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
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
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
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VOLUME III, PART 14

SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE KOREAN CONFLICT
AND THEIR SOLUTIONS

This monograph was compiled by personnel of the Historical Section, EUSAK, and the Eighth Army Historical Service Detachment (Prov). Principal research and preparation of the manuscript was the work of 1st Lt. Martin Blumenson, except for Chapters VII and VIII, which were written by Capt. Edward C. Williamson and 1st Lt. William D. Magnes, respectively. Information was secured both from interviews with informed personnel, and from official documents of GHQ FEC, EUSAK, and EUSAK subordinate units.

The manuscript was edited in the Office, Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Only minor editorial changes have been made by this office. The classification of this document is SECRET; handling and regrading will be accomplished in accordance with the provisions of AR 380 - 5.

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AG 314.7 (5 Feb 52)MHS 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal

HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND, APO 500, 17 June 1952

TO: The Adjutant General, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: HIS

1. The attached monograph has been reviewed in this Headquarters and the following general comments appear to be in order:

a. The monograph is interesting, informative, and of high value as a document for use by Army agencies.

b. The statements made in this monograph are substantially correct. However, Chapter II, "X Corps" should be read with full awareness of the fact that this monograph presents the Eighth Army viewpoint. The whole account must be considered in the light of the tactical situation at the time. The decisions made were, of course, the decisions considered to be the ones most likely to bring success to our forces.

2. Attention is invited to inclosure 2 which contains the thoughtful comments of Colonel A. D. Smith, formerly ACofS G4, X Corps. Colonel Smith is now Chief of Plans and Operations Division, G4 Section, Headquarters, FEC.

3. X Corps' point of view on the matters discussed in this monograph can be obtained by consulting X Corps' Command Reports for the period as well as numerous X Corps operational studies prepared and distributed widely by that headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

2 Incls
Trip copy Incl 1 w/d
Added 1 Incl
2. Comments, Col Smith

C. C. B. WARDEN
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

Copy furnished:
CG, EIGHTH ARMY, APO 301

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* Statement follows Chapter II.

CHAPTER I

KMAG

BackgroundOrganization and Mission

The United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) came into being in July 1949. With the mission of developing the internal security forces of the Republic of Korea within the limitations of the Korean economy, KMAG was to advise and assist the Republic of Korea in the organization, administration, and training of the Korean military forces. Further, KMAG was to insure that the Korean military forces made effective use of any forthcoming United States military aid. In the event of civil strife or hostile incursions into Korea, KMAG personnel were to advise local Korean commanders in combat areas and to "use every available means short of actual command or active combat participation in hostilities, to encourage the South Korean Security Forces to resist most effectively."

Limited to a maximum complement of 500, KMAG was an integral part of the American Mission in Korea (AMIK) and as such was under the overall direction of the United States ambassador to Korea. Yet KMAG was authorized to communicate directly with the United States Department of

*These consisted of the Army, the Coast Guard, and the National Police. This chapter deals only with KMAG responsibilities to the Korean Army. KMAG was relieved of its responsibilities to the Coast Guard soon after the outbreak of hostilities in 1950. The National Police is treated in connection with "Rear Area Security," Chapter VII.

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the Army, and was instructed to keep the Commander in Chief, Far East Command, informed on military matters.

Establishing the Advisory Pattern

The Korean Army was created as the Korean Constabulary, and U.S. advisors, who retained "certain necessary controls," functioned under the direction of the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea. On 1 December 1948, when the Korean Department of Internal Security became the Department of National Defense and the Korean Constabulary became the Korean Army, ninety U.S. officers were acting in an advisory capacity. In 1949, as the Korean Army strength rose to about 65,000, a U.S. advisory group numbering 500 was authorized. In July 1949, after North Korean Forces had raided across the 38th parallel in May and June, KMAG was formed. Its organization, mission, and function were derived from previous U.S. advisory experience.

The advisory method consisted of having a U.S. adviser work with a particular Korean command or staff officer. These U.S. and Korean officers were termed each other's counterpart. Thus, while the adviser exercised no direct authority over the Korean Army, he was in a position to control operations by influence, suggestion, and guidance.

The system had been tested under combat conditions as early as October 1948, when a communist-inspired rebellion broke out in a ROK regiment. The nine-day campaign which ensued included tracking down rebels who had fled to the mountains, and it caused the death of about 1,000 combatants. This campaign, in addition to training commanders, staff, and units in field operations, demonstrated that

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a U.S. adviser could successfully advise "his counterpart even in battle."

The North Korean attacks on ROK territory in 1949 indicated the necessity for advisers to concentrate on teaching U.S. tactics to the Korean Army, which persisted in using Japanese methods of attack and defense. During the subsequent North Korean attacks and invasions that occurred in 1949 and early 1950, KMAG officers were able to develop the techniques of functioning as an advisory group in combat; similarly, the Korean Army became accustomed to working in close conjunction with U.S. advisers.

Two North Korean guerrilla columns, each over 300 in number, which crossed the border in March 1950, comprised the last North Korean threat before the outbreak of hostilities in June. These enemy columns were destroyed by the Korean Army. At the same time, National Police battalions, which had been organized as antiguerrilla units to free Korean Army units for training in defense of the 38th parallel, appeared to have eliminated the guerrilla menace in the interior of South Korea. By May 1950, both the parallel and the interior were "exceedingly quiet," and continued quiet until 25 June 1950.²

The Situation before 25 June 1950

Although the Korean Army theoretically could exist without KMAG, KMAG had little existence apart from the Korean Army. As one officer termed it, KMAG was "parasite in reverse," a body attached to the Korean Army to give the Korean Army direction and guidance. Consequently, the problems of the Korean Army were the problems of KMAG. What then

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were the problems of KMAG and the Korean Army just before 25 June 1950?

On 15 June 1950, the Korean Army numbered 94,808; the National Police, organized for internal security and antiguerrilla activity, totaled 48,273. Eight divisions, four of which had only two regiments, and two separate regiments comprised the Korean Army organization. Four divisions and one regiment defended the 38th parallel; the remainder was in reserve. Yet this force, which appeared formidable enough, was hardly prepared for a situation which was to develop into a major operation. "Full scale defensive operations with the equipment on hand," reported KMAG on 15 June 1950, "can be supported fully for approximately 10 to 15 days."

The Korean Army logistical situation had steadily deteriorated. Supply and service could be provided only on a bare subsistence standard. The six-month supply of spare parts originally provided by the United States was exhausted. Fifteen percent of the weapons and 35 percent of the vehicles of the Korean Army were estimated unserviceable. Because the Korean economy lacked the resources to provide military equipment and supplies from its own production or from foreign exchange, the situation would remain very critical, reported KMAG, until United States aid was forthcoming and until Korean political and economic conditions were improved by a "greater display of ability and leadership and sounder political and economic philosophy above the C/S [Korean Army] level." "The US investment in Korea," KMAG warned, "cannot be assured of adequate protection until delivery of military

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aid, . . . [is effected]."

Added to this basic problem were deficiencies in Korean practices and concepts due largely to simple lack of experience and training. A sound basis in regulations, orders, doctrine, and SOP's had never been established. Allowances of supply and equipment, instructions for handling them, maintenance procedure, and other logistical matters were prescribed largely by piecemeal, unco-ordinated, and inadequate instructions. Unsound procurement practices and fiscal and financial procedures were in force. Weak staff and command procedure at all levels was apparent. Improper planning, co-ordination, and supervision were obvious. Irresponsible handling of funds, supplies, and equipment was customary. Unregulated distribution, improper salvage, poor supply discipline, defective maintenance systems, and careless property accounting further precluded efficient and effective operations of the Korean military force.

The Impact of the North Korean Attack

Early Confusion

The North Korean attack on 25 June 1950 achieved complete surprise. Initial gains were exploited with energy as the enemy made maximum use of his tanks and artillery. Enemy aircraft were active over Seoul and its surrounding areas. By the end of the first day it appeared obvious that the Korean Army could not halt the enemy advance. The South Koreans were unable to cope with the armor and the numerical superiority of the invading forces. KMAC personnel who were cut off on the Ongjin Peninsula were evacuated to Seoul by KMAC pilots in L-5 planes. With

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no outside aid expected, evacuation from Korea of AMIK and KMAG civilians and dependents by plane and ship began on 26 June. Between 25 and 30 June, the steady advance of numerically superior enemy forces with superior arms and equipment continued as the enemy made his major effort down the Uijongbu corridor. Guerrillas became active in the southeast and southwest portions of Korea. Secondary attacks developed on the Kimpo peninsula and in the Imwonjin area.

Confusion marked the military and civil situation in South Korea. Demolition of one of the main Han River bridges while it was still in use killed an estimated 400 soldiers and refugees. Destruction of all Han bridges in the Seoul area cut off elements of four Korean Army divisions, which were able to withdraw southward across the river only in small boats.

When the enemy threatened Seoul on 26 June, most of the KMAG personnel were sent to Japan. About 90 KMAG officers remained with the Korean Army. That afternoon word was received from Tokyo, that a small GHQ staff was on its way to Korea, that United States aid was forthcoming, and that air support would be available on the following day.

KMAG personnel in the Pusan area, who were instructed by the United States ambassador to evacuate U.S. personnel to Japan, worked feverishly. In the very early morning of 28 June, word came from Tokyo that aid in the form of supplies and equipment, and possibly U.S. troops, would soon arrive in Korea. KMAG personnel were ordered to remain. The ten officers who comprised the KMAG force in the Pusan area took over the port, railroads, and airfield there. When they heard that two vessels were en route from Japan with arms and ammunition,

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one KMAG officer in the absence of cryptograph experts ingeniously worked out a code based on Field Manual 101-10 so that he might learn over the one telephone line connecting Pusan and Tokyo which types of equipment and supplies were coming. Understaffed and unprepared for the volume of equipment and supplies which soon began to arrive, KMAG personnel continued their endeavors to reduce chaos to order. Because communications between Pusan and the front lines did not exist, no one in the Pusan area had any idea of the Korean Army troop dispositions or of the extent of the North Korean penetration and advance. Railroad cars brought Korean wounded and dead into Pusan, where in the early days of the conflict they could not receive adequate care in the absence of facilities. Walking wounded carried nonambulatory patients on mats, on boards, and on doors taken off buildings.

The Beginning of U.S. Organization

On 28 June 1950, the Commander in Chief, Far East Command, assumed operational control of all United States military activities in Korea, including those of KMAG. CINCFE exercised control through the Chief, GHQ Advance Command Liaison Group (GHQ ADCOM), Brig. Gen. John H. Church, who arrived in Korea on that day. The primary mission of GHQ ADCOM, which established its headquarters in Suwon, was the reconstitution of the disorganized and depleted Korean Army.

During those early days of disintegration and collapse, KMAG regarded itself as attached to GHQ ADCOM. KMAG personnel moved with that headquarters from Suwon to Taejon on 30 June, while the Korean

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Army headquarters remained in Suwon. On the following day, however, five KMAG officers were sent back to Suwon to be with the Korean Army headquarters and the field units "to encourage them and send back information." The preconflict patterns of KMAG operations, the technique of advising Korean counterparts, had temporarily vanished.

On 4 July 1950, United States Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) was established under the command of Maj. Gen. William F. Dean. This organization assumed control over GHQ ADCOM and KMAG. Nine days later, EUSAK assumed command of ground forces in Korea, and on 17 July, in accordance with President Syngman Rhee's desires, the Commanding General, EUSAK, assumed command of the Korean Army.

Shortly after the arrival of EUSAK and its stabilizing influence, the Korean situation began to show evidences of organization. As increased personnel became available, United States Army procedures began to be followed. Information on the tactical situation became available, and KMAG began to function in accordance with its mission. In addition to performing its advisory mission, KMAG began to act as a fact-gathering agency for EUSAK by reporting on Korean Army dispositions and capabilities. Furthermore, KMAG made certain that the Korean Army understood and followed EUSAK directives. By September, although the situation continued critical, military operations were being conducted in a normal manner. The five remaining Korean Army divisions, after fighting isolated regimental and division combat team actions during the first ten weeks of the

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conflict, were consolidated into one solid front running from a point northwest of Taegu to the east coast a few miles from Pohang-Dong.⁵

KMAG's Immediate Problem

The problem of KMAG, simply stated, was that of keeping the Korean Army in the conflict. It was estimated that 70 percent of the Korean Army supplies was lost north of the Han River. Although the premature destruction of the Han River bridges prevented the evacuation of much of the supplies and equipment to the south, about 35 percent of the Korean Army vehicles had been deadlined awaiting maintenance on 25 June 1950; consequently, these vehicles would have been lost even if the bridges had not been destroyed. Of the 95,000 effective personnel comprising the Korean Army on 25 June 1950, only about 40,000 remained on 10 July. One week later, this figure rose to an estimate of 46,000.

So great was the impact of the North Korean attack that the resulting loss in personnel and equipment dictated the inactivation of three Korean Army divisions. Five divisions remained, each with an approximate strength of 7,900. This situation prevailed until about 20 July, when the process of rebuilding the Korean Army commenced.

For keeping the Korean Army in the field and preventing it from surrendering or collapsing completely during the early days of the conflict, KMAG must receive full credit. For solving most of the seemingly insolvable problems that faced KMAG, particularly in the first weeks of the conflict, there was no recourse but to the ingenuity

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of the individual KMAG officers who performed magnificently.

Keeping the Korean Army in the War

The Problems of Command and Operations

✓ Faced with a disintegrating Korean Army, KMAG assumed a responsibility beyond its normal limits of activity. Although formally and officially acting in an advisory capacity, KMAG had most of the problems of the Korean Army devolve upon itself for solution. Training that the Korean Army had absorbed before the conflict began was in large part lost in the general confusion and distrust that appeared during the days immediately following 25 June 1950. Utter disregard of command responsibility and flagrant disobedience of orders occurred within the ranks of the Korean Army during this time of extreme crisis. The inexperience of the Korean staff on problems that had never arisen during peacetime, the small numbers of KMAG personnel, and the critical nature of the tactical situation made it impossible for KMAG to insist upon its purely advisory capacity. It ✓ was necessary for KMAG to become operational, and it did so. In the ✓ rapid turnover of Korean Army officers, KMAG personnel in many cases preserved a continuity of action. For example, between 25 June and 31 July, three different Korean officers successively held the post of G - 1. When it early became apparent that the Korean Army ✓ Logistical Section was unable to function because of the seeming unawareness of the Korean G - 4 of his responsibility and the ignorance of his staff, U.S. advisers quickly assumed full control of logistical

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operations. Detailed planning, allocations, the preparation of requisitions, the publication of administrative orders and directives, the routing of transportation, the shipment of supplies, equipment, and personnel, receipt, distribution, and storage functions of the major items of equipment and supplies were performed by KMAG personnel. Throughout the Korean Army, at all echelons, it was necessary for KMAG advisers to exercise command functions. In order to obtain cooperation from Korean personnel, KMAG issued strict directives and closely supervised execution. Harsh methods were necessary to obtain the required results.

Problems of Personnel and Training

When the Korean Army withdrew from Seoul, most of its records and documents were lost. Korean Army units were dispersed; individuals were scattered. No clear idea of the strength or disposition of much of the Korean Army existed. Due largely to the insistence of the KMAG advisers, unit rosters were submitted to Korean Army headquarters in August 1950. At about this time, morning reports began to be received.

Two needs at once became apparent -- additional units and adequate replacements.

The activation of one Korean Army division per month was planned for an eighth-month period. Actually, however, six divisions were activated in four months to comply with the accelerated rate demanded by EUSAK. With the Korean recruiting system in chaos, the formation of these new units bordered on the miraculous.

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✓ Prior to the conflict, each Korean division trained its own replacements. No replacement training centers existed, although plans were being made to establish a centralized Army-wide replacement training system.

✓ Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, the Korean Army gathered together approximately 16,000 recruits and assembled them in four locations. Before training could begin, however, the rapid enemy advance forced two of these projected replacement training centers to close. The recruits were moved to Taegu and Pusan, where training centers began to operate. Initially, a ten-day cycle of training was contemplated, but even this abbreviated training period had to be shortened because of the critical need for replacements. Although individual "battle indoctrination" was part of the curriculum, the basic course for Korean Army recruits was rifle marksmanship. A "complete lecture on morale" was also given. Emphasis was placed on "practical" training, a training that would provide the individual soldier within the minimum period of time the ability "to destroy the puppet army," which had invaded South Korea.

✓ From the first, training was hampered by limited facilities. The initial loss of weapons made shortages so acute that rifles and machine guns could not be spared from the combat elements for training purposes. During the first four weeks of the conflict, the shortage of small arms was particularly acute. Old Japanese rifles and unserviceable weapons were used so that trainees could fire a few rounds on the range. On 25 July 1950, a limited number of small arms was issued to

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training centers by the 2d Logistical Command, which wanted to use trainees as a reserve and antiguerrilla force.

Range practice and the issue of uniforms for replacements commenced at the rate of 600 a day at Taegu; 300 replacements a day were shipped from Pusan to Taegu for completion of their clothing issue.

Closely allied to the problem of replacement training was that of reinstating the Army school system. The first officers candidate class began its schooling on 28 August 1950. Composed of lieutenants of the Youth Defense Corps (a National Guard bureau) and Korean Military Academy cadets, this class graduated on 10 September 1950. Another class, consisting of selected noncommissioned officers, received instruction between 4 and 18 September 1950. The graduates of the classes together totaled 273 officers.

Instruction for the technical specialists needed by the arms and services was received on the job.

The brevity and the haste of the initial training and school programs, designed to meet an immediate and critical situation, resulted in a variety of additional problems that had to be met later.

Problems of Logistical Support

The problems of logistical support were complicated not only by the heavy losses in equipment and supplies sustained by the North Korean Army but also by the tremendous losses suffered by U.S. troops in the early engagements. Priority for re-equipment was given to

U.S. units, and the heavy U.S. losses during the first sixty days of the conflict precluded, in large part, equipping the Korean Army from U.S. stocks. Added to this was the need for equipping and supplying new Korean units at the accelerated rate of activation demanded by EUSAK.

When the Eighth Army arrived in Korea, it had no stocks of supply. The U.S. 24th Infantry Division, which was to have brought thirty days of all classes of supply to Korea, was not anxious to make issues to the Korean Army, and understandably so. Even in Japan, initially, there was a shortage of stocks since there had been no forewarning of a conflict of major proportions.

Two factors made extremely difficult the efficient distribution of the small amount of supplies and equipment KMAG secured for the Korean Army. First, the Korean Army had very few vehicles. Secondly, the railroad facilities were overburdened with U.S. troops and supplies.

In order to overcome these logistical problems of apparently impossible solution, KMAG officers were forced to the utmost in the exercise of their ingenuity. Supplies were diverted from Japan Logistical Command stocks and later from EUSAK stocks to re-equip and supply the Korean forces.

In addition to meeting these operational exigencies, KMAG personnel had to organize technical and service units. Ordnance companies, quartermaster truck companies, engineer groups, and signal operating battalions had to be formed. Because of the need for these units on the line, personnel received only on-the-job training.

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In the Pusan area, KMAG officers working to prepare facilities to receive the tremendous volume of U.S. troops, equipment, and supplies found that the Koreans lacked the ability to conceive of or imagine the tremendous flow which was to arrive. Bewildered by the quantity of matériel as well as its bulk, Koreans were unable to improvise facilities, such as flat-car loading ramps capable of supporting tanks and howitzers. Specific direction and close supervision on the part of KMAG personnel were necessary in order to prepare and organize installations for the reception of this matériel. ⁹

Rebuilding the Korean Army

The Changing Emphasis of KMAG

After the first days of frenzy, KMAG's operations, as did those of other organizations, became somewhat more balanced. Problems still remained to be solved, but there was at least organization. Assumptions could be made with some degree of accuracy, and plans could be developed. With the exception of the period of the Chinese offensive of November and December 1950, when KMAG's operations for a time resembled closely those immediately following 25 June 1950, KMAG proceeded to turn more and more of its attention to training the Korean Army, to the end of having it achieve a self-sufficiency in combat. This was aided by a change on the part of EUSAK in its operational conception. In November 1950 three Korean Army corps, each with three Korean Army divisions, were operating in the eastern sector of the peninsula. Korean Army-EUSAK relations existed through KMAG.

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✓ EUSAK issued its directives in general form, leaving KMAG the responsibility for working out the detailed planning. After the Chinese offensive in November and December 1950, Korean Army divisions were committed beside U.S. divisions, as KMAG had recommended earlier. As EUSAK gradually assumed a more direct control over the operational activities of the Korean Army, KMAG was able, by the spring of 1951, to suspend in large part its function as a combat G - 3 agency and to concentrate on other aspects of its mission. Most important was its efforts to rebuild Korean military self-confidence. This ✓ it accomplished by thoroughly overhauling the Korean military educational system.

Training of Individuals

The extraordinary accomplishment of KMAG can best be gauged ✓ from the fact that the 50,000-man Korean Army which remained after the initial weeks of the conflict was expanded to a force of 250,000 in the period of one year. This meant that the replacement and ✓ school system originally designed to support a 100,000-man army had to be similarly expanded. This was in addition to the combat casualties, which had to be replaced. A total of approximately 300,000 replacements was provided.

While training was carried out to meet the immediate exigencies of the tactical situation in the early days of the war, plans were ✓ made for the institution of a complete school and training system, so that "a self-sustaining Army for the Republic of Korea" could be

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insured.

The regular officers candidate course was established on 4 September 1950 at Tongnae, near Pusan, with a course consisting of four weeks of branch-immaterial training and two to four weeks of special training, depending on the arm or service. On 15 November 1950 the length of the course was increased by three weeks of basic training to precede branch-immaterial training, in order to overcome deficiencies apparent in the field of officers who had received too hasty and too brief training.

By September 1950, seven replacement training centers were training basic enlisted replacements. Training for military specialists varied from on-the-job training to four weeks of school. In February 1951, the Korean Army Ground General School established separate schools to train infantry, signal, engineer, ordnance, and artillery personnel. Each school conducted its own officer candidate courses, officer basic and advanced courses, and courses for enlisted technicians or specialists. At the same time, the replacement training centers were inactivated, and one training center was established with a capacity of 14,000 recruits.

At the end of March 1951 the Korean Army, assisted by KMAG, was conducting the following training institutions: the Infantry Schools; the noncommissioned Leaders School; the Infantry Replacement Training Center; the Artillery Center; the Engineer Training Center; the Ordnance School; the Quartermaster School; the Medical School; the

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Signal Training School; the Military Police School; the WAC Training Center; the Band Training Unit; the Field Finance Training Unit.

In contrast with the training based on expediency that marked the early stages of the conflict, the Korean Army possessed a complete school and training program. The Chief, KMAG, was able to write at the end of April 1951, as follows:

Because of the rapid expansion of the KA since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea and because all the original training establishments of the KA were overrun in the initial stages of the war, the expansion of training installations has not kept pace with the training requirements of the expanded Korean forces. However, the capabilities of the KA education system are being improved and expanded as rapidly as the operational and logistical situation will permit, and are rapidly approaching the final requirements to support fully the present forces.

It is expected that this integrated replacement and school system, patterned after that of the US Army, will be fully operational on the basis of the expanded requirements by 1 Sep 51.

