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BELIEFS of ENEMY SOLDIERS about the KOREAN WAR

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by
International Public Opinion Research, Inc.
written by
William Kendall
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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST
APO 343

AG 350.06 GC-PO

30 May 1953

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Technical Memorandum ORO-T-39 (FEC)

TO: The Adjutant General
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: Assistant Chief of Staff, G3

1. REFERENCE: Letter, AG 370.2 GC-PO, Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Far East, 22 March 1953, subject: "Letter of Transmittal of Technical Memorandum ORO-T-39 (FEC)."

2. Two hundred fifty copies of this letter are forwarded for attachment to subject Technical Memorandum in compliance with Department of the Army letter, G3 040 ORO (6 Feb 52), 7 February 1952, subject: "Distribution of Publications of the Department of the Army Operations Research Office (ORO)."

3. Technical Memorandum, ORO-T-39, "Beliefs of Enemy Soldiers About the Korean War," is a specialized analysis of prisoner-of-war interrogations. The methods used to collect and analyze the facts have been logical and objective; the presentation has been made in clear, easily understandable language; and the conclusions appear to be based soundly and objectively on fact.

4. For the period covered, it is felt that this study gives only a portion of what is known concerning Communist troop-indoctrination. Significant phases of indoctrination such as "atrocities" propaganda are ignored. Furthermore, the study neglects Communist methods of "mental discipline," a matter of considerable importance for a true understanding of the extent of indoctrination. Considerably more information on enemy troop-indoctrination has been secured through routine intelligence channels.

5. The facts contained in this study were collected from prisoners early in 1951. This analysis was not published until more than a year later, however, and this review is being written just two years later. The kind of information disclosed by this study should have been

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
SUBJECT: Evaluation of Technical Memorandum ORO-T-39 (FEC)

applied in the Psywar and prisoner-indoctrination programs immediately to be of real value as intelligence. The information is valuable now only as history and will be of use as intelligence only if it is followed by continuing investigations in an effort to counteract the North Korean and Chinese Communist soldier-indoctrination programs.

6. Copies of this letter and comments of subordinate commands and staff sections of Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Far East, have been furnished the Director of Operations Research Office, Far East Command, for his information.

7. Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Far East, has no specific comments to make on subject Technical Memorandum.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:



H. W. ORCUTT
Lt Col, AGC
Asst Adj Gen

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
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abstract

BELIEFS OF ENEMY SOLDIERS ABOUT THE KOREAN WAR

by

International Public Opinion Research, Inc.

revised by

Willmoore Kendall

Operations Research Office

To determine the most effective approach to the enemy soldier through psychological warfare, the Army needs to know to what extent he has been influenced by his own propaganda and background. Accordingly, ORO has examined what North Korean and Chinese Communist troops in Korea know of political affairs, and to what extent they have been Communist-indoctrinated. To get this information ORO, through International Public Opinion Research, Inc., interviewed 768 North Korean POWs and 238 Chinese Communist POWs in Korea from 26 January - 5 March 1951. Prisoners were asked what they thought and knew about the causes of the war; about their countries' allies, and about various world figures, as well as what their leaders had told them about the US, Russia, the UN, and South Korea. Here are a few of the conclusions:

- Most POWs had heard about the US and Russia, while a larger proportion of North Korean than of Chinese prisoners had heard of the UN and South Korea. Of the two groups, the North Koreans showed more hostility to the UN's purposes.
- A majority of North Koreans blamed South Korea for the start of the war. In contrast, most Chinese prisoners had no opinion on this question and believed that their government was fighting a defensive war to prevent US invasion of China.
- Russia was named most frequently as ally to both North Korea and China. North Koreans named Red China as their ally as often as they did Russia, but a smaller proportion of Chinese named North Korea than named Russia.

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iii

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U. S. Army Military History Institute

Technical Memorandum ORO-T-39(FEC)

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BY Clara B. Tapp ON 2/3/58



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BELIEFS of ENEMY SOLDIERS about the KOREAN WAR

by

International Public Opinion Research, Inc.

revised by

Willmoore Kendall

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CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	iii
SUMMARY	1
Problem—Facts—Discussion—Conclusions	
INTRODUCTION	7
Questionnaire Used—Sample Selected—Personnel	
INDOCTRINATION OF ENEMY SOLDIERS	10
Sources of Indoctrination—Intensity of Indoctrination— Indoctrination Themes	
ORIENTATION OF NK AND CCF SOLDIERS TO THE WAR, THEIR ALLIES, AND THE UN	39
Opinions on Cause of War and Reasons for Fighting— Knowledge of Allies—Knowledge of, and Orientation to, the UN	
IDENTIFICATION OF PROMINENT POLITICAL PERSONALITIES	60
INFLUENCE OF BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS ON KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEFS OF POWS	64
Summary—Influence of Education upon POW Responses—Influence of Length of Imprisonment on North Korean POWs—Influence of Rank on North Korean Responses—Additional Background Charac- teristics—Influence of Prior Membership in CNA on Chinese POW Responses	
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ORIENTATION TO THE WAR AND CAPTURE-SURRENDER BEHAVIOR	74
North Korean Behavior—Chinese Prisoner Behavior	
RESULTS OF LAND REFORM PROGRAMS	81
On North Koreans—On Chinese Forces	
CONCLUSIONS	87
APPENDICES	
A. REACTION OF NK AND CCF SOLDIERS TO MARCHING	91
B. RELEVANT PORTIONS OF QUESTIONNAIRE	99

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SUMMARY

PROBLEM

To determine what North Korean and Chinese Communist troops in Korea know of political affairs, and to what extent they are Communist-indoctrinated: to summarize this information with a view to its use in future psychological warfare operations against North Korean or Chinese Communist soldiers.

FACTS

International Public Opinion Research, Inc. (IPOR) conducted 768 interviews with North Korean POWs and 238 interviews with Chinese Communist POWs in Korea during the period 26 January -- 5 March 1951.

This report supplements two earlier reports -- one on the North Koreans, the other on the Chinese Communists (ORO-T-12 FEC and ORO-T-16 FEC) -- dealing with the effects of psychological warfare, particularly propaganda leaflets, on the capture-surrender behavior of enemy soldiers.

Interviewees were selected by controlled processes, and the interviews were conducted by a staff of 15 carefully selected and trained Korean interviewers, five of them fluent in at least one Chinese dialect.

DISCUSSION

This report makes use of what the prisoners thought and knew about the causes of the Korean war, about their countries' allies, and about various world figures, as well as what their leaders had told them about the US, Russia, the UN, and South Korea. Reports by prisoners about what they had heard about these countries do not necessarily indicate what the prisoners believed about them, but do reveal what the Communist leaders had wished their troops to believe.

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CONCLUSIONS

Indoctrination of Enemy Soldiers

1. Chinese prisoners had been indoctrinated almost entirely within the army; North Koreans, by contrast, had received all or part of their indoctrination as civilians.
2. Attendance at propaganda meetings was approximately the same for civilian-indoctrinated North Koreans as for the Chinese, but attendance was much higher for those North Koreans whose indoctrination had been limited to the People's Army. Indoctrination periods were much shorter for the Chinese and military-indoctrinated North Koreans than for those North Koreans who had attended civilian indoctrination lectures.

What POWs Were Told About US

3. Nine out of ten Chinese and North Korean prisoners had heard something about the US. Educated prisoners of both groups and North Koreans taken relatively late in the war were most likely to report on this subject. Emphasis had been placed by North Korean leaders on alleged plans on the part of the US to colonize Korea, frequently coupled with claims that the US was planning further aggressive moves, was imperialistic, and controlled by capitalistic interests. Chinese leaders also castigated the US for aggressiveness and warmongering, usually in connection with plans to invade China and help Chiang Kai-shek regain power.

What POWs Were Told About Russia

4. Almost all North Koreans, particularly the educated, and most of the Chinese prisoners as well, said that their leaders had spoken to them about Russia. Both groups had been told that Russia was the liberator and ally of their countries, seeking peace and "democracy" in the world. North Koreans had also been told that Russia is the friend of all small, weak nations, while the Chinese were told of Russia's economic and military power.

What POWs Were Told About UN, Their Attitudes Toward It, and Ability to Identify Member Nations

5. Discussion of the UN was reported by a much larger fraction of North Koreans than of Chinese, with educated prisoners in both groups representing the largest proportion of those reporting. In general, the Chinese showed a more favorable attitude toward the UN than did the North Koreans. Chinese

prisoners viewed the UN in generalized terms, whereas North Koreans saw it in relation to Korea, believing that the UN was intervening illegally in their country and was a pawn of the US.

6. In identifying members of the UN, both North Koreans and Chinese mentioned the US most frequently. Russia was named as a member twice as often by the Chinese as by the North Koreans, the latter group having difficulty in associating an ally with an organization they considered as an enemy. In general, the Chinese were poorly informed about their own government's nonmembership in the UN.

What POWs Were Told About South Korea

7. Almost all of the North Koreans had heard something about South Korea, while one-third of the Chinese had heard nothing at all from their officers about either South or North Korea. Reports by both groups of prisoners differed on this topic in more respects than on any of the other subjects covered in the survey. Generally, the appeal of the North Korean leaders had been emotional, directed toward a criticism of the government but not of the South Korean people. Chinese leaders had aimed their propaganda at an ideological level; the CCF should help their North Korean "democratic" allies and "liberate" Korea.

Opinions on How The War Started

8. Most North Koreans had opinions about how the war started, almost two-thirds of them blaming South Korea, and the remainder believing that North Korea had initiated hostilities. According to the majority of North Korean POWs, their government was fighting for the unification of Korea. In contrast, most Chinese prisoners had no opinion as to how the war had started, and a majority believed their government to be fighting a defensive war to prevent the US Army from invading China.

Knowledge of Allies

9. Most Chinese and North Koreans were able to name at least one ally of their country, Russia being named frequently in both groups. As large a proportion of North Koreans named Red China as named Russia, but a smaller proportion of Chinese named North Korea than named Russia. The Chinese, fighting what they regarded as a defensive war, seem to have thought of allies in terms of countries that might help them if they were ever in need; the North Koreans, by contrast, seem to have thought of allies in terms of countries that had come to their assistance, whether with men or supplies, in the war they were actually fighting.

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Identification of Political Personalities

10. Almost all North Korean prisoners were able to identify Stalin; not many more than half correctly identified President Truman, compared with a larger proportion who identified Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Tse-tung, and Pak Hun Young. President Truman and Stalin were about equally identified by Chinese prisoners along with Chu-teh and Kim Il Sung, while Chiang Kai-shek was best known to them.

Influence of Background Characteristics

11. North Koreans were younger and much better educated than the Chinese prisoners. Older North Koreans tended to have less education than the younger ones. In both groups the better educated prisoners were better informed, but their beliefs varied little with the amount of their schooling. Age alone had little influence on knowledge or beliefs of North Korean prisoners.

12. A larger proportion of officers and NCOs than of privates supported their government. However, less support for the PDRK cause was evidenced by those North Korean prisoners who had been taken early in the war.

Relationship of Orientation to The War and North Korean Capture-Surrender Behavior

13. "Critical" prisoners — those who believed North Korea had started the war and who expected favorable treatment as POWs — surrendered in greater numbers than those who believed South Korea had started the war.

14. "Critical" prisoners were more apt to dislike military life and to give ideological reasons for their behavior.

Results of North Korean Land-Reform Program

15. More than half the prisoners had neither benefited by, nor suffered from, the land reform; the remainder split about equally between those who had benefited and those who had suffered.

16. Capture-surrender behavior was not affected to any great degree by whether a prisoner had lost or acquired land under the reform. Those prisoners who had lost land, however, showed a higher surrender rate.

Results of Chinese Communist Land-Reform Program

17. Few Chinese prisoners had knowledge of how the land-reform program had affected them and their families; of those who knew, only a minority had received land and no significant difference was discernible between their capture-surrender behavior and that of prisoners whose families had suffered under the program.

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BELIEFS OF ENEMY SOLDIERS
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INTRODUCTION

This is the last of a series of three memoranda embodying the results of a field study the purpose of which was to determine the effects of psychological warfare on Communist soldiers in Korea.¹ The study was made by International Public Opinion Research, Inc. (IPOR) and took the form of interviews with prisoners of war in POW camps in and near Pusan, Korea during the winter of 1950-51.

The purpose of these reports is (a) to determine as far as possible the effect upon the enemy of current psychological warfare operations, particularly propaganda leaflets, (b) to identify and solve methodological problems encountered in the course of pursuing the above goal, and (c) to make recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of future psychological warfare.

The two memoranda submitted previously discussed the influence of current psychological warfare operations on the capture-surrender behavior of North Korean and Chinese Communist prisoners of war, in the light of certain other immediate and direct influences on behavior: the military situation, expectations about prisoner treatment, length of military service, and other background factors. The present report is peripheral to the main purposes of the series in that the material with which it deals is not so directly related to capture-surrender behavior as that summarized in the other reports. It fixes attention on what the prisoners knew of political affairs, and the extent to which they were Communist-indoctrinated.

Questionnaire Used

The earlier reports were largely based on data derived from questions dealing with the circumstances in which prisoners had

¹To permit detailed comparison of the North Korean and Chinese prisoners, findings originally intended for presentation in two separate memoranda have been consolidated in this report. The previous two reports are entitled ORO-T-12(FEC), "Evaluation of Psywar Influence on North Korean Troops," 23 June 1951, and ORO-T-16(FEC), "Evaluation of Psywar Influence on Chinese Troops." Both these memoranda are CONFIDENTIAL.

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ORO-T-39 (FEC)

7

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fallen into the hands of UN forces.² The present report deals with the data obtained from questions 19-24 and question 29 of the original questionnaire: what the prisoners thought about the cause of the war, about their countries' allies and various world figures, as well as what they had heard from their leaders about the US, Russia, UN, and South Korea. An effort was also made to ascertain the effect of North Korean and Chinese Communist land-reform laws on the prisoners.

The interviews (see Appendix B) made little attempt to elicit prisoner opinion on matters not directly related to psychological warfare or to their own military experience. This limitation was imposed in view of the serious difficulties that must be surmounted in order to get reliable answers to questions calculated to obtain expressions of opinion rather than of information. For example, the prisoners had a natural desire to show that they were not Communists and that they considered Americans fine people. Thus certain questions that had proved useful in international public opinion research in the past were not used, because of the danger that the answers would be unreliable.

Conceivably, of course, many prisoners actually do prefer western democracy to communism. In order to arrive at a reliable estimate of how many, however, it would be necessary to obtain long and careful interviews, based on adequate experiment and pretesting, and conducted by extremely skilled interviewers with (preferably) some background in social science. The deadline for the present study precluded this kind of interviewing, and it was decided that the principal aims of the study — the evaluation of psychological warfare — could be achieved without reliable data on the prisoners' opinions about democracy and communism.

Some of the questions used to obtain the data for this report were "loaded" questions, and unreliable answers were to be expected. Often, however, unreliable content can be detected, and the unreliable part of an answer ignored. For instance, many answers to the question about how the war started read, "I thought that South Korea started the war, but now I know that it isn't true." The latter part of such an answer may well be unreliable, but it can be disregarded without prejudice to the earlier part, which provides information as to the state of mind of enemy soldiers in general.

²See questions 1-18, 25-28, and 30-33 in the questionnaire appended to the memoranda cited in preceding footnote.

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Sample Selected

A total of 1,006 prisoners were interviewed during the field work phase of this study. Interviewing started on 31 December 1950 and ended on 5 March 1951, during which time interviewers talked with 768 North Korean and 238 Chinese prisoners. Most of the Chinese and a little less than half of the North Koreans were interviewed within two days to two weeks of their capture by, or surrender to, UN troops. The others had been in the hands of the UN forces for varying periods, ranging up to several months, at the time of interview.³

Personnel

Interviewing was accomplished by a staff of 15 native Koreans, five of whom were fluent in at least one Chinese dialect. The interviews were recorded in Korean, and subsequently rendered into English by a staff of 19 translators.⁴

³Discussion of the sampling procedure and detailed analyses of the North Korean and Chinese samples will be found on p. 4 and p. 3 respectively of the memoranda listed in Footnote 1.

⁴See ORO-T-12(FEC), p. 3.

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INDOCTRINATION OF ENEMY SOLDIERS

All the prisoners in the sample were asked what they had been told about the US, about Russia, about the UN, and about South Korea (the Chinese were asked about both South Korea and North Korea). The information they reported does not necessarily reflect what the prisoners actually believed about these countries. It does reveal what the Communist leaders evidently want their troops to believe about their friends and enemies. And it should help to provide a clearer picture of the enemy's domestic propaganda, which our psywar activities must be designed to combat.

SOURCES OF INDOCTRINATION

The following analysis of indoctrination subject matter will, for reasons of a practical character, make comparisons between the reports of the North Korean prisoners and those of the Chinese prisoners. It must be borne in mind, however, that the two groups may not be entirely comparable, since most Chinese indoctrination took place in the army, whereas only one out of eight North Koreans reported indoctrination in the army alone. Half the North Koreans reported indoctrination by civilian agencies only, and nearly one-third said they had attended civilian indoctrination meetings as well as army-conducted meetings

⁵A larger proportion of North Korean officers and NCOs, who by and large had had longer service in the People's Army than the privates (many were professional soldiers), had received indoctrination exclusively in army meetings.

Attended indoctrination meetings:	535	142 Officers
	Privates, %	and NCOs, %
Only as a civilian	63	34
Only in the army	8	28
Both as a civilian and in the army	29	38
	100	100

Totals do not include 83 privates and 9 NCOs and officers for whom this information was not ascertainable

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On the other hand, the reports of leaders' remarks by North Koreans who had attended only civilian meetings did not differ essentially from those of North Koreans who had attended army indoctrination meetings. Only rarely was there a significant difference in the frequency with which particular remarks were mentioned by members of the two groups.

Thus the basic comparison between North Koreans and Chinese appears to be warranted. Where, however, significant differences have been found between North Koreans who had been indoctrinated by civilians and those who had been indoctrinated by army officers, the differences have been duly noted.

Similarly, important differences between various other sub-groups of North Koreans have been noted, as have those between sub-groups of Chinese.

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE OF NORTH KOREANS AND CHINESE WHO ATTENDED INDOCTRINATION MEETINGS

	657 NK, %	139 CCF, %
<u>Attended Indoctrination Meetings</u>		
Only as a civilian	56	(a)
Only in the army	13	99
Both as a civilian and in the army	31	—
	<u>100^b</u>	<u>100^b</u>

^aLess than 0.5 percent.

