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
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REDEPLOYMENT TRAINING

Study No. 38

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U. S. Army Military History Institute

The Army Ground Forces

REDEPLOYMENT TRAINING

Study No. 38

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY GROUND FORCES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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314.7(1 Sept 1946)GNHIS

1 September 1945

SUBJECT: Studies in the History of Army Ground Forces

TO: All Interested Agencies


1. The history of the Army Ground Forces as a command was prepared during the course of the war and completed immediately thereafter. The studies prepared in Headquarters Army Ground Forces, were written by professional historians, three of whom served as commissioned officers, and one as a civilian. The histories of the subordinate commands were prepared by historical officers, who except in Second Army, acted as such in addition to other duties.

2. From the first, the history was designed primarily for the Army. Its object is to give an account of what was done from the point of view of the command preparing the history, including a candid, and factual account of difficulties, mistakes recognized as such, the means by which, in the opinion of those concerned, they might have been avoided, the measures used to overcome them, and the effectiveness of such measures. The history is not intended to be laudatory.

3. The history of the Army Ground Forces is composed of monographs on the subjects selected, and of two volumes in which an overall history is presented. A separate volume is devoted to the activities of each of the major subordinate commands.

4. In order that the studies may be made available to interested agencies at the earliest possible date, they are being reproduced and distributed in manuscript form. As such they must be regarded as drafts subject to final editing and revision. Persons finding errors of fact or important omissions are encouraged to communicate with the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Attention: Historical Section, in order that corrections may be made prior to publication in printed form by the War Department.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL DEVERS:


J. L. TARR
Colonel, AGF
Acting Ground Adj General

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I

THE TRAINING PROGRAM

The training program for the redeployment period was prescribed in Army Ground Forces Training Memorandum No. 1, issued tentatively in April 1945 and published in permanent form on 1 June.¹ This memorandum had its inception in the early fall of 1944, when G-3 of the Army Ground Forces proposed that the multitude of tests and directives then in effect, some of which went back to the GHQ period and which altogether made up a mass of paper weighing eight pounds, be brought up to date and compressed into a single document.² In October 1944, shortly after the G-3 proposal had been initiated, instructions were received from the War Department requiring the preparation of a program of training for use during the period that would follow the defeat of Germany.³ It was decided to combine the proposed streamlining of literature on training with the charting of a redeployment training program.⁴

The War Department directive of 5 October 1944 specified that redeployment training should be "planned and conducted with the objective of preparing individuals, crews, teams, and organizations specifically for operations against Japan." It also required that the following subjects be stressed:⁵

1. Maintenance of health, including malarial discipline and control.
2. Training of junior officers and NCO's in leadership.
3. Chemical warfare, including the tactical use of smoke and the offensive employment of toxic gases.
4. Swimming, life-saving, and resuscitation.
5. Japanese tactics, techniques, and weapons.
6. Identification of Japanese planes and equipment.
7. Care and maintenance of arms, vehicles, equipment, and clothing under climatic conditions prevailing in the Pacific.
8. Map and aerial photograph reading.
9. Natural and artificial camouflage.

The War Department directed further that special attention be devoted to physical ruggedness, small-unit training, scouting and patrolling, and security against surprise ground attacks. A minimum of two hours a week was required for "orientation," but in no other case did the War Department specify the time to be devoted to a subject.⁶ To preserve a high state of morale and discipline during redeployment and to promote efficiency in battle, the War Department ordered that in so far as practicable unit commanders and training instructors be men with combat experience.

In general, the principles stated by the War Department were in harmony with AGF concepts of redeployment training, and they were embodied in Training Memorandum No. 1, the new comprehensive AGF directive. The chief source on which the Army Ground Forces drew in preparing the new program was its own experience during the years of mobilization and war and the experience of overseas commands as reported by AGF and War Department observers. In short, the redeployment training program was for the most part a simplification and rearrangement of existing training literature to meet the needs of

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an all-out effort against Japan. No significant change was made in procedure or doctrine.⁷ Indeed, except for increased stress on subjects peculiarly applicable to Pacific warfare, such as swimming, small-unit training, security, Japanese weapons, and Japanese tactics and cave warfare, the redeployment training program contained nothing that was new. Its main principles were stated by Col. S. E. Faine at a conference with representatives of subordinate commands on 28 March 1945: "The attitude of this headquarters is that our first problem is to see that the man is basically trained. We're not worrying too much about the man being sure he knows how to fight the Japs, if he is a basically trained soldier."⁸ This was the philosophy that General McNair held from the beginning.

Training Memorandum No. 1 was divided into thirteen sections, each devoted to a distinct aspect of redeployment training and each having separate pagination to permit revision of one or more sections without revising the whole document or tacking on a confusing mass of changes and amendments.

Section I, "General," set forth certain fundamental principles and provisions deemed applicable to redeployment training. This section was drawn largely from the War Department directive of 5 October 1944 and basic AGF documents of an earlier period, particularly the Training Directive effective 1 November 1942 and the supplement thereto dated 7 June 1943.⁹ The portion (paragraph 5) which summarized fundamental combat qualifications, such as strong leadership, rigid discipline, proficiency and ruggedness of the individual soldier, team work, security, and ability to fight at night, was taken almost verbatim from the supplement dated 7 June 1943. Drawing on this and other AGF directives, the introductory section of the new program called for emphasis on combat firing, expert use of weapons, small-unit leadership, flame-thrower training, reconnaissance, combat intelligence, air-ground training, chemical warfare training, training in maintenance and supply, and mental and physical conditioning. The keynote sentences of the "Special Battle Courses" letter were repeated. "Soldiers without combat experience must be trained mentally for the shock of battle. They must be subjected in training to every possible sight, sound, and sensation of battle."¹⁰

Specific adaptations for warfare against Japan were apparent in the following provisions: (1) Attack of fortified positions was modified to provide for operations against emplacements constructed of earth and logs, with emphasis on the use of flame thrower and bulldozer. (2) The "combat in cities" exercise was redrafted to afford training for attacks in Japanese villages, a sketch being included as a guide for constructing mock-ups of the oriental type of building. (3) Additional stress was placed on small-unit security to guard against infiltration and on camouflage because it was thought that Japanese air strength might be greater than that encountered in Europe after 1943. (4) All personnel, except nurses, of medical detachments and units were to fire the rifle, carbine, and pistol for familiarization and receive instruction in the unloading of other weapons and the handling of grenades. The ostensible purpose of this provision was to prevent accidental discharge of weapons by medical personnel who cleared armed casualties from the battlefield. Experience in Europe had demonstrated the need of training medical personnel in the safe handling of firearms, but it seems likely that instruction in shooting was included in the redeployment program at least partly because of the reputation of the Japanese for ignoring the Geneva Convention.¹¹

Section II of Training Memorandum No. 1 was devoted to the training of undeployed nondivisional units during the redeployment period. (There were no undeployed divisions, and no divisional activations were in prospect.) The schedule set forth in this section was practically the same as that prescribed by the Army Ground Forces in July 1944 for the accelerated training of nondivisional units.¹² Allotments of training time varied with units of different type and also according to the sources from which they obtained their fillers. Those units whose fillers came from reception centers were allotted considerably more time than those whose fillers came from replacement training centers or

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units of other branches. Those whose fillers came from replacement training centers or units of the same branch were to have the shortest training periods of all. Content of the training program was to be based on appropriate Mobilization Training Programs and applicable provisions of Training Memorandum No. 1.

