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12

WAR DIARY X CORPS

MONTHLY SUMMARY

1 OCT 1950 to 31 OCT 1950

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF
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WONSAN-IWON LANDINGS

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HEADQUARTERS X CORPS

WAR DIARY SUMMARIES


1-31 OCTOBER 1950

APPROVED BY:
COMMANDING GENERAL



EDWARD M. ALMOND
Lt Gen USA

OFFICIAL:



JOHN S. GUTHRIE
Colonel GSC
Chief of Staff

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LIST OF INCLOSURES*

1. Operations Orders X Corps
2. Operations Instructions X Corps
3. Operation Plan No. 8 X Corps

*See Book of Inclosures (issued with copies Nos 1, 2 & 3)

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EVALUATION OF X CORPS OPERATIONS

Following the powerful amphibious envelopment by X Corps on 15 September at INCHON and, in conjunction with Eighth Army, the subsequent destruction of the North Korean Forces in southern KOREA, the next logical step in the prosecution of the Korean War was the crossing of the 38th Parallel and the invasion of Communist territory to end the conflict.

Exercising his authority as Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, General MacArthur outlined the offensive against North Korea in CINCPAC Operation Plan 9-50, dated 29 September 1950. The mission of the UN Command was the conduct of operations north of the 38th Parallel to complete the destruction of the North Korean Forces and to implement the United Nations 1947 resolution for the unification of KOREA. *Also see p. 383*

Again X Corps was assigned an amphibious assault role which this time was directed at the East Coast of KOREA while Eighth Army was to continue its drive to the north with the main effort along the KAESONG - SARIWON axis to the enemy capital of PYONGYANG. After securing a beachhead, X Corps was to make a juncture with Eighth Army and destroy encircled North Korean Forces. The target date for planning purposes was twelve (12) days after Eighth Army troops passed thru X Corps Forces in the SEOUL area. The Eighth Army attack was to precede the amphibious assault by from three (3) to five (5) days. In accordance with these directives, the Eighth Army continued to make successful gains against enemy rear guards and X Corps prepared for the amphibious encirclement of the few surviving North Korean Units (See Map 1). *1941-1951*

The immediate problem facing X Corps was the staging and out-loading of its major components, the 1st Marine Division, the 7th Infantry Division and Corps Troops.

The 187th Airborne RCT, which had participated in the latter phases of Operation Chromite under X Corps, reverted to GHQ Reserve with a future airborne mission.

The adjacent port of INCHON did not have the capacity to out-load all of X Corps and at the same time give logistical support to the Eighth Army offensive to the north. It was therefore decided that the 1st Marine

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Division, which was designed to make the assault landing, should have the embarkation priority at INCHON. The 7th Infantry Division and some Corps Troops were ordered to proceed overland by motor and rail to the port of PUSAN while a few units proceeded by air. This movement presented transportation difficulties of major proportions considering the short time available, the intersecting lines of communication with Eighth Army, the poor road net, the damaged condition of the railroads, and the enemy guerrilla-type interference.

All problems of staging and loading were successfully overcome and the next major difficulty in the amphibious operation was encountered by the Navy. WONSAN Harbor, the site of the landing, had one of the highest underwater mine densities ever employed in naval warfare. This obstacle would have had serious consequences if an assault amphibious landing had been necessary. The loss of a week while the mines were being swept gave valuable time to the enemy to reorganize and to receive foreign assistance.

During the period that X Corps units were seaborne (Map 1), the I ROK Corps, on the right of the Eighth Army attack, made rapid advances against sporadic enemy resistance and captured WONSAN on 10 October.

The original X Corps order (Opn O 4, 4 Oct 50) called for an assault amphibious landing at WONSAN by the 1st Marine Division to seize a Corps base of operations. The 7th Division was to land on order in the beach-head and initiate an attack to the west along the WONSAN - TONGYANG - SONGYANG - PYONGYANG axis to effect a juncture with Eighth Army. The 187th Airborne RCT (when available) was to be prepared to assist this advance by an air-drop at SURI, or TONGYANG, or SONGCHON, or SUNCHON. Initial air support operations were to be under US Navy control (CTF 90). This included X Corps TAC aircraft at KIMPO and carrier aircraft off WONSAN. After the capture of WONSAN Airfield, X Corps TAC would be echeloned ashore and CG TAC, under CG X Corps, would assume command.

After the seizure of WONSAN by I ROK Corps, Operation Order 4 was modified by Operations Instructions 11, published 14 October 1950, to become effective on D-Day, H-Hour. I ROK Corps, after assignment to X

Corps control, was to secure a beachhead line embracing WONSAN and WONSAN Airfield. The decision was also reached by CG X Corps to use two routes of advance to the west instead of the one route specified in operation order 4. The originally selected route was designated Route "A" and a second northern axis running west from YONGHUNG was designated Route "B". I ROK Corps was to advance strong reconnaissance forces along the two (2) routes on D-Day and had the further mission of advancing the 3d ROK Div (-) to secure HAMHUNG (Obj X).

After landing across the beaches, the 1st Mar Div and the 7th Inf Div were to advance along Routes "A" and "B" respectively.

On 14 October at a conference at I ROK Corps, General Almond was informed that I ROK Corps would make a reconnaissance in force along the WONSAN - PYONGYANG axis prior to D-Day to secure the more rapid advance of X Corps units.

On 18 October an alternate UNC Order, to be effective in the event PYONGYANG was captured before D-Day, was received. This order was issued as a result of the disintegration of enemy resistance in all sectors, and established parallel zones of action for Eighth Army and X Corps in the direction of the enemy's lines of retreat northward. The watershed of the TAEBAEK Range was the boundary between the major forces. A new line restricting the northward advance of all UN Forces, with the exception of ROK Units, was established farther north to include, from west to east, TOKSILLI, PUNGSAN, and SONGJIN. The new zone facilitated control and logistical support of X Corps, particularly I ROK Corps in its advance along the coast. LST's carried a large percentage of the supplies to the ROK units.

At 201200 October, CG X Corps assumed command of all troops north of 39° 10' and east of the TAEBAEK Range. This was published in Operations Instructions 12, 19 October 1950, which further stated that the 3d US Inf Div would be attached to X Corps for logistical support upon landing at WONSAN from JAPAN.

Following assumption of command of the Northeast Zone of KOREA, the CG X Corps began a series of tours and conferences to organize civil government. The basic policy which governed these talks was the United Nations policy of establishing Democratic practices in North Korea. The UN Forces and the new

policies were enthusiastically received by the recently communist-dominated population.

On 26 October Operations Instructions 13 gave missions to subordinate commands in compliance with a CINUNC Directive (Msg CX66705, 17 Oct 50) reorienting the X Corps advance to the North. I ROK Corps was ordered to continue to advance along the coast and to secure CHOSIN and FUSEN Reservoirs and PUNGSAN without delay. (During the advance of the 26th ROK Regt on CHOSIN Reservoir the first contact was made with the CCF in Northeast KOREA on 28 Oct.) The 1st Mar Div was to protect the WONSAN - KOJO - MAJONNI area; relieve I ROK Corps elements in the HAMHUNG area; advance along the HAMHUNG - CHOSIN axis to the border; prepare to land one (1) BLT in CHONGJIN on order; and to assist ROK Engineers repair the WONSAN - HAMHUNG RR. (The order was never given to land the BLT at CHONGJIN.) The remainder of these missions were successfully carried out except the advance to the border which was halted on 28 November by the CCF "Counter-Offensive". The 7th Inf Div was ordered to land over the beaches at IWON and to advance rapidly along the PUKCHONG - PUNGSAN axis to the border. (The 7th Inf Div accomplished these missions reaching the border on 21 November.) All units were warned against violations of the MANCHURIAN or USSR Borders.

On 29 October, the X Corps zone was extended south to the 38th Parallel and Task Force Baker was organized to control the new area. TF Baker consisted of the 1st, 3d, and 5th Battalions KMC. The CG, Brigadier General Shin, Korean Marine Corps, reported directly to X Corps from his CP at KOSONG approximately eighty (80) air miles south of WONSAN.

During October, X Corps had successfully concluded OPERATION CHROMITE, redeployed approximately 60,000 men to the Northeast Zone of KOREA, and by the end of the month was rapidly advancing toward the northern border while conducting mopping-up operations throughout its zone.

CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS

1 - 7	October	X Corps continued mopping-up operations in the INCHON - SEOUL Beachhead.
7	October	X Corps relieved of area responsibility for INCHON - SEOUL Beachhead.
5 - 11	October	7th Inf Div moved overland to PUSAN.
10	October	WONSAN captured by I ROK Corps.
14	October	Advance X Corps CP established at WONSAN.
17	October	X Corps Command Group sailed from INCHON.
18	October	1st Mar Div sailed from INCHON. HAMHUNG captured by I ROK Corps.
201200	October	X Corps assumed operational responsibility for all of Northeast KOREA. I ROK Corps assigned to X Corps.
20	October	7th Inf Div sailed from PUSAN.
26	October	Hq X Corps and 1st Mar Div landed at WONSAN.
28	October	Capture of first POW's from organized CCF Units operating in X Corps Zone.
29	October	7th Inf Div landed at IWON.

A. COMMAND:

One of the chief activities of the Corps Commander during October was that of planning. Planning encompassed not only tactical operations (relief of X Corps by Eighth Army in the SEOUL - INCHON area; mounting X Corps for a second amphibious assault; conquest of Northeast Korea; etc.) but also measures for the control and rehabilitation of the civil populace of Northeast Korea being freed from Communist domination by these same tactical operations.

Important to the planning were the many conferences in which Gen Almond engaged throughout the month. These conferences involved members of GHQ staff, commanders and staff members of supporting naval and air units, commanders and staff members of those units subordinate to X Corps, and civic leaders of WONSAN and HAMHUNG and other large cities on the East Coast of North Korea. These conferences were in addition to the regular, daily staff briefings. Gen Almond naturally conferred frequently with Gen Ruffner, his Chief of Staff, and individual officers of X Corps staff on matters of their special concern.

These conferences were a source of detailed information. Throughout October the current tactical situations of individual X Corps units were discussed. And, starting 14 October, conferences with the KMAG Advisors and unit commanders of I ROK Corps dealt with the subjects of the civil and military situation in the I ROK Corps area.

A conference with the city officials of the WONSAN area was held on 24 October. Following opening remarks of welcome, and a presentation of UN intentions by Gen Almond, these matters were brought to his attention: reconstruction of the fishing industry, medical facilities; comparison of population of WONSAN a year ago and of that time; Communist land reform; and the money problem. At the conference with civil authorities of the HAMHUNG area, 31 October, Gen Almond gave an opening address and then requested that the various representatives present their problems. The subjects discussed were, for the most part, similar to those discussed on the 24th of October at the meeting with the WONSAN area civil authorities.

