

U  
285  
G7  
R46  
1907

# REPORT

ON A

# STAFF RIDE,

Held by the

# CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF,

7TH TO 12TH OCTOBER, 1907.



LONDON:

PRINTED FOR HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONARY OFFICE,  
BY HARRISON AND SONS, ST. MARTIN'S LANE,  
PRINTERS IN ORDINARY TO HIS MAJESTY.



JAN 20 1909


# REPORT

ON A

~~Carded~~

*ag*  
*01225. G*  
*1907*  
*AS*

# STAFF RIDE,



HELD BY THE

# CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF,

7TH TO 12TH OCTOBER, 1907.



*Gift of Lt. Genl. W. G. ...*

LONDON:  
PRINTED FOR HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONARY OFFICE,  
BY HARRISON AND SONS, ST. MARTIN'S LANE,  
PRINTERS IN ORDINARY TO HIS MAJESTY.

U  
285  
37  
R46  
1907

OCLC# 17367713

CONTENTS.

PART I.

7TH—10TH OCTOBER.

	PAGE
Composition of Directing Staff .. .. .	3
Officers attending .. .. .	4
General Information (for both sides) .. .. .	5
General Programme of Work .. .. .	6
Special Information—Eastland .. .. .	7
Appreciation of the Situation by the Commander-in-Chief, Eastland Forces .. .. .	9
Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief, Eastland Forces .. .. .	11
Notes on Appreciation by Army Directing Staff .. .. .	12
Remarks by the Director-in-Chief on Eastland Appreciation .. .. .	13
Special Information—Westland and Northland .. .. .	14
Sketch of an Appreciation—Westland .. .. .	16
Remarks by Director—Westland Forces .. .. .	16
Brief Appreciation by General Officer Commanding Westland Forces .. .. .	17
Remarks by Director—Westland Forces .. .. .	18
Brief Narrative of Events—8th October .. .. .	20
Operation Orders by Commander-in-Chief, Eastland Forces .. .. .	21
Remarks on the Orders of Commander-in-Chief, Eastland Forces .. .. .	22
Operation Orders by General Officer Commanding, Westland Forces .. .. .	23
Remarks by Director, Westland Forces, on Operation Orders by General Officer Com- manding, Westland Forces, 8th October .. .. .	24
Notes by Assistant Director, Cavalry, Westland Forces .. .. .	24
Remarks by Director-in-Chief .. .. .	26
Remarks by Army Director, Westland Forces, at a Conference, 9th October .. .. .	27

PART II.

10TH—11TH OCTOBER.

General Idea .. .. .	30
Special Idea—Eastland .. .. .	30
Information of Westland .. .. .	31
Memorandum by Commander-in-Chief, Eastland Forces .. .. .	31
Special Idea—Westland .. .. .	32
Information of Eastland (Western Army) .. .. .	32
Lines of Advance of Westland Army .. .. .	33
Notes by Director, Westland Forces, on Situation on Evening of 9th October .. .. .	33
Operation Orders by the Commander-in-Chief, Eastland Forces .. .. .	35
Operation Orders by General Officer Commanding, Westland Forces .. .. .	39
Remarks made at a Conference on 11th October, by Director, Westland Forces .. .. .	41
Remarks by Director-in-Chief .. .. .	43
Final Conference .. .. .	44

MAPS IN POCKET AT END OF BOOK.

1. Situation at the opening of the 1st Phase of Operations on Monday afternoon, 7th October.
2. " " " " 2nd " " " " Wednesday afternoon, 9th October.
3. Map of Severn Valley.

## COMPOSITION OF DIRECTING STAFFS.

*Director-in-Chief.*

General Hon. Sir N. G. LYTTTELTON, G.C.B., Chief of the General Staff.

*Staff of the Director-in-Chief.*

Major-General D. HAIG, C.V.O., C.B., Director of Military Training.

Colonel L. E. KIGGELL.

Captain E. A. PLUNKETT.

Captain W. M. C. DU Q. CAILLARD.

*Assistant Directors.*

Major-General Sir H. H. SETTLE, K.C.B.,  
*D.S.O.*

Brigadier-General F. S. ROBB, C.B., M.V.O.

Brigadier-General B. R. MITFORD, C.B.,  
*D.S.O.*

Colonel A. HAMILTON-GORDON, C.B.

Colonel J. T. JOHNSTON.

Colonel R. C. B. HAKING.

Colonel P. A. KENNA, *V.C.*, *D.S.O.*, A.D.C.

Colonel G. T. FORESTIER-WALKER, A.D.C.

Lieut.-Colonel R. G. BROOKE, *D.S.O.*

Lieut.-Colonel C. M. DOBELL, *D.S.O.*

Major H. S. JEUDWINE.

Major W. A. MACBEAN.

Major G. W. M. MACDONOGH.

Major Hon. A. R. MONTAGU-STUART-  
WORTLEY, *D.S.O.*

Captain G. PALEY.

Captain A. SOLLY-FLOOD, *D.S.O.*

Lieutenant B. G. JOLLIFFE.

Lieut.-General Sir C. J. BURNETT, K.C.B.

Major-General A. N. ROCHFORD, C.B.,  
C.M.G.

Brigadier-General S. H. LOMAX.

Colonel C. E. CALLWELL, C.B.

Colonel A. J. KELLY.

Lieut.-Colonel H. W. G. GRAHAM, *D.S.O.*

Major M. L. MACEWEN.

Major E. S. NAIRNE.

Major H. D. FARQUHARSON.

Captain A. GRANT-DUFF.

Captain N. MALCOLM, *D.S.O.*

Captain W. O. HOLLOWAY.

Captain A. H. MARINDIN.

Captain S. H. WILSON.

*Attached.*

Lieut.-Colonel A. F. RUSSELL, C.M.G.,  
M.B.

## OFFICERS ATTENDING.

Major-General H. E. BELFIELD, C.B., <i>D.S.O.</i>	Major-General J. C. DALTON.
Colonel K. E. LEAN.	Colonel J. C. OUGHTERSON.
Colonel G. MACKINTOSH.	Colonel R. N. R. READE.
Colonel F. C. SHAW.	Colonel H. N. C. HEATH.
Colonel A. E. W. COUNT GLEICHEN, C.V.O., C.B., C.M.G., <i>D.S.O.</i>	Colonel G. F. MILNE, <i>D.S.O.</i>
Colonel H. CHANCE.	Colonel E. AGAR.
Colonel W. B. HICKIE.	Colonel R. SCOTT-KERR, <i>D.S.O.</i>
Colonel W. E. FAIRHOLME, C.M.G., M.V.O.	Colonel J. R. F. SLADEN.
Colonel D. J. PROBY.	Lieut.-Colonel R. FANSHAWE, <i>D.S.O.</i>
Lieut.-Colonel S. W. SCRASE-DICKINS.	Lieut.-Colonel W. G. LEY.
Lieut.-Colonel L. L. NICOL.	Lieut.-Colonel G. V. DAUGLISH.
Lieut.-Colonel G. DE W. VERNER.	Lieut.-Colonel R. J. STRACHEY.
Lieut.-Colonel T. ST. C. DAVIDSON, <i>D.S.O.</i>	Major N. W. H. DU BOULAY.
Major H. O'DONNELL.	Major A. W. GAY, <i>D.S.O.</i>
Major H. L. TENNANT.	Major S. C. LONG.
Major C. P. A. HULL.	Major G. T. G. EDWARDS.
Major J. L. J. CLARKE.	Major E. E. CARTER, C.M.G., M.V.O.
Major M. F. HALFORD.	Major G. A. EGERTON.
Major F. W. MUSSENDEN.	Major P. G. REYNOLDS, <i>D.S.O.</i>
Major C. L. MACNAB.	Major A. H. BARTHORP.
Major T. T. PITMAN.	Major M. F. GAGE.
Major A. V. L. WOOD, <i>D.S.O.</i>	Captain H. B. DES V. WILKINSON.
Major CLIFFORD COFFIN.	Captain R. F. MEIKLEJOHN, <i>D.S.O.</i>
Major H. F. FRASER.	Captain H. M. VANDELEUR.
Captain G. MEYNELL.	Captain C. G. FULLER.
Captain A. BRYANT.	
Captain W. M. OGG.	
Captain L. J. LIPSETT.	
Captain D. H. BLUNDELL-HOLLINSHEAD- BLUNDELL, M.V.O.	
Lieutenant S. H. KERSHAW.	

*Attached.*

Lieut.-Colonel J. S. DAVIDSON, M.B.  
Captain B. B. BURKE.

REPORT ON A STAFF RIDE HELD UNDER THE CHIEF OF  
THE GENERAL STAFF, 7TH TO 12TH OCTOBER, 1907.

---

PART I.

---

7th — 10th October.

(See Map No. 1.)

---

GENERAL INFORMATION (FOR BOTH SIDES).

The General and Special Ideas are as in the Report of the Staff Ride held in May, 1907.\*

The events recorded in that report (27th to 30th May) are to be taken as having occurred between the 27th and 30th of September, *i.e.*, the situation on the 30th May, as described in the report, is to be taken as existing on the 30th September.

The following developments are assumed to have taken place between the 1st and 7th October:—

1. In the naval battle off Portland Bill the Eastland fleet was defeated. It took refuge in Portsmouth Harbour, where it is protected by fortifications and has facilities for executing repairs. The Westland fleet remains in observation, ready to resist any attempt of the hostile fleet to break out. Meanwhile Westland has complete command of the sea.

2. On the 30th September, Northland declared war. Her troops commenced crossing the frontier next day, the main force moving west of the Pennines, but a considerable force also moving east of that range, from the neighbourhood of Darlington. The Eastland forces at first opposed to this advance were comparatively weak, and failed to delay it seriously. In falling back the Eastland troops removed all rolling stock, disabled the railways and broke many of the road bridges.

On the 7th October, Northland gained possession of Manchester, and that evening her advanced troops hold the following line:—

Liverpool—Widnes—Warrington—Withington—Hyde — Ashton-under-Lyne  
— Stalybridge — Holmfirth — Barnsley — Doncaster, along which line  
Eastland troops are in touch.

(The coasts and harbours of Cheshire and Lancashire are to be taken as not fortified.)

3. Meanwhile the general course of events on the Cambrian frontier has been as follows:—

After the battle on the 30th September the Eastland forces fell back for some miles, Westland advanced troops keeping touch. The 1st October was spent by both sides in reorganizing and resting. On the 2nd October, Westland, having secretly transferred troops from left to right (north to south), attacked the left of the Eastland forces and forced them back towards Hereford. On the 3rd October the Eastland forces took up a position between Hereford and Ross, on the left bank of the Wye, which the Westland Army reconnoitred, with a view to attack on the 4th October.

---

\* A copy of this report was supplied to all officers taking part in the Staff Ride. Copies have been supplied to all Reference Libraries.

Eastland reinforcements had, however, meanwhile arrived. Westland found the position strongly held and, moreover, learnt of a strong advance (3rd October) from the Severn Tunnel (which Eastland had taken steps to secure) towards Monmouth.

Westland was compelled to detach strongly to Monmouth to meet this threat, and, finding her line of retreat to Abergavenny was seriously threatened, she fell back towards that point on the 4th October.

The Westland retirement was continued next day and by noon on the 6th October Westland had taken up a position at Abergavenny, where strong reinforcements joined her. Having reconnoitred the position on the 6th October, Eastland attacked it on the 7th, but, finding it very strongly held, drew back in the afternoon behind a strong outpost line. The situation on the Cambrian frontier on the evening of the 7th October is as follows:—

Westland holds the general line Newport—Abergavenny—Three Cocks Junction—Builth, the main position being just east of Abergavenny. Eastland troops are in touch along this line.

- N.B.—1. Having had time to replace losses, units are to be taken at full strength on the 7th October.
2. Eastland has Line of Communication troops as laid down in War Establishment. Northland and Westland also have Line of Communication troops in proportion to their numbers.

---

#### GENERAL PROGRAMME OF WORK.

On arrival at places of assembly all officers (excepting any who have already been required to render them) will hand in to the Directing Staff a *brief* appreciation of the situation, made from the point of view of the Army Commander.

Tuesday, 8th October, will be available for reconnaissance work. No movement of troops will be permitted before 8 p.m. on that day in either theatre of war.

Instructions for Tuesday's reconnaissance work will be issued on Monday evening. Army Commanders should notify to subordinates what information (if any) they require from them. Failing receipt of any special instructions on the subject, Assistant Directors will see that all officers are given relevant and useful work to do.

Army Orders should be issued on Tuesday in time to reach Divisional Commanders by 6 p.m. Army Commanders must arrange for any necessary reconnaissance reports to be rendered to them in time to admit of this. Summaries of required information may be sent by wire if necessary.

Copies of Divisional Orders must be despatched to Army Directors as early as possible on Tuesday evening.

Army Directors will then exchange information as to the plans of the opposing Commanders, and will also inform the Director-in-Chief.

Wednesday will be devoted to working out tactical situations and staff duty problems arising out of the orders issued.

Army Directors will issue any necessary instructions for Wednesday's work, but failing receipt of such instructions, Assistant Directors will arrange the work of their parties.

On Wednesday afternoon the Director-in-Chief will issue a fresh situation, which may necessitate a change of quarters on Thursday.

Thursday will be devoted to reconnaissance, the necessary orders for next day's operations being written that evening. On Friday, the problems arising out of the

orders will be worked out. On Saturday morning a general conference will be held and the Ride will conclude early that afternoon.

As the work on Tuesday and Wednesday will be based on the situation existing on the 7th October, no "narrative" will be issued by the Director-in-Chief until Wednesday, when the situation to be dealt with on the next 2 days will be laid down.

The operations in the northern theatre of war will be imaginary, only those in the western theatre being worked out on the ground. The supposed progress of events in the northern theatre will be communicated by the Director-in-Chief to the Army Commanders in the western theatre, who should communicate to the Director-in-Chief any information or instructions they would send to the Commanders in the northern theatre.

Subject to minor variations necessitated by the above the instructions issued for the May Staff Ride (pages 75 to 80 of Report) will be adhered to generally. Assistant Directors will, however, send in all orders and other work to their respective Army Director, instead of to the Director-in-Chief, and will also communicate to the Army Director (and not to the Director-in-Chief) the points they suggest should be discussed at the conference. Army Directors will return the work to Assistant Directors after examining it, and noting any points for subsequent discussion.

Army Directors will inform the Director-in-Chief what subjects they propose to discuss at the final conference, as long as possible beforehand.

WAR OFFICE,

September, 1907.

---

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION—EASTLAND.

(See No. 3 Map for details.)

The distribution of the Eastland Forces on the evening of the 7th October is as follows:—

##### *Western Theatre.*

5th Division.—About Pontrilas and Llanello (2 miles south-west of Pontrilas). Outpost line (approximate), Longtown—Hatteral Hill—Llangattock-lingoed.

6th Division.—About Skenfreth (9 miles west of Ross). Outpost line across Abergavenny—Skenfreth Road, connecting outposts of 5th and 1st Divisions.

1st Division.—A little east of Llantilio Crossenny (on northern Abergavenny—Monmouth Road), with a Brigade at Dingestow (4 miles west of Monmouth). Outpost line (approximately) from Point 200, 2 miles east of Llanvupley—passing 1 mile west of Penrhos—Raglan—Llangoven.

4th Cavalry Brigade.—Watching right flank to east of line Builth—Three Cocks Junction—Waun Fach (2660 Black Mountains), on which line Westland Cavalry are disposed.

1st Cavalry Brigade.—Watching left flank, holding Llandenny, and thence southward along left bank of the Usk.

The two Mounted Brigades, other Army Troops, and all Transport and Supply Columns and Parks may be placed as desired on, or behind, the above line.

Head-quarters of above ("Western") Army—Hereford.

##### *Northern Theatre.*

3rd Division near Sheffield.

4th Division 3 miles south-east of Stockport.

2nd Division, Chapel-en-le-Firth and Hayfield (4 miles further north).

2nd Cavalry Brigade, north and east of Sheffield, watching right flank.  
 3rd Cavalry Brigade, about Knutsford and Northwich, watching left flank.  
 Head-quarters of Eastland's "Northern" Army, Buxton (20 miles S.S.E. of Manchester).

N.B.—Divisional troops of the Cavalry Division may be placed as desired in the Western theatre.

#### INFORMATION AVAILABLE AS TO WESTLAND FORCES.

The right of the main Westland position rests on the River Usk, 5 miles below Abergavenny. The position extends thence by the first L of Llanvapley ( $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch map) to Skirrid Fawr, whence it bends back towards the P in Patrishow. Bettws Newydd (7 miles S.S.E. of Abergavenny) is also held by Westland. South of this position the line of the Usk is watched by mounted troops (units not identified). North of the position as far as Buih the country is watched by detachments of the 1st and 3rd Westland Cavalry Brigades.

Westland's 2nd Division has been located on the southern part of the position, and the 1st Division on the northern part. Units of the 4th Division have been located near Patrishow.

It is believed that Westland has already concentrated most, if not all, of her forces in the neighbourhood of Abergavenny.

#### INFORMATION AS TO NORTHLAND FORCES.

Northland's 1st Cavalry Brigade and 2nd Division concentrated on the Durham frontier on the 30th September. Most, if not all, of the remaining Northland Forces concentrated on the Westmoreland frontier. The enemy's line of advance through Yorkshire was directed through Leeds, and the 1st Cavalry Brigade, supported by troops of 2nd Division, is now on the line Holmfirth—Barnsley—Doncaster.

West of the Pennines the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Brigades are on the line already given in the "general information," and spies report strong bodies of Infantry about Manchester and Oldham.

The Northland advance has been very vigorously conducted. The evacuation of Manchester (and positions further west) by Eastland troops was necessitated by an apparent intention of the enemy to turn Manchester by the east, cutting in between the troops there and those at Sheffield.

NOTE.—The Army Troops of Westland consist of—

- 1 Mounted Brigade.
- 2 Yeomanry squadrons.
- 1 Infantry battalion.
- Various Telegraph companies.
- 2 Balloon companies.
- 2 Bridging Trains.
- 2 Field Ambulances.
- 1 Transport and Supply Column.

The Army Troops of Northland are similar to those of Westland.

---

The Commander-in-Chief, Eastland Forces, assumed command of the Western Army, Eastland Forces, on the morning of the 7th October, 1907.

APPRECIATION OF SITUATION FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE EASTLAND FORCES ON THE  
EVENING OF 7TH OCTOBER, 1907.

1. From the data given in "General Information," and "Special Information, Eastland," the Eastland Field Army is divided into two armies in the western theatre and the northern theatre respectively, with their headquarters at Hereford and Buxton, about 100 miles apart. Several large railway centres, within 25 miles of each of these places, are available to be utilized for the entrainment of any number of troops it may be desired to transfer from one theatre to the other.

2. The two Eastland armies are composed each of two Cavalry brigades and three Divisions. In addition there are two Mounted Brigades and other Army troops at disposal.

Each of the Eastland armies is confronted by a hostile force which may consist of a Cavalry Division (three Brigades), four Divisions, and Army troops (comprising one Mounted Brigade).

3. It would appear from the information available, that our Western army has in front of it the whole of the Westland Army; and almost certainly, three Cavalry Brigades (one may be the "Mounted Brigade"), three Divisions and due proportion of Army troops. On the latter assumption there still remain one Cavalry (or Mounted) Brigade, and one Division to be accounted for.

The Northern army has, in front of it, the Northland Cavalry Division, and, as the Northland advance has been "very vigorously conducted," it appears likely that all the remaining Northland forces, which were concentrated on the Durham and Westmoreland frontiers, have taken part in it.

Assuming that the entire Westland and Northland armies are assembled in the respective theatres, the result is that, in both, an Eastland army of two Cavalry Brigades and three Divisions is opposed to an invading force of three Cavalry Brigades, one Mounted Brigade, and four Divisions. Eastland, however, has in hand two Mounted Brigades, which may be utilized in either theatre, but which are, at present, in the western.

4. "Westland has complete command of the sea," and the conditions (as set forth in Appendix, page 6, "Report on a Staff Ride, May, 1907, &c.") which enabled her to defeat and drive into port the Eastland fleet, render it unlikely that Westland will lose that command for some time to come.

5. Command of the sea enables the enemy—

- (a.) To transfer troops from one theatre of war to the other.
- (b.) To land troops on the southern or eastern coast of Eastland to threaten London.
- (c.) To change a base as required.

6. Eastland, on the other hand, has the advantages on land which are conferred by action on interior lines.

7. With regard to 5 (a) the following points must be taken into consideration :—

(a.) There will certainly be hesitation in the case of both Westland and Northland to place a portion of their respective armies under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the other country, and neither will be inclined to run the risk of invasion of its own territory by withdrawing some of its troops to fight in the other theatre of war.

This is largely a matter of probabilities, and is dependent upon (i.) the relations which exist between the two countries; (ii.) the influence of their respective governments with regard to the nation; (iii.) and the capacity of those governments or

nations to realize strategical requirements. On the whole, it may be assumed that either country will only place a portion of its army in the other theatre of war with extreme reluctance.

8. With regard to 5 (b), the points to be taken into consideration are again, for the most part, dependent upon the particular circumstances. One point is clear, Northland, which has no navy and no seaborne trade, though possessing a long stretch of coast, will not entrust any portion of its army to be carried in foreign vessels escorted by foreign men-of-war to effect a landing at a point not already secured.

For Westland the case is different. The enormous effect which would be produced by the landing of even one Division anywhere in the neighbourhood of London cannot be left out of account. The difficulties and the risks are considerable. It would be difficult to conceal the intention, and still more difficult to carry out its execution up the Channel with secrecy, whilst its success must be largely dependent upon weather. It also implies absolute powerlessness of the destroyers, &c., of the Eastland fleet.

Here, as in 7, in this case the value of action upon interior lines upon land would counterbalance the advantages of command of the sea.

For these reasons the probability of such an operation by Westland at this period may be discounted, especially as command of the sea has not been definitively established; but the necessity of preparedness to detach a force from our Field Army to oppose such a threat must never be lost sight of.

9. With regard to 5 (c), the advantage to the enemy is not so great in this instance as it appears theoretically.

The retention of separate Lines of Communication for the Westland and Northland Armies holds good for the same reasons and to the same extent as for the Prussian and British Armies in 1815.

No change of base from Northland to a point south of Northland, but north of Liverpool can be of any use to Northland on account of the short distance. A change of base to Liverpool, until the Northland Army has advanced some distance southwards, would be dangerous, as the Line of Communication would run parallel, or nearly parallel, to the front.

Similarly, the coast of Cambria has no port suitable for a base north of Milford Haven for the Westland Army.

10. From the foregoing it would appear that two armies of equal strength, operating from divergent bases, are attempting the invasion of a country having two armies operating upon interior lines, the invaders being in the proportion of four to three to the defenders. The problem, therefore, largely becomes an economic one, as the defenders have not got command of the sea, and the extent to which they can hold out largely depends on their capability to supply themselves. In any case, the sooner they can get the war finished the better for them.

The enemy can hardly expect to gain any decisive advantage in either theatre with the numbers at his disposal, unless (a) we afford him an opportunity; (b) or allow the two invading armies to unite and crush one of ours; (c) or a successful coup is carried out against London.

11. The enemy's most probable course thus appears to be to attempt to wear down our capacity of resistance (largely a political matter), inflicting a blow where he can, and eventually to combine against one of our armies. The friendly disposition of the inhabitants of Northern Cambria will probably lead the enemy to attempt to effect this combination by working through that part of the country, and utilizing this advantage to the utmost. In reserve he has the possible threat against London, which will every day appear larger to the Eastland Government as long as the enemy retains command of the sea and is not drawn far from his base.

