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US Army Military History Institute

SENIOR OFFICERS DEBRIEFING PROGRAM

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CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY S. AURAND

AND

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM O. MORRISON

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA. 17013

A

25 FEB 1977
(Date)

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Henry S. Aurand

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INTERVIEW WITH LTG HENRY S. AURAND

by

Major William O. Morrison

THIS IS TAPE 1, SIDE 1, OF A SERIES OF INTERVIEWS WITH LTG HENRY S. AURAND, U.S. ARMY RETIRED. IT IS PART OF THE SENIOR OFFICER ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM CONDUCTED BY THE U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PROGRAM OF THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE. I AM MAJOR WILLIAM O. MORRISON. THE DATE IS 5 APRIL 1974, AND THE LOCATION IS GENERAL AURAND'S HOME IN ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI.

LTG AURAND: My name is Henry Spiese Aurand. I'm a retired Lieutenant General of the United States Army. I think of myself as having been a logistician. Before Major William O. Morrison, Jr., whom I shall call Bill asks the first question of my oral history, I would like to make two remarks. First, my oral history is divided into two parts. Part I, I consider to be quote "a diary written in retrospect." The purpose of this diary is to provide an introduction and a chronological index to the events of my career which constitute the experience on which Part II is based. The purpose of Part II is to present the observations, concepts, philosophies, and views resulting from my experience in Part I. Second, an old man's memory is not accurate. Principal facts may be fairly accurately recalled. But, the surrounding details are frequently either distorted by the memory or are mixed with those which belong to some other principal fact. Also, opinions drawn from the facts are more often than not, not the ones held at the time. Many events have occurred since which may have made the old man change his opinion. My view of what was in the minds of my superiors may be compared to that of a fish looking up at people in a glass bottom boat. There was some of them up there doing

something, but I wasn't sure why or what. Bill, now you can ask your first question.

MAJ MORRISON: General Aurand, the first series of questions will cover the early period of your life from your birth in 1894 to your graduation from West Point in June 1915. Sir, you were born on April 21, 1894 in Tamaqua in eastern Pennsylvania. Your parents were Peter and Annie Aurand. Please describe your parents and your family.

LTG AURAND: My father was the third of four sons; my mother, the middle of three sisters. All were married and lived in Tamaqua. My father's parents I remember. My mother's died before I could remember them. Since I was an only child, my cousins were my brothers and sisters. On my father's side, there were six boys, three older and three younger than I. And one girl who was older. On my mother's side, there were three boys and three girls; one boy and one girl being younger. The three sisters lived in adjacent houses; my mother and father in the middle. We moved from this locality in Tamaqua when I was about nine years old and to Shamokin, Pennsylvania when I was not yet eleven.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, your father was a passenger conductor for the Reading Railroad. What lasting influence on your life and profession did he play?

LTG AURAND: May I pronounce that Reading for you - the Reading Railroad. My father's influence was limited because he was away from home so much on Monday, Wednesday, Friday nights, and two Sundays out of three. In Tamaqua on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, he was home until about 2 o'clock. But in Shamokin, he left home about 5:50 in the morning. On Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, he got home at 7:00 P.M. at both places. He

helped me get summer jobs on the railroad as soon as I was eligible under the newly enacted Child Labor Laws, which for me was 14 years of age. I learned my profanity as a waterboy on a section gang and my trigonometry as a member of the surveying corps the next two summers. All the time, my father told me that he would send me to college so I wouldn't have to work on the railroad. But, I had my first toy railroad in 1904, and my hobby today is a H-O Pike, also he could get railroad passes for me. Consequently, I was the most travelled boy in the neighborhood, having visited Washington, Philadelphia, New York, Atlantic City, Buffalo, Toronto and Montreal.

MAJ MORRISON: Very good, sir. How about your mother and other members of the family?

LTG AURAND: Being an only child with my father away much from home, my mother influenced me greatly. She was a born teacher, and I can't remember when I couldn't read at least the funnies in the newspaper. She was also a good Methodist, teaching an adult class in Sunday School and pinch-hitting as choir organist. I was dragged to the church four times on Sunday and at least one evening a week until I was old enough to stay home by myself. She insisted on giving me piano and violin lessons. The only lasting benefit came from my violin teacher who told me frequently, "The easiest way is the best way." Ever since I've tried to find the easiest way. Also, she was a pacifist. Because, as she said, "War is killing people and the Bible says,'Thou shall not kill'". This has been my definition of war throughout my life.

