



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY CHAPLAIN CENTER AND SCHOOL
FORT MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY 07703-5000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

Historian

24 May 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMY MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE

SUBJECT: Staff Ride Information

1. Enclosed is a selected compilation of materials used in the staff ride of the battle of Antietam, for the Chaplain Advanced Course (CHOAC) at the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School (USACHCS), Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.
2. The Chaplain School will move at the end of 1995 to Fort Jackson, South Carolina. The tentative site for the new staff ride will be at the Revolutionary War battlefield of Camden.
3. The request for information was an open ended one, and I hope that what I have sent is helpful. Please let me know if I should send other materials; e.g., copies of vu-graphs, etc.


WILLIAM J. HOURIHAN, Ph.D.
Chaplain Branch Historian

SUBJECT: CHOAC Staff Ride Guidance

I. INSTRUCTORS

CH (MAJ) Larson
Dr. Hourihan
4 SGIs

II. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES. The Antietam Staff Ride is designed to get students thinking about their profession and the "face of battle". This is done by studying a campaign and /or battle and deriving lessons learned which apply to the 1990s. Each student will participate in Preliminary Study, Field Study, and Integration Phases. Some of our specific objectives are:

- a. Expose students to the human aspect of battle.
- b. Derive lessons in leadership, communications, use of terrain, weapon systems, and logistics and apply them to present day.
- c. Expose students to military history and further their professional development.

III. FORMAT. The Antietam Staff Ride follows the methodology explained in The Staff Ride pamphlet by William G. Robertson.

- a. Preliminary Study. Each student is assigned a commander and an issue of the Maryland Campaign. Given 6 weeks to research topics, students will present a 15-minute briefing to the members of their groups on 19-20 Apr 94 (schedule to be published).
- b. Field Study. All students will participate in the staff ride of the Maryland Campaign area (South Mountain, Harper's Ferry, and Sharpsburg/Antietam), on Thursday and Friday, 21-22 Apr 94.
- c. Integration. Upon completion of the staff ride, students will participate in the integration phase. During this portion, students and instructors reflect upon their experience and articulate their impressions of both the campaign and the lessons derived from its study. This will be done on the field at Antietam.

- IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR PRESENTATIONS. We do not expect graduate level research on your commander/action. We do expect you to organize your research efforts and use some of the available material to prepare a simple and coherent briefing that analyses your assigned issue.
- a. Presentations should be 15 minutes in length, leaving 10 minutes for questions and discussion. Simple visual aids (photos, maps, diagrams, etc.) save time and make your briefing more effective.
 - b. Specific assignments are noted in enclosure 1. In addition, specific notes/guidance on limiting each briefing are included. Please feel free to seek help from your instructor.
- V. SOURCE MATERIALS. The basic text for the campaign is Stephen Sears' Landscape Turned Red, available in the library. Familiarity with Sear's book is key to a successful Staff Ride experience. Additional sources include:
- a. War College Guide to the Battle of Antietam, Luuvas and Nelson. This includes extracts of the Official Records, which are primary sources.
 - b. Photographic Legacy of Antietam, William Frassanito.
 - c. Civil War Dictionary, Mark Boatner.
 - d. Generals in Blue, Generals in Gray, Ezra Warner.
 - e. The Gleam of Bayonets, James V. Murfin.
- Additional sources on reserve in library.

ADMIN DATA SHEET
CHOAC STAFF RIDE

1. Dates: The CHOAC Staff Ride will be conducted on 19, 20, 21 and 22 April 1994. The Preliminary Study Phase will be held at the school building on the 19th and 20th, and the Field Study Phase and Integration Phase will be held on the battle field on the 21st and 22nd.

2. Student Responsibilities:

a. Present a comprehensive, well-organized 15-minute briefing to your small group on 19 or 20 April.

b. Participate in discussions held on 19 and 20 April after each briefing.

c. Integrate your briefing knowledge with on-the-ground experience during the Field Study Phase on 21 and 22 April. Explain tactical decisions and leader personality influences to of assigned leader while at the battle site.

3. Transportation:

a. Vehicles will depart from the Post Theater west parking lot (nearest USACHCS) at 0700 hours on 21 April. We will return to that location at approximately 2400 hours on 22 April.

b. Personnel will be transported by bus. Travel by POV is not authorized, except as determined by the Chief, TD-AC.

4. Hotel Arrangements

a. All personnel will be staying in contracted rooms at the Holiday Inn, Frederick, Maryland. Since they are contracted, no spouse participation will be allowed.

b. Student room assignments will be two to a room. The Government pays only for the room. Use of room service or in-room video, movies will be at individual's expense.

5. Eating Arrangements

a. You should eat breakfast before departure on the 21st. The bus will stop at a Maryland House Interstate Rest-Stop for 15 minutes at approximately 0930, but will not remain long enough for personnel to eat a served/cooked meal. Lunch options on 21 April are for the student to brown-bag it, buy snacks at the Maryland House, or buy lunch at one of several small restaurants in Harper's Ferry from 1325-1525. Supper options that evening are any of a dozen restaurants within walking distance of the Holiday Inn in Frederick. A 7/11 and a supermarket are also near by should you desire "snack food" instead.

b. 22 April

(1) Breakfast: Breakfast options are to eat at an early-opening restaurant across the street from the Holiday Inn, or at the Holiday Inn Dining Room, prior to departure at 0730, or to buy food at the 7-11 or supermarket (supermarket is open 24 hours).

(2) Lunch: There are no eating or drinking facilities on the Antietam Battlefield, other than a drinking fountain at the Visitor's Center (to which you will have only limited access). Also, there will be no stops at any of the limited facilities in the very small town of Sharpsburg (by the battlefield) for lunch, supper, or snacks. You may want to buy something for lunch at the 7/11 or the supermarket. This can be done the night before or very early prior to departure. (The bus will not drive to the supermarket that morning for you to buy food).

(3) Supper: Supper options will be either food brought from the supermarket earlier, or a meal at one of three restaurants (Sizzler, Mr. B's Barbecue, or International House of Pancakes) or a couple fast food places clustered at our planned return stop on I-95.

6. Shopping Facilities: There are no facilities of any kind at South Mountain on 21 April. Students will have free time that afternoon to tour the historical town of Harper's Ferry, which has numerous antique and craft shops. Facilities of all types are available within walking distance of the hotel at Frederick on the evening of the 21st. There are excellent Civil War bookstores at both the Visitor's Center at Antietam and at Harper's Ferry. There will be no time to visit any of the extremely limited small facilities at Sharpsburg.

7. What to make sure and bring: April is a changeable month. Be prepared for it to be hot or cool. Uniform is comfortable civilian clothing. Wet weather gear is advised. We will be walking almost all day on the 22nd, so have comfortable walking shoes or boots. A canteen or water bottle in a day pack is strongly recommended for Antietam (Note: You will NOT have the opportunity to stop somewhere for a drink at Antietam from at least 0730 to 1215).

8. Dr. Hourihan or CH Larson are available during office hours for questions/consultations. Room 110, Commandant's Wing is Dr. Hourihan's office, and Room 127, Allensworth Hall is CH Larson's office. Dr. Hourihan and CH Larson will also be available for guidance and advice from 1230-1330, 11-15 April in room 307.

10. Direct any questions to CH (LTC) McCoy, or CH Larson.

SMALL GROUP INSTRUCTOR
GUIDANCE

for the


MILITARY HISTORY STAFF RIDE

SUBJECT: The Preliminary Phase of the Staff Ride

This packet gives you all the material you will need during the pre-staff ride briefings each of your students will give on 19 or 20 April 1994 (15 minute briefing and 10 minute discussion). Each individual will give his/her briefing in front of his/her small group (and you), and support that briefing with appropriate audio-visuals.

The packet contains a schedule of how the briefings must proceed. It is important that you keep your group on this schedule so that they meet all large group times and so that those who visit your briefings will be in proper sequence. There are also some "tickler" questions that you can bring up if the discussion needs "tickling." These questions should also be of use to you in your own pre-study of the Maryland Campaign. You will not be able to guide these discussions unless you study the campaign and the battle of Antietam beforehand. Dr. Hourihan and I will go from small group to small group on the briefing days, listening and helping you to guide the discussion. Others who are accompanying us on the staff ride (to include the Commandant) will also visit so that they gain deeper knowledge of the Antietam battle.

By now, your module leader should have assigned your students to their individual briefing assignments on the sheets that I supplied to them. This packet you receive today is for you, not the students.



