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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS AND FAR EAST COMMAND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

THE
COMMUNIST WAR
IN POW CAMPS

The Background of Incidents
Among Communist Prisoners in Korea

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Foreword

From time to time during the past year, communists in the United Nations prisoner-of-war camps in Korea have demonstrated, rioted, refused to obey orders, held kangaroo courts, kidnapped, and murdered. Many of these incidents have been of a nature or on a scale requiring suppression by force, with resultant deaths and injuries. These the communists everywhere assiduously have propagandized. By no means accidental is the connection between the incidents and their exploitation by the communists. The United Nations Command offers the following information about that connection as a contribution to wider and fuller understanding of communism and its methods.

PART I

THE BACKGROUND

A. United Nations Command Policy on Treatment of War Prisoners

1. Within a few days of the start of the Korean conflict, the intentions of the United Nations forces with regard to the treatment of prisoners of war were made clear. Their commander-in-chief, General Douglas MacArthur, announced on July 4, 1950, that captured enemy personnel "will be treated in accordance with the humanitarian principles applied by and recognized by civilized nations involved in armed conflict."

2. The United States Government affirmed this policy in notifying the International Committee of the Red Cross that "the United States will, of course, be guided by the humanitarian principles of the Conventions (on the treatment of prisoners of war), particularly Article 3 of the Geneva Convention of 1949." To enable the Committee to see for itself that these principles were being applied, a senior delegate appointed by it was welcomed to Korea with official accreditation on July 23, 1950, at which time General MacArthur formally directed his field command that "the handling of prisoners of war . . . will be in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention."

3. The obligations thus assumed as a matter of course by the United Nations Command required, in general, that prisoners be treated as human beings who had ceased to be combatants and were entitled to adequate food, shelter, and facilities for their physical, spiritual and intellectual welfare. These are based on humanitarian concepts so generally accepted that they are implied rather than explicitly stated in the successive international conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war, the most recent of which was drawn up in Geneva in 1949.

4. No less implicit in the conventions is the concept that prisoners merit such humane treatment because, voluntarily or involuntarily, they no longer are waging war and have become subject to "the laws, regulations and orders in force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power," which, according to Article 82 of the 1949 Geneva Convention, "shall be justified in taking judicial or disciplinary measures in respect of any offense committed by a prisoner of war against such laws, regulations or orders."

5. Because they have ceased to be "instruments of the enemy," prisoners can be allowed a generous measure of self-government. The Geneva Convention provides, in Articles 79 and 80, that they are to have "representatives" with a wide range of duties. Where there are officers, the senior officer is to be the representative. Where there are no officers, "the prisoners shall freely elect by secret ballot, every six months," their choice for this post.

6. It was in accordance with these requirements and concepts that the United Nations Command established the administrative and operational structure for handling all captured personnel. Ends and means were equally humanitarian and in harmony with the spirit and the letter of the 1949 Geneva Convention.

B. The Continued Communist Hold on Prisoners in United Nations Camps

1. From the beginning, it was recognized that it would be in keeping with their character for the communists to take the fullest advantage of the scrupulous adherence of the United Nations Command to the Geneva Convention without themselves being restrained by it in any way in their own actions. The exact nature of what they might attempt, however, was not apparent. Nor was there evidence of anything unusual for more than a year. Communist prisoners in United Nations camps were tractable and relatively quiet. Such incidents as occurred were very similar to those known wherever

there had been prisoners of war in modern times. The North Korean and Chinese communist propaganda machines rarely mentioned the prisoners or their treatment.

2. When their hand began to be exposed, through interrogation of prisoners and captured documents, it gradually became clear that:

a. The communist high command regarded the prisoners in United Nations camps as still in combatant status.

b. The prisoners were controlled within the camps by the same political system which had dominated them while fighting.

c. There was communication between the communist high command and communist leaders in the camps.

d. The prisoners were to be used, regardless of the consequences to themselves, to embarrass the United Nations Command in the eyes of the world and strengthen the position of the communists in the Panmunjom armistice negotiations.

e. The plans for prisoner mutinies and other incidents were formulated and timed by the very same communists who were negotiating with the United Nations Command representatives at Panmunjom.

3. In their attitude toward the North Korean and Chinese prisoners in United Nations camps, the communists are faithful to their well-known axioms that the individual is of no importance except as he can contribute to communist ends and that such ends justify any means. He has no rights of his own as a human being, least of all the right to consider himself freed by capture from the obligation to obey the orders of his communist military and political masters. The Geneva Convention may imply that his whole status as a prisoner entitled to humane treatment is posited on his willingness to cease resistance and be passive, but the communists do not recognize any such obligation on his part. Though separated geographically from his army, he still is part of that army, and his sole obligation is to carry out such orders as it may have given him before his capture

or gets to him after his capture. To the communists, therefore, the Geneva Convention has value not in safeguarding the welfare of their captured personnel but in assuring for them circumstances in which they can do maximum harm to their guardians and providing a useful peg for propaganda exploitation of any countermeasures taken against them.

4. This belief of the communist prisoners in themselves as "fighters" continuing the war within the camps, revealed in detail in countless interviews and seized documents, is shown with exceptional clarity and fullness in a hand-written exhortative party summary of the results of the Pongam-do riot of December 14, 1952. In that attempt at mass breakout, 85 prisoners were killed and 113 wounded. That there would be heavy casualties had been expected, according to the document, and "our fighting comrades . . . were determined to die a glorious death". Though the "task imposed on us by the party and fatherland" -- which was to break out -- could not be fulfilled, the "main purpose is to develop a class fight to give the enemy a crushing defeat". The party leadership was satisfied that this had been done. In the "magnificent effort", the prisoners "lost nothing but their shameful lives in the fight, and these were for liberation and glorious victory." The uprising was a "legal fight . . . connected with the fatherland war". What made it successful was that by sacrificing themselves "the sons of Korea, the fatherland, and honorable fighters of the Great Stalin" had "exposed nakedly the inhumanitarian, brutal, cannibalistic slaughtering violence of the American imperialists, causing the peaceable peoples of the whole world, the fatherland, the party and all democratic (sic!) nations to shout for revenge". They had "won a great victory by estranging the Americans from the peaceable peoples of the world". The United Nations Command had been compelled to disclose the Pongam-do

incident by radio, "without concealment, to the world", and "the press of the whole world devoted its attention to Compound F and the investigation of the incident". As a result, "the offensive by the democratic (sic!) nations of the world against the crimes and slaughtering policy toward prisoners of war committed by the enemy is now developing briskly". This will, according to the document, "hasten the time of our rejoining the fatherland". (1)

5. The communist concept of continued authority over troops after their capture by the enemy would have little meaning without the elaborate control system learned by the North Korean and Chinese communists from the Soviets. In their armies, perhaps many of the officers and some of their subordinates are well-indoctrinated and often fanatical communists, but most of the soldiers are involuntary conscripts who must be held together and made to fight through fear instilled by intensive "instruction," constant surveillance, and ruthless punishment. This is done by political officers or commissars (2), hundreds of whom have been among the prisoners in United Nations Command camps, themselves members of the communist party and skilled in dominating others. In accordance with standard policy, those who have been captured or perhaps deliberately have allowed themselves to be captured methodically have established control over other prisoners. It is they who have decided who would

(1) POW Camp No. 1, Koje-do. Special Intelligence Report No. 7. Because of what it reveals of the thinking of the communist prisoners, a translation of this document in its entirety is given as Annex 1.

(2) Of the 120,000 prisoners held by the United Nations Command, all have undergone instruction by political officers. Specific and detailed references to the system are found in the following documents: 521 MISD Rpt #1375, 21 Nov 51, 528-MISPI-0662, 18 Oct 1951, KOR-8-100 (10a), 10 July 1951, KOR-2-502 (10b), 25 Sept 1951. Air University Far East Research Group, Questionnaire 5a-Brief on Cultural Political Officers, Self Criticism Meetings and Relations to Men, KT 4022, 6 Nov 52, KT 4044, 14 Nov 52, KT 4054, 14 Nov 52.

be the "representative" leaders in the camps and compounds, ensuring that responsibility for the maintenance of discipline and order and the distribution of food and clothing would be in communist hands (1). As long as they were together, unorganized and politically inept non-communists were completely in their power. Strict adherence by the United Nations Command to the stipulations of the Geneva Convention on the selection of "representatives" was decidedly to the advantage of the political officers.