MAJ MORRISON: You graduated from high school in Shamokin, Pennsylvania?

When did your parents move there and how old were you then?

LTG AURAND: May I say again that this is Shamokin?

MAJ MORRISON: Shamokin?

LTG AURAND: When my father had enough seniority, he bid in a run which was based in Shamokin. I believe it was in the spring of 1905. I became eleven just after we moved to Shamokin. There were eight primary school grades in Shamokin, and I was put in the fifth. In Tamaqua, because of my mother's preparation I was about to graduate from grammar school which was sixth grade but still spent two years going over what I had already learned in Tamaqua. To keep me out of trouble, my teachers gave me the assignment of drawing pictures on the blackboards in accordance with the seasons of the year. One thing this move did for me was to introduce me at least into the necessity for making new friends. I did have a good start for the many moves we made in the Army to new posts and new people. Also, I learned to cherish finding new friends . . . old friends at the new post.

MAJ MORRISON: In the pre-West Point years of your life, what were the main influences on you and how did these influences affect your future?

LTG AURAND : Outside of my family, I find it difficult to determine any influences which I can connect definitely with something that the future held in store for me. The declaration of war with Spain took effect on my 4th birthday. And either then or shortly afterwards, I saw the Company "A" of the 1st Pennsylvania Volunteers march off to war. But that incident is remembered not for being a forerunner of a military career but because my father took me to the barber shop and had my curls cut off. In 1902

there was a hard coal strike called by John Mitchell, not John Lewis, to solidify the organization of the United Mine Workers. I was then about 8 years old. A large group of miners marched over the mountains from Mahoney City to Tamaqua and headed for the Panther Creek Valley where there were many collieries. Word was passed through the town towards midnight that they were on the way, but in a very few minutes we knew that they had arrived because they set fire to a colliery across the creek from the rear of our house and up a steep hill, and the blaze lit up our street. Here they came carrying pine knot torches and looking for all the world as though they were going to burn down the whole town. My mother held me in her arms as we watched between the slats of the shudder of our upstairs window. Perhaps I remembered this when I was in command of the 6th Service Command at the time of the Illinois coal strike or the Detroit race riot, but I don't think I did. We had floods too, but never up to the first floor. The backyard was covered and the cellar flooded, and we used to go up to my grandfather's store in the middle of town. One year the flood backed up the mainstreet and flooded Grandpa's cellar. Perhaps the most cheerful recollection of my young days is the installation of a water closet in our house. No longer did I have to sit on the two holer that stuck out over the creek. At least, I wasn't surprised at a trench latrine. As to the influence of people, my boss on the surveying gang and my high school math teacher were brothers. They were as different as could be but great teachers. One taught me how to be a handbook engineer using a book entitled Railroad Curves and Earthworks. The other taught me how to construct my own geometry theorems and prove them, and how to handle

trigonometric functions and equations. But before then I had an old man with a club foot who taught mental arithmetic. The subject is now obsolete but for me it is the procedure for logical deduction. The teacher as well as the subject interested me greatly. There was a brilliant young English teacher who informed the class that the English language was a very poor vehicle for conveying an idea. So we had to study it very hard in order to make sure that the vehicle wouldn't break down. And to this day I say, "Amen to that."

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what were your likes and interests in those days?

LTG AURAND: Likes and interests are easy to enumerate because I had so little choice. I liked the church and the school and the railroad. I had little interest in the mines. I played high school and YMCA basketball, and I had a one wire telegraph line between my home and that of a grammar school classmate one block away. And I had a toy train in the attic.

MAJ MORRISON: In retrospect, what do you recall as a general feeling that you, your family, and your community had toward the Army?