The program included the establishment of a Command and General Staff College to open on 10 December 1951, and the re-establishment of the Korean Military Academy by 3 January 1952.

A major problem in the establishment of the military educational system of the Korean Army was the lack of qualified instructors. Combat experienced commissioned and noncommissioned officers, needed with the combat elements, were not available as instructors. The Korean social system, emphasizing the importance of rank without reference to ability, prevented the use of sergeant instructors for classes composed of officers. Similarly, in the enlisted ranks qualified technicians and specialists could not always be used in

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direct relation to their ability.

Other problems connected with enlarging the training program of the Korean Army included obtaining equipment for training, securing adequate physical examinations for recruits before they reached the training centers, transporting personnel and supplies to the training centers and schools (the problem of water transportation to Cheju-do, which had to be worked out with EUSAK), expanding the limited facilities and building new camps and training sites.

As an example of the physical needs of the growing system, a second replacement training center, planned to open on 1 November 1951 with a total capacity of 18,000 recruits, presented the following construction requirements: kitchens, washrooms, latrines, utilities, roads, firing ranges, an airstrip, 400 prefabricated tropical shells, and housing facilities for KMAG personnel numbering 50 officers and 100 enlisted men. U.S. engineer troops helped to establish this center.

Shortages of supplies was an ever-present problem. In January 1951 the lack of training ammunition made it necessary to consider men to have been trained in mortars and in rocket launchers after they had fired only one round. Particularly troublesome was the lack of adequate supplies of paper for students' notebooks and for the publication of manuals, a problem because Korea manufactured only a rice paper of inferior quality.

Because combat records of the Korean Army during the first ten months of the conflict indicated that the greatest single weakness of the Army was the lack of trained and aggressive officer leaders,

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plans were instituted and completed to send selected Korean officers to the United States to attend Army technical and service schools. This was considered particularly desirable in order to make the Korean Army self-sufficient by having an adequate nucleus of well-indoctrinated officers available as qualified instructors to implement the training of the Korean Army. In September 1951, 250 Korean Army officers departed from the Far East Command for schooling in the United States. 11

Training of Units

✓ The primary need of the Korean Army for individually trained replacements was met by the establishment of the military educational system. The continuing critical tactical situation did not permit unit or team training until the summer of 1951, even though the deficiencies of Korean unit tactics had long been noted.

As early as June 1951, the Commanding General, EUSAK, planned to rotate Korean Army divisions, one or two at a time, for sixty days' field training. Later that summer he ordered the U.S. I Corps to relieve the ROK 9th Division and move it to an assembly area where the division would be trained under the supervision of KMAG. The ten-week training program projected was to devote two weeks to the training of the individual soldier; the remainder of the time would be devoted to unit tactics and exercises. By August, a nine-week training program was scheduled for each of the ten ROK Divisions.

To fulfill the requirements of unit training, KMAG activated the Field Training Command, an organization responsible for conducting unit

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training for the Korean Army. Three training centers were initially opened, two of which were functioning in October 1951 and were giving extensive training to ROK divisions. By 1 November four field training centers were available to the Korean Army.

12

The Problem of LanguagePlacing the Burden on Koreans

The fundamental problem of KMAG operations was the language barrier. KMAG's solution was to place the burden of translation on the Koreans. This was carried to such an extreme in some instances that officer promotions in one Korean division were largely based on the ability to speak English.

One KMAG officer suggested that the United States Army should assume some of the responsibilities for overcoming the language barrier by selecting as far in advance as possible certain U.S. officers for duty with U.S. military advisory missions throughout the world. Those officers selected, he felt, should have not less than eight months of intensive training in the language, history, political, and economic background of the country to which they would be sent.

13

The Use of Interpreters

The language problem made the use of Korean interpreters imperative. Adequately trained interpreters were always in great demand and shortage always existed. Recruited from civilian life, and with little or no military experience, Korean interpreters were entitled to the pay, allowances, and privileges of a first lieutenant,

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except for the exercise of command function. Qualifications set up by the Korean Army for interpreters provided that they be high school graduates, between the ages of 21 and 35, and of sound body and mind. To have gone through bankruptcy, to have been tried by a court and imprisoned, or to have been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces disqualified a man from being an interpreter. Once an applicant was accepted, he was sent to a school where he learned military terminology. By 20 December 1950 a total of 976 interpreters had been hired. Twenty-one had been discharged, 50 were missing in action, five had been retired, 11 killed in action, and 10 wounded in action. No attempt was made to use women as interpreters because of the social status of women in Korea and because of the additional provisions for their care that would have been necessary.

14

Lines of Communication

The problem of language necessitated setting up parallel lines of communication on the lower echelons, one in Korean and one in English. Because of the shortage of trained signal communications personnel and equipment, this sometimes did not work with optimum efficiency. Orders that were co-ordinated at the top Korean Army-KMAG level sometimes reached lower echelons at different times, thereby delaying operations until orders were received by both Korean Army and KMAG officers. The Commanding General, EUSAK, was dissatisfied at least once with the delay with which reports on ROK Army dispositions reached him. Two solutions were found to overcome the problem of dual-language communications: (1) KMAG officers secured signal communications equipment

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from adjacent United States units, so that parallel communications lines would function effectively; and (2) English-speaking Koreans were employed on the switchboards, thus obviating the necessity for parallel communications systems.

15

Deficiencies of the Korean Language.

The Korean language lacked many modern words and military terms. There was, for example, no word for "electric light." Therefore, in order to designate a "headlight," the Korean said, "the rice bowl with a candle inside mounted on the fender of a truck." For the word "transmission," Koreans used "mission"; the variety of meanings for "mission" occasionally caused confusion.

Although the Japanese language contained technical words which the Koreans were able to use, the ROK President decreed that the Korean Army would not use Japanese in any of its publications, directives, and schools.

Before the outbreak of hostilities, under KMAG direction Mr. Oh, a 73-year-old man who had worked for British and U.S. concerns most of his life, compiled a technical dictionary of the Korean language. All copies of this dictionary were lost in the first few days of the conflict, as was Mr. Oh, himself. In the fall of 1951 each Korean Army Technical school was compiling a dictionary of its own to be submitted to a central agency which would then publish a complete technical dictionary.

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* At least one copy of Mr. Oh's work may be extant.

Korean DeficienciesLeadership

The tremendous accomplishment of KMAC in expanding the 50,000-man Korean Army, which remained after the initial weeks of the conflict, to an army of 250,000 was, for the most part, done without native leaders. Because the Korean people had no tradition of leadership due to the policy of the Japanese preventing Korean leaders from developing, one of the greatest obstacles in reconstituting the Korean Army was the lack of a trained officer corps.

The Korean soldier was generally praised by KMAC officers. But effective use of the excellent Korean soldier was not always made because of weak Korean officer leadership. While U.S. training was based in large part on the initiative and self-reliance of the U.S. soldier, the Korean soldier trained by his heritage to obey orders blindly, was at a loss in the absence of leadership.

The inexperience of Korean leaders was complicated by the necessarily rapid rise of officers to high rank. Company grade officers became general officers in the period of a year. By U.S. standards, Korean officers lacked initiative and drive. They tended to "take it easy" in periods of battle calm and did not enforce aggressive patrolling.

In letters sent to the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, and to the Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, written to indicate the specific deficiencies of the Korean Army officers being sent there for schooling, the Chief, KMAC, made the following observations. Because modern military methods were comparatively recent to the Korean Army, leaders of that Army, he wrote, lacked military background,

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or a "reservoir of past experience and training in solving military problems." The Korean Army, consequently, did not have the advantage of capable, reliable troop leaders and was particularly deficient in capable instructors. There was a lack of understanding among many officers of the mechanics of troop leadership and troop control. The Korean officers in many cases did not appreciate or accept the responsibilities inherent in their commission and position, primarily because of their lethargy caused by centuries of subjugation.

Specific deficiencies among infantry officers were noted as follows. They were generally unfamiliar with the technique of zeroing in a rifle. Korean small unit commanders did not fully appreciate the importance of aggressive action in attack; the proper use of supporting fires in the attack; the necessity of delaying enemy forces during withdrawal; occupying and organizing defensive positions, including the preparation of fields of fire and obstacles; the organization of strong perimeter defense; the concept of defense in depth; and the necessity for maintaining lateral contact in the offense and the defense. Korean officers were not skilled in map reading, the use of the compass, and night operations.

Deficiencies of artillery officers were listed as including the inability to reconnoiter and select positions and emplace individual pieces to mass battalion fires, to plan artillery preparations and defensive fires and barrages, to use wire and radio communication, to understand the duties and the responsibilities of liaison officers, or to recognize the importance of internal security. Lack of knowledge of command responsibility resulted in the abuse of vehicles, the

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nonperformance of first echelon maintenance, and deficiencies in field
17
sanitation.

Property Accountability and Responsibility

Because a Korean private received only 50 cents a month, it was no penalty to punish him for loss of supplies or equipment through his negligence by taking away his pay. The only way to impress supply discipline on the Korean soldier was to apply the fear motivation, an Oriental technique with which KMAG was at variance. One Korean regimental commander warned his soldiers that those who reported to the rear for medical treatment without their individual weapons would be shot.

Because a company grade Korean officer received between five and seven dollars a month, he had to supplement his income in order to maintain himself and his family. Units, therefore, sold government property or leased Army equipment to civilians. * Income thus derived was divided among commissioned officers and the first three noncommissioned grades. This caused the supply system to break down; all supplies such as tires, batteries, gasoline in excess of the unit's immediate needs were sold by the unit. Consequently, everything issued to the Korean Army had to be closely rationed and controlled. Unofficially, KMAG advisors to depots controlled the issue of supplies to units so that only the bare and immediate needs would be met. The practice of selling government property and of diverting Army equipment to unauthorized civilian use went unpunished by the Korean Government

* A truck for hauling was normally leased for 2,000,000 won a month, or approximately \$333.

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and caused some bitterness among KMAG officers.

Organizational Weakness of the Korean Army

Although the organization of the Korean Army division was based on that of the U.S. division, it lacked the fire power of the latter. A Korean division had only one battalion of 105-mm. artillery; It had no tanks, no heavy mortars. The infantry regiments had no recoilless rifles. The organic antiaircraft weapon of the Korean Army was the standard .50-caliber machine gun. Japanese trucks, used in large numbers by the Korean Army, had no ring mounts for machine guns. Consequently, a Korean division committed to responsibility of a sector did not have the tactical strength of a U.S. organization committed to an adjacent and similar sector.

In June 1951, the Commanding General, EUSAK, directed the Chief, KMAG, to institute a study of Korean Army organizations directed toward the purpose of eliminating superfluous units. This was the beginning of an attempt to bring the Korean Army organizationally up to U.S. standards.

In September 1951 plans were completed for the activation of four 155-mm. artillery battalions, one to be activated in each of the final months of the year. Although it was planned to have one tank company (22 tanks) with each division, this plan was later abandoned. In October Korean Army units began to receive instruction and training on recoilless rifles. By December 1951 each Korean Army division had a heavy mortar company attached or assigned to it.

Economic Deficiencies

One of the most serious problems concerning the ability of the

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Korean Army to achieve self-sufficiency was the ever-present shortage of supplies. The Korean economy could not support a modern mechanized army of the size required for defense of the country. The lack of industrial organization, the absence of sufficient raw materials, the deficiencies of the railroad system and the road network, and the lack of maintenance shops were some of the factors which made the future self-sufficiency of Korea doubtful.

As a result of the lack of spare parts, lubricants, and trained personnel, as well as of improper maintenance, equipment was lost.

Physical Capabilities of the Korean People

The strength necessary to operate a prime mover, to handle artillery ammunition, and to perform other such military duties was sometimes beyond the capabilities of the average Korean Army soldier who was smaller than the average American.

Problems of KMAG Operation

KMAG--Korean Army Relations and the Problems of Command

It was always a problem of the individual KMAG officer to devise means by which U.S. training, experience, and general know-how could best be imparted to, and accepted and utilized by, Korean counterparts, most of whom possessed ideas and concepts completely foreign to those that an adviser tended to regard as normal.

In this connection, the choice of an adviser was dictated to a certain extent by his being temperamentally suited for advisory work.

* One officer was of the opinion that the failure to use available lubricants properly was more important in this connection.

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Some Americans displayed a superior attitude toward the Koreans, regarding them as subservient, conquered, or occupied people rather than as allies. Personnel of this type could not be used in an advisory capacity.

Each KMAG officer had to solve the problem of how best to advise on the basis of his own personality and the circumstances of the situation. Some KMAG officers cemented good relations with Korean Army personnel by securing for Korean use such items as sugar and medicine from adjacent U.S. units, by sharing such U.S. luxuries as cigarettes, by purchasing from U.S. mail order houses inexpensive gifts, and by learning enough of the Korean language to demonstrate a respect for it. Other KMAG officers have performed their functions by sheer force of character. Still others went to more drastic extremes. One Korean officer, who was severely disciplined by a KMAG officer for inexcusable conduct, later acknowledged, "You taught me much in a short time."

Some KMAG officers felt that advisory personnel should have officially been granted that command function nominal in staff duties. They felt that in many cases it was impossible to carry out the mission described since they could not advise a local commander in a combat zone without actively participating in combat.

Furthermore, the exigencies of the moment resulted many times in advisers inaugurating and completely staffing a plan without the knowledge of their Korean counterparts. The problem then of having the plan implemented by Korean commanders and staffs who had had no hand in its formulation resulted frequently in faulty execution or in confusion, and in some instances in distrust. Unquestionably, there were many

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critical periods in which time did not permit advisers to follow a line of action purely advisory. In matters of life and death, advisers felt justified in taking action best calculated to secure the most satisfactory results. In such instances, they assumed command.

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Living in the Field

With one headquarters in Taegu and individuals dispersed throughout Korea, KMAG had a difficult problem in insuring adequate provisions for proper distribution of food, mail, and medical care to its own personnel. The dispersion of detachments, poor roads, limited transportation, and prolonged periods of bad weather complicated this logistical support. KMAG officers serving with Korean units slept in borrowed tents and obtained U.S. rations, spare parts, and gasoline from near-by U.S. units. For the most part, they ate Korean food until U.S. canned rations began to be received in November 1950.

The few KMAG officers were so scattered and isolated that it was difficult to make adequate logistical arrangements for them.

By 1951, however, KMAG officers in the field had increased in

* Korean unit officers did make available to KMAG officers as a special issue of an unofficial nature quantities of chickens, eggs, and beef.

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number, thereby making their support less of a problem. A KMAG supply officer was appointed to serve with each Korean Army corps in order to expedite KMAG logistical support in that sector.

Personnel Shortage

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The shortage of KMAG personnel caused heavy individual work loads and precluded the possibility of doing more than the necessities of the immediate moment. Thus, long-range plans and policy were not possible for many months; nor were long-range aims able to be organized

* There were nine KMAG officers who worked with a Korean Army corps. These included the senior adviser, the assistant senior adviser, and advisers for the G - 1, G - 2, G - 3, G - 4, the engineer officer, and the signal officer; the supply officer acted as headquarters commandant and as the enlisted detachment commander. Two noncommissioned operations officers, two field communications chiefs, two mess stewards, two mechanics, one medical aid man, one cook, two clerk-typists, one light truck driver, one supply sergeant, and one supply clerk comprised the KMAG enlisted personnel.

With each Korean Army division were a senior adviser, an assistant senior adviser, an adviser for the G - 1 and G - 4, and adviser for the G - 2 and G - 3, a division artillery adviser, an engineer adviser, and a signal adviser. There were three regimental advisers, one for each regiment, and nine battalion advisers, one for each battalion.

** KMAG Strength (figures furnished by AG, KMAG)

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total</u>
25 June 1950	183	286	469
31 December 1950	367	392	759
30 June 1951	414	559	973
30 October 1951	578	940	1518
3 December 1951	672	1140	1812

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in procedures (SOPs), regulations, and circulars.

The heavy work loads, the frustrations of the language barrier, and the irritations of working with people unfamiliar with U.S. procedures caused fatigue and strain on KMAG personnel. ²⁴

Conclusion

KMAG accomplished its mission of advising, assisting, and training the Korean Army within the limits of the Korean economy and of insuring effective use of United States aid. During this period of armed conflict, (1950 - 51), the Korean Army was expanded beyond the capacity of the Korean Government to support it. The ultimate effectiveness of the Korean Army will depend upon the government support and outside assistance made available to it.

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CHAPTER II

X CORPS

On 13 July 1950, Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, Commanding General, Eighth Army, assumed command of ground forces in Korea. ²⁵ Ten days later CINCPAC informed the Department of the Army of a plan to land two divisions amphibiously in the rear of hostile lines in order to envelop and destroy the enemy in conjunction with the Eighth U.S. Army, Korea (EUSAK) attack northward from the Pusan perimeter. ²⁶

X Corps was designated to make an amphibious landing in September, and its planning staff was formed on 15 August. Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, designated Commanding General, X Corps, continued as Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, Far East Command. ²⁷

The concept of the amphibious landing was that of a wide envelopment by X Corps in the vicinity of Inchon and rapid advance to Seoul to cut the main enemy line of communications. It was hoped that this operation, in co-ordination with a northward drive by EUSAK, would trap a large part of the North Korean Army. If a rapid link-up of EUSAK and X Corps were not possible, however, X Corps was to be capable of maintaining itself independently. ²⁸

To enable X Corps to operate independently, General Douglas MacArthur Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), authorized X Corps additional allowances of personnel and equipment. Augmentation included service-type units. ²⁹ CINCUNC also directed X Corps to establish a minimum 15-day level for all classes of supply by D plus 10, and a minimum 30-day level by a later date. EUSAK, however, was to be prepared to assume logistical support of X Corps after junction

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of the two forces and upon order of the United Nations Command. Although³⁰
X Corps was to operate directly under CINCUNC until otherwise directed,³¹
it was believed, and it appeared a logical assumption, that EUSAK would
take command of X Corps some time after the forces joined.³²

While efforts in Japan were directed toward preparing X Corps
for the Inchon landing, EUSAK forces were compressed into the Pusan-
Taegu perimeter. EUSAK requested that the 5th Field Artillery Group,
the 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. self-propelled
howitzers), and the 96th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. howitzers)
be sent to Korea for "urgent immediate use." Before the Eighth Army
was committed to Korea, these units, with others, had been transferred
to the 7th Infantry Division for training in Japan. Subsequently, they
were held for the Inchon landing. EUSAK needed artillery so desperately
that on 22 August it requested these units even on a temporary basis,
"pending other commitment when they can be released."³³ The units
arrived in Korea as part of the X Corps landing force at Inchon on
15 September 1950.³⁴

Because EUSAK elements were so hard pressed in the early days of
the conflict, CINCUNC released the 2d Infantry Division to EUSAK.^{**}
During the very early stages of the Inchon planning, thought had
been given to using this organization with the 1st Marine Division to
make the landing, but later the 7th Infantry Division was substituted
for the 2d Division. The 7th Division had furnished replacements to all

* Annex D, Operation Order 1, GHQ UNC, states: "After CG, Eighth
Army assumes command of X Corps. . . ."

** The division advance party and the 9th Infantry Regiment arrived
in Korea on 30 July.

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divisions in Korea and was 488 officers and 9,099 men below table of organization authorization when preparations were begun to build it up to tactical strength. ³⁵ As equipment, personnel, and supplies were diverted to the 7th Infantry Division, some EUSAK shortages could not be filled. ³⁶ On 21 September, in a telephone conversation with the Acting Chief of Staff, GHQ, the army commander stated: "I'm ready to break loose if it weren't for the physical trouble." ³⁷

The surprise landing at Inchon on 15 September was effected with light losses to friendly elements. On 21 September, the Commanding General, X Corps, assumed command of ground forces within the beach-head. ^{**} Five days later, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (EUSAK) and the 7th Infantry Division (X Corps) made contact in the vicinity of Osan. ³⁸ Had EUSAK assumed command of X Corps at this time, a divided command and its attendant problems would have been avoided.

On 23 September, in reply to a message from CINCFE, ³⁹ the Army commander made the statement, paraphrased as follows: ⁴⁰

Eighth Army is now attacking on a front of 150 miles with four U.S. divisions and six Republic of Korea (ROK) divisions. Although there are strong indications of the deterioration of enemy forces, there is no indication of a large-scale withdrawal in front of Eighth Army except that which is being forced by friendly attack.

Principal objectives in the ROK Army zone are the important communications centers of Andong and Chungju. Control of these in conjunction with the seizure of Suwon by X Corps would cut off all major routes of escape for enemy forces remaining in southwest Korea.

There are still four enemy divisions on the eastern front that should be eliminated by the ROK Army. Three of these are

* "Physical trouble" referred to lack of material.

** The Navy was in command of the landing.

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being engaged by ROK I Corps, which has committed all of its divisions. In order to satisfy the requirement set forth in CINCFE's message, one of these ROK I Corps divisions now fully engaged with the enemy must be withdrawn.

Further considerations are that ten days will be needed to move this ROK division to another front, a loss which comes at a critical time, and that such a move will involve transportation urgently needed for current operation.

Provided the urgency of the X Corps situation requires movement of one division despite the foregoing consideration, an estimated five days will be necessary to withdraw one ROK division and assemble it at Pusan for loading.

During this period, EUSAK knowledge of the X Corps mission was limited to the information contained in UNC Operation Order Number 1, which instructed X Corps to land at Inchon and make juncture with EUSAK. On 26 September, the army commander sent CINCUNC the following ⁴¹ message:

To facilitate advance planning for the approaching junction with X Corps, rqt this hq be kept informed of plans and progress this corps to greatest extent practicable. To date X Corps operations plans have not been received.

⁴² EUSAK received no reply. On the following day, CINCUNC instructed X ⁴³ Corps to prepare to execute a new GHQ-directed operation.

✓ Elements of the 1st Cavalry Division that made contact with X Corps were a great distance from EUSAK supply installations, and EUSAK stocks were not at high levels. Consequently, EUSAK felt that it would be expeditious for the forward elements of the 1st Cavalry Division initially to be supplied by X Corps. ⁴⁴ EUSAK supported the 1st Cavalry Division overland from Tawgu because a message from CINCUNC on 17 September stated that except for emergency issues, ⁴⁵ forward units of EUSAK would not be supplied by X Corps.

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The United Nations Command sought to allocate supplies in an equitable manner. When the Commanding General, X Corps, requested that the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team be air landed in Korea, he assumed that cargo tonnage allocations to X Corps would be increased to 850 tons daily. GHQ replied:

[It is] not considered advisable to make definite commitment of daily airlift to X Corps.

Cargo tonnage lift made available through cancellation of airdrop of 187th Abn RCT will be distributed in accordance with over-all theatre needs.

On the same day, 27 September, CINUNC advised the Commanding General, X Corps, as follows:

1. Since the beginning of the current X Corps operation staff officers from X Corps have made requests for various types of supplies through GHQ G - 4 Staff Section. Every effort has been made to comply with the requests but in two recent cases difficulty has arisen leading to the delay in receipt by X Corps of needed supplies.

2. It is desired that staff officers, your hq, be instructed to make their requests for supplies through appropriate channels to Japan Logistical Command in order that supply action on urgently needed supplies can be made more expeditiously.

