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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH UNITED STATES ARMY
FORT SHERIDAN, ILLINOIS 60037

ALFGC-OP

SUBJECT: After Action Report Exercise REFORGER I

28 APR 1969

Commanding General
United States Continental Army Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia 23351

1. General:

a. References.

- (1) Message USCONARC, 60244, ATOPS-RE-MAN, dated 24 June 1968.
- (2) Letter, USCONARC, ATOPS-RE-MAN, subject: After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I (RCS ATOPS-365) dated 24 December 1968.
- (3) Annex L, CON REG 350-1.

b. Exercise Name: REFORGER I

c. ARSTRIKE Action Agent: Commanding General, Fifth United States Army.

d. Date and Location of Exercise: 5 January to 23 March 1969, Federal Republic of Germany. Dates are inclusive from departure of initial aircraft until return of last aircraft to CONUS.

e. Support Requirements. Support provided by CONUS installations to units participating in Exercise REFORGER I was in the main that of providing training facilities prior to departure and expediting requisitions and transfer of personnel and equipment to participating units. Support of the actual departure consisted of providing transportation to various airfields and reporting on departing elements as per instructions.

f. Sequence of events: See Inclosure 1.

2. Pre-Exercise Planning. An ARSTRIKE Action Agent representative attended conferences at various headquarters (see Incl 1) in CONUS and in USAREUR for

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coordination and planning of movement of troops and equipment to Europe. A conference was conducted at Fort Riley for all REFORGER action officers to coordinate details of planning, resolve questions and align procedures for the movement and return. Fifth US Army published an OPLAN to all REFORGER units delineating support and reporting requirements for the CONUS portion of the exercise. Pre-exercise planning for installations with REFORGER units included the following:

- a. Requisitioning of replacement personnel.
- b. Requisitioning of equipment shortages and special clothing items needed.
- c. Providing spaces at post schools where needed.
- d. Assisting in conduct of ATTs or ORTs and other special training when required.
- e. Providing special priority of training areas to units.

3. Conclusions and Lessons Learned.

a. Personnel.

(1) Conclusion. The turbulence created by levies against the units while preparing for REFORGER adversely affected the units in that personnel did not in all cases receive the required training nor were they molded into an effective team. Replacements received to fill shortages caused by personnel levies were not of the grade and MOS required, which created a further training problem.

(2) Lessons Learned. For a unit to prepare adequately for an exercise of this magnitude a definite date must be established when the unit will no longer be levied for personnel and by which time all replacements will be for duty in the unit. This will allow a proper and meaningful training phase. Also, replacements should be assigned in the grade and MOS required.

b. Training.

(1) Conclusions. Units were able to complete training phases and required subjects such as driver orientation but the personnel turbulence nullified, to some extent, the training since numerous personnel received the training in make up classes or not at all. Also, assignment in other than required MOS required additional OJT for the individuals. Transportation units in particular had difficulty with drivers as they did not have

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time to adequately train them with OJT and insure familiarity with vehicles and USAREUR driving requirements.

(2) Lessons Learned. Adequate time for training of REFORGER units was available; however, the personnel turbulence dissipated this advantage as personnel were levied and replacements received at late dates which precluded adequate training or disrupted training in progress. It was pointed out in the critiques of the FTX that units needed further training in troop leading, intelligence reporting and analyzing, fire support planning and in ammunition and POL resupply. The problems mentioned are for the most part solved by continued training and working as a team. The continuous movement of personnel throughout the preparation phase did not permit full realization of the potential of training time available.

c. Logistics.

(1) Conclusions. The pre-positioning of equipment in specified locations is sound and the equipment is generally in good condition when drawn. The procedures for returning the equipment to prepositioning sites is also sound but could be studied with a view to streamlining the procedure to eliminate delays; simplify and expedite the submission and processing of surveys and provision of maintenance space. During the CONUS portion of the preparation phase difficulty was encountered in transfer of equipment in that stations did not have a sufficient lead time in which to prepare and ship equipment. The lack of a specific authorization document covering 24th Inf Div (MECH) units caused delay in submitting timely requisitions for equipment needed for training.

(2) Lessons Learned. This lack of a specific authorization document covering 24th Inf Div (MECH) units caused confusion, delayed timely requisitioning, and acquisition of equipment necessary for training.

d. Deployment and Redeployment.

(1) Conclusions. The deployment and redeployment phases were well planned and went smoothly. Minor internal problems were encountered but they are capable of being solved at unit level.

(2) Lessons Learned. Two items were commented on by units in their reports. One was the fatigue and discomfort created by the web style seats. If it is not possible to have air line type seats in all planes the provision of pillows and blankets to those troops occupying the web seats would add greatly to their comfort. The second deals with the composition of the advance parties and rear parties on the return flights. Some units felt manifests for the deployment flights should not be held to exactly for the

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return flights. It might save time and be more efficient if the units were permitted to make modifications to their flight manifests for the return trip. In some cases it was found that the rear party scheduled to remain in Europe was too large and could have been more profitably engaged if some of them had shipped with the main body for the return trip.

e. Operational Readiness Staging.

(1) Conclusions. While some difficulties were experienced, no major problems were encountered.

(2) Lessons Learned. Shortage of components slowed readiness and maintenance capability. This in part would have been overcome if complete inventories had been conducted prior to arriving at the ORT area. In the AC Sqdn it was found that the DA Form 2408-4 had not been placed with the proper weapon in the maintenance area. Also, it was commented that a better program for tuning gas engines and checking electrical and fuel systems is needed since much trouble was experienced in this area. Unit mechanics needed additional training in trouble shooting.

f. Information Office.

(1) Conclusion. Advance Information planning would have been facilitated by early guidance concerning news media travel aboard troop air lift. Also, the USCONARC IO is more suited for handling REFORGER IO actions than a CONUS Army, as higher headquarters address their messages to USCONARC.

(2) Lessons Learned. Delays in furnishing authorization for news media to accompany the troop airlift inconvenienced news media and necessitated numerous and lengthy telephone calls and messages for coordination purposes.

4. Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) That REFORGER units not be levied for personnel transfer for a period 90 days prior to departure date for the Exercise.

(2) That all replacements be on hand on station or in the unit 90 days prior to the scheduled departure date of REFORGER units.

b. Logistics. That REFORGER units be given, when needed, firm authorization documents.

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
28 APR 1969

c. Information.

(1) That initial guidance to CONUSA include definitive guidance on news media travel aboard troop airlift.

(2) That USCONARC IO retain action on information matters for the ARSTRIKE Action Agent.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



GERALD KROLL
MAJ, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

2 Incl

1. Sequence of Events
2. After Action Reports-Non Divisional Units

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ATOPS-OPS-MVR (28 Apr 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: After Action Report Exercise REFORGER I

Headquarters, United States Continental Army Command, Fort Monroe,
Virginia 233511 9 MAY 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. To ensure that problems experienced by non-divisional units were reported to serve as a basis for improvement in future exercises, this headquarters required each of them to submit a report covering:

- a. Preparation.
- b. Deployment.
- c. Drawing prepositioned equipment.
- d. Operational readiness staging.
- e. Field training exercise.
- f. Maintenance stand-down.
- g. Turn in of prepositioned equipment.
- h. Redeployment.

2. Recommendations relative to preparation and deployment are addressed herein; the remaining ones are of primary interest to CINCUSAREUR.

3. The major problem of ensuring adequate training for all units was compounded by the late arrival of minimum equipment essential for training in 24th Infantry Division (ultimately resolved by extensive intra-CONUSA transfers of equipment) and late arrival of personnel in appropriate grade and MOS.

a. Subject to unforeseen future requirements, the significant divisional training equipment problems appear to have been resolved on an expedient basis, by a number of one-time actions. Changes in the troop list of non-divisional units may develop additional problems.

b. The personnel problem is expected to recur in preparing for future exercises. It is recommended that not less than 150 days before future REFORGER exercises, units scheduled to participate be:

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19 MAY 1969

SUBJECT: After Action Report Exercise REFORGER I

(1) Furnished maximum personnel fill, with particular emphasis throughout on officer grades 03-04 and enlisted grades E-5 - E-7 who are retainable through the termination (return to CONUS) phase of the exercise.

(2) Exempted from levies during the period D-120 days to D+60 days.

c. Under the past and projected exercise schedule, for a great number of personnel, especially in the 24th Infantry Division (Mech)(-), a normal holiday leave is impossible. Timely assignment of filler personnel should be made with this in mind to preclude damaging effects on morale.

4. Although the absence of approved authorization documents was a notable problem in preparation for REFORGER I, this is considered a one-time problem.

5. With respect to information activities, it is planned that overall responsibility for future REFORGER exercises will be delegated in the normal manner to the USCONARC/USARSTRIKE action agent. This headquarters will be prepared to assist, as required. Recommend that policy on news media representatives be announced at least 30 days in advance of their projected deployment to permit more deliberate planning to accommodate them and to minimize late rearrangement of aircraft personnel loads.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl
nc

Gary L. Holland
GARY L. HOLLAND
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

Copies furnished: wo incl
CINCUSAREUR
CG Fifth US Army

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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

24 June 1968	CG Fifth US Army appointed ARSTRIKE Action Agent.
7-9 August 1968	USCONARC REFORGER I Coordination Conference attended by ARSTRIKE Action Agent.
23 September 1968	USCONARC Conference on equipment and training requirements attended by representative of Fifth US Army and Fort Riley.
26-28 September 1968	STRICOM REFORGER Conference attended by representative of Fifth US Army and Fort Riley.
14-15 October 1968	USAREUR REFORGER Conference in Germany attended by ARSTRIKE Action Agent
31 October 1968 - 1 November 1968	ARSTRIKE Action Agent conference held at Fort Riley. All REFORGER Action officers attended.
12 November 1968	Request submitted to USCONARC for permission to move specific equipment (DTC Vans to USAREUR.
13-15 November 1968	DCSOGT-TN Staff visit to Fort Riley REFORGER units.
21 November 1968	Budget Estimate to USCONARC.
22 November 1968	USCONARC LOI received
2-5 December 1968	DCSPER Staff visit to REFORGER units at Fort Riley
6 December 1968	DA News Release of REFORGER I
9-13 December 1968	DA Transportation Ping Conf attended by ARSTRIKE Action Agent.
13 December 1968	Fifth US Army OPLAN for REFORGER published. USAREUR Customs Team arrived at Fort Riley to begin customs orientation.
15-17 December 1968	DCSOGT-TN Staff visit to Fort Riley REFORGER units. DCSLOG Staff visit to Ft Riley REFORGER units.
18-20 December 1968	DCSPER Staff visit to Fort Riley REFORGER units.

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INCL 1

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26-27 December 1968	DCSO&T-TN Staff visit to Fort Riley REFORGER units
3 January 1969	Double Take and Round House received for REFORGER units
4 January 1969	Initial movement of advance parties began
5 January 1969	Deployment of REFORGER units to USAREUR begins. CG, 24th Div departs.
7-16 January 1969	5 USA DCSLOG observer in Germany to observe REFORGER actions
8 January 1969	DCSPER Staff visit to Fort Riley REFORGER units
10 January 1969	DCSO&T-PO Staff visit to Fort Riley REFORGER units
13-17 January 1969	Fifth US Army observer to Fort Riley to observe REFORGER outloading operations
19-21 January 1969	Main Body departure. Fifth US Army observer to Fort Riley to observe outloading operations Fifth US Army observer to Fort Lewis to observe outloading operations
27 January 1969 - 7 February 1969	5 USA DCSO&T observer in Germany to observe FTX
29 January 1969 - 4 February 1969	FTX
10 February 1969	Initiation of return movement
13 March 1969	CG, 24th Div returned Div Main CP opened at Fort Riley
23 March 1969	Redeployment complete
27 April 1969	After Action Report submitted to USCONARC

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SUBJECT: After Action Reports - Non Divisional Units.

Incl 1 to Incl 2: Company D, 1st Composite Support Battalion After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I.

Incl 2 to Incl 2: 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I.

Incl 3 to Incl 2: US Army Training Center, Infantry, Fort Lewis, After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I.

Incl 4 to Incl 2: Hq, First US Army After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I with After Action Reports of the 5th Surgical Hospital and 100th Transportation Company attached.

Incl 5 to Incl 2: 36th Medical Bn and Company D, 440th Signal Bn. After Action Reports, Exercise REFORGER I.

Incl 6 to Incl 2: 342d Transportation Company After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I.

Incl 7 to Incl 2: US Army Flight Training Center After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I with After Action Report of the 417th Medical Company attached.

Incl 8 to Incl 2: 517th Medical Company After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS FORT RILEY
FORT RILEY, KANSAS 66442

23 APR 1969

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
SUBJECT: After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I

Commanding General
Fifth US Army
ATTN: MAJ Cantlin, ALRGC-PO
Fort Sheridan, Illinois 60037

Company D, 1st Composite Support Battalion After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I, is forwarded for your information and retention.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as


GORDON E. SNYDER
1 LT, AGC
ASST AG

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Incl 1 to Incl 2

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
COMPANY D, 1ST MAINTENANCE BATTALION
Fort Riley, Kansas 66442

10 April 1969


SUBJECT: After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I

THRU: Commanding General
Headquarters, Fort Riley
ATTN: CT&I
Fort Riley, Kansas

TO: Commanding General
Fifth US Army
ATTN: ARSTRIKE Action Agent
Fort Sheridan, Illinois

1. On 3 January 1969, Company D, 1st Composite Support Battalion deployed to Federal Republic of Germany as part of Exercise REFORGER I.
2. Our mission was to provide direct support maintenance and repair parts supply to non-divisional REFORGER units participating in Exercise CARBIDE ICE, to provide back up direct support maintenance to the 724th Maintenance Battalion and to provide on call recovery service in the Grafenwohr area. Upon completion at Grafenwohr, the unit provided direct support maintenance for all units prepositioning in Kaiserslautern, Germany.
3. On 21-22 March 1969, Company D, 1st Composite Support Battalion successfully returned to Fort Riley, Kansas.
4. The inclosed report is intended to give a concise and complete summary of this unit's participation in Exercise REFORGER I to include major problem areas.

1 Incl
as


JOHN D. LADDEN JR.
CPT, OrdC
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
COMPANY D, 1ST MAINTENANCE BATTALION
Fort Riley, Kansas 66442

10 April 1969

SUBJECT: After Action Report, REFORGER I Exercise

I. TOPIC: Preparation

A. DISCUSSION:

1. This unit closed at Fort Riley, Kansas, on 3 September 1968 as part of Exercise REFORGER. Thus, as soon as the unit arrived from USAREUR, preparations began for Exercise REFORGER I. Initially, progress was slow as our immediate command was able to provide only limited assistance and information concerning the exercise. On 1 November 1969, this unit was placed under 24th Infantry Division for training, operations, and Military Justice jurisdiction. Effective this date, the unit projected all training and operations towards Exercise REFORGER I.

2. From 1 November 1968 to 5 January 1969, all training was conducted in preparation for deployment to USAREUR. Personnel were trained as applicable in the following areas:

a. Drivers Training - Sixty-three (63) drivers received instruction and were qualified to operate military vehicles in USAREUR. This amount proved to be adequate during the operation.

b. All personnel received range familiarization of their respective weapons.

c. All personnel received class room instructions on Soviet Military Liaison Mission, Status of Forces Agreement, Cold Weather Instruction, Life and Customs in Germany, and Winter Driving.

d. The unit participated in a three day non-graded FTX. During this exercise, all phases of mission operation were set up and operated under field conditions. In addition, experience was gained in setting up and operating non-mechanical field equipment.

3. Pre-exercise planning was assisted significantly by numerous conferences conducted at Headquarters, 24th Infantry Division and by the Division Reforger Newsletter. These conferences and newsletters assisted in administrative and organizational planning a great deal.

4. Some problems were encountered in attaining the required ramp strength of 90% authorized strength (140 personnel). This became a problem as this unit was scheduled to be in USAREUR until 15 April 1969. Thus, using a safety factor of 15 days, no one could deploy with an ETS or new assignment prior to 30 April. This meant that 90% TOE had to be acquired over and above projected losses for 120 days. Also a permanent rear party had to be provided. The ramp strength was reached and rear party personnel consisted mostly of personnel with profiles. But to reach this, the personnel strength was raised to 179, 114.7% of the full TO&E.

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10 April 1969

B. LESSONS LEARNED:

The largest problem encountered in the planning and preparation phase was created by the nature of the unit's assignment. When this unit arrived from USAFEUR on 3 September 1968, it was assigned to 265th Maintenance Battalion. Although a good battalion, this unit had no Reforger staff action officer or Reforger planning personnel. Thus the OPLANS, instructions and guidance necessary to prepare a unit for overseas move were not afforded this unit. This problem was alleviated when the unit became attached to 24th Infantry Division on 1 November 1969 for training and logistics, and Uniform Code of Military Justice.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS:

Separate units that, as a result of REFORGER, were split from the rest of their battalion should be attached to a unit in COMARC that is REFORGER orientated. When in a non-REFORGER chain of command, these units cannot receive the proper guidance and instruction necessary and do not have the assistance of a REFORGER action staff to assist in planning the many minute details.

II. TOPIC: Deployment

A. DISCUSSION:

The deployment phase of the operation was well planned and executed with minimum difficulty. MEE, baggage and personnel were picked up as scheduled for delivery to the departure air field. The unit deployed on time aboard flight A036, departing at 1700 hours 8 January 1969 and flight A037, departing at 2000 hours 8 January 1969. The flight over was good with few inconveniences. The 94 personnel aboard flight A036 landed at Rhein-Main AFB and the 41 personnel aboard flight A037 arrived at Ramstein AFB. The personnel arriving at Rhein-Main AFB were briefed and loaded into beds of 2½ ton Cargo Trucks to be transported to Spinelli Barracks in Mannheim, Germany. A slight problem arose here, however, as the guides and drivers were apparently not well briefed as to the convoy route. The convoy got lost in Mannheim and was split. It took the drivers several hours to find their way to the point of destination. The convoy departed Rhein-Main AFB at 1500 hours 9 January 1969 and did not close at Spinelli Barracks in Mannheim until 2100 hours 9 January 1969. A severe discomfort was caused during this time by the sub-freezing temperature. Personnel arriving on flight A037 were transported on busses from Ramstein AFB to Mannheim.

B. LESSONS LEARNED: The discomforts suffered by the personnel transported from Rhein-Main to Mannheim could have been avoided had drivers and guides been properly instructed as to what route to take and what to do if the convoy was separated.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS: NONE

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, REFORGER I Exercise

III. TOPIC: Drawing of Prepositioned Equipment

A. DISCUSSION:

The UARG operation for drawing equipment proved to be very adequate and was accomplished in minimum time. Advance party personnel arrived five days prior to the unit. Through cooperation with UARG, all equipment was signed for and loaded on vehicles. When the unit arrived to pick up the equipment it was lined up and ready to go. The convoy to include all equipment, personnel and baggage departed at 0500 hours 4 January 1969 from Mannheim, Germany, to Grafenwohr, Germany.

B. LESSONS LEARNED:

On 3 January 1969, the unit went to the preposition site in order to load baggage on the vehicles and to check the vehicles out. At this time numerous deficiencies were noted on the vehicles. We were told that we were not allowed to fix the deficiencies but that contact teams from UARG would fix them during the night. When the unit returned the following morning, many of the deficiencies still existed. This was brought to the attention of UARG and we were told that we would not be held responsible for correcting the deficiencies. UARG had no system for verifying this and, since we repositioned at a different site, we were responsible for correcting the deficiencies.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS:

That when a unit draws its equipment out of prepositioning, the vehicle operators be allowed to check their equipment and note found discrepancies on a DA Form 2404. The drawing unit should then keep a copy and the preposition site keep a copy. Then, when time comes to turn the equipment in, there will be no argument over who is responsible for correcting vehicle discrepancies.

IV. TOPIC: Operation Readiness Staging

A. DISCUSSION:

The convoy moved from Mannheim to the 7th Army Training Center on 10 January 1969. The unit closed at 2000 hours 10 January. Enroute three vehicles were lost due to roadside breakdowns. These vehicles and personnel rejoined the unit within the next 24 hours. There were no accidents enroute. Upon closure at Grafenwohr, the unit became part of Task Force Gypsy. Task Force Gypsy was assigned the mission of supply, maintenance and services support to non-divisional units participating in the exercise and back-up support to the 724th Maintenance Battalion. Under Task Force Gypsy a mess hall, latrine, tent area and maintenance shop were provided. On 14 January 1969, this unit was fully operational. The assigned mission was to provide direct support maintenance and repair parts supply to the following units:

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, REFORGER I Exercise

- a. Company D, 1st CS Battalion (DS) Maintenance
- b. 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment
- c. 5th Surgical Hospital
- d. 36th Medical Battalion
- e. 100th Transportation Company
- f. 342d Transportation Company
- g. 417th Medical Company
- h. Company D, 440th Signal Battalion
- i. 517th Medical Company (CLR)

In addition, this unit was responsible for back-up support to Company D, 71st Maintenance Battalion and 724th Maintenance Battalion and for emergency wrecker service in the Grafenwohr area.

2. A 1400 line ASL was provided by 3d Support Brigade. It was delivered on site at Grafenwohr. This ASL was designed to provide repair part support for the above non-divisional units. This unit carried on the assigned mission from 12 January to 27 February. During this time, we remained operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Production accomplished during this period is as follows:

Wheel Vehicles:	186
Track Vehicles:	25
Small Arms:	40
Other Jobs:	20

Of the 1400 lines on the ASL, 187 were depleted to zero balance and 956 were not used (remained at 100% fill).

3. The general consensus was that this unit was highly successful in completing the assigned direct support mission.

B. LESSONS LEARNED:

1. The ASL prepared for this unit was successful in providing repair parts to the non-divisional units. It was of little use, however, in providing a stockage of 3rd echelon assemblies to be used in direct support maintenance of the same units. Thus when a piece of equipment came in for direct support maintenance, the part was usually not on hand in our ASL. If the densities of the supported units had been screened in advance and 3rd echelon parts placed in the ASL much time could have been saved in getting a piece of equipment back to the customer.

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, REFORGER I Exercise

2. Many small details in the administration of a unit were not planned in advance for non-divisional units. Decisions were reached after the problems arose but more planning in the following areas could have prevented many problems.