12. Our course of action, owing to our strategic (including political) circumstances must conform to that of the enemy. At the same time our object must be to strike a decisive blow at the enemy as soon as possible. For this latter, we are not strong

enough in either theatre of war. If we attempt to reinforce in one theatre from the other, the operation must involve *at least* 4 days, during which the troops being moved, are lost for that period, and the situation in both theatres will probably have entirely changed from that which existed at the commencement of the move. If two Divisions were successfully moved from one theatre to the other, our preponderance would only be five to four in one and might lead to disastrous results in the other. The respective theatres are too far apart, and the goal (London) too near, taking into account modern facilities of communication, for the enemy not to take advantage of the weakening of our forces in the depleted theatre of war. There is also the possibly changed situation in the other theatre when the reinforcements have arrived.

13. Our present objective must be, in both theatres, to take advantage of any opportunity of inflicting such a blow on the enemy immediately opposed to us, either in attack or defence, as will enable us to reinforce one of our armies from the other without compromising the safety of the capital. If such opportunity does not offer the pre-eminent factor to be borne in mind is that both of our armies must withdraw in combination towards some point (only to be determined as events progress), which will (a) ensure their combination; (b) cover London; (c) enable them to combine within 24 hours to attack one or other of the invading armies.

14. It is recognized that the above is an "opportunist" policy, and is largely dependent upon political and economic circumstances, at the time rapidity of action is essentially called for. But, the moral factors being eliminated, no other course of action offers any chance of decisive success.

---

MEMORANDUM BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EASTLAND FORCES,  
ON THE PROBABLE COURSE OF ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY HIM  
ON 8TH AND 9TH OCTOBER, 1907.

1. I do not propose, at present, to alter the existing distribution of the Northern and Western armies.

2. I propose to reconnoitre the enemy's position, Newport—Builth, on 8th October, with a view to a reconnaissance in force on 9th October.

3. The experience gained by that reconnaissance will decide me as to whether I attack, await attack or withdraw to another position which I shall have previously reconnoitred.

4. I propose to place both my Mounted Brigades at or near Llanfihangel on the road Builth—New Radnor ( $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch map).

5. I shall distribute the Cavalry Divisional troops equally between the two armies.

6. The Army troops will be similarly divided, except that the two Mounted Brigades and the Infantry battalion and two Balloon companies will be allotted to the "Western" army.

7. I shall give general instructions to the General Officer Commanding Northern army to delay the Northland forces to the utmost without compromising himself more than can be avoided, and to use his own initiative towards gaining any possible advantage which may offer itself. His further course of action will depend on the progress of events in the western theatre, but the ultimate object to be aimed at, if success cannot be obtained in other ways, is to withdraw in such a manner as to enable him to combine with the Western army, and at the same time prevent Northland and Westland from effecting a junction. By this means it is hoped that the combined Eastland forces may deal a decisive blow against one or other of the enemy's armies.

## NOTES ON APPRECIATION BY ARMY DIRECTING STAFF.

1. The troops were as given in the general situation. Of the Westland troops, three Divisions have been located, also 1st and 3rd Cavalry Brigades. It is believed that *most if not all* of her forces are in the neighbourhood of Abergavenny. Of the Northland forces the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Cavalry Brigades and the 2nd Division are located, and *most if not all* of the Northland forces were known to have concentrated on the Westmoreland frontier. Both Eastland and Northland have Line of Communication troops in proportion to their armies.

2. From this information it is fair to assume that Eastland is slightly inferior to the enemy in both theatres of operations.

3. The defeat of Eastland at sea and the action of Northland in joining Westland have made the situation very critical.

4. The advance of Northland is bringing her daily nearer to Westland and the advantage of the interior position held by Eastland is growing less. Meanwhile it is fair to assume that the economic conditions in the south of England are causing great distress.

Both military and economic conditions therefore call for prompt action.

Northland and Westland doubtless wish to drive Eastland back and to join hands as quickly as possible. They may do so—

(i.) By transferring troops from either force to the other by sea and attempting to gain a big victory.

(ii.) By pushing Eastland gradually backwards.

There are many objections to the first course, particularly political ones, for though each force has a preponderance over Eastland's troops, neither of them can afford to spare much in the interests of another country.

The second course is therefore the most probable.

6. Eastland's only hope for success in a very difficult situation is, therefore, to transfer as large a force as possible from one theatre to another in hopes of a decisive success.

It is therefore necessary to consider in which theatre success would produce the greatest results. This is of more importance than to consider in which theatre it could be most easily attained.

7. Westland is the preponderant partner in the alliance. Northland has vacillated for some time before joining against us, and would very likely come to terms if a defeat was inflicted on either of the allies. Westland is therefore the enemy to go for.

8. Eastland's Western army should therefore be reinforced from the north as strongly as possible—probably by two Divisions.

9. These two Divisions could be brought either to the line now held, or to one rather further back, say Gloucester—Worcester.

10. The latter position would have the advantage that should Westland transfer part of her troops south of the Bristol Channel they could be easily met.

11. The time required for this transfer would not be more than 2 days; if the Gloucester—Worcester line were chosen, the Western army could fall back slowly while the reinforcements were coming up by train.

If the forward line were chosen, the Western army might stand fast.

REMARKS BY THE DIRECTOR-IN-CHIEF ON THE EASTLAND APPRECIATION.

The problem to be solved was that of an army occupying "interior lines," against two enemies advancing from divergent bases, whose total strength in the whole area of operations gave them a superiority of about 4 to 3.

Under such conditions it is evident that if the two hostile armies can once effect a junction the numerical odds will then be in their favour. Consequently the best, if not the only chance of victory for the army on interior lines is to seek to mass a superior force against one or other of the separated armies before they can effect a junction. It is often very difficult to decide which army to mass against first, and at what moment to do so. A deep study of military history is the best guide to this difficult decision, the various factors affecting which are fully discussed in various strategical works. But, whatever view may be taken as to which army the General Officer Commanding Eastland should have first struck at, it is quite certain that he should have struck heavily *at one or other*, and as soon as possible—there was no reason to expect that the situation would be simplified or ameliorated by waiting.

The General Officer Commanding Eastland calculated that it would take 4 days to transfer troops from one theatre to the other. This calculation was founded on the belief that, although there were several railways and a plenitude of rolling stock, the troops to be transferred would first have to make a forced march to entraining stations out of the enemy's reach, and would subsequently have to be detrained out of reach in the other theatre, and then moved up by road. This belief was probably justified, and it was wise to avoid any underestimate of the time likely to be required. But the deduction drawn (*viz.*, that the transfer should therefore be postponed) was hardly logical. The longer the time necessary for such a transfer the more urgent was the necessity to commence preparations for it at once, while the hostile armies were still widely separated. The nearer they drew towards one another the less the time that would be available to deal with them in detail. No doubt some risk of failure would be involved, but no strategical combination can be attempted without risk, and, in this case, far greater risks would appear to be entailed by merely conforming to the enemy and awaiting developments. It may safely be laid down as a principle that the most dangerous plan of operations that can possibly be adopted is to conform to the enemy, giving him time to carry out his own plans.

It must be noted that the problem for Eastland had been considerably complicated by the original distribution of the troops, as arranged in the "Special Idea." The original allotment of approximately equal numbers to each theatre of war was not sound strategy, and mistakes in the original strategical concentration of armies are always difficult, if not impossible, to remedy during the subsequent operations.

On the other hand, the General Officer Commanding Eastland had in his favour the facts that the opposing armies belonged to different nations, and were (presumably) under independent commanders; and that Eastland was acting in a friendly country where it should be comparatively easy to conceal movements and spread false information. Each of two separated armies, knowing the possibilities of "interior lines," is prone to believe that the weight of the enemy will be brought against itself. This is apt to cause caution and hesitation, especially in the case of allies acting without unity of command.

Again, the political situation called for vigorous measures. The appreciation points out the probability of scares in London, owing to the possibility of a landing on the coasts in its vicinity. The more probable such scares were the more necessary it became to gain a victory without delay, in order to establish confidence and so lessen the danger of interference in the General's plans being brought about by popular clamour.

The fact, mentioned in the appreciation, that during the transfer of troops the situation might alter considerably, cannot be accepted as a valid argument against the transfer. The only change probable could be foreseen, viz., efforts by the allied armies to lessen the distance between them. It was within the power of the Eastland Commander to affect the extent of the change by the amount of resistance he might decide to offer in each theatre, and to estimate the extent of it sufficiently accurately for his purpose.

---

SPECIAL INFORMATION—WESTLAND AND NORTHLAND.

NOTE.—The "Army Troops" of Westland consist of—

Army Head-quarters.  
 1 Mounted Brigade.  
 2 Yeomanry squadrons.  
 1 Infantry battalion.  
 1 Wireless Telegraph company.  
 1 Cable Telegraph company.  
 2 Air Line Telegraph companies.  
 2 Balloon companies.  
 2 Bridging Trains.  
 Army Troops, Transport and Supply Column.  
 2 Field Ambulances.

The Army Troops of Northland are similar to the above.

WESTLAND.

The whole of the Westland Forces have reached the front by the evening of the 7th October, and are disposed as follows:—

Main position—

2nd Division.—Right flank on the Usk, 5 miles S.S.E. of Abergavenny, and extending thence to just north of the first L in Llanvapley. This Division also holds a strong detached post at Bettws Newydd (on its right flank). Divisional Cavalry is watching the right bank of the Usk below the position.

1st Division continues the line of defence northward by Skirrid Fawr to the hill just west of Llanvihangel Station.

4th Division has one brigade on the hill about P of Patrishow. Remainder of Division is about Crickhowell.

3rd Division.—Just west of Abergavenny.

1st and 3rd Cavalry Brigades watching left flank; patrols on line Builth—Three Cocks Junction—Waun Fach (2660 Black Mountains). (Cavalry Division Head-quarters may be placed as desired.)

2nd Cavalry Brigade.—Near Crickhowell.

Mounted Brigade.—Llanover (3½ miles south of Abergavenny).

Remainder of Army Troops, Transport and Supply Columns and Parks may be placed as desired on, or behind, above line.

Head-quarters of Westland Army—Abergavenny.

## NORTHLAND.

The position of the Northland forces on the evening of the 7th October is as follows:—

1st Division.—Close to Manchester. Outposts south of Manchester along River Mersey to Hyde.

3rd Division.—South of Oldham. Outposts, Ashton-under-Lyne—Stalybridge—Mossley.

4th Division and Army Troops (less Mounted Brigade).—Rochdale (north of Oldham).

2nd Division.—Dewsbury (9 miles south of Leeds) with a Brigade near Wakefield.

1st Cavalry Brigade.—Outposts on line Holmfirth—Barnsley—Doncaster.

Cavalry Division (less 1st Brigade).—East of Oldham, connecting with 1st Cavalry Brigade at Holmfirth.

Mounted Brigade.—Watching right flank with posts from Liverpool by Widnes and Warrington to the western outskirts of Manchester.

Army Head-quarters—Rochdale.

## INFORMATION AS TO EASTLAND FORCES IN WESTERN THEATRE.

The Eastland outposts extend from Longtown (5 miles north-west of Pontilas), by Hatteral Hill—Llangattock-lingoed—2 miles east of Llanvapley—1 mile west of Penrhos—to Llandenny. Further to north and to south the country is carefully watched by Eastland Cavalry, 4th Cavalry Brigade to the north, 1st Cavalry Brigade to the south.

In the attack on the position (7th October) the enemy's 5th Division was located on his right (across Abergavenny—Pontilas road), the 6th Division in his centre, the 1st Division on his left (across the southern Abergavenny—Monmouth road).

The attack was not pressed, and was of the nature of a reconnaissance in force.

## INFORMATION AS TO EASTLAND FORCES IN NORTHERN THEATRE.

The advance from Darlington has been opposed by the 2nd Eastland Cavalry Brigade, supported by units of the 3rd Division.

The advance west of the Pennines has been opposed by the 3rd Eastland Cavalry Brigade, supported by units of the 4th Division. It has been ascertained that the 3rd Division was at Harrogate on the 1st October and retired southward on the 2nd October, passing through Leeds next day, towards Huddersfield and Wakefield. The 4th Division was at Skipton (35 miles north (by east) of Manchester) on the 1st October, and retired on the 2nd towards Manchester. A considerable force of Artillery and Infantry retired from Manchester early on the 7th October through Stockport.

Hostile troops are in touch all along the front of the Northland outpost line.

## SKETCH OF AN APPRECIATION.—WESTLAND.

*Position of enemy's forces.*

The following are unknown :—

2nd Division (Group A).—It is probable that it has moved to the Cambrian frontier with the remainder of the group.

1st Mounted Brigade.—May be either towards Northland or the Cambrian frontier.

2nd Mounted Brigade.—Has been up to the 1st October on the Cambrian frontier, and is probably there now.

It is by no means unlikely that one of the Divisions (3rd and 4th) has been withdrawn from the northern to the western theatre.

*Courses open to the enemy.*

(a.) To endeavour to smash Westland before Northland can join in, perhaps receiving reinforcements from the north.

(b.) Withdraw nearer to his capital to avoid the squeezing by his two opponents; he may thus force each to weaken itself by guarding communications.

(c.) Hold Westland and turn against Northland.

The second course (b) appears to me to be the most probable. During the attack of the 7th October Eastland has probably realized that she has the whole strength of Westland against her; she may, indeed, have located the various Divisions and Corps.

*Courses open to the allies.*

There appears to be but one, viz., to reduce the distance between them, which at present amounts to 120 miles. In effecting this Westland can do little directly, and it must rest with Northland to push on as fast as possible, sending forward Cavalry on her left and directing the main body on the line Shrewsbury—Lichfield.

Westland can best help Northland by holding in front of her as large a force as possible. The forces of Eastland on the Cambrian frontier are not thoroughly known; it is most probable that they equal those of Westland and not improbably exceed them. To make an attack on the Eastland position appears, therefore, at present inadvisable, but should it be evident that Eastland is withdrawing, a vigorous attack must be made on her to delay and hold her to her position as long as possible so as to give time to the Northland forces to push forward to such a distance as may allow of their acting more immediately in conjunction with those of Westland.

Should Eastland determine to make an attack on the Westland position our right is the cause of some anxiety, threatened as it is from the Severn Tunnel.

---

 REMARKS BY DIRECTOR, WESTLAND FORCES, ON THE ABOVE APPRECIATION.

I agree with your remarks regarding the position of the enemy's forces, except that I do not think it likely that two Divisions would have been withdrawn from the northern to the western theatre by the evening of the 7th October. It is true that in the attack of that day Eastland found itself confronted with most of Westland's forces, and had to fall back. If the former still decided on accomplishing the defeat of Westland before the latter could count on the immediate co-operation of Northland, it would be of moment to delay Northland's advance as much as possible; the withdrawal of two

Divisions might, therefore, frustrate the object in view. It would therefore appear advisable to gain more information of the extent of front of Northland's advance and strength. If widely extended it could then possibly be contained or delayed by a less force.

The courses open to the enemy are clearly stated. As regards (b) it is doubtful whether Eastland would allow its two opponents to concentrate, although their communications would be lengthened and liable to be attacked and broken. On the whole, I think course (a) is the more likely one to be adopted.

I agree with your idea that the chief object of your endeavours should be to reduce the distance between your force and Northland, but I cannot think that you will be playing your part in the operations if you are under the impression that your force can do little.

In operations of this nature where two allied armies are advancing with determination to concentrate in spite of anything the enemy may do, it frequently occurs that each Commander thinks the other should push on for the reason that each thinks that the main forces of the enemy may be in front of him.

It appears to me that the only solution of so difficult a problem is for each Commander to attack vigorously whatever is in front of him, unless the enemy is absolutely concentrated. The latter cannot be strong everywhere, and the Commander who concentrates for attack at a point is almost certain to gain a victory. The further advantage of attacking is that the enemy pauses before he attacks himself, and hesitates before releasing troops to reinforce in another direction. If the Western forces of Eastland are not engaged, Eastland would be more likely to attack before Northland can co-operate with Westland.

As regards Eastland withdrawing, I fear that under modern conditions of war the withdrawal would be discovered too late, and it might happen that the fact was not brought to light till he had concentrated against and defeated Westland's Northern ally.

I offer these remarks for your consideration because I am of opinion that in such circumstances an attack is the only sound course open to you, especially as you have a safe line of retreat.

Even if the enemy did advance by the Severn Tunnel, a success east of Abergavenny would at once render abortive any such hostile demonstration, whilst even an unsuccessful attack on your part would probably draw the Severn Tunnel troops northwards, and you would be in no worse position than you were before.

---

BRIEF APPRECIATION FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF GENERAL  
OFFICER COMMANDING WESTLAND FORCES.

*(Submitted by an Assistant Director.)*

BLUE (WESTLAND).

The allies have numerical superiority over Eastland, which will tell when they can combine. Meanwhile, their forces are in two equal parts, upwards of 100 miles apart, on converging lines of advance towards the enemy's capital, and as no superior direction of the campaign is alluded to in the General Information, they must at present be considered to be acting independently.

In the Western theatre the moral advantage lies with Westland. Defeat of Eastland here before troops can be brought from north to south is, therefore, desirable and necessary to an early combination with Northland.

## RED.

Eastland will probably concentrate his strength against one of the allies before the other can come up. He will choose Westland first because most of the Red troops are there already, and because a defeat of Westland will have great moral effect on Northland, who hesitated at first to declare war. Popular clamour will also indicate Westland as being the most threatening to London.

The expressions "reinforcements had meanwhile arrived" and "moreover a strong advance from the Severn Tunnel," point in the same direction, and it is anticipated that the 2nd Division and 2nd Mounted Brigade\* (Red troops unaccounted for) are in front of the Westland forces. The action of the Red Northern troops is clearly of a delaying nature, and it is quite possible that Eastland is even now transferring the bulk or part of the 2nd and 3rd Divisions from north to south for the anticipated engagement with Westland. It is possible that popular pressure may have taken another direction, and may refuse to permit Birmingham and the Midlands to remain apparently uncovered, but strategical considerations ought to prevail. Naval considerations need no longer be considered because Red has no troops to spare to invade Westland, and nothing but a complete reversal of the existing conditions would seriously interrupt communications between Westland and Cambria. The campaign will be over before that could occur.

## BLUE'S ACTION.

The importance of keeping Red's forces separated and of attacking their lines of communication points to bold strategical action of Blue's Cavalry, passing round the north of the forces in the Western theatre. The main action by the four Blue Divisions and the Mounted Brigade must be decided after reconnaissance of Red's positions, but holding his left and attacking his right so as to drive him east and south-east into Forest of Dean country is probably the best general idea. Red will probably move during the night 8th—9th, with a view to attacking the Abergavenny position. This will suit the above idea. If Red does not do this he must be attacked.

## REMARKS BY DIRECTOR, WESTLAND FORCES.

I fully concur in the above. After mature consideration on my part I am of opinion that the points alluded to in this appreciation are sound and practical in their application. I am glad to note that my Assistant Director arrived at the same conclusions from an independent study of the problem.

GENERAL REMARKS ON APPRECIATIONS BY THE DIRECTOR,  
WESTLAND FORCES.

1. The principal points brought out in the appreciations submitted to me are of a very interesting nature, and officers appear to have based their suggested schemes on well-reasoned arguments, even in cases where I do not entirely agree with their conclusions.
2. The Westland Commander is not only ignorant of the strength of the Eastland forces opposed to him, but is also uninformed as to what extent he can depend upon the vigorous co-operation of Northland. This want of confidence in Northland's co-operation is reflected in some appreciations in which officers very rightly conclude

\* The 1st Mounted Brigade is not mentioned, but it is known to have been in action on 30th September, and it is probably now on Red's right rear.

that, political reasons apart, Eastland should endeavour to gain a decisive victory over Westland, with a view to discourage Northland from attempting further operations.

3. The allies are acting on exterior lines, whereas Eastland is on interior lines, facilitated by a good and ample railway system. Whether exterior lines are the same disadvantage under modern conditions of inter-communication as in former days is a moot point, but the disadvantage of divided control is always the same, and can only be discounted by vigorous action and loyal co-operation on the part of Commanders; thus some officers, in appreciating from the Westland point of view, favour hanging back and waiting for further progress on the part of Northland. No doubt the Northland Commander would be doing the same, and with more reason, since this is not his quarrel, if we could have read his appreciation. This tendency on the part of the separated Commanders to hang back has many examples in history. The action of the Federal Commanders Booker and Sedgwick at Chancellorsville, and the half-hearted attempt of Shields and Fremont to cut off Stonewall Jackson in his retreat from the Potomac during the American Civil War, are some of many failures of separated Commanders, while Waterloo, Königgrätz, and the second battle of Manassas (Lee and Jackson *v.* Pope), are examples of what bold Commanders can effect by determination. Any tendency to hang back will give Eastland time, and it is time that is essential to give her any chance of ultimate success.

Thus, at the present rate of advance, some 10 days must elapse before Northland can reach the vicinity of Hereford, and thereby get in touch with Westland.

4. Time gained by a passive attitude on the part of Westland may allow Eastland to concentrate against and defeat Northland while masking Westland, and it must be remembered that in these days of long-range weapons it is easier for comparatively small forces to mask a larger force than heretofore.

In 10 days' time, too, the Eastland forces may be in a position to again dispute the command of the sea, and endanger the existence of the Westland forces in Cambria.

5. The danger of an attack by Westland on the forces opposed to it has, in my opinion, been exaggerated in some instances. At most, Eastland is likely to have five Divisions, two Cavalry Brigades and Army troops in the Western theatre, which is not a greatly superior force to that of Westland; even if unsuccessful, Westland could only be driven back along a line of communication which can be strongly defended. But it must be remembered that the "morale" of Westland is high as the result of the previous operations, the enemy may be even weaker than expected—for she cannot be strong everywhere—and an attack is the best means of holding her to the ground, and thereby facilitate Northland's task. Finally, a decisive victory in this theatre will have most far-reaching results, enabling a junction with Northland for the final crushing of the scattered Eastland forces.

6. The final point from a strategical point of view is, "Which is the strategic flank?"

An advance against the enemy's left or south flank would, if successful, only drive the Eastland Army towards the centre of Eastland, and do nothing to interfere with her concentration or her passage of the Severn. If the enemy is stronger than ourselves our communications would be somewhat exposed from the north-east. If we were unsuccessful we might become involved in the difficult country to the south, compelled to fight with our backs to the Bristol Channel.

An attack on the enemy's centre is to be commended from the point of view of driving a wedge into and driving the enemy apart.

An attack on the enemy's right or north flank would, if successful, place us nearer to Northland, would cover our own communications, and would separate the divided wings of the Eastland forces.

The north is certainly our strategic flank from the enemy's point of view, as most officers have mentioned in their appreciations; since seeing the ground to-day, it is certainly the flank which offers us the best chance of a tactical success.

## BRIEF NARRATIVE OF EVENTS, 8TH OCTOBER.

On the 8th October the necessary reconnaissances were carried out by the officers on both sides. That afternoon the following telegrams were received by the Commanders to whom they were addressed:—

*From General Officer Commanding Northland to General Officer Commanding Westland.*

(Decipher.)

Rochdale, 8th October, 1907, 1 p.m.

The Eastland troops now in touch with me appear to include the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Brigades and the 3rd and 4th Divisions. Reports from reliable sources state that large forces were railed up through Derby some days ago, but I have failed to locate in my front any troops except those mentioned above. I shall press on to-morrow towards the line Stafford—Derby, attacking any force that may oppose me.

(Received by General Officer Commanding Westland at 3 p.m., 8th October.)

---

*From General Officer Commanding Northern Army, Eastland Forces, to Chief.*

Buxton, 8th October, 1907, 2 p.m.

I expect enemy to continue his advance to-morrow; I intend falling back towards Derby keeping touch but avoiding decisive action.

(Received by Commander-in-Chief, Eastland Forces, at 3 p.m., 8th October.)