Section III set forth principles for the training of redeployed units for the minimum eight-week period established by the War Department. It included a schedule of subjects designed specifically as a guide for units of the arms:13

Eight-Weeks Redeployment Training Schedule
for Units of the Arms

No.	Subject	Individual				Unit		Combined		Total
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
		Hours				Hours				
1	Japanese tactics and technique			2	2			Each week to consist of $5\frac{1}{4}$ days of combined training with all available types of supporting arms		4
2	Japanese materiel	2	2							4
3	First aid and sanitation	2	2							4
4	Hygiene and prevention of diseases	4	4							8
5	Physical training including swimming	2	2	2	2	2	2			12
6	Organized athletics	4	4	4	4	4	4			24
7	Chemical warfare	2	2							4
8	Use of maps and air photos	3	3							6
9	Military courtesy	1	1					2		
10	Inspections	2	2	2	2	2	2	12		
11	Dismounted drill and ceremonies	2	2	2	2	2	2	12		
12	Care and maintenance of clothing and equipment	2	2					4		
13	Weapons training	10	10	20				40		
14	Interior guard and local security	2	2					4		
15	Tactical marches and bivouacs					4	4	8		
16	Squad and crew training			6	6			12		
17	Mines and booby traps				2		2	4		
18	Unit training, tactics and techniques, including scouting and patrolling				16	24	20	60		
19	Orientation	2	2	2	2	2	2	12		
20	Open time	4	4	4	6	4	6	28		
	Total hours	44	44	44	44	44	44		264 (not including combined training)	

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Training called for in this section was to begin when units had available 80 percent of their T/O strength and 50 percent of essential equipment. It was expected that a "shakedown" period of about a week would be required for the assembly of personnel after their recuperation furloughs.¹⁴

Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, took steps to facilitate the training of redeployed units in operations peculiar to the Pacific. (1) It prepared for War Department publication a comprehensive training circular on Japanese characteristics and tactics. This circular told of the character and training of the Japanese soldier, described his weapons, gave a brief summary of Japanese organization and communications, and outlined the high points of the enemy's offensive and defensive tactics.¹⁵ (2) It supervised the preparation for War Department publication of a training circular on the reduction of Japanese cave fortifications (Sphinx Project).¹⁶ This document described in detail the structure of cave fortifications, means of detecting their location, methods of defense, and planning and execution of attack. Stress was laid on coordination of the various arms in both planning and assault phases.¹⁷ (3) It compiled AGF observer and board reports on Japanese tactics and techniques, for distribution to subordinate training agencies.¹⁸ (4) It cooperated with the War Department in the organization of fifteen mobile intelligence training units for instruction of unit and replacement training center personnel in Japanese organization, weapons, equipment, and uniforms and in small-unit tactics, maintenance of health, and employment of camouflage. These mobile units were trained at Camp Ritchie, Md., from which six of them were graduated in late June and turned over to the Army Ground Forces for assignment to their instructional duties.¹⁹

Training Memorandum No. 1 did not include detailed instructions for redeployment training of AGF service type units or of combat engineer, signal, and chemical units. But provision was made for the drawing up by G-3 and the appropriate special staff section, AGF, of a separate redeployment training program for units in each of the service branches.²⁰

Section IV of Training Memorandum No. 1 directed that converted units follow the schedules prescribed in Section II for undeployed units.

Since it was anticipated that many units would have an opportunity to extend their training considerably beyond the minimum eight-week period prescribed by the War Department, Section V, "Supplemental Training," was included to provide systematic guidance during an additional period of indefinite duration. This section, modelled on the program of postmaneuver training outlined in the general AGF directive of 7 June 1943, prescribed four periods of progressive training. These began with squad and platoon exercises in the first period and built up to regimental combat team and division exercises in the fourth. Since no tests were scheduled in the initial eight weeks of redeployment training, the supplementary phase was devoted largely to squad, platoon, battalion, and other testing exercises. The special battle courses were also scheduled for this period, and it was specifically directed that in the village fighting exercise coordination of infantry with tanks should be stressed. Camouflage exercises, training of tank, tank destroyer, and antiaircraft units in the secondary role of supporting artillery, and the participation of service-type units in technical functions were also emphasized.

Redeployment plans anticipated an accumulation of large numbers of casualties in the Zone of Interior as a consequence of unit inactivations and redeployments.²¹ Section VI therefore provided for the organization of AGF casualties into temporary companies, battalions, groups, and regiments for training under armies and corps. Two training periods were prescribed for casual units: during the first they were to follow the initial two-week program laid down in Section III for redeployed units; during the second, which was of indeterminate length, they were to receive progressive small-unit

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and Military Occupational Specialty training.

Section VII provided that schools and replacement training centers should continue training under current mobilization training programs, with adaptation of instruction, whenever practicable, to combat against Japan. Subjects for which emphasis was specifically directed included weapons firing, health, leadership, Japanese equipment and tactics, security, maintenance, and the training of assault teams.

General provisions for training in replacement depots were set forth in Section VIII; these emphasized correction of individual deficiencies, physical and mental conditioning, and final polishing of individual and small-unit training.

Section IX contained detailed instructions on the subjects of information and education. The emphasis which Training Memorandum No. 1 gave to orientation sprang from two principal sources: (1) concern of the War Department and of Army Ground Forces for morale of redeployed personnel; and (2) the strong personal interest of General Lear, Commander of Army Ground Forces during the latter half of 1944 when planning for redeployment was active, in a broad and forceful indoctrination course. Section IX provided for a comprehensive film-lecture-discussion program of one full hour per week in undeployed units and replacement training centers and of two hours per week for redeployed personnel. This program covered the history of Asiatic countries, American interest in the Pacific, the character of the Japanese, and the scope of the task ahead. It contained little that was new, but its publication as an integral part of the basic AGF training directive gave to orientation an emphasis which was likely to impress its subordinate commanders strongly.

Section X, "Administration and Supply," summarized briefly current AGF doctrines and practices governing supply, maintenance, and ammunition. Commanders of subordinate headquarters were directed "to set up a display of clothing and equipment" in order to demonstrate required maintenance standards.

In Section XI training for infiltration, combat in cities, and close combat was outlined, with appropriate illustrations accompanying the text.

Section XII was devoted to tests. Except for the basic medical and intelligence tests, only those which required firing were included. In some cases established tests were revised for the redeployment program, but modifications, designed to remove deficiencies revealed by experience, were of a minor nature. It was not considered necessary to change testing exercises drastically for adaptation to operations in the Pacific.²² Section XII comprised about nine-tenths of Training Memorandum No. 1.

Thirty-two tests, some consisting of several distinct exercises, were included in the redeployment program. As stated above, no tests were to be given to a redeployed unit during the first eight weeks of training. The plan to defer all tests to the supplemental training period was based on three considerations: (1) The primary need of redeployed units was orientation in conditions and techniques peculiar to the Pacific and a polishing of small-unit training. Inclusion of tests in initial training periods would interfere with the accomplishment of this basic objective. (2) Units remaining in the United States for eight weeks or less would not have time to grow stale and therefore would have no great need of testing. (3) Units remaining in the Zone of Interior for extended periods would need the refreshing afforded by tests and would have ample time for them.²³ The prescribed program provided a flexible schedule of progressive testing for an unlimited period.

The final division of Training Memorandum No. 1, Section XIII, summarized POM requirements for units trained during the redeployment period. Requirements varied with the amount of time available for training. For example, redeployed units which had

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opportunity to complete the second period of supplementary training were required to participate in the combat-in-cities course, while those training for lesser periods were exempted from this requirement. Infantry units which progressed no further than the first period of supplementary training had to take only squad combat firing tests, while those completing the fourth period were required to take platoon and battalion combat firing tests as well as a series of tests in combat intelligence. There was also a differentiation in the requirements of undeployed and redeployed units.

