


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# PREPARATION OF UNITS FOR OVERSEAS MOVEMENT

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY GROUND FORCES  
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1 September 1945

SUBJECT: Studies in the History of Army Ground Forces

TO: All Interested Agencies


1. The history of the Army Ground Forces as a command was prepared during the course of the war and completed immediately thereafter. The studies prepared in Headquarters Army Ground Forces, were written by professional historians, three of whom served as commissioned officers, and one as a civilian. The histories of the subordinate commands were prepared by historical officers, who except in Second Army, acted as such in addition to other duties.

2. From the first, the history was designed primarily for the Army. Its object is to give an account of what was done from the point of view of the command preparing the history, including a candid, and factual account of difficulties, mistakes recognized as such, the means by which, in the opinion of those concerned, they might have been avoided, the measures used to overcome them, and the effectiveness of such measures. The history is not intended to be laudatory.

3. The history of the Army Ground Forces is composed of monographs on the subjects selected, and of two volumes in which an overall history is presented. A separate volume is devoted to the activities of each of the major subordinate commands.

4. In order that the studies may be made available to interested agencies at the earliest possible date, they are being reproduced and distributed in manuscript form. As such they must be regarded as drafts subject to final editing and revision. Persons finding errors of fact or important omissions are encouraged to communicate with the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Attention: Historical Section, in order that corrections may be made prior to publication in printed form by the War Department.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL DEVERS:

  
J. L. FARR  
Colonel, AGD  
Acting Ground Adj General

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The Army Ground Forces

PREPARATION OF UNITS FOR OVERSEAS MOVEMENT

Study No. 21

By

Major Bell I. Wiley

Historical Section . Army Ground Forces

1946

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PREFATORY NOTE

This study was prepared in the Historical Section, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, by Major Bell I. Wiley. It was read and criticized in draft form by officers of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, whose experience and position gave them a special knowledge of the processing of units for shipment overseas. These officers also assisted in the preparation of the draft by furnishing oral information on points not fully covered in records. The following, each of whom was interviewed several times, gave particularly valuable assistance: Col. V. A. St. Onge, Chief of the Task Force Division, G-4 Section; Lt. Col. J. A. Hanson, Task Force Division, G-4 Section; Col. S. E. Weld, Chief of the Task Force Division, G-3 Section; Maj. G. H. Nichol, Task Force Division, G-3 Section; and Lt. Col. J. D. Byrne, Task Force Division, G-3 Section.

Maj. Gen Phillip E. Brown of The Inspector General's Office, in an interview with Major Wiley in July 1945, supplied valuable information as to the role of The Inspector General in the final checking of units before their movement to port.

Materials obtained from records and interviews in Washington were supplemented by observations in the field. The following units were visited while POM activities were in full swing: 92d Infantry Division (370th Combat Team), 65th Infantry Division and 69th Infantry Division.

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PREPARATION OF UNITS FOR OVERSEAS MOVEMENT

Organization and Functions of AGF for POM in 1942

The culminating function of Army Ground Forces (AGF) was the delivery of units to ports of embarkation as required by theater commanders. Even though in actual practice most units shipped overseas received considerable training in the theaters, Army Ground Forces was held responsible, except in cases of specific exemption by the War Department, for bringing units to a state of complete combat readiness before releasing them to port commanders for staging and shipment.

A casual perusal of training literature might lead to the assumption that normally units were ready for combat when they completed the prescribed cycle of training and that a call for overseas shipment entailed nothing more than a final checking of personnel and equipment and a routine movement to port. But conditions which prevailed during most of the period from 1942 to 1945 made the processing of units a difficult and complicated matter. Chronic shortages of personnel and, especially in 1941-1943, of equipment made it impossible to keep units fully manned and equipped. Consequently the earmarking of a unit for movement usually necessitated a hurried draft on other tactical organizations for both men and materiel. The vicious circle of robbing and replenishing resulted almost without exception in units reaching final stages of training with a heavy admixture of partially trained men. These had to be replaced or rushed to completion of minimum training requirements.

AGF responsibilities for final processing of units for overseas movement - which came to be referred to as POM - included the following: (1) designation of specific units when the War Department gave notice that certain numbers of various types were needed; (2) informing major subordinate commands of the earmarking of units under their jurisdiction for early overseas shipment; (3) drafting of movement orders for issuance by The Adjutant General to all major commands concerned, specifying units to be moved, shipment code numbers, and the agency charged with execution of the movement and giving general information as to equipment, clothing, personnel, and mode of travel; (4) collaboration with other War Department agencies in the preparation and revision of detailed instructions for guidance of all echelons having a part in bringing units to a state of combat readiness and moving them to port; (5) issuance of supplementary information on points not covered in movement orders and War Department instructions; (6) coordination with Army Service Forces (ASF) to expedite filling of equipment shortages and to assure movement of units within a reasonable time after they were alerted; and (7) periodic checking, through command channels, of pertinent Ground Force agencies and activities to

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assure compliance with current instructions.

Normally units were transferred to intermediate stations called "staging areas" for last-minute processing before moving to loading docks. Staging areas were regarded as adjuncts to ports of embarkation, and units on arrival therein passed to the control of the port commander.<sup>1</sup>

Facilities provided for discharge of POM functions in the initial organization of Army Ground Forces were limited. The only suborganization of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, specifically charged with these functions was the Task Forces Branch of the Operations Division which after the reorganization in July 1942 became the Task Force Division of G-3. The Task Force Branch originally consisted of six officers and one enlisted man, all of whom came at inception of Army Ground Forces from the Operations Division of G-3, War Department.<sup>2</sup> Personnel phases of overseas movement during the early AGF period were handled largely by Colonel Stanton, of the G-1 Section, in addition to his other duties as head of the Officers Branch of the Personnel Division.<sup>3</sup> Col. V. A. St. Onge of the Supply Division performed most of the equipment and supply functions; he too had other duties.<sup>4</sup> Not until December 1942 and March 1943, respectively, were separate Task Force Divisions created in the G-1 and G-4 Sections.<sup>5</sup>

The application of the term "task force" to Ground agencies charged with POM functions requires a word of explanation. The War Department directive of 2 March 1942 which created Army Ground Forces intimated that the preparation of task forces might be a major function of the new headquarters. One paragraph of this directive stated that "The mission of the Army Ground Forces is to provide Ground units properly organized, trained and equipped for combat operations." Another listed among the duties specifically assigned to Army Ground Forces "the organization, equipment and training of such task forces as are directed by The Chief of Staff."<sup>6</sup> During the first few months of its existence Army Ground Forces was charged with organizing and preparing a few task forces. In March, for instance, General McNair was given the responsibility of setting up a force for Tongatabu, an island in the South Pacific. Duties performed by Army Ground Forces in this connection included the selection of the task force commander, activation of a force headquarters, designation of the necessary ground units, coordination with Services of Supply (later Army Service Forces) for supplies and organization of service units, and movement of elements of the force to the port of embarkation.<sup>7</sup> In July 1942, Army Ground Forces had similar responsibilities for two other shipments.<sup>8</sup> In these cases

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Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, functioned as General Headquarters (GHQ), U. S. Army, had functioned. But in each of these instances the size of the force was so small and the objective so limited as hardly to merit the designation "task force" as the term was usually understood.

Late in 1942 the War Department delegated to Army Ground Forces the preparation of a large combat-loaded task force consisting of the 45th Division and attached elements.<sup>9</sup> In July 1943 this Force, aggregating some 21,000 officers and men, participated in the Sicily landings.<sup>10</sup> But the three other major combat-loaded task forces organized in this country - those destined for North Africa, Kiska, and Attu - were prepared by agencies other than Army Ground Forces.<sup>11</sup>

In view of the fact that only an insignificant portion of the units prepared for overseas movement by Army Ground Forces were parts of task forces, the Task Force divisions of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, were misnamed. These organizations might more logically have been called POM divisions.

The first two months of the AGF period was a time of comparative inactivity as far as overseas movements were concerned. In March 1942 only 8 Ground Force units with an authorized enlisted strength aggregating 1,187 were shipped to ports of embarkation. In April, 16 units with a strength of 11,660 were shipped.<sup>12</sup> But in the latter month steps were instituted by the War Department which promised an immediate and tremendous acceleration of POM activities. These had to do with the plans for a cross-Channel invasion of Europe in the spring of 1943.

This plan, known as "Bolero," called for the shipment to England of some 750,000 to 1,000,000 men. A variant of the scheme (called the "modified" plan) contemplated invasion by a smaller force whose American contingent would number over 100,000 men, about 1 September 1942.<sup>13</sup>

The Plans Section represented Army Ground Force Headquarters on the War Department committee charged with preparations. In early May, Plans, in close collaboration with G-3, completed a tentative movement schedule of Ground Force units for "Bolero." This schedule designated specific units, including 18 divisions, for monthly shipment to the United Kingdom from May 1942 to April 1943 of AGF units totalling over a half-million men.<sup>14</sup> There were many modifications of this schedule to meet changes in estimates of its requirements and variation in shipping facilities. In the late summer "Bolero" was laid aside in favor of a revised "Gymnast" plan which called for the landing of a large force in North Africa.<sup>15</sup>

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The immediate effect of "Bolero" was to speed up processing of units earmarked for early shipment. In May 1942, 57 AGF units - including 2 divisions - having an enlisted strength of 41,218 men, were moved to ports of embarkation. In June and July movements to port fell to about 15,000 men per month, but definite decision in the late summer to invade Africa in the fall brought a new impetus. In August AGF agencies shipped 49 units and 40,209 enlisted men to ports of embarkation, and in September 1942 preparation of Task Force "A" (the force which with elements from England invaded North Africa in November 1942) raised movements to the unprecedented figure of 67 units and 88,636 men - the highest attained for any month prior to January 1944. All told, movement of AGF elements to ports of embarkation from 9 March to 31 December 1942 aggregated 361 units and 268,107 men.<sup>16</sup>

#### Salient Problems in 1942

The processing of such a large number of units and men entailed many difficulties and revealed not a few deficiencies. A basic source of trouble was inexperience. Comparatively few of the officers charged with POM responsibilities, from the War Department on down, had had first-hand contact with problems of overseas movement prior to the reorganization of 9 March 1942, and those who did have experience had acquired it only recently.<sup>17</sup> There was naturally a considerable amount of fumbling while officers of the various echelons learned their jobs. A second fundamental handicap was the haste with which units had to be prepared. First there was the press of "Bolero" and then of "Gymnast." Urgency was so great as to preclude the prior planning essential to an orderly and efficient processing. A third basic deterrent was a shortage of virtually everything needed to bring units to a state of combat readiness. As previously noted, 1942 was a period of enormous expansion of the armed forces. New units vied with old ones for officers, men, and materiel. There was simply not enough to go around. Units earmarked for early shipment overseas were given highest priority, but when movements were ordered at such speed and in such volume as in 1942, it was exceedingly difficult to meet the demands of the preferred units and at the same time to leave anything for the swarm of units being activated each month.<sup>18</sup>

Of specific difficulties in 1942 those having to do with personnel were most acute. Because of demands for cadres, losses to the Air Forces and officer candidate schools, and other attritional influences, most units were considerably understrength when they were earmarked for overseas movement. The 3d Division had only 65 percent of its authorized strength when alerted, and two other divisions of Task Force "A" were each short over 2,000

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enlisted men on the eve of their call to intensive training.<sup>19</sup> The last-minute filling of depleted units was accomplished at the expense of organizations of lower priority. The units thus robbed were often alerted after only a brief interval, with the result that they in turn had to draw fillers from other organizations; and so an endless sequence of stripping and filling was set in motion.<sup>20</sup>

A similar problem arose in connection with the disposition of personnel mentally, physically, or otherwise disqualified for overseas service. Because of manpower shortages, difficulty under existing regulations of getting rid of the mentally inept, repeated dosages of untrained filler replacements, and dilatoriness of command in instituting housecleaning measures, units commonly found themselves on alert status burdened with considerable numbers of substandard officers and men. With movement to port imminent, the only feasible course was to direct some unit of lower priority to accept the substandards and the untrained in exchange for an equal number of personnel qualified for combat. But unfortunately it sometimes happened that the unit which received the undesirables was itself alerted a short time later. Whereupon it proceeded to dump its recently acquired incapables, along with substandard personnel of its own upbringing, upon some unit farther down the line of priority.<sup>21</sup>

The absorption of large numbers of new men and officers, for whatever reason, on the eve of sailing was apt to be disruptive. An officer of a division shipped overseas in the spring of 1942 wrote just prior to leaving port: "We drew over 3,000 Inf at last minute at PE. This is a slug. Men do not know officers and vice versa."<sup>22</sup>

The haste of last-minute transfers sometimes resulted in flagrant cases of misassignment. When Task Force "A" was on the point of debarkation "a number of enlisted men who had been trained as machine gunners were assigned as riflemen and consequently did not know how to fire the M-1 rifles which were issued to them practically at the pier."<sup>23</sup>

Equipment gave rise to difficulties no less harassing. Because of the shortage prevalent in 1942, few units when earmarked for overseas shipment had anything like the full allotment of equipment. Service-type units often had considerably less than 50 percent of their authorized allowances. When units were alerted, steps were initiated immediately to supply deficiencies from stock or production. In 1942 requisitions on these sources frequently could not be met. The only alternative was to take the needed equipment from units in training, thus setting up a vicious circle

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like that pertaining to personnel.<sup>24</sup>

The completion of equipment from whatever source required time. Frequently shortages were not filled until arrival at port. It was not unusual in 1942 for units in staging areas to rush large numbers of men through required firing courses with weapons borrowed from neighboring units or from port commanders.<sup>25</sup>

After qualifications had thus been accomplished it sometimes happened that when allotted weapons finally arrived they were of a model or type different from that which the men had fired. In 1942 units, particularly those in service categories, whose Tables of Basic Allowances (T/BA's) called for carbines, were compelled, because of the prevalent shortage of these weapons, to complete training with 1903 or 1917 rifles. But these units faced the possibility always of having their rifles replaced by carbines at staging areas or ports too late for practice in firing.<sup>26</sup>

Sometimes radical innovations just emerging from production lines were issued to units on the eve of embarkation. In November 1942 General Marshall informed General McNair that "bazookas" were issued at the last minute to troops in Task Force "A" "without anybody knowing how to use them or even what they were for." New types of landing nets and radios were also issued to a portion of this force just prior to its sailing.<sup>27</sup>

Sometimes units that had weapons could not obtain shells for them. An Armored Corps commander reported to General McNair early in 1943: While there are sufficient carbines in the corps to permit rotation on temporary loan to alerted units ---ammunition ---is inadequate ---over a thousand Launchers, Rocket AT M-1 are available ---but to date neither M-6 nor M-7 ammunition have been available."<sup>28</sup>

Frequent modification of movement schedules to meet changes of strategic plans, variations of theater requirements, and fluctuations of available shipping were other sources of difficulty. In some instances units that had been directed on one day to prepare for movement in two or three months had to be informed a few days later to expect movement within two or three weeks. In other cases units were alerted and "de-alerted" several times. In still others they were actually called to port, and their organizational equipment shipped to the theater, whereupon they were transferred back to a training status under Ground Forces.<sup>29</sup>

Estimates of theater requirements changed so rapidly in 1942 that Army Ground Forces sometimes received conflicting instructions from closely related War Department agencies.<sup>30</sup> On receipt in July

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of the projected overseas movement schedule for the fourth quarter of 1942, prepared by War Department G-3, Army Ground Forces commented: "The Ground Force units listed in the attached memo do not agree with current plans of OPD WDGS, as recently conveyed to this Headquarters. There are differences in the number and types of divisions, and number of Army Corps Headquarters ---It is believed that discrepancies also exist between the list of units on attached memorandum and latest revised plans of OPD, WDGS."<sup>31</sup>

The effect of changing plans on individual units may be illustrated by the experience of the 32d Infantry Division, as set forth by an AGF staff officer:<sup>32</sup>

Late in December 1941, the 32d Division --- was earmarked for Force Magnet ---The Division was placed in a priority for distribution of controlled items of equipment and for assignment of personnel to meet a planned schedule of movement to overseas destination. Shipping facilities retarded the contemplated date of sailing. It was now estimated that this division would sail ---not earlier than July 1942. At 8:45 A.M. 25 March 1942 telephonic information was received from the OPD War Department General Staff to the effect that the 32d Division would sail from the San Francisco P/E not later than April 15. At this time the division was short 4788 enlisted men. In addition its Engineer Regiment had been shipped to North Ireland. It was now necessary to complete the preparation of this unit and place it at the Port in San Francisco all the way across the country from Ft. Devens, Mass. in three weeks time, whereas existing schedule of priority provided for completion of its preparation in time to sail in three months. In order to prepare the division within the limited time available, it was necessary to ship fillers and equipment direct to the Port of Embarkation.