Another purpose of these conferences was to inform subordinate units of X Corps policy and unit missions. In one (1) conference, on 21 October, with the Commanding General, Chief of Staff, and KMAG Officers of the ROK

Capital Division, General Almond explained that every effort within reason must be made to convince the North Koreans of the sincerity of the United Nations effort to establish Democratic practices in North Korea. In this matter, General Almond directed that the procurement of food and supplies from North Korean civilians should be on a payment basis.

Of comparable importance in his planning, were the reconnaissance activities of General Almond during this month. In aerial flights on 1 and 2 October, he surveyed the OSAN area and the river valley leading northward to SEOUL, the SUWON - ICHON axis, YOJU, and the HAN River northwestward from YOJU to SEOUL. On 14 October, the day of the opening of the Advance X Corps CP at WONSAN, General Almond flew there, landed at the WONSAN Airfield, and inspected the airfield and the city from the ground. During the morning of 22 October, General Almond flew from WONSAN to the KOJO area 40 miles south of WONSAN and observed the activities of the small port. He then continued the same flight north as far as IWON to determine the possible existence of landing beaches. The dock area at KOJO was the subject of an on-the-ground inspection, and the WONSAN - KOJO road and bridges the object of an aerial inspection on 23 October. General Almond, on 25 October, toured the dock area of WONSAN and proceeded along the road to be used by 1st Marine Division troops from the time of their landing on the beach near WONSAN Airfield until their loading aboard trains at the railroad siding west of the airfield.

The manner of execution of the orders which resulted from this planning was subject to close aerial and on-the-ground supervision by the Corps Commander throughout the whole of October.

Some examples of personal attention by the Commanding General are set forth chronologically below:

1 October: Accompanied Colonel Bowen, CO, 187th Airborne RCT, to the OP of the 1st Battalion which had just started to move forward to clean up the last enemy resistance on the peninsula northwest of SEOUL.

2 October: Arrived CP, 7th Marine Regiment. At this time 3d Battalion was engaged in pushing up on the high ground immediately southwest of UIJONGBU. Proceeded forward to the CP, 3d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment.

3 October: Attended a demonstration at SUWON of high explosive plastic artillery ammunition fired against Russian T-34 tanks.

4 October: Observed 31st Infantry Battalion combat exercise. An order was issued that every battalion of the 7th Division would conduct a similar exercise. Proceeded by jeep to 32d Infantry and observed combat exercise.

7 October: Visited TAEGU RTO and observed stragglers of the 32d Infantry being loaded aboard a train to PUSAN.

9 October: Inspected port facilities and progress of loading in INCHON Harbor.

11 October: Observed loading of 73d Tank Battalion in LSTs at INCHON Harbor.

12 October: Visited Battalion CPs, 31st Infantry, and observed training being held throughout the Regiment.

13 October: Inspected loading operations at INCHON beaches.

15 October: Inspected loading operations in INCHON.

26 October: Flew south along the coast and observed convoy in WONSAN Harbor and the Marines landing on the WONSAN Airport peninsula.

28 October: Visited CP, 1st Marine Division, and conferred with General Smith. Message arrived during conference from the battalion engaged in the KOJO area. Battalion Commander requested either reinforcements or permission to withdraw. Commanding General X Corps directed the unit should not withdraw. Proceeded to beach area to observe unloading operations which were proceeding satisfactorily. Inspected hill at southern end of WONSAN Airfield. Found enemy 120mm mortar and ammunition and directed that this weapon and ammunition be removed from hill.

29 October: Departed HAMHUNG for IWON, observing the 7th Inf Div landing. Eight (8) LSTs were beached and were dry landing troops and equipment. Arrived KOJO. Was met at the beach by Colonel Puller who stated that the local situation was under control and that there had been no enemy contact during the day.

30 October: Departed HAMHUNG and flew to IWON observing the 7th Inf Div landing.

General Almond conferred on several occasions with press correspondents. At these conferences, he explained the mission of X Corps and gave a general summary of X Corps activities. At a press briefing aboard the USS Mount McKinley, enroute from INCHON, the general situation was discussed and details of the landing at WONSAN were presented. The purpose of these press conferences was to enable correspondents to write more accurate accounts of X Corps activities.

CHIEF OF STAFF:

On 1 October 1950, preliminary instructions were received from GHQ, FEC regarding the forthcoming amphibious assault landing of X Corps on the Northeast Coast of Korea at WONSAN. For logistical reasons, these instructions provided for movement of the 7th Infantry Division overland to PUSAN for embarkation from that point, while the assault force, the 1st Marine Division, was to embark from the port of INCHON. The same day a conference was held with the G-4 and D/CS, Eighth Army, at which the following matters were discussed:

- a. The assumption of operational control of the X Corps Zone by Eighth Army.
- b. Logistical support of the outloading of the elements of X Corps.
- c. Coordination of the movement of the 7th Infantry Division overland to PUSAN through the Eighth Army Zone.

Following the conference, immediate road reconnaissance for the movement of the 7th Infantry Division to PUSAN was initiated in coordination with Eighth Army.

UN Order No. 2 was received on 3 October, formalizing instructions previously received from higher headquarters. Active staff planning for the forthcoming operations was initiated, and the 7th Infantry Division directed to assemble by RCT for movement to PUSAN, upon order. On the following day the route for the movement of the 7th Division was prescribed, and the Division directed to initiate its movement at 050400 October.

During the period 5-12 October, the planning of the X Corps Staff for the ensuing operations was carefully supervised by the Chief of Staff. Air observation of the movement of the 7th Infantry Division to PUSAN was also accomplished. During the period, numerous conferences were held with representatives of GHQ and Eighth Army, at which were discussed the relief of X Corps units by elements of Eighth Army, the movement of X Corps units to staging areas at PUSAN and INCHON, and other matters pertaining to the launching of the amphibious assault on the East Coast by X Corps.

On 13 October, the Command Group of X Corps loaded on the USS Mount McKinley. The party consisted of the CG, aides, Chief of Staff, representatives of the Office of the Chief of Staff (Colonel Forney and Lieut Colonel McCaffrey), G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, Engineer Officer, Signal Officer, and one Adjutant General. The balance of the Staff loaded on the USS General Mann.

The same date, plans were finalized for the movement of a small Liaison Group by air to WONSAN for the purpose of (1) establishing liaison with the I ROK Corps and (2) selecting a new CP site for X Corps. Composition of the Liaison Group was as follows: Lieut Colonel McCaffrey, Office of the C/S; Lieut Colonel Barsanti, G-1; Lieut Colonel Glass, G-2; Lieut Colonel Williamson, G-3; Lieut Colonel Dews, G-4; and representatives of Signal, Engineer, Ordnance, and Quartermaster. This group moved from KIMPO Airfield at 141300 October.

On 16 October, an additional advance detachment of X Corps Headquarters, consisting of five (5) officers and some EM of Headquarters Company and nine (9) Officers and EM of the Engineer Section, was airlifted to WONSAN. A number of Officers and EM of the headquarters were also airlifted to WONSAN on 25 October, bringing the total number of X Corps Personnel in the WONSAN area to an estimated one hundred and fifty (150).

At 261100 October, the X Corps convoy arrived at WONSAN, and later the same day the Office of the Chief of Staff, X Corps, was officially established in North Korea.

PUBLIC INFORMATION SUMMARY:

Principal effort during the month of October was expended towards the fostering and maintenance of cordial relations with the civilian war correspondents attached to the X Corps. To this end, a careful analysis was made of experiences during Operation Chromite, and detailed plans were considered to provide civilian war correspondents with optimum accommodations and transmission facilities during the ensuing operations in Northeast Korea.

PIO Releases during the month were generally confined to feature stories by PIO Staff Reporters and a limited number of hometown releases. Consideration was given to the initiating of an energetic and comprehensive Hometown Release Program after the landing at WONSAN.

On 16 October, Lieut Colonel Kenneth E. Lay, formerly assigned to the Public Information Section, Headquarters Army Field Forces, was appointed X Corps Public Information Officer, vice Major S. D. Cosgrove.

B. INTELLIGENCE:

The beginning of the period found the North Korean Forces fighting to the south of SEOUL almost completely disorganized, cut off from their main sources of supply, and faced with the prospect of either destruction by the UN Forces or a hurried and un-coordinated withdrawal to the north. This situation was brought about by the whirlwind seizure of the INCHON - SEOUL communications complex by the X Corps and the rapid drive northward from the PUSAN Perimeter by the Eighth Army - and the linkup of the two attacking UN Forces south of SUWON in late September.

As a result, enemy action in the southern portion of the X Corps Zone during the early part of the month was minimal, and generally confined to stragglers and small harassing groups seldom exceeding battalion size. To prevent withdrawal of these disorganized enemy groups to the north where re-supply and re-organization might be effected, the 7th Infantry Division occupied blocking positions along the SEOUL - SUWON - ICHON - YOJU axis forcing the enemy to break down into even smaller, more ineffective groups. Enemy activity on the KUMPO Peninsula to the northwest of SEOUL during the same period was similarly ineffective.

During the first four (4) days of October, retreating enemy groups joined forces with reserve units which the enemy had maintained north of SEOUL during Operation Chromite, and attempted to make a strong delaying stand in the UIJONGBU sector approximately fifteen (15) miles to the north of SEOUL. Determined action by elements of the 1st Marine Division dispersed this enemy concentration and forced their continued withdrawal to the north. Remaining enemy activity in the X Corps Zone until 11 October when the Corps reverted to GHQ Reserve was negligible.

From information gained by air observation and PW reports, it was indicated that the enemy was moving available reinforcements into positions along the PYONGYANG - WONSAN axis. Considerable movement was noted on the east-west and north-south roads in that area, with heavy rail traffic south from Manchuria to the northwest and the USSR to the northeast observed.

(See Map 2)

In view of the fact that much heavy equipment and arms were lost by

the enemy as a result of his operations in the south, and in view of his hurried action to re-supply and re-group his forces to the north, it was evident that his capabilities at the middle of the period were only to continue delaying tactics before the UN advance to the north; in the meantime, he would attempt to re-group, re-equip, and re-deploy his forces in preparation for future defensive operations.

In order to exploit the disorganization of the enemy's forces and prevent his establishment of an effective defensive alignment along the PYONGYANG - WONSAN axis, plans were developed for an assault landing on the northeast coast at WONSAN by the X Corps, to be followed by an immediate drive westward along the WONSAN - PYONGYANG axis to effect a juncture with Eighth Army elements advancing north along the west coast. ROK elements were to continue to drive north along Korea's east coast in order to deny to the enemy his main supply route from the USSR and the industrial output of the HAMHUNG - HUNGNAM industrial complex.