---

After receipt of these telegrams and of the various reconnaissance reports required, the Commanders issued orders as follows:—

Secret.

No. 25.

GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING CAVALRY DIVISION, EASTLAND.

In accordance with the verbal instructions communicated to you this morning, I want to ascertain for certain if the whole of the Westland Army is in front of us, and where the left of his main position rests.

You will, therefore, start at 8 p.m. with the 4th Cavalry Brigade and the two Mounted Brigades (now at Llanfihangel-Nant-Melan on the Builth—New Radnor road) which are placed under your orders for this purpose, driving in the enemy's Cavalry on his left\* flank, and endeavour to uncover the flank of his main position.

At 8 a.m. to-morrow, if I am not myself attacked, I shall try to distract the enemy's attention from your movements by demonstrating along the whole front.

I shall be at Point 884, north of Llangattock-lingoed, at 9 a.m. to-morrow, to which point you may be able to communicate with me direct by signal. You will repeat all your messages to Hereford.

In the event of my deciding to retire on to the Hereford—Ross position, I wish you to bear in mind that you may be required to cover our retirement on the 10th instant with the Cavalry and the Mounted Brigades.

Handed to General Officer Commanding Cavalry Division personally by a Staff Officer at Hay, at 1 p.m., 8th October, 1907.

---

\* Through an error in typing the word "right" was here substituted for "left." This error, which was not discovered when the order was issued, led to some doubt as to the Commander-in-Chief's intentions.

## OPERATION ORDERS BY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EASTLAND FORCES.

No. 15.

Head-quarters,

Green Dragon Hotel, Hereford.

8th October, 1907.

1. Our Northern army continues to oppose the advance of the Northland Army. There is no fresh information concerning the enemy in either theatre.

2. The Commander-in-Chief intends to-morrow to endeavour to locate the enemy's positions and strength, and with this object the 4th Cavalry Brigade and 1st and 2nd Mounted Brigades are acting on our right flank. In the event of the enemy making an attack on our present position, the General Officer Commanding intends to maintain it.

3. General Officers Commanding Divisions and 4th Cavalry Brigade, if not themselves attacked by the enemy, will at 8 a.m. to-morrow push forward small reconnaissances supported by Artillery fire, more especially to draw the Artillery fire of the enemy.

4. The Commander-in-Chief will be at Point 884, about 5 miles north-east of Abergavenny, at 9 a.m. to-morrow, but any messages for him will be repeated to Hereford.

Copies despatched by Staff Officers in motor car at 3 p.m. to General Officers Commanding Divisions, Cavalry Division, 1st Cavalry Brigade.

---

Secret.

*From Chief, Eastland Forces, to Commanding Cavalry Division, 4th Cavalry Brigade, 1st, 5th and 6th Divisions.*

(Cipher.)  
(No. Z 102.)

8th October, 1907, 6.30 p.m.

Reference Operation Order No. 15 of this date, in the event of the enemy attacking to-morrow and we are compelled to fall back, Commander-in-Chief intends to retire on position between Hereford and Ross. The 5th and 6th Divisions must at all costs hold the line of the Monnow until 1st Division is across the Monnow. Line of retreat for 1st Division by roads in and south of line Llantilio—St. Maughan's—Ross. 6th Division by roads north of above line and on and south of line Llanfair Green—Orcop Hill—Ballingham. 5th Division by roads north of line named for 6th Division. 1st Cavalry Brigade would cover exposed flank of 1st Division. 4th Cavalry Brigade and two Mounted Brigades would cover general retirement. Commander-in-Chief hopes, however, to maintain the position if attacked.

Addressed Commanding Cavalry Division. Repeated Commanding 4th Cavalry Brigade, 1st, 5th, and 6th Divisions.

---

*From Chief, Eastland Forces, to General Officer Commanding Northern Army,  
Eastland Forces.*

(Cipher.)  
(No. Z 101.)

8th October, 1907, 3.30 p.m.

Your message *re* your proposed operations to-morrow received. If opportunity offers endeavour to draw enemy from direction of North Cambria by threatening his left. 4th Cavalry Brigade and 2 Mounted Brigades start 8 p.m. to-night to get information by movement against Westland's left flank and rear. This movement will be supported by demonstration to-morrow along whole of our front. If enemy attacks us to-morrow, Commander-in-Chief intends to maintain our position.

---

Urgent.

*From General Officer Commanding Northern Army, Eastland Forces, to Commander-in-Chief, Eastland Forces.*

(Cipher.)  
(No. 21 Z.)

Buxton, 8th October, 1907, 5 p.m.

Your No. Z 101 received. In order to be prepared to comply with your instructions I have directed 3rd Division to demonstrate northwards from Sheffield at 6 a.m. to-morrow. 2nd Division to move at 3 a.m. on Chesterfield in readiness to support. Line of retreat for both through Nottingham. 4th Division to cover left flank and rear of this movement, retiring towards Derby if necessary. If you have to fall back what will be general direction of your move? Please reply, urgent.

To this telegram the Commander-in-Chief, Eastland Forces, replied that in the case of eventualities he would retire on Hereford and Ross, and thence on Worcester and Gloucester, unless he saw an opportunity of combining with the Northern army by rail from the two first-named places.

---

#### REMARKS ON THE ORDERS OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EASTLAND FORCES.

The Eastland Cavalry were, according to the "Special Idea," in touch with hostile Cavalry along their front, Westland's strength on the northern flank being apparently at least two Cavalry Brigades. The country is so difficult that movement off the roads would be impossible for Cavalry at night. The night of the 8th—9th October was dark and the weather foggy and inclement.

It was certain that the night movement of the Eastland Cavalry must be discovered and opposed as soon as it advanced, and under the conditions prevailing the enterprise was certain to be exhausting and unlikely to have much success. A better chance of obtaining the object in view might have been expected if the Eastland Cavalry had been secretly massed on the evening of the 8th October, with a view to attempting to break through, round the enemy's left, after daybreak on the 9th.

In the 3 p.m. Operation Order, directing Divisions to "maintain their positions" if attacked, it would appear that the fact had been overlooked that the Divisions were not occupying a position, and that none had been allotted to them. The result of the order was that the Divisional Commanders were in doubt as to what they should do, and the Westland attack next morning found them unprepared (excepting the 1st Division, on Eastland's left, which had moved into position on the outpost line),

and without any concerted plan of action. The order (No. Z 102) issued at 6.30 p.m. cleared up the situation somewhat, but it was not received until after nightfall.

The order to the Northern army to threaten the enemy's left, might have been effective had that army been considered strong enough to push home an attack against his left, threatening his communications. But a mere demonstration was unlikely to have any far-reaching effect, and the movement tended to separate the Northern army from the Western, and to expose the former to the danger of being driven away eastward or south-eastward.

---

OPERATION ORDERS BY GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING  
WESTLAND FORCES.

No. 7.

Abergavenny,  
8th October, 1907.

1. Information from Northland is to the effect that two Divisions of the enemy are still facing the Northland troops. It is not, therefore, probable that more than four Divisions are opposed to us.

2. It is the intention of the General Officer Commanding to advance to-morrow and drive the enemy back.

3. The Cavalry Division will move round our left flank and, moving west and north of the Black Mountains, seize the Bredwardine—Vowchurch ridge (to the east of the Golden Valley Railway). If the enemy are in too great force, the Cavalry Division will guard the northern flank of the main advance.

4. The 4th Division will move forward and, clearing the ground to the west of the Abergavenny—Hereford road, will seize the 884 ridge (north of Llangattock-Lingoed). It will be supported by the 3rd Division, which will be at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.

5. That portion of the 1st Division which is in occupation of ground west of the Abergavenny—Hereford road will be relieved by 6 a.m. to-morrow by a similar portion of the 4th Division, the named troops of the 1st Division moving across the road to the western slopes of Skirrid Fawr by 7 a.m. Such troops of the 4th Division as have to use the Crickhowell—Abergavenny road must be clear of Abergavenny by 7 a.m.

6. The 1st and 2nd Divisions will attack eastwards between the line Skirrid Fawr—Level 449 (Cross Ash) on the north and the Llanvihangel nigh Usk (Southern)—Monmouth road on the south. The dividing line between these Divisions will be Llanthewy Rytherch—Level 225 on the Abergavenny—Monmouth road.

7. The Mounted Brigade will cover the right flank of the army, and will search the ground towards Coleford and Lydney.

8. All troops will be in position to move by 9 a.m.

9. The Chief Engineer will arrange that communication be kept up between the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and the Cavalry by wireless telegraphy, and between the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and Divisions and Mounted Brigade by cable telegraphy. A balloon will ascend from Llantilio pertholey. The remainder of the Army troops will await orders at Llanfoist.

10. Reports will be rendered to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief at the road junction just west of the L in Llanvetherine (3 miles east of Abergavenny on the Ross road).

Issued at 5.45 p.m., 8th October, 1907.

---

**Confidential.**

TO THE GENERAL OFFICERS COMMANDING 1ST, 2ND, 3RD, AND 4TH DIVISIONS.

The attack of the 1st and 2nd Divisions is intended to be of a holding nature, the main attack being that delivered by the 3rd and 4th Divisions.

ABERGAVENNY,  
8th October, 1907.

*Major-General,  
Commanding Westland Forces.*

REMARKS BY DIRECTOR, WESTLAND FORCES, ON OPERATION ORDERS OF GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, WESTLAND FORCES, 8TH OCTOBER, 1907.

These orders are well drawn up and sound in principle.

With regard to paragraph 3, it appears to me that the Commander of the Cavalry Division should understand that the protection of the northern flank of the main advance is at all times his duty. I suggest this, as a Commander might exaggerate the strength of the enemy and not carry out the more difficult duty of trying to seize the Bredwardine—Vowchurch ridge, but rather confine himself to guarding only the northern flank.

With regard to paragraph 8 this would be clearer if the order were worded for troops to be in position to attack by 9 a.m.

Paragraph 9. The Air-line Telegraph companies and bridging trains might be detailed.

*From the General Officer Commanding Westland to General Officer Commanding  
Northland, Rochdale.*

(No. 001.)

Abergavenny, 8th October, 5.30 p.m.

Your telegram (cipher) of to-day (unnumbered) received. Enemy attacked me in position just east of here yesterday, but were repulsed. I located the 1st, 5th, and 6th Divisions and 1st and 4th Cavalry Brigades in my front. I shall attack to-morrow and hope to drive him eastwards.

NOTES BY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CAVALRY, WESTLAND FORCE.

In my opinion it would have been better to have concentrated all the mounted troops on the left flank of the Westland Army at the commencement (as it was, the Mounted Brigade was on the right flank, whilst the remainder of the mounted troops were on the left). Undoubtedly by doing this the right flank of the Westland Army would have been exposed: still, to obtain decisive results with the mounted troops, it is essential they should be as strong as possible at the moment they come in contact with the enemy, either in the strategical phase or during the general fighting. By distributing the mounted troops on both flanks with a false idea of obtaining security, one renders oneself liable to the danger of one or other body being defeated by the combined hostile mounted forces and of obtaining no decisive results. The effect of the bold use of the concentrated mounted troops of the Westland Army on their left flank would have been invaluable, for they would probably have succeeded in obtaining possession of the ridge commanding the Golden Valley and might have forced the Eastland Commander to retire south towards the Severn when defeated by the Westland Infantry, thus stopping a junction between his forces and the Northern Eastland Divisions, and possibly leading to the destruction of the Eastland Army penned up against the Bristol Channel.

9TH OCTOBER.

On the 9th October a series of tactical situations, arising out of the orders issued on the 8th, were discussed on the ground. The general results of the day's operations were as follows:—

At 5 a.m. the mass of the Eastland Cavalry and mounted troops on the northern flank were checked in an attempt to cross the Wye about Pipton (near Three Cocks Junction). A flanking party moving by Builth failed to force a crossing there. By 10 a.m. the Eastland Cavalry and mounted troops, continuing the attempt to press south from Pipton, were in contact on the line Three Cocks Junction—Wau Fach with the Westland Cavalry, which was moving in accordance with paragraph 3 of Westland Operation Orders of the 8th October. The Westland Cavalry being fresh and in fully equal strength was more than a match for its opponents.

Meanwhile, the Westland Divisions had advanced to the attack. They quickly drove in the small reconnoitring forces which Eastland had sent out, and pressed on against the outpost position, the main attack being made against ridge 884 north of Llangattock-lingoed, an important feature commanding the ground to north and south. The Eastland Divisions, especially on Eastland's right flank where the main attack fell, and from which the main Hereford road ran, were ill-prepared to meet this attack. By 12.30 p.m. it was evident that a defeat of Eastland's right flank was inevitable, and that the line of retreat on Hereford was already endangered. The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastland, therefore decided to retire, and issued the following order:—

*From Chief, Eastland Forces, to General Officers Commanding, 1st Division, 6th Division, 18th Infantry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Brigade, Cavalry Division.*

(No. X 151.)

9th October, 1907, 12.30 p.m.

We are being hard pressed on Abergavenny—Hereford road, and may be pushed off it if we delay retirement. 1st Division will, therefore, commence retiring from its left, retirement being covered by 1st Cavalry Brigade. The retirement of 1st Division across Monnow must be covered by 5th and 6th Divisions as ordered. Commander-in-Chief is now moving to Wormbridge Church on Hereford—Abergavenny road.

Repeated to General Officers Commanding, 1st Division, 18th Infantry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Brigade, Cavalry Division, and communicated verbally to General Officer Commanding 5th Division.

Subsequent to the issue of this order the Westland attack continued to gain ground against Eastland's right, and at 3.30 p.m. the following orders were issued:—

*From Chief, Eastland Forces, to General Officers Commanding, Cavalry Division, 1st, 5th, and 6th Divisions, 1st Cavalry Brigade.*

(No. X 154.)

9th October, 3.30 p.m.

1st Division have crossed the Monnow at Monmouth covered by 1st Cavalry Brigade. Column under General Officer Commanding 18th Infantry Brigade and the 5th Division should now retire, the 18th Brigade covered by the 1st Cavalry Brigade, and the 5th Division by the General Officer Commanding Cavalry Division. The 1st Division and General Officer Commanding 18th Infantry Brigade will take up positions on the left bank of the Monnow to secure the passage of that river by 1st Cavalry Brigade, and will then continue to retire on to a selected position. The 5th Division will retire direct to this position covered by the 6th Division and by the General Officer Commanding Cavalry Division. The Commander-in-Chief will establish his head-quarters at Hereford. The position selected for the army to retire

upon extends from Ridge Hill about 3 miles south of Hereford to Whitchurch about 4 miles south-west of Ross. This position will be covered to the north and north-west by the General Officer Commanding Cavalry Division, and to the south and south-east by the 1st Cavalry Brigade. The position itself will be occupied as follows:—5th Division from Ridge Hill to Point 549 at Much Birch, inclusive; 6th Division from Point 540, exclusive, to Point 379 south of Hentland Church, inclusive; 1st Division from Point 379, exclusive, to Whitchurch, inclusive. Each Division will be responsible for its own security. After replenishing ammunition and supplies all Divisional Ammunition Columns, Transport and Supply Columns, will be sent to refill as follows:—Army Head-quarters, 4th Cavalry Brigade; 1st and 2nd Mounted Brigades and 1st Division to Hereford; remainder to Ross.

NOTE.—When these orders were issued, the Cavalry Division (one Cavalry Brigade, two Mounted Brigades) was extended from about Builth to about Longtown, and was trying unsuccessfully to push through the Black Mountains against an equal force. The 1st Cavalry Brigade was on the Lower Usk, faced by a hostile Cavalry Brigade, neither gaining any advantage.

---

REMARKS BY DIRECTOR ON ORDERS NO. X 154, 9TH OCTOBER, 3.30 P.M.

These orders would, it is feared, have proved in some respects impracticable to carry out. They do not entirely take the situation at 1.30 p.m. into account, when the enemy was clearly working round the right flank. Actually the enemy would have almost certainly got beyond the Golden Valley railway line on that side during the afternoon.

The 1st Division would certainly not have crossed the Monnow by 3.30 p.m. It had to withdraw out of action, but there is no reason to doubt that it would have been across the river by nightfall.

The plan of withdrawing the mounted troops from a distance on either flank, to cover an Infantry and Artillery retirement out of action at a critical stage in a general engagement, is almost impracticable—in any case in such a country if the Cavalry Division and 1st Cavalry Brigade carried out their orders (or tried to) both flanks would have been entirely uncovered to the enemy's Cavalry. The Cavalry Division, it must be remembered, started at 8 p.m. the previous night, and would not be fit for much by the afternoon of the 9th.

The situation on the right was so serious that it would have probably been best to hold on as far as possible till nightfall, and then to retire to the Monnow position, but with the right thrown back from Point 687 towards Orcop Hill, and to decide on retiring slowly to the Severn, on the line Tewkesbury—Gloucester.

Under the circumstances, Hereford as head-quarters was becoming very exposed.

General Belfield's plan would appear to have been to keep the two Eastland armies apart, and to drive the Western one, if possible, on to the Severn estuary; he would probably only have partially succeeded in this, but the western part of Eastland would have been fortunate to find itself on the line Worcester—Tewkesbury a week later, as it does in the "New Situation."

---

REMARKS BY DIRECTOR-IN-CHIEF.

There can be no reasonable doubt that Eastland's right flank would have been completely defeated, and it is probable that the direct line of retreat to Hereford would have been lost. The immediate rear of the army had not been cleared of impedimenta, which would have increased the confusion of the retreat, and much of which would

probably have been captured. Strategically, Eastland's right flank was far the more dangerous one, and tactically the ground lent itself to a turning movement by Westland round that flank. Adequate steps to secure the flank and to prepare for possible attack were not taken.

On the afternoon of the 9th October a new situation was issued, to be dealt with on the 10th and 11th.

This new situation was supposed to have arisen out of the events described above, after a sufficient interval had elapsed.

Some of the many interesting and complicated problems which would have resulted in connection with Eastland's retreat on the 9th October were considered that afternoon, the events of which would have thrown a severe strain on Generals, staffs, and troops.

---

REMARKS BY ARMY DIRECTOR, WESTLAND FORCES, AT A CONFERENCE  
HELD AT 9.30 P.M., 9TH OCTOBER.

I will discuss this evening a few of the points that were raised during the exercise to-day.

1st and 2nd Situations.—I think we were all inclined to use more troops than were absolutely necessary to drive the enemy from the first position we attacked.

There is no doubt that this is a common mistake, and that all Commanders must endeavour to keep as many troops in hand as possible. Otherwise, during the early stages of an attack so many troops will be used up and spread about the country, that, at the later stages, sufficient reserves are not available, and the attack dies out earlier than it otherwise would. This applies to all Commanders from a company to an army. In small commands, when the strength of the enemy in front is not known, the main attack should always be preceded by the attack of a small body, performing the ordinary duties of an advanced guard.

If this attack is stopped, some advantage and ground will probably have been gained, the enemy's position and some idea of his strength will be revealed, and troops are close at hand to support the attack or manœuvre to a flank without any loss of time.

This particular attack was rendered more difficult by the absence of any Cavalry on our left flank, and it is a question for discussion whether, when about to engage in battle, the independent Cavalry should ever be sent away so far that it cannot closely protect the attack of the Infantry.

Infantry become very demoralized when they are constantly exposed to attacks in flank and rear by hostile horsemen, possibly supported by Horse Artillery fire.

As regards the action of the Artillery in this first attack, the majority of the officers were of opinion that it would be best to hand over one Artillery Brigade to the Infantry Brigadier who was dealing with the situation.

All Artillery Brigadiers realize that during the early stages of an attack it is necessary to hand over some Artillery to the Commander of the leading troops. This Artillery, if it occupies a carefully selected position, should not lose its power of movement, and when desired it can again be brought under the command of the Artillery Brigadier at a moment's notice.

The question arose on the ground as to whether in this first situation the Artillery should have taken up a concealed position or come out in the open. There were different opinions expressed on this point.

To my mind it is chiefly ruled by the nature of the target. Here the target was fixed. The enemy's Infantry must either hold the position pointed out on the ground or evacuate it, when we should immediately occupy it. There was no ground available

for manoeuvre, and the only fear was that the enemy might be stronger than was anticipated and might deliver a counterstroke. The ground, however, in rear or on the western flank of the position did not appear to favour counterstroke because of the stream on the west, which would hamper movement, and because of the wood on the top of the hill we were attacking, out of which it would be difficult to initiate any counterstroke. On the eastern flank, however, on that low spur it would be quite possible to deliver a very effective counterstroke, which could be strongly supported by the enemy's Artillery from the neighbourhood of Hill 884 to the north-east.

In the one case, therefore, it would be best for the Artillery to occupy a covered position, as there were excellent observing stations and a fixed target, whilst in the other case it would be better for the Artillery to use direct fire, so as to be able to turn on to the moving target of the counterstroke without the least delay.

I should like Artillery officers to state whether they think that guns from a concealed position could at once take on such a counterstroke as this and bring effective fire to bear on it.

A question arose on the ground whether the 3rd Division in reserve should move forward to help the 4th Division without first obtaining the permission of the Commander-in-Chief.

This is a matter which can be decided without any great trouble. The Commander-in-Chief, like every other Commander in his force, will not be desirous of using his reserve until it is absolutely necessary, and he would not care for any part of it to be frittered away and its complete organization thus impaired.

This being the case, I do not think the 3rd Division should have been used to assist the 4th Division in carrying out the task given to the latter without the direct orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

If the 4th Division, after using its whole strength, fails to carry the enemy's position, then the Commander-in-Chief should be the person to decide how his reserve is to be used. If, on the other hand, the 4th Division not only fails in its attack, but is driven back by a great counterstroke, then no doubt the General Officer Commanding 3rd Division would not wait a moment for orders, but would restore the battle by whatever action he considered best, either defensive or offensive.

As regards the Divisional Cavalry, I do not think there is much to add to what we have already discussed on the ground. There is no doubt that we have none too many and that unless carefully watched a large number of mounted men will be employed on various orderly duties. Divisional Cavalry is required above everything else for reconnaissance, Infantry scouts move very slowly, formations for attack and defence require time to arrange, and it is essential that early warning should reach the Infantry of any unexpected hostile advance. Cavalry scouts were particularly necessary to-day because our independent Cavalry were miles away in what I think was hardly a good position, and where they were completely blocked by the enemy's Cavalry.

This being the case we must do all we can to keep our Divisional squadrons fresh and available for scouting, and not fritter them away in orderly duty or expect them to fight and charge in formed bodies.

The 3rd situation was probably as difficult a task as a Divisional Commander is likely to encounter when attacking in war.

One Brigade of the 4th Division, supported by one Q.F. Brigade, had carried the small hill just north-west of Llanvihangel Crucorney Church and was holding that hill against hostile troops which were occupying the hill south-west of Old Castle Church just across the little stream.

Another Infantry Brigade, having formed up on the ridge just east of The Court, had advanced in a northerly direction towards Point 884 and had reached a line across the top of the spur facing N.N.E. about Ll in Llangattock. The remainder of the Division was in reserve about The Court. This leading Brigade discovered that any

further advance towards Point 884 on the eastern slopes of the ridge would expose their troops to enfilade fire from hostile Artillery, which had opened fire from a well-marked ridge which runs south from Point 884 to Llangattock Lingoed Church. Whilst any change of front towards the east of these slopes to guard against a counterstroke from this last-mentioned ridge was exposed to enfilade fire from hostile Artillery which had opened fire west of Point 884.

These difficulties were further increased by the fact that the northern flank of the attack eastwards of the 1st Division on the right was some 2 miles away to the south. This space between the two Divisions (4th and 1st) would be rapidly increased as the attack of each progressed. A great gap was thus formed, which afforded a favourable opportunity for a counterstroke to be delivered either against the northern flank of the 1st Division on our right or against the eastern flank of the 3rd Division, this counterstroke being capable of good Artillery support from the ridge running south from Point 884.