^bTotals include only prisoners who reported that their leaders had spoken to them about South Korea (or, in the case of the Chinese, about Koreans).

INTENSITY OF INDOCTRINATION

The Chinese and North Koreans differed in the frequency with which they had attended indoctrination meetings.

Almost all the soldier-indoctrinated North Koreans (eight out of ten) had attended indoctrination meetings at least once a week,

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compared with six out of ten of the civilian-indoctrinated North Koreans and two-thirds of the Chinese. In fact, a large number of the soldier-indoctrinated Koreans — more than two-fifths — had been lectured to every day. Only about one in seven of the remaining Koreans, and a similar fraction of the Chinese, had been indoctrinated thus intensively.

TABLE 2

FREQUENCY OF ATTENDANCE AT
INDOCTRINATION MEETINGS

Times Attended ^b	North Koreans		
	574 Civilian- Indoctrinated, ^a	83 Soldier- Indoctrinated, ^a	127 CCF,
	%	%	%
Daily	13	44	15
Less often than daily, but at least 1/week	48	34	52
Less often than weekly, but at least 1/month	28	8	9
Less often than monthly	10	13	24
Did not remember	1	1	—
	100	100	100

^aIncludes prisoners who said they had attended both civilian and military indoctrination meetings, as well as those indoctrinated only as civilians. Frequency of attendance did not vary between these two groups to any significant degree. Most of these prisoners (83 percent) were privates, but among the soldier-indoctrinees just about half (53 percent) were privates.

^bTotals do not include prisoners who said they had attended indoctrination meetings but did not say how often.

The educated North Koreans had attended civilian-indoctrination lectures much more frequently than North Koreans with little or no education. Meetings were attended at least once a week by 69 percent of the former and only 49 percent of the latter. Among the soldier-indoctrinated prisoners, where attendance at indoctrination lectures would presumably have been compulsory for all troops, frequency of attendance did not vary with level of education.

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Frequency of attendance did not vary among other sub-groups of North Korean prisoners, or among the various sub-groups of Chinese prisoners.

The soldier-indoctrinated Koreans differed little from the Chinese as regards the period over which they had attended indoctrination lectures, both groups having been propagandized over much shorter periods than the North Koreans who had attended civilian indoctrination lectures.

TABLE 3
ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS

Total Time Meetings Were Attended ^b	North Koreans		
	374 Civilian- Indoctrinated, ^a %	61 Soldier- Indoctrinated, %	134 CCF, %
Six months or less	7	41	42
Six months to 1 year	4	13	19
1 to 3 years	19	26	38
3 to 5 years	43	18	1
Longer than 5 years	27	2	—
	100	100	100

^aIncludes prisoners who had been indoctrinated both as civilians and soldiers, as well as those indoctrinated only as civilians.

^bTotals include only prisoners who indicated total period during which they attended meetings.

More than half of the soldier-indoctrinated prisoners (both Chinese and Korean) had attended lectures by their officers through a period of less than one year, while only one out of six civilian-indoctrinated Koreans had heard talks by their leaders over any such brief period. In fact, six out of ten of the latter had attended indoctrination meetings for three years or longer, while very few of the soldier-indoctrinated Koreans and one lone Chinese reported an indoctrination period of any such length. All this is consistent with what is known of the background conditions: (a) North Korean leaders had started to indoctrinate the civilian population of their country immediately after the end of the war with Japan, so that indoctrination had proceeded through some five years before the outbreak of present hostilities; (b) the bulk of the CCF dates from the period following the loss of Manchuria by the Nationalists

in October, 1948, which means that most of the CCF soldiers (mainly former Nationalists) had been exposed to Communist indoctrination over a period of less than three years; and (c) the soldier-indoctrinated North Koreans included such diverse elements as recent recruits, who had never bothered to attend indoctrination meetings as civilians, and professional soldiers, whose indoctrination, through their relatively longer periods of service in the People's Army, would naturally have been confined to military agencies.

INDOCTRINATION THEMES

What POWs Had Been Told About the US

Of the prisoners interviewed, nine out of ten indicated that their leaders had talked to them about the US.

TABLE 4

<u>Did your leaders ever talk to you about the US? ^a</u>	<u>739 NK, %</u>	<u>206 CCF, %</u>
Yes	92	88
No	7	12
Don't remember	1	—
	<hr/> 100	<hr/> 100

^aBased only on those prisoners who answered the question. Twenty-nine North Koreans (3 percent of the total) and 32 Chinese (14 percent of the total) either were not asked or did not answer this question.

A higher percentage of educated North Koreans reported having heard about the US than of North Koreans with little or no education. As noted above, 87 percent of the North Koreans had attended civilian indoctrination meetings, and the better educated among them had attended meetings much more often than those with little or no education. The better educated thus had been more intensively propagandized about things in general, including the US. It is also possible, however, that the better educated North Koreans had been more interested in international affairs than their fellow prisoners, and thus recalled remarks about the US more readily than they.

A higher percentage of North Korean prisoners taken after 12 November 1950 than of prisoners taken prior to that date reported having heard about the US. This might mean either that the North Korean leaders had spoken of the US more frequently during this "later" part of the war than they had before, or that a factor of recall was involved; the newer captives may have reported as they did because their recollections of discussions in which the US had been mentioned were relatively fresh, as compared to those of prisoners most of whom had been held captive in POW camps for several months before they were interviewed.⁶

References to the US were likewise reported more frequently by the better educated Chinese prisoners than by those with little or no education. In the absence of evidence that attendance at indoctrination lectures had been relatively more frequent among educated members of the CCF, it seems likely that their greater recall of references to the US resulted from greater interest in the subject matter.

A higher percentage of former members of the CNA reported reference to the US than of prisoners who had served exclusively in the CCF. This is in keeping with what is known about the opportunities they would have had in the CNA for hearing about the US.

Both North Korean and Chinese leaders had apparently attempted to justify the war with the US by portraying it as a dangerous enemy to their people. They had not, however, made use of identical specific charges against the US.

The North Korean propagandists had stressed alleged plans on the part of the US to take Korea over as a colony. When the North Korean prisoners repeated this accusation, they usually coupled it with another frequent allegation — that the US was planning further aggression:

"[The United States] is interfering by force in order to make Korea her colony. She intends to make Korea a military base for the invasion of China and Russia." (POW #793)⁷

⁶Educational factors were not involved in this difference between early and later captives. In fact, since the later captives were by and large less well educated than those taken earlier, the later prisoners might have been expected to have heard about the US less frequently rather than more frequently. Some 48 percent of the prisoners taken after 12 November as compared with 40 percent of those taken between 15 September and 11 November, had had little or no education.

⁷The POW number in parentheses is an arbitrary designation assigned by IPOR to a particular interview for filing purposes.

UNCLASSIFIED

"The United States is training the South Korean army for the purpose of invading North Korea. Under the guise of economic assistance the US takes away the natural resources of Korea and sends them to America. The US is going to make Korea a colony and use it for a military base when it invades Russia." (POW #407)

The designs of the US on Korea had, the responses show, often been described as fitting into an alleged pattern of imperialistic behavior involving numerous potential "victims":

"The US is an imperialistic country which is trying to make all the small, weak nations of the world her colonies. She is trying to make Korea her colony too. She takes valuable materials out of Korea and brings in useless articles. She wants to occupy Korea because Korea would be an important military base in a fight against China and Russia." (POW #627)

Sometimes the broad pattern of imperialism had been alleged without specific application to Korea:

"America provoked war in order to colonize small countries and control the whole world. She sells her goods and enslaves many people..." (POW #645)

Comments stressing the allegedly imperialistic behavior of the US had frequently been accompanied by criticism of the US on the grounds that it is a capitalist nation. Internal economic difficulties arising out of capitalism had usually been cited as reasons for America's "invasion" of the small, weak nations of the world:

"The US is controlled by capitalists. It is not true that the US is helping Korea to bring about the independence of Korea. The US is an imperialist and capitalist nation, which is trying to take advantage of Korea under the pretext of helping Korea to win independence. The US is facing an economic crisis as a result of over-production, and in order to avoid this crisis she is making war on small, weak nations." (POW #418)

"The US is a highly developed capitalist state, and there are many unemployed persons because of a financial panic. The government exports surplus materials to foreign countries, and adopts this as an instrument for invading the nations of the world." (POW #625)

References, like that above (to the condition of the American people under capitalism), had been infrequent. When the leaders had mentioned the people of the US at all, they had done so in terms of suffering from unemployment or some other alleged form of capitalistic exploitation, and fierce popular opposition to the fighting in Korea:

“There is much unemployment in the US. Even now there are frequent strikes in opposition to this war. The US will come to internal destruction in the near future.” (POW #649)

To judge from the comments of the CCF prisoners, the Chinese leaders had been even more extreme than the North Koreans in castigating the US for alleged aggressiveness and war-mongering. Sometimes their accusations had been of a highly generalized character:

“They said that the US was a capitalistic and aggressive country and was going to dominate the world.” (POW #1102)

Usually, however, US enmity toward China and US designs for conquest had been mentioned specifically, and reference had often been made to a desire on the part of the US to help Chiang Kai-shek regain his authority:

“The US is an aggressive nation. She wants to invade China and re-establish Chiang Kai-shek's political powers in China, to oppress the people.” (POW #1138)

“At present, America is controlling South Korea. In the future, she will invade China in order to get our abundant underground resources.” (POW #1002)

The implicit charge of imperialism in the above statement had been made more explicit in some of the anti-US remarks recalled by prisoners. Sometimes the charge had been urged in vague, general terms like the following:

“The US is an imperialistic nation. It instigates the weaker nations into making war and losing the lives of many innocent people.” (POW #1110)

More often, however, it had been combined with the charge of aggressive intentions:

“The US is an imperialistic nation, and after she invades North Korea she will attack China. Therefore, she is helping Chiang Kai-shek, to enable the Central Army to return to the Chinese mainland.” (POW #1117)

"America is an imperialist country and she is aggressive. Having agitated all the minor countries of the world she is gathering them under her control. She has given arms to Japan and Western Germany. She is eagerly seeking a chance to invade China." (POW #1127)

"The US is an imperialist nation. In the past the US helped Chiang Kai-shek to invade China. They took away Chinese people to use as live targets when they practised shooting, and boiled them to get airplane gasoline from their bodies and did many other cruel things to them. They sucked up the blood of the Chinese people. Now the US intends to invade China after the conquest of North Korea. The US invasion of China would result in even greater oppression of the Chinese people than before." (POW #1140)

In general, the North Korean leaders' comments, as revealed by the prisoners, had reflected the hostility of a small nation afraid of being overrun by an enemy: two-thirds of the prisoners repeated accusations that the US aims to reduce Korea to a colony in order to make it into a market for its goods; one out of four remembered more general allegations of imperialism on the part of the US; and four out of ten said they had heard the US branded as an aggressor or warmonger.

The Chinese leaders' comments, by contrast, had reflected the hostility of a nation that deems itself the peer of the country with which it is at odds. The alleged danger of invasion had been expressed, but not the fear of being overrun. The Chinese leaders had been highly specific as to why the US was an enemy: two-thirds of the Chinese soldiers repeated the accusation that the US was against the People's Government of their country, was helping its enemies, or planning an invasion; and almost as many (for the most part the same prisoners) said that the US had been denounced on numerous occasions as an aggressor and warmonger. Only one out of three CCF prisoners recalled generalized accusations of imperialism, while a slightly smaller proportion of North Koreans remembered such accusations. The question in Table 5 was asked of those prisoners who said their leaders had talked to them about the US.

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Certain criticisms of the US were more likely to be reported by the better educated North Korean prisoners: that the US is aggressive and warmongering, that it is imperialistic, and that it is a capitalist nation. They may have recalled these themes thus often either because they had been more attentive to them than the uneducated, or because these particular criticisms happen to have been made more often or with greater emphasis to educated soldiers than to uneducated ones. Another possible explanation

TABLE 5

<u>What did leaders say about the US?^a</u>	<u>680 NK, %</u>	<u>181 CCF, %</u>
Seeks to make (has made) Korea a colony, market for its goods	66	2
Is aggressive, warmongering	40	62
Is imperialistic	27	33
Is a capitalist nation, in which common people suffer and are exploited	14	5
Interferes illegally in Korean affairs	7	—
Is huge, well-supplied	7	8
Uses same imperialistic policy as Japan	2	—
Anti-Red China; wants to invade Red China, help her enemies	—	66
Is an ally of South Korea	—	13
Other anti-US comments	3	3
Miscellaneous comments	3	4
Don't remember; no answer	1	—

^aTotals add up to more than 100 percent because some prisoners repeated more than one comment about the US.

would be that the poorly educated prisoners found it relatively easier to remember concrete items (the US seeks loot in Korea) than abstract ones (the US is imperialistic).

The various sub-groups of Chinese prisoners recalled various comments about the US in approximately the same proportions.

What POWs Had Been Told About Russia

Almost all the North Koreans and most of the Chinese stated that their leaders had spoken to them about Russia. Of the better educated North Koreans, for example, 99 percent answered the question on this point affirmatively.

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TABLE 6

Did your leaders ever talk to you about Russia? ^a	482 NK, %	286 CCF, %
Yes	96	90
No	3	10
Don't remember	1	(b)
	100	100

^aBased only on those prisoners who answered the question. Thirty-two Chinese (13 percent of the total) and 286 North Koreans (37 percent of the total) either were not asked or did not answer the question.

^bLess than 0.5 percent.

What the North Koreans had been told about Russia differed little from what the Chinese had been told. Both groups had heard Russia described most frequently as their country's liberator and ally, and the source of assistance of various kinds:

Chinese POWs:

"They said that Russia was our big brother. It had helped China during World War II. It had liberated China from the bondage of the Japanese. Red China was depending on Russia in every way for the reconstruction of China." (POW #1131)

"Russia is China's big brother. Russia is giving tremendous help in order to reconstruct the factories and railroads of China which had been destroyed by Chiang Kai-shek's Army." (POW #1138)

A North Korean POW:

"Russia liberated Korea from the yoke of the Japanese. She is helping Korea to develop in a democratic fashion. She brings machines for the factories and sends teachers to explain new techniques. She will improve farming by bringing tractors to the farmers." (POW #627)

The above is typical of a large number of the reports of discussion of Russia by North Korean leaders. In a large number of other cases, Russia's assistance to Korea had been presented as an aspect of her friendship for all small, weak nations:

"Russia liberated weak and small nations and helped them toward self-government. For the North Korean government

she provides instructors in military tactics, and supplies arms, and politically she is helping to put a democratic plan into effect. This is true assistance and Russia has no territorial ambitions." (POW #605)

It is interesting to notice that the Korean leaders, in their statements about Russia's friendship for Korea, had often insisted that Russia keeps out of Korea's internal affairs -- that, for example, Russia had withdrawn her troops, which had not returned even when the war started:

"The Russians withdrew from Korea for the sake of Korea's independence. But the US does not withdraw because she wants to make South Korea into a colony. Russia has no desire to colonize weaker nations, but helps them. Russia liberated North Korea." (POW #623)

"North Korea should try to develop good will between itself and Russia, just as though they were brothers. Generalissimo Stalin liberated Korea and helped us so that Koreans can lead better lives. Russia did not participate in this war, saying, 'The troubles in Korea should be settled by the Koreans themselves.'" (POW #637)

Of the North Korean prisoners, one out of three recalled statements concerning the benefits the people of Russia were allegedly reaping from their system of socialism. Such benefits were mentioned by somewhat fewer Chinese (one out of five):

North Korean POWs:

"There is no illiteracy in Russia. All the people are graduates of middle schools and universities. They are very progressive in their outlook. At present they have an eight-hour work day, but in the near future when goods are more plentiful, a four-hour work day will be put into effect." (POW #649)

"Russia is a proletarian country and distributes the products of her factories to the people at cost, as a means of making the life of the poor easy and comfortable." (POW #444)

Chinese POWs:

"In Russia there is no discrimination between persons and they are all equal. The people are not oppressed but are enjoying freedom. All of them can live within their own incomes." (POW #1023)

UNCLASSIFIED

"Russia is a democratic nation and a Communist nation where people are equal. There is no exploitation and food and clothes are distributed equally to all." (POW #1119)

In reporting statements about Russia's actions, about the same fraction of both groups of prisoners (one out of four) described them as the actions of a country that wants nothing except world peace:

North Korean POWs:

"Russia is a country which is trying hard to maintain world peace, and is the liberator of weaker nations. She is fighting at the UN to prevent a war in the world." (POW #401)

Chinese POWs:

"Russia is a socialistic nation which never invades other nations. We have to stand by its side. Russia is a fortress of world peace." (POW #1013)

"[Russia is] fighting for the peace and freedom of the world." (POW #1102)

Reference to Russia as the chief exponent of "democracy" in the world were also reported:

North Korean POWs:

"Russia, because it is a democratic nation, excludes capitalists and does not make war on other countries, but helps weak and small nations to establish their independence. In the UN Security Council, Russian proposals are turned down even though they are good proposals. That is why Russia denies American proposals." (POW #418)

Chinese POWs:

"Russia is a democratic nation and is fighting... for the liberation of all the nations of the world." (POW #1117)

"Russia is a Communist nation and the nation of freedom and equality." (POW #1140)

"Russia is a true democratic country. She never invades foreign countries." (POW #1127)

There were also reports of statements that it would be well for other countries to emulate Russia's socialist experiment:

"As Russia is a progressive country we must follow her example." (POW #801)

The propaganda line reported by the Chinese prisoners differed in some respects from that reported by the North Koreans. The differences appear, however, to be related to known differences between the two nations. The Chinese leaders, speaking for a country that is neither small nor weak, had not stressed Russia's role as the friend and liberator of all small weak nations, while the North Korean leaders, as noted above, had done so.

The references to the Russians reported by the Chinese prisoners appear, moreover, to reflect certain attitudes that would grow naturally out of the fact that the alliance between China and Russia, much more than that between Russia and North Korea, is a "partnership of equals." It is interesting to notice, for example, that the Chinese leaders had frequently referred to Russia's economic and military power as a reason for alliance, while the North Korean leaders had made statements of this kind much less frequently:

"Russia is a great nation which is our ally and is giving us tremendous help which includes not only weapons but also numerous tractors which increase production." (POW #1044)

"Russia has become the most powerful nation in the world." (POW #1006)

"Russia is one of the greatest countries in the world." (POW #1102)

The Chinese leaders, again, had spoken frequently of China's and Russia's common ideology as justifying an alliance between them:

"Russia, like China, is a Communist and proletariat country." (POW #1138)

The better educated North Koreans reported two specific comments on Russia more often than the North Koreans with little or no education, namely: that Russia seeks nothing but world peace, and that Russia is the liberator and friend of all nations that are small and weak. These statements evidently belong to the type described above as "abstract" and, by comparison with the other statements reported, bear less directly upon Korea itself. They might, for these reasons, have been less interesting to the relatively uneducated North Koreans than to the better educated.