Another source of difficulty in 1942 was the confusion caused by overlapping authority of the various agencies involved in the processing of units for overseas movement. The situation with reference to staging areas is a case in point.

As previously noted, directives in effect when Army Ground Forces was created put units in staging areas under the control of commanders of ports of embarkation and therefore, of the Services of Supply (SOS).<sup>33</sup> This arrangement was predicated on the supposition that units would not proceed to staging areas until fully trained,

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manned, and equipped, and that they would remain there for only a short time.

But things did not work out as planned. The need for utilization of shipping as soon as it became available to meet such urgent requirements as "Bolero", led to the practice of assembling men near ports in numbers that far exceeded normal shipping capacities. Changes in strategic plans, as noted above, sometimes caused postponement or cancellation of shipment after units were moved to staging areas. The net result of these and other tendencies was the overflow of "true staging areas," such as Camp Kilmer, designed and equipped solely for routine steps incident to final processing, into quasi-staging establishments such as Ft. Ord, Calif., Indiantown Gap, Pa., and Ft. Dix, N. J. Instead of remaining in staging areas for two or three weeks as originally planned, units frequently lingered for two or three months. Staging activities, instead of being limited to final processing and maintenance of combat readiness, were extended to include reception of large increments of personnel and equipment, putting considerable numbers of replacements through firing courses and other minimum training requirements, and instructing old and new personnel in the use of recently acquired equipment. In short, staging installations to a large extent became training establishments. But port facilities were not designed for training functions, and port authorities were not familiar with Ground training programs. Consequently the combat fitness of units deteriorated during the long wait for overseas movement.

On 26 March 1942, the War Department took cognizance of this unhappy situation by giving General McNair and General Arnold authority to supervise the training, in coordination with port commanders concerned, of ground and air units awaiting embarkation at Ft. Dix, Indiantown Gap, Ft. Ord, and other stations used to augment the capacity of true staging areas. But the provision was added that this step was "not to be construed to diminish the control of the unit by the Port Commander."<sup>34</sup>

Army Ground Forces on 10 July 1942 issued a training directive for units in staging areas, but this directive, owing to adoption concurrently of the policy of preshipping equipment of units destined for England and uncertainty as to the authority conferred by the War Department letter of 26 March, was couched in terms so general as to be of little practical use.<sup>35</sup>

The plan of having Army Ground Forces supervise the training of units controlled by Services of Supply did not work out satis-

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factorily. In August 1942, General Marshall indicated to General McNair his desire for a scheme that would give Army Ground Forces closer control over units during the staging period.<sup>36</sup> A staff officer charged by General McNair with digging out key data on which to base a response to General Marshall's request reported difficulty in determining precisely what installations were considered as staging areas. "The whole question of staging areas is confused and rather complicated," he said.<sup>37</sup> His comment is borne out by a report from the Second Army a short time previously that SOS authorities had attempted to designate Ft. Jackson, S. C., as a staging area, and had sent officers there from the Boston Port of Embarkation to supervise POM activities of certain units scheduled for early movement. Backed by Army Ground Forces, Second Army restricted the visitors to liaison functions on the ground that Ft. Jackson was a training camp and not a staging area.<sup>38</sup>

General McNair recommended to General Marshall on 19 August 1942 that Ground units sent to Ft. Dix, Indiantown Gap, and Ft. Ord, the three staging areas where dual responsibility had existed, remain under command of Army Ground Forces, "subject to direct orders by the port commander in connection with administrative measures and other preparations for movement overseas." He added the observation that most of the difficulty arose from the long sojourns of units in staging areas. "If conditions become such that units could be moved more promptly," he added, "the necessity of the action recommended would be lessened."<sup>39</sup>

General McNair's proposal that Army Ground Forces be given command of units staged at Ft. Dix, Indiantown Gap, and Ft. Ord was not adopted. On 12 September 1942, a directive issued over General Marshall's signature perpetuated the port commanders' control over units in all staging areas. This control included "continuance of such training as will not interfere with preparation for overseas movement." To provide more effective supervision of nondivisional units the directive required establishment of small permanent command groups in each staging area. Separate command groups of each of the three major forces were authorized in cases where the number of units of each command was large enough to make such action desirable. Commanding generals of Army Ground Forces were required to maintain liaison with these command groups (which were under command of the port commander, and therefore of of Commanding General, SOS) and "to cause periodical inspections to be made of their respective units within staging areas, to insure that training is continued and that disciplinary standards

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are maintained."<sup>40</sup>

On 5 October 1942, Army Ground Forces issued a directive to its principal components informing them that command groups were soon to be set up in the various staging areas and delegating to appropriate armies and corps the liaison and inspectional responsibilities set forth in the Chief of Staff's directive of 12 September.<sup>41</sup>

But while steps were being taken to implement the directive of 12 September, there was much shaking of heads at Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, as to its effectiveness. One staff member commented:<sup>42</sup>

A duplication of personnel and effort is indicated here. It is not believed that the establishment of these command groups, although directed by the War Department, will accomplish the desires of the Chief of Staff, United States Army --- This matter has been tossed about by successive echelons of the War Department, each being farther removed from the original conception, until the final product is a makeshift which, in my opinion, is far from the most effective solution. It merely sets up additional help for the staging area commander and places additional requirements upon Army Ground Forces for personnel.

General McNair felt that Army Ground Forces could exercise its limited training responsibilities in staging areas through existing Army and Corps inspectional systems, and in view of the prevalent shortage of personnel, he was reluctant to turn officers and men over to the Services of Supply for use in administrative capacities the value of which he could not clearly see.<sup>43</sup> Apparently no one was satisfied with the system instituted by the directive of 12 September. SOS disliked the idea of outsiders coming into staging areas to inspect units that had passed to its command. Army Ground Forces turned a cold shoulder to the suggestion that it provide personnel for command groups which it did not control.<sup>44</sup>

After General Marshall expressed strong dissatisfaction in November 1942 with the circumstances surrounding the final processing of Task Force "A", Army Ground Forces again proposed that it be allowed to retain command of Ground units during their staging period, but nothing came of this recommendation.<sup>45</sup>

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On 5 January 1943 the War Department, in a general revamping of POM policies, revoked the requirement that Army Ground Forces inspect ground units in staging areas, and at the same time directed port commanders to make every effort to reduce staging periods to a maximum of two weeks.<sup>46</sup> This action did not specifically forbid Army Ground Forces to make inspections of units while they were being staged, but that Army Ground Forces interpreted it in this light is indicated by an incident that occurred in June 1943. On 2 June Brigadier General Weible, Director of Military Training, Army Service Forces, wrote G-3, Army Ground Forces, that training in staging areas was suffering from lack of proper guidance. "I would appreciate it greatly if you would have your training inspectors visit staging areas containing units or individuals of the Army Ground Forces," he said, "to determine what further steps could or should be taken to improve the training possibilities during their period in the staging area. I would welcome any suggestions on the subject as apparently such training has important effects on morale."<sup>47</sup> This letter was finally sent to the Adjutant General's Records in August 1943, with the pencilled note: "General Lentz desired no further action."<sup>48</sup>

Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, apparently made no further attempt after that of December 1942 to secure control over units in staging areas. Improvement in the shipping situation, repeated protests on the part of Army Ground Forces against the tendency of Army Service Forces' control. The command groups persisted into 1944, and Ground commands were instructed, through these liaison connections, to "render such assistance as requested by the port commander as may be practicable." Indications are that "such assistance" was rarely, if ever, requested.<sup>49</sup>

Confusion from overlapping authority also arose in connection with the preparation of task forces, mainly because of the entrance of another authority, the task force headquarters, into an already complicated picture. The Tongatabu Task Force prepared in the spring of 1942 is a case in point. As previously noted, major responsibility for the organization of this force was delegated by War Plans Division to Army Ground Forces. According to plans drafted at Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, the V Corps

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was directed to organize the bulk of the force from elements of the 37th Division at Indiantown Gap; one small detachment was to be organized by the First Army at Ft. Dix and another by the Third Army at Camp Livingston; shipment was to be from the New York Port of Embarkation, after staging at Ft. Dix and Indiantown Gap.<sup>50</sup>

While the army and corps commanders concerned were complying with these arrangements, Brig. Gen. Benjamin C. Lockwood was designated as Task Force Commander, and a force headquarters was set up in the Munitions Building. The confusion which ensued was vividly depicted in a report made by General Lockwood to General Marshall on 1 April 1942:<sup>51</sup>

The component elements of this force were assembled from numerous stations and many had to be organized just prior to their movement to the staging area.

Numerous new Tables of Organization and Tables of Basic Allowances had to be prepared and issued to the supply services, the units concerned, this headquarters, the two staging areas and to the port of embarkation. Many of these required check and modification to fit requirements.

There was little or no chance for the force commander to assemble this force, get to know the unit commander, and expedite adjustment of numerous problems and difficulties. Actually he had practically no control prior to embarkation. Practically all of the headquarters staff and all organization commanders and units were strangers to the force commander.

Many of the difficulties and delays --- were due to the numerous intermediate commanders and staffs which entered into the picture. For example, upon visiting the Indiantown Gap Staging Area, it was found that the Division Commander of the 37th Infantry Division was requiring the Infantry and Field Artillery components of this force to participate in a review during the last week of their stay in the staging area. The V Army Corps was requiring the Field Artillery battalion to fire a test, using their 75mm guns which they had already turned in. Last-minute arrangements were made, at my instigation, which resulted in a modification of this test so that the unit could use the 105mm howitzer and devote the remainder of their short stay to intensive instruction in the new weapon. This was in spite of clear instructions that upon

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reaching staging areas these units passed to the control of the port commander.

Little wonder that General Lockwood recommended to General Marshall that in setting up task forces in the future "elements of the task force be assembled in but one staging area as early as practicable so that the task force commander and a portion of his staff can ---act as intermediary between units and numerous --- agencies charged with preparing them for the mission."<sup>52</sup>

The Tongatabu expedition was a small affair, consisting of only a few thousand men. In September 1942 Task Force "A", aggregating more than 60,000 men ---the largest combat-loaded task force ever to sail from the United States ---was organized in the United States for participation in the North African invasion of November. Responsibility for preparation of this force reposed in agencies other than Army Ground Forces, but AGF commands, notably the Desert Training Center (DTC), were called upon to process a number of nondivisional components.<sup>53</sup>

In August the War Department set up a Force Headquarters in Washington to function directly under the Operations Division (OPD) in preparing the expedition and designated Major General (later General) George C. Patton as Task Force Commander. Liaison was established between the Force Headquarters and Army Ground Forces for the selection and processing of Ground units. But the Force Commander complicated proceedings by acting independently of liaison agencies, and disregarding established channels of command.<sup>54</sup> A responsible officer of DTC, in answer to an inquiry from the Task Force Branch of Ground G-3, stated in September 1942: "Individuals in Washington have called units direct and have given instructions. There have been times when we didn't know whether they were official, personal or what ... I think a great many of those calls came from individuals who had been here, had gone to Washington, and had information that we didn't have."<sup>55</sup> This officer cautiously refrained from naming the offending individuals in Washington. But a memorandum of an AGF staff officer drafted the following day established definite identification and threw additional light on the confusion attending preparation of Task Force "A". "Frequent changes of instructions on troop movements have been normal since we entered the war," he wrote. "This condition appears to be getting worse. The preparation of a special task force recently was the most disorderly of any thus far. In this particular case the condition was aggravated by the introduction of ... General Patton's Headquarters, here in Washington, which

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dealt directly with the Desert Training Center and issued certain instructions at variance with those issued by this office without notifying this office ... In addition to this, the Services of Supply issued directives to its supply agencies to ship equipment direct to the units."<sup>56</sup>

The 45th Division expedition, the only large combat-loaded task force dispatched from the United States after shipment of Task Force "A", was prepared under AGF auspices.<sup>57</sup> Conflict of authority was much less pronounced in the preparation of this force than in previous instances. But some difficulty arose over the failure of OPD to call Army Ground Forces into early councils on supply problems. In a report covering preparation of this force General Troy Middleton, force commander, stated that he and his chief of staff were summoned to Washington in mid-March for consultation with reference to the part which the force was to play in the Sicilian operations. "During the following twenty (20) days," he added, "numerous conferences were held between staff officers of the division and the OPD, War Department, at which conferences certain policies regarding the procurement of equipment and supplies were set up. The Army Ground Forces, during this period, was not brought into the picture ... Some delay and misunderstanding did occur in this operation by reason of the Army Ground Forces not being represented until about April 15."<sup>58</sup>

Processing of units in 1942, whether in task forces or as separate organizations, was complicated by lack of coordination between tactical and supply agencies. Army Ground Forces in September 1942 complained that SOS agencies had contacted units direct "before it had definitely been determined that the unit was to be alerted either for overseas movement or for equipment and personnel."<sup>59</sup> The effect of dealings out of channel with field organizations, many of which were already jittery with anticipation, was to disrupt final training. The situation was aptly summarized by an AGF staff officer who observed in the early fall: "In general units in the field are on edge and many have been known to alert themselves for overseas movement on rumors of the most meagre information. Inquiries from Washington reference strength of a unit, status of training, or equipment often have been misinterpreted as being indicative of early overseas movement."<sup>60</sup>

#### Efforts to Improve POM, 1942 - 1943

Struggles with chronic difficulties were matched by efforts to

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correct the conditions which caused them. Army Ground Forces attempted to reduce confusion and duplication within its own administrative organization by consolidating in September 1942 POM instructions issuing from G-1, G-3, and G-4 into a single directive sent out by G-3.<sup>61</sup> At about the same time Army Ground Forces requested the cooperation of War Department OPD in eliminating direct communication with Ground units by task force commanders and other outside authorities.<sup>62</sup> Efforts were made concurrently to prevent premature alerting of Ground units by SOS agencies.<sup>63</sup>

Another ameliorative step grew out of adverse reports of The Inspector General in September 1942 with reference to serviceability of equipment of certain Ground units at staging areas. In commenting on these reports Army Ground Forces made the point that the unfavorable findings of The Inspector General were due largely to a difference in the standards of inspection.<sup>64</sup>

In an effort to provide a single standard for the evaluation of equipment, Army Ground Forces arranged in October for alerted units to be inspected at their home stations by teams from The Inspector General's office, functioning as representatives of Headquarters Army Ground Forces.<sup>65</sup> Later a follow-up system was devised to assure prompt correction of deficiencies revealed by The Inspector General declared any unit unready for combat, Army Ground Forces dispatched a letter to the army, corps, or other agency responsible for preparing the unit for movement, which ran something like this:<sup>66</sup>

1. a. Attention is invited to the attached memorandum (of TIG) ... relative to the overseas readiness status of ... (unit).
- b. Immediate action will be taken to correct the deficiencies set forth in the above cited memorandum.
2. Necessary action will be taken to prevent the recurrence of similar deficiencies in other units.
3. A report will be submitted to this headquarters when these deficiencies have been corrected.