Even as plans for the aforementioned operations were being finalized, the rapid advance of Eighth Army along the west coast and the ROK units along the east coast in the face of practically no organized enemy resistance indicated that the disorganization of the enemy's forces was so complete that his ability to present an effective field force without the aid of alien intervention was highly improbable. The mission of X Corps accordingly was changed to provide for the landing of Corps elements at WONSAN and IWON on 26 and 29 October respectively, to be followed by complete investiture of Northeast Korea and the destruction of all remaining enemy forces in that area.

The X Corps landings on the northeast coast of Korea met no organized enemy resistance. While elements of the I ROK Corps continued to advance northeasterly along the coast, the 1st Marine and 7th Infantry Divisions were deployed to accomplish the assigned Corps mission.

At the same time increased, unconfirmed reports were received to the effect that Chinese Communist Forces were present south of the Manchurian Border, dressed in North Korean uniforms and posing as Korean volunteers from China. It was known at this time that there were over 300,000 Chinese

Communist troops available in Manchuria just across from the North Korean Border.

At the end of the period, elements of the 1st Marine Division were successfully countering small organized elements in the KOJO area to the south of WONSAN, while other Marine elements were encountering retreating enemy forces up to battalion size attempting to work their way north along the inland corridor running south and north through MAJON-NI. Elements of the 7th Infantry Division preparing to drive northwesterly from IWON to the Manchurian Border reported no organized enemy resistance. However, there was increased guerrilla activity in the south and west sectors of the Corps Zone.

Enemy resistance in the area north of HAMHUNG, particularly in the vicinity of the CHOSIN and FUSEN Reservoirs, showed a marked increase as the period closed. Reports received from ROK elements operating in that area indicated that the enemy had effected a re-organization of a number of NKPA units up to regimental size (See Map A) and strongly indicated the presence of an undetermined number of CCF troops. The presence of the latter alien forces was established definitely on 28 October with the capture of two (2) CCF POW's by elements of the 26th ROK Regiment in the area south of the CHOSIN Reservoir in the vicinity of SUDONG. This direct evidence of alien intervention, plus the availability of re-supply from just across the border made it evident that enemy resistance would continue to increase.

At the end of October, the enemy capabilities were as follows:

- a. To withdraw to the north to defensive positions along the CHONGJIN - KAPBAN - MANPOJIN line for a final stand in North Korea.
- b. To delay advance of X Corps units to the north and northeast by the defense of successive blocking positions manned by the enemy units withdrawing from the south and available reconstituted NKPA units.
- c. To dispatch organized SOVIET or CCF units across the border into North Korea for the purpose of assisting NKPA units in defensive or offensive operations.
- d. To conduct extensive guerrilla activities within the X Corps Zone.

C. OPERATIONS:

PHASE I: COMPLETION OF OPERATION CHROMITE

During the month of September 1950, decisive victories had been won by United Nations Forces in South Korea. A powerful envelopment by X Corps at INCHON on 15 September had driven eastward liberating SEOUL and forming a juncture with the Eighth Army Offensive from the PUSAN Perimeter in the South. (See Map B)

By the end of September the combined offensives of X Corps and Eighth Army had resulted in the disorganization and the virtual destruction of the North Korean Army south of the 38th Parallel. During the first part of October, the 187th Abn RCT and the 3d Battalion, KMC, were engaged in mop-up operations on the KUMPO Peninsula west of SEOUL. The only noteworthy enemy resistance remaining in the X Corps Zone was in the sector occupied by the 1st Marine Division, north of SEOUL and bounded by the HAN River on the west. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (Reinforced) reconnoitered to the northwest with the 1st and 2d Battalions in reserve. The entire 7th Marine Regiment was committed to the north Vic. ULJONGBU, where elements of the retreating enemy were making a last stand supported by North Korean Reserves from that area. Elements of the KMC protected the eastern portion of the division sector, while the 1st Marine Regiment was deployed around the northern outskirts of the city of SEOUL.

In the southern sector of the X Corps Zone, the 7th Infantry Division occupied blocking positions, with the 17th Infantry at ICHON and YOJU, the 31st Infantry at SUWON and KYONGAN-NI, and the 32d Infantry in reserve at KWANGJU. The mission of these 7th Infantry Division elements was to prevent the escape of scattered enemy forces travelling to the north, and secure the southern flank of the Corps until relieved by Eighth Army elements then advancing from the south. Leading elements of the Eighth Army drive, the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions, were passing through the X Corps Zone to relieve Corps troops on the northern flank.

While field commanders were still busy completing the successful phase outlined above, planning staffs were developing detailed plans for the next great phase; the crossing of the 38th Parallel and the final destruction of the North Korean Army. Again X Corps was to be the enveloping force with

an amphibious landing on the East Coast of Korea at WONSAN, North Korea. Eighth Army was to drive directly northward with one (1) prong of the attack directed at the North Korean Capital at PYONGYANG, and the other along the east coast. After the X Corps landing in the WONSAN area, the East Coast Offensive would become the mission of X Corps.

By 6 October, all organized enemy resistance in the 1st Marine Division zone had been broken with the successful action of the 7th Marine Regiment at UIJONGBU. The 5th Marine Regiment to the northwest was relieved by elements of the 1st Cavalry and the 24th Infantry Divisions driving to the north, while ROKA units relieved other elements of the 1st Marine Division in the vicinity of SEOUL and to the north of the city. Upon relief, the 1st Marine Division moved by motor march to staging areas at INCHON where units began to embark on assault shipping for movement to the East Coast and the assault landing at WONSAN.

The 187th Airborne RCT with attached KMC units, having successfully completed mopping-up operations on the KUMPO Peninsula moved to an assembly area at KIMPO Airfield where it was later turned over to the operational control of Eighth Army.

Since the harbor facilities at INCHON would not permit the out-loading of the entire X Corps and at the same time provide off-loading of the necessary support for Eighth Army elements, it was necessary to plan to send part of the X Corps overland for shipment through the Port of PUSAN. Accordingly the 7th Division and non-divisional units of X Corps were alerted for motor and rail movement to the south. The 31st and 32d Infantry Regiments, after having been relieved by elements of the 1st Cavalry Division, assembled in the SUWON area on 3 October in preparation for this move. Utilizing organizational equipment and vehicles of the 52d Truck Battalion, with a pre-arranged shuttle of vehicles, the two (2) regiments closed in PUSAN by 7 October. The route of march was SUWON - ICHON - CHUNGJU - KUMCH'ON - TAEGU - PUSAN. On 8 October, the 17th Infantry was relieved of its blocking positions and proceeded to PUSAN by motor convoy. Both of the 7th Infantry Division convoys were held up for short periods of time south of CHUNGJU near MONGYANG by guerrilla action which resulted in several

friendly casualties.

In all, 1,459 tons of supplies and equipment and 13,422 personnel were transported a total distance of 281,600 driven miles by the 52d Truck Battalion and the organizational vehicles of the 7th Division.

The remaining elements of the 7th Infantry Division were airlifted from KIMPO Airfield on 11 October.

A special task organization, Embarkation Group Charlie, was formed for the purpose of out-loading certain service elements of X Corps. Embarkation Group Charlie consisted of X Corps Medical, Engineer, Ordnance, Chemical, Transportation, Quartermaster, and Signal units which moved by rail and motor to PUSAN during the period 10 to 11 October, and subsequently out-loaded from that port.

PHASE II: LANDINGS AT WONSAN AND IWON - DRIVE UP THE EAST COAST

With the consolidation of the INCHON - SEOUL area and the continued drive northward by Eighth Army, CINCFE Operation Plan 9-50 was published 29 September, calling for the X Corps to mount an assault landing on the east coast and subsequently to effect a juncture with Eighth Army elements north of the 38th Parallel, and directing the Eighth Army to continue to drive northward along the SEOUL - PYONGYANG axis and to seize the North Korean Capital.

Immediate plans were developed to provide for the X Corps to make its amphibious assault landing in the vicinity of WONSAN, and advance on the WONSAN - PYONGYANG axis to effect a juncture with elements of Eighth Army in the general PYONGYANG area. Additional plans were developed for the employment of the 187th Airborne RCT in a combat drop northeast of PYONGYANG and astride the WONSAN - PYONGYANG axis in the vicinity of SURI, SONGCHON, SUNCH'ON, or TONGYANG to secure the route of the X Corps advance to the west. (See Maps C and D)

The selection of WONSAN as the site of the X Corps assault was predicated on several factors. WONSAN is a principal port on the east coast of North Korea, a key point on the main supply line from the USSR, by sea and rail from VLADIVOSTOK, and the east anchor of the lateral arterial highway across the narrow neck of the Korean Peninsula. It was the site of one of the two (2) major enemy supply depots in North Korea, one of the most active

centers for the training of enemy troops, and served as a staging area for the movement to the front of a large share of the enemy's military equipment and materiel. In addition, it provided a ready base from which to undertake an advance against the highly important HAMHUNG - HUNGNAM industrial complex.

While the aforementioned plans were being mapped out in detail, during the period 11-20 October, X Corps was non-operational and retained in GHQ Reserve. At this time it became apparent, due to the rapid advance of the I ROK Corps up the east coast and its seizure of WONSAN on 10 October, that the planned amphibious assault landing at WONSAN would become unnecessary. Similarly, the speedy advance of Eighth Army elements in the west and their imminent capture of PYONGYANG made the westward drive of X Corps along the WONSAN - PYONGYANG axis appear to be no longer necessary. Accordingly, an alert order was received, CINCUNC Msg CX 66705, on 17 October providing that if PYONGYANG were seized by the Eighth Army, X Corps would be ordered to advance northward after its landing on the East Coast.

With the fall of PYONGYANG, Execution Order, CINCUNC Msg CX 66739, was received on 19 October directing the X Corps to proceed in rapid advancement to the border of North Korea. On 20 October, the I ROK Corps came under operational control of X Corps, whose advance CP had been flown to WONSAN on 14 October. Elements of the I ROK Corps continued their drive along the east coast and seized the key cities of HUNGNAM and HAMHUNG. These two (2) cities formed a highly industrial complex, embodying the bulk of the chemical and ordnance production in Northeast Korea. In addition, the area served as a key transport hub for the routing of supplies and equipment from the USSR to the northeast, and from industrialized Manchuria to the northwest, and provided the finest harbor facilities on the northeast coast.

On 26 October, the remainder of Headquarters X Corps and the 1st Marine Division were landed at WONSAN after a six (6) day delay in off-loading occasioned by the unusually heavy mine patterns in the harbor. (See Maps C and D)

Three (3) days later, after careful beach reconnaissance, elements of the 7th Infantry Division landed at IWON approximately one hundred and fifty

(150) land miles along the coast to the northeast of WONSAN.

With the successful landing of Corps elements, operational instructions were issued directing the disposition and deployment of troop units to accomplish the mission assigned to X Corps.