Some officers were of opinion that the small rise some 800 yards in front of the place reached by our Eastern Brigade should be carried and held. Personally, I was of opinion that this eminence, if occupied, would be exposed to a very heavy crossfire of hostile Artillery from the north and from the east. That, however, is a matter which could hardly be decided in a peace exercise.

The solution most generally suggested was to move forward part of the leading Brigade to the last eminence, the reserve Brigade also coming up on its left. The leading Brigade would then face east, to guard against a counterstroke from the east, and the reserve Brigade would face N.N.E. towards Point 884. The 3rd Division was then to move on Pandy with its western flank protected by the Brigade of the 4th Division still holding a hill north-west of Llanvihangel Crucorney Church. The 3rd Division was then to form for an attack facing east and advance up the hill against Point 884, the attack in its later stages being supported by the advance of the centre Brigade of the 4th Division towards the same point.

During this operation there is little doubt that the 3rd Division would be exposed to enfilade fire from any hostile Artillery which might have been posted in the vicinity of Walterstone, though no doubt some cover would be obtained owing to the spurs running down west from Point 884 and south-west of it. The advance would also be covered to some extent by the trees.

Finally, we come to the question of Artillery support for this attack, and it appears to me that it would be impossible to find either direct or concealed positions for all the Artillery of the two Divisions, a total of 24 batteries. Some batteries could find positions on the southern slopes of the hill occupied by the left Brigade of the 4th Division, but these batteries could only support the initial stages of the advance of the 3rd Division from Pandy. They could not see beyond the bend of the road, 1,700 yards west of Point 884, and any guns which unlimbered facing N.N.E. on the eastern slopes of the 884—Skirrid Fawr Ridge would be enfiladed by hostile Artillery from the ridge running south from Point 884. Fortunately, the first-named ridge commanded the last, and I am of opinion that a large part of the Artillery should deploy north-east of Skirrid Fawr, and keep down all hostile Artillery fire from the ridge running south from Point 884.

The supply of ammunition to any guns on the 884—Skirrid Fawr Ridge would be very difficult; there is only one road which leads down to The Court. This road is very narrow and steep; ammunition wagons, empty and full, could hardly pass; the road would be choked up with Infantry, machine guns, ambulances, reserves, teams going to water, &c., and very careful staff work would be required to preserve any sort of order.

---

## PART II.

10th—11th October.

(See No. 2 Map.)

The following is the situation to be dealt with on Thursday and Friday, a sufficient interval being supposed to have elapsed:—

### GENERAL IDEA.

In consequence of the operations on the 9th October, the Eastland Western army has fallen back towards the Severn, followed up by Westland. Eastland's Northern army has also failed to stop Northland's advance.

In the Western theatre Eastland now holds a general line from Woodbury Hill (8 miles south-west of Kidderminster) southwards by Martley and along the Malvern Hills to the neighbourhood of Redmarley D'Abitot.

Westland advanced troops are in touch along the front of the Eastland position.

### SPECIAL IDEA—EASTLAND.

The position mentioned in the General Idea is held by rearguards only.

The 5th Division is bivouacked near Worcester, the 6th Division near Upton-upon-Severn, the 1st Division near Tewkesbury—all on the right bank of the Severn.

The 4th Cavalry Brigade and both Mounted Brigades are protecting the right flank, holding Cleobury Mortimer (West of Kidderminster) and Frith Common (4 miles south of Cleobury Mortimer).

The 1st Cavalry Brigade is protecting the left flank, holding Newent—May Hill—Huntley Hill.

The army is somewhat demoralized, and Commanders report that they do not consider their men are fit to fight with the Severn behind them.

The fortifications at Worcester and Gloucester (*vide* page 7 of Report of May Staff Ride) are old, out-of-date earthworks, close to the towns, and incapable of resisting modern artillery.

The General Officer Commanding Northern army reports that he has fallen back to the line Wolverhampton—Lichfield—Ashby-de-la-Zouch, and that Northland has been pressing his advance very vigorously. He asks for orders.

At this juncture the following telegram is received from the Secretary of State, London:—

“Serious riots in London, owing to a rise in prices. Police are demanding military assistance. Rumours of landing imminent on south coast causing great agitation. Fear these matters will lead to early recall of some troops to capital. Government urge absolute need for early success to allay anxiety. Consider you should be able to find opportunity while enemy is trying to cross Severn.”

## INFORMATION OF WESTLAND.

The Westland troops have been located as follows:—

The line of advance of the 3rd and 4th Divisions was through Hereford; they are now supposed to be behind the line Bromyard Downs—Bosbury (6 miles W.S.W. of Great Malvern), which line is held by Infantry outposts.

The 1st Division crossed the Wye between Hereford and Ross; its outposts are now on the line Bosbury—2 miles west of Ledbury—1 mile east of Preston.

The 2nd Division passed through Ross, and its outposts now extend from near Preston to 1 mile west of Gorseley (west of Newent). The enemy's Mounted Brigade is on his right, in close touch with Eastland's 1st Cavalry Brigade. His Cavalry Division is on the line Bromyard—Tenbury.

*From General Officer Commanding Northern Army, Eastland Forces, to Commander-in-Chief, Eastland Forces.*

Tamworth, S.E. of Lichfield,  
9th October, 1907, 9 p.m.

My address is as above. Dispositions my force as follows:—

3rd Division at and south of Ashby-de-la-Zouch. 2nd Division about Lullington, 6 miles south of Burton-upon-Trent and Elford, further to south-west. 4th Division, Lichfield. 2nd Cavalry Brigade just east of Ashby-de-la-Zouch, guarding roads from north-east. 3rd Cavalry Brigade on general front, Lichfield—Wolverhampton. Secret agents report enemy's 1st Division halted this afternoon about 6 miles south of Stafford. His 2nd Division to-day reached a point about midway between Derby and Burton-upon-Trent. His 3rd and 4th Divisions are probably in line with and between these, but probably nearer to Stafford than to Derby. He has some Cavalry on his left, but greater part of it is working to west and south-west of Stafford, and has seized Shrewsbury and Ironbridge, south-east of Shrewsbury.

## MEMORANDUM BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EASTLAND FORCES.

9th October, 1907, 10.30 p.m.

1. My intention is to withdraw the Western army to-morrow from their positions along the right bank of the Severn to a new position, Worcester—Persnore, with a detachment on Bredon Hill.

2. The General Officer Commanding Northern army was ordered, early this afternoon, secretly to entrain the Infantry of his 2nd and 3rd Divisions, and the Bridging Train of the Army troops at Tamworth, Ashby-de-la-Zouch and Tamworth respectively, to be detrained in the neighbourhood of Worcester. The movement to commence by 5 p.m.

3. The Artillery and other Divisional troops of these Divisions were ordered, at the same time, to march as soon as possible on Worcester.

4. In accordance with the original instructions, the General Officer Commanding Northern army has withdrawn all rolling stock as he retired, and has trains ready for instant use.

5. The remainder of the Northern army will be disposed so as to hold the enemy.

6. The 3rd and 4th Cavalry Brigades, Eastland, will get in touch with one another.

7. My head-quarters will be at Worcester.

## SPECIAL IDEA, WESTLAND.

The 3rd and 4th Divisions have passed through Hereford, following the retreating enemy. Their outposts now extend from Bromyard, by Bosbury (6 miles W.S.W. of Great Malvern) to about 2 miles west of Ledbury.

The 1st Division passed the Wye about King's Caple, and may be placed to west or south-west of Ledbury, but at least 4 miles from it.

The 2nd Division passed through Ross, and may be placed 4 or 5 miles beyond it.

The Cavalry Division holds the line Bromyard—Tenbury. The Mounted Brigade is on the right of the 2nd Division.

The General Officer Commanding Northland reports that he has driven the enemy in front of him to the line Wolverhampton—Lichfield—Ashby-de-la-Zouch. The Northland Army is now in front of that line, and intends to attack it. He has definitely ascertained that his advance so far has been opposed by three Eastland Divisions and two Cavalry Brigades.

---

 INFORMATION OF EASTLAND (WESTERN ARMY).

Westland's advance has been opposed by the 1st, 5th, and 6th Divisions (the 1st being on Eastland's left, the 5th on his right); also by the 4th Cavalry Brigade and two Mounted Brigades on Eastland's right, and the 1st Cavalry Brigade on his left.

Eastland's Infantry now holds the position given in the General Idea. North of that position his mounted troops extend the line by Frith Common to Cleobury Mortimer. South of the position, Eastland's Cavalry holds the line Newent—May Hill—Huntley Hill.

All evidence tends to make it probable that the enemy intends to retire across the Severn.

N.B.—The General Officer Commanding Westland was also furnished with general information regarding the Severn and its crossings, which information was supposed to have been collected by Westland Intelligence Officers before the war.

---

*From General Officer Commanding Northland Forces to General Officer Commanding Westland Forces.*

(Cipher.)  
(No. 30 Z.)

Rugeley, 10th October, 1907, 3 p.m.

My 1st Division occupied Wolverhampton at 2 p.m. to-day, driving enemy's Cavalry from there. No hostile Infantry met there; the Cavalry retired southward, keeping touch. 3rd Division has occupied Lichfield, whence enemy's 4th Division retired to Sutton Coldfield. 2nd Division has reached Appleby Magna, 5 miles south-west of Ashby-de-la-Zouch, driving back enemy's Cavalry to Atherstone. Enemy's 3rd Division are reported to have left Ashby-de-la-Zouch during yesterday afternoon and last night. Reports vary as to direction of move, and whether by road or rail, but several reports point to intention of enemy to mass against my left flank. My 4th Division is at Cannock; 1st Cavalry Brigade, Charnwood Forest, and ordered to seize Leicester; remainder of Cavalry Division on line Shrewsbury—Ironbridge, and ordered to secure line Church Stretton—Bridgnorth by to-night. I must halt in above positions to-morrow, as I have completely out-marched my supplies and exhausted local resources behind me. Enemy has destroyed all important railway and road bridges during his retirement, and removes rolling stock as he goes. It would be easy

for enemy, while holding Severn against you, to mass against my left, and seriously endanger my communications, while covering his own to London. Several reports state such is his intention. Am sure you will recognize need for my halt after very rapid advance to here, and that you will not give enemy time to withdraw troops from your front.

To this telegram the General Officer Commanding Westland replied at 8 p.m. the same evening, giving his dispositions and intentions and all information available as to the enemy in his front, also asking whether he might expect him to advance on the 12th instant. To this latter query no answer was received.

---

LINES OF ADVANCE OF WESTLAND ARMY FROM THE POSITION  
NEAR ABERGAVENNY TO THE POSITION TENBURY—BROMYARD—  
LEDBURY—LEA.

After the action on the 9th October the Cavalry Division moved with its centre along the Willersley—Weodley—Leominster road to position about Hope and Layster (6 miles north-east of Leominster on the Tenbury road).

The 4th Division moved similarly along the Abergavenny—Hereford road, and passing through this latter town moved to the cross-roads at Newtown (7½ miles north-east of Hereford on the Worcester road).

The 3rd Division moved, 24 hours later, along the same road, and halted at Stoke Lacy (9 miles north-east of Hereford on the Bromyard road).

The 1st Division moved along the Ross road to Peterstow, crossed the Wye at King's Capel, and halted about Fixley (9 miles east of Hereford on the Ledbury road.)

The 2nd Division, sending its Artillery and heavy transport *viâ* the southern (Raglan) road to Monmouth, proceeded to the same place *viâ* the northern road (*viâ* Llantilio Crossenny). Thence it proceeded *viâ* Ross to the neighbourhood of Upton Bishop (3¼ miles north-east of Ross).

The Mounted Brigade moved *viâ* Coleford to the neighbourhood of Hope Mansel (3 miles south-east of Ross).

The Army troops (minus the Mounted Brigade) followed the units to which they were detailed, and, with a few exceptions, halted in Hereford.

---

NOTES BY THE DIRECTOR, WESTLAND FORCES, ON THE SITUATION  
ON THE EVENING OF THE 9TH OCTOBER.

(When these notes were written, Eastland was believed to intend holding a position on the Malvern Hills. The situation discussed did not arise owing to Eastland's retirement across the Severn.)

It is by no means as easy to suggest a better course as it is to criticize one advocated by someone else, but it appears to me that to prosecute the campaign with success Westland must keep clearly in front of her the following points:—

1. Eastland must be so hard pressed in her retreat that she cannot afford to detach any troops northwards, and risk uncovering her Lines of Communication with London.
2. Any attack made against Eastland's present position on the Malvern Hills must be so directed that the troops, if successful, will be well placed for a further attack on the line of the Severn.

3. If we attack the line of the Severn north of Worcester we have two difficult obstacles to pass, the Teme and the Severn. These obstacles will not be overcome in a day, Eastland is sure to discover the movement; she can delay us there and concentrate against Northland without any serious danger to her Lines of Communication, and at the same time we shall be exposing our own.

4. If we attack the line of the Severn between Worcester and Tewkesbury we have again two difficult objects to deal with, the Severn and the Avon, with no favourable bend in the Severn to force a passage. The passage would take some time even in the face of slight resistance, but if successful the Westland Army would be covering its own communications and threatening those of Eastland.

5. If we attack between Tewkesbury and Gloucester, the Hasfield Tirley Hills appear to be favourable for assisting in forcing the passage. Tewkesbury and its crossing would immediately be seized (the bridge being repaired if broken), and two Divisions could cross rapidly, and by a vigorous offensive these Divisions could compel the enemy to draw troops southwards, and the Divisions could slip back if anything serious turned up in front of them, still holding the line Tewkesbury—Roman Road—Sandhurst, which appears to be good for defence. Considering the present position of the Red Divisions, such a scheme could be carried out with rapidity and probably without very serious opposition, the 1st and 2nd Divisions and the Mounted Brigade being well placed for the purpose.

The pressure being taken off Northland, she could advance; we could then hold the enemy all along the Severn instead of the enemy holding us, and Northland could advance from the north, and we could advance from the south with both our western flanks secured by the Severn. In such a position the enemy could do nothing, and must retire.

Briefly, therefore, I recommend that our object should be first to turn the Malvern position on the south with the 1st and 2nd Divisions.

Second, to move the whole army forward to the Severn.

Third, to force the Severn below Tewkesbury with the 1st and 2nd Divisions, and thus compel the enemy to keep troops to the south, and enable Northland to advance.

Fourth, if the enemy concentrate against us on the Severn before we can execute the above manoeuvre, to let him cross part of his troops and then attack them heavily while in the act of crossing.

Fifth, if, when advancing against the Malvern position, we find that he has been reinforced, to be prepared to occupy our present line, which appears to be strong for defence, keep the enemy in front of us and thus enable Northland to continue his advance.

---

10TH OCTOBER.

In accordance with arrangements made by the Directing Staff, the 10th October was devoted by both sides to reconnaissance, with a view to fixing the exact distribution of the troops and making plans for further action. Eastland's plans are explained in the orders issued that evening, as follows:—

OPERATION ORDERS BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EASTLAND FORCES.

Head-quarters,  
Hopmarket Hotel,  
Worcester,

No. 20.

10th October, 1907.

1. Our position and that of the enemy is as detailed in General Idea and Special Idea (Eastland), dated 9th October, 1907.

2. The Commander-in-Chief will continue the retirement to-morrow to a position, Worcester—Persnore—Bredon Hill, which he intends to occupy.

3. The Cavalry and Mounted Brigades will cover the retirement on their respective flanks.

4. The following are the areas allotted to Divisions in the new position:—

5th Division (in reserve, and responsible for the defence of Worcester) between Worcester and Warndon.

6th Division, from Point 207 on Worcester—Stratford-on-Avon road, along the Oxford, Worcester and Wolverhampton Railway to Norton Station (inclusive).

1st Division from Norton Station (inclusive) to the Avon at Persnore.

5. For the passage of the Severn, road bridges are allotted as follows:—5th Division, Worcester; 6th Division, Upton-on-Severn; 1st Division, Tewkesbury. In addition, the Bridging Train, Army troops, has been ordered to construct a bridge south of Worcester, and one near Tewkesbury for use of 5th and 1st Divisions respectively.

General Officers Commanding Divisions will take any steps they can to supplement the means of crossing the Severn.

6. All 2nd Line Transport and Divisional troops (except Artillery Brigades with their Brigade Ammunition Columns, Imperial Yeomanry squadrons and Royal Engineer companies) must cross the Severn to left bank before midnight, and march to the areas allotted to their Divisions in the positions to be occupied.

7. The remainder of the Divisions, except the rearguards and the Imperial Yeomanry squadrons, must have crossed to the left bank of the river by 4 a.m. At this hour the rearguards on, and to the north and the south of, the Malvern Hills will commence their retirement. They will be covered by the Cavalry, and they will be further covered by their respective Divisions from the left bank of the Severn river.

8. Tewkesbury Bridge will be prepared for demolition by rearguard of the 1st Cavalry Brigade. This Brigade will take up a position on Bredon Hill to cover our left flank.

9. The Commander-in-Chief will be at Worcester.

Copies sent to General Officers, Commanding Cavalry Division, 4th Cavalry Brigade, 1st, 5th, 6th Divisions by Staff Officers in motor cars at 4.30 p.m.

## NOTES ON ABOVE ORDERS.

Paragraph 6.—Impedimenta like 2nd Line Transport and Supply Columns should be sent well to the rear, out of the way, when a battle is imminent.

Paragraph 8.—No one is made responsible for the actual blowing up of the bridge. What bridges are the Cavalry and Mounted Brigades to retire by?

Each division is to furnish its own rearguard to cover its retirement (*see* paragraph 8). In case of attack (which must be expected) there will be no unity of control over the action of these rearguards.

The 5th and 6th Divisions, as placed, will be cramped for room to manœuvre, especially as their impedimenta has not been sent back, and with the town and river in front the Divisions would find it almost impossible to issue for a counter attack on the right bank. If Worcester is attacked the 5th Division must almost inevitably be drawn into its defence and cease to be a reserve. It is presumed that the reason the bridges (excepting that at Tewkesbury) are left standing is with a view to encouraging the enemy to cross in order to fall on him while he is doing so.

Worcester, in front line, does not seem a suitable position for the Commander-in-Chief.

---

*Telegram from Chief of the General Staff, Eastland, Worcester, to the General Officers Commanding, Cavalry Division and Northern Army.*

(No. X 220.)

10th October, 6 p.m.

Reference Operation Order No. 20 of this date, in addition to covering our right you will endeavour to get into touch with the left of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, which covers the left flank of our Northern army south-west of Wolverhampton. The Northland and Westland Cavalry will no doubt endeavour to work in conjunction against you to-morrow. You will note that our Western army will be reinforced at Worcester by the 2nd and 3rd Divisions of our Northern army. These Divisions will move during this night, the Infantry by train and the Artillery by road and rail, so as to reach Worcester by 5 a.m. to-morrow.

I intend to put the 2nd and 3rd Divisions from the Northern army on the west of Worcester, north of Teme, and keep them concealed until a favourable opportunity occurs for their employment. I hope enemy will attack me on Worcester—Pershore position, which would give me an opportunity of delivering great counterstroke with these two Divisions. I should have preferred to hold the strong position on the Malvern Hills now occupied by our rearguards, as the enemy could not have neglected it, but the losses suffered by the Western army compelled me to cross the Severn. If the enemy now attempts to move north without attacking me, I rely upon you to delay him to the utmost of your power to give me time to collect all my troops to attack him.

Addressed General Officer Commanding Cavalry Division, and repeated General Officer Commanding Northern army.

---

NOTE BY DIRECTING STAFF.

No doubt it is intended to say that the Infantry will *begin* to reach Worcester at 5 a.m. to-morrow.

The Artillery coming by road cannot, of course, arrive by 5 a.m.

This was, of course, sent in cipher in view of last paragraph. It should be "repeated" to Northern army.

It would perhaps be better to speak of outposts instead of rearguards on Malvern Hills.

Urgent.

*Telegram from Commander-in-Chief, Eastland Forces, to General Officer Commanding Northern Army, Eastland Forces.*

(No. X 221.)

10th October, 6.15 p.m.

Enough rolling stock has been collected to entrain Field Artillery, including howitzers of 2nd and 3rd Divisions. Please direct these by quickest means at your disposal to entrain as follows :—

Artillery, 2nd Division, at Birmingham; two Brigades at Camp Hill Station; one Brigade and Howitzer Brigade at Snow Hill Station; 3rd Division, Artillery, at Tamworth (North-Western station). Both Divisions will commence to entrain at midnight.

Above was telephoned from Worcester to General Officer Commanding Northern army.

---

NOTE BY DIRECTING STAFF.

Surely this is wrong. The General Officer Commanding Northern army, Eastland Forces, will have a railway staff and will know much more about rolling stock on the spot than the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief on the Severn possibly can.

What the Northern Commander-in-Chief wants to know is where this Artillery is going to, not where it is to entrain, which he will see to.

[N.B.—It was subsequently explained that the reason for the arrangement criticized was that the Director of Railways of the Eastland forces was with the Western army.]

---

*Telegram from the General Officer Commanding 5th Division to the General Officer Commanding, 4th Cavalry Brigade, Eastland Forces.*

(No. X 222.)

10th October, 6.45 p.m.

Send two Brigades Field Artillery, 5th Division, with one squadron Imperial Yeomanry as escort, to march at 8 o'clock to Evesham, *via* Churchill. They will take up favourable position on Bredon Hill by 4 a.m. to-morrow to cover retirement of the 5th and 6th Divisions and 4th Cavalry Brigade. General Officer Commanding 4th Cavalry Brigade will assume command when he arrives at Bredon Hill.

Addressed General Officer Commanding 5th Division, and repeated General Officer Commanding, 4th Cavalry Brigade.

---

NOTE BY DIRECTING STAFF.

Why should not the 1st Division find Artillery for Bredon Hill, which is on its own flank? Surely Bredon Hill will not help the 5th Division while crossing the Severn at Worcester. 4th Cavalry Brigade evidently should read 1st Cavalry Brigade.

---

GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING 2ND DIVISION AND GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING  
3RD DIVISION.

1. Major-General "X," Commanding 2nd Division, will assume command of the 2nd and 3rd Divisions constituting the 1st army.
2. Copies of Operation Orders No. 20 and Telegram X 220 herewith. Commander-in-Chief intends 1st army to take up positions west of Worcester behind River Teme immediately after their arrival. Every effort must be made to keep their presence here secret from the enemy. This cannot be too strongly impressed upon all ranks. The Commander-in-Chief relies upon this army to make a most decisive counterstroke when ordered, if the enemy attacks us on the Worcester—Pershore position. Not a sign of the presence of your force is to be given, even if they are exposed to fire, until the order is received by you from Army Head-quarters.
3. In the event of the Cavalry Division being driven in upon you the necessary measures must, of course, be taken to support them, but even then the enemy should not be allowed to gain any idea of the strength of the force under your orders.
4. If the enemy does not attack us in our position but attempts to move off northwards or westwards, General Officer Commanding 1st army will, on his own initiative, attack him with great boldness to delay him until the Commander-in-Chief is able to bring up the Western (2nd) army to attack him decisively in flank.
5. Positions to be occupied by you will be pointed out on your arrival at Worcester.

*Colonel,  
Chief of the General Staff.*

WORCESTER,  
10th October, 1907. 10.30 p.m.

Copies sent by a Staff Officer to meet General Officers Commanding 2nd and 3rd Divisions on arrival.

Copies sent to General Officers Commanding Cavalry Division, 1st, 5th and 6th Divisions, at 11 p.m., 10th October, by Staff Officer.

Copies sent to General Officer Commanding Cavalry Division and 1st Cavalry Brigade by Staff Officer at 6 a.m., 11th October.