Shortly after junction was made between EUSAK and X Corps elements, the operation indicated that at least a regimental combat team should be dispatched to Chunchon to cut off approximately 6,000 North Koreans. Had X Corps been under EUSAK control, EUSAK would have directed it to do so. But when X Corps commenced its preparations for a new amphibious operation, EUSAK, on 1 October, authorized the ROK 6th Division to secure Chunchon without delay. The city was taken on 2 October.

UNC Operation Order Number 2, instructing EUSAK to attack north to Pyongyang, directed X Corps to outload from Inchon and Pusan, land in the Wonsan area, and attack west toward Pyongyang to

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✓ effect a juncture with the Eighth Army. EUSAK was given responsibility for the logistical support of all United Nations forces in Korea. It was also enjoined to give priority at Inchon and Pusan to outloading X Corps units.
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✓ Between 1 and 17 October, "all discharging activities" of the port of Inchon "were drastically curtailed and all capabilities were diverted to X Corps loading." The total tonnage unloaded "was negligible and most of that was necessarily diverted to X Corps with the result that levels of some supplies were, at one time, reduced to one day." By the end of the month almost all of X Corps units had been outloaded.
50

In the meantime, while X Corps headquarters was closing in Korea and opening on the USS Mt McKinley, ROK I Corps, under control of EUSAK, secured Wonsan on 11 October. Although the X Corps command post opened at Wonsan on 20 October, sizeable elements of the 1st Marine Division did not begin landing until the 26th because of the need for extensive mine-sweeping operations in the harbor.
51

✓ Sending X Corps to make its landing at Wonsan prevented operations from being instituted immediately to the north or east of Seoul. EUSAK would have preferred X Corps to make this effort because of its location in place. Instead, relief of X Corps in zone by EUSAK had to be effected before X Corps could be outloaded and before EUSAK could attack to the north. This expended what EUSAK considered valuable time.
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Outloading the 1st Marine Division from Inchon prevented use of

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of the port to receive much-needed EUSAK supplies. Only a single-track railroad was open to Seoul at that time, a line that was not reliable. Inability of EUSAK to utilize the port of Incheon caused a critical supply situation, and impeded rapid build-up north of Seoul, EUSAK's future forward area.

53
While the 1st Marine Division was being outloaded from Incheon the 7th Infantry Division, with certain X Corps troops, was moving overland to Pusan to be outloaded for the Wonsan landing. As the 7th Infantry Division moved to the south, EUSAK displaced the 2d Infantry Division to the north. Thus, two divisions exchanged relative positions.

54
On its overland march to Pusan, the 7th Infantry Division lost equipment and suffered casualties as a result of guerrilla raids on two infantry companies and one antiaircraft battery. The rough roads caused excessive wear and tear on the division vehicles.

55
On 8 October, the 2d Logistical Command, a EUSAK unit, received an administrative order from X Corps. This order directed the organization to outload the 7th Infantry Division and certain X Corps units, totaling 25,000 troops, and the necessary supplies.

* EUSAK had planned to support X Corps logistically through the port of Incheon on the assumption that X Corps would come under EUSAK control.

** Although Incheon was not a first-rate port because of the tidal conditions there, it was the only port of major size on the west coast. The lock gates in the harbor, later partially destroyed, were in good working order at this time.

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Outloading was to be accomplished between 10 and 17 October. When the X Corps advance party arrived at Pusan on 9 October, a conference was called to determine the outloading requirements. The advance party could not present its requirements because units then on their way to Pusan had departed Seoul on very short notice and without an opportunity to hold shake-down inspections. Furthermore, some of the supply ships supporting X Corps at Inchon had not been unloaded, and presumably they would accompany X Corps to Wonsan. Since the actual supply requirements could not be determined, FM 101 - 10 was used "to the maximum" to evolve a plan for supply and resupply.⁵⁶

The 7th Infantry Division and attachments were completely loaded by 17 October. On 19 October, loading of corps troops began.⁵⁷

The 2d Logistical Command was also required to furnish 15 days' supply of all classes for the 25,000 troops loading at Pusan and ten days' class II and IV supplies for 25,000 troops loading at Inchon; 15 days' resupply of all classes for the entire corps of approximately 75,000 men was to be in the Wonsan area by D plus 8. This requirement depleted depot stocks, particularly PX comfort items, winter clothing, operational rations, and POL. Much of the resupply was requisitioned from the Japan Logistical Command.⁵⁸

Because of critical levels of supply, POL shortages in 7th Infantry Division stocks showed up immediately in the Wonsan area, and soon afterwards ammunition deficiencies appeared.⁵⁹

Upon receipt of the high priority assignment to furnish winter clothing to approximately 40,000 X Corps troops outloading at Inchon

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and Pusan, the Quartermaster Section, 2d Logistical Command, halted all other operations to fulfill this requirement. Supply co-ordination between X Corps and EUSAK was difficult. Although the quartermaster depot was under EUSAK control, the depot commander received a X Corps administrative order directing that support would be furnished. The EUSAK quartermaster had not seen this order. After the command problem was solved, the operation commenced. Filling the winter clothing requirements of the outloaded troops caused such a depletion of Pusan stocks that issues to some EUSAK divisions were retarded.

UNC Operation Order Number 4, 17 October 1950, directed EUSAK and X Corps to advance north in zone on 20 October. On 24 October, CINCUNC authorized commanders to use any or all ground forces to secure all of North Korea, but instructed them to withdraw units other than those of the ROK Army from the Manchurian border when feasible.

In order to close "any gap which might develop" between EUSAK and X Corps as the two commands began their race toward the Yalu River, EUSAK ordered the 2d Infantry Division to assemble elements as a strong mobile force prepared to counter enemy infiltration. On 6 November a reinforced company of the 23d Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, set out to make contact with X Corps elements along the army-corps boundary. This patrol reached Yangdok (BU9644), halfway between Pyongyang and Wonsan, then continued a few miles farther east without meeting friendly troops. When X Corps radioed EUSAK on 7 November that

* Sailing time was delayed on several occasions because of lack of winter clothing. 60

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contact was not feasible because of guerrilla activity, EUSAK ordered the 2d Infantry Division patrol to return.⁶⁴ On 18 November, a contact patrol of the 38th RCT, 2d Infantry Division, again attempted without success to locate X Corps elements.⁶⁵ Although EUSAK suggested by radio on 20 November that Yangdok be made a mutual point of daily contact,⁶⁶ it was not possible^{*} to establish physical contact.⁶⁷

✓ There was an almost complete lack of liaison between the two separated fronts. At the daily EUSAK briefings in Seoul, held at 1330 hours, the X Corps liaison reports were read. These reports "ended as of 0600 on the previous morning."⁶⁸

✓ While X Corps operated north from Wonsan, EUSAK attempted to give it the same logistical support it rendered I and IX Corps. Thus, EUSAK's problem was basically that of making equitable distribution to three corps. This operation was complicated by serious difficulties.⁶⁹

Lack of direct communications between X Corps and EUSAK, except by radio and liaison, hampered the exchange of information and prevented EUSAK from having accurate knowledge of X Corps needs. The distance and the terrain between EUSAK and X Corps imposed further problems. Vehicular transportation was unsafe because of guerrilla activity. Rail lines were nonexistent. EUSAK was thus unable to supply X Corps from its forward depots and through its normal channels. Because air transport facilities were limited by space and priorities, it became necessary to support X Corps by water. Consequently, EUSAK directed the 2d

* The Narrative, Command Report, EUSAK, December 1950, refers to "the occasional patrol contact between EUSAK and the US X Corps" This statement should read, "the occasional radio contact."

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Logistical Command at Pusan to provide proper supplies for X Corps. It became practical for X Corps to send its requisitions directly to the 2d Logistical Command. There, continuing shortages, particularly in winter clothing and spare parts, further complicated the supply situation.
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Because of the inability of Pusan to supply X Corps with sufficient amounts of class II and IV supplies, X Corps secured authorization from CINCUNC early in November to requisition these items directly from the Japan Logistical Command. Then X Corps became concerned about Class I, III, and V supplies, which still came by water from Pusan. These shipments were arriving in less than requested amounts since the supply section of EUSAK was editing requisitions down without notifying X Corps. EUSAK did this because it felt that X Corps was building up its levels of supply too high. Although EUSAK held X Corps to a 10- to 15-day level, as it did with I and IX Corps, X Corps had secured CINCUNC approval for a 30-day level. Certain shipments for X Corps support arrived in unbalanced lots because the 2d Logistical Command was diverting ships from the zone of interior directly to X Corps without checking their cargoes. As a result, X Corps secured permission from CINCUNC to draw class I supplies directly from Japan. Later, shortly before the Chinese offensive, X Corps obtained authority to receive all classes of supply directly from the Japan Logistical Command. Pusan supplied only such items as tents, stoves, and winter clothing, which were not available in Japan.
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Lack of maintenance support caused serious vehicular breakdowns in the X Corps sector. It had been planned to have X Corps link up with EUSAK by a westward thrust toward Pyongyang. Consequently, when X Corps outloaded from Inchon, certain ordnance units were screened out as being unnecessary in view of the tactical plans. When the plans were changed and X Corps drove north instead of west, it suffered from a lack of ordnance units. Had the original plans been in force and X Corps joined with EUSAK, these deficiencies in maintenance might not have occurred.

The entrance of the Chinese communist forces (CCF) into the Korean conflict and the initially disastrous consequences caused CINCUNC on 7 December to make plans for the withdrawal of X Corps from the Hungnam area. On 8 December, in Operation Order Number 5, UNC ordered X Corps to evacuate through Hungnam, join EUSAK, and pass to EUSAK operational control. Outloading of X Corps elements began on 9 December and terminated on 24 December. The last units off-loaded at Pusan on 26 December. On that day, X Corps was assigned to EUSAK.

A X Corps advance party arrived in Pusan to co-ordinate the reception by EUSAK of X Corps elements. As each unit landed, it was dispatched to assembly areas near Pusan which EUSAK had reconnoitered and prepared, and there all X Corps units were re-equipped and re-organized. EUSAK made daily inspections to determine combat efficiency so that X Corps could be recommitted as quickly as possible.

Because the enemy penetration of the EUSAK right flank comprised

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a major threat to the army rear, at the end of December EUSAK directed X Corps to establish an advance command post at Wonju and assume operational control of the 2d Infantry Division -- already in the Wonju area -- and the 7th Infantry Division. When X Corps complied with these instructions, integration of X Corps into EUSAK, from the tactical point of view, was accomplished. There were no problems. ⁷⁶

Logistically, certain problems presented difficulties. The scarcity of locomotives and the limited capacity of rail lines impeded more rapid redeployment of X Corps units. Transportation facilities were strained in moving units north from Pusan. Organic transportation was utilized to the maximum extent to displace personnel and equipment forward. This was done without causing serious congestion at Pusan. ⁷⁷

X Corps units did not lose much equipment after the initial enemy attack, and they were able to bring most of their matériel with them. But they had not been able, for good cause, to load their equipment systematically at Hungnam. Consequently, X Corps supplies had to be segregated and organized. A great deal of renovation, rehabilitation, and repair was necessary. ⁷⁸

All matériel evacuated by X Corps was placed in EUSAK depots. EUSAK had already been increasing its depot stocks in preparation for the incorporation of X Corps into EUSAK. ^{*} The necessity of supplying

* G - 4 EUSAK problems were complicated throughout the month of December because there was doubt whether U.N. forces would remain in Korea. Continued juggling resulted as the requirements of the troops in Korea were weighed against the possible necessity to withdraw from the peninsula.

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X Corps nearly doubled receipt, handling, storage distribution, and accounting operations for EUSAK. Although EUSAK received no appreciable increase in depot storage (stock control) personnel, it did get a proportionately favorable increase in service troops from X Corps, units such as engineer and ordnance battalions and quartermaster laundry and shower companies, which alleviated these problems. ⁷⁹

EUSAK had its forward depots in the western part of Korea. With the addition of X Corps, EUSAK had to establish forward installations in the east-central portion. After the commitment of X Corps, it became necessary to extend communication and engineer service. Although this service had been rendered the ROK Army, U.S. units, utilizing heavier equipment and more supplies, required increased support. ⁸⁰

With X Corps under EUSAK, vehicle maintenance doubled. Day-to-day handling through the port of Pusan increased. Distribution functions grew. Normal attrition of equipment increased and made additional replacement and salvage operations necessary. The rail transportation facilities had not improved in proportion to the additional weight that X Corps requirements imposed, and rail cars and port and depot facilities were burdened. ⁸¹

These problems were simply the normal difficulties resulting from the addition of any large increment of troops. Since EUSAK had had prior advice of the arrival of X Corps under EUSAK, necessary adjustments had been made, and X Corps had no real impact on the logistical arrangements in force. ⁸²

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One problem, however, was peculiar to the EUSAK-X Corps relationship. In order to re-equip the 1st Marine and 7th Infantry Divisions shortly after the Chinese attack, the Japan Logistical Command loaded four ships of class II and IV supplies on an emergency basis for X Corps. Before these ships reached Hungnam, X Corps had received orders to evacuate. Therefore, the ships were not unloaded, but were sent to Pusan. There, several questions arose. Did these items, which had been allocated to X Corps before it came under EUSAK control, belong to X Corps or to EUSAK? Should they be issued to X Corps elements only? Or should they be distributed among all EUSAK elements?

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The heated discussion that took place among G - 4 representatives of the two commands revealed the extent of the mutual resentment that existed among certain members of the commands. X Corps representatives felt that the supplies had been secured through initiative and aggressiveness, while those of EUSAK felt that X Corps had received special consideration in logistical support by the Japan Logistical Command. X Corps representatives stated that EUSAK had "inherited" many supplies that X Corps had had to leave at Inchon when it cut-loaded; EUSAK representatives stated that X Corps had refused to leave any supplies at Inchon in exchange for EUSAK supplies coming on the water from Japan.

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The decision was finally reached to divert the four shiploads of supplies to EUSAK stocks and allocate them to all EUSAK elements. EUSAK pointed out that I and IX Corps had sustained heavy losses in

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their withdrawal from Pyongyang and therefore needed equipment and supplies. Some individuals of X Corps termed this EUSAK's "confiscation" of X Corps supplies. ⁸⁵

It took time and patience to resolve differences, a great many of which were due simply to the absence of adequate communications. Mis-
understanding resulted because of the inability to clarify particular ⁸⁶ situations.

When X Corps came under EUSAK control, it no longer required the authorized augmentations of units and personnel that it had needed to enable it to operate independently. Between January and May, 1951, X Corps was reduced in units and strength to conform to its role as ⁸⁷ an army corps of EUSAK.

EUSAK had been operating, in the words of the army commander, with a "shortage of critical items of signal supply, signal specialists, and signal units." ⁸⁸ As late as 1 December 1950, I and IX Corps had not acquired the necessary organic signal battalions to enable them to ⁸⁹ establish the communications organization normal to corps operations.

X Corps had the following assigned units: the 4th Signal Battalion, Corps (less one construction company); the 272d Signal Construction Company (which filled out the 4th Signal Battalion, Corps); the 581st Signal Radio Relay Company (VHF); and the 226th Signal Operations Company (switchboard, radio operations). At the same time, EUSAK had one operations battalion, three construction companies (one secured in December), and two VHF companies (each smaller than the X Corps VHF company). When X Corps came under EUSAK, it was shorn of its three

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signal companies. It was left only with its 4th Signal Battalion, Corps (the normal corps signal support): The operations company taken from X Corps was used by EUSAK at Pusan. The other two companies were given to IX Corps, which until then had been functioning with one operations company bolstered by EUSAK troops. I Corps had by then secured a signal battalion, corps. A similar situation existed with regard to truck companies.

As an independent command, X Corps wrestled with problems beyond its organizational capabilities. It was performing army-type functions with a corps-size staff. Its augmentations of personnel and units were not adequate. It found itself handicapped particularly in matters affecting the technical services and supply. Incorporation into EUSAK relieved X Corps of such problems and responsibilities as determining its requirements, drawing up its requisitions, allocating its supplies. Coming under EUSAK meant passing to EUSAK the difficulties of supplying Marine ground and air units with their special Navy equipment.

The integration of X Corps into EUSAK alleviated problems inherent in both commands since the link-up at Osan. On 6 December the army

* A provisional construction company was formed to make the battalion complete.

** Strength (including KATUSA), 30 Nov 50: EUSAK, 133,754; X Corps, 83,828. Figures from Summary, War Diary, EUSAK, 1 - 30 Nov 50.

*** Lack of standardization of Army-Navy parts and supplies caused a nuisance problem. After the X Corps withdrawal from Hungnam, EUSAK could not supply parts for the International trucks used by the 1st Marine Division. 92

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commander, in suming up his experience in Korea to that date, stated,
"The importance of a single commander for a . . . force in the field
is recognized."

P Had X Corps been utilized as an integrated corps from the time of contact in September, EUSAK felt that the Yalu might have been reached and made secure before the Chinese communist forces could have entered Korea. Failure to send elements to Chunchon immediately after the Inchon landing permitted some North Korean forces to escape. Out-loading the Marines from Inchon held up needed EUSAK supplies for the advance to the north. Sending the 7th Infantry Division overland to Pusan and making the administrative Wonsan landing proved to be unnecessary. The effect of this was to slow the United Nations advance to the Yalu, thereby permitting the Chinese time to enter Korea in force.

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When Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway arrived in Korea as commander of all the ground forces, he found the Eighth Army organizationally prepared for complete co-ordinated operations in the field.

* More accurate intelligence might have resulted if the two commands had been integrated. See Summary, War Diary, EUSAK, 1 - 30 Nov 50, entries of 18 and 20 Nov 50.

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COMMENTS OF COLONEL A. D. SMITH
Former ACofS G - 4, X Corps

1. On analyzing comments regarding the activation of X Corps Headquarters and the authorizations for personnel and equipment, it must be understood that for security reasons when this group was first formed it was designated by the vague term "GHQ Reserve." No TO&E, TA or TD were prescribed as a basis of activation. Although published equipment and personnel tables were used as a guide, actual allowances had to be modified due to the fact that the Corps Headquarters was to perform duties in command of a separate Corps similar to that of a field type Army Headquarters. As a result, all equipment drawn had to be requisitioned and such requests had to be approved as items "over and beyond" authorized allowances. This required each requisition to be reviewed personally by G4 of Corps and in turn be approved by the Chief, Supply Division, G4 GHQ. Limited time available, new and inexperienced personnel, and the urgent press of planning the impending operation greatly complicated this problem. It is obvious that if the Corps had been formally activated under appropriate tables and augmented by special authorizations, this problem would have been greatly simplified. *

2. With reference to comments pertaining to contact made by members of the Corps staff direct with GHQ counterpart staff sections, such contact was necessary due to the smallness of the original Corps staff and the urgent need of these individuals for advice and assistance from GHQ staff sections. Also several members of the staff could not be released at once from their former duties in GHQ and therefore, wore "two hats" in their dual capacity with the section which they were leaving and with their assignment in X Corps. Without the all-out assistance afforded by GHQ staff sections, the Corps could not have been formed and shipped out in time for the 15 September landings at Inchon.

3. Several comments are made relative to the logistic problems which occurred during the out-loading of the X Corps from Inchon in preparation for the Wonsan landing. At the time Eighth Army made contact with X Corps in the Suwon area, Corps had displaced large quantities of supplies north of the Han in anticipation of a drive to the North. Requirements for support of the Wonsan operation necessitated that these supplies be withdrawn and out-loaded at Inchon to accompany Corps and 1st Marine Division Units. This out-loading prevented any appreciable discharge of cargo through the restricted Inchon port area for Eighth Army. Had an attempt been made to utilize Inchon for Eighth Army support in this period, out-loading would have been so delayed that the proposed date of landing at Wonsan could not have been met. During the out-loading period, emergency issues were made from X Corps stocks to Eighth Army Unit. Residual stocks in substantial quantities not required to meet the levels prescribed by GHQ for X Corps were turned over to Eighth Army by X Corps supply agencies.

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* 4. The preparation for the East Coast landing was further complicated from a logistic view point by action taken by GHQ to revise channels during the out-loading so that the Eighth Army became responsible for logistic support of the Corps instead of Corps dealing directly with logistical agencies in Japan. Through direct contact of X Corps staff with JLCOM Agencies, detailed supply plans had been completed to meet expected difficulties in unloading. The introduction of Eighth Army into channels interrupted these arrangements at a critical time.

5. Although Eighth Army made every effort to assist the Corps in out-loading in conformance with the plan, the loss of direct contact with JLCOM resulted in resupply difficulties during the unloading phases. Rations arrived on large ships, bulk loaded. In order to assemble logical menus for issue to troops, almost the entire ship had to be unloaded before a balanced meal could be provided. This required emergency airlift of rations into the Corps area. Had the original plan for shallow-draft ships with cargo prepared for selective discharge been followed, it would have been possible to have met the troop requirements from day to day.

6. A similar problem occurred in the out-loading of Signal supplies. At this time the Corps was utilizing three ports for unloading. Instead of distributing Signal supply items to permit this discharge at each area, all items were placed on one ship and unloaded at Iwon with the Seventh Division. Lack of rail facilities and limited truck transportation delayed redistribution of these supplies to other units.

7. POL intended for resupply of Seventh Division was never unloaded by JLCOM due to a misunderstanding based on a cancellation of what they thought to be a duplication. This necessitated an emergency shipment by LST to meet an urgent requirement for the Seventh Division.

* 8. It is believed that the above and many similar problems were created primarily by the change of channels at a time when all staffs were over-worked and involved in a very complicated operation requiring the closest of liaison and direct coordination. Many of these difficulties would not have arisen had X Corps continued to receive logistic support direct from JLCOM at least until the initial landings had been established on the East Coast.

9. Initial service support authorized the X Corps would not have been adequate to support sustained operations even if it could have been placed ashore and utilized by the Corps. Actually many units shipped from Japan and assigned to the Corps never were unloaded in support of the Corps, but were released to Eighth Army and did not accompany Corps to the East Coast. As a result, service support was totally inadequate to perform its missions over wide frontages with limited routes of communication. The book just had to be thrown out the window, and the

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1st Marine Division Combat Service Group and Shore party, plus the 2d Engr Special Brigade, assumed the bulk of these responsibilities. The few service units present were spread so thin that even with the maximum utilization of North Korean labor, they barely kept their heads above water. Consolidation of port activities with only minor exceptions in the Hungnam area and the rehabilitation of air fields, railroads, and roads tended to assist in solving these problems.

10. Due to a series of current and estimated potential future losses of equipment in the Chosen reservoir area, it was obvious that large amounts of equipment would be required for the Corps units on their arrival at the beach head. Heavy estimates placed on GHQ for immediate supply were based on the understanding that a lodgement would be held in the Hamhung-Hungnam area. To carry out this mission, major items of equipment were a necessity.

11. When evacuation was ordered, it was requested that most of this equipment be diverted to Pusan for issue to Corps units on their arrival at that port. Since Corps became a part of Eighth Army on its arrival at Pusan, the decision to turn over these stocks to Eighth Army for distribution as they saw fit was the only logical solution. Actual issue made to Corps units by Eighth Army were adequate to place these units in position to re-enter combat.

