

*Major Daniel G. Doyle, 188-RTZ*

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# ADVISORS' HANDBOOK



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~~RESTRICTED~~

UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
8202d AU  
Office of the Chief  
APO 301

c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, Calif  
1 March 1951

ADVISOR'S HANDBOOK

1. This handbook is published for your guidance and reference with the purpose:

a. To give the functions, objectives, mission and standards of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (K MAG).

b. To provide a complete picture of the organizational structure of the Korean Army and of K MAG.

c. To show certain internal functions of K MAG, particularly administrative procedures, internal supply system, and the interpreter service.

d. To furnish certain functioning and procedures of the staff sections as explained in ~~the~~ staff annexes.

2. Thorough familiarization with this handbook and strict compliance with the prescribed procedures should expedite the efficient accomplishment of the K MAG mission and the successful termination of this campaign.

  
F. W. FARRELL  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army  
Chief

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A D V I S O R ' S H A N D B O O K

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# I N D E X

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SUBJECT: Advisor's Handbook

TO: All KMAG Advisors

PART I - GENERAL

SECTION I. ORIENTATION

1. Original Objective.

Prior to 25 June 1950 when the North Korean aggressor crossed the 38° North Parallel into the Republic of Korea, the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) was assisting the infant republic in the organization, administration, equipping, and training of the Korean Army and National Police. An initial major objective of KMAG was the training of the Korean Army to perform capably the mission: Defense of the 38° North Parallel against aggression.

2. Function and Mission.

Presently, KMAG is an integral part in the combat effort of the Eighth U.S. Army Korea (EUSAK). It is the advisory agency (with operational, liaison, and supervisory functions) of the Commanding General, EUSAK with the Department of National Defense of the Republic of Korea. The primary mission of KMAG is to advise, in accordance with EUSAK orders and directives, the Korean commanders and staffs in the combat operations waged by Republic of Korea (ROK) Army units. In support of the combat operations, KMAG assists the normal military functions of the ROK Army (See Charts 1, 2 and 3, Inclosures 1, 2 and 3).

3. Command Relationship.

a. Chief, KMAG is responsible to the Commanding General, EUSAK for advice to the ROK Army in organization, administration, training, equipping, and combat operations; and for advice to the Korean National Police.

b. Each United States Army Officer, KMAG is responsible to his immediate United States Army military superior and to Chief, KMAG.

4. Organization, Staff Officers:

4. Mission, KMAG Officers: The mission of all KMAG Officers is:

a. To advise the Korean counterparts so as to provide them with the benefits of the military experience of the KMAG officers in order to accomplish successfully the overall combat mission.

b. To function as an information gathering and reporting agency so that accurate and timely reports on all phases of the military operation can be forwarded through United States channels to Chief, KMAG.

5. Standards for Advisors.

a. In the execution of his advisory mission, the advisor begins with considerable prestige which he must continually endeavor to maintain. With finesse and intelligence many advisors have made recommendations to their counterparts so logically and effectively that United States military doctrine stands out clearly in the issuance and execution of orders by Korean counterparts. Advisors should establish cordial relationships with their counterparts; and are cautioned to avoid issues over authority. They will insure the teamwork in preparation of plans, in checks on execution of orders, and in coordination of logistical support essential to the accomplishment of the operational mission. Whenever hot spots occur, they will go there with their counterparts and assist in the coordination of attacks, defense, and counterattacks; especially the air, artillery, and naval gun fire support.

b. In the performance of his information gathering and reporting mission, the unit field advisor is charged with rendering periodic and flash reports as prescribed and with particular attention to their accuracy and timeliness. Senior Field Advisors are directly responsible to their United States superior officers for the accomplishment of the above mission. They alone are responsible that communications are always open, never closed down. They must know the normal procedures under which radio traffic is handled and must give important outgoing message sufficiently high precedence classification to insure timely encoding and transmission. Accordingly, the signal personnel and the communications net must be attuned to meet the exigencies of the tactical situation, the movement of command posts, and the changes in the composition of forces. A backlog of incoming messages must be anticipated and, when necessary, normal procedures must be modified and the signal personnel placed on an overtime basis. Senior Advisors must insist that all members of their staffs know the capabilities, limitations and working rules of the communications teams necessary for efficient execution of the timely transmission and receipt of official messages.

c. Senior Advisors will maintain in their organizations the same high standards of discipline required in any United States Army command. In an isolated unit such as an advisory group, high standards in performance of duty and in individual conduct are of the utmost importance. Senior Advisors will devote particular attention to the welfare of the individual and maintain the high morale distinguishing all United States Army units.

## SECTION II. ORGANIZATION OF THE KOREAN ARMY AND OF KMAG.

### 6. Organization of the Korean Army.

The organization of the Korean Army is shown in Charts #1, 2, and 3, Inclosures. With a Department of National Defense organized along U.S. lines, but also exercising the functions of our Department of the Army, the Korean channel of responsibility goes directly to the Chief of Staff, Korean Army. From the Chief of Staff the chain of responsibility proceeds directly to Korean Corps Commanders. (There is no intervening field Army Commander or headquarters and, hence, Headquarters Korean Army exercises the usual operational functions of the U.S. Field Army Headquarters). In the Korean Corps and Divisions Headquarters, the organizational structure is based upon and closely parallels the structure of U.S. organizations. The organization of the Division is based upon U.S. organization but lacks the fire power of the U.S. unit. The principal shortage in fire power is apparent upon analyzing the Division Artillery structure. Instead of a Division Artillery of three 105mm gun batteries and one 155mm Howitzer battery, the Korean Division has only one battalion of 105mm Artillery. Also the Division does not have within the Infantry regiments, tanks, heavy mortars, or recoilless weapons. Present plans, however, call for an augmentation in each Division of one heavy tank company, one battery of 155mm artillery, and recoilless weapons at the company levels where prescribed in the U.S. organizational structure.

7. The organization of KMAG is shown in Charts #4, 5, and 6, Inclosures #4, 5, and 6, to G-3 Annex #3.

a. Chart #4, United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea shows the KMAG Headquarters organizational structure; particularly the correlating advisory agency to each Korean Staff Division.

b. Chart #5, KMAG Corps Headquarters, portrays the KMAG organization functioning with ROK Corps Headquarters.

c. Chart #6, KMAG Division Headquarters, illustrates the KMAG organization prescribed to function with the Headquarters of ROK Divisions.

d. From the Ordnance and Quartermaster Staff Sections of KMAG Headquarters, advisors are assigned to Ordnance and Quartermaster Army Service Troops supporting combat operations.

e. In summary, KMAG advisors function from the Headquarters Korean Army level down to include the battalion level in combat units, and down to company in some of the Korean Army Service Units.

NOTE: Also see Section II, Organization, G-3 Annex #3.

## SECTION III. INTERNAL FUNCTIONS, KMAG HEADQUARTERS.

### 8. Important Administrative Procedures.

a. OFFICIAL OFFICERS REGISTER: The official officers register is maintained in the Adjutant General's Section. Officers will sign in and/or out when remaining at, or being absent from, this headquarters for periods in excess of twenty-four (24) hours.

b. PAYMENT: Personnel of all sections within KMAG are paid by a Class A Agent. Full use should be made of allotments of pay, since facilities for obtaining money orders or US Treasury Checks are not readily available to most units in the field.

c. IDENTIFICATION TAGS: Wearing of Identification Tags is required. Personnel who do not have Identification Tags may obtain them by submitting the following information to this office: Name, service number, last tetanus immunization, blood type and religious preference.

d. POSTAL INFORMATION: (1) The mailing address for personnel assigned this group is: KMAG, APO 301, c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California.

(2) Free mailing privilege is extended to members of the Armed Forces of the United States on active duty in Korea. Mail matter to be entitled to free transmission must:

(a) Be addressed for delivery in the United States, its territories and possessions, or to Army - Air Force or Navy Post Offices, wherever located.

(b) Be deposited for mailing in a U.S. APO in Korea.

(c) Have in the upper left corner of the address side the hand written name of the sender, service number, grade, unit designation and complete military address.

(d) Have in the upper right corner of the address side, in the hand writing of the sender, the word Free. If air mail is desired, inscribe the words air mail below the word Free.

(e) Be normal size letters weighing one (1) ounce or less.

(3) Members of the Armed Forces may send gift packages into the United States valued at fifty dollars (\$50.00) or less, free of customs duty if acquired as a gift, purchased at a PX, a Ships Store, or on the indigenous market in Korea or Japan. Such packages will have attached WD AGO Form 159, completed by the sender. Part B of the form will be executed by a certifying officer.

(4) At present war souvenirs such as guns, swords, knives etc., will not be accepted for mailing by any APO in the Far East Command.

e. PERSONAL EFFECTS: Under no circumstances will the effects of personnel KIA or MIA be forwarded to the next-of-kin direct. All such effects will be forwarded to this headquarters for disposition through proper channels.

f. LETTER OF INQUIRY? Letters of inquiry from the relative or a friend of an individual casualty addressed to a commander of Chaplain by name or official designation will be referred to this office for reply. If the addressee is a personal friend of the writer the letter of inquiry may be answered direct. Any statement relative to a casualty however, will be cleared with this office to ensure that any information given in reply is in accord with the official report of casualty.