G-3's of subordinate commands, called to a redeployment conference in Washington on 27-28 March 1945, viewed the new program favorably. But when Training Memorandum No. 1 was circulated in draft form among the staff sections of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, for comment and concurrence, G-4 and some of the special staff heads registered objection to certain of the provisions. The main points at issue were as follows: (1) allotment of time for maintenance of clothing and equipment; (2) provision for training in maintenance and supply discipline; (3) relative stress on training of units of the arms as against those of the services; and (4) relative emphasis in service units of tactical as distinguished from technical training.²⁴

The principals in the controversy were G-4 and Ordnance on the one hand and G-3 on the other. The position of G-4 and Ordnance, in brief, was to the following effect: (1) Reports from the European Theater of Operations and findings of The Inspector General indicated that maintenance conditions both overseas and in the Zone of Interior left much to be desired. The only way to correct this situation was to make specific provision in the training program for the upkeep of equipment and for instruction in maintenance, particularly in preventative maintenance. The four hours earmarked for "care and maintenance of clothing and equipment" in Section III of Training Memorandum No. 1 was considered grossly inadequate; at least twelve hours should be set aside for this purpose. (2) The form and provisions of the document were deemed prejudicial to service units. Emphasis throughout was on training in the arms. For example, Section III specified a training program for redeployed units of the arms but confined itself to stating that service units would be guided by separate redeployment training programs to be issued later. This would inevitably tend to give subordinate commands the impression that units of the arms were the primary concern of the Army Ground Forces and that service units were viewed somewhat in the light of stepchildren. It was believed that a more equitable plan would be to divide the training program into two parts, one for units of the arms and the other for units of the services. (3) The program as drafted would result in requiring service units to devote a disproportionate amount of time to tactical training, with consequent neglect of training in their primary technical duties. (4) Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, should make Military Occupational Specialty tests mandatory for personnel of service units, to assure a check on these units comparable to that provided by the squad, platoon, and battalion tests required of combat units. Mainly because of the predominant role of the individual specialist in service units, unit testing of functional proficiency in the services was impracticable and hence was not required. It was therefore all the more important that Military Occupational Specialty tests be made obligatory. While subordinate commands in some instances required testing of service personnel in their individual specialties, AGF action was necessary to guarantee uniform application of the practice in all ground organizations. Until such action was taken, the Army Ground Forces could have no assurance that service units sent to port were as well qualified as units of the arms to perform their primary missions.²⁵

The position of G-3, on the other hand, was substantially as follows: (1) Care and maintenance of equipment, while important, was secondary to the principal mission of the Army Ground Forces -- that of preparing units for combat. There was danger of stressing maintenance to a point where troops would have more concern for keeping their weapons in shiny condition than for expending them in realistic training. (2) Maintenance and maintenance training were primarily matters of command and discipline.

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It was neither necessary nor desirable to set aside considerable periods of time for these activities. A good commander would teach his men to care for their weapons as he trained them in the use of those weapons; he would instruct them in the care of their clothing at inspections and in other phases of training. (3) Adequate provision for technical training of service units would be made in redeployment training programs subsequently to be issued for units of each service branch. (4) Tests required by the Army Ground Forces should be kept to a minimum and should not extend to the individual level.²⁶

This argument over Training Memorandum No. 1 revealed grievances that had long been smouldering among those who represented the services in Headquarters, Army Ground Forces. These grievances centered in a feeling that the Army Ground Forces was dominated by the arms and that service matters received only secondary consideration. It was believed that G-3 was so overwhelmingly concerned with the training of combat units, especially divisions, that it permitted only a minimum of attention to preparation of service units. Such units, it was held, were put through a routine of training designed primarily for units of the arms, with the result that service personnel were required to spend many hours in marching and shooting that were more vitally needed in perfecting technical specialties.²⁷

It is impossible to say that in this conflict of opinion one side was right and the other wrong. The points at issue might have been reduced if not resolved had there been more time available for training -- time to make both soldiers and finished technicians out of service personnel, and time to care for equipment and provide for maintenance instructions without imperilling other aspects of the training program.

The Chief of Staff, Army Ground Forces, sustained G-3's position that no more time than that provided in the draft of Training Memorandum No. 1 could be allotted to maintenance and that Military Occupational Specialty tests should not be made mandatory.²⁸ The relative importance of tactical and technical subjects in the training of service units was threshed out between G-3 and the various special staff sections in the course of preparing redeployment training programs (RTP's) for each of the services. When work on the redeployment training programs was initiated special staff heads were handed a schedule of "must" subjects, including items prescribed in War Department directives, which differed little from the schedule outlined in Training Memorandum No. 1 (Section III, "Redeployed Units") for units of the arms and which left comparatively little time for technical training within the eight-week minimum specified by the War Department. Special staff heads protested, and in subsequent exchanges of views they secured some adjustment in favor of technical training.²⁹ In the case of signal units, for example, the time prescribed for dismounted drill and ceremonies was reduced to 4 hours as compared with 12 hours for units of the arms; the time for tactical marches and bivouacs to 6 hours as compared with 12 for the arms. Most of the time saved by these reductions was earmarked for "specialist refresher training" of signal personnel.³⁰ Similar adjustments were made in other Ground services, but the redeployment training programs as published in final form on 1 June 1945 fell considerably short of what was regarded by special staff heads as a desirable balance between tactical and technical subjects. One concession that was obtained applied to all the services. In the RTP of each service was included this provision:³¹

Unless specifically modified by the Commanding General, AGF, the specifications set forth in TM 12-427, "Military Occupational Classification of Enlisted Personnel," are adopted as the standard of individual training. In order to insure appropriate assignment of personnel, unit commanders will carefully analyze current T/O&E applicable to their units and conduct training to qualify fully each specialist in his MOS.

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Generally speaking, the redeployment training programs for service units differed in three important respects from previous programs. First, they gave subordinate commanders considerable latitude in arranging the details of training. The engineer program, for example, contained this statement:³²

Hours allotted are not sufficient to cover all the above subjects during this phase. Overseas experience and individual unit needs must be considered in allotment of training hours. Additional training needs should be covered by allotment of open time hours or scheduled during the supplemental training phase.

Delegation of broad discretionary prerogatives to lower commanders was prompted by the realization that training needs of returned units would vary greatly because of differences in such matters as prior training, combat experience, and turnover of personnel. In the second place, the redeployment training programs, to a larger extent than earlier programs, were based on lessons learned in combat. This was apparently due to two factors: first, the fact that information on combat experience available to Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, through overseas reports and the testimony of officers returning for reassignment was more complete than ever before; second, the fact that in most cases the spade work of preparing the RTP's had been entrusted to officers who had served overseas.³³ The following are examples of the use of combat lessons in RTP's:

Engineer RTP

1. Interior Guard and Local Security Stress should be made on working party security and day and night perimeter defense against snipers, banzai raids and infiltration tactics as used by the Japanese. Against the Japanese there is no so-called "secure" rear areas.

2. Specialist Training All units will conduct technical training of individuals and units concurrently with other training. The training of additional engineer equipment operators will be emphasized. SWP and POA reports indicate a need for additional trained equipment operators in engineer units.³⁴

Ordnance RTP

1. Maintenance companies Insofar as availability of Japanese equipment will permit, all units will be trained in the maintenance and reconditioning of such equipment. Third echelon maintenance companies will stress contact party procedure ... provision must be made for contact party visits to supported units at least daily. Concurrently, the supply section of the maintenance must be so organized and trained that deliveries on requisitions to supported units are on a 24-hour or less basis. Provision also must be made for an efficient back order system so that re-requisitioning by supported units is never required.

