

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
 HEADQUARTERS
 EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY, KOREA (EUSAK)
 Office of the Commanding General
 APO 301

COMBAT INFORMATION BULLETIN NO. 1

Section I - North Korean Army
Tactics and Techniques

Section II- Lessons Learned

Section III-Enemy Materiel

Section I

North Korean Tactics and Technique

1. Infantry Tactics.

a. Indications are that Division tactics include a frontal attack with a strong flanking movement supported by artillery and tanks. The unit attacking frontally is widely dispersed and keeps up heavy fire, while strong flanking elements constitute the main effort. Reports indicate that enemy infantry will infiltrate our line disguised as refugees in civilian clothing carrying dis-assembled fire arms and uniforms in bundles. It is believed that ammunition and supplies are transported by carts, or porters, mostly at night. Infantry sometimes moves toward our lines along the tops of mountain ridges disguised as farmers, whose dress is predominately white. Women and children often accompany these groups. When the enemy reaches a point adjacent to and behind friendly lines they assemble their weapons. Weapons normally carried by disguised infiltrating elements are rifles, .30 cal Machine guns, mortars and grenades. Upon a given signal fire is directed from ridges upon friendly flanks and rear forcing friendly forces to retire. Further to the rear the withdrawing forces are cleverly ambushed. Logs or barbed wire road blocks are not normally used, but concentrated fire is utilized as a block to stop personnel and equipment attempting to withdraw. Road blocks are established behind friendly lines in defiles through which heavy equipment must be moved in the withdrawal. It has been reported that the enemy has usually had sufficient time to determine very accurately the route of withdrawal and has placed his automatic and heavy weapons accordingly. At the same time the enemy's main body is moving forward to mop up behind withdrawing friendly units.

b. In the attack, in some instances, a group of eight or ten enemy will raise their hands as if to surrender. When fire is lifted and friendly personnel move out to accept these prisoners, a Company sized enemy force will launch an attack from concealed positions. Several "Banzai" charges have been made by groups of 50 or more. While friendly forces concentrate fire on this group, another enemy force is sent around the flanks.

c. One U.S. Division reports that the enemy used time fire with mortars. Another U.S. Division reported that one tank, manned by an enemy crew and destroyed in their sector, was a U.S. M-24 tank.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

COPY

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF
 TAGO 530584
 ON 5/24/63 BY Smith (Vet) 2/25/61

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

d. All sources agree that guerrilla activity is a problem of major proportion. North Korean soldiers are coming through the lines as refugees, securing arms and uniforms behind our lines and operating against our rear. In one case men in enemy uniform were observed going into a house, and shortly thereafter the same number of men left the house in civilian garb. The personnel of guerrilla units are reportedly well trained in demolition work and carry about 800 grams of TNT each (1.75 lbs). They travel on foot and are armed with American BAR's, M-1 Rifles, water cooled machine guns, and Japanese rifles.

e. In several cases North Korean soldiers in uniform and carrying weapons were seen walking down a road into the vicinity of our positions. A few minutes later, a group of 4 or 5 men followed, which in turn was followed by a group of 10 and 12. As the main body came forward, it deployed about 2000 yards from our positions and disappeared from sight. The enemy could not be seen again until they were within 700 yards of our positions, at which time our troops would catch glimpses of individuals moving about. A skirmish line was not used. Instead, groups of about 15 men operated as tactical units. The number of these groups varied according to the size of the force, but the groups appeared to be of standard size in all cases. A small force of the enemy usually engaged our forces frontally while the bulk executed a double envelopment. This double envelopment was executed in nearly every attack. Another feature of these envelopments was in their depth, which frequently reached behind regimental CP's. At night the signal for an envelopment was usually a white flare. Bugle calls have also been used as signals for attacks.

f. At night it is common for small raiding parties to seek out and destroy mortars and ammunition stocks, moving deliberately to these locations.

g. To gain what our troops believed to be inaccessible high ground the enemy, in one instance, used a device similar to a whale harpoon, shooting the harpoon, with a rope attached, to high ground. Enemy troops then climbed the rope and attacked our positions from the rear. The rear was not covered because our troops believed the vertical cliffs prevented infiltration from this direction.

h. In one case, a group of approximately 200 refugees consisting of women, children and old men walked into the battle position from the direction of the enemy. They proceeded through the battle position creating confusion as our forces rounded them up for processing. At this time the enemy launched a frontal attack, the leading elements mingling with the stragglers of the refugee group. The refugees had no weapons nor uniforms, and upon interrogation revealed that they were directed by the North Koreans to proceed in the direction taken.