LTG AURAND: It was a strange situation. The GAR Post was still active. The Sons of Veterans Post was more so. The few Spanish-American War Veterans had not yet organized a post. But all were honored on the Declaration Day and 4th of July Day parades. There was patriotism and pacifism side by side and equal quantities. But I knew only one person who ever enlisted in the Armed Forces while I was in Shamokin. He enlisted in the Navy.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, this will be a three part question. Why did you decide to go to West Point? Did you plan to make the military a career?

And how did you go about getting your appointment?

LTG AURAND: I decided to go to West Point because of the way I got my appointment. My congressman advertised a competitive examinatinn for appointments to West Point and Annapolis. I took the exam because I was 17 on the day the exam started and that's what I had to be. And I wanted also to see how well I would do and how well I would compare with the graduates of other high schools. I came out third and was offered an alternate either to West Point or Annapolis. I turned it down, but the congressman insisted that since I had taken the examination, I had to go through with the final examination for West Point. I chose the alternate for West Point because I had once seen the ocean at Atlantic City. I had passed the examination, but my principal failed physically. My father, mother, and I agreed that after my four years compulsary commission service was up, I would resign and my father would send me to graduate school at Penn State where I had been about to enroll as an undergraduate civil engineer.

MAJ MORRISON: You entered West Point in June 1911. How did you fare in Beast Barracks?

LTG AURAND: I had a comparatively easy time due to the first classman in charge of my division being not as rough as others. And to the fact that there was a turnback living on my floor. At 5'11 3/4" and 125 pounds, the physical beating that I took made me think of resigning, but I stuck it out.

MAJ MORRISON: World War I was three years in the future. What were your thoughts on the U.S. foreign policy at that time?

LTG AURAND : Until the invasion of the Low Countries and France in 1914,

I had little regard for foreign policy. The doctrine was that the military carried out foreign policy when the diplomats failed to keep the peace. And the signal for the takeover was the Declaration of War by Congress After the war started, I was vocally pro-German, or perhaps anti-British may be a better description. I had studied whatever I could lay my hands on since that time about the two German Armies on the right wing. Today, I'm convinced that they failed in their mission for lack of an army group commander and staff.

MAJ MORRISON: Did your parents visit you at West Point and what were their impressions?

LTG AURAND: Because of the availability of railroad passes, my mother visited West Point often. She had been invited to attend the graduation of the Class of 1911 by a cadet from near by Mount Carmel who had heard of my appointment through his brother who ran the local newspaper there. This experience sold her on West Point. She was much in demand as a chaperone by girls from as far away as Philadelphia. And my religious activities at the Point pleased her very much. My father came less frequently but certainly was much pleased that I had become a cadet.

MAJ MORRISON: Do you recall a professor at West Point who exercised a great deal of influence on you and why?

LTG AURAND : In my plebe year, Captain Bell, assistant professor of mathematics, appealed to me as a great teacher. I also saw a good deal of him in my yearling year. I believe there is a story about him in one of Eisenhower's books. Lieutenant Ganoe who taught English and history in my plebe year also was a great instructor. I was in personal touch with

both of these officers until their recent deaths. My most outstanding regard was for Colonel Tschappat and Major Somers who were head of the Department of Ordnance and Gunnery. These gentlemen and scholars caused me to think very much of having a career in the Ordnance Department. On the reverse side of this picture the officers of the Corps of Engineers rubbed me the wrong way and led me to decide not to take a commission in the Corps of Engineers. My company tactical officer in my first class year was a coast artilleryman whom I liked very much contrary to the general opinion of my classmates. Also, my instructor in physics with whom I had a rather odd experience appealed to me very much. I saw him quite often in my future career, and he was my first company commander. He too, was a coast artilleryman. Hence, my choice of the coast artillery upon graduation where I expected to spend two years before I could be detailed to the Ordnance Department.

MAJ MORRISON: What were your primary interests during college?

LTG AURAND: Mostly religious and academic. I taught a Sunday School class of six year old boys and a cadet Bible class and attended Miss Warner's Bible class on Constitution Island regularly. Also, I worked at the Cadet YMCA, finally becoming its vice-president. My academic interest was in coaching other cadets, particularly those on the varsity athletic squads. Also, I used the library a great deal. My interest being in the history of railroads, particularly in Alaska. I walked a good deal in the hills back of the barracks. And when the weather was too bad, I played pick-up games in the gymnasium, particularly basketball. I stayed away from the horses.