If The Inspector General's report revealed a flagrant violation of existing instructions, a clause requiring explanation of this circumstance was included in the letter.<sup>67</sup>

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In order to place POM activities on a more efficient and orderly basis Army Ground Forces in October 1942 recommended to the War Department: (1) that a proposal made earlier in the year be effectuated at once; namely, creation and maintenance of a pool of trained units so that unexpected requirements of theater commanders might be met without resort to the vicious circle of robbing units in training; (2) that the War Department "inform AGF of the numbers and types of units and the conditions under which they will be employed at least four months, and preferably five months, prior to the sailing date of each unit"; (3) that specific units earmarked to meet these estimated requirements be automatically authorized full strength combat personnel and given an A-3 priority for equipment; (5) that "every possible means ... be directed toward providing complete allowance of equipment in time to permit the unit to conduct three months realistic training prior to its entry into combat"; (6) that Army Ground Forces retain control over personnel assignment to ground units until they left the continental limits of the United States; and (7) that preparation of units for movement overseas be regarded as a continuous process from the time of activation, and that every effort be made to assure completion of this process prior to the staging period.<sup>68</sup>

The War Department, because of prior suggestions of Army Ground Forces and on the basis of its own experience, particularly with Task Force "A", had already developed a favorable attitude toward most of these proposals.<sup>69</sup> The improvement of the manpower situation and prospects of more abundant equipment indicated that remedial action was practicable. Further exchange of views among War Department agencies and the three major commands led in late 1942 to tentative revisions which were followed early in 1943 by a general revamping of policies and procedures for overseas movement. Adoption of the revised program was an important episode in that it indicated transition from a period when haste, scarcity, and confusion were the keynotes to an era when advance planning and routine administration were predominant.<sup>70</sup>

Fundamentals of the revised procedure were laid down in a War Department letter of 5 January 1943. This document contained the following important provisions: (1) OPD each month was to furnish the three major commands lists of estimated monthly overseas requirements for the succeeding six-month period, broken down by quantities and types of units. The list would designate unusual operations for which special training was required. (2) Each major command was to designate specific units to meet the

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War Department requirements; upon approval by the War Department of the units selected, a combined list, known as the six-months list, was to be prepared. This list was to constitute the basis for establishing equipment and personnel priorities and initiating overseas movement procedures. (3) To meet emergency demands for additional units which had not been previously earmarked for overseas shipment, each major command was to maintain a pool of units completely organized, manned, and equipped. (4) Units designated for overseas shipment were to be placed in priorities for equipment in this order:<sup>71</sup>

- a. Units under orders or earmarked for movement within three months
- b. Units in the emergency pool
- c. Units listed for shipment in the 4th, 5th, and 6th months

(5) To insure each unit having full equipment in time to complete final training at its home station, supply agencies were to fill shortages from stock or production 45 days prior to the estimated date of departure. If such delivery could not be made, supply agencies were to notify the responsible command 60 days prior to the departure date so that equipment could be transferred, if practicable, from neighboring units. Unfamiliar equipment was not, except as a last resort, to be delivered to units at ports or staging areas. (6) Measures were to be taken promptly to clear alerted units of personnel unsuitable for combat and to bring them to full T/O (Table of Organization) strength. No individual, except certain technical specialists not organically armed, was to be sent to staging areas or ports unless he had completed basic training and fired the prescribed course in marksmanship with his principal weapon. (7) Port commanders were to make every effort to reduce staging periods to two weeks. (8) Instructions to units designated for overseas movement were to be transmitted through normal command channels.<sup>72</sup>

This letter also directed inspection of alerted units by The Inspector General "to determine adequacy and efficiency of personnel, the state of technical training, and the completeness and conditions of equipment."<sup>73</sup> Previously The Inspector General had, on his own initiative or on order of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, occasionally conducted POM inspections for the War Department; the directive of 5 January 1943 made these inspections standing operating procedure, broadened their scope, and placed at The Inspector General's

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disposal the personnel needed to effectuate the enlarged program.<sup>74</sup>

Adoption of the new policy brought to an end the practice initiated in October, 1942, of The Inspector General inspecting alerted units as the representative of the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces.<sup>75</sup>

In evaluating readiness of ground units for combat, The Inspector General was guided by standards prescribed by the War Department, and Army Ground Forces as laid down in Mobilization Training Programs (MTP's), training directives, POM literature, and similar publications.<sup>76</sup>

The 5 January directive approved and carried forward one item previously recognized as standing operating procedure; namely, submission to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, by the appropriate major command of a status report covering organization, training, and equipment of each unit designated for overseas movement.<sup>77</sup>

It will be noted that the new directive included, with slight variation of detail, most of the recommendations made in October by Army Ground Forces. The principal point of disagreement was the control of units in staging areas. When War Department G-3 submitted the draft of the directive to Army Ground Forces for comment prior to its publication, Ground G-1 observed: "We should insist upon complete control and responsibility for everything except movement orders until a unit is actually embarked."<sup>78</sup> The War Department did not concur in this suggestion but compromised by urging restriction of staging periods to two weeks and requiring transmission of instructions to earmarked units through command channels.<sup>79</sup>

Adoption of the policies and procedures laid down in the letter of 5 January 1943 necessitated a revision of current War Department instructions governing preparation of units for overseas movement. Hitherto the practice had been followed of issuing instructions in several installments, the most important of which was Inclosure No. 1 to the secret movement order sent to army, corps, or other major command charged with preparing the unit for shipment. Since the movement order often was not published until thirty days, or less, before a unit's departure for the staging area, the unit commander and the local supply agencies frequently did not have amply time to complete the equipment of the unit before it left camp. Now that preparation for overseas

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shipment was set up on a long-range basis, it was deemed imperative that instructions issue before a unit was alerted for movement; moreover, it was desirable that they go in the clear, as a single document, to unit commanders as far down as the company level.

To accomplish these ends OPD in January held conferences with representatives of Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Services of Supply. The result of these consultations was a 34-page document, published 1 February 1943, under the title Preparation for Overseas Movement, with the short title "POM". This set forth in detail the duties and responsibilities of each commander and agency involved in the processing of a unit for overseas shipment. It became the "Bible" for all concerned.<sup>80</sup>

"POM" was the result of the accumulated experience of the agencies that shared in its preparation. AGF's contribution was considerable. Specific features for which it deserves major credit include the definition of general purpose motor vehicles (paragraph 9 c (6)) and the tabulation of responsibilities of all commands having a part in movement preparations (paragraph 16). It participated with Army Service Forces in the shaping of passages covering original and initial lists of shortages (paragraph 9).<sup>81</sup>

On 19 February 1943, Army Ground Forces dispatched a letter to its subcommands, implementing and elaborating the policies and procedures laid down in the War Department letter of 5 January 1943 and in "POM".<sup>82</sup> A few days later provision was made for placing "POM" and the AGF letter of 19 February in the hands of commanding officers of all units at the time of activation.<sup>83</sup> About the same time the form "Alert Instruction" letter, which AGF customarily sent to major subordinate commands approximately three months before units designated therein were scheduled for movement, was revised to conform to the new system.

Other changes in the program of preparation for overseas movement made by Army Ground Forces early in 1943 included the addition of the requirement that all individuals go through infiltration courses before proceeding to ports of embarkation and the issuance of a new directive to guide training in staging areas. The latter simply substituted the general training directive of 1 November 1942 for the one issued in June 1942 as the applicable reference; again, as in the original staging directive of 10 July 1942, phrasing was so general as to offer little effective assistance in shaping the training program.<sup>84</sup>

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In view of the fact that the changes instituted in January and February placed overseas movement procedures on a fairly permanent basis, it is appropriate at this point to summarize the system as applied in the spring of 1943.<sup>85</sup>

The first step in the process was transmission to Army Ground Forces by War Department OPD of estimated monthly requirements of various types of ground units for the next six months. Task Force Division of G-3, in coordination with the Training Division, and where necessary with subordinate commands, designated specific units to fill OPD requirements. Units thus selected became the ground portion of the War Department's official six-months list. This list was fundamental to all subsequent POM activities.

From this point activities proceeded along two broad lines --- lines which merged or crossed so frequently as to make it difficult at times to distinguish them --- one having to do with equipment and the other with general processing, including phases of equipment. Equipment activities began with publication by War Department G-3 of an equipment priority list, based on OPD's six-months list. Units scheduled for movement during the latter half of the six-month period usually fell in the A-4 group. War Department distribution of the equipment priority list included AGF commands, but it was intended primarily as a guide for supply agencies. It frequently happened that the post commander received the priority list before notice of a change of status reached the responsible tactical commander located at the same station --- a situation which sometimes led to confusion and misunderstanding. It was normal in 1943 for a nondivisional unit commander to receive first intimation of the earmarking of his unit through notification by the commanding officer, headquarters and headquarters detachment special troops, that his organization had been assigned an A-4 equipment priority. This notification had the effect of initiating proceedings laid down in "POM".

The other line of activities springing from the six-months list --- the main line, it may be called, to distinguish it from that of equipment --- proceeded as follows: Two or three months before the date set for a unit's movement, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, sent an Alert Instruction letter --- prepared in the Task Force Division of G-3 --- to the agency responsible for the unit's movement, i. e., an army, separate corps, command, or center. For convenience let us assume that the agency was Second Army and that the unit was "C" Ordnance Company (commanding officer, Captain Smith) assigned to the 11th Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment

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Special Troops (commanding officer, Colonel Doe) located at Camp Forrest. The Alert Instruction letter informed the Second Army commander that a list of units, including "C" Company, had been earmarked for early movement and that training should be completed on a date two months hence. A training paragraph, drafted by Task Force Division G-3, directed that a program of intensive training --- based insofar as possible on current training programs --- be instituted at once. A personnel paragraph, drafted by Task Force Division G-1, prohibited further departure of officers or men to schools and required the army commander within fifteen days to accomplish the following: (1) replace officers and men unqualified for foreign service; and (2) initiate action to bring the unit to full T/O strength, plus known future losses. A supply paragraph, drafted by Task Force Division G-4, gave notice of A-2 priority status, and directed compliance with appropriate provisions of "POM" and the AGF letter of 19 February 1943.

Upon receipt of this communication Second Army dispatched an Alert Instruction letter of its own to Colonel Doe, the Detachment Commander at Camp Forrest, informing him that certain units under his command, including "C" Company, had been placed on an intensive training status. This letter, which also contained sections covering training, personnel, and equipment, prepared respectively by Army G-3, G-1, and G-4, prescribed in considerable detail Colonel Doe's responsibilities in accomplishing the objectives laid down in the AGF Alert Instructions. Colonel Doe immediately called on Captain Smith, Commander of "C" Company, and explained the steps which he was to take in preparing his unit for movement. Colonel Doe also checked with the post commander to see that the latter had been informed of the A-2 equipment priority status. Henceforth there was close collaboration between Colonel Doe, Captain Smith, and the post commander.

About six weeks after dispatch of the Alert Instruction letter Army Ground Forces received a secret memorandum from War Department OPD directing preparation of certain units, including "C" Company, for movement to North Africa via a port of embarkation to be designated by the Commanding General, Army Service Forces. This memorandum fixed a date three weeks hence by which the unit should be ready to move to the staging area.

Upon receipt of this memorandum AGF Task Force Division G-3 warned Second Army G-3 (Troop Movements Division) that "C" Company was alerted for movement. Second Army immediately transmitted this information to Colonel Doe at Camp Forrest, who in turn alerted

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"C" Company for movement.

About this time Army Ground Forces ascertained from Army Service Forces that the port of embarkation would be Hampton Roads.

During the week following receipt of the OPD memorandum, Army Ground Forces prepared the draft of a movement order for dispatch by the War Department.<sup>86</sup> This draft assigned a shipment number, which for security reasons was henceforth to be used instead of the usual unit designation in all communications and markings. It specified Second Army as the "Agency to Issue Movement Orders" and designated the T/O and T/BA to be followed in completing movement preparations. Hampton Roads was designated as the port of embarkation. The readiness date for personnel was the same as that given in the OPD memorandum; that for equipment was four days earlier.

The draft contained paragraphs on supply and personnel drawn respectively by G-4 and G-1 Task Force Divisions. The personnel paragraph elaborated instructions given in the "Alert Instruction" letter. The supply paragraph directed certain modifications of clothing and equipment prescribed in applicable T/BA's. Other portions of the draft specified modifications of "POM", stated that movement was to be by rail, and required report of the unit's departure from the home station.

The draft order prepared by Army Ground Forces was combined by OPD with instructions submitted by Army Service Forces, and a single letter was sent to The Adjutant General's Office for publication. Distribution included the Second Army, the Fourth Service Command, the Replacement and School Command, the Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation, the Chief of Transportation, and the Chiefs of Supply Services, as subsequent activities involved coordination among these agencies.

The movement order reached Second Army ten days before the readiness date for equipment, and portions relating to "C" Company were immediately passed on to Colonel Doe. Action indicated in the order had already been initiated by the alert for movement.

During the period ensuing before movement, Army Ground Forces assisted in final preparations by checking to see that the Chiefs of Supply Services were informed of equipment expected of them and arranging for last-minute transfer from other ground units of a

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few scarce items not obtainable from Army Service Forces.

In the meantime things had been moving with increasing tempo at Camp Forrest. Immediately following Colonel Doe's visit to tell him that his company was earmarked for early movement, Captain Smith had taken steps to accelerate immunizations, physical checkups, record firing of principal arms, familiarization firing of additional weapons, and other requirements laid down in "POM". He had also made provision for bringing company records up to date. During this period a Second Army inspection team, including representatives of G-1, The Inspector General, and Ordnance, visited the unit and gave advice concerning such matters as removal of undesirable personnel and the completion of training requirements. By informal contact with post supply authorities Captain Smith began the replacement of unserviceable equipment. In all of these matters the unit commander consulted freely with Colonel Doe and members of the latter's staff.

On receipt of alert instructions from Colonel Doe, Captain Smith, assisted by officers of headquarters, special troops, and of the post, conducted a show-down inspection and made an inventory of the company's clothing, supplies, and equipment. From this inspection Captain Smith prepared lists of "original shortages" which were submitted to the station commander. The station commander, through his director of supply, immediately arranged to fill all possible shortages from stocks on hand and from depots which ordinarily served him. He then tabulated the remaining deficiencies in "Initial Lists of Shortages" and forwarded "Action Copies" of these lists by the most expeditious means to the appropriate Chiefs of Services; information copies were sent by regular mail to Second Army, Fourth Service Command, G-4 of Army Ground Forces, and Stock Control Division of Army Service Forces. Deficiencies which developed subsequently and which could not be filled by the station commander from his own stock or the usual depots, were dispatched as "Supplementary Lists of Shortages." The Chiefs of Services delivered a part of the needed equipment to "C" Company at its home station. Because of factors of time and distance, arrangements had to be made to ship some items to the port of embarkation. The Chief of Ordnance, being unable to procure a few unusually scarce items of ordnance equipment included in the Initial List of Shortages sent to his office, notified the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, of this fact through the Stock Control Division of ASF. G-4 of AGF immediately arranged for transfer of these items to "C" Company at Hampton Roads from an AGF unit of low priority. The Stock Control Division, ASF,

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was then informed of the transfer so that items thus transferred would be replaced as soon as they became available. G-4, AGF, kept War Department G-3 informed of critical items transferred.

"C" Company spent a considerable portion of its last three weeks at Camp Forrest greasing and packing the equipment which was to precede it to port. This was a tedious chore as it had to be done in accordance with detailed rules laid down in "POM", to insure arrival of equipment overseas in a usable condition.

Equipment was all packed by the readiness date designated in the movement order --- except of course for a few housekeeping and administrative items essential to the unit's welfare at the staging area, and rifles and individual equipment which the soldiers were to take with them on shipboard. But three days passed without any notice of the expected move. On the fourth day word was received through channels that the port commander had called for delivery of the equipment at Hampton Roads at 1800, two days hence. After the shipping of the equipment there was another wait of five days. Then came the port commander's call --- through channels of course --- to the Hampton Roads Staging Area. Upon arrival at the staging area, "C" Company passed from the jurisdiction of Army Ground Forces to the command of the Commanding General, Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation.

Continuing Difficulty in 1943

The above account affords a picture of overseas movement preparations as they might have worked under optimum conditions in accordance with the system prescribed in early 1943.

But continuing difficulties often prevented the system from functioning as intended. Shortages of equipment, while considerably less in 1943 than the previous year, made it impossible to deliver anything like full allowances to units soon after they were earmarked for overseas service.<sup>87</sup> The provision in the War Department letter of 5 January 1943, requiring SOS to notify responsible tactical commanders 60 days before the estimated movement date of inability to deliver full equipment to earmarked units' home stations 45 days prior to their scheduled departure, was a dead letter from the beginning.<sup>88</sup> Preshipment of large stocks of material to Great Britain in the summer of 1943 in order to make maximum use of cargo and dock facilities, while beneficial in the long run, had the immediate effect of curbing the flow of equipment to units in advanced stages of training. Because of this

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and other factors, last-minute transfers of equipment continued to impair the combat readiness of AGF units throughout the greater part of 1943.