6. With the communist organization well entrenched in the prisoner-of-war camps, the next step was to establish effective communications between it and the high command in North Korea without arousing the suspicions of the United Nations Command. How this was done is explained in some detail in Part II, but in general use was made of agents who allowed themselves to be captured (2) or members of the communist guerrilla network in South Korea who infiltrated, often in the guise of refugees, to the vicinity of the prisoner-of-war camps to pass messages back and forth.

7. Through such channels eventually flowed instructions to the communists in the camps to prepare for open violence in the form of mass mutinies, riots and breakouts. They were to disobey, challenge and attack their guards. They were to cause enough trouble to

(1) Plans, policies, directives and methods of implementation of control, mutinies and punishment of PWs by the Communist are revealed in documents - KOR - 308 - 208 (5C) 5 June 1952, 11 June 1952, 25 June 1952, 17 July 1952, 9 July 1952, 19 June 1952, 24 July 1952 and 31 July 1952. KOR - 704 - 1005 (5a) 13 Dec 1952, HQ UNC POW Camp #1 (Koje-do) dated 1 Oct 1952 and 2 Sept 1952, 2 November 1952 and assorted documents taken from PWs, KOR - 704 - 1005 (5a) 25 Sept 1952.

(2) In late 1951 the United Nations Command captured its first North Korean Prison Camp agents. These prisoners revealed that they were deliberate plants and had been trained by the Political Security Department of the North Korean Army. These agents revealed that their mission was to stir prisoners of war to riot and mutiny to foster Communist aims regardless of the outcome to the participants. 528-MISPI-0730, 18 Dec 1951, 528 MISPI-0729, 16 Dec 1951.

weaken the position of the United Nations Command in the Panmunjom armistice negotiations (1). If they succeeded in breaking out, they were to link up with the communist bandits operating in South Korea to terrorize the local populace and force the United Nations Command to pull troops and equipment from forward areas. It was anticipated that the rioting prisoners would meet with resistance and that many might be killed. They were expendable, however, and the instructions were explicit in ordering the communist leaders to disregard any possible consequence to the participants in incidents. The more casualties there were, the better their propaganda value. Moral condemnation of the United Nations Command in the eyes of the world, it was reasoned, would help to weaken its firmness in the armistice negotiations.

8. The source of these instructions was not simply the high command in North Korea. It was the very men who sat with the United Nations Command representatives around the table of the Panmunjom armistice negotiations. They were doubly charged with carrying on the negotiations in furtherance of the objectives of the communist hierarchy and devising and putting into effect measures, primarily military, which would help to swing the negotiations to their advantage. Their assignment as delegates was only incidental to their continued performance of their military duties (2). Nam Il, a former

(1) Special Intelligence Reports, HQ, UNC POW Camp #1 (Koje-do) 2 Sept and 1 Oct 1952. Interrogation of Prisoner of War Reports of Prison Camp Agents. KOR - 308 - 208 - entire 5C series dated May 1952 to Dec 1952.

(2) Intelligence derived from thousands of documents has established the mission and duties of the Communist delegates as identical with their primary missions in the Communist armies. Supplement Number 1 to Operational Memorandum 8, 308 CIC, 29 Oct 1951, 521 MISDI - 1322, 28 Oct 51, (U.S. X Corps, PIR No. 403) 3 Nov 51, CCRAK #103, 10 January 1952, ZJY-5555, 1 Nov 1951, ZJY-5893, 21 Dec 1951, ZJY 8957, 5 Dec 1952.

Soviet officer, was the most important of them, and as Cultural Chief of Staff and Chief of the Security Agency of the North Korean Army (1), was responsible for ensuring the loyalty of the army to the State by controlling all personnel through political officers or commissars. Lee Sang Jo, Nam's deputy at Panmunjom, was Chief of Collection of Military Intelligence. (2). Frequently with them at Panmunjom, disguised as a lieutenant or sergeant, was General Kim Pa, former Soviet MVD agent with a high position in the North Korean Political Security Department, who served as liaison officer for Nam between Panmunjom and his command in the North Korean Army headquarters (3). One of his tasks was to recruit and train agents to be sent into the prisoner-of-war camps.

C. The Koje-do Outbreak

Toward the end of 1951, the United Nations Command became aware of increasing efforts by the communists to keep in contact with the prisoners of war. The success of these efforts could not be measured. That the communists would like to instigate trouble was taken for granted, but the prisoner-of-war compounds remained quiet and gave no evidence that anything was developing. Surprise was an essential ingredient in the communist plot, and special care was taken to ensure it. Not until after the outbreak was it possible to fit the

(1) NAM Il's rise as a Soviet officer has been traced from his Soviet Army career to Korea as a Soviet-sponsored North Korean general in KG 1122, 31 May 52.

(2) LEE Sang Jo has been identified as the head of the North Korean Army Intelligence. He was brought from Russia and placed in this position in July 1950. 302 - MISC - 1 - 2768, Feb 52. KOR - 308 - 207 (2), Dec 1952.

(3) General KIM Pa has been identified as a former Soviet MVD agent and now one of the high-ranking officers of the North Korean Political Security Department. Eye witnesses have seen him at Panmunjom disguised variously as a lieutenant or sergeant. KOR - 308 - 207 (2). Nov 1952, ZJY-5275, 19 Oct 51.

pieces together and reconstruct what had happened. In the armistice negotiations, only one major issue remained, repatriation of prisoners of war. Nam Il's delegation began to stall, and communist propaganda became more vehement. That was the moment chosen for the Kojedo prisoners to mutiny. They carried out their instructions to the letter, and it must be admitted that initially the advantage of surprise enabled them to achieve a measure of success. Only stern counter-action by the United Nations Command saved the situation and brought the camp under control. Even so, Nam Il gained an opportunity to attract worldwide attention with propaganda allegations of "illegal and barbaric persecution of Communist prisoners of war" by the United Nations Command.

THE UNFOLDING OF THE PLCT

A. Development of the Situation

1. With the collapse of the North Korean forces toward the end of 1950, well over 100,000 Communists were held by the United Nations Command in installations throughout the rear area of the Eighth Army. The entrance of Chinese forces into the Korean conflict and the subsequent withdrawal of United Nations forces necessitated mass evacuation of prisoners to the Pusan area, where their concentration soon imperiled logistical channels. After consideration of several courses of action, it was decided to establish a POW installation on the island of Koje-do, off the south coast of Korea, which would be large enough to accommodate the mass of Communist prisoners. Initial construction and first shipments of prisoners began in early 1951, and by midyear the total population at Koje-do exceeded 150,000. On the mainland, at Pusan, a smaller installation housed hospital patients. The Koje-do population was divided into about 130,000 Koreans and 20,000 Chinese.

2. In the early days of Koje-do, little difficulty was experienced by camp authorities. Not until 1952 was there trouble of any significance. When it appeared, it paralleled developments in the Armistice negotiations at Panmunjom on Agenda Item 4, pertaining to prisoners of war. The talks on this issue had narrowed to the question of who would be repatriated. The Communist negotiators indicated that, before they would make any substantive agreement on arrangements for exchange of prisoners, they required an estimate of the total number of Communist prisoners the United Nations Command would return to Communist control under its principle that no prisoner would be repatriated by force against his wish.

3. No effort had been made until that time to screen captured personnel to determine their political sympathies. The Communist demand for an estimate, however, made it necessary to question the prisoners.

Careful plans were made to ascertain who among the prisoners forcibly would resist return to Communist control. North Korean and Chinese prisoners were to be asked whether in their own minds they thought they would forcibly resist repatriation, and South Koreans were to be asked merely whether they elected to be handed over to Communist authorities.

4. No particular difficulty was experienced until the screening teams reached the first of a group of compounds led and controlled by fanatical Communist elements who refused to cooperate in the program. Screening could have been accomplished at the time by force, but in view of what was then considered to be the favorable trend of the Armistice negotiations it was decided to wait. At about the same time, a series of scattered incidents at Koje-do reflected the same rebellious spirit in certain other compounds. These were climaxed on May 7, 1952, by the capture of General Dodd, then commanding general of the island. This demonstration of overt defiance dictated by compound leaders made it quite clear to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, that such disregard of discipline and authority could not be tolerated if the United Nations Command was to discharge its responsibilities properly toward all captured personnel as required by the Geneva Convention. Brigadier General Haydon L. Boatner, an experienced combat leader and an officer with a diversified background of service in the Orient, was placed in command of Koje-do with orders to regain uncontested control. After receiving an augmentation of security forces on the island, General Boatner, within about one week, was in complete control of all the Communist compounds.