MAJ MORRISON: The 1915 Howister also alluded that you tutored many of the Academy athletes with considerable success. How did this come about?

LTG AURAND: When my roommate and I heard the call for tryouts for the basketball team, we both turned out. About the third night, we were caught asleep with our heads on the tables during study hour. We determined that one or the other of us had to stay home and study while the other played basketball. We must have tossed up the blackbook which was the book of regulations. At any rate, I won the study job. This was fitting and proper by the way. Doc Waldron, my roommate, had played college basketball for three years at the University of Rochester. The academic study of these first three years for him was a mere repetition of what he had had at the University of Rochester. So I stayed home and studied while he practiced basketball. And then in the evening, I told him about what I had studied. From this came the idea of helping other athletes who were having a hard time, particularly in math. I was welcomed with open arms at 4:00 A.M. after dodging a half dozen sentinels. Two things resulted. In my first class year, I finally got permission to visit during study hours to tutor other cadets. And under my picture in the Howister there is a quote which I have lived by. "If you would thoroughly know anything, teach it to others." I wish I knew who put that quotation there; I'd like to thank him.

MAJ MORRISON: What were your impressions of the cadre? Did one group of officers stand out over the others?

LTG AURAND: As I have said, I thought that the ordnance officers were outstanding although they were very few in number. However, my impressions

were the reverse about the Corps of Engineers. Next came a group of officers on the reverse side. It was composed of the horsemen.

MAJ MORRISON: The Class of 1915 is spoken of as the class the stars fell on. Did it appear that Cadets Eisenhower, Bradley, NcNarney, or Van Fleet were destined for higher places?

LTG AURAND: One of my classmates resents this designation of our class very much indeed. He insists that we should be called, "the class that reached the stars." In the order they appear in your question, the answers would be: Eisenhower, he loved life and people and didn't seem to be very ambitious. Bradley, bound to be the first general officer from the class. McNarney, the silent one. Van Fleet, the late comer and fast riser . . . very, very able.

MAJ MORRISON: What do you think of the silencing system at West Point?

LTG AURAND : Silencing was a punishment under the honor system. The honor system was alright, but I felt it was being improperly used in my time to enforce discipline. Also, I believed that a silence should not be imposed by the cadets, if a cadet was facing a court martial. The court martial verdict should be awaited before cadet action should take place.

MAJ MORRISON: Was there a case of silencing while you were at the Academy?

LTG AURAND: There was a classmate who was charged with cheating, and a silence was imposed. Then charges were preferred against him for trial by a general court martial. I insisted that the silence should be lifted. At least until the court martial had reached a verdict. The silence was not lifted, but so many other people had my same point of view that it

became ineffective.

MAJ MORRISON: You graduated from West Point on 12 June 1915 and were commissioned a second lieutenant in the coast artillery corp. Why did you choose the coast artillery over infantry, cavalry, or field artillery?

LTG AURAND: Someone advised me that I should choose my branch based upon what I thought of the officers with whom I had come in contact. As I stated previously the engineers were at the bottom of my list. So I regretfully gave up a career as a civil engineer because I did not want to join that branch. The ordnance officers were my favorites, so I decided on an ordnance career. But there was a rule that for two years you must serve in a line branch before you could be detailed in the Ordnance Department. I therefore took the coast artillery for my first two years of duty.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, this next group of questions will cover the years when you first came on active duty as a company grade officer which took you to Fort Monroe; Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia; the Mexican border; back to Fort Monroe; Sandy Hook Proving Ground, New Jersey, back to Fort Monroe; back to Texas at San Antonio; the Watertown Arsenal; Fifth Corps Area; Washington; the Philippines; the Command and General Staff School at Leavenworth; back to the V Corps Area; and up until the time when you became a student at the Army War College in August of 1930. Your first assignment was with the 169th Company, Coast Artillery Corps, Fort Monroe, Virginia. How did you find your first assignment and how were you received by the officers and men?

LTG AURAND: My company commander was my West Point physics instructor.