12. Limited maintenance in support of X Corps had resulted in a general deterioration of equipment. Extensive maintenance was required to place the existing equipment in shape to do its job. This placed an additional burden on Eighth Army. There was just no solution to this problem because there was a general shortage of maintenance units as well as other service units throughout the Far East Command. Equipment, run down and badly in need of maintenance, had to be used as long as it would operate if units were to function. This continued use without maintenance increased further the burden of resupply placed on Eighth Army by X Corps units.

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CHAPTER III
TRAINING TO MEET SPECIAL KOREAN CONDITIONS

United States military doctrine and training methods tested in the Korean conflict have proved in general to be sound. *

The Eighth Army, which had been on occupation duty in Japan, expected hostilities in Korea to end quickly. During the early weeks of the campaign, the Eighth Army was in large part, trained by combat and taught by disaster.

This chapter is not concerned with failure to apply tactical doctrine correctly in Korea. Many instances could be listed, as could impelling reasons, for each departure from accepted tactics. The important considerations are that a relatively untrained and consequently unprepared army was sent into the field, poorly equipped and understrength, against an underrated enemy. The training to meet special Korean conditions in the early part of the conflict was determined to a great extent by these considerations.

During the first fourteen months of Korean campaign, two main needs conditioned EUSAK training: (1) the necessity for combat commanders to follow basic offensive and defensive doctrine, and (2) the necessity to teach "basic and fundamental" subjects in accordance with the field and technical manuals, but "with emphasis on the special subjects applicable to combat in this theater." It is with the aspects of training that were emphasized to meet conditions peculiar to the Korean conflict that this

* No distinction is made in this chapter between training and indoctrination.

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chapter is concerned.

It must be borne in mind that where specific training was directed by a higher headquarters, a specific deficiency existed on a lower level. 96

The Terrain

Troops arriving in Korea after performing administrative or caretaker duties in Japan were not physically prepared for the rugged terrain of Korea. The strenuous climbing required and the need to hand-carry equipment, supplies, and individual and crew-served weapons long distances over mountain trails demanded a high degree of physical fitness. Immediately, therefore, physical hardening was stressed in all training.

The poor physical condition of replacements arriving in Korea throughout this period made it virtually impossible to utilize them in tactical units at once. As a result, physical training programs were instituted all along the replacement pipeline. Though replacement battalions and companies had neither the facilities, the personnel, nor the time to conduct large-scale training programs, and though it was realized that interrupting the replacement flow by training might seriously impair combat effectiveness of tactical units, it became necessary for replacement organizations to assume physical training responsibilities. EUSAK recommended that GHQ conduct several hours of physical training daily for replacements and hospital returnees, and GHQ requested that all units and individual replacements continue physical training aboard troopships.

Wherever possible, obstacle course and cross-country-type training was instituted. Units in reserve engaged continuously in programs of

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physical training.

The mountainous terrain, lack of a good road net, poor condition of the roads, demolished bridges and lack of bridges capable of supporting tanks, steep high paddy dikes, and rice paddies had little effect on tank warfare. The only change the terrain imposed on the employment of armor was to lower the number of tanks that could be deployed in any given area at one time.

In order to explode the myth that the hills and the steep paddy dikes of Korea were impassable obstacles for tanks, training was instituted to impress tank crews with the tremendous hill-climbing ability their vehicles possessed. Whenever combat conditions permitted, tank units conducted training in detecting the best tank approaches and routes before actually negotiating hills. Crews were taught to avoid snagging gun muzzles in depressions or on trees, and practiced operating turret and gun controls while the tank was canted or heavily pitched. 98

Flash floods due to the lack of vegetation on the mountains necessitated increased training in the techniques of reconnaissance in order to prevent artillery positions and command posts from being located in areas susceptible to floods. The destruction caused by flash floods and by ice on tidal rivers resulted in the construction of more bridges in this campaign than in any comparable one. At the beginning of hostilities, many road-patrolling units such as intelligence and reconnaissance platoons were unable to report accurate data to engineer organizations because they lacked knowledge of classification

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procedures and military personnel of all branches consequently had to
be trained in road and bridge reconnaissance. ⁹⁹

Hills denuded of vegetation afforded little natural concealment for troops, yet the absence of enemy air power made friendly forces in Korea lax in camouflage discipline. Since the enemy was capable of employing air power, however, commanders had to indoctrinate the troops
in the methods of proper camouflage and concealment. ¹⁰⁰

The Enemy

The enemy consistently took advantage of the rugged terrain, lack of friendly communications, and the wide U.N. frontage of U.N. units by infiltrating and isolating friendly elements. As a result, the necessity for close-knit, tied-in perimeter defense against attack from all directions had to be continuously emphasized. Team and unit training included problems in the establishment of perimeter defense. Combat lessons and studies cautioned commanders of the necessity of establishing perimeters by nightfall, of the need to have forward observers register artillery before dark, and of the desirability of employing mines, wire, and trip flares.

The increased use of wire, trip flares, mines, and expedient traps in Korea when organizing defensive positions necessitated increased training in the proper use of these items. U.S. minefield doctrine proved sound in every respect, but training in minefield techniques and

* Hand grenades with pins pulled and wired with trip strings.

mine discipline was not satisfactory. This was true not only of engineer units but of troops of other branches as well. Failure to report minefields, to record their locations properly, to orient relieving units about existing minefields, and to cover fields with fire revealed deficiencies in training. To correct these deficiencies, training in Korea was intensified.

Infiltration as a major enemy tactic, and the constant threat to rear area units from guerrillas, made it necessary for all units to be thoroughly trained in the use of arms. Service-type units were instructed to conduct frequent familiarization firing with individual and crew-served weapons. Separate units, command posts, and artillery battalions were directed to train in defense against enemy ground attack. Information on how to repel guerrillas was disseminated to supply depots. Local security training was emphasized.

Since the enemy used infiltration tactics, guerrilla raids, and large masses of manpower, it was recommended that every U.S. soldier be trained basically as an infantryman. Every soldier in Korea was aware that he might be called upon at any time to act as an infantryman
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in repelling enemy attack.

The inferiority of his fire power and air support caused the enemy to make his tactical movements at night. To cope with this, friendly units conducted training in such techniques as night movement, the establishment of blocking positions, and the ability to choose correct
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troop locations from map reconnaissance and study.

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The enemy made intensive use of mines to destroy friendly tanks rather than to delay them by inflicting damage. In the absence of flails ✓ or mine exploders of any type, there had to be an emphasis on training sufficient numbers of engineer troops in mine sweeping. Great success was particularly achieved in training Korean personnel in this technique. 103.

The enemy tactic of utilizing defensive bunkers on the hills and mountains of Korea made it desirable to use tanks to reduce them wherever possible. Special training was given to tank crews to teach them to destroy enemy bunkers by charging into them or by crushing them with tank weight. Tankers were instilled with an aggressive spirit and indoctrinated with the fact that tanks were capable of attacking hill 104 positions at close range.

The Effect of the Troop Ceiling

Because of the rigid troop ceiling imposed on U.S. forces in Korea, personnel had to be efficient and versatile in the performance of their duties. The shortage of trained specialists of all arms and services in 1950 and the lack of organized service units made on-the-job training a continuing necessity.

It was decided early in the campaign that, since EUSAK was heavily ✓ engaged in combat, GHQ would assume the responsibility for training technical service units arriving from the zone of the interior, as well as for training replacements as specialists of all types at Eta Jima in Japan. Wheeled and tracked vehicle mechanics were in particular demand.

In early 1951, shortages of infantry replacements made it necessary to convert excess rear area and service personnel into combat infantrymen, and this was done at the U.N. Reception Center at Pusan. But in the

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spring of 1951, the shortage of trained specialists was again felt, and to alleviate this shortage, Korean personnel were trained in technical specialties whenever feasible.

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Climate

The cold and wet weather conditions in Korea were responsible for instruction in the preventing of immersion (trench) foot and frostbite. The low temperatures, producing arctic-like conditions, accounted for 85 percent of the 5,100 cold weather injury cases during the winter of 1950 - 51. Because extremely cold weather sometimes caused initial shock, troops were indoctrinated in the use of warming tents. Particular emphasis was placed on the proper care of the feet.

Quartermaster teams from GHQ were sent into the field in 1950, to demonstrate, instruct, and supervise the fitting of winter clothing at all echelons. Medical officers and aid men taught troops how to prevent as well as care for cold weather injuries. In the fall of 1951, quartermaster teams trained unit representatives in the techniques of protection from cold weather. These men then carried the information to their units, while the quartermaster teams inspected and evaluated training effectiveness. Lessons learned during the winter of 1950 - 51 applied during the second winter of the campaign.

Poster, pamphlets, and spot announcements over AFRS stations also aided in this training.

The important consideration, however, was not disseminating information, but insuring that instructions were carried out by the troops. Important also was the necessity for teaching cold weather habits so

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that movement and combat operations would not be unnecessarily impeded by weather. Combat information bulletins and staff and liaison visits from higher headquarters were part of this training program. Ordnance and engineer teams performed demonstrations with regard to cold-weather use of equipment.

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Sanitation

The sanitary standards of the Korean population with regard to food and beverages were such that continuous indoctrination was necessary to caution troops of the possibility of contamination from these sources. Troops were taught to regard all water as nonpotable until treated.

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Miscellaneous

Because of the long supply line between the zone of the interior and Korea and the poor transportation facilities in Korea, it was necessary to instruct troops continually in the need to maintain supply discipline. Because of the rugged terrain, the poor roads, and the shortage of spare parts, excessive numbers of vehicles were deadlined. Additional training and constant indoctrination in the proper use and care of vehicles were necessary. Enemy infiltration and guerrilla activity, as well as climatic conditions, required troops to be indoctrinated with the necessity of keeping their weapons and equipment operational at all times. The similarity of terrain throughout Korea emphasized the importance of basic map reading and use of the lensatic compass. Although first aid training for troops in Korea was the same as elsewhere, it assumed greater importance because the evacuation of casualties from rugged terrain was much more difficult. A small

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mechanized and technological army faced by a numerically superior though poorly armed force found it necessary to emphasize the training of infantry-tank-artillery-engineer-air support teams. The necessity for using native bearers to transport supplies required that data be compiled and disseminated on the best methods of employing them. Since there was a lack of recreational facilities in Korea, competitive sports were stressed during the time units were in reserve.

Problems of Training

The troop ceiling precluded establishing a depot in Korea for training materials. To make training literature available to combat elements as soon as the units were placed in reserve, it had to be air-lifted from Japan. Thus, emergency measures had to be applied repeatedly to meet what would otherwise have been a normal situation.

Relatively small amounts of training ammunition were received in Korea from the zone of the interior. More than "normal" amounts of artillery, mortar, and automatic rifle ammunition were expended since the troop ceiling in part made increased fire power necessary. Consequently, rationing to avoid shortages resulted, and ammunition for training in the desired amounts was sometimes difficult to obtain.

Certain weaknesses in the Organized Reserve program became apparent in the Korean experience. The many Reserve officers and men who arrived as individuals, rather than with units, in most instances were relatively untrained. Officers were trained by combat. Enlisted men received training in division and regimental rear areas, a practice not particularly satisfactory because such training reduced unit effectiveness and

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dispersed unit personnel.

Conclusion

Between June 1950 and the fall of 1951, the Korean campaign demonstrated the validity of the basic doctrine of the United States Army. It also indicated that proper application of that doctrine necessitated emphasis on certain aspects of training in order to correct deficiencies of untrained or poorly trained personnel.

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CHAPTER IV
THE AUGMENTATION OF U.S. UNITS BY KOREAN TROOPS

U.S. units, committed in Korea at low peacetime strengths, suffered so many casualties in the early engagements that some companies numbered only 50 to 75 men. Because adequate numbers of U.S. replacements were not immediately available to reconstitute the depleted forces, a program termed the Korean Army Troops, United States Army (KATUSA) was inaugurated to integrate South Korean soldiers into U.S. units.

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Frankly planned as an expedient, this program was expected to have several advantages. It would build up U.S. units quickly with Korean manpower. It would make possible the absorption of more Korean soldiers than the disorganized Korean forces, already involved in reorganizing and retraining its combat elements, could handle. It would provide U.S. units with troops familiar with the terrain. It would give Koreans rapid training in U.S. methods and techniques, thereby providing a U.S.-trained cadre for a peacetime Korean Army.

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In the middle of August 1950, EUSAK representatives of G - 1, G - 3, G - 4, and the surgeon, and representatives of G - 1, KMAG, and the Korean Army G - 1, held preliminary conferences to make plans to procure, train, equip, transport, and integrate approximately 40,000 Korean soldiers into five U.S. divisions: the 1st Cavalry Division, the 2d, 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions, all in Korea, and the 7th Infantry Division in Japan. Koreans were to be processed, equipped with a carbine or rifle, and trained at the Taegu and Pusan training centers of the Korean Army.

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In August 1950, before the training centers were properly established, each division in Korea received an initial increment of 250 untrained

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Korean soldiers. Immediately thereafter, a training center was set up at Kupo-ri, under U.S. supervision but conducted by Korean officers, to give ten days of training to KATUSA personnel. Subjects included familiarization firing, hygiene, sanitation, and military discipline. Koreans were to be sent out from this training center at the rate of 500 a day; thus each division in Korea would receive 500 every fourth day. This flow was to continue without interruption until the established quota was reached. ¹²³ Quartermaster equipment for 8,360 KATUSA personnel ^{*} to be absorbed by the 7th Infantry Division was made available, and preparations were completed for furnishing Korean soldiers to the 3d Infantry Division, also in Japan. While the flow of KATUSA personnel was not achieved in the numbers planned, a substantial group was ^{**} ¹²⁴ integrated into U.S. units.

Each U.S. combat company and battery was to receive 100 Koreans who were to be employed as combat soldiers, riflemen, and artillerymen. The method of integrating the Koreans into the U.S. units was left to the discretion of the field commanders, but Korean troops were not to be used as common laborers or cargo carriers. They were to receive the same gratuitous issue of quartermaster items as U.S. soldiers. They would receive the same medical care in the combat area, but would be evacuated to Korean hospitals. Disciplinary control and courts-martial jurisdiction of KATUSA personnel remained with the Korean Army, to

* Initial problems included obtaining shoes and clothing in small sizes for Koreans.

** See Charts I and II.

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*
whom offenses would be reported and offenders delivered. The pay of these troops was the responsibility of the Korean Army. AG teams of the Korean Army were placed on duty with U.S. units to administer the KATUSA personnel; a special section of the Korean Army AG handled KATUSA records and administration.

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The method of integrating Koreans into U.S. units followed generally the same pattern. The 25th Infantry Division was ordered by EUSAK to pair each Korean recruit with a U.S. "buddy" in order to facilitate the passing on of U.S. military "know-how." The 25th Division instituted the buddy system in the infantry companies, and also experimented by forming several platoons and one entire company composed only of Koreans. Division artillery used the Koreans as perimeter guards. On 6 September 1950, this division estimated its KATUSA personnel to have a combat effectiveness of 25 percent of that of U.S. personnel. Ten days later, it reported that Koreans employed in accordance with the buddy system achieved a combat effectiveness of 50 percent; those in platoons and squads under U.S. noncommissioned officers reached an effectiveness of 35 percent; those integrated into various sections of the lettered artillery batteries were 25 percent effective; and KATUSA personnel with the reconnaissance company were 60 percent effective. By October, all Koreans had been integrated into the existing squads; the reconnaissance company estimated a 60 percent effectiveness; one regiment reported an efficiency of 48 percent; in

* Korean officers who accompanied KATUSA personnel to the 7th Infantry Division Japan had authority to exercise disciplinary control and courts-martial action.

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other unit reports the efficiency varied between 20 and 35 percent.

The 1st Cavalry Division integrated its KATUSA personnel into the infantry squads as riflemen, assistant machine gunners, communications linemen, and ammunition bearers; into the artillery gun squads as ammunition bearers and local security; into the signal company as linemen and security guards for line crews; and into the reconnaissance company as riflemen, scouts, and observers. Combat effectiveness during the month of September 1950 was judged to be 50 percent.

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The 24th Infantry Division used its Koreans as riflemen in the infantry squads, as litter bearers in the medical companies, and as security for artillery positions. Estimated combat effectiveness as infantrymen increased from 10 percent on 6 September 1950 to 45 percent one month later. Combat effectiveness for the other elements was estimated at an average of 30 percent. This division reported the successful employment of each Korean with two U.S. buddies.

128

The 2d Infantry Division integrated its KATUSA personnel into the existing units. On 6 September 1950 combat effectiveness in one infantry battalion was estimated as only 25 percent, but in the others as 75 percent. Division artillery, using Koreans as wiremen and interior guards, estimated their effectiveness as 80 percent. The military police company rated them as 90 percent effective. Ten days later these estimates declined to an over-all figure of 50 percent, and by 16 October to 10 percent.

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When the Koreans first arrived at the U.S. units, officers and men "were glad to see fresh troops coming in." But it was not long

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before difficulties became apparent. The language barrier and the lack of a sufficient number of interpreters were basic problems. As a result, maximum utilization of the Koreans was not possible. It was "most difficult" to control Koreans in combat. If one interpreter were available for each platoon, reported the 24th Infantry Division, the combat effectiveness of the KATUSA personnel would increase greatly. Requests for additional Korean interpreters continued throughout the first month that KATUSA personnel were employed. On 16 September the 2d Infantry Division, after receiving 29 liaison officer-interpreters, expressed the hope that this group would alleviate "the principal complaint" that Koreans could not understand instructions in English.

130

Because of the language barrier and the relative ineffectiveness of sign language between U.S. and Korean troops, U.S. officers, commissioned and noncommissioned, frequently had to expose themselves to enemy fire in order to get an attack moving or to prevent Koreans from withdrawing. Under ordinary conditions such exposure would have been unnecessary. This caused heavy casualties among U.S. personnel and a resulting drop in morale. The language barrier, besides placing an additional burden on all U.S. leaders in combat, made it impossible to train Koreans in the technical aspects of weapons and gunnery.

131

When the decision was made to augment U.S. units with Koreans, the Korean Army was depleted. Beaten back from the 38th parallel to the Pusan-Taegu perimeter, the Korean Army had suffered extremely high losses. Korean soldiers for the U.S. units were recruited from the civilian population. The chaos in South Korea during the early weeks

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of the conflict and the exigencies that rapid reorganization necessitated made the manner of recruitment simply one of "gathering people off the streets." * As a result of inadequate processing and classification machinery, KATUSA personnel included comparatively few potential leaders; few commissioned and noncommissioned officers accompanied them to U.S. units, which reiterated the need for Korean leadership. ¹³²

The first group of replacements that U.S. units received was completely untrained. Although some units were able to give their Korean replacements two or three weeks' training, others had to commit them to combat immediately. Those units able to train their Koreans before combat found them acceptable and creditable in most cases. But those units forced to commit Koreans immediately found them "absolutely unfit" -- "they didn't so much as know how to load a rifle." ¹³³

The original increment of 250 untrained Koreans received by the 2d Infantry Division and committed with the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, was overrun on the night of 31 August 1950. This resulted in "many desertions and stragglers," although the division pointed out that "straggling was not confined to the ROK personnel." The second KATUSA increment of 500 soldiers, which had received 84 hours of training before their arrival, "had excellent morale and have done good work as combat riflemen." But the early optimism that the

*One man on his way to his office when recruited still had his business papers with him when he arrived at the U.S. unit. Another, who had gone to the pharmacy to obtain medicine for his sick wife, still had the medicine in his pocket when he was committed to combat.

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"ROK personnel with this division are doing well" soon changed, and the 2d Infantry Division later bleakly reported that Koreans assigned to Company F, 9th Infantry Regiment, had abandoned their positions in the face of enemy attack on the night of 14 - 15 September. ¹³⁴

The 1st Cavalry Division reported that the Koreans were "susceptible to training," but when they were engaged in a fire fight they expended ammunition "rapidly with little or no results," and it was difficult to get them to move forward to contact. "This situation," stated the division optimistically, "may improve with time and experience." Ten days later the division reported that Koreans had left their positions on several occasions, thereby "jeopardizing the positions of remaining American troops." ¹³⁵

Not only did Koreans lack training in the use of arms, in basic combat team tactics, and in the organization of U.S. forces, they also lacked training in field sanitation, and personal hygiene. The ten-day indoctrination they received in the training center in these matters before reaching U.S. units proved far from sufficient. Korean sanitation and hygiene habits endangered the health of the command.

The failure to immunize Koreans during their initial processing caused medical officers great concern because of the possibility of epidemics. Deficient in military discipline training, Koreans were sometimes difficult to control. Because of the necessity of turning offenders over to the Korean Army, discipline could not be administered rapidly enough to connect the offense with the punishment. ¹³⁶

"The success of this program," one division had stated, "will

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depend to a high degree on the resourcefulness and initiative of the company commanders." This statement did not take into account the inability of the Korean soldier to grasp the U.S. conception of everyday living, his bewilderment when confronted with the American way of life, his need to acquaint himself, for example, with the structure, the function, and the operation of a 2 1/2-ton truck, and all the personal adaptations imposed upon him by his sudden transfer from a simple existence to a highly organized, modern army in combat. There was not time to develop with the Koreans the personal relationships necessary for the proper performance of an infantry squad. This situation was intensified because the Koreans lacked training, did not know his weapons, and, therefore, could not be depended upon in combat. The lack of time available for training, the language barrier, and the cultural differences caused Korean soldiers to be most confused and made their presence a burden on unit commanders rather than an asset.

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The Koreans inability to perform skilled technical jobs, their disregard of supply discipline, their incompetence in independent positions such as outposts, listening posts, and guard duty were additional deficiencies which made some units request in October that KATUSA personnel be returned to the Korean Army. Although Korean soldiers "tried to be of service," one company commander stated, the "language barrier and lack of training changed a welcome supplement to an irritating cumbersome burden." The KATUSA personnel, it was believed by many, reduced rather than aided unit combat effectiveness. Should the Koreans be returned to the Korean Army, U.S. troops could

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be given more supervision, thereby improving unit efficiency, morale,
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and discipline.

KATUSA personnel with artillery and service units were much more effective than those with the infantry. Artillery units used them as security guards and in the higher numbered positions in the gun squads where commands could be relayed by arm and hand signals. Ordnance units found them well-trained and careful welders, good auto mechanics. Signal units utilized them satisfactorily as wiremen and guards. Yet, although they admitted the good work of Koreans in these organizations, division commanders recommended that no more KATUSA personnel be assigned and, even further, that all Koreans be returned to the Korean Army.
139

On 21 October 1950, EUSAK ordered reductions in KATUSA strength. Five days later the 2d Infantry Division had 1,088 Koreans available for transfer to the Korean Army. On the same day, KATUSA personnel were released from the 1st Cavalry Division and the 24th Infantry Division and airshipped from Pyongyang to Kimpo for release to the Korean Army. Three thousand Koreans were returned from Japan by the 3d Infantry Division; approximately 3,000 additional Koreans in Japan were to be returned as soon as possible. KATUSA personnel released
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were to cadre newly activated Korean Army units.

KATUSA personnel were to be reduced from 100 to 25 per company-

*KATUSA personnel returned to the Korean Army by 31 December 50 were estimated variously as 9,946 and 13,601. Figures furnished by Lt. Col. P. W. Scott, KMAG advisor to the G - 1, Korean Army.