Personnel was also a source of chronic worry. The POM system prescribed early in 1943 was predicated on the assumption that the 15 percent initial overstrength instituted in the fall of 1942 would enable most units to complete their training with a full complement of personnel; and that such fillers as were needed by organizations designated for overseas movement could be readily obtained from replacement training centers. But these fair hopes had only a limited fruition. Replacement center capacities were diverted almost completely to the filling of overseas requirements. By autumn the manpower situation had relapsed into the stark leanness of the previous summer. And before the year's end the old circle of stripping units at lower priority to fill those on the verge of overseas shipment had revived in all its former viciousness. As late as May 1944, Army Ground Forces was attempting to stay the evil by freezing personnel in units that had been subjected to one or more rounds of robbing and refilling.<sup>89</sup>

The POM system prescribed at the beginning of 1943 also assumed degree of stability in operational and shipping predictions which failed to materialize. Changing estimates by OPD required frequent modification of the six-months list and adjustments of equipment priorities. In November 1943, and March 1944, Army Service Forces called on Army Ground Forces on very short notice to deliver at ports shipments aggregating respectively 22,000 and 15,000 men.<sup>90</sup> More frequently it happened that units which had been alerted for movement and had packed their equipment waited for several weeks beyond the designated readiness date before port commanders issued the call to staging area. In such cases Army Ground Forces checked with Army Service Forces the feasibility of permitting units to unpack at least a part of the equipment so as to permit a resumption of normal training.<sup>91</sup>

In a considerable number of instances units whose equipment --- except minimum essentials --- had been sent to port or perhaps shipped overseas, lingered for several weeks in staging areas while combat proficiency brought to a peak during final training under Army Ground Forces steadily deteriorated.<sup>92</sup> Sometimes units whose shipment was thus delayed were deleted from movement orders because of sudden changes in theater requirements, or for other reasons, and turned back to Army Ground Forces for further training.<sup>93</sup> This necessitated a scurrying about to replace the organizational

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equipment that had gone overseas.

Accomplishment and Adjustments, 1943

But, generally speaking, difficulties declined in both number and gravity during 1943. And there was concurrently an upward trend in movement of AGF units. In April 1943 shipments to ports (or staging areas) aggregated 158 units and 60,992 men. There was a considerable drop during the next three months but in August the figures were 193 units and 69,126 men. After another temporary decline shipment climbed in December to 202 units and 81,235 men. From 9 March 1942 through 31 December 1943 Army Ground Forces sent to ports of embarkation 2,067 units with a strength of 805,848 men.<sup>94</sup>

The mounting scale of shipments in 1943 was accompanied by continuing modification of movement procedure. In March 1943 the War Department, on AGF recommendation, amended "POM" to provide for return to their units of officers who happened to be absent at school when movement orders were issued.<sup>95</sup> The original edition of "POM" had directed transfer to other organizations of such officers as could not complete courses prior to their unit's shipment. This provision had made commanders reluctant to recommend their best officers for schooling after a unit reached advanced stages of training. On 1 August 1943 the War Department issued a second edition of "POM".<sup>96</sup> The revision made no significant changes in policy, but it clarified the functions of each of the three major commands, and set up instructions in such a way as considerably to facilitate their use. AGF contributions to the revision included: amendments to the list of definitions in order to reduce the likelihood of misinterpretation; sharpening of differentiation between roles of Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces in the warning process to prevent jittery units from alerting themselves upon notification of changes in equipment priority; and participation with Army Service Forces in the preparation of War Department AGF Form No. 412 for reporting status of equipment.<sup>97</sup>

On 10 August 1943 the War Department issued a supplement to "POM" under the title "Identification of Organizational Impedimenta and Preparation of Records Concerning its Shipment". (short title IOI).<sup>98</sup> The purpose of this document was to assist unit commanders in the numerous details incident to the segregation, packing, marking, and recording of the organizational equipment which current policies required to be shipped from home stations to ports of embarkation. This document was prepared by Army Service Forces, but Army Ground Forces contributed to portions covering activities

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scheduled for the prestaging period.<sup>99</sup>

Army Ground Forces followed up these War Department actions by revising the letter which it had issued on 19 February 1943 to supplement the first edition of "POM". The new letter, dated 28 August 1943, elaborated the purpose and emphasized the importance of status reports. It also attempted to eliminate the all-too-common practice of units prematurely packing their equipment by making a clear distinction between the date for completion of training specified in Alert Instructions and the readiness date fixed in movement orders. Finally, it required of Field agencies a more careful consideration of all factors involved before they reported a unit ready for overseas service.<sup>100</sup>

Despite the practice, instituted in the summer of 1943 as a result of the preshipment program, of having units destined for Great Britain leave their organizational equipment behind when they went to port, commanders were still required to hold show-down inspections and submit shortage reports for all items prescribed in current T/BA's and T/E's. On 30 November 1943, Army Ground Forces recommended in the interest of saving time and effort that units earmarked for shipment to Great Britain be relieved of inspection and shortage reports except for such articles of equipment as they were supposed to take with them.<sup>101</sup> Early in December OPD authorized this procedure for all units scheduled for movement to the United Kingdom between 1 January and 30 April 1944.<sup>102</sup> The date was subsequently extended to 31 August 1944. Units operating under this modification of "POM" --- which comprised the major portion of all those moved during the period indicated --- were referred to as the "Blue List."<sup>103</sup>

In the summer and fall of 1943 Army Ground Forces held conferences with representatives of its principal components for the purpose of explaining and articulating POM functions.<sup>104</sup> In September an AGF officer was sent to Indiantown Gap to attend an ASF conference on procedure in packing, marking, and loading equipment.<sup>105</sup> These and other activities indicated during the final months of 1943 a conscious and aggressive effort to improve Ground phases of the overseas shipment program.

The ameliorative program was not wholly efficacious. At the end of 1943 there was still frequent complaint of units arriving at ports with such flagrant and avoidable deficiencies as "personnel physically unqualified for overseas service, personnel requiring dental treatment, missing or incomplete identification tags, and incomplete immunizations."<sup>106</sup> Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, continued its efforts to secure better results by exercising a closer check over agencies charged with POM responsibilities and by further improvement of its own part in the program.

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The steady trend of improvement in preparing units for overseas movement in spite of difficulties, deficiencies, and increasing theater requirements was strikingly revealed by the quarterly reports of The Inspector General to the Chief of Staff. The first report, that covering the first quarter of 1943, showed 18 percent "not ready" of the ground units inspected. In the second quarter the figure was 20 percent, in the third quarter 12 percent, and in the fourth quarter 11 percent.<sup>107</sup>

Revision of POM Procedures, January - April 1944

The early months of 1944 witnessed a continuing effort to place the processing of units for overseas movement on a more efficient basis. On 3 April 1944 the AGF letter supplementing POM was revised to require preparation of a personnel status report for each alerted unit. This report, submitted by major subcommands to Task Force Division of G-1 Section, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, soon after receipt of alert instructions, indicated action for replacement of unqualified individuals by personnel fit for combat. The revised letter also raised minimum requirements for overseas readiness to include completion of combined training for combat organizations and three weeks of field training for service type units.<sup>108</sup>

A most significant step toward improvement of POM procedure made by the Army Ground Forces early in 1944 was institution in April of the practice of revealing to armies and other principal agencies all units under their control appearing in the War Department Six Months List immediately after each monthly revision of that list.<sup>109</sup> Hitherto subcommands had been given complete information only as to overseas movements scheduled within the next three months. Now they were told what units were earmarked for the fourth, fifth, and sixth months.

The monthly notification of earmarkings was accompanied by appropriate instructions for initiation of steps prescribed in "POM". Thus, for the first time in AGF history it became possible and feasible for responsible agencies to begin a planned program of shaping their units for overseas movement six months prior to the expected date of shipment. It was frankly admitted by AGF staff officers that the new procedure was an experiment and that its effectiveness would depend in large measure on adequacy of personnel resources and the stability of OPD requirements estimates.<sup>110</sup>

Difficulties and Deficiencies, April 1944 - May 1945

Fundamental to many of the difficulties experienced in preparing units for overseas movement in 1944 was the enormous turnover

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of personnel characteristic of the period. "POM" laid down the principle that processing for shipment should be continuous from activation to embarkation. But with personnel coming and going as it did throughout most of 1944 continuity for most units was an impossibility. Unit commanders time and again trained men, gave them their "shots", and fitted them with glasses and dentures, only to lose them to other units of higher priority. This was especially true of specialists, whose replacement in kind was always difficult and frequently impossible, and whose training required considerable time. It was not unusual for a unit to receive a heavy slug of partially trained, incompletely processed fillers only a few weeks prior to shipment.<sup>111</sup> The result was a frenzied effort to get the newcomers "qualified" and "to get them by" the POM inspectors. Under these circumstances there was a tendency to place more emphasis on paper than on proficiency, on crediting a man's record with weapon's firing than in establishing his ability to hit the target, on checking off such requirements as overhead fire, close combat, and "combat in cities" on charts posted in headquarters offices than in actually indoctrinating the trainees for battle and moulding them into smooth-working teams.<sup>112</sup>

A common sight in almost any AGF camp in the spring and summer of 1944 was a group of lieutenants herding a batch of casualties from the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), low priority units, or converted organizations through weapons firing and combat courses so that they might be put down as POM qualified and taken to port with the unit. Frequently these newcomers were so ignorant of tactics and so unaccustomed to firearms that the lieutenants dared not permit freedom of maneuver, but felt constrained instead literally to talk them through the exercises, with frequent admonitions to "get back in line" and "don't fire till I tell you." Circumscribed thus, the well-conceived processing became an empty ritual.<sup>113</sup>

Personnel turnover was not a phenomenon limited to a brief period or a few unfortunate units; it was prolonged and extensive, being most acute during the summer of 1944. A study by The Inspector General of 4 divisions and 56 AGF nondivisional units for a six-month period beginning in March and ending in September revealed that during that time the divisions lost 27,192 men (55.1 percent of their authorized strength) and gained 39,091 (74 percent). The nondivisional units lost 8,852 (38.3 percent) and gained 12,034 (52.2 percent). Some of the men transferred into these units remained only a short time and then were sent

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out to other units, or to replacement depots, thus aggravating disruption and multiplying the burdens of POM.<sup>114</sup>

Many units fared much worse than the average of those included in The Inspector General's survey. The 506th Military Police Battalion activated in March 1944 with a T/O enlisted strength of 519, between May and October 1944 gained 870 men and lost 833.<sup>115</sup> The 1282d Engineer Combat Battalion received 470 men from the 2d Coast Artillery Provisional Battalion on 23 June and lost them on 21 July. During the period 7 - 22 July this unit received 180 men from various military police, quartermaster, ordnance and paratroop organizations. On 24 July 240 men came in from a coast artillery (antiaircraft) battalion. In October, with movement to port imminent, the unit was 41 men understrength, and 30-odd of the men present had yet to be replaced because of physical disqualifications, deficiencies in specialist training, or for other reasons.<sup>116</sup> The sad effect of personnel changes on the unit's general proficiency is reflected in this statement from The Inspector General's POM inspection report:<sup>117</sup>

The battalion's basic training did not begin until 31 July ... Individual technical training has not been satisfactorily completed because of the lack of technicians ... and because one-third of the squad specialists are insufficiently trained for satisfactory performance of their specialties; also, only limited training has been conducted in construction of roads, laying and removal of mines, booby traps, general construction, and combat principles. No unit training has been conducted ...

The 381st Ordnance Medium Auto Maintenance Company, activated in March 1944 with a T/O strength of 112 men, received 71 fillers after it was placed under alert instructions. Sixty-two men gained late in the training period had to be sent to school immediately to remove deficiencies in technical training. They completed their course a few weeks before the readiness date, but not in time to be molded into the team.<sup>118</sup>

In view of the pervasiveness of personnel turnover, there is little surprise in the observation made by The Inspector General at the end of 1944 that "throughout the year unsatisfactory unit training was the principal reason for declaring units not ready".<sup>119</sup>

A second basic difficulty in the processing of units for over-

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seas movement in 1944 was the practice common in the summer and fall of War Department OPD calling for shipment of units considerably in advance of expected dates. In the fall of 1944 OPD ordered the alerting of seven divisions whose training had been planned on the assumption that they would not be moved overseas until after June 1945.<sup>120</sup> In October, to meet a pressing theater need, the Army Ground Forces was directed to move on very short notice, and from one to six months prior to previously fixed dates for completion of training, 66 engineer combat battalions.<sup>121</sup> These battalions were ordered shipped in current status of training, which permitted the waiving of certain "POM" requirements, but in other instances there was no modification of requirements when shipment dates were moved up; in such instances processing had to be intensified to meet the new dates.

POM activities were further complicated by the instability of completion of training dates even after they had been advanced by several months. In mid-August 1944 several divisions which were moved from the strategic reserve (and whose shipment had not been anticipated prior to July 1945) were earmarked for the European Theater of Operations (ETO) and given tentative readiness dates ranging from 9 November 1944 to 27 January 1945. Two months later, on 13 October, Lt. Col. S. L. Weld, head of the G-3 Task Force Division, was called out of bed at 0230 by an OPD officer and directed to proceed to his office to receive an urgent message from ETO. The message called for a statement of the earliest possible date on which the infantry regiments of all divisions earmarked for ETO could be ready to move in current status of training. An answer was expected in Paris by 0600.<sup>122</sup>

Colonel Weld immediately placed telephone calls for Headquarters, Second Army, Fourth Army and XXIII Corps, but there was considerable delay in getting the necessary information. Between 0600 and 0800 a tentative answer was transmitted to Paris. At a noon conference in the Pentagon it was agreed that 28 October was the earliest date that could be met for the movement of the infantry regiments (except for those of four divisions which were given personnel readiness dates of 13 November), and information to this effect was passed on to ETO.<sup>123</sup>

The divisions were alerted in accordance with the dates agreed on at the conference.<sup>124</sup> Subsequently there were many changes. The following chronology of the alert status of the 65th Division at Camp Shelby, Miss., affords an example of the

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divisions affected: 125


- 15 Oct 44 Unit alerted by telegram; dates for Infantry regiments and VQ (provisional headquarters detachment): personnel, 13 November; equipment, 28 October. Dates for other elements later.
- 17 Oct 44 Dates for infantry regiments and VQ changed: personnel, 12 November, equipment, no change.
- 18 Oct 44 WD movement order received.
- 19 Oct 44 Received port call for infantry regiments and provisional headquarters detachment Camp Shanks, N. Y., 15-17 November.
- 23 Oct 44 Readiness dates as follows for division less infantry regiments and provisional headquarters detachment: personnel, 25 November; equipment, 15 November.
- 25 Oct 44 Port call for infantry regiments and VQ cancelled.
- 27 Oct 44 Notice received that new dates would probably be forthcoming by 15 November, spare parts of division directed to stop packing but ordered not to unpack, infantry regiments and VQ 95% complete on packing, none of the balance of division complete; boxes all completed.
- 3 Nov 44 Division directed to unpack minimum of equipment necessary to carry on training.
- 16 Nov 44 New York announced as port.
- 21 Nov 44 VQ deleted and new readiness given division: personnel, 24 December; equipment, 10 December; advance detachment, 10 December.
- 25 Nov 44 Port call received for Camp Shanks, N. Y. as follows: Advance Detachment, 21 December; Unit, 26 December - 2 January; equipment to arrive no later than 29 December.

The effect of these changes on personnel of the division is not

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 TABLES OF ORGANIZATION ENLISTED STRENGTHS  
 OF  
**ARMY GROUND FORCE UNITS**  
 ARRIVING IN PORTS OF EMBARKATION  
 BY MONTHS



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difficult to imagine. Packing and unpacking of military equipment in camp was paralleled by packing and unpacking of household goods by officers' and soldiers' wives in the near-by town of Hattiesburg.<sup>126</sup>

Other difficulties sprang from the enormous volume of overseas movements in 1944. In January 1944, 283 AGF units, including 6 divisions, with a T/O enlisted strength of 116,860, arrived at ports of embarkation. During the next seven months shipments were not as heavy, but in September they aggregated 385 units, including 9 divisions, and 139,839 men. The all-time high was attained in October with movement to port of 393 units, including 5 divisions, and 149,313 men. Shipments fell off in November and December, but even so, strength of units moved to ports in each of these months was greater than that of any month prior to January 1944. (See Chart I, opposite). For the year 1944 movements to port reached a total of 3,418 units, including 49 divisions, and 1,195,046 men. This exceeded by some 1,350 units and 390,000 men the aggregate of all AGF shipments prior to 1944.<sup>127</sup>

This stupendous volume of movement meant an overloading of installations and an overtaxing of personnel charged with POM functions and responsibilities. In June, the peak month for units on alert status in the Army Ground Forces, there were 474 units in A-2 priority and 604 in A-4 priority. In July the figures were: A-2, 446 units and A-4, 502 units.<sup>128</sup> The 12th Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Special Troops, at Ft. Jackson, S. C., had 69 alerted units under its supervision at one time, a large number of which had been placed on alert status almost simultaneously. The task of supervising this flood of units proved too great for the small headquarters of 18 officers and 51 enlisted men, and some of these units were found "Not Ready" in POM inspections.<sup>129</sup>

The work load of staff officers who bore the brunt of POM responsibilities in higher headquarters was also exceedingly heavy. Lights in the Task Force Divisions of the G-3 and G-4 Sections of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, burned late on many nights during peak periods of summer and fall, as weary personnel labored over preparation of Alert Instructions letters, checking status reports, issuing directives for transfer of equipment, and writing movement orders. The load of office work borne by each individual was made heavier by the necessity of keeping a portion of the staff on the road to assist lower headquarters with their multiplied tasks.<sup>130</sup>

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POM activities were also complicated by frequent changes of supervisory headquarters and by rotation of personnel within these headquarters. Corps, group, and battalion headquarters were moved overseas in great numbers in 1944 and, as they usually moved as separate organizations, units attached to them for supervision had to be taken over by other headquarters for completion of training and POM. This made continuity of procedure very difficult. Attachment to headquarters and headquarters detachments, special troops, usually fluctuated less, but changes of personnel within these headquarters in 1944 were frequent.