RAYMOND E. LARSON, SR.
CH (MAJ) USA
Military Historical Officer

STAFF RIDE BRIEFING SCHEDULE

TUESDAY 19 APRIL 1994

- 1330-1420 The Civil War Chaplain (by CH Larson and
Dr Hourihan in room 307)
- 1430-1520 Civil War Infantry and Artillery Tactics (by
CH Larson and Dr Hourihan in room 307)
- 1530-1620 The Civil War Common Soldier (by CH Larson
and Dr Hourihan in room 307)
- 1630-1655 LEE/McCLELLAN Background in Small Groups
- 1700-1725 LEE/McCLELLAN Maryland Campaign in Small
Groups

WEDNESDAY, 20 APRIL 1994
(In Small Groups)

0700-0725	D.H. HILL (SOUTH MOUNTAIN)
0725-0750	COX (SOUTH MOUNTAIN)
0800-0825	JACKSON (HARPER'S FERRY)
0825-0850	MILES (HARPER'S FERRY)
0900-0925	S. D. LEE (ANTIETAM - MORNING PHASE)
0925-0950	HOOKER (ANTIETAM- MORNING PHASE)
1000-1330	Chapel/PT/Lunch
1330-1355	LONGSTREET (ANTIETAM - MIDDAY PHASE)
1355-1420	FRENCH/RICHARDSON (ANTIETAM- MIDDAY PHASE)
1430-1455	BURNSIDE (ANTIETAM- AFTERNOON PHASE)
1455-1520	A.P. HILL (ANTIETAM- AFTERNOON PHASE)
1530-1630	WRAP-UP/DISCUSSION/QUESTIONS (by CH Larson and Dr Hourihan in room 307)
1630-1730	STAFF RIDE PREPARATION (To be determined by small group instructors)

SUBJECT: Antietam Staff Ride Briefing Assignments

TO: Small Group Instructor

INSTRUCTOR

-----	Group 1	CH Miller
-----	Group 2	CH Wesley
-----	Group 3	CH Walker

Commander: GEN Robert E. Lee (Background) and MG George B. McClellan (Background)

Analyze Lee's and McClellan's background. Include Mexican War experiences, Civil War experiences prior to the battle of 2d Manassas, and their attitudes toward offense/defense. Present your observations/conclusions in a 15-minute briefing to your group. Also available are 10 minutes for discussion.

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Possible topics for discussion :

Lee

- o experience in the Mexican War
- o John Brown Raid
- o decision to reject command of Union forces
- o unique knowledge of Union commanders
- o use of audacity
- o Civil War battle experience prior to Maryland Campaign

McClellan

- o experience in Mexico and Europe
- o picked as Union commander after minor victories in WV
- o command philosophy during Peninsula campaign
- o tremendous organizational ability
- o messianic complex
- o relationship with President Lincoln and cabinet

SUBJECT: Antietam Staff Ride Briefing Assignments

TO: Small Group Instructor

INSTRUCTOR

-----	Group 1	CH Miller
-----	Group 2	CH Wesley
-----	Group 3	CH Walker

Commander: GEN Robert E. Lee and MG George B. McClellan
(Maryland Campaign)

Analyze Lee's and McClellan's conduct of the Maryland Campaign. Use the results of the battle of 2d Manassas as a jump-off point. Select one relevant issue (such as command climate, concept of operations, mission, etc.). Details of the conduct of the campaign from South Mountain on will be covered by other students from your group. Present your observations/conclusions in a 15-minute briefing to your group. Also available are 10 minutes for discussion.

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Possible topics for discussion :

- o Lee's reasons for conducting the campaign
- o inability to rally Maryland to Confederate side
- o Lee's confidence in splitting his forces
- o gamble of giving battle with back to the Potomac
- o importance of terrain in the campaign and the battle of Antietam
- o Lee's ability to shift forces and continually gain tactical parity
- o Lee's Order 191 and McClellan's response to it
- o McClellan's concept of the operation and how he relayed it to his subordinate commanders
- o McClellan's lack of reconnaissance and faulty assumption as to Confederate strength
- o McClellan's campaign of "lost opportunities"; bungling leadership with little sense of urgency
- o how McClellan's personality influenced the campaign

SUBJECT: Antietam Staff Ride Briefing Assignments

TO: Small Group Instructor

INSTRUCTOR

-----	Group 1	CH Miller
-----	Group 2	CH Wesley
-----	Group 3	CH Walker

Commander: MG Daniel Harvey Hill, CSA (South Mountain)

Analyze Hill's conduct of the delaying action at South Mountain, to include Fox's, Turner's, and Crampton's Gaps and present your observations/conclusions in a 15-minute briefing to your group. Also available are 10 minutes for discussion. Include background on Hill's life and experiences.

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Possible topics for discussion:

- o importance of this action to Lee's overall strategy
- o importance of Union delays to Hill's defense; time to bring up reinforcements
- o Crampton's Gap only lightly held; most important of the passes - a major lost opportunity

SUBJECT: Antietam Staff Ride Briefing Assignments

TO: Small Group Instructor

	<u>INSTRUCTOR</u>
----- Group 1	CH Miller
----- Group 2	CH Wesley
----- Group 3	CH Walker

Commander: BG Jacob D. Cox, USA (South Mountain)

Analyze Cox's conduct of the assault on Fox's and Turner's Gaps. Also include an overview of Franklin's assault on Crampton's Gap, and present your observations/conclusions in a 15-minute briefing to your group. Also available are 10 minutes for discussion. Include background on Cox's life and experiences.

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Possible topics for discussion:

- o the amount of time for Union forces to move after discovery of Lee's Order 191 (18 hours)
- o large scale assault not attempted until late afternoon
- o lost opportunity at Crampton's Gap; Confederates outnumbered 10-1
- o Union actions upon taking the gaps

SUBJECT: Antietam Staff Ride Briefing Assignments

TO: Small Group Instructor

INSTRUCTOR

-----	Group 1	CH Miller
-----	Group 2	CH Wesley
-----	Group 3	CH Walker

Commander: MG Thomas J. Jackson, CSA (Harper's Ferry)

Analyze Jackson's conduct of the operation against Harper's Ferry and present your observations/conclusions in a 15-minute briefing to your group. Also available are 10 minutes for discussion. Include background on Jackson's life and experiences.

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Possible topics for discussion:

- o Lee estimated three days to eliminate Harper's Ferry; it took six
- o control of Maryland and Loudoun Heights was key element in capturing Harper's Ferry
- o effect of Jackson's message to Lee on the imminent fall of Harper's Ferry
- o Confederate units' actions after the garrison's fall

SUBJECT: Antietam Staff Ride Briefing Assignments

TO: Small Group Instructor

INSTRUCTOR

-----	Group 1	CH Miller
-----	Group 2	CH Wesley
-----	Group 3	CH Walker

Commander: COL Dixon Miles, USA (Harper's Ferry)

Analyze Miles' conduct of the defense of Harper's Ferry and present your observations /conclusions in a 15-minute briefing to your group. Also available are 10 minutes for discussion. Include background on Miles' life and experiences.

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Possible topics for discussion:

- o collapse of Maryland Heights defense
- o Union cavalry escape under Grimes Davis
- o different options for the defense of Harper's Ferry
- o Miles' reputation and attitude toward the defensive effort

SUBJECT: Antietam Staff Ride Briefing Assignments

TO: Small Group Instructor

	<u>INSTRUCTOR</u>
----- Group 1	CH Miller
----- Group 2	CH Wesley
----- Group 3	CH Walker

Commander: COL S. D. Lee, CSA (Antietam)

Analyze Lee's support of Jackson's conduct of the action on the Confederate left during the morning phase and present your observations/conclusions in a 15-minute briefing to your group. Also available are 10 minutes for discussion.

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Possible topics for discussion:

- o Confederate's preparations; how they sustained heavy casualties but met each piecemeal Union assault
- o John Bell Hood's counterattack
- o tactical advantage of Confederate artillery, especially on Nicodemus Hill
- o Lee's ability to shift forces from the uncommitted right
- o repulse of Sedgwick's division in the West Woods; advantage of position, artillery and surprise

SUBJECT: Antietam Staff Ride Briefing Assignments

TO: Small Group Instructor

INSTRUCTOR

-----	Group 1	CH Miller
-----	Group 2	CH Wesley
-----	Group 3	CH Walker

Commander: MG Joseph Hooker, USA (Antietam)

Analyze Hooker's conduct of the opening Union attacks during the morning phase. Include an overview of Mansfield's and Sedgwick's attacks and present your observations/conclusions in a 15-minute briefing to your group. Also available are 10 minutes for discussion. Include background on Hooker's life and experiences.