---

It was assumed that the foregoing orders were carried out on the day after issue, and that the resulting situation was then as follows:—

SITUATION OF EASTLAND TROOPS AT 8 P.M. (NOMINALLY ON 11TH OCTOBER).

1. The Divisional Cavalry, Infantry and Artillery of the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions from the north had all arrived by noon on the 11th, had detrained at Worcester and Droitwich, and had taken up the position west of Worcester behind the Teme by 5 p.m. General "X" decided to detrain part of his force at Droitwich owing to confusion in Worcester during the night and early morning between his force and the 5th Division.
2. The 5th, 6th and 1st Divisions reached the position assigned to them in Operation Orders No. 20 on the 11th. The rearguard retired without difficulty and the troops joined the Divisions, leaving an outpost line.
3. The Cavalry Division on the right were pressed back gradually during the 11th to a line Bewdley—Abberley—Martley—Point 85 (5 miles on the Worcester—Bromyard road). At Point 85 they were supported by some Infantry of the 1st army skilfully concealed. Late in the evening they were being outflanked by superior Cavalry in front of Bewdley and were driven out of Abberley by strong columns of

Infantry with guns. They also had to abandon the line between Abberley and Martley owing to the advance of two strong columns from west and south-west.

4. There is certain information that there has been a large force all the 11th at Storridge, 2 miles north-west of Great Malvern.

5. The 1st Cavalry Brigade has been opposed all day by mounted troops east and south of the Malvern Hills and has held its own easily.

6. Hostile Cavalry patrols have approached Gloucester, but they retired when observed.

THE FOLLOWING NARRATIVE WAS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTING STAFF TO THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING WESTLAND AT 6 P.M., 10TH OCTOBER, 1907.

During the afternoon of 10th the Westland Cavalry discover that the enemy is retiring from the position he occupied yesterday.

By 6 p.m. on 10th the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Westland Army, receives reports from Cavalry scouts that all ground is clear of the enemy up to the Severn, except that no scouts can penetrate to within 2 miles of any of the bridges.

On this information the General Officer Commanding Westland was allowed to assume that such movements as he desired to make next day had been carried out. The positions of his troops after those movements are shown in paragraph 4 of the following orders, actually written on the 10th, but nominally on the 11th.

#### OPERATION ORDERS BY GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING WESTLAND FORCES.

Tenbury, 11th October, 1907.

1. The enemy has fallen back across the Severn, but has left small posts on the western bank of the river.

2. The Northland forces which halted to-day are believed to be advancing to-morrow.

3. The actual disposition of the Eastland Forces is at present uncertain.

4. The disposition of our troops to-day is as follows:—

Cavalry Division—Head-quarters, Cleobury Mortimer, and in touch with Northland Cavalry which reached the line Church Stretton—Bridgnorth on the 10th instant. Scouts are watching the line of the River Severn from Hampton to Dunley.

3rd Division at Newnham (3 miles east of Tenbury).

4th Division at Harpley (10 miles south-east of Tenbury).

1st Division at Bromyard Down.

2nd Division at Storridge (3 miles north-west of Great Malvern).

Mounted Brigade at Little Malvern.

Army troops at Tenbury.

5. The river between Stourport and Bushley (3 miles west of Tewkesbury) has been and is being closely watched by mounted troops of the various Divisions of the Mounted Brigade.

6. The General Officer Commanding intends to force the passage of the Severn to-morrow in the neighbourhood of Stourport, but any secondary crossing which may be effected is at once to be made good on the further bank.

7. The crossing will be effected as follows:—

- (a.) The Mounted Brigade will advance at 7 a.m. and endeavour to cross the river at Upton-upon-Severn.
- (b.) The 2nd Division (which has been joined this evening by the Bridging Train and one Balloon company) will move at the same hour on Worcester, and endeavour to effect a crossing there. The Bridging Train is to be employed in throwing a secondary bridge with the object of impressing on the enemy the importance attached to our crossing in this neighbourhood.
- (c.) The points of assembly for the Cavalry Division, 3rd, 4th, and 1st Divisions, will be as follows:—
  - Cavalry Division—Callow Hill (Point 578).
  - 3rd Division—Abberley.
  - 4th Division—Shelsley Beauchamp.
  - 1st Division—Woodbury Hill.
- (d.) Troops are to leave their present bivouacs for these points at 7 a.m.
- (e.) It is of extreme importance that the above movements and dispositions when halted should be concealed from the enemy. The mounted scouts now along the river will not be moved during these operations.
- (f.) The Chief Engineer will arrange for telegraphic communication between the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and the various Divisions, including the Cavalry Division. Wireless telegraphic communication will be established with the Mounted Brigade.

8. The crossing places of the Cavalry Division, 3rd and 4th Divisions, will be as follows:—

- Cavalry Division—Kidderminster Bridge.
- 3rd Division—Stourport.
- 4th Division—Holt Heath.

Orders for the advance of these Divisions on these crossing places will be communicated by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief by cable, but should this means of communication fail all (except as noted in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Order No. 7 above) will advance from their points of assembly at noon.

9. The 1st Division will be held in Army Reserve at Woodbury Hill.

10. The Army troops not otherwise detailed will follow the 3rd Division and halt at Stockton-on-Teme.

11. Reports will be rendered to Woodbury Hill.

Issued to General Officers Commanding Divisions and Mounted Brigade.

---

It will be seen that the arrangements of the opposing Commanders led up to a battle on the following day, in which the Westland Commander hoped to force a passage above Worcester, while the Eastland Commander intended to deliver a decisive counter attack, while his adversary's troops were entangled in the crossing.

This battle, which would really have been fought on Saturday, was discussed on the ground on Friday, a series of tactical situations being put forward by the Directing Staff for solution. As an example of these exercises the following "situations," which were worked out by the Westland officers, are given, together with the Director's remarks on the solutions, which were given verbally on the ground.

## 4TH DIVISION AND CAVALRY.

## FIRST SITUATION.

The attack of 2nd Division on Worcester completely fails.

4th Division receives cable message to move on Holt Heath.

Note down how you, as General Officer Commanding 4th Division, would conduct this advance.

Detail advance guard, and give any special instructions you would give to the Officer Commanding.

## SECOND SITUATION.

Advance guard (1 brigade Infantry, 1 brigade Royal Field Artillery, 1 company Royal Engineers, Divisional squadron) moves forward without opposition, and gains line of Severn. The squadron then reports enemy in strength everywhere on left bank. Officer Commanding advance guard halts his machine gun about Point 223, and sends 1 battalion to Point 172, Shrawley. The vanguard (1 battalion) moves to Holt Heath, and  $\frac{1}{2}$  battalion is detached to Holt. The Officer Commanding rides forward to reconnoitre, finds that it is quite impossible for advance guard, unaided, to force passage, and sends back to General Officer Commanding 4th Division.

At the same time information comes in from 3rd Division that they are stopped everywhere about Stourport.

As General Officer Commanding 4th Division, draw up a scheme for crossing the river.

## THIRD SITUATION.

The enemy are driven back and fall back on Droitwich.

4th Division have got two brigades across and one brigade Royal Field Artillery, when a heavy attack develops from line Elmley—Lovett—Droitwich.

3rd Division, owing to the success of the 4th Division, were about to build a bridge at Stourport when a hostile advance was made against it.

Information was received that the Eastland Army had received large reinforcements from the north.

The General Officer Commanding Westland Army directed the 3rd and 4th Divisions to retire behind the Teme, and to resume this morning's positions. State how you would withdraw your two brigades and Royal Field Artillery Brigade.

---

 REMARKS MADE AT A CONFERENCE HELD AT 9.30 P.M., 11TH OCTOBER, 1907, BY DIRECTOR, WESTLAND FORCES.

I will first recapitulate a few of the points which arose on the ground to-day during the tactical exercise. The first situation dealt with the organization of an advance by an Infantry Division when there was every prospect of meeting the enemy before much ground had been covered. The officers almost unanimously decided to advance the 4th Division in two columns. This had certain advantages in so far that the Division could be moved more rapidly to the front, and could be concentrated in a smaller area than if the advance be made by one road. At the same time it necessitated two advanced guards, each under independent Commanders, and the breaking up of at least two Infantry Brigades.

In some schemes which have been sent in these advanced guards were not commanded by General Officers, the troops composing them belonged to different Brigades, and it is doubtful if unity of action could have resulted when the enemy was met.

It was suggested by some officers that a Division might advance on two roads

with only one advanced guard covering both. This, I think, would be a better arrangement, provided the advance of the columns on each road was adequately protected. With one advanced guard a complete fighting body, such as a Brigade with its proper Commander and staff, who are accustomed to dealing with tactical situations on the ground, is provided, and in my opinion would be able to deal more satisfactorily with any situations which might arise in front.

The distance of the advanced guard from the main body was also discussed. Although "Combined Training" lays down that a General Officer Commanding the main body must tell the advanced guard Commander what distance he is to maintain between his advanced guard and the main body, it is difficult to apply this principle in practice. There is no doubt that the distances would constantly vary, and that great delay would ensue if the Officer Commanding the advanced guard had constantly to send back to the General Officer Commanding the main body when he wished to vary that distance. The distance is really governed entirely by the situation in front of the advanced guard, by the nature of the country, and by the size of the force. For example, in this particular case it would be necessary for the advanced guard of the 4th Division to gain the high ground just west of Holt Heath before the main body began to cross the Teme. Similarly, it would be necessary, if no opposition was met, for the advanced guard to gain the high ground about Ombersley before the main body began to cross at Holt Heath. So that in the first operation the advanced guard would push forward as rapidly as possible, and gain the first-mentioned high ground, and then halt there until the main body had begun to cross the Teme and was approaching Little Witley. The advanced guard would then press forward and gain Point 119.

I think it is only when there is no enemy about that an advanced guard can maintain one fixed distance between itself and the main body. The necessity for reconnaissance of the enemy's movements and for studying the ground in front will mean frequent halts when the advance is in any way opposed by the enemy, even though he may not be very strong.

Some officers discussed the best position for the General Officer Commanding 4th Division during the advance, and it was generally agreed that in the present circumstances it would be better for him to move with the advanced guard, so that he would be on the spot to deal with the situation directly the advanced guard was held up.

There is, however, a matter of human nature which comes into this, and which is worth consideration. There is a great temptation for the General Officer Commanding Division to fight the advanced-guard action. He is apt to become absorbed in the comparatively minor operation of the advanced guard instead of looking ahead and thinking of nothing but how he is going to employ his whole Division in order to carry out the task imposed upon him.

It is hardly possible for an advanced guard Commander to accept responsibility and to carry on his own task without reference to his superior when that superior is riding close behind him.

There is one more point which I should like to bring forward which we did not discuss on the ground to-day, and that is the selection of the officer who is to command the advanced guard. If the Officer Commanding a battalion is selected, he would not have had so much practice as the Officer Commanding the Brigade; he will have no staff with him at a time when an adequate staff is essential for the correct and rapid execution of his design. For myself, if I sent forward two battalions of a Brigade, with a detachment of Artillery, to act as an advanced guard, I should certainly detail the General Officer Commanding the Brigade to command the advanced guard, and I should not leave it to the Battalion Commander who happened to be the senior.

Second  
situation.

The second situation necessitated the forcing of the passage of the River Severn in the face of serious resistance. We dealt with that fully on the ground, and I do not

think there is much more to be said about it. It appears to be absolutely essential to obtain some means of getting pontoons down to the river under cover from view of the enemy, in order to get the first detachment of Infantry across the stream. Fortunately, on this occasion the wood at the bend of the river, where it was decided to force the passage, favoured this operation, otherwise I think that the Division could have been held up on the line of the Severn for a very long time, even by such a small force as one Infantry Brigade.

As regards the third situation, it is usually considered difficult to withdraw a force across the river when pressed by greatly superior hostile force, but personally I do not think that the task in the third situation was so difficult as that in the second. With modern quick-firing rifles, rearguard action, provided the flanks of the rearguard are secure, is not difficult; these flanks would be secured by the River Severn, and the enemy could gain no ground either to the north or to the south whence he could enfilade the detachment left behind to cover the retreat. In these circumstances, the various stages to be taken in the retirement would appear to be—

Firstly.—Get the Artillery to the right bank of the river.

Secondly.—Draw off one Brigade if it is possible to do so, if not, to draw off the reserve battalions of each of the two Brigades, and place the remainder of the troops on the left bank of the river, under the command of one of the Infantry Brigadiers. The Brigade already on the right bank would, of course, at once take up a defensive position to cover the retirement of the remainder, and an adequate force of Artillery would be prepared to bring a very heavy shell fire over the ground evacuated by the last detachment immediately they retired. If necessary, a few guns must be pushed forward even into the Infantry line of defence for the purpose.

The destruction of the bridge by the last detachment will not be an easy task unless the pursuing troops can be held back until it is accomplished, but every effort must be made to destroy it.

As regards the pontoons, it is easy enough. It is only necessary to knock a hole in the bottom of the pontoons and sink them by the weight of the roadway. The trestles, however, are not easy to destroy, though perhaps some Engineer officers here would tell us the best manner of doing it.

The fact that the Severn is quite unfordable would materially assist the operation upon which the 4th Division was engaged. Though the enemy might press the rearguard very heavily up to the Severn, they could come no further, and the pursuing enemy would find it far more difficult to force the passage when held by several Divisions than when we had to force the passage with a convenient re-entrant when the opposite bank was only held by one Brigade.

---

#### REMARKS BY DIRECTOR-IN-CHIEF.

On learning the direction of the Westland attack, the Eastland Commander hurried troops from his left northward, by rail and road, to meet it, from which action it would appear that his original plans had been designed in the belief that the enemy's attack would be made at and below Worcester, and not above that place, as it was.

The Director-in-Chief considers that this sudden change of the Eastland plans would certainly have led to great confusion, especially in such close, cramped country, and with the roads blocked by masses of troops and transport. The movement of *masses* of troops by rail, for short distances, and in the immediate neighbourhood of the enemy, even if possible, is slower and more dangerous than movement by road.

In transferring troops from the Northern to the Western theatre it appears to have been intended to leave behind the "impedimenta" of the troops so transferred. Such a measure may be justifiable under very special circumstances, but it is open to most serious objections. If men are deprived of their second line transport for any time their health is likely to suffer. Troops, deprived of their ordinary sources of supply and medical attention, soon become impotent. They cannot follow up a success or carry out an orderly retreat. Even in a friendly country the arrangements made to supply one division cannot suddenly meet the strain of providing for two, and men left without the necessaries of life for even 24 hours cease to be a fighting force. When troops and their transport are once separated it is generally very hard to bring them together again, and the separation in this case would probably have been disastrous if Eastland had been defeated on the Severn. This tendency to separate troops from their transport and supplies, in order to meet a sudden crisis, is often shown in Staff Rides, but seldom in real warfare where the consequences are more easily realized.

As regards Westland: In the plan he adopted, the Westland Commander doubtless relied on the protection afforded by the Severn to guard him from the danger of counter attack coming from Worcester and below, while he was engaged in forcing a passage higher up. Under the circumstances, and remembering that his move brought him within some 6 hours' march of the positions reached by a great part of the Northland Army 2 days before, it is considered that although there was a risk it was justified. Any attempt by Westland to cross at and below Worcester would have placed the battlefield a day's march, or more, further from Northland and would therefore have given Eastland so much more time to act; while inaction on Westland's part at this crisis might have given Eastland time to throw his weight against Northland.

---

#### FINAL CONFERENCE.

On Saturday, the 12th October, a final conference was held by the Chief of the General Staff, at which all officers attending the Staff Ride were present.

The opposing commanders first explained their views and the reasons for their actions.

The Directors and Assistant Directors then remarked on various points noticed during the operations, and brought forward various suggestions.

The following notes were handed in for consideration :—

#### NOTES FOR GENERAL CONFERENCE.

1. The strategical situation presented by the Ride has been an extraordinarily interesting one, and every officer who has had to prepare an Appreciation on the Eastland side has had a difficult task. The Commanding-in-Chief, Eastland Forces, was confronted by a singularly difficult problem throughout, one which was very awkward even on a Staff Ride and one which no one who took part in the Ride would care to take on in real war.

2. It was noticeable that both sides in the first phase kept a whole brigade of mounted troops on their southern flank where there was very little scope for their use, either tactically or strategically. All that either side would seem to have wanted there was observation. This is, however, a point on which expert opinion might be of great interest to officers present at the conference.

3. Appreciations on the whole were generally sound, but inclined to go into too much detail and not to indicate clearly enough the plan actually recommended. The

reconnaissance work, generally, was good, some of it very good. In some cases, however, it was difficult, owing to the forms in which reports were presented, to extract essential information from them when in a hurry.

4. Rapidity in preparing orders once the situation has been appreciated, should be insisted upon from officers trained to staff work. There is a tendency to depreciate the importance of practice in writing orders; but it is only by practice that an officer can learn to prepare satisfactory orders *rapidly*. Anybody can write out good orders if he only takes long enough over it. Delay, of course, causes inconvenience even on Staff Rides; but it causes infinitely more inconvenience when actually dealing with troops.

5. It has proved very difficult to allot work such as administrative staffs would deal with. Reconnaissance of positions to meet various conditions, road reports, and river reports, entraining and detraining schemes, reports on camps, &c., are easily thought of. But there is a great deal of work of quite a different kind, which the administrative staff has to deal with and on which practical schemes should be set. A book on the conduct of Staff Rides, with examples and suggestions of all kinds, prepared by the General Staff at Head-quarters, would be an immense help to Commanders and to Directing Staffs.

6. This also applies to tactical work on the ground. Only few understand the method on which this is carried out, for instance giving situations and making each Commander say what he would do with his unit. It seems doubtful, however, whether work of this kind is very profitable when done on a large scale, and the work done yesterday afternoon by the Eastland Army cannot have been very instructive to Commanders of divisions, brigades, &c. In any case, it cannot be carried out effectively with only the  $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch maps, unless all concerned know the ground. Tactical work on the ground seems more suitable for Staff Rides, when the troops only cover a small front, Staff Rides on a large scale being reserved for the training of Staff Officers in Staff Duties.

7. In Staff Rides on this scale, where Assistant Directors with Staff Officers to help them are told off to groups, it seems worthy of consideration whether the Directing Staffs should deal with any reconnaissance work, reports and so forth, which Assistant Directors criticise, except when this has been called for by the Commander-in-Chief.

8. This Staff Ride must have been most instructive to the officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps who took part in it, and it seems most desirable that a proportion of them should be included in Staff Rides undertaken by commands, divisions, and districts when the work on the whole is on a smaller scale.

9. Assistant Directors have found it very difficult to get the clerical work through. Clerks, of course, add considerably to the expense, but it seems worthy of consideration whether in Rides of this magnitude each Assistant Director should not have a clerk.

The following remarks were then made by the Director-in-Chief:—

#### STRATEGICAL NOTES.

The original distribution of the Eastland forces, subsequent to the 30th September, was unsound. The only way in which the possibilities of "Interior Lines" can be turned to full account against separated armies advancing to concentrate is by striking vigorously and in the greatest possible strength at one of the hostile armies while merely delaying the other. The proper strength to be devoted to each purpose is chiefly a matter of time and space calculation. The time likely to be required to bring one of the enemies to battle and to complete his overthrow must be carefully

calculated. The force necessary to delay the other hostile army *for a sufficient time* can then be considered, allowing a reasonable margin for safety, but remembering that the stronger one is at the decisive point the more certain will be success, and the more rapidly can it be gained. After defeating one of the separated armies it should be comparatively easy to defeat the other, provided proper precautions are taken to hold off the one originally beaten meanwhile (Waterloo). Or, on occasions, it may be desirable to follow up the beaten army instead of immediately turning on the other, which is unlikely to press on under the circumstances.

It may be open to question whether the first blow in this campaign should have been struck at Northland or at Westland. There are arguments on both sides. But what is certain is that Eastland should have struck hard at one or other while they were far apart; that at least five divisions would have been required at the decisive point to make success reasonably sure; and that one division with, say, one Cavalry brigade and one mounted brigade should have sufficed to delay the other army, and was the very most that should have been allotted to the purpose. However, when the Eastland Commander took over the Eastland forces on the 7th October he had to accept the distribution already made, and to make the best of a bad situation, a situation which reminds us of Moltke's saying that "mistakes in the original concentration of an army can scarcely ever be remedied during the subsequent operations."

In the operations on the 9th October the Eastland forces were rather taken by surprise. Adequate preparations to meet possible attack had not been made, doubtless owing to the short time available for reconnaissance.

In my opinion, the best plan for Eastland at first (*i.e.*, after the 7th October) would have been to transfer two Divisions by rail from one army to the other, as secretly and as rapidly as possible, and while this movement was going on to decline decisive battle in both theatres.

Suppose, for argument's sake, that the decision was to bring down two Divisions from the north. Then, immediately that decision had been formed, all impedimenta of the Western Army of Eastland should have been sent well to the rear. The Divisions should have been quickly withdrawn across the Wye and held ready to dispute its passage if it should seem advisable, later on, to do so. All available Cavalry and mounted troops, supported by a strong rear guard, should have kept in close contact with the enemy and delayed his movement every mile of the way. Possibly, the two reinforcing Divisions would have arrived in time to afford a favourable opportunity of falling on the enemy while he was engaged in crossing the Wye. If not, an opportunity must have been sought for during his advance from the Wye to the Severn.

Plans of this nature are open to argument, and there is always more than one solution. But there are certain general principles on which the success of all plans must depend, and one object of Staff Rides is to illustrate such principles. In connection with the events of the 9th October, the following principles especially stand out:—

- (a.) No force, whatever its size, should be allowed to remain for even an hour within striking distance of an enemy without a clear plan being formed as to the action to be taken in case of attack—such plan being communicated without delay to all concerned.
- (b.) Even if we intend to attack the enemy we should still have a clear plan of defence, and communicate it to all concerned—for we can never be sure that the enemy may not forestall us.  
All troops in contact with the enemy must have clear and definite instructions of what they are to do if attacked.
- (c.) Not only must there be a plan, but every preparation must be made to carry it out should necessity arise.

- (d.) An army within striking distance of an enemy, with a possibility of being engaged with him at any moment, must be careful to see that it has every possible facility for freedom of movement. Its immediate rear must never be blocked by any transport which can be temporarily dispensed with and sent back well out of the way; say, at least, a short march. Where railways are available much use can, and should, be made of them to run up supplies daily to the front, thereby reducing road transport and enabling Supply Parks to be kept back out of the way.
- (e.) Subordinate commanders, failing receipt of orders from higher authority, must themselves make definite plans to meet an unexpected attack, and give instructions to their advanced troops, and they must at once inform their superior and their neighbours of such plans.
- (f.) It is only thus that unity of effort can be ensured, especially in case of surprise. Englishmen, beyond all nations, should understand the advantages of a team playing together, and should be constantly studying how to apply that principle in war. It requires study and thought to know how to do this.

If these principles had been attended to by the Eastland Generals, things would have gone better for them on the 9th October, and they might not have lost the initiative, which they never succeeded in regaining.

Eastland's retreat after the fight of the 9th October would have been a most difficult problem in staff duties. Time and weather did not admit of its being fully worked out, but it is very well worth the while of all officers to consider it after leaving here. It is not only *during* a Staff Ride that we may learn lessons, but, perhaps even more, by ruminating over it all after finishing the Staff Ride.

Turning now to the second phase of the operations. Several officers in their Appreciations argued that at that stage troops should be transferred from the Western to the Northern Army, using the Severn and its tributaries for delaying purposes, and striking at Northland's right (Western) flank. The rivers certainly offered attractive facilities for delaying action, but, I think, under the conditions of the scheme, that it was too late for this, at any rate against the western flank of the Northland Army, and it would have been a desperate enterprise. Place the troops on the map, calculate the time conditions carefully, and I think it will be evident that failure in the proposed plan would mean annihilation, and that the chances of success were not great enough to compensate for the greatness of the risks. There is more to be said in favour of an attempt, at this stage, to mass against Northland's eastern flank, but that course was not suggested.