9. Internal Supply, KMAG.

The supply of KMAG field personnel is a matter of particular concern to Chief, KMAG. Dispersion of detachments, poor roads, limited transportation facilities, and prolonged periods of bad weather complicate the problem of logistical support. To overcome these obstacles, the internal supply of KMAG is placed under the Headquarters Commandant, with an operating agency, the Director of Supply, acting as the executor for all logistical matters. To facilitate and expedite logistical support of field installations, there is attached to each Corps Advisory Detachment, a Corps Supply Detachment consisting of one (1) officer and one (1) enlisted man. It is the function of this section to insure that requisitions are properly and promptly submitted to this headquarters; that supplies are promptly drawn and delivered to using units, and that effective liaison is maintained with the Director of Supply to insure continuing prompt and adequate logistical support of field personnel. Details of this internal supply are prescribed in letter this headquarters, subject: SOP for Internal Supply, KMAG, dated 20 December 1950.

10. Interpreter Service, KMAG.


Of the utmost importance to an Advisor is the interpreter. Interpreters will be provided by this Headquarters (AC of S, G1) to newly arrived field advisors prior to their departure from this Headquarters. Recruited from civilian life, with little military experience, interpreters are entitled to the pay, allowances, and privileges of first lieutenants but have no command status. They must meet prescribed physical, educational, and loyalty clearance standards. Interpreters are entitled to the same consideration given other officers, and menial jobs will not be imposed upon them. The support of the interpreter is a responsibility of the ROK unit where he is attached. Advisors are morally responsible that their interpreters have the necessary items of clothing and individual equipment. Reassignments of interpreters will be promptly reported to this headquarters (AC of S, G1) giving name, rank, and serial number of the interpreter, the circumstances of the reassignment, and the name and assignment of the losing, or gaining, advisors.

11. Reference.

a. For your reference, five (5) staff annexes are published as Part II, and two (2) KMAG Standing Operating Procedures, and one (1) letter are published as Part III of this handbook.

b. The Advisor's Handbook is supplemented by other publications of this Headquarters, and it is planned to keep the present Handbooks up to date by issuance of appropriate KMAG letters, memorandums, and SOP's.

# KOREAN ARMY



DAVID  
KIM





# ADVISOR'S HANDBOOK

## G-1

### 1. Functions of the G-1 Advisor's Section.

a. At Army level the principal functions of the G-1 Advisor's Section are:

- (1) Advising and assisting in the over-all G-1 functions of the Korean Army.
- (2) Keeping the Chief, KMAG, Chief of Staff, and all interested General and Special Staff Advisors informed of the personnel situation in the Korean Army.
- (3) Furnishing KA strength reports to FUSAF, and effecting necessary coordination of appropriate personnel matters between Korean Army G-1 and other United Nations Forces in Korea.

b. At Corps and Division level the G-1 Advisor functions are:

- (1) Advising and assisting in G-1 functions.
- (2) Keeping Corps and Division Senior Advisors informed of the personnel situation in the respective commands.
- (3) Keeping the Senior G-1 Advisor at Army level informed of any unusual personnel problems or situations at their levels.

### 2. G-1 Organization.

a. The organization and functions of the Korean Army G-1 section are shown by Chart No. 1, Inclosure No. 4.

b. The organization and functions of the Korean Army G-1 Advisor section are shown by Chart No. 2, Inclosure No. 5.

c. The G-1 Advisor section at Corps level consists of only one officer. At Division level the G-1 Advisor's functions are performed by one officer who is assigned as G-1/G-4 Advisor. There is no officer provided in the FMAG T/O as S-1 Advisor at regimental level. However, the tactical advisors assigned to the regiments and battalions have an additional duty of advising in S-1 functions at regimental level and battalion level, respectively.

### 3. Mission.

a. At Army level the mission of the G-1 Advisor is to:

- (1) Advise and assist the G-1 in the formulation of Korean Army personnel policies, procedures, and directives (using U.S. Army doctrine and methods).

- (2) Assist G-1 in planning, coordinating, and expediting the overall G-1 functions in support of the Army mission.
- (3) Effect necessary coordination of appropriate personnel matters between G-1 KA and EUSAK.

b. At Corps and Division level the mission of the G-1 Advisors is to advise and assist counterparts in planning and coordinating activities pertaining to the G-1 functions (See par 15, FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Procedure, dated July 1950).

#### 4. Hints to Corps and Division G-1 Advisors.

a. Check daily the personnel daily summary report. Keep the Senior Advisors informed of strengths, casualties, etc.

b. Assist in the allocating and assignment of replacements to, and within, divisions; coordinate the necessary transportation.

c. Coordinate with the counterparts, Corps and Division Provost Marshals, and field team from the office of Advisor to the FMG on matters of discipline, law and order. Place particular emphasis on the collecting and disposition of stragglers.

d. Inform the counterparts and Provost Marshals of the policies of United Nations Headquarters pertaining to the care and treatment of prisoners of war.

e. Assist Senior Advisors in the preparation of recommendations for U.S. Army decorations for Korean Army personnel.

f. Assist, when directed, in the distribution of U.N. relief supplies and coordinate the necessary transportation.

g. Coordinate with counterparts in the site location and internal arrangement of command posts. Secure adequate accommodations to meet the needs of the KMAG Group at the location of the Corps and Division command posts.

#### 5. Miscellaneous.


a. Arrangements for the administration (records, pay, etc) of Korean Army personnel integrated into the UN Forces in Korea are coordinated by the Army G-1 Advisor.

b. The Army G-1 Advisor is responsible for the final preparation and processing of recommendations for awards and decorations for personnel of KMAG. (This is the only KMAG G-1 function performed by the G-1 Advisor. All other KMAG personnel matters are handled by the KMAG Adjutant General and Deputy Chief of Staff).

#### 4. Inclosures:


- Incl #1, marked #4, Chart Organization of G-1
- Incl #2, marked #5, Chart Organization, Advisor G-1, KA
- Incl #3, marked #6, Chart Procurement of Enlisted Personnel
- Incl #4, marked #7, Chart Procurement of Officers

# ORGANIZATION OF G1



# ORGANIZATIONAL CHART


## ADVISOR G-1, KOREAN ARMY



Inclosure No 5

# PROCUREMENT OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL


士兵補充経路圖解



INCLOSURE NO 6

# PROCUREMENT OF OFFICERS

將校補充経路図解



INCLOSURE NO7

# ADVISOR'S HANDBOOK

## G-2

### 1. Functions of KMIAG G-2 Section

The functions of the KMIAG G-2 Section are:

- a. To keep Chief KMIAG and all interested agencies and sections fully informed of the enemy situation and capabilities, and of weather and terrain.
- b. To advise the Korean counterparts so as to provide them with the benefit of the military experience of the KMIAG officers in order to accomplish successfully the over-all combat mission.
- c. To assist the Chief of Staff in the coordination of functions pertaining to intelligence and counterintelligence.
- d. To plan and supervise intelligence training of the G-2 Section and, in coordination with G-3, such training within KMIAG.

### 2. Organization of Corps and Divisions G-2 Sections

The G-2 functions are performed at KMIAG Corps levels by one officer assigned as G-2. At division levels, the G-2 functions are executed by an officer assigned as G-2/G-3. There is no officer provided in the KMIAG T/O as S-2/S-3 at regimental and battalion levels. However, the tactical advisors assigned to the regiments and battalions have an additional duty of advising in S-2 functions at the regimental level and battalion levels, respectively.

### 3. Mission

At Corps and Division levels, the G-2 mission is:

- a. To advise the Korean G-2 counterparts so as to enable them to accomplish their mission, and
- b. To act as an information gathering and reporting agency so that accurate, timely, and prescribed G-2 reports on the enemy situation and capabilities may be forwarded through American channels to Chief KMIAG and all interested agencies and sections.

### 4. Detailed Instructions

The G-2 field advisor should supervise or perform the following activities.

b. New Type Captured Enemy Equipment: New type captured enemy equipment should be immediately reported and held in special custody pending instructions for its disposition by this Headquarters.

c. Captured Documents: All documents collected from enemy dead and from POWs should be examined for timely and important information. Such information should be classified secret and, if affecting adjacent units and higher headquarters, reported with the utmost practicable speed.

d. Daily Intelligence Plan: A daily Intelligence Plan will be prepared at division level. This plan should contain detailed instructions to the Korean collection agencies, among the most important of which are ground patrols. Effective ground patrolling, difficult to achieve in any army, is particularly so in the Korean Army because of its lack of training and the lack of appreciation by Korean commanders of the vital nature of ground patrolling. Hence, the advisor must constantly stress to the Korean commander the importance and necessity of ground patrolling, must actively assist in the preparation of patrol plans and of detailed instructions for patrols, and do everything in his power to assure the actual execution of patrol missions. Advisors must assure that information from all sources must be reported to higher headquarters and affected adjacent headquarters with the utmost practicable speed.

e. Intelligence Estimate: G-2 Advisors will keep continuously abreast of the tactical situation and will be prepared to present an intelligence estimate-of-the-situation at any time.

## 5. Combat Intelligence

a. Prescribed Reports: Daily Unit Intelligence Reports, Special Situation Reports, and Spot Reports should be submitted by the most expeditious means.

b. Report Schedule: (NOTE: Code where necessitated).

<u>TYPE REPORT</u>	<u>DIVS TO CORPS</u>	<u>CORPS TO KTAG</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Unit Report	2000	2100	24 hour period ending 1800. Report has appropriate paragraphs relative to intelligence
Special Report	0800	0900	Brief general picture of situation with negative information being reported in absence of positive information.
Spot Report	At once	At once	Includes who, what, when, where, and why, with an evaluation symbol (see paragraph 8 below).