5. As a consequence of what had been revealed, it was decided to reduce the concentration of the prisoner population on Koje-do by establishing new camps dispersed on the Korean mainland and on other islands into which would be shifted, insofar as possible, prisoners of the same nationality and political feeling. Under the direction of the newly organized United Nations Prisoner of War Command, pro-Communist

Korean prisoners were transferred to three other locations--Chogu-ri, on the southwest tip of Koje-do, and to Pongam-do and Yongeho-do, two islands immediately southwest of Koje. All Chinese prisoners were brought together on the island of Cheju-do, with the pro-Communists on the north side of the island and the anti-Communists on the south. Anti-Communist Korean prisoners were settled in a chain of camps throughout South Korea. The operation included a carefully worked out plan for the construction and winterization of self-contained camps in which prisoners would be housed in smaller, more manageable groups.

6. The breakup of the Koje-do compounds following the completion of screening successfully curtailed large-scale subversive demonstrations, but isolated acts challenging the authority of camp officials continued to occur in pro-Communist installations. In all anti-Communist installations, once the prisoners realized that they had in fact been handled in exact accordance with the plans announced to them by the United Nations Prisoner of War Command, there was enthusiastic cooperation and evident sincerity in accepting their new locations as a desirable improvement in living conditions.

B. How the Communists Reached Into the Camps

1. Toward the end of 1951, when the Panmunjom Armistice negotiations approached the issue of exchanging prisoners of war, it was learned that the Communists had organized a special unit to help in influencing the discussions. This unit, attached to the headquarters of the North Korean Army, had the specific missions of training agents to send into the prisoner-of-war camps as POWs to carry out various plans and of furnishing intelligence to the Communist negotiators at Panmunjom. It was under the supervision of General Nam Il, senior Communist delegate at Panmunjom (1).

(1) Prison camp agents have revealed that a special unit was formed to train them in their mission of penetrating United Nations camps by allowing themselves to be captured by UN forces. This unit was part of the Political Security Department of the North Korean Army, GHQ. General Nam Il, in his capacity as Cultural Chief of Staff of the North Korean Army, commands and supervises the duties of the Political Security Department. 528-MISPI-0730, 18 Dec 1951, 528 MISPI-0729, 16 Dec 51. CCRAK #103, 10 Jan 52, ZUY-5555, 1 Nov 1951.

In December of 1951, the translation of a captured document signed by the Chief of the Southern Section of the Korean Labor Party stated that "according to information from the party in Kyongsang Namdo, South Korea, approximately thirty thousand to sixty thousand North Korean Army soldiers interned in the Koje-do prisoner-of-war camp have been organized, and the Kyongsang Namdo Branch of the Korean Labor Communist Party will start activities in their behalf" (1).

2. The unit was part of Nam's political control organization which extended down through each military echelon from corps, brigade or division to three-man party cells. The organization handled party, youth, civil and propaganda affairs. It published daily and weekly newspapers, organized choirs and service shows, censored mail and utilized all possible media to indoctrinate troops, secure their blind loyalty and bolster morale. It controlled a soldier's career either by admitting him to or suspending him from party membership or by prosecuting him for any deviation from the party line. Additional missions of Nam's machinery for both thought and physical control of all Communist troops included the detection of dissident elements within the armed forces, preparation of military propaganda, the recruitment, training and dispatching of agents, and the corporeal punishment of traitors (2).

3. Many prisoners captured by the United Nations forces have admitted that they were deliberate plants and had been dispatched to penetrate the prisoner camps at Koje-do. Male agents were dispersed in front-line Communist units and, during small combat engagements, either surrendered or were "captured." This method enabled many agents to find their way into the compounds with ease and comfort through the normal prisoner-of-war channels without detection. Female agents were dispatched as refugees. They were instructed to secure employment at or live nearby prisoner-of-war hospitals or camps in order to assist the Communist agents within the camps.

(1) ATIS DOCUMENT 27, December 1951 by Chief of Southern Section of Korean Labor Party.

(2) Thousands of prisoners through interrogation reports, documents and other sources of intelligence have revealed in detail the function and missions of the Communist political apparatus which binds their armies into combat units. ATIS Enemy Documents 9 Nov 1951, 521 MISD Rpt #1375, 21 Nov 51, Supplement #1 CPN MEMO 8, 29 Oct 51 KT 4029, 8 Nov 52, KG 1409, 6 Dec 52, Air University Far East Research Group Questionnaire 5a, Brief on cultural political officers, self-criticism meetings and relations to men.

4. All agents initially were selected from hard-core Communists. After selection, they were thoroughly schooled for two months in the following subjects: (a) History of the USSR Communist Party and Korean Labor Party; (b) Communist theory; (c) methods of organizing party groups, either civilian or military; (d) Korean revolution and world situation, and (e) the situation in South Korea. The agents were directed specifically to spread propaganda among the prisoners to the effect that unification of Korea under the North Korean Government was a certainty and that withdrawal of the United Nations forces from Korea was imminent. They were also to emphasize that modern equipment was being given to the North Korean Army by the Soviet Union and China, that the life of the North Korean soldier had vastly improved, that high North Korean Government officials were concerned about the welfare of the prisoners of war and that high respect and consideration would be shown them upon their return.

5. To stimulate maximum loyalty and zeal in their mission, the agents were told that an Armistice definitely would be signed and that they soon would return to North Korea. To dispel fears previously engendered by the Communist propaganda that the United Nations forces killed all prisoners, the Communist leaders now stated that because of the Armistice negotiations the enemy had stopped murdering prisoners. As a final encouragement and inducement, the agents were promised that they would be publicly praised and decorated upon their return. They would be treated as heroes of the North Korean people (1).

6. Specific instructions stipulated the establishment of "cell organization committees" in each prisoner-of-war camp and close supervision within them down to their smallest three-prisoner units. Three cells were considered to constitute a group, three groups a division and three divisions a committee. North Korean officers were to be assigned by the agents to responsible positions within the cellular network in order to foster stringent military discipline. As the cells grew strong, they were to instigate and carry out strikes, protests and demonstrations.

(1) 528-MISPI-0730, 18 Dec 1951, 528-MISPI-0729, 16 Dec 51, KT 4158, 7 Dec 1952.

7. In addition to their cellular organizing functions, the agents were further instructed to investigate the attitude and conduct of each prisoner. They were to obtain the names of those who had surrendered voluntarily, those who were unsympathetic to the North Korean Government, and those whom the camp authorities had called in several times for interrogation. Names of the Republic of Korea guards and all informers posing as prisoners were also to be obtained for future reference.

8. To establish contact with Communist prisoners of war and insure effective coordination, the Communist high command used the Guerrilla Guidance Bureau, which is responsible for the infiltration of agents into South Korea and the control of guerrilla operations (1). In addition, the Military Intelligence Section of the North Korean Army was employed. To its Espionage Department, composed of the elite of the North Korean military intelligence system, was entrusted much of the transmission of the records and messages from prisoners to North Korea. It is organized into agent teams of 10 to 12 officers and non-commissioned officers with the ranks of the team commanders varying from senior lieutenant to colonel. The teams are equipped with portable radios of Soviet manufacture and are dispatched with instructions to form covert intelligence nets throughout South Korea. These units, together with guerrilla couriers of the Guerrilla Guidance Bureau, were the primary means of contact between the Communist prisoners at Koje-do and North Korea (2).

9. It has further been determined that the Communists utilized the non-Communist press for communication and planning. They anticipated that direct contact would not always be possible because of increased

(1) Thousands of bandits, agents and guerrillas have surrendered or been captured by UNC counterintelligence units. They have revealed in detail the functions, duties and missions assigned to them by the Guerrilla Guidance Bureau under the leadership of General Pae Chol, who also is a Soviet Army officer. 521-MISDI-1400, 3 Dec 51, 521 MISDI-1426, 17 Dec 51, 521-MISDI-1444, 26 Dec 51, KOR 016583-24 Sept 51, KOR-704, 1002 (10a) 2 Dec 1952, CCRAK F-6260, 2 Dec 52, KT 4083, 24 Nov 52, KT 3879 29 Oct 52.

(2) Communist military agents operating in South Korea have been captured and stated they were part of, and trained by the Espionage Department of the North Korean MI Section. They were generally officers with cryptographic and signal training. (North Korean Intelligence System FECID 13). Guerrilla couriers of the Guerrilla Guidance Bureau were utilized as a primary means of contact KOR - 704 - 1003 (5a) 2, 5, 6 Nov 1952 and Special Intelligence Report #4, HQ UNC PCW Camp #1, (Koje-do), 24 Oct 1952.

