Forces for Contingency Operations to ltr, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS, n.d. [Aug 58], subj: Substitution of Infantry Battle Groups for Airborne Battle Groups in USAREUR Troop Basis (C). AEAGC-PL 250/18 GC. Both SECRET.

[6]Cable DA-949232, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, 7 Oct 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[7]AMLANFOR Rept, Part I. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[8]Cable DA-946464, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Aug 58. SECRET.

One Marine battalion landing team began to reembark on the morning of 12 August and completed its withdrawal three days later.[9]

During the remainder of August and the early part of September AMLANFOR developed plans for both a retraction and the winterization of units and storage areas, so that either course of action could be taken. Some winter equipment--tents and clothing, for example--was actually shipped to Beirut and arrived in the latter part of September. Then, although no firm date for retraction had yet been established, further shipments of winter equipment were canceled on the assumption that the retraction would take place before winter.

The basic concept was that personnel and materiel--to include unit equipment as well as supplies--would be phased out of the objective area simultaneously if possible. Such a coordinated movement would insure the immediate effectiveness of units upon arrival and would also guarantee that proportionate supply levels would be maintained in the objective area during the withdrawal.[10]

The retraction was to be tactical rather than administrative. After the withdrawal of the Marine forces, which would be the first to leave, Army logistical support elements would depart, followed by the seatail of the combat elements. The airborne elements would be last to leave.[11] The ships to be used would take 10 days after receipt of the withdrawal order to travel to Beirut and 14 additional days to complete the outloading.[12] The retraction of the airborne brigade was to take place over a 7-day period, with the outloading of combat and service-support units being scheduled so as to retain a balanced force at all times.[13]

25. Political Developments

On 9 September General Chehab and President Chamoun met to discuss the withdrawal of U.S. forces. President Chamoun wanted the

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[9](1) AMLANFOR Rept, Part I. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Cable DA-946687, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Aug 58. SECRET.

[10]AMLANFOR Rept, Part II, Sec IV, p. 9; Annex D, pp. 3-4; Annex E, p. 6; Annex G, p. 3. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[11]AMLANFOR OPLAN 8-58, 16 Sep 58. SECRET. In USAREUR AG Hq AMLANFOR file, docu nr 852-58/S.

[12]DF, USAREUR ACofS G3 to CofS, 30 Sep 58, subj: Withdrawal of U.S. Forces From Lebanon (U). AEAGC-OP 250/H5.3 GC. SECRET.

[13]Abn Bde Rept, 1-26 Oct 58. CONF.

American troops to remain until President Nasser's intent could be more clearly ascertained, but General Chehab felt that the new government should insist on an almost immediate withdrawal. Apparently they both agreed that the U.N. observer group should remain in Lebanon follwing the U.S. departure.[14]

On 10 September the situation suddenly changed when Salaam's men attacked Hakim's headquarters in the Basta. The fight between these two rival groups allegedly developed over Hakim's desire to continue the revolt. Concurrently, the Syrians who had left Lebanon were returning to reinforce the various rebel groups.[15]

While General Chehab favored Karami, an opposition leader, for premier, the Partie Populaire Sociale (PPS), a Socialist group that had cooperated with the Lebanese Army against the rebels, feared Karami. President Chamoun was trying to get the PPS to support his new party, and on the eve of the Presidential inauguration, his followers and the Socialists were displeased by the conciliatory attitude that General Chehab had adopted toward the opposition.[16]

President Chehab was inaugurated on 23 September 1958. With the exception of two neutrals who were of little importance, his new cabinet favored the opposition.[17] When the cabinet was announced, the loyalist Phalange, supporting Chamoun, expanded its demands for lifting the strike and asked for reorganization of the cabinet to provide a balanced loyalist-opposition composition. The loyalists felt that a cabinet that excluded their members would be disastrous for Christian political influence in the country. They particularly objected to the appointment of Karami as Premier.[18]

The internal political situation was now reversed, and the loyalists became the rebellious opposition. The former opposition began to take down their barricades in the Basta while the Phalangists erected new ones in their areas and rebuilt them as fast as the Lebanese Army destroyed them. Meanwhile the Lebanese Army distributed unity and friendship posters calling on the people to lay down their

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[14]Cable DA-947895, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 11 Sep 58. SECRET.

[15]Cable ALFJB-X-13-9-1, COMAMLANFOR to CINCSPECOMME, 13 Sep 58. SECRET.

[16]Cables ALFJB-X-14-9-2 & ALFJB-X-16-9-4, COMAMLANFOR to CINCSPECOMME, 14 & 16 Sep 58. SECRET.

[17]Appendix II, to Log Comd Rept, 13 Oct-30 Nov 58, p. 6. CONF (info used OFLUSE).

[18]AMLANFOR Rept, Part III. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

arms, but the curfew was continued in Beirut.[19] Private vehicles were inspected at the roadblocks, but United States vehicles were not stopped, although on the morning of 24 September the Phalangists prevented stevedores from unloading ships with U.S. military cargo.[20]

On 24 September the Lebanese Army intervened in a major Phalangist-opposition clash and inflicted heavy casualties. This intervention apparently impressed both sides with the Army's determination to end the fighting, because Beirut was quiet for the next few days. Thereafter, the Phalangists demonstrated peacefully and erected undefended roadblocks. Although weapons were not collected, the Lebanese Army enforced the order to shoot anyone carrying arms.[21]

When President Chehab conferred with opposition and loyalist leaders to work out a political compromise, the opposition leaders told him that he could take whatever action he deemed appropriate to effect a conciliation.[22] On 8 October 1958 Premier Karami submitted his resignation to President Chehab, who refused to accept it.[23] The announcement of the withdrawal of U.S. forces, made on the same day, was well received. The Christians interpreted it as meaning the situation had improved, and the Moslems believed that the Karami cabinet had forced the withdrawal.[24]

On 11 October the Lebanese trade unions put pressure on the various political factions by threatening a general strike if they failed to reach an early agreement. Leaders of the various religious councils thereupon decided to form a joint congress to watch over national unity. Moreover, both the statements issued by labor and religious councils and the agreement of Moslem leaders to accept pro-Chamoun representation in the cabinet indicated a general desire to resolve the crisis as soon as possible.[25]

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[19] Cable ALFJB-X-24-9-1, COMAMLANFOR to CINCSPECOMME, 24 Sep 58. CONF.