6. Counterintelligence.

a. G-2 should execute the necessary security surveillance within the Advisory Headquarters at Corps and Division levels.

b. G-2 should supervise the necessary security surveillance measures within the Korean Headquarters at Corps and Division levels. (Note: Such inspections are a function of the Korean CIG).

7. Tactical Propaganda. Special attention should be given to reporting:

- a. The number of POWs carrying surrender leaflets.
- b. Refugee movement trends.
- c. Civilian attitudes in areas of probable revolt.

8. Evaluation System.

Information will be examined, analyzed, and evaluated in accordance with paragraphs 50-34, FM 30-5, as to source and accuracy. The evaluation symbols (See FM 32-18) are listed below:

<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>ACCURACY</u>
A Reliable	1 Confirmed by other sources, true
B Usually reliable	2 Probably true
C Fairly reliable	3 Possibly true
D Doubtfully reliable	4 Doubtfully true
E Unreliable	5 Improbable
F Unknown	6 Cannot be judged

NOTE: The use of the letter symbol with the numbers can take any combination, i.e., C-6, B-5, F-3, etc., as the credibility of the source and the accuracy of the information are considered separately, then joined as a rating symbol.



a. To exercise operational control of the KMAG Light Aircraft Section.

## SECTION II

### ORGANIZATION

1. The troop basis for the Korean Army has been established at 250,000. Generally, the breakdown of this figure is 135,000 troops comprising 10 Infantry Divisions, 64,000 troops comprising Army supporting troop units, Army and Corps Headquarters, and the training cadres of the various service schools and replacement training centers. The remainder are trainees in the RTC's, students in the service schools and patients in the hospitals.

2. The ROK Inf Division is similar in structure to the American Division, although certain supporting units, Armor, AAA, Artillery and Heavy Mortar units, organic to the American Division are not included. (See Incl #1 #1).

3. Two Corps Headquarters are in operation and are organized in much the same manner as American Corps Headquarters. (See Incl #2).

4. A complete organization of Army supporting units to support a 10 division Army has been developed and is operating. This organization includes Engr, QM, Signal, Field Artillery, Ordnance, Military Police, Medical, CIC and HID units. (See Incls #3 and #3 to Part I).

5. The Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) has a total strength of approximately 1,000 officers and men. Both advisors and administrative personnel are included in this figure. KMAG parallels the organization of the Korean Army with Advisors assigned (at all levels) down to Battalion in tactical units and to company in some of the service elements. The structure of KMAG organization is shown in Incls 4, 5, and 6.

## SECTION III

### TRAINING

#### 1. GENERAL.

Prior to the war the Korean Army established a replacement and school system similar to that utilized in the U.S. Army. This system operated at maximum efficiency and was designed to train officers and enlisted personnel in the jobs and technical specialities necessary to support a 100,000 man Army. The school system conducted basic and advanced officers training in each branch of the service and included a Command and General Staff College which was operating at full capacity. With the outbreak of hostilities and a rapid withdrawal to the south, the school and replacement system was disrupted. Additionally, the school and replacement system utilized prior to the war became impractical as a result of the Army's increase from 100,000 to 250,000 and the necessity for maintaining increased replacements. In September 1950, seven (7) replacement training centers were or-

ganized for the purpose of training basic enlisted replacements, and the various branch schools were placed under central control at the Korean Army Ground General School. Here officer candidates were trained for all arms and services.

2. With the progress of the war and the stabilization of the combat picture the school and replacement system for the Korean Army was recently redesigned to meet the present and foreseeable needs. During February 1951 the Korean Army Ground General School was redesignated The Infantry School, and separate schools were established for Signal, Engineers, Ordnance and Artillery. In addition to officer candidate courses, these schools conduct officer basic and advanced courses and those enlisted specialized courses pertaining to the branch concerned. The replacement centers have been inactivated and one well-organized training center established with a capacity of 14,000. (See Incl #7).

3. To develop a higher standard of non-commissioned officer a Leaders School was organized and began operations 1 March 1951 with a capacity of 7200. (See Incl #7).

4. While no large unit training programs have been conducted since the outbreak of the war, a division rehabilitation program has been developed and is operating. As the situation will permit divisions will be rotated through this 4 weeks rehabilitation and retraining. Already one division is in process and it is expected that other divisions will follow. As appropriate this headquarters will publish training directives, memorandums and circulars pertaining to training within the division area. These publications are designed to take maximum benefit of the information gained from enemy tactics and the lessons learned from successful friendly operations against the enemy. Field advisors should make every effort to insure that these training publications are implemented with maximum efficiency. The Korean officers and enlisted personnel that will be assigned the unit to which you are an Advisor will have received the maximum training within the allowable time. However it should be remembered that they need more training, especially in the combat application of the principles taught during their school and replacement program. Unit training within the reserve areas of your unit will do much to make an efficient fighting team of your unit. In this regard Field Advisors should remain keenly aware of the training status of the Korean Army. The G-3 Section will make every effort to keep Advisors abreast of changes in the training situation and will welcome reports and recommendations from the field regarding the success or lack of success of training methods used in the replacement and schools system.

#### SECTION IV

#### OPERATIONS

##### 1. GENERAL.

The functions of the Operations Section G-3 are closely related to the duties of the field advisors from Corps through battalion levels. In order that this relation may be amplified for the information and guidance of all concerned, the detailed functions of the Operations Section G-3 Section

G-3 are listed as follows:

- a. To prepare Operations plans, orders and instructions.
- b. To maintain an operations map reflecting the location of all combat units UN and ROFA employed in Korea.
- c. To receive, evaluate, and report to TUSAK the tactical situation of ROFA units, and to remain continually briefed on the complete tactical situation with particular emphasis on ROFA units.
- d. To be prepared to make sound and timely recommendations on the following:
  - (1) Commitment of reserves, and changes in boundary and task organizations to facilitate accomplishment of the assigned mission.
  - (2) Bomblines changes (To JOC), in relation to front line units.
  - (3) Issuance of additional fragmentary orders and instructions modifying the assigned missions for more effective accomplishment.
- e. To maintain a complete current journal.
- f. To request, and establish where necessary, priority for air support for ROFA units ~~through JOC~~ through JOC.
- g. To maintain close coordination with KA G-3 operations officer, and advise him in the performance of his duties.

## 2. OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVES.

### a. General:

All operational directives, normally prepared in the form of an operations plan, order or instruction, are based on TUSAK operational directives and instructions. Operations officer, KA G-3, is briefed on all proposed operational directives, his comments and concurrence, obtained and parallel publications in Korean and English are distributed simultaneously to all units concerned. Advisors with subordinate units are enjoined to follow this same procedure in issuing instructions within units to which they are assigned. This practice insures maximum coordination and mutual understanding between Advisors and their Korean counterparts.

### b. Operation Plans:

Plans are prepared on proposed operations and distributed to Field Commanders and Advisors as early as possible to permit maximum time in preparations for new operations. To order the plan into execution, an "Operations Instruction" is published redesignating the plan as an order and directing the order be executed.

c. Operations Orders:

Orders are published to assign operational type missions to all combat units under operational control of Chief of Staff ROKA. Normally, orders are issued only when the over-all mission of the majority of units under operational control of the Chief of Staff ROKA is affected.

d. Operations Instructions:

Operations Instructions are published as a vehicle to amend the operations order in effect and normally effects minor changes in the general operational mission of the majority of units under operational control of Chief of Staff ROKA.

3. OPERATIONS REPORTS.

a. General:

The Commanding General EUSAK depends upon Chief FMAG to provide him with information and advice concerning the tactical employment of ROKA units. One of the most important duties of the FMAG advisor is to keep the next higher FMAG headquarters informed of the current tactical situation.

b. Periodic operations reports submitted by this headquarters to EUSAK, is a consolidation of evaluated information received from field advisors in the form of "spot" and periodic reports. These reports are submitted to EUSAK as the official periodic operations report of the Korean Army.

c. Periodic operations reports will be submitted to this headquarters by Senior Advisors of all units assigned or attached to Headquarters Korean Army for operational control. Reference: Tactical Standing Operating Procedure, this headquarters, dated 16 December 1950. (Incl #8).

d. Periodic operations reports will be supplemented by brief, spot reports as necessary to keep this headquarters abreast of the current situation.


4. AIR SUPPORT:

Air support for the Korean Army is provided by Fifth US Air Force in the same manner as for US units. In view of the language barrier and lack of knowledge in the tactical employment of air support by the majority of ROKA Officers, the FMAG Advisor is G-3 Air to the unit to which he is assigned. As such, he is responsible for the location of the Bomblines and for requesting air support as required. For procedures in requesting and controlling tactical air support for ROKA units, see "Operations SOP for Tactical Air Support", this headquarters, dated 150800 Jan 1951 (Incl #9) and letter "Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne)", this headquarters, dated 15 Feb 1951 (Incl #10).

Ten (10) Inclosures:


- #1 Organizational Chart  
The Infantry Division
- #2 Organization Chart  
Korean Corps Headquarters
- #3 Organization Chart  
Korean Army
- #4 Organizational Chart  
KMAC
- #5 Ltr, KMAC, Assignment of Field Advisors, dtd 22 Feb 51
- #6 Ltr, KMAC, Assignment of Field Advisors, Divisions, dtd 1 Mar 51
- #7 Chart Replacement School System, KA
- #8 Ltr, KMAC, Tactical Standing Operating Procedure, dtd 16 Dec 50
- #9 Ltr, KMAC, Operations SOP for Tactical Air Support, dtd 15 Jan 51
- #10 Ltr, KMAC, Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne), dtd 1 Mar 51.