And I was the senior of two of us from my class who joined this company. Since this happened every year, the Senior NCO's were accustomed to new second lieutenants. So, I would say I was well received. The 169th Company was a mine company which was a new field for me, and I enjoyed it. The company also manned a battery of 6" Barbette Guns which protected the mine fields.

MAJ MORRISON : Describe what your company battalion or other higher headquarters did to prepare the junior officers for their duties.

LTG AURAND : The detailed company training was left to the NCO's. The two second lieutenants alternated between the gun platoon and the mine platoon. Company duties ended with officer's call at Post headquarters in dress blue uniforms at 11:30 A.M. In the afternoon, there was Garrison school. This corresponded to the basic course of a branch school today. In addition, I had many other assignments. Those which I shall call assistant should have the label changed because the word "assistant" should be omitted . . . assistant post exchange officer; assistant secretary-treasurer of the Army-Navy Club at Fort Monroe; defense counsel of the general court martial; summary court officer; adjutant and quartermaster of the mine battalion.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, during your first year of service, you were also stationed at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia; Fort Hancock, Texas; and El Paso, Texas. Were you changing stations as an individual replacement or was the 169th being relocated because of the problem on the Mexican border?

LTG AURAND: By the time of these moves and the usual custom of giving an all around experience to a second lieutenant, I had been transferred

to the 69th Company which manned a 12" gun battery of two guns on disappearing carriages. So, I made these moves as a member of the 69th Company. They were temporary - on a detached basis. They were triggered by trouble on the Mexican border.

MAJ MORRISON : I believe you commanded Fort Hancock, Texas which had some forty enlisted men assigned. What were your duties and responsibilities and how did you go about carrying these out?

LTG AURAND: Well, first of all, I would like to say that I never saw any of these forty enlisted men before, and there wasn't a single man wearing chevrons in the whole group. My primary duty was to guard the station and water tank at Fort Hancock; the pumping station on the Rio Grande about a mile away and the pipeline which connected the pumping station with the water tank. In addition, I was to patrol forty miles of the river to prevent cattle rustling. There was absolutely no transportation of any kind available. Even the railroad left the river at Fort Hancock. I divided up the forty men into eight squads consisting of an acting noncom and three soldiers. The remaining eight took care of the camp and the cooking. One squad was available to guard all trains which stopped at the station at Fort Hancock. And it provided a sentry at the station. Two squads alternated at the pumping station as guards of the station on a twelve hours on - twelve hours off basis, and they patrolled the pipeline going to and from the station. Four squads were on border patrol. They were encamped two days and on patrol four days along the river. This meant about a ten mile march every day they were on patrol. In this way I had most of the men in camp at one time. I should say half of the men

in camp at one time. So, if there was any emergency at the station, I could have somebody handy.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, you were married in El Paso in July 1916. I have here a copy of an article that appeared in the July 22, 1916 Army-Navy Journal. As I read the article there are several inconsistencies. Your bride's name, Margaret John Decker or Derkert. And the exact date 12 July or 13 July. And the chaplain in one place is listed as Futcher and in another place is McFetridge. What is correct, sir?

LTG AURAND: My bride's name was Margaret John Decker without the "T". She was called Peggy or Peg. The exact date was supposed to be 12 July 1916, but because Peggy and her mother missed the train at Amarillo due to the train from Quanah to Amarillo being late, the wedding did not take place until noon 13 July 1916. The chaplain who married us was a member of the division of Pennsylvania National Guardsmen who had just arrived at El Paso. He was a minister of the Methodist Church in Tamaqua and knew many of my relatives there. Of the two choices of names you have given me, I take neither. I will choose the name Fletcher. But when I have told this story before, I have always called him Rowbottom. Perhaps it would be better right at this time to tell the story of my married life and get it over with. To begin with, Peggy was the great granddaughter of Sam Houston. Her grandmother had married a Morrow from Kentucky, and at this time I knew two Colonel Murrows who were somehow related to him. One of her mother's sisters had married a man named Decker, Davis Evan Decker a lawyer in Quanah, Texas. And they had a son. The son was named Stiles Morrow Decker. He graduated from the Naval Academy in 1912 and was