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Possible topics for discussion:

- o Hooker's understanding of McClellan's intent
- o inability or noninterest to take Nicodemus Hill; Union cavalry positioning
- o XII Corps (Mansfield) foothold around Dunker Church not supported
- o impact of Hooker's wounding
- o Sumner/Sedgwick advance into the West Woods
- o Federal assault characterized by piecemeal attacks with no support or timely reinforcement

SUBJECT: Antietam Staff Ride Briefing Assignments

TO: Small Group Instructor

INSTRUCTOR

-----	Group 1	CH Miller
-----	Group 2	CH Wesley
-----	Group 3	CH Walker

Commander: MG James Longstreet, CSA (Antietam)

Analyze Longstreet's conduct of the action around the "Sunken Road" during the midday phase and present your observations/conclusions in a 15-minute briefing to your group. Also available are 10 minutes for discussion. Include background on Longstreet's life and experiences.

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Possible topics for discussion:

- o Confederate's in Sunken Road outnumbered 2 to 1, yet beat back 3 separate Union brigades; advantage of terrain
- o Army of Northern Virginia fully committed (with simultaneous action at lower bridge)
- o two command/communication mistakes cause Confederate line to collapse (Posey trying to relieve crowded conditions by extracting his Mississippians on the right, and 6th Alabama under Lightfoot trying to get out of enfilading fire on the left)
- o Confederate counterattacks buy time for positioning artillery support, which stalls Union advance

SUBJECT: Antietam Staff Ride Briefing Assignments

TO: Small Group Instructors

INSTRUCTOR

-----	Group 1	CH Miller
-----	Group 2	CH Wesley
-----	Group 3	CH Walker

Commander: BG William French, USA and MG Israel Richardson, USA
(Antietam)

Analyze French's and Richardson's assaults on the Confederate center at the "Sunken Road" during the midday phase and present your observations/conclusions in a 15-minute briefing to your group. Also available are 10 minutes for discussion. Include background on French's or Richardson's life and experiences.

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Possible topics for discussion:

- o Sumner's failure of position, and French's decision to attack Sunken Road
- o continued piecemeal attacks
- o Richardson stabilization of the line; enfilades and breaks Confederate defense
- o advance stalled by 20 Confederate guns; Richardson's mortal wound
- o McClellan refusal to commit more troops to the Union right/center

SUBJECT: Antietam Staff Ride Briefing Assignments

TO: Small Group Instructor

INSTRUCTOR

-----	Group 1	CH Miller
-----	Group 2	CH Wesley
-----	Group 3	CH Walker

Commander: MG Ambrose E. Burnside, USA (Antietam)

Analyze Burnside's conduct of the taking of the Lower Bridge and actions during the afternoon phase and present your observations/conclusions in a 15-minute briefing to your group. Also available are 10 minutes for discussion. Include background on Burnside's life and experiences.

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Possible topics for discussion:

- o lack of reconnaissance and intelligence
- o confusing command structure (McClellan vs Burnside vs Cox)
- o attacks open at 1000; late and again piecemeal
- o bridge finally taken at 1300; no immediate continuation because of supply; two hour delay
- o Burnside's advance to the outskirts of Sharpsburg
- o McClellan's refusal to send reinforcements; 1/3 of Union force not committed

SUBJECT: Antietam Staff Ride Briefing Assignments

TO: Small Group Instructor

INSTRUCTOR

-----	Group 1	CH Miller
-----	Group 2	CH Wesley
-----	Group 3	CH Walker

Commander: MG Ambrose Powell Hill, CSA (Antietam)

Analyze Hill's conduct of the counterattack against Burnside. Include an overview of preceding Confederate action at the Lower Bridge and present your observations/conclusions in a 15-minute briefing to your group. Also available are 10 minutes for discussion. Include background on Hill's life and experiences.

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Possible topics for discussion:

- o Toomb's 400 Georgians defend bridge for three hours against 12,500 Federals
- o D. R. Jones' use of his depleted forces/Artillery
- o Confederate use of terrain
- o arrival of A P Hill at critical moment; factor of "luck" in battle
- o Confederates not strong enough to push Federals back across bridge

SUBJECT: Antietam Staff Ride Briefing Assignments

TO: Small Group Instructor

INSTRUCTOR

-----	Group 1	CH Troyer
-----	Group 2	CH Murdoch
-----	Group 3	CH Barnes
-----	Group 4	CH Larsen

Commander: GEN Robert E. Lee (Campaign)

Analyze Lee's conduct of the Maryland Campaign against McClellan. Select one relevant issue (such as command climate, concept of operations, mission, etc.) and present your observations/conclusions in a 15-minute briefing to your group. Also available are 10 minutes for discussion. [Another student will brief his pre-Antietam background.]

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Possible topics for discussion :

- o inability to rally Maryland to Confederate side
- o Lee's confidence in splitting his forces
- o gamble of giving battle with back to the Potomac
- o importance of terrain in the campaign and the battle of Antietam
- o Lee's ability to shift forces and continually gain tactical parity

SUBJECT: Antietam Staff Ride Briefing Assignments

TO: Small Group Instructor

INSTRUCTOR

-----	Group 1	CH Troyer
-----	Group 2	CH Murdoch
-----	Group 3	CH Barnes
-----	Group 4	CH Larsen

Commander: MG George B. McClellan (Campaign)

Analyze McClellan's conduct of the Maryland Campaign against Lee. Select one relevant issue (such as command climate, concept of operations, mission, etc.) and present your observations/conclusions in a 15-minute briefing to your group. Also available are 10 minutes for discussion. [Another student will brief his pre-Antietam background.]

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Possible topics for discussion:

- o Lee's Order 191 and McClellan's response to it
- o McClellan's concept of the operation and how he relayed it to his subordinate commanders
- o lack of reconnaissance and faulty assumption as to Confederate strength
- o campaign of "lost opportunities"; bungling leadership with little sense of urgency
- o how McClellan's personality influenced the campaign

WRAP UP

Who won the battle of Antietam?

Historians generally agree that it was a strategic victory for the Union, but was at best a tactical draw and perhaps even a tactical victory for the Confederacy. Certainly, it was one of Lee's finest displays of the tactical Art of War.

Antietam not as decisive a battle as it could have been for the Union; poor communication, reconnaissance and lack of leadership at highest levels prevented the destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia.

If there was a decisive battle of the Civil War, it was probably Antietam (not Gettysburg, as many of us have believed since childhood. This belief is a result of the acceptance of the Lost Cause myth). Antietam:

- o Ended the South's invasion of the North
- o Allowed Lincoln to make Emancipation Proclamation
- o Ended possibility of European recognition for the Confederacy (England is the most virulent anti-slavery power in the world)
- o Union war aims changed; abolition of slavery now linked with preservation of the Union
- o beginning of the end for the Confederacy

SUBJECT: Antietam Staff Ride Briefing Assignments

Staff Ride Schedule

Day	Time	Action	Comments
1	0700	Depart from Post Theater west parking lot (nearest USACHCS)	
	0700-1100	Motor to Bolivar Road, South Mountain	Short stop at Maryland House. Play tape last 1/2 hour of trip.
	1100-1110	Stop at Bolivar Road	Do not exit bus. Point out Turner's and Fox's Gaps.
<p>NOTE: At this point, if Washington Monument tower fixed, motor to top of Turner's Gap, stop bus, walk to monument, and review terrain on east side of South Mountain. Add one (1) hour to schedule for this trip.</p>			
	1110-1130	Motor to intersection of Mountain Church Rd & Gapland Rd	Talk about & point out Mumford/Parham Confederate positions in front of Crampton's Gap
	1130-1200	Stop at War Correspondent's Memorial at Crampton's Gap	Students talk. See Instructor Guide. (Toilets here)
	1200-1215	Motor to intersection of MD67 and MD340.	Point out Maryland Hgts on Elk Ridge
	1215-1225	Motor on MD340 west to Bolivar Hgts at Harper's Ferry. Walk to "Fine Predicament" plaque.	Point out Potomac River into VA. Point out Harper's Ferry, Maryland Hgts, Loudon Hgts.
	1225-1250	At Bolivar Hgts	Students talk. See Instr. Guide.
<p>NOTE: Students will eat their lunches when they wish on the bus or while walking about.</p>			
	1250-1320	At Bolivar Hgts	Service.
	1320-1325	Motor to Harper's Ferry.	
	1325-1530	Stop at rivers'	See Instr. Guide.

convergence at
Harpers' Ferry

Students explore town.