The pattern of the responses showed no significant differences among the various sub-groups of Chinese prisoners.

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Table 7 presents the answers given by the prisoners who said their leaders had spoken to them about Russia.

TABLE 7

What did leaders say about Russia? ^a	465 NK, %	184 CCF, %
Russia is the friend, liberator of Korea	59	—
Russia is the friend, liberator of China	—	66
Russia is the liberator, friend of all small, weak nations	42	(b)
Mentioned the benefits of Socialist life in Russia	34	20
Russia is the chief exponent of "democracy"	27	22
Russia seeks only world peace	24	25
Korea should emulate Russia for its own welfare	10	—
China should emulate Russia for its own welfare	—	10
China and Russia conform to same ideology	—	23
Russia possesses economic and military power	(b)	20
Criticism of Russia	—	2
Other	5	1
Don't remember, no answer	2	1

^aTotals add up to more than 100 percent because some prisoners repeated more than one comment about Russia.

^bLess than 0.5 percent.

What POWs Had Been Told About the UN

The comments of the Chinese leaders on the UN differed more than their comments on USSR or the US from those of the North Korean leaders. To begin with, the Chinese leaders had made much less frequent mention of the UN than the North Korean leaders. Only four out of every ten CCF prisoners, as against more than two-thirds of the North Korean prisoners, stated that their officers had spoken of the UN.

A larger proportion of the better educated North Koreans than of the North Koreans with little or no education remembered

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having heard references to the UN, and a larger proportion of prisoners who had attended civilian indoctrination meetings than of those who had been indoctrinated exclusively in the army recalled such references. The difference in this respect between the better educated prisoners and their fellows may have been due to greater interest in the UN on the part of the better educated, or may have been due to more frequent exposure to discussions in which it was mentioned. Possibly both factors were at work, but the first seems the more probable explanation. The fact that civilian-indoctrinated prisoners more often than soldier-indoctrinated prisoners

TABLE 8

Did your leaders ever talk to you about the UN? ^a	733 NK,	204 CCF,
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Yes	69	40
No	28	59
Don't remember	3	1
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

^aBased only on those prisoners who answered the question. Thirty-two Chinese (13 percent of the total) and 35 North Koreans (5 percent of the total) were not asked or did not answer the question.

recalled references to the UN, on the other hand, can probably be explained in terms of more frequent exposure to such references.

Among the Chinese prisoners as among the North Koreans, the better educated more often remembered references to the UN. Here again the more probable explanation appears to be that they had been more interested in the UN.

Most of the North Korean leaders' comments on the UN, as reported by the prisoners, appear to have been critical of its activities, while a high proportion of the comments by Chinese leaders had been favorable to the UN. This difference between the two groups of prisoners seems more significant than the difference in the frequency with which they recalled references to the UN.

Half the North Koreans recalled having been told that the UN is, to all intents and purposes, a pawn of the US. Most of the comments recalled ran in terms of such generalized criticism of the UN.

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"The main power of the UN is the US, and the capitalistic nations in the UN are nothing but tools of the US, supporting its warmaking plans." (POW #418)

"The UN, being a tool of the US, works for the US. The US is a rich country, so she bribes the other nations of the world." (POW #623)

"The General Assembly of the UN is a yes-voting robot. Because most of the UN members are the pawns of the US they do as America orders." (POW #645)

In some cases, however, specific UN activities aimed toward the unification of Korea had been denounced as attempts to colonize Korea on behalf of the US:

"The UN claims that its Commission for Korea is trying to make Korea independent, but it is a lie. The Commission's true purpose is to colonize Korea for the US." (POW #421)

"It is said that the commission is operating for the unification of Korea, but the fact is that it is trying to make our Korea a colony of the US." (POW #605)

North Korean leaders were reported as having sometimes taken the position that the UN, though basically well-intentioned, is controlled by the US, and is used for the latter's imperialist designs:

"Although the UN is an organization for world peace, when the two opposed groups, the US bloc and the Russian bloc, try to solve a problem, many nations bought off by the US act on the instructions of the US." (POW #401)

"The real purpose of the UN was good, but it turned out, in actuality, to be an instrument of the US, which uses the UN in its efforts to rule the world." (POW #415)

Another frequently reported criticism of the UN involved the charge that it was interfering in Korean affairs and that such interference is illegal:

"This Korean problem, namely, the war between North and South, is merely a civil war and therefore the UN should not interfere, but the UN is interfering. Nevertheless, the UN does not invite the representatives of both sides, but only the representatives of South Korea, unfairly neglecting the government of North Korea." (POW #401)

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"The UN is interfering in Korea by force, after unlawfully reaching a decision about the Korean problem at the Security Council. . . without inviting the Korean delegate." (POW #793)

Some — though not many — prisoners recalled predictions by North Korean leaders to the effect that the efforts of the UN in Korea would not succeed:

"It is interfering in vain." (POW #806)

An approximately equal number recalled references to the UN as anti-Russian, or as engaged in combatting Russia's efforts to settle the Korean problem:

"While Russia intends to solve Korean problems peacefully the UN opposes them." (POW #811)

"Russia has always been defeated." (POW #401)

Many of the Chinese prisoners, as against a mere handful of the North Korean prisoners, recalled having heard the UN discussed approvingly. Not less than one-third of the Chinese prisoners had heard the UN's aim described as that of solving international problems with a view to maintaining world peace:

"They said that the UN was a meeting of all the countries of the world which tried to prevent war from breaking out." (POW #1030)

A somewhat smaller proportion, one out of six, recalled having heard severe attacks on the UN. Some of these had run in terms of alleged UN opposition to Red China:

"They didn't talk much about the UN, but just said that there was the Security Council in the UN, and that Red China had been refused membership in the UN by all the countries in it." (POW #1102)

"I don't know the reason, but I heard that the UN did not allow Red China to become a member." (POW #1023)

Others had run in terms of the UN's being a puppet of the US:

"The UN is now controlled by America and it is her slave, therefore we are denied [membership]. . ." (POW #1002)

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Still others had taken the form of denouncing the UN as "capitalistic," this charge sometimes standing alone and sometimes being accompanied by further allegations:

"The UN is only a group of capitalists, except for Russia. The small countries have no choice except to obey the US."
(POW #1131)

The North Korean leaders' criticism of the UN as reported by the prisoners appears to have concerned UN activities in Korea prior to the outbreak of the current war. It will be recalled in this connection that Korea's Communist leaders had been at odds with the UN Commission on Korea almost from the day of its establishment by the UN General Assembly in 1948. In a sense, therefore, they had long regarded the UN as the major enemy, and the US as merely a part, although the most powerful part, of the UN. The Chinese Communist leaders, by contrast, had not previously clashed with the UN, and had been in the habit of regarding the US, because of its support of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists, as their major external enemy. If, moreover, the Chinese leaders had had nothing good to say of the UN, they would have been taking a position inconsistent with their avowed intention to replace the representatives of the Nationalist Government in UN councils.

If we fix attention upon the three comments about the UN most frequently reported by North Korean prisoners (that members of the UN are puppets of the US, that the UN is interfering in Korea affairs, and that the UN is anti-Russian), we find that a larger proportion of the better educated North Koreans than of the North Koreans with little or no education recalled such comments. These, like the similar points described above, presumably reflect more frequent exposure to comments on the UN on the part of the better educated North Koreans than on the part of those with little or no education.

The comments reported differed little from sub-group to sub-group of Chinese prisoners.

What POWs Had Heard About South Korea

As might have been expected, almost all the North Korean prisoners had heard their leaders discuss South Korea. By contrast, only two-thirds of the Chinese prisoners had heard their leaders discuss Korea—North or South.⁸

⁸The CCF prisoners were asked what their leaders had told them about the Korean people as a whole, not just about the South Koreans. Most of the remarks they repeated, however, referred in fact to the South Koreans, by a ratio of two to one.

Educated CCF prisoners were more likely than those without schooling to fall within the group that had heard the leaders discuss Korea, although they had received, as noted previously, about the same amount of indoctrination.

Table 9 presents the answers of prisoners who said their leaders had spoken to them about the UN.

TABLE 9

What did leaders say about the UN? ^a	503 NK, %	82 CCF, %
The UN is controlled by the US; members are puppets of the US	48	17
The UN is interfering in Korean affairs; its activities in Korea are illegal	33	-
The UN is anti-Russian; fights Russia's plans for peaceful settlement of Korean problem	13	2
The UN is unsuccessful (cannot succeed)	11	-
The UN is capitalistic and anti- "democratic"	6	12
The UN solves or helps to solve international problems to maintain world peace	5	35
The UN is trying to help Korea	3	1
The UN is anti-Red China, will attack China	-	17
Other remarks anti-UN	5	1
Other remarks pro-UN	1	4
Miscellaneous comments	1	11
Don't remember	14	13
No answer	1	1

^aTotals add up to more than 100 percent because some prisoners repeated more than one comment about the UN.

The comments on South Koreans reported by the North Koreans differed notably from those reported by the Chinese. This may perhaps be attributed, in large part, to the fact that the North Koreans were usually repeating comments heard prior to the war. The Chinese prisoners, by contrast, had heard about Korea from their leaders only after the war broke out, usually, indeed, after their units had actually crossed the Manchurian border

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TABLE 10

Did your leaders ever talk to you about the South Korean people and their government? (Chinese: "about the Korean people and their governments?") ^a	762 NK, %	211 CCF, %
Yes	97	66
No	3	34
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

^aBased only on those prisoners who answered the question. Twenty-seven prisoners and six North Koreans were not asked or did not answer the question.

into Korea. The difference is further illuminated by what is known about the sources of the respondents' information. Most of what CCF soldiers knew about Korea they had learned from their officers, while most of what the North Korean soldiers knew they had heard from civilian propagandists.⁹ As indicated previously, almost none of the Chinese had heard about the Korean people from civilian propagandists, who had been the chief source of information about South Korea among the North Koreans. The sources of information mentioned by those prisoners who had heard referen to South Korea are as follows:

<u>736 NK</u>	<u>%</u>
Army officers (including cultural officers)	40
Chiefs of social, labor, youth groups	47
Chiefs of people's committees	41
Other local government officials, propagandists	25
Party cell chiefs	14
School teachers	10
Other persons	3
Not specified	2
<u>140 CCF</u>	
Army line officers	23
Army propaganda and cultural officers	71
Civilian propagandists and officials	1
Not specified	14

⁹Among the North Koreans, army officers were of course most often mentioned by prisoners who had attended only military indoctrination meetings (94 percent); older, better-educated individuals and those from large cities mentioned teachers more often, and chiefs of people's committees less often, than little-educated prisoners or those from towns or rural areas; and chiefs of people's committees were likewise mentioned less often by early captives than by later ones.

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In any case, it is clear from their comments that the antagonism of the North Korean propagandists was directed against the government of South Korea and not against the people. North Korean propaganda frequently expressed strong sympathy for the plight of the South Korean common man.

The statement that the South Koreans were suffering from lack of food was reported by the North Koreans more often than any other:

"Excessive enforced collections and contributions to the government are bringing starvation to the people and making it very difficult for them to live." (POW #616)

"People are dying of hunger. Rice is forcibly collected from the farmers for export to foreign countries and they are left with nothing to eat." (POW #422)

Criticism of the South Korean government had usually taken the explicit form of describing the people of South Korea as oppressed and exploited:

"The people are exploited. Laborers work for low wages and find life very difficult because prices are so high. There is no land reform, so the farmers are exploited by the landowners." (POW #623)

"The people are oppressed. The factory workers and farmers are being exploited and are finding life very difficult." (POW #646)

Four further allegations were frequently reported: (1) That the South Korean government is anti-"democratic" and anti-proletarian, or that it is capitalist, imperialist, or reactionary, as in the following excerpts:

"South Korea is a capitalist country where the people have no sympathy for one another. The rich lead good lives but the poor will never be any better off." (POW #440)

"The South Korean government is just as imperialist as the Japanese regime was." (POW #616)

"The South Korean government is made up of monopolistic capitalists, so the will of the people is entirely ignored." (POW #646)

(2) That South Korea either is now or is going to become a US colony, as in the following excerpt:

"The US is trying to colonize Korea. That is why it does not withdraw from South Korea." (POW #421)

UNCLASSIFIED

(3) That the Rhee government is controlled by the US, as in the following excerpt:

“They called the government ‘Syngman Rhee’s puppet government.’ They said Rhee was selling Korea to the US.”
(POW #439)

(4) That unsolved economic problems are causing suffering among the South Korean people, as in the following excerpt:

“[Because the farmers are exploited by the landlords] they are greatly in debt. Many are leaving their farms and moving to the cities to get jobs and as a result there are many jobless persons in the cities. Laborers and clerks are forced to live on very low salaries....” (POW #407)

Other, less frequently reported comments, had accused the South Korean Government of torturing or killing South Korean patriots (Communists):

“People who believe in communism are massacred.” (POW #422)

“The people are beaten and the patriots are slaughtered.”
(POW #645)

North Korean propagandists, according to the respondents, had also described conditions in South Korea as no better than they had been under Japanese rule, and had denied that any land reform had taken place in South Korea.

Most of the comments just quoted are excerpts from detailed statements by prisoners. More often than not, the North Koreans repeated several things they had been told about South Korea, not just one. In fact, the prisoners reported, on the average, no less than three comments. This is a larger number of comments than they were able to recall on any of the other topics about which they were questioned, and a considerably larger number than the Chinese prisoners were able to recall on the same topic.

Average number of remarks about:	By NK	By CCF
US	1.7	2.0
Russia	2.0	1.9
UN	1.3	1.0
(South) Korea	2.9	1.2

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Next to remarks about South Korea, the North Koreans apparently had heard most about Russia. The Chinese appear to have heard discussions about the US and Russia twice as often as discussions about either Korea or the UN. The detailed character of some of the comments is exemplified by the following excerpt:

"The South Korean government is merely a colonial government like that during the Japanese regime, and is a pawn of the US capitalists. It is not for all the people but only for a few capitalists. They send rice, raw materials, and precious metals to Japan or to the US and bring in unnecessary materials, bad flour, and foodstuff. Factories are not operating because of this influx of foreign commodities and the number of jobless persons is increasing daily and people are starving. There are many uprisings against the government; the government is using force on the people and does not respect the feelings of the people." (POW #625)

In general, the reported assertions of Chinese officers about Korea (North or South) add up to a multi-faceted rationalization of CCF participation in the fighting in Korea. These assertions should be considered, therefore, in the context of what the CCF leaders appear to have designated as the motive underlying CCF participation, namely, self-defense. Of the CCF prisoners, 60 percent stated that they were fighting to keep their country from being invaded. (This will be discussed in greater detail in a later section of this report.)

Briefly, the Chinese leaders' argument seems to have been that the North Korean government and the government of Red China both function in the interest of the welfare of all the people, and that the government of South Korea is their natural enemy because, like the Chinese Nationalist government, it is controlled by a small clique of selfish anti-"democratic" leaders. One-third of the Chinese prisoners recalled having heard one variant or another of the statement that North Korea and Red China are alike, and that the sole concern of Kim Il Sung and his "democratic" government is the welfare of the Korean people:

"In North Korea all the people live equally well and the government is democratic, just like Red China." (POW #1087)

"Kim Il Sung, who is in full accord with Mao Tse-tung, truly respects the opinions of the people and works only for their benefit." (POW #1084)

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There were occasional references (by one Chinese out of ten) to the fact that North Korea is the friend, neighbor, or ally of Red China:

"North Korea is very close to China geographically."
(POW #1083)

"The Kim Il Sung government is friendly toward China."
(POW #1079)

"North Korea is our ally...." (POW #1070)

One Chinese out of seven recalled having heard that, in view of the common ideals of the two countries, and their mutual good will, it was only natural that the CCF should help the North Koreans or "liberate" the Korean people:

"We are helping North Korea because she is in a tight spot because of the war." (POW #1055)

"North Korea is in alliance with Red China, and we are going to fight to liberate her." (POW #1040)

"The Korean people are suffering because of the war and are oppressed by the US. Therefore we must go to Korea and liberate them." (POW #1006)

Finally, a small group of Chinese prisoners recalled having heard that North Korea deserves assistance because of the help it gave the CCF when the latter were fighting the Nationalists:

"The People's Army of North Korea helped us a great deal when we were fighting for liberation, so we are helping them to the fullest extent in this war." (POW #1079)

Many Chinese prisoners remembered statements by their leaders in which the South Korean government had been described as very much like the Chiang regime, which the CCF had fought to overthrow. According to one out of three, Rhee and his government had been described as capitalists, imperialists, or reactionaries:

"Syngman Rhee is an imperialist and has a different viewpoint from that of the leaders of our country and North Korea."
(POW #1070)

"In South Korea Syngman Rhee is fighting for the sake of landowners and capitalists." (POW #1006)

"Syngman Rhee is just like Chiang Kai-shek." (POW #1084)

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Somewhat less than one-third of the Chinese prisoners recalled statements, often made in connection with denunciations of the South Korean government as capitalist or reactionary, alleging that that government oppressed, exploited, and abused its people:

"Syngman Rhee is oppressing the people, robbing them of freedom, carrying out the tyranny of massacre and imprisonment, and squeezing the people." (POW #1102)

"Syngman Rhee oppresses the people of South Korea, in spite of the opposition of the people and enforces all kinds of bad policies...." (POW #1084)

"The South Korean government oppresses and harasses the people. It confiscates valuable rice from the people and then sends hundreds of thousands of kun of rice to Japan. The people are suffering from poverty but the top officials don't care." (POW #1140)

A few reported statements describing the South Korean people as "suffering" because of shortages of food and other necessities:

"The North Korean people live well but the South Korean people are suffering from lack of food and clothing." (POW #1066)

"The Koreans are very miserable...because they did not have food to eat." (POW #1062)

Some of the remarks reported about South Korea were more directly related to the current war than those just noted. One out of four prisoners remembered having heard allegations stressing the aggressive character of the South Korean government — its alleged invasion of North Korea, or, in some cases, its plans for the invasion of China:

"Syngman Rhee invaded North Korea because he was afraid his political power would be weakened by the power of Kim Il Sung." (POW #1073)

"Syngman Rhee intends to invade North Korea and then invade China." (POW #1085)

Many comments reported included criticism of the US for having come to South Korea's assistance when it was committing acts of aggression:

"In cooperation with the USA, Syngman Rhee is invading North Korea." (POW #1074)

"The South Korean army of Syngman Rhee is receiving the aid of the US Army." (POW #1061)

Finally, some of the comments the prisoners recalled castigated US imperialism on the grounds that the Rhee government is a puppet of the US and that, in any case, South Korea's destiny is to become, within the near future, a colony of the US:

"Syngman Rhee is an agent of American imperialists. He has sold out his country and his policies are not for the people but for the capitalists. The administration is not for the people but for the few capitalists." (POW #1172)

"Syngman Rhee is doing just what the US orders him to do. He is becoming a puppet of the US and is disregarding the will of the people." (POW #1023)

The only other remark that any considerable number of the Chinese prisoners recalled having heard about Korea was to the effect that Korea is now divided into two parts, the 38th parallel being mentioned sometimes as the dividing line. In a few instances, a comparison appears to have been made between the partition of Korea and that of China.