- a. Uniform Code of Military Justice jurisdiction.
- b. A chain of command in which to submit accident reports, reports of survey, and other special correspondence.
- c. Promotion authority.
- d. A chain of command for Officer Efficiency Reports.

3. This unit was under operational control of several different commands throughout REFORGER I, but each command only assumed control over certain logistical and training operations. All other areas of responsibility were left undecided or solely with the unit to figure out.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. When preparing an ASL in support of a special exercise, the stockage should encompass the following areas:

- a. Repair Parts (Class IX) supply based on assigned supported unit's PLL.
- b. Major assemblies based on the supported unit's equipment density.
- c. Shop stock based on projected needs to operate a direct support maintenance shop in support of assigned supported units.

2. A complete and concise operations plan should be written for non-divisional units deploying on exercises similar to REFORGER I. In planning for a division move, many areas of concern for separate units are overlooked. Many problems can be solved with minimum difficulty if proper guidelines are furnished in advance.

V. TOPIC: Field Training Exercise

A. DISCUSSION:

During Exercise CARBIDE ICE, this unit continued its assigned direct support mission. In addition to the assigned mission this unit provided the following support to the exercise:

1. Provided maintenance contact teams to perform on site support maintenance in the field.
2. Established a sub-shop in Vielsek, Germany, to support wheel and track vehicles in need of direct support maintenance in the Vielsek area.

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, REFORGER I Exercise

B. LESSONS LEARNED: NONE

C. RECOMMENDATIONS: NONE

VI. TOPIC: Maintenance Standown

A. DISCUSSION:

During the standown period, this unit assisted its supported units in the preparation of their equipment for return to the preposition site. This unit continued around the clock support to these units and had their equipment ready in time for scheduled deployment to the preposition sites. On 27 February 1969, this unit departed Grafenwohr and deployed to the preposition site at Kleber Kaserne, Kaiserslautern, Germany. A direct support maintenance shop was set up in support of units prepositioning at this site. Units prepositioning here were 2/3 Armored Cavalry, 517 Medical Company, 5th Surgical Hospital and Company D, 1st CS Battalion (DS) Maintenance. While at Kaiserslautern, the following production was completed:

Wheel Vehicle: 35

Track Vehicle: 14

Small Arms: 47

Other Jobs: 27

B. LESSONS LEARNED: NONE

C. RECOMMENDATIONS: NONE

VII. TOPIC: Turn-in of Prepositioned Equipment

A. DISCUSSION:

This unit began turning in its own equipment on 10 March 1969. The turn in of equipment was smooth and all property was transferred over to UARG on 19 March 1969.

B. LESSONS LEARNED: NONE

C. RECOMMENDATION: NONE

VIII. TOPIC: Redeployment

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, REFORGER I Exercise

A. DISCUSSION:

The unit deployed in two groups. Eighty-seven on flight number R775 departing at 1700 hours 20 March 1969 and forty-nine on flight R777 departing at 1700 hours 21 March 1969. Two personnel returned with the MRE on 22 March, one man returned early via medical evacuation and one man returned early for emergency leave. The last of the 140 personnel that deployed closed at Fort Riley on 23 March 1969. The equipment joined the unit at Fort Riley on 25 March. To date, two footlockers and two metal cabinets have not returned.

B. LESSON LEARNED: NONE

C. RECOMMENDATIONS: NONE

IX. OVERALL COMMENTS:

This unit accomplished its assigned mission in REFORGER I. It has successfully deployed to USAREUR and set up direct support maintenance operations in support of assigned units. Thus it has proved successful for its designated purpose. Problems and situations arose but solutions were found. Should the mission of this unit continue to be that of dual-basing between COMARC and USAREUR, I feel that it can continue to successfully deploy for training or during emergency periods of heightened tension.

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AIR MAIL

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AMOPT-T1 (8 Mar 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I

HQ SIXTH US ARMY, Presidio of San Francisco, California 94129 11 APR 1969

TO: Commanding General, Fifth US Army, Fort Sheridan, IL 60037

1. The attached report has been reviewed by interested staff sections of this headquarters. Each staff section concurs in the recommendations contained in Incl 1, a, b, c.

2. In addition, it is recommended that United States Army, Germany institute a program to upgrade the condition of end items in storage (e.g. replace bad tracks and worn sprockets).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

5 Incl
nc



BEN KVITKY,
LTC, AGC
Asst AG

Incl 2 to Incl 2

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry
Fort Lewis, Washington 98433

AMTDR--JCC

8 March 1969

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I

THRU: Commanding Officer
3d Armored Cavalry
Fort Lewis, Washington 98433

TO: Commanding General
5th United States Army
Fort Sheridan, Illinois 60037

1. References.


a. ATOPB-CPS-4UR, Headquarters, United States Continental Army Command, 24 December 1968, subject: After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I, (RCS ATOPB-368).

b. ALFGC-OF, Headquarters, 5th United States Army, 31 January 1969, subject: After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I (RCS ATOPB-368).

2. In compliance with above references, After Operations Report is herewith submitted. After Operations Reports for three areas, Maintenance Stand-Down, Turn in of Prepositioned Equipment, and Redeployment cannot be submitted until rear party closes this station. These portions of the reports will be submitted prior to 27 March 1969.

5 Incl

1. Preparation
2. Deployment
3. Drawing Prepositioned Equipment
4. Operational Readiness Staging
5. Field Training Exercise


RICHARD J. WOELZELAGER
LTC, Armor
Commanding

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Topic: Preparation

Discussion: By September 1968 it was apparent that REFORGER I would take place. During initial planning and preparation the following factors were considered:

a. Personnel. The Squadron was at about 75% of level 1 in September. Approximately 150 EM and officers were non-deployable due to ETS and overseas orders. Intra-Regimental transfers were accomplished involving some 350 personnel. Overseas levies through November and levies for Viet Nam which continued through December and January caused considerable turbulence and uncertainty. DA was receptive to requests for postponement of these levies in cases of key personnel. Unavoidable replacement of personnel for medical reasons, especially profiles, continued until deployment.

b. Security. The classification of the plan hampered coordination and caused considerable morale problems. Information that this Squadron would participate in the exercise was released through the local news media in Seattle and Tacoma prior to the date of the Squadron's notification as the official news release date.

c. Training. Training in preparation for REFORGER I began in September at Squad and Section levels. Annual Service Firing, Platoon and Troop tests, a 72 hour Squadron FTX and a 72 hour Squadron CRT were successfully completed by 21 December 1968. Special USAREUR oriented classes were conducted on driver training and testing, winter safety hazards, rail-loading, Five-K Zone, SAEDA, Gold Flow, Status of Forces Agreement and German Customs and Laws. Personnel turbulence had an adverse effect upon this training and the final quality of crews and small units involved in the exercise.

d. Equipment. Equipment shortages necessary for training were made up through normal supply channels and from within Regimental resources. TA 50-901 particularly Zone VI type personal equipment was drawn from Regimental sources. Fleece caps were in short supply and were replaced by insulating helmet liner (FSN 8415-782-2917) which proved superior to the fleece cap. There were equipment shortages at the prepositioning site that were identified and prepared for shipment by the advanced party. These items included, in particular, radios, and TOE M-60 machine guns. In the case of some tool sets it was felt that the effort in drawing, accounting for and repositioning was more effort than bringing only selected items from the sets as MEE.

e. Coordination. Initial planning began with conferences at ARSTRIKE; HQ USAREUR; HQ COMZEU; 5th Army REFORGER I held at Fort Riley; ALCE at McChord AFB; HQ Fort Lewis and telephonic coordination with REFORGER officers of the 24th Division; 5th Army; COMARC. Squadron representatives were able to make on the ground operational and logistical coordination with HQ, USAREUR; COMZEU; VII Corps; 7th Army Support Command; Rhineland/Phalz District; 7th Army Training Center, Grafenwohr; and the 6th Maint Battalion (UARG) in

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November. These coordinating visits proved invaluable especially in those cases where different headquarters were under the misconception that the Squadron came under the 24th Division for all support throughout the entire REFORGER I exercise. The Squadron's most valuable coordination was with the 24th Infantry Division and VII Corps, which continued on a daily basis.

Lessons Learned:

- a. Use of two duffle bags per individual proved adequate.
- b. Individual weapons could have been shipped in boxes with accompanied baggage.
- c. Regimental and Squadron representation should be included at all planning conferences.

Recommendations:

- a. A cut-off of at least 90 days prior to deployment be established for personnel assignments and reassignments involving REFORGER I Exercise units.
- b. EEE, such as radios, that can be drawn from other Regimental resources at the prep site be transferred at site rather than shipped from home station.
- c. REFORGER units should be kept at appropriate strength levels with deployable personnel.
- d. Security restrictions must allow the deploying units to announce facts to their personnel--not to wait for public news media to make the announcements.

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Tonic: Deployment

Discussion: The 2d Squadron (-) was deployed to the Federal Republic of Germany in three increments: (1) Quartering party consisting of 37 personnel, departed 4 & 7 January (2) Advance party of 269 personnel, departed 17 January (3) Main body of 419 personnel, departed 19, 20, 21 January. The allocation of 306 personnel on the advance party was sufficient to draw and move all equipment and vehicles to 7th ATC at Grafenwohr, Germany. The 2d Squadron (-) shipped the following amount of LBE for ENFORCE I: (1) Quartering party 2,000 pounds (2) Advance party 9,300 rounds (3) Main body 11,400 pounds. The unit had no difficulty in the transporting of LBE, troops or baggage.

Lessons Learned:

- a. During the break out period and convoy, control became a problem due to the fact that the advance party was made up essentially of drivers, mechanics, cooks and supply personnel with only a limited number of NCO's for control and supervision.
- b. The 2d Squadron (-) palletized all baggage and LBE in the unit area. This procedure allowed maximum time and packaging flexibility and is recommended for all future exercises.
- c. Palletizing crews should receive some advance training.
- d. The web seats on the aircraft proved very uncomfortable and fatiguing.
- e. Troop staging areas should have latrine facilities available.

Recommendations:

- a. Recommend instructions be given to the unit on palletizing to include all appropriate regulations and T's.
- b. It is recommended that in future air movements of this type that the airline seat configuration be used for the following reasons:
 - (1) Safety was compromised because it was nearly impossible to move for/aft through the web seated personnel.
 - (2) Troop comfort was nearly nonexistent since movement to latrines, water points or just to stretch cramped muscles was extremely difficult due to the web seat configuration. The serving of food or drink had to be accomplished by passing containers the entire length of the cabin, the resultant spillage and handling of food detracts from otherwise tasty and attractive food.

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- c. Food-plan to permit easy for/aft movement even if it means loss of one line of seats.
- d. Provide latrines in the aft section as well as in the comfort pallet.
- e. Provide pillows and blankets to "web-seat flights" rather than to airline-seat flights.
- f. Provide for more frequent announcements of position, weather at surface, correct time zone, etc.

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Topic: Drawing Prepositioned Equipment

Discussion:

a. Prepositioned equipment to be used during the exercise was drawn by the Squadron during the period 6 Jan thru 16 Jan 1969 at Kleber Kaserne, Kaiserslautern from the 6th Maint BN, UARG-Europe. Large major end ¹⁷⁰⁰⁰ ²⁵ tactical vehicles were drawn by actual joint inventories by losing and gaining Property Book Officers. Small major and virtually all minor end items had been preloaded on the Squadron's TO&E 5 ton cargo trucks prior to arrival of the Squadron. No physical inventory would be allowed by the commander of the 6th Maint BN; therefore items drawn from prepositioned storage were accepted "per joint inventory" on the basis of packing lists prepared in advance by the PBO of the 6th Maint. January 17-19 the 271 man advance party was received, matched with equipment, and preparations for movement by wheel and railloading preparations were made. All elements of the Squadron closed at the Seventh Army Training Center on schedule by 21 Jan.

b. For specific problem areas see "lesson learned."

(1) Generally the concept employed in the drawing of items from preposition was not sound. The lack of a joint inventory, especially considering that 10 days to conduct an inventory was available, eventually led to confusion, shortages and, in many cases, unexplainable overages. These were discovered in preparation for the FTX Phase and after, since none of the crates were allowed to be opened at the Preposition Site by order of the UARG.

(2) On unpacking at the 7th ATC, the crated TOE material was found to be uniformly jumbled and mispacked; neither company sized packing nor line item pack was used. In reality what we found were 5 ton cargo truck loads of mixed items. When crates were opened, the crate packing lists were found to be practically worthless. Overages and wrong issues of every description were found. Considering the activities of the Squadron at the time - occupation of the training area, operational preparations, maintenance staging and weapons shakedowns, the principles of supply accountability were abandoned. Time to resolve the confusion in the property was simply not available.

(3) Following the FTX, a thorough, line-by-line physical inventory was personally conducted by the Squadron Property Book Officer, confirming the accuracy of pre-FTX reports of shortages and overages. 6th Maint BN personnel attached to the Squadron participated in this inventory.

(4) Components and Basic Issue List Item Shortages created considerable problems.

All 9 4.2 inch Mortar Sights turned up missing. Only a special courier run to Kaiserslautern produced the missing components in time to conduct test firing.

Two (2) of 9 M577 Command Post were received with complete vehicle extension (tent) assemblies. Five others were short essential frame components, and two were short all frame components. As the Commander of the 6th Maint BN refused to supply the frames, local USAREUR units were "scrounged" by Squadron personnel

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to replace the shortages.

(5) A significant percentage of radios were issued short hand microphones and earphones. All AN/VRC-29 and the 2 AN/GRC-26D Radioteletype rigs were issued less the wiring required to install cryptographic equipment, negating all Squadron RTT capabilities.

(6) Four M1937 Field Ranges were received less the BILLI Repair Parts, which proved to be available through NORS requisition or from the 6th Maint BN. None of the 4 ever functioned.

(7) Tool Set item shortages were found, greatly hampering maintenance operations. Shortages of M113, M114 and M60 slings for use in pulling power packs later proved a very critical shortage.

(8) Two of the three BILLI Sets for M62 Wreckers lacked chains and towbars, rendering these vehicles useless for their principal employment as recovery vehicles.

Lessons Learned:

a. Drawing equipment must be handled either (1) with great speed and accuracy, dispensing with any pretense of a joint inventory. (This would apply in a combat situation), or (2) issuance must be by a physical, per-joint-inventory by line item, as in a garrison situation. It is difficult and time-wasting to attempt both, as was tried in REFORGER I.

b. No substitutes, no number of valid requisitions for missing components of sets, kits, outfits and major end items does the slightest bit of good for any unit airlifted into Europe destined to fight or train using prepositioned equipment. If critical items are missing, the mission will suffer accordingly for the most critical first few weeks of engagement or field training.

c. Considering the large number of obvious "controlled substitutions" apparent in the 2d Squadron TO&E as issued, it is doubtful if the 6th Maint Bn using present resources could issue combat ready TO&E sets of equipment to the entire 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment; much less the other battalions and smaller units prepositioned in Kaiserslautern.

Recommendations:

a. That the UARG be reorganized, increasing the ratio of maintenance and supervisory personnel to prepositioned equipment by at least 100%.

b. That the grade structure of UARG Maintenance and Supervisory personnel be revised upward substantially, and that the branch of the battalion commanders be specified according to the type unit prepositioned.

c. That realistic short notice airlifts of units not smaller than company size be conducted at least twice yearly on each UARG battalion to test issue procedures.

d. That supply system issue priorities not lower than those assigned

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combat-ready USAREUR units be applied to UARG requisitions of all types.

e. That permanent unit liaison from CONUS to USAREUR be established to include:

(1) Monthly reports of deadline and shortage from UARG to the CONUS unit.

(2) Regular - not less than twice yearly - inspections by CONUS battalion/squadron commanders accompanied by supply and maintenance advisors be established.

(3) Permanent unit representation in USAREUR, on a monthly rotating basis, of experienced company grade officers from the CONUS-based pre-positioned unit to assist the UARG in supervision of maintenance.

f. That battalion-sized sets of tactical vehicles be kept segregated and clearly identifiable from all other battalion/squadrons. At present all unit identity of vehicles is blurred by like-item parking and the UARG policy of removing and ignoring unit markings and designations.

g. That issue procedures be made faster, more reliable and more realistic in accordance with Lesson Learned #1, above.

h. That railloading equipment be permanently mounted on all prepositioned tracked vehicles and continuously accounted for and inspected.

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Tonic: Operational Readiness Staging

Discussion: a. Weapons test firing was conducted prior to exercise Carhide Ice. Ranges and test firing presented no problem; however, some of the weapons withdrawn from prepositioning storage were non-operational. Parts were exchanged from operational weapons, which had completed the firing exercise, and placed on the non-operational weapons. More than 90% of all weapons were originally operational. Another problem, in some cases, was the Weapons Card 2408-4 for selected crew weapons. These weapons were removed from storage and placed on any vehicle requiring that kind of weapon. However, the weapons card remained in the vehicle log book to which the weapon belonged. This resulted in a problem of insuring that the proper weapons card was matched up with the proper weapon.

b. Special Problems.

(1) Of nine 4.2" mortars drawn, two were condemned two days prior to firing. No replacements were available. Also the sights for the mortars were not issued with the weapon. A special courier run was required to locate and transport these to the training center from Kaiserslautern.

(2) More ^{than} 75% of the M2 machineguns were issued without mounting pins. Again, a special trip to Kaiserslautern produced enough pins to mount another 25% of the machineguns. With much switching all M2 machineguns were eventually fired.

c. Maintenance. Readiness Staging began in detail at the Seventh Army Training Center on 21 Jan 69. Equipment was moved from road and rail directly to two unit motor pools, where Technical Inspections were immediately begun. Wheeled vehicles operators, who drove the vehicles from Kaiserslautern, prepared 2404's and immediately began to work. During the period 21-26 Jan, the time allotted to maintenance staging, time and equipment available were enough to correct deficiencies, safety hazards, and deadline items. Although it is very obvious that the majority of wheeled vehicles engines were improperly tuned accountable to bad points, plugs, and dirty fuel systems, time was not available for tune ups. This lack of tuning resulted in increased fuel consumption and lowered performance of most wheeled vehicles during operation Carhide Ice. Poor tune was also noted on some gasoline powered track vehicles.

d. Problem areas.

(1) M-62 Wrecker - These were missing BILI, towbar, chains, and had leaking hydraulic systems. One engine threw a rod during the second day of the FTX, another wrecker was down for most of the FTX with a blown clutch. During the FTX--when they were in the heaviest demand--there were never more than one operational wrecker available at any time.

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(2) M114 - Though generally satisfactory, there was an abnormally high percentage of electrical system failures, faulty transmissions, steer gear assemblies, and road wheels.

(3) M113/M106 - These vehicles were generally satisfactory, although M113 had a higher than usual failure rate in electrical systems and an unusual number of fuel system leaks.

(4) M60 - Although generally satisfactory, there were problems with electric systems, engines, and several cases of worn out drive sprockets.

(5) M88 - Severe problems were encountered in this critical item. At most times not more than one M88 was available. Bad track, worn sprockets, miss-timed engines and transmissions failures are examples of M88 mechanical failures.

Lessons Learned: a. Lessons learned during weapons test firing were as follows: all weapons should be completely tested to insure that they are operational before departing the prepo site; secondly, all weapons data cards must remain with the assigned weapon.

b. Lack of critical maintenance tools such as slings and towing components along with a high deadline rate in recovery vehicles limited maintenance capabilities.

c. Much greater emphasis in the UARG maintenance program should be made in the area of gasoline engine tuning.

d. No significant inferences concerning the general serviceability of the prepositioned equipment can be made, for in some respects the equipment used by the unit represented the pick of the entire Regiment's prepositioned equipment.

Recommendations: a. Weapons Firing:

(1) That all weapons be given an operational test prior to departure from prepo site.

(2) That the Weapons Card 2408-4 be stored and issued with the weapon, not with the vehicle that normally carries the weapon.

b. General Maintenance:

(1) More training of unit mechanics in electrical systems troubleshooting is required.

(2) All tool kits and EIII sets must be checked continuously to ensure that essential items such as slings and tow bars are present.

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(3) Further research into the reliability of Preservative Engine and Drive Train Lubricants should be undertaken. Some engine trouble may have originated from breakdown of lubricant under sustained operation.

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Topic: Field Training Exercise

Discussion: The exercise "Carbide Ice" afforded this Squadron an opportunity to improve its effectiveness. The unfamiliar and difficult terrain gave leaders at all echelons an appreciation evaluation, and improvement of their tactical skills in all areas.

a. Command and Operations. Exercise "Carbide Ice" was of great value since it provided this unit with the opportunity to perform in an unfamiliar combat type environment. It tested the units' ability to function and the commanders' ability to retain control under fast changing situations. Specifically, the Squadron operated well under simulated combat conditions and the unit completed all exercise objectives with exception of executing a withdrawal. The exception was due to the change from Orange to Blue Forces. The play of fire and movement could not generally be realistically stressed due to the maneuver damage conditions, but this problem was alleviated by the use of substitution, such as flags on staves.

b. Personnel and Administration. The administrative sections were given the opportunity to work as an attached unit with all the related personnel and administrative problems inherent as an attached unit.

c. Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Security. The exercise proved invaluable in respect to realistic combat type situations. In this atmosphere the troops had much realistic reportable material instead of simulated and canned situations which are often found in unit level training.

d. Logistics. Due to the long distances involved the Squadron's support elements received valuable training in long range logistical support. The unit also depended upon support from the 24th Division; this aspect will be discussed under recommendations.

Lessons Learned: a. During tactical operations it was realized that the Squadron needs more FM radios for increased control by the commanders.

b. Because of the maneuver damage conditions the Squadron's tactical operations were limited to existing roads. This situation led to sizeable traffic tie-ups.

c. The Squadron did not receive adequate logistics information from higher headquarters. Upon attachment to the 24th Division Main, correct locations of the Class I and III points could not be obtained.