1530-1600 Motor to Frederick.
1600-1630 Check in to accommodations.
1630-on Small Group Instruction time.

2. 0730--0752 Motor from Hotel on 40A to MD34 at Econsboro Play tape.

0752-0802 Motor (left) on MD34 to MD65 (right) to Antietam parking lot (right) Play tape.

0802-0820 Assemble at cannons by Visitor's Center Give geographical orientation. (Powell talks about cannons)

0820-0825 Walk to Dunker Chch

0825-0845 Stop #1 in Dunker Church See Instr. Guide. (Powell talks about civilians & church)

0845-0905 Walk down Smocketown Road.

0905-0910 Stop #2 at Yellow Curve Sign See Instr. Guide

0910-0930 Walk down Smocketown Rd and Mansfield Ave

0930-0945 Stop #3 at Brown Garbage Can by North Woods on Mansfield Students talk. (Powell anecdotes on 1st Corps) See Instr. Guide.

0945-1015 Walk down Hagerstown Rd to Cornfield Ave

1015-1035 Stop #4 at Wide Spot on Cornfield Ave. (Powell anecdotes on Cornfield) See Instr. Guide.


1035-1045 Walk to West Woods.

1045-1100 Stop #5 is 2d Corps spire monument in West Woods Students talk. (Powell anecdotes on West Woods) See Instr. Guide.

1100-1120 Walk down Smocketown Rd to Mumma Cemetary.

1120-1130	Stop #6 is Mumma Cemetary.	(Powell anecdotes on Sumner/French/Richardson) See Instr. Guide.
1130-1155	Walk down Mumma Lane to Surken Road	
1155-1240	Stop #7 is Bloody Lane.	Students talk. (Powell anecdotes on Bloody Lane) See Instr. Guide. Students walk in lane with pix, eat lunch, go to tower.
1240-1250	Board bus and van.	
1250-1300	Bus motors to Burnside Bridge.	Lets students off at park area below Bridge. Then bus goes to top parking lot.
1300-1305	Walk across bridge to open area by creek.	
1305-1315	Stop #8 is Burnside Bridge area.	Students talk. (Powell anecdotes on Burnside) See Instr. Guide.
1315-1330	Recross bridge.	Students talk. (Powell anecdotes on Toombs) See Instr. Guide.
1330-1335	Board bus.	
1335-1345	Motor to corner of Branch Ave and Harper's Ferry Road.	
1345-1400	Stop #9 is corner of road.	Students talk. (Powell anecdotes on A.P. Hill) See Instr. Guide.
1400-1405	Board bus.	
1405-1410	Motor to cemetary.	
1410-1445	Stop #10 is cemetary.	See Instr. Guide. Followed by service at cemetary.
1445-1450	Board bus.	
1450-1455	Motor back to Visitors Center	

1455-1530	Integration Phase under trees across street from Dunker Chch	See Instr. Guide
1530-1630	Visitor's Center	Student time.
1630-1820	Motor out of parking lot, turn left onto 65, left onto 34. Go to Boonsboro turn right onto 40A. 40A to I-70E to I-695N to I-95N to Exit 74.	
1820-1920	Stop enroute, eat supper.	Note: You don't get back on I-95N where you got off.
1920-2230	Motor I-95N to Ft Monmouth.	




After the battle of Chantilly (or Ox Hill), August 30, 1862, a sharp clash in the aftermath of Second Manassas, General John Pope's luckless Army of Virginia was absorbed into the greater Army of the Potomac under the splendid organizer, Major General George B. McClellan. Meanwhile, General Robert E. Lee's victory-flushed Army of Northern Virginia launched its first invasion of the North. The map shows the route of each army in the opening phases of the Maryland Campaign. In Frederick on September 9, a few days march ahead of McClellan's pursuit, Lee formulated his famous Special Orders #191.




Scale: 1" = 10 miles

- * Frederick's Gap - 18 miles
- * South Mountain - 1300 feet
- * Middleburg Valley - 6 miles
- * Crampton's Gap - 6 miles
- * Brown Farm's Gap (South)

- * Maryland Heights 1450'
- * Strassburg 1250'
- * Colburn 650'



THE ANTIETAM BATTLEFIELD



STOP: South Mountain A- Bolivar Road

SITUATION: South Mountain is a military barrier, beginning at the Potomac River and running 50 miles north, cresting at 1000-1300 feet. It has 4 practicable crossings from north to south - Turners', Fox's, Crampton's, and Brownsville Gaps. It shielded Lee's movements from McClellan.

2200 hours, 13 September: Lee receives message from Stuart that Federals have knowledge of Order #191. D.H. Hill is ordered to defend Turner's Gap with Stuart. Longstreet is to move at 1st light to support.

0600, 14 September: Hill moves into place at Turner's Gap. Stuart has moved most of his cavalry to Crampton's Gap in the south. Hill has one brigade at Turner's (Colquitt) and one at Fox's (Garland).

0900, 14 September: Cox's Division of Burnside's IX Corps moves up to attack Fox's Gap.

TEACHING
POINTS

- Effect of terrain (South Mountain passes)
- Principle of War: Security (Lee's screening of his force)
- Principle of War: Surprise (McClellan's failure to move immediately upon receiving Order #191-18 hours lost)

VIGNETTES

None

STDP: South Mountain B- Washington Park Tower, Turner's Gap
(Note: May not be possible, due to tower repair work)

SITUATION: 0900 hours, Cox's Division of Burnside's IX Corps attacks Fox's Gap. Confederates outnumbered 3 to 1. Brigade Cdr Garland mortally wounded, and his troops pushed out.

1300 hours, Confederate reinforcements arrive and fight at Fox's Gap continues.

1600 hours. Remainder of IX Corps divisions attack up Fox's Gap, led by Gen Reno (who is killed). Hatch's and Meade's divisions of Hooker's I Corps attack Turner's Gap. Federals fight up to the top of both gaps by nightfall, but are not able to break out into the valley beyond. Federals lost 1800 men, Confederates 2300.


TEACHING POINTS

- Face of battle
- Operational art of war (Confederate defense of the passes. Meade's attempt to hook around the north end of Turner's Gap)

VIGNETTES


-Chaplain Nicholas A. Davis, 4th Texas Infantry, Hood's Bde, "Several attempts were made to charge our lines; but they were only able to utter a few huzzas and move up but a few paces, when another volley would check and cause them to waver and stagger like drunken men. Finally the expected "forward" was heard, and then came the full grown shout of success, which always tells what the Texans are doing, when they struggle for victory in the presence of mighty foes."

-Chaplain George Smith, Phillips' Georgia Legion, Col-quitt's Brigade, Hill's Division, "The regiment was now retreating in a broken and confused manner. One of the boys, Gus Tomlinson, in tears, said: 'Parson, we've been whipped; the regiment is retreating.' 'And none to soon either,' said I, 'for we are surrounded on all sides but one.' Just then I felt a strange dizziness and fell, my arm dropping lifeless by my side. I knew that I was hit, and I thought mortally wounded. But where was I hit? Was my arm torn off by a shell? No, here that is. Was I shot through the breast? or-yes-here it was-blood was gurgling from my throat. The dear boys rushed to me, laid me out on a blanket and bore me off the field. I thought I was mortally wounded; so did they. 'Yes, parson,' said they, 'it's all up with you.'"




MAP 2

Battle and Tour Map of Fox's Gap and Turner's Gap



MAP 3
Map of Middletown



Area of Operations



Certain color and black & white photos are keyed by caption number to the maps on pp. 6-9. Color: "C" followed by a number. Black & White: "BW" followed by a number. The page number for each photo is indicated below.

C1-10	C8-36	BW1-51	BW6-50
C2-15	C7-37	BW2-52	BW7-46
C3-40	C6-37	BW3-54	BW8-46
C4-40	C5-38	BW4-54	BW9-41
C5-35	C10-39	BW5-50	BW10-41



George B. McClellan, USA

STOP: South Mountain C- War Correspondent's Memorial, Crampton's Gap


SITUATION: 1200 hours, 14 September. Franklin's VI Corps units arrive at Crampton's Gap. It is defended at the bottom of the pass by Parham's Brigade of Anderson's Division and Munford's small brigade of cavalrymen from Stuart's cavalry division. Franklin has 12,300 men.