United Nations security measures. Thus instruction was given in how to use the non-Communist press as a secondary and interim medium of contact. Prisoners have stated that copies of current newspapers were smuggled daily into the compounds. Material for indoctrination lectures was prepared from the newspapers by distorting the published news items. The main advantage, however, was that these newspapers enabled the Communist leaders in the camps to keep current on developments in the Armistice negotiations and thus to time their activities, riots, disorders and other violence to be most advantageous to the Communist negotiators (1).

10. To keep the compounds organized, functioning and under control, an internal communication system was needed. The principal means of internal communication was through the 64th Field Hospital. When there was occasion to get in touch with members of other compounds, prisoners feigned illness to get into the hospital. Communication was then established between the wards by throwing notes tied to rocks or by word of mouth. The officers' ward was the nerve center of the hospital communication system. All information and directives were centralized in this ward and then disseminated by patients released to different compounds. Each ward was known as a "yuk" or company. Each group of wards was designated a "ku" or battalion. Ward A-6 was the headquarters for the Communist intra-hospital organization (2). Most of the prisoner workers in the hospital joined the Communist organization either voluntarily or involuntarily. Each was interrogated carefully by his ward leader to ascertain whether or not the man was already a good Communist. If acceptable, he was then made a member of the Korean Labor Party and became an integral part of the communication system.

11. In addition to the hospital communication system, the prisoners used semaphore flags, hand signals, whistling and chanting and throwing messages wrapped around rocks for inter-compound communications. Messages

(1) KOR - 308 - 208 (5C) 9 June 1952. Special Intelligence Report #1 and 2, HQ UNC, POW Camp #1, (Kcja-dc), 1 and 2 Sept 1952, and KOR - 704 - 1005 (5a), 5 Oct 1952.

(2) KOR - 704th CIC Det, KCOMZ APO 234, 2 November 1952, KOR - 308 - 208 (5C) dated 9 June 1952.

were also placed in rations, clothing and supplies being delivered to the various compounds. The prisoners overlooked no possibility of communication as evidenced by a rather ingenious attempt to tie messages to large dragon flies (1).

12. Communication between prisoners and points outside the camps, including North Korea, was accomplished mainly by agent-prisoners dispatched from North Korea through the medium of capture with instructions to be delivered upon arrival in the enclosures. This system was augmented by covert agents on the outside who received and passed on messages from Communist prisoners for delivery in North Korea. Such messages addressed to even Kim Il Sung and Mao Tse-tung have been confiscated from prisoners within the compounds (2).

(1) KCZGI 350.09 subject, Communist Subversion within UNC Camps for Communist POW and Civilian Internees, dated 20 Oct 1952.

(2) Special Intelligence Report #4, HQ, UNC POW Camp #1, 24 Oct 52. CZGI Letter, transmittal documents, 30 Oct 52.

PART III

COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION WITHIN THE CAMPS

A. Political Organization.


1. The over-all organizational structure which the North Korean communists developed to exploit the Koje-do prisoners is shown in Chart 1. Months before this became operative however, the Communist prisoners in individual compounds were organizing. The Communists in Compound 92 in May of 1951 established the Koje-do branch of the Korean Labor Party (1) which they termed the "Liberation Fighting Association." Similar groups were formed in most of the other compounds. Each came to have subordinate political, agitation, and Youth Association (military) sections, and members were divided into cells as in all communist organizations. Among them circulated a statement of such aims and principles as the following:

- (a). "We are reborn members of the Party and will sacrifice our lives and display all our ability for the Party so that the North Korean People's Republic may win the final victory."
- (b). "We are reborn members of the Party and will be faithful to the Party and carry out the Party's proclamation to educate all prisoners of war."
- (c). "Our Party will implement the platform of the People's Republic to have all prisoners of war, indigenous refugees, or officers and soldiers of the Republic of Korea recognize the platform."
- (d). "Our Party will foster internationalism, try to be friendly with the Chinese Communist forces, and infuse class consciousness into United Nations soldiers." (2)

(1) KOR - 308 - 208 (5C), June 1952; KOR - 308-208 (5C) 4 April 52 and 26 May '52.

(2) KOR - 308 - 208 (5a, 17 June 1952.

COMMUNIST COMMAND STRUCTURE AND CONTROL WITHIN UNC PW CAMP ON AGOE-DO



*NOTE: For breakdown of the General Leading Headquarters or Political Committee See Chart 2.

Chart 1

2. At a later stage, the expanding Communist organization clarified its objective as follows:

"We must consider the possible rupture of the cease-fire negotiations which are now underway and be ready to liberate ourselves in accordance with orders from Kim Il Sung. The prisoners of war should educate themselves and surround themselves with Party members. All types of units must be organized to rise in revolt simultaneously - in order to liberate all the prisoners of war and attack the ROK and American forces that now occupy Koje-do. After we win autonomous rights we will keep in touch with the commanding officer of the North Korean People's Army by wireless and will land on Korea proper. After that we will join the NKPA together with the Chiri-san guerrilla units." (1)

Some of the slogans adopted at the same time were:

- (a). "We are soldiers of the Korean Democratic People's Republic."
- (b). "We have fought for the People's Republic and will continue to fight for it."
- (c). "We must be re-trained."
- (d). "American imperialism is the enemy of humankind. Withdraw your hands from Korea."
- (e). "Our Fatherland is waiting for us. We must be ready to go to Chiri-san."
- (f). "We must be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention."
- (g). "We must be friendly with all leftist camps." (2)

3. As directives and instructions began to flow in from Nam P, the party structure was perfected and strengthened. An over-all

(1) KOR - 308 - 208 (5a), 17 June 1952.

(2) KOR - 308 - 208 (5a), 17 June 1952.

Political Committee was established to control the prisoners in the various compounds through four sections, Political Security, Organization, Military, and Agitation, as shown in Chart 2. Military administration committees were organized in all compounds under communist control (Chart 3). These committees, in turn, organized so-called military units to enforce the plans and directives of the committees. "People's courts" were established to punish offenders who deviated from the Party's policies or refused to join its militant organizations. Informants or loyal party members penetrated into or were placed in every military echelon down to squad level (1).

4. The leader of the Political Committee or "General Leading Headquarters" was Jeon Moon Il, ISN 182117, listed as a private in the North Korean Army. Jeon has been identified by his fellow prisoners as Pak Sang Hyon, one of the original group of 36 Soviet-Koreans brought into North Korea by the Soviets in 1945 to organize the North Korean Satellite State. Other members of this same Soviet group were Kim Il Sung, Ho Kai and Nam Il. Within the compounds, Pak went by the code name of Ro Sun Saeng. Prisoners have stated that he controlled all the compounds and personally ordered the capture of General Dodd. He also was allegedly responsible for instigating the riots in Compound 77 against the United Nations screening program for voluntary repatriation. He issued instructions, directives and propaganda. It was he who sentenced to death many of the prisoners who had dared to defy the Party directives


(2). Pak Sang Hyon has been removed from the compounds and is presently being held separately.

5. The four sections of the "General Leading Headquarters" had the following functions:

(1) Special Intelligence Reports, HQ UNC POW Camp #1 (Koje-do), 1 Oct and 2 Sept 52.

(2) Special Intelligence Report #5, HQ UNC POW Camp #1 (Koje-do), 2 November 1952.

COMMUNIST POLITICAL ORGANIZATION WITHIN UNC PW CAMP (KOJE-DO) IN SOUTH KOREA



Note: A Similar Committee or Organization Patterned After General Leading Headquarters Was Established in Each Compound, in the Compound. The Committees Have Subordinated to Them a Military Administrative Committee (See Chart 3).

COMMUNIST POLITICAL AND MILITARY ORGANIZATION WITHIN EACH UNC PW COMPOUND




CHART 3

(a). The Political Security or First Section (Chart 4)

was to investigate all Party members for any deviation from the Party line, recruit members, and take precautionary measures against outside infiltration. It was divided into two sub-sections as follows:

(1). Organizational Security or First Sub-section:

"To conduct an investigation in secret of Party members involved in acts of petty individual heroism (as opposed to "heroic" group activity), factionalism, opportunism, and cowardice; and of degenerative destructive elements who have been smuggled into the organization under the mask of democracy. All of these people will be blacklisted. Only superior experienced members will be selected, and they will be dispatched to each company, platoon, and squad. Their status and functions will be kept secret, and they will perform their duties at the risk of their lives. They will investigate and report on all personnel within the assigned units and must be ready to report whenever the higher organization directs. A daily activity report will be submitted. In case a secret task is compromised, the respective members will be responsible for the indiscretion." (1)

Captured documents reveal how this section implemented its duties (2). Its plans included detailed instructions as to substance of tasks, dates, executors, responsible persons and supervisors (3).