commissioned a second lieutenant of coast artillery in the Army. When he was still a small boy, his mother died. Peg's mother went to Quanah to take care of her nephew and keep house for his father. About a year later she was married to Davis Evans Decker and Peg was their child. Peggy and I met at Fort Monroe while she was visiting her brother who was stationed there. She was helping to take care of their young son, her nephew. Peggy and I had a son who was born in the Lying-In Hospital in New York City, June 10, 1917. I don't remember his birthday very well anymore. We named him Evan Peter after both of his grandfathers. He graduated from the Naval Academy in 1938; married Patricia Riley in Honolulu on 27 December 1941; and they have one daughter, Peggy, who in turn is married to Terry K. Young. And Terry and Peggy have two sons who are my great grandsons. My wife, Peggy and I were divorced in the first half of 1921 in San Antonio. We were remarried in Houston in March 1922. We had another son born in the Ohio State University Hospital in Columbus, Ohio and we named him Henry Spiese Aurand, Jr. Son Hank graduated from West Point in the Class of 1944 and resigned in 1954 when he was of all things, a major of engineers. And he is now in a civilian laboratory in the Naval Laboratories at San Diego. He was married in May 1945 - 1946. I can't remember these dates - to Marcie Wade, an Army brat and they have two children, both in college . . . a son and a daughter. Peg and I were divorced again in the Fall of 1929. On Ground Hog Day in 1933, I married Elizabeth Muir Steele. She was a Shamokinite and graduated from Shamokin High School just four years after I did. I never did know her in those days. We lost one daughter, stillborn, but had another one born on

1 August 1938, named Linda Ann, now Linda Aurand Nelson. She studied at Punahow, Swarthmore, Washington University in St. Louis, and St. Louis University. The latter two after three and four sons respectively. She had both a masters and doctors degree in psychology and she teaches at Lindenwood College, in St.Charles, Missouri. We live about a mile from her and her husband, William G. Nelson, IV who has a PhD in economics from Rice and their four sons ages sixteen to three and one-half. I believe that this information is essential to Oral History of my military service because my family situation entered into a good many of my decisions concerning my career. I believe that this intrusion of family into career decisions is common to most males in all walks of life. For the military man, I believe that he should remain unmarried.

MAJ MORRISON: As I am at the present moment. After El Paso, you went to Del Rio and from there back to Fort Monroe. What were the reasons and background for these changes in station?

LTG AURAND: The trigger for the troop movements was Pancho Villa's raid on Columbus, New Mexico. A provisional battalion of coast artillery was hastily organized and assembled at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, to relieve the 11th Cavalry which went into Mexico. The Cavalry regiment had been running a civilian military training camp at the time. And this was one of those camps where the civilians paid their way. The 69th Company was part of this provisional battalion. It's Captain Gulick who later became Chief of Coast Artillery - became battalion commander and I inherited the company. I was also battalion adjutant, and quartermaster, and instructor in engineering and field artillery. This provisional battalion of coast

artillery was not long at Oglethorpe. A more important mission caused it to move. Coast artillery units were being sent to fill gaps in the guard along the border while the troops left their posts along the border to help chase Villa in Mexico. The failure of the National Guard to respond promptly enough to call to fill these gaps made the presence of an emergency guard necessary. The first assignment of the coast artillery battalion was to the sector of the eastern outskirts of El Paso to beyond Diarr Blanca. Fort Hancock was within this sector. Next, it was sent to guard the smelter and cement plant just west of El Paso and the railroad bridge over the Rio Grande into New Mexico at that place. Hence, the duty in El Paso as military policy and then to Del Rio as railroad guard. At Del Rio the battalion became part of a provisional regiment CAC. And I had added to my numerous jobs the command of two civilian truck companies. The return to Fort Monroe was caused by a threatened national railroad strike.

MAJ MORRISON: Please describe your mission at Del Rio, and did you have contact with General Pershing during your Mexican border duty? And if so, what were the circumstances?

LTG AURAND : The provisional Battalions mission was primarily railroad bridge and station guard. Its sector included the famous Pecos High Bridge. The sector was about 200 miles long. The truck companies hauled supplies to a point about 40 miles away. I think that was an outpost of the regiment not of our battalion. I did not have any contact with General Pershing while I was on the border.