i. Information from patrols indicates that the enemy does not stay in villages during the daytime but disperses to the hills. As night patrols are fired on from the villages it is presumed the enemy returns to the villages at night. One dawn patrol surprised a group of North Korean soldiers eating a village. This patrol captured two bundles, each bundle containing a complete change of clothing (white) and a package of money (approximately 5,000 S.K. Won). Military equipment, hand grenades and small arms ammunition were also found in the same area.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

COPY

j. It is believed that crew served weapons have at least one expert in the crew. The accuracy of artillery and mortar fire indicates that this man together with the observer is well qualified. The other crew members, as well as the infantry rifleman, are believed to be considered expendible. The enemy recruits such expendibles from the villages and towns as it goes, gives them two or three days training and drives them into the lines. It is apparent that the enemy is perfectly willing to sacrifice these newly recruited soldiers.

k. The enemy will occupy every terrain feature that we do not physically occupy. He does this with what appears to be groups of civilians who have uniforms and weapons hidden in bundles, and are brought through the lines with the refugees. In mass frontal attacks, refugees and civilians are often pushed ahead of the infantry while the tanks and automatic weapons attack from the flanks. These mass attacks are usually made after a series of repulses.

2. Camouflage and Concealment.

All agree that the enemy is a master of camouflage and concealment. When not moving he is practically impossible to see unless he is against the sky-line. Careful observation discloses that enemy soldiers camouflage their uniforms and entrenching tools. When digging in, they use very short strokes with the entrenching tool and place the excess earth on a cloth spread on the ground. This spoil is dragged away and disposed elsewhere so as not to disclose the position. A man will spend hours digging in by this method and although theoretically within full view, his activities can hardly be seen. Their art of concealing the location of small arms is very effective. Although they can be heard our troops are unable to see the flash. Their small arms is reported to be rather inaccurate, but volume of fire is great. The fact that the enemy is camouflage-conscious is born out by statements from our Liaison and Reconnaissance planes who have stated on occasion that 'No enemy observed in certain sectors', where later ground contact was made. Enemy troops have been known to camouflage their bodies with mud and wear American uniforms in an attempt to infiltrate our lines. The enemy is reluctant to enter action during day-light hours, and his tanks and trucks that earlier drove brazenly down principle roads now make extensive use of back roads and trails. The use of haystacks to camouflage tanks and fuel dumps is common practice. Concealing operational vehicles among destroyed ones, hiding them under bridges, over-passes or in tunnels are measures being employed to protect tanks and transports. One method of hiding tanks is by knocking the wall out of a house and driving the tank inside. The area of the removed wall is then camouflaged. In one instance pontoon bridges were used for foot traffic at night and removed in the daytime. Towed ammunition vehicles have been observed as ox-drawn carts.

3. Armored Units.

The North Korean tank regiment is believed to be of strength equivalent to the U.S. tank battalion. Tanks normally precede the infantry by 15 - 45 minutes in the attack, press through our forward positions to the rear searching out heavy close support weapons and tanks. In one known case however the tanks did not spearhead the attack but came in about an hour later from the flanks. Infantry in this case used rifles and automatic weapons. North Korean tanks move generally along secondary roads and trails to avoid aerial observation and attacks. Movement at night without lights has been the rule to date.

Orders are usually received from the Infantry Division Commander by the Tank Regimental Commander who relays them to lower echelons. Infantry moves out approximately 1 kilometer; tanks moved up in line, take defensive positions and shell our positions. Small groups infiltrate during darkness and then rally for an attack in coordination with the frontal attack by tanks and infantry.

4. Communications.

Telephone codes are believed to be changed daily with messages revised by one cryptographer per battalion, regimental and division headquarters. A single wire telephone net is laid from a Regiment to its battalion, while communications from Regiments to Division headquarters and supporting artillery units is by radio.

Section II

Lessons Learned

1. Defensive Tactics.

a. The problem of combating enemy tactics of flanking and enveloping our rear is of major proportion when fighting a delaying action to gain time and avoid decisive action. Because of the many techniques used by the enemy to infiltrate positions at night, regimental, battalion and smaller unit commanders are constantly faced with the problem of organizing to gain maximum flexibility for counter-attack and defense. As one regimental commander stated "defensive positions must have depth. Linear defense so far has proved unsatisfactory".

b. The fact that the enemy will occupy all terrain features that we do not physically occupy, with what appear to be civilians or refugees, has caused commanders to forcibly deny if necessary, any refugees within their sectors. They must be sent back toward the enemy lines. One combat commander emphasized that if it becomes necessary to disengage for a withdrawal, a move of at least 5000 yards is needed to give sufficient time for reorganization, reconnaissance and occupation.