Recommendations: a. Troop level command post vehicles (1577) need one additional radio set, AM/GRC 47. The troop must monitor four radio nets but can monitor only two with present configuration. Additionally, the

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following specific personnel need some type of FM radio; each troop level first sergeant, each troop level wrecker, and selected fuel tankers. The addition of these radios would greatly ease the control of the units' logistical elements which presently have no communications with the unit commander:

b. The use of Military Police at traffic control points with a list of units in order of priority would relieve the problem of traffic congestion; a problem that was compounded because of interference of civilian traffic with military.

c. Recommend that in future BIFORGER operations, provisions be made for replacement of simulated casualties to the Squadron.

d. The lack of a field bath or shower point could have created a serious morale problem had the exercise continued. In future exercises the morale of the soldiers could be greatly improved with the use of shower points.

e. It would have been helpful if Squadron operations had received more frequent reports from higher headquarters such as: Intsums, Intrens, and results of air recon missions.

f. There were no night movements of units. This was unrealistic and did not allow for needed night drivers training, night map reading, and training of radar personnel.

g. It is recommended that in future exercises of this type, the parent units forecast and program responsible and realistic FLL requirements for the attached units.

h. Communications with higher headquarters was sometimes tenuous. Relays should be employed as distances increase. Also all communications were by FM radios due to lack of complete Com Sec equipment, specifically the lack of a Com Sec cable. The UHF team furnished by the 24th Division was unable to get communications within 12 hours and their equipment was unable to keep up with Squadron headquarters during movements.

i. Motivation of individual controllers varied greatly. Poorly motivated controllers were infrequently present with the commander. Two troop level controllers were absent for the entire second phase of the problem. Their absence was translated into a lack of bomb damage assessments and casualty assessments as a result of artillery and ground contact. Usually their radio nets seemed to be continually inoperative. More motivated and experienced controllers would have solved many of the control problems.

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AMOPT-T1 (20 Mar 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Exercise REFORGER I (RCS ATOPS-368)

28 MAR 1969

HQ SIXTH US ARMY, Presidio of San Francisco, California 94129

TO: Commanding General, Fifth US Army, Fort Sheridan, Illinois 60037

This Hq recognizes that the comments outlined in para 4, basic communication, may not be feasible for implementation; however, based upon the experience of subject unit, this Hq recommends that consideration by DA in future exercises be given to:

- a. Providing personnel fill beyond the capability of this Hq.
- b. Stabilization of personnel both presently assigned and subsequently assigned until completion of exercise.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



BEN KVITKY,
LTC, AGC
Asst AG

Incl 3 to Incl 2

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY TRAINING CENTER, INFANTRY AND FORT LEWIS
Fort Lewis, Washington 98433

AMNLE-GCT-P&O

20 MAR 1969

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Exercise REFORGER I
(RCS ATOPS-368)

THRU: Commanding General
Sixth US Army
Presidio of San Francisco, California 94129

TO: Commanding General
Fifth US Army
Fort Sheridan, Illinois 60037

1. Reference: a. Letter, Hq Fifth US Army, ALFGC-OP, subject as above, dated 31 January 1969.

b. Fifth US Army Message 4350, dated 14 February 1969, Subj: After Action and Other Exercise REFORGER Cost Reports.

2. In accordance with paragraph 4b, reference 1a, the following comments are submitted:

a. Upon receipt of notification that the 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment would participate in Exercise REFORGER I, this headquarters assigned the mission to the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment to prepare its subordinate unit for the exercise.

b. The 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment is a self-sustaining unit which is capable of independent operation. Consequently, little support was required from outside the unit in this preparation.

c. The Squadron was given priority for schools and training areas to insure completion of training prior to its departure. Troop and Squadron ATT's were administered for all units participating in Exercise REFORGER I and all units were found to be in a satisfactory state of Combat Readiness. A total of 39 personnel were used for testing.

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20 MAR 1969

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Exercise REFORGER I
(RCS ATOPS-368)

d. Equipment required for deployment was prepared for shipment by the Squadron assisted by the installation transportation office. Cargo was transported to the departure airfield (McChord AFB) utilizing both military and commercial vehicles. CTA 50-902 clothing and equipment required was provided from resources within the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and augmented as necessary from the Installation Supply Division.

e. Transportation of troops to and from the departure airfield was provided by the installation transportation office utilizing commercial buses. The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment provided five (5) trucks on a stand-by basis as back-up for troop movement if required. These trucks were not utilized. A total of 8 personnel were utilized as drivers.

f. In order that the 2d Squadron be able to close its mess facilities, the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment provided the squadron with other messing facilities for a period of three (3) days prior to departure and provided the squadron with prepared meals upon its return.

3. As in all similar type operations, some problem areas arose which required assistance from installation and higher headquarters. Problem areas experienced in this operation were as follows:

a. PERSONNEL. For participation in the exercise the 2d Squadron was required to be brought to 100% of TOE strength. In order to do this from within local resources the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment would have been reduced to zero strength in many MOS's and grades. This installation notified Sixth US Army of this and was informed that the squadron would be filled regardless of the impact on the other units. In addition, the squadron continued to receive levies for overseas replacement. Department of the Army was notified of this and a request for deletion from levy was submitted with a result of nine (9) personnel being deleted who were earmarked for other than Southeast Asia areas. This installation filled the squadron with personnel from within the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and as a last resort filled from local resources using maximum MOS and grade substitution. This ultimately resulted in creating 144 vacancies in other units within the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment which, if left vacant, would have created serious operational problems. Sixty-nine (69) filler personnel were received by DA requisition fill and the remaining seventy-five (75) position vacancies were filled locally without regard to MOS.

b. LOGISTICS. Non-receipt of changes to MAC Airlift Flow Plan created several last minute changes on flight planning with the squadron and the local Airlift Control Element (ALCE) at McChord AFB. This created problems in coordinating the surface movement of personnel and equipment between this

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AMNLE-GCT-P&O

20 MAR 1969

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Exercise REFORGER I
(RCS ATOPS-368)

installation and the departure airfield. Several long distance telephone calls were required to Fifth US Army, CONARC and STRICOM to obtain the required information.

4. As a result of this installation's participation in Exercise REFORGER I, the following recommendations are submitted:

a. That a six month stabilization period be provided units participating in future exercises to allow for an adequate personnel posture to be maintained without drawdown of other units which create operational problems.

b. That DA levies should not be directed against participating units until after unit returns from Exercise.

c. That authority to submit emergency requisitions for current and projected losses with a guarantee of immediate fill action should be granted.

d. That position vacancies be filled with proper grade and MOS.

e. That the Military Airlift Command be requested to furnish copies of all MAC published movement plans, and change thereto to the installation Transportation Officer on a timely basis.

5. Cost reports for this exercise will be submitted in accordance with reference 1b.

6. The 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment will submit a separate After Action Report in accordance with reference 1a above.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



W. W. KILLIAN

CPT, AGC

Asst Adjutant General

CF:

G1

G2

G4

C-E

Compt

IO

3d ACR

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

AHABC-OR

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I (RCS ATOPS 368)

Commanding General
Fifth United States Army
Fort Sheridan, Illinois 60037

1. References: a. Unclassified message 51927, ATOPS-OPS-MUR, HQ USCONARC, 12 February 1969, subject as above.

b. Letter, ALFGC-OP, HQ Fifth US Army, 31 January 1969, subject as above.

2. In accordance with reference b, the following REFORGER I After Action Report is submitted:

a. Two non-divisional REFORGER units from First US Army participated in the exercise. These were the 5th Surgical Hospital, Fort Knox and the 100th Transportation Company, Fort Eustis. Exercise planning for these units was generally conducted at installation level. The formulation of a REFORGER I address indicator group (AIG) for all participants facilitated this planning through the direct dissemination of planning guidance from USCONARC and your headquarters. Planning included the development of plans for pre-deployment training, preparation of movement data and the development of plans to move units to and from on/off load bases. The exercise planning conference conducted at Fort Riley, Kansas during October and November 1968, was of valuable assistance during this planning phase. Comments concerning this headquarters support requirements are at Tab 1.

b. After action reports from installations/units concerned are at Tab 2 (Ft Knox/5th Surgical Hospital) and Tab 3 (Ft Eustis/100 Transportation Company).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Anne C. Dryden".

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as

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14 March 1969

TOPIC: Proposed Visit of USAREUR Safety Team

DISCUSSION: Preparation for participation in Exercise REFORGER I included in the pre-exercise phase a proposed visit of the USAREUR Safety Team to participating unit of First US Army. This was concurred in by this headquarters and the desirability of this visit was stated in message to Commanding General, Fifth US Army, on 14 November 1968. In late November, CINCUSAEUR recommended that proposed safety briefing and assistance be deferred until arrival of units in USAREUR due to shortages of personnel and the costs involved. This information was disseminated to First US Army Exercise REFORGER I units.

LESSONS LEARNED:

(1) Units could not complete USAREUR safety orientation prior to deployment due to the cancellation of the proposed orientation.

(2) Information available to this headquarters indicates that lack of this orientation prior to deployment did not unduly affect their operations.

(3) The conduct of this orientation after arrival in USAREUR effects an obvious savings of manpower and funds.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That future exercises provide for the conduct of this type orientation upon arrival overseas of the participating unit.

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TOPIC: Redistribution of Equipment for REFORGER I Units

DISCUSSION: This Army was levied to transfer 22 line items to Reforger units. A total of 138 pieces of equipment were involved up to and including SP Howitzers and Semi-trailers. Material was shipped to the 24th Inf Div, Fort Riley and 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Lewis, to satisfy urgent training requirements. Notices were received 2 and 3 October 1968 that 16 lines or 93 pieces of equipment had to be at destination not later than 18 October 1968. During the period 8-12 October 1968, instructions were received directing remaining items be shipped to arrive at destination on 21 October 1968. The quantity of items together with the short suspense date and the required time to process the material to a prescribed serviceability standard, packing, crating and shipping time all contributed to a very confused situation. Additionally, numerous amendments to the original requirements contributed to the difficulties encountered in the transfer.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- (1) Levies were not always firm when received at Army thus requiring a change to shipping instructions and dates already furnished to installations.
- (2) Time frames allowed to effect the transfers were not realistic as rail shipment times exceeded the total time frame in almost all instances.

RECOMMENDATION:

- (1) Prior to levying Armies, NICP's should be required to make a positive commitment as to whether item will be supplied from depot stocks. This commitment to be made far enough in advance of the Required Delivery Date (RDD) to permit orderly selection of alternate supply sources, i.e., Troop units, repair of the equipment, and shipment with sufficient time to meet the RDD.
- (2) Realistic time frames be established for transfers. Consideration must be given to the work load being created at installation level. Inspection, processing material to a specified serviceability standard, packing, crating, loading and obtaining transportation clearances are time consuming projects requiring a large amount of man hours at installation level. Installations are not staffed with sufficient personnel or maintenance equipment to accomplish last minute equipment transfers especially when large end items such as M109 155 SP Howitzers or Semi-trailers are involved. During these periods of activity, routine supply, maintenance and transportation work load backlog to an unacceptable level.

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INFORMATION OFFICE

TOPIC: Information Activities

12 March 1969

DISCUSSION: Information activities for Exercise REFORGER I were limited to two areas--prepositioning of news releases at the Army Home Town News Center and the extension of invitations to and the preparation of travel orders for civilian news media covering the exercise.

1. Home Town News Releases. Coordination was made with the Army Home Town News Center in late December to determine their capability for handling prepositioned news releases for personnel participating in the exercise. After receiving an affirmative answer, contact was made with the Information Officers at Forts Knox and Eustis. DA Forms 1526 were prepared on all individuals in the two participating units who desired news releases. Prepared releases with a cover story were forwarded to the Army Home Town News Center at Kansas City. While difficult to assess the results of the project, it is noted that several weekly newspapers in the greater Baltimore area did carry "home town" items concerning personnel participating in the REFORGER.

2. Coordination of Civilian News Media Coverage. Department of the Army on 8 January 1969 requested that First Army Information Office nominate news media personnel to accompany participating units during the exercise. Because of the short time frame (7 days) in which to determine press interest, nominations were requested from newsmen in the areas adjacent to Forts Knox and Eustis only. In addition, the New York branch, Office of the Chief of Information, nominated newsmen from the New York City area. A total of eight invitations were approved by Department of the Army. Invitational travel orders were prepared by the Adjutant General Section this headquarters on 15 January, and forwarded to the individuals concerned.

LESSONS LEARNED:

Insufficient lead time was allowed for determining news media interest in covering the exercise. While this headquarters was able to determine interest in the areas adjacent to Fort Knox and Fort Eustis and in New York, we did not have sufficient time to explore other larger cities in the First Army area. For example: Boston, Cleveland and Newark all have full-time military writers on their papers who may have desired to cover the event in person.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That notification requesting nominations from civilian news media be made a minimum of 30 days prior to departure date from CONUS for overseas exercises.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY ARMOR CENTER
FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY 40121

12 MAR 1969

AHBAGT-T


SUBJECT: After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I (RCS ATOPS 368)

Commanding General
First United States Army
ATTN: AHABC-OO
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755

1. References: a. Letter, ATOPS-OPS-MUR, HQ, USCONARC, dated 24 December 1968, subject as above.
b. Letter, ALFGC-OP, HQ, Fifth US Army, dated 31 January 1969, subject as above.
c. Unclassified message 12380, AHABC-OO, HQ, First US Army, dated 14 February 1969, subject as above.
2. In accordance with reference c above, the attached after action report from the 5th Surgical Hospital (Mobile Army) is forwarded. (Incl 1)
3. Pre-exercise planning was conducted at installation level in conjunction with US Ireland Army Hospital and the unit. Details on this preparation are contained in the body of the report. No significant problems were encountered in furnishing additional (non-REFORGER) personnel or equipment to the unit with the exception of the Medical Equipment Set, Hospital, Training, Number Five (FSN 6545-959-8750), which arrived at this installation with many shortages. Action has been taken to rectify these shortages.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as


ROBERT L. EATON
Administrative Asst
AG Office

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Tab 2 to Incl 4 to Incl 2 ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL (MA)
FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY 40121

AETZMB-L

3 March 1969

SUBJECT: Transmittal of After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I
(RCS ATOPS-368)

THRU: ~~Commanding Officer~~ 
~~US Ireland Army Hospital~~
~~ATTN: Plans & Training~~
~~Ft Knox, Kentucky 40121~~

TO: Commanding General
USAARMC
ATTN: AHBAGT-T
Ft Knox, Kentucky 40121

In accordance with your letter, 13 February 1969, Subject: After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I, (RCS ATOPS-368), required report is attached.

1 Incl
as


ROBERT R. TURMAN
CPT, MSC
Commanding

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1. to Tab 1 to incl 4 to incl 2

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL (MA)
FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY 40121

AETZMB-L

3 March 1969

TOPIC: Preparation

DISCUSSION: On 16 September 1968, the 5th Surgical Hospital began an intensive unit training cycle in preparation for Exercise REFORGER I. This eleven week training period was fully oriented toward a European area of operations, and was based upon USAREUR training publications as implemented by CONARC Regulation 350-6. The total training program was conducted under the supervision of the Plans and Training Office, Ireland Army Hospital and the G3 Training Staff, Headquarters, US Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky. Conducted concurrently with the unit training program were numerous pre-exercise planning conferences at the Armor Center level. The Fort Knox REFORGER project officer and the unit commander attended a 5th US Army Exercise REFORGER I Planning Conference held at Fort Riley, Kansas, 31 October - 1 November 1968. On 9 December 1968, a series of POR/PCM "inspections" were initiated to insure that the personnel and equipment of the 5th Surgical Hospital were ready for deployment. Deficiencies noted were scheduled for re-inspection. Approximately eighty five per-cent of the unit requested leave during the Christmas holidays. In order to accommodate as many personnel as possible, two two-week holiday leave periods (14-27 December and 28 Dec - 10 Jan) were established by the unit commander. Make up training and pre-deployment preparation continued throughout the holiday period except for 25 December and 1 January. During the week of 6 January 1969, all MEE was crated and appropriately marked. Unit members were given individual clothing and packing lists, issued pre-marked foot lockers, and instructed to have their personal gear ready for final inspection (to include customs inspection) two days prior to deployment. Upon completion of the final inspection, footlockers and MEE crates were banded and placed in locked storage to await movement to the departure airfield.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- (1) Due to a high turnover of personnel (approximately 65% - many arriving after 16 September 1968), a significant number of "make-up" instructional periods had to be conducted.
- (2) The four week holiday period proved to be less effective than anticipated. The amount of makeup training already required increased in inverse proportion to the number of personnel present for duty. The preparation for deployment decreased in direct proportion to the present for duty strength.
- (3) Use of the POR/PCM inspections proved to be a highly

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5th Surgical Hospital (MA) 3 March 1969

TOPIC: Preparation

effective procedure to insure individual and unit readiness for deployment.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) To the maximum extent possible, personnel assignments and reassignments should be accomplished prior to the beginning date of the intensive unit training cycle which will culminate in participation in a REFORGER Exercise.

(2) Observe the normal two week holiday leave period. Training and pre-deployment preparations should be either suspended during this period, or geared to the number of personnel present for duty.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL (MA)
FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY 40121

AETZMB-L

3 March 1969

TOPIC: Deployment

DISCUSSION: The advance-advance party (10ff, 3EM) departed Fort Knox, Kentucky on 4 January 1969. Upon their arrival at McGuire AFB, the Air Force officer in charge was not aware of their scheduled departure on the MAC transport aircraft, and in fact, informed them that all seats were filled and that they would have to fly commercial. Several hours and several phone calls were required to establish the fact that these four personnel were to join the group already on the aircraft when it stopped at McGuire AFB to re-fuel. (Other REFORGER representatives located east of Mississippi River experienced similar difficulties upon their arrival.) On 15 January 1969, MEE and personal baggage of the advance party were transported to Standiford field for loading onto pre-positioned pallets. On 16 January, advance party personnel were transported by bus to Standiford field for departure. On 17 January, personal baggage of the Main body was transported to Standiford field for loading onto pre-positioned pallets. On 19 January, Main body personnel were transported by bus to Standiford field for departure. Both advance party and main body departed on schedule. Total time required for movement from Fort Knox to the arrival airfields in the Federal Republic of Germany was approximately twelve hours. Upon arrival, the advance party was transported to Ludwigsburg to prepare for convoy movement of vehicles and equipment to Grafenwohr. The main body, being the first unit to arrive at the Nuremburg Airfield, participated in a brief welcoming ceremony and then traveled by convoy to Grafenwohr.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- (1) Except for the initial confusion on the movement of the advance-advance party, the deployment phase was well planned and well executed.
- (2) Palletizing of MEE and personal baggage at least twenty-four hours prior to departure eliminated the possibility of delay due to preparation of cargo for loading after the aircraft arrived.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) More detailed coordination be effected for all REFORGER advance-advance party personnel when meeting at a common point for departure. An Army liaison staff meeting the incoming parties and "directing traffic" would be helpful.

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5th Surgical Hospital (MA) 3 March 1969

TOPIC: Deployment

(2) Continue the present system of sending Air Force liaison official to departure airfields to assist in all phases of the departure.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL (MA)
FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY 40121

AETZMB-L

3 March 1969

TOPIC: Drawing Prepositioned Equipment

DISCUSSION: The USAREUR Augmentation Readiness Group (UARG) pre-loaded all vehicles and trailers with non-medical equipment prior to arrival of the advance-advance party. Their inventory and issue system was geared to utilization of a fifteen man team from the REFORGER unit to inventory, accept and move the equipment. Medical equipment and supplies were stored at a different location. The issue system was basically the same; however, S&P trucks were used for transporting the equipment to Ludwigsburg. With the assistance of the 128th Evacuation Hospital personnel (a host unit assigned by the 7th Medical Brigade), all non-medical equipment was inventoried, accepted and moved by convoy to Ludwigsburg to await the arrival of the advance party. The OIC of the advance-advance party went from the preposition site to Grafenwohr to accept buildings and property and to establish/confirm supply support channels.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- (1) The size of the advance-advance party was insufficient to adequately accomplish the inventory and withdrawal of equipment without assistance.
- (2) Consolidation of all equipment and supplies from pre-positioning sites to one location prior to movement to the exercise area was advantageous for purposes of separating that equipment not required for the exercise.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) Size of advance-advance party be increased to accommodate the inventory team system established by UARG or continue use of "host unit" concept for required assistance.
- (2) If available, assign two officers to advance-advance party with one responsible for the withdrawal of the equipment and the other responsible for coordinating facility and supply requirements in exercise area.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL (MA)
FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY 40121

TOPIC: Operational Readiness Staging

DISCUSSION: On 22 January 1969, the unit began inspecting and preparing equipment for utilization. The overall condition of the equipment withdrawn from storage was good to excellent. There appeared to be no damage as a result of storage. Vehicles were generally in a good state of repair and only two 2½ ton trucks were deadlined due to mechanical failure. Both of these vehicles were repaired at the third echelon maintenance level. Some outstanding requisitions had not been filled; however, no critical items were missing. There were a few minor instances of mis-marked equipment and supplies. Tentage was generally in poor condition. Torn places were found, waterproofing was faulty, and much of the canvas had rotted to some degree. All medical equipment was in excellent condition. Non-medical mechanical equipment (generators, Herman Nelson heaters, etc.,) required continued maintenance and several minor repairs of direct exchange type items were required. During this phase, a prescribed load list (PLL) was established. The PLL had been requested by USAREUR during the earliest planning period while the unit was still in CONUS. A PLL of four line items had been pre-positioned and due to a lack of "experience factors", the PLL was not increased.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- (1) Processing of equipment for the initial storage period proved to be adequate in most instances.
- (2) Third echelon maintenance support was outstanding, considering the density of vehicles involved in the exercise.
- (3) Tentage appeared to be the least servicable item withdrawn from storage. (Problems could be anticipated during extended operations.)
- (4) Establishing the PLL during the staging phase caused some delays in repair.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) Tentage be thoroughly inspected on a periodic basis and, when discovered to be non-servicable, repaired or replaced with new tentage.
- (2) Based on the "experience factors" gained from this exercise, establish a standard prescribed load list (PLL) for the various types of participating units.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL (MA)
FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY 40121

ASTZMB-L

3 March 1969

TOPIC: Field Training Exercise (FTX)

DISCUSSION: The 5th Surgical Hospital was given a dual mission of providing medical support for actual casualties generated by the exercise and establishing a display hospital representative of the capability of a surgical hospital in field conditions. In addition, the display established was to be capable of becoming operational in minimum time if so required. At the time of the 5th Surgical Hospitals' arrival in USAREUR, it was not entirely clear as to how the medical support was to be rendered. In particular, the relationship between the 547th General Dispensary, whose fixed facility was to be utilized, and the 5th Surgical Hospital was not clear. Augmentation of medical personnel to the dispensary had been anticipated; however, the extent that medical equipment and supply support would be required was not known. Upon arrival in Grafenwohr, coordination was established with the CO, 547th General Dispensary, and personnel support was effected. The possibility of medical equipment support and expendable medical supply support was at this time made known to the CO, 5th Surgical Hospital. After thorough evaluation, action was initiated to establish appropriate support channels. The 5th Surgical Hospital was directed to plan for and be prepared to set up the entire hospital, less ward tents except one, at the site of the Grafenwohr "Sports Field". All planning prior to departure from Fort Knox, Kentucky, had been toward the directed requirement. Movement of all TO&E equipment to Grafenwohr was planned so that the display could be properly established. Three days prior to departure of the main body, a letter was received from the OIC of the advance-advance party indicating that changes had been made in the proposed display. A six tent display was the new requirement, and all excess equipment, both medical and non-medical, was to remain in Ludwigsburg. The equipment brought to Grafenwohr proved to be insufficient for an adequate display, and the change to the size of the display later was discovered to be in error. In addition, the site of the display was changed to avoid damage to the "Sports Field". The alternate and final location was not adequate. It would have been more desirable had numerous restrictions on the use of the field not been imposed (i.e. trenching, driving vehicles on the field, etc..). When the erroneous change to the original plan was corrected and additional equipment was transported to Grafenwohr, a display hospital was established

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5th Surgical Hospital (MA) 3 March 1969

TOPIC: Field Training Exercise (FTX)

that was representative of a surgical hospitals' capability and which covered the possibility of conversion to a working facility if required.