1400 hours. Slocum's division of VI Corps begins exchanging fire with the Confederates, but Franklin is too timid to attack. Finally, at 1600 hours, Slocum attacks on his own initiative, and rout the rebels.

Confederates ran through the gap to the other side, where they were put under control by meeting fresh reinforcements. Formed a battle line in Pleasant Valley between the Gap and Harper's Ferry, visible to the advancing Federals (who were coming over the Gap crest). Franklin halts as darkness falls.

TEACHING POINTS

- Principle of War: Offensive (Franklin's failure to exploit the initiative immediately)
- Leadership (Franklin's timidity vs Slocum's aggressiveness.)
- Principle of War: Objective (Franklin's satisfaction with the limited objective of Crampton's Gap as opposed to the real objective of Harper's Ferry)
- Principle of War: Simplicity (McClellan's failure to issue clear, concise orders to Franklin, "Having gained the pass, your duty will be first to cut off, destroy, or capture McLaws' command and relieve Col Miles...my general idea is to cut the enemy in two and beat him in detail...I ask of you, at this important moment, all your intellect and the utmost activity that a general can exercise," then "...granted the latitude to change any of the details of this order as circumstances may change, provided the purpose is carried out." There was nothing said of any advance earlier than 'daybreak in the morning' and as if underscore that timetable, Franklin's orders were not sent until 1820 on 13 Sep.)



Rt. 97 (to Harpers Ferry)

Crampton's Gap



CRAMPTON'S GAP

GATHLAND STATE PARK

BEGIN TOUR

War Correspondents Arch

Mountain Church Road

BURKITTSVILLE

FRANKLIN VI

ARNOLDSTOWN


Certain color and black & white photos are keyed by caption number to the maps on pp. 6-9. Color: "C" followed by a number. Black & White: "BW" followed by a number. The page number for each photo is indicated below.

C1-10	C1-50	BW1-51	BW6-56
C2-15	C7-37	BW2-32	BW7-59
C3-40	C3-37	BW3-34	BW8-60
C4-45	C3-38	BW4-34	BW9-61
C5-55	C18-59	BW5-39	BW10-61

HALF MILE

MAP 1

Battle and Tour Map of Crampton's Gap



TOUR →

DER

STOP: Harper's Ferry A, Bolivar Heights

SITUATION: 9 September: After ascertaining that Harper's Ferry will not be evacuated, Lee issues Special Order #191, directing its capture by Jackson's Corps.

Union dispositions were 1st and 2d Brigades (7000 men) on Bolivar Heights, 3rd Brigade (2000 men) on Maryland Heights, and 4th Brigade (2000 men) with 14 guns on Camp Hill.

12 September: McLaws' division reaches Maryland Heights by dark, but doesn't attack (8000 men)

0630 hours, 13 September: McLaws attacks and pushes the Federals off Maryland Heights by 1530. Posts cannon to fire on Bolivar Heights. At 1200, Walker's Brigade of Ewell's division reaches Loudoun Heights, and Jackson (14,000 men) occupies School House Ridge, 1000 yards west of Bolivar Heights. Federals are now outgunned and surrounded.

1000, 14 September. Walker drags 5 guns up to top of rugged Loudoun Heights...because of its "impassability" the Federals had not defended it. At 1400, Walker begins firing on Bolivar Heights and other Confederate batteries join in.

In late afternoon, McLaws sends 2 brigades to help defend Crampton's Gap.


**TEACHING
POINTS**

- Logistical Considerations (Lee's decision to take Harper's Ferry to use as a base of transportation and clear his lines of supply back into the Shenandoah Valley)
- Effect of terrain (Dominance of Maryland Heights)
- Principle of War: Surprise (Walker's placing cannon atop Loudoun's Heights)
- Principle of War: Security (Mile's failure to fortify the crest of Maryland Heights or Solomon's Gap, the only practicable approach to the crest from the north)
- Unit cohesion (Mile's placement of green troops (126th New York in the army only 21 days) to defend Maryland Heights)

VIGNETTES

- None

deemed secure, Miles returned to ridge possessing Thomas Ford's day, September 13, 1862, 3:30 p.m.




MARYLAND HEIGHTS
 Sept. 13, 1862
 Situation about 10:30 a.m. (Just before the wounding of Colonel Sherrill)

Editor's Note: Refer to the photo on Pg. 17. Colonel Ford's men retreated down the mountain road (white streak in trees, upper right) with Confederates advancing behind them. Much of the fighting on Maryland Heights occurred on the crest of the ridge at left.



THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM SEPTEMBER 17, 1862

UNION  CONFEDERATE 



STOP: Harper's Ferry B, overlooking old railroad bridge at convergence of rivers

SITUATION: 2000, 14 September. Col Grimes Davis escapes over the pontoon bridge with his 2000 Federal cavalry - a clean breakout.

Late evening, 14 September. Jackson sends his message to Lee, saying he will take Harper's Ferry the next day.

0600, 15 September. Confederate bombardment begins again. By 0800, Federals had expended all their long-range ammo. COL White orders the surrender, and shortly thereafter, is mortally wounded by artillery fire from Loudoun Heights. BG White, the commander of the troops who had come in to Harper's Ferry from Martinsburg (18 miles NW), surrendered to Jackson.

Booty included 11,500 prisoners, 13,000 small arms, 200 wagons, 73 pieces of artillery, and abundant supplies.

**TEACHING
POINTS**

- Operational art (Jackson's conduct of the siege)
- Leadership (Davis' daring escape with his cavalry)

VIGNETTES

- Henry Kyd Douglas, aide to Jackson, when BG White, resplendent in a best dress uniform, surrendered to Jackson, "...he must have been somewhat astonished to find in General Jackson the worst dressed, worst mounted, most faded and dingy looking general he had every seen anyone surrender to... AND

A captured Federal to his fellow soldiers in Harper's Ferry, upon seeing Jackson ride by, " he isn't much for looks, but if we'd had him we wouldn't have been caught in this trap."

- Henry Kyd Douglas, aide to Jackson, on COL Miles, " The memory of COL Miles has been harshly dealt with by his own people. He has been charged with cowardice and treachery at Harper's Ferry. He died with his face to the foe, and he should not be called a coward. Worse yet is the charge of treachery, for the crime is worse. It was said he had communicated with Jackson and had surrendered according to agreement. Such a charge is like stoning the dead. As closely as I was associated with General Jackson in this movement, I never had a suspicion of such an arrangement; no member of the staff ever heard of it; no one in our army believed it..."

noon of the 14th—a move which placed the relieving Federals only six miles from Harpers Ferry—the advance of

and quickly hustled them into a long line of battle one and one-half miles south of Crampton's Gap. Another line of Confederate gray paralleled the

he dispatched this caution: "The enemy out two to one. I fear I cannot afford re-enforcements."



**Miles' Predicament—
September 15, 1862 a.m.**

OFF MAP, lower down Potomac: PRYOR and WRIGHT, assigned to McLAWS

PLEASANT VALLEY

MARYLAND HEIGHTS

McLAWS

LOUDOUN HEIGHTS

WALKER

MILES

JACKSON'S DIVISION

JACKSON

LWELL'S DIVISION

SCHOOL HOUSE RIDGE

HAYS

RTNEY (ARTY)

TRIMME

TAWLON

aligned along road: JONES and TALLAFERR

STOP #: Assembly area by cannons, facing east

SITUATION: September 16. Lee has organized his line of battle in defensive formation to the east of Sharpsburg. His dispositions are:

- Jackson's corps (minus A.P. Hill's division) placed to the north of the town.
- Stuart on Nicodemus Hill with 14 guns.
- S.D. Lee near the Visitor's Center with 4 batteries.
- D.H. Hill's division positioned in and around a sunken farm road in the center.
- Longstreet's corps (minus McLaws and Anderson) south of Sharpsburg guarding the Lower Bridge.

McClellan's Army of the Potomac is moving as follows:

- Hooker's I Corps crossed the Upper Bridge at 1600, had a preliminary firefight with Hood's division in the North and East Woods, and bivouacked at sunset just north of the North Woods (Poffenberger Farm).
- Mansfield's XII Corps crosses Upper Bridge at about 2400 and bivouacks one mile behind Hooker.
- Sumner's II Corps bivouacs behind Antietam Creek between the Upper and Middle Bridges.
- Burnside's IX Corps overlooked the Lower Bridge.
- Porter's V Corps and Pleasanton's entire cavalry division (4300 horsemen) were behind the Antietam as the reserve.