The Infantry Division  
Organizational Chart



Inclosure #1


ORGANIZATIONAL CHART  
KOREAN CORPS HEADQUARTERS



Inclusion #2


ORGANIZATIONAL CHART  
KOREAN ARMY

265 277



Inlosure #3

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART  
 UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY  
 GROUP TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA



LEGEND:  
 Denotes dual functions

Inclosure #4

UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
8202d AU  
Office of the Chief  
APO 301

c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, Calif.  
22 February 1951

SUBJECT: Assignment of Field Advisors

TO: Senior Advisor Each Corps

1. The policy governing the assignment of personnel within the advisory structure of each corps is as follows:

- a. Senior Advisor (1)
- b. Assistant Senior Advisor (1)
- c. G-1 Advisor (1)
- d. G-2 Advisor (1)
- e. G-3 Advisor (1)
- f. G-4 Advisor (1)
- g. Engineer Advisor Corps (1)
- h. Signal Advisor Corps (1)
- i. Detachment Supply Officer (1)
- j. Operations NCO (2)
- k. Field Communication Chief (2)
- l. Mess Steward (2)
- m. Mechanics (2)
- n. Medical Aidman (1)
- o. Cook (1)
- p. Clerk typist (2)
- q. Light Truck Driver (2)
- r. Supply Sgt (1)
- s. Supply Clerk (1)

In addition to the above, communication teams including radio-crypto personnel and equipment will be attached to Corps Headquarters from KMAC Signal Detachment.

2. Normally the Detachment Supply Officer will also perform the functions of Headquarters Commandant and Enlisted Detachment Commander.

3. The Signal Advisor's primary mission is to advise the Signal Officer of the Corps on all matters pertaining to Signal communication. Two Field Communication NCO's are assigned to assist the Corps Signal Advisor.

4. The radio teams are attached to provide communication for the advisory personnel and will normally operate under the direct control of the Signal Advisor.

5. The organization and policy outlined in preceding paragraphs will be considered standard except under exceptional circumstances. It may be modified in certain cases at the discretion of the Senior Corps Advisor. These exceptional circumstances include:


- a. The necessity for close liaison with adjacent units or subordinate units.
- b. The necessity for close coordination with supporting troops.
- c. Difficulties with normal communication channels.
- d. An inexperienced Korean staff requiring more advice than would normally be expected.

However such adjustments should be considered temporary measures to meet the requirements of the tactical situation. The organization as outlined is considered adequate to accomplish the Corps Advisory mission.


BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL FARRELL:

EARL MATTICE  
Col Inf  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

  
JOHN L. ADAMS  
1st Lt AGC  
Actg Adjutant General

ORGANIZATION CHART  
KMAG CORPS HEADQUARTERS



Inlosure

UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
8202 AU  
Office of the Chief  
APO 331

c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, Calif  
1 March 1951

SUBJECT: Assignment of Field Advisors, Divisions

To: Senior Advisor each Division

1. The policy governing the assignment of officer personnel within the advisory structure of each division is as follows:


- a. Senior Advisor (1)
- b. Assistant Senior Advisor (1)
- c. G-1, G-4 Advisor (1)
- d. G-2, G-3 Advisor (1)
- e. Division Artillery Advisor (1)
- f. Engineer Advisor, Engineer Combat Battalion (1)
- g. Signal Advisor Division (1)
- h. Senior Advisor ~~each Regiment~~ (1) Total (3)
- i. Battalion Advisor each Regiment (3) Total (9)

The tactical advisors assigned to the regiments and battalions have an additional duty of advising in staff function at the regimental level and battalion levels, respectively.

2. The organization outlined above will be considered standard except under exceptional circumstances. It may be modified in certain cases at the discretion of the Senior Advisor of the division. These exceptional circumstances include:

- a. The necessity for close liaison with adjacent or higher headquarters.
- b. The necessity for coordination with supporting troops.
- c. Difficulties with normal communication channels.
- d. An inexperienced Korean staff which may require more advice than would normally be expected. However, such adjustments should be considered as temporary measures to meet requirements of the tactical situation. The organization is designed to provide adequate personnel to accomplish the division advisory mission.

A TRUE COPY

  
JOHN L. ADAMS  
1st Lt AGC  
Actg Adjutant General


DISTRIBUTION

1 -- Chief of Staff  
1 -- ea Staff Section  
3 -- ea Corps  
110 -- ea Division  
20 -- Engr  
20 -- Signal  
12 -- FA  
3 -- G-3 File  
2 -- AG File

Incl:


Organization Chart  
KMAG Division Headquarters

ORGANIZATION CHART  
 KMAG DIVISION HEADQUARTERS



INCL.

REPLACEMENT & SCHOOL SYSTEM  
KOREAN ARMY



Inclsure #7

UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
8202d AU  
Office of the Chief  
APO 301

c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, Calif.  
16 December 1950

KMAG

Tactical Standing Operating Procedure

1. General.

a. This Standing Operating Procedure is applicable to Senior Advisors of all units assigned or attached to Headquarters, KA for operational control.

b. This Standing Operating Procedure becomes effective on receipt and supercedes all previously published directives concerning operating procedure.

2. Liaison.

a. Senior Advisors of Corps, Divisions and separate combat units of regimental size operating directly under this headquarters will request counterparts to furnish at least one liaison officer (Korean) to KA Headquarters.

b. KA Headquarters will furnish liaison officers to subordinate units as required.

3. Command Posts.

Prior to movement of command posts, Senior Advisors with major subordinate combat units will report a general area to be occupied. Upon establishment of the new CP the exact location will be reported by the most expeditious means. The old CP. (KMAG-FA) will not be closed until communications from this Headquarters to the new CP have been established.

4. Orders.

Copies (Korean and English) of all operational type orders issued by major subordinate units will be forwarded to this Headquarters (Attn G-3).

5. Operations Reports.

a. Periodic Operations Reports will be submitted three times daily by Senior Advisors of Corps, Divisions, separate Task Forces and separate Regiments operating under direct control of this headquarters. These reports will be submitted as of 0300, 1600 and 2200 so as to reach this Headquarters not later than 0500, 1800 and 2400. Reports will be forwarded by radio.

teletype, telephone (using telephone code) or messenger. Negative reports will be submitted. For format and contents see inclosure No. 1. An overlay to cover location of subordinate units down to and including battalions and separate companies will be prepared as of 2200 daily. This overlay will be forwarded by first available courier.

b. Periodic operations reports will be supplemented by brief, special reports as necessary to keep this headquarters abreast of the current situation.

6. Intelligence Reports.

Intelligence Reports of major subordinate tactical units will be submitted by Senior Advisor as follows:

<u>Report</u>	<u>How Submitted</u>	<u>Time</u>
a. Spot Reports	Most expeditious means	At once
b. Intelligence Summary	Radio, Teletype, Telephone	Daily as of 1800

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL FARRILL:

EARL MATTHEW  
Colonel, Inf  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

*J. W. Mann*  
J. W. MANN  
Major, AGC  
Adjutant General

Inclosure #1, Tactical Operating Procedure.

Format and Content, Periodic Operations Report

Issuing Headquarters  
Location  
Date and Time of Report

Periodic Operations Report No. \_\_\_\_\_.

For Period \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ 50.

1. Composition of Friendly Forces:

a. List any changes in composition of units (attachments, detachments, etc.).

b. List any changes in location of subordinate elements down to and including battalions and separate companies.

2. Operations Planned:

Outline all operations which are in the planning stage only.

3. Operations Ordered:

List all operations ordered during the period regardless of the degree of completion.

4. Results of Operations:

a. List all operations conducted during period of report with results obtained. Include Who - What - Where - When for each subordinate unit.

b. Unit strength expressed in percentage of authorized strength (2200 report only).

c. Morale expressed as Excellent, Good, Fair or Poor (2200 report only).

d. Combat efficiency expressed as Excellent, Good, Fair or Poor (2200 report only).

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
8202 AU  
Office of the Chief  
APO 301

c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, Calif  
150800 Jan 1951

OPERATIONS  
SOP  
For Tactical Air Support

1. Purpose. - To provide KMAC Personnel with ROK tactical units the standard procedure for requesting tactical air support and to provide assistance in proper utilization of attached Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP).

2. General. - UN Tactical Air Forces are available for direct support of ROK Army Forces consistent with availability of aircraft and priority established by JOC as dictated by the overall tactical situation.

3. Requesting Procedure. -

a. Request for pre-planned tactical air missions will be submitted to this Headquarters (ATTN G-3) through Advisory channels 24 hours prior to time mission is to be flown. Such requests will include:

- (1) Target areas, in priority desired, by grid coordinates (plus overlay when request is forwarded by courier).
- (2) Location of forward elements of friendly troops by coordinates (plus overlay if request is forwarded by courier) in relation to target area.
- (3) Type targets in target area and location (i.e., troop concentration, supply dumps, CP's, tanks, vehicle concentrations, etc).
- (4) Time mission is desired (indicate time mission is to end, if in conjunction with friendly attacks).
- (5) To whom aircraft is to report and whether or not TACP and/or Mosquito can control.

b. Request for tactical aircraft, other than that covered in paragraph 2 above, will be forwarded thru Advisory channels by most expeditious means. ALL REQUESTS WILL INCLUDE:

- (1) Type targets (i.e., troop concentrations, enemy support weapons, supply dumps, tanks, etc).
- (2) Location of targets by coordinates.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

(3) To whom aircraft is to report (TACP - Mosquito).