I ROK Corps units to the south in the KOJO area and to the north in the area north of HAMHUNG were ordered relieved by elements of the 1st Marine and 7th Infantry Divisions. The I ROK Corps was directed to continue its advance to the North Korean Border via the coastal route. Arrangements were made to supply this force by LST as it proceeded along the coast.

The 1st Marine Division was ordered to deploy as follows: The 1st Marine Regiment was sent to relieve I ROK Corps elements in the KOJO area; the 5th Marine Regiment was committed to the defense of the immediate WONSAN area, the X Corps west flank and the air installations at YONPO; the 7th Marine Regiment was ordered northward to secure the power installations in the area of the CHOSIN and FUSEN Reservoirs and to relieve I ROK Corps elements for the latter's drive along the coast.

At the end of the period, these actions were underway: (See Map A)

a. The 1st Marine Regiment to the south at KOJO encountered considerable resistance from retreating North Korean Forces, but after several days of fighting succeeded in dispersing the enemy to the mountainous area to the west. Other Marine elements in the general WONSAN area encountered resistance from by-passed groups of enemy, and small bands of guerrillas. Contact was frequent with enemy units up to battalion size seeking to escape northward along the inland corridor running south to north through MAJCN-NI.

b. To the north, elements of the I ROK Corps in the CHOSIN and FUSEN Reservoirs area, awaiting relief by the 7th Marine Regiment, encountered increasing resistance from the enemy which was undergoing reorganization and was being resupplied from across the Manchurian Border. As the period closed, the ROK Forces were receiving heavy pressure particularly in the SUDCNG area south of the CHOSIN Reservoir. The capture of two (2) CCF POW's by the 26th ROK Regiment on 28 October for the first time definitely established the presence of alien forces intervening in the Korean conflict in the X Corps Zone. This intervention by alien forces was to have far-reaching

effect upon the prosecution of the war in Korea, as later events proved.

c. The 7th Infantry Division, after landing at I'WON without resistance, was consolidating its beachhead area and preparing for its drive to the northwest.

D. LOGISTICS:

During the month of October 1950, logistics played a major role in the missions assigned to and carried out by X Corps.

At the beginning of the month the details of a powerful amphibious operation had to be worked out. This involved the water movement of the 1st Marine Division and Corps troops from the overtaxed port of INCHON to the northeast coast of Korea, while at the same time transporting the 7th Infantry Division and Embarkation Group Charlie (Corps Medical, Engineer, Ordnance, Transportation, Quartermaster, Chemical, and Signal units) overland to PUSAN for outloading to the target area. The port facilities at INCHON could not accommodate these units.

The move overland was by motor, rail, and air and was complicated by the northward movement of Eighth Army rear elements and some interference from by-passed enemy groups. The large number of units being moved necessitated adherence to a rigid time table and Corps Staff Officers assisted coordination at both ends of the route as well as checking the columns from the air. The magnitude of this operation can be judged by reports from the 7th Infantry Division and the 52d Transportation Truck Battalion. In all, one thousand four hundred and fifty-nine (1459) tons of supplies and equipment and thirteen thousand four hundred and twenty-two (13422) personnel were transported two hundred eighty one thousand six hundred (281600) driven miles.

While the elements of the Corps were engaged in the above movements the G-4 and the technical services were further developing plans for the support of operations in the severe winter climate of northern Korea where temperatures ranging from twenty (20) to thirty (30) degrees below zero could be expected. Some winter clothing was issued in the staging areas before embarkation and the balance of it reached troop units in the target area. Although clothing the ROK units under operational control of X Corps was a ROK Army function, emergency issues were made by G-4, X Corps to those organizations when the weather turned very cold.

The capture of WONSAN on 10 October by the rapidly advancing I ROK Corps made the planned assault landing by the 1st Marine Division unneces-

sary.

On 14 October an advance command group from X Corps was air lifted to WONSAN and surveys were immediately started to determine the logistical facilities of the area. Every effort was made to rehabilitate quickly existing means of communication and transportation in order to maintain the impetus of the I ROK Corps drive and to provide logistical support upon the arrival of X Corps troops.

The off loading of X Corps elements in the objective area was delayed over a week, due to the large number (3000) of underwater mines protecting WONSAN Harbor. A channel was cleared by 26 October and the remainder of X Corps Headquarters and elements of the 1st Marine Division landed. Yellow and Blue Beaches were used for the debarkation and later the docks in the inner harbor were employed. (See Maps C and D)

On 29 October the 7th Infantry Division started a difficult landing across beaches at IWON, approximately one hundred and fifty (150) land miles northeast of WONSAN.

Use of LST's along the coast combined with limited train and motor transport made it possible to give adequate logistical support to I ROK Corps in the North, 7th Infantry Division in the center, and the 1st Marine Division in the South. As these commands moved inland, however, the problem of supporting them over the limited rail and road net in mountainous country with winter approaching became a logistician's nightmare.

CHEMICAL:

During the early part of October the Chemical Section conducted normal operations within the X Corps Zone and prepared their section for outloading on the WONSAN operation. All section equipment was loaded on 12 October and on 13 October all personnel boarded the USS General Mann. From 14 to 26 October the section was enroute to WONSAN where they debarked on 27 October.

Request was received from the Chemical Officer GHQ, FEC to make a survey of the Chemical Plants in the HAMHUNG - HUNGNAM area to procure production records, determine techniques, sources of raw materials, and the disposition of finished products. An officer from the 51st Chemical Technical Intelligence Detachment was detailed to secure this information. He found that chemicals were being produced for Russia and production records and techniques were procured for further study. The following plants were located, but were in a demolished condition: Fertilizer Plant; Gunpowder Plant; Medical Plant; Mineralogical Plant; Dye Works; and a large Chemical Plant located between HAMHUNG and HUNGNAM.

The remainder of the period to the end of October was spent in organizing the Chemical Section office.

ENGINEER:

The early part of October was occupied in planning engineer operations for the WONSAN landing. Cadres were formed to be airlifted to the WONSAN area, the remaining members of the section arriving by ship on 27 October. Major Keane, the logistics officer, was placed in PUSAN to take care of the problem of Engineer Supply and the coordination of all logistical activities concerning the Engineer units assigned to X Corps.

The Corps Engineer and cadre arrived in WONSAN 14-15 October.

Engineer troops which arrived with the main body of the X Corps Headquarters were the 8224th Engineer Construction Group Headquarters, the 73d Engineer Combat Battalion, advance elements of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, and the 44th Engineer Construction Battalion. An advance Engineer Section was established in HAMHUNG for reconnaissance to the north and northeast and coordination with I ROK CORPS.

Although a gravity-fed city water system was found to be intact in the section of WONSAN occupied by X Corps Headquarters, water points were established for drinking water purposes for Marine, Air, and ground units.

It was determined that the roads in the area would prove to be inadequate for heavy military traffic. Plans had to be made for road maintenance as engineer units became available. There existed only one road of $1\frac{1}{2}$ way capacity for Corps and Division MSR's combined, with no alternate routes worthy of consideration.

Due to the Transportation Section still being afloat, the Engineer Section was given the mission of repair and operation of the existing rail line KOJO - WONSAN - HAMHUNG. The 101st ROK Engineer Group was engaged in the task of rehabilitating the bridges and roadbeds; operation of the railroad was undertaken by the 301st ROK QM Railway Bn. Seven (7) locomotives and thirty (30) cars were rehabilitated, fifty (50) sidings cleaned up and repaired, and the rail yards and marshalling yards cleaned up. During the period 23-27 October approximately one hundred and fifty (150) cars of ROK supplies were hauled from KOJO to YONGHUNG and later to HAMHUNG. Seventy (70) cars of US troops were transported from WONSAN to KOJO to relieve ROK troops in that area. On 29 October 1950 responsibility for the operation of the railroad was turned over to the Transportation Section, X Corps.

At the end of the period plans were made for the procurement of supplies in order to further projects of housing, winterization of existing structures, river crossing, bridging, Korean labor, field fortifications, water supply, utilities, roads, beaches, POW camps, and snow removal. Due to the fact that most engineer troops were not yet ashore at the end of the period engineer activities were, of necessity, limited to planning and reconnaissance.

TRANSPORTATION:

The Transportation Section spent the early part of the month of October in preparation for the WONSAN operation and arrived at WONSAN 26 October 1950. Major Meisell, Transportation Section, was already working on the railroad with the 301st ROK QM Railway Battalion in rehabilitating the system. At this time the road was open and operating from KOJO -

WONSAN to HAMHUNG.

Due to the lack of suitable road net for the proper operation of truck convoys, the 1st Marine Division upon landing in the WONSAN area requested rail transportation to the HAMHUNG area. This was accomplished plus the dispatching of a daily supply train for their support. Supplies also had to be sent forward to support the I ROK Corps which was being relieved by the 1st Marine Division.

The availability of equipment was limited due to the destruction of cars, locomotives and tracks. Although repairs on spur tracks would have released a great number of rolling stock, maintenance of the right of way consumed the efforts of the repair gangs.

It was necessary to send Transportation Corps personnel on each train in order to expedite the turn-around time of the trains. Lack of communication between terminals made this procedure necessary.

At the end of the period of October it was felt that considerable progress had been made toward satisfying the demands for transportation within the X Corps Zone and that within a short period of time all needs would be met.

MEDICAL:

The early part of October 1950, was spent by the Medical Section in preparation for the movement to WONSAN and in the advisement of Eighth Army Medical Section and units on hospital sites then being taken over by that headquarters upon the relief of X Corps. During this period a visit was made to the X Corps medical facilities by Maj Gen R. W. Bliss, The Surgeon General, Department of the Army, Maj Gen E. E. Hume, Chief Surgeon, FEC, Brig Gen S. B. Hays, Surgeon, JIC, and members of their staffs, to inspect X Corps medical facilities.

On 10 and 11 October Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 163d Medical Battalion with 618th Clearing Company, 2 platoons 421st Medical Clearing Company, 559th Medical Ambulance Company (-1 Plat), 560th Medical Ambulance Company (-2 Plat), and the 121st Evacuation Hospital (SM) less five (5) truckloads of supplies left in motor convoy for PUSAN for shipment to WONSAN. Supplies of these units left behind were transported to

ASCOM CITY for outloading with the X Corps Medical Supply Depot from INCHON

On 11 October medical responsibilities for the X Corps zone were turned over to the Medical Section of Eighth Army. While an advance cadre under the supervision of Capt John P. Craig MC departed by air for the X Corps Advance CP at WONSAN, Major Rivenbark, X Corps Medical Supply Officer departed for PUSAN in order to coordinate the medical resupply for the WONSAN area. All other medical personnel embarked on the USS General Mann for transport to WONSAN where they debarked 27 October 1950.