(2). Internal Security of Second Sub-section:

"Strengthen the party by leading the prisoners of war to affiliate with the organization. Investigate the independent mob (those not under

(1) (2) (3) Special Intelligence Reports, HQ, UNC POW Camp #1 (Koja-do), 1 Oct and 2 Sept 1952.

1st SECTION POLITICAL SECURITY

Compilation of Party members, League members and military formations who are under control of underground party. Strongly and develop party by recruiting and present/carry measures against outsiders seeking to destroy the party.

1st Sub-Section Organizational Security
Investigate in Secret Party Members for individualism, factionalism, opportunism, cowardice, and degeneratives, destructive elements who smuggled into the organization. The above will be blacklisted.

SC - SUNG
3 men calls
1 sent to en. CO

1st grade agent in en. Platoon

1-2 Grade agent in en. Platoon

2nd Sub-Section Internal Security
Investigate the unorganized mob and all members under PW administration, spies, and agents. Check agents of NKMA civil interpreters, christian ministers, religionists party members with bad qualities and those who associate with reactionary.

SJ - HUNG
3 men calls
1 sent to en. BN

1st grade member in en. Company

2nd grade member in en. Platoon

Chart 4

or amenable to communist control) and all members under the POW administration. Take precautionary measures against spies and agents to include agents of the Republic of Korea Army, civil interpreters, Christian ministers, Party members with bad qualities, religionists, former security chiefs, draft evaders, reactionary groups, and those who associate with reactionary elements. The above people will be blacklisted. An outstanding experienced member will be sub-section chief. One leader will be dispatched to each battalion -- a first grade member to each company and a second grade member to each platoon. Their status and mission will be secret; they will perform their duties at the risk of their lives and, if a task is compromised, the member will be held responsible." (1)

Captured documents reveal the task plans for this sub-section; i.e., detailed instructions as to the substance of tasks, dates, executors, responsible officers and supervisors (2).

(b). The Organization and Planning of Second Section (Chart 5) was to maintain external liaison and contact with guerrillas, render intelligence reports on camp guards, and cover news and world events. It had two sub-sections with the following missions:

(1). External Liaison and Reconnaissance or Third

Sub-section:

"Reconnaissance of the United Nations military establishment, channels of communication, and supply lines. Connect with the guerrillas on the

(1, 2) Special Intelligence Report, HQ, UNC POW Camp 1, 1 Oct and 2 Sept 1952.




Chart 5

mainland and co-operate with the North Korean Army in accordance with instructions issued by the party in order to destroy the enemy's military establishment. Whenever the time is appropriate for an uprising or break, the members dispatched to the outside will assist the basic fighting units to get out of the compound by occupying stationary firing posts and guard posts by surprise attack, light signal fires on the hills, capture weapons, and destroy United Nations ammunition and armory store houses. This sub-section will be organized from Party members experienced in guerrilla fighting in China and South Korea, those who have a thorough knowledge of enemy weapons, and those who served in the North Korean Army in engineering and reconnaissance units. Members will be dispatched outside after strict investigation and examination of their ability." (1)

Specific instructions were given to the members of this group and, once outside of the compounds, they had the following orders: "After extrication, construct a partisan base and set fire to the camp's headquarters petroleum dump, food storage and other supply areas, and destroy the transportation route. After completion of this duty, they will get to the mainland and report to an officer higher than major and join the partisans. Extrication or escape will be accomplished before dawn, while on work details, or during foggy weather." (2)

- (2). External Intelligence or Fourth Sub-section:
"To find out the type of enemy units by squad, platoon, company, etc., classified by military service through command post signs, marks on vehicles, signs, shoulder patches, and all other signs and appropriate weapons. Compile the

full name, age, birthplace, address, and political ideals of all ROK soldiers, police, civilians, and government officials. All members must have a knowledge of affairs in South Korea and be able to speak English. The sub-section will have ten plain members. They will be placed on outside work details in order to collect newspapers, military documents, and other papers in order to gain knowledge of international and internal affairs for our information in order to assist in attaining our final purpose. This sub-section has four units; USA, ROK, Civil, and Reconnaissance. The USA sub-unit will make a chart with location of troops, names, formation and number, kinds of weapons, location of weapons, number of officers and NCO's, location of command posts and billets, condition of communications, and guard dispositions. The ROK sub-unit will make a sketch chart with location of troops, names of troops, formation and number, kinds of weapons and location, number of officers and NCO's, location of command posts and billets, and conditions of communication. It will further make a record of any discord between officers and NCO's and the current ideas and thinking of the soldiers. The civilian sub-section will make a sketch chart with disposition of the national police, their location, number of officers and their political thinking, and the location of the ROK CIC." (1)

(1) Special Intelligence Reports 1 and 2, HQ, UNC POW Camp #1, dated 1 Oct 1952 and 2 Sept 1952.

The reconnaissance sub-unit was to watch from inside the compounds and formulate reconnaissance reports and charts. The following table is an example of this type of reporting:

Movement of Enemy Military Power

<u>TIME</u>	<u>ARMS</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>NUMBER OF PEOPLE</u>	<u>MOVING DIRECTION</u>	<u>RESULT</u>
0700	Carbine	50	Yankee (US) 54	Northeast	Unknown
	M-1	4			
0710	Carbine	4	Puppet Soldier(POK)	Northeast	Unknown
	M-1	21	25		


(1)

(c). The Guard Unit or Third Section (Chart 6) was to safeguard staff members, documents, and communications and punish all violators and reactionaries. Its two sub-sections had the following missions:

(1). Guard Unit or Fifth Sub-section:

"One leader will be dispatched to each staff member as a body guard. Outstanding members will be chosen who have more than five years of party experience and more than three years in the North Korean Army. Each leader will control three plain members who must have served in the North Korean Army for more than three years. The members are required to keep the secrets of the staff members and if there is any compromise, the members will be punished for the indiscretion. They will be responsible for the staff members' safety under all circumstances and will submit activity reports every ten days. The members will sleep within staff rooms. Constant care should be exercised regarding the staff's health conditions (securing their health, food and clothes); strict observation

(1) Special Intelligence Reports 1 and 2, HQ, UNC POW Camp #1, dated 1 Oct 1952 and 2 Sept 1952.



of internal opportunists, cowards and reactionaries should be maintained to prevent the kidnapping of the staff members." (1)

(2). Special Activity or Sixth Sub-section:

"To punish by physical or other means all reactionary, destructive elements and spies who act in defiance of the advice of party members and who violate the party regulations and rebel against the Fatherland and people. The sub-section chief will have five or more plain members. They will be selected from those who have more than three years of experience in the Party. They must perform their duties at the risk of their lives and, in case secrets are compromised they will be responsible for the indiscretion. The members of this group are the executioners or the strong-arm squads who punish, beat, and execute violators condemned by the 'peoples courts'. The 'peoples courts' are organized at various levels. For minor violations, the platoon acts as judge while the company and battalion leaders are judges for more serious offenses, and the Political Committee Courts -- the highest -- punish all serious offenses which could result in the death sentence." (2)

A few of the many examples of "people's court" actions and other activities of the special-activity units known to the United Nations Command follow:

On 5 June 1952, a "people's court" accused a defendant of planning to overthrow the Communist regime in the compound. He denied the charge, but after having been beaten with fists, kicked and struck across the shoulders with tent pole clubs, he made a

(1, 2) Special Intelligence Reports 1 and 2, HQ, UNC POW Camp #1, dated 2 Sept and 1 Oct 1952.

"self-criticism," admitted lack of zeal for the Communist cause but promised future loyalty. (1)

A "people's court" in Compound 85 forced 500 prisoners to attend a trial of a prisoner for his participation in the writing of petitions in blood against returning to North Korea (2).

A 1,000-man "jury" (250 men from each battalion) on June 6, 1952 conducted a "self-criticism" of prisoners and sentenced one to death. The prisoner who received the death sentence was a member of an anti-Communist group which, it was alleged, had plotted to kill the Communist leaders and take control of Compound 85 (3).

A prisoner in Compound #10 was interrogated by the Communists and found not to belong to any North Korean communist organization. He was alleged to be a traitor, sentenced to death and murdered (4).

Communist leaders stated that if any United Nations personnel should attempt to rescue any anti-Communist prisoner from their control, the prisoner would be killed by them (5).