TEACHING
POINTS

- General orientation of the terrain
- Artillery tactics and placement
- Principle of War: Surprise

VIGNETTES:

Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, Corps Cdr, Army of Northern Virginia: "On the forenoon of the 15th, the blue uniforms of the Federals appeared among the trees that crowned the heights on the eastern bank of the Antietam. The number increased, and larger and larger grew the field of the blue until it seemed to stretch as far as the eye could see, and from the tops of the mountains down to the edges of the stream gathered the great army of McClellan."

STOP #: 1, The Dunker Church

SITUATION: 17 September. Same situation as above. Civilians are in and around the battlefield. Dunker Church is a small, plain, whitewashed brick building set into a patch of woods. Many of the soldiers took it for a schoolhouse, but it was a church of the German Baptist Brethren, a gentle and pacifist sect that shunned such vanities of the world as church steeples and whose baptism by total immersion led people to call them Dunkers.

TEACHING
POINTS

- Period before the battle, to include possible brief description of the Maryland Campaign
- Civilian thoughts and background

VIGNETTES

- Mary Redinger Mitchell, resident of Shepherdstown, "As night drew nearer, whispers of a great battle to be fought the next day grew louder, and we shuddered at the prospect, for battles had come to mean to us, as they never had before, blood, wounds, and death."

STOP #: 2, Yellow Curve Sign on Smocketown Road

SITUATION: 16 September. Jackson possessed 7,700 men facing Hooker's I Corps, facing north. On Jackson's left, anchored in the West Woods, was John R. Jones' 4 brigades (formerly Jackson's old division). On Jackson's right was Ewells' old division, under Alexander Lawton. He had a brigade in the pasture immediately south of the Cornfield, and a brigade straddling the Smocketown Road on the Mumma Farm. Hood's division had skirmished with Hooker's men that night and pulled back to the West Woods to be a reserve and eat a hot meal. The Mumma Farm was burning, set afire by D.H. Hill's men to prevent it being used as a Yankee strong-point.

TEACHING
POINTS

- Effects of terrain (folds in ground, Jackson facing north, lack of undergrowth in East Woods as we walk)
- Principle of War: Security

VIGNETTES:

- PVT Ezra E. Stickley, Company A, 5th Virginia Infantry, Jackson's Division, "...I began to feel wretchedly faint of heart, for it seemed timely that the coming of battle meant my certain death."
- PVT Miles C. Huyette, Company B, 125th Pennsylvania Infantry, "We were massed in column by company in a cornfield; the night was close, air heavy...some rainfall...The air was perfumed with a mixture of crushed green corn stalks, ragweed and clover. We made our beds between rows of corn and would not remove our accouterments."

STOP #: 3, Brown garbage can by North Woods on Mansfield Avenue

SITUATION: 17 September, daybreak. Hooker's I Corps moves out of the North Woods south across the Miller Farm, with the objective as the Dunker Church. Doubleday's Division moving down the Hagerstown Pike on the right, Meade's Division moving through the Cornfield, and Rickett's Division attacking through the East Woods on the left.

Of the Confederates, J. R. Jones' division engages Doubleday, and Lawton engages Meade and Ricketts. Stuart's artillery on Nicodemus Hill hits Doubleday, and S. D. Lee's artillery at the Visitor's Center hits Meade and Ricketts.

TEACHING POINTS

- Face of battle
- Combined arms operations (Confederate infantry and artillery)
- Effects of terrain (point out folds in the ground as we walk the Hagerstown Pike)
- Principle of War: Objective (Hooker and the Dunker Church, no effort to take Nicodemus Hill)
- Principle of War: Mass (McClellan's holding his entire cavalry division in reserve)
- Relationship of technology to doctrine (advance in ranks across the Cornfield, and the Confederates not dug in)

VIGNETTES


- Charles Carlton Coffin, Army Correspondent, Boston Journal, "It was no longer alone the boom of the batteries, but a rattle of musketry--at first like pattering drops upon a roof; then a roll, crash, roar, and rush, like a mighty ocean billow upon the shore, chafing the pebbles, wave on wave, with deep and heavy explosions of the batteries, like the crashing of thunderbolts."
- Army Correspondent, New York Herald, "It is beyond all wonder how men such as these rebel troops are--can fight as they do. That those ragged and filthy wretches, sick, hungry, and, in all ways miserable, should prove such heroes in the fight, is past explanation. Men never fought better. There was one regiment that stood up before the fire of two or three of our long range batteries, and two regiments of infantry. And though

STOP #: 3 (CONTINUED):

the air was vocal with the whistle of bullets and the scream of shells, there they stood, and delivered their fire in perfect order."

- Major Northrup, 97th New York Infantry, Rickett's Division," The men tripped over roots in the dim light of dawn, pulled themselves together, and plunged into the Cornfield, a blood-spattered mass of stalks and ears and leaves. They stumbled over the bodies of Confederate dead and wounded.....human throats had not chance above the rattle of musketry and the booming of cannon. Officers yelling orders were not heard. Regiments tried to close ranks but became hopelessly separated."

OPENING ATTACK
September 17, 1862
Morning Phase 6:00 a.m.-9:30 a.m.



HOOKER
11.2
Doubleday
6:00 a.m.

HOOKER
11.2
Hess
6:00 a.m.

MANSFIELD
11.2
Williams
7:45 a.m.

MANSFIELD
11.2
Greene
6:00 a.m.

HOOKER
11.2
Ricketts
6:30 a.m.

SUMNER
11.2
Sedgwick
6:45 a.m.

6:00 a.m.

6:00 a.m.

6:00 a.m.

6:00 a.m.

6:00 a.m.

6:20 a.m.

6:00 a.m.

7:00 a.m.

CONFEDERATE DEAD ALONG HAGERSTOWN PIKE



MODERN PHOTOGRAPH
OF SAME SCENE

STOP #: 4, Wide Spot on Cornfield Avenue

SITUATION: Hooker's I Corps has pushed through the East Woods and the Cornfield with heavy losses to itself and Lawton's (Confederate) division. Also, the Federals have advanced down Hagerstown Pike to the West Woods.

Part of J. R. Jones' (Confederate) division counterattacks Doubleday's (Federal) division on Hagerstown Pike, stopping its advance. At 0700, Hood's division (2300 men) counterattacks thru the Cornfield and into the East Woods. 1st Texas suffers 82% casualties.

Mansfield's XII Corps (7200 men) attacks at 0730, with Williams' division on the right into the Cornfield and Greene's division on the left through the East Woods.

Confederates from D. H. Hill's division (from the center of the Confederate line) try to reinforce Hood's division at the south corner of the East Woods, but are brushed aside by Greene's advancing division.

Greene's division advances to the open area in front of the Dunker Church. Hooker is wounded and evacuated, and Mansfield killed during the fighting.

TEACHING POINTS

- Face of battle
- Operational art of war (Lee's shifting units from his center and right to support his left)
- Unity of Command (effect of Hooker's wounding and Mansfield's death)
- Principle of War: Mass (McClellan's failure to have Mansfield properly support Hooker's attack)

VIGNETTES

- Maj Gen Joseph Hooker, Cdr, I Corps, "In the time I am writing every stalk of corn in the northern and greater part of the field was cut as closely as could have been with a knife, and the slain lay in rows precisely as they had stood in their ranks a few moments before. It was never my fortune to witness a more bloody, dismal battlefield."
- Chaplain Richard Eddy, 60th New York Infantry, Greene's division, XII Corps, "I noticed one rebel with five shots through his head. He was kneeling on one knee, his gun lying on his left hand, as though he had just been in the act of taking aim....others were in a sitting

STOP #: 4 (Continued)

posture; some were lying on their side, as if asleep; some were lying on their backs, with arms outstretched, and fingers spread, as if they were clutching or keeping off a foe."

- Unknown letter, 83rd New York Infantry, Rickett's division, I Corps, "Our brigade suffered badly; were under a galling fire two hours and ten minutes....our company lost 13 wounded out of 23. Two of our company were shot in front of me and two who were behind me, and I have not a scratch. Just in front of us a house was burning (Mumma's farm), and the fire and smoke, flashing of muskets and whizzing of bullets, yells of the men were perfectly horrible...when men lie from Wednesday to Sunday with wounds undressed, I feel as if Glory did not count for much..."

STOP #: 5, II Corps spire monument in West Woods

SITUATION: 0900 hours. Sumner's II Corps, with Sedgwick's division in the lead, has crossed Antietam Creek and reached the East Woods. French's and Richardson's divisions were still advancing from behind. Sedgwick's division is led by Sumner across the fields into the West Woods, where Jackson's Confederates have retreated to.