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size unit as U.S. replacements became available. U.S. organizations screened their Korean personnel carefully and retained those that most nearly approached U.S. standards. No additional KATUSA assignments were made to the combat elements, although service units continued to receive them on a limited basis until April 1951. Koreans assigned to rear area installations -- for example, 400 employed as prisoner of war guards at Koje-do -- performed satisfactorily. Those remaining with combat elements had been sufficiently trained by combat to be assets to their organizations. They proved invaluable in handling refugees, in establishing identities of Oriental personnel during night operations, and in securing information from civilians. If a natural selectivity toward the survival of the fittest prevailed, these KATUSA personnel remaining with U.S. units in 1951 were competent and seasoned combat soldiers. * Unfortunately, however, when a Korean was evacuated from his U.S. unit for medical or ** other reasons, he could not return to that organization, but was returned to duty through Korean Army replacement channels to a Korean unit. 141

In May 1951 procedures were established to make possible the promotion of KATUSA personnel. Five months later, EUSAK officially stated that because the Korean Army urgently needed troops, KATUSA replacements would not be requisitioned by U.S. units. 142

In October 1951, when EUSAK queried the six U.S. infantry divisions

* See Chart III for KATUSA personnel, September 1950 - October 1951.

**See Chart IV, for KATUSA casualties.

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for their views about a proposed levy on the divisions on a pro rata basis of 400 KATUSA personnel for special mission, four of the six division commanders expressed their objections to the proposed less of this relatively small number of KATUSA personnel. One division commander¹⁴³ stated:

KATUSA personnel remaining with this division are highly trained, well-disciplined, and skilled combat soldiers serving for the most part with infantry companies. They are of the utmost value as fighting soldiers, interpreters and in contacts with Korean civilians.

The KATUSA program, an emergency measure, was instituted at a time when the tactical situation did not permit Koreans to be adequately trained. The reception of poorly trained soldiers by units then engaging the enemy caused a decided drop in morale among U.S. troops, although for a short period of time the strength of U.S. units was so low that the arrival of KATUSA personnel tended as a simple presence of numbers to outweigh the lack of training. Some Korean soldiers -- a minority -- were outstanding in their ability to adapt rapidly to their new situation, but the language barrier prevented many from quickly learning the basic rules of combat.

From the point of view of immediately providing combat effective soldiers to the depleted U.S. forces, the KATUSA program failed. In spite of the adverse conditions under which this program was inaugurated, however, and despite the extreme difficulties experienced by all personnel involved, KATUSA soldiers did render valuable services. Because KATUSA personnel were rapidly, and necessarily, placed into U.S. units without training or military skills of any sort, and because of the profound

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language barrier, the cultural differences, and the adverse tactical conditions under which KATUSA and U.S. personnel were operating, it is seriously doubted whether any groups of such varying nationalities could have performed with greater effectiveness. By November 1951, and even earlier, many of the original difficulties were overcome since better understanding, partial grasp by each group of the other's language and customs, and valuable training under favorable conditions had been accomplished. Integration had been effected.

* Mention must be made of the Staff Memorandum, "The Use of South Korean Troops (6 May - 31 Aug 1951)," Operations Research Office, GHQ FEC, Report No. 4, 1 Aug 51, prepared by J. D. Oates. This report, concerned with proving the value of the system of Korean integration utilized by the French battalion, comes to a hasty conclusion that the KATUSA program failed elsewhere because of faults of the individual Korean soldier, faults such as his inability to realize that equality with the U.S. soldier brought responsibility as well as privilege, and his resentment of the fact that equality did not extend to the payroll.

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CHART I -- KATUSA, 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION

PRESENT FOR DUTY

	<u>6 Sep 50</u>	<u>16 Sep 50</u>	<u>26 Sep 50</u>	<u>5 Oct 50</u>
5th Cav Regt	288	541	653	662
7th Cav Regt	271	532	703	669
8th Cav Regt	275	523	670	680
61st FA Bn	19	---	---	---
77th FA Bn	50	---	---	---
82d FA Bn	50	---	---	---
99th FA Bn	19	---	---	---
Div Arty	---	395	536	584
13th Sig Co	100	100	98	97
16th Recon Co	50	19	50	46
8th Engr C Bn	---	198	199	195
15th Repl Co (Awaiting asgmt)	---	---	25	---
Hqs, 1st Cav Div	---	---	---	19
TOTAL PRESENT FOR DUTY:	1182	2338	2934	2952
TOTAL ASSIGNED:	1182	2519	3319	3319

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KATUSA, 25th INFANTRY DIVISION

PRESENT FOR DUTY

	<u>6 Sep 50</u>	<u>16 Sep 50</u>	<u>26 Sep 50</u>	<u>6 Oct 50</u>
24th Inf Regt	323	405	598	708
27th Inf Regt	243	670	789	834
35th Inf Regt	236	632	844	890
25th Div Arty	200	611	707	777
65th Engr C Bn	---	---	---	100
25th Recon Co	55	129	168	159
25th QM Co	---	---	---	19
5th RCT	66	---	---	---
TOTAL:	1123	2447	3106	3517

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KATUSA, 24th INFANTRY DIVISION

PRESENT FOR DUTY

	<u>6 Sep 50</u>	<u>17 Sep 50</u>	<u>29 Sep 50</u>	<u>8 Oct 50</u>
19th Inf Regt	399	781	942	912
21st Inf Regt	549	837	689	736
5th Inf Regt	---	---	745	731
24th Div Arty	296 ROK 124 NP*	407	809	809
3d Engr C Bn	200	200	279	279
TOTAL:	1568	2225	3464	3467

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CHART II -- KATUSA, 2D INFANTRY DIVISION

1950 ASSIGNED	<u>20 Aug</u>	<u>1 Sep</u>	<u>5 Sep</u>	<u>9 Sep</u>	<u>13 Sep</u>	<u>15 Sep</u>	<u>17 Sep</u>	<u>19 Sep</u>	<u>23 Sep</u>
9th Inf Regt	200	295	---	290	150	10	---	250	10
23d Inf Regt	---	160	374	---	150	9	200	---	10
38th Inf Regt	---	---	---	---	200	4	200	---	10
Div Arty	50	---	---	---	---	1	100	250	11
2d Recon Co	---	---	---	75	---	1	---	---	1
2d Engr Bn	---	---	100	---	---	2	---	---	---
2d Sig Co	---	---	25	---	---	---	---	---	---
Div Hqs Co	---	---	---	25	---	1	---	---	---
2d MP Co	---	45	---	---	---	1	---	---	---
72d Tank Bn	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1
2d QM Co	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1
702d Ord Co	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1
2d Med Co	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL:	250	500	499	390	500	29**	500	500	45**

* National Police,

** Officer Personnel

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1950
ASSIGNED

	<u>25 Sep</u>	<u>29 Sep</u>	<u>TOTAL ASG 29 Sep</u>	<u>PRES FOR DY 29 Sep</u>	<u>TOTAL RELEASED 6 Nov</u>	<u>PRES FOR DY 6 Nov</u>	<u>PRES FOR DY 26 Nov</u>	<u>PRES FOR DY 16 Jan 51</u>
9th Inf Regt	---	25	1230	767	251	547	450	76
23d Inf Regt	---	---	903	647	382	272	268	125
38th Inf Regt	200	25	639	535	27	505	473	80
Div Arty	200	---	612	608	329	263	263	173
2d Recon Co	---	---	77	67	---	65	14	11
2d Engr Bn	---	99	201	173	164	29	1*	---
2d Sig Co	---	25	50	49	---	46	49	20
Div Hqs Co	---	---	26	26	---	26	26	24
2d MP Co	---	---	46	42	---	42	42	38
72d Tank Bn	75	75	151	148	43	103	104	92
2d QM Co	25	25	51	51	---	51	51	48
702d Ord Co	---	50	51	50	---	49	47	45
2d Med Co	---	75	75	72	---	61	61	36
Ivanhoe Sec Force	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	138
Netherlands Bn	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	99
French Bn	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	94
1st Ranger Co	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	4
TOTAL:	500	399	4112	3235	1196	2059	1819	1103

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CHART III -- KATUSA STRENGTHS

	<u>8 Sep 50</u>	<u>30 Sep 50</u>	<u>31 Oct 50</u>	<u>30 Nov 50</u>	<u>31 Dec 50</u>
1st Cav Div	1673	2956	2071	1542	1377
2d Inf Div	1085	2756	3022	1041	1137
65th RCT	---	3560	1131	---	---
3d Inf Div	---	---	---	---	3627
7th Inf Div	---	---	---	---	3093
24th Inf Div	---	3634	2017	1898	1797
25th Inf Div	1585	3230	2703	1385	1248
Eighth Army Troops	---	---	1325	1325	1303
I Corps Troops	---	572	879	296	311
IX Corps Troops	---	110	435	317	302
X Corps Troops	---	---	---	---	1081
2d Log Cmd	---	---	626	639	648
Eighth Army Ranger Co	---	---	---	4	---
3d Log Cmd	---	---	941	643	112

* Officer Personnel

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	<u>31 Jan 51</u>	<u>28 Feb 51</u>	<u>31 Mar 51</u>	<u>30 Apr 51</u>	<u>31 May 51</u>
1st Cav Div	1308	1186	1118	1042	1044
2d Inf Div	1037	1224	1192	1109	729
3d Inf Div	2668	2557	2416	2286	2168
7th Inf Div	2756	2440	2300	2177	2130
24th Inf Div	1644	1465	1370	1255	1165
25th Inf Div	1119	1052	978	910	863
Eighth Army Troops	1303	1303	3517	4626	4205
I Corps Troops	307	22	12	139	10
IX Corps Troops	283	264	79	141	80
X Corps Troops	1081	834	752	266	269
2d Log Cmd	1160	1112	222	358	331

	<u>30 Jun 51</u>	<u>31 Jul 51</u>	<u>31 Aug 51</u>	<u>30 Sep 51</u>	<u>27 Oct 51</u>
1st Cav Div	950	933	894	887	820
2d Inf Div	759	735	724	727	780
3d Inf Div	1679	1528	1504	1475	1444
7th Inf Div	2069	1915	1863	1814	1750
24th Inf Div	1132	1030	1023	1013	927
25th Inf Div	831	803	671	629	631
Eighth Army Troops	4227	4177	4177	4177	4177
I Corps Troops	52	52	52	52	31
IX Corps Troops	80	80	80	80	67
X Corps Troops	258	258	258	258	238
2d Log Cmd	335	335	335	266	266

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CHART IV -- KATUSA CASUALTIES

Totals, 27 October 1951

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL BATTLE</u>	<u>NBC</u>
1st Cav Div	102	616	513	1231	603
2d Inf Div	164	582	1083	1827	473
3d Inf Div	94	341	198	635	591
7th Inf Div	119	312	802	1233	618
24th Inf Div	85	392	143	620	525
25th Inf Div	89	377	250	716	455
TOTAL DIVISIONS:	<u>653</u>	<u>2620</u>	<u>2989</u>	<u>6262</u>	<u>3265</u>
Eighth Army	---	---	---	---	---
I Corps	---	---	---	---	---
IX Corps	---	---	---	---	26
X Corps	8	28	3	39	64
2d Log Cmd	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL EIGHTH ARMY:	<u>661</u>	<u>2648</u>	<u>2992</u>	<u>6301</u>	<u>3355</u>
	---	---	---	---	---

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CHAPTER V
RANGER UNITS

On 25 August 1950, under authority of GHQ FEC, the Eighth Army activated the Eighth Army Ranger Company in Japan. When this unit arrived in Korea, it was dispatched to IX Corps, effective 10 October 1950. Four days later it was attached to the 25th Infantry Division. 150

Within the next few months, six Ranger infantry companies (airborne) arrived in Korea from the Ranger Training Center, Fort Benning, Georgia.

Each company was assigned to a division. When the 5th Ranger Company was assigned to the 25th Infantry Division, the Eighth Army Ranger 151


Company was inactivated.

**

Ranger infantry companies (airborne), organized and equipped for

	<u>Arrived in Korea</u>	<u>Assignment</u>
*1st Ranger Co	17 Dec 50	2nd Inf Div
2nd Ranger Co	30 Dec 50	7th Inf Div
3rd Ranger Co	24 Mar 51	3rd Inf Div (3 Apr 51)
4th Ranger Co	30 Dec 50	1st Cav Div
5th Ranger Co	24 Mar 51	25th Inf Div (31 Mar 51)
8th Ranger Co	24 Mar 51	24th Inf Div (31 Mar 51)

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Includes augmentation of 7 EM. 81

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rapid movement and brief and decisive engagements, for aggressive action, day or night, were not intended to be employed in sustained combat. Their attacks were to be made by employing surprise, stealth, heavy automatic fire, rapid movement, and short hard action at the objective. ¹⁵²

These companies were organized and trained to infiltrate enemy lines and attack command posts, artillery positions, tank parks, and major communications centers or facilities. Their capabilities included maneuvering in all types of terrain and climate, conducting reconnaissance and intelligence operations, and landing by parachute, glider, or assault aircraft. Thus, attaching a Ranger company to a division provided the division commander an added increment of trained and aggressive fighters capable of airborne, amphibious, or ground-infiltration penetration of enemy rear areas for destruction, harassment, and intelligence. ¹⁵³

These advantages were not made use of in Korea to the extent anticipated. The airborne capability of the Ranger companies was utilized only once, when the 2d and 4th Ranger Companies were attached to the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team for the Munsan-ni drop on 23 March 1951. On another occasion, one ranger company was alerted for a drop intended to cut off the escape routes of high-ranking enemy personnel, but this operation was cancelled. ¹⁵⁴ The amphibious capability of the Ranger companies was taken advantage of only once, when the 4th Ranger Company on 11 April 1951 crossed the Hwachon Dam in assault boats to make an enveloping move as part of the 7th Cavalry Regiment attack. ¹⁵⁵ The ability of the Ranger companies to infiltrate by ground

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action was used to some extent by the divisions to which they were assigned. The 1st Ranger Company, after a penetration of eight miles into enemy territory, inflicted severe damage on an enemy command post. On other occasions it made deep forays to capture prisoners, create confusion, and place antipersonnel mines across enemy escape routes. But even this ability to infiltrate by ground action was not exploited since Ranger companies were too large to be used as a unit to perform division-type infiltration missions -- platoon and squad-size elements were more appropriate.

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The language and physical differences, which made their presence too easily detected in enemy rear areas, also reduced the effectiveness of the Ranger companies. This increased hazard brought about a reluctance on the part of division commanders to send Rangers behind the enemy lines where they might have to be reinforced or rescued. The extended unit frontages in Korea and the necessity of placing almost all units on line resulted in few reserve elements that would be available for reinforcement or rescue mission.

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Although Rangers were adept at night operations, commanders were reluctant to commit them on such missions because the practice of the enemy to maneuver during darkness would probably force the Rangers to deviate from preplanned routes and thus disarrange planned artillery fires.

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* The Commanding General, 3d Infantry Division, recommended that Ranger companies be augmented with Korean interpreters so that listening posts, which were easily established, would have value.

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Commanders recognized the value of Ranger companies to perform independent long-range missions. Yet they felt that Ranger companies were light in numbers and in fire power, too small in size to be entrusted with a deep penetration mission, and not organized to conduct independent operations for more than a short period of time. Profitable Ranger targets were nor normally present on the immediate division front in Korea because division intelligence failed to discover suitable targets or because possible targets were overrun by the division before they could be taken under Ranger attack.

161

It was difficult to plan and co-ordinate Ranger operations at division level where intelligence, naval, and air force agencies were not present. Even when only ground operations were involved, it was difficult for division and regimental staffs to think in terms of employing Ranger companies for special ranger-type missions.

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How then were Ranger companies used in Korea? They secured and held key terrain features, acted as infantry support for tanks, protected and screened division, regimental, and battalion flanks, provided command post security, performed intelligence and reconnaissance missions. Although the Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division, stated that Ranger missions were "preselected" to make maximum use of Ranger company capabilities without wasting the organization on missions other units could perform, the Commanding Officer, 8th Ranger Company, stated that his unit performed "in no other way except as a straight infantry company." Because the 5th Ranger Company was employed "on what was considered to be proper ranger missions without profitable results,"

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the Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, felt that a division Ranger company was "a luxury rather than a useful unit."¹⁶⁴

When they were used as standard infantry companies, their organizational deficiencies became obvious. Tactically, they were able to act independently for short periods of time, but because of lack of personnel and equipment, they were incapable of performing their own administration and supply. Hampered by lack of organic transportation and adequate communication, they were a burden to the organizations to which they were attached. They lacked weapons for sustained, unsupported action.¹⁶⁵ Special organizations with "valuable capabilities [which] should not be wasted on inappropriate assignments and tasks," they provoked the objection universally held with respect to all special units: they did not pull their weight in prolonged combat. They were not economical.¹⁶⁶

To add vehicles, an administrative element, a weapons platoon, a liaison group, and fire control team for artillery and tactical air support would have made the Ranger companies unwieldy. If special units were needed, selected infantrymen could be withdrawn from the line, rehearsed for special missions, and dispatched. In this way special capabilities would be those in addition to the ability to perform sustained combat.¹⁶⁷

There were additional reasons why Ranger companies were not economical. Special units of this sort attracted personnel high in leadership potentiality and battlefield efficiency, thereby depriving standard ground units of their use. Ranger companies also complicated

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the replacement system, for casualties in small organizations followed no patterns, and trained replacements from the Ranger Training Command arrived in Korea only every three months.

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✓ The necessity for arranging training jumps every three months so that Rangers could continue to draw increased pay and remain qualified for airborne operations was an annoyance. Jumps frequently were cancelled, postponed, or rearranged because of difficulties of coordination, of weather, and of the suddenly changing combat conditions. The shortage of parachutes in the theater, the limited availability of planes, the reluctance to withdraw planes from scheduled cargo and air evacuation missions to train Rangers, the limited availability and proximity of suitable airstrips and drop zones made this problem an irritating one.

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* As a result of these problems, the Ranger companies were inactivated in Korea, effective 1 August 1951. Qualified parachutists were re-assigned to the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team. Other personnel were reassigned within the divisions. Several months later, the Department of the Army directed the extension of Ranger training to all combat units of the Army. This training, not requiring parachutist qualification, would permit overt operations in enemy territory, normally not in excess of forty-eight hours.

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* The Ranger companies, composed of highly trained and aggressive personnel who accomplished their missions in a superior manner, proved tactically unsatisfactory in the Korean conflict because of their

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administrative weakness, the difficulties of planning Ranger missions,
the factor of Oriental enemies, and the extremely broad frontages of
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the Korean theater.

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CHAPTER VI
HELICOPTER EVACUATION

Few operations in the Korean campaign have been more dramatic than the helicopter evacuation of combat casualties. For the first time in armed conflict this technique has been employed on a wide scale. *

In the past the tendency has been to move surgery as close to the patient as possible. In Korea, this would have meant locating the mobile army surgical hospitals beside the division clearing stations. The fluid tactical situation made it undesirable to locate medical installations in close proximity to the front lines. Instead, medical installations were able to remain in relatively safe areas while helicopters brought the patient quickly to the rear for life-saving treatment. At the same time, with medical installations relatively stable, the patient was able to receive the four or five days of postoperative care essential for further evacuation to the rear for convalescence. ¹⁷³

Helicopter evacuation was particularly important in Korea because the poor road condition made ambulance evacuation dangerous for seriously wounded patients. Vehicular traffic taxed the limited Korean road net and slowed ambulance evacuation. Much of the territory in which operations were conducted was inaccessible to vehicles. Without helicopters it would have been necessary to hand-carry casualties painfully over long distances in difficult terrain. Fortunately, ¹⁷⁴ friendly air superiority permitted helicopters to be used.

* This chapter covers only the period from 30 June 1950 - 31 August 1951.

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Helicopter evacuation in Korea evolved out of circumstance rather than from plan. A detachment of the 3d Air Rescue Squadron, U.S. Air Force, which had the mission of retrieving pilots downed behind enemy lines, began to receive occasional requests from ground elements to evacuate casualties from difficult terrain. Because its helicopters were not always engaged in pilot rescue work, the detachment responded. By August 1950, it was answering so many calls from the combat elements that it found itself "in the evacuation business."¹⁷⁵

The detachment used the H - 5 Sikorski helicopter, which carried a pilot and a medical aid man. The H - 5 could evacuate two litter cases in the capsules or pods attached outside the cabin, and one ambulatory patient (two, under ideal flying conditions) inside the cabin. Thus, in cases of extreme necessity, the pilot, alone, could evacuate three ambulatory and two litter patients in one flight.¹⁷⁶

The detachment of the Air Rescue Squadron gave excellent support to the combat forces of EUSAK after the perimeter breakout when the lines of communication were long. Use of helicopters, nevertheless, remained sporadic until the Chinese attack at Kunu-ri in November 1950. At that time, the full helicopter potential in Korea was recognized.¹⁷⁷

In January 1951 three Army helicopter detachments arrived in Korea with the mission of evacuating seriously wounded patients from the front lines. Each detachment consisted of four helicopters, four pilots, and

* Planning and experimentation in the use of helicopters were being carried out as early as 1942 by the Army. Consequently, certain individuals were aware of the helicopter potentiality for medical evacuation.

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four mechanics. Two detachments were equipped with Bell H - 13 helicopters; one had Hiller H - 23 craft. These were smaller than the Air Force Sikorski. Each carried only a pilot and was equipped with two baskets or pods for litter patients. Under exceptionally good flight conditions, one ambulatory patient could be transported at the same time. 178

The Eighth Army surgeon placed the first two detachments to arrive in Korea under the control of the IX Corps surgeon. Since IX Corps was operating in the central sector of Korea, helicopters located there could also serve the other corps areas. 179

The first problem that arose was the necessity of teaching the helicopter pilots the capabilities of their craft insofar as front-line evacuation of casualties in Korea was concerned. The pilots could only learn by the trial and error method. 180

The ground forces then had to learn the limitations of helicopter evacuation. In the popular conception, helicopters landed on mountain peaks, lifted straight up into the air, and operated in all types of weather. It was necessary to understand that helicopters could not fly at night, operate in bad weather, or land in all types of terrain. They needed take-off space; they could not fly in heavy winds; they

* In taking off from the ground, the helicopter could over (rise straight up) one half the diameter of the rotor blade, about 24 feet for the Sikorski, 15 feet for the Bell. When it achieved a certain speed, it acquired additional lift power. Then it gained altitude as it went forward. Weather and wind as well as altitude of the terrain affected the take-off.

** The problem of controlling the helicopter in flight was always greater than that of flying conventional aircraft.

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had limitations of range and altitude. They also had less lift power
181
in the thin, warm air of summer.

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When requesting a helicopter, ground troops had to be made aware of the importance of reporting accurate co-ordinates to locate the patient. They had to be taught the necessity of marking the landing site with panels and of using colored smoke grenades to indicate proper location
182
and wind direction to help the pilot land his craft.

Combat elements sometimes requested helicopters as a convenience. Front-line commanders demanded the use of helicopters for tactical missions until they began to receive their own aircraft. Standing operating procedure, disseminated by the EUSAK surgeon on 23 June 1951, outlined the helicopter evacuation mission as follows:

. . . to provide immediate means of evacuating non-transportable and selected critically injured or ill patients needing immediate surgical or medical care not provided by forward medical facilities.