[20] Cable ALFJB-X-25-9-1, COMAMLANFOR to CINCSPECOMME, 25 Sep 58. CONF.

[21] Cable ALFJB-X-29-9-1, COMAMLANFOR to CINCSPECOMME, 29 Sep 58. SECRET.

[22] Cable ALFJB-X-10-10-1, COMAMLANFOR to CINCSPECOMME, 10 Oct 58. CONF.

[23] Cable DA-949508, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Oct 58. SECRET.

[24] Cable DA-949422, same to same, 10 Oct 58. SECRET.

[25] (1) Cable DA-949508, same to same, 13 Oct 58. SECRET. (2) Cable ALFJB-X-13-10-1, COMAMLANFOR to CINCSPECOMME, 13 Oct 58. CONF.

A new cabinet, which was headed by Karami but preserved the traditional balance between Christians and Moslems, was announced on 15 October. The controversy over its composition, which had caused more violence than had occurred from 15 July to 23 September, had come to an end.[26] The trade unions and the Phalange canceled their strike plans, and general quiet prevailed throughout Beirut for the first time since U.S. troops had arrived. By 20 October travel throughout Lebanon was safe. The Lebanese Army units returned to their permanent quarters. When the last U.S. forces withdrew, all organized opposition groups had disbanded and business establishments had reopened.[27]

26. Security During the Withdrawal Phase

On 14 September the 201st Logistical Command relieved the Marines of their security mission in the Beirut dock area,[28] and the 187th Infantry assumed responsibility for securing the U.S. and British Embassies.[29]

On 28 September, when the 24th Airborne Brigade relieved the last departing Marine battalion landing team, the Army forces were redistributed to occupy the tactical positions remaining as a U.S. responsibility. The resulting redistribution of forces was as follows:

In the northern sector--formerly the Marines' responsibility--1 rifle company was on line and 1 in reserve; artillery support consisted of a composite battery of four 4.2-inch mortars and three 105-mm howitzers.

The southern--Army--sector was secured by 1 rifle company reinforced by a reconnaissance platoon on line, with 2 rifle companies and the equivalent of 6 tank platoons in reserve. A cavalry troop--reinforced with 1 reconnaissance platoon of the 187th Infantry--was responsible for the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) line in front of the U.S.-occupied sector. The 3d Medium Tank Battalion assumed full responsibility for the security of Beirut International

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[26](1) Appendix II, to Log Comd Rept, 13 Oct-30 Nov 58, p. 11. CONF (info used OFLUSE). (2) Cable DA-949663, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Oct 58. SECRET.

[27](1) Cable DA-949888, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Oct 58. SECRET. (2) Abn Bde Rept, 1-26 Oct 58. CONF.

[28](1) AMLANFOR Rept, Part I. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Log Comd Rept, 14-21 Sep 58, p. 4. CONF.

[29]Incl 3, to Abn Bde Rept, 1-30 Sep 58, p. 7. CONF.

UNCLASSIFIED

Airborne Troops Dug into Hill on the Outskirts of Beirut Airport

AGL (1) 6-59-300-71960



UNCLASSIFIED

Airport. With the departure of the Marines, CYCLONE ALPHA and CYCLONE BRAVO remained as the only internal security forces in an alert status.

By 30 September the U.S. roadblocks were withdrawn once more, and motorized reconnaissance patrols assumed security responsibility for the main supply routes.[30]

On 3 October, as the withdrawal of support units continued, the 187th Infantry relieved the 201st Logistical Command of responsibility for the perimeter security of the dock area, although the logistical command remained responsible for internal security up to its departure.[31]

On 7 October the 187th Infantry assumed responsibility for the security of the airport, relieving the tank battalion, which went into bivouac to prepare for departure. Two days later the CYCLONE forces were disbanded, and the tank battalion was relieved of all tactical requirements. However, the CYCLONE concept of defense was still maintained, and 1 artillery battery was assigned the mission of forming 3 mobile task forces with M42 gun carriers. After the battery departed on 13 October, the 187th Infantry continued to patrol the main supply routes. On 14 October the R&S line was discontinued, and thereafter units in tactical positions no longer conducted contact patrols. The motor patrols were reduced to two ¼-ton vehicles each, and on 18 October the cavalry troop was relieved of its tactical commitments.[32]

By mid-October the 187th Infantry was the only unit with tactical responsibility. On 18 October the force responsible for the former Marine sector was relieved of its missions and dissolved. Both infantry companies and the support units were withdrawn from the sector and moved to the marshalling area. On the following day the infantry company providing security in the Beirut dock area was replaced by Lebanese gendarmerie. As the units were relieved, they began outloading the following day. From 20 to 22 October the remaining support units and those in reserve were outloaded, with security provisions unchanged. On 23 October the last infantry company and the reconnaissance platoon were relieved of their security missions.

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[30](1) AMLANFOR Rept, Part I. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Abn Bde Rept, 1-30 Sep 58, p. 2; Incl 3, p. 8; Incs 7 & 8. CONF.

[31]This was generally true. Throughout the operation each unit provided its own internal security. CONF.

[32](1) AMLANFOR Rept, Part I. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Log Comd Rept, 1-12 Oct 58, p. 3; 13 Oct-30 Nov 58, p. 15. CONF. (3) Abn Bde Rept, 1-26 Oct 58, pp. 1-2; Incl 3, pp. 2, 3, & 6; Incl 6 passim; Incl 7 passim. CONF.