The 121st Evacuation Hospital and other medical units arrived from PUSAN at this time. Action was taken to provide medical service for the 1st Marine Division, POW enclosure, and US units. A team under the supervision of Lieut Col Binkley proceeded to HAMHUNG to establish sites for medical units in that area. At the same time a staging area for medical units was selected in the WONSAN area.

At the end of the period additional provision had been made to care for the civilian population through the North Korea Health Service, and approximately one (1) ton of medical supplies were issued to the civilian hospitals in WONSAN.

At this time a team was formed, at the request of Col Ranck, X Corps Quartermaster, and Mr William F. Pounder, representative of the OQMG, consisting of Lieut Col Weidenkopf and Capt Craig of the Medical Section, and Major Tanous of the Corps QM Section, for the study of cold weather clothing.

ORDNANCE:

At the beginning of this reporting period, X Corps Ordnance service in Korea was just beginning to assume normal field ordnance service operations. Corps Ordnance units, except ammunition units, had only recently been off-loaded at INCHON and assembled in working areas. Maintenance shop space in damaged buildings was being cleared of debris and unit equipment was beginning to arrive from ships in the harbor.

Upon being informed of the forthcoming operation, the invasion of WONSAN on the east coast, plans were made for the ordnance support of the mission. Plans had to include leaving some Ordnance troops in the ASCOM CITY area to receive the ordnance Class II, IV, and V supplies still being unloaded at INCHON.

CITY area to receive the ordnance Class II, IV and V supplies still being unloaded at INCHON. The final Ordnance troop list established for the X Corps operation was: Hq and Hq Det, 328th Ord Bn; 1st Ord MM Co; 2nd Ord MM Co; Det 330th Ord Depot Co; 58th Ord Ammo Co; 69th Ord Ammo Co; 14th Explosive Ord Disposal Squad; and the 508th Ord Tech Intell Team.

On 7, 8 and 9 October the Corps Ordnance Executive Officer visited the Eighth Army Headquarters at TAEGU and the 2d Logistical Command at PUSAN to discuss Ordnance maintenance and supply matters pertaining to the X Corps operation.

On 13 October the Corps Ordnance Officer and one (1) NCO were airlifted to WONSAN with the Corps Advance CP; the remainder of the Ordnance Section arrived at WONSAN with the X Corps Headquarters on 27 October.

At the end of the reporting period the Ordnance Section was in operation at the Corps CP at WONSAN. No Corps Ordnance service troops had arrived in the objective area by 31 October 1950, except the 508th Ordnance Technical Intelligence Detachment which was attached to the 1st Marine Division and which arrived at WONSAN on 27 October 1950.

QUARTERMASTER:

Although normal supply functions were carried on by the Quartermaster Section in the early part of October planning was effected for the supply and equipment of the force to invade WONSAN towards the end of October. On the 10th of October C-rations became available in sufficient stocks to meet the outloading requirements of the INCHON embarkation group. Ninety thousand (90000) were off-loaded from vessels in the INCHON Harbor and one hundred thousand (100000) arrived by air from Japan. The actual requirement was one hundred and seventy-five thousand (175000) C-rations - a five (5) day supply for the embarkation force. In addition, thirty-two thousand (32000) assault rations arrived by air from Japan and were immediately released to the 1st Marine Division for combat loading.

During this same period winter clothing continued to come ashore and immediate issue was made to units. It was estimated that only half of the clothing was issued when it became necessary to discontinue clothing issues, because troops were alerted to embark. Due to delay in shipment the INCHON embarkation group did not receive their wet-cold weather clothing prior to

embarkation. The PUSAN Embarkation Group consisting of the 7th Inf Div and the bulk of Corps Troops were issued winter and wet-cold weather clothing prior to embarkation. All troops received a completed issue of winter and wet-cold weather clothing after arrival at WONSAN. While the Corps Quartermaster proceeded to the X Corps Advance CP at WONSAN by air on 22 October 1950, working groups of the section accompanied each of the embarkation groups from INCHON and WONSAN in order to establish minimum Quartermaster activities at the objective area.

While awaiting the arrival of the sea-borne troops the Corps Quartermaster reconnoitered for suitable dump areas and air drop zones in connection with rations and POL. Although no suitable dump areas could be found in WONSAN, since it was heavily bombed out, open storage was available in the beach areas. Prior to and immediately after the arrival of the X Corps Headquarters and accompanying troops the ration level was very low; this situation was corrected by the timely arrival of a ration ship on 27 October and another on 31 October with six hundred thousand (600000) rations. The Marine Combat Service Group established dumps on the beach immediately upon landing.

SIGNAL:

During the early part of October the Signal Section had completed its communication net within the X Corps zone and had in operation a teletype circuit to Headquarters Eighth Army and to the 2d Log Command at PUSAN. Plans for the impending move of the X Corps, as they affected the Signal Section, were worked out on 7-8 October. On 8 October the 3d Log Command at SEOUL assumed operation of the ASCOM CITY Comcenter and the Frisco exchange. A radio telephone and teletype (VHF) circuit was activated on the same date between ASCOM CITY and the command ship the USS Mount McKinley. Personnel from the 4th Signal Battalion were sent to PUSAN to coordinate the forthcoming overland movement of elements of the battalion.

A survey party was made up of members of the Signal Section, and elements of the 4th Signal Battalion and 581st Radio Relay Company to be airlifted to the WONSAN area with the X Corps Advance CP. Upon arrival in the WONSAN area VHF voice circuits were established with the new Corps

CP site at HAMHUNG on 30 October; an SCR-399 team was sent to serve Task Force BAKER; and an AN/GRC-26 team was dispatched to IWON to link the 7th Infantry Division with X Corps by teletype.

By the end of October radio communication was in to all X Corps units and with GHQ in Tokyo. Through use of existing wire facilities and laying of additional wire, plus the use of signal equipment to replace those installations damaged by retreating forces, a telephone net was available to all units of the command.

A beach dump area was established to store the signal equipment being off-loaded. Advance shipping documents indicated that approximately five hundred and twenty-one thousand nine hundred and eighty-nine (521989) pounds of signal equipment would be landed in the WONSAN area in the immediate future.

E. PERSONNEL:

The month of October presented the G-1 Section with a multitude of personnel problems attendant to operations in the field by the newly established X Corps. Normal operating problems were aggravated by the heterogeneous composition of the Corps task organization, the mass re-deployment of the Corps to Northeast Korea, and the fact that several smaller units of paramount importance to troop welfare and morale (notably Finance and Postal) had not yet joined the Corps at the start of the month. Throughout the period, the entire G-1 Staff was engaged in resolving the diverse problems which arose, placing emphasis upon the establishment of procedures and facilities essential to the maintenance of high troop morale and efficient personnel management.

The assignment to X Corps of a new amphibious assault mission in Northeast Korea, less than a month after the landing at INCHON, posed a number of administrative problems. Arrangements had to be made to provide for disposition of military prisoners and POW's in custody of the Corps, provision had to be made for bringing Corps units up to authorized strength before the new operation, and administrative functions in the Corps Zone such as Civil Affairs had to be transferred to EUSAK, or the 3d Logistical Command. Such matters were the subject of several conferences and communications with CINCFE and the other interested agencies.

Postal Service, perhaps the most important single factor in the maintenance of high troop morale was a matter of especial concern throughout the period. Since the 1st Base Post Office did not land with Corps at INCHON, as scheduled, local arrangements had to be made to provide limited postal service until the joining of this unit which was not accomplished until 31 October at WONSAN. The matter of expediting the arrival of Army Postal Units at Corps Hq and subordinate units was the subject of several communications with CINCFE during the month. Likewise, the establishment of an effective American Red Cross Program in the Corps, provision of PX facilities, and similar soldier-welfare activities were given close attention by the G-1.

Civil Affairs activities during OPERATION CHROMITE were not too extensive, due to the short duration of the operation and the existence

of Civil Affairs sections of other commands in the same general area. It became readily apparent that with the redeployment of the Corps to Northeast Korea the Civil Affairs Section would have to be augmented, and the scope of its activities greatly expanded. Accordingly, personnel requisitions for trained or experienced Civil Affairs specialists were submitted to CINCFE, and plans prepared for an expansion in the Civil Affairs program following the landing of the Corps in Northeast Korea.

The problem of replacements for all Corps units was a continuing one throughout the period. Efficient administration of the program was accomplished through constant liaison with unit G-1's and Replacement Officials in Japan. A special project undertaken during the month was the establishment of a program to "phase out" ROK soldiers who had been used to augment the 7th Infantry Division during OPERATION CHROMITE.

The Commanding General was at all times apprised of the G-1 Situation. The section was represented in the Advance CP Party which flew to WONSAN on 14 October, the G-1 was a member of the Command Group aboard the USS Mount McKinley during the trip from INCHON to WONSAN, and the remainder of the section travelled from INCHON to WONSAN with elements of the Corps Headquarters aboard the USS General Mann, arriving on 27 October.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S SECTION:

The difficulties of embarkation and debarkation, together with the resultant confusion and temporary loss of equipment, were the biggest problems of the section during October. There was a higher loss of supplies and equipment loaded as bulk cargo for the movement from INCHON to WONSAN than had been the case for the INCHON invasion. During the period of 1 October to 6 October, two (2) officers devoted their full time to a search of the beaches and supply dumps in an effort to locate supplies and equipment being off-loaded. From the 6th to the 12th of October, these officers, together with additional personnel of the AG Section, devoted full time to packing and crating of AG supplies and equipment for packing and embarkation. Bulk loading of cargo took place on the late afternoon of the 12th and personnel loaded aboard the transport USS General Mann on the 13th. On the 15th it was discovered that the AG bulk cargo, together with the bulk cargo of some other sections had been loaded on the wrong

vessel, unloaded, and returned to a warehouse in INCHON. Some of it had been lost. Personnel were dispatched to effect reloading of these supplies and equipment. On the 22d, one (1) officer and four (4) EM, together with a minimum of supplies and equipment, were air-moved to the Advance CP at WONSAN to supplement the one (1) officer and one (1) EM who had been sent up originally as reconnaissance personnel. On October 27th, the AG Section, together with other sections of the headquarters, disembarked at WONSAN, moved to the new CP, and began setting up for normal operations.

The 1st Base Post Office, which was to have moved with the Corps Headquarters from YOKOHAMA to INCHON, arrived at INCHON as the Corps was embarking for WONSAN. The 1st Base Post Office equipment and supplies were not unpacked, but rather were reloaded for movement to the new area. They arrived on 31 October. Thus the Corps Postal Officer, assisted by a few untrained or partially-trained individuals, carried the postal load of X Corps from the beginning of the operation until the end of October. Because of this lack of foresight as to the importance of mail, Corps and its subordinate units did not receive the postal service to which it was entitled and for which the Corps Postal Officer had made extensive plans, and insofar as he could accomplish, provided adequate provisions.