2. Security.

Employment of basic Infantry Artillery Tactics are of utmost importance, i.e., strong local security and perimeter defense in depth in every case regardless of the size unit and its location to the front line. Coordination between counterattack elements to increase effectiveness is essential. Because infiltration methods used by the North Korean troops are effective in sufficient force to cause complete over-run of units from company to battalion size, definite assignments of responsible sectors of observation to security and outpost elements is of extreme importance, particularly when South Korean troops are occupying positions in the vicinity of U.S. forces. Timely warning is the key to reducing losses of personnel and equipment resulting from cleverly planned ambushes and road blocks. Personnel should be well dug in and prepared to fire in any direction. It is essential that the defense plan be complete and wired in. Constant information of the situation in adjacent sectors is necessary for flank security.

3. Prior Planning.

~~SECRET~~

a. Careful selection of positions cannot be overemphasized. Terrain features encountered in the battle area demand that every precaution be taken to select positions that afford maximum cover, concealment and protection of troops. A glaring example of poor judgement was reflected in the selection of positions at the base of an almost vertical stone cliff, where enemy artillery and mortar fired anywhere against the cliff could reduce the positions. Continued reconnaissance after occupation is essential particularly where heavy or crew served weapons are involved. Every precaution must be taken in planning to evacuate both personnel and equipment. In several instances critical items of equipment were abandoned, i.e., 2 radio jeeps, 1 SCR 399 radio van complete and 3 M-26 tanks. All are considered to have been captured intact by the enemy.

b. Orientation and instruction of personnel in the use and value of demolitions, obstacles and mine fields to delay enemy advances is essential. Plans must be made well in advance and aggressively executed at the appropriate time.

c. In the accomplishment of initial ground missions, commanders should give careful consideration to an appropriate approach march formation after leaving the assembly area with particular emphasis on patrols to protect flanks and rear, to gain contact with adjacent units, and to secure information of the enemy and terrain. Reports indicate instances of commanders having moved from the assembly area to the line of departure with troops loaded in trucks, which could have easily resulted in surprise flank or frontal attacks.

d. Information obtained from interrogation of 3.5 Rocket Launcher crews indicate that enemy tanks have been stopped by one hit. Rocket Launcher crews should be trained and reminded not to fire from positions with backs close to a wall. Back blast has been reported to knock out walls when crew fired with backs too close. It is recommended that when firing in towns, positions be changed after firing the second round. Results of hits observed were very effective. Most tanks and crews were burned out immediately after being hit.

4. Tactical Air Support.

a. The exploitation of tactical air support by divisions is of utmost importance. USAF forward controllers (TACP's) are allocated within means available, i.e., one per Infantry Regiment. These TACP's are the means by which Division and Regimental commanders employ the tactical air made available to them. To this extent the selection of targets should be very carefully considered PRIOR to the arrival of close support aircraft. Priority of targets in the area, method of control, land marks to be used in directing the aircraft to the target and the possibility of artillery marking the target must be predetermined. Experience to date indicates too much time is wasted by requesting aircraft to orbit or wait airborne while such details are being accomplished. This responsibility must be assumed by the Unit CO and not the TACP.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

b. The protection and security of the TACP is a responsibility of the unit to which the TACP is attached. On two occasions these TACP's and equipment were lost to the enemy foot elements because ground force units failed to notify the party to withdraw and failed to provide security.

c. The nature of the radio equipment used by TACP's precludes fast moves over rough terrain if the equipment is to remain operational. Planned moves by the ground unit should be coordinated with the TACP in sufficient time to permit proper securing of their radio equipment. In several cases the equipment was damaged and rendered inoperative because of lack of such planning.

d. A positive system of communication must be established between G-3 Air at Division, TACP's and Division Artillery. In many cases aircraft have failed to locate lucrative targets which could have been marked by artillery fire had such communications and coordination existed.

e. Division G-3 Air should evaluate requests for air strikes prior to submission to JOG. With limited air capabilities, air effort is wasted or misused on targets such as "battery of artillery" which turns out to be a mortar position within artillery range, or a "concentration" of troops which actually is a squad.

f. In an effort to establish better control and communication between ground elements and Liaison and Tactical Air Control aircraft, the following technique, using the SCR 300 radio set is being used successfully in this theater. Installations to date have been made in the AT-6 type aircraft (known as Mosquito Control) presently being used to spot and control friendly air strikes in close support of ground units. With this installation the aircraft acts as a relay station for ground SCR 300 nets and is capable of getting exact location of both friendly and enemy troops, acts as air OP for ground units, and receive new air strike missions direct from front line units.

g. In brief, the following method of installation was used.