During the final 3-day period up to 25 October only internal unit security was provided.[33]

27. Phase-Out of Logistical Support

Logistical support in the objective area decreased steadily as the support units left.[34] Preparations for the withdrawal began around 15 September, and in the early stages consisted almost entirely of segregating and marking depot stocks that were to be returned to Europe and preparing for the packing and crating of unit equipment. Beginning on 22 September, the support units that were scheduled to depart earliest started to turn in surplus clothing, rations, and ammunition stocks. During the remainder of September equipment and supplies continued to be turned in by departing units. Certain stocks were transferred to the Lebanese Army--most notably chemical munitions and protective masks.

Curtailment of support activities began in earnest early in October. On 8 October the engineer water production platoon and water transportation team ceased operations, and local purchase of gasoline was halted so that reserves on hand could be expended. Hospital support was discontinued after 15 October, although a medical clearing platoon, supplemented by a surgical team, remained in the area for 5 more days. On 17 October the quartermaster bakery ceased operations, after first baking sufficient bread to be frozen and stored for the supply of the remaining troops until 24 October. The disbursing office was closed on 19 October and postal service was terminated on the following day. Truck transportation was provided until the last ship departed on 24 October.

The major workload of the technical service agencies was generated by the need to receive, segregate, pack, and ship the depot stocks in the objective area, for the vast majority of these items were to be returned to the depots in Europe. Certain stocks were disposed of otherwise, however. All departing troops were issued winter clothing--either wool OG shirts and trousers or woolen underwear--in addition to field jackets. Troops departing by air, or those who would have to travel long distances by truck from the ports of debarkation to their home stations, were provided with adequate supplies of "C" rations. In addition, more than 10 tons of winter clothing, 60 tons of quartermaster class III supply, and

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[33] Incl 6, to Abn Bde Rept, 1-26 Oct 58. CONF.

[34] Unless otherwise indicated, all information in this paragraph was extracted from the 201st Logistical Command's historical and command reports for the periods 14-21 September, 22-30 September, 1-12 October, and 13 October-30 November 1958. CONF.

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[33] Incl 6, to Abn Bde Rept, 1-26 Oct 58. CONF.

[34] Unless otherwise indicated, all information in this paragraph was extracted from the 201st Logistical Command's historical and command reports for the periods 14-21 September, 22-30 September, 1-12 October, and 13 October-30 November 1958. CONF.

50 tons of rations were shipped to Adana for storage, which reduced the quantities of supplies to be returned to Europe.

Ordnance class V items were handled separately. A combined team of Army and Marine Corps personnel was formed late in September to inspect, classify, and segregate unserviceable ammunition. To avoid waste, maximum use was made of broken cases and lots of ammunition in firing demonstrations and, whenever possible, loose but serviceable ammunition was boxed and returned to storage. Nevertheless, more than 16 tons of Marine and 10 tons of Army ammunition were dumped at sea on 26 September and 16 October. Small amounts of miscellaneous class V items were also destroyed at the demolition area ashore.[35]

Supplies, and particularly ammunition, for the combat elements that provided final security and were the last to depart also presented a special problem. The turn-in of equipment and supplies over and above the amounts authorized in TOE's began early and was completed by 20 October, the day after the airlift began. Prescribed loads of class I, III, and V items that were not turned in were expended to reduce the airlift tonnage requirements. Nevertheless, the basic load of class V items had to be maintained by each unit until it relinquished its mission and moved into the marshaling area. The problem of disposition was solved by establishing, at the departure airfield, an ammunition section that relieved each unit coming into the marshaling area of its basic load. Ammunition was classified, counted, boxed, and marked for turn-in. (All but small-arms ammunition was turned in.) One box was loaded on each departing aircraft, and upon reaching the arrival airfields in Europe was turned over to similar ammunition sections there.[36]

28. Troop Movements

a. Withdrawals by Sea. A survey of the retraction by sea revealed that a total of 3,686 personnel, 2,661 vehicles, 14 helicopters, and 17,381 long tons and 72,002 measurement tons of supplies and equipment were returned to Europe, utilizing 12 cargo ships, 3 passenger vessels, and 1 aircraft carrier.[37] A detailed breakdown of the phasing of this operation may be found in Table 1.

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[35](1) Log Comd Repts, cited above. CONF. (2) AMLANFOR Rept, Part II, Sec IV, p. 12; Annex D, pp. 3-4; Annex E, pp. 10-11. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[36]Incls 4 & 6, to Abn Bde Rept, 1-26 Oct 58. CONF.

[37]The aircraft carrier transported helicopters to Leghorn, from whence they were flown to their home stations. CONF.

Table 1--The Withdrawal by Sea

| Ship | Date of Departure | Units, unit equipment, and depot stocks (cargo) | | | Vehicles | Personnel |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Type | Long Tons | Meas. Tons | | |
| 1st cargo | 25 Sep | Heavy engineer equipment | 961 | 5,436 | 260 | 12 |
| 2d cargo | 27 Sep | Heavy engineer and hospital equipment; quartermaster stocks | 1,350 | 6,558 | 212 | 16 |
| 3d cargo | 1 Oct | Ordnance and small support units; engineer and quartermaster stocks | 1,733 | 6,532 | 129 | 2 |
| 4th cargo | 4 Oct | Several small support units; quartermaster, engineer, and ordnance stocks | 1,140 | 5,912 | 148 | 10 |
| 1st pax | 5 Oct | Various support units | - | - | - | 1,056 |
| 5th cargo | 9 Oct | Various support units | 866 | 4,778 | 254 | 12 |
| 6th cargo | 15 Oct | Various support units; technical service and post exchange stocks | 1,904 | 6,162 | 397 | 13 |
| Aircraft carrier | 15 Oct | Aviation support units | 88 | 3,674 | 14* | 44 |
| 7th cargo | 16 Oct | Equipment of 3d Tank Battalion | 4,012 | 8,453 | 259 | 19 |
| 2d pax | 17 Oct | 3d Tank Battalion 187th Airborne Brigade seatail, various support units | - | - | - | 1,337 |
| 8th cargo | 18 Oct | Support units; 3d Tank Battalion; Battery A, 13th Artillery | 1,151 | 6,083 | 384 | 12 |
| 9th cargo | 20 Oct | Quartermaster and ordnance stocks | 108 | 254 | 1 | - |
| 10th cargo | 22 Oct | Battery A, 3d Automatic Weapons Battalion (SP); various support units; technical service and post exchange stocks | 2,321 | 8,652 | 215 | 5 |
| 11th cargo | 24 Oct | Support units; technical service and post exchange stocks | 1,072 | 4,861 | 191 | 19 |
| 3d pax | 24 Oct | Headquarters, 201st Logistical Command; Battery A, 23d Antiaircraft Artillery; support units | - | - | - | 1,126 |
| 12th cargo | 25 Oct | Troop C, 17th Cavalry; support units; ordnance and quartermaster stocks | 675 | 4,647 | 211 | 3 |