A fairly clear picture emerges from the comments described and quoted above, as supplemented by other recollections of North Korean prisoners, as to what the North Korean leaders had wished their followers to believe about conditions in South Korea. The tone of their arguments, intentional or unintentional, had been largely emotional. The people of South Korea, they had insisted, are suffering and starving under an anti-"democratic" regime dominated by a capitalist power: South Korean "patriots" are being tortured and slain; the people of South Korea are no better off than they were during the Japanese occupation.

On the other hand, the rationale of the Chinese leaders for their part in the war had had, for the most part, an ideological basis. The major emphasis in their remarks had been on the contrast between the "democratic" government of North Korea (like Red China) and the capitalist and reactionary government of South Korea (like Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government). They had also emphasized, though to a lesser degree, the alleged aggressive behavior of the South Korean army. Emotion-tinged comments on the suffering and exploitation of the South Korean people and the friendship between North Korea and Red China were recalled by a much smaller proportion of the Chinese

respondents than of the North Korean. Table 11 presents the answers of prisoners who said their leaders had spoken to them about South Korea.

TABLE 11^a

<u>What did leaders say about (South) Korea?</u>	<u>736 NK, %</u>	<u>140 CCF, %</u>
The people are suffering from lack of food, are starving	52	8
The people are oppressed and exploited, are abused by their government	42	16
The government (Syngman Rhee) is capitalist, imperialist, and reactionary	39	31
South Korea is (will be) a colony of the US, is a market for US goods, and a source of raw materials	39	6
Economic conditions are very bad	38	1
The Rhee government is a puppet government	35	8
Patriots are murdered or tortured	24	1
Conditions are no different from the days of Japanese rule	13	—
There has been no land reform	7	—
Is an aggressor — invaded North Korea, plans to invade China	—	26
Is allied with the US in this war	—	17
<u>North Korea</u>		
Is democratic, like Red China, for the people	—	33
We fight to help her, to liberate Korean people	—	14
Is our friend, neighbor, ally	—	10
Deserves help because she helped us fight Chiang	—	6
<u>Other</u>		
Korea is divided into North and South	—	15
Miscellaneous remarks	3	7
Don't remember	1	1
No relevant answer	1	11

^aTotals add up to more than 100 percent because prisoners gave more than one answer.

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It is noteworthy that most of the North Korean leaders' comments are of such character that they would have been appropriate to the Korean situation as long ago as 1945, when the Communists first attempted to exercise authority over Korea as a whole. As noted above, many of the North Korean interviewees had had little or no indoctrination subsequent to the outbreak of the war, and they might therefore have been expected to reflect the prewar North Korean Communist "line" rather than the wartime "line." This point should not be overemphasized, however, since evidently little refurbishing would have been required in order to transform arguments for the "liberation" of the "oppressed" South Koreans by means short of war into arguments for their "liberation" by means of war — especially as the North Korean leaders had at least professed to regard the war as being fought primarily for the benefit of the South Koreans. But it seems a reasonable inference from the data presented above that the interviewees were repeating the content of indoctrination lectures offered prior to and in preparation for the current war.

The responses of the prisoners who had been indoctrinated in the army differed from those of prisoners whose indoctrination had occurred at a time when they were civilians. This suggests that there had been differences in emphasis between civilian and military propaganda. The prisoners indoctrinated before recruitment in the army recalled, more often than soldier-indoctrinated prisoners, such assertions as the following: the people of South Korea are suffering from want of food; the Rhee government is a puppet government. Similarly, the better educated prisoners (both North Korean and Chinese), more often than the less well educated, recalled assertions of this kind, and certain further assertions as well, namely: conditions in South Korea are no different from conditions in the days of Japanese rule; South Korean patriots are being tortured and murdered. The fact that the better educated North Koreans recalled having heard these assertions more often than the uneducated is presumably due either to their having heard such assertions more often, or to their having, for whatever reason, remembered them better.

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ORIENTATION OF NK AND CCF SOLDIERS
TO THE WAR, THEIR ALLIES, AND THE UN

The chief value of the information examined in the preceding pages lies in the fact that it reveals, indirectly, the political and ideological orientation the prisoners had received from their leaders. Reliable data on the beliefs of the prisoners themselves about the US, Russia, and the UN, and on their respective roles in world affairs, could not, that is to say, have been obtained under the conditions in which the interviewing took place. It did prove possible, however, to get at least some data on the prisoners' picture of the war in Korea, or, more concretely, on their beliefs as to how the war had started, the reasons they ascribed to their governments for fighting it, and their feelings about countries that might be depended on for aid. Data were elicited also about their attitudes toward the UN, their knowledge as to what countries belong to the UN, and their familiarity with the names of certain leading political figures.

The data obtained on all the points just mentioned are interesting in the light of what we have learned about the prisoners' indoctrination. The prisoners' knowledge about and their attitudes toward the war had presumably been influenced to some extent at least by their leaders, or, to put it a little differently, the orientation the prisoners had received represents one element at least in the over-all context in which their beliefs had been formed and their knowledge acquired. The data on indoctrination are specially relevant in the case of the Chinese, who had lacked sources of news about day-to-day happenings in the world that had been available to the North Koreans. Five out of every six Chinese reported that in the months before the Korean war they had received no news of what was going on in the world from any source. Of the North Koreans, however, only one out of three had been without news. The following are the sources of news reported by the Chinese and North Korean prisoners.

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TABLE 12

"In the months before the war, where did you get most of your news about what was going on in the world?"^a

<u>Source</u>	<u>419 NK, %</u>	<u>209 CCF, %</u>
No news from any source	34	84
Army officers	—	10
Newspapers	33	10
"Propaganda"	20	—
Mass meetings (type unspecified)	13	1
Radio	10	—
Organizational meetings	8	—
School sessions, teachers	6	—
Friends (CCF: includes co-fighters)	4	(b)
Labor magazines	2	—

^aTotals include only those prisoners who answered the question.

^bLess than 0.5 percent.

OPINIONS ON CAUSE OF WAR AND REASONS FOR FIGHTING

Beliefs of North Koreans

Most of the North Koreans (four out of five) had some opinion about how the war started. If only prisoners who expressed an opinion are considered, about five out of eight blamed South Korea, and one-third thought the fighting had been started by North Korea itself.

TABLE 13

Do you know how this war started?^a

<u>Responses</u>	<u>753 NK, %</u>
Affirmative	
South Korea started the war ^b	50
North Korea started the war	27
The war was caused by enmity engendered by opposing political ideologies	3

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TABLE 13 -Continued

<u>Do you know how this war started?^a</u>	
<u>Responses</u>	<u>753 NK,</u> <u>%</u>
Affirmative	
The Communists (Kim Il Sung) started the war to satisfy their greed, ambitions	1
Miscellaneous answers	1
	<u>82</u>
Negative	
Heard conflicting reports, undecided who is right	4
Don't know	14
	<u>18</u>
	<u>100</u>

^aBased only on those who answered. Fifteen North Koreans were not asked or did not answer the question.

^bIncludes a small number of North Koreans (5 percent) who said they were not certain who had started the war, but had heard or were of the opinion that South Korea had started it.

The alleged aggression by the South Korean army had not, in the view of the People's Army soldiers, been a major reason for the PDRK's participation in the war. Although half of the total group of North Koreans accused South Korea of having started the fighting, only a very small fraction, 1 out of 25, named self-defense as the North Korean government's reason for fighting the war. The others pointed to the issues involved in the partition of Korea as major reasons for the PDRK's involvement in the fighting.

TABLE 14

Why is the People's Democratic Republic of Korea fighting?^a

<u>Responses</u>	<u>757 NK,</u> <u>%</u>
Favorable to North Korea	
To unify Korea (remove frontier at 38th parallel)	46

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TABLE 14-Continued

Why is the People's Democratic Republic of Korea fighting? ^a

<u>Responses</u>	<u>757 NK, %</u>
Favorable to North Korea	
To liberate the oppressed South Koreans (so that the people of South Korea can live in peace) (to destroy the puppet government of Syngman Rhee)	28
To prevent colonization of Korea by the US	13
For the defense of North Korea	4
To extend the North Korean form of government	36
Unfavorable to North Korea	
To satisfy leaders' greed and ambitions	11
Were ordered to fight by Russia	11
Other reasons	1
Don't know	6

^aTotal includes only the North Korean prisoners who answered the question. Eleven prisoners were not asked or did not answer the question. Total adds up to more than 100 percent because some prisoners gave more than one reason.

The principal motive of the PDRK, as stated by almost half of the prisoners, had been the unification of Korea:

"She is fighting in order to unify the motherland. She intends to carry out democratic policies in South Korea and make the South Korean people as happy as the North Koreans." (POW #632)

"[the PDRK] is fighting in order to unify the North and South, because only unification will bring happiness to the people of Korea." (POW #635)

Somewhat less than a third saw the war as a struggle for the liberation of their "oppressed brethren" in South Korea and about one out of eight described the fighting as a means of preventing the US from taking over their country.

Responses critical of the North Korean government were much less frequent. A small proportion of the prisoners, one out of nine, saw the war either as a consequence of the greed and ambition of the North Korean leaders or as a matter of obedience to orders from Russia.

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Some of the prisoners just mentioned revealed a generally disaffected attitude toward the North Korean regime. This is illustrated by the prisoner who not only indicated a strong doubt that South Korea had started the war, but also showed a general disinclination to believe the claims of the North Korean regime:

"... Though they claim in North Korea that South Korea started the war, I don't believe it, as I don't believe anything that a dog would say....

"[The North Korean leaders] said the PDRK was fighting to overthrow capitalism and by practicing democracy to insure that all the people would live a life of freedom and happiness. But it is a lie, for although we make money after hard work, they take away our earnings in taxes. Judging from the fact that straw rice bags are sent to Russia, it seems to me that we are fighting because Russia told us to, and in order to placate Russia. Kim Il Sung thinks only of his own happiness and ignores the well-being of his people. The PDRK cannot help fighting because it is subjugated by Russia." (POW #634)

More than one-third of the prisoners expressed the belief that the PDRK was fighting to extend the North Korean form of government. Some of these apparently intended this statement as unfavorable criticism of the PDRK's motives, while others apparently did not so intend it. For a considerable number it was impossible to determine whether unfavorable criticism was intended or not. If, for example, a respondent said his government wanted to "communize Korea," his use of the word "communize" might be derogatory or it might be merely descriptive. Of those who expressed any belief about the PDRK's motives in fighting the war, almost half (47 percent) confined themselves to remarks clearly favorable to North Korea. Included are all the responses classified in Table 13 as favorable to North Korea. One-third (32 percent) cited reasons that were not clearly favorable ("to extend the North Korean form of government" was included in this category). Approximately one prisoner out of five cited reasons on both sides of the line that divides the clearly favorable from the possibly or clearly critical.

The "mixed" group included a high proportion of prisoners who believed the PDRK was fighting to extend its form of government. Since prisoners who expressed clear dissatisfaction with the North Korean regime would presumably not at the same time spoken of it in favorable terms, it seems probable that most of those who mentioned "extending its form of government" as their government's motive did not intend this as unfavorable criticism. Apparently, therefore, only a minority

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of the prisoners did not support their government in its fight against the South Koreans. (Further analysis was attempted with a view to determining the influences that had led one-third of those with opinions to the belief that North Korea had started the war, despite the fact that their leaders had told them otherwise.)

A large proportion of prisoners questioned their leaders' statements as to how the war had started, but still spoke in support of their government's motives in fighting it. Four out of ten, 41 percent, expressed the belief that North Korea had started the war, but said their government was fighting to unify Korea and remove the 38th-parallel boundary. Viewpoints clearly more favorable were expressed by yet other prisoners, who stated that North Korea had struck the first blow: one out of five, 19 percent, believed that the PDRK was fighting to liberate the oppressed South Koreans; one out of ten believed it was fighting to prevent colonization of Korea by the US.

Here several factors were apparently at work, one of them being that the prisoners seem to have regarded the issues about which the war was being fought as much more important than the question of who had started the war. Another was that the North Koreans, though they had hoped for unification by peaceful means, had probably been prepared by their leaders for a possible war, and thus may well have been ready to believe that North Korea had itself started it.

That some prisoners were ready to question whether South Korea had started the war, without at the same time questioning whether the PDRK was fighting in a good cause, may be seen from the following responses by a North Korean prisoner to queries as to how the war had started and as to the PDRK's motives in fighting it:

(Do you know how this war started?) "According to the North Korean broadcaster after the war broke out, the South Korean National Army illegally invaded the North who was obliged to go to war. Newspapers also reported the same story. I believed it because I did not see the 38th line myself. But I came to realize that the North Korean broadcast was all wrong. I found later, in Seoul, that the North Korean broadcast was quite opposite to the real fact... (Why is the People's Democratic Republic of Korea fighting in this war?) I see the North as fighting (1) to unify our motherland and (2) to drive the US army out of Korea for the purpose of settling all matters among Koreans." (POW #422)

Some prisoners had witnessed North Korean troop movements toward the 38th parallel, and had concluded from them that their government, and not that of South Korea, had started the war.

Beliefs of Chinese Prisoners

The Chinese prisoner's view of the war was very different from that of the North Korean prisoner. His reason for fighting had little to do with the war between North and South Korea. Most of the Chinese prisoners, seven out of ten, did not, for example, profess to know how the war in Korea had started.

TABLE 15

Do you know how this war started?

<u>Responses</u>	<u>238 CCF,</u> <u>%</u>
Affirmative	
South Korea started the war	17
North Korea started the war	4
The war was caused by enmity engendered by opposing ideologies	1
The Communists (Kim Il Sung) started the war to satisfy their greed, ambitions	1
Miscellaneous answers	8
	<hr/> 31
Negative	
Heard conflicting reports, undecided who is right	2
Don't know	67
	<hr/> 69
	<hr/> 100

Among the Chinese who did express an opinion, as among the North Koreans, the most frequent opinion was that South Korea had started the war. If we consider only prisoners who expressed an opinion, the proportion blaming South Korea (17 percent out of 31 percent, or three out of five) is roughly comparable to that of North Koreans blaming South Korea (50 percent out of 82 percent, or about five out of eight).

Only two percent of the CCF interviewees were undecided as to who had started the war, the vast majority expressing complete

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ignorance about it. After the Chinese prisoners' beliefs about their government's motives in fighting have been examined, an attempt will be made to explain this general lack of knowledge.

TABLE 16

Why is the People's Democratic Republic of China fighting?^a

<u>Responses</u>	<u>238 CCF, %</u>
Favorable to North Korea	
To unify Korea (remove the 38th-parallel boundary)	2
To liberate the oppressed South Koreans (so that the people of South Korea can live in peace) (to destroy the puppet government of Syngman Rhee)	8
To prevent colonization of Korea by the US	6
For the defense of North Korea	17
Pertaining to China	
For defense of China, next victim of the US	60
Friendship, alliance between China and North Korea	17
To satisfy leaders' greed and ambitions	2
Other reasons	2
Don't know	21

^aTotal adds up to more than 100 percent because some prisoners gave more than one reason.

The reasons given by the North Korean prisoners pertained, as we have seen, to Korean issues — e. g. , the unification and liberation of South Korea. The Chinese prisoners' reasons pertained not to those issues, but to the defense of their own country. Most of the CCF prisoners, six out of ten, said the PDRC was fighting to prevent an attack on their motherland by the US. Their leaders had told them that the US had sent troops to Korea, and that these troops had to be defeated to prevent their invading China. While China itself was not under attack, the presence of the Americans so close to the Chinese border had lent plausibility

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to the CCF leaders' otherwise unverifiable claim that there was real danger that, if North Korea were subdued, China would be next:

"It is my belief that Mao Tse-tung is fighting to prevent future aggression which might be undertaken by the US, using North Korea as her military base after the US Army had completely occupied North Korea." (POW #1044)

"When I was in Manchuria the cultural officer said, '... the US Army has approached the frontier of our country across North Korea. We are defending our motherland and voluntarily helping North Korea.' Thus we participated in this war. At that time, I wondered why America was interfering in the Korean Civil War." (POW #1002)

The fact that the CCF leaders had emphasized the danger to China and had not fixed attention on how the war had started explains the Chinese prisoners' general ignorance with respect to that topic. Some of the prisoners had learned of the war in Korea for the first time at a moment when their leaders were warning them that China's borders were threatened, and that "we must go to Korea and drive out the Americans lest they invade our country." That being the case, the question of who had started the war in Korea would have had little relevance, and the fact that a majority of the Chinese prisoners had not been motivated to raise it is not surprising.

With the Chinese as with the North Koreans, the primary reasons given for fighting the war were nationalistic. When reasons other than the defense of China were given, the emphasis was on the cultural and ideological bond between North Korea and China. According to one prisoner out of six, the CCF was fighting to defend North Korea; also according to one out of six, the CCF was fighting because of the friendship or alliance between the two countries. A very small minority, 1 prisoner out of 50, described the CCF's presence in Korea as an outgrowth of greed or ambition on the part of the leaders of Red China.

KNOWLEDGE OF ALLIES

Most of the prisoners, four out of every five Chinese and three out of every four North Koreans, named one or more countries they believed to be their allies in the war.

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TABLE 17

Does the People's Democratic Republic of Korea/China have any allies?