From August to December in 1951, a total of 124 officer prisoners were tried by "people's courts" in Compound #66. These were officers who either had surrendered their units or had killed their commanding officers in order to gain control of their units for surrender. Seventy-seven of them confessed their anti-Communist sympathies. The remaining 47 were accused of anti-Communist sympathies but never confessed to the "people's court." The 77 who did confess were sentenced to death upon return to North Korea (6).

In December, 1951 three prisoners were stoned to death on orders of the communist "people's court" (7). Tent No. 12 in Compound 66 was used as a prison where 40 men were detained (8).

(1) KOR - 308 - 208 (5a), 18 June, 11 June, 25 June, 17 July 1952.
(2, 3, 4, 5, 6) KOR - 308 - 208 (5a), dated 11 June, 25 June, 3 July, 17 July, 24 July 1952.
(7, 8) KOR - 308 - 208 (5a), 3 July, 17 July, 25 July 1952.

A prisoner accused of being an anti communist refused to speak before the Chief of the Political Committee in Compound 66 on November 11, 1951. All platoon members kicked or struck the prisoner. Two of them then took a section of a tent pole and beat him to death (1).

In addition to the above enumerated "duties", the special activity units organized perimeter guards to prevent anti-Communist prisoners from escaping from their control. Forty-five men from each battalion usually were chosen for this duty (2).

(d). The Agitation and Propaganda or Fourth Section (Chart 7) was charged with the responsibilities of keeping statistics and documents and planning and preparing teaching material and propaganda. Its two sub-sections had the following missions:

(1). Statistics, Documents, and Publications or Seventh Sub-section:

"Responsible for safe-keeping documents, statistics, plants of other sections, and copying and reproduction of documents and directives for distribution. On the basis of intelligence received, this sub-section will establish plans for new intelligence activities." (3)

An example of the directives and documents distributed by this sub-section is the following schedule published for the month of August, 1952:

(1) KCR - 308 - 208 (5a), 3 July, 17 July, 25 July 1952.

(2, 3) Special Intelligence Reports 1 and 2, HQ, UNC POW Camp #1, dated 2 Sept and 1 Oct 1952.

4th Section Agitation & Propaganda
Keep statistics, documents and plans of other sections. Prepare teaching materials and propaganda. Distribute plans and directives.

7th Sub-Section Statistics, Documents and Publications
Keep documents, statistics, plans of other sections and copy documents.

Cells
3 to 5 men

8th Sub-Section
Education and Culture
Prepare teaching material for members and keep forms and charts on attitude, reaction, education and methods of operation.

?

Chart 7

Schedule for the Month of August, 1952

Main Direction:

- a. Strengthening of the task for leadership in order to strengthen the Party organization, establishing the organization system, and stirring up the leaders of the Party.
- b. Expansion and strengthening of the Party, fighting against the objectionable elements in the Party.
- c. Educational task to throw whole soul into Marxism and Leninism--to stir up all members to resolve to fight on with the spirit of June 10.
- d. A task to give a stimulus to military spirit by instigation, propaganda and moral education in order to strengthen the League organization which is the reserve power of our party.
- e. Legalization and strengthening of administrative task. (1)

In addition to the "main direction," these plans included the frequency and date of meetings, subjects to be discussed, periods of preparation, the persons responsible for preparation and the executors.

(2). Education and Culture or Eighth Sub-section:

"Prepares propaganda, lectures, indoctrination and agitation data." (2)

Examples of the results of the instigation of the Fourth Section follow:

In Compound 1, a group of prisoners in North Korean Army uniforms paraded and defied the United Nations authorities. The demonstration was noteworthy in that the prisoners had manufactured North Korean Army shoulder boards and insignia. (3)

Prisoners published a clandestine newspaper which contained distorted and inflammatory items designed to create incidents.

This news was also disseminated through political lectures. (4)

(1, 2) Special Intelligence Report, HQ, UNC POW Camp #1, 2 September 1952.

(3, 4) KOR - 308 - 208 (5a and 5c) series from June to November 1952.

Prisoners published leaflets addressed to ROK and US guards.

(1). Political lectures and military training constituted the program for all daylight and early evening hours. (2)

In March of 1952, platoon leaders told the prisoners that the armistice negotiations had failed and therefore they must escape in order to reach North Korea and save their lives. Subsequently, the compound leaders advised the prisoners not to submit to screening. They added that the armistice negotiations were nearly completed and all prisoners would be repatriated. Still later, they spread the allegation that the United Nations Command wanted to move all faithful communists into other compounds away from the other prisoners in order that the true Communists could be killed. The prisoners were further advised that if United Nations soldiers entered the compounds they could not and would not be allowed to fire their weapons at the prisoners because it was contrary to the precepts of the Geneva Convention. All prisoners were to concentrate in one place and fight the United Nations soldiers. "Each man kill one soldier before he is subdued," they were enjoined.

Leaders goaded the prisoners to try to break out, capture any United Nations soldiers and hold them as hostages. "If our demands are not met, kill them," they were told. (3)

"If any prisoner reveals information, he will be killed by us and we will blame the United Nations authorities." the Fourth Section's representatives warned. (4)

The prisoners in Compound 10 were told repeatedly that the North Korean Army was receiving "new" and effective weapons from the Soviet Union, including anti-aircraft and coastal guns to prevent attacks by ships and planes. (5)

(1) KOR - 704 - 1005 (5a), 13 Nov 1952.
(2, 3, 4, 5) KOR - 308 - 208 (5a and 5c) series June and July 1952. Special Intelligence Reports 1 and 2, HQ, UNC POW Camp #1, 2 Sept and 1 Oct 1952.

B. Military Organization

1. Once the political apparatus was organized, Military Administrative Committees were created in the various compounds. These committees established brigade or regimental headquarters units to which the compound spokesman, interpreter, monitor and security chief were attached as shown in Chart 3. These were all under the command of the assistant brigade or regimental commander. The next echelon was the battalion, which was the basic "fighting" unit within the compound. The battalions in turn had three or four companies, broken down into platoons and squads (Chart 8). In lower units, the political organization was represented by the assistant commander of the battalion, company, platoon, or squad, who usually was the commissar or political officer. Other political agents, their identities secret, infiltrated the lower echelons. (1)


2. Of no little importance in connection with the outbreaks was the Political Security Section of the military organization. As all orders emanated from or passed through this section, it controlled political channels to the compound Political Committee, operation of the compound, actions to be taken and policies to be followed. The compound monitors, battalion monitors and spokesmen all received orders from it. (2) Examples of the material it provided to the Political Committee follow:

Movement of Puppet Troops (ROK)!.. "Approximately 1110 hours, 30 Aug, a couple of puppet soldiers carrying a roll of cable passed behind this compound (605) through the right side road of Compound 606. It is supposed that the enemies are going to expand the network of telegraphic wires."

Movement of Detaining Power?.. An unknown comrade kidnapped from the 4th Battalion of 607 on 30 Aug was interrogated by a US Major and a US Captain inside the tent in front of main gate of 607."

(1, 2) Special Intelligence Reports, HQ UNC POW Camp #1 (Koje-Do) 1 October 1952 and 2 September 1952

CHART NO. 8



Note: See Chart 3 for place of Battalion in compound politico-military organization.

Movement of Other Compounds..."At approximately 1600 hours on 28 Aug, 48 prisoners were forcibly assembled at the front ground on account of disobedience to the enemies' order to the 1st Platoon to send out the platoon. The leader, under the pretext of singing songs, defied the instructions. And then, one out of 48 was kidnapped by the enemy."..."At 1900 hours on the 27th, a Yankee 2d Lt. brought a prisoner into the 3d Battalion of 605, who is believed to be an enemy informer by his behavior."

Information Obtained from Patients Who Left the Hospital...

"According to the Yankees' newspaper dated 25 Aug the Yankees are sending the puppet troops to the rear because the puppet troops in front are going over to the North Koreans every day, surrendering themselves." ... "An informant said that 40 puppet army officers and our KPA (NK.) prisoners who were escaping to North Korea by boat were caught about a week ago by the Yankees near the 38th parallel; but the puppet officers committed suicide on the spot." ... "The female prisoners have been fighting by singing songs; however, they have been prohibited from singing songs since 15 Aug by the enemy's order."

Information Obtained From the Yankee Newspaper "Stars"...