*Helicopters

Source: Log Comd Rept, 13 Oct-30 Nov 58, pp. 11-17. CONF.

b. Withdrawals by Air. Although most of the airlift capacity had been reserved for the 24th Airborne Brigade movement during the seven days following the withdrawal of support forces by sea, a number of support personnel were airlifted to Europe while the sea movement was under way. From 24 September to 17 October one or two special air logistical mission flights were made between Beirut and Europe daily. These regular flights were supplemented by a number of unscheduled flights, so that more than 1,300 support personnel returned to Europe by air during this phase.[38]

The advance party of the 24th Airborne Brigade--comprising 67 personnel and equipment totaling 27.9 short tons--was airlifted from Beirut in 1 C-130 and 1 C-124 on 15 October. The 7-day phased withdrawal--planned by AMLANFOR in coordination with USAREUR and USAFE--began on 19 October. Each day 14 aircraft--12 C-130's and 2 C-124's--lifted men and equipment of the brigade. For a detailed breakdown of the phasing of this operation, see Table 2.[39]

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[38](1) Incl 1, to Annex G, to AMLANFOR Rept, Part II, Sec IV. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals (info used OFLUSE). (2) Cable (DTG 182011Z), CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 18 Oct 58. CONF.

[39]Abn Bde Rept, 1-26 Oct 58, Incl 3, pp. 6-7; Incl 6. CONF.

Table 2--The Withdrawal of the Airborne Brigade

| Date | Types of Units | Number of passengers | Total weight, passengers and equipment* |
|---|---|---|---|
| October | | | |
| 19 | One and one-half infantry companies; part of one engineer company. | 304 | 204.5 |
| 20 | One infantry company, remainder of engineer company, part of a field artillery battery. | 373 | 206.7 |
| 21 | Parts of three infantry companies, remainder of artillery battery, some smaller units. | 405 | 196.2 |
| 22 | Remainder of 187th Infantry Regiment, less part of headquarters and one company, and some small support detachments. | 329 | 192.2 |
| 23 | Additional support detachments, remainder of 201st Logistical Command, and one cavalry troop. | 358 | 188.3 |
| 24 | Last units of 187th Infantry, support elements, and AMLANFOR headquarters. | 272 | 169.4 |
| 25** | Remaining administrative elements of airborne brigade and AMLANFOR headquarters, part of medical platoon, a signal detachment. | 105 | 87.5 |

* In short tons.
** Only seven aircraft were used.

Source: Abn Bde Rept, 1-26 Oct 58, Incl 3, pp. 6-7; Incl 6. CONF.




AGL (1) 6-59-150-71961

**Loading 1/4-ton Truck Aboard C130 Aircraft for Move to Germany from Beirut, Lebanon, as Troops Stand by to Load.**

# CHAPTER 6

## Funding and Personnel Problems

### 29. Funding

a. Budgetary Problems. The deployment of the Army task force to Lebanon and the need to furnish logistical support increased USAREUR's operating costs. No budgetary preparations could have been made in advance, and Emergency Plan 201 provided no funding guidance. The situation was further complicated by the triservice nature of the operation.

On 15 July the Department of the Army directed that funds then available to USAREUR headquarters would be used to finance the force deployed under EP 201. Normal fiscal procedures would be followed, except that records would be so kept as to identify costs of the Lebanon operation separately from normal operating expenditures. This procedure seemed simple, and the operation would be financed in anticipation of future supplemental funding.[1]

However, in reality the problem was complex. To so finance the operation, USAREUR would be forced either to over-obligate--an illegal action--or to curtail other assigned missions--which would have invalidated the Army programming system.[2] USAREUR therefore requested that

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[1] USAREUR Compt Bul, 15 Mar 59, pp. 30-31. UNCLAS.

[2] Ltr, USAREUR CofS to DCSOPS, 21 Nov 58, cited above. SECRET (info used CONF).

a responsible agency be designated for funding the Lebanon operation.[3] This request was not granted, and the accounting functions were further complicated by a departmental requirement for detailed accounting for supplies and services plus manpower costs of servicing the operation. In addition, USAREUR was to recoup cross-servicing charges from the Air Force and Navy.[4]

On the other hand, a certain amount of relief was granted when the Department of the Army authorized an increase of $8 million in USAREUR's first-quarter obligational authority.[5] This action, plus the ultimate reimbursement of the $6,847,100 actually expended by USAREUR on the Lebanon operation, largely solved the funding problem.[6]

b. Stock Fund Accounting. A further difficulty was encountered in the area of stock-fund supplies issued to ATF 201. Theoretically, these issues should have been paid for from USAREUR's consumer-fund authorizations, but the low rate of supply consumption in the objective area meant that a major portion of the supplies would not be used. Thus, USAREUR proposed, and the Department of the Army accepted, a system whereby all supplies in the objective area would be considered to remain in the stock fund, even though they were physically located within Lebanon or Turkey. A subsidiary "accounts receivable" account was established for EP 201 issues from the stock fund, and when supplies were returned after the operation they were treated as sales-return credits and applied as downward adjustments to the accounts receivable. Under this plan USAREUR had to pay the stock fund only for the supplies actually consumed.[7]

c. Financial Planning for Future Contingency Operations. USAREUR recommended that in future operations of a contingency nature the headquarters imposing emergency requirements upon a command simultaneously provide for automatic financing of the operation.[8]

The weakness of EP 201 also was partially remedied with the publication of a Comptroller Annex to the basic plan in early 1959.