LESSONS LEARNED:

(1) Changes to basic planning must be thoroughly reviewed and coordinated prior to action being taken.

(2) Personnel, equipment, and supply support requirements to fixed facilities should all be pre-arranged to provide a more efficient transition upon arrival of the REFORGER unit.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Authority for all changes to basic planning be retained in command channels.

(2) A REFORGER "project officer" be appointed from within USAFEBUR medical channels to coordinate basic plans and changes involving the REFORGER medical unit. (The project officer should be appointed during the earliest planning phase and all REFORGER units so notified. From this point thru redeployment, copies of all communications should be submitted to the project officer for information and necessary coordination.)

(3) Direct coordination be effected, during earliest planning phase, between REFORGER units and fixed facility to be supported.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL (MA)
FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY 40121

AETZMB-L

3 March 1969

TOPIC: Maintenance Stand-Down

DISCUSSION: On 4 February 1969, the display hospital was taken down and equipment was prepared for storage. One tent, general purpose, large was utilized as a maintenance tent and one tent, general purpose, medium was utilized to provide a "warming area" for personnel. Equipment was cleaned and maintenance performed on 4 and 5 February. Vehicles received an initial inspection on 5 February. On 6 February, non-medical equipment was packed and crated by UARG representatives and returned to the unit for convoy movement to the pre-positioning site. Medical equipment was transported to Ludwigsburg on 6 February to be processed for storage with the assistance of the 128th Evacuation Hospital personnel.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- (1) Use of a GP large tent for a maintenance area proved to be inadequate due to space and heating problems.
- (2) Establishment of the UARG pre-positioning processing point proved to be highly effective and saved a considerable amount of time in preparing equipment for storage.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) If available, heated temporary buildings or warehouse space be provided for each unit as a maintenance stand-down area.
- (2) Continue present system of assembly line processing of equipment as operated by UARG.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL (MA)
FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY 40121

AETZMB-L

3 March 1969

TOPIC: Turn-In of Prepositioned Equipment

DISCUSSION: The convoy with non-medical equipment arrived at the pre-positioning site on the night of 7 February 1969. The equipment was unloaded, inventoried, and placed in storage by the afternoon of 8 February. Vehicle maintenance was initiated and on the following Thursday (13 February), all vehicles were accepted for pre-positioning. Several personnel (medical MOS's) were then transported to Ludwigsburg to assist in maintenance and processing of medical equipment. By 16 February, the medical equipment had not been completely processed for storage, however, the rear detachment, less the property book officer, redeployed to COMUS as scheduled. As of the report date, the property book officer has not yet returned from Germany. He will not be released until all medical equipment has been pre-positioned. Just what is causing the difficulties in the turn-in procedure is unknown. From past experience, the problem area was anticipated to be with pre-positioning of vehicles and non-medical mechanical equipment. As the medical equipment was primarily used for display purposes, it is assumed that the problems that have been encountered are in the areas of inventory and packing. A complete report is expected upon the return of the property book officer.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- (1) Processing the non-medical equipment for pre-positioning at the exercise area saved considerable time in the actual turn-in of the equipment for storage at the pre-positioning site.
- (2) There are apparent flaws in the current system of processing medical equipment for pre-positioning.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) Continue present system of processing non-medical equipment for pre-positioning at the exercise area.
- (2) Review present system of processing medical equipment for pre-positioning and establish more effective procedures.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL (MA)
FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY 40121

AETZMB-L

3 March 1969

TOPIC: Redeployment

DISCUSSION: On 8 February 1969, the main body was transported to Nuremberg for redeployment to CONUS. As in the deployment phase, all details of movement were well planned and coordinated. The MEE and footlockers belonging to the main body personnel had been transported to the airfield twenty four hours prior to departure to be loaded onto pallets. As cold weather gear and sleeping bags were required up to the day of departure, duffle bags were retained by individuals until arrival at the departure briefing and inspection site, Grafenwohr. The duffle bags were then loaded onto trucks for immediate movement to the departure airfield. Redeployment of the rear detachment was on 16 February and was essentially the same procedure as for the main body. Fort Knox, Kentucky, transportation personnel and vehicles met the arrival of both groups at Standiford Field. The total time required for redeployment of both groups was approximately fifteen hours (excluding a three hour delay due to aircraft maintenance problems on main body flight). The three hour difference from the deployment phase was due to the amount of time scheduled by USARGE for out-processing.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- (1) The redeployment phase was well planned and well executed.
- (2) Palletizing of MEE and personal baggage at least twenty four hours prior to departure eliminated the possibility of delay due to preparation of cargo for loading after the aircraft arrived.
- (3) Out-processing time was somewhat lengthy due to required inspections of ID Cards, dog tags, and immunization records.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) Continue present system of pre-palletizing MEE and personal baggage.
- (2) Give unit commanders responsibility of inspecting ID cards, dog tags, and immunization records prior to arrival at departure briefing site.

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AHBE-GC-OP (31 Jan 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I (RCS ATOPS-368)

HQ, U. S. Army Transportation Center and Fort Eustis, Fort Eustis, Virginia
23604

20 MAR 1969


TO: Commanding General, First United States Army, ATTN: AHABC-00, Fort
George G. Meade, Maryland 20755

1. Subject report prepared by the participating REFORGER I Unit Commander
is attached as Inclosure 1.

2. Comments of this headquarters are attached as Inclosure 2.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl
as


WILLARD WALTON, JR.
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

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3 to Incl 4 to Incl 2

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
100TH TRANSPORTATION COMPANY
Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604

10 March 1969

TOPIC: Preparation

DISCUSSION: Preparation for participation in Exercise REFORGER I began in September 1968 with unit training conducted under a modified ATP 55-11. This training included an FTX during November 1968 and culminated with a successful ATT during December 1968. The ATP was modified to include mandatory USAREUR training requirements. Training was seriously hampered during this period by excessive personnel turbulence. This unit is authorized an aggregate total of 160 personnel. During the period September 1968 through December 1968 the unit experienced 128 gains in personnel and 106 losses. This necessitated repetitive training for several phases of mandatory subjects and greatly increased the work load on unit training personnel. Pre-exercise planning included one conference held by USARSTRIKE at Fort Riley, Kansas; two conducted by Post Headquarters; two by Post Transportation Office and three by HQ, 38th Transportation Battalion. A unit loading plan was developed for the movement of all equipment during November 1968. All MEE was packed and appropriately marked during the week of 23 December 1968. A sequence of events check list was developed for the actions to be accomplished from D+30 until deployment. Individual clothing and equipment lists were developed and disseminated. Items to be hand carried or worn on personnel were identified as well as those items to be carried in the duffle bags (this unit deployed with two duffle bags rather than one duffle bag and one footlocker). Arrangements were made for an Advance Party to accompany the initial party of the 24th Infantry Division on 5 January 1969. Upon completion of the ATT, all vehicles and equipment not deploying with the unit were prepared for administrative storage. They were to be considered nonoperational for commitment purpose during this period. A complicating factor occurred in that during this period the unit was also called on to turn in to CSO approximately 20 vehicles and to draw replacement vehicles. This procedure was further complicated due to the holiday season for the remainder of the Post falling simultaneously. The holiday season terminated 6 January 1969 and the unit deployed two days later, 8 January 1969. That which could not be physically accomplished due to the time factor was prepared, to include all necessary paper work, and left for the company's rear detachment to complete. Additionally, the unit was instructed to expect a First US Army CMMI re-inspection prior to 21 December 1968. This failed to materialize until 20 January 1969. The unit's equipment received a satisfactory rating.

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rel, to Tab 3 to Incl 4 to Incl 2

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LESSONS LEARNED:

(1) All unit and individual training was completed despite intense personnel turbulence. However, training was conducted up until one day prior to deployment. They included several night classes and an immense work load on the company's training personnel and leadership echelons.

(2) Personnel turbulence made it difficult for those personnel assigned just prior to deployment to complete the necessary training and adequately prepare their personal affairs for the movement.

(3) Two duffle bags per individual proved adequate for the exercise and decreased handling problems.


RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Personnel assignments and reassignments should be stabilized at least 90 days prior to deployment.

(2) That a ten percent (10%) excess be authorized and trained within the unit to insure personnel requirements are adequately fulfilled.

(3) That DA levy action be cut off 90 days prior to participation in future exercises.

(4) That parent units performing like missions maintain a reserve pool of personnel trained to meet USAREUR requirements at all times. These personnel should be identified and attend all mandatory training with the REFORGER unit.


JULIAN B. JOHNSON
CPT, TC
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
100TH TRANSPORTATION COMPANY
Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604

10 March 1969

TOPIC: Deployment

DISCUSSION: All preparations and documentation for deployment was completed during December 1968. Cargo manifests remained stable throughout. However, the passenger manifest required continuous updating due to personnel turbulence. The company was divided into two MAC flights. The first consisted of 94 troops and yellow disk, TAT weighing approximately 400 pounds. The second flight consisted of 63 troops and the unit's MEE of approximately 2.5 S/T. The flight with the MEE aboard did not have a comfort pallet. Both flights departed Langley AFB, Virginia, on 8 January 1969 with no problems encountered. The Advance Party was scheduled to deploy on 5 January 1969 from McGuire AFB. A slight problem occurred here as the Air Force did not have these personnel included in their flight manifest. This was handled telephonically with the First US Army and the unit's Advance Party departed McGuire at 052050 January 1969.

Both MAC flights were routed to RAF Mildenhall, England due to weather conditions at Rhein/Main AFB. USAEUCOM Control Center was informed of the delay and our present location via telephone conversation with the CO, 100th Trans Co. After a delay of approximately ten hours both flights continued on to Rhein/Main AFB and all personnel and equipment were convoyed in 2½-ton tactical vehicles to Mannheim, Germany. The unit closed into Mannheim at 100030Z January 1969. Billets had been arranged by the host unit, the 181st Trans Bn. All personnel were billeted by 100100Z January 1969. The host unit had prepared bunks and had them made up for all personnel when the unit arrived. This was a definite morale factor as most personnel were weary following the flight. Box lunches were furnished to each individual by UARG for the convoy to Mannheim.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- (1) Passenger Manifests prepared in advance are subject to continuous updating.
- (2) An orderly deployment is definitely feasible. According to Air Force officials, even under weather conditions as they existed, MAC could have landed at Rhein/Main under emergency conditions.

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
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RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Passenger manifests should be completed as far in advance as possible even though they may change.

(2) The passenger load and MEE should be distributed evenly throughout both flights in order to enable a comfort pallet to be available to all troops.

(3) The actions of UARG and the host unit regarding box lunches and billets should be maintained as part of the regular procedures for future REFORGER exercises.


JULIAN R. JOHNSON
CPT, TC
Commanding

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
100TH TRANSPORTATION COMPANY
Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604

10 March 1969

TOPIC: Drawing Prepositioned Equipment

DISCUSSION: An inventory of all equipment was made by the Advance Party from 061700Z January 1969 through 070100Z January 1969. Every set and component was not completely inspected as the plan formulated by UARG called for these to be inventoried within 72 hours after closing into the field locations. At this time a joint inventory with the UARG Liaison representative would be made and shortages listed and submitted to UARG Forward. By the morning of 10 January 1969 UARG personnel had the unit's vehicles formed into three lines for departure. After a briefing on the route to Grafenwoehr, all vehicles were checked by the operators and DA Form 2404 completed. Deficiencies noted consisted of flat tires, burned out headlights or inoperative trailer lights. Only one vehicle, an M-52 5-ton tractor had to be replaced. The transfer was inoperative on this vehicle and it could not be replaced prior to the unit's departure time. The company was originally scheduled to depart at 0500 hours, 13 January 1969. This was rescheduled for 0548 hours, 11 January 1969. This allowed approximately twenty-eight hours for operators checks and loading of MEE. More time scheduled should have been allowed in light of the necessary adjustment of Central European Time from Eastern Standard Time. The PLL did not match that submitted by the unit. PLL records were not included with the packet issued.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- (1) The equipment's overall condition exceeded expectations.
- (2) UARG had all vehicles and equipment ready for issue to the Advance Party.
- (3) The amount of time allowed the Advance Party to sign for the unit's equipment, approximately three days, proved sufficient.


RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) At least three days should be allowed to perform operators maintenance checks prior to departure from UARG. This period would also allow personnel to adjust to the different time schedule.

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(2) For wheel vehicle units, Advance Party departure can be limited to three or four days prior to the main body if only an inventory of equipment is expected.

(3) An effort should be made to have the unit's PLL as submitted on hand for issue. The records required for maintaining a PLL should be included with the repair parts.


JULIAN R. JOHNSON
CPT, TC
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
100TH TRANSPORTATION COMPANY
Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604

10 March 1969

TOPIC: Operational Readiness Staging

DISCUSSION: The unit departed Spinelli Barracks, Mannheim for Grafenwoehr at 0548, 11 January 1969. All drivers had been thoroughly briefed on routes to be followed, emergency procedures and maintenance operations to be performed enroute. Preplanning by UARG was evident as much had been accomplished to make the Autobahn as safe as possible for REFORGER units. Routes were marked with REFORGER directional signs from the Start Point to the Release Point. The only improvement in the signs would be to make them luminous for easier detection during periods of reduced visibility and darkness. Three Convoy Control Centers were established on the route to furnish maintenance support, recovery facilities, medical and military police support. Radio frequencies were disseminated to each march unit commander in the event emergency contact with the CCC's was required. The maintenance support was exceptionally efficient. The company experienced eleven vehicle failures enroute. All of these vehicles were repaired and joined the unit within twenty-four hours. The last march unit closed into Grafenwoehr at 1930 hours, 11 January 1969. The company was billeted at Camp Cheb, Grafenwoehr in GP Medium tents with other units of the Third Support Brigade. Logistical support was furnished by Task Force Gypsy, a provisional unit formed by the brigade. OPCON passed to the 3rd Support Brigade upon closure. The company erected two Maintenance Tent Frames for organizational maintenance. The period 12 January through 15 January was spent maintaining the vehicles and making the necessary preparations to insure operational readiness. Most sets and components were inventoried and shortage lists submitted to the UARG Liaison NCO. Due to the facilities available, it was not necessary to unpack all of the TOE equipment. Those items that were not opened were accepted at the prepositioning site without being rechecked. The company's maintenance section went into operation and insured that all vehicles were operational. On 13 January 1969, the company received a warning order to prepare for displacement to Nurnberg to move the Main Body from the airport to the east train station. The unit was to depart for Nurnberg on 16 January 1969. A liaison visit to the USARGE Center and the North Bavarian Support District was conducted on 13 and 14 January. Convoy clearances were obtained from TMO Nurnberg. All administrative details were finalized with the tenant unit, 1st Battalion, 94th Artillery.

LESSONS LEARNED:

(1) Extremely rapid deployment from the prepositioning sites is possible.

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(2) The Convoy Control Centers furnished exceptional maintenance support along the convoy routes.


(3) Effective maintenance can be accomplished under extremely adverse weather conditions in the Maintenance Tent Frame (an average of eight inches of snow was on the ground during the operational readiness phase).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) The Convoy Control Centers should be utilized in future REFORGER exercises.

(2) Equipment which is not required to accomplish the mission should remain crated and preserved throughout the exercise.

(3) REFORGER Directional Signs should be luminous for easier detection during hours of darkness or reduced visibility.


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
100TH TRANSPORTATION COMPANY
Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604

10 March 1969

TOPIC: Field Training Exercise

DISCUSSION: On 16 January 1969 the main portion of the company departed for Nurnberg. The planning for the Main Body's arrival called for 36 each 2½-ton cargo vehicles and 10 each 5-ton tractors with 12-ton stake and platform trailers. An additional nine 2½-ton cargo task vehicles were taken as back-up. One hundred twenty-seven men participated in the operation. The company closed into William O Darby Barracks, Nurnberg at 1030 hours, 16 January. On the 17th and 18th of January, the company made practice runs from the airport to the train station. Additional coordination was effected with USARGE to insure accomplishment of the mission. The vehicles were parked at the airport and left until 20 January. Several coordinating conferences were held with LTC Carey, OIC UARGE. Plans called for one plane every thirty minutes. Due to a three hour break in arrival time, the first aircraft was to be taken directly to Grafenwoehr by the 342d Trans Co. All other missions were handled by this unit. The first aircraft landed at 0903 hours and was loaded out to Grafenwoehr by the 342d Trans Co. The next aircraft landed at 1230 hours and was convoyed to the train station. During the approximate thirty-two hours of the operation, 5,122 troops were convoyed to the train station. An additional 332.5 S/T of personal baggage was moved over the same route. More than 74 S/T of MEE was moved by S&P from Nurnberg directly to Grafenwoehr. During this operation several aircraft were rescheduled due to weather conditions. As a result, from 1105 hours to 1243 hours on 21 January 1969, ten aircraft landed at Nurnberg. This totaled approximately 950 troops and their baggage to be processed in an extremely short time period. This was accomplished with a minimum of delay by reducing the convoy from seven to five vehicles thereby allowing an extra convoy to work the route. This did not cause excessive overcrowding as the average truck load was only 19 personnel. All transitions went smoothly with no time lost in the change. The last convoy departed the airfield at 1935 hours on 21 January 1969.

On 22 January 1969 the company was split. One platoon of twenty 2½-ton cargo vehicles and six 5-ton tractors with S&P were dispatched to Augsburg to support the 3rd Brigade, 24th Infantry Division (Orange Forces). The remainder returned to Grafenwoehr to furnish general support to the Blue Forces. The third platoon departed for Augsburg at 1430 hours. The remainder departed for Grafenwoehr at 1545 hours, 22 January 1969.

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
During the period of the FTX, the third platoon compiled a total of 43,608 miles and transported 257 S/T of supplies and equipment. They operated out of Hohenfels training area during most of this time. The remainder of the company was in a general support role and averaged only four dispatches per day. Vehicle availability averaged 95% during this period. The 342d Trans Co was in a similar situation but did not have a platoon detached. The percent of vehicle utilization during this period was extremely low for both the 100th and the 342d Trans Companies. The FTX terminated on 4 February 1969. Due to adverse weather, the third platoon did not close into Grafenwoehr until 1500 hours, 10 February 1969. On 29 January 1969, a conference was conducted by the CO, USARG Forward, on repositioning procedures for nondivisional units. This unit's departure date from Grafenwoehr was moved up to 12 February from 25 February.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- (1) It is feasible to plan on utilizing a REFORGER transportation unit to move the Main Body of REFORGER personnel with minimum lead time. Equipment and personnel are capable of performing the mission.
- (2) Backup transportation may be required in the event weather forces a stack up of aircraft. However, at one period a flight landed on the average of every 9.8 minutes and was cleared in acceptable time.
- (3) For an exercise of this duration, transportation assets were in excess of requirements. This would probably change during sustained combat support operations.
- (4) The exercise familiarized most personnel with USAREUR operating procedures and conditions.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) REFORGER transportation units should be utilized in support of future REFORGER exercises. This would enable the transportation units to remain technically and tactically proficient for their USAREUR mission.
- (2) Transportation assets should be fully utilized during the next REFORGER exercise in order to conduct a thorough test of the equipment.


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
100TH TRANSPORTATION COMPANY
Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604

10 March 1969

TOPIC: Maintenance Stand-down

DISCUSSION: The maintenance stand-down was conducted during 4 February through 11 February. On 4 February a maintenance team from UARG conducted the initial TI on vehicles and equipment available at that time. Those deficiencies or shortcomings found were corrected immediately. The remainder of the company's equipment was inspected at 0800 hours, 11 February, after the closure of the third platoon from Augsburg. Organizational mechanics and drivers corrected these faults as they were noted to insure that all vehicles would be operational for the unit's displacement the following morning at 0500 hours. During the later stages of the FTX and until the unit left for Mannheim, approximately 200 parts were replaced. General Support Maintenance was furnished by Co D, 1st Maint Bn, a REFORGER unit. The quality of support was excellent. On 5 February from 1800 hours to 2200 hours, all TOE equipment and OVM was preserved and packed by UARG. This was accomplished rapidly due to accurate inventory conducted by the unit. All equipment was cleaned and prepared for crating by the company. During this period a few vehicles required Reports of Survey. The task of completing most of the paperwork was easily performed. However, excessive delays were encountered due to the delay in not having a centralized Report of Survey operation for nondivisional units at Grafenwoehr. Orders appointing the surveying officer had to be published in Stuttgart and mailed to Grafenwoehr. This developed into the major administrative problem at Grafenwoehr. Until the surveying officer released the vehicles, no repairs could be made. This caused three vehicles to be left in support maintenance when the unit departed for the Mannheim repositioning site. The unit departed Grafenwoehr at 0500 hours, 12 February 1969. As the company cleared the Start Point, a heavy snow was falling. The weather remained generally bad all the way to Mannheim. The company lost four vehicles enroute to Mannheim. Three were due to maintenance problems above organizational level and one due to a traffic accident attributable to road conditions. Convoy Control Centers were established along the route in the same manner as those for the convoy to Grafenwoehr. Again, maintenance, medical and military police support were made available. In addition, each CCC had hot coffee and soup available. The return route was marked in the same manner and driver information packets with the route description and emergency procedures were furnished to each driver. The company closed into Turley Barracks, Mannheim, at 1910 hours.