McLaw's division arrives at the lower, southern part of the West Woods after marching most of the last 24 hours. They take up positions facing north.

Sedgwick advances in 3 parallel brigade-wide battle lines, 500 yards wide and 50 yards apart. The first line went thru the West Woods to the other side, and were slaughtered by the waiting Rebels as they emerged.

McLaws' division counterattacks Sedgwick's left flank at the bottom of the West Woods, and rolls it up to the north. Casualties are 2355 out of 5400. Sedgwick retreats up the Hagerstown Pike back toward the Poffenberger Farm where I Corps had already gone.

TEACHING
POINTS

- Face of battle
- Principle of War: Offensive (How Lee seized the initiative from Sumner with McLaws' counterattack)
- Principle of War: Manuever (same as above)
- Principle of War: Leadership (McClellan's failure to eliminate the piecemeal attacks by his corps)
- Principle of War: Security (Sumner's failure to listen to Gen Williams, the acting XII Corps Cdr)

VIGNETTES

- Brig Gen Alpheus Williams, Acting Cdr of XII Corps upon Mansfield's death, "...Sumner (is of the type of) generals who would come up with their commands and pitch in at the first point without consultation with those who knew the ground or without reconnoitering or looking for the effective points of attack."
- Charles Carlton Coffin, Army Correspondent, Boston Journal, "I recall a Union soldier lying near the Dunker Church with his face turned upward, and his pocket Bible open upon his breast. I lifted the volume and read the words: "Though I walk through the valley of the shadow

STOP #: 5 (Continued):

of death, I will fear no evil; for thou art with me. Thy rod and thy staff, they comfort me." Upon the flyleaf were the words, "We hope and pray that you may be permitted by kind Providence, after the war is over, to return."

- Lieut. H.W. Seaford, 34th New York Infantry, Sedgwick's division, "Surrender or death seemed to be the only thing in sight. To secure liberty, the Cornfield must be recrossed, over the bodies of the dead and dying, not by the route we had come (from the East Woods) but by a circuitous route, in the face of a destructive fire of musketry at short range. It is a mystery that will never be solved, how it was possible for any one to pass through such a death-trap and live to record the fact. Many of the men fell from exhaustion, and were swept beneath the wave, like the undertow of an ocean beach."

STOP #: 6, Mumma Cemetery

SITUATION: @930 hours. The next division of Sumner's II Corps, French's division, arrives at the East Woods and there is no sign of where Sedgwick's division (with Sumner in front of it) had gone. French noted the Union troops around Dunker Church (Greene's division of XII Corps), perhaps thought they were Sedgwick, and moved off to attack on their left (which was the Confederate middle-the Sunken Road).

Richardson's division of II Corps was behind French and moved to assist him when he saw French engaged.

TEACHING
POINTS


- Leadership (Sumner's failure to be where he was needed to direct the battle)
- Principle of War: Security (French's failure to reconnoiter the situation in the East Woods)

VIGNETTES

NONE

The Battle of Antietam FIGHT AT BLOODY LANE

September 17, 1862
Midday Phase 9:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m.



STOP #: 7, Bloody Lane

SITUATION: 1000 hours. French's division (5700 men) of II Corps attacks Harvey Hill's Confederate division (2500 men) at the Sunken Road. His brigades are repulsed with very heavy losses (1750).

Richardson's division is too far behind to support French, but not too far to try the same tactics again. Lee's last reserve, Anderson's division, is moved up to support Hill.

Richardson's men suffer heavy losses. One of Richardson's brigades (Caldwell) flanks the Confederate Sunken Road on its right, and delivers enfilading fire down the right half of the road. Another brigade (Meagher's) penetrates at the tip of the road salient (in the middle) and delivers enfilading fire down the left half of the road.

The Confederates retreat and Richardson's division continues to advance past the road. Several small Confederate counterattacks fail to stop the Federals, but gain time. Richardson is killed. A Confederate Artillery counterattack from Piper's Farm halts the Federals, with Longstreet personally at the guns himself. With no further support in sight, the Federals pull back.

TEACHING
POINTS

- Face of battle
- Combined arms operations (role of the artillery)
- Unit cohesion (Posey's trying to relieve crowded conditions by extricating his Mississippians on the right causes the Confederate right to collapse, and Lightfoot trying to get his men out of enfilading fire on the left causes the Confederate left to collapse)
- Effects of terrain (Confederates "dug in" on the Sunken Road)
- Principle of War: Mass (McClellan's refusal to reinforce his right or his center.

VIGNETTES

-Excerpt from the Baltimore American, from a soldier in Richardson's division, "Passing back again...2 Rebel colonels and 1 brigadier were found on the ground, and interspersed with the multitudes of their fallen were so many of those in the National uniform that at one glance one might see how fearful was the cost of the

STOP #: 7 (continued):

victory. Upon one dead body was found a large black dog, dead also from some chance shot which had struck him whilst stretched upon his master's corpse carressingly, his fore-paws across the man's breast."


- David Judd, New York Times Correspondent, "...entering Bloody Lane, the most appalling sight of all meets our eye. Here our boys succeeded in getting a cross fire on the Rebels, and they lie in heaps from one end of the lane to the other. Retreat, they could not, surrender, they would not."
- David Judd, New York Times Correspondent, "The Chaplain is kneeling in prayer with a young South Carolinian, who was shot through the hip and afterwards had his arm broken and fingers taken off by a shell, as he lay stretched upon his back. There are pools of blood all around, and we have to pick our way carefully to avoid tramping upon the prostrate forms."



TWO PHOTOGRAPHS OF CONFEDERATE DEAD IN THE BLOODY LANE



The Battle of Antietam
THE FINAL ASSAULT
 September 17, 1862
 Afternoon Phase 1:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.



SHARPSBURG

Harpers Ferry Road

BURNSIDE
 Div. II, 3
 Rodman
 2:00 p.m.

BURNSIDE
 Div. I
 Spring
 2:00 p.m.

BURNSIDE
 Div. II, 2
 Sturgis
 2:00 p.m.

BURNSIDE
 Div. I
 Wilcox
 2:00 p.m.

BURNSIDE
 Div. I
 Keenan, 2
 2:00 p.m.

PORTER
 Div. 2
 Sykes
 2:00 p.m.

10:15 p.m.

STOP #: B, Open area on Union side of Burnside Bridge

SITUATION: By 0700, Burnside alerted to expect the order to open his attack on the Rohrbach (Lower) Bridge. About 1000 hours, Burnside received McClellan's 0910 order. Scammon's division to assault the bridge, and Rodman's division moves off to ford the Antietam downstream. No prior attempt is made to reconnoiter the area.

Bridge defended by 400 Georgians under Toombs, supported by five batteries artillery.

Two assaults on bridge beaten off. Rodman's division finds designated ford is unusable.

Third attempt at bridge succeeds as Georgians begin to run out of ammunition at 1300. Sturgis' division crosses and consolidates; Rodman's division finds a different ford and crosses. They advance to take Sharpsburg at 1500.

D.R. Jones' division remaining troops to defend in front of Harpers' Ferry Road. Burnside advances with Willcox division on his right, Sturgis in the center, and Rodman on the left. D.R. Jones heavily outnumbered and starts to collapse—Sharpsburg about to fall.

TEACHING POINTS

- Face of battle
- Effect of terrain (Toombs' Georgians on the bluff)
- Principle of War: Offensive (McClellan's failure to use Burnside early as a diversion. Burnside's failure to move out promptly upon taking the bridge)
- Principle of War: Surprise (Burnside's failure to properly reconnoiter beforehand)

VIGNETTES

- Lieut. Matthew J. Graham, 9th New York Infantry, Rodman's division, "I was lying on my back, supported on my elbows, watching the shells explode overhead and speculating as to how long I could hold up my finger before it would be shot off, for the very air seemed full of bullets, when the order to get up was given. I turned over quickly to look at Col. Kimball, who had given the order, thinking he had become suddenly insane."
- History of the 35th Massachusetts Infantry, Sturgis' division, "The force of a mini ball or piece of shell striking any solid portion of a person is astonishing; it comes like

STOP #: 8 (continued)

a blow from a sledgehammer, and the recipient finds himself sprawling on the ground before he is conscious of being hit; then he feels about for the wound, the benumbing blow deadening sensation for a few moments. Unless struck in the head or about the heart, men mortally wounded live some time, often in great pain, and toss about on the ground."