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[3] Cable SC-38196, USAREUR to DA, 29 Jul 58. SECRET.

[4] Compt Bul, cited above, pp. 31-32. UNCLAS.

[5] Ibid., p. 33. UNCLAS.

[6] Fonecon, Mr. Siemon with Mr. E. R. Slye, USAREUR Ofc of Compt Bud Br, 12 May 58. UNCLAS.

[7] (1) Compt Bul, cited above, pp. 33-34. (2) Cable SC-42169, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 29 Aug 58. Both UNCLAS.

[8] Ltr, USAREUR CofS to DCSOPS, 21 Nov 58, cited above. SECRET (info used CONF).

In the annex it was assumed that in future implementations of the plan funds would be provided by the Department of the Army concurrently with the notice of implementation. The annex specified the procedures that would be used in budgeting and funding, accounting, finance and disbursing activities, management services, welfare funds, and support to dependents of personnel deployed. In addition, a cost estimate for 30 days of operations was developed for future guidance.[9]

30. Personnel Management

a. Discharge, Rotation, and Replacement. The deployment of ATF 201 created considerable upheaval in almost every unit involved, principally because of interference with the plans of individuals previously scheduled for rotation to the United States and the difficulty of replacing personnel slated for imminent discharge. Moreover, since over-all troop ceilings had not permitted the Seventh Army to carry overstrengths in the units assigned to the task force, maintaining the units in Lebanon at or even near their authorized strength proved difficult. This development might have resulted in critical weakness in a combat situation if no reservoir of airborne specialists and fillers had been available. USAREUR suggested that, if the combat effectiveness of the assault units of future emergency forces was to be fully maintained, earmarked units should be kept at 10 percent overstrength. Moreover, units alerted for deployment, should suspend rotation and discharge dates, and the deployment should take place at complete present-for-duty strength. In addition, qualified replacements should be sent promptly from the United States to the objective area upon requisition.[10]

b. Disposition of Dependents. EP 201 provided that when task force personnel were deployed, their dependents in Europe would have the option of remaining in place or returning to the United States. All except a very few remained. However, since the duration of the sponsors' absence could not be determined, both dependents and sponsors were handicapped in deciding upon the appropriate course. USAREUR suggested that in future emergencies the dependents involved be instructed to stay in place, whether in Europe or in the United States. Port calls already issued in either direction should be canceled or deferred. Moreover, USAREUR should be authorized to announce a firm policy on the disposition of families as soon as the situation clarified or within 90 days from the declaration of the emergency, whichever was sooner.[11]

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[9] Compt Annex, to USAREUR EP 201, n.d. SECRET (info used CONF).

[10] Tab K, to Rept Leb Op. SECRET.

[11] Tab D, to Rept Leb Op. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

c. Emergency Allotments. The emergency allotment system under which military personnel had the privilege of signing written authorizations for special allotments of their pay to their dependents was found to be workable. There were instances, however, of lax administration of the system by unit commanders and negligence on the part of sponsors.

In the light of the Lebanon experience, checking of emergency allotments was made a routine item for future unit IG inspections. In addition, the Comptroller Annex to the revised EP 201 laid greater stress upon the pre-authorization of emergency allotments and, more broadly, all plans for the rapid phase-out of dependents (RAPOD) and the noncombatant evacuation order (NEO) were revised to require commanders to review emergency allotments at least twice a year.[12]

[12] Intvw, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col J. R. Duffy, USAREUR Ofc of Compt Fin & Acct Br Plans & Prog Off, 11 May 59. UNCLAS.

# CHAPTER 7

## Summary and Evaluation

### 31. Adequacy of Plans

The operation in Lebanon was a successful demonstration of the United States' willingness and ability to respond rapidly to a crisis involving aggression against a friendly government. The timely landing of American forces averted a planned coup that would have removed the legitimate government of Lebanon from power. Later, the presence of the U.S. forces and their convincing state of readiness had an important psychological effect in stabilizing the situation.

a. Deficiencies Related to a Noncombat Situation. The initial stages of the deployment generally followed the plans. However, the fact that no fighting developed caused a number of problems that would not have arisen, or that would have been considered relatively insignificant, in a combat situation. Among these problems, might be included the delays in deployment caused by the congestion at the Beirut airport, which resulted largely from the necessity to superimpose military upon normal civil operations.[1]

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[1](1) Tabs A & C, to Rept Leb Op. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (2) AMLANFOR Rept, Part II, Sec III. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (3) Memo, Lt Col J. D. Bird, USAREUR Trans Div Tfc Br, to Brig Gen F. D. Atkinson, Trans Off, 30 Sep 58, no subj. CONF. In Trans Div Tfc Br.