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LESSONS LEARNED:

(1) Administrative procedures, especially in regard to Report of Survey, need refinement for nondivisional units.


(2) Accurate inventories and correct property accountability procedures contributed greatly to the ease of acceptance of TOE equipment and OVM by UARG.

RECOMMENDATION:

(1) A central appointing authority should be established in the major training areas to handle such administrative details as appointing surveying officers and administering military justice.

(2) The initial technical inspections should be continued in future exercises as an aid to unit maintenance sections.

(3) Accurate and complete inventories should be compiled prior to taking equipment to the UARG packing and crating unit for processing. This greatly reduces the time required for processing.


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
100TH TRANSPORTATION COMPANY
Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604

10 March 1969

TOPIC: Turn-in of Prepositional Equipment

DISCUSSION: The company received an initial technical inspection from USARGE/UARG at 0800 hours on 13 February 1969. Established procedures included the initial TI, steam cleaning, final TI and acceptance. General Support Maintenance was furnished by the 88th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company, 8th Maintenance Battalion. Following the initial TI, vehicles were moved to maintenance bays furnished by the 181st Transportation Battalion. At this time all faults were corrected by either the operator, organization maintenance personnel or mechanics from the 88th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company, or a combination of all three. The vehicles were then driven to Taylor Barracks for steam cleaning. A team from the company processed all vehicles through this operation. Steam cleaning was necessary due to the extremely cold weather experienced at the time. Due to limited facilities, the steam cleaning operation was the most time consuming step in the turn-in process. Following the steam cleaning, the vehicles were returned to Turley Barracks for final inspection. It is noteworthy that only one vehicle was turned down at this inspection. The rest were accepted and driven to Spinelli Barracks for return to the preposition site. All vehicles were turned in by 1520 hours, 20 February 1969. A total of 480 parts, from a light bulb to an engine, were replaced at Turley Barracks. Many of these consisted of windshield wiper blades and arms. It is felt that all vehicles repositioned are in combat serviceable condition and are capable of performing their mission in future exercises or contingencies.

All engineer and nonmechanical equipment was returned to storage. This equipment was turned in by 1530 hours, 16 February 1969.

The Property Book Officers from this unit and the PBO from UARG spent several days conducting a joint inventory. Incomplete maintenance action on vehicles due to delayed Reports of Survey were the primary obstacle. All other property was accounted for and on 2 March 1969 our PBO was given verbal clearance by CW2 Dardif, S-4, UARG. There appears to be a problem as yet unresolved which may require the unit's PBO to return to USAREUR. This could have been prevented had an efficient Report of Survey procedure been established. The unit departed USAREUR on 3 March 1969.

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
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LESSONS LEARNED:

- (1) An effective and standard procedure needs to be established in regard to turn-in of equipment pending completion of Reports of Survey.
- (2) Adequate maintenance facilities were made available to the unit for preparing equipment and vehicles for prepositioning.
- (3) Steam cleaning vehicles developed into the most time consuming action due to limited facilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) A standard operating procedure for turn-in of vehicles pending Report of Survey action should be established for nondivisional units.
- (2) Positive, written clearance must be obtained by unit PBO's to preclude possible returns to USAREUR to clarify property accountability.


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U. S. ARMY TRANSPORTATION CENTER AND FORT EUSTIS
Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604

20 March 1969

TOPIC: Predeployment Preparations

DISCUSSION: Personnel turbulence within the 100th Transportation Company immediately prior to deployment was created by overseas levies imposed by Department of the Army and replacement of personnel unqualified to deploy with the unit. Turbulence is not considered to have been any more severe than in other units with deployment missions.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) REFORGER units be considered no different than other units of equivalent REDCAPE with the exception that all assigned personnel have at least 90 days remaining to ETS.

(2) Replacement of personnel upon receipt of overseas levy or 90 days prior to ETS should be a continuing policy.

(3) One week prior to deployment REFORGER units be exempt from DA levies.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
100TH TRANSPORTATION COMPANY
Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604

10 March 1969

TOPIC: Redeployment

DISCUSSION: Preparations for redeployment were initiated at Grafenwoehr on 8 February 1969. Most MEE was packed in conex inserts and ready to be banded by 9 February. The actual banding was accomplished at Turley Barracks, Mannheim on 25 February. Two outprocessing conferences were held with UARG personnel at Spinelli Barracks. The initial conference was conducted on 24 February during which MAC mission numbers and passenger lists were furnished to the unit by USARGE. Both the passenger manifest and cargo manifest were submitted to USARGE on 26 February. Copies were returned to the unit on 1 March 1969. Coordination for transportation to Rhein/Main AFB was effected at this conference as well as a pick up time for the unit's MEE. The final outprocessing conference was conducted on 1 March. This brief conference consisted essentially of verifying previous information. The company departed Mannheim at 030430Z Mar for Rhein/Main. The unit redeployed in two flights, the first departed Rhein/Main AFB at 030725Z March 1969 with 94 personnel and approximately 300 pounds of yellow Disk TAT. The second flight departed at approximately 031200Z March. Slight maintenance problems caused the first flight to be delayed for approximately two hours longer than scheduled at McGuire AFB. The S-3 of the 38th Transportation Battalion was notified of this development via AUTOVON at 1910Z 3 March. At 2015Z the first flight departed McGuire and landed at Langley AFB, Virginia at 2100Z 3 March and closed at Fort Eustis at 0045Z, 4 March 1969. No significant problems were encountered by either flight.


LESSONS LEARNED:

- (1) MAC flow charts are disseminated in ample time to allow units to prepare necessary documentation for redeployment.
- (2) The redeployment functioned smoothly in every respect.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) Units should prepare MEE for redeployment at the earliest possible time consistent with their assigned mission.
- (2) Future REFORGER exercises should incorporate most of those redeployment procedures utilized in REFORGER I.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U. S. ARMY TRANSPORTATION CENTER AND FORT EUSTIS
Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604

20 March 1969

TOPIC: Security Classification

DISCUSSION: Documents published by the Military Airlift Command bearing the protective marking of FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY contained information classified CONFIDENTIAL or higher in USAREUR and COMZ documents. Personnel of the unit were prevented from informing dependents of the exercise until 6 December 1968 (the date of the public announcement). This did not provide sufficient time for arrangement of appropriate domestic affairs. MAC OPLAN 927, Redeployment Schedule, was initially classified CONFIDENTIAL and subsequently changed to FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY making it impossible to inform dependents of arrival of sponsors at arrival airfield.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) A joint agreement between participating services as to the classification of documents.
- (2) Provide an unclassified portion of the plan in order to enable proper planning of domestic affairs. For this purpose, an unclassified orientation to include month, general area, and length of the operation could be disseminated to adult dependents.

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AKPHO-G3-OP (5 Mar 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: After Action Report: Exercise REFORGER I


DA, HQ III Corps and Fort Hood, Texas 76544 7 APR 1969

TO: Commanding General, Fifth US Army, ATTN: ALFGC-OP, Fort Sheridan,
Illinois 60037

1. During the personnel buildup of units participating in REFORGER I, difficulties were encountered in maintaining required strengths due to overseas levies from higher headquarters. Relief was not granted for these units from levy until approximately one month prior to departure date. It is recommended that deferment from all levies for future Reforger exercises be provided a minimum of 90 days prior to departure month to permit better continuity of operations and to provide minimum time for training and qualification of personnel.
2. With reference to supply actions recommend that Zone VI TA50-901 clothing be maintained in each REFORGER unit and that MTOE changes be made on those units whose radio communications equipment was determined to be inadequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

- 2 Incl
1. After Action Report
HHD 36th Med Bn
2. After Action Report
Co D 440th Sig Bn


LEE L. STEWART
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

Incl 5 to Incl 2

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 36TH MEDICAL BATTALION
FORT HOOD, TEXAS 76544

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I

5 March 1969

THRU: Commanding General
III Corps and Fort Hood
ATTN: G-3
Fort Hood, Texas 76544

THRU: Commanding General
Fourth US Army
ATTN: G-3
Fort Sam Houston, Texas 76544

TO: Commanding General
Fifth US Army
Fort Sheridan, Illinois 60037

• REFERENCES:

- a. USCOMZEUR OPORD 7-68 dated 21 Dec 68.
- b. ANNEX Q (MEDICAL) to 7th (US) Corps Exercise Directive for Exercise CARBIDE ICE.
- c. 7th Medical Brigade OPLAN 3-68 for Exercise REFORGER I dated 12 Dec 68.
- d. Appendix X, to Annex L (Airstrike Action Agent's Final Report).
- e. USCONARC Reg 350-1.
- f. USARSTRIKE Message 68752 DTG 022190Z Nov 68.
- g. USARSTRIKE Exercise Directive REFORGER I Unclas.

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Incl 1 to Incl 5 to Incl 2

2. GENERAL:

a. REFORGER I dates were fixed at 15 Jan-16 Feb 69. The commencing date was changed to 12 Jan 69 and remained unchanged. Exercise REFORGER I was executed as finally scheduled.

b. OVERALL EXERCISE OBJECTIVES:

(1) To test the capabilities of REFORGER I units to deploy from CONUS stations to the Grafenwohr-Hohenfels Training area.

(2) To provide REFORGER personnel with more realistic and effective training exercises.

(3) To familiarize REFORGER personnel with the weather and terrain conditions of the European Continent.

c. MEDICAL OBJECTIVES:

(1) To familiarize the Reforger Exercise Medical Units with the material and equipment available for them in Europe.

(2) To provide a more realistic vehicle for patient care training.

(3) To familiarize Reforger personnel with the methods and procedures required to preposition medical material and equipment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

8 Incl:

1. Preparation
2. Deployment
3. Drawing of prepositioned equipment
4. Operational Readiness Staging
5. Field Training Exercise
6. Maintenance Stand-down
7. Turn in of prepositioned equipment
8. Redeployment

William F. Morris
WILLIAM F. MORRIS
Capt. MSC
Adjutant

TOPIC: Preparation HHD 36th Medical Battalion

DISCUSSION: Headquarters 36th Medical Battalion initiated preparations for Operation REFORGER I on 24 June 1968. Requisitions were submitted at that time for all MOS vacancies. The unit experienced no difficulty in obtaining personnel. The normal rotation of personnel did hinder the effort of the unit to become combat ready. This problem was solved on 6 Dec 68 by a message from CG USCONARC that exempted this unit from personnel levies.

On 8 Sep 68 this Headquarters started the basic unit training cycle under Army Training Program 8-200 and participated in the following Battalion level field training exercises with attached units:

- a. 21-23 Oct 68
- b. 4-7 Nov 68
- c. 16-19 Nov 68

The Battalion Staff participated in the following Corps level command post exercises:

- a. Pre Iron Knight I
- b. Iron Knight I 23-26 Aug 68
- c. Iron Knight II 11-14 Oct 68

The following pre-deployment orientation subjects for Exercise REFORGER I were integrated into the basic unit training schedule:

- a. Soviet Military Liaison Mission (All personnel were issued

AE Form 3231, dated 1 Aug 64)

- b. Geneva Convention
- c. German American Relations
- d. Discipline and Military Courtesy
- e. Code of Conduct
- f. Survival, Escape and Evasion
- g. Chemical, Nuclear and Biological Training
- h. Border Restriction
- i. U.S. Customs and Agriculture Inspections
- j. Seasonal Hazards (winter)

Basic Unit Training Program was completed on 2 Dec 68. The Battalion Headquarters underwent an Operational Readiness Test administered by G-3 Training Division, III Corps and Fort Hood under the direct supervision of III Corps Surgeon's Office on 3,4,5, Dec 68. The Unit was designated: "Combat Ready". The remaining time before redeployment was occupied by POM qualifications under Fort Hood Reg 210-38, driver training testing in accordance with USAREUR Pam 55-1, and supply preparation.

Incl 1

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Incl 1 to Incl 5 to Incl 2

On 12 Dec 68 each individual was issued a packing list for his personal equipment as directed by COMZ Message dated 6 Dec 68 (see APP 1) The packing and shipment of both MEE and personnel equipment was completed by 9 Jan 69. It was palatized and transported to Air Force facilities at Bergstrom Air Force Base on 12 Jan 69. Transportation arrangements of both equipment and personnel were handled through Transportation Officer, Fort Hood, Texas. Coordination of prepatation were a joint effort of Mr Farrell, G-3 III Corps and the Battalion Commander and staff.

LESSON LEARNED:

1. Exemption of unit from personnel levy solved the major personnel problem.
2. Participation of Battalion Staff in III Corps Combined Arms CPX enable Staff to train at appropriate level for operations during REFORGER I.
3. Use of III Corps and Fort Hood Reg 210-38 Facilitated POM qualification of unit.
4. One footlocker and one duffel bag proved adequate to ship each individual's personal gear and TA 50 equipment.
5. Use of Project Officer at Corps or Post level was essential for efficient prepatation and necessary coordination of REFORGER I.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. All REFORGER Units be exempted from levy for 90 days prior to deployment.
2. All REFORGER Units of Battalion size have Staff Participation in CPX's of Division level or higher.
3. Continued use of III Corps and Fort Hood Reg 210-38 for POM qualification.
4. A Project Officer be appointed at Post or Corps level to coordinate prepatations for future REFORGER Exercise as was done in this exercise.

Appendix 1 To Inclosure 1 (Logistics)

1. Below is a list of the individual equipment to be worn or carried by the individual soldier during the deployment and redeployment phase.

a. The following Class II items will be worn or carried by the individual:

Bag, Duffel	Undershirt, Wool (Optional)
Belt, Trousers	Drawers, Wool (Optional)
Boots, Combat	Field Pack, Canvas
Buckle, Belt	Scarf, Wool
Belt, Indiv Equip	Shirt Wool Flannel, OG108
Case, Field First Aid W/Packet	Suspenders, Trousers
Case, Ammo (2) W/4 Magazine	Suspenders, Field, Pack
Drawers, Cotton (Optional)	Trousers, Wool Serge, OG108 (Optional)
Glove, Inserts, Wool	Trousers, Field, Cotton (OG107)
Glove, Shell, Leather	Protective Mask, Field
Handkerchief	Individual Weapon
Helmet, Steel, W/Liner W/Camouflage	Watch (If Available)
Cover, Brown	ID, Tag, Personnel
Necklace ID, Tag	Coat, Mens OG107, W/Liner (Fld Jkt)

b. The following items will be packed in the field pack which will be individually tagged and hand carried by each soldier - in addition, necessary Class VI (Personal demand items) (e.g., soap, razor, razor blades, tooth brush, tooth paste, after shave, shaving soap, etc.) will be packed, for accessibility, in the field pack:

Drawers, Cotton (3)	Mess Pan
Undershirt, Cotton (3)	Toilet Articles
Socks, Cushion Sole (3)	Canteen Cup
Poncho, Nylon	Canteen cover
Knife	Canteen
Fork	Cap, Field, Pile
Spoon	

c. The following items will be packed in individual duffel bags which will be palletized and loaded onto troop carrying aircraft:

Bag, Barracks	Intrrenching Tool
Bag, Water-Proof	Case, Sleeping Bag
Blanket, Bed	Mattress, Pneumatic
Parka, Mens, Cotton OG106	Shelter Half, W/Rope & Poles
Liner, Parka, OG106	Sleeping Bag
Carrier, Intrrenching Tool	Sling, Carrying, Bag & Case
Mask, Cold Weather	Hood, Winter, OG107
Mitten, Insert	Bayonet, W/Scabbard
Mitten, Shell	Boots, Insulated
Strap, Carrying	CVC Helmet: (For Track Veh Crew Men)

Strap, Field Pack, Adapter	Goggles, Driving (If Auth)
Coveralls, Wet Weather (If Available)	Paras, Wet Weather (If Available)
Overshoes, Rubber	
Liner, Trousers	

d. The following items will be packed into a footlocker (without tray) and shipped by troop carrying aircraft:

Boots, Combat	Shirt, Cotton, Polyester
Cap, Garrison	Shirt, Utility, CG107 (3)
Cap, Utility	Shoes, Dress Oxford, Black
Cap, Field	Socks, Cotton, Black
Coat, Wool, AG44	Socks, Cushion Sole
Drawers, Cotton (2)	Towel, Bath
Drawers, Wool	Trousers, Wool AG44
Handkerchief	Trousers, Utility, CG107 (3)
Insignia, US	Undershirt, Cotton (2)
Insignia, Branch of Service	Shirt, Wool Flannel, CG108
Insignia, Rank	Trousers, Field, Cotton, CG107
Necktie, Wool, Black	Civilian Clothing (If Auth)
Overcoat	Coat, Mens, (Fld Jkt)
Rain coat	

e. Paras with liner will be last item packed in the duffel bag, so it will be readily available if needed. The CVC helmet should be packed immediately under the paras (If Authorized).

2. MISCELLANEOUS:

a. All cargo must undergo customs inspection to preclude entry of unauthorized items into FRG or upon return to CONUS.

b. Insure that stowed and hand carried baggage does not contain inflammable or explosives. Portable radios will not be turned on during flight. Flash bulbs will not be carried in stowed baggage. Only cotton filled lighters are permitted aboard an aircraft, and only when carried on the passenger's person - other type lighters will be empty of fluid or gas content.

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TOPIC: Deployment HHD, 36th Medical Battalion

DISCUSSION: The Advance-Party, consisting of Property Book Officer, Supply Sergeant and one clerk, departed from Forbes AFB, Kansas, on 5 January 1969, arriving Rhein Main AFB, Germany on 6 January 69.

The Main Body consisting of 7 Officers and 27 EM departed Fort Hood, by government bus, at 1000 hours on 12 January 1969, and arrived at Bergstrom AFB, Texas, for further transportation to FRG. The aircraft (C-141), with reclining seats departed at 1200 hours, on 12 January 1969, and arrived at Rhein Main AFB Germany, after a refueling stop at Dover AFB, Delaware, at 1000 hours, 13 January 1969.

Upon arrival in FRG, representatives from USARGE, met and briefed personnel. The 30th Medical Group and UARGE furnished our escort and necessary transportation to move this units personnel and equipment to Ludwigsburg, where we were quartered until our departure for Grafenwohr.

No problems were encountered during the deployment phase. Troops arrived in Europe rested, with morale high and capable of performing their mission.

LESSONS LEARNED: The feeding of hot meals enroute, and the use of reclining type seats, was a great morale factor, and enabled the personnel to arrive in USAREUR prepared to carry out their assigned mission.

RECOMMENDATIONS: The Air Force continue its use of reclining type seats when airlifting troops to USAREUR or other overseas destinations. Continued use of hot meals while enroute.

Incl 2

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Incl 2 to Incl 5 to Incl 2

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TOPIC: Drawing of Prepositioned Equipment HHD 36th Medical Battalion

DISCUSSION: The Unit Property Book Officer and two enlisted men arrived in the ERG on 6 Jan 69 and were transported immediately to Spinelly Barracks, Mannheim. The drawing of prepositioned equipment occurred on 7 Jan 69 and took 8 hours. This length of time was required because U.S. Army Europe Augmentation Readiness Group had not prepacked the unit vehicles in an orderly manner and the Property Book Officer 36th Medical Battalion, had to hunt for many of the items on the preloaded trucks.

On 8 Jan 69 the 30th Medical Group dispatched a team of one officer and approximately thirty enlisted men from Ludwigsburg to Mannheim to assist the 36th Medical Battalion in transporting of prepositioned equipment to Ludwigsburg. At 1100 hours, 8 Jan 69, a convoy including 36th Medical Battalion vehicles and equipment left Mannheim for Ludwigsburg under the supervision of 30th Medical Battalion Property Book Officer and Liaison Officer, 30th Medical Group. The convoy arrived at Ludwigsburg at approximately 1630 hours 8 Jan 69. The equipment immediately needed was then uncrated and checked under the supervision of USAREUR Augmentation Readiness Group Liaison NOO. It was found at this time that requisitions submitted at time of prepositioning of equipment had not been filled. It was also noted at this time that subordinate medical units had their medical equipment stored at sites other than where their general TO&E Equipment was stored and additional planning, transportation and time was required to marry up the unit medical and general equipment at an appropriate location.

LESSON LEARNED:

1. The use of in Theatre Sponsoring Units to assist medical units in the withdrawal of equipment increases the efficiency of this phase of the operation.
2. Pre-packing vehicle in disorganized manner by UARG slowed down inventory of equipment.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. USAREUR Medical Sponsoring Units should continue to assist medical units being redeployed on future REFORGER type exercises in drawing both medical and general equipment.
2. The deploying unit Property Book Officer be sent to preposition sites sufficiently in advance to conduct loading and inventory of unit vehicles.