- History of the 35th Massachusetts Infantry, Sturgis' division," A good many shot and shell came over us during the following two hours, but we were so well sheltered as to be able to read our home letters, without much danger of getting our heads knocked off...The color guard were grouped close together while one of them was reading aloud from a newspaper, when a shell descended into their midst as if from the sky, buried itself in the ground and exploded, blowing colors and guard in all directions."

STOP #: 9, Corner of Harpers' Ferry Road and Branch Avenue

SITUATION: Burnside's IX Corps moving into Sharpsburg. D.R. Jones' defensive line collapsing...if Sharpsburg falls, Lee's retreat line to the Potomac is cut off.

AT 1630, A.P. Hill's light division arrives, having marched 17 miles in 8 hours. Without stopping to rest, he immediately attacked Rodman's division on Burnside's left flank. IX Corps retreated back to the Lower Bridge when Burnside found he would not receive any reinforcements.

TEACHING POINTS

- Dynamics of battle (the factor of "luck")
- Leadership (A.P. Hill's march from Harpers' Ferry.
- Principle of War: Surprise (Hill's attack on Burnside's right flank)
- Principle of War: Security (Burnside's failure to screen his flank to prevent surprise)
- Principle of War: Offensive (McClellan's failure to exploit Burnside's success and against Hill's counterattack, even though he had Porter's V Corps, most of Franklin's VI Corps, and Pleasanton's cavalry division waiting in reserve).

VIGNETTES

- None

STOP #: 10, Antietam Cemetery

SITUATION: The battle of Antietam is over. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, badly hurt, stood ready to do battle that night and the next day. McClellan, however, remained in character, so fearful of losing that he would not risk winning.

The night of the 17 September and the day of 18 September were spent consolidating units, caring for the wounded. Lee slipped away across the Potomac with his army that night.

TEACHING
POINTS

- Face of the aftermath of battle
- Leadership (McClellan's failure to attack on the 18th)

VIGNETTES

- Mary Bedinger Mitchell, resident of Shepherdstown, "When night came we could still hear the sullen guns and hoarse, indefinite murmurs that succeeded the day's turmoil. That night was dark and lowering and the air heavy and dull. Across the river, innumeral campfires were blazing, and we could but too well imagine the scenes that they are lighting."
- Clinton Beckwith, 14th New York Infantry, V Corps, "All the dead presented a horrible spectacle, and it would have been impossible to recognize a brother, they were so changed from life. The weather being extremely hot, the men heated with passion, immediately after death, decomposed rapidly, gases formed, and the bodies swelled up to enormous proportions. For instance, the eyes would bulge out from the sockets and look like small bladders. Many had burst, so great was the pressure upon their tissues."
- Lieut. A.H. Nickerson, Federal Army, "The operating surgeons were in their shirtsleeves, which were rolled up, leaving their bare arms exposed and covered with blood, giving them the appearance of a bevy of butchers in a Chicago abattoir. While sitting awaiting the surgeon, every few minutes an attendant would bring past me, to the open window, an arm, a leg, or a mangled hand, which he pitched into a little trench dug under the window for that purpose.... Pretty soon a young surgeon came up, and grabbing me by the shoulder, said, "Shoulder smashed?" A sickening feeling came over me as I

replied that it certainly would be now if it were not before. "Bring this man some whiskey," said he as I reeled in my seat. A glass of whiskey...did not seem to affect me any more than would so much water, the pain was so intense. Then the young surgeon thrust his finger into the hole where the bullet had entered, and with his other forefinger plunged into the place of its exit he rummaged around for broken bones, splinters, etc., until I swooned away..."

- A Baltimore correspondent writing to the London Index, "The Reverend ----- was with me during a part of my tour. He was asked on one occasion to lead in prayer, in a barn filled with wounded.... a young man called the reverend gentleman to his side, and said, "I am dying, sir; but I am not afraid to die, for I hope to go to heaven. Nor am I sorry that I have been slain in battle, for I would willingly sacrifice a dozen lives, if I had them, for such a cause as we are fighting for."
- Henry Kyd Douglas, aide to Stonewall Jackson, "It was noticeable in how much better condition were the Confederate dead...than were those of the Union Army. The latter were nearly all discolored, some black, some much decayed, while the Confederates were but little affected by the exposure...it was not difficult to guess the real cause. The Federal troops were well cared for, well fed, fat, and in good physical condition; upon them decay and decomposition made quick work. The Confederates had little flesh upon them, no fat, nothing to decay. The difference was so marked that in places the lines of battle could be distinguished by the color of the dead. The horrors of war are innumerable."

"THE BIVOUAC OF THE DEAD"

The muffled drum's sad roll has beat
The soldier's last tattoo;
No more on life's parade shall meet
That brave and fallen few.
On Fane's eternal camping ground
Their silent tents are spread,
And glory guards, with solemn round,
The bivouac of the dead.

No rumour of the foe's advance
Now swells upon the wind;
No troubled thought at midnight haunts
Of loved ones left behind;
No vision of the morrow's strife
The warrior's dream alarms;
No braying horn, nor screaming fife,
At dawn shall call to arms.

The neighboring troop, the flashing blade,
The bugle's stirring blast,
The charge, the dreadful cannonade,
The din and shout are past;
Now war's wild note nor glory's peal
Shall thrill with fierce delight
Those breasts that never more may feel
The rapture of the fight.

Like the fierce northern hurricane
That sweeps his great plateau
Flushed with the triumph yet to gain,
Came down the serried foe.
Who heard the thunder of the fray
Break o'er the field beneath,
Knew well the watchword of that day
Was "Victory or death."

Long had the doubtful conflict raged
O'er all that stricken plain,
For never fiercer fight had waged
The vengeful blood of Spain;
And still the storm of battle blew,
Still swelled the glory tide;
Not long, our stout chieftain knew,
Such odds his strength could bide.

'Twas in that hour his stern command
Called to a martyr's grave
The flower of his beloved land
The nation's flag to save.
By the rivers of their fathers' gore
His first-born laurels grew,
And well he deemed the sons would pour
Their lives for glory too.

Sons of the Dark and Bloody Ground,
Ye must not slumber there,
Where stranger steps and tongues resounds
Along the heedless air;
Your own proud land's heroic soil
Shall be your fitter grave;
She claims from war his richest spoil
The ashes of her brave.

Rest on, embalmed and sainted dead,
Dear as the blood ye gave;
No impious footstep here shall tread
The herbage of your grave;
Nor shall your glory be forgot
While Fame her record keeps,
On Honour points the hallowed spot
Where Valour proudly sleeps.

You marble minstrel's voiceless stone,
In deathless song shall tell,
When many a vanished age hath flown,
The story how ye fell;
Nor wreck, nor change, nor winter's blight,
Nor Time's remorseless doom,
Shall dim on ray of glory's light
Tha gilds your deathless tomb.

Written in August, 1847 by
Theodore O'Hara, to commemorate
the Americans slain in the
Mexican War battle at Buena Vista,
Feb. 22-23, 1847.

(Stanzas of this poem, cast into
iron tablets, are Mounted in
Antietam National Cemetery, and
in other Civil War cemeteries
established by the War Department
and now administered by the
National Park Service)

STOP: INTEGRATION PHASE

- OBJECTIVES:
1. Require students to analyze the previous phases and integrate what they learned in each into a coherent overall view.
 2. Provide a mechanism through which students may organize and articulate their impressions of both the Maryland Campaign and the lessons derived from its study.
 3. Let students gain additional insights from sharing their impressions with their peers.
 4. Solicit student comments on the Staff Ride performance and suggestions for improvement.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

- Objective: Direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
- Offensive: Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
- Mass: Concentrate combat power at the decisive time and place.
- Economy of Force: Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.
- Maneuver: Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.
- Unity of Command: For every objective, insure unity of effort under one responsible commander.
- Security: Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.
- Surprise: Strike the enemy at a time and/or place and in a manner for which he is unprepared.
- Simplicity: Prepare, clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to insure thorough understanding.

MODERN RELIGIOUS SUPPORT DURING COMBAT OPERATIONS

- Nurture the living...care for casualties...honor the dead

INTEGRATION PHASE (CONTINUED)

BATTLEFIELD ANALYSIS TO BE PERFORMED BY UNIT MINISTRY TEAM (UMT)

- Type of combat action (ie defense, offense, withdrawl, retrograde, delay)
- Threat analysis of the battlefield
- The "main effort"
- The proposed "flow of battle"
- The elements reflecting the highest risk