Similarly, the major logistical problems resulted from the noncombat status of the task force. The need for selective unloading of cargoes--and the difficulty caused by nonselective loading and incomplete documentation--would not have arisen but for the low consumption rate caused by the peaceful nature of the operation. Additionally, detailed guidance and trained personnel in the fields of civil affairs, contracting and procurement, and legal activities were missed only because the emphasis of the operation had changed.[2]

Finally, in combat there would have been slight requirement for training or for recreation programs for the troops.[3]

One solution would be the development of alternate plans, or at least of annexes to the basic plan, that would cover noncombat operations.

b. General Weaknesses in the Middle East Plans. Perhaps the most serious deficiency in the planning effort was the failure to provide a joint headquarters staff for what was obviously to be a joint, triservice effort. While the plans had spelled out the roles of the various service components of the specified command that would respond to a crisis in the Middle East, the need for a joint land headquarters was apparently not recognized until after the ground forces had arrived in the objective area. The problem was solved on the spot by forming such a headquarters with personnel from the staffs of the units in the area, but the weakening of the subordinate staffs to accomplish this end could have had serious consequences if combat had developed. It was recommended that future plans provide for a joint headquarters, complete with staff and necessary communications and other equipment.[4]

Although some consideration was given to amending the basic plan to provide for a ground commander and headquarters within the Specified Command Middle East command structure, it was decided later that the plan would not be so revised. At the writing of this report CINCSPECOMME plans that in any future operation his Army commander will perform the same mission that COMAMLANFOR did in Lebanon.[5]

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[2]Tab D, to Rept Leb Op. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

[3]Tab A, to Rept Leb Op. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

[4](1) Tabs A, G, I & L, to Rept Leb Op. SECRET. (2) AMLANFOR Rept, Part III. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

[5]Cmt 2, USAREUR G3 to Hist Div, 29 Jun 59, subj: Review of Draft Monograph "The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon" (U). SECRET. AEAGC-OP 250/18 (25 May 59).

While the major problems of logistics grew out of the noncombat situation, the lack of prestocks was a serious over-all deficiency that was due to noncompletion of diplomatic negotiations rather than to a failure to plan for them. The operation in Lebanon did point up the need for prestocking in the Middle East, however, and a good start to remedy this weakness was made by diverting surplus supplies from Beirut to the Adana area for prestockage.[6]

On the other hand, the large number of nonstandard items of engineer equipment used in the area caused considerable difficulty in procuring spare parts. It would appear that future emergency plans should either require units earmarked for a task force to be equipped with only standard items of equipment or, alternately, require these units to maintain a current inventory of their TOE equipment with the supply control agencies to facilitate the stocking of needed repair parts.[7]

The deployment itself was hampered by two weaknesses in the planning. First, the unduly restrictive interpretation of the "need-to-know" regulation made the dissemination of necessary information to subordinate units difficult; this in turn impaired the planning effort of these subordinate units and led to confusion and delay. (By the same token, the NATO Allies could not be kept fully informed, which caused some ill feeling.) It would appear that as much information about plans and operations as possible should be disseminated on as low a classification level as possible to all units concerned in the planned emergency operations.[8]

Lack of information as to aircraft loading factors and lift capabilities hampered deployment. Future plans might contain up-to-date listings, not only of troop lift requirements, but also of lift capabilities of the individual types of aircraft and the availability of the various types.[9]

While planning had not provided for the hospitalization of personnel of other services, approximately 25 percent of the Army's hospitalization activities in Lebanon had been in support of the

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[6] Tab D, to Rept Leb Op. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

[7] Ibid. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

[8] (1) Abn Bde Rept, 15-31 Jul 58. CONF. (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon & Mr. Sher with Mr. Flinn, cited above. UNCLAS.

[9] (1) Memo, Col Bird to Gen Atkinson, cited above. CONF. (2) Memo, Col McHaney to Col Clayman, 6 Aug 58, cited above. SECRET. (3) 2d Ind, Seventh Army to USAREUR, 17 Sep 58. AETGC-OP 250/18 (8 Aug 58). CONF.

Marines. The additional requirement was met easily. If similar support for Air Force personnel had been required, and if there had been a large number of battle casualties, complications would have arisen. In the revision of Army medical plans for the support of joint task forces, provision should be made for the needs of other participating services.[10]

Finally, although liaison with the Lebanese Army presented no major problems, the plans did not contain detailed guidance as to procedures and policy for such liaison. Since the contingency plans were primarily intended as a means to implement the President's Middle East Doctrine of aid to friendly nations upon request, guidance should be provided for establishing and maintaining liaison between future task forces and the governments they are sent to support.[11]

32. USAREUR's Role in Emergencies

Perhaps the most important single consideration arising from the Lebanon operation was whether the U.S. Army, Europe, should be required to furnish troops for the support of contingency-type operations in theaters outside of continental Europe.

As previously mentioned, both the USAREUR and the Seventh Army commanders held that the weakening of the forces present in Europe impaired their ability to fulfill the primary missions of defense along the Iron Curtain. However, USAREUR's request for the rapid replacement of deployed units was not acted upon before the return of the troops to Europe at the end of the operation.

a. Airborne Capability. Current contingency plans for the Middle East were the only reason for maintaining in Europe forces capable of executing parachute operations. No airborne capability was needed for the execution of USAREUR's own primary missions. To maintain such an airborne capability, specialized personnel and equipment were diverted from USAREUR's limited resources, thus impairing the command's posture along the Iron Curtain. Furthermore, the forces earmarked for contingency operations could not be held on a constant alert status because of the need for field training required for combat readiness. However, if the units

[10] Tab D, to Rept Leb Op. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

[11] AMLANFOR Rept, Part II, Sec III. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

were at training areas when a crisis developed, their commitment to the area of difficulty would be delayed.[12]

b. The Implementation of Middle East Contingency Plans. The requirement that USAREUR have a contingency force in readiness for deployment to the Middle East seemed difficult to reconcile with the fact that the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) was being maintained in the continental United States for this very purpose. Units of STRAC are specifically organized, trained, equipped, and located for such missions. The division of responsibility found in the Lebanon operation not only tended to reduce the efficiency of the contingency operation--which presumably would not be the case if an organization such as STRAC performed such tasks--but also reduced USAREUR's administrative and logistical support capability.[13]