	768 NK, %	238 CCF, %
No	10	6
Yes ^a		
Russia	59	67
Red China/North Korea	59	53
Satellite countries	15	13
Mongolia	7	9
Other	3	3
	74	79
Don't know	14	15
No answer	2	—
	100	100

^aPercentages of prisoners saying "yes" add up to more than 100 percent because most of the prisoners named more than one ally.

Understandably, Russia was often mentioned by both the Chinese and the North Koreans, but slightly more often by the Chinese. The latter, indeed, actually mentioned Russia more frequently than North Korea. The People's Army soldiers mentioned Russia and Red China equally often.

When queried about their information sources concerning their countries' allies, the prisoners gave answers that revealed sharper differences between the two groups than those just noted. The North Koreans usually cited personal experience, or the reported experience of co-fighters. The Chinese, by contrast, spoke most frequently of their officers as the source of their information.

More than a third of the North Korean prisoners stated that they had either seen Chinese troops or heard from co-fighters that the Chinese were taking part in the war; three out of ten stated that they had seen or heard about Russian supplies received by the People's Army; only one out of five reported that they had heard about their country's allies from their officers.

Civilian sources of information were named by even smaller fractions of the prisoners than those just noted. One out of eight

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mentioned mass meetings as the source of information, and one out of ten mentioned newspapers. Another small group referred vaguely to "propaganda," and still another to evidence they had seen of common ideology or close economic and cultural ties on the part of North Korea and the country named as an ally.

TABLE 18

Does the PDRK/PDRC have allies? ^a	569 NK,	186 CCF,
How did you learn about this?	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Saw Chinese troops, heard they were taking part	37	—
Fighting in Korea; saw North Korean troops	—	11
Saw or heard about weapons, supplies from Russia	31	(b)
Told by officers (cultural or others)	19	74
Heard about it at mass meetings	13	2
Relationship of Russia and Red China to North Korea	11	—
Relationship of North Korea and Russia to Red China	—	13
Newspapers	10	8
"Propaganda"	9	(b)
Heard about it at school lectures	2	—
Told by villagers while in army	1	—
Other	5	3
No answer	2	(b)

^aTotals mentioning at least one ally add up to more than 100 percent because some prisoners mentioned more than one country.

^bLess than 0.5 percent.

The North Korean prisoners who mentioned the active participation of Chinese troops in the war in accounting for their knowledge of Red China as an ally necessarily belong to the "later" captives—those taken after 12 November 1950 since earlier before there had been few if any Chinese on the scene. The "early" captives (taken

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before 12 November) were much less likely than the prisoners taken later to mention China as an ally. As the table shows, fewer than half of the early captives against eight out of ten of the later POWs mentioned Red China as an ally. The proportion mentioning Russia does not appear to have been affected by China's entry into the war.¹⁰

TABLE 19

<u>Date of Capture-Surrender</u>	<u>% Mentioning alliance with^a</u>	
	<u>Russia</u>	<u>China</u>
442 POWs - 25 June 1950- 11 November 1950	61	45
305 POWs - 12 November 1950 and later	55	79

^aTotals do not include small groups of prisoners for whom date of capture was indeterminate.

Three out of four CCF soldiers stated that their officers had told them about Red China's alliances. However, only one out of nine mentioned that they had seen North Korean troops or referred to the CCF's own presence in North Korea as evidence of an alliance with the PDRK (less than 1 percent spoke of having seen or heard about supplies from Russia). Almost as many Chinese as Koreans cited newspapers as their source, but there were few if any references by the Chinese to other civilian sources: mass meetings, school lectures, and "propaganda."

Further analysis reveals a possible explanation of the different sources of information named by the two groups. For one thing, judging from comments elsewhere in the interviews, the Chinese prisoners had apparently been armed chiefly with captured Japanese weapons, and thus were less likely to have seen Russian weapons and to have concluded from them that Russia was an ally.

Comparison of information sources cited by CCF prisoners who mentioned Russia and those who mentioned only North Korea threw light on the incidence of Chinese prisoners who cited their officers as their source of information about their government's allies.

¹⁰The increased mention of China as an ally by "later" captives resulted in an over-all increase in the proportion of prisoners who knew of at least one ally of the PDRK: only 16 percent of the "later" captives said the PDRK had no allies, compared with 30 percent of the "early" captives who said this.

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POWs who named Russia as an ally usually cited their officers as the source of their information, this being the case regardless of whether Russia was the only ally mentioned, or whether other allies, including North Korea, were mentioned also. By contrast, prisoners who named only North Korea as an ally, tended to refer to their experiences in Korea, or to having seen or heard about North Korean troops. Almost two-thirds of them mentioned the fighting in Korea or the presence of North Korean troops, these being mentioned by only 2 percent of the prisoners who named both Korea and Russia as allies of their country.

TABLE 20^a

<u>Sources of Information</u>	Named as Allies by POWs ^b		
	61 Russia, ^c %	97 North Korea, %	28 North Korea, %
Saw or heard about			
North Korean troops	2	2	64
Officers	79	85	29

^a Among the Chinese prisoners, four out of ten (41 percent) mentioned both Russia and North Korea, but the number who mentioned Russia without also mentioning North Korea (25 percent) was twice as great as the number who named North Korea without mentioning Russia (12 percent). Thus two-thirds of the CCF interviewees were referring to Russia (alone or in combination with North Korea) while slightly more than one out of ten were referring only to North Korea when they explained how they had learned of the particular ally or allies they named. Twenty-two percent said the PDRC had no allies or believed she had allies but could not name any.

^b Percentages do not add up to 100% because some prisoners named no source.

^c Among those who mentioned Russia but did not mention North Korea, all but 2 percent named only Russia and no other country. The 2 percent were combined with the 23 percent who named Russia alone. None of the prisoners who mentioned North Korea without mentioning Russia also mentioned other countries. Also, the 41 percent who mentioned both Russia and North Korea includes those who mentioned other countries as well.

It seems clear that the Chinese prisoners – because their orientation to the war ran in terms of defense against threatened invasion by the US – when they thought of allies thought primarily of countries that could be counted on to come to their aid in the event of their needing it. In light of this fact, it is easy to understand, moreover, why those who cited their officers as the source of their information named Russia as an ally, since the officers would presumably have deemed Russia a more important ally than North Korea. But for the North Korean alliance having been brought home to the Chinese by the PA troops they had seen or

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heard about, North Korea would presumably have been mentioned much less often than it was.

The North Korean prisoners, on the other hand, apparently thought of allies in terms of the war in Korea, and thus in terms of countries that had already come to their aid in that war. They knew of Red China from having seen CCF troops, and of Russia from having seen Soviet weapons and supplies.

The relative importance of different countries as allies would also explain the fact that the North Koreans mentioned Red China more often than the CCF soldiers mentioned North Korea.

KNOWLEDGE OF, AND ORIENTATION TO, THE UN

It will be remembered that most of the North Korean prisoners, but fewer than half of the Chinese, had heard their leaders discuss the UN. The Chinese leaders had concentrated on the US as the enemy, and had talked less than the North Korean leaders about the UN. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that almost six out of ten Chinese said they had never heard of the UN, whereas eight out of ten North Koreans had at least heard of it.¹¹

POWs' Beliefs about Purpose of UN

The proportion of prisoners who had heard of the UN — about one out of four — was about equal to that of prisoners who did not know its purpose. Among those who had heard of it, there was surprising agreement in describing its purpose as good: only one out of every ten North Koreans and Chinese made comments on it that could be classified as unfavorable. Table 21 shows the responses of prisoners who had heard of the UN.

Chinese and North Korean prisoners made favorable comments on the UN in different proportions, the differences apparently being related to differences in frame of reference. The Chinese prisoners, more than the North Korean, tended to describe the purpose of the UN in such generalized terms as promoting world peace and arbitrating differences between nations. The North Korean prisoners, more than the Chinese prisoners, tended to describe the UN in terms of its relation to Korea and countries like it. One out of five of the North Koreans described the UN's purpose as: (a) that of solving the problems of small countries like Korea, or more specifically; (b) that of unifying Korea.

¹¹In response to the question, "Have you ever heard of the United Nations?", 79 percent of the North Koreans and 42 percent of the Chinese answered "yes."

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Even the North Koreans, however, named as the primary goal of the UN the preservation of world peace.

TABLE 21

What is the UN? What is its purpose?

<u>Response^a</u>	<u>603 NK, %</u>	<u>100 CCF, %</u>
Favorable to UN:		
A gathering of nations to promote world peace	43	53
To arbitrate differences between countries (settle world problems)	12	30
To help unite Korea	12	—
To help Red China	—	2
Settles problems of small nations (helps countries like Korea to unify)	8	1
Miscellaneous favorable remarks	3	1
Unfavorable to UN:		
Capitalistic, exploits proletarian countries	4	3
Puppet of the US	4	2
Unfair organization; interfering in Korea	2	—
Miscellaneous unfavorable remarks	1	4
Don't know	23	23
No answer	1	2

^aResponses total more than 100 percent because prisoners gave more than one answer.

The low incidence of unfavorable statements regarding the purpose of the UN is somewhat surprising in the context of the frequency with which the leaders, as reported by the prisoners, had commented on it unfavorably. Even among prisoners reporting wholly unfavorable comments on the UN by their leaders, only a

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small minority, one out of nine, made statements clearly critical of the UN's purpose, and no less than seven out of ten described that purpose in wholly favorable terms. This is the more interesting in view of the fact that only nine out of ten of the prisoners reporting favorable comments on the UN described the UN's purposes in favorable terms.

TABLE 22
PART A

<u>Purpose of UN</u>	<u>42 NK Reporting Comments by Leaders Favorable to UN, %</u>	<u>379 NK Reporting Comments by Leaders Unfavorable to UN, %</u>
Agree with leaders	93	73
Expressed mixed viewpoint	2	2
Disagreed with leaders	—	11
No opinion	5	12
No answer	—	2
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

PART B

<u>Purpose of UN</u>	<u>34 CCF Reporting Comments by Leaders Favorable to UN, %</u>	<u>27 CCF Reporting Comments by Leaders Unfavorable to UN, %</u>
Agreed with leaders	91	70
Expressed mixed viewpoint	3	4
Disagreed with leaders	—	11
No opinion	6	11
No answer	—	4
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

Detailed examination shows that there is no necessary incompatibility between prisoners' reports of what they had been told about the UN and their own statements regarding its purpose. For one thing, given the limited scope of the present study, as defined in the Summary and Introduction, it was impossible to obtain reliable information regarding the extent to which the prisoners believed what they had been told about the UN. Thus an individual prisoner commenting unfavorably on the UN's purpose may either not have believed the unfavorable remarks made by his leaders, or

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may have believed them and subsequently changed his mind. Secondly, the fact that an individual prisoner described the purpose of the UN in favorable terms does not necessarily mean that he approved of the present mode of functioning of the UN as he understood it. It will be remembered, in this connection, that some North Korean prisoners reported having been told that the UN was basically well intentioned, but had fallen under US domination and was being used by the US for its own selfish purposes.

Some consideration, moreover, must be given to the fact that the prisoners, particularly the North Koreans, had had access to other sources of information about the UN: civilians, co-fighters, and leaflets disseminated by UN psywar. The possibility must also be borne in mind that the high proportion of prisoners who described the purposes of the UN in favorable terms were reflecting, to a greater or lesser extent, the alleged tendency on the part of prisoners of war to attempt to get into the good graces of their captors by making responses that, in their opinion, the interviewers would welcome.

There is some indication that the Chinese prisoners' attitude toward the UN may have been, in general, less unfavorable than the North Korean prisoners' attitude. Despite the fact that statements regarding the purpose of the UN fall into much the same pattern for both groups, Table 21 shows that a larger proportion of CCF prisoners than of NK prisoners made favorable remarks about the UN. Moreover, as we have seen, a larger proportion of CCF prisoners than of NK prisoners reported having heard their leaders comment favorably on the UN.

Finally, as will be shown in Table 24, the Chinese, unlike the North Koreans, did not tend to disassociate Russia, their friend and ally, from the UN, their enemy.

It does not necessarily follow that the Chinese prisoners in general took a favorable view of the UN. The most that can be said is that they had heard of the UN in a context less likely to produce unfavorable attitudes about it than that in which the North Koreans had heard of it, and that there is some evidence suggesting that their attitude toward the UN may, in consequence, have been more favorable than that of the North Koreans.

POWs' Knowledge as to What Nations Are UN Members

Both North Korean and Chinese prisoners tended, in general, to identify the UN with the US and the non-Communist countries of Europe, or merely with "many nations."

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Since the US Army is, to all intents and purposes, the UN's unified command in Korea, it is no surprise that six out of every ten prisoners, Chinese and North Koreans alike, knew that the US is a member of the UN. It should be remembered also that half of the North Koreans who had heard of the UN from their leaders had heard it described as the pawn of the US.

TABLE 23

<u>Which nations are members of the UN?^a</u>	<u>603 NK, %</u>	<u>100 CCF, %</u>
United States	59	63
"Many nations" ("50 nations," "59 nations")	53	46
European non-Communist countries (named)	52	55
Asiatic countries (named)	29	28
Nationalist China	26	38
Russia	25	49
British commonwealth nations	22	12
Republic of Korea (South Korea)	12	16
"Non-Communist countries"	7	2
European satellite countries (named)	6	5
Red China	1	18
Others	15	12
Don't know	19	20
No answer	2	—

^aResponses total more than 100 percent because some prisoners gave more than one answer.

A larger proportion of CCF prisoners than of North Korean prisoners, as might have been expected, knew of Nationalist China's membership (four out of ten Chinese against only one out of four North Koreans). The Chinese, however, were also better informed as to Russia's membership: half of the CCF prisoners knew that Russia is a member, as against only one out of four North Koreans. When prisoners who had not spontaneously mentioned Russian membership in the UN were specifically asked whether Russia is a member, the relative lack of knowledge on the part of the North Koreans manifested itself again: one-third of the Chinese against only one-fifth of the North Koreans gave the right answer. Among the North Koreans who did not say "yes" (don't know, no answer groups) the majority said "no"; the

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Chinese, by contrast, tended to say that they did not know rather than to give the wrong answer.

TABLE 24

<u>Is Russia a member of the UN?^a</u>	451 NK, %	51 CCF, %
Yes	22	33
No	51	14
Don't know	25	49
No answer	2	4

^aIncludes only prisoners who did not spontaneously mention Russia as a member of the UN.

The fact that so many North Korean prisoners did not identify Russia as a member of the UN was apparently due, in part, to the difficulty they experienced in associating an ally with an organization that had been presented as their enemy, even before the war. The reasons given by those North Koreans who said that Russia is not a UN member make this quite clear. Four out of every five pointed to differences on the level of principle: the "democracy" or socialism of Russia versus the "imperialism" of the UN, for example, and one out of ten stressed this difference, by implication, in statements to the effect that the UN would not permit Russia to become a member.

The following question was asked of those prisoners who said that Russia is not a UN member:

TABLE 25

<u>Why isn't Russia a member?</u>	229 NK, %
<u>Responses^a</u>	
Differences about principles (Russia is democracy, UN countries are capitalistic Russia is socialistic, UN capitalistic Communism is contrary to democracy)	81
UN did not permit Russia to join	11
Russia did not want to join	7
Because of the division of Korea	4
Other reasons	3
Don't know/no answer	9

^aThe percentages total more than 100 because some prisoners fall into more than one of the groupings. Only seven Chinese prisoners, when asked directly, said that Russia is not a member of the UN. Six of them ascribed Russia's non-membership to differences on matters of principle.

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The following response illustrates the denial, on logical grounds, that Russia could possibly be a member of the alliance against which the North Koreans were fighting:

"I was told that the Russian policy was one of liberation of the small and weak nations, and guarantees that they would remain free and at peace. Moreover, she has not the slightest ambition to invade or colonize other nations. Therefore, it seems to me that Russia cannot be a member of the UN."
(POW # 625)

On the question of Red China's own membership in the UN, the Chinese were as poorly informed as the North Koreans had been on Russia's membership. Almost one out of five spontaneously mentioned Red China as a member of UN; when those who did not were asked directly whether or not Red China is a member, less than one-half gave the correct answer.

TABLE 26

Is the People's Democratic Republic of China a member of the UN?^a

	82 CCF, %
Yes	20
No	45
Don't know	28
No answer	7
	<hr/> 100

^aIncludes only prisoners who did not spontaneously mention Red China as a member of the UN.

In view of the limited sources of information to which the Chinese prisoners had access, the fact that so few possessed correct knowledge about Red China's membership in the UN probably indicates nothing more than that this topic had been discussed infrequently by CCF leaders. Most of those who said that Red China is not a member of the UN explained that she had been refused admission, because of opposition either from the US itself or from an alleged US bloc in the UN.

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TABLE 27

Why isn't the PDRC a UN member?

<u>Responses</u>	CCF,	
	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>
Refused entrance by the UN	46	17
Opposed by the US or US bloc	16	6
Considered a puppet of Russia	8	3
Other reasons	8	3
Don't know/no answer	<u>22</u>	<u>8</u>
	100	37

Thus, most of the prisoners who knew that Red China is not a member of the UN were reasonably correct as to why she is not.

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IDENTIFICATION OF PROMINENT
POLITICAL PERSONALITIES

In an attempt to gauge the general level of information of the North Korean and Chinese prisoners, the interviewers asked them to identify the names of a number of personalities who are outstanding in contemporary world politics. All were asked to identify Truman, Stalin, and Chiang Kai-shek. The North Koreans only were asked to identify Mao Tse-tung, Pak Hun Young (former South Korean Communist leader who is now North Korean Foreign Minister), and Cho Man Sik (anti-Communist leader of the North Korean Democratic party, who is known to have been imprisoned by the Communists). The Chinese only were asked to identify Kim Il Sung, Chou En-lai, Chu-Teh (Commander in Chief of the People's Liberation Army and Vice-Chairman of the Central People's Government Council of Red China), and Soong Ching-ling (the widow of Sun Yet-sen, sister of Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, and, at the present time, head of the Chinese Women's Committee and Vice-Chairman of the Central People's Government Council of Red China).

TABLE 28

<u>People Identified</u>	768 NK, %	
	<u>Name Recognized</u>	<u>Correctly Identified</u>
Stalin	98	95
Chiang Kai-shek	90	74
Mao Tse-tung	87	72
Pak Hun Young	83	64
Truman	66	55
Cho Man Sik	50	19

Almost all of the North Korean prisoners were able to identify Joseph Stalin. Only a few more than half, however, were able to identify President Truman.