(4) Whether or not TACP and/or Mosquito will control.

c. Mosquito aircraft can often obtain tactical aircraft by requesting same directly from Mosquito control Hq.

3. Tactical Procedure:

a. TACP's will be kept as close as possible to current front lines consistent with capability of rapid displacement to critical areas. However, a TACP is not in itself a combat element and will be provided with adequate security. Advisory Personnel will maintain contact with TACP Personnel at all times.

b. Air strikes inside the bomblines must be controlled by either a TACP and/or Mosquito and will be requested as outlined in par 3b above.

c. Air strikes beyond the bomblines need not be controlled and will be requested as outlined in par 3a above.

4. Assignment of TACP's and Mosquitoes:

a. Each ROK Corps Hq and each ROK Division will normally be assigned one TACP.


b. Mosquito will be assigned on a day to day basis consistent with availability of Mosquito aircraft. This Hq will notify each Corps Hq the scheduled assignment of Mosquito aircraft 12 hours prior to prepared operations.

5. Extract of 5th Air Force SOP for Tactical Air Control Parties is attached for information and guidance.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL FARRWELL:

EARL MATTICE  
Col Inf  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

  
JOHN L. ADAMS  
1st Lt ACC  
Actg Adjutant General

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
8202d AU  
Office of the Chief  
APO 301

c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, Calif  
1 March 1951

SUBJECT: Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne)

TO: See Distribution

1. Reference is made to Standing Operating Procedure Number 55-26, Headquarters 5th Air Force, dated 26 January 1951, attached as inclosure number 1.

2. Reference SOP is forwarded for your information and guidance in conduct of future operations.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL FARRELL:

1 Incl:  
5th AF SOP, No. 55-26  
dtd 26 Jan 51  
(True cy)

*John L. Adams*  
JOHN L. ADAMS  
1st Lt AGC  
Actg Adjutant General

Inclosure #10

~~RESTRICTED~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~ UNCLASSIFIED

5AF Standing Operating)  
Procedure :  
NO. 55-26)

OPERATIONS

HQ FIFTH AIR FORCE  
APO 970  
26 January 1951

Standing Operating Procedure for Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne)

1. Purpose - To prescribe the functions, duties and procedures of Tactical Air Coordinators (Airborne).

2. General - To obtain maximum effectiveness from tactical air power and eliminate the possibility of inflicting damage on friendly troops, Tactical Air Coordinators (Airborne) are provided to control and coordinate attacks of tactical aircraft in the vicinity of the front lines, and to maintain other tactical air control as directed by the Joint Operations Center. These instructions apply to those Fifth Air Force units actively engaged in airborne control of tactical aircraft.

3. Requirements - Each Tactical Coordinator (Airborne) team will consist of:

a. Personnel - One pilot and one observer (Army Officer if available.)

b. Equipment - An aircraft having reciprocating engine, full visibility, tandem seats, capable of long endurance, and reduced speed and equipped with VHF communications, identification rockets, and an external fuel tank.

4. Responsibility - While airborne, the Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne) will be responsible to the Division Air Liaison Officer (ALO) through the Division Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) in whose area operations are being conducted. Targets will not be attacked inside the bomb line unless both the TACP and the Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne) (TAC) agree on the identity. Where doubt exists on the part of either the TACP or the TAC, the target will not be attacked.

5. Functions - The functions of a Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne) controlling and coordinating close support strikes generally include:

a. Receiving and evaluating target locations for air strikes from the ground controllers.

b. Searching for targets of opportunity, to include specified route and area reconnaissance, and directing tactical aircraft on such targets.

c. Advising the TACP and/or Division ALO of all observed locations, activity, concentrations, positions, installations, dispositions, and movements of the enemy in his area of responsibility.

d. Reporting the results of controlled strikes to the TACP and/or the Division ALO.

e. Performing special missions as directed by the Joint Operations Center (JOC); such as, column cover, identifying and locating friendly elements, monitoring and relaying messages to the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), assisting and guiding downed crews and escaped Prisoners of War (PWs).

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~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

6. Procedure - a. Tactical Air Coordinators (Airborne) will be assigned call signs as follows: the name of the TACP preceded by the word "Mosquito;" a second aircraft to the same TACP will use the same call sign with word "Special" added. (Example: "Mosquito Cobalt", and "Mosquito Cobalt Special.")

b. TAC's are assigned daily by the Fifth Air Force Operations Order to operate in designated area or in the vicinity of the front line with a designated TACP. These stations will be maintained continuously between the hours indicated in the Operations Order by relieving on station unless otherwise specified.

c. When departing from their home base, all TAC's will report to the TACC giving airborne times and assigned TACP's. In the vicinity of their assigned Division area, each TAC will report in to the Division TACP for target information and instructions. This Division TACP will normally designate a Forward TACP or an area to reconnoiter. After reporting in to the Forward TACP, the TAC will orient himself in relation to friendly and enemy positions and commence an immediate search for targets. Should targets be unavailable in the vicinity of his frontline sector, the TAC will reconnoiter planned routes and areas reporting back periodically to the Forward TACP for continued control of strikes against close support targets.

d. An altitude will be flown conducive to searching and making detailed observations. Special efforts will be made to detect camouflaged objects. The resulting target information will be passed to the Forward TACP or, if applicable, to the Division TACP. The TAC will consult with these controllers concerning the suitability and selection of targets for possible air action. The location of appropriate targets for air attack will be designated by reference to the Universal Transverse Mercator Grid used by tactical aircraft and TACPs.

e. Tactical flights report in to the Division TACP and/or the Forward TACP who may assign them to the control of a TAC. After visual contact has been established with the tactical aircraft, the TAC will pass to them the following information: an accurate description and identification of the target, its location and/or position relative to prominent landmarks, any potential target hazards and any other pertinent information. Whenever friendly troops are in the immediate proximity of the target area, the TAC will always inform the tactical aircraft accordingly. When required, for target identification, the TAC will lead the tactical aircraft to the target using rockets when available to pinpoint its location.

f. A TAC will not call tactical flights to its area which have been assigned to other areas. However, should a flight be unable to contact a predesignated forward air controller, a TAC operating in another area aware of this fact may assume control of the flight to attack immediate targets if available.

g. Each TAC will check out with his Division TACP giving the following information: results of the controlled strikes, enemy disposition and movements, and condition of TACP radio.

2  
~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

7. Communications - Current COI's will govern communications.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL PARTRIDGE:

OFFICIAL:

E. J. TIMBERLAKE, JR  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Vice Commander

/s/James L. O'Connor  
/t/JAMES L. O'CONNOR  
Major, USAF  
Adjutant General

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- 10 - 314th Air Div
- 12 - COMNAVEE
- 12 - 1 MAW
- 2 - FEAF
- 50 - 6147th TAC Sq
- 15 - ea Bmr Wg
- 10 - 502d TAC Gp
- 5 - 6146th ABU

A TRUE COPY:

*John L. Adams*  
JOHN L. ADAMS  
1st Lt AGC

~~RESTRICTED~~ UNCLASSIFIED

Incl to Operation SOP for Tactical Air Support.

Following is extracted from 5th AF Regulations number 55-5 for information and guidance of KMAG Advisors.

SOP for TACTICAL CONTROL PARTIES (TACP)

SECTION I

Introduction

1. Purpose - To provide a consolidated manual of instructions defining the responsibilities and duties of Tactical Air Control Parties, to prescribe operational procedures for close support missions, and to clarify some of the problems encountered when embarking upon field duty with army units.

2. General - The Tactical Air Control Party is an operations combat team that by use of voice radio controls aircraft engaged in close support of ground forces who are in contact with the enemy. Each team is attached directly to a Corps, Division, or regiment and accompanies that unit wherever it goes. This assignment may be changed by the Air Liaison Officer who has operational control of the TACP, when tactical requirements so dictate.

3. Organization - The commander of the TACP is the Forward Air Controller (FAC) who will be a pilot who has had combat experience in close support in this theater. Each team will be organized as follows:

PERSONNEL

EQUIPMENT

One (1) Forward Air Controller (FAC)	Two (2) VRC-1 Radio Jeeps with One (1) SCR-522 and One (1) SCR-191 each.
One (1) Radio Mechanic (648) or (754)	One (1) spare SCR-522.
One (1) Radio Operator (766) or (776)	One (1) Remote system for SCR-522.
	One (1) personnel carrier jeep.
	One (1) AN/TRC-7, Portable VHF radio.

4. Tour of Duty - The Forward Air Controller is furnished on a rotational basis by an active combat wing and during his period of duty in the field he will be on TDY or DS to the TAC Squadron. Normally, but not always, he will be relieved by a pilot from his own group and squadron to his parent organization. Airmen crew members are selected from a TACP pool of men who are permanently assigned to the detachment, and are rotated with the FAC.

SECTION II

SOP for Tactical Air Control Parties

5. Duties - The TACP in the field will be under the operational control of the Army Air Liaison Officer. In his area of responsibility the FAC will maintain cognizance of targets and their priority as determined by the Division or Corps Advisor or his representative.

6. Responsibility - The FAC will determine the extent of damage done by our aircraft and maintain a record in the daily log. This information will also be reported to the Air Liaison Officer by High Frequency Radio or telephone. He will maintain a journal of daily events to include: call signs of flights working and times in the area; results of attacks; failure of communications; movements of the TACP; pertinent remarks. The journal will be forwarded by him to the Director of Liaison, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force on Wednesdays.