- (1) The whip antenna removed and use made of the already existing aircraft aerial.
- (2) The battery pack, BA 70, disconnected and placed either behind the rear seat or in the cargo compartment, thus cutting down on the package size of the radio.
- (3) The battery cable is lengthened to a length at least 6 feet in order to move the battery to a suitable place. Suitable wire is used in order to keep the voltage drop to a minimum.
- (4) The small radio package is then installed by a rope or brackets to any point in the aircraft that would be accessible to the pilot or the observer.
- (5) The already existing headphone and microphone in the aircraft gives better performance than those normally used with the SCR 300.

~~SECRET~~

- (6) The above installation increases the range of the SCR 300 from an effective range of 3 miles to an effective range of 40 to 60 miles depending upon the terrain and weather. Ground radio should use the long antenna for the best results.

Section III

Enemy Materiel

The following are some weapons known or believed to be in the North Korean People's Army:

1. Soviet 7.62 mm PPsh 1941 Sub-machine gun
 - System of Operation - Blow back; selective Automatic and Semi-automatic
 - Weight - 10.5 lbs unloaded, 11.6 lbs loaded, w/drum magazine, 8.3 lbs unloaded, 9.09 lbs loaded w/box magazine.
 - Feeding Device - Either 72 rd drum magazine or 35 rd box magazine.
 - Maximum Range - 875 yards
2. Soviet 7/62 mm M1891/30 Rifle
 - System of Operation - Manually operated, turning bolt action
 - Weight - 9.92 unloaded, 10.18 loaded w/bayonet and sling.
 - Feeding Device - 5 rd box magazine.
 - Maximum Range - 3,200 yards.
 - Effective Range - 440 yards w/iron sights, 880 yards w/telescopic sight
3. Soviet 7.62 mm DP Light Machine Gun
 - System of Operation - Gas operated, automatic fire only.
 - Weight - Gun w/o Magazine 20.72 lbs. With Magazine 26.88 lbs.
 - Maximum Range - 3300 yards w/M1908 light ball, 5500 yards w/M1930 heavy ball.
 - Effective Range - Ground 880 yards, AA 550 yards.
 - Practical Rate of Fire - 80 RPM

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

4. Soviet 7.62 mm M1910 Maximum Hvy Machine Gun
- System of Operation - Recoil operated w/gas assist.
- Weight - 152 lbs w/mount, 145 w/o mount.
- Feeding Device - 250 rd fabric belt.
- Maximum Range - 5500 yards w/heavy ball, 3300 yards w/light ball.
- Effective Range - Ground 1,100 yards, AA w/o special AA sight 550 yards, w/special AA sight 1,100 yards
5. Soviet 82 mm M1941 Battalion Mortar
- Caliber - 82 mm (3.23 in)
- Weight in traveling position - 118 lbs for pack, 111.33 lbs for towing
- Weight in firing position - 99.21 lbs
- Maximum Range - HE - 3,326 yards.
- Rate of Fire - Up to 25 RPM
6. Soviet F-1 Defensive Hand Grenade
- Type - Defensive, Fragmentation.
- Weight and Type of filling - 2 oz TNT.
- Length of Delay - 3.5 - 4.5 seconds.
- Average Range - 40 - 50 yards
- Effective Range of Fragmentation - Up to 220 yards
7. Soviet 76 mm Field Gun M1939
- Caliber - 76.2 mm (3 in)
- Weight in firing position - 3,272 lbs
- Weight in traveling position - 5,291 lbs
- Elevation Limits - 6° to 45°

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Total traverse - 60°

8. Soviet 122 mm Field Howitzer

Caliber - 121.9 mm (4.8 in)

Weight in firing position - 4,961 lbs

Weight in traveling position - 6,173 lbs

9. Soviet 45 mm Anti-Tank Gun M1942

Caliber - 45 mm (1.77 in)

Weight in firing position - 1,257 lbs

Weight in traveling position - 2,701 lbs

Elevation limits - 8° to + 25°

Total traverse - 60°

10. Soviet T-34/76 Med Tank

Weight - 30.8 tons

Maximum frontal armor - Hull 1.8 inches at 60°

Maximum side armor - 1.8 inches vertical

Armament

Main - One 76 mm Gun

Rounds carried - 77

Maximum Range HE - 13,200 yards

Penetration APHE - 546 yards at 30° 2.72 inches

Performance

Maximum Speed - 35 MPH

Range of Action - 186 miles

Maximum trench crossing - 8.2 feet

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

COPY

Maximum vertical - 2.1 feet
step

WALKER
Lt Gen USA

OFFICIAL

s/ Bullock
for t/ DABNEY
G-3

DISTRIBUTION:
"B" & "S"

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

COPY