Fourth echelon maintenance companies will stress rebuilding of assemblies and major items with sufficient emphasis on fifth echelon rebuild to enable the unit to operate without Base Shop support when necessary. Service personnel will be trained to an especially high degree of proficiency in the manufacture of parts within the capability of machine tools authorized for the unit.³⁵

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Signal RTP

1. Training emphasis communications units ...
 - a. Installation and maintenance of wire facilities under unfavorable conditions of weather, terrain and in darkness with particular attention to trouble-shooting procedure.
 - b. ... Procedure in event of jamming and fading. Net operation with heavy traffic loads.
 - c. Intensive practice by cryptographic personnel under heavy traffic loads.

2. Training emphasis Signal Photographic Company
 - a. Training of combat assignment personnel in missions involving photographic reconnaissance from liaison type aircraft and supplementation of other ground reconnaissance agencies.
 - b. Pertinent instruction in combat tactics and technique of the individual soldier to assure continued functioning of combat assignment personnel under battle conditions.

3. Supplemental training team and section
 - a. Training in the technique of organizing day and night perimeter defense and the security of wire parties and other signal personnel on isolated missions. Fire discipline to prevent promiscuous firing when in a defensive situation and against aircraft
 - b. The development of and training in techniques of active coordination and cooperation with engineer construction troops by wire installation personnel wherever possible.³⁶

The third distinctive aspect of redeployment training programs has already been indicated, namely, concentration on a single enemy and a fairly limited geographical area. Former programs had to be general enough to prepare units and individuals for operations against many enemies in widely scattered portions of the world. Now it was possible to point all training activities directly toward Japan.

In general the Army Ground Forces contemplated little change in technique for redeployment training. One innovation, however, should be mentioned -- the use of demonstration teams organized and trained on the War Department level to facilitate instruction in complicated equipment and procedures. Reference has already been made to the mobile intelligence training teams trained at Camp Ritchie, Md., for use in acquainting AGF units and replacement centers with Japanese organization, weapons, equipment, and uniforms, and for instructing ground intelligence personnel in foreign maps, Japanese psychology, handling of prisoners, and use of specialist teams.³⁷ Plans drafted jointly by Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, and the Chemical Warfare Service, Army Service Forces, provided that teams trained by the Chemical Warfare Service should be employed by the Army Ground Forces for demonstrations of chemical-warfare equipment and technique to redeployed divisions. Items scheduled for demonstration included the portable flame thrower, the mechanized flame thrower, the one-shot flame thrower, the gun, assault, mechanized flame thrower, the 4.2-inch recoilless chemical mortar, and the 7.2-inch rocket, incendiary, and/or chemical filling. Six mobile intelligence training teams were trained and turned over to the Army Ground Forces in July 1945. V-J Day came while the Chemical Warfare Service demonstration teams were still in the planning stage; none was ever organized.³⁸

At the request of the Army Ground Forces the Quartermaster General, U. S. Army, in July 1945 conducted a four-week course in clothing and equipment for 17 teams (1 officer and 2 enlisted men per team) of armies and other major ground commands. On graduation from this course at Camp Lee, Va., the teams conducted schools for representatives of

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units and other subordinate installations, who in turn instructed the individuals of their respective commands. The Army Ground Forces planned to give every enlisted man sent to the Pacific at least two hours of training in clothing and equipment, and every officer four hours.³⁹

Provision of this instruction was suggested mainly by experience in Europe, particularly during the last winter of hostilities. At that time failure of commanders to requisition proper clothing and lack of knowledge of officers and men as to its use caused excessively heavy "cold weather" casualties, particularly from trench foot and frostbite. Subjects emphasized in the new courses included clothing insulation, proper sizing of garments, ventilation in clothing, means of obtaining maximum efficiency from clothing, the relation of food and water to clothing, principles of cleanliness, methods of laundering, and the relation of rest and shelter to clothing. Officers were also instructed in such subjects as the relation of clothing to climate and terrain, correlation of tactical movement and clothing factors, principles of selecting clothing suitable to the activities of the soldier, clothing inspections, responsibilities of officers in procurement and proper use of clothing, and accustoming men to unfamiliar garments.⁴⁰

The war came to an end shortly after the first clothing and equipment teams completed their training; but steps were taken in the following months both to increase the scope of special instruction in quartermaster schools and to make specific provision in Ground training schedules for instruction in the selection and use of clothing.⁴¹

Training by extraneous and migratory groups might have been construed as a violation of General McNair's fundamental dictum that soldiers should be trained in the unit by the unit commander. But General McNair himself had sanctioned modification of the unit training principle in certain instances where instruction was of a highly specialized nature, as shown by his approval of training centers for antiaircraft and tank destroyer units. In the case of redeployment training in intelligence, clothing, and chemical subjects, limitation of time was an additional factor calling for the application of mass-production techniques. No radical departure was made, in this or other respects, from the training policies which the Army Ground Forces had developed and applied under the direction of General McNair during the original mobilization of the ground forces in 1942-43.

II

DIFFICULTIES, 8 MAY -- 14 AUGUST 1945

The surrender of Japan on 14 August 1945 brought the war to an end before redeployment training as prescribed in Training Memorandum No. 1 could be put into effect. The first units to return to the United States, including the 86th and 97th Divisions, which arrived on 17 and 24 June respectively, were in process of reassembly following completion of recuperation furloughs when the end came.⁴² After V-J Day, units scheduled for occupation service initiated a modified program, but training during that period is part of another story.

The course of events during the months before August 1945 had been such as to make the prospects of redeployment training unfavorable in the extreme. Difficulties in prospect were so formidable, indeed, that a key officer in the G-3 Section of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, reflecting on the situation after V-J Day, was constrained to remark:⁴³

The capitulation of Hirohito on 14 August saved our necks. With things being as they were it would have been absolutely impossible for us to have sent well-trained teams to the Pacific for participation in the scheduled invasion of Japan.

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This officer had in mind primarily the disruptive effect on units of personnel readjustment policies after V-E Day. Therein lay the greatest problem of redeployment training.

Status reports prepared in ETO reveal the effect of these policies on typical units selected for redeployment. The 28th Division in one week experienced a turnover of 20 percent of its enlisted strength and in 40 days a turnover of 46 percent of its officers. Between V-E Day and V-J Day the 35th Infantry Division lost 285 officers and 3,880 men. The 804th Tank Destroyer Battalion during the three months following V-E Day lost 50 percent of its personnel; the 330th Ordnance Depot Company reported in August 1945 that 73 percent of its personnel had been in the unit less than one month; and the 122d Signal Radio Intelligence Company reported that 95 percent of its strength was above the critical score of credits for early discharge.⁴⁴

A large proportion of the men lost under readjustment policies were key specialists and NCO's. To make matters worse, newcomers usually were greatly inferior in training, experience, and leadership to the men whom they replaced.⁴⁵

Personnel problems were increased by unforeseen, last-minute extensions of campaign credits. The 2d Infantry Division, for example, after having replaced all men with scores of 85 or above, received credit shortly before sailing from Europe for two additional campaigns. This made some 2,700 more men eligible for discharge.⁴⁶ Because of lack of time, the prescribed policy of completing personnel adjustments in Europe, where replacements were available, had to be abandoned and adjustments postponed until return of the organization to the United States. But since the output of RTC's was being sent to the Pacific there was no adequate source of replacements in the Zone of Interior, and hence provision had to be made for the return from ETO, not only for the 2d Division but for others as well, of a "packet" of about 2,000 low-score replacements to fill the gap left by removal of personnel made eligible for discharge by the addition of battle credits.⁴⁷ This arrangement would have been fairly satisfactory if the packets could have been shipped promptly, but lack of shipping space, owing partly to concessions to public pressure for the early return of high-point men, caused a delay in the forwarding of these replacements. None had arrived by V-J Day. In fact it was not until October that these packets began to reach American ports. Possibly they would have been given higher priority if the war had continued.⁴⁸