Incl 3

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Incl 3 to Incl 5 & Incl 2

OPIC: Operation Readiness Staging HHD, 36th Medical Battalion

DISCUSSION: At 0700 hours 17 Jan 69 HHD, 36th Medical Battalion and the 417th Medical Company (Amb) left Ludwigsburg for Grafenwohr FRG. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment arrived at the release point just outside of Grafenwohr at 1720 hours the same day. The motor march was carried out in a higher successful manner and was within 2 minutes of the scheduled arrival time. Upon closing to Grafenwohr the Headquarters was established in semi-permanent facilities at Camp Normandy. The battalion assumed operational control of the subordinate units upon their closing at Grafenwohr training site:

<u>UNITS</u>	<u>CLOSING DATES</u>
417th Medical Company (Amb)	17 Jan 69
5th Surgical Hospital	19 Jan 69
517th Medical Company (Amb)	20 Jan 69
Hospital Train	22 Jan 69
421st Air Amb Company (3rd Plt)	27 Jan 69

During the period 18-26 Jan 69 the staff sections established communications with higher, adjacent and subordinate Headquarters. Prior to our arrival at Grafenwohr, no radio frequencies were allocated to this Headquarters. The Battalion Communications Officer contacted 7th Corps Signal Officer, but no frequencies were available for this headquarters as directed in 7th Med Bde OPN PLAN (S) 3-68 dated 12 Dec 68. Also during this period detailed inspection of equipment, including opening of sealed containers, revealed several minor discrepancies, however none that would materially affect operational readiness of the unit. The only item found to be unserviceable was a duplication machine. Other discrepancies that caused inconvenience included absence of generator grounding rods, missing hose and nozzle for the gasoline pod, missing typewriter covers and issue of the incorrect insecticide sprayer. Support at Grafenwohr was excellent except for the difficulty in locating maintenance and supply activities. All classes of supply were adequate and readily available. Two day laundry service was provided by Grafenwohr Quartermaster Laundry. On 27 Jan 69 7th Corps Surgeon assumed operational control of the 36th Medical Battalion and subordinate units. This phase was concluded 28 Jan 69.

LESSONS LEARNED: Medical units, even though they are actually involved in patient care, did experience much difficulty in obtaining the needed radio frequencies to establish a medical radio net.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Radio frequencies be allocated to this Headquarters prior to deployment to exercise area.

Incl 4

TOPIC: Field Training Exercise

DISCUSSION: During the field training phase "Carbide Ice", the VII Corps Surgeon had operational control of all Non-Divisional medical units. The duties and responsibilities assigned each unit were as follows.

- a. 36TH MEDICAL BATTALION: Provide command and control of medical units under the direction of the 7th Corps Surgeon.
- b. 5TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL: Operate the dispensary at Grafenwohr, augmented by the 547th General Dispensary. To provide definitive care for all categories of personnel authorized medical care and augment other medical units as directed. Set up a portion of the hospital as a static display.
- c. 517TH MEDICAL COMPANY (CLEARING): Operate a dispensary and hospital facility at Hohenfels, augmented by the 731st General Dispensary. Be prepared to deploy one platoon on order. Augment other medical units as directed.
- d. 417TH MEDICAL COMPANY (AMBULANCE): Provide ground evacuation support for the Grafenwohr and Hohenfels area during exercise "Carbide Ice". Evacuate patients from the division clearing stations.
- e. 3d PLT, 421ST MEDICAL COMPANY (AIR AMBULANCE): Provide air evacuation support on a mission basis, in the Grafenwohr and Hohenfels training areas.
- f. 57TH MEDICAL BATTALION: Will furnish a hospital train to run daily from the Grafenwohr area to Nurnberg, 130th General Hospital.

All duties and responsibilities were discharged in a highly efficient manner. Radio communication continues to be a major problem for medical units in the field. The absence of simulated patient play enabled the medical units concentrate on actual patient care and evacuation. Minor discrepancies in what information should be contained in the Bed and Patient report developed early in the exercise, but subsequently were resolved (For patient activities report see APP. 1)

Normal S-4 activities in the support of attached medical units were carried out. The major problem encountered was the lack of spare parts for the 3/4 ton ambulances (M43). These ambulances are now obsolete, their eventual replacement will correct this minor discrepancy.

Normal personnel and administration duties were performed without encountering any major problems. No serious accidents or incidents were reported. Two enlisted personnel were returned to CONUS on emergency leave. (For personnel statistics see APP. 2) During this phase the Battalion received and briefed a number of distinguished visitors. (For a list of visitors see APP. 3)

LESSON LEARNED: Normal staff function are comparable in different theaters and can be carried out effectively in a minimum of allowed transition time. Elimination of simulated patient play, enables medical personnel to concentrate on actual care and evacuation of patients.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That the quantity and quality of radio communication equipment be increased to enable medical units to better maintain liaison with subordinate and higher headquarters. That patient reporting procedures be standardized at all echelons of command.

WP. 1 to Incl 5, (Patient Activities Report - 28 Jan to 5 Feb 69)

REFORGER PATIENT ACTIVITIES

1. Admissions	Grafenwohr 143	Hohenfels 23	Total 166
2. Dispositions			
a. Duty	137	14	151
b. Transfers	9	6	15
c. Deaths	∅	∅	∅

Non REFORGER PATIENT ACTIVITIES

1. Admissions	Grafenwohr 11	Hohenfels 39	Total 50
2. Dispositions			
a. Duty	1	13	14
b. Transfers	7	29	36
c. Deaths	∅	∅	∅

Consolidated Patient Activities

1. Admissions	Grafenwohr 154	Hohenfels 62	Total 214
2. Dispositions			
a. Duty	138	27	165
b. Transfers	16	35	51
c. Deaths	∅	∅	∅
3. Upper Respiratory Infection Patients-	124		
4. Cold Weather Injuries-	3		

Ground Ambulance, Hospital Train and Air Evacuation Operation

1. Ground Ambulance Operations: (Hohenfels to Grafenwohr)	
a. Ambulatory Patients-	15
b. Litter Patients-	4
Total-	19
2. Hospital Train Operations: (Grafenwohr to Nurnberg)	
a. Ambulatory Patients-	32
b. Litter Patients-	∅
Total-	32
3. Air Evacuations-	3

Appendix 2 To Incl 5 (Personnel Report)

	<u>36th Med</u>	<u>5th Surg</u>	<u>417th Med</u>	<u>517th Med</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Auth	8/29	6/96	3/87	3/114	20/326
Asgd	8/29	4/91	4/85	3/114	19/319
Mob Des MC	-	2/	-	2/	4/
ANC	-	3/	-	2/	5/

pendix 3 to Incl 5 (VISITORS LIST)

LT GEN HUCKLEHEIN
MAJ GEN MCGIBNEY
MAJ GEN BOATRIGHT
COL JUEL
COL LINDSEY
COL BINKLEY
COL WHEELER
COL RUMOR
COL ALLEN
COL SKY
LTC POWERS
LTC TAYLOR
LTC HALLENBACK
LTC WIDDIFIELD
LTC BENSON
LTC SCHADDER
MAJ HAMILTON
MAJ IRONS

ARMY BRG (RET)
CG, USAREUR MED COMM
CG, 24TH INF DIV
CO, 7TH MED BDE
CO, NURNBERG MED AREA
DEPUTY USAREUR SURG
CHIEF OFNS USAREUR MED COMD
DEPUTY SURG USAREUR FOR SEVENTH ARMY
CORPS SURGEON, 7TH CORPS
CO, 30TH MED GP
DIV SURG, 24TH INF DIV
COMZ LAISON GP
CO, 440TH SIG BN
CO, 128TH EVAC HOSP
CO, #1ST MED GP
S5, 7TH MED BDE
USAMA OTSG
DA, OTSG

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TOPIC: Maintenance Standown, IHHD, 36th Medical Battalion

DISCUSSION: Maintenance Standown commenced on 5 Feb 69 and continued until our departure from Grafenwohr on 7 Feb 69. This period was used by the unit to inspect and correct all deficiencies found in unit equipment. UARG inspect unit vehicles on 5 Feb 69 and cleared them for return to pre-po site. On 6 Feb 69 all non-mechanical equipment preservation and repackaging was processed through a UARG processing point. Three pieces of equipment, a pair of binoculars, a detector kit and an insecticide sprayer, were unaccounted for during the process as a result of accounting procedures practiced by the UARG team. The processing point was set up on an assembly line basis where the items were checked at the starting point and the packing list presented at the end. No precautions were taken to insure proper accountability of smaller items during the processing by UARG personnel. It was quite possible for the missing items to have been packed with other equipment and just not accounted for on paper.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. UARG inspection of vehicles at Grafenwehr enabled unit to spot and correct deficiencies prior to departure from Grafenwohr.
2. The use of an assembly line was the most effective way of preservation and packing of non-mechanical equipment and assured departure from Grafenwohr on schedule.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. UARG continue to inspect vehicles prior to departure from Grafenwohr
2. Tighter accountability procedures be instituted to insure against loss or unaccountability of smaller items of equipment.

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Incl 6

Incl 6 to Incl 5 to Incl 2

TOPIC: Turn In Of Prepositioned Equipment

DISCUSSION: At 0500 hours 7 Feb 69 HHD, 36th Medical Battalion moved from Grafenwohr to Spinelli Barracks, Mannheim by motor vehicle convoy, arriving at 1620 hours the same day. The TO&E, less vehicles, was turned into UARG personnel prior to 2045 hours the same night. All vehicles were inspected and accepted by UARG on 9 Feb 69 and a joint inventory was completed by 1600 hours 10 Feb 69. At this time UARG PBD # 5 assumed responsibility for all prepositioned 36th Medical Battalion equipment. The remainder of the time prior to the flight on 16 Feb 69 was used for cleaning, care, and preparation of minimum essential equipment and personal baggage for shipment to COMUS. During this phase this unit experienced difficulty in receiving it's mail. This was due to the fact that the 28th Base Post Office at Frankfurt failed to follow verbal agreement arrived at by all parties and confirmed by letter, HQ, United States Army Postal Group Europe, dated 10 Feb 69. This agreement stated that mail for HHD, 36th Medical Battalion would be stopped at Frankfurt as of 6 Feb 69 and instead of being forwarded to Grafenwohr would be routed to Mannheim. By the time this mixup was corrected, weather conditions further delayed the delivery of mail. The first mail delivery for the unit in Mannheim was on 13 Feb 69. This phase concluded 15 Feb 69.

LESSONS LEARNED:

1. Inventory of equipment immediately upon arrival does not allow Property Book Officer and assistants sufficient time for reorganization.
2. Length of time necessary for pre-positioning of equipment was more than adequate.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That UARG allow PBD and assistants time for reorganization after arrival of convoy from exercise site. Three (3) hours would be considered sufficient after 12 hour convoy.
2. That European postal authorities plan sufficiently in advance so that written orders can be issued for coordination of mail deliveries to units at pre-positioning sites.

Incl 7

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27 to Incl 5 to Incl 2

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TOPIC: Redeployment HHD, 36th Medical Battalion

DISCUSSION: Redeployment back to CONUS was accomplished essentially in the same manner as the deployment phase with no problems encountered. The HHD, 36th Medical Battalion boarded a civilian bus and departed Mannheim, Germany at 161300 Feb 69, arriving at Rhein Main AFB at 161400 Feb 69. Personal immunization records as well as ID Cards and ID Tags were checked by representatives of UARG. Minimum Essential Equipment and personal baggage was palletized and loaded. Unit departed Rhein Main AFB at 161730 Feb 69 arriving at Gray Army Air Field, Killeen, Texas at 170145 Feb 69, with a two hour stop over at McGuire AFB, New Jersey. Unit was transported by military bus to Ft Hood, Texas where all MEE and personal baggage was found to be in excellent condition. No disciplinary problems were encountered during the Redeployment phase.

Incl 8

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
D/440th, 366th Signal Battalion
Fort Hood, Texas 76544

HQ-366SI-D/440

14 March 1969

SUBJECT: After Action Report-REFORGER I (RCS ATOPS-368)

THRU: Commanding Officer
366th Signal Battalion
Fort Hood, Texas 76544

Commanding General
III Corps & Ft Hood
ATTN: G-3 Opns
Fort Hood, Texas 76544

TO: Commanding General
5th US Army
ATTN: ALFGC-OP
Fort Sheridan, Illinois 60037

1. References:

a. Letter, ATOPS-CPS-MVR, HQ USCOMARC, subject as above, dated 24 December 1968.

b. Letter, ALFGC-OP, HQ Fifth US Army, subject as above, dated 31 January 1969.

2. In compliance with the above references the After Action Report for this unit is submitted.

Kent E Seiler

KENT E. SEILER
CPT, SigC
Commanding

1 Incl
as

Copies Furnished:
CG, 4th US Army.
Ft Sam Houston, Texas 78234

CO, 440th Sig Bn
APO NY 09227

CO, 6th Maintenance Bn
APO NY 09227

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
D/440th, 366th Signal Battalion
Fort Hood, Texas 76544

TOPIC: Preparation

12 March 1966

DISCUSSION: Preparation for Exercise REFORGER I began in September 1968. The Unit Commander attended the planning conference held at Ft Riley, Ka. on 1 November. Information and reference material provided at this conference was complete and accurate, allowing the unit to conduct training in those subjects which were required for the exercise. Permission from STRICOM was requested at this time to ship the signal shelters mounted on organic vehicles. This permission was subsequently granted during December. However, information was not received as to what special preparations were required for the vehicles. (ie, Anti-Freeze Protection Level, 10 Wt Crankcase Oil, Blacked Out USA Numbers, Number of Tire Chain Sets Required for each Vehicle, Special Highway Warning Kits, and Turn Indicators on 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton Trucks) The results was some of these requirements were not met on vehicles shipped from CONUS. The unit experienced difficulty in obtaining some of the Zone IV TA 50-901 organizational clothing. Items such as insulated boots and parkas are not stocked at Fort Hood, and had to be requisitioned. These requisitions were not filled prior to the unit's departure, and clothing was obtained "on-loan" from other REFORGER units at Ft Hood which did not deploy for the exercise. Losses due to levies continued until 15 December 1968. For the period October through December, losses totaled 78, while gains totaled 128. Of these, 23 were gained during December. Many of those gained did not hold the proper MOS, or had not been trained on the equipment operated by the unit. (The AN/GRC 50 radio operated in Europe by this unit is only now being issued to Army units throughout the world. Very few newly assigned 31M radio operators were familiar with this equipment). Training on HF radios, and crypto equipment was also hampered because the unit did not possess this equipment at Fort Hood. Teams authorized this equipment were sent to other signal units on post for training, but this training could not be integrated into the unit training cycle. The late arrival of personnel, lack of qualified personnel, and the Christmas Holiday period made it impossible to conduct sufficient unit training prior to deployment. All MEE and signal equipment was crated and marked during the week of 6 December. The only problem encountered was in obtaining plywood, and 2X4 lumber for internal bracing in the signal shelter. Since standards for internal bracing of signal equipment shelters are not published, these materials had to be justified to Post Engineers at Fort Hood. Once the requirement for these materials was established, the material was delivered and installed with no further problem. The 16 vehicles with signal shelters and power generator trailers were convoyed to Bergstrom AFB on 10 January. The COMZEUR OPORD specified that upon arrival at Rhein Main the vehicles were to be driven to Kleber Kaserne, in Kiaserslauten. Upon arrival at Rhein Main the drivers were told that they were to proceed in convoy directly to Grafenwohr. Hasty preparations had to be made at Rhein Main to receive the drivers as their flights arrived, feed and billet them until they all had arrived, and obtain convoy clearance to Grafenwohr.

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LESSONS LEARNED:

(1) Zone VI, TA 50-901 clothing is not immediately available to CONUS REFORGER Units.

(2) USAREUR special requirement for tactical vehicles are not known in CONUS.

(3) The average 31M radio operator is not familiar with the AN/GRC-50 radio operated in Europe.

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(4) Lack of FM and AM radios limit the ability of the unit to train.

(5) Shipment of properly braced signal equipment mounted on vehicles resulted in the equipment arriving for the exercise in perfect condition.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Stocks of Zone IV TA50-901 should be maintained at CONUS installations for use by units committed to USAREUR OPLANS, or in USAREUR receiving ports.

(2) A cut off date of at least 60 days prior to deployment should be established for personnel assignments and reassignments involving REFORGER Exercise Units.

(3) Copies of USAREUR directives on operation, maintenance, and special safety features required on tactical vehicles should be provided to REFORGER Units.

(4) Standards should be published on what internal bracing is required when air-shipping signal shelters

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
D/440th, 366th Signal Battalion
Fort Hood, Texas 76544

TOPIC: Deployment

12 March 1969

DISCUSSION: The unit was bussed to Bergstrom AFB on 12 January. At Bergstrom the personnel boarded C-141 aircraft for the trip to Germany. One stop was made at Dover AFB, Delaware. The troops were fed a hot meal, then re-boarded their flight for the remainder of their flight to Rhein Main AFB. The aircraft was met at Rhein Main by the REFORGER personnel and the troops were transported to Kiaserslauten. At Kiaserslauten, the unit was met by the Assembly Area Control Group (AACG). That unit had made preparations for messing, and billeting of the unit. The supply personnel of the unit then reported to the 6th Maintenance Battalion to draw the prepositioned equipment. The unit deployed in convoy from Kiaserslauten to Grafenwohr on 16 January. The equipment deployed from CONUS was collected at Rhein Main AFB, and convoyed to Grafenwohr the same date. Support received by the unit from the Military Police and convoy control centers during the move was excellent. The Military Police provided traffic control points at the convoy entrances and exits on the Autobahn, and provided road guides or guide vehicles to direct the convoy at points where wrong turns could be made. Strip maps provided and "R-1" signs made the ~~convoy~~ route easy to follow. The four convoy control centers stationed along the route were well staffed and equipped to provide minor maintenance, weather and road information, and hot beverages for the drivers.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- (1) Movement of troops and equipment by the US Air Force was well planned and executed.
- (2) Reception of the unit in Germany by REFORGER personnel was well planned and executed.
- (3) Convoy Control procedures and facilities were excellent.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) None

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
D/440th, 366th Signal Battalion
Fort Hood, Texas 76544

TOPIC: Drawing of Prepositioned Equipment

12 March 1969

DISCUSSION: The main body of the unit arrived 13 January. A meeting was held with the 440th Signal Battalion, and the 6th Maintenance Battalion to determine what equipment was to be withdrawn from storage. Packing lists were then inventoried and the property picked up on the property book. Inventory of the actual equipment was not permitted. Although the unit stayed at the preposition site until 16 January, it did not have access to any of the prepositioned equipment. By command directive, none of the boxes could be opened, nor any of the loads rearranged. The non-mechanical equipment was random loaded on the vehicles without regard to which section was authorized the equipment or the vehicle. Maintenance of the vehicles which failed on the road between Convoy Control Centers was hampered because vehicle OEM and mechanics tool kits were still crated and not available to maintenance personnel or drivers. The equipment drawn from storage was inventoried at Grafenwohr during the period 17 to 19 January. Several minor shortages were discovered, but these were quickly taken care of by personnel of the 6th Maintenance Battalion, and supply personnel at Grafenwohr. The most notable shortage was the switch-box for the 45 KW generators. Since this item was not available in the supply system for the exercise, one had to be hand-receipted from the 440th Signal Battalion.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- (1) The REFORGER unit should furnish a loading plan for each vehicle to the supporting maintenance battalion prior to an exercise of this type.
- (2) Considerable time was wasted between the time when the equipment was signed over to the unit, and the actual inventory at Grafenwohr.
- (3) Vehicle maintenance on the road was hampered because the unit did not have the tool kits and OEM available.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) Equipment should be loaded on prepositioned vehicles IAW loading plans furnished by the unit.
- (2) Tool kits, vehicle OEM, and PLL should be opened and inspected prior to any convoy.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
D/440th, 366th Signal Battalion
Fort Hood, Texas 76544

TOPIC: Operational Readiness Staging

12 March 1969

DISCUSSION: The unit arrived at Grafenwohr on 16 January, and proceeded to conduct operational testing of all equipment. Of the 23 vehicles drawn from storage, eight required maintenance on the road. One required an engine change, four required minor assembly replacements (carburetor, spark plugs, air compressor, distributor), one required brake adjustment, two had flat tires. The signal equipment drawn from prepositioned storage was in excellent condition. However, neither of the 45 KW generators drawn from storage were operational. Both were turned in to maintenance and remained there until the end of the exercise. The equipment which arrived from CONUS was found to be in excellent condition. Crew served weapons were not test fired in Europe but were tested in CONUS prior to the exercise.

LESSONS LEARNED:

(1) Prepositioned equipment generally was well maintained and well prepared for the exercise.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Additional road testing of vehicles prior to the units arrival would have uncovered many of the defects which were present when the equipment was drawn.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
D/440th. 366th Signal Battalion
Fort Hood, Texas 76544

TOPIC: Field Training Exercise

12 March 1969

DISCUSSION: The unit deployed from Grafenwohr to its operational site on 20 January. The Army Area Signal Center (AASC) was established as a portion of the 7th Army Communications Command's network to provide support for the exercise. The Unit operated three ultra-high frequency (UHF) radio relay systems to three other AASC's. It provided long distance switching services through the CARTWHEEL switchboard and supported the 24 Division Support Command with one AN/MRC-102 UHF radio set to tie them into the Army Area Communications system. The only subscriber directly off the units switchboard was the 440th Signal Battalion Headquarters. The site was located on the side of a hill covered with 12 inches of snow. Initially, difficulties were encountered in positioning the equipment and erecting antennas because most of the units personnel were not familiar with operations in snow and ice. Once the snow melted, the ground became soft and marshy, hampering the movement of vehicles and personnel. The signal equipment drawn from prepositioned storage and that brought from CONUS operated very well. Only a few minor breakdown occurred. However, maintenance on the equipment that which did fail was hampered because the PLL issued for the exercise included no signal items. This PLL was apparently developed from the equipment in storage and did not include parts necessary to repair that equipment deployed from CONUS. The PLL further did not include parts to repair the PU-619 generators deployed from CONUS. This problem became critical because the two 45 KW generators drawn from storage did not operate and the unit was forced to rely on the 15 sets of PU-619 generators for primary power. By the end of the exercise six of these sets were deadlined for parts. Parts could not be requisitioned because the supporting maintenance activities did have parts or the parts manual for these sets. The generators were initially shipped with 10 wt oil in the crankcase because the temperature in Grafenwohr was near 0 degrees. During the exercise several thaws were experienced with the temperatures approaching 30 degrees for periods up to 15 hours. Each time the temperature rose the generator sets overheated and cut off. In some cases damage was done to the generator engines. When 30 wt oil was used, the generators would not crank in 0 degrees temperature. No major problems were encountered in maintaining communications during the exercise. The major cause of down-time was power failures because of the generator problems explained above. In some cases the unit was slow in responding to circuit and system changes. This is attributed to the inadequacy of mission training received by the unit prior to deployment. Communications were maintained until 5 February when the exercise was terminated.