The 716th Engineer Depot Company was supervised by four different headquarters as follows: 1122d Engineer Combat Group, 15 December 1943 - 8 March 1944; 1152d Engineer Combat Group, 13 March 1944 - 5 June 1944; 14th Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Special Troops, Fourth Army, 8 June 1944 - 15 July 1944; 1152d Engineer Combat Group, 17 July 1944 - 21 September 1944; and 1161st Engineer Combat Group, 22 September 1944 until movement to port.<sup>131</sup> The 67th Signal Battalion was at various times supervised by seven different headquarters.<sup>132</sup>

With so many units on alert status at one time, and with supervisory headquarters changing so frequently, it was impossible for units to receive the assistance needed in preparing themselves for overseas movement.

Lack of coordination between the various agencies involved in POM of units continued to be an impediment in 1944, though to a lesser extent than 1942 and 1943. On numerous occasions supply agencies, functioning automatically on being informed that a unit had been placed in A-4 priority, began to ship equipment to the post for the unit, and this in spite of the fact that information received by the unit commander through command channels indicated that the unit was to move with minimum essential equipment only. When the clouds of confusion had cleared in such cases much equipment had to be repacked and sent back to the supply depots.<sup>133</sup>

Considerable confusion existed also as to the responsibility of the group and of the headquarters and headquarters detachment, special troops, for the POM of battalions and separate companies attached to groups.<sup>134</sup>

Varying standards as to combat serviceability of equipment was another source of difficulty and misunderstanding. Time and again unit commanders whose equipment had been certified as combat

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serviceable by army or lower headquarters would a short time later have a portion of that equipment condemned as unserviceable by representatives of The Inspector General in the final POM inspection. The result was a hurried replacement of the equipment rejected and a "black eye" for the unit and its supervisory headquarters for letting such equipment get by.<sup>135</sup> Prior to November 1944 the situation was further complicated by port commanders passing on the serviceability of small arms and other items of individual equipment, using standards somewhat at variance from those applied by either tactical commands or The Inspector General.<sup>136</sup> Schools on combat serviceability instituted by the Army Service Forces in November 1944 and attended by personnel of the Army Ground Forces, the Army Service Forces, and The Inspector General conducted to better agreement on applicable standards, and elimination in the fall of port inspections of small arms, except as specifically requested by unit commanders, reduced the number of authorities who had to be satisfied as to certain items being combat serviceable.<sup>137</sup>

Another obstacle to POM in 1944 was insistence by the Army Service Forces on keeping station stock at a very low level, thus necessitating the filling of equipment orders from depots which sometimes were at a considerable distance from units having shortages to fill.<sup>138</sup> This consumed time that often in view of the accelerated training and movement of units could ill be spared. The Army Ground Forces took umbrage also at what appeared to be a tendency of the Army Service Forces to regard equipment of low priority units as a reserve source which might be drawn on in lieu of depot stocks for completing the equipment of alerted units.<sup>139</sup>

Still another source of difficulty in the POM of units in 1944 was the failure to allow units an overstrength sufficient to absorb losses from attrition, transfers, and other causes. In January 1944 the War Department, because of dwindling manpower resources, discontinued the 15 percent initial overstrength that had been authorized since the fall of 1942.<sup>140</sup> In May 1944, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, made strong representations to the War Department for a 6 percent overstrength for units as soon as they appeared on the Six Months List. Only thus, the Army Ground Forces insisted, could the woeful necessity of stripping low priority organizations to fill alerted units be avoided.<sup>141</sup> The War Department responded to this request by authorizing a 2 percent overstrength for units having an A-2 priority.<sup>142</sup> This allotment was both too little and too late.

Of less basic difficulties, those cited most frequently by

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unit commanders were overabundance of inspections, excess of reports, and multiplicity and redundancy of instructions. The III Corps early in 1944 called on the 91st Division for four status reports; in addition the division was subjected to numerous inspections by officers "with varied ideas as to combat serviceability of equipment".<sup>143</sup> Units at Camp McCoy were inspected periodically by inspection teams of the headquarters and headquarters detachment, special troops, and of the post; moreover, those on alert status were inspected daily by the commanding officer, the executive officer, or the S-3 of the headquarters and headquarters detachment, special troops.<sup>144</sup>

In August 1944, the Army Ground Forces polled lower commands for comments on POM procedures, and received almost universal complaint of the mass and complexity of current instructions. A corps commander observed: "The sources of instruction available to a unit for preparation for overseas movement are so numerous and involved that it is difficult for the unit commander to keep abreast of all requirements."<sup>145</sup> A division commander suggested "that regulations published by each port be coordinated with those of other ports, and that such regulations be thoroughly coordinated with POM and LOL (Identification of Organizational Impedimenta and Preparation of Records Concerning its Shipment). Instructions in these documents, in some cases, conflict or supplement one another."<sup>146</sup> Fourth Army submitted this statement: "The multiplicity of sources of information on POM requirements is a definite source of delay and lost motion in smaller units ... What is desired ... (is) a consolidated manual of all POM requirements and directives."<sup>147</sup> In another connection, a special troops commander, chafing under criticism of a unit supervised by him going to port with some of its equipment combat unserviceable, remarked: "... combat serviceability", in the absence of specific information, can only be considered a matter of opinion. Since Circular 296, WD 44, uses such terms as "approximately 75% of wear expectancy", 'approximate shade of original color', and 'degree of light reflection', this headquarters had endeavored to comply with the last sentence of paragraph 3c thereof."<sup>148</sup>

These and other difficulties were productive of numerous deficiencies in the processing of units for overseas movement. A study of various pertinent sources, but mainly of reports of The Inspector General, indicate that these were the most frequent and persistent shortcomings:<sup>149</sup>

1. Individual technical training unsatisfactory.

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2. Unit training unsatisfactory.
3. Individual and crew-served weapons firing incomplete.
4. Administration and records unsatisfactory.
5. Discipline and morale unsatisfactory.
6. Maintenance and supply discipline unsatisfactory.
7. Shortage or unserviceability of organizational and individual equipment.

Changes in Policy and Procedure, May 1944 - May 1945

To meet difficulties and deficiencies and to refine procedure in the light of continuing experience, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, and subcommands made significant revisions of POM policy in the latter half of 1944 and the early months of 1945.

One important change was the initiation in the summer of 1944 of a modified or "streamlined" system of POM, known as "Red Lists" procedure for units destined for ETO. The Red List procedure superseded the Blue List system. Incidentally, both designations were suggested by Task Force Division of the AGF G-4 Section.<sup>150</sup> It will be recalled that the Blue List comprised units shipped to Great Britain prior to the Normandy landings; organizational equipment for these units was preshipped and picked up by them after their arrival in England.<sup>151</sup> After establishment of the Normandy bridgehead, most units shipped to ETO went directly to the continent, or else stopped only briefly in England before proceeding to France. In the case of these units it was neither necessary nor desirable to preship equipment.

Units moving under the Red List procedure were at the suggestion of AGF G-4 Task Force Division given a "theater priority" for equipment, which meant in effect that they received complete allowances of combat serviceable equipment before leaving the United States. As a rule Red List units took all their equipment with them except general purpose vehicles; it was found that the latter required 40 percent less space if shipped knocked down in separate cargoes than if loaded with the units. For economy and convenience, certain types of organizational equipment, including special purpose vehicles, were laid down at the ASF Holding and

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Reconsignment Point, Elmira, N. Y., and held there until the unit was ready to embark. This prevented the overtaxing of post facilities by advance accumulation of heavy impedimenta at the docks. Supply officers of Red List units were routed through Elmira on their way to port to complete equipment arrangements. The Army Ground Forces assigned a liaison representative to the Holding and Reconsignment Point to assist these officers.<sup>152</sup>

Details of Red List procedure were worked out by a War Department Control Board. The Army Ground Forces was represented on this Board by the head of the G-4 Task Force Division.<sup>153</sup>

Red List procedure provided for a date (known as the date of delivery or "DDL"), usually about 30 days prior to the personnel readiness date, at which time supply agencies aimed for completion of equipment scheduled for delivery at the home station. Shortages still outstanding on that date were listed on a special report (known as the "DDL Report"), with information as to prospective delivery, signed by both the station and the unit commanders. This report, which at the suggestion of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, was consolidated with the nondelivery information report usually submitted by the unit commander forty days after the submission of the showdown shortage list, had the effect of expediting completion of equipment and keeping all parties concerned fully informed as to the status of shortages. Subsequently the date of delivery and the "DDL" report were prescribed for all units in POM.<sup>154</sup>

Most units shipped to ETO between September 1944 and February 1945 inclusive were governed by Red List procedures. All in all, 939 units were moved under Red List provisions; included among these were 32 divisions, 6 corps headquarters, and 1 army headquarters.<sup>155</sup>

Mainly to meet deficiencies in administration and record keeping revealed in POM inspections of The Inspector General, the Army Ground Forces took action as follows:

1. Allotted personnel and classification officers to headquarters and headquarters detachments, special troops, to assist nondivisional units in assignment and other administrative matters.
2. Published instructions on administrative records and procedure in the AGF Weekly Directive.
3. Sent AG officers to the field at frequent intervals to check compliance with AGF directives and to instruct personnel in

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administrative policies.<sup>156</sup>

Another important step taken by Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, for improvement of POM was the strengthening of liaison with various agencies involved in preparing units for shipment. In 1944 and the early months of 1945 Task Force representatives of the Army Ground Forces intensified visits to army headquarters, to keep them up to date on POM policies, to check up on POM activities, and to secure recommendations for changes in procedure.<sup>157</sup> These visits afforded a means of passing on to one headquarters improvements developed by another, as witness the following excerpt from the report of the head of the G-3 Task Force Division after a trip in November 1944:<sup>158</sup>

The party obtained from the Second Army their procedure for committing units, POM inspection, and pre-IG inspections in order to carry this information to Fourth Army in an effort to improve Fourth Army's operation in these matters.

Liaison with alerted units, with headquarters and headquarters detachments, special troops, and with posts was also strengthened. Prior to the summer of 1944, AGF representatives had visited some of the divisions and other units preparing for movement, but these trips had been occasional, and assistance with POM had been more or less incidental. Beginning about July 1944, POM liaison visits were increased and systematized, and assistance in preparing units for shipment was recognized as a primary responsibility of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces. All of the divisions in the Red List, and many of the nondivisional units, were visited at least once between the time of their alert and their departure from port.<sup>159</sup>

Visits were by team, rather than by individuals. The POM liaison team usually consisted of one or more representatives from each of the following: G-1 Task Force Division, G-3 Task Force Division, G-4 Task Force Division, and Distribution Division, ASF. Whenever practicable the AGF visit was coordinated with that of port of embarkation representatives. Beginning in August 1944, a representative of War Department G-4 accompanied the AGF liaison party on its trips.<sup>160</sup>

A conference, arranged by army or other agency responsible for movement of the units concerned, was held at each station visited by the AGF party. This conference was attended by representatives of all units under POM, by officers from corps, by

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the commander and key staff members of the headquarters and headquarters detachments, special troops, and by representatives of the post.<sup>161</sup>

At each post where a division was stationed, the division commander or his chief of staff opened the conference by introducing the members of the visiting party. The AGF G-1 Task Force member discussed current POM personnel policies and gave advice on preparation of personnel status reports and clearing of officers and men who were not qualified for overseas service.<sup>162</sup> The Task Force officer from G-4 of the Army Ground Forces talked at length on matters of equipment. For the benefit of units moving under Red List procedures he gave a brief explanation of the purposes and function of that system. He then took up such topics as standards of combat serviceability, relations with ASF supply agencies and port authorities, applicable modifications of "POM", and various means of expediting equipment deliveries. He laid particular stress on the importance of aggressiveness in pursuing equipment requisitions. "Remember," he said, that "the squeaky wheel gets the grease."<sup>163</sup>

The G-3 Task Force representative discussed completion of training requirements, but in view of the fact that in most cases little remained to be done in the way of training, his talk was comparatively brief. G-4 carried the ball for the Army Ground Forces at these conferences.<sup>164</sup>

The Port of Embarkation representative usually covered these points:<sup>165</sup>

1. Geography of the port, including approaches, terminals, and lighterage problems.
2. Relations with staging areas.
3. Sequence of dates of calls to port.
4. Reports, including Port Impedimenta Report, Form 413, Shipment Packing List, Initial and Supplemental Shortages.
5. Shipment of baggage.
6. Shipment of organizational equipment.

Conferences were concluded by a question period during which unit and station representatives were able to clean up points of

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confusion still outstanding.<sup>166</sup> The War Department G-4 representative commented informally on War Department policies and procedures.<sup>167</sup> Following the formal sessions members of the AGF party talked informally with officers of the post, alerted units, headquarters and headquarters detachment, special troops, and corps. These get-togethers contributed greatly to mutual understanding of problems and to harmonious relations.<sup>168</sup> Sometime during the visit representatives of the ASF Distribution Division conferred with the post commander and director of supply on matters relating to procurement and distribution of equipment.<sup>169</sup>

Another important liaison step taken by Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, in 1944 was the creation in May of an "IG Reports Branch" in the G-3 Task Force Division. The principal function of this branch was the maintenance of liaison between Ground organizations and The Inspector General's Department. An officer from the branch attended POM inspections, rendering such assistance as was appropriate to both IG officers and units under inspection. When deficiencies calling for correction by higher headquarters were found, such as officers in a unit being unqualified, the AGF representative could telephone corps, army, or other responsible agency directly, and quickly secure the necessary action.<sup>170</sup>

The AGF officer's attendance at these inspections had other consequences which, though not so tangible as this, were no less salutary. The Inspector General's "going over" was a thing dreaded by most units, and the mere presence among them of General Lear's or General Stillwell's representative during their hour of travail was a solace and a support; they felt less alone. Then, the association on inspection trips of AGF and TIG officers developed personal acquaintance and conduced to closer cooperation. In former days there had been some inclination on the part of General McNair and his staff to look on The Inspector General's Department as an arbitrary agency, unduly concerned with impressing its efficiency on the War Department by pointing out a multitude of faults, and interested more in "skinning" than in helping.<sup>171</sup>

As AGF and TIG officers came to know each other better through association, this feeling subsided. It was common practice in late 1944 and early 1945 for TIG officers on returning from a trip to telephone the AGF IG Reports Branch and say that such and such a unit was in bad shape and that the need of a visit by Ground officers was indicated.<sup>172</sup>

Owing to lack of sufficient personnel, AGF representatives did not attend all the POM inspections of The Inspector General, but they made a generous sampling of them. Between 1 June 1944 and V-E

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Day, the Army Ground Forces was represented at the inspection of some 40 units, including 11 divisions.<sup>173</sup>

Still another significant move made in the period May 1944 - May 1945 for better coordination of AGF functions with those of other War Department agencies was the establishment of Ground personnel liaison officers at ports of embarkation. Some of the Task Force staff of the Army Ground Forces had long felt a need of liaison representation at ports, but apparently because of reluctance of General McNair to enter installations not commanded by him, liaison officers were not authorized until after his departure.<sup>174</sup>

The port liaison officers began to function in the spring of 1945. Experience of the period immediately preceding V-E Day indicated that the work of these officers in helping units through the port and in assuring commanders and their men of a continuing interest of the Army Ground Forces in their welfare after they passed to the control of other agencies was valuable. Both officers and men seemed glad to have representatives of the command that trained them present at the dock to bid them Godspeed as the transports cast off for foreign shores.<sup>175</sup>

As the Army Ground Forces increased its contacts with alerted units it intensified pressure on subcommands to give these units the assistance and supervision necessary for successful completion of POM requirements. In the fall of 1944, for example, the Army Ground Forces instituted the practice of requiring major subcommands, within 24 hours after notification that The Inspector General had rated a unit unsatisfactory, to submit a report stating:<sup>176</sup>

1. Why the preparation of the unit was such as to result in a NOT READY report from The Inspector General.
2. The steps being taken to correct the deficiencies reported by The Inspector General.
3. If the deficiencies reported by The Inspector General could be corrected by the readiness date.
4. Any other information pertinent to the readiness of the unit involved.