By the fall of 1951, tactical forces had learned to request a helicopter only for serious cases such as head, sucking chest and abdominal wounds, and other serious emergencies; and only (1) if an ambulance could not reach the patient, (2) if a rough ambulance ride would seriously injure the patient, or (3) if it was necessary to get the patient quickly to a medical installation. As a working premise, the local surgeon decided whether the patient needed helicopter evacuation

*The Sikorski could travel 180 miles without refueling; the Bell could fly 60 miles.

** Request for helicopters in IX Corps were made by the division surgeon directly to the officer handling helicopter evacuation. This officer made all the checks necessary before sending the pilot on the mission.

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and the helicopter detachment commander decided whether the helicopter
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could reach the patient.

Ground forces generally did not realize the extreme vulnerability of helicopters. Their lack of speed and their inability to fly at high altitude increased the hazards of enemy ground fire. Furthermore, helicopters were extremely sensitive to damage. The lack of gliding power such as that of a conventional plane and the increased problem of pilot control meant that almost any damage from enemy fire was fatal to the craft. Pilots did not wear parachutes because of the danger of falling into the blades if they jumped from a disabled craft. Consequently, ground troops had to realize that helicopters could not enter areas under enemy small arms fire. When an area was under enemy observation, the patient had to be prepared to be evacuated immediately after the helicopter landed in order to prevent loss of the craft from enemy artillery or mortar fire. Because there was always a shortage of
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helicopters in Korea, a policy decision was made by EUSAK that helicopters would not be employed in missions involving the likelihood of danger from enemy action. This did not prevent helicopter pilots from evacuating patients from units surrounded by the enemy; nor did it keep pilots from evacuating casualties sustained by patrols operating forward of
184
friendly front lines.

One of the problems of helicopter evacuation concerned the echelon

* Amounts requested for use in Korea exceeded production capabilities. The Air Force pulled helicopters out of Europe, the Canal Zone, and Alaska for use in Korea.

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where helicopters would be located. The army surgeon attached the first two Army helicopter detachments that arrived in Korea to the 8076th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital. At that time, corps headquarters was at Chungju; the hospital was located forty miles to the rear, at Sangju. This arrangement proved cumbersome because of the long distance of the helicopters from the combat elements. It was then decided to dispatch the helicopters on missions from corps. Thus, every morning when the weather permitted flight, two helicopters came to corps headquarters to await calls from the front lines. Later, all the helicopters moved forward. Gradually, the helicopters were worked into locations as close to the combat forces as possible. By the winter of 1951, it was customary to keep at least one helicopter at the division clearing station. From there, it was but a few minutes to the front lines. 185

It soon became apparent that the Hiller helicopter was not adequate for the evacuation mission in Korea. It was underpowered and a defect in the structure of the metal in the cooling fan caused the blades to crack. It was necessary to replace the Hiller craft with Bell helicopters. 186

The many moving parts of the helicopter and the absence of hangars in Korea caused maintenance to be a serious problem. The lack of an adequate number of craft and the resulting necessity for keeping the ones on hand in continuous use further prevented ideal maintenance procedure. 187 The shortage of spare parts was critical. This was complicated for the Sikorski since that helicopter was no longer in production. Securing the proper octane gasoline for the Bell was

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sometimes difficult. Pilots on distant flights carried gasoline with them in order to have the correct fuel for the return trip. Boosters
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were developed for starting the engines in cold weather.

Certain expedients were developed to adapt the helicopters to evacuation purposes. Flexible tubes were fitted from the engine to heat the patients in flight. Plastic bags were used to keep the patients warm. Covers for the pods were devised to keep the wind from the patients' faces. That the patients in the pods were unable to receive medical care while in flight remained one of the serious limitations of the helicopter, though a mechanical arrangement was fitted on the craft to enable the medical aid man to give plasma to the patients in the pods while the craft was in flight. The limitation on medical care was another reason why it was necessary to keep the
189
helicopter flights as short as possible.

Helicopters in Korea evacuated approximately 8,000 casualties by
**
1 November 1951. Many of these patients would not have survived without helicopter transportation. The smooth ride and the rapid treatment possible caused a lower rate of shock fatalities than in World War II. The treatment of head injuries was expedited because helicopters were able to carry patients swiftly to a neurosurgical team located minutes

* The Air Force did not have this problem.

**Ninety-five percent of the productive effort of Detachment, 3d Air Rescue Squadron, was directed toward casualty evacuation. The 8,000 figure does not include evacuees by Marine helicopters, which operated in the 1st Marine Division sector.

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from the battlefield. The presence of helicopters^{*} in Korea exerted a beneficent influence on morale. Although much experimentation in the use of helicopters for evacuation remained to be done, this "ambulance in the air" had proved its usefulness in the Korean conflict by the fall of 1951.¹⁹⁰

*Helicopters also carried emergency issues of medical supplies forward. This was particularly useful in the case of whole blood, which could not be stockpiled for long periods of time.

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CHAPTER VII

REAR AREA SECURITY

The National Police, responsible for maintaining internal security, totaled 48,273 men at the outbreak of the Korean conflict. Operating under the provincial police chiefs, * this organization was essentially civilian and corresponded somewhat to U.S. state police forces. In the spring of 1950, in order to relieve the Korean Army from antiguerrilla missions and permit it to concentrate on defense of the 38th parallel area, National Police battalions were organized on a quasi-military basis. 191

Just before the outbreak of hostilities, guerrillas in the interior of South Korea were quiescent. Simultaneous with the North Korean attack, however, approximately 5,000 guerrillas became active. Taking advantage of the mass withdrawal of soldiers and civilians in the early days of the action, guerrillas added their efforts to the confusion. 192

When the Eighth U.S. Army assumed command of ground forces in Korea, it found itself in the confusing situation of being in presumably friendly territory through which communist guerrillas freely operated. Refugees streaming south into friendly rear areas were accompanied by communist agents and sympathizers. The National Police was assigned the task of routing out these elements dangerous to security, an operation termed "weeding." 193

Setting up a security perimeter in an arc fifteen miles around the city of Pusan, the National Police checked the identification of civilians

*The provincial police chiefs were under the National Police chief, who was in turn responsible to the Minister of Home Affairs.

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at all roads, rail lines, and rivers. Inside the city, a detective was assigned to each block, and check points were established at various locations. Informers were employed to ferret out spies. 194

National Police units were also to guard vital installations and communications centers. Mobile units and railway guards furnished this security.

The operating of the National Police during the early days of the conflict and during the operations within the Pusan perimeter were rendered difficult by certain factors. In its withdrawal from the north, the National Police had lost vehicles and weapons. This intensified the shortage of transportation and arms that had always plagued the National Police. Its training facilities were limited. It employed as its principal arm the Japanese '99 rifle. Policemen used old shell casings to make their own ammunition. Medical supplies were virtually nonexistent. Bandages were washed and used several times. 195

Resentment and rivalry between the National Police and the Korean Army had existed for several years, and the Korean Army, faced with its own problems of reorganization in the early days of the conflict, was not particularly disposed or able to aid the National Police. Troop ceilings established by the U.S. as a basis for allocating logistical support, did not take into consideration the National Police. 196 To obtain arms for the National Police, KMAC officers operated in an aggressive fashion. They visited ordnance depots and by personal persuasion secured captured weapons, so that National Police units could

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guard key installations within the Pusan perimeter, an operation of
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utmost importance.

The National Police employed Oriental methods of criminal investi-
gation, which were based on Japanese procedure and stressed the use
of brutality to obtain confessions. Mass arrests of communists had
been made in August 1947. The government had subsequently instituted
✓ strong measures against this group. In view of past government policy
and the brutality of the police, large-scale surrenders of communists
and collaborators were deterred. The estimated 600,000 communists and
sympathizers, 10,000 of whom were party members, at the time of the
North Korean invasion comprised a latent potential danger to U.S. rear
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area security.

* The shortage of U.S. military police and CIC units, in addition
to the early deficiencies of the National Police, made necessary an
organization to co-ordinate all agencies concerned with rear area
security. On 21 July the Army commander Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker,
* created the Office of the Coordinator and Protector of Lines of
Communication, Rear Area, under G - 3, EUSAK. The co-ordinator was
responsible for achieving the maximum protection for railroads, MSR's,
bridges, signal communication lines, and relay stations against sabotage
and enemy guerrilla activity. The co-ordinator immediately made an

* A month before the Korean conflict, three communist agents with
radios were captured in Pusan. These agents had been trained in
Pyongyang, given an amount of money considered necessary to accomplish
their mission, and sent to Pusan. There they attempted to watch the
ECA and military activities of the port. They were able to radio
back one message of limited value.

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inspection of the perimeter to insure mutual aid and co-operation among U.S., Korean Army, and National Police units engaged in rear area security functions.
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In the middle of August the area north of Masan was saturated with guerrillas. From Pohang-dong on the east coast, to Taegu on the north side of the perimeter, to the south coast of Korea guerrilla activities flourished. One band, on 11 August, struck close to EUSAK headquarters when it successfully raided a VHF relay station only five and one-half miles south of Taegu. One hundred police reinforcements, with three machine guns and other weapons, repulsed a second attack a few days later. Dynamiting of railroad tracks at Ahwa (EQ0470) in early August, sabotage of a hospital train between Taegu and Pusan on the night of 24-25 August, two ambush incidents south of Ulsan in late August, and a night attack on the 38th Ordnance MM Company near Chongdo (DQ7444) in early September were some of the guerrilla depredations that occurred.
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Guerrillas concentrated on attacking trucks and railcars, particularly between Taegu and Pusan, and made the MSR unsafe for single vehicles. Ambushes were usually set up on hairpin curves where a gully afforded cover for the guerrillas. Mortar shells were sometimes placed in the road. Yet because a guerrilla force never succeeded in getting inside a large United Nations installation or in engaging in a serious action with a United Nations force, guerrilla activity within the perimeter had nuisance value only.
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The many gaps in the thinly held United Nations perimeter defense made the threat of enemy infiltration a constant one. In addition to

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the threat of enemy penetration, there was the danger of civilian-clothed enemy troops passing through the lines. To meet this problem,²⁰² the National Police patrolled these areas extensively.

During the early morning hours of 18 August, four to six rounds of enemy artillery fell near the RTO in Taegu, killing one and wounding eight persons. The Provincial Government, in panic, ordered the evacuation of the city. Determined to hold Taegu, and to prevent the number of refugees from increasing, EUSAK immediately halted the²⁰³ evacuation.

In September, when EUSAK broke out of the perimeter and drove north, it bypassed thousands of enemy troops, some still organized as units. These were supplemented by stragglers from other enemy units which had succeeded in effecting an escape. The bypassed elements found themselves in positions where their own immediate withdrawal to the north was virtually impossible. As a result, they formed their own guerrilla units or joined forces with previously established bands. Known communists and communist sympathizers, forced underground by the North Korean withdrawal, swelled the ranks of the guerrilla forces.
*
Civilian groups, while not considered a serious threat as actual fighters because of their lack of arms and training, were able to

* These elements were joined by normally lawless groups. Although bandits and guerrillas could be distinguished by certain patterns of behavior, the National Police made no differentiation between the two. Communist bands generally burned public buildings, killed the village head, or kidnapped his sons; bandits were concerned with stealing property, food, and clothing.

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provide logistical support and perform espionage missions for the guerrillas.

Guerrilla activities centered particularly in the rough, mountainous terrain of the Chiri Mountains where dense foliage and scrub afforded natural cover and concealment. Observation posts on high peaks enabled the communists to observe friendly units moving against them as early as twenty hours in advance and at distances as great as twenty miles. Citizens disloyal to the Republic acted as a primary means of communication for these guerrilla forces and provided them with food from the large rice producing areas nearby. Recruits were obtained by kidnapping and political indoctrination.

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Subsequently, a second guerrilla center developed northeast of Seoul between the Pukhan River and the "Iron Triangle." And later, another area became active in the Taebaek mountain region.

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The expulsion of the North Korean Army from South Korea made it possible for the Republic of Korea once more to assume control of its territory. To prepare regions for the return of civil administration, National Police groups were sent north. Police returning to their posts closely followed the advance of the friendly forces. By late September, over 2,000 police had arrived in the Inchon area, and by 16 October, the Seoul police force numbered more than 6,600. Captured arms and ammunition continued to aid in solving the perennial problem of arming the National Police, although as late as 1 November 5,000 National Police were still without weapons.

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With extended lines of communication, EUSAK continued to be plagued by guerrilla activity. On 3 October, the army commander, not yet

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ready to turn rear area security back to the South Koreans, ordered the U.S. IX Corps to relieve the U.S. I Corps in the zone without delay. He directed IX Corps to protect the line of communications Seoul-Suwon-Taejon-Pusan and, in conjunction with the National Police, to destroy the remaining enemy elements in South Korea. The U.S. 25th Infantry Division furnished the troops for this duty. At least once, elements of this division were ambushed by guerrilla forces.

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While IX Corps was in charge of rear area security, plans were put into effect to return the administration of South Korea to the Republic of Korea Government. In the middle of October, all ROK Security Police were ordered released from attachment to U.S. units. The first was relieved from attachment to the U.S. 24th Infantry Division on 14 October. However, on 26 October, the original directive releasing the ROK Security Police was amended to allow the U.S. I Corps to retain its units. It was felt that since these police units were being used in a purely military function, their presence north of the 38th parallel would not affect the internal administration of North Korean territory.

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The Commanding General, EUSAK, on 23 October, clearly stated his intention of turning over to the Korean Army that territory south of the 38th parallel not required for the logistical support of current military operations. Giving the ROK Army full responsibility for military control and security of South Korea, the Army Commander ordered the ROK III Corps to relieve the U.S. IX Corps not later than 10 November. To reduce the pockets of disorganized enemy that still

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existed would require small unit and police-type actions. This became
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a mission of the Chief of Staff, Korean Army.

In North Korea, as a result of aggressive advance of railroad operations, railroad security became an important problem and necessitated the training of additional railway police. By 15 October it was expected that railway service would resume to Chorwon within ten days. Further north, the ROK 17th Regiment provided protection for railway repair work parties between Pyonggang and Wonsan. In preparation for the increased railroad mileage to be protected by the end of October,
211
1,000 additional railway police underwent training.

It was originally planned to place a railway security battalion at each of three cities: Sariwon, Pyongyang, and Pyonggang. On 15 November, the first National Railway Police Battalion departed from Seoul for duty north of the 38th parallel. The movement of a second battalion from Seoul at the same time was delayed by lack of arms. On 20 November, this battalion received a shipment of 1,062 Springfield rifles from Pusan. The battalion's departure from Seoul then was delayed by the lack of winter clothing. By 22 November, a railway escort company was in operation between Chinnampo and Pyongyang. In late November, friction between Railway Police detachments at Chungwa, ten miles south of Pyongyang, and the local police caused the former to be withdrawn to Seoul. Shortly thereafter, the entrance of the Chinese communists into the war and the subsequent withdrawal of U.N. forces
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eliminated the need for railway security in North Korea.

A total of 2,500 police reinforcements attempted to cope with

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guerrilla activities northeast of Seoul and along the 38th parallel in November 1950. Of these, 750 were sent to Kapyong and 250 to Pochon (CT1544). On the night of 24 - 25 November, while the ROK 17th Regiment held positions north of Yongchon (CS3117), the enemy killed or captured all but one of sixty National Police guarding the Hantan River railway bridge (CT30376), five miles south of the town on the Seoul-Wonsan line, before blowing the span. The enemy continued to hold Kapyong, where the Seoul-Chunchon railway crossed the steep-banked Pukhan River, in spite of continuous attack by the ROK 5th Division.

Neither the area northeast of Seoul nor the Chiri-san had been cleared of guerrillas and bypassed units when the Chinese communists entered the war. At the outset of the Chinese offensive, the pattern of guerrilla activity showed a marked co-ordination with the operations of the main communist forces. Guerrilla bands made repeated forays, striking U.N. elements on the flanks and rear. Friendly units, moving to support those under attack, were ambushed. Striking at MSR's, guerrilla forces attempted to disrupt the flow of supplies and to ambush friendly troop convoys. During the first twelve days in December, a total of eighty-seven guerrilla incidents occurred. Of these, forty-five were attacks on U.N. troops, thirty-three were raids on lines of communication; only nine were aggressions against villages and police installations.

For the period 1 - 10 December, the National Police reported the

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following casualties resulting from rear area security operations:
enemy: 2,250 KIA, 406 captured, a total of 2,656; friendly: 61 KIA,
83 MIA, 109 WIA, a total of 253; civilian : 62 KIA, 119 kidnapped or
missing, 247 wounded, a total of 458. Enemy weapons captured included
214 foreign rifles, 59 M's, 24 carbines, 14 machine guns, 5 mortars,
143 grenades, 2 pistols, and 1 field piece. Property destroyed included
19 government buildings (mostly police stations) and 145 farm houses. ²¹⁵

The serious guerrilla threat to rear area security continued into
January 1951. Incidents of the MSR being blocked between Hongchon
and Hoensong and the interruption of rail traffic northwest of Pungni
by guerrillas infiltrating in force indicated that well-planned
guerrilla maneuvers were supplementing the Chinese offensive. These
maneuvers were designed to prevent the reinforcement and resupply of
friendly front-line forces opposing the main attack from the north.
As the North Koreans and Chinese pushed southward, the guerrillas
likewise moved to the south and continued to harass friendly rear area
installations. The Andong, Kunchon, and Taejon areas served as control
points for this activity. ²¹⁶

The infiltration in force of the North Korean 10th Division early
in January from the 38th parallel through the central mountains toward
Chang-to (DR3969) aggravated the problem of rear area security in a
region where communist sympathizers were already active. This North
Korean force replenished its arms and ammunition by raids on friendly
units, and relied on the countryside for food and clothing, but lacked
medical facilities. The rear area security force at Chang-to consisted

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of the Special Activities Group. This organization had been formed by X Corps as a small, select force to raid behind enemy lines; to destroy roads, railroads, and bridges; to harass the enemy; and to force the enemy to keep large groups occupied in his rear area. Because of communist infiltration and rear area activity, however, the Special Activities Group was forced to remain in the friendly rear. Thus it was paradoxical that the Special Activities Group was used against this North Korean force.

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Although the North Korean 10th Division was repulsed in its attack on Chang-to, it continued south to within twenty miles northeast of Taegu. There, the 1st Marine Division and Korean Army security forces were committed against it. Despite heavy losses from constant attack, the communist division maintained its military organization and, after breaking into small groups, managed to withdraw north through the United Nations lines.

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In late February 1951, because of the seriousness of the situation, the Army Commander ordered a thorough reorganization of rear area security. Divisions were directed to institute security measures to their own rear boundaries; corps were similarly instructed; and EUSAK and the 2d Logistical Command were directed to assume responsibility in their sectors. On ROK Army security battalion with each corps was responsible for corps rear area security. Other security battalions guarded installations and MSR's, particularly in mountain passes, in the EUSAK sector.

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During March 1951 inspections revealed that rear area security

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measures were fragmentary and inadequate. Tactical support for some installations was not readily available, should guerrillas attack. A lack of co-ordination in security activities existed between the National Police on one hand and U.N. tactical and service elements on the other. To correct these deficiencies and faced with increased guerrilla activity, the Army Commander directed that additional measures be taken to insure the security of supply installations, supply trains, and railroad lines. Plans were to permit maximum evacuation or destruction of supplies, equipment, and facilities in the event a sudden withdrawal became necessary. If practicable, defense plans were to be co-ordinated with the internal security measures in operation at installations and were to include all class I, III, and V supply points, airfields, and major railheads.

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Particularly because of the insecurity of railheads, continued pilferage, and the ever-present threats of sabotage and guerrilla activity, it became imperative that a completely co-ordinated plan for internal security be established for all major railyards. Such a plan was to be co-ordinated with the security measures of army service units operating in the railyards to provide security twenty-four hours daily. Sandbagged gondolas carrying guards were attached to each train. Guard detachments were placed on tunnels and bridges between Pusan and Chechon. The ROK 2d Division, in co-ordination with the National Police, was assigned the responsibility of providing security for the EUSAK line of communications, which included the Yongchon (DQ9479) - Tanyang (DR3987) railroad line.

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As a result of the successful U.N. drive north of the 38th parallel in the spring of 1951, plans were again formulated to place rear area security under the Republic of Korea. On 28 April 1951 the Korean Army organized the Taebak-san Command. Korean Army units, in conjunction with National Police personnel, engaged in antiguerrilla activities. In August, 1951, the Commanding General, EUSAK, ordered the Korean Army to assume responsibility of the territory south of the corps rear boundaries. * On 16 September 1951, the Korean Army formed the SONAM Command to combat guerrillas in the southwest portion of Korea. ²²²

Rear area security in the beginning was concerned with a small area behind a thinly held perimeter. Its problems were "weeding" civilians and combating scattered guerrilla attacks. Direction of rear area security measures came from EUSAK. Personnel utilized were mainly National Police. During the break-through, U.S. IX Corps, Korean Army troops, and National Police were used to reduce bypassed enemy elements. Plans were made to turn the problem of internal security back to the government. However, with the entrance of the Chinese communists into the conflict, well-planned guerrilla activity in rear areas seriously threatened the logistical support of front-line units. The Army Commander ordered close co-ordination of rear area security to be effected by EUSAK and the Korean Army security forces. With the failure of the Chinese offensive and the drive of EUSAK north of the 38th parallel, the main task of rear area security became the reduction of guerrilla

* Pusan came under the administration of the 2d Logistical Command. See map page 111.

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
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strongholds. This was being carried out by well-organized efforts in the fall of 1951. Plans were again formulated to have the Republic of Korea assume control of its own internal security. *

* See chart following this page.

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ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
REAR AREA SECURITY UNITS



200 205 203 207
 1-2-3- 1-2-3 1-2-3 1-2-3-5
 (CAN BE MOVED TO ANY LOCATION
 TO SUPPRESS GUERRILLA ACTIVITY)

201 202 206 208 209
 1-2-3-5 (GUARD FIXED
 6-7-8 INSTALLATION AND
 CANNOT BE MOVED)

HOME POLICE
(PROVINCIAL POLICE)

UNITS ARE LOCATED IN THESE LARGE POPULATION CENTERS AND MUST REMAIN WITHIN PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES

- | | |
|----------|------------|
| SEOUL | CHONJU |
| CHEJU DO | TAEJON |
| PUSAN | CHUNGJU |
| TAEJU | YONGDUNGPO |
| KWANJU | WONJU |

FROM ORIGINAL SKETCH BY
Lt. Col. Milton H Baughn, Jr.
Ops Sec G - 3, EUSAK
16 Oct 51

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PRESS CENSORSHIP

Complete press censorship in Korea was imposed on 23 December 1950, six months after the outbreak of hostilities and eleven hours after the accidental death of Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker. Before this time, voluntary censorship, an honor system among the individual correspondents, had been in effect. But when the Eighth Army commander's death was disclosed by correspondents, without consideration of the effect such news would have on the enemy, and without permitting the Army time to notify General Walker's next of kin, the need for a controlled censorship became apparent. Although knowledge of the army commander's death later proved to be of no aid to the enemy, the security violation involved in the disclosure culminated a series of irritating and sometimes serious breaches of good faith. ²²³

At a press conference on 21 July 1950, the General Walker had informed correspondents that the Eighth Army would not supervise press dispatches. This decision was made in view of the fact that the Korean conflict, a "police action," would require commitment of only a limited number of troops for a short period of time. ²²⁴

As correspondents used their own discretion in filing their stories, press revelations endangered military plans and lives in varying degrees. Over 90 percent of the correspondents favored Army censorship; many sought it. Responsible and experienced correspondents desired censorship because they realized that it would insure military security, for in many instances only the Army knew the information which should be

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censored.