7. Tactical Procedure - a. In selecting a site to operate the AN/VRC-1 consideration must be given to the limitations of the equipment. The VHF radios operate on the "line of sight" principle therefore, in so far as practical they should be located where there is least obstruction from terrain features in order that transmissions between aircraft and controller may obtain maximum possible range. The BC-191 operates on the high frequency band and is not seriously hampered by terrain features, however it has very low-out and a whip antenna is nearly always necessary to obtain range. One further precaution; Do not operate the transmitter unless the engine generator is operating, as the transmitter draws high wattage and will discharge a fully charged battery in a few seconds.

b. When he is prepared to operate the controller must keep a current list of targets marked on his map and continually evaluate them in order to advise as to their suitability with reference to the weapons that he will have available. He must constantly plan in his mind just how he will describe each target and how he will direct his aircraft against it so that when his planes report in stating their armament load, and the final target selection is made, his directions will be prompt and as brief as clarity will permit. He should anticipate the arrival of his scheduled flights and be monitoring the "reporting" frequency. Monitoring the reporting frequency is very important in order that the flight leader may obtain prompt instructions. When the controller is working a flight, he should have his radio operator listening in on the spare equipment, if available, or on the AN/TRC-7, in order that he can inform the controller when a flight calls in for instructions. The controller can switch frequencies momentarily to give a "stand by" or direct the flight back to the next higher controller. Even when there are no targets it is important to monitor the "reporting" net in order to be able to redirect aircraft promptly.

c. After the target has been described it will be initially located by reference to UTM Grid Coordinates. As the aircraft begin their attack, he must carefully scrutinize the final approach, giving continuous directions with reference to prominent landmarks and if it appears that the wrong target will be struck, he must call off the attack. It may be necessary in some cases to require a dry run, and in many cases the mosquito aircraft must be called upon to assist in finding the target or to point the way. Army Liaison type aircraft (L-5) (L-17) will not be used for controlling our planes except under very exceptional conditions and when such cases do occur, the circumstances will be reported to the ALO who will make a report to this headquarters. The Forward Air Controller must be an AF pilot thoroughly familiar with our aircraft. The liaison pilots are not adept in our procedures, are not familiar with communications problems, and in their enthusiasm have been known to call aircraft away from a vital target to attack a less lucrative one selected by the liaison observer. However, their radioed advice is valuable to the army and is used extensively by them in target selection. The army when requested, will assist in marking targets by smoke, and friendly troops by panels.

d. The reasons for being prompt and concise are apparent when it is realized that the fighter, particularly a jet is limited in endurance. He has only a short time to stay in the area before it becomes necessary to return to his base. If he begins to run low on fuel his work becomes hasty and haphazard with resulting inaccuracy against the enemy. Then, to, wasting time over the target is inefficient use of the aircraft, adds extra, tiring time to the pilots flying, and keeps him unnecessarily long circling at low altitude where he is a cripple for light flak and hostile fighters. When it is necessary to have aircraft circle to keep the enemy pinned, that type of mission will have been requested instead of close support. Our present VRC-1's are equipped with the SCR-522 radio which permits 4 radio channels only for voice communications. This is an additional reason for stressing brevity and clear instructions. No unnecessary chatter should take place, such as long congratulatory or abusive messages or inquiries about the boys back in the group.

8. Communications - Communications frequencies will be established by FAF COI. The COI will also establish call signs, voice and OW, for each army unit, these call signs to be assumed by the TACP assigned.

9. Maintenance - a. The condition of automotive and radio equipment determines whether a TACP can operate. The automotive equipment must be well maintained (the jeep engine provides power for the radio) and ready to move immediately when the Command Post moves. Field maintenance will be difficult and many hours must be spent on it. Encrusted mud must be removed and vehicles washed to allow lubrication and inspection for defects. The army regiments or divisions, although not required to do so, will assist on maintenance and repair and will supply such parts as tires, spark plugs, and batteries, but for the most part, needed supplies must be procured thru the Air Liaison Officer.

b. Operative radio equipment is vital. Mechanics must be thoroughly qualified to install the radios, align frequencies, change tubes, trace circuits, and make other minor repairs. He must have a frequency meter and other tools for performing these functions as the frequencies will nearly always go out of alignment after driving the AN/VRC-1 even for a short distance. Driving the jeep over rough terrain may also cause internal damage. It is therefore exceedingly important that the equipment be moved only when it is mandatory to move it and never purely for personal conveniences. A small stock of spares should be kept on hand and when new sets are required, the Air Liaison Officer will arrange to have this equipment brought by an L-5.

10. Summary - The responsibilities of the TACP cannot be over-stressed. The success of one mission may result in the winning of important objectives; its failure may result in the loss of important positions and in the unnecessary loss of many lives. Constant vigilance, patience, endurance, initiative and courage are necessary to insure the success of our mission in close support.

# ADVISOR'S HANDBOOK

## G-4

### 1. Functions of KMAG G-4 Section.

The functions of the KMAG G-4 Section are:

- a. To keep Chief KMAG and all interested agencies and sections fully informed of Korean Army (KA) logistics in the functions pertaining to supply, evacuation, and hospitalization, transportation, service, and miscellaneous related subjects.
- b. To insure that the Korean Army (KA) receives prescribed logistical support from FUSAK.
- c. To advise the Korean counterparts so as to provide them with the benefits of the military experience of the KMAG officers in order to accomplish successfully the logistical support necessary in the over-all combat effort.
- d. To plan, coordinate, and supervise the logistical support measures and operations necessary to implement the flow of supplies and equipment to the using agency in a timely and efficient manner.
- e. To assist the Chief of Staff in the coordination of functions pertaining to logistics.
- f. To plan and supervise the logistical training of his own section and, in coordination with G-3, such training within KMAG.
- g. To assist and supervise salvage and reclamation operations, and to encourage the recovery of captured enemy materiel.
- h. To review the budgetary requirements for items or services to be procured with Korean funds and to assure that the necessary funds will be available to cover the requisition.

### 2. Organization of Corps and Division G-4 Sections.

The G-4 functions are performed at KMAG Corps levels by one officer assigned as G-4. At division levels, the G-4 functions are executed by an officer assigned as G-1/G-4. There is no officer provided in the KMAG T/O as S-1/S-4 at regimental levels. However, the tactical advisors assigned to the regiments and battalions have an additional duty of advising in S-4 functions at the regimental level and battalion levels, respectively.

### 3. Mission.

At Corps and Division levels, the G-4 mission is:

- a. To advise the Korean G-4 counterparts so as to provide them with the benefit of the military experience of the KMAG G-4.

b. To act as a supervising, coordinating, and control agency so that timely logistical support can be implemented through American channels to all elements of the ROK forces.

#### 4. Detailed Instructions.

The G-4 field advisor is charged with the following major functions:

a. To determine, in coordination with the Technical Service and G-3 Advisors, KA requirements for supplies and equipment, to initiate procurement action against these requirements, either from local sources or by requisition on KA supply agencies.

b. To expedite, in coordination with Technical Service Advisors, the delivery of requisitioned supplies and equipment by tracing action on requisitions.

c. To advise, coordinate, and supervise the allocation of major items of equipment so as to maintain all units at maximum operational capacity insofar as availability of equipment permits.

d. To supervise and expedite the timely distribution of supplies and equipment to using troops.

e. To prepare weekly periodic logistic reports for submission to KMAC headquarters.

f. To advise, coordinate, and supervise measures for enforcement of supply discipline.

g. To advise, coordinate, and supervise, in coordination with Technical Services and G-3 Advisors, the employment of logistical support units, including the drafting of administrative orders.

h. To advise, in coordination with other advisory sections, logistical policies and procedures; and to supervise their implementation.

i. To determine requirements for transportation to meet requirements and to supervise and expedite the efficient use of transportation means.

#### 5. Hints to G-4 Advisors.

##### a. General:

- (1) Recommend the supply levels with margins of safety; request sufficient dumps in forward areas to provide food, ammunition, and fuel sufficient for several days consumption and providing against disruptions in the MSR caused by weather conditions or enemy action.

- (2) Watch each of the 39 odd items of ammunition supply. Avoid the accumulation of excesses which may serve to impede the operations.
- (3) Inform the technical advisors with the supporting services of any information indicating major troop movements with the utmost practicable speed.
- (4) When front line units are in short supply and MSR's are cut, request air drops with the utmost practicable speed. Air drops have a psychological effect in maintaining morale that is far out of proportion to the tonnages (relative to truck deliveries) actually dropped.
- (5) Pay particular attention to the evacuation of the wounded.
- (6) Devote attention to immunization of troops against typhoid, typhus, cholera, smallpox, and tetanus.
- (7) Anticipate the need for DDT and mosquito netting to prevent diseases caused by insects and rodents.
- (8) Make frequent checks on the purification of water used by both Americans and Koreans.

b. Coordination:

- (1) Coordinate with G-2 and keep informed of the enemy capabilities. Such information will have a direct bearing on the locations of your dumps and on the amount of your stock levels.
- (2) Coordinate with G-3. Keep abreast of possible changes in our own line of action and determine necessary modifications in the administrative plan under possible changes in the line of action. Inform the representatives of the supporting services.
- (3) Coordinate the supply activities of all service forces' representatives in order to insure maximum cooperation in the logistical support of the tactical operation.
- (4) Coordinate with the Engineer Advisor. Keep informed as to the Class IV supplies in his dumps.
- (5) Coordinate with the Ordnance Advisor. Keep informed on the status of dead-lined vehicles. Stress preventative maintenance. Keep abreast of the number of weapons, by type, in the supporting installations. Check daily the status of ammunition by item.