Personnel turnover in the 45th Division, originally scheduled for return to the United States in August 1945, was much greater than in other divisions selected for redeployment. AGF staff officers who visited the 45th Division in July were informed that on the basis of currently applicable discharge scores a turnover of 11,000 enlisted men and 600 officers was anticipated; the Division Artillery staff was to have only one officer left -- the Artillery Commander himself.⁴⁹ The basis for selecting divisions to be redeployed and for determining the order of their return was not known in Headquarters, Army Ground Forces. But designating for redeployment units such as the 45th Division, which had a preponderance of high-score personnel, while choosing for inactivation many units such as the 63d and 65th Divisions, with comparatively few men eligible for discharge, created formidable difficulties.⁵⁰ Certainly the effect of replacing a large percentage of the personnel on the eve of redeployment would have been exceedingly injurious to the team -- and the concept of the division as a team was approved by the War Department and considered cardinal by the Army Ground Forces. The period of redeployment training was all too brief to permit of moulding into a team a unit which had lost most of its key specialists and from one-third to three-fourths of its officers and men. The team had been violated before, particularly in the strippings of 1944 for overseas replacements, and the results, as attested by the performance of rebuilt divisions on the battlefield, were not so bad as had been feared.⁵¹ While the time available in redeployment for remoulding the team was by no means as long as in 1944, and while the loss of specialists was much heavier in redeployment

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than before, it seems not unlikely that the rehabilitated divisions would have given a good account of themselves in the Pacific. But judged by the basic principle which had not been abrogated and which experience had justified, violation of the team would mean loss of lives and battle efficiency.

Another problem faced by those responsible for redeployment training in the United States was the lack of coordination with European theaters. In the early stages of redeployment planning it appeared that coordination would leave little to be desired. On 19 March 1945, key AGF officers conferred at length in Washington with Brig. Gen. G. S. Eyster, G-3, ETO, with reference to redeployment matters. At this conference General Eyster said in substance:⁵²

There will have to be a closely integrated program between ETO and Ground Forces. For example, when ETO returns a unit they will forward a training status report which may state that the unit has done 120 days of training. Then after returning to the United States and having had fur-loughs, the unit would start on the 121st day of training.

General Eyster stated further that one of the Army Groups, probably the Sixth, would be responsible for supervising redeployment training in ETO, and that a master training program then in process of preparation should be very closely integrated with programs drawn up by the Army Ground Forces.⁵³

Draft copies of AGF Training Memorandum No. 1 were sent to ETO in April 1945 and to MTO a few weeks later.⁵⁴ Early in May 1945, Col. S. E. Faine and Col. A. M. Parsons of Training Division, G-3 Section, AGF, visited ETO for the purpose of furthering coordination of the Army Ground Forces and ETO on matters of redeployment training. Colonel Faine and Colonel Parsons, after a conference with General Eyster, met with Brig. Gen. William P. Shepard and other officers of Headquarters, Sixth Army Group, to work out details of coordination. Concerning this and subsequent meetings, the AGF representatives wrote in their report to the Ground Chief of Staff:⁵⁵

The first conference with General Shepard's Group covered the purpose of our visit, and copies of AGF training literature were briefly explained. General Shepard agreed to accept our training memoranda in toto, with minor changes to be made to fit the training facilities to be available to them. We agreed to assist in rewriting these training memoranda. The next several days were spent in the actual rewrite.

The report explained the machinery set up for redeployment training in ETO, by which units were to be readjusted by Twelfth Army Group, passed to control of Sixth Army Group for training, and, after a minimum of eight weeks' training under the supervision of an Army Headquarters, shipped to an assembly area for POM. The report then stated:⁵⁶

In addition to the status report which will be furnished OPD by the theater, Sixth Army Group has promised to send a copy of training status report direct to AGF; this report being in more complete detail than the theater report. Their status training report will include a statement as to the operations performed by the unit in combat At a final conference held on 11 May 1945 with Generals Shepard and Eyster, it was agreed that Hq AGF would recommend to OPD that training officers ... from each of the special staff sections of AGF would be assigned to the staff of Sixth Army Group; that the Sixth Army Group would in turn select, and return for duty at Hq AGF, an officer of corresponding rank from their special staff sections. It was also recommended by Gen. Eyster that arrangements be made for the establishment of liaison between Hq AGF, Hq ETO, Hq Assembly Area Command, and Port of Le Havre, in order to provide the latest information on AGF units returning to the U. S. General Eyster and General Shepard assured us that such a request would be promptly acted upon in the theater.

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The report concluded with the statement: "Our visit resulted in Sixth Army Group adopting AGF training programs lock, stock and barrel!"⁵⁷

But the training plans drafted in ETO in May did not work out. Because of the absorption of units and higher headquarters with occupation duties, inadequacy of training facilities, acceleration of the shipment schedule, and other obstacles, the scheme of training units at home stations in ETO under armies and corps proved impracticable, and in general responsibility for training passed to the Assembly Area Commands. But restrictions of space and equipment precluded any but the most limited training by units after they left their home stations in Europe. An AGF officer who visited Europe in July 1945 reported: "Very little, if any, training will be accomplished in USFET by indirectly redeployed units."⁵⁸

The proposals made by General Eyster that the Army Ground Forces send officers periodically to ETO to maintain liaison on redeployment matters also went by the board. An AGF request in May for permission to send a liaison party to Europe elicited a reply from ETO to the effect that such liaison was neither necessary nor desirable.⁵⁹ Renewal of the request in June, through General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff who was visiting in Washington, met with a favorable response. A party of three officers (Col. Harrison W. Todd, G-3 Mobilization Division, Col. S. L. Weld, G-3 Task Force Division, and Lt. Col. John A. Hanson, G-4 Task Force Division) left Washington on 7 July 1945 and returned three weeks later.⁶⁰ Much valuable information was exchanged, but the trip came too late to yield maximum benefits. The conclusion of the visiting officers was: "The trip should have been made in May as originally recommended."⁶¹

Liaison was all the more imperative in view of the tardiness and inadequacy of status reports. AGF plans, based on War Department directives, contemplated receipt by air mail of complete and up-to-date reports on organization, status, and training of redeployed units at about the time of their arrival in the United States. But on 11 July 1945 Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, reported to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army: "To date status reports have been received for only four of the 170 units which are listed to return to the U.S. in June, and no lists of shortages of the units by grade, SSN, and arm or service have been received."⁶² The status reports that were received did not give a true picture of either training or personnel because of the practice followed in ETO prior to August 1945. This required submission of all but the personnel portions of the reports before movement to the assembly area, where most of the training was conducted, and the filling in of personnel paragraphs twenty days before the readiness date for movement to the staging area. Considerable turnover of personnel occurred after preparation of both phases of the report.⁶³

Other effects of poor coordination between the Army Ground Forces and ETO may be listed as follows:⁶⁴ (1) Many authorities in ETO held the erroneous opinion that reinforcements were available in the United States for replacement of high-point personnel. (2) "Organization detachments" required by War Department regulations to proceed directly from ports to assembly stations with essential records to prepare the way for the rest of the unit were not designated and oriented in their duties prior to departure of units from ETO. (3) Copies of reports of equipment authorized for return to the United States, intended for dispatch to the Army Ground Forces, were sent to the Army Service Forces.