The voluntary censorship system did not fail. It was not practiced. Imposition of restraint was alien to the traditions, customs, and competition of reporting. During the period of voluntary censorship, it was possible for correspondents to phone whatever they wished to their Tokyo bureaus. ** Then over the Tokyo radio would be broadcast the strength, route, and objective of a patrol before it went into action, the details of a task force about to depart on a secret mission, the U.N. order of battle, U.N. strengths and losses, and tactical plans of Eighth Army. Again, there were leaks of vital information from reporters visiting Japan from Korea. And there were biased opinions expressed by correspondents who returned to the zone of interior with "predictions" of what would develop in Korea. ***

* Some correspondents sought censorship in order to avoid competition among themselves and to dispense with the relentless urgency of press, news agencies, and radio chains for the latest news concerning front-line action and probable action, often without regard for the welfare of EUSAK or the United Nations.

** The news services sold their information to Japanese radio and press chains as well as to the U.S. Armed Forces Radio network.

*** Following the U.N. withdrawal from North Korea after the Chinese Communist Forces crossed the Yalu River, a number of correspondents returned to the United States to reap the profits of lecture tours and dramatic, sometimes sensational, magazine articles, and to receive a variety of awards for "distinguished reporting." These often were achieved at the expense of misleading the American public. In January 1951, Don Whitehead and Hal Boyle of the Associated Press predicted the finish of Eighth Army; during the same month Jim Lucas of Scripps-Howard stated that EUSAK would be out of Korea in six weeks. Control of these correspondents was, of course, outside the power of EUSAK.

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Correspondents were often outraged by some of the representatives of their profession, those who shirked responsibility, who considered themselves above criticism, who flagrantly refused to confess errors or untruths in their stories, who wrote releases with misleading emphasis, and who had little knowledge of the military. ²²⁵

At no time, however, after censorship was imposed, did Eighth Army accuse correspondents of any form of misconduct other than the violation of security. Before censorship became effective, no disciplinary action was taken against correspondents who revealed information through press and radio. Officially accredited U.S. press correspondents in war zones were subject, by Act of Congress, to the 1951 Uniform Code of Military Justice. With respect to security regulations, correspondents who failed to obey orders of the zone in which they worked could be charged and tried under UCMJ Article 92. ^{**226}

It was apparent that correspondents did not abide by the voluntary censorship in effect during the first six months of the Korean campaign. Minor violations of security, which occurred daily, were considered

* Accredited correspondents were given the privileges, and were expected to assume some of the responsibility, of field grade officers. Most of the time there were about 300 correspondents accredited to EUSAK by GHQ, FEC. Of these, from 60 to 100 were in Korea, about one half with corps and divisions, the remainder with army headquarters.

** This was an opinion of the Judge Advocate General, but as no accusation ever was made, the procedure actually has not been tested before military or civil courts. Article 2 (11) of UCMJ provides for jurisdiction.

collectively to be more damaging than any single major breach. Fortunately, however, no serious repercussions were caused since major operations were well planned and not affected by security violations. * Before the establishment of censorship, the press publicized the following events, thereby violating voluntary security and endangering the success of military operations and the safety of personnel: (1) the withdrawal of U.N. troops to the Naktong River line; (2) the arrival of the 2d Infantry Division at Pusan; (3) the amphibious landing of the 1st Cavalry Division at Pohang-dong (4) the arrival in Korea of the first British troops; (5) the first landing in Korea of the 1st Marine Division; (6) the loss of Maj. Gen. William F. Dean; (7) the entrance of the first Air Force Sabre jet plane into combat; (8) the movement of the 1st Cavalry Division from reserve to the front line when the CCF attacked in the Chunchon River battle; (9) the first recovery of American prisoners from the Chinese; ** (10) evacuation of the bridgehead at Hungnam as the X Corps operation in northeast Korea ended. ²²⁷

When EUSAK established complete censorship, there were only three officers in the Information Section to act as censors. These officers,

*An example is the publicity and attendant speculation of plans for the landing of X Corps at Inchon. A poorly kept secret, the security breach, nevertheless, had no obvious affect on the success of the operation.

** At the time, it was felt that this security breach possibly forestalled efforts of EUSAK to negotiate a return of more prisoners.

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together with two enlisted men, had no previous experience to qualify them for this task there were no directives, no guiding manuals, except a copy of a World War II Army publication on the rules of censorship, which was adopted in its entirety. Immediately, a few newspaper stories appeared carrying the news that the rules of censorship in effect were the most drastic in military history; that correspondents were threatened with imprisonment; that all adverse criticism of military operations was to be suppressed; and that the world public was to be deprived of all news of the war in Korea. * Such statements, however, were voiced only by inexperienced correspondents. **228

On 3 January 1951, the Press Security Division, EUSAK PIO Section, published an SOP to govern censorship operations, a memorandum of instructions for censors and clerks, and a guiding letter of information for correspondents. Some censors had had civilian experience in the newspaper and allied fields. But later, a policy was adopted by GHQ wherein men "who had newspaper or radio experience" were not to be assigned as censors. This policy, effective in March 1951 when GHQ

* An Associated Press article advised its readers that reporters violating the censorship code "will" be court-martialed. Actually, the code, both in World War II and during the Korean campaign, stated: "In extreme cases of offense, where investigation proves the circumstances warrant, the correspondents may be placed in arrest to await deportation or trial by court-martial." As has been pointed out, during the Korean campaign no arrests of correspondents were made.

** The Press Security Division, PIO, EUSAK, pointed out that truth had to be suppressed when there was a possibility of its being of value to the enemy. Truth, per se, did not justify passing a fact through censorship.

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began to censor all copy that had been approved by EUSAK, was cumbersome to both censors and correspondents, for neither group was familiar with the problems peculiar to the other.
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Five days after Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway assumed command of Eighth Army, he not only forbade further disclosure of the EUSAK order of battle, a violation that had been and continued to be called to the attention of correspondents, but he directed that a news blackout be maintained when units were not in full contact with the enemy. *
Subsequently, correspondents were required to submit in writing all proposed stories to censors located at EUSAK headquarters. Once a story was cleared by the censor, the correspondent was free to phone it, via Army communications to his Tokyo bureau, or cable it to his home office. It was then that a limited number of correspondents developed a new technique in an effort to evade censorship security rules. This, known as the "twenty questions" trick, was a code easily arranged between correspondents, who frequently flew in military aircraft without charge to Tokyo, and their bureaus, or through use of the uncensored mail system. *** Once the correspondent with Eighth Army had finished

* On 29 December, at a press conference in Korea, General Ridgway told correspondents that he fully supported enforced censorship and that he expected correspondents to abide by the rules "as members of the team."

** A travel privilege of which some correspondents took undue advantage, being permitted as they were by the Army to travel wherever and whenever they pleased.

*** Mail censorship never was established in Korea. Generally, because of the time it took for a letter to reach the ZI, it was felt that any news leakage through the mails would no longer be important or timely. This would not have been true, of course, in connection with a major operation that required long-range planning, but to control mail censorship, it would have been necessary to impose it also in Japan -- only several hours from Korea by air -- and possibly in other foreign countries in which U.S. troops were stationed.

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dictating his story over the phone, his Tokyo agency man would question him in the following manner:

Question: Where's Joe?

Translation: Where is the enemy?

Answer: Seventeen ess.

Translation: Seventeen miles south of the 38th Parallel.

Question: Where's Sam?

Translation: Where are our troops?

Answer: Ten enn Pearl.

Translation: Ten miles north of Seoul ["The Pearl of the Orient"]

Question: How's the weather?

Translation: What is the military situation?

Answer: Stormy.

Translation: Not good for our side.

Question: Any lightning?

Translation: Is the enemy attacking?

Answer: Sharp in the mountains.

Translation: Yes, in the mountains.

Question: Are you coming over soon?

Translation: Do you expect that we will surrender it [Seoul]?

Answer: I think so.

Translation: Yes.

Question: When do you expect to come?

Translation: When do you think we'll retreat [from Seoul and go south of the Han]?

Answer: I'll try to leave in three or four days.

Translation: In the next three or four days.

"Twenty questions," which lasted for only a short time, was halted when the EUSAK censors threatened to have the correspondents guilty of such subterfuge expelled from Korea.

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Scarcely had security censorship been established when it was violated by an American news service in connection with a major tactical battle. As Eighth Army troops were withdrawing southward, on 3 January 1951, the order was given to evacuate Seoul. The Chief of Staff, EUSAK, estimated that the critical withdrawal across the Han River could not be completed before the evening of 4 January. Correspondents, therefore, were requested by the army commander to help conceal the Army's plans from the enemy by holding their news stories in abeyance until the tens of thousands of men and millions of dollars worth of equipment involved had reached the opposite side of the Han River. At 2030, 3 January, a correspondent of the Associated Press phoned his colleague at army headquarters south of Seoul and informed him that U.N. troops had begun evacuation of the city. The story, submitted to army censors, was stamped "delayed" and was not sent out of Korea. But at 0500, 4 January, the Tokyo office of AP advised that "the opposition had broken the story" in the United States. A United Press correspondent had phoned the story to his office at the EUSAK press billet, and it had then been phoned to Earnest Hoberecht, UP bureau manager in Tokyo. The story appeared in the United States under Hoberecht's byline. Each of the three newspapermen involved had had immediate contact with army censors, but each had avoided prescribed conduct -- and the enemy had been informed that Eighth Army was moving across the Han. Facing an enemy vastly superior in number were thousands

* Stan Swinton

** Phoned by Joe Quian to William Burson.

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of U.N. troops still north of the river.

In a formal statement to GHQ, FEC, Colonel N. J. Wiley, EUSAK PIO, recommended that the two correspondents be expelled from Korea and that Hoberecht be reported to his home office for disciplinary action. GHQ took no action; the United Press ignored the incident. *231

✓ On 11 January, GHQ decided to leave censorship completely in the hands of the Eighth Army, allowing the Press Security Division, EUSAK PIO, to issue all releases about ground military action in Korea and to censor all copy from all sources. ** GHQ would continue to issue only releases and communiqués of a general nature, those that pertained to the Far East Command. As closely as possible, stories released through EUSAK were to be confined to army subjects. Two months later, it was agreed that certain stories, which EUSAK was not in a position to censor, would be approved by Eighth Army for transmission, marked "delayed," and submitted to the GHQ Press Advisory Group for review and possible release. Such stories included the following subjects: (1) blackmarket activities; (2) government affairs of the U.S., ROK, and U.N. countries; (3) horror stories that would have a deleterious effect on readers in the United States, on the morale of South Koreans, or that might put the U.N. in an

* But probably as a result of this security violation, the editor in chief of International News Service wired his Tokyo bureau manager that all INS personnel were to abide strictly by regulations and make no attempt to break censorship: ". . . we place security far above any competitive advantage in reporting news," he stated.

**FEAF was designated to issue and censor all releases concerning air action; COMNAVFE, naval action. As long as EUSAK was in charge of censorship, all copy concerning Air Force and Marine units was passed through EUSAK censors in the same procedure as Army press copy.

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unfavorable light; (4) stories tending to discredit the ROK forces or the South Korean people; (5) references to dance halls, beer parlors, liquor sales, and such related matters. ²³²

On 16 March, GHQ decreed that stories already censored by EUSAK should be reviewed by censors in Tokyo. On 25 March the EUSAK chief censor recommended that this system of double censorship be halted. He also suggested discontinuing the practice of submitting press copy via the Tokyo-Korea telephone circuits. Although this latter suggestion was eventually adopted, no directive was ever published to prohibit correspondents from using telephones for this purpose. ²³³

The system of double censorship was not changed until June, when GHQ, then under the command of General Ridgway, assumed all censorship duties. Double censorship had several faults. Stories censored by Eighth Army might be released by GHQ. Occasionally stories written in Korea and flown to Japan were approved by GHQ, even though they violated EUSAK security regulations or existing orders. Furthermore, correspondents were able to appeal to one censorship bureau against the decision of the other, thereby breaking down censorship discipline among correspondents and weakening the confidence in military censorship personnel. ^{*234}

Weekly news magazines were also security violators. The 18 June issue of Newsweek offers an example. When U.N. forces had for the

* Although there was censorship imposed at army level, it was never enforced at corps and division, from which correspondents could phone any information they wished.

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third time driven northward over the 38th parallel, there were rumors of a possible cease fire agreement. Newsweek stated: "Although censors cracked down on the identification of most U.N. units, they did clear broad hints that the victorious I Corps now comprised fighting men of eight nations, including three American divisions." Then, negating its own reference to censorship, on the same page the magazine published a map of the battle area and the order of battle of I Corps. **

Pointing out this violation of security, CINCPAC radioed the Department of Army that the Eighth Army commander had desired, in particular, that the concentration of Commonwealth units and the return of the 3d Infantry Division to I Corps not be revealed. Newsweek explained that its information had been compiled from cleared dispatches and other information, which had been "presented to Pentagon for clearance and clearance granted . . ." The Department of the Army advised CINCPAC: "Newsweek article and map . . . not submitted for clearance to Army Public Information Division nor to security review branch of Office Secretary of Defense, the authorized agencies for arranging for clearances." Furthermore, the Department of the Army stated that the gravity of the violation had been pointed out to

*During the second U.N. drive toward the 38th parallel, GHQ on 20 March issued the dictum that in news stories no mention would be made of the 38th parallel. And yet the eyes of the world were fixed on that imaginary line. The order was amended on the next day, permitting correspondents, but not military personnel or "spokesmen," to mention the line.

** Showing the positions of the 1st Cavalry Division, 3d Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, British 28th and 29th Brigades, Canadian 25th Brigade, Turkish brigade, the Greek, Thailand, and Philippine battalions, and the ROK 1st Division.

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Newsweek representatives, that wire services and the press had been repeatedly requested to publish nothing concerning strength and order of battle. "No order of battle or comparable information," concluded the Department of the Army message, "is released in daily press briefings [at the Pentagon] or in answer to press queries."

The defense made by Newsweek was simply that it had compiled the order of battle by piecing facts together. It was not denied, however, that this had been a deliberate, dangerous breach of security. ²³⁵

On 15 June, sole responsibility for all censorship in the Far East Command was assumed by GHQ. Eighth Army henceforth acted only in an advisory capacity on matters of a tactical nature. GHQ established a censorship office at army headquarters, and this office submitted to army censors copies of press releases at the end of every 24-hour period. These were scanned by EUSAK, which might offer suggestions, but only in regard to the tactical situation. In cases involving such questions, GHQ censors checked with the pertinent EUSAK staff section before clearing for press release. ²³⁶

By August 1951 some of the major problems had been solved. Problems, however, continued to arise, problems due to the inherent conflict between military obligations and press requirements.

* Again, in an October 1951 issue of Newsweek, the order of battle, in this case, of all EUSAK units, was graphically printed on a map.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Incoming Msg, KMAG from DA, 5 Jul 49, WARK 90992.
2. Hist Rpt, Oct 1945 - 31 Dec 1949, Office of Chief, KMAG; Interv with Lt Col Charles S. Finch, KMAG Advisor to Provost Marshal; Interv with Lt Col Robert P. Brust, Exec Officer, G - 4 Sec, KMAG.
3. Interv, Finch; Semi-Annual Rpt, KMAG, 15 Jun 50; Hist Rpt prepared by Lt Col P. W. Scott, KMAG Advisor to G - 1, KMAG Files; Pers ltr written by Col Scott (copy in possession of the writer).
4. Pers Ltr, Scott; Interv, Finch; Hist Rpt, Scott; Interv, Brust; Interv with Lt Col C. R. Stegner, KMAG Supply Advisor, G - 4; Interv with Lt Col P. W. Scott.
5. Narrative, War Diary, EUSAK, 13 - 31 Jul 50; Cmd Rpt of G - 3 Sec, GHQ, 1 Jan - 31 Oct 50; Incoming Msg, EUSAK from CINCPAC, 4 Aug 50, CX 59229; Incoming Msg, EUSAK from CINCPAC, 8 Sep 50, no ref number; Pers ltr, Scott; Interv, Finch; Interv, Maj Edward Costello, Exec Officer, G - 3 Sec, KMAG.
6. Interv, Brust; Interv, Stegner; Interv, Scott; Interv, Finch; Interv, Col William C. Bullock, Deputy G - 3, EUSAK.
7. Interv, Bullock; Interv, Stegner; Interv, Brust; Interv, Finch; Interv, Scott; Ltr, Maj C. R. Stegner, "Utilization of KA G - 4 Staff," Nov 50 (copy in possession of the writer).
8. Narrative Account of Operations of the Office of Advisor to G - 1, Korean Army, 24 Jun - 31 Jul 50, KMAG Files; Interv, Scott; "Translation Report: Training Schedule for (Korean Army) Recruits," Hq EUSAK, 7 Sep 50, G - 3 Tng Div EUSAK Files; Advisor's Handbook, KMAG.
9. Interv, Finch; Interv, Brust; Interv, Stegner; Ltr, Stegner; Memo, Stegner.
10. Interv, Finch; Interv, Costello; Interv, Brust.
11. Interv, Stegner; Interv with Capt Benedict Freund, Troop Control, G - 3, EUSAK; Advisor's Handbook, KMAG; Ltr, KMAG, "Comments on the Training Status of Korean Officers," 18 Sep 51; Disposition Form, no subject (KGOT), EUSAK, 26 Mar 51, G - 3 Tng Div EUSAK Files; Incoming Msg, EUSAK from Chief, KMAG, 24 Apr 51, no ref number; Disposition Form, G - 3 KMAG to G - 3 EUSAK (Tng Div), "Korean Army Training Program," 28 Apr 51; Disposition Form, EUSAK, "Replacement Training for ROK Army at 1st RCT," 18 Jan 51, G - 3 Tng Div EUSAK Files; Interv with Maj Robert L. Crossman,

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KMAG Ammunition Officer; Interv, Scott; Incoming Msg, EUSAK from Chief, KMAG, 12 Oct 51, no ref number; Incoming Msg, EUSAK, from CINCPAC to DA, "Personal for Collins," 10 May 51; Informal Check Slip, EUSAK, no subject (KGOT), "Attendance of ROKA Officers at US Service Schools," 28 Jul 51, G - 3 Tng Div EUSAK Files; Incoming Msg, EUSAK from Chief, KMAG, 2 Oct 51, no ref number; See "Utilization of Indigenous Manpower in Korea," ORO-R-4 (FEC), Operations Research Office, 1 Mar 51.

12. Narrative, Cnd Rpts, EUSAK, Jun and Aug 51; G - 3 Jnl, Cnd Rpt, EUSAK, Aug 51; Incoming Msg, EUSAK from CINCPAC, 22 Aug 51, no ref number; Interv with Capt Wilbert J. Kovar, Troop Control and Training Officer, IX Corps; Interv with Maj Warren Rosengren, G - 3 and Chief of Staff, Field Training Command, KMAG; GO 18, Hq EUSAK, 9 Aug 51.

13. Interv, Finch, Interv, Costello; Interv, Crossman.

14. Interv, Scott; Adviser's Handbook, KMAG; Info furnished by Lt Col Scott, KMAG Files.

15. Interv, Crossman; Interv, Costello; Narrative, Cnd Rpt, EUSAK, May 51.

16. Interv, Rosengren; Interv, Crossman.

17. Interv, Stegner; Interv, Rosengren; Interv, Bullock; Interv, Finch, Interv, Costello; Ltr, KMAG, "Comments on the Training Status of Korean Officers," 18 Sep 51; Ltr, KMAG, "Comments on the Training Status of Korean Officers," 17 Sep 51.

18. Interv, Crossman; Interv, Rosengren; Interv, Finch; Interv, Stegner.

19. Interv, Stegner; Narrative, Cnd Rpt, EUSAK, Jun 51; Disposition Form, KMAG, "Plan for Activation and Organization of 155mm Howitzer Battalions," 26 Sep 51

20. Interv, Stegner.

21. Ibid.

22. Interv, Costello; Interv, Rosengren; Interv, Crossman; Interv, Finch; Interv, Stegner; Ltr, Maj Stegner; Memo, Maj Stegner.

23. Interv, Rosengren; Interv, Costello; Interv, Crossman; Adviser's Handbook, KMAG.

24. Interv, Scott; Interv, Crossman.

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25. GO 13, GHQ FEC, 12 Jul 50.
26. Cmd Rpt of G - 3 Sec GHQ FEC, 1 Jan - 31 Oct 50, p. 27.
27. Ibid., pp. 31 - 32; GO 24, GHQ FEC, 26 Aug 50.
28. Cmd Rpt of G - 3 Sec, GHQ FEC, 1 Jan - 31 Oct 50, p. 33.
29. Annex H, Signal, Operation Order 1, GHQ UNC, 31 Aug 50; Interv with Maj Charles Crockett, Troop Control, G - 3, EUSAK; Interv with Lt Col George Lieberberg, Operations Officer, Signal Sec, EUSAK; Interv with Lt Col Belton S. Pierce, Logistical Staff Officers, EUSAK.
30. Annex D, Logistics, Opn O 1, GHQ UNC, 31 Aug 50.
31. Annex E, Command Relationship, Opn O 1, GHQ UNC, 4 Sep 50; GO 25, GHQ FEC, 14 Sep 50.
32. Annex D, Opn O 1, GHQ UNC, 31 Aug 50.
33. Outgoing Msg, GHQ FEC, from CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 10 Aug 50; Incoming Msg, GHQ FEC, from CG EUSAK, to CINCFE, 22 Aug 50.
34. Annex B, Opn O 1, GHQ UNC, 31 Aug 50.
35. Cmd Rpt of G - 3 Sec, GHQ FEC, 1 Jan - 31 Oct 50, p. 28.
36. Interv with Lt Col Elbert L. Nelson, Historian, EUSAK.
37. Telephone conv, Gen Walker with Gen Hickey, 21 Sep 50, in G - 3 GHQ Files.
38. Cmd Rpt of G - 3 Sec, GHQ FEC, 1 Jan - 31 Oct 50, pp. 34 - 36; POR 230, EUSAK, 27 Sep 50.
39. CX 61027. This message could not be located by the writer.
40. Msg, CG EUSAK to CINCFE, in War Diary, EUSAK, 23 Sep 50.
41. Incoming Msg, GHQ, from CG Army Eight to CINCFE, 26 Sep 50.
42. Interv with Col William C. Bullock, Deputy G - 3, EUSAK.
43. Cmd Rpt of G - 3 Sec, GHQ FEC, 1 Jan - 31 Oct 50, p. 36.
44. Interv with Lt Col Chester W. Bigger, Opns Sec, G - 4, EUSAK.
45. Ibid.; Outgoing Msg, GHQ, from CINCFE to CG X Corps, 27 Sep 50.