- (6) Coordinate with the QM Advisor of the supporting service unit. Frequently he has trucks under his control which he may use to eliminate bottlenecks in ammunition resupply. Keep informed of the POL levels and keep the G-3 informed of this matter.
- (7) Maintain close liaison with G-3 and insure proper security for supporting installations.
- (8) On attachment of ROX units to U.S. units, establish contact with the G-4 of the U.S. unit without delay.
- (9) In airdrop requests, comply with normal airdrop procedure prescribed in KMAC Administrative SOP.

c. Supply Discipline.

The proper administration, safeguarding, accounting, reporting, and maintenance of supplies rests in large measures upon the impetus of the KMAC G-4. Property must be properly cared for, properly used and periodically maintained. Advisors must encourage Korean counterparts to cause frequent inspections of clothing, equipment, and supplies. Repair and reissue, in lieu of replacement, must be the rule.

6. Supply References.

- a. Letter, KMAC, Subject: Administrative Standing Operating Procedure, (currently being revised).
- b. Ordnance Section, FA Administrative Standing Operating Procedure dtd 26 Aug 1950.
- c. Letter, KMAC, Subject: Maintenance and Evacuation of Ordnance Materiel, dtd 17 Sep 1950.
- d. Current Letter, KMAC, Subject: Ammunition Supply, ROKA, dtd 7 Feb 1951.
- e. Letter, KMAC, Subject: Maintenance and Supply Discipline With Relation to Ordnance Materiel, dtd 27 Feb 1951.
- f. Letter, KMAC, Subject: Ammunition Used for Signal Purposes With Launching Devices, dtd 20 Feb 1951.
- g. Memo, KMAC, To All Advisors on Echelons of Maintenance, dtd 29 Nov 1950.

# ADVISOR'S HANDBOOK

## Signal

### KMAG (US) Functions

1. The functions of the KMAG Signal Section Are:
  - a. To advise Chief KMAG and staff on signal matters.
  - b. To plan and supervise signal operations, including:
    - (1) Installation, operation, and maintenance of the signal system.
    - (2) Photographic services.
    - (3) Operation of signal maintenance and repair facilities.
    - (4) Technical inspection of signal equipment and organizational maintenance of such equipment.
  - c. To exercise operational control of the signal section.
  - d. To operate a signal supply agency.
  - e. To make recommendations for procurement and employment of signal troops and their allotment to subordinate units.

### 2. KMAG (US) Organization.

- a. The Senior Advisor, Signal is Signal Officer of FMAG and as a member of the special staff of the Chief, FMAG, is responsible for the accomplishment of the KMAG signal mission.
- b. The Signal Officer utilizes the organization shown in the FMAG Signal Communications Functional Chart (Incl. #1) and the FMAG Radio Nets Chart (Incl #2) to discharge his responsibilities.

3. CORPS AND DIVISION ADVISORS: At advisory headquarters of Corps and Divisions the Signal Advisor, in addition to his duties as Signal Advisor, has the additional duty of Signal Officer on the staff of the Senior Advisor. These duties are:

- a. To keep the Senior Advisor currently informed of the status of the KMAG communications at his unit headquarters.
- b. To advise the Senior Advisor and his advisory staff on signal matters.
- c. To recommend axes of signal communication and location of command posts to the Senior Advisor.
- d. To supervise the installation, maintenance and operation of the KMAG signal system at the unit headquarters.

#### 4. MOVEMENT OF COMMAND POSTS:

a. Every effort will be exerted to maintain communications twenty-four hours a day. During the movement of division command posts continuous operation may be impracticable because only one radio set (SCR-193) is issued to the division signal detachment. The radio set should be moved to predesignated points on long moves in order to open up temporarily.

b. When the command post moves, indicate the general desired location of the future command post and request the Signal Advisor's recommendations on communications. Adequate advance notice to the Signal Advisor prior to the move will improve signal communications during movements. The Senior Advisor will notify the Chief FMAG of the period of time the station will be off the air.

c. When practicable communications should be in operation in the new command post before the command group displaces. This will be accomplished by the "jump method" where two radio sets are assigned to the unit.

d. All messages should be cleared, or relayed to the new command post, before a station is closed down for a move to a new location.

5. MESSAGE DELAY: If an outgoing message is not cleared promptly (maximum delay four hours) the writer will be notified by the communications center. When traffic congestion occurs the senior advisor will consult with his signal officer to ascertain the status of precedence of messages. Failure to do this may result in traffic, which the senior advisor urgently desires to be transmitted, being held up by messages of higher precedence, incoming and outgoing.

#### 6. MESSAGE DELAYS - Causes and Example.

a. Causes: Message delays may be attributed to one or several of the following causes.

- (1) Overclassification in the category of precedence.
- (2) The limitation of the M-209 cipher device.

NOTE: A hundred group (word) message requires about two hours from the time it is received in plain text by the local crypto section until it is received and available for delivery in plain text at the distant crypto section.

- (3) At Division (with respect to a higher headquarters):
  - (a) The limitation imposed by minimum operation personnel, together with the dual job assignments (radio operator and crypto clerk).
  - (b) The necessarily prescribed signal standing operating procedure: That, in respect to messages of equal precedence classification, the station at the higher headquarters transmits its message before the lower headquarters transmits.

b. Example: Recently an important message signed at a division about 2300 hours was not transmitted by 0830 hours the following day. Check disclosed that seven incoming messages, of between 700 and 800 code groups, were received from the higher headquarters during the period; that only one of the two operators (crypto men) was on duty; that the man on duty immediately began deciphering the incoming messages after their receipt (such action was proper because of their classification); That these messages because of their length were not deciphered by 0830 hours of "the following day" mentioned above; that the writer was not notified - in accordance with the rule mentioned in paragraph 5, above - of this delay; and that the important outgoing message had not been completely enciphered at 0830 hours of "the following day" mentioned above.

c. Conclusion: It is believed that the several corrective measures necessary in the above example are apparent. The example is cited in the hope of minimizing such occurrences.


2 Incls:

- #1 Functional Chart
- #2 KMAG Radio Nets



Annex #5

KMAG SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

FUNCTIONAL CHART



KMAG RADIO NETS



Note a. - Radio teams from the KMAG signal section are assigned at KMAG Headquarters and lower echelons to include division headquarters. Teams at Corps include radio operators, crypto personnel and, when the availability of personnel permits, a radio repairman and powerman. Teams at division level are usually limited to one radio operator who also performs crypto functions.

UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
8202<sup>d</sup> AU  
Office of the Chief  
APO 301

c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, Calif  
20 December 1950

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE  
FOR  
INTERNAL SUPPLY, FMAG

1. The conditions under which field advisory personnel of this group serve are varied. In some situations, distances and tactical conditions make it relatively simple for the Director of Supply to satisfy all requirements of the field advisory detachments. In other situations, distances, lack of communications, and the tactical situation make it feasible but difficult to supply field installations. Under still other circumstances, distances or the tactical situation make it impossible for the Director of Supply to furnish logistical support. In this case, special arrangements must be made for the supply of field advisory detachments. Generally these detachments will be attached to US units for logistical support. When such arrangements are necessary, separate instructions will be issued by this headquarters.

2. GENERAL: In general, the Director of Supply will requisition, receive, store, and issue all classes of supplies to all members or units of the group. It is the responsibility of the senior advisor of each field advisory detachment to insure the following:

a. That all US personnel assigned or attached to his detachment are properly supplied.

b. That there is no misuse, waste, or accumulation of excess supplies in his detachment.

c. That informal records of all non-expendable property in his detachment are maintained.

3. CORPS SUPPLY SECTION:

a. ORGANIZATION. Supply sections as listed below are hereby authorized for each Corps as an addition to the staff of the senior advisor. These units will deal directly with the Director of Supply on purely technical matters. It must be clearly understood, however, that they are not an integral part of the Director of Supply organization but are a part of the staff of the senior advisor.

1 Lieutenant -- Supply Officer  
1 Sgt 1/cl -- Supply NCO

(1) SUPPLY OFFICER: The Corps Supply Officer is responsible for the proper operation of the Corps supply section. He will assist the senior advisor on all matters pertaining

to supply of US personnel. He is responsible that informal records of all non-expendable property in the Corps are maintained. He will comply with procedures and schedules as outlined by his supplying agency.

- (2) SUPPLY NCO: The Supply NCO will edit and consolidate requests from Corps units and personnel. He will receive, store, and issue supplies, maintain records, and perform additional duties as may be required.

#### 4. DIVISION OR SEPARATE UNIT SUPPLY:

a. ORGANIZATION: The Senior Advisor is responsible for compliance with procedures and schedules prescribed herein. He may appoint a Supply Officer or a Supply NCO to assist him in meeting this responsibility. He will use assigned personnel for this purpose and such duties will constitute an additional duty for personnel so appointed.