CHAPLAIN SECTION:

During the period from the 1st to the 5th of October, Chaplain (Col) Frank A. Tobey and Chaplain (Lt Col) Urban J. Wurm (then Major) visited Chaplains at Headquarters, 1st Marine Division near KIMPO Airfield, Headquarters, 7th Infantry Division, south of Seoul, and many other Chaplains in their unit areas. Many of the Chaplains came to the Corps Headquarters seeking information and supplies. During this period, the two (2) X Corps Chaplains personally interviewed fifty-three (53) of the sixty-five (65) Chaplains assigned to Corps units. During this operation there were no casualties other than Lt William G. Tennant, 5th Marines, and Lt Robert A. Bonner, 11th Marines, who were wounded and evacuated.

A Memorial Service was held at the X Corps Cemetery, near INCHON, on the 6th of October, where on that date five hundred and forty (540) Americans and fifty-nine (59) Republic of Korea soldiers lay buried beneath the

white Crosses and Stars of David. Most of the Koreans who were buried in a separate plot, had been assigned to and died with the American 7th Infantry Division in battle. Chaplain Tobey delivered the Memorial Address. Chaplain (Comdr) Robert M. Schwyhart and Chaplain (Lt Col) Maurice Powers (then Major) made the Invocation and gave the Benediction respectively. There was an attendance of approximately twelve hundred (1200) persons. The services lasted approximately twenty-five (25) minutes. Chaplains and enlisted men of the various unit Chaplain Sections were in attendance. From the 7th until the 12th of October the Chaplains at Corps Headquarters, including the DAC Chaplains, were on the road, visiting units and officiating at Services, or visiting Chaplains of subordinate units.

FINANCE:

Although the X Corps Headquarters Disbursing Section achieved a remarkable volume of operations for its size during the first nine (9) days of October, the total monthly finance service provided to the X Corps organizations as a whole fell far short of satisfying needs and desires for the following reasons: Most finance disbursing units did not arrive in Korea at or near the most suitable time; numerous individuals did not execute necessary allotments for the support of dependents before embarking for Korea; nearly one-half of the month of October was spent aboard ship, with equipment inaccessible, and lacking suitable office space and contact with personnel officers of troops served. Deficiencies in Military Pay Records of numerous units and individuals resulted because of extremely negligent and slipshod service received at home stations, at staging areas in the United States and in Japan, while enroute to Korea.

During the preparation for the X Corps operations in the INCHON - SEOUL area, the prevailing attitude among staff officers concerned was reflected by the frequently repeated remark: "No one will want to be paid in Korea - there won't be any use for money." Accordingly, no attempt was made to adjust the embarkation or debarkation schedules and priorities for finance disbursing personnel. However, by 25 September, the fallacy of the belief that prompt payment of personnel was unimportant was clearly evident. A very large percentage of individuals had failed to make adequate allotments

for the support of their dependents either in the United States or in Japan. Consequently, many individuals were counting not only on prompt cash payment, but also on facilities for transmitting money to their dependents by means other than allotments.

As soon as the need became evident, a small disbursing unit was improvised in the Headquarters X Corps Finance Section to serve the X Corps Headquarters and as many Corps Troops as possible. However, enough men and machines were not available to serve more than about one-sixth of the non-divisional troops assigned to the X Corps during the period. In addition, no finance service was available to the 7th Infantry Division because the Division Finance Section personnel and equipment were not put ashore at INCHON until embarkation for the next operation was begun. Consequently, only personnel were put ashore, but equipment and records were left aboard ship, making it impossible for the 7th Infantry Division Finance Section to function. This situation was finally remedied during the last half of October when personnel were moved overland to PUSAN while the ship which was transporting their equipment also proceeded to PUSAN. Office space was improvised aboard ship, and by the end of October the majority of 7th Infantry Division troops were paid for the month of September.

On the X Corps troop list were two finance disbursing sections, each with an aggregate strength of 22. If these units had been available in the INCHON-SEOUL area from about 25 September to 15 October, satisfactory finance service could have been provided for all nondivisional Corps troops. However, these units did not arrive in Japan from the United States until 3 October. In response to a request, the 106th Finance Disbursing Section was moved to Korea by air, arriving on the 7th of October, but the 105th FDS was deleted from the X Corps Troop List and was assigned to the Eighth Army prior to arrival in Korea. When the 106th FDS finally came under the control of X Corps, warning orders for embarkation for the next operation had been received. Operations of the section were begun only on a very limited scale, since the time remaining prior to embarkation did not justify preparation of equipment for full scale operations.

In contrast to the unsatisfactory finance service afforded units of

the Army under X Corps control, the finance service provided the 1st Marine Division was highly satisfactory. This was due primarily to the following: A more realistic embarkation and debarkation schedule for personnel than that used for Army Finance units; and approximately twice the amount of disbursing personnel and equipment provided by T/O & E's per one thousand (1000) individuals served than is provided in Army units.

It is evident that correct phasing-in of finance disbursing personnel is essential. To embark and schedule arrival of finance disbursing personnel too early causes loss of time which could have been used at the old location. To schedule arrival of FDS personnel too late makes them inaccessible to the troops when needed.

Through extraordinary effort on the part of the disbursing officer and other personnel of the Finance Section, constructive steps for placing operations back on a current basis were taken.

In addition to regular operations all finance disbursing sections and all personnel officers were placed under the additional burden, beginning in October, of processing Class Q Allotments required by the Dependents Assistance Act of 1950, as implemented by DA Circular 48, 1950. The difficulties of contacting Finance Disbursing Officers, Personnel Officers and individuals, and failure of the publications distribution system to provide Personnel Officers and individuals with the information needed in order to execute Class Q Allotments promptly when they were required, prevented many men from beginning these allotments promptly enough to enable all payments to dependents in the United States to be timely.

All the difficulties experienced in connection with finance service in X Corps during October can be avoided in the future if the following principles or methods are applied:

1. Finance Disbursing Units are employed most effectively if moved in a later echelon than the troops which they serve. Whenever practicable they should be moved only when operating facilities have been provided in a new location.

2. FDS serving Divisions or Corps ordinarily should be available within two (2) weeks after troops have been moved to a new area. The number of

finance disbursing personnel provided must be determined in accordance with the number of troops served.

3. Military personnel should be enjoined to make intelligent use of Class E Allotments in providing for their dependents. It is folly to expect uninterrupted finance service during military operations, especially during amphibious operations.

4. Personnel and Finance Officers at stations in the Zone of Interior, at personnel centers, staging areas, ports, and similar installations must place more emphasis on correct and accurate service and must take positive steps to prevent slipshod methods which result in an excessive number of adjustments and corrections to be made in the Combat Zone.

5. Extraordinary steps must be taken to insure distribution and timely implementation of instructions requiring individuals to execute allotments or to take other similar actions in connection with personal affairs.

Disbursing activities of the X Corps Headquarters Disbursing Section in October are summarized below:

Military Personnel payments vouchered:	<u>Number</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Cash	3,539	\$360,390.32
Check	16	5,513.00
Totals	<u>3,555</u>	<u>365,903.32</u>
Travel Vouchers paid	65	1,688.68
Turnovers of funds to Class A Agents	62	130,600.48
Returns by Class A Agents	52	64,213.48
Local Procurement Vouchers completed:		
Purchases and Contracts	32	6,973.74
Indigenous Payrolls (21,773 individuals)	16	38,081.74
Totals	<u>48</u>	<u>45,055.48</u>
Currency exchanges:		
Script to Won	320	7,689.25
US Currency to Script	26	958.37
Checks cashed	12	1,074.38
Totals	<u>358</u>	<u>9,722.00</u>
Treasury Checks issued in exchange for cash	90	190,082.79
Receipts:		
Soldiers Deposits	78	8,419.00
Cash for Bonds	1	750.00
Other collections	2	1,030.80
Totals	<u>81</u>	<u>10,199.80</u>

Correspondence and forms pertaining
to disbursements:

Number of items received	2,272	
Number of items sent out	2,044	
Savings Bonds scheduled	255	7,368.75

Funds transferred in:

MFC's and US Coins		1,846,100.00
Treasury Check		1,000,000.00
Korean Won		366,666.67
	Totals	<u>3,212,766.67</u>

Funds transferred out:

Checks		185.16
Korean Won		33,395.02
	Totals	<u>33,580.18</u>

Deposits:

Checks		230,775.40
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INSPECTOR GENERAL:

During the period of 1 October 1950 through 11 October 1950, the major elements of the command were either loading aboard ship or were in motor convoy to PUSAN. This movement was in conjunction with the transfer of the entire Corps from the INCHON - SEOUL area. The movement of the Corps elements necessitated the cancellation of all visits and inspections which had been proposed by this office. However, two (2) complaints were processed by this office during the period. Captain Weaver was designated as Officer Courier to GHQ. He departed on 5 October and was absent two (2) days, returning to duty on the 7th. Lieut Col Boram was designated CO of Troops and Embarkation Officer. The remainder of the section began making preparation for the proposed movements. The bulk cargo was loaded and on the 13th of October the personnel departed for INCHON to board the USS General Mann. During this period, only the necessary reports were rendered and daily office routine prevailed.

During the period of 14 through 27 October the personnel were aboard the Navy Transport USS General Mann. One complaint was processed during the period. No unusual duties were performed aboard ship. On the 28th of October we arrived at WONSAN, Korea. Debarkation began at 0900, the date of arrival, and at 1400 we arrived at our new location. The office was set up in an annex building, approximately five hundred (500) yards from

the main CP building. On 30 October, Lieut Col Boram, who was still on board the USS Green Bay Victory, was notified of the expected visit of Gen Craig, the Inspector General, Department of the Army; General Zundel, Inspector General, GHQ, FEC; and Col Perry, Inspector General, Eighth Army. Lieut Col Boram made final arrangements for the discharge of the remaining cargo and rejoined the section. On 31 October, Gen Craig and party arrived. They were accompanied on the inspection of the Corps elements by Lieut Col Boram. The visit lasted only a few hours and they departed at noon that day.

JUDGE ADVOCATE:

On 30 September 1950 the Judge Advocate Section, X Corps, was composed of the following: Col Boyle, Corps Judge Advocate; Major Ricks, Asst Corps JA (On TDY from GHQ, FEC); Sergeant Stidham, Corporal Moyer, and Corporal Sandlin.

WOJG Malcom Z. Brown was assigned to the JA Section on the 1st of October as the Administration Officer and on the 3d of October, Major Walter T. Tsukamoto was assigned as the Assistant Corps Judge Advocate.

Col George W. Hickman, Jr, Command JA, GHQ, FEC, visited the JA Section, X Corps, from the 2d to the 4th of October in connection with JA activities and a conference re possible War Crimes in Korea.