The airlift of a Marine battalion from the continental United States to the objective area demonstrated that such a movement was both feasible and expeditious. The first aircraft carrying elements of this force arrived in Beirut on the morning of 18 July, a full day before the forces from Europe began to land.[14] STRAC staff officers reported that one airborne battle group could close in a Middle East objective area at approximately the same time as a similar unit moved from Europe.[15]

c. USAREUR's Recommendations. In light of USAREUR's difficulties in maintaining forces for the support of Middle East contingency plans, CINCUSAREUR recommended to the Department of the Army four possible courses of action:

(1) The Task Force 201 mission could be performed by STRAC forces deploying directly from the United States;

(2) Two airborne battle groups could be stationed on a rotational, temporary-duty basis in the Middle East or in Europe;

(3) An Army tank force could be permanently stationed in the Middle East area; and

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[12] Incl, stf study, USAREUR G3 Plans & Plcy Br, n.d. [Aug 58], subj: Forces for Contingency Operations, w/2 incls, to ltr, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS, 4 Sep 58, subj: Substitution of Infantry Battle Groups for Airborne Battle Groups in the USAREUR Troop Basis (C). AEAGC-PL 250/18 GC. SECRET.

[13] Ibid. SECRET.

[14] Marine Diary, 1-31 Jul 58, pp. 4-5. SECRET.

[15] Cable EC-9-5606, USCINCEUR to JCS, 27 Oct 58. SECRET.

(4) An Army task force could be permanently stationed in the USAREUR area, with the corresponding spaces being added to the current USAREUR troop basis.

Of these choices, CINCUSAREUR preferred the first. In his opinion the situation presented an excellent opportunity for emphasizing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that STRAC should assume primary Army responsibility for planning and executing contingency operations. This course of action would have the added advantage of establishing firm Army requirements for strategic airlift. Since no airborne units were required for accomplishing USAREUR's primary mission, the airborne troops could be replaced by infantry as soon as the responsibility for contingency operations was transferred to STRAC.[16]

While these recommendations were still under consideration, the Department of the Army suggested two possible solutions. USAREUR's two airborne battle groups could be converted by replacing individual parachutists with infantrymen at the expiration of overseas tours. As an alternative the 2 airborne battle groups could be replaced by 2 infantry battle groups whose personnel, however, would not be in a gyroscope posture.[17]

Seventh Army preferred, and USAREUR requested, that the unit replacement method be used.[18] Complications arose, however. Because gyroscope planning had progressed so far, the exchange of airborne battle groups would have to proceed according to schedule. However, while USAREUR would thus receive airborne battle groups as replacements, the incoming units could later be converted to infantry groups.[19]

d. General Norstad's Recommendations. In the meantime USCINCEUR had also reviewed the USAREUR study on the command's readiness posture and the need for troops to support contingency operations. In light of his responsibilities under JCS directives, General Norstad informed the Department of the Army that he shared General Hode's concern over the impact of the implementation of emergency plans upon USAREUR's

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[16] Cable SX-6191, CINCUSAREUR to DA for Taylor, 21 Aug 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. For a detailed discussion of STRAC's need for, and lack of, firm commitments of airlift capacity, see Yoshpe & Bykofsky, op. cit. SECRET.

[17] Cables DA-363307 & DA-947346, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 28 & 29 Aug 58. SECRET.

[18] DF, USAREUR G3 to CofS, 13 Sep, subj: Replacement of Airborne Battle Groups (U), w/atchd draft cable, no nr, CINCUSAREUR to DA. AEAGC-PL. SECRET.

[19] Cable DA-948475, DA from Moore (DCSOPS) to CINCUSAREUR exclusive for Hodes, 23 Sep 58. SECRET.

capability to perform its D-day missions. Based on the information available in Europe and the STRAC staff's estimates of deployment times, he recommended that further consideration be given to General Hodes' suggestion that STRAC assume responsibility for the missions currently assigned to Army Task Force 201. To the Joint Chiefs of Staff he recommended that a detailed joint study be made to determine whether the airborne capability required for the contingency plans of CINCSPECOMME and USCINCEUR might not be furnished from resources within the continental United States.[20]

Early in November 1958 an interim reply from the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that the problem was under consideration. However, because of the complexity of the over-all planning effort involved in such a major revision of concepts, no final decision had been reached by late April 1959. At that time USAREUR was still responsible for providing forces for the implementation of CINCSPECOMME's contingency plans and still maintained an airborne capability for this mission.[21]

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[20] Cable EC-9-5606, cited above. SECRET.

[21] Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Lt Col W. P. King and Maj S. F. Adams, USAREUR G3 Plans & Plcy Br, 29 Apr 59. SECRET.

# APPENDIX A

## Station List of USAREUR Units Sent to Lebanon

Hq AMLANFOR[a]

24th Airborne Brigade

| | |
|---|---|
| Brigade Headquarters | Augsburg |
| Provisional Artillery Headquarters | Augsburg |
| 3d Med Tank Bn, 35th Armor | Mannheim |
| Trp C (Recon) (Abn), 17th Cav | Augsburg |
| 1st Plat, 3d Avn Co [redacted]TP | Kitzingen |
| Det, 11 PS&M Co | Gablingen |
| Det, 24th Avn Co | Augsburg |
| Det, 24th QM Co | Augsburg |
| Det, 724th Ord Bn | Augsburg & Munich |

Combat Team 187

| | |
|---|---|
| 1st Battle Gp, 187th Inf | Gablingen |
| Btry A, 13th Arty | Augsburg |
| Btry A, 23d AAA Bn | Nellingen |
| Co E, 3d Engr Bn | Munich |
| Hq Flt Sec [b] | |
| CIC Team [b] | |
| 1st Amb Plat, 24th Med Bn | Augsburg |
| 1st Clr Plat, 24th Med Bn | Augsburg |

320th ASA Detachment [b]

585th Signal Support Company

| | |
|---|---|
| 585th Sig Spt Co (-) | Boeblingen |
| 545th Storage & Issue | Kaefertal |
| Radio Repair Team [b] | |
| Det A, USACA [b] | |
| Det, 17th Sig Bn | Karlsruhe |
| Det, 24th Sig Bn | Augsburg |
| Det, 97th Sig Bn | Boeblingen |
| Det, 69th Sig Bn | Kaiserslautern |
| Det 1, Army Pict Cen | Long Island City, New York |