#### 5. PROCEDURES:

a. The basic unit for supply purposes is the division advisory detachment. Personnel assigned or attached to divisions will requisition weekly on the division advisory detachment Supply Officer or NCO. The Division Supply Officer or NCO will then consolidate requisitions, edit them for completeness as to site, nomenclature, and quantity. The Division Supply Officer or NCO will submit one copy of his requisition to the Corps Supply Officer (or appropriate supply agency, in the case of divisions not attached to a ROK Corps), retaining one copy for his own use in issuing items when received.

b. The Corps Supply Officer will prepare his requisition for the personnel assigned or attached to the Corps Advisory Detachment in the manner described above. He will then consolidate that requisition with those submitted by the Supply Officers of the attached Division Advisory Detachments. The final consolidation will be submitted to the agency supplying the Corps as a formal requisition. One copy of the requisition will be retained by the Corps Supply Officer for his use in making issue of supplies received.

#### 6. SCHEDULES:

a. Units based on an agency other than KMAG for supply will comply with schedules and procedures as directed by the supporting agency.

b. The following procedure is prescribed for units based on FMAG for supply:

- (1) Requests will be consolidated weekly by Corps, Separate Division, Separate Regiments, and other separate units and forwarded, ATTN: Director of Supply, so as to reach this headquarters on or before Tuesday. Supplies will be ready for issue at the Director of Supply warehouse on Friday of the same week.

(All classes and services may be placed on one (1) requisition. Requests may be informal).

- (2) Requests for major items (i.e. - field ranges, vehicles, tool sets and generators, etc.) or for unusual amounts of any item must be fully explained and justified.
- (3) Authorized items, when not in stock, will be placed on back order and issued when available.
- (4) Bonafide emergencies will be processed at any time.

7. AUTHORIZED LEVELS: The following are the authorized levels of supply and will not be exceeded without specific approval from this headquarters:

a. Class I (Rations) one day - "A" or "B" rations, fifteen (15) days condiments, one day "Operational" rations (5 in 1 or "C" rations) for 75% of troops served.

b. Class II (Clothing and equipment) - seven (7) days.

c. Class III (Petroleum, oil and lubricants for motor vehicles) - one (1) day.

d. Class IV (Office machines, furniture and items for which special authorization is needed) - seven (7) days. Cleaning and preserving material and office and stationery supplies - fifteen (15) days.

8. SALVAGE. All items of salvage will be turned in to the nearest US salvage collecting point or to the Director of Supply Warehouse, using Form 447 (Turn-in Slip) if available. Receipt will be obtained in duplicate in all cases. One copy will be retained as a permanent record in the unit; the second copy will be forwarded to the Director of Supply.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL FARRELL:

EARL MATTHEW  
Colonel Inf  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

*J. W. Mann*  
J. W. MANN  
Major, AGC  
Adjutant General

UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
8202d AU  
Office of the Chief  
APO 301


c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, Calif  
2 February 1951

KMAGCG 350.05

SUBJECT: Suggestions for Unit Advisors

TO: Field Advisors

1. The attached memorandum is forwarded for the information and guidance of personnel concerned.
2. The contents should be carefully read and considered by all field advisors. They are the comments of a veteran advisor with both prewar and war experience. These suggestions should not be considered as solutions to all the problems confronting advisors. However they illustrate principles that have been applied with excellent results.
3. Particular attention should be directed to the comments regarding leadership. Though field advisors do not exercise command in any sense, an example of leadership may influence the Korean officers to the extent that an over-all improvement may be effected.
4. The principles outlined in this memorandum should be studied carefully and applied whenever and wherever practicable.

  
F. W. FARRELL  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army  
Chief

Your function as an American Advisor with units of the Korean Army is twofold. First, your mission is to provide your Korean officers with the benefits of your past military experience. This requirement does not apply to tactical operations alone. It applies to all phases of military operations such as logistics, personnel, training, medical support. Second, your mission is to act as an information gathering agency so that accurate, timely reports on all phases of the military operation can be forwarded through American channels to the Chief KMAG. From this information accurate reports can be prepared and submitted to the Army Commander.

In order to perform these two functions you **must** have an understanding of the type of people with whom you are working. You must realize that the Korean Army is a new army, that there is not an old established system. You must also realize that the Koreans are very much aware of their inexperience and are looking for good advice. Remember that you are not dealing with a group of unintelligent people. On the contrary they are extremely intelligent and easily recognize the difference between good advice, indifferent advice, and bad advice. The manner in which you provide advice to your unit officers is extremely important. If you give advice in an indifferent, lackadaisical manner, they will accept it as such and react to it in the same manner. Therefore it can be said that your first job is to study your officers, learn to understand them, and lend every effort to establish a spirit of mutual trust, respect, and cooperation. You should consider the lack of experience and training of your personnel a challenge rather than an obstacle.

You must approach the securing of accurate information in much the same manner as giving advice. You must attempt to develop a willingness on the part of your officers to bring information to you. The alternative - to dig it out yourself - is uncertain and far too slow. You will find it good practice to require certain reports each morning or each week depending on the subject and the situation. An S-1 report each morning showing the strengths of each unit, and the number of casualties is invaluable. Information on battle casualties can be utilized in various ways. First of all it provides a check on the efficiency of your unit in combat. From this report you may note that B Company has suffered serious casualties in an action the previous day. Take this information to the S-3 and determine just what took place. Check with the commander concerned to find out the circumstances. Often in this way you secure information that you might otherwise have overlooked. Corrective action can then be taken immediately that may prevent future difficulties. A second use of the S-1 report is to determine the number of non-battle casualties. When these are excessive, you can often make appropriate recommendations to the medical officer or unit officers to eliminate the cause of these losses. Example: Fifteen men are listed as non-battle casualties. Check with the regimental aid station and determine the reason. It may be dysentery, frostbite, or any of a number of other reasons. In this case, let us say frostbite was the cause. Immediately bring this to the attention of the platoon leaders. Have them conduct foot inspection twice daily, have them supervise the changing of socks, have them provide means of drying the mens socks and shoes. Recommend periodic massaging of the feet using the buddy system. Finally go forward yourself and check the front line platoons to determine what is being done. You may find that the casualties are not due to faulty equipment but due to lack of it. This condition can be brought to the attention of S-4. Necessary action can at least be started to eliminate the shortage. The most important thing is to show interest and to do something constructive.

Appendix # 2

There are other types of reports that you should receive periodically. They will assist you in advising unit officers properly. They will aid you in rendering accurate reports to higher headquarters. They include the following:

Ammunition Status Report: This is a necessity! In order to prevent the stockpiling of ammunition far beyond combat requirements you must always be up to date on what is on hand. You must always remember the capacity of your transportation and keep your supply of ammunition at a level that can be handled. Excessive supplies usually must be destroyed or abandoned.

Status of Weapons Report: You must always show much concern about the loss of weapons. Recommend some system whereby the weapons of casualties are salvaged and removed to a safe storage place for reissue at a later date. Constantly work on means of controlling the loss of weapons. You will find this one of your greatest problems.

S-4 Report: This report at least once a week should show shortages of clothing and equipment. Establish a system of checking all requisitions for resupply of food, clothing, POL, equipment, etc. In this way you keep abreast of the supply situation and eliminate waste and overdrawing.

Operations and Intelligence Reports: You can best secure this type of information through personal observation and by personal contact with the S-2 and S-3. Know what information you want! Take an interpreter and question the appropriate staff officer until you get that information. This information, coupled with your personal observation, will give you a working knowledge of the situation at all times. Personally conduct PW interrogations, interview civilians coming through friendly lines, talk to our personnel who escaped. This does not take long and the results more than justify the effort and time expended.

You will note the term "personal observation" has been used. Assume that you are the commander of any size unit of the American Army engaged in combat. How do you keep yourself informed? You do so through a series of reports from your staff officers, followed by frequent personal inspections. In your position as an advisor to a unit of the Korean Army the same system applies. These inspections must include both the administrative and tactical situation. These inspections are essential if you are to accomplish your mission successfully.

The following suggestions are offered as possible means of making your job an easier one to perform. They may result in greatly improving your status in your unit. Even though you are not in a position of command, try to be a leader - set an example for your officers. You must be neat, clean, and soldierly in appearance at all times no matter how difficult it may be to maintain yourself so. Remember that no one respects a sloven. If you find a wounded soldier from your unit, take him to the aid station in your jeep. Check the aid station periodically concerning care of the wounded. Show an interest in the soldiers and officers. Ask questions about their clothing. Are they warm enough? Do they have gloves or socks? If discrepancies are found - do something about it.

Show confidence in your unit. Always try to build Esprit De Corps. Do not evidence defeatism or fear in front of your officers or your interpreters no matter how strongly you may be tempted to do so.

Explain tactical failures to your officers in such a way that they feel you are sincerely trying to help them. Do not condemn them for their failure. Instruct them so such failures do not recur.

Do not harass them constantly. When you feel forceful corrective action is necessary, stop and think, then act in such a way that you are sure to obtain results.

Be sufficiently aware of the situation so that you KNOW when advice is needed. Then give it freely. You must know enough of the situation at all times to be capable of giving advice. If you do not know, do not give advice.

The American advisor in the field, or in a headquarters, or wherever he may be is faced with many difficulties. The solution to some of these difficulties may appear impossible. As a result of this feeling, advisors often take the line of least resistance. This attitude does not get the job done. To quit is to let down the other advisors in KMAC. Remember that there are American officers and men serving in all levels of the Korean Army. They are faced with the same problems that you are. The amount of effort expended by you as an individual to secure accurate, timely information will increase the effectiveness of the advisors operating adjacent to you. Lack of effort may result in unnecessary loss of American lives. The combat effectiveness of a Korean unit is directly proportional to the efficiency and enthusiasm of the American advisor.