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Not only Stalin but three other personalities as well were better known to the North Koreans than was the President of the US: Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Tse-tung, and Pak Hun Young. In fact, the anti-Communist Cho Man Sik was the only other personality identified as infrequently by North Koreans as President Truman.¹²

The fact that more North Koreans were able to identify Stalin than were able to identify Truman is not surprising, although the responses to other questions by no means indicates that their leaders had talked to them more frequently about Russia than about the US. However, Russia's occupation of North Korea, and Russia's activities there during the interval between the occupation and the outbreak of hostilities, must undoubtedly have given the average North Korean citizen access to various potential sources of information, official and unofficial, about the Russians, other than oral propaganda by North Korean civilians and military leaders.

A higher percentage of the Chinese prisoners recognized Chiang Kai-shek than any other personality on the list submitted to them.

TABLE 29

<u>People Identified</u>	238 Chinese, %	
	<u>Name Recognized</u>	<u>Correctly Identified</u>
Chiang Kai-shek	98	86
Chu-Teh	83	64
Truman	73	61
Kim Il Sung	68	60
Stalin	70	59
Chou En-lai	50	41
Soong Ching-ling	46	26

Seven out of eight CCF prisoners identified Chiang correctly, while the best known of the Red Chinese notables on the list, Chu-Teh, who is Commander in Chief of the People's Liberation Army, was identified by a bare six out of ten. Chu-Teh was about

¹²As Table 28 indicates, most of the prisoners who had heard of all the public figures except Cho Man Sik were able to identify them: almost all who had heard of Stalin (96 percent), and four out of five who had heard of Chiang (83 percent), Truman (83 percent), Mao (83 percent) and Pak Hun Young (78 percent) identified them correctly, but only four out of ten (39 percent) who had heard of Cho Man Sik identified him correctly.

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equally well known with US, North Korean, and Russian leaders, all of whom, it is interesting to notice, were correctly identified much more often than Chou En-lai, the Premier of Red China. Least well-known of all was Soong Ching-ling, widow of the founder of the Chinese Republic, Sun Yat-sen. She was identified by only one Chinese prisoner out of every four.¹³

Truman and Stalin were identified by equal proportions of the Chinese. There was no reason to expect a larger proportion to identify Truman, but the proportion recognizing Stalin might well have been greater. The fact that it was not possibly means that CCF propagandists had spoken of Stalin no more often than of President Truman. (We have already seen that they had discussed Russia and the US equally often.)¹⁴

When the totals for the three names that appeared on both North Korean and Chinese lists are compared, it is seen that Stalin was better known to the North Koreans than to the Chinese, and Chiang better known to the Chinese than to the North Koreans, and Truman about equally well known to both.

TABLE 30

<u>People Identified</u>	Proportion Making Correct Identification Among:	
	768 NK,	238 CCF,
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Stalin	95	59
Chiang	74	86
Truman	55	61

¹³Only a few more than half (55 percent) of the prisoners who had heard of Mme. Soong correctly identified her, but in most cases prisoners who had heard of the other notables on the list correctly identified them: Chiang and Kim Il Sung were identified by 88 percent of the prisoners who had heard of them, Truman and Stalin by 84 percent, Chou En-lai by 81 percent and Chu Teh by 77 percent.

¹⁴More CCF prisoners reported having heard the US or Russia discussed by their leaders than were able to identify Truman or Stalin: 88 percent had heard about the US, but only 61 percent identified Truman; 90 percent had heard about Russia, but only 59 percent were able to identify Stalin. It seems clear that the emphasis in discussions about the US and Russia had been on the countries and not their leaders.

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Given Russia's post-World War II intervention in North Korean affairs, there was good reason to expect Stalin to be better known to the North Korean than to the Chinese prisoners. The fact that Chiang was identified by a larger proportion of the Chinese prisoners than of the North Koreans was also to be expected, the surprising thing here being that the difference was not greater.

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INFLUENCE OF BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS
ON KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEFS OF POWS

SUMMARY

The North Korean prisoners were by and large younger and better educated than the Chinese, and a smaller proportion thought of themselves as professional soldiers. Six out of ten North Koreans were under 25 years of age; seven out of ten had at least been to elementary school. Of the Chinese, only four out of ten were under 25, and not quite half had been to school; one out of six (as against one out of ten North Koreans) described themselves as professional soldiers.

Almost equal proportions of North Koreans and Chinese had been farmers (or farm laborers) in civilian life.

TABLE 31

<u>Responses</u>	768 NK, <u>%</u>	238 CCF, <u>%</u>
Age, Years		
24 or younger	63	43
25-29	20	39
30 or older	17	18
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Education		
No schooling	29	52
Some schooling	71	48
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Occupation		
Professional soldier	10	18
Professional, proprietor, white collar	9	7
Student	13	8
Farmer	47	46

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TABLE 31-Continued

<u>Responses</u>	768 NK, %	238 CCF, %
<u>Occupation</u>		
Farm laborer	4	9
Worker	13	10
Other	3	(a)
Unemployed	1	2
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

^aLess than 0.5 percent.

The older North Koreans — those over 24 years of age — tended to be less well educated than the younger. This is in keeping with what is known about the expansion of educational facilities by the Communists which, other things being equal, would have affected the younger but not the older prisoners. The evidence points to a

TABLE 32

<u>Education</u>	220 POWs (19 or younger), %	263 POWs (20-24), %	282 POWs (25 and older), %
No schooling, or did not complete elementary school	34	35	63
Completed elementary school or beyond	66	65	37
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

similar tendency among the Chinese, although the differences in education between the older and younger CCF prisoners were not statistically significant.

INFLUENCE OF EDUCATION UPON POW RESPONSES

In an attempt to determine the relation between the level of education and the knowledge and beliefs of the North Korean prisoners, the responses of prisoners who were elementary school graduates (54 percent of the total) were compared with

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those who had a lesser amount of schooling (46 percent of the total). Among the Chinese, the line was drawn between comments of prisoners with some schooling, however brief, and those of prisoners with no schooling at all.

In view of the fact that all Chinese, whatever their education, had relied on their officers for news and information, there was little reason to expect their views on issues that had arisen for the first time during their years of military service to vary with differences in education. Apparently, however, education had influenced the Chinese prisoners' over-all conception of the issues involved, and their recollection, understanding, and interpretation of what they had been told by their officers.

The better educated prisoners — North Koreans and Chinese alike — were on the whole better informed than, but did not appear to hold notably different beliefs from, the prisoners with little or no schooling. The prisoners' knowledge about the UN and about the leading international figures whose names were submitted to them did vary to a considerable degree with amount of education. Beliefs as to how the war had started, however, and why the PDRK and CCF were fighting varied only to a limited extent.

On the question as to who had started the war, a larger proportion of the better educated North Koreans and Chinese than of the uneducated POWs had an opinion about it. There was, however, no discernible tendency for them to believe that one or the other country started the fighting. On the question as to why their country was fighting the war, again a larger proportion of the educated Chinese than of the uneducated expressed an opinion about why their country was fighting. Among the North Koreans, it was only the older of the better educated individuals that were more likely than the less well educated to have an opinion on this issue.¹⁵

Among the North Koreans, there is a clear relation between knowledge of the UN and level of education. Among the Chinese, 61 percent of the educated prisoners as against 24 percent of the prisoners with no education reported having heard of the UN, but those with schooling did not appear to be better informed than those without schooling as to UN membership or purpose. This perhaps merely reflects the fact that the amount of information about the UN available to CCF soldiers had been extremely limited. The better educated Chinese soldiers, even if they had heard of the UN, had had little opportunity to learn about its purpose or about what nations are members.

¹⁵A larger proportion of educated Chinese than of uneducated Chinese tended to cite the defense of China as a reason for fighting, while those without schooling tended to refer specifically to Korea, i.e., to the liberation of South Korea.

Among the North Koreans also a larger proportion of the better educated than of the relatively uneducated had heard of the UN (89 percent as against 66 percent). Among prisoners aware of the UN's existence, however, the better educated tended to be better informed as to what nations are members. The better educated North Koreans were also more likely to have some idea of the purpose of the UN, tending to emphasize the broader, more generalized aims of the organization, most particularly that of promoting world peace. The less well educated, by contrast, tended to state the UN's purpose in more limited terms, that is, in terms of the unification of Korea.¹⁶

The amount of education prisoners had had was clearly a determinant of the extent of their knowledge of leading political figures. A larger proportion of the better educated North Korean and Chinese prisoners than of their less educated fellows identified each of the prominent political figures about whom they were asked.

Among the North Koreans, amount of education was least predictive of correct identification of leading political figures in the case of Stalin, and most predictive for Cho Man Sik and Truman. (Stalin, in point of fact, was known to all the prisoners, the poorly educated as well as the better educated.) The proportion of educated prisoners who identified Truman was twice as high as that of prisoners with little or no education. The proportion able to identify Cho Man Sik was three times as high among the educated as among the uneducated.

TABLE 33

Identification of	North Korean ^a	
	422 Better Educated,	343 Less Well Educated,
	%	%
Stalin	97	92
Chiang Kai-shek	86	60
Mao Tse-tung	85	57
Pak Hun Young	80	44
Truman	74	32
Cho Man Sik	28	9

^aThe level of education of three North Korean prisoners was not ascertainable.

¹⁶Among the relatively few North Korean prisoners who made unfavorable remarks about the UN (that it is interfering in Korean affairs, is capitalist, is a pawn of the US), no variations attributable to level of education were apparent. Thus, as with the questions as to who had started the war and why the PDRK was fighting—questions in which attitudes as well as knowledge were involved—the better educated North Koreans were not more likely to give answers indicative of greater political conservatism.

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Among the Chinese, correct identification of Chiang was less dependent upon amount of education than that of the other leaders, and correct identification of Chou En-lai and Soong Ching-ling was more dependent on it. A slightly higher proportion of educated Chinese than of those without schooling correctly identified Chiang, while Soong Ching-ling and Chou En-lai were almost unknown to the prisoners without education. Both President Truman and Stalin were twice as likely to be identified by the educated Chinese as by the Chinese without schooling.

TABLE 34

<u>Identification of</u>	Chinese	
	Some School-	No School-
	ing (124), %	ing (114), %
Chiang Kai-shek	93	80
Kim Il Sung	76	45
Truman	80	44
Chu-Teh	84	46
Stalin	82	38
Soong Ching-ling	41	11
Chou En-lai	68	15

Amount of education appears to have influenced both North Korean and Chinese replies to questions about allies. The educated Chinese were more likely than those lacking education to know of at least one ally, and were more likely to mention Russia and the satellite countries. Similarly, educated North Koreans were more likely than uneducated ones to mention these same allies, along with Red China and Mongolia. A higher proportion of educated prisoners than of uneducated ones in both groups cited newspapers as their source of information about their allies, and the educated Chinese were more likely than the uneducated to show awareness of the relationship between Russia, Red China, and North Korea.

INFLUENCE OF LENGTH OF IMPRISONMENT ON NORTH KOREAN POWS

The data suggest that exposure to opinions and information at the permanent prisoner of war camps had influenced the prisoners

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to some degree. If we compare the responses of North Koreans who had been imprisoned for some time with those of prisoners taken later in the war, we find that the former tended to be better informed, and to express attitudes less favorable to the cause of the PDRK, than the prisoners taken at a later date.

Most of the early prisoners were from the routed North Korean Army, and had fallen into UN hands between 15 September and 11 November 1950.¹⁷ They were interviewed between 1 January and 25 January 1951. The bulk of the more recent prisoners had been taken after 1 January 1951, well after China's entry into the war, and were interviewed two days to two weeks after their capture-surrender. About half of them had been captured, or had surrendered, at a time when the Chinese troops were advancing; the remainder had been taken during the UN's "Operation Killer."¹⁸

Background characteristics of the more recent prisoners were compared with characteristics of individuals taken earlier with a view to determining whether differences in the composition of the two groups might account for the differences between them in the matter of knowledge and beliefs. (The prisoners taken earlier tended on the whole to be somewhat better educated. Education was therefore held constant when the two groups of prisoners were compared.)¹⁹

The early captives (who had been in camps the longest) were less apt than the more recent prisoners to say that South Korea had started the war, or that the PDRK was fighting to unify Korea or liberate the oppressed South Koreans.²⁰

A larger proportion of the early captives than of the later ones were able to identify Harry S. Truman. (Of the early captives, 66 percent identified Truman, as compared with 47 percent of the later captives.) A larger proportion of the better educated earlier captives than of the less well educated identified Cho Man Sik, the anti-Communist leader of the North Korean Democratic Party. A larger proportion of the less well educated earlier captives than of the later ones were able to identify Chiang Kai-shek. The

¹⁷Sixty-two prisoners captured very early in the war, during the period of the early "going" army, have been excluded from the group of "early" captives discussed below.

¹⁸The responses of members of these two groups of later prisoners were so similar as not to require separate discussion.

¹⁹Size of the prisoner's home community, age, occupation, and effect of the land reform either were the same for both groups of prisoners, or did not affect responses to the questions asked.

²⁰The respondents were asked for their beliefs at time of capture-surrender. But the present, as we know, plays tricks with memory and influences responses.

differences, it will be noted, are all in ability to identify non-Communist leaders, and this tends to corroborate the statement that the knowledge of the early prisoners had been increased by their exposure to various sources of information in the POW camps.

While the proportion of the new prisoners who had heard of the UN was about the same as that of the earlier prisoners, the new prisoners tended to be less well informed than the earlier ones as to what nations are UN members, and as to what the UN's purposes are.

As for the question on the PDRK's allies, the later prisoners were more likely than the earlier to mention at least one ally. This difference, the only one observable in the responses to this question, may be explained by the fact that the later prisoners were taken after China's entry into the war, and therefore had had an opportunity to see evidence of another country's participation.

There seems little doubt, then, that POW camps had afforded the prisoners new sources of information, so that the early captives, who had been in them longer, were better informed than the later. It is less certain that the camps had influenced beliefs in the same way, since other factors had been at work that might well account for observed differences in beliefs between early and more recent captives. The prisoners who had surrendered or been captured earlier had had shorter periods of service in the People's Army than those who had been taken later. We might expect, especially in view of what is known about indoctrination in that army, that a longer rather than shorter service period would reinforce and strengthen belief in its cause. Entirely apart from the impact of the camps on the prisoners, we might expect the later ones, who had been fighting longer, to be more devoted than the earlier POWs to the PDRK cause.

Also relevant is the fact that the early prisoners came largely from a routed army, and this also might well have influenced their beliefs. In general, morale is known to have been higher among prisoners taken during the period of the later "going" army.²¹

INFLUENCE OF RANK ON NORTH KOREAN RESPONSES

Of the sample of North Korean prisoners, 12 percent were officers and 7 percent were NCOs. Both officers and NCOs showed a greater incidence of support for the cause of the People's Army than did the privates: they were, for instance, more likely to say that

²¹See ORO-T-12(FEC), p. 100.

UNCLASSIFIED

South Korea had started the war, and that the PDRK was fighting to unify Korea and prevent colonization of Korea by the US. Since political reliability and adherence to the regime would presumably have been taken into account in selecting these soldiers, and since their relatively longer military service would have exposed them to a greater amount of indoctrination, this datum is not surprising.

In general, the officers tended to be better informed than the NCOs about the UN and the names of internationally prominent political leaders. The NCOs, in turn, were somewhat better informed on these topics than the privates. A larger proportion of NCOs than of privates correctly identified Chiang and Truman, and were more likely to know about the UN and to be aware that Russia is a member.²² The officers, however, did not tend to be better informed than the NCOs, or the NCOs than the privates, as to the PDRK's allies.

In general, in answering the question as to the purpose of the UN, the officers, who might have been expected to stand closer to the propaganda line than the NCOs or privates, were more likely to define the UN's purpose as that of making peace: three out of four officers as against only about four out of ten NCOs and privates so defined it. Moreover, the officers were not more inclined than others to make unfavorable remarks about the UN.

ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS

North Korean POWs

In general, neither the prisoners' knowledge nor their beliefs appear to have varied with age, independent of other factors (e.g., education). However, a larger percentage of the older prisoners than of the younger ones, as might have been expected, recalled political figures who had been outstanding in the more or less remote past. For example, a larger proportion of prisoners 25 years of age or older were able to identify Chiang Kai-shek and Cho Man Sik (the anti-Communist leader of North Korea's "Democratic" Party), and mentioned Nationalist China as a member of the UN.

²²The tendency of officers to be better informed is due to the fact that in general they are better educated than privates. Half of the privates had not completed elementary school, whereas only 15 percent of the officers had had less than an elementary school education.

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The data do suggest that the better educated older prisoners were, in general, somewhat better informed than the remainder of the prisoner population. A larger percentage of them cited the radio and newspapers as news sources and gave more correct answers to questions about the UN. Also, a higher percentage of them mentioned Russia as an ally (newspapers usually being cited as the source of this information) and stated that the PDRK had been ordered to fight by Russia.

A higher percentage of professional soldiers and workers than of farmers and students believed that South Korea had started the war. Of these four categories, the farmers were least likely and the professional soldiers most likely to blame the outbreak of the war on South Korea.

In general, prisoners whose homes were in small cities, towns, or rural areas revealed about the same level of information, and entertained fairly uniform beliefs. As compared to such prisoners, those whose homes were in large cities showed themselves to be somewhat better informed on the UN and the identity of leading political figures. These differences, however, appear to reflect degrees of education, since, as has been pointed out, the prisoners from large cities tended to be better educated. (On some questions, e.g., as to who had started the war and why the PDRK was fighting it, there was no discernible difference between prisoners from large cities and those from rural areas or smaller towns.)

Seventy percent of the prisoners who described themselves as volunteers and 84 percent of those who described themselves as professional soldiers were either officers or NCOs. To a considerable extent the volunteers and the professional soldiers also tended to be the same persons. As might have been expected from these facts, volunteers, professional soldiers, and officers responded to the questions in much the same way. (The number of individual members of these three groups who were not members of a second or third group was too small to warrant statistical treatment.)

Chinese POWs

The Chinese prisoners' beliefs about the war and their ability to identify leading political figures do not appear to have varied with age. A higher percentage of the older prisoners than of the younger described the UN as an agency for arbitrating differences among nations, but there were no discernible differences on other issues. The older prisoners do appear to have been somewhat

UNCLASSIFIED

better informed than the younger: almost all of them were able to name at least one nation that belongs to the UN. Also a higher percentage of them than of the younger prisoners named Russia and the US, along with certain European countries and Nationalist China, as members of the UN.