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LESSONS LEARNED:

- (1) With the exception of generators, the equipment for the exercise worked very well.
- (2) The exercise PLL was not adequate for the exercise.
- (3) The unit proved it could be deployed and operate in Germany despite weather and training handicaps.
- (4) The cold weather affected the operation of the PU-619 generator.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) There will always be some differences in equipment operated in CONUS and prepositioned equipment. Therefore, the PLL for this equipment brought from CONUS should be brought by the using unit. (USAREUR OPORD 6-68 did not permit PLL to be deployed).
- (2) Units deployed on REFORGER exercises should notify supporting maintenance units in Germany of the types of equipment to be deployed from CONUS. This will allow the support activities to stock repair parts and direct exchange components for this equipment.
- (3) A good 10-W-30 wt oil should be stocked and used for the 10 KW air cooled generators.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
D/440th, 366th Signal Battalion
Fort Hood, Texas 76544

TOPIC: Maintenance Stand-down

DISCUSSION: The units equipment was returned from the field site to Grafenwohr on 5 February. Here the equipment was inspected and cleaned. Four trucks required major maintenance. One engine was changed, three other trucks required support maintenance on the engines. Here again maintenance support for the PU-619 generators was not available. No maintenance was required on any of the signal equipment at this time.

LESSONS LEARNED:

(1) Although the vehicles were operated under adverse conditions, they held up well. The major problem was fuel leaks, and plugged fuel lines in the Multi-Fuel 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) None

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
D/440th, 366th Signal Battalion
Fort Hood, Texas 76544

TOPIC: Turn in of Prepositioned Equipment

12 March 1969

DISCUSSION: The equipment was convoyed back to Kaiserslautern on 10 February. On 11-12 February personnel of the 4th and 6th Maintenance Battalions inspected all equipment to be prepositioned. A pre-printed DA form 2404 for each type of equipment was used. This form listed all points to be inspected and saved considerable time by making it unnecessary for the inspector to extract the information from the TM. One copy of each completed 2404 was provided to the unit. A team from the unit was then assigned to each piece of equipment to correct the deficiencies. Parts required were requisitioned through the 6th Maintenance Battalion. Maintenance beyond the capabilities of the unit was performed either by the 6th Maintenance Battalion or their supporting units. When the equipment had been repaired it was accepted by the 4th Maintenance Battalion and preserved for storage. Non-mechanical items such as tents and tent stoves were cleaned and preserved in Grafenwohr on 8 February. Tents were turned in at Grafenwohr and the remaining non-mechanical items were boxed and turned in to the 4th Maintenance Battalion at Kaiserslautern on 12 February. The entire turn-in process proceeded very smoothly. All turn-in was completed by 14 February.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- (1) Considerable time was saved in equipment inspection by the use of pre-printed DA form 2404.
- (2) Personnel of the 4th and 6th Maintenance Battalion were well organized and trained to assist in prepositioning of equipment.
- (3) Cleaning and preserving of non-mechanical items in Grafenwohr saved considerable time in turn-in of equipment at Kaiserslautern.

RECOMMENDATION:

- (1) None

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
D/440th, 366th Signal Battalion
Fort Hood, Texas 76544

TOPIC: Redeployment

12 March 1969

DISCUSSION: Prepositioning was completed on 14 February. The period 14 to 16 February was devoted to maintenance on the 16 vehicles to be returned to CONUS. Only minor problems were encountered in preparing this equipment for return. Personnel of the 6th Maintenance Battalion assisted with the inspection and maintenance of this equipment. The equipment was conveyed to Rhein Main AFB on 17 February. A loading detail of eight men was sent to assist in loading the equipment on to the aircraft. A total of eight flights were provided between 18 and 24 February to move this equipment. The remainder of the unit departed Kaiserslauten 4 March. At Rhein Main personnel were processed and loaded aboard C-141 aircraft for the return trip. The personnel arrived at Gray Army Airfield on 5 March. The main body of the unit spent the period from 16 February to 4 March in Kaiserslauten with nothing to do. The unit requested from COMZEUR that the main body's flight be moved up, but this request was turned down. The result was the loss of two weeks time which could have been put to better use at Fort Hood.

LESSONS LEARNED:

(1) Personnel from the 6th Maintenance Battalion would have been unavailable for assistance in maintenance of the CONUS equipment, had there been another unit to preposition at that time.

(2) Considerable time was wasted between the time prepositioning was finished, and the departure of the main body.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Provisions should be made in future exercises to maintain CONUS based equipment at either the preposition site or the departure air field.

(2) Future OPLANS of this nature should provide for the adjustment of flight schedules to prevent lost time

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AJMCT (24 Mar 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I (RCS ATOPS-368)

HQ, US Army School/Training Center and Fort McClellan, Fort McClellan,
Alabama 36201

4 APR 1969

TO: Commanding General, Fifth United States Army, ATTN: ALFGC-OP,
Fort Sheridan, Illinois 60027

1. Concur with unit commander's comments (Inclosure 1). Concur with
Movement Report (Inclosure 2).

2. Transportation was provided for the 342d Transportation Company
to Birmingham Municipal Airport by commercial buses.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl
Added 1 incl
2. Movement Report

William B. Owens
WILLIAM B. OWENS
LTC, CMLG
Adjutant

CF:
CG, Third US Army
ATTN: AJAGT-PO
Ft McPherson, GA 30330

Incl 6 to Incl 2

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
342d Transportation Company (Lt-Med Trk)
Fort McClellan, Alabama 36201

24 March 1969

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I (RCS ATOPS- 368)

THRU: Commanding Officer
2d Chemical Battalion (Smoke Generator)
Fort McClellan, Alabama 36201

THRU: Commanding Officer
US Army School/Training Center and Fort McClellan
Fort McClellan, Alabama 36201

TO: Commanding General
Fifth United States Army
ATTN: ALFGC-OP
Fort Sheridan, Illinois


1. References:

a. Letter, ATOPS-OPS-MVR, HQ USCONARC, subject as above, dated 24 December 1968.

b. Letter, ALFGC-OP, HQ Fifth US Army, subject as above, dated 31 January 1969.

2. After action report on Exercise REFORGER I has been prepared and is submitted in accordance with references a and b above.

1 Incl
After Action Report


THOMAS L MCKEON
1LT, TC
Commanding

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AJNCM-SC (24 Mar 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I (RCS ATOPS-368)


DA, HEADQUARTERS, 2D CHEMICAL BATTALION (SMOKE GENERATOR), Fort
McClellan, Alabama 36201 2 April 1969

THRU: Commanding Officer, US Army School/Training Center and Fort
McClellan, Fort McClellan, Alabama 36201

TO: Commanding General, Fifth United States Army, ATTN: ALFGC-OP,
Fort Sheridan, Illinois

1. The 342d Transportation Company (Lt-mdm Trk) was attached to this Headquarters upon its return to CONUS in Aug 1968. Unit strength was less than 60% of authorized strength and many personnel were known 90-day losses. Extreme personnel turbulence was experienced up to the very date of deployment for Exercise REFORGER I.
2. Personnel fill of the unit began on an emergency basis in November following notification of participation in the Exercise. Although accelerated training was initiated, a significant percentage of the personnel deployed did not participate in part, and in some cases all, of the program.
3. Since the unit's return from Exercise REFORGER I levies have been received for 66 of its personnel. All assigned officers, senior noncommissioned officers and other noncommissioned officers in critical positions will be lost within the next 90 days. The reporting dates prescribed will not permit replacement before departure under the normal requisition cycle.
4. This Headquarters supports the recommendation of the unit Commander that personnel stability of REFORGER units be improved. The current situation militates against a high state of training readiness for emergency deployment.

1 Incl
nc


JOHN P BYRNE
LTC, CMIC
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
342d Transportation Company (Lt-Med Trk)
Ft McClellan, Alabama 36201

24 March 1969

SUBJECT: REFORGER I After Action Report

TOPIC: Preparation

DISCUSSION: Preparation for participation on Operation REFORGER I began in November 1968. Information on the Exercise did not reach the 342d Transportation Company in sufficient volume to allow for proper planning until after the REFORGER conference held by the 24th Infantry Division, in November. As a Non-Divisional Unit the 342d Transportation Company was not in the mainstream of communication, either in the planning phase or at times in the execution of the mission. Conferences held during the planning phase included the REFORGER Conference conducted by the 24th Infantry Division; one conducted at Headquarters, USA School/ Training Center & Fort McClellan; one conducted at 100th Chemical Group, Fort McClellan. Several problems arose as a result of the late date on which planning was initiated. Requisitioning of special winter clothing and equipment had not been accomplished prior to November. Priority requisitions were submitted, but time proved to be against us; items requested were late in arriving and lack of some sized items made it necessary to reassign personnel at the last minute. Time also proved to be a limiting factor in the training of personnel in all aspects of the operation, but particularly in drivers training. Our record of eleven (11) vehicle accidents is indicative of the inadequate drivers training that was accomplished prior to deployment. Unit loading plans for MEE were executed prior to the Christmas holidays. Individual clothing and equipment lists were published as well as a packing SOP for footlockers, duffle bags and cargo packs. Customs teams were appointed on Unit Orders, and were briefed by a representative from the USAREUR Provost Marshal's Office. Customs checks were accomplished as footlockers and duffle bags were banded and locked.

LESSONS LEARNED:

1. Constant training and retraining for drivers is necessary due to the high personnel turbulence experienced by this unit prior to deployment, and upon return to CONUS.
2. Special emphasis is needed to keep Non-Divisional Units informed on all phases of the operation.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Personnel should be stabilized as much as possible for REFORGER Units. Assignment and reassignments should be cut-off at least 60 days prior to deployment of REFORGER Units.
2. A provisional headquarters should be established to provide assistance to Non-Divisional Units which are currently located on various posts throughout CONUS.

Incl 1 to Incl 6 to Incl 2 105

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
342d Transportation Company (Lt-Med Trk)
Ft McClellan, Alabama 36201

24 March 1969

SUBJECT: REFORGER I After Action Report

TOPIC: Deployment

DISCUSSION: Deployment of the 342d Transportation Company began on 5 January 1969 with the departure of an advance party composed of the Unit Property Book Officer, Supply Sergeant, two (2) supply clerks and one driver. Advance Party arrived in the Federal Republic of Germany on 6 January 1969 and immediately began inventory of the equipment. This inventory was hurried and accomplished at night with the use of flashlights. On 8 January 1969 the main body departed Birmingham Municipal Airport on two (2) missions provided by MAC. The first flight was grounded at McGuire Air Force Base due to engine trouble. The second flight was grounded in the Azores due to bad weather. On all stops the Air Force was well prepared to take care of all personnel. Ground time was kept to a minimum, with emphasis placed on the comfort and welfare of the deploying personnel. The first flight arrived at Rhein-Main on 9 January 1969, while the second flight arrived on 10 January 1969. Movement of personnel by air to Mannheim was efficient and well coordinated. Accommodations provided at Taylor Barracks were adequate. Cooperation extended by the installation coordinator as well as the host units, the 535th Engineer Company and the 552d Engineer Company was commendable. The entire unit closed at Mannheim by 10 January 1969 and was ready to draw prepositioned equipment by 11 January 1969.

LESSON LEARNED: Deployment was well planned and executed. Briefings prior to, during, and after deployment were sufficient to keep deployment moving smoothly.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
342d Transportation Company (Lt-Med Trk)
Ft McClellan, Alabama 36201

24 March 1969

SUBJECT: REFORGER I After Action Report

TOPIC: Drawing Prepositioned Equipment

DISCUSSION: Our unit arrived in sufficient time to inventory all equipment and to check vehicles prior to movement to exercise area. Inventory was nevertheless rushed and conducted at night the same day that the Property Book Officer arrived. The day prior to the scheduled departure for the exercise area the unit went to the preposition site in order to pull motor stables on the vehicles which had already been lined up for the convoy. At this time the unit was not permitted to perform motor stables by the UARG. The next day drivers were not permitted to mount vehicles until approximately one (1) hour prior to movement of the convoy. As a result, many vehicles went on the road with faulty tail lights, head lights, and directional signals. Drawing of equipment was rapid, but it caused us to accept equipment that was less than satisfactory. However on the road maintenance provided between Mannheim and Grafenwohr was able to correct many of the deficiencies on the spot.

LESSONS LEARNED:

1. Property inventory should be accomplished with greater care and under better conditions.
2. The unit should have pulled motor stables prior to drawing equipment.
3. Age and mileage of the vehicles make them less than acceptable as equipment to be relied upon in combat situations.

RECOMMENDATION: Equipment now in preposition storage should be replaced by newer equipment.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
342d Transportation Company (Lt-Med Trk)
Ft McClellan, Alabama 36201

24 March 1969

SUBJECT: REFORGER I After Action Report

TOPIC: Operational Readiness Staging

DISCUSSION: Our unit closed Grafenwohr 12 January 1969 and assumed an operational posture by 0800 hours, 13 January 1969. All vehicles underwent a Technical Inspection upon arrival. Organizational maintenance was established under field conditions. PLL did not coincide with FLL submitted by unit from CONUS installation. As a result many parts were not needed and many parts that were needed could not be immediately obtained. Support maintenance coverage on the convoy route and at Grafenwohr was excellent. The efforts of the units own organizational maintenance section and direct support units kept vehicle availability high throughout the exercise. Headquarters, Task Force Gypsy was well organized and directed. As our main source of logistical support, Task Force Gypsy, proved to be an outstanding operational organization.

LESSONS LEARNED:

1. A quartering party should have preceded the unit to the camp site at Grafenwohr. A party was not sent on the recommendation of the REFORGER Headquarters in Mannheim.
2. A PLL based on demand support experience would be more valuable than the FLL that was provided.

RECOMMENDATION: PLL should be computed by each unit, based on demand experience in Europe, and should be filled as early as possible at the unit's CONUS installation. This PLL would then be boxed and stored for inclusion as part of the MEE to be carried during the deployment of the unit to exercise areas.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
342d Transportation Company (Lt-Med Trk)
Ft McClellan, Alabama 36201

24 March 1969

SUBJECT: REFORGER I After Action Report

TOPIC: Field Training Exercise

DISCUSSION: During the actual Field Training Exercise missions assigned to this unit were very light. Direct support of the actual exercise was limited to very few trucks. Most commitments were in support of the support maintenance activities and involved parts runs and other related missions. During the entire exercise period the following mileage and tonnage was compiled: Miles 64,698, tons 2819ST. In addition 7,538 personnel were transported.

LESSONS LEARNED:

1. Units operational capability far exceeded the commitments assigned.
2. This unit has the capability of setting up operations rapidly and sustaining operations under field conditions indefinitely with the kind of support that was available during the exercise.

RECOMMENDATION: In future exercises units be utilized to a greater extent to provide more extensive training for the personnel involved.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
342d Transportation Company (Lt-Med Trk)
Ft McClellan, Alabama 36201

24 March 1969

SUBJECT: REFORGER I After Action Report

TOPIC: Maintenance Stand-down

DISCUSSION: Initial inspection of equipment was conducted at Grafenwohr prior to convoy back to Mannheim. Inspection was not thorough enough to be considered more than a safety inspection. Reinspection upon arrival in Mannheim established the criteria of acceptance for prepositioning. The unit moved to Mannheim eleven (11) days ahead of schedule. A gap in communications left REFORGER Headquarters in Mannheim unprepared to receive or aid the unit during this early arrival. The unit did receive voluntary help upon arrival at Taylor Barracks from the Mannheim Equipment Maintenance Center. We were provided with a secure motor park and shop space in which to work off deficiencies on vehicles. During this time operational control of the unit remained with the 4th Transportation Battalion located in Ludwigsburg. The distance factor made control difficult and direct support almost impossible. COMMZ REFORGER headquarters would not take control until 22 February 1969, this left the unit in a less than satisfactory position for accomplishing routine administrative actions. The support provided by the installation coordinator and host units at Taylor Barracks helped to smooth some of the rough spots in unit administration.

LESSONS LEARNED:

1. Timing and proper scheduling are important to the smooth and successful completion of an operation of this type.
2. Well equipped shop space is a valuable aid in preparing the equipment for storage. While much can be accomplished under field conditions, better facilities are needed upon completion to insure adequate storage preparation.

RECOMMENDATION: Scheduling should be made flexible enough to allow for early completion of mission and subsequent early preparation for storage and redeployment.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
342d Transportation Company (Lt-Med Trk)
Ft McClellan, Alabama 36201

24 March 1969

SUBJECT: REFORGER I After Action Report

TOPIC: Turn in of Prepositioned Equipment

DISCUSSION: Turn in of equipment went smoothly and rapidly. All equipment was accepted in a period of nine (9) days. UARG assigned an inspector directly to the unit. This enabled the time between the recording of deficiencies and the correction of the same to be reduced significantly. Cooperation extended by the inspectors is to be commended, and is largely responsible for equipment being prepositioned in better condition than that in which it was drawn. The largest problem that was encountered was the age of the equipment. Because the equipment had been used for such a long period of time, and much of that time under field conditions, such items as electrical wiring have passed the point where adequate repair is possible.

LESSONS LEARNED:

1. Equipment is in less than satisfactory condition due to age and mileage.
2. Cooperation was the key to a successful preposition operation.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. New equipment should be substituted as soon as possible.
2. A thorough evaluation should be made of the true condition of the equipment now in preposition storage to determine the dependability of this equipment in the face of another similar operation.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
342d Transportation Company (Lt-Med Trk)
Ft McClellan, Alabama 36201

24 March 1969

SUBJECT: REFORGER I After Action Report

TOPIC: Redeployment

DISCUSSION: Redeployment was accomplished from 28 February 1969 through 1 March 1969. A six (6) day delay between turn in of equipment and redeployment was experienced. During this time the unit was left to its own devices for maintenance of morale. Personnel were moved from Mannheim to Rhein-Main by commercial bus. Out processing was completed rapidly. No delays were experienced during this phase of the operation; each flight arrived at its destination in CONUS ahead of schedule.

LESSON LEARNED: None

RECOMMENDATION: None

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY SCHOOL/TRAINING CENTER
Fort McClellan, Alabama 36201

3 April 1969

SUBJECT: REFORGER I After Action Report

TOPIC: EXMOVREP - Arrival

DISCUSSION: CONARC called Third Army who in turn called Transportation for an explanation of why 9 Short Tons were shipped back from overseas and only 2 Short Tons were shipped overseas. The personal baggage; M&E; TAT and organizational equipment were all inclusive when reporting Unit equipment (cargo) movement on the return.

LESSON LEARNED: To keep the Short Tons of organizational equipment separated from all other items. Report deviations from actual shipment on the departure versus the return.

RECOMMENDATION: That AR 220-10 on EXMOVREP be fully complied with.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY FLIGHT TRAINING CENTER
FORT STEWART, GEORGIA 31313

IN REPLY REFER TO
AJSGT-P

2 APR 1969

SUBJECT: After-Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I (RCS-ATOPS-368)

Commanding General
Fifth United States Army
ATTN: ALFGC-OP
Fort Sheridan, Illinois 60037

1. References:

- a. Letter, ATOPS-OPS-MVR, HQ USCONARC, subject same as above, dtd 24 Dec 68.
- b. Letter, ALFGC-OP, HQ Fifth US Army, subject same as above, dtd 31 Jan 69.
- c. Message, Unclassified SC13610, from CINCUSAREUR, subject same as above, dtg 061650Z Feb 69.
- d. Message, Unclassified 51927, from CG, USCONARC, ATOPS-OPS-MVR, subject same as above dtg 121700Z Feb 69.

2. The attached After-Action Reports are submitted in format and forwarded as directed in references above.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

John H. Bowers
JOHN H. BOWERS
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

- 2 Incl
1. Commanding General's AAR
2. 417th AAR

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY FLIGHT TRAINING CENTER AND FORT STEWART
Fort Stewart, Georgia 31313

SUBJECT: After-Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I (RCS-ATOPS-368)

Topic - Pre-Exercise Planning

a. Discussion: During Sep 68; this installation was notified that the 417th Med Co (Amb) would participate in Exercise REFORGER I during Jan-Feb 69. Numerous letters and messages from various headquarters were received dictating actions to be taken. This action caused some unnecessary confusion to the unit concerned as well as major staff sections of the installation. All planning was coordinated through the G Staff Sections. The 417th was attached to the USA Garrison Battalion for training supervision and Troop Brigade for assistance in movement preparation. This arrangement proved very effective in that it alleviated the unit commander of all but essential training responsibilities. The installation was required to fill the 417th to authorized level utilizing hospital personnel. This caused personnel turbulence within the hospital and the unit due to no other source having MOS qualified personnel. Filler personnel arrived too late to be assigned to the unit and receive proper unit training. After sufficient information was available, an OPORD and a movement order was published that covered the unit from preparation to redeployment. Generally, a movement order would have been sufficient but because of the various operation plans and orders received from different headquarters, a considerable amount of information was available that was not applicable. Therefore, the installation published an OPORD with pertinent information applicable to the 417th only. The utilization of the installation base airfield as the departure airfield greatly simplified deployment preparation.

b. Recommendations: Timely arrival of fill or replacement personnel so that they may receive unit training. One headquarters disseminate required information to installations housing REFORGER type units.

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SUBJECT: After-Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I (RCS-ATOPS-368)

Topic - During the Exercise

a. Discussion: The only requirement placed on the installation during this phase was payment of personnel. This was accomplished by sending checks for each individual to the unit Class "A" agent. The agent had a change list and a master check. When the agent delivered each man's check, he could then cash the check and by turning in the cashed checks clear himself. The unit states this system worked well because they were dispersed over a wide area.

b. Recommendations: That above system be utilized for future exercises.