"According to the 'Stars' paper dated 4 Aug, Hae In Sa (biggest temple in Korea, 1,200 years old) was destroyed by fire by about 50 partisans and 20 marines; and 12 youths were kidnapped at the same time." ... "According to the newspaper dated 18 Aug, the drought this year inflicted heavy losses on agricultural products all over America. The representatives of respective farms are now having a meeting in Washington, D.C., to talk about the situation. Forty-five states out of the 48 are badly in need of relief. The US Government is now

issuing public bonds in order to bridge over the difficulty.

The damage is inflicted on not only the farms but the ranches."..

"The agricultural production will be decreased by one fourth of the average year on account of the drought. The amount of damages up to this date comes up to \$100,000,000."

Information on 14 Aug..."The American steel industry gets a big blow due to the general strike called by the laborers of the industry for 52 days which has influenced munitions production. It is said that it will take about three months at least to reach normal production of the steel industry."

..."This strike resulted in a 50 per cent decrease in the average yearly production. This strike was settled in the White House between the President and representatives of the laborers."

3. Each compound was organized along military lines, and the barracks and other facilities were allotted to specific military echelons as shown in Chart 9. (1). Examples follow of plans and activities of the Military Administrative Committees learned through prisoner interrogations:

"In April of 1952, the leaders instructed the men to seize any US or ROK guards who entered Compound #77." (2)

"In the event of entry by UN troops, 1,500 communist prisoners will lead the attack and be led by the compound commandant and vice-commandant. This first line will be backed by 3,500 other prisoners led by their platoon leaders. The estimated 2,500 anti-communist prisoners will remain in their quarters and not join in the attack. The plan is to attack UN troops from the flanks, capturing weapons and troops, preferably officers. The weapons to be utilized in the attack are spears made from tent poles, a piece of pipe six inches long, racks, knives, flails and clubs." (3)

(1) KOR - 308 - 208 (5c) 9 June 1952 and Special Intelligence Reports Hq UNC POW Camp #1, 1 October and 2 September 1952.

(2, 3) KOR - 308 - 208 (5a) Entire series June to Nov 1952.




Chart 9

"An official US Army map, taken during June, showed the southern sector of Korea marked with a red line, which was apparently a planned route from UN POW Camp #1, Koje-do to Chiri-san." (1)

"The communists had detailed maps of Koje-do showing locations of UN troops and weapons and were constructing tunnels for the purpose of escape from the compounds." (2)

"When the UN troops came into the areas, the prisoners were prepared with knives and clubs to fight the troops (14 May 52)." (3)

"On 30 May 1952, the strategy of the communists in compound #62 was to entice or decoy the UN troops between the 1st and 2nd Battalions and then surround them." (4)

"Communist escape plans included provision for the prisoners to have 10-meter ropes which were to be thrown around fence poles to pull down the barbed wire surrounding the compound. The first wave of prisoners would then throw themselves on the barbed wire to form a human bridge for the attacking communists."

(1, 2, 3, 4) KOR - 308 - 208 (5a) and (5c) Series June to Nov 1952.

CONCLUSIONS

1. From the Kojedo outbreak came the confirmation that the Communist high command, undeterred by the provisions of the Geneva Convention or any other humane considerations, would use every means, including murder, to maintain its hold on those of its personnel captured by the other side and to expend them in whatever actions would hurt or weaken the enemy. A Communist prisoner of war, therefore, had to be regarded not as a passive human being in need of care and protection until he could be returned to his home but as still an active enemy determined to fight on in whatever way his leaders dictated.

2. This warfare through prisoners did not require that they possess arms in enough strength to overwhelm their guards and enter into large-scale military operations. They were to break out if they could and join the nearest irregulars, but this they were told more to fire their imaginations than with any expectation that they could succeed in doing it. Military objectives would be served no less, the Communist high command thought, if they created incidents which would make it necessary for their guards to use force against them, resulting in deaths and injuries which could be represented to peoples in both Communist and free countries as convincing evidence of the "brutality" and "inhumanity" of the United Nations Command and especially of the United States. The loss of Communist lives -- as many hundreds or even thousands of them as might be necessary -- was a small price to pay for gaining propaganda material to accomplish two purposes, first, to turn free world opinion against the United States and thereby to weaken its leadership in the resistance to Communism in Korea and elsewhere and, second, to unify public opinion in Communist lands against the United Nations cause.

3. Over the years, the Communists had become very familiar with the effect on public opinion of reports, whether true or false, of

inhumane treatment of human beings. Though by no means moved, except to be even more secretive about it, by disclosures of their own widespread and flagrant disregard for the dignity of the human individual and the sanctity of his life, they had seen time and again the horrified reaction to them of even many of their own friends in noncommunist countries. Because of their effectiveness, the leveling of similar charges against opponents became a standard practice in their own propaganda. When they had nothing concrete on which to peg such propaganda, they manufactured something, as they did in the germ-warfare hoax against the United Nations Command in Korea. To provide a better propaganda peg of this kind was the mission required of the Communist prisoners on Koje-do, and such was the importance attached to it that no efforts were spared to build up a fantastically elaborate organization in the prisoner-of-war compounds.

4. Enlightened by this knowledge, the United Nations Command moved swiftly to block Communist warfare through the Koje-do prisoners. Prisoners who were confirmed Communists, as indicated by their readiness to return to Communist territory, were dispersed into smaller and more easily handled groups on Koje-do and nearby islands. Compounds were built for an average of 500 to 600 men; these were wired and separated by corridors, in enclosures averaging not more than eight compounds. A much stricter regimen was instituted. Compound inspections by camp authorities were more frequent, including thorough searches for contraband. Security forces were strengthened. In some places, to reduce the opportunity for clandestine activities, a curfew was enforced from 1900 to 0500 hours. Intelligence systems were expanded to give fuller information about what was going on in the compounds and especially to identify and segregate subversive leaders.

5. To make it more difficult for the Communist prisoners to receive and send messages from and to the high command in North Korea, a native village and isolated civilian homes, which formerly sheltered agents,

were moved out of the camp area on Kojedo. Steps were taken to prevent the carrying of oral instructions by agents disguised as soldiers who surrendered at the front. Use of the prisoner-of-war hospitals as the internal communications center for transmission of messages between compounds and enclosures was broken up, and the establishment of a substitute center was made next to impossible.

6. Despite these measures, however, or any other measures permissible under the Geneva Convention, it was apparent that the Communist POW leaders retained their fanatical devotion to Communism, still were organized, and were capable of continuing their warfare against the United Nations Command. The timing of outbreaks to synchronize with developments in the Armistice negotiations or elsewhere would be handicapped by the loss of communications, but leaders among the prisoners were well enough acquainted with the purposes and methods of the party and army command to know without further instructions that incidents at any time could be exploited. Constant and close surveillance might deprive the prisoners of the advantage of surprise, but there can be no guarantee that control measures now in force will prevent the fanatical Communist leaders from throwing away the lives of those they dominate.

ANNEX 1
SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE
REPORT NO. 7

UNC POW CAMP NO. 1
KORJ-DO

ENCOURAGEMENT TO
ALL PARTY MEMBERS

Interim consolidation of the December 14 Fight exposing the violence of the American Imperialists for slaughtering PW, and encouragement to all X members. (X is a code believed to be the party).

Dear Party Members:

Dear staff members and fighting comrades of the respective organizations!

We hereby encourage you upon reviewing the significance of the Dec 14 Fight as follows:

Even though we have not gone through with the task imposed upon us by the party and fatherland, we hereby pray for the bliss of the dead who sacrificed themselves for the revolution, the party, unification of the fatherland and peace.

The enemy finally ventured a coercive break-up to cover up their political, moral and military crushing defeat sustained in the May 7 and June 10 Fights for slaughtering of PW in order to rearm the PW to rebel against the fatherland in defiance of all international laws and morality. (Coercive break refers to the dispersal of prisoners into small compounds of 500 men each).

All party members:

Even after the coercive break-up, the enemy has continued to force us to rebel against our fatherland.

We, however, could not pass over the violence in silence and tried to thrust away the enemy's horrible policy with blood and death. Throughout the world the enemy is now known as the enemy of human beings and the offensive by the democratic (SIC!) nations of the world against the crimes and the slaughtering policy toward PW committed by the enemy is now being briskly developed.

The enemy is now destined for annihilation. Especially, during the change of presidents great importance is attached to the PW question.

However, Eisenhower has not made clear his standpoint toward the Korean war even though he visited Korea as he had promised the people of America in order to be elected. During his trip to Korea he received a bomb-attack by 15 MIGs of the People's Republic as a christmas present which satisfactorily showed the strong solidarity of the people of Korea and the power of the People's Republic.