INFLUENCE OF PRIOR MEMBERSHIP IN CNA ON CHINESE POW RESPONSES

Of the Chinese prisoners, seven out of ten had belonged to the CNA prior to their recruitment in the CCF. It was possible, therefore, that they had been exposed to sources of information to which other Chinese prisoners had not had access, and that they had formed opinions and acquired information that the other prisoners (who had been civilians while they were serving in the Nationalist Army) would have been unlikely to have. It is, therefore, not surprising that the former CNA soldiers showed themselves to be somewhat better informed than the remaining Chinese prisoners. Although they were no more likely to have heard of the UN, they tended to be better informed about what nations are members, and tended to express more favorable opinions as to the UN's purpose.²³

A higher percentage of CNA prisoners than of the remaining Chinese prisoners were able, as was to be expected, to identify Chiang Kai-shek and Soong Ching-ling (Mme. Chiang's sister). This difference does not necessarily mean that they were generally better informed about leading political figures, although it is interesting to notice that a larger percentage of them than of the other Chinese prisoners also correctly identified Truman. The warranted conclusion appears to be merely that while serving in the CNA they had had a better opportunity to pick up certain pieces of information than that enjoyed, during the same period, by prisoners not serving in the CNA. There was no discernible difference between prisoners who had served in the CNA and those who had not as regards responses to questions on issues that had arisen at the time of and after the outbreak of the war in Korea — how the war had started, why the PDRC was fighting it, what nations (if any) were its allies, and whether or not Red China belongs to the UN. This was to be expected, inasmuch as seven Chinese soldiers out of ten had done more than a year's service in the CCF before their capture-surrender.

²³Since former CNA soldiers were no better educated than the other prisoners, the differences noted are not disguised educational differences.

UNCLASSIFIED

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ORIENTATION TO THE WAR AND CAPTURE-SURRENDER BEHAVIOR

There does not appear to have been any direct relation between the prisoners' beliefs about the war and the nations participating in it, or between the propaganda to which their leaders had exposed them, on the one hand, and their having surrendered or their having formed particular expectations as to the kind of treatment awaiting them after surrendering on the other. (This is not to say, of course, that the prisoners' behavior had not been affected at all by their beliefs, or by the propaganda to which they had been exposed.)

Even when there is evidence, in a study of this type, that there is a relationship between a particular belief and the capture-surrender behavior of the prisoners entertaining it, it is difficult to determine the precise character of the relationship. The meaning of an expressed belief is often ambiguous; in so far as it is ambiguous, conclusive analysis of its effect on behavior is rendered more difficult. It is, moreover, often difficult to decide whether an apparent relationship between a particular belief or attitude and a particular type of behavior is in fact due to the influence of the former upon the latter, since it is always possible that both are due to the influence of some third, unknown, factor.

The effort to relate the opinions held by North Koreans and Chinese Communist prisoners to their capture-surrender behavior has been made in full recognition of the difficulties just mentioned, which, while they are not of such character as to preclude analytical inquiry into the relationship, do limit sharply the scope of the resulting interpretations.

North Korean Behavior

The North Korean prisoners who believed that South Korea had started the war had, as might have been expected, behaved somewhat differently from the others as regards capture-surrender.

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North Korean prisoners who had accepted the Communist account of the origin of the war had evidently been less inclined to give up voluntarily to the enemy than prisoners who had held the North Korean government responsible.²⁴

TABLE 35

Do you know how this war started? <hr/>	387 NK	209 NK
	Reporting South Korea Started It, <hr/>	Reporting North Korea Started It, <hr/>
Became Prisoners:	%	%
Capture	54	36
Permissive capture	10	12
Situational surrender	11	14
Surrender	24	38
Not ascertainable	1	(a)
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	100	100

^aLess than 0.5 percent.

Analysis of the responses from prisoners who believed that North Korea had started the war showed that these prisoners were of two types: (a) those who believed North Korea had done so for some "good" purpose (to unify Korea, to liberate oppressed South Koreans, to defend North Korea, to prevent colonization of Korea by the US, etc.), and (b) those who believed North Korea had done so for some "bad" purpose on its leaders' part (to satisfy their greed, to communize South Korea, to comply with orders from Russia).²⁵ The former — uncritical of the North Korean regime, but not denying its responsibility for the outbreak of the war — had been only a little more likely to surrender than the prisoners who blamed South Korea, while the latter had been twice as likely to surrender as the prisoners who blamed South Korea.

²⁴However, 137 prisoners who said they did not know how the war had started apparently had not behaved differently from the prisoners who blamed South Korea.

²⁵This group also included prisoners who believed that the war was being fought to extend the North Korean form of government. Some of them did not intend this remark as unfavorable criticism, these being, presumably, less disaffected than the others. The fact that they are included means that the findings are biased to some extent, and thus minimizes the difference in capture-surrender behavior between the "critical" and "uncritical" prisoners.

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It is noteworthy that a larger proportion of the "critical" prisoners had surrendered than had been captured (the ratio between them was nine to five). A larger proportion of the remainder had been captured than had surrendered.²⁶

TABLE 36

Became Prisoners:	South Korea Started War, ^a %	NK Started War and Is Fighting For: ^b	
		"Good" Purpose, ^c %	"Bad" Purpose, ^d %
Capture	54	44	34
Permissive capture	10	16	6
Situational surrender	11	10	14
Surrender	24	30	45
Not ascertainable	1	—	1
	<hr/> 100	<hr/> 100	<hr/> 100

^aPrisoners reporting, 387.

^bThe total number of prisoners who said that North Korea had started the war was smaller than the total in Table 34 because those who did not know why the PDRK was fighting or named other purposes were necessarily excluded.

^cPrisoners reporting, 91.

^dPrisoners reporting, 101.

The large proportion of surrenderers among the "critical" prisoners — those who said North Korea had started the war for "bad" purposes — may perhaps be explained to some extent by the fact that so many of them had favorable expectations as to how they would be treated as prisoners.²⁷ Three out of four (75 percent) among them believed that the UN forces treated prisoners well, as against only half (53 percent) of those who named "good" purposes and less than two-fifths (38 percent) of those who blamed South Korea.

²⁶When the behavior of privates only is examined in this context, the findings are essentially the same: surrender was more likely than capture only among "critical" privates (the ratio was six to four), and twice as likely among them as among privates who blamed South Korea.

²⁷This holds true even when prisoners from the routed army are considered separately from those from the going army: in each case, more of those who blamed the Communist regime for the fighting had had favorable expectations. And it is likewise true when prisoners who had been exposed to the influence of leaflets or villagers are examined apart from those who had neither seen leaflets nor talked to villagers.

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If for purposes of comparison we fix attention on prisoners with favorable expectations about treatment after imprisonment and those with unfavorable expectations as distinct groups, the "critical" prisoners in each group were more likely to have surrendered than the uncritical. That is, the surrender rate among prisoners with favorable expectations, as well as among those who thought they would be treated badly if they fell into the hands of the enemy, is highest for the "critical" prisoners.

TABLE 37

	South Korea Started War, ^a %	NK Started War and Is Fighting For:	
		"Good" Purpose, ^b %	"Bad" Purpose, ^c %
<u>Had Favorable Expectations about Prisoner Treatment</u>			
Capture	31	27	24
Permissive capture	7	17	3
Situational surrender	16	8	16
Surrender	45	48	57
Not ascertainable	<u>1</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>
	100	100	100
<u>Expected to Be Treated Badly or Killed</u>			
Capture	79	79	52
Permissive capture	10	11	16
Situational surrender	8	7	12
Surrender	3	3	16
Not ascertainable	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>4</u>
	100	100	100

^aPOWs reporting favorable expectations, 146; expecting to be treated badly, 182.

^bPOWs reporting favorable expectations, 48; expecting to be treated badly, 28.

^cPOWs reporting favorable expectations, 76; expecting to be treated badly, 25.

As was to be expected, a larger percentage of prisoners who had thought they would be well treated surrendered than of those who thought they might be mistreated, whatever they thought about the cause of the war. In both groups, however, the prisoners who accused North Korea of bad intentions were those most likely to have surrendered.

As was pointed out on page 27 of "An Evaluation of Psywar Influence on North Korean Troops", a large proportion of North Korean prisoners from the routed army than of those from the

UNCLASSIFIED

going army had surrendered. The question thus arises whether the prisoners who criticized North Korea for having started the war may have included a higher proportion of individuals from the routed army, and whether this in itself may explain the higher proportion of surrenders among the "critical" prisoners. Routed army soldiers did indeed outnumber going army soldiers among those who blamed North Korea for the war. If, however, we fix attention on prisoners from the routed army and those from the going army as distinct groups, the pattern shown in Table 37 remains fundamentally unchanged.

TABLE 38

	NK Started		
	South Korea Started War, ^a %	War and Is Fighting For: "Good" Purposes, ^b %	"Bad" Purposes, ^c %
<u>Routed Army</u>			
Capture	51	53	39
Permissive capture	6	10	4
Situational surrender	14	8	12
Surrender	28	29	43
Not ascertainable	1	—	2
	100	100	100
<u>Going Army</u>			
Capture	63	33	24
Permissive capture	13	25	9
Situational surrender	11	12	18
Surrender	13	30	49
Not ascertainable	—	—	—
	100	100	100

^aPOWs reporting from the routed army, 198; from the going army, 167.

^bPOWs reporting from the routed army, 51; from the going army, 40.

^cPOWs reporting from the routed army, 67; from the going army, 34.

Another possible source of bias in the findings is the extent to which prisoners had been exposed to two important sources of information: UN leaflets and Korean villagers. Prisoners who had seen leaflets or had talked to villagers might well have acquired their notions about the cause of the war from either or both of them.

As Table 39 shows, however, whether or not they had talked to villagers or had seen leaflets, the "critical" prisoners had been more willing to surrender than the "uncritical."

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Thus the capture-surrender behavior of prisoners who said that North Korea had started the war and criticized the motives of their leaders differed, regardless of how they may have arrived at their opinions, from that of (a) prisoners who said North Korea had been justified in starting the war, and, even more clearly, from that of (b) those who claimed that South Korea had been to blame. The prisoners' opinions about the North Korean Communist regime seem, in general, to have fallen into one of three categories: favorable, somewhat unfavorable, and very unfavorable (or disaffected).

TABLE 39

	NK Started		
	South Korea Started War, ^a %	War and Is Fighting For: "Good" Purposes, ^b %	"Bad" Purposes, ^c %
<u>Exposed to Influence of Leaflets and/or Villagers</u>			
Capture	48	30	27
Permissive capture	6	24	5
Situational surrender	15	16	19
Surrender	31	30	49
Not ascertainable	(d)	—	—
	100	100	100
<u>Not Exposed to Influence of Leaflets or Villagers</u>			
Capture	70	65	53
Permissive capture	14	12	9
Situational surrender	7	4	2
Surrender	9	19	34
Not ascertainable	—	—	2
	100	100	100

^aPOWs reporting influence of leaflets, etc., 219; not influenced, 150.

^bPOWs reporting influence of leaflets, etc., 37; not influenced, 26.

^cPOWs reporting influence of leaflets, etc., 93; not influenced, 43.

^dLess than 0.5 percent.

Almost nine out of ten (89 percent) of the prisoners who were "disaffected" expressed dislike for the life of a soldier, as against 75 percent of those who blamed South Korea for the war.

Claims of having been wounded, disabled, or sick were offered as explanations for having been captured by a smaller proportion (14 percent) of the "disaffected" prisoners than of the prisoners who blamed South Korea (32 percent). If only prisoners who had

UNCLASSIFIED

surrendered are considered, nearly half (47 percent) of the "dis-affected" POWs and only one-quarter (27 percent) of those who said South Korea had started the war, gave ideological reasons.

Analysis revealed no significant differences among categories of prisoners regarding reasons given for their expectations about treatment after capture, or regarding their responses to various leaflet themes.

Chinese Prisoner Behavior

Few Chinese prisoners (less than one-third), as we have seen, blamed the hostilities in which they had taken part on the South Koreans. In any case, the capture-surrender behavior of the CCF prisoners who did express that opinion does not appear to have been affected by it, since there is no significant difference between their rate of surrender and that of prisoners who did not know how the war had started.

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RESULTS OF LAND REFORM PROGRAMS

ON NORTH KOREANS

According to the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), when Japanese rule in North Korea ended in 1945, 58 percent of the land was owned by 3 percent of the population, and rent payments averaged 60 percent or more of the annual harvest. When, therefore, in March 1946, the North Korean Interim People's Committee put a land reform ordinance into effect, the farming population welcomed it. Subsequently, however, high taxes (seldom less than 50 percent and often as much as 60 or 70 percent of the annual harvest), redistribution of land, and compulsory labor turned their first-blush enthusiasm into disillusionment. According to UNCURK's report to the Sixth UN General Assembly:

"Ownership of the land did not bring the feeling of security that might have been expected. . . . There is a difference of opinion whether the conditions of the former tenants were better following the land reform than under the Japanese regime. For the most part, it would appear that there was merely a substitution of the Communist authorities for the former landlords. While a few persons expressed the view that there was some improvement, others stated that formerly they had at least been able to retain enough grain for their own subsistence, and that they were not able to do so under the Communist regime."²⁵

In this context, it cannot be assumed that all recipients of land under the land reform scheme were ipso facto favorably oriented toward the North Korean Communist regime. Similarly, it cannot be assumed that persons who had lost land became as a matter

²⁵See pp. 27-28, "Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea," General Assembly Official Records: Sixth Session, Supplement No. 12, 1951.

UNCLASSIFIED

of course opponents of the government or even of the land reform: they may have lost only a little land, or they may have lost land that they had not themselves been farming.²⁹ The extent to which different attitudes toward the regime are tied up with differential treatment under the land reform laws merits investigation, as does the extent to which capture-surrender behavior was influenced, indirectly at least, by those attitudes.

The largest single group of prisoners (almost half) stated that neither they themselves nor their families had been affected by the land reform: some, who had had only a little land, had been permitted to keep it; others had had no land before the reform, but had received none as a result of it. Somewhat more than one prisoner out of four had "benefited," in theory, at least, from the reform: some, who had previously had no land, had received a few chungbo; others, who had had a little land, had received a little more. Another group, again nearly one prisoner out of four, had been adversely affected: some had lost all of their land, others had lost some of it.

When the capture-surrender behavior of these three groups of prisoners was examined, those who had acquired land in the reform did not appear to differ from those who had not been affected by it. But prisoners who had lost land had behaved differently from the others: a higher proportion of them had surrendered.

Prisoners who had "benefited" from the land reform laws or had not been affected were, it appears, twice as likely to have

²⁹The North Korean ordinance on land reform specified that land in the following categories would be confiscated:

- (1) land owned by Japanese individuals or the Japanese government,
- (2) land owned by traitors, collaborators, and those who fled from North Korea at the time of liberation from Japanese rule,
- (3) land owned by Korean landlords in excess of five chungbo (12.3 acres) per family,
- (4) land not personally cultivated by the landowner,
- (5) land rented to tenants,
- (6) land owned by churches, temples, and religious organizations in excess of five chungbo.

Land was expropriated without compensation for the owner, and the land-reform ordinance provided that it be distributed free for permanent ownership to those who would cultivate it for themselves. (See p.27. "Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea," General Assembly Official Records: Sixth Session, Supplement No. 12.)

UNCLASSIFIED

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TABLE 40

<u>Responses</u>	<u>768 POWs Reporting, %</u>
Benefited from Land Reform	
Had no land - received some	16
Had some land - received more	11
	27
Not Affected	
Had no land - received none	21
Had some land - received no more, lost none	23
	44
Suffered from Land Reform	
Had some land - lost some of it	20
Had some land - lost all of it	6
	26
No Answer	3
	<u>100</u>

TABLE 41

<u>Type of Behavior</u>	<u>209 Received Land, %</u>	<u>338 Got No Land, Lost None, %</u>	<u>199 Lost Land, %</u>
Capture	54	55	40
Permissive capture	9	9	10
Situational surrender	12	10	13
Surrender	25	26	35
Not ascertainable	(a)	(a)	2
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

^aLess than 0.5 percent.

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been captured as to have surrendered, while prisoners who had lost land were almost as likely to have surrendered as to have been captured.³⁰

Further examination reveals that of the prisoners who had lost land a high proportion (six out of ten or 59 percent) had had favorable expectations of prisoner treatment. However, only four out of ten (43 percent) of the prisoners who had received land, and slightly less than half of those who had not been affected by the reform, had expected good treatment. Thus the high percentage of prisoners expecting favorable treatment helps explain the large incidence of surrenderers among this group.

When expectations about treatment are held constant, how prisoner had been affected by the land reform laws ceases to be predictive of capture-surrender behavior. The surrender rate for prisoners with good expectations who had acquired land does not, that is to say, differ from that for prisoners with good expectations who had lost land. Likewise, the capture-surrender behavior of prisoners who had expected to be killed or treated badly does not seem to have been affected by the land reform category to which they belonged.

Possibly disaffection following loss of land predisposed former landowners to think well of the UN forces, and to disbelieve reports of UN mistreatment of prisoners of war. If disaffection did help in this way to create good expectations, it can be said to have indirectly led to surrender, since enemy soldiers who had anticipated good treatment were more likely to have surrendered than those who had not. However, loss of land had presumably occurred most often among that group of North Koreans whose social and economic status would have predisposed them to be hostile to the Communist regime.

ON CHINESE FORCES

Many of the CCF prisoners had been away from their homes for so long that they did not know what had been happening to their families, and could not say how their families had been affected by the Communist land reform program. More than four out of ten did not know, for example, whether their families had gained

³⁰This pattern persists when the military situation is held constant: whether in the routed army or the going army, prisoners who had lost land were more likely to surrender. Similarly, the tendency of such prisoners to surrender continues to be evident when prisoners who had been exposed to the influence of leaflets or villagers are distinguished from those who had not. Essentially the same findings result when the behavior of privates only is examined.

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or lost land in the reform. Among those who did know how they and theirs had been affected, however, a very small proportion reported that their families had benefited.