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SUBJECT: After-Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I (RCS-ATOPS-368)

Topic - After the Exercise

a. Discussion: The return of the unit to Fort Stewart was delayed due to weather conditions encountered by the aircraft at the arrival airfield. The plane landed at Charleston, SC (alternate airfield) and continued on to the original destination (Hunter AAF, Ga) approximately 6 hours later the same day. Unit was transported by military vehicle from arrival airfield to CONUS station without incident. Unit was fully operational immediately upon arrival and no processing time for unit was necessary. The movement of this unit did not disrupt their normal activities and provided a very realistic training test for the unit.

b. Recommendations: None

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
417th MEDICAL COMPANY (AMBULANCE)
Fort Stewart, Georgia 31313

SUBJECT: After-Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I (RCS-ATOPS-368)

1. Topic - Preparation

a. Discussion: Preparation for participation in Exercise REFORGER I began in August of 1968. At that time the annual training schedule was revised to meet the requirements for readiness. The subjects, both mandatory and mission, previously scheduled to be conducted in the fiscal year were compressed into a five month time frame. This revised training schedule included the required subjects prescribed in AR 220-1 Annex D, Refresher Training, and included the majority of those subjects required by the unit's ATP 8-200. The unit participated in two field exercises. The first was conducted in October and included an Operational Readiness Test and second was a three day exercise which took place in December. Due to the fluctuation of personnel, the unit conducted its USAREUR oriented training in November and December so that all personnel which deployed were able to receive this training. Emphasis was placed on USAREUR driving regulations, traffic signs and German laws. In addition, classes were given in aspects of Intelligence for Europe and cold weather injury, prevention and treatment. In December, the unit issued winter protective clothing. Due to incomplete supply action, the issue of this clothing was later than what was expected. Although certain items of clothing were not available, the majority of the requisitions had been filled and the deficits within the organization were covered by lateral transfers from the other REFORGER unit at Fort Stewart. As was stated, personnel fluctuations were a factor to be contended with. From 20 September to 20 December the unit lost fifty-one personnel and gained 70 new personnel. By the end of the year, the unit was up to its authorized strength. During the week prior to deployment, the unit packed its equipment and baggage.

b. Lessons learned:

- (1) The footlocker and duffle bag per individual proved to be adequate.
- (2) Although USAREUR driver's training can be taught in CONUS, experience in driving in Europe is far more meaningful and valuable.
- (3) Two field exercises prior to deployment are helpful but not absolutely necessary for the type of mission this unit was given during the exercise.
- (4) Although the personnel fluctuations do interfere with the continuity of a training program, the essential subjects can be given to all personnel by scheduling two programs which was done by this unit.

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c. Recommendations:

(1) During the time the unit's personnel strength was increasing, there was a shortage of medical personnel at the Fort Stewart and Hunter AAF hospitals. Because of this, about twenty-five percent of the unit were on special duty on OJT to the hospital's staff and could not be released until late November from their commitment. Recommend that all commitments and other non-mission function be cut off 60 days prior to the deployment date.

(2) Recommend that personnel assignments be cut off 60 days prior to deployment.

(3) Recommend that a total of 8 weeks to be devoted to advanced unit training, driver's training and USAREUR oriented training.

(4) Recommend that all personnel be issued winter protective clothing at least 6 weeks prior to deployment.

(5) The unit has been issued the 1 1/4 ton truck ambulances for training and operations in CONUS. The 3/4 ton truck ambulances are pre-positioned in Europe. Although the unit used the 3/4 ton ambulance in its USAREUR oriented driver's training, the two weeks involved was inadequate and recommend increased attention be given to the utilization of 3/4 ton trucks and ambulances.

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2. Topic - Deployment

a. Discussion: The unit deployed on 12 Jan 69. Beginning at Fort Stewart, Georgia, the personnel and equipment were transported to Hunter Army Air Field to meet an Air Force C-141. The transportation requirements were coordinated by the Fort Stewart Transportation Office and the Air Force. The unit was flown to Rhein Main Air Force Base and was met by the unit's advance party and sponsor unit, the 651st Medical Company (Ambulance). From Frankfurt the unit was trucked to Wilkins Barracks, Ludwigsburg, Germany. The unit's equipment had been drawn by the advance party and sponsor unit and was located at Wilkins Barracks.

b. Lessons learned: By sending an advance party to the pre-position sight with assistance from the sponsor unit, closing of the unit and its equipment was surprisingly simple. The deployment stage of the operation went very smooth.

c. Recommendations: None.

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3. Topic - Drawing Pre-position Equipment

a. Discussion: As was stated in the deployment topic, the drawing of the pre-position equipment was accomplished by the unit's advance party with the assistance of the sponsor unit. On 5 Jan 69, the unit's advance party consisting of one officer and four enlisted men departed Fort Stewart. Arriving at Frankfurt on the 6th of Jan, they were transported to the pre-position site. They made contact with UARG and the sponsor unit. The inventory was accomplished on 8 Jan 69 and on 9 Jan 69, they convoyed the vehicles and equipment to the assembly area at Ludwigsburg, Germany. During the convoy, there were seven breakdowns. After closing at Ludwigsburg, the sponsor unit performed maintenance on the equipment and the advance party made preparations for the unit's arrival. After the main body closed, the equipment was checked over and on 17 Jan the unit convoyed to the 7th Army Training Area at Grafenwoehr, Germany. The unit suffered 8 more breakdowns during this movement.

b. Lessons learned:

(1) Although an inventory can be accomplished in a day, it was complicated by the fact that unit's equipment was pre-loaded.

(2) The number of breakdowns was excessive, however roadside repairs proved adequate.

(3) The limitation of 24 vehicles per march unit was adequate for control purposes.

c. Recommendations:

(1) For inventory of equipment, it would be better not to pre-load in order to improve accountability.

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4. Topic - Operational Readiness Staging

a. Discussion: During the week of operational stage, the unit inspected the vehicles and began repairs. The unit had a mission to provide area medical evacuation support and commitments began the day after arrival. Since the unit had no weapons to test, the Exercise area was reconned and the unit conducted more driver's training. The unit committed one platoon of ambulances to the Hohenfels Training Center.

b. Lessons learned:

(1) The reconnaissance by the individual drivers proved valuable for the evacuation mission during Carbide Ice.

c. Recommendations:

(1) The unit was assigned an area without a building for maintenance. Since there was no maintenance tent in the TO&E and with the number of vehicle repairs experienced, the unit should have had a fixed maintenance facility.

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5. Topic - Field Training Exercise

a. Discussion: By the time the Field Training Exercise Carbide Ice began, the unit had committed seven ambulances to various units in the area, ten ambulances were supporting the Hohenfels Training Center and three ambulances were inoperable. The remaining twelve operational ambulances went in support of the 1st and 2d Brigades of the 24th Infantry Division. The unit provided ambulances at all of the 24th Med Battalion's clearing stations and set up one relay point between the clearing platoons and the Grafenwoehr Dispensary. During the exercise, the unit evacuated over one hundred and fifty patients. During the week of the exercises the deadline rate increased and by the end of the problem eleven ambulances were inoperable. By calling in some of the other commitments from the Hohenfels Training Area, the unit was able to keep a sufficient number of vehicles in support of the exercise.

b. Lessons learned:

(1) The use of a relay station between the patient pick-up points and destination at the hospital proved to be an excellent concept. By using a relay point vehicle movement can be better monitored, patients were transported more efficiently and vehicles were returned to the clearing stations faster.

(2) Radio communication with the units organic radios was very poor, but by using a liaison team which traveled throughout the exercise area and evacuation routes, messenger service, and the reports from the personnel at the relay station the headquarters in Grafenwoehr was able to keep well informed.

(3) The supply system of repair parts required at least three days to react to the requests from this unit. As a result of this time lag, the unit was unable to put any of the deadlined vehicles back into operation prior to the end of the exercise.

c. Recommendations:

(1) The unit was one hundred percent committed by the time the exercise terminated. Recommend that an additional unit be placed in standby readiness in the event that the patient workload becomes heavier than what can be handled by one unit.

(2) Recommend that the medical evacuation units be given the highest priority possible, when these units are handling actual patients.

6. Topic - Maintenance Stand Down

a. Discussion: The unit was in a maintenance stand down from 5 Feb 69 until 16 Feb 69. A final commitment was taken on 7 Feb 69 and dispatched to the 3d Eng Bn, 24th Inf Div. On 9 Feb 69, the non-mechanical equipment of the unit was processed through the C&P assembly line of the UARG Forward Operation's Base. During the week commitments were returned to the unit's base at Grafenwoehr. The unit was somewhat hampered in its maintenance program because of the lack of maintenance facility. The 36th Medical Battalion, which had operational control of the unit, departed on 10 Feb 69.

b. Lessons learned: If the unit can get repair parts quickly, the 11-day maintenance stand down can be shortened.

c. Recommendations:

(1) All possible efforts should be made to provide the unit with a maintenance facility.

(2) It would be better policy to have the headquarters of company-sized units to depart after the subordinates leave.

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7. Topic - Turn-in of Preposition Equipment

a. Discussion: The unit had relatively few problems with prepositioning the equipment. On 17 Feb 69, the unit convoyed from Grahenwoehr to Spinelli Barracks. All vehicles were at the preposition site by 18 Feb 69. The unit went quickly through the maintenance shops and by 21 Feb 69 all actions were complete. The unit had \$55.00 of operational loss.

b. Lessons learned: The cooperative effort between the preposition site and the unit can make the turn-over of equipment a matter of routine.

c. Recommendations: None.

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8. Topic - Redelpoyment

a. Discussion: The unit's MEE was picked up on 21 Feb 69 and transported to Rhein Main Air Force Base. On 22 Feb 69 the personnel and baggage were transported to the Air Force Base and departed for CONUS. The plane stopped at McGuire AFB for customs. Three hours later, the unit was flown to Hunter AAF, but because of weather, the plane returned to Charleston AFB. After six hours the weather cleared enough to continue on to Hunter AAF where buses and trucks were waiting to transport the unit to Fort Stewart. Upon arrival the unit was short its MEE.

b. Recommendations: For this size unit, recommend that the MEE accompany the personnel and baggage throughout redeployment.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED) "THE RED DEVILS"
AND HEADQUARTERS, FORT CARSON
FORT CARSON, COLORADO 80913

ALCGC-O

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Exercise REFORGER I (RCS ATOPS 368)

Commanding General
Fifth United States Army
ATTN: ALFGC-PO
Fort Sheridan, Illinois 60037

1. References:

a. USCONARC letter, ATOPS-OPS-MVR, 24 December 1968,
Subject: Same as above.

b. Fifth United States Army letter, ALFGC-OP, 31 January
1969.

c. USCONARC message UNCLAS 51927, From: ATOPS-OPS-MVR,
DTG: 121700Z February 1969, Subject: Same as above.

2. In accordance with the above references, the attached
after action report is submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
AAR 517th Medical Company

Joel W. Breeding
JOEL W. BREEDING
Major, AGC
Adjutant General

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Incl 8 to Incl 2

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AETZMC-W (12 Mar 69)

SUBJECT: Reforger I After Action Report

1. TOPIC: Preparation

DISCUSSION: During the initial preparation for REFORGER I the unit requested through its higher headquarters an augmentation of its personnel strength in order to meet the personnel demands of the exercise.

A. In November 1968, in accordance with Reforger I personnel requirements, it was necessary for the unit to obtain key non-commissioned officers. Difficulty was experienced in this area as the First Sergeant arrived shortly before the departure of the Company's advance party. The shortage of three platoon sergeants during a portion of the training program was detrimental to the preparation of the unit.

B. During this process of personnel fill in November and December 1968, the unit was enhancing its training program, especially that of European driver orientation and actual field training exercises (FTX). The unit did not train in the field as a whole (total of 117 personnel) until 10 days prior to the beginning of the Christmas holiday period. This necessitated extra field training for the company when the holiday period ended in order to fulfill the deployment requirements.

C. The 517th Medical Company (Clearing) was not allowed to take foot lockers or Class A uniforms on the REFORGER I Exercise, notwithstanding that the advance parties would be in-country almost two (2) months. Only two duffle bags were authorized. It was noticed that other REFORGER unit had foot lockers and Class A uniforms which created a definite morale problem and evidenced unequal treatment among REFORGER I personnel.

D. The 5th Army OPLAN for REFORGER I and the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) OPLAN were received late, approximately three (3) weeks prior to the departure of the Company's advanced elements. A more timely submission of the OPLANs would have facilitated the deployment process.

E. Confusion resulted from messages being received which changed the unit's forthcoming APO number on three different occasions. This necessitated changing six separate sets of postal locator cards each time that a change came down. This was a loss of valuable time in lieu of all the other details and requirements that needed to be accomplished.

AETZMC-W (12 Mar 69)
SUBJECT: Reforger I After Action Report

Preparation (Continued)

LESSONS LEARNED:

(1) Continuous training of vehicle drivers in European road requirements is necessary in order for the unit to maintain its readiness posture as a REFORGER organization.

(2) Use of two duffle bags was not sufficient during the course of the REFORGER exercise.

(3) Personnel assigned to the unit 30 days prior to the beginning of the exercise could not be properly trained prior to the deployment of the unit.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) All REFORGER organizations should maintain unit loading plans and checklists to facilitate the ease of deployment; this is to include a vigorous training program in European driver orientation; it is further recommended that approximately 1/3 of the members of a Clearing Company be proficient in European driving standards at all times.

(2) There should be timely submission of appropriate OPLANS from higher headquarters.

(3) Whenever a unit is being filled, higher ranking personnel should arrive first in order to facilitate the process of training, organizing and deploying the unit.

(4) In future exercises the APO number should not be changed with such frequency; this creates a great amount of duplication of work, changing six locator cards per individual involved.

(5) Being a REFORGER unit, the 517th should be maintained at its appropriate TOE strength at all times in the event of necessary deployment.

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SUBJECT: Reforger I After Action Report

2. TOPIC: Deployment

DISCUSSION: The deployment phase was conducted in the following phases:

(1) The advance-advance party consisting of one officer and four enlisted personnel departed Fort Carson on 4 January 1969.

(2) The advance party consisting of one officer and thirty-three enlisted personnel departed on 16 January 1969.

(3) The main body consisting of one officer and seventy-seven enlisted personnel departed Fort Carson on 20 January 1969.

Upon the arrival of the main body in Germany, the unit was transported from Nurenburg to Grafenwohr by train, then from Grafenwohr to Hohenfels the final destination. This created needless travel time on the part of the company. It would have saved two hours travel time and transportation costs if the unit was transported directly from the Nurenburg airport to Hohenfels, instead of the intermediate stop at Grafenwohr

LESSONS LEARNED:

In the event of a real crisis and an actual alert, the above travel time could or would be of decisive importance.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that the units, which coordinate and actually transport the troops, be more closely guided and prepared in an effort to reduce travel time and transportation costs.

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AETZMC-W (12 Mar 69)

SUBJECT: Reforger I After Action Report

3. TOPIC: Drawing Prepositioned Equipment

DISCUSSION: The advance-advance party concept worked out quite well from the standpoint that this element had the two-fold function of preparing for the arrival of the advance party as well as the arrival of the main body.

a. The advance-advance element consisted of the property book officer, and NCO from the company's Supply section, an NCO Medical MOS type, and an NCO from the mess hall and a driver-clerk.

b. The advance party consisted of the Motor officer, drivers trained and licensed in European standards of driving, radioman and clerks,

c. Upon the arrival of the main body, all equipment had been taken out of the prepositioned storage, had been roadtested and was readily available for use. Further, necessary billets and messing arrangements had been made for immediate operational use.

LESSONS LEARNED:

It is absolutely necessary to have proper arrangements made for billeting and messing for immediate use. This was found to enhance the morale of the troops to a great degree.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

In future REFORGER exercises the advance-advance element should contain the property book officer, a supply NCO, a mess hall representative and an individual proficient in the use of medical equipment and medical chests.

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SUBJECT: Reforger I After Action Report

4. TOPIC: Operational Readiness Staging

DISCUSSION: Upon closing Hohenfels, the company began to coordinate with its immediate headquarters relative to report, maintenance support and other liaison matters.

a. The vehicular maintenance support for the unit was the chief difficulty encountered during the operational readiness staging period. This support was originally planned for the Grafenwhor-Vilsek region, but the unit was located in Hohenfels, approximately one hour and 45 minutes drive in fair weather conditions. By adding poor weather conditions, crowded roads, and towing vehicles, the travel time to Vilsek region was more than doubled.

b. The company's maintenance support was to be located behind the opposing enemy's lines. It was then necessary to make arrangements through our higher headquarters to have a Hohenfels stationed maintenance unit serve the company. It took a full eight days to set up this maintenance system. This lapse in time fortunately occurred prior to the actual field training exercise.

c. By 24 January 1969, the company had assumed complete operational control of the Hohenfels Dispensary and was ready to receive patients.

LESSONS LEARNED:

The vehicular maintenance support should be better organized and located closer to the unit to insure safety, a reduction in travel time as well as transportation costs.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

More care should be taken to insure that non-divisional units are provided with the most efficient form of transportation. Apparently, all CONUS based REFORGER units were to begin the exercise in the Grafenwohr area, however, the 517th Medical Company (Clearing) was the only exception in that it was to be located in Hohenfels.

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5. TOPIC: Field Training Exercise

DISCUSSION: The 517th took operational control of the Hohenfels Dispensary on 24 January 1969, retaining such control until 8 February 1969 at 2400 hours. During this time the Company took care of actual patients and casualties to include in-patient care in the ward and outpatient treatment. One helicopter was attached to the unit and an ambulance platoon provided the evacuation transportation. The Company provided a display set-up of one entire platoon of a Clearing Company in a field situation which had the dual purpose of being a display and a possible area where overflow patients could be administered aid. The Company was fortunate that it was not strained in its manpower resources during the exercise and could probably have contributed men to the Grafenwohr training area, had they been requested.

LESSONS LEARNED:

It was found that rotating one platoon at a time to operate the dispensary area proved to be efficient and effective. This left two other complete units free to handle the day to day company activities and act in reserve in the event it was needed.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

In the event a clearing company operates the Hohenfels Dispensary in the future, one platoon should take operational control for a period of time thus allowing the other platoons to remain in reserve.

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SUBJECT: Reforger I After Action Report

6. TOPIC: Maintenance Stand-Down

DISCUSSION: On 7 February 1969 a preinspection team inspected all the vehicles in the motor pool area. On 10 February 1969 the unit moved from Hohenfels to the Grafenwohr training area for the packing and crating process as well as further maintenance stand-down.

a. At Grafenwohr during the maintenance stand-down period, there was no warehouse space available for use. In addition, there were no facilities for the care and maintenance of vehicles, such as, racks to service and wash the vehicles.

b. The standards of cleanliness and serviceability demanded by the repositioning personnel was above that which is normally required in a combat or simulated combat situation. Consequently, indoor facilities were necessary in view of the severe winter conditions.

c. It became necessary to carry much of the equipment that had to be cleaned and serviced into the personnel billets creating an inconvenience. The German officials at the training camp were obsessed with the idea of keeping vehicles off of the billets grounds even though there were several inches of frozen snow on the ground. This necessitated carrying much TO&E equipment longer distances than needed in order to move the equipment into the billets. The facilities that were available were generally reserved for the 24th Infantry Division.

d. The 36th Medical Battalion was scheduled for earlier deployment and repositioning than almost all of the subordinate units. Therefore, the situation arose where several subordinate medical units duplicated the same steps during the maintenance stand-down and deployment stages of the exercise. All of these similar activities could have been coordinated through one central source which had been in Grafenwohr all during the exercise and which understood the peculiarities of the situation. Aid from liaison members of the 7th Medical Brigade and subordinate brigade units (all being non-REFORGER units) was very good, however, it was no substitute for an on-the-spot headquarters.

LESSONS LEARNED:

(1) Troop billets may have to be used to clean unit equipment in the event warehouse space is not provided during the stand-down phase after a REFORGER exercise.

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SUBJECT: Reforger I After Action Report

MAINTENANCE Stand-Down Continued

LESSONS LEARNED: (Continued) *rt*

(2) Extreme care must be taken prior to signing for the billets and grounds in a German training area to ascertain any damage caused by other units having previously used the same billets and grounds. The standards of damage estimation of the German training centers are very high and an inexperienced individual will tend to overlook many minor points which are later observed by the training grounds officials.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) During the planning stage of future REFORGER exercises, provisions should be made so that non-divisional headquarters for medical units remain in-country until such time as its subordinate units have departed.

(2) Proper provisions should be made to give non-divisional units warehouse space or appropriate tentage in order to clean and service TO&E equipment in view of the high prepositioning standards.

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SUBJECT: Reforger After Action Report

7. TOPIC: Turn-in of Prepositioned Equipment

DISCUSSION: After the deployment of the main body back to CONUS on 16 February 1969, the rear body (consisting of those persons who were in the original advance and advance-advance parties) remained behind in order to prepare for the packing and crating process and the prepositioning of unit TO&E equipment, to include 17 vehicles. On 20 February 1969, the rear party departed the Grafenwohr area to the prepositioning site at Kaiserslautern (6th Maintenance Battalion). By 23 February 1969, all TO&E equipment and medical assmblage kits had been prepositioned at their respective sites.

a. Some difficulty was experienced with the gasoline pod in view of the fact that the unit had excess gasoline upon the termination of the convoy movement from Grafenwohr to Kaiserslautern. The prepositioning site will not except gasoline in the pod, which needs to be cleaned and prepared for prepositioning.

b. This type of minor harassment tends to lower the moral of the troops after having made a long convoy and expended much time and labor in the process.

LESSONS LEARNED:

(1) More drivers should be trained in the mechanical features of their respective vehicles.

(2) Care must be taken to insure no great excess of gasoline remains after closing the preposition site.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) The rear body should consist of primarily of drivers and mechanics and medical and non-medical supply personnel in order to facilitate the prepositioning process.

(2) During the last stage of the exercise, no great quantities of gasoline should be requisitioned in view of the fact that the prepositioning site will not accept excess gasoline.

(3) During the training phase for European driving actual motor marches should be held on hard-surfaced roads at speeds closer to the maximum speed limit (i.e. 40 mph) in order to simulate convoy movements on German Autobahns.

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SUBJECT: Reforger I After Action Report

8. TOPIC: Redeployment

DISCUSSION: The rear body departed from Rheim Main on the 25th of February 1969 without any problems after having prepositioned all TO&E equipment and medical assemblage kits.

LESSONS LEARNED:

This phase of operations, the prepositioning of all TO&E equipment and medical kits, is probably the most time consuming and laborious of all phases of the REFORGER I exercises.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Care should be taken to insure that the troops have sufficient rest before the commencement of the final prepositioning stage of all TO&E equipment and medical assemblage kits, in order to have maximum cooperation and effort in the above work.

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