But the fact most distressing to those charged with receipt and training of redeployed units was that the Army Ground Forces, until the latter part of July, did not receive up-to-date information concerning the shipment of returning ground units. Schedules laid down prior to V-E Day in redeployment forecasts were stepped up considerably by ETO as more shipping became available than had been anticipated, with the result that units expected in August came pouring into the United States in July. AGF officers asked OPD for revised schedules only to find that they were not available in the War Department.⁶⁵

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The AGF liaison party that visited ETO in July 1945 obtained up-to-date redeployment schedules and cleared up other major points of misunderstanding mentioned above. But as previously indicated, this action came too late to be of great benefit.

AGF officers who held key positions with respect to the training of redeployed units were of the opinion that many of the difficulties growing out of the return of units from Europe might have been avoided if strong control of redeployment activities had been exercised on the War Department level. Lack of coordination seemed due in large measure to persistence after V-E Day of the previous practice of permitting theater commanders a free hand in overseas activities. This principle, when applied to matters as closely related to responsibilities of interior agencies as redeployment, greatly aggravated the problems of those agencies.⁶⁶

The problem of equipment, while apparently not as formidable in redeployment as in most of the prior period, was nevertheless a source of considerable concern at Headquarters, Army Ground Forces. According to War Department regulations, units, before their departure from Europe, were to turn in to supply agencies all except minimum essential equipment for shipment direct to the Pacific. As previously stated, this meant that equipment required for training in the United States would have to be furnished from ASF stock in the Zone of Interior. The War Department, in response to AGF insistence, directed that 100 percent T/O&E equipment be laid down at the training station of the unit's return, and that it be in condition serviceable for combat.⁶⁷ In at least one instance -- in connection with provision of one-ton 2-wheel cargo trailers -- the Army Service Forces sought by direct negotiations with the Army Ground Forces to be relieved of the 100 percent combat serviceable requirement. But the Army Ground Forces, apprehensive lest this be the first of a series of such requests, gave a firm negative reply.⁶⁸

Two factors, beyond the control of both commands, complicated the equipment problem. One was the acceleration of the rate of return of divisions and other units from ETO. The second was the shifting of division stations to meet unforeseen changes in strategic plans. This shifting is exemplified in the case of the first two armored divisions (the 13th and 20th) scheduled for return to the United States. The Army Ground Forces in mid-April 1945, in reply to an inquiry from the ASF Distribution Division, designated Camp Polk and Ft. Benning as stations to receive the first armored divisions selected for redeployment. The Army Service Forces initiated measures necessary to lay down a complete set of equipment for an armored division at each of these stations. Subsequently, strategic plans were modified to provide for inclusion of the first two redeployed armored divisions in an armored task force attack on the Japanese homeland. Because of this change, it was necessary to give the divisions amphibious training; hence Camp Cooke, Calif., was designated as their station instead of the two camps previously selected. The Army Service Forces, notwithstanding the fact that some armored equipment had already been shipped to Ft. Benning, was now called on to lay down two complete sets of armored equipment at Camp Cooke.⁶⁹

One type of equipment which was a source of special concern was that required for implementation of the athletic and recreational program directed by the War Department. On 9 March 1945, the Army Ground Forces, to implement this program, requested the Army Service Forces to provide equipment for 500,000 men, in the following categories: athletic supplies; dayroom furniture; musical instruments; workshop outfits of various types (artist's, printing, clay modelling, metal craft, carpentry, etc); soldier show supplies; and photo darkroom outfits. It was estimated that the materials requested would cost about \$8,000,000. In submitting the request, the Army Ground Forces called attention to the urgent need of laying down supplies at redeployment stations ahead of time to avoid delay in initiating the recreational program.⁷⁰

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The Army Ground Forces, after waiting more than two months for a reply to its letter of 9 March, on 12 May made written inquiry as to action contemplated by the Army Service Forces.⁷¹ When the answer to the letter of 9 March finally came, dated 19 May, it reported a decision of The Secretary of War on 18 May 1945 that no additional recreational equipment would be procured for use during duty hours within the Zone of Interior, and stated that "every reasonable effort is being made to provide equipment and facilities adequate for recreational purposes [in off-duty hours] during the redeployment period."⁷²

Taking the view that additional athletic equipment was indispensable to accomplishment of provisions specified in War Department redeployment training directives and that procurement of this equipment was not prohibited by The Secretary of War's ruling of 18 May -- since it was to be used for after-duty games as well as for on-duty physical conditioning -- the Army Ground Forces on 19 June 1945 made a new request for athletic training equipment sufficient for 500,000 men and asked for delivery of 20 percent of the equipment by 15 July.⁷³ The Army Service Forces replied on 22 June 1945 that G-3 of the War Department had interpreted recreational equipment intended for use during duty hours as including athletic equipment and that the AGF request was therefore returned without action.⁷⁴

In the meantime, prospects had become very discouraging for provision of nonathletic equipment intended solely for after-duty recreational purposes. The situation confronting the Army Ground Forces may be indicated by quoting extracts from a telephone conversation on 28 May 1945 between the Personal Services Officer of Headquarters, AGF (Colonel Waters) and an officer of the Special Services Division of Army Service Forces in New York. Colonel Waters was seeking information on the action being taken to supply material requested by the Army Ground Forces for the off-duty program:⁷⁵

Waters: ... The first item I would like to find out about concerns musical instruments. This headquarters requested some \$2,000,000 worth.

Murray: [Special Services]: ... They will be very short. That industry has been closed up for years and they are just beginning to get it rolling again.

Waters: Well, will we get 10 percent, 20 percent, or what?

Murray: There are a couple of hundred items involved. Couldn't give you an estimate. The policy paper describing the method of distribution of these supplies has not left the office ...

Waters: This headquarters requested some 2,500 day rooms be equipped. Are they to be equipped?

Murray: ... Distribution will be started as soon as Congress comes out with the appropriation. There will be some sort of furniture available, though not immediately. This involves a big manufacturing job ...

Waters: What about radios? We requested 2,500 radios, or one for each day room.

Murray: Radios are entirely between you and the Signal Corps.

Waters: Haven't been told anything about that. Just requested the radios from the Commanding General, Army Service Forces We requested a numerous amount of small games. What is the supply status of those?

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Murray: Some of these will be available. It is all outlined in the [policy] letter. It hasn't left the office, hasn't been approved.

Waters: Arts and crafts?

Murray: Arts and crafts will be available under that letter. Not the kind of things you asked for. We now have small kits but not shop equipment. The shop equipment will be available in about four or five months.