Motivated in part at least by pressure from above, armies and other subcommands took extraordinary steps to forestall units being declared unready. For instance, in the fall of 1944, when preparations for movement were proceeding at an accelerated pace to meet increased overseas requirements, Second Army sent a G-3

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Liaison officer and a G-4 officer to each division alerted. These officers remained with the division, rendering all practicable assistance, until movement from camp was completed. Armies also increased the pressure on corps and headquarters and headquarters detachments, special troops, for more effective supervision of nondivisional units, operating under POM.<sup>177</sup> As previously mentioned, some of the lower headquarters, reacting overzealously to the pressure from above, carried supervision to such extremes as to hinder units in their POM efforts.<sup>178</sup>

Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, in the interest of more rapid and efficient equipping of units for overseas movement, also brought increased pressure on supply agencies. In the late spring of 1944 Task Force Division of G-4 persuaded the Army Service Forces to raise post stock levels, so that units might receive more of their equipment directly from home stations.<sup>179</sup>

Influenced to some extent, at least, by pressure from the Army Ground Forces, Chiefs of Technical Service in the fall of 1944 assigned "expeditors" to most camps to assist station and tactical commanders in obtaining equipment for alerted units. These expeditors were empowered to bypass intermediate agencies and go direct to their chiefs to meet emergency equipment needs. Their "know how" and authority were of considerable benefit to AGF agencies.<sup>180</sup>

Prompted by the insistence of AGF G-4 Task Force Division, representatives of the Army Service Forces, The Inspector General's Department, and the Army Ground Forces held a conference, in May 1944, for clarification of ordnance service standards, so as to reduce the confusion arising over varying interpretations of combat serviceability.<sup>181</sup> Later in the year, the Army Service Forces, as stated above, adopted the recommendation of AGF G-4 Task Force Division to set up schools of instruction in combat serviceability for representatives of The Inspector General, the Army Service Forces, and the Army Ground Forces.<sup>182</sup>

In August 1944 the Army Service Forces, influenced no doubt by continuing AGF insistence on advance information as to equipment deliveries, issued a new manual of supply procedures for organizational equipment. Major changes prescribed in this document were: (1) fixing of a time limit by which depots and stock control points were required to furnish equipment delivery information to the station commander; (2) taking over by technical service stock control points of all necessary action in supplying

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equipment, drawing on depots, and directing shipment to stations; and (3) designation of a time known as the "Required Date" (30 days after receipt by the station commander of a unit's showdown shortage list), by which shortages must be received at the home station. These changes had practically the same objectives as those sought by the Army Ground Forces in the 40-Day Reports, and were hailed by Ground G-4 officers as acceptance by the Army Service Forces, after persistent objection, of a position long advocated by them.<sup>183</sup>

In the spring of 1945 the Army Ground Forces made two other notable gains in its efforts to assure adequate and timely equipment of units in training. First, the Army Ground Forces succeeded in getting the War Department to place restrictions on ASF requests for transfer of equipment from low priority units to fill requisitions of those on alert status. Such transfers had originated back in the days when ASF stocks were necessarily low and when production could not keep pace with requirements. But in 1944 and 1945, after the production situation had greatly improved, the Army Service Forces instead of filling requisitions from stock, continued to make numerous requests for transfers of various items from units in early stages of training. The Army Ground Forces protested that the Army Service Forces by greater exertion could meet most if not all of these needs from production or stock.<sup>184</sup> Influenced by the AGF argument, the Secretary of War in May 1945 directed the Army Service Forces henceforth to report immediately to the War Department each request for transfer of equipment, stating: (1) "why each item of equipment reported is not currently available for issue"; (2) "that all other prospective sources of supply of each item reported short have been exhausted, and that there exists no other method of filling the shortage other than by transfer"; (3) action being taken on procurement of each item; and (4) estimate of total quantities of each item required in the next 90 days.<sup>185</sup> Following issuance of this directive there was a decline in the number of requests on the Army Ground Forces for transfers of equipment from one unit to another.<sup>186</sup>

The second gain made by the Army Ground Forces with reference to equipment was issuance by the War Department in May of a directive requiring that units in redeployment training be given an A-2 priority and completely furnished with 100 percent combat serviceable equipment.<sup>187</sup>

These changes in POM equipment provisions were accompanied by revisions of policies governing personnel and training. In

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November 1944, steps were taken to permit withdrawal under certain conditions of enlisted specialists from schools in cases where units were shipped in advance of expected dates; if students were not withdrawn and their unit sailed without them, they were not to remain under control of the Army Service Forces on graduation (as had previously been the case) but were to revert to AGF jurisdiction.<sup>188</sup> In December 1944, because of exigencies of conversion, the War Department deleted from "POM" the requirement that each individual must have completed individual training for his arm or service before shipment overseas.<sup>189</sup> Prior to this modification, it had been necessary for the Army Ground Forces, before shipping a cook transferred from the engineers to a dough-by unit, to give him basic infantry training, despite the fact that there was very little change in his duties. As a safeguard against abuse of the liberalized procedure, the War Department added the provision that agencies preparing units for overseas service should not relax efforts to furnish personnel in the arm or service normally required, and "in the event that personnel of one arm or service must be used to fill a vacancy in another arm or service, such personnel will be reasonably qualified to perform the job to which they are assigned."

These and various other changes in procedure made after issuance of the second edition of "POM" in August 1943 were embodied in a third edition of that document, dated 15 January 1945, and distributed in March. As in previous revisions, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, contributed suggestions both orally in conference and in written comments on drafts submitted by the War Department.<sup>191</sup>

In addition to those previously mentioned, the third edition of "POM" included these changes:

1. A-3 and A-4 were not listed as equipment priorities. A-3 was a special priority that had been created late in 1942 for units stored in a pool to meet emergency overseas calls. Reserve pools were maintained for a while in 1943, but increased theater demands in 1944 so depleted these reservoirs that they consisted almost exclusively of units for which there was no overseas requirement, and which "floated about" awaiting inactivation or conversion. Hence it was deemed pointless to continue the A-3 priority. The A-4 priority had been provided for units in the 4th, 5th, and 6th months of the War Department's "Six Months List." At conferences held late in 1944 for revision of "POM" the Army Service Forces presented these arguments: (a) If units

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actually received their full allotment of combat serviceable equipment three to six months prior to shipment, contemplated in the A-4 priority, they would wear it out before movement to port. (b) If the units did not receive the equipment, the net result of the priority was a burden of worry and paper work. (c) The A-2 priority provided for units receiving the bulk of their combat equipment about 90 days prior to shipment and this was soon enough. The Army Ground Forces, influenced partly by these arguments and partly by the fact that the A-4 priority had never produced any considerable increase in the flow of equipment, agreed to its discontinuance.

2. Reports of noncontrolled equipment shortages to chiefs of services after showdown inspections were discontinued. (Under the revised system an Equipment Delivery Report, made 5 days prior to the impedimenta readiness date, informed the ASF depot of shortages still outstanding, but there was no report of noncontrolled equipment shortages to the chiefs of services.) The Army Service Forces requested this change on the ground that station supply officers could get noncontrolled items from depots by routine requisition without bothering chiefs of services.

3. Certain provisions of the Red List procedure and of ASF Manual 414 were included. Among these was the fixing of a "required date" by which supply agencies were to complete delivery of equipment at the home station for filling of shortages. The required date for units in A-2 priority or under warning on movement was 30 days after receipt by the station commander of a unit's show-down shortage report. Station commanders were required to submit "equipment delivery reports" of all unit shortages not filled at the home station seven days prior to the impedimenta readiness date.

The third edition of POM embodied the provisions of IOI and certain other instructions that had been issued as separate documents. In bringing these various publications together within the covers of a single booklet, much was accomplished toward removal of one of the principal criticisms of field commanders; namely, the multiplicity and redundancy of POM literature. But there remained considerable room for improvement. Further simplification of terminology also was needed.

In November 1944 and again in March 1945 the Army Ground Forces revised the form letter "Preparation and Movement of Units for Overseas Service" addressed to principal subcommands to bring it

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
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**CHART II**

TABLES OF ORGANIZATION ENLISTED STRENGTHS

OF  
**ARMY GROUND FORCES**  
ARRIVING IN PORTS OF EMBARKATION

CUMULATIVE BY MONTHS



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into line with changes in "POM." Moreover, a provision was added requiring that the report to Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, of shortages outstanding 40 days after submission of the show-down shortage list should be prepared by the unit commander in coordination with the station commander and that it should be signed by both.<sup>192</sup> This had the effect of reducing misunderstanding as to the status of equipment and of impressing upon the station commander the urgent necessity of completing equipment delivery.<sup>193</sup>

Summary

In spite of the tremendous increase in the volume of overseas movement in 1944, the Army Ground Forces was able to maintain a good record with reference to the readiness of units inspected by The Inspector General. Of 1,000 Ground units inspected in 1944, only 113, or 11 percent, were reported as "Not Ready."<sup>194</sup> The following tabulation shows the trend in "Not Ready" percentages from the first quarter of 1943, when TIG readiness reports were initiated, through the first quarter of 1945:

<u>1943</u>				<u>1944</u>				<u>1945</u>
<u>1st Q</u>	<u>2d Q</u>	<u>3d Q</u>	<u>4th Q</u>	<u>1st Q</u>	<u>2d Q</u>	<u>3d Q</u>	<u>4th Q</u>	<u>1st Q</u>
18%	20%	12%	11%	13%	11%	9%	11%	7.8%

It will be noted that the percent of units "Not Ready" during the first quarter of 1945 (7.8 percent) was the lowest of any quarter covered by The Inspector General's reports.<sup>195</sup> While the number of units shipped during this quarter was relatively small, the period during which they were trained was one in which obstacles to training were unusually formidable.

In the early spring of 1945 it became apparent that the defeat of Germany was imminent and that the movement of AGF units to Europe soon would cease. But the War Department, mindful of von Runstedt's counterthrust in December, and determined to take no chance of being again "caught short," waited until 30 April, only one week before V-E Day, to suspend the flow of movement to ETO. Shipments to the Mediterranean Theater were not discontinued until 2 May.<sup>196</sup>

On 30 April 1945, the cumulative figure for movement to port of ground units during the period since inception of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, on 9 March 1942, stood at 6,066 units and 2,172,823 men.<sup>197</sup> This represented an achievement of which the headquarters

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staff was exceedingly proud. The trend of movement is graphically portrayed in Chart II, opposite. 198

Behind these figures on units and men sent to port there is a story of progress in procedure, for POM technique was much better at V-E Day than during the pioneer period of the Army Ground Forces. In the early months of 1942 instructions sent out by the Army Ground Forces for guidance of subordinate commanders charged with preparing units for overseas movement were lacking in coordination and fullness; in 1945 directives were comprehensive and well coordinated. During the first year of the AGF period there was no provision for systematic follow-up of final inspections by The Inspector General to assure prompt correction of deficiencies which he found or to prevent their occurrence in other units; in 1945 the Army Ground Forces after each inspection immediately called deficiencies to the attention of appropriate lower commanders and required of them a prompt report of remedial action. In addition, following each quarterly report of The Inspector General, Army Ground Forces prepared a statistical study of the frequency of POM deficiencies and distributed copies of the study among subordinate commanders for their admonition and guidance. In 1942-1943 there was no established liaison with The Inspector General's Department; in 1945 an AGF liaison officer was commonly at hand when The Inspector General visited alerted units, to slash red tape and otherwise to expedite such corrective action, as was indicated. In 1942 there was no liaison with ports of embarkation on the level of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces --- armies and separate corps were directed to maintain liaison with staging areas, but this provision was ineffective; in 1945 the Army Ground Forces had ample and active liaison staffs in all ports of embarkation. In 1942 visits of AGF staff to armies and alerted units for advice and assistance in POM functions were occasional and incidental; during the year prior to V-E Day such visits were standard operating procedure.

Gradually during the period 1942-1945 the Army Ground Forces intensified its supervision of armies, separate corps, and other principal commands charged with implementing POM policies. This evolution was a result in large measure of increasing experience of personnel in Headquarters, Army Ground Forces; as the staff acquired "know-how" and a sense of confidence, there was naturally a tendency toward stronger control. Intensified supervision was implemented by such devices as the requirement of more detailed status reports, more frequent visits, and specific instruction by telephone and telegraph.

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Refinement of ground phases of POM came in part on initiative of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, and in part as a result of War Department pressure. For the War Department, like the Army Ground Forces, tended to exercise stronger control as its staff became more familiar with POM problems. The last quarter of 1942 represents a turning point in War Department control, for conditions revealed in connection with large-scale shipments in this period, particularly Task Force "A", caused the War Department to step in and take a firmer grasp of POM matters. From this circumstance came the important policy changes of January 1943, including comprehensive POM inspections by The Inspector General of alerted units, improved status reports for alerted units, provision of a reserve pool of units trained and equipped for overseas movement, and the War Department pamphlet "POM". Undoubtedly these vigorous measures influenced the Army Ground Forces in turn to intensify surveillance over POM activities of its own domain.

It seems unfortunate that the War Department did not go farther in control of POM functions, at least to the extent of compelling closer collaboration of the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces. Cooperation was better in 1945 than it was in 1942, but it came slowly and at best it left much to be desired. Mutual lack of confidence, exaggerated concern with prerogative, and a tendency of the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces each to regard its activities and functions as separate and distinct from those of the other prevented attainment of that degree of efficiency in POM that might have been realized by exercise of a stronger control on the War Department level.

Even so, the Army Ground Forces might have done a better job than it did under the system as it existed. The organization of the AGF staff contained no section representing the inspectorial function. General McNair's strict adherence to principle of the chain of command and decentralization of operating functions to lower headquarters combined with his rigid insistence on a "lean headquarters" to delay unduly the establishment of liaison with ports of embarkation which was found to be necessary. His determination to have his headquarters practice the economy which the War Department preached also held the staffs of task force divisions in Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, to such meager proportions that during periods of heavy movement it was impossible for them to handle the work passing across their desks without regularly working late at night, much less to visit at needed frequency subordinate commands struggling with enormous problems of POM.

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It should be borne in mind always that the greatest obstacles to efficient preparation of units for overseas movement were the lack of firmness in estimates of overseas operational needs, failure to place full allowances of combat serviceable equipment in the hands of troops well in advance of their movement to port, and turnover of personnel. Over these matters the Army Ground Forces did not have control.

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Notes

1. WD ltr AG 353 (3-24-42) MT-C to CG AGF, 26 Mar 42, sub: Tng of Units at Staging Areas. 320.2/1 (Staging Areas).
2. Statement of Lt Col S. L. Weld, G-3 Task Force Div AGF, to AGF Hist Off, 24 May 44.
3. Statement of Maj J. S. Claypool, G-1 Task Force Div AGF, to AGF Hist Off, 26 May 44.
4. Statement of Col V. A. St. Onge, G-4 Task Force Div AGF, to AGF Hist Off, 23 May 44.
5. (1) Ibid. (2) AGF Daily Bull, 3 Dec 42.
6. Cir 59, WD, 2 Mar 42.
7. (1) AGF memo (S) 370.5-OPN for TAG, 14 Mar 42, sub: Orgn and Mvmt Orders, Shipment 0051 (Ground Forces). (See especially M/R atchd). AGF G-3 Shipment file 0051 (S), AG Records. (2) WD ltr (S) AG 370.5 (3-14-42) MC-CN-M to CGs First and Third Armies and V Army Corps, 15 Mar 42, sub: Mvmt Orders, Shipment 0051 (Ground Forces). Ibid.
8. WD memo (S) OPD 370.5 (7-7-42) to CGs, 7 Jul 42, sub: Task Force for Ostler and Lineout. AGF Movement Order Files (S), Shipment 8408.
9. (1) OPD D/F (S) 353 Amph Fce (12-31-42) to AGF, 31 Dec 42, sub: Designation of Units for Amph Tng. 353/53 (Amph Tng Comd-AF) (S). (2) Statement of Lt Col S. L. Weld to AGF Hist Off, 24 May 44. (3) AGF ltr (S) to CG 2d Army, 16 Jan 43, sub: Amph Task Force. 320.2/10 (Amph Tng Comd-AF) (S). (4) Ltr (S) of Maj Gen Troy Middleton, CG 45th Div to AGF, 1 Jun 43, sub: Amph Task Force. Ibid. (5) AGF M/R (S), 12 Apr 43, sub: Equip for 45th Div and ATChd Units. AGF G-4 Task Force Files, binder marked "Task Force 45th Div" (S).
10. See papers filed in AGF G-4 Task Force files, binders marked "North African Books" (Top Sec), especially WD ltr (S) OPD 370.5(4-14-43) to CGs 45th Div, AGF, and ASF, 14 Apr 43, sub: Overseas Mvmt of 45th Inf Div, Re-inf.
11. Statement of Lt Col S. L. Weld to AGF Hist Off, 24 May 44.