On 5 October, Major Hicks returned to GHQ, FEC, upon termination of his period of TDY to X Corps. On 6 October, Lieut Col Williamson, of the office of the Command JA, GHQ, FEC, arrived at X Corps for a staff visit to the JA Section, X Corps, which terminated 13 October 1950.

During the period from 1 to 13 October, this office received and reviewed nine (9) Special courts-martial cases and thirteen (13) Summary cases. Thirteen legal assistance matters were handled, including: four (4) power-of-attorney, four (4) marriage problems, two (2) deeds, two (2) divorce problems, and one (1) insurance matter.

During this period Col Boyle and Major Ricks made several visits to SEOUL and the HAN River area in connection with possible war crimes atrocities. Witnesses were questioned and the dead were photographed.

The JA Section embarked on the USAP 112 on 13 October 1950. The Section stayed aboard the ship until the 27th of the month. During this period

one (1) Summary Court case was tried under AW 65. One (1) power-of-attorney was drawn also while aboard ship.

The JA Section, X Corps, debarked from the USAP 112 on 27 October 1950 at WONSAN, Korea.

During the last few days of October, this office reviewed three (3) Summary Courts-martial cases. One (1) memorandum was written to the Commanding General, X Corps, recommending the appointment of claims officer for X Corps. One (1) opinion was rendered in connection with Courts-Martial Jurisdiction of the CO of Special Troops. One (1) line of duty investigation was reviewed and opinion rendered concerning injuries received by a soldier. During this period three (3) legal assistance matters were handled; one (1) power-of-attorney, one (1) marriage problem, and questions of adoption.

SPECIAL SERVICES:

Special Services activities for the month of October included duties beyond the scope of a Corps Staff Section. The section made distribution of over twenty thousand (20000) Stars and Stripes daily. (This normally is a TI&E function, but no TI&E Section had been organized at that time.) A film and equipment exchange was set up and serviced over twenty-six (26) units. Arrangements were made with the Red Cross representative for the air shipment of eighty thousand (80000) envelopes and one hundred and fifty thousand (150000) letterheads to relieve a critical shortage. A Post Exchange was established in the Corps area, selling comfort items. An indigenous musical show was obtained which played in the 1st Marine Division assembly area and X Corps Headquarters.

On 11 October, at the request of the Special Services Officer, a representative of the FEC Motion Picture Service arrived at X Corps Headquarters to set up and manage the motion picture film and equipment exchange. Twenty-five (25) 16mm projectors, fifty-five (55) feature films and equipment were airlifted from TOKYO, Japan.

On 12 October all Special Services activities were turned over to the 3d Logistical Command in preparation for the forthcoming move to WONSAN, Korea.

The section, intact, boarded the USS General Mann at 1930 hours, 14 October. On 25 October materials were airlifted from Japan for building a suitable stage for the presentation of the Bob Hope show. The show was held on the WONSAN airstrip. Bob Hope, Marilyn Maxwell, Judy Kelly, Jimmy Wakley, the Taylor Maids, the High Hatters, and Les Brown and his orchestra comprised the show, performing before an audience of two thousand (2000). On the 28th, the section began operation of a 16mm theater at the X Corps CP.

PROVOST MARSHAL:

The X Corps PM Section supervised traffic control on the HAN River Bridge from 051600 to 061600 October 1950. During that period six thousand five hundred and thirty-five (6535) vehicles crossed this one-way span.

At 071200 hours, EUSAK assumed responsibility for traffic, police, and POW operations in the INCHON - SEOUL area.

After boarding the USS General W. A. Mann at INCHON, a staff study was completed on the INCHON - SEOUL operation. Personnel debarked from the "Mann" at WONSAN, Korea, on the 27th Of October.

During the first few days in WONSAN, a house to house search was conducted to confiscate unauthorized weapons, ammunition, and radio equipment. Check points were established at all entrances to WONSAN with the mission of searching civilians entering and leaving town. ROK personnel and civil police were used to advantage.

The 772d MP Battalion, assigned to X Corps, arrived at INCHON on the 8th of October without vehicles or equipment.

The 92d MP Battalion, Hq & Hq Detachment, was activated on 10 October. On the 29th of the month the battalion was assigned to EUSAK.

Prisoners were evacuated from WONSAN to PUSAN by LST's.

The 772d MP Battalion arrived at WONSAN Harbor on the 31st of October and became operational on the 2d of November.

The X Corps MP Company operated the police station at WONSAN.

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT:

During the period 1-11 October the Headquarters Commandant Section continued work on improving the Corps CP, located at ASCOM CITY. Problems

of labor which were directly associated with the improvement of the CP were solved under the guidance of Captain Martin.

On 14 October the Headquarters Commandant, together with members of his section and representatives from other staff sections, departed from KIMPO Airfield at about 1300 hours and arrived at WONSAN Airfield at about 1500 hours, remaining at the airfield over night before going into WONSAN to set up the Advance CP. Lieut Col. McCaffrey was in charge of the entire operation. On 14 October a reconnaissance party consisting of Lieut Col McCaffrey, Lieut Col Barsanti and Major Medusky determined where all installations of the advance CP would be located in WONSAN.

The remainder of the Headquarters Commandant Section boarded the USS General W. A. Mann, enroute to WONSAN by water. The Command Post was officially opened in WONSAN on the 20th of October. While the usual establishment and improvement of the CP was underway, a reconnaissance party consisting of the Headquarters Commandant and other staff representatives reconnoitered HAMHUNG for a future CP site. On the 24th of October a debarkation plan for the USS General Mann was issued. The ship arrived in WONSAN Harbor on the 26th of the month and began unloading immediately.

On the 27th a party from the CP consisting of members from the Headquarters Commandant Section and drivers from Headquarters Company, X Corps, departed for HAMHUNG under control of Captain Ortzman to prepare a future CP.

31 October 1950

CATALOGUE OF PLANS AND ORDERS

The following plans were prepared and orders issued during October
1950:

PLANS

ORDERS

1. OI No. 8 011600 Oct 50

X Corps task organization was changed to detach from 187th Airborne RCT the following: Co A, 56th Amph Tk & Trac Bn; 96th FA Bn; Btry C, 50th AAA AW Bn; Co C, 73d Tk Bn; one (1) NGLO Team (Regt'1) and two (2) Bn SFCP Teams. Detached units reverted to control of their parent organizations. 3d Bn, KMC, was detached from 187th Airborne RCT and attached to 1st Mar Div. Sp Opns Co was detached from 187th Airborne RCT and reverted to Corps Res. 3d Bn, 187th Airborne RCT reverted to 187th Airborne RCT from Corps Res.

OI No. 8 ordered:

a. 1st Mar Div: (1) Assume Resp KUMPO Peninsula. (2) Cont mission assigned Z.

b. 187th Airborne RCT: Assemble Corps Res SE KIMPO Afld. Rpt Loc.

c. Sp Opns Co: Assemble Corps Res Vic Corps CP.

d. Corps Arty: 96th FA Bn: Revert Corps Arty control Vic ASCOM CITY, Prep for G/S.

1. Opn Plan No. 8 2 Oct 50 2. OO No. 3 022000I Oct 50

Due to the limited ability of INCHON Harbor for outloading, X Corps was to load out some of its elements at PUSAN, so as not to delay the planned amphibious operation. (Operation Plan CINCFE No. 9-50, 29 September 1950) Opn Plan 8 had these assumptions: (1) Available trucks will be furnished by this Hq upon request CG 7th Inf Div. (2) Rail route(s) for all or a major portion of the SUWON-PUSAN movement will be available. Opn Plan 8 proposed that X Corps move 7th Inf Div to PUSAN area by motor and rail.

2. Operation Plan CINCFE No. 9-50 assigned the priority of INCHON outloading to 1st Mar Div, the amphibious assault element of X Corps.

3. In conjunction with the offensive operations to be conducted by Eighth Army on the SEOUL-KAESONG-PYONGYANG axis, X Corps lands at D-Day Vic WONSAN, advances on the WONSAN-PYONGYANG axis, and effects a juncture with Eighth Army to entrap NKPA Forces. (Operation Plan

Opn O 3 ordered:

a. 7th Inf Div (Reinf): Initiate movement immediately when relieved by Elms Eighth Army: (1) All tracked vehicles and Hvy Engr Equip by rail or motor to PUSAN area. (2) Motorized units from present areas to PUSAN area by motor. (3) Foot Elms to PUSAN area, utilizing motor and rail transportation. (4) Organic equipment by rail and/or motor to PUSAN area.

b. 187th Abn RCT: Conduct Nec Ren, prepare, on O, on relief of Elms 7th Inf Div by Elms Eighth Army, to assume responsibility for that portion 7th Inf Div Z not assumed by Elms Eighth Army.

3. OI No. 9 031600 Oct 50

OI No. 9 ordered 1st Mar Div:

(1) Initiate movement to assembly area designated by CG 3d Log Comd in INCHON area. (2) Priority of movement to heavy materiel and units not in contact with enemy.

4. Opn O No. 4 4 Oct 50

Opn O 4 ordered:

a. 1st Mar Div (Reinf): (1) Rept to Atk Force Cmdr as Landing Force. (2) Seize and secure Corps base of Opns, phase line Y, Annex 3, Opn Overlay; protect WONSAN Afld. Conduct Opn ashore Coord w/Corps plan of Opns.

CINCFE No. 9-50, 29 September 1950) Furnish Log Spt all forces ashore until relieved by Corps Shore Party.

b. 7th Inf Div (Reinf): (1) Cont Mv PUSAN for Mting on relief by Elms Eighth Army; load on shipping designated by COMNAVFE. (2) Land WONSAN BH on O; Adv on O, Opn overlay, Annex 3.

c. 187th Abn RCT: (1) When available, conduct Abn Opn on O. (2) Prep drop Vic SURI 09041835, TANGYANG 09911838, SONGCHON 09261849, or SUNCHON 91001870; destroy En in Z, hold key terrain features on Corps axis of Adv, Opn overlay, Annex 3.

5. OI No. 10 041530 Oct 50

In continuation of the relief of X Corps units in the SEOUL-INCHON area by elements of Eighth Army, OI No. 10 ordered:

a. 1st Mar Div: Forward Elms of 1st Mar Div will be relieved of responsibility for the defense of individual Regt'l sectors when a minimum of one (1) Bn of friendly troops has passed through the forward areas of those Regt'l sectors.

b. Others: N/C.

6. Embarkation O 6 October 1950
Number 2-50

This order directed the embarkation of X Corps approximately 7 Oct. The details of embarkation established by this order conformed to the

logistical aspects developed in Operation Plan CINCFE No. 9-50, 29 September 1950. Five (5) Embarkation Divisions, "A" through "E", were designated by this Order. Details of composition, embarkation areas, and methods of loading prescribed by this order were as follows:

1. Embarkation Division "A":

Subdivision one was composed of 1st Mar Div (Reinf). Subdivision two consisted of Hq & Hq Co, X Corps and certain Corps units, primarily communications, intelligence, and command in nature. INCHON was designated the embarkation area. Embarkation Division "A" was to be combat loaded.