TABLE 42

Type of Behavior	Had Favorable Expectations of Prisoner Treatment		
	89 Got Land, %	159 Not Affected, %	117 Lost Land, %
Capture	26	33	23
Permissive capture	6	6	9
Situational surrender	15	12	15
Surrender	52	48	51
Not ascertainable	1	1	2
	100	100	100

Type of Behavior	Expected to Be Killed or Treated Badly		
	97 Got Land, %	146 Not Affected, %	61 Lost Land, %
Capture	78	79	75
Permissive capture	10	11	11
Situational surrender	9	6	7
Surrender	3	4	5
Not ascertainable	-	-	2
	100	100	100

The total number of prisoners who said their families had acquired land under the reform program is so small as to preclude comparison of their capture-surrender behavior with that of the prisoners who had lost land. The prisoners who had not been affected by the land reform were sufficiently numerous for statistical comparison with those who had suffered under land reform, but there was no discernible difference in capture-surrender behavior between the two groups. Even if we bring together those not affected by the land reform and those who had acquired land, and treat them as a single group for comparison with prisoners who had lost land, the rate of surrender was approximately the same on both sides of the line.

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TABLE 43

<u>Responses</u>	<u>238 CCF Reporting</u>	
	<u>%</u>	
Did Not Know How Family Was Affected		
Previously had some land	27	
Previously had no land	13	
No indication of previous possession of land	<u>3</u>	43
Benefited from Land Reform		
Had no land - received some	4	
Had some land - received more	<u>3</u>	7
Not Affected		
Had no land - received none	16	
Had some land - received no more, lost none	<u>11</u>	27
Suffered from Land Reform		
Had some land - lost some of it	17	
Had some land - lost all of it	<u>4</u>	21
No Answer	2	
	<u>100</u>	

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CONCLUSIONS

This section will attempt to consolidate the major findings set forth in the foregoing discussion:

1. The knowledge and beliefs revealed by the Chinese prisoners reflect what their military leaders, from whom they had received almost all their indoctrination and their information about world affairs, had wished them to know and believe.

2. Some of the North Korean prisoners had likewise been propagandized only by their military leaders. Most of them, however, had been exposed to indoctrination while still civilians, and for the most part, their knowledge and beliefs seem to have reflected what their civilian leaders had wished them to know and think. Over-all exposure of the North Koreans to propaganda had been greater than that of the Chinese; for example, they had attended propaganda meetings, by and large, much more often than the Chinese.

3. The North Koreans and the Chinese had been equally indoctrinated about the US and Russia, although they had been told to some extent different things. The Chinese leaders apparently had spoken less frequently than the North Koreans of the UN and South Korea. The Chinese leaders' relative silence about the UN is in keeping with what is known about their having represented Chinese participation in the Korean war as a defensive measure (to prevent the US Army from invading China proper).

4. The North Koreans had heard most frequently that the US wishes to make Korea a colony; the Chinese had heard most often that the US, an aggressive, warmongering nation, wishes to invade their motherland. Both the North Korean and Chinese leaders had described Russia as their friend and liberator, a lover of peace and "democracy." The North Korean leaders had depicted Russia as the friend of all small, weak nations, while the Chinese had described it as possessing economic and military strength, and as representing an ideology shared by Red China.

5. The Chinese leaders had made favorable comments about the UN more often than the North Korean leaders, who had been

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attacking the UN since its first representatives had appeared in South Korea after World War II. The North Koreans had stressed the alleged fact that the UN is a pawn of the US, and is striving to colonize Korea for the US. The Chinese leaders had often described the UN as an agency for preserving world peace, although more than half of the Chinese respondents reported having heard some kind of unfavorable criticism of the UN.

6. The North Korean leaders had criticized the government of South Korea for its alleged anti-“democratic” practices, its alleged abuse of the common people of South Korea, and its alleged control by the US, thus paving the way for a summons to the people of North Korea to embark on a crusade to rescue their South Korean kinsmen from oppression at the hands of the reactionary Rhee government. The Chinese leaders had presented arguments calculated to justify the presence of the CCF in Korea: for example, that they were helping their ideological brethren and sister “democracy” in a struggle against the aggressive, anti-proletarian regime of Syngman Rhee.

7. The North Korean prisoners differed from the Chinese both in their knowledge of the war and their orientation toward it. Most of the North Koreans had some opinion about how the war had started, while the majority of the Chinese had not. The prevailing opinion among the North Koreans was that the People’s Army was fighting for the unification of Korea. The Chinese prisoners understood that the CCF was engaged in a defensive war that would prevent the US from invading their homeland.

8. Few of the North Koreans believed that their own government had started the war, and even the majority of them did not criticize their leaders for having started it. In their view, the issues about which the war was being fought apparently mattered more to them than the question as to who had started the fighting.

9. The North Koreans, who tended to regard as allies only countries that were currently helping them in their war against South Korea, were equally likely, when asked to name an ally, to mention China – which was helping with troops – and Russia – which was helping with weapons and other supplies. The Chinese, on the other hand, who tended to think of an ally as a country that would lend a hand if help was needed at some future time, were more likely to mention Russia as an ally than North Korea.

10. The North Koreans tended to cite personal experience as their source of knowledge about their country’s allies. Usually this was a matter of their own or their co-fighters’ first-hand observation of Chinese troops and Russian supplies. The Chinese,

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fighting with captured Japanese weapons, rarely mentioned having seen North Korean troops. They were most likely to have learned what they knew about Red China's allies from their officers.

11. Information about the UN was much more current among the North Koreans than among the Chinese. Those who had some information about the UN, however, tended to make favorable comments on its purpose, the Chinese stating that purpose in generalized terms, and the North Koreans seeing it in relationship to Korea and countries like it.

12. The prisoners' largely favorable comments on the purpose of the UN are not out of keeping with the unfavorable comments known to have been made by their leaders, since (a) the prisoners may not have believed what they were told, (b) they may have drawn a distinction between the purpose of the UN and its current activities, and (c) they are known to have had some sources of information about the UN other than their own officers and propagandists.

13. The US was identified more often than any other country as a member of the UN both by the North Koreans and the Chinese. The North Koreans were less likely than the Chinese to mention Russia as a UN member, in part, apparently, because the North Koreans found it difficult to associate a known ally with the organization they were fighting.

14. Stalin was more likely to be correctly identified than any other name on the list of prominent political leaders shown to the North Koreans, who would have learned about him as a consequence of the Russian occupation of their country. He was less well known among the Chinese, however, who were more likely to identify Chiang Kai-shek than anyone else. President Truman was about equally well known to the North Koreans and the Chinese.

15. The influence of education on the knowledge of the North Korean prisoners (who tended to be younger and better educated, on the whole, than the Chinese) was apparent. Most of the North Koreans had, in the months and years before the war, been exposed (as civilians) to various sources of information and news. The better educated North Koreans also tended to be better informed. The responses of the Chinese, whose chief (and sometimes sole) source of information had been their officers, did not suggest that their knowledge varied with educational level. Among neither the North Koreans nor the Chinese did educated prisoners reveal beliefs about the war that differed significantly from the beliefs of the prisoners with little or no schooling.

16. Prisoners taken early in the war showed less support for the North Korean cause, and were in general better informed,

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than more recent prisoners. Their relatively greater "knowledge" was probably a result of their having been exposed to various sources of information in the prisoner camps. Their attitude toward the war may also have been due, in part, to their longer imprisonment, as also to their briefer service in the People's Army. The fact that most of them came from a routed army, in which morale was very low, also helps explain their attitude toward the war.

17. A larger proportion of North Korean officers than of North Korean privates expressed support of their government's cause. The officers were also better informed than the privates, as might have been expected since they were better educated. People's Army prisoners from large cities tended to be better informed than those from smaller communities. This, again, was to be expected, since the big city residents tended to be better educated than the remainder of the population.

18. The best informed Chinese prisoners were found among former CNA soldiers and the older age group.

19. Disaffection vis-a-vis the North Korean Communist regime, as revealed by the tendency to blame North Korea for having started the war, appears to have predisposed the individuals concerned toward surrender. Prisoners who believed their own government had started the war, and were critical of its motives in carrying it on, usually entertained favorable expectations as to UN treatment of prisoners, expressed strong dislike of life in the People's Army, and tended to give ideological reasons for their capture-surrender behavior.

20. The fact that a prisoner had acquired land under North Korean land reform laws did not necessarily mean that he felt gratitude toward the regime. But prisoners whose families had lost land were more likely to have surrendered than prisoners whose families had received land or had not been affected. It must be kept in mind, however, that the relatively high rate of surrender and the accompanying expectations of good treatment among prisoners whose families had suffered under the land reform may mean nothing more than that the social and economic status of the individuals concerned had predisposed them to be hostile to the Communist regime in any case, entirely apart from what happened to their land.

21. Most of the Chinese prisoners either were uninformed about the effects of land reform on their families or knew they had not been affected. The number who knew their families had acquired land as a result of the reform was too small to permit comparison with those whose families had lost land.

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APPENDIX A
REACTION OF NK AND CCF SOLDIERS TO MARCHING

CONTENTS

	Page
Generalized Opinions about Marching	93
Distances Marched — Time Spent	95
Load Carried	96
Officer Comments	96

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REACTION OF NK AND CCF SOLDIERS TO MARCHING

An attempt was made, in connection with the interviewing of newly captured prisoners, to determine whether extraordinary physical exertions had been demanded of them — that is, whether the Communist leaders had, in keeping with the idealized image of the good Communist, insisted on the "miracles of energy" sometimes mentioned in Communist literature. The prisoners were asked what the longest march was they had made during the present fighting, how heavy a load they had carried, how they had felt about marching, what they had heard others say about it, and what their officers had said to them about marching.¹ Questions on this topic were put to 257 prisoners (134 North Koreans and 123 Chinese Communists).

The answers to these questions suggest that no attempt had been made to prepare soldiers ideologically for long, hard marches. Rather, marching seems to have been presented merely as an incident to military operations, and discussed without resort to any special propaganda techniques. The findings are made available here for their informational value to psychological warfare.

Generalized Opinions About Marching

Almost all North Korean and Chinese Communist POWs expressed a strong dislike of marching. They were asked: What did you think about your longest march and marching in general?

TABLE A1

<u>Opinions</u>	134 NK, <u>%</u>	123 CCF, <u>%</u>
Did not mind marching	—	—
Mild dislike of marching	2	1
Strong dislike	98	98
No answer	—	1
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

¹See question 25 (d), Appendix A, "An Evaluation of Psywar Influence on North Korean Troops."

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They were also asked to report on their fellow soldiers: Were they tired?

TABLE A2

<u>Responses</u>	<u>134 NK, %</u>	<u>123 CCF, %</u>
All of the others were tired ^d	94	96
Most of them were tired	4	2
A few were tired	1	1
None were tired	—	1
No answer	1	—
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

Although the Chinese and North Koreans did not disagree as to whether marching wears a man out, they did say quite different things about it. The inexperienced North Koreans had apparently found marching more painful than the battle-wise Chinese; more of them had "cried out" in pain, or voiced a wish for more rest than they were getting. Practically none of the North Koreans had complained to their officers, however, while a large proportion of the Chinese had done so. In this connection POWs were asked what they had said while marching.

TABLE A3

<u>Responses^a</u>	<u>134 NK, %</u>	<u>123 CCF, %</u>
Cried out in pain	38	20
Protested would be too tired to fight	10	19
Wanted more rest	10	2
Wanted vehicles to ride on (like ROKA)	9	—
Talked of deserting or surren- dering	6	4
Complained to officers	1	32
Said nothing, due to fear	4	11
Other comments	18	21
No answer, don't remember	11	1

^aPercentages add up to over 100 because some prisoners gave more than one of the replies listed.

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Distances Marched - Time Spent

The relative infrequency of "cries of pain" among the Chinese reflects their generally greater resistance to the rigors of combat and military life. This is the more noteworthy because they seem to have marched longer distances, on the average, than the North Koreans, and to have marched more rapidly and with heavier burdens.

On the toughest march they reported, the Chinese said they had travelled an average of 105 ris in 11 hours, with an average load of 38 kun, while the North Koreans had marched an average of 99 ris in 11 1/2 hours, carrying 28 kun. Prisoners were asked: How far did you march?

TABLE A4

<u>Distances</u>	<u>134 NK,</u> <u>%</u>	<u>123 CCF,</u> <u>%</u>
Less than 60 ris (15 mi)	9	1
60-99 ris (15-24 mi)		
60-89 ris (15-22 mi)	27	23
90-99 ris (22-24 mi)	10	11
	<u>37</u>	<u>34</u>
100-119 ris (25-29 mi)		
100-109 ris (25-27 mi)	19	19
110-119 ris (27-29 mi)	5	12
	<u>24</u>	<u>31</u>
120 ris or more (30 mi or more)		
120-129 ris (30-32 mi)	18	19
130 ris or more (more than 32 mi)	12	13
	<u>30</u>	<u>32</u>
No answer	-	2

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How long did this march take?

TABLE A5

<u>Hours:</u>	134 NK, <u>%</u>	123 CCF, <u>%</u>
6-9	9	12
9-10	4	5
10-11	18	20
	<u>22</u>	<u>25</u>
11-12	16	12
12-13	19	31
	<u>35</u>	<u>43</u>
13 hours or longer	34	15
No answer	-	5
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

Load Carried

The question was: How heavy a load did you carry?

TABLE A6

<u>Weight:</u>	134 NK, <u>%</u>	123 CCF, <u>%</u>
Less than 20 kun (about 26 lb)	48	7
20-29 kun (about 27-39 lb)	19	12
30-39 kun (about 40-52 lb)	13	36
	<u>32</u>	<u>48</u>
40-49 kun (about 53-65 lb)	8	30
50-59 kun (about 66-79 lb)	3	11
	<u>11</u>	<u>41</u>
60 kun or more (80 lb or more)	4	2
No answer	5	2

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Officer Comments

The comments that People's Army or CCF officers had made to their troops about the long marches they were making appear to have been largely free of ideological content, the exception being the references to stragglers as "reactionaries." There are, however, certain revealing differences as regards what the two groups of officers had said to their men - differences that take on considerable meaning when viewed in the light of the fundamental contrast between the People's Army and the CCF, that is, the contrast between an inexperienced "citizen's army" and a thoroughly experienced, battle-hardened army. Prisoners were asked: Did your officers say anything to you?

TABLE A7

<u>Comments</u>	<u>134 NK,</u> <u>%</u>	<u>123 CCF,</u> <u>%</u>
Ordered stragglers not to lag	31	48
Scolded stragglers as cowards, reactionaries	30	19
Warned that stragglers would be killed by the enemy if they fell behind	30	11
Warned that suffering and hard- ships are necessary if enemy is to be defeated	22	7
Forced us to march, threatened to beat us or shoot us	21	-
Urged the strong to help the weak	19	30
Promised rest, "glory" and good times when marching and arduous duty were no longer necessary	15	2
Gave instructions about preventing sore feet and frostbite	14	3
Other comments	1	20
No answer	1	2

The remarks of the Chinese officers appear to reflect the realistic attitude of leaders who know what it is to command well disciplined troops. The CCF officers, while for the most part confining themselves to orders to stragglers not to

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lag, had not infrequently, but mostly without recrimination, urged the stronger members of their units to help those who had weakened. Unlike the North Korean officers, they had not threatened their men with violence (beatings or shooting), and had seldom tried to frighten them with dire warnings that stragglers would be killed by the enemy. They had less often criticized stragglers as cowards or reactionaries, and had rarely either tried to explain the necessity for enduring hardships or held out the promise of rewards. The North Korean officers, by contrast, had frequently reminded their men that victory could not be achieved without some degree of suffering, and had promised "rewards": the prospect of rest, "glory," and good times when the shooting was over.

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APPENDIX B
RELEVANT PORTIONS OF QUESTIONNAIRE

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(For complete questionnaire, see Appendix A in "An Evaluation of Psywar Influence on North Korean Troops" and in "An Evaluation of Psywar Influence on Chinese Communist Troops.")

- Q. 19: Do you know how this war started?
(If POW repeats what he heard from other persons or from a propaganda source, ask what he himself thinks.)
- Q. 20: Why is the People's Democratic Republic of Korea/China fighting in this war?
- Q. 21: Does the People's Democratic Republic of Korea/China have any allies in this war?
- 21a. (If YES): Who are its allies?
21b. How did you learn about this?
- Q. 22: Have you ever heard of the UN?
- 22a. (If YES): What is the UN? What is its purpose?
(If POW tells what he heard about the UN at the POW camp, ask what he heard about the UN before he fell into enemy hands.)
- 22b. What nations are members?
22c. Is Russia a member?
(If answer to 22c is NO, try to get a complete statement about why POW thinks Russia is not a member. The purpose of this is to get a complete picture of the POW's opinions about the UN.)
(Asked of Chinese:)
- 22d. Is the People's Democratic Republic of China a member?
- Q. 23: Did any of your leaders ever talk to you about the South Korean people and their government? (Asked of Chinese:)
about the Korean people and their government?
- 23a. (If YES): Who?
23b. What did he (they) say?
23c. How often did he (they) talk to you?
(We want to know how often, when, and during how long a period of time.)
- 23d. Did he (they) ever talk to you about the UN?
23e. What did he (they) say?
23f. Did he (they) ever say anything about the US?

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23g What did he (they) say?
(If POW does not mention his Army cultural officer, probe to find out if the latter talked to the POW about any of these subjects.)

Q. 24: Did your family have any land of its own before the land reform law?

24a. (If NO): Did it get any since then? How much?

24b. (If YES): How much did it have?

24c. Did it lose any since then?

(If YES): How much? What happened to it?

24d. Did it get any more land?

(If YES): How much?

Q. 25d.: (1) During the time your troops were advancing, what was the longest (or fastest) march you made in one day?

(2) How far did you go? How long did it take?

(3) What were you carrying? (weight estimate)

(4) Were you tired at the end?

(5) What did you think about this march and marching in general?

(6) Were others tired? What did they say about it?

(7) Did your officers say anything about not tiring, about rest, about the weak ones who could not keep up with the others? What did they say?

Q. 29: Have you ever heard of any of these people? Who are they?

(Asked of all prisoners):

	<u>Heard</u>	<u>Identified</u>
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Stalin

Chiang Kai-shek

Truman

(Asked only of North Koreans):

Mao Tse-tung

Pak Hun Young¹

Cho Man Sik²

¹Former South Korean Communist leader, now North Korean foreign minister.

²Leader of North Korean Democratic party, anti-Communist, jailed by Communists.

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(Asked only of Chinese):

Kim Il Sung
Chu-Teh³
Soong Ching-ling⁴
Chou En-lai

³Commander in Chief, People's Liberation Army, and a vice-chairman of the Central People's Government Council.

⁴Mme. Sun Yat-sen, also a vice-chairman of the Central People's Government Council.

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