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12. Information compiled from monthly AGF Stat Sec Rpt No 19 (S), "AGF Units Arriving at PE". AGF Stat files.
13. (1) Plan for Opn in Western Europe (S). Bolero/4. (S).  
(2) Memo (S) of Lt Col L. L. Lemnitzer, Plans Sec for CofS AGF, 1 May 42, sub: Meeting of Bolero Committee. Bolero/6 (S).
14. (1) Ibid. (2) "Tentative Movement Schedule, AGF, Bolero Plan, 9 May 42," (S). Bolero/19 (S).
15. (1) Memo (S) of Plans Sec (Col F. J. Tate) for cofS AGF, 25 Sep 42, sub: Rpt on OPD Conference on Pers Matters. 320.2/114 (S). (2) AGF M/S (S) of Lt Col L. L. Lemnitzer for cofS AGF, 19 Jun 42, sub: Meeting of Bolero Committee, 18 Jun Bolero/35 (S).
16. Information compiled from monthly AGF Stat Sec Rpt No 19 (S), "AGF Units Arriving at PE." AGF Stat files. There is a slight discrepancy between the figures in this report and a special composite report "AGF Units Arriving at PE, March 1942 - April 1944" (in files of AGF Stat Sec), owing to the fact that reports of units arriving at port late in the month sometimes did not arrive at AGF in time for inclusion in the current issue of Report No 19. It was deemed preferable in this study for the sake of consistency to use information based on Report No 19.
17. Statement of Lt Col S. L. Weld to AGF Hist Off, 24 May 44.
18. (1) Ibid. (2) Statements of Col V. A. St. Onge to AGF Hist Off, 30 Mar 44. (3) AGF memo (S) for Col Eliot D. Cooke, IGD, 31 Oct 42, sub: Processing of Task Forces. 320.2/33 (S).
19. Memo (S) of Gen G. C. Marshall for Gen McNair, 28 Nov 42 (no sub) and atchd papers. 353/151 (S), sep binder.
20. AGF memo (S) for Col Eliot D. Cooke, IGD, 31 Oct 42, sub: Processing of Task Forces. 320.2/133 (S)
21. (1) See Studies in History of AGF No 4, Procurement of Enlisted Personnel for the Army Ground Forces: the Problem of Quality, and No 12, The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions. (2) Ltr (S) of CO Boston POE to CofTrans WD, 22 Aug 42, sub: WD Tr Mvmt Orders --- Delayed or Not Recd. 370.5/530 (S).
22. Personal ltr (S) of Col William Hones, CofS 32d Div to

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Col (later Gen) Lloyd D. Brown, AGF, 21 Apr 42. 370.5/4 (32d Div)(S)

23. Memo (S) of Gen Marshall for Gen McNair, 28 Nov 42 (no sub) and atchd papers. 353/151 (S) sep binder.

24. (1) AGF memo (S) for Col Eliot D. Cooke, 31 Oct 42, sub: Processing of Task Forces. 320.2/133 (S). (2) Studies in History of AGF No 14, The Activation and Training of Nondivisional Units. (3) Studies in History of AGF No 12, The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions.

25. Ltr (S) of Brig Gen Benjamin C. Lockwood to CofS USA, 1 Apr 42, sub: Task Force 0051. G-3 shipment file 0051 (S), AG Records.

26. Ltr (C) II Armd Corps to AGF, 3 Feb 43, sub: Small Arms Tng of Alerted Units. 353/116 (Int Tng) (C).

27. Memo (S) of Gen Marshall for Gen McNair, 28 Nov 42, (no sub) and atchd papers. 353/151 (S), sep binder.

28. II Armd Corps ltr (C) to AGF, 3 Feb 43, sub: Small Arms Tng of Alerted Units. 353/116 (Int Tng) (C).

29. (1) AGF M/S (S) Opns Div G-3 to Sec Gen Staff, 28 Apr 42, (no sub). 370.5/4 (32d Div) (S). (2) Data (S) on overseas movement of 38th Div in G-3 Shipment File 5264 (S). AG Records. (3) Data (S) on overseas movement of 29th Div in G-3 Shipment file 0550 (S). Ibid. (4) AGF memo (draft) (S) for WD G-3, 24 Jun 42, sub: Str of Units in Bolero. Bolero/47 (S). (5) AGF M/S (S) Opns Div to G-3, 19 Jun 42, sub: withdrawal of Equip from Divs for Shipment to Bolero. 370.5/407 (S). (6) Statement of Lt Col J. A. Hanson, G-4 Task Force Div AGF, to AGF Hist Off, 10 Mar 45.

30. Memo (R) of Plans Sec (Col F. J. Tate) for CofS AGF, 2 Sep 42, sub: Confusion at DTC over Conflicting orders. 370.5/134 (R)

31. AGF memo (S) for G-3 WD, 31 Jul 42, sub: Tentative Overseas Mvmt Projected Augmentation and Task Forces (Estimate) for Fourth Quarter 42. 370.5/451 (S).

32. AGF M/S (S), Opns Div to Sec Gen Staff, 28 Apr 42 (no sub). 370.5/4 (32d Div) (S).

33. See above, p

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34. WD ltr AG 353(3-24-42) MT-C to CG AGF, 26 Mar 42, sub: Tng of Units at Staging Areas. 320.2/1 (Staging Areas).
35. AGF ltr to CGs 10 Jul 42, sub: Tng Dir for Units during Period from Arrival at Staging Areas to Departure for PEs. 353/1515.
36. AGF memo (S) for CofS USA, 19 Aug 42, sub: Comd of Units Ordered Overseas. 320.2/1 (Staging Areas) (C).
37. Memo (C) of Lt Col William J. Eyerly for Gen McNair, 19 Aug 42, sub: Status of Staging areas. Ibid.
38. Second Army 5th ind (S), 30 Oct 42, on ltr (no file) of CO Boston POE to CofTrans WD, 22 Aug 42, sub: WD Tr Mvmt Orders --- Delayed and Not Recd. 370.5/530 (S).
39. AGF memo (C) for CofS USA, 19 Aug 42, sub: Cond of Units Ordered Overseas. 320.2/1 (Staging Areas) (C).
40. Memo (R) of Gen Marshall for CGs, AGF, AAF, SOS, 12 Sep 42, sub: Control of Units in Staging Areas. 320.2/2 (Staging Areas) (R).
41. AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 5 Oct 42, sub as above. Ibid.
42. AGF M/S (S) Plans Sec to CofS, 22 Oct 42, sub as above. 320.2/1 (Staging Areas) (S).
43. AGF M/S (S) Gen McNair to G-3, 12 Oct 42, sub: Conferences on Control of Units in Staging Areas. Ibid.
44. Memo (S) of Lt Col Herbert B. Powell for G-3 AGF, 8 Oct 42, sub as above, and accompanying papers. Ibid.
45. (1) Memo (S) of Gen Marshall for Gen McNair, 28 Nov 42 (no sub), and atchd papers. 353/151 (S), sep binder. (2) AGF memo (S) of DCofS for CG, 4 Dec 42, sub: Conference. 337/24 (S). (3) AGF memo (C), DCofS for DCofS USA, 17 Dec 42, sub: Preparation of Task Forces, and incl. 322/1 Task Forces (C).
46. WD ltr (C) AG 320.2 (1-2-43) OB-S-C-M to CGs, 5 Jan 43, sub: Orgn, Tng, and Equip of Units for Overseas Serv. 320.2/2 (Staging Areas) (C).
47. Memo (R) of Brig Gen Walter L. Weible for G-3 AGF, 2 Jun 43,

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sub: Continuation of Tng in Staging Areas, PEs. 320.2/4 (Staging Areas) (R).

48. Ibid.

49. Statement of Lt Thomas P. Govan, Hist Off, Second Army to AGF Hist Off, 26 Jul 44.

50. AGF memo (S) 370.5-OPM for TAG 14 Mar 42, sub: Orgn and Mvmt orders, Shipment 0051. AGF G-3 Shipment file 0051 (S), AG Records.

51. Ltr (S) of Brig Gen Benjamin C. Lockwood to CofS USA, 1 Apr 42, sub: Task Force 0051. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. (1) WD ltr (S) OPD 320.2 (ETO) (9-3-42) to CGs AGF, SOS, and Task Force "A" 3 Sep 42, sub: Creation of a Task Force. 370.5/6 (Top Secret), Binder 1-B. (2) AGF M/S (R) Plans Sec for CofS, 2 Sep 42, sub: Confusion at DTC over Conflicting Orders. 370.5/134 (R). (3) AGF memo (S) Asst G-1 to G-1, 2 Dec 42, sub: Untrained Men in the 9th Inf Div. 353/151 (S), sep binder.

54. AGF M/S (R) Plans Sec for CofS, 2 Sep 42, sub: Confusion at DTC over Conflicting Orders. 370.5/134 (R).

55. Record of telephone conversation (R) between Col Schabacker, AGF and Col Pierce, CofS DTC, 1 Sep 42. 370.5/134 (R).

56. AGF M/S (R) Plans Sec for CofS, 2 Sep 42, sub: Confusion at DTC over Conflicting Orders. 370.5/134 (R).

57. (1) First Annual Rpt (C) of G-4 Task Force Div AGF to G-4 AGF, 10 Apr 44. G-4 Task Force files (C) (2) Statement of Lt Col S. L. Weld to AGF Hist Off, 24 May 44.

58. 45th Div ltr (S) to CG AGF, 1 Jun 43, sub: Amph Task Force. 320.2/10 (Amph Tng Comd-AF) (S).

59. AGF memo (R) for SOS, 10 Sep 42, sub: Alert Orders 370.5/3 17 (MO) (R)

60. AGF M/S (R) Plans Sec for CofS, 2 Sep 42, sub: Confusion at DTC over Conflicting Orders. 370.5/134 (R).

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61. AGF memo (R) for CofS USA (Attn OPD), 15 Sep 42, sub as above. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Memo of TIG (S) 333.1 (43d Div) for DCofS USA, 10 Oct 42, (no sub), and accompanying papers. 333.1/29 (S).

65. Ibid.

66. See AGF form ltr (R) to subcomds in 353(Int Tng) (S), e.g., AGF ltr (R) 353/255(Int Tng) (2 Dec 43)GNGCT for CG A/B Comd, 2 Dec 43, sub: Overseas Readiness Status of Hq & Hq Co, 2d A/B Inf Brig. This procedure apparently was initiated in the Spring of 1943.

67. E.g., see AGF ltr (R) 353/253(Int Tng)(6 Dec 43)GNGCT to CG AA Comd, 6 Dec 43, sub: Overseas Readiness status of 129th AAA Gun Bn (Mob).

68. AGF memo (S) for Col Eliot D. Cooke, 31 Oct 42, sub: Processing of Task Forces. 320.2/133 (S).

69. See AGF memo (S), DCofS for CG, 4 Dec 42, sub: Conference. 337/24 (S).

70. Statement of Lt Col S. L. Weld to AGF Hist Off, 24 May 44.

71. Priorities for equipment and personnel were designated and broken down as follows:

	<u>Status of Units</u>	<u>Priority</u>	
		<u>Pers</u>	<u>Equip</u>
a.	Units under orders or earmarked for shipment within 3 months	13	A-2
	1. Units under orders or earmarked for shipment within 1 month	13-a	A-2a
	2. Units under orders or earmarked for shipment within 2 months	13-b	A-2b
	3. Units under orders or earmarked for shipment within 3 months	13-b	A-2c
b.	Units in emergency pool	-	A-3

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- c. Units not under orders but designated for 4th, 5th, 114-1 A-4  
and 6th months to 999
1. Units not under orders but designated for 4th 114-1 A-4a  
month to 299
2. Units not under orders but designated for 5th 114-300 A-4b  
month to 599
3. Units not under orders but designated for 6th 114-600 A-4c  
month to 999
- d. Units not definitely earmarked but filled with 114-1000 ---  
personnel and authorized to receive replacements and up  
from RTC graduates
- e. Units neither earmarked not filled and which were to 3 ---  
receive personnel from RC's

72. WD ltr (C) AG 320.2 (1-2-43) OB-S-C-M to CGs, 5 Jan 43,  
sub: Orgn, Tng, and Equip of Units for Overseas Serv. 320.2/2  
(Staging Areas) (C).

73. Ibid.

74. Statement of Maj Gen Phillip E. Brown, Acting The Inspector General, to AGF Historical Officer, 26 July 1945. General Brown cited as factors contributing to adoption of the War Department policy requiring PCM inspections by The Inspector General the following: a. Adverse findings of The Inspector General in special alert inspections in the fall of 1942 of the 43d and 4th Divisions. b. Dissatisfaction of General Marshall with conditions which came to light in connection with the shipment of units in Task Force A. c. Complaint of theater commanders that units arriving overseas were not ready for combat --- that men had not fired their weapons, equipment was in poor condition, and officers were not qualified. d. A strong desire on the part of the Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army, (General McNarney) who since July 1942 had been charged with the responsibility of certifying readiness for combat of all units shipped overseas, to have an impartial agency investigate and underwrite the readiness of alerted units.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. (1) WD ltr (C) AG 320.2(1-2-43)OB-S-C-M to CGs, 5 Jan 43,  
sub: Orgn, Tng, and Equip of Units for Overseas Serv. 320.2/2

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(Staging Areas) (C). (2) Status reports were first required in July 1942, as a result of the policy adopted at that time of having readiness of all units certified by the Deputy Chief of Staff prior to their movement overseas. See OPD memo 370.5 (7-1-42) for CGs AGF, SOS, and AAF, 4 Jul 42, sub: Stat Rpts. 370.5/3402.

78. AGF M/S (S), G-1 to Plans Sec, 1 Jan 43, sub: Orgn, Equip & Tng of Units for Overseas Serv. 320.2/145 (S).

79. WD ltr (C) AG 320.2(1-2-43)OB-S-C-M to CGs, 5 Jan 43, sub: Orgn, Tng, and Equip of Units for Overseas Serv. 320.2/2 (Staging Areas) (C).

80. This document is filed in 370.5/4113, sep binder.

81. Statement of Col V. A. St. Onge to AGF Hist Off, 31 May 44.

82. AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 19 Feb 43, sub: Preparation and Mvmt of Units for Overseas Shipment. 370.5/171 (R).

83. AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 23 Feb 43, sub as above. 370.5/71 (R).

84. AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 12 Mar 43, sub as above. 370.5/171 (R).

85. This summary, unless otherwise indicated, is based on the following sources:

(1) WD ltr (C) AG 320.2(1-2-43)OB-S-C-M to CGs, 5 Jan 43, sub: Orgn, Tng and Equip of Units for Overseas Serv. 320.2/2 (Staging Areas) (C). (2) WD document POM, 2d Edition. 370.5/4113, sep binder. (3) AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 19 Feb 43, sub: Preparation and Mvmt of Units for Overseas Shipment. 370.5/171(R). (4) Statements of Lt Col S. L. Weld to AGF Hist Off, May 44. (5) Statements of Col V. A. St. Onge and Lt Col J. A. Hanson to AGF Hist Off, May and Aug 44. (6) Various G-3 and G-4 Shipment files in AG Records. NOTE: Each alerted unit was given a shipment number. All key papers pertaining to the movement of the unit were henceforth kept in separate files --- one, pertaining primarily to personnel and training was kept by G-3 Task Force Division, and another, covering equipment matters was maintained by G-4 Section --- each bearing the unit's shipment number. After arrival of the unit at its destination, these files were transferred to AG Records (Secret). Binders for Shipment 9850 afford an idea of procedures followed

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in the movement of a unit in 1943.

86. All essential information contained in the movement order had been transmitted to Second Army, by telephone or otherwise, prior to completion of the draft. Statement of Lt Col Weld to AGF Hist Off, 24 Aug 44.

87. Statement of Col V. A. St. Onge to AGF Hist Off, 3 Jun 44.

88. Ibid.

89. Studies in History of AGF No 4, Mobilization of the Ground Army: No 12, The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions: and No 14, The Activation and Training of Nondivisional Units.