This telephone conversation took place nearly three months after the Army Ground Forces had put in a detailed requisition for recreational equipment. It appeared that the recreational program was destined to be thwarted by lack of equipment.⁷⁶

Outside of radios, which were eventually obtained through direct negotiations with the Signal Corps, the Army Ground Forces on V-J Day had secured very little of the nonathletic recreational equipment requested in March, and the prospect of getting such equipment remained unpromising.⁷⁷ By continuing pressure, it had obtained Enlisted Men's Welfare Funds to the extent of \$1.75 per man for purchase of athletic playing equipment for use in both training and nontraining activities.⁷⁸ When Japan surrendered, the War Department was considering an AGF request for distribution from ASF stocks in Kansas City of \$3.00 worth of athletic clothing (shirts, shoes, and supporters) to each enlisted man in redeployment training.⁷⁹ All in all, the efforts of the Army Ground Forces to secure the means of carrying out War Department directives for bolstering the mental and physical health of redeployed soldiers through an intensive program of recreation were disappointing in the extreme.⁸⁰

Another difficulty sprang from the acceleration of the operations timetable in the Pacific which took place after the original plans for redeployment had been put into effect. This threatened to reduce to a fraction the eight-week period of training which had been based on these plans and which was regarded as the minimum for effective training. On 7 August 1945 the War Department gave new readiness dates to the 86th and 97th Divisions, the first to be brought back from Europe, which precluded any redeployment training under the Army Ground Forces.⁸¹ If one plan still under consideration on V-J Day had been carried out, the 20th Armored Division would have had only 20 days training in the United States and the 13th Armored Division only 9 days⁸² -- a situation that was particularly disturbing in view of the fact that the scheduled operation was amphibious, and neither division had had amphibious training.⁸³

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1. The tentative edition (mimeographed, dated 25 Apr 45) is filed in 353.01/1 (Tng Memos); the final edition (lithographed, dated 1 Jun 45), ibid, separate binder A typed draft that was circulated among AGF staff sections for comments in March is filed in G-3 Records, 300.6 (AGF Tng Memo No 1).
2. (1) Statement of Lt Col M. F. Brennan, AGF G-3 Sec to AGF Hist Off, 10 Oct (2) AGF M/S, G-3 to CG, 30 Mar 45, sub: Tng Memo No 1. G-3 Records, 300.6 (AGF Tng Memo No 1).
3. WD memo (R) 353 (5 Oct 44) for CGs AGF, ASF, AAF, 5 Oct 44, sub: Tng after the Defeat of Germany. 353/5 (Redepl)(R).
4. Statement of Lt Col M. F. Brennan to AGF Hist Off, 10 Oct 45.
5. WD memo (R) 353 (5 Oct 44) for CGs AGF, ASF, AAF, 5 Oct 44, sub: Tng after Defeat of Germany. 353/5 (Redepl)(R).
6. Ibid.
7. Statements in this paragraph are based mainly on comparison of Training Memorandum No. 1 with earlier AGF training literature and on conversations of the AG Historical Officer with various members of the AGF G-3 Section in October 1945.
8. Record of Conference (S) on Redepl Policies and Procedures, Hq AGF, 27-28 Mar 45. 337/1 (Redepl)(S).
9. Both the training directive of 1 November 1942 and the supplement of 7 June 1943 are filed in 353/52 (Tng Dir).
10. AGF ltr to CG, 4 Feb 43, sub: Spec Battle Courses. 353.01/61.
11. Record of Conference (S) on Redepl Policies and Procedures, Hq AGF, 27-28 Mar 45 (Question and answer session following talk by Col Faine). 337/1 (Redepl)(S)
12. History of AGF, Study No 14, Problems of Nondivisional Training in the AGF.
13. See Training Memorandum No 1, Sec, III, p. 2.
14. See note 11.
15. (1) Tng Cir 23, WD, 28 May 45. (2) Statement of Col C. N. Hunter (who prepared the draft of this circular), AGF Tng Div, G-3 Sec to AGF Hist Off, 12 Feb 4
16. See History of AGF, Study No 29, The Tank Destroyer History, p 92 ff.
17. (1) Tng Cir 34, WD, 11 Aug 45. (2) Statement of Lt Col M. G. Brennan, AGF Sec to AGF Hist Off, 10 Oct 45.
18. Ibid.
19. (1) Record of Conference (S) on Redepl Policies and Procedures, Hq AGF, 27-Mar 45, talks by AGF G-2 Representative, 28 Mar 45. 337/1 (Redepl)(S). (2) WD Gen Co Minutes (S), 2 Jul 45.

20. AGF M/S, G-3 to CofS, 2 Apr 45, sub: Tng Memo No 1. G-3 Records, 300.6 (AGF Tng Memo No 1).

21. Record of Conference (S) on Redepl Policies and Procedures, Hq AGF, 28 Mar 45, talks by Col Faine. 337/1 (Redepl)(S).

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. (1) AGF M/S, G-4 to CofS, 1 Apr 45, sub: Tng Memo No 1. G-3 Records, 300.6 (Tng Memo No 1). (2) AGF M/S, G-3 to other staff sections, 3 Mar 45, sub: AGF Tng Memo No 1 and replies thereto (various dates). Ibid.

25. (1) AGF M/S, G-3 to CofS, 1 Apr 45, sub: Tng Memo No 1. Ibid. (2) AGF M/S, Ord to G-3, 10 Mar 45, sub: Tng Memo No 1. Ibid. (3) AGF memo, G-4 to G-3, 10 Mar 45, sub: Tng Memo No 1. Ibid. (4) Statement of Lt Col G. T. Petersen, AGF Ord Sec to AGF Hist Off, 4 May and 12 Oct 45. (5) Interview of Col K. M. Matthews and other members of AGF G-4 Sec by AGF Hist Off, 10 Oct 45. (6) Statement of Maj G. R. Hill, AGF QM Sec to AGF Hist Off, 10 Oct 45. (7) Statement of Col O. K. Sadtler, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, SOS (formerly AGF Signal Off) to AGF Hist Off, 15 Sep 45.

26. AGF M/S, G-3 to CofS, 2 Apr 45, sub: Tng Memo No 1. G-3 Records, 300.6 (Tng Memo No 1).

27. Statements in this paragraph are based mainly on the following sources:
(1) Interviews of the AGF Hist Off with offs of AGF Sp Staff Secs in 1944 and 1945. (For list of officers and dates of interviews see footnotes 35 and 182, History of AGF, Study No 14, Problems of Nondivisional Training in the AGF. (2) Interview of Col K. M. Matthews and other officers of the AGF G-4 Sec by AGF Hist Off, 10 Oct 45. (3) AGF M/S (S), Ord to G-3, 13 Apr 45, sub: Maint Tng and Procedures. AGF Ord file "Ord Maint 1945" (S).

28. Statement of Maj Gen Leo Donovan to AGF Hist Off, 7 Aug 45.

29. Statements to AGF Hist Off of the following:

- (1) Col O. K. Sadtler, Officer of the CSigO, ASF (formerly AGF Signal Officer), 1 Nov 45.
- (2) Lt Col C. T. Petersen, AGF Ord Sec, 12 Oct 45.
- (3) Maj G. R. Hill, 1 Nov 45.

30. (1) Statement of Col O. K. Sadtler to AGF Hist Off, 1 Nov 45.
(2) RTP for Sig Units of AGF (printed), 1 Jun 45. Files of AGF Hist Sec.

31. Par 5 of printed RTP for each of the services in AGF, 1 Jun 45.
Ibid.

32. RTP for Engr Units of AGF (printed), 1 Jun 45. Ibid.

33. (1) Statement of Lt Col R. N. Blancett to AGF Hist Off, 1 Nov 45.
(2) Observations of AGF Hist Off, based on personal acquaintance with officers who prepared the RTPs.