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46. Outgoing Msg, GHQ, from CINCPAC to CG X Corps, 27 Sep 50.
47. Outgoing Msg, GHQ, from CINCPAC to CG X Corps, 27 Sep 50. (NOTE: This message is not the same as the one referred to in the preceding citation. The reference numbers of these messages are not available to the writer.)
48. Interv, Bullock; POR's 242, 246, EUSAK, 1 Oct, 2 Oct 50.
49. Opn O 2, GHQ UNCG, 2 Oct 50.
50. Hist Rpt, 3d Leg Cnd, 1 - 31 Oct 50, Vol 1.
51. Cmd Rpt of G - 3 Sec, GHQ FEC, 1 Jan - 31 Oct 50, pp. 37 - 38; POR 274, EUSAK, 11 Oct 50; Summary, War Diary, EUSAK, 1 - 31 Oct 50.
52. Cmd Rpt of G - 3 Sec, GHQ FEC, 1 Jan - 31 Oct 50, p. 37; POR's 250, 253, EUSAK, 3 Oct, 4 Oct 50; Interv, Bullock.
53. Interv, Bullock; Interv, Bigger; Interv with Lt Col J. H. Wagner, Plans Sec, G - 4, EUSAK; see R. B. Black, W. A. Taylor, Wm. Neilson, "An Evaluation of Service Support in the Korean Campaign," Technical Memo, ORO-T-6 (FEC), 1 Mar 51, p. 53.
54. Interv Bullock; Interv with Lt Col Charles I. Davis, Exec Officer, G - 4 Sec, EUSAK.
55. Interv, Davis; Interv with Lt Col Max Murray, G - 4 Sec, X Corps; Interv with Lt Col Thomas B. Jones, G - 4 Sec, EUSAK.
56. G - 4 Staff Sec Rpt, 2d Leg Cnd, Oct 50.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Interv, Murray.
60. Ibid.
61. QM Staff Sec Rpt, Cmd Rpt, 2d Leg Cnd, Oct 50.
62. Cmd Rpt of G - 3 Sec, GHQ FEC, 1 Jan - 31 Oct 50, pp. 38 - 39.
63. Summary, War Diary, EUSAK, 1 - 30 Nov 50; POR's 352, 353, 368, EUSAK, 6 Nov, 7 Nov, 8 Nov 50.
64. Summary, War Diary, EUSAK, 1 - 30 Nov 50; POR 365, EUSAK, 11 Nov 50.

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65. POR 388, EUSAK, 19 Nov 50.
66. Summary, War Diary, EUSAK, 1 - 30 Nov 50.
67. POR 399, EUSAK, 22 Nov 50; Interv Bullock.
68. Tech Memo, ORO-T-6 (FEC), 1 Mar 50, p. 9.
69. Interv, Jones.
70. Ibid; Hist Rpt, 3d Log Cmd, 1 - 31 Oct 50, Vol 1; Interv, Davis;
71. Interv, Murray; Interv, Wagner.
72. Tech Memo, ORO-T-6 (FEC), pp. 70 - 71.
73. Narrative Summary of G - 3 Activities, Cmd Rpt, GHQ, Dec 50; Cmd Rpt, X Corps, Dec 50; Narrative, Cmd Rpt, EUSAK, Dec 50.
74. GO 90, GHQ FEC, 26 Dec 50.
75. Narrative, Cmd Rpt, EUSAK, Dec 50; Interv with Capt B. J. Hunter, Tng Div, G - 3, EUSAK; Interv, Bullock.
76. Narrative, Cmd Rpt, EUSAK, Dec 50; Interv with Lt Col C. P. Babcock, Plans Sec, G - 3, EUSAK.
77. G - 4 Staff Sec Rpt, Cmd Rpt, EUSAK, Dec 50.
78. Interv, Hunter; Interv, Davis.
79. Interv, Davis.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Interv, Wagner
83. Interv, Bigger; Interv, Murray.
84. Ibid; Interv, Wagner; Interv, David; Interv, Pierce; Interv, Bigger. (Lt. Col. Murray, a X Corps G - 4 representative, and Lt. Col. Bigger, a EUSAK G - 4 representative, were both present at this meeting.)
85. Ibid; G - 4 Staff Sec Rpt, EUSAK, Dec 50.
86. Summary, War Diary, EUSAK, 1 - 30 Nov 50.
87. Interv, Crockett; Interv, Pierce; Interv with Maj Lloyd A. Brown,

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89. Cnd Rpt of G - 3 Sec, GHQ FEC, 1 Jan - 31 Oct 50, footnote, p. 11.

90. Interv, Lieberberg.

91. Ltr, EUSAK, "Broad Comments . . .," 6 Dec 50; Interv, Bigger.

92. Interv, Hunter; Interv, Murray.

93. Interv, Murray.

94. Ltr, EUSAK, "Broad Comments . . .," 6 Dec 50.

95. Ibid.

96. Training Directive 1, EUSAK, 19 Aug 50; Combat Info Bul 5, EUSAK, 17 Dec 50; Ltr, Armor Sec, EUSAK, "Comments on Tactical and Technical Problems," 29 Nov 50; Training Memo 1 [proposed], EUSAK, no date; Ltr, EUSAK, "Broad Comments and Recommendations Resulting from Eighth Army Experience in the Korean War," 6 Dec 50; G - 3 Jnl, Cnd Rpt, GHQ, 18 Dec 50; Disposition Form, EUSAK, "Tanks in Korea," 6 Nov 51; Training Memo 5, I Corps, 23 Jul 51; Ltr, Armored Officer, IX Corps, "Training Directive for Tank Units," 31 Oct 51; Memo for Corps Commanders, "Tactical Observations," EUSAK, 17 Sep 51 (AG350.06 KGO); Memo for Corps Commanders, "Tactical Observations," EUSAK, 31 May 51; Training Memo 7, I Corps, 20 Aug 51; Training Memo 8, I Corps, 1 Sep 51; Interv, Maj Lucas M. Prescott, Historian, IX Corps; Interv, Maj John T. Dunphy, Historian, I Corps; Interv, Maj William C. Hingate, G - 3 Tng, I Corps.

97. Narrative, War Diary, EUSAK, 13 - 31 Jul 50; Training Directive 1, EUSAK, 19 Aug 50; Training Memo 1 [proposed], EUSAK, no date, in G - 3 Tng Div EUSAK Files; Memo, "Combat Lessons in Korea," Tng Sec, G - 3 IX Corps, Mar 51; Ltr [EUSAK], "Physical Training Program," 26 Mar 51; Narrative, Cnd Rpt, EUSAK, Apr 51; Ltr, EUSAK, "Physical Conditioning of Replacements," AG 353 KGOT, 18 Apr 51; EUSAK, "Physical Conditioning of Replacements," AG 353 KGOT, 24 Apr 51; Training Memo 5, Hq I Corps, 23 Jul 51; Ltr, CIACF 351, Hq I Corps, 11 Aug 51; Interv with Capt B. J. Hunter, Tng Div G - 3, EUSAK, Interv with Capt W. J. Kever, Troop Control and Training Officer, IX Corps; Memo, EUSAK, "Training," KGOT, 1 May 51.

98. Incl 2, "Report of Observation of Performance of Ordnance Equipment in Korea," Ltr, Armor Section, EUSAK, 29 Nov 50; Disposition Form, EUSAK, "Tanks in Korea," 6 Nov 51, G - 3 Tng Div EUSAK Files; Training Memo 9, Hq I Corps, "Tank Driver Training in Hills," 29 Sep 51.

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100. Interv, Hunter; Memo, "Combat Lessons in Korea," IX Corps, Mar 51; Incl 2, "Report of Performance of Ordnance Equipment in Korea," Ltr, Armor Section, EUSAK, 29 Nov 50.
101. Tng Memo 1 [proposed], EUSAK, no date; Artillery Info Bull 10, EUSAK, 2 Feb 51; Ltr, EUSAK, "Broad Comments and Recommendations Resulting from Eighth Army Experience in the Korean War," 6 Dec 50; G - 3 Jnl, Cnd Rpt, GHQ, 18 Dec 50; Interv, Kovar; Memo, IX Corps, Mar 51; Interv, Hungate; Combat Info Bull 5, EUSAK, 17 Dec 50; Combat Info Bull 6, EUSAK, 17 Dec 50; Informal Check Slip, EUSAK, "Tactical Principles," 25 Feb 51, G - 3 Tng Div EUSAK Files; See "Artillery in Perimeter Defense," After Action Intervs prepared by 3d Hist Det; Interv, Hunter; Training Directive 1, EUSAK, 19 Aug 50; Intervs with Lt Col John W. Chesley and Maj R. L. Spivey, Engr Sec, EUSAK.
102. Interv, Hungate; Training Memo 1 [proposed], EUSAK, no date; Training Directive 1, EUSAK, 19 Aug 50.
103. Combat Info Bull 3, EUSAK, 28 Nov 50; Interv with Capt Allen Scullen, Assistant Armor Officer, EUSAK.
104. Training Memo 9, I Corps, "Tank Driver Training on Hills," 29 Sep 51.
105. Narrative, War Diary, EUSAK, 1 - 31 Aug 50; Ltr, EUSAK, "Broad Comments," 6 Dec 50; Narrative, Cnd Rpt, EUSAK, Jan 51; Msg, CG EUSAK to CINCFE, no date (in reply to CX55969); Ltr, EUSAK, AG 353 KGOT, "Infantry Training Program," 28 Jan 51; Memo, EUSAK, "Training" (KGOT), 1 May 51; Disposition Form, EUSAK, from Chemical Warfare Sec to G - 3 Tng, 26 Oct 51; Interv with Capt H. R. Lindquist, Chemical Warfare Sec, EUSAK; Training Memo 1 [proposed], EUSAK, no date; Interv, Capt Benedict Freund, Troop Control, G - 3, EUSAK; Interv, Hunter.
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107. Interv, Hunter; Memo, IX Corps, Mar 51.
108. Memo, EUSAK, "Supply Discipline," no date; G - 3 Tng Div EUSAK Files; Memo IX Corps, Mar 51; Interv, Dunphy; Interv, Hunter.

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113. Ibid: Training Memo 1 [proposed], EUSAK, no date.
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116. Interv, Hunter; Ltr, EUSAK, "Training Literature," 14 Sep 51.
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118. Interv, Hunter.
119. Interv with Lt Col T. W. Ackert, Artillery Sec, EUSAK; Interv, Hunter; Interv, Huntegate; Interv, Dumphy; Interv, Prescott.
120. Discussion, no identification, no date, in Korean Augmentation File, G - 3 Tng Div, EUSAK Files; Interv with Lt Col George Fairbanks, Chief, Plans Div, G - 1, EUSAK.
121. Interv, Fairbanks; Summary, War Diary, EUSAK, 1 - 31 Aug 50.
122. Narrative, War Diary, EUSAK, 1 - 31 Aug 50.
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124. Narrative, War Diary. EUSAK, 1 - 30 Sep 50; Incoming Msg, EUSAK from JLC, 9 Sep 50; Incoming Msg, EUSAK from CINCPAC, 15 Sep 50; Interv, Fairbanks.
125. Cir 21, EUSAK, 22 Aug 50; Cir 35, EUSAK, 9 Sep 50; Informal Memo, KMAG Adviser to G - 1 to Chief, KMAG, 8 Sep 51.
126. POR 113, EUSAK, 19 Apr 50; Incoming Msgs, EUSAK from 25th Inf Div, 6 Sep, 16 Sep, 26 Sep, 6 Oct 50.
127. Ltrs, 1st Cav Div, "Korean Army Augmentation," 6 Sep, 16 Sep, 26 Sep 50.

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130. Ltrs, 1st Cav Div, "Korean Army Augmentation," 15 Sep, 26 Sep 50; Ltrs, 24th Inf Div, "Report on ROK Personnel," 6 Sep, 29 Sep, 8 Oct 50; Ltrs, 2d Inf Div, "Report on ROK Personnel," 6 Sep, 16 Sep 50; Discussion in G - 3 Tng Div EUSAK Files; Ltr, 2d Inf Div, AMBIG 333.5, "Investigation into Manner of Performance of Republic of Korea Soldiers Assigned to the 2d Infantry Division," 24 Oct 50; Interv, Fairbanks.

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135. Ltrs, 1st Cav Div, "Korean Army Augmentation," 6 Sep, 16 Sep 50.

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138. Ltr, 2d Inf Div, "Report on ROK Personnel," 6 Sep 50; Ltr, Co A, 19th Inf Regt, "Removal of ROK Personnel," 5 Oct 50; Ltr, Co D, 19th Inf, "Republic of Korea Soldiers," 6 Oct 50.

139. Discussion in G - 3 Tng Div EUSAK Files ("All units remain adamant . . . in requesting no more ROKs be assigned to them."); Ltr, 2d Inf Div, "Report on ROK Personnel," 16 Oct 50 ("ROK personnel assigned to service units of the division continue to be satisfactorily utilized although their presence in most units is not desired."); Ltr, 2d Inf Div, "ROK Personnel Report," 26 Oct 50.

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143. Info furnished by G - 1 Sec, EUSAK.

144. Ltrs, 1st Cav Div, "Korean Army Augmentation," 6 Sep, 16 Sep, 26 Sep, 5 Oct 50.

145. Incoming Msgs, EUSAK from 25th Inf Div, 6 Sep, 16 Sep, 26 Sep, 6 Oct 50.

146. Ltrs, 24th Inf Div, "Report on ROK Personnel," 6 Sep, 17 Sep, 29 Sep, 8 Oct 50.

147. Ltrs, 2d Inf Div, "Report on ROK Personnel," 6 Sep, 16 Sep 50; Ltrs, 2d Inf Div, "ROK Personnel Report," 26 Oct, 6 Nov, 26 Nov 50, 16 Jan 51.

148. Compiled from Personnel Daily Summary, G - 1, EUSAK.

149. Ibid.

150. GO 237, Eighth Army, 25 Apr 50; G - 3 Sec, War Diary, EUSAK, Oct 50; Ltr, Brig Gen J. S. Bradley, CG 25th Inf Div, "Employment of Ranger Companies," 1 Apr 51.

151. GO 172, EUSAK, 28 Mar 51; Info furnished by Maj Charles Crockett, Troop Control, G - 3 EUSAK.

152. Ranger Company (Tentative), Ranger Tag Center, TIC, Fort Benning, Ga, 13 Nov 50; Revision No 1, Ranger Co (Tentative), Ranger Tag Center, TIC, Ft Benning, Ga, 28 Mar 51.

153. "Interim Ranger Report," 30 Jun 51, prepared by Lt Col James V. Adams, Ranger Representative, EUSAK.

154. Narrative, Cmd Rpt, EUSAK, Jan 51; See After Action Interv with Capt Dorsey B. Anderson, CO, 4th Ranger Company, Operation TOMAHAWK, 4th Hist Det.

155. After Action Intervs, Hwachen Dam, 3d Hist Det.

156. Ltr, Brig Gen G. C. Stewart, CG 2d Inf Div, to Lt Gen M. B. Ridgway,

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157. After Action Interv with Lt Alfred J. Giacherine, CO, 8th Ranger Company, in connection with the action on Hill 628, 3d Hist Det.

158. "Interim Ranger Report"; Memo, Lt Col A. D. Surles, Acting C/S, EUSAK, TAC, for CG EUSAK, 14 Apr 51; Ltr, Maj Gen Robert H. Soule, CG 3d Inf Div, "Comments on Proposed Employment of 3d Ranger Company," 3 Apr 51; Ltr, Lt Gen F. W. Milburn, CG I Corps, to Lt Gen M. B. Ridgway, CG EUSAK, 1 Apr 51.

159. "Interim Report."

160. Ibid; Ltr, Stewart.

161. Memo, Surles; Ltr, Brig Gen J. S. Bradley, CG 25th Inf Div, "Employment of Ranger Company," 1 Apr 51; Ltr, Milburn; Incoming Msg, EUSAK from CG 7th Inf Div, 8 Apr 51; Interv, Giacherine; Ltr, Brig Gen F. S. Bowen, Jr., CG 18th Abn RCT, "Ranger Companies," 1 Apr 51; Incoming Msg, EUSAK from CG 24th Inf Div, 12 Apr 51.

162. Ltr, Milburn; Memo, Surles; "Interim Report."

163. See After Action Intervs, Hwachon Dam, for an example of staff ineptitude with regard to employing a ranger company.

164. Ltr, Bowen; Interv, Giacherine; Interv, Anderson; Incoming Msg, EUSAK from CG 24th Inf Div, 13 Apr 51; Ltr, Bradley.

165. "Interim Report"; Ltr, Stewart; Incoming Msg, EUSAK from CG 7th Inf Div; Ranger Company (Tentative).

166. "Interim Report"; Ranger Company (Tentative); Ltr, Maj Gen W. M. Hoge, CG IX Corps, to CG EUSAK, "Use of Ranger Companies," 4 Apr 51.

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
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
171. Ltr, DA, "Ranger Training," 3 Oct 51.

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173. Interv with Col Thomas N. Page, EUSAK Surgeon.
174. Ibid; Interv with Lt Col Orne D. Smith, Medical Sec, EUSAK, and Capt Charles J. Stefka, Army Surgeon's AF Liaison Officer (Air Evac); The Surgeon's Circular Letter, Medical Sec, GHQ FEC, 1 Mar 51 (Vol VI, No. 3), p. 54.
175. Interv with Maj Sydney L. Fouts, Liaison Rescue Officer to Fifth Air Force, and Capt M. A. Mecca, Fifth Air Force Rescue Controller; Interv, Page.
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183. Ibid; Interv with Capt. James E. Childers, CO, Helicopter Det, 8193 AU, After Action Intervs, "8076th MASH," 3d Hist Det.
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188. Ibid; "Helicopter Evac," 8th Hist Det; Interview, Childers, "8076th MASH," 3d Hist Det.
189. Ibid; Interv with Lt Col John L. Methershead, CO, 8076th MASH, After Action Interviews, "8076th MASH," 3d Hist Det.
190. Ibid; The Surgeon's Circular Letter, 1 Mar 51, p. 46.
191. Semi-Annual Report, KMAG 15 Jun 50; Interv with Lt Col Charles S. Finch, KMAG Adviser to Provost Marshal, Korean Army, Interv with Col William R. Hamby, KMAG Adviser to Home Ministry and National Police; Interv with Capt A. J. Beatty, KMAG G - 3 operations.



- 192. Semi-Annual Report, KMAG, 15 Jun 50; Enemy Tactics, Techniques and Doctrine, G - 2 See, IX U.S. Corps.
- 193. Interv, Finch.
- 194. Ibid.
- 195. Interv, Hamby; Interv, Finch.
- 196. Ibid.; Interv, Beatty.
- 197. Interv, Finch.
- 198. Ibid.; Enemy Tactics, Techniques and Doctrine, G - 2 See, IX U.S. Corps.
- 199. War Diary, G - 3 See EUSAK, 21, 23, Jul 50.
- 200. Ibid., 9, 11, 14, 25, 31 Aug 50; After Action interv, "Guerrilla Attacks Against the 38th Ordnance MM Company," 4th Hist Det.
- 201. Interv, Finch.
- 202. POR's 162, 163, EUSAK, 2 Aug, 5 Sep 50; War Diary, G - 3 See, EUSAK, 28, 29 Aug, 5 Sep 50.
- 203. Ibid., 18 Aug 50.
- 204. Interv, Hamby; Enemy Tactics, Techniques and Doctrine, G - 2 See, IX U.S. Corps; Combat Bull 21, Korean Army, 24 May 51; War Diary, EUSAK, 1 - 31 Oct 50.
- 205. Ibid., 1 - 31 Oct 50; Interv, Beatty.
- 206. POR 411, EUSAK, 26 Nov 50; Narrative, Gnd Rpt, EUSAK, Jan 51.
- 207. War Diary, G - 3 See, EUSAK, 25, 26 Sep, 16 Oct, 1 Nov 50.
- 208. POR's 250, 300, 304, EUSAK, 20, 21, 24 Oct 50.
- 209. War Diary, See II, EUSAK, 14 Oct 50; Ibid., G - 3 See 22, 26 Oct 50.
- 210. Ltr, Hq Eighth Army, "Letter of Instructions," 23 Oct 50.
- 211. War Diary, G - 3 See, EUSAK, 15, 28, 29 Oct 50.
- 212. Ibid., 10, 11, 15, 16, 22, 26 Nov 50; Ibid., See I, Summary, 20 Nov 50.



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214. Enemy Tactics, Techniques and Doctrine, G - 2 Sec, IX U.S. Corps.
215. G - 3 Staff Sec Rpt, Cmd Rpt, EUSAK, 13 Dec 50.
216. Narrative, Cmd Rpt, EUSAK, Jan 51.
217. G - 3 Staff Sec Rpt, Cmd Rpt, EUSAK, 1 - 31 Mar 51; Extracts from Special Activities Group history; Interv with Lt Col Bolton S. Pierce, Hq Commandant, Special Activities Group.
218. G - 3 Staff Sec Rpt, Cmd Rpt, EUSAK, 1- 31 Mar 51.
219. Memo for G - 3 EUSAK, "Tactical Principles," from CG EUSAK, 24 Feb 51.
220. Narrative, Cmd Rpt, EUSAK, Mar 51.
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222. Info from G - 3 Sec, EUSAK; "Letter of Instructions," AG 370 KGO, EUSAK, 19 Aug 51.
223. "Military Censorship," unofficial report of Lt Col Mel Voorhees, PIO, EUSAK; Interv with Col Voorhees.
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227. "Military Censorship"; "The Press"; Interv, Voorhees.
228. Ibid.; Combat Cmd Rpts, Press Security Div, Info Sec, EUSAK, Feb, Mar 51.
229. SOP, Press Security Div, Info Sec, EUSAK, 3 Jan 51; Instructions for Censors, Press Security Div, Info Sec, EUSAK, 3 Jan 51; Info for Correspondents, Press Security Div, Info Sec, EUSAK, 3 Jan 51; United Press news release, Tokyo, 12 Mar 51.
230. "Military Censorship"; "The Press"; Interv, Voorhees; Combat Cmd Rpts, Press Security Div, Info Sec, EUSAK, Feb, Mar 51; Memos to Correspondents, Press Security Div, Info Sec, EUSAK.

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231. Ibid.; "Evacuation of Seoul" by Joe Quinn, United Press correspondent, to EUSAK PIO Advance.

232. "Military Censorship"; "The Press"; Interv, Voorhees; Combat Cmd Rpts, Press Security Div, Info Sec, EUSAK, Feb, Mar 51; Memo to Press Security Div from Info Sec Chief, EUSAK, 8 Mar 51; Interv with Capt Harold N. Cheatham, PIO, EUSAK.

233. Ibid.; Check Slip, "Censorship Recommendations," Chief Censor, EUSAK, to Info Sec Chief, EUSAK, 25 Mar 51.

234. Ibid.; Interv with Lt Col Joseph J. Borchert, GHQ Censor of press releases through EUSAK.

235. Interv, Voorhees; Interv, Pelwetzky; Interv with William Jordan, Associated Press correspondent; Radio, CINCFE to DA, 21 May 51; Radio, DA94861, EUSAK to CINCFE, 24 Jun 51.

236. Interv, Voorhees; Interv, Borchert.

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