201st Logistical Command (A)

| | |
|---|---|
| Hq & Hq Co [b] | |
| 285th MP Co (-) | Karlsruhe |

| | |
|---|---|
| 68th APU Det | Aschaffenburg |

Chemical Units

| | |
|---|---|
| Hq & Adm Team b/ | |
| Unit & Mess Team b/ | |
| Maint Team b/ | |
| Supply Team b/ | |

Engineer Units

| | |
|---|---|
| 299th Engr Bn | Hoechst |
| Fld Maint Team b/ | |
| 79th Engr Const Bn (-) | Pirmasens |
| 2 Well Drilling Teams b/ | |
| Prod Plat, 687th Wtr Sup Co | Chinon c/ |
| Wtr Trans Team, 687th Wtr Sup Co | Chinon c/ |
| Depot Sup Team, USA Engr Depot b/ | |

Medical Units

| | |
|---|---|
| 58th Evac Hosp, Smbl (-) | Idar Oberstein |
| 4th Surg Hosp (Mbl Army) | Ludwigsburg |
| 47th Hcptr Amb Team | Illesheim |
| 485th Prev Med Co (Sep) (-) | Ludwigsburg |
| Prov Med Sup Team b/ | |
| 583d Amb Co (-) | Landstuhl |
| Vet Food Insp Team b/ | |

Ordnance Units

| | |
|---|---|
| 22d Ord DS Co | Munich |
| Ammon Plat, 663d Ord Co | Vilseck |
| 856th Ord EOD Team | Feudenheim |

Quartermaster Units

| | |
|---|---|
| Bakery Plat (-) b/ | |
| Bath Platoon (-), 565th QM Co | Kaiserslautern |
| Laundry Plat (-) b/ | |
| QM Co, Hq Team b/ | |
| Unit Mess Team, 15th QM Bn | Kaefertal |
| POL Sup Plat, 25th QM Bn b/ | |
| Mess Team Aug, 2d QM Gp | Ludwigsburg |
| Autmv Maint Team, 2d QM Gp | Ludwigsburg |
| Supply Team, 2d QM Gp | Ludwigsburg |
| Labor Team, 95th QM Bn | Fuerth |
| QM Plat Hq Team, 2d QM Gp | Ludwigsburg |
| POL Lab Team, 2d QM Gp | Ludwigsburg |
| Graves Reg Plat (Type B), 565th QM Co | Kaiserslautern |
| Salvage Team, 2d QM Gp | Ludwigsburg |

| | |
|---|---|
| Aerial Spt Team, 557th AS Co | Evreux c/ |

Transportation Units

| | |
|---|---|
| 38th Trans Trk Bn (HHC) | Worms |
| 533d Trk Co | Augsburg |
| 583d Lt Trk Co (Aug) | Bussac c/ |
| Med Trk Plat (Refrig), 1st Trk Co | Orleans c/ |
| Trk Plat (Petr), 109th Trans Co | Ludwigsburg |
| 78th Med Trk Co, S&P | Bussac c/ |
| Army Aircraft Repair Team b/ | |
| Mvt Cont Team, 594th TC Gp | Paris & Orelans c/ |
| Prov Port Supv Det, 11 TC | La Rochelle c/ |
| 570th Terminal Svc Co | Croix Chapeau c/ |

a/ Formed in Lebanon from the staffs of subordinate units.

b/ Home station unknown.

c/ France.

Source: (1) Annex E, to AMLANFOR Rept, Part II, Sec III. CONF.
(2) USAREUR Station Lists, 30 Jun & 30 Sep 58. CONF.

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(1) Seven linear feet of classified files.

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(1) Secretary of the General Staff files.

(2) General and special staff division files.

Interviews with staff officers.

# APPENDIX C

## Glossary

This glossary contains all abbreviations used in this volume except those found in AR 320-50, 29 October 1958, as changed.

| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| ADVON | Advanced Operations (USAFE) |
| AMAIRFOR | American Air Forces (part of SPECOMME) |
| AMLANFOR | American Land Forces " " " |
| AMNAVFOR | American Naval Forces " " " |
| ATF | Army task force |
| CG | commanding general |
| CGT | Confederation Generale du Travail (General Confederation of Labor, French labor union) |
| EP | emergency plan |
| *et al.* | *et allii* (and others) |
| FCC | Foreign Claims Commission (followed by number) |
| GRANDIOS | 24th Division operation plan for the implementation of USAREUR EP 201 |
| *ibid.* | *ibidem* (in the same place) |
| NELM | United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean |
| NEO | noncombatant evacuation order |
| NODEX | new offshore discharge exercise |
| ONI | Office of Naval Intelligence |
| *op. cit.* | *opere citato*, (in the work cited) |
| p (p). | page(s) |
| *passim* | here and there |
| RAPOD | rapid phase-out of dependents |
| R&S | reconnaissance and surveillance (line) |
| *sic* | thus |
| SMC | staff message control |

| | |
|---|---|
| SOFA | status of forces agreement |
| SPECOMME | Specified Command, Middle East |
| STARCOM | strategic nontactical Army communications system |
| TACC | tactical air control center |
| TUSLOG | Turkey-United States Logistical (unit) |
| U.A.R. | United Arab Republic |
| U.N. | United Nations |
| USACOMZEUR | United States Army Communications Zone, Europe |
| USAFE | United States Air Forces in Europe |
| USAPEB | United States Army Port of Embarkation, Bremerhaven |
| USATA | United States Army Troops Assigned (to SPECOMME) |
| USEUCOM | United States European Command |
| USIS | United States Information Service |
| USMARCORTA | United States Marine Corps Troops Assigned (to SPECOMME) |
| U.S.S. | United States Ship (followed by name) |

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