2. Embarkation Division "B":

7th Inf Div (Reinf) was to be combat loaded to the extent practicable considering the number and types of ships assigned, at PUSAN, except for those elements designated to load at INCHON.

3. Embarkation Division "C" com-

prised the bulk of X Corps logistical units. Embarkation Division "C" was to be unit loaded insofar as possible. Like Embarkation Division "B", Embarkation Division "C"'s embarkation area was PUSAN, except for those elements designated to load at INCHON.

4. Embarkation Division "D" was

primarily 2d ESB, with some medical units and 56th Amph Trac Bn (-).

It was to unit load, insofar as possible, from INCHON.

5. Embarkation Division "E" was composed of units not in KOREA. Its embarkation area was to be designated by JICOM. Unit loading was to be used insofar as possible.

Annex A designated the units of each Embarkation Division. Annex B designated the ships of each Embarkation Division. Annex C established loading and embarkation schedules and designated embarkation areas for each Embarkation Division.

6a. Change 1 8 October 1950
Embarkation 0
Number 2-50

This change consisted of new Annexes A and B. The new annexes contained the same type of information as in those superseded.

6b. Change 2 9 October 1950
Embarkation 0
Number 2-50

This change modified Annexes A and B to change certain units and ships

6c. Change 3 10 October 1950
Embarkation 0
Number 2-50

This change (1) restricted unloading at INCHON to that which would not interrupt the outloading of 1st Mar Div. (2) amended reporting procedures, (3) changed certain units from Embarkation Division "E" to "C".

6d. Change 4 11 October 1950
Embarkation 0
Number 2-50

This change deleted one (1) unit.

6e. Change 5 12 October 1950
Embarkation O
Number 2-50

This change amended ship assignments to Embarkation Divisions.

7. Opn O No. 5 072100 Oct 50

A special task organization, Embarkation Group Charlie, was formed by this Order for the purpose of moving and outloading certain service elements of X Corps. Embarkation Group Charlie consisted of X Corps Medical, Engineer, Ordnance, Transportation, Quartermaster, Chemical, and Signal units.

Opn O No. 5 ordered:

a. CO Embarkation Group Charlie:
Move to PUSAN during period 10 to 11
Oct 50.

b. 73d Engr (C) Bn: Conduct route
Rcn and Maint.

c. 44th Engr Const Bn: Eff traffic control.

7. OI No. 8. 14 Oct 50

Further details for the operation embodied in Operations Order No. 4 were delineated in these Instructions. The only changes in the task organization were: (1) I ROK Corps passes to Opn control X Corps effective H-Hour, D-Day, WONSAN area. (2) 92d AFA Bn and 96th FA Bn revert X Corps Arty control on landing.

OI No. 11 ordered:

a. I ROK Corps: (1) At H-Hour, D-Day, Adv strong Recon Forces from BHL over Routes A and B, employing not less than one (1) Inf Bn, Reinf, on each route. Recon Elms revert to I ROK Corps on X Corps O. (2) Secure BHL, with special emphasis WONSAN and WONSAN Afld. (3) Adv 3d ROK Div (-) to secure Obj X.

b. 1st Mar Div: (1) Land and Adv in Z, seize and secure Obj Y; Prep to Adv one (1) RCT over Route B on O. (2) Protect Corps left flank.

c. 7th Inf Div: (1) Land and Adv in Z, seize and secure Obj Z. (2) One (1) Inf Regt, Corps Res. (3) Protect Corps right flank.

8. OI No. 9. 19 Oct 50

These instructions announced D-Day and H-Hour (O111) and directed that 1st Mar Div and 7th Inf Div execute the operations contained in OI 11. The task organization was changed as follows:

a. All UN and ROK Grd forces N of 39° 10' N Lat, except 187th Abn RCT and Eighth Army Elms directed to Est contact with 187th Abn RCT, pass to Opn control X Corps Eff 201200 I Oct 50.

b. 3d Inf Div Atch X Corps for Log Spt Eff arrival WONSAN area.

c. X Corps TAC Air Comd Det X
Corps, reverts to 1st MAW.

10. OI No. 13 261000 Oct 50

The unexpected success of I ROK Corps in its advance up the East Coast prompted a delay in X Corps' landing to permit a thorough sweeping of WONSAN Harbor, which was infested with mines. In the meantime, Eighth Army was so successful in its operations on the West Coast that the tactical operation contained in Operation Order No. 4 and further detailed by OI's 11 and 12 (X Corps advances on the WONSAN-PYONGYANG axis to effect a juncture with Eighth Army) was superseded by a plan to advance north from WONSAN to the Korean Northern Border.

OI No. 13 ordered:

a. I ROK Corps: (1) Adv rapidly in Z in multiple columns to Korean Northern Border. (2) Organize a self-contained flying column of not less than one (1) RCT, supported by one (1) supply LST. Adv this force on coastal road with maximum speed practicable to Korean Northern Border, Vic of UNGGI FB2488. (3) Secure CHOSIN Reservoir, FUSEN Reservoir and PUNGSAN without delay.

b. 1st Mar Div: (1) Land over beaches Vic WONSAN. (2) Relieve all Elms I ROK Corps in KOJO and in

Z. (3) Protect WONSAN-KOJO-MAJON-NI area, employing not less than one (1) RCT, patrolling all routes to W in Z. (4) Concentrate not less than one (1) RCT without delay in HAMHUNG-HUNGNAM area. (5) Adv rapidly in Z to Korean Northern Border. (6) Prep to land one (1) BLT in CHONGJIN EB 6424 area rapidly on O. (7) Assist 101st Engr (C) Gp (ROK) repair YONGHUNG-HAMHUNG RR, employing not less than one (1) Engr Co (C).

c. 7th Inf Div: (1) Land over beaches in the HONGWON DV1131 - IWON DV6664 area, initially land one (1) RCT Vic IWON. (2) Adv rapidly in Z to Korean Northern Border relieving Elms I ROK Corps in place.

d. All units upon reaching Korean Northern Border insure against violations of MANCHURIAN or USSR territory.

11. OI No. 14 291000 Oct 50

X Corps zone was extended southward from the WONSAN area to the 38th Parallel. The task organization was changed to create Task Force Baker (1st, 3d, and 5th Bns, KMC) for separate employment under X Corps.

OI No. 14 ordered:

a. 1st Mar Div: Continue present Opns in Z as extended.

b. TF Baker: Employing 1st, 3d, and 5th Bns, KMC, from initial areas

at KANSONG, KOSONG, CHANGJON, respectively, operate to destroy all En forces in Z.

c. I ROK Corps: Organize Hq TF Baker. CO TF Baker rept Hq X Corps by 300800I Oct 50.

d. Others: N/C.

12. OI No. 15 30 Oct 50

The offensive operations initiated by OI's 13 and 14 were further developed in these Instructions.

OI No. 15 ordered:

a. I ROK Corps: (1) Cont present missions. (2) Atk, destroy En Elms S of CHOSIN and FUSEN Reservoirs.

b. 1st Mar Div: (1) Protect KOJO-WONSAN-MAJON-NI-MUNCHON area employing one (1) RCT. (2) Adv two (2) RCT's rapidly to HAMHUNG, relieve I ROK Corps Elms in Z, destroy En forces in Z. (3) Facilitate movement of 5th Bn, KMC, S through 1st Mar Div Z.

c. 7th Inf Div: Cont present missions, expediting to maximum extent practicable completion of landing all Elms.

d. TF Baker: Execute present missions, move TF (-5th Bn, KMC) by assigned shipping initially to Vic KOSONG, move 5th Bn, KMC, to assigned Z by rail to KOJO, thence by motor and marching.

13. OI No. 16 311300 Oct 50

13. OI No. 16 311300 Oct 50

These Instructions expanded on OI 15, with respect to TF Baker as follows:


a. TF Baker: (1) Employing 1st, 3d, and 5th Bns, KMC, move TF (-5th Bn KMC) by assigned shipping initially to Vic KOSONG, move 5th Bn KMC by assigned shipping to KOJO, thence by motor and marching to KOSONG. (2) From initial base areas, operate to destroy all En forces in Zone.

b. Admin: Units will carry minimum ten (10) days Class I, III, and V supply.

c. Others: N/C.


ROUTES OF X CORPS UNITS ON INVASION OF WONSAN AND VICINITY

USSR



29 OCT

REA



36°



MAP I

LEGEND

-  TROOP MOVEMENT
-  ADVANCE OF I ROK CORPS

20 OCT 1950 HQ X CORPS 1ST MARINE DIV AND CORPS UNITS.

E

OBJECTIVE AREA

26 OCT.

I ROK

CORPS

SEOUL

INCHON

SUWON

5 OCT. 1950

1ST INF DIV

KUMCHON

MANCHANG

CHUNGJU


H

HUMSNAM


WONSA


PYONG YANG

IWON



MAP OF NORTHERN KOREA 1:1,000,000





127°

128°

129°

130°

39

38

JAPANESE

ONJONG-NI

ELMS 42

NAV WONSAN

IME

HWACHON-NI

15 DIV

5 DIV

12 DIV

1 DIV

3 DIV

8 DIV

25 ELMS

18 ELMS

19

27

70 DIV

CHORWON

PYONGGANG

u/i

KOSONG

TANGYANG


CHUNCHON

YALU RIVER

TUMEN RIVER

INJIN


KAESONG




125°


5 0 10 20

MAP. 2
ENEMY SITUATION
8 OCT 50







MAP OF WESTERN KOREA




MAP B
SEOUL AREA
X CORPS BEACHHEAD
SITUATION 012400 1 OCT
1950






REPRO BY 8218TH ENGR TOPO DET

PANORAMIC VIEW OF WONSAN CITY & VICINITY




LEGEND
Y - YELLOW BEACH
B - BLUE BEACH
R - RED BEACH


IIIC VIEW OF WONSAN CITY & VICINITY



LEGEND
Y - YELLOW BEACH
B - BLUE BEACH
R - RED BEACH




WONSAN BAY



MAP "C"
WONSAN LANDING BEACHES
October 1950
0 ———— 1
MILE

(NOTE: This PANORAMIC MAP prepared from photo XIV-25, FEAF 29 June 1950)



MAP D
NAVAL PLAN OF
WONSAN LANDINGS

OCT 1950



COMPHIBGRU ONE OP ORDER 16-50
ANCHORAGE AREAS—PLAN ZEBRA
FOR SHIP TO SHORE.
NOTE: NAVAL PLAN NOT TO SCALE.