I think a better plan than that suggested would have been to have placed one Division somewhere a little east of Worcester, with orders to secure Bredon Hill by a detachment and to throw forward a screen to watch the passages from Gloucester to Holt Heath, one of the mounted brigades being attached to the Division to assist in watching this front. All bridges below Worcester to be destroyed. The remainder of the force to be concentrated somewhere about Droitwich and Bromsgrove, and one or two Divisions to be brought down to the same neighbourhood from the Northern Army. The extent to which the Northern Army might be weakened at this crisis would be a matter for careful time calculation.

The Cavalry Division, supported by a mounted brigade, to keep in contact with the enemy to north-west and north of Worcester, covering the bridges at Upper Arley, Bewdley, and Stourport, and falling back by them when compelled.

The object to be kept in view would be to allow, or rather induce, the enemy to cross the river before the Northland Army could arrive, and then to fall on him heavily before he had completed the operation and secured himself on the left bank.

If he crossed on the front Worcester—Stourport the blow would fall on his front and right. If he crossed lower down the blow would fall on his left flank. In any case, Eastland would be well placed to strike if opportunity offered, or to retire behind the Avon if the chances of fighting Westland before Northland could arrive did not seem strong enough. The situation was difficult and dangerous, and this was the most that could be hoped for.

Once Westland had been defeated and thrown back over the Severn, Northland's Army could be dealt with if it waited for the blow, or Westland could be followed up and, perhaps, annihilated, if Northland retired, as would be probable.

It would take too long to discuss all the possibilities of the plan I suggest, but if you will consider it carefully afterwards I am sure you will recognize them. At any rate, it is always essential to have some definite and possible plan of offence, otherwise, it always ends in our conforming to the enemy.

Eastland's Northern Army showed little delaying power, probably less than the Commanding-in-Chief, Eastland, had relied on, but the task of delaying a superior force which acts really boldly and energetically is a very difficult one, unless considerable risk of being drawn into a serious engagement is accepted, and Northland's advance was much assisted by the proximity of the sea, and the consequent facility of drawing supplies from the coast as the army advanced.

The task Westland and Northland had to face was, in some respects, far simpler than that undertaken by the General Officer Commanding Eastland. Purely offensive operations against inferior forces are undoubtedly easier to conduct than are defensive-offensive ones. Given a superiority in each theatre of war, armies on exterior lines have only to push on with the greatest determination and energy, attacking any opposing force, until their junction is assured. Then, if they combine from different directions on the same battlefield, decisive victory is practically certain (Königgrätz). The danger of exterior lines may, however, be great when the enemy's numbers, and time and space considerations, make it possible for one army to be delayed while the other is overwhelmed, and when the enemy is bold and energetic, not willing to merely conform, but likely to seize any opportunity offered. In that case, it may be highly dangerous to attack at once whenever opposition is offered. And yet if this is not done the enemy gains time to manoeuvre and to transfer troops. The separated armies must make every effort to keep in constant communication and to ascertain and exchange information as to what forces seem to be in their respective fronts. They must keep up constant, vigorous, and simultaneous pressure, and only when quite sure that the enemy has massed superior forces in his front should either commander hesitate to attack. When he is so sure, however, he would generally be right to manoeuvre, maintaining close contact and a threatening attitude, but not risking serious defeat, while the other army pushes on as hard as it can.

Armies on exterior lines should always be under one command if possible. The most dangerous form of exterior lines is when the armies are merely allied, under independent commanders, and without absolute unity of interests.

The main strategical plans of Northland and Westland seem to me sound.

#### TACTICAL NOTES.

The Westland plan of attack on the 9th October was good, but the first orders given to the Cavalry to push on to seize a *given line* in front were not wise. In a battle, all available forces of every arm should combine on the battlefield. A study of Lee's

campaigns shows the disastrous results which may be caused by sending Cavalry away on the eve of battle. This point has, however, been thoroughly discussed already by the Director with the Westland forces.

An interesting and important question as regards advanced and rear guards is whether each Division should furnish its own when several Divisions are moving in parallel columns, or whether one general advanced or rear guard, for all the columns, should be provided. The latter, I consider, is usually preferable. It gives the Commander-in-Chief more control and more freedom of manoeuvre.

As an example, consider the advance of the Westland Divisions on the 10th October to the Malvern Hills, which they found held, and consider whether a line of small divisional advanced guards would have been so suitable to the situation as a strategic advanced guard of one complete Division with a proportion of mounted troops, especially in view of the manoeuvres undertaken on the following day. Also consider whether you would have used a rear guard of one complete Division to cover Eastland's retirement from the Wye, or small independent rear guards furnished by each Division.

No doubt when an army is advancing in several columns on a very wide front, independent advanced guards to each column may be almost unavoidable. But it does not seem advisable to adopt such a system when it is possible to avoid it.

As regards Westland's operations on Friday, the advance to attack in a close country of this nature presents a difficult problem. Once the units move forward inter-communication becomes very difficult. Every possible precaution must be taken to facilitate combination and control and to prevent confusion. Fronts of attack must be allotted to the different Divisions, by the map if they cannot be pointed out on the ground. The roads at the disposal of each Division in moving forward must be very carefully told off. The fronts of the Divisions must be covered by advanced guards, but every little column should not have its own advanced guard, as I noticed was advocated by several officers yesterday. Each Division should move in two, or more, columns if suitable roads sufficiently near each other exist; but though one general advanced guard may not be suitable to this situation, at least all the columns of each Division should be covered by one advanced guard, under one Commander.

In Westland's advance yesterday, to force the Severn above Worcester, the normal order of procedure in the preliminary movements would be as follows:—

The mounted troops having pushed on as far as they could get, the advanced guard, or guards, would next come up and secure artillery positions. The guns would then be placed in readiness to open fire, and the main columns would close up into rendezvous positions. The mounted troops when relieved by the advanced guards would draw off to a flank, or pass through the intervals of the troops coming up behind. The next step would be to push forward some Infantry to force the enemy to disclose his position and offer a target to our guns. Further measures would depend a good deal on the situation disclosed by these preliminaries.

In allotting roads for parallel columns it is usually not satisfactory to lay down a straight line from one point to another as the dividing line between columns. I saw this done in some orders during this Ride. With these winding roads the only satisfactory method is to describe the flank roads themselves, saying which unit each is to belong to.

It is important to remember that an obstacle close in front of a defending army is very useful for purely passive defence, but makes counter-attack practically impossible. When decisive counter-attack is meant it is necessary either to draw back in order to strike the enemy just as he has partly crossed, or to fight beyond the obstacle, in which case every possible facility must be provided for recrossing it in case of defeat.

Eastland's task in carrying out a long and trying retreat was a very difficult one. Retreat tries "moral" severely, and Commanders have often been forced to fight

merely to put better heart into their men. It is urgently necessary that all officers should do their utmost to set a good example of patience and cheeriness under such difficulties in order to prevent any serious deterioration of "moral."

#### ADMINISTRATIVE NOTES.

Many interesting administrative problems arose during the Ride, although there was, unfortunately, not always time to work them out fully. In this very hilly and enclosed country the movement of all road transport would be extremely difficult and require much forethought and very careful arrangements. Of course, the more the existing railways could be used to minimise movement of transport by road the better.

Various interesting medical problems have been considered, and notes drawn up by the Royal Army Medical Corps officers with the Eastland Army.

No doubt it is difficult on these Rides, when everyone is working at high pressure on strategical and tactical problems, to find time to think out administrative problems.

Due care for administrative requirements is, however, absolutely essential, and success in this respect requires thought and practice. If the General Staff are to be the brains of the army, as we hope, they must understand the needs of all departments and be always careful to afford the Administrative Staff every help in carrying on its indispensable work.

Useful instruction can be gained by organizing occasional Staff Rides in which practice in such staff work is made a principal object, merely a framework of strategy and tactics being provided, just to hang the other work on.

Meanwhile, on this Ride, many very useful and interesting points have been brought forward for consideration, and the adaptability of War Establishments and various war manuals has been tested. The various points brought forward will be fully considered at the War Office. These Staff Rides are of the greatest use in drawing attention to them.

One final matter I want to mention is that Divisional squadrons are intended primarily to afford the means of keeping up communication between different columns; to furnish patrols to help Infantry advanced, flank, or rear guards, or outposts, to do their scouting work; and to provide the necessary orderlies for Staff Officers, telegraph offices, &c. Duties such as these will absorb practically all the Divisional Cavalry, and it will seldom be possible, or advisable, to take it away from Divisions for any other purposes.

---

The following instructions, which were issued by the Directing Staff, Westland Forces, are printed as an example of the method of organizing tactical exercises on the ground:—

#### WESTLAND.

9th October, 1907.

#### *Tactical work on the ground.*

Assistant Director, 1st Division,

In accordance with the orders of the Westland Commander-in-Chief, the 1st Division will carry out its holding attack eastwards. The north flank of attack of the 1st Division will be, roughly, from just north of Skirrid Fawr to Llanfair Green Church. The south flank of the attack will be along a line drawn from Point 273 (south-west of Llanvapley) to Point 225 (2½ miles west of Rockfield Church). This line marks the general northern limit of the attack of the 2nd Division.

You are requested to issue definite situations to your officers from time to time in accordance with the following scheme :—

- (a.) At first it will be difficult for the Division to advance at all with the ground about Point 884 still held by the enemy. At the same time it may be possible to push forward part of the Division to attack some ground which is not under Artillery fire from Point 884, and thus facilitate the advance of the 2nd Division on the right of 1st Division, which is also making a holding attack.
- (b.) Having decided on the best course of action, as above, the General Officer Commanding 1st Division can then write his orders for an attack on some point which he decides to carry to facilitate the successful prosecution of the Westland Commander's plan.
- (c.) The details of this attack can be worked out on the ground, special attention being paid to the selection of Artillery positions, the method of deployment, the support of one part of the Infantry by covering fire from another part.
- (d.) Having gained this position (whatever it may be) the General Officer Commanding 1st Division will naturally wait till Point 884 is carried by the 4th and 3rd Divisions. Meanwhile you can get the officers to decide how they would hold the position gained and what movements of Artillery or Reserves would be made.
- (e.) When you consider that sufficient time has elapsed to enable the 4th and 3rd Divisions to carry Point 884, you can inform the officers that this has been gained, and give them any information about the 2nd Division on your right which you consider fit. The General Officer Commanding 1st Division must then decide what he proposes to do. If he wishes to send back to the Commander-in-Chief, Westland Army, you should act for that officer, and probably the reply of the Commander-in-Chief would be to do what he (the General Officer Commanding 1st Division) thinks best, but in any case to continue to attack the enemy. This will furnish another exercise in which probably the whole Division will be employed.
- (f.) The intentions of the Eastland Commander are forwarded herewith and you can yourself decide, and inform the officers, what they would know in real war of the enemy's positions and movements from time to time as the various situations you give them develop.

8th October, 1907.

---

The following is an example of evening work done during the Staff Ride :—

EXERCISE FOR OFFICERS, 3RD DIVISION.

Describe in narrative form the arrangements which the Head-quarters of the Division would have to make on the afternoon and evening of 9th October, stating which officers would deal with the various points, and what points would be mentioned in orders.

The following imaginary information may be assumed:—

The enemy commenced to retreat at 3 p.m. By nightfall Head-quarters of 3rd<sup>2</sup> Division had reached Llancillo, the leading troops being in touch with the enemy at Pontrilas.

Army Orders direct 3rd and 4th Divisions (3rd leading) on Hereford, 1st Division on King's Cople. The enemy's mounted troops are retiring rapidly on Hereford. Our Cavalry Division is also moving towards Hereford.

The enemy has consumed or removed all supplies.

The proportion of killed and wounded may be taken as on page 56 of "Staff Ride in May." The total of killed and wounded being about 10 per cent.

About 50 per cent. of 1st line ammunition has been expended and replaced from Brigade Ammunition Columns, which have not yet been refilled.

The following is the solution of the above problem, which was handed in:—

G.O.C., R.A.

Brigade and Battery Ammunition Columns return at once to Abergavenny and fill up direct from the Ordnance Depôt.

Deal with returns of ammunition expended.

NOTE.—Supply is from rear to front. Brigade Ammunition Columns must be ready to march, and the Divisional Ammunition Columns should send up what is required. The latter march a day in rear of the Division.

O.C., A.S.C.

Divisional Transport and Supply Column, after issuing supplies to units, will return to Abergavenny and refill direct from the Supply Depôt.

The Divisional Transport and Supply Park will remain full.

NOTE.—The same applies here. The Transport and Supply Park will march a day after the Division and will have time to fill up and start full.

D.A.Q.M.G.

Arrange for replacement of casualties among horses. (From Remount Depôt in Abergavenny.)

Choose position of bivouac for the night.

A.M.O.

Estimated casualties—Total, 1,900. Killed, 380. Wounded—unable to be moved, 76; able to walk, 304; to be provided with sitting accommodation, 912; to be provided with lying accommodation, 228.

Arrange for two tent sections to remain for the care of those wounded unable to move. Arrange for the supply of these.

Arrange for transport of remainder of wounded to Llanfihangel Station and for trains to take them to hospitals in Abergavenny. Inform Abergavenny of time of arrival so that reception and accommodation may be arranged.

NOTE.—Only 30 ambulances are available, so each ambulance will have to make four or five trips, or extra transport will have to be arranged for. Meanwhile the wounded will be in the tent divisions.

Chaplain.

Arrange for burial services. If no chaplain, then D.A.Q.M.G.

General Staff.

Select outpost line.

Prepare orders for next day's advance.

Pick up any cable laid during the day.

C R.E.

Replace tools and stores expended by the Ordnance Depot in Abergavenny.

*Commanding Officer of Divisional Telegraph Company should do this without waiting for orders.*

Report of casualties.

D.A.A.G.

Arrange for disposal of wounded horses.

A.V.O.

*Commanding 3rd Division.*

NEWPORT,

9th October, 1907, 10.50 p.m.

MEMORANDA AND ORDERS SHOWING SOME OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE  
WORK DONE BY THE HEAD-QUARTERS STAFF, WESTERN ARMY,  
EASTLAND.

Secret.

WESTERN ARMY (EASTLAND).

The Administrative Staff will prepare tentative proposals for the evacuation of the Supply Depot at Ross, should such a step become necessary. To be submitted on 8th instant.

HEAD-QUARTERS, HEREFORD,

7th October, 1907.

In accordance with the above instructions the following was handed in :—

Secret.

PROPOSALS for the evacuation of Supplies at Ross in the event of a retirement from position on 7th and 8th October being ordered.

By 6 a.m., 8th October, 3 days' supplies for the whole force had been collected at Ross, in the Supply Depot there, amounting in all to 900 tons, and arrangements made with G.O.C. Lines of Communication that a day's supply (300 tons) should be forwarded each day from the Advanced Depot (Gloucester) to replace issues. This will keep the weight of supplies to be evacuated, in the event of orders to that effect being given, to 900 tons on any date.

One-third of the Supply Parks wagons (one section in each Park) will either be empty or containing one third of the 900 tons (300 tons), leaving 600 tons to be carried by other means. The Supply Depot is alongside the railway station, and it is estimated the whole 600 tons could be loaded within 12 hours on trains which the Director of Railways holds in readiness for the purpose. To facilitate evacuation, orders have been given that trains of supplies arriving on and after the 8th October shall not be off-loaded. The Supply Parks can draw direct from the railway wagons, and, if evacuation be ordered after the 10th, no loading of trucks will have to be done.

At the earliest intimation that evacuation is probable, "secret" instructions will be telegraphed to General Officer Commanding Lines of Communication to forthwith discontinue sending forward supplies.

HEAD-QUARTERS, HEREFORD,

8th October, 1907.

## WESTERN ARMY (EASTLAND).

The Administrative Staff will furnish on 8th instant to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief a memorandum explanatory of the system of supplies of the Western Army.

HEAD-QUARTERS, EASTLAND, MONMOUTH,  
7th October, 1907.

In accordance with the above instructions the following was handed in:—

MEMORANDUM on Supplies for Western Army (Eastland), 7th—8th October, 1907.  
(Drawn up by Administrative Staff, Army Head-quarters.)

The Advanced Depôt on the Lines of Communication has now been established at Gloucester. For the supply of the Army operating west of Ross a Supply Depôt has been formed there in close proximity to the railway station. To it supplies have been pushed forward from Gloucester by railway; the line is a single one, but its carrying capacity is sufficient for the purpose. Additional sidings and platforms required in the station are in process of construction, and if time admits, a siding will be run into the Supply Depôt.

The Supply Parks have filled up at Ross, and will be pushed forward to meet the respective Supply Columns to the following points:—

5th Division.—By Ross—last H in Michaelchurch—M in Michaelchurch—  
Pontrilas road to cross roads, Point 247, 1 mile north of St. Weonard.

6th Division.—By the Ross—Peterstow—Skenfreth road to cross roads at  
Point 213, about a mile west of Broad Oak.

1st Division.—To Monmouth.

Provision has been made for Cavalry Brigade Supply Column, and small detached units, Army troops, to fill up at nearest Supply Park.

The Supply Column of the Army troops has been distributed between its units *pro rata*.

A subsidiary Supply Depôt has been formed at Hereford for the troops there and the 4th Cavalry Brigade and two Mounted Brigades on the right flank (Llanfihangel—Nant—Melan), in which 3 days' supply purchased in the country has been stored. The Hereford Supply Depôt will be replenished by Ross so long as necessary.

The Mounted Brigades arrived at Llanfihangel on the night of the 7th with 2 days' supplies (until mid-day on the 9th). During the night of the 7th—8th, supplies to fill up their Supply Column have been forwarded from Hereford by railway (Hereford—Leominster—New Radnor, which is intact) to New Radnor Station, where they will be available at 8 a.m. on the 8th. This will be repeated nightly so long as the Supply Columns are within reach of New Radnor. Similarly supplies will be forwarded from Hereford by train to Hay for 4th Cavalry Brigade.

By 6 a.m. on the 8th October, 3 days' supplies for the whole force have been collected at Ross; this, pending the result of reconnaissance on the 9th, is as much as it is deemed desirable to bring so far to the front. A plentiful supply of cattle has been obtained in the country, and sufficient hay, supplemented by grazing, to last until mid-day, 10th, has been found.

On the night of the 4th—5th October, the Bakery Detachments of the Supply Parks were ordered up to Ross. Field ovens were established, and baking commenced on the 5th; biscuit was issued to the troops on the 7th, consequently, by 10 p.m. on the 8th, 2 days' bread will be in hand, lasting until the first meal on the 11th.

The capacity of the Field Bakery is 67,500 lbs. per day.  
The total daily weight of supplies for the whole force, including forage (oats only), is approximately 296 tons, say 300 tons.

The General Officer Commanding Lines of Communication has been directed to forward 300 tons daily until further orders from the Advanced Depôt to replace issues.

All references to 4 miles to an inch, Ordnance Survey Map No. 14.

*Colonel,  
Administrative Staff, Eastland.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, HEREFORD,  
8th October, 1907.

---

Commander-in-Chief, Eastland Forces,

Please let your Administrative Staff prepare a memorandum, giving each Division and each Cavalry and Mounted Brigade information as to supply arrangements.

*Director, Eastland.*

“BEAUFORT ARMS HOTEL,” MONMOUTH,  
8th October, 1907.

---

In accordance with the above the following memorandum was handed in :—

WESTERN ARMY, EASTLAND, 8TH OCTOBER, 1907.

*Memorandum.*

(Reference to Ordnance Map No. 14, 4 miles to the inch.)

*Lines of Communication and of Supply.*

1. The Advanced Depôt on the Lines of Communication is at Gloucester, the Base Depôt at London.
2. A Supply Depôt has been formed at Ross for the supply of troops west of that place.
3. A subsidiary Supply Depôt has been established at Hereford for the supply of troops there, for the two Mounted Brigades now at Llanfihangel—Nant—Melan, and the 4th Cavalry Brigade at Hay.
4. The Supply Parks of the 5th, 6th, and 1st Divisions will, until further orders, fill up at Ross and proceed to meet the supply wagons of their respective Supply and Transport Columns as under :—
  - 5th Division.—At cross roads, Point 247 (1 mile north of St. Weonard) on road Ross—last h of Michaelchurch—M of Michaelchurch—Pontilas road. To be clear of Ross by 5 a.m.
  - 6th Division.—At cross roads, Point 213, about a mile east of Broad Oak on Ross—Peterstow—Skenfreth road. To be clear of Ross by 7 a.m.
  - 1st Division.—At Monmouth at 7 a.m.

(N.B.—Times are given to prevent risk of blocking roads.)
5. Provision has been made to fill up the supply wagons of the Cavalry Divisional troops and 1st Cavalry Brigade from the 1st Division Supply Park.

6. Supplies from Hereford to fill up the supply wagons, Transport and Supply Columns, of the two Mounted Brigades, now at Llanfihangel, will, until further orders, be available at New Radnor Railway Station at 8 a.m. each day.

Similarly, supplies for the 2nd Cavalry Brigade will be available at 8 a.m. each day at Hay Railway Station.

7. The supply wagons of the small detached units, Army troops, will be filled up by the nearest Supply Park.

8. The Transport and Supply Column, Army troops, has been divided *pro rata* among the various units.

Colonel,  
*Administrative Staff, Eastland Army.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, HEREFORD,  
8th October, 1907.

REMARKS BY DIRECTOR, EASTLAND FORCES.

1. It appears from the report on the railway arrangements which has been drawn up that all supplies are sent up by rail to Ross. It is, therefore, not quite clear how your supplies are to get to Hereford and other points.

2. The distribution of the Cavalry Divisional troops is not very clear, but from page 9 of the Report on the May Staff Ride there appears to be a considerable portion of them with the 4th Cavalry Brigade. Should not the supplies for this portion go with those for the 4th Cavalry Brigade?

3. A clear and thorough memorandum.

“BEAUFORT ARMS HOTEL,” MONMOUTH,  
9th October, 1907.

REMARKS BY DIRECTOR IN CHIEF.

I am not clear that sufficient use has been made of the railway (Hereford—Abergavenny) to supply the Division at Llaneillo. The points selected for Supply Parks are in very hilly country, where the roads are very narrow in places, and I think difficulties would arise, especially between Broad Oak and Shentorth.

9th October, 1907.

The following are some of the orders, &c., issued by the Quarter-Master-General, Eastland Forces, during the operations on the 9th October:—

*From the Commander-in-Chief, Eastland Forces, to Head-quarters, Lines of Communication.*

(Telegram.)  
(No. 33.)

Engagement proceeding. Clear hospitals on Lines of Communication to base.

*Quarter-Master-General.*

Sent at 9 a.m., 9th October, 1907.

*From Commander-in-Chief, Eastland Forces, to Head-quarters, 5th Division, Cavalry Division, 4th Cavalry Brigade and two Mounted Brigades.*

(Telegram.)  
(No. 34.)

Supply wagons of your Transport and Supply Column will fill up to-night from Supply Depôt, Hereford.

*Quarter-Master-General.*

One copy each sent at 12.30 p.m., 9th October, 1907.

---

*From Commander-in-Chief, Eastland Forces, to Head-quarters, 6th Division, 1st Division and 1st Cavalry Brigade.*

(Telegram.)  
(No. 35.)

Supply wagons of your Transport and Supply Columns will fill up to-night from Supply Depôt at Ross. All empty supply wagons going to Ross to be placed at disposal of medical authorities for removal of wounded.

*Quarter-Master-General.*

One copy to each of above sent at 12.30 p.m., 9th October, 1907.