34. RTP for Engr Units of the AGF, 1 Jun 45.

35. RTP for Ord Units of AGF, 1 Jun 45.

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36. RTP for Sig Units of AGF, 1 Jun 45.
37. Record of Conference (S) on Redepl Policies and Procedures. Talks by AGF G-2 representative. 337/1 (Redepl)(S).
38. (1) ASF ltr (C) SPCVK to CG AGF, 16 Jun 45, sub: Chemical Warfare Materiel Demonstration for Redeployed Divs and 1st ind by AGF, 4 Jul 45. 475/17 (Redepl)(C). (2) Statement of Lt Col T. L. Edwards, AGF Chem Sec to AGF Hist Off, 5 Nov 45.
39. (1) Statement of Col G. H. Chapman, Sp Projects Br, AGF G-3 Sec to AGF Hist Off, 28 Feb 46. (2) AGF ltr to CGs, 15 Jun 45, sub: Clothing Tng. 352/276 (QM Sch). (3) TM 5, 16 Jul 45, sub: Clothing Instruction. 353.01/5 (Tng Memos). (4) Sundry papers filed in binder marked "Clothing Training - Background." Files of Sp Projects Br, AGF G-3 Sec.
40. Ibid.
41. Statement of Col G. H. Chapman, Sp Projects Br, AGF G-3 Sec to AGF Hist Off, 28 Feb 46.
42. Information furnished AGF Hist Off by Col S. L. Weld, AGF G-3 Sec, 16 Oct 45.
43. Statement of Col S. L. Weld to AGF Hist Off, 16 Oct 45.
44. AGF M/S (S), G-3 to CofS, 30 Aug 45, sub: Returning Units Reported Not Fully Qualified. 353/1564. (Readiness)(S).
45. (1) Ibid. (2) Status Report (R) on 5th Inf Div, 12 Jun 45. 319.1/51 (Redepl)(R). (3) Statement of Brig Gen A. D. Warnock, Asst Div Comdr, 5th Inf Div to AGF Hist Off, 20 Nov 45.
46. AGF memo (S) for CofS USA, 2 Jul 45, sub: Pers for Redeployed Units. 200.3/4 (Redepl)(S).
47. Statement of Col H. T. Todd, AGF G-3 Sec to AGF Hist Off, 12 Oct 45.
48. Ibid.
49. Statement of Col S. L. Weld, AGF G-3 Sec to AGF Hist Off, 16 Oct 45. This statement is supported by a memo (draft) of Col Weld to Gen Leo Donovan (undated but Aug 45), sub: Liaison Trip to USFET. Copy in files of AGF Hist Sec.
50. (1) Statement of Col H. T. Todd to AGF Hist Off, 12 Oct 45. (2) Statement of Col S. L. Weld to AGF Hist Off, 16 Oct 45.
51. See History of AGF Study No 12, The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions, pp 43-44, 52-54, 62-64.
52. AGF M/R (S), 19 Mar 45, sub: Conference with Brig Gen Eyster, G-3 Hq ETO, on Matters Pertaining to Redepl. AGF G-1 Control Div, binder marked "Special Planning - Interim Redeployment."
53. Ibid.
54. (1) AGF M/S (S), G-3 to CofS, 3 May 45, sub: Extract from Final Rpt of Col Hans W. Holmer, Engr member, AGF Bd, MTO. 353/6 (Redepl)(S). (2) AGF ltr (S) for MTO, 9 May 45, sub: AGF Tng Memo No 1, dated 28 Apr 45. Ibid.

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55. Memo (S) of Col S. E. Faine and A. M. Parsons, AGF G-3 Sec for CofS, AGF 14 May 45, sub: Rpt of Visit to ETO Concerning Redepl Tng of Units in that Theater. 353/7 (Redepl)(S).
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Memo (draft) of Col S. L. Weld, AGF G-3 Sec for Gen Leo Donovan (undated but Aug 45. AGF Hist Sec.
59. Statement of Col S. L. Weld to AGF Hist Off, 16 Oct 45.
60. Ibid.
61. Memo (draft) of Col S. L. Weld, AGF G-3 Sec for Gen Leo Donovan (undated but Aug 45, sub: Liaison Trip to USFET. AGF Hist Sec.
62. AGF memo for CofS USA, 11 Jul 45, sub: Status Rpts on Units Scheduled for Redepl. 319.1/6 (Redepl).
63. Statement of Col S. L. Weld to AGF Hist Off, 16 Oct 45.
64. (1) Memo (R) of Lt Col John A. Hanson, G-4 TF Div, AGF for G-4 AGF, 22 Aug 45, sub: In Trip to ETO. Originally consulted in AGF G-4 Task Force Div; document missing at date of final revision. (2) Statement of Lt Col John A. Hanson to AGF Hist Off, 9 Oct 45. (3) Statement of Col S. L. Weld to AGF Hist Off, 16 Oct 45.
65. (1) Statement of Col S. L. Weld to AGF Hist Off, 16 Oct 45. (2) Chart (S), Divisional Readiness Dates (undated) prepared by Task Force Division G-3. Copy in files of AGF Hist Off.
66. Statements of this paragraph are based primarily on conversations of the AGF Hist Off with key members of the G-1, G-3 and G-4 Secs in Oct 45.
67. (1) AGF M/S, G-4 for CofS, 30 Apr 45, sub: Equip for Redepl Tng. G-4 Task Force Div. (2) AGF M/S (S), G-4 to CofS, 30 May 45, sub: Conference on Equip Priorities. Ibid. (3) Statement of Lt Col John A. Hanson, Task Force Div G-4 to AGF Hist Off, 9 Oct 45.
68. ASF memo (C) SPRLR 370.01 for CG AGF, 14 Jun 45, sub: Redepl Tng Demands for Trailer 1-ton 2 Wheel Cargo, and attached papers. 475/11 (Redepl)(C).
69. (1) Statement of Col A. L. Harding, AGF G-3 Sec to AGF Hist Off, 7 Nov 45. (2) AGF 2d ind (draft) 354.1 (R)(11 Apr 45), 21 Apr 45, on WD memo (S) WDGS 11721 for CGs AAF, AGF, ASF, 12 Apr 45, sub: WD Installations. Files of Col A. L. Harding, AGF G-3 Sec. (3) AGF M/S, G-3 to CofS, 29 May 45, sub: Stations for Divs. Ibid.
70. (1) AGF ltr (R) to CG ASF, 9 Mar 45, sub: Redepl Tng. 353/5 (Redepl)(R). (2) AGF M/S (R), G-1 to CofS, 1 Jun 45, sub: Sp Serv Supplies for Redepl Tng. Ibid.
71. AGF ltr (R) to CG ASF, 12 May 45, sub: Redepl Tng. Ibid.
72. ASF memo SPOPD 353 for CG AGF, 19 May 45, sub: Redepl Tng. Ibid.
73. AGF ltr (S) to CG ASF, 19 Jun 45, sub: Athletic Equip for Redepl Tng. 400/3 (Redepl)(S).

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74. ASF 1st ind (S) SPDOD 353 (19 Jun 45), 22 Jun 45, on AGF ltr to CG ASF, 19 Jun 45. Ibid.
75. Record of telephone conversations (R) between Col Waters, AGF and Maj Murray, Spec Serv Div ASF, 28 May 45. 353/5 (Redepl)(R).
76. Statement of Col J. F. Waters, AGF G-1 Sec to AGF Hist Off, 9 Nov 45.
77. Ibid.
78. AGF memo (R) for CofS USA, attn: G-3 Div, 1 Aug 45, sub: Athletic Equip for Redepl Tng. 418/1(R)
79. Ibid.
80. Statement of Col J. F. Waters, AGF G-1 Sec to AGF Hist Off, 9 Nov 45.
81. AGF memo (S) for CofS USA, 9 Aug 45, sub: Conditions of O'seas Movement of 86th and 97th Inf Div and Allied Repl Shipment. 353/1559 (Readiness)(S).
82. Statement of Col S. L. Weld, AGF G-3 Sec to AGF Hist Off, 16 Oct 45.
83. Statement of Col S. L. Weld, AGF G-3 Sec to AGF Hist Off, 5 Mar 46.

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