In such an important moment, the party people and all peaceable people of the whole world are now appealing to the KPL PW and CPV PW to spring up, overcoming the slaughtering violence of the brutal American Imperialists. Everywhere in the whole world people are shouting for revenge on the enemy against the slaughtering and unlawful reassignment of the PW.

The following is the significance and the aim of our fight developed last time:

1. A class fight.

To cause the enemy to be annihilated, by inflicting a political and moral crushing defeat upon the American Imperialists and estranging them from the peaceable people of the whole world upon exposing the slaughtering policy of the American Imperialists toward the PW.

2. A righteous fight.

To receive the cooperation and encouragement from the democratic (SIC!) powers and peaceable people of the whole world so that we may return and again take our places as faithful citizens of the fatherland.

3. After due consideration and examination of both the subjective and objective conditions and the situation, this fight was a legal fight which was properly planned and improved the opportunity to give a crushing defeat to the enemy by being the vanguard of 100,000 members (PW). (Literally, the Pengam riot was an example for the other PWs to follow.)

All comrades:

Let us appeal to all comrades in this righteous fight by exposing the slaughtering violence of the American Imperialists at XXXXX. (An unknown code).

The merits and defects produced in this battalion during the last fight are as follows.

1. The fighters have satisfactorily displayed heroism, self-sacrificing spirit and patriotism in the fight as the knights of democracy (SIC!), the sons of the XXX of Korea, of the fatherland and the honorable fighters of the Great Stalin by remaining loyal to their party as a result of realizing the significance and aim of the fight, and the decisions and instructions of XXXX.

2. The staff members and workers of the respective organizations have exhausted all possible means in discharging their duties displaying heroism, self-sacrificing spirit and creative power, especially the comrades of the 4th, 9th and 10th platoons who protected the formation at the risk of their lives. Oh XX and Mo XX, both league members, accomplished the intelligence and reconnaissance task even under the enemy's heavy fire. The medical comrades of the rescue-party, at the risk of their lives, swiftly gave first-aid treatment to the wounded comrades. Furthermore, even under such a difficult atmosphere the comrades who were filled with friendship carried the wounded comrades into the hospital voluntarily. Suh X Nam, Huh X Soo and Lee X Dong were brave in stirring up the other comrades by keeping their positions during the operation and also Song X Chang, a party member, and Lee X San, a league member, were so brave in the individual fight against the enemy even after the break-up into the double barbed wire. Such meritorious activities will be our pattern in the future fight.

3. Many heroes were produced during the fight; such as Ji Myong Hi, Kim Ki Won and Lee Kwang Lak who shouted "Democratic People's Republic of Korea forever!" and "Long live the PKA!" sinking to the ground bleeding all over, and Lee X Lyul and others who shouted "Comrades! Sing Song!" for stirring up other comrades while being carried on the back of other comrades. Such meritorious service can be rendered only by the Marxians, Leninites and Bolshoviks.

4. Before and after the preparation for the last fight, part of the staff members and the constituents had a tendency to depend upon others and remain indifferent to their tasks without discharging their duties.

Such shameful activities will be swept away and will not be tolerated and the formation will be strengthened more than before.

All Comrades!

Even under such poor conditions and atmosphere we have carried out the heroic fight which caused 14 comrades to be sacrificed and more than 30 comrades to shed blood. All comrades! However, the successful results of the said bloodshed are as follows: (14 comrades sacrificed and 30 shed blood refers to party members. Total killed were 85, 113 hospitalized).

1. Nakedly exposed the inhumanitarian, brutal, cannibalistic slaughtering violence of the American Imperialists which caused the peaceable people of the whole world, the fatherland, the party and all democratic (SIC!) nations to shout for revenge against the American Imperialist, the enemy of human beings and this gave a crushing political and moral defeat to the enemy.

a. On 15 Dec 1952, the so-called UN Far East Command had no other alternative but to broadcast the Pongam-Do incident of 14 Dec 1952 by radio, without concealment, to the whole world.

b. After laying violent hands upon us the scoundrel of a commanding officer of Koje Camp, in confusion, directly led his troops on 14 December. The next day (15 Dec) a scoundrel, Major General "Kay", general commander and ring-leader of the murderers, with trembling distorting their faces, were confused in making an inspection of F Compound after surrounding us with a large military force.

c. No sooner was the slaughtering violence exposed to the whole world on 16 Dec 1952, the press of the whole world devoted their attention to Compound "F" and the investigation of the incident.

d. The invaders, in fear of the power of our fatherland, the democratic (SIC!) nations and the people of the whole world, established the so-called court martial on this Pongam-Do and called our representatives and comrades in to testify and questioned them, "Who will take the responsibility for the purpose of legalizing their violent conduct?"

e. There is no material evidence whatsoever that the enemy was exposed since we have not received encouragement from the fatherland, the democratic (SIC!) nations and the peaceable people of the whole world. However, we feel confident that the violence of the enemy was already exposed and we are encouraged by this fact.

2. We have demonstrated to the whole world the inflexible fighting capacity and capacity for unity of the KPA PW unified for the fight to be returned to the fatherland. The enemy was amazed at this demonstration, and we, by ourselves, hasten the time of rejoining the fatherland upon giving the enemy a crushing defeat.

a. Satisfactorily we showed our heroism, sacrificing ourselves for the party, fatherland and justice, and strongly demonstrated that even a million troops, bayonets or the A-bomb will not be able to make our fighting strength yield.

b. We exposed to the whole world that KPA PW fighters and the people of Korea were so strongly bonded together that they sprung up against the enemy who are now being defeated in this fatherland, and that all PW desire to return themselves into the breast of the fatherland as soon as possible.

c. The American Imperialists who were confused by such a strong powerful fight by the PW, had to reinforce in order to quell down us, even though the troops are short at the front. In addition to this, among the enemy, the troops hate their commanders and some conscientious ROKA troops rather sympathize with us. The invading army and the Puppet troops are hustling about shifting responsibility upon each other. By so doing, the Puppet troops were moved out of this place. Such a result is evidence that the enemy military sustained a crushing defeat.

d. Our fight was so fair and proper and the crime committed by the enemy was so big that the enemy have not as yet even established any measures to settle this incident. Accordingly, even though the enemy wanted to take revenge directly against us, they are unable to do so because of our strong solidarity.

In the struggle party members failed to sing songs, especially during the fight; the singing of songs is basic in our struggle since

our main purpose is to develop a class fight to give the enemy a crushing defeat. The class fight can attain its aim and succeed only in the final fight. (Communists use singing and chanting to build up courage and mass hypnotism).

Didn't we gain a successful result in the last fight?

We died a glorious death in the great fight giving the enemy a crushing defeat.

Even though we sustained heavy casualties our fighting comrades already expected it and determined to die a glorious death. Are not the comrades-in-arms parents and brothers of the fatherland fighting for final victory and for the unification of the fatherland, dying a glorious death even at this moment?

Is the death and blood which was shed in the fight, which caused the enemy to sustain a crushing defeat valueless? How so?

This was our fight and the noble death of the comrades will be brilliant in history of the war of the fatherland and the crimes committed by the enemy will be exposed to all peaceable people of the whole world without a doubt.

All Comrades!

The party and the fatherland will never desert us in our fight against the enemy if we keep our loyalty to the utmost and stick out our breasts before the blood-stained bayonets of the brutal American Imperialists, and as long as we do not rebel against our fatherland and the party, we will not only receive help from them but resolve ourselves into their breasts.

All comrades!

The conscience and the spirit of the party will never be destroyed by the flame throwers, tanks or the poison gas. It will be brilliant forever. Whatever may happen, it will be universally valid. The flame of our fight will not be put out by such suppression by the enemy but the more the enemy lays violent hands upon us the stronger we will defend the political and military policies of the party and by so doing let's go

forward toward the base of liberation upholding the flag of revenge.

Dear Comrades!

PW's lost nothing but their shameful lives in the fight and these were for liberation and glorious victory.

We all congratulate the successful result of the magnificent effort supporting the signal of charging against the enemy for the party and the fatherland so as to stab the spear of revenge right into the hearts of the enemy when they destroyed everything, even a little tree, by fire on this little Pongam-Do and Koje-Do.

1. Our group is peerlessly organized for victory and prosperity forever.
2. Keep the honor and responsibility as a member of the Korean Labor Party at the risk of life!
3. Give death and revenge to the manslaughtering American Imperialism!
4. Bless the patriotic fighters who are united around the General Leading XXX (a code believed to be General Leading Committee).