---

*From Director of Supplies (Western Army), to Officers Commanding Supply Parks, 1st Division, 5th Division and 6th Division.*

(Telegram.)  
(No. 107.)

Fill up 2 days' supply at Supply Depôt, Ross, and immediately push on to Worcester with all despatch. Park east of Worcester clear of the town and wait orders.

*Director of Supplies.*

One copy to each sent at 12.30 p.m., 9th October, 1907.

---

(Secret.)

*From Commander-in-Chief, Eastland Forces, to Head-quarters, Lines of Communication.*

(Telegram.)  
(No. 36, decipher.)

Cease at once forwarding supplies to Ross. Make arrangements for probable change of Advanced Depôt from Gloucester to Evesham, with line of communication through Oxford. Stores, supplies, &c., at Gloucester to be put on train for immediate transfer to Evesham on receipt of orders. Events may later necessitate withdrawal of Advanced Depôt to Chipping-Camden. Stationary Hospital (No. 3) at Gloucester to remain open.

*Quarter-Master-General.*

Sent at 12.30 p.m., 9th October, 1907.

---

*From Commander-in-Chief, Eastland Forces, to Head-quarters, Lines of Communication.*

(Telegram.)  
(No. 37.)

Reference my telegram No. 36 of to-day. The Advanced Depôt is to be transferred to Evesham with all expedition.

Supply Parks will fill there on Saturday, 12th.

*Quarter-Master-General.*

Sent at 3 p.m., 9th October, 1907.

---

*From Commander-in-Chief, Eastland Forces, to Head-quarters, 1st Division, 5th Division and 6th Division.*

(Telegram.)  
(No. 38.)

Your Supply Park has been ordered to fill up 2 days' supplies at Supply Depôt at Ross, and then immediately to push forward to Worcester.

*Quarter-Master-General.*

One copy sent to each at 3.30 p.m., 9th October, 1907.

---

*From the Commander-in-Chief, Eastland Forces, to General Officer Commanding Lines of Communication.*

(Telegram.)  
(No. 39.)

Reference my telegrams No. 36 and No. 37 to-day. Circumstances have arisen obliging Advanced Depôt to be now fixed at Banbury, not Evesham. Line of communication through Oxford. Instructions regarding Evesham in telegram No. 36 to hold good for Banbury. Change to be made with utmost despatch. A Supply Depôt will be formed at Stratford-on-Avon, to which supplies must be pushed forward by rail from Banbury to fill Supply Parks on 12th. Detail personnel for this to proceed to Stratford-on-Avon at once.

*Quarter-Master-General.*

Sent at 7.30 p.m., 9th October, 1907.

---

MEMORANDUM on Lines of Communication and Supply on the assumption that General Officer Commanding-in-Chief considers Gloucester unsuitable as an advanced base for present situation (drawn up by the Administrative Staff, Eastland Forces).

At 12 noon on the 9th instant the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastland, made up his mind that the Western Army would retire in the general direction of the line Worcester—Gloucester. Orders were at once sent to the General Officer Commanding Lines of Communication to be prepared to abandon Gloucester as the Advanced Depôt, and to change the lines of communication.

At 7.30 p.m. definite orders were sent him to establish lines of communication through Oxford with Advanced Depôt at Banbury (*vide* copy of telegram attached marked X); a Supply Depôt to be formed in front of the Advanced Depôt at Stratford-on-Avon.

It is estimated that in 36 hours the 3 days' supplies, about 1,000 tons, maintained at Gloucester, would be loaded and transferred to Banbury, and in 12 hours more 300 tons, a day's supply for the Western Army, pushed on to Stratford-on-Avon. It is desirable to increase the stock at Stratford-on-Avon to 2 days' supply as soon as possible, and to maintain it at this figure with three additional days at Banbury. The Supply Parks will fill up at Stratford-on-Avon.

On the evening of the 9th the troops had 4 days' (beginning from the issue on the 10th) supplies in wagons, viz., 1 day in regimental wagons, 1 day in Supply and Transport Columns, and 2 days in Supply Parks, the depôts at Hereford and Ross being cleared by the two last.

This carried them on to the day after that on which the Supply Parks could replenish the Supply and Transport Columns with supplies drawn from Stratford-on-Avon, and ensured a certainty of supply.

In addition, the country along the line of march and in its vicinity is peculiarly rich, and has only to a small extent been drawn on, and towns are numerous. It must be assumed that purchases have been made, and the resources of the Transport and Supply Columns and Supply Parks have thereby been relieved to the extent of one-half during the retirement.

The situation now is: The Western Army is placed, as specified, in the General and Special Ideas of the "Situation to be dealt with on Thursday and Friday." The head of the lines of communication "Advanced Depôt" is at Banbury. A Supply Depôt in front of the Advanced Depôt has been formed at Stratford-on-Avon, in which there are 2 days' supply. The depôt is in the goods station yard, and supplies are left on the truck, bringing them from Banbury in case events require a sudden withdrawal. There is no difficulty in loading the Supply Parks direct from the trucks.

The General Officers Commanding the 5th, 6th, and 1st Divisions will direct their Supply Parks, replenished at Stratford-on-Avon, to places convenient for the Supply and Transport Columns to meet them. The 4th Cavalry Brigade and two brigades Mounted Troops are provided for by purchases in and round Kidderminster under Cavalry Division arrangements, and their Supply and Transport Columns are full.

The 1st Cavalry Brigade is similarly provided for by purchases in Cheltenham and Gloucester under Brigade arrangements. These supplies are brought by road to Newent and junction of roads  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile north-east of Huntley Hill. Civilian transport and labour has been organized for this; no rolling stock available on railway.

Army troops Transport and Supply Column wagons draw from nearest Supply Park to the various units. The Infantry of two Divisions of the Northern Army (now 1st Army) will reach the neighbourhood of Worcester during the night, followed soon after by the remainder of the Divisions.

It is assumed these troops will arrive with 1 day's rations in their possession, but to guard against any mistake the following arrangements are made:—

One train with supplies, Banbury to Henwick Station, just west of Worcester, to arrive at 8 p.m. to-day.

Two trains with supplies, Banbury to Norton Junction, to arrive at 9 and 9.30 p.m. to-day.

The Director of Railways has arranged these trains.

Unloading parties of civilians have been organized and hired transport to convey the supplies to where they may be wanted somewhere west of Worcester, but not to move until the roads are clear of retiring troops.

*Colonel,  
Administrative Staff, Eastland.*

10th October, 1907.

## REMARKS BY DIRECTOR, EASTLAND FORCES.

Good work, but, considering the state of affairs, I do not think much reliance could have been placed on local supplies, except in the case of hay and oats.

---

THE FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM WORK SENT IN BY THE ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL CORPS OFFICERS ON THE STAFF RIDE.

Medical arrange-  
ments.

Appreciation of the Eastland situation from the point of view of the requisite medical arrangements:—

1. The main object is to remove the sick and wounded as rapidly as possible from the front, so as to facilitate the mobility of the fighting force.

2. For this purpose the large number of railways available for evacuation towards the base hospitals is an important factor. Their existence will, to a large extent, render unnecessary the establishment of general and stationary hospitals on the lines of communication, a condition also favourably affected by the shortness of the lines of communication. This will render possible the transfer of the wounded directly from the clearing hospitals to the base hospitals, without any intermediate stages, by means of ambulance, or ordinary corridor trains, which can be readily made suitable for sick transport.

3. There are six ambulance trains available for the forces in the field, one for each Division. In each of these, after an action, 100 lying-down, cases can be at once railed to the base from the clearing hospitals. In addition, I propose to requisition for corridor trains (probably two for each Division) to remove sitting-up cases from the clearing hospital to the base. Each train should be capable of removing some 250 to 300 sick.

4. In dealing with the sick and wounded of a force in the field, however, the fact should not be overlooked that there is a certain percentage suffering from trivial ailments, who will be fit to rejoin their units in a short time, and whom it may be advisable to keep at the front. For the purpose of relieving the field units of these cases, I propose to establish stationary hospitals close to the front. These hospitals are not intended to treat serious cases; their function is to retain and treat only such cases as are likely to be efficient in 1 week, and to forward all other cases to the base.

5. Each Division will have one of these stationary hospitals (though a stationary hospital has been allotted to each Division, the sick from any Division will be sent to the nearest stationary hospital) close to the head of their lines of communication, and as they will, if possible, be placed in populous centres, their tents should be kept packed in the wagons, and public and other suitable buildings used to accommodate the sick. They will be capable of expansion, if required, by requisition on local resources. They will accommodate 1 per cent. of the troops at the front. There is no reason why the stationary hospitals, if suitably situated close to the field ambulances, should not after an action perform the duties of clearing hospitals.

6. In the event of an action being imminent, all sick with the field ambulances will be transferred to these hospitals prior to the field ambulances accompanying their Divisions.

7. There are six clearing hospitals available, one for each Division. They should be kept on rail conveniently near the head of the lines of communication, preferably at junctions, so that they can be railed up at once to the nearest point at which the field ambulances will open after an action. As in the case of the stationary hospitals, they

should seldom require to pitch tents, which should be kept packed in their wagons, and only such stores as are necessary should be unpacked. After they have opened, the field ambulances will evacuate their sick into them as rapidly as possible, and by means of the ambulance trains the clearing hospitals will evacuate all serious cases directly to the base in the following order :—

- (1.) The most serious cases (lying-down cases).
- (2.) Less serious cases (sitting-up cases).

Slight cases, likely to be well within a week, will not be transferred to the base, but treated at the stationary hospitals.

8. After an action the sick and wounded, who are unfit for transport, will be looked after by the field ambulances and clearing hospitals until a further advance or retreat is ordered, when they will be left where they are (if possible, under the care of the civil practitioners in the neighbourhood).

9. The field ambulances should only pitch their tents when the accommodation of villages near the seat of action is insufficient. This will enhance their mobility.

10. All sick from the seat of war will be railed direct to London, unless otherwise ordered, where accommodation should in the first instance be arranged for 3,000 casualties, and where the Deputy-Assistant Director-General or a special staff should be available for dealing with their transfer to the other base hospitals, viz., Netley, Woolwich, Aldershot, Portsmouth, Colchester, Devonport, and Shorncliffe.\* The Administrative Medical Officers in whose districts these hospitals are situated will make arrangements to transfer their local sick to the smaller hospitals in their districts. These hospitals are also capable of expansion by the construction of huts. Further accommodation for the sick will be supplied as required. Birmingham, from its situation in relation to the Western and Northern forces, will later probably become the centre of a large general hospital. It is considered that sick accommodation for from 6 to 7 per cent. of the forces should suffice in view of the favourable conditions present for rapid evacuation. Invaliding will only take place at the base hospitals.

Refreshment stations, under the management of the Red Cross Society, will be available at intervals of 3 hours' journey, at large stations, for the refreshment of sick passing towards the base; but with a rapid train service there should not be much necessity for using them.

In arranging for the sick accommodation in ambulance trains, stationary hospitals, and clearing hospitals, the proportion required for a Division is given. As these are lines of communication units they do not belong to any particular Division, but will be available for the nearest troops. Their positions should be arranged so that they can utilize as many lines of railway as are available.

---

#### WESTERN AREA.

##### *Theatre of War.*

In both theatres the position of the Medical units must depend on the position of the troops to which they are allotted.

In the Western theatre, on 7th October, the position of the various troops, as

---

\* The cases are not by the above necessity intended to be detained at London, but the staff there will give orders, say, for sick trains to go direct to Netley, &c.

stated in the special Eastland information, will govern the position of the field medical units. The position of the field ambulances will, therefore, be as follows:—

Three field ambulances, 5th Division, about Pontrilas and Llanello.

Three field ambulances, 6th Division, about Skenfreth.

Two field ambulances, 1st Division (less Brigade), at Llantilio Crosseny.

One field ambulance for Brigade detached from 1st Division, Dingestow.

One Cavalry field ambulance will be with the main body of the Cavalry, extended from Builth to Waun Fach.

One Cavalry field ambulance, 1st Cavalry Brigade, at Llandenny.

The two Mounted Brigades will each have a Cavalry field ambulance with them.

The clearing hospital for the 5th Division will be at Hereford, for the 6th Division at Ross, and for the 1st Division at Monmouth.

The stationary hospitals will be situated as follows:—

For the 5th Division at Hereford; good communication by both rail and road is available (distance 12 miles).

For the 6th Division at Ross; a good road (Abergavenny—Ross) is available (distance 10 miles).

For the 1st Division at Monmouth; communication by the Abergavenny—Monmouth road for the two Brigades at Llantilio Crosseny (distance 7 miles), and by adjacent railway for Brigade at Dingestow (distance 4 miles).

---

#### NORTHERN AREA.

The field ambulances will be with their Divisions. One Cavalry field ambulance with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade and 1 Cavalry field ambulance with the 3rd Cavalry Brigade. Clearing hospitals will be placed conveniently on rail near the head of the lines of communication, one for each Division.

One stationary hospital for each Division:—

One situated at Chesterfield for 3rd Division. No. 4.

„ Buxton for 2nd Division. No. 5.

„ Macclesfield for 4th Division. No. 6.

J. S. DAVIDSON, *Lieut.-Colonel,*  
*Royal Army Medical Corps.*

7th October, 1907.

---

#### NOTES on the Medical appreciation of the situation submitted by the Director of Medical Services, Eastland.

The arrangements made for the evacuation of the sick and wounded to the base are, on the whole, excellent.

Some of the suggestions, however, appear to be open to criticism—

3. It scarcely seems necessary to requisition for corridor trains when there are six ambulance trains available for the transfer of serious cases.

Getting corridor trains up to the clearing hospitals would hamper other railway movements. “Sitting-up” patients can quite well travel to the base in ordinary trains, as arrangements can be made to feed and attend to them at the larger railway stations.

4. Patients who are likely to recover within a week should all be sent to the base. The journey only takes from 6 to 12 hours.

The housing and feeding of these men at the front takes up accommodation and supplies that can be expended to greater advantage on patients who are unfit for

removal. In the event of a retreat, moreover, these soldiers would be liable to capture.

5. A stationary hospital cannot take the place of a clearing hospital. The latter is adapted for moving at short notice and, if necessary, to places off the railway line. It has no nursing sisters. In all probability stationary hospitals would not be required, as the patients who are unfit for removal to the base would be treated in civil hospitals.

7. The clearing hospitals should always be within easy reach of the field ambulances. The ordinary sick have to be removed from the field ambulances to the clearing hospitals, even when there is no fighting.

The clearing hospital at Hereford is 12 miles by rail from the 5th Division and the clearing hospital at Ross is 10 miles by road from the 6th Division. Some indications should be given as to how this gap is bridged over.

Who has the medical care of the sick between the field ambulances and the clearing hospitals?

8. The field ambulance personnel should be free to move at any moment, and, therefore, they should not have to attend to patients who must be left behind. This duty should be taken over by the clearing hospital or by civil medical practitioner.

10. Railing all patients to London would be very inconvenient. The railway lines near London would be fully taken up with other traffic. The ambulance trains can quite well proceed direct to the military hospitals mentioned.

No mention is made of reports having been called for from Medical Officers of Health regarding the prevalence of infectious disease among the civil population in the theatre of war. This information would have been most useful, especially as regards the billeting of troops.

A. F. RUSSELL, *Lieut.-Colonel, R.A.M.C.,*  
*Attached to Directing Staff, Eastland.*

“BEAUFORT ARMS HOTEL,” MONMOUTH,  
9th October, 1907.

*Notes by Directing Staff.*

The arrangements for dealing with the casualties in the action of the 9th October, 1907, were as follows:—

*5th Division.*

Three dressing stations were opened at Pontrilas to deal with casualties coming from this Division. Thirty ambulance wagons of the three field ambulances attached to this Division were with their dressing stations.

One ambulance and two troop trains which had been ordered arrived at Pontrilas Junction at 10.30 a.m.

The tent divisions of these field ambulances were left at Kenderchurch. Sufficient of the personnel of these tent divisions were detailed to proceed to Pontrilas for the purpose of loading sick direct into the trains as they arrived from the dressing stations.

Casualties were loaded into the trains as they were dealt with at the dressing stations.

The cases were chiefly those who were slightly wounded and made their own way to the dressing stations.

It was found impossible to remove any wounded from the field while the engagement was proceeding on account of the severity of the enemy's fire.

Railway trains in an advanced position generally attract heavy artillery fire.

Is it sound—

(1) To open 3 bearer division dressing stations at the same place, on presumably a wide front of fighting?

(2) To bring L. of C. units, such as ambulance trains, in advance of the tent division?

(3) To send men of the tent division to load trains, especially when only slight cases able to walk went into them?

Field ambulances or ambulance wagons?

At 1.30 p.m. the Division was ordered to retire, and the dressing stations, wounded on the field, and the ambulances were abandoned to the enemy.

On account of this retirement it is impossible to give the details asked for in "Medical Arrangements" of 8th October, 1907. The number of wounded fit to walk who were entrained = 336.

The ambulance and troop trains, although under shell fire, were got safely away.

#### 6th Division.

The field ambulance attached to the 18th Brigade opened a dressing station at Cross Ash, the tent division being stationed at Skenfreth. The remarks made as to the difficulty experienced in removing wounded for the 5th Division apply equally to the 6th Division.

By 1.30 p.m. the Brigade had lost one-fourth of its numbers and was ordered to retire, the wounded on the field were left to the enemy, with the exception of those fit to walk, who were brought back in ambulance wagons and empty G.S. wagons, and roughly amounted to 172. The dressing station was captured by the enemy, the tent division being some distance in rear, was successfully removed.

Why till midnight only? When was it opened? When did wounded begin to arrive at it? If it closed at midnight, how did it evacuate the patients, and where to?

For the reception of the wounded from this Division, No. 2 Clearing Hospital was opened at Ross and remained open till midnight.

#### 1st Division.

The arrangements for this Division were as follows:—

A dressing station was opened at Point 144, Llantilio Crosseny—Monmouth road, by the field ambulance attached to the 1st Brigade, the tent division being stationed at Rockfield.

There are no bearers with tent divisions. How did they carry wounded to the trains?

Two dressing stations were opened at Dingestow by the field ambulances attached to the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, the tent divisions being kept here and the personnel employed entraining wounded from the dressing stations. One ambulance and one troop train were at Dingestow ready to receive these casualties.

This Division not being heavily engaged, their retirement was slow, and it was found possible to remove the comparatively small number of casualties that occurred from the field through the dressing stations to the trains.

The wounded from the 1st Brigade were brought direct by road in the ambulance wagons to Monmouth.

J. S. DAVIDSON, *Lieut.-Colonel, R.A.M.C.,*  
*Director of Medical Services.*

#### REMARKS on the medical arrangements for dealing with the casualties in the action on the 9th October, 1907.

The arrangements for the removal and care of the wounded were satisfactory.

Owing to the rapid fire and the rapid advance of the enemy it was necessary to abandon all but the slightly wounded of the 5th and 6th Divisions.

Part of the personnel of the field ambulances, with surgical supplies, &c., was left with the wounded.

The report does not explain why the ambulance wagons were captured. They should not have been so near the front.

There is no mention of arrangements having been made in anticipation of the engagement to provide G.S. wagons and local transport for the purpose of assisting in the removal of the wounded of the 6th Division from the field to the clearing hospital at Ross, a distance of 10 miles by road.

The expression "one ambulance and two troop trains" is ambiguous. It might be mistaken for one ambulance wagon and two troop trains.

A. F. RUSSELL, *Lieut.-Colonel, R.A.M.C.,*  
*attached to Directing Staff, Eastland Army.*

"BEAUFORT ARMS HOTEL,"  
MONMOUTH,

9th October, 1907.

REMARKS on some aspects of the Staff Ride from the point of view of the Medical Service.

It was not always realized that a field ambulance should receive orders from the General Officer Commanding, just like other units. On one occasion separate "Operation Orders" for the field ambulances were issued. Chain of command in regard to medical units.

It is important that all orders for the moves of Field Ambulances, or of any section thereof, should be published for the information of all units of the force to which they belong.

The term "Principal Medical Officer" or "Senior Medical Officer," Ambulances, was at times made use of instead of Administrative Medical Officer. This will rarely occur when officers are accustomed to the latter title. Confusion of medical titles.

The adoption of the same titles in peace and in the field would obviate many mistakes.

The word "ambulance" is very ambiguous, and yet it was often employed when messages were signalled or sent by telegram. It was doubtful whether the word applied to a field ambulance or to an ambulance wagon. The word "ambulance" ambiguous.

Much confusion would be avoided were the ambulance wagon called by some distinctive name.

Detached forces should, as a rule, be accompanied by divisional medical units in the proportion of one section of a field ambulance to 1,000 men, or one field ambulance to a Brigade. Detached forces should be accompanied by a proportion of medical units.

Advanced, flank and rearguards should be accompanied by Bearer Divisions in the same proportion.

It is suggested that these Bearer Divisions should march immediately behind the main body of advanced and flank guards, and that they should immediately precede the Infantry of the main body of a rearguard when the latter is retiring.

The position of the ambulance wagons, with a strong rearguard, caused some difficulty, but although they are often an encumbrance to troops, their presence is necessary to prevent temporarily disabled men from falling into the hands of the enemy. Position of ambulance wagons with a rearguard.

In addition, their presence has a good moral effect, for a man dreads the possibility of having to lie unattended for hours, and dislikes falling into the hands of even a civilized foe.

**Formation of dressing stations.**

It must be noted that a Bearer Division of a Field Ambulance has no means of forming a dressing station without assistance from the Tent Division. For instance, when a Bearer Division accompanies an advanced guard, &c., a section of the Tent Division, with its forage cart, but without its G.S. wagons, should go with it in order to form the dressing station.

Unless this is remembered before the Bearer Divisions and Tent Divisions are separated, serious difficulties may result.

**Units railed to the scene of operations should be accompanied by a proportion of medical units.**

When the Infantry of the 2nd and 3rd Divisions of the Northern Army were railed to near Worcester, no divisional medical units or detachments accompanied the force.

The 1st and 5th Divisions were railed to Stourport in similar circumstances.

It was impossible to take the stores and wagons of the field ambulance by train, but at least three-fourths of their Royal Army Medical Corps personnel should have accompanied the Infantry.

Had this been done, about 90 officers and 1,600 men of the Royal Army Medical Corps would have been added to the strength of the Army Medical Service, and would have been present at the engagement near Stourport.

Ample surgical and other stores, with civilian transport, could have been sent from Worcester to the battlefield in a few hours, and improvised field ambulances organized.\*

**Clearing hospital.**

The clearing hospital is the weakest link, as regards present organization, in the medical chain from the field ambulances to the base.

The matériel of the hospital weighs more than 40 tons, which represents at least 28 G.S. wagons.

It is evident that the clearing hospital is a very slightly modified stationary hospital, and, like the latter, is only supplied with transport when this is specially ordered by the General Officer Commanding Lines of Communication.

Field ambulances under orders to march at short notice or on the morning of a march cannot send patients to the clearing hospital in wagons. The staff of the clearing hospital must, therefore, be always prepared to take charge on the camping ground of patients left by the field ambulances, and to feed them and treat them there until transport is available to move the patients to the hospital.†

The working of the system depends entirely on a rather uncertain supply of empty wagons.

**Suggested further training of medical officers.**

It is evident from the experience gained on this Staff Ride that much remains to be learned by Royal Army Medical Corps officers before the kind of Staff Ride work that is done by medical officers of the French, German, and Austrian armies is approached.

Systematic training is necessary for our Royal Army Medical Corps officers, such as is given to the medical officers of those armies by officers of the General Staff in war games, map reading, sketching and the general principles of military tactics, strategy and administration, all of which are of importance in enabling the medical service to appreciate, and co-ordinate with, the work of other branches in the field.