90. Statement of Col V. A. St. Onge to AGF Hist Off, 31 May 44.

91. For example, see AGF memo (S) for WD OPD, 22 Oct 43, sub: Mvmt of Units from Home Sta. 370.5/939(MO)(S).

92. For example, see AGF memo (S) to WD OPD, 31 Mar 43, sub: Return of Units to Ground Force Control. 370.5/717 (S).

93. For example, see AGF memo (S) for CofS USA (Attn: OPD), 29 May 43, sub: Amendment to Mvmt Orders, Shipment 9255. AGF Movement order Files (S), Shipment 9255.

94. Information compiled from monthly AGF Stat Sec Rpt No 19 (S), "AGF Units Arriving at PE". AGF Stat Sec files.

95. AGF memo for G-1 WD & G-3 WD 24 Mar 43, sub: Amendment to WD Document (short title "POMU"). 370.5/4113.

96. This document is filed in 370.5/4131, sep binder.

97. Tab F to AGF ltr 370.5/233(R)GNGCT(28 Aug 43) to CGs, sub: Preparation and Mvmt of Units for Overseas Serv. G-3 Task Force files.

98. This document is filed in 370.5/4131, sep binder.

99. Statement of Col V. A. St. Onge to AGF Hist Off, 31 May 44.

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100. (1) AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 28 Aug 43, sub: Preparation and Mvmt of Units for Overseas serv. 370.5/233(R). (2) Tab F to above ltr. G-3 Task Force files.

101. AGF memo (S) GNGDS-4 to CofS USA, 30 Nov 43, sub: Modification to Current Dir. 370.5/97(ETO) (S).

102. WD memo (S) OPD 353(30 Nov 43) for AGF, ASF, TIG, 9 Dec 43, sub as above. Ibid.

103. Statement of Col V. A. St. Onge to AGF Hist Off, 31 May 44.

104. AGF memo (S) for CofS USA, 16 Nov 43, sub: Readiness of Units for Overseas Serv. 353/21 (Readiness Rpts) (S).

105. 3d SvC ltr to AGF, 7 Sep 43, sub: Conference on Revised POM. 370.5/4131.

106. AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 10 Jan 44, sub: Preparation of Units for Overseas Serv. 370.5/300 (R).

107. TIG Memo (S) for DCofS USA, 22Apr 44, sub: Readiness of units for Movement Overseas. TIG files WD SIG 333.1(Quarterly Report(1st) SP.

108. AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 3 Apr 44, sub: Preparation of Units for Overseas Serv. 370.5/352 (R).

109. AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 10 Apr 44, sub: Tentative Selection of Units for Overseas Serv. 353/644(Readiness) (R).

110. Statement of Lt Col S. L. Weld to AGF Hist Off, 5 Jun 44.

111. See Studies in History of AGF No 10, The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions, pp

112. (1) Personal absns of AGF Hist Off on visits to Divs in Tng in Jun, Jul, and Oct 44. (2) Memo of Lt Col Ralph L. Zwicker for G-3 AGF, 26 Feb 44, sub: Visit to Cps Adair, White, and Beale, 18-23 Feb 44. G-3 file 333.1/75(Insps by AGF Staff Offs.)

113. Ibid.

114. TIG memo (C) for DCofS USA, 27 Sep 44, sub: Transfer of personnel between T/O Units of the Army. TIG file WD SIG 333.9

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(Personnel Transfers).

115. TIG memo (R) for DCofS USA, 9 Oct 44, sub: Overseas Readiness Status of 506th MP Bn. 353/1018(Readiness) (R).

116. TIG memo (R) for DCofS USA, 18 Oct 44, sub: Overseas Readiness Status of 1282d Engr C Bn. 353/1039(Readiness) (R).

117. Ibid.

118. TIG memo (R) for DCofS USA, 3 Mar 45, sub: Overseas Readiness Status of 381st Ord M Auto Maint Co. 353/1385(Readiness) (R).

119. TIG memo (R) for DCofS USA, 8 Jan 45, sub: Readiness of units for Mvmt Overseas, 4th Quarter 1944. 353/1878(Readiness) (R).

120. (1) AGF M/S (R), G-3 for DCofS, 13 Oct 44, sub: Move-up for Shipment of Inf Divs to ETO. G-3 Task Force file "Availability, Preparation and Tng of Units for Overseas" (R) (2) Statement of Lt Col S. L. Weld to AGF Hist Off, 24 Feb 45.

121. Statement of Maj L. R. Watson, AGF Engr Sec to AGF Hist Off, 19 Jun 45.

122. AGF M/S (R), G-3 to DCofS, 13 Oct 44, sub: Move-up for Shipment of Inf Divs to ETO. G-3 Task Force file "Availability, Preparation and Tng of Units for Overseas". (R)

123. Ibid.

124. AGF M/S (R), G-3 for CofS, 2 Nov 44, sub: Shipment of Divs to ETO. G-3 Task Force file "Availability, Preparation and Tng of Units for Overseas". (R)

125. Information furnished AGF Hist Off by Lt Col V. P. Mock, G-3 Sec, 3d Army, 3 Apr 45.

126. Based on personal obsns of AGF Hist Off on a visit to Cp Shelby and Mattiesburg, Miss, 30 Oct - 3 Nov 44.

127. Information compiled from monthly AGF Stat Sec Rpt No 19 (S), "AGF Units arriving at PE". AGF Stat files.

128. AGF M/S (C), G-4 Task Force Div to G-4, 6 Apr 45, sub:

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Second Annual Rpt. G-4 Task Force Div files (C).

129. AGF M/S, G-4 to CofS, 8 Jan 45, sub: Visit to Ft Jackson, S. C., 12-15 Dec 44. 353.02/730(AGF).

130. Statements of various offs of G-3 and G-4 Task Force Divs to AGF Hist Off, Feb 45.

131. TIG memo (R) for DCofS USA, 2 Oct 44, sub: Overseas Readiness Status of 716th Engr Dep Co. 353/998(Readiness) (R).

132. TIG memo (R) for DCofS USA, 12 Oct 44, sub: Overseas Readiness Status of 67th Sig Bn. 353/1020(Readiness) (R).

133. Memo of Col Charles H. Bryan for G-4 AGF, 27 May 44, sub: Notes on Trip to Ft Knox, Ky, and Ft Leonard Wood, Mo., 24-26 May 44. G-3 files 333.1(Insp by AGF Staff Off), Binder 28.

134. AGF Memo, G-1 representative for G-3, 1 May 44, sub: Rpt of G-1 Representative on Gen McNair's Insp Trip 23-29 Apr 44. 353.02/599(AGF).

135. (1) AGF M/S (R) G-3 to CofS, 17 Jan 45, sub: IG Rpt for the Last Quarters. 353/1378(Readiness) (R). (2) AGF M/S (C), G-4 Task Force Div to G-4, 2 Jul 44, sub: Quarterly Rpt. G-4 Task Force Stat Book (C).

136. Statement of Lt Col J. A. Hanson, G-4 Task Force Div, to AGF Hist Off, 2 Jun 45.

137. (1) Ibid. (2) AGF M/S (C), G-4 Task Force Div to G-4, 9 Jan 45, sub: Quarterly Rpt. G-4 Task Force Stat Book (C).

138. (1) AGF M/S (C), G-4 Task Force Div to G-4, 2 Jul 44, sub: Quarterly Rpt. G-4 Task Force Div Stat Book (C). (2) AGF M/S (C), G-4 Task Force Div to G-4, 9 Jun 45, sub: Quarterly Rpt. Ibid.

139. AGF M/S, G-4 to CofS, 30 Apr 45, sub: Equipment for Redeployment Tng. G-4 Task Force file "Chief of Staff."

140. WD ltr (R) AG 320.2(15 Jan 44)OB-S-C-M to CGs, 20 Jan 44, sub: Overstrength in Units in the Continental U. S. 320.2/309 (R).

141. AGF memo (C) for CofS USA, Attn: G-3, sub: Overstrength

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- in units to Neutralize Losses through Attrition. 320.2/428 (C).
142. WD memo (C)WDGCT 320.2(16 May 44) for CGs, 19 May 44, sub: Overstrength of Units. Ibid.
143. Memo of Lt Col Ralph W. Zwicker for G-3 AGF, 26 Feb 44, sub: Visit to Cps Adair, White and Beale, 18-23 Feb 44. G-3 file 331.1/75 (Insp by AGF Staff Off).
144. Memo of G-3 representative for G-3 AGF, 12 Jul 44, sub: Visit to Cp Carson, Colo, and Cp McCoy, Wis, 6-8 Jul 44. G-3 file 331.1(Insp by AGF Staff Off), binder 40.
145. AGF ltr (C) to CGs 2d and 4th Armies, R&SC, and AAComd, 7 Aug 44, sub: Comments on POM Procedures, and accompanying papers. 370.5/632(C).
146. Ibid.
147. Ibid.
148. 2d ind by 7th Hq & Hq Det Sp Trs 4th Army to AGF ltr to CG Fourth Army, 18 Oct 44, sub: Overseas Readiness Status of 65th Sig Bn, Cp Howze, Tex. 353/1024(Readiness)(R).
149. For quarterly summaries of deficiencies revealed by TIG reports see AGF letters, subject: Readiness of Units for Movement Overseas, with file numbers and dates as follows:
- 353/621(Readiness)(R), 9 May 44
  - 353/822(Readiness)(R), 5 May 44
  - 353/1046(Readiness)(R), 29 Oct 44
  - 353/1257(Readiness)(R), 21 Jan 45
  - 353/1447(Readiness)(R), 24 Apr 45.
150. AGF M/S (C), G-4 Task Force Div to G-4, 6 Apr 45, sub: Second Annual Rpt. G-4 Task Force Stat Book (C).
151. See above, pp 38-39.
152. (1) AGF M/S (C), G-4 Task Force Div to G-4, 6 Apr 45, sub: Second Annual Rpt. G-4 Task Force Stat Book (C). (2) Statement of Col V. A. St. Onge to AGF Hist Off, 20 Sep 44.
153. AGF M/S (C), G-4 Task Force Div to G-4, 6 Apr 45, sub:

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Second Annual Rpt. G-4 Task Force Stat Book (C).

154. (1) Ibid. (2) AGF M/S (C), G-4 Task Force Div to G-4, 2 Oct 44, sub: Quarterly Rpt. Ibid. (3) Statements of Lt Col J. A. Hanson to AGF Hist Off, 2 and 21 Jun 45.

155. M/R (C), 27 Jan 45, sub: Summary of Units under Red List Procedures. G-4 Task Force "Red Unit Book."

156. AGF M/S (R), AG to CofS, 9 Feb 45, sub: IG Rpt for the Last Quarter. 353/1378(Readiness) (R).

157. Statement of Lt Col S. L. Weld to AGF Hist Off, 11 Jun 45.

158. AGF M/S, G-3 Task Force Div to G-3, 28 Nov 44, sub: POM Inspection Trip to Second and Fourth Armies. G-3 file 333.1/474 (Insp by AGF Staff Off). This action was desirable in view of the fact that personnel of the Fourth Army Headquarters had undergone a complete turnover.

159. (1) Statement of Lt Col J. A. Hanson to AGF Hist Off, 2 Jun 45. (2) AGF M/S (C), G-4 Task Force Div to G-4, 2 Jul 44, 2 Oct 44, and 9 Jan 45, sub: Quarterly Rpt. G-4 Task Force Stat Book. (3) AGF M/S (C), G-4 Task Force Div to G-4, 6 Apr 45, sub: Second Annual Rpt. Ibid.

160. Statement of Lt Col J. A. Hanson to AGF Hist Off, 2 Jun 45.

161. Ibid.

162. Ibid.

163. Transcript of speech made by Lt Col J. A. Hanson at Cp Chaffee, Ark, 28 Nov 44. G-4 Task Force files (Lt Col Hanson's Book).

164. Statement of Lt Col J. A. Hanson to AGF Hist Off, 2 Jun 45.

165. Memo (C) of Lt Col Hanson for AGF G-4, 26 Oct 44, sub: POM Liaison Trip to Ft Benning, Ga; Cp Rucker, Ala; Cp Van Dorn, Miss; and Cp Shelby, Miss. G-4 Task Force Files (Lt Col Hanson's Book).

166. Memo (R) of Lt Col Hanson for G-4 AGF, 4 Dec 44, sub: POM Liaison Visits. Ibid.

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167. Statement of Lt Col Hanson to AGF Hist Off, 2 Jun 45.
168. Ibid.
169. Ibid.
170. (1) Biennial Rpt of AGF June 45 (S), p 29. 319.1/102 (AGF)(S). (2) Statement of Lt Col H. L. Herberts, IG Rpts Br G-3 Task Force, to AGF Hist Off, 19 Jun 45.
171. Personal ltr of Gen McNair to Maj Gen A. C. Gillem Jr, CG XIII Corps, 6 Mar 44. McNair Personal Correspondence.
172. Statement of Lt Col H. L. Herberts to AGF Hist Off, 19 Jun 45.
173. Biennial Rpt of AGF Jun 45 (S), p 29. 319.1/102(AGF)(S).
174. (1) Statement of Lt Col J. A. Hanson to AGF Hist Off, 5 Jun 45. (2) AGF M/S (C), G-4 Task Force Div to G-4, 6 Apr 45, sub: Second Annual Rpt. G-4 Task Force Stat Book.
175. Ibid.
176. AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 11 Nov 44, sub: Preparation for Overseas Mvmt (IG Rpts). 370.5/455 (R).
177. (1) Statement of Lt Col S. L. Weld to AGF Hist Off, 11 Jun 45. (2) Statement of Lt Col J. A. Hanson to AGF Hist Off, 2 Jun 45.
178. See above p 50.
179. (1) Statement of Lt Col J. A. Hanson to AGF Hist Off, 2 Jun 45. (2) AGF M/S (C), G-4 Task Force Div to G-4, 2 Jul 44, 9 Jan 45, sub: Quarterly Rpt. G-4 Task Force Stat Book.
180. AGF M/S (C), G-4 Task Force Div to G-4, 6 Apr 45, sub: Second Annual Rpt. G-4 Task Force Stat Book.
181. Ibid.
182. See above p 49.

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183. AGF M/S (C), G-4 Task Force Div to G-4, 2 Oct 44, sub: Quarterly Rpt. G-4 Task Force Div Stat Book.

184. (1) Statement of Lt Col J. A. Hanson to AGF Hist Off, 2 Jun 45. (2) AGF M/S, G-4 to CofS, 25 May 45, sub: Transfers of Equip. G-4 Task Force Div file "Chief of Staff".

185. WD D/F, memo of WD G-4 for CG ASF, 17 May 45, sub as above. 475/2358(Equipment of Transfers)

186. Statement of Lt Col J. A. Hanson to AGF Hist Off, 23 Jun 45.

187. AGF M/S, G-4 to CofS, 30 Apr 45, sub: Equip for Redeployment Tng. G-4 Task Force Div file "Chief of Staff".

188. AGF M/S, G-4 to G-1, 29 Nov 44, sub: Draft No 2 --- POM. 370.5/4227.

189. WD ltr AG 370.5(23 Dec 44)OB-S-E-SPMOT-M to CGs, 24 Dec 44, sub: Modification to POM. 370.5/4219.

190. Ibid.

191. The third edition of POM, along with a summary of principal changes in procedure made by this revision, is filed in 370.5/506(R), sep binder.

192. (1) AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 26 Nov 44, sub: Preparation and Mvmt of Units for Overseas Service. 370.5/352(R). (2) AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 17 Mar 45, sub: Preparation and Mvmt of Units for Overseas Serv. 370.5/506(R).

193. Statement of Lt Col J. A. Hanson to AGF Hist Off, 2 Jun 45.

194. AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 21 Jan 45, sub: Readiness of Units for Mvmt Overseas. 353/1257(Int Tng)(R).

195. (1) Ibid. (2) TIG Memo (S) for D/CS USA 22 Apr 46, sub: Readiness of Units for Movement Overseas, TIG File WD SIG 333.1 Working Report (125) SP (3) AGF ltr (S) to CGs, 24 Apr 45, sub: Readiness of Units for Mvmt Overseas. 353/1447(Readiness) (S).

196. AGF M/S (S), G-3 Sec (Harding) to CofS, 4 May 45, sub: Cessation of Mvmt of Units to ETO and MTO. 370.5/535 (S).

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197. Information compiled from monthly AGF Stat Sec Rpt No 19 (S), "AGF Units Arriving at PE". AGF Stat Sec files.

198. This chart was prepared for the AGF Hist Off in May 1945 by the AGF Stat Sec. It is based on figures compiled from monthly AGF Stat Sec Rpt No 19 (S), "AGF Units Arriving at PE".

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