\* This is open to discussion. In practice it probably would not have been a simple matter, even in a big town like Worcester, to improvise field ambulances in an emergency like this; and it might have been better to send by train one ambulance, or a portion of one, with a modified equipment with each Division, than to send on all the personnel without the material necessary to carry on their work.

† The clearing hospital might, with advantage, be handled as the Japanese handled their reserve medical personnel in Manchuria. The latter was a unit that was kept at the head of the lines of communication of each division, and sent forward to take over the patients in the field hospitals, when the latter were required to move on.

THE FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM THE RAILWAY ARRANGEMENTS MADE DURING THE STAFF RIDE.

ORDERS ISSUED TO DIRECTOR OF RAILWAYS ON 8TH OCTOBER.

To report on the railway arrangements required at Ross, Lydbrook Junction, Hereford, and intermediate stations, in order to ensure the supply of the troops and transport of the sick, and also the arrangements necessary in the event of a troop move being ordered.

To report also on the best places at which to damage the railway.

In accordance with the above the following memorandum was submitted:—

MEMORANDUM ON RAILWAY ARRANGEMENTS FOR WESTERN ARMY (EASTLAND),  
OCTOBER 7TH—8TH, 1907.

The Director of Railways of the Eastland Forces makes the following arrangements through the Great Western Railway District Superintendent at Hereford:—

He posts No. 1 train for clearing hospital at Hereford.	Hospital trains.
"    No. 2                    "            "            Ross.	
"    No. 3                    "            "            Lydbrook Junction.	

Also one ambulance train each at Hereford, Gloucester, and Ross.

Three ordinary troop trains, composed entirely of passenger stock, available either for moving troops or wounded (sitting down cases), are kept in readiness, properly marshalled at Gloucester and Hereford each.

All private trucks on the lines—

Private goods.

    Monmouth—Ross,  
    Hereford—Ross—Grange Court—Gloucester,  
    Hereford—Ledbury—Worcester,

to be off-loaded at once, or worked back to Worcester and Gloucester, or beyond, respectively.

Three trains of goods trucks (25 empties each) to be ready marshalled in the goods sidings at Ross, in readiness to remove the 600 tons of supplies there. 300 tons of supplies, *i.e.*, 37 trucks, arrive daily at Ross for the supply of the Army, and these trucks on the 8th will be retained full at Ross to make up the 75 trucks required.

Supply trains.

A Deputy-Assistant Director of Railways is appointed at Hereford (Barr's Court Junction Station) with one Railway Staff Officer each at Monmouth, Lydbrook Junction, Ross, Hereford (Barrs Court), Hereford (Moorfields), Hereford (Barton Goods), and Ledbury, besides one each at Gloucester and Worcester.

Appointment of one D.A.D.R. and nine R.S.O.'s.

The Great Western Railway was instructed to increase the number of locomotives at Hereford, Worcester, and Gloucester, and also to immediately dump 10 trucks of coal each at Ledbury and Ross, so as to form supplies there, and save engines having to run back to Worcester or Hereford to coal.

Locomotives and coal supply.

The two Railway Companies Royal Engineers, with stores obtained locally or from the Great Western Railway, receive orders to erect tanks at Ross and Ledbury, so as to supplement the water supply at those places.

Water supply.

[The 3rd Railway Company Royal Engineers is allotted to the Northern Army.]

The Railway Companies Royal Engineers are also instructed to improve the platform accommodation, by means of sleepers or timber trestles, at Monmouth, Lydbrook Junction, Ross, Ledbury, and Hereford, special attention being paid to the station approaches, and the means of access to existing platforms.

Platforms.

No attempt is to be made to increase or alter the existing lines of rails, as no time is available for this work.

**Rolling stock for troop moves.**

The London and North-Western Railway District Superintendent at Shrewsbury and the District Superintendents of the Great Western Railway at Worcester, at Gloucester (*via* Hereford), and at Stoke Gifford (*via* the District Superintendent at Bristol), are instructed to keep on hand as much rolling stock for moving troops, vehicles and horses, as they have room for, and to get in touch with other rolling stock at hand, so as to be able to rail it down in case of emergency.

**Personnel.**

The railway personnel at the following stations, *i.e.*, Monmouth, Ross, Hereford, Lydbrook Junction, and Ledbury, is duplicated, and the signalmen along the line also duplicated. Additional engine-drivers and firemen are drafted to Hereford.

**Transmission of orders.**

All orders are sent by the Director of Railways direct to the District Superintendents, copies being at the same time transmitted to the War Railway Council in London.

**Supply trains for mounted brigades.**

Two supply trains of two trucks each leave Hereford daily at nightfall for New Radnor *via* Leominster and Hay.

**Demolition of bridges.**

The Railway Companies, Royal Engineers, send sections to prepare for the demolition of the following:—

- The two railway bridges south of Hereford over the River Wye.
- The railway bridge over the River Wye north of Fawley Station.
- The railway tunnel east of Symond's Yat Station.
- The high viaduct west of Ledbury Station.
- The road bridge west of Hereford on the Eardisley line.

**Civil population.**

The civil population are only permitted to travel west of the Gloucester—Worcester line, and south and south-west of the Shrewsbury—Worcester line on production of permits.

Three trains leave Monmouth daily for refugees, and eight leave Hereford, three to Shrewsbury, and five to Worcester.

*Director of Railways,  
Western Army, Eastland.*

"BEAUFORT ARMS," MONMOUTH,  
8th October, 1907.

---

REMARKS ON THE ABOVE REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR, EASTLAND FORCES.

1. It would have perhaps been better to divide this report into two parts—
  - (1.) The arrangements required to supply the troops and to transport the sick.
  - (2.) The arrangements required in the event of a troop move being ordered (including demolitions).
2. Paragraph 3 (Supply Trains) is not very clear. Apparently 300 tons of supplies are to be kept loaded up on trucks and a similar amount issued from the reserve at Ross; but are you still going to keep the three trains of 25 empties each, or are you going to send away 37 empties in place of 37 full trucks retained?

3. Does not the Midland Railway run to Hereford? Apparently the District Superintendents of the London and North-Western Railway and the Great Western Railway are to collect rolling stock, but nothing is said about the Midland.\*

4. The arrangements for civil traffic do not appear to be very complete. Would it not be better to allot a definite number of trains per diem for civil traffic? Otherwise you will have civilians with passes trying to crowd into all military trains, and constant friction will result.

5. Presumably the arrangements for the various medical units have been made in co-operation with the Director of Medical Services, although this does not appear from the report.

9th October, 1907.

---

MEMORANDUM drawn up by the Director of Railways on the arrangements made for training troops from the Northern Army (Eastland) to Worcester on the night of the 9th—10th October, 1907.

1. At 4 p.m. on 9th October the Director of Railways at Worcester is informed by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief that he must entrain at once three Brigades of Infantry, 3rd Division, from Ashby-de-la-Zouch to Worcester, and three Brigades of Infantry, 2nd Division, and one bridging train from Tamworth to Worcester. Movements ordered.

2. The Director of Railways at once confers with the District Superintendent, Great Western Railway, at Worcester, and wires the London and North-Western Railway District Superintendents at Birmingham and Northampton, the Midland District Superintendent at Tamworth (removed from Derby), and the Great Western District Superintendent at Birmingham, to arrange for the trains shown below. Provision of trains.

3. He issues instructions that all civil traffic is to cease at once on the lines— Civil traffic.  
 Tamworth — Whitacre Junction — Birmingham — Worcester and Ashby —  
 Coalville—Nuneaton—Rugby—Leamington—Stratford—Honeybourne—  
 Evesham—Worcester.

4. Further, the rolling stock and engines of these lines is to be at once commandeered, and further rolling stock and locomotives removed from civil trains, if necessary, in the zone bounded by the above-mentioned two lines, and including the Coalville—Leicester line. Private goods loaded on trucks to be dumped anywhere, if necessary, to release trucks. Commandeering trucks.

5. The stations at Worcester, *i.e.*, Shrub Hill, the Midland Railway Goods, Foregate Street and Henwick, to be cleared of all rolling stock, which is to be worked back at once to Birmingham and Evesham and Chipping Norton, irrespective of whether the goods are unloaded or not. Clearing Worcester Station.

6. All available Wells' flarelights and acetylene lamps in Worcester to be appropriated for lighting Shrub Hill, Midland Railway Goods and Henwick Stations. Lighting stations.

7. There are locomotive depôts at Rugby, Nuneaton, Wolverhampton, Birmingham (3), and Leicester, so that there will be no difficulty in supplying the requisite locomotives. Locomotive depôts.

---

\* The Midland Railway keeps no locomotives at Hereford, and has only a goods station there.—D. of R.

**Marshalling yards.** 8. Marshalling yards exist at Birmingham (3), Leicester, Northampton, and Wolverhampton, so that with the existing traffic on the lines, the requisite amount of rolling stock will be available.

**Further movements.** 9. At 6 p.m. the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief orders the Northern Army Commander to entrain at Tamworth the three Field Artillery Brigades and Howitzer Brigade of the 3rd Division, now on its way by march route to Worcester, and two Field Artillery Brigades at Camp Hill (Birmingham) and one Field Artillery Brigade and Howitzer Brigade at Snow Hill (Birmingham) from the 2nd Division, who are also marching to Worcester. The entraining to commence at midnight.

**Clearing stations at Worcester.** 10. As the detraining will take place at night, the Director of Railways details two Railway Staff Officers for each of the stations, Shrub Hill, Midland Goods and Henwick, and arranges with the Chief of the General Staff (Eastland Forces) for a special Staff Officer with one assistant to be told off to lead each Infantry Brigade to its halting place, and thus get them clear of the stations.

**Lickey incline.** 11. Additional locomotives are despatched to Bromsgrove to work the trains over the steep bank between Bromsgrove and Blackwell.

**Composition of trains and selection of stations.** 12. Cattle trucks are used on all trains instead of horse boxes. This reduces the number of trains considerably. All the stations utilized for entraining troops have platforms suitable for the loading of vehicles and horses. Double engines are used on most of the trains on account of their length, so as to prevent loss of time in running.

**Time table for 3rd Division.**

\*13. 3rd Division.—Three Brigades Infantry, Nos. 7, 8 and 9.  
No. 7 Brigade entrains at Ashby-de-la-Zouch in five trains—

Ashby-de-la-Zouche, dep.	7.30 p.m.	Henwick (Worcester), arr.	11 p.m.
"	"	"	12 midnight.
"	8.30 "	"	1 a.m.
"	9.30 "	"	2 "
"	10.30 "	"	3 "
"	11.30 "	"	"

These trains proceed *via* Coalville.

Similarly, the 8th and 9th Brigades commence entraining at Coalville (Midland Railway) at 8 p.m., and London and North-Western Railway at 8.20 p.m., respectively, each on five trains. The last train of these Brigades reaches Henwick (Worcester) at 3.30 a.m. and 3.50 a.m. respectively, and the detraining of all three Brigades is completed by 4.30 a.m.

The above trains run *via* Shakerstone Junction, Nuneaton (Midland Railway), and Birmingham.

The Ashby-de-la-Zouche—Coalville—Shakerstone Junction line is a single one, and consequently 20 minutes' interval between trains is allowed.

The Midland Railway trains are obtained from Leicester and the London and North-Western Railway trains from Nuneaton.

The distance between Ashby and Henwick is about 66 miles.

The sidings and platform at Henwick can accommodate two trains at a time.

---

\* *N.B.*—It is particularly to be noticed that by the orders of the Commander-in-Chief the following Brigades were entrained, with only their small-arm ammunition carts and machine guns, the remainder of the transport being instructed to follow by road forthwith.

Only under these conditions could the Brigades be entrained in the number of trains and in the time allotted.

14. 2nd Division.—Three Brigades Infantry, Nos. 4, 5 and 6.  
No. 4 Brigade entrains at Tamworth (Midland Railway) in five trains—

Time table for  
2nd Division and  
bridging train.

Tamworth, dep. 7 p.m.	Worcester (Shrub Hill), arr. 11 p.m.
"    7.45 p.m.	"    "    11.45 p.m.
"    8.30 "	"    "    12.30 a.m.
"    9.15 "	"    "    1.15 "
"    10 p.m.	"    "    2 a.m.

Similarly, the 5th and 6th Brigades commenced entraining at Tamworth and Atherstone at 7.30 p.m. and 7.45 p.m. respectively, each Brigade in five trains. The last train of these Brigades reached Worcester (Shrub Hill) and Worcester (Midland Goods) Stations at 2.30 a.m. and 2.45 a.m. respectively, and the detraining of both Brigades was completed by 3.15 a.m.

Bridging train entrains at Tamworth (London and North-Western Railway) in four trains—

Tamworth, dep. 7 p.m.	Worcester (Shrub Hill), arr. 11 p.m.
"    8.30 p.m.	"    "    12.30 a.m.
"    10 p.m.	"    "    2 a.m.
"    11.30 p.m.	"    "    3.30 a.m.

The bridging train is completely detrained by 4.30 a.m.

Tamworth Station (London and North-Western Railway) has four main lines and numerous platforms and sidings.

Worcester (Shrub Hill) Station has four main lines, four sidings for off-loading vehicles, and numerous sidings and platforms at the adjoining Midland Railway Goods Station.

The above trains (London and North-Western Railway) proceed *via* Rugby—Leamington—Stratford—Honeybourne Junction—Evesham.

The Midland trains *via* Whitacre Junction and Birmingham.

The London and North-Western Railway trains are made up from stock from Rugby and Tamworth, and the Midland trains from stock from Birmingham and Whitacre Junction.

15. On arrival at Tamworth, the Field Artillery Brigades receive further instructions as to entraining stations.

Entraining of  
Artillery, 3rd  
Division.

One Field Artillery Brigade of the 3rd Division at Tamworth (London and North-Western Railway), at two platforms.

Tamworth, dep. 1.30 a.m.	} Worcester (Shrub Hill and Midland Goods) }	arr. 4.0 a.m.
"    "    2.15 "		"    "    "    4.45 "
"    "    3.0 "		"    "    "    5.30 "
"    "    3.45 "		"    "    "    6.15 "
"    "    4.30 "		"    "    "    7.0 "
"    "    5.15 "		"    "    "    7.45 "
"    "    6.0 "		"    "    "    8.30 "
"    "    7.45 "		"    "    "    10.15 "

This movement is completed by 11.15 a.m.

Similarly, the two remaining Field Artillery Brigades commence entraining at Tamworth (Midland Railway) and Atherstone (London and North-Western Railway) at 1.45 a.m. and 2.30 a.m. respectively. There are eight trains and two platforms for each Brigade, and the last trains of the Brigades reach Droitwich and Worcester (Shrub Hill and Midland Goods) at 9 a.m. and 10.15 a.m. respectively.

The detraining of these Brigades is completed by 11.15 a.m.

One Howitzer Brigade of the 3rd Division at Wilnecote (Midland) at one platform.

Wilnecote, dep.	2.30 a.m.	Stoulton, arr.	4.45 a.m.
"	" 4.30 "	"	" 6.45 "
"	" 6.30 "	"	" 8.45 "
"	" 8.30 "	"	" 10.45 "

The times are considerably accelerated, as by this time the staff have got accustomed to the working, and there are no signal delays.

Entraining of  
Artillery of  
2nd Division.

16. One Field Artillery Brigade entrains at Camp Hill (Birmingham).

Camp Hill, dep.	1.30 a.m.	Spetchley Goods, arr.	3.30 a.m.
"	" 2.30 "	"	" 4.30 "
"	" 3.30 "	"	" 5.30 "
"	" 4.30 "	"	" 6.30 "
"	" 5.30 "	"	" 7.30 "
"	" 6.30 "	"	" 8.30 "
"	" 7.30 "	"	" 9.30 "
"	" 8.30 "	"	" 10.30 "

The move is completed by 11.30 a.m., and troops detrained.

Two other Field Artillery Brigades entrain at Camp Hill (Birmingham) and Snow Hill (Birmingham) respectively, in eight trains each.

The operation commences at 8 a.m., and the Brigades are detrained at Droitwich and Worcester (Shrub Hill and Midland Goods Station), the movement being completed and all the three Brigades detrained by 3.15 p.m.

One Howitzer Brigade entrains at Snow Hill (Birmingham).

Snow Hill, dep.	12.15 p.m.	{ Worcester (Shrub Hill) and Midland Goods }	arr.	2.15 p.m.
"	" 12.30 "	"	"	" 2.30 "
"	" 1.0 "	"	"	" 3.0 "
"	" 1.15 "	"	"	" 3.15 "

Hospital train  
arrangements for  
Western Army.

17. The stationary hospital trains are stabled as under :—

No. 1	at Banbury, from Worcester.
" 2 "	" " " "
" 3 "	Oxford " Gloucester.

The clearing hospital trains Nos. 1, 2 and 3 at Evesham, from Gloucester and Worcester respectively.

The ambulance trains are stationed thus :—

No. 1	at Stratford.
" 2 "	Stoke Prior.
" 3 "	Broom.

Six of the troop trains, already used for the moves to Worcester, are sent to Banbury, there to be retained for the use of sitting-up hospital cases, if required.

Hospital trains for  
Northern Army.

18. The two ambulance trains and six of the troop trains of the Northern Army are stabled, the former at New Street Station, and the latter, half at Camp Hill and half at Snow Hill, Birmingham, so as to be within easy reach if required. Hospital trains run after all troop trains, and as the exigencies of the railway service permit.

19. The above time tables summarized give the following results :—

Summary.

47	trains arrive	Worcester (Shrub Hill and Midland Goods)	between 11 p.m. on the 9th and 3.15 p.m. on the 10th.
16	„ „	Droitwich	between 3.45 a.m. and 2 p.m. on the 10th.
15	„ „	Henwick	between 11 p.m. on the 9th and 3.50 a.m. on the 10th.
8	„ „	Spetchley	between 3.30 a.m. and 10.30 a.m. on the 10th.
4	„ „	Stoulton	between 4.45 a.m. and 10.45 a.m. on the 10th.
<hr/>			
90			
<hr/>			

20. The total amount of stock required is 3,150 carriages and trucks. This can be somewhat reduced by working stock back to sending station and utilizing it for a second journey. As, however, the first troop trains are chiefly composed of passenger coaches, and the latter trains of open trucks, it will be easier to form most of the trains from fresh stock. It is considered that the empty trains can be removed, so as not to block the following ones, by sending the empties off to Birmingham, Wolverhampton, Evesham, Chipping Norton, Rugby, &c. Rolling stock, supply, and clearing of stations.

21. On the retreat from Gloucester, the depôt there was cleared out and removed to Banbury. This required only seven trains, four for the 1,000 tons of supplies, two for ammunition and Ordnance stores, and one for remounts. Supply trains.

The troops coming from the north will only have 1 day's rations with them, according to calculations. It is necessary, therefore, to arrange to fill their transport wagons with supplies on their arrival.

For this purpose two trains of supplies are run from Banbury to Norton Junction, where they can be shunted on to the junction, and off-loaded at leisure, and one to Henwick on to a spare siding. The former arrive at 9 p.m. on the 9th, and the latter arrives at 8 p.m. Labour for off-loading is requisitioned in Worcester. The 2 days' supplies at Stratford remain loaded up in their trucks, there awaiting orders.

#### REMARKS BY DIRECTOR, EASTLAND FORCES.

1. A very careful piece of work.
2. Might not the Infantry of the 2nd Division who entrain at Atherstone be blocked by those of the 3rd Division outside Nuneaton?\*
3. As empties have been returned to Birmingham, Wolverhampton, Evesham, &c., it would be interesting to know how the 1st and 5th Divisions were moved from Worcester and Pershore to Stourport and Droitwich.†

#### MISCELLANEOUS EXTRACTS FROM NOTES MADE BY MEMBERS OF THE DIRECTING STAFF.

##### *The organization of hired transport.*

The main point to be borne in mind in framing schemes of this nature is that of placing before your General a plan sufficiently worked out to enable him to put it in the hands of a subordinate and say "Carry on."

A scheme which, after submission, requires to be worked out or explained by the Staff before it can be acted on, is a scheme which causes unnecessary trouble and delay.

\* There are four lines of metals between Rugby and Tamworth.

† By utilizing the six trains held in readiness at Birmingham and Banbury respectively (see paragraphs 17 and 18, page 72) to commence with, and marshalling 12 other trains at the centres named.—D. of R.

The following details usually require consideration :—

- (a.) Amount of transport to be taken up immediately, and method of collecting it.
- (b.) Proposed cadres for working purposes.
- (c.) Selection of a depôt and camp, and its special organization.
- (d.) Provision of expert military and civilian superintendence and assistance.
- (e.) Financial limitations and responsibility of the officer charged with the execution of the plan.

*Supply Depôts.*

Supply depôts in or near a town should, if possible, be established so as to avoid the transport passing through the town on its way to and from the front.

*Defence of a Post.*

With a small garrison, the best means of defence is provided by efficient observation. The bulk of the force available for defence should be kept in hand with a view, in the event of attack, to occupying previously considered and, if possible, prepared positions in the direction from which the attack is coming. It is courting disaster to fritter away a force in an endeavour to occupy an extended perimeter in the first instance.

---

## APPENDIX I.

STAFF RIDE UNDER THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF,  
7TH—12TH OCTOBER, 1907.

## INSTRUCTIONS AS TO ASSEMBLY, &amp;C.

1. Officers will assemble by 5.30 p.m. on Monday afternoon, 7th October. Places of assembly are shown in the annexed table. Accommodation for all officers attending the Staff Ride has been engaged, at the hotels named, from the evening of 7th to morning of 10th October.

2. Plain clothes will be worn.

3. Officers of the rank of Major-General, or above, may bring one aide-de-camp each, also one servant each, for whom expenses may be charged at Allowance Regulation rates. No expenses for servants will be allowed to officers under the rank of Major-General.

4. Motor-cars will be provided for officers on the Directing Staff and for Army Commanders, but not for other officers who should bring bicycles. If private motors are used no allowance for them can be claimed.

5. LIST OF DOCUMENTS, &C., FORWARDED HEREWITH.

Report of Staff Ride held in May, 1907.

General Information of Events from 1st to 7th October, 1907.

Special Information { Eastland.  
Westland and Northland.

General Programme of Work for the October Staff Ride.

Small Scale Map ( $\frac{1}{1000000}$ ) (in pocket of Report of May Staff Ride).

$\frac{1}{4}$ -inch Map. Set of 6 sheets.

Table showing Places of Assembly, &c.

Table showing Reserved Accommodation at Places of Assembly.

NOTE.—Each officer should bring with him a copy of the Field Service Pocket Book.

6. Officers detailed to attend the Staff Ride will please acknowledge receipt of the above as soon as possible, direct to the Director of Staff Duties, War Office, in the enclosed envelope. An address to which any further communications may be sent should be given at the same time.

WAR OFFICE,

24th September, 1907.

## APPENDIX II.

---

### STAFF RIDE UNDER THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, OCTOBER, 1907.

#### NOTES FOR DIRECTING STAFF.

The Chief of the General Staff desires that careful attention may be paid to administrative arrangements, such as supply and transport, supply of ammunition, and disposal of sick, wounded, and prisoners. Directors and Assistant Directors should design and issue problems on such questions.

After the necessary reconnaissances have been carried out on Tuesday, Commanders should be required to show the exact disposition of all parts of their Commands, including Transport and Supply Columns and other "impedimenta," all necessary orders for which must receive careful attention.

It has been left open to Army Commanders, within the general limits of the scheme, to select their own bases, advanced depôts, and lines of communication. After assembling, it is open to Army Directors to vary the allotment of motor cars and orderlies, should they find it advisable to do so.

The operations from Thursday to Saturday will probably be in the neighbourhood of the River Severn.

Further instructions as to this will be issued on Wednesday; meanwhile, this information is to be treated as confidential. All necessary arrangements as to accommodation on Thursday and Friday will be made under the orders of the Chief of the General Staff.

---