MAJ MORRISON: Less than 30 days after your return to Fort Monroe, you

were transferred to Sandy Hook Proving Grounds in New Jersey as a student at the Ordnance School. What was the reason or background for this change of station?

LTG AURAND: The reason was that I had requested a detail to the Ordnance School under a newly passed act of Congress permitting line officers to attend the school "on duty with" the Ordnance Department after one year's commission service. In other words, you continued to wear the line insignia. Before going to Oglethorpe, I had applied for this course. It began on 1 July 1916, and when I returned to Fort Monroe in September, the course was well started and I had forgotten all about my application. I had had a taste of soldiering and I rather liked it. And there was a smell in the air of our getting into war in Europe. Maybe I should withdraw this request, but I had my sights set on an Ordnance career and I had gone into the coast artillery solely for the purpose of having one. Wouldn't it be better to stick to my original plan? And then too, I had a new bride. So I went to Sandy Hook Proving Grounds.

MAJ MORRISON: What was Army life during this early part? What were the social activities?

LTG AURAND: At Fort Monroe, there were many formal dances and many dinner parties with the officers wearing special evening dress. There was a fine Army-Navy Club in the case mates with the Navy officers much in evidence since the fleet was then based entirely on Hampton Road. Also, there were two civilian hotels on the post. The Hotel Chamberlain was a very fashionable resort. In addition, I had dabbled in amateur dramatics; failing miserably as an actor however. But I did qualify as a stagehand,

scenery builder, and walk-on actor. Later in my career at Corregidor and Leavenworth, I became stage manager for the amateur dramatics there and I also worked behind the scenes at the Little Theater in Columbus, Ohio after I left Leavenworth.

MAJ MORRISON: As a young Army officer did you and Mrs. Aurand participate in town functions or have friends beyond the post community?

LTG AURAND : Fort Monroe gave us all the social life that we could take or afford. Incidentally, this was the only period in my career in which I was out of debt until I sold my house in Washington in 1951. Sandy Hook Proving Grounds was completely isolated. Particularly in the winter when storms cut off the neck of the hook. When we had to live off post, we did have a few friends in Atlantic Highlands.

MAJ MORRISON: Describe the demands of leadership and responsibility placed on you as a junior officer.

LTG AURAND: My border experiences I have already talked about . . . described. I might say that I was a company commander, I guess, less than a year after I was out of West Point. And I never had just that job. So that I was a very busy young officer. During the brief time that I commanded the company on return to Fort Monroe, I had no trouble. One thing that I lacked throughout this one year plus of company command . . . Pardon me, I should say company duty because only about half of it was command. . . was any information about what was going to happen next. I was much impressed with my lack of information to pass along to my men.

MAJ MORRISON: What would you choose as the big difference between the 22 year-old lieutenant of 1916 and those when you retired or possibly those of today?

LTG AURAND: Well, the 22 year-old second lieutenants of 1916 were all West Point graduates. In fact, a good many of my class were commissioned as additional second lieutenants. Consequently, my comparison can be made only with West Point graduates whom I have known either at the time of my retirement or since. My impression is that they had a much better education at West Point than I did, and that the advantage of the basic course at the branch schools is very great. If this sounds trite it is because I commanded a company as early as May 1916, and was made a first lieutenant in July 1916. At this time, I looked like a 17 year-old recruit.

MAJ MORRISON: How did you use your NCO's? Did they assist and/or influence you, and if so, how?

LTG AURAND: When I first reported, I would have been helpless without the three top company NCO's and the company clerk. They were excellent teachers, and I caught on very fast. I accepted their teaching very well. But that left me with the difficulty of then giving them orders about the stuff that they taught me. The transfer from the 169th Company to the 69th Company, we agreed to divide the work up. I would take care of administration and discipline and he would take care of anything else.

MAJ MORRISON: This might be a little repetitious of what you just answered, but what was the working relation between the junior officers and the NCO's during those days? Did you remain aloof or work closely with them?

LTG AURAND: The working relations couldn't have been closer. They were very close indeed. But otherwise I remained as aloof as I could. I felt that I had no advice to offer them on either their family problems or prospective retirement.

MAJ MORRISON: You spent about 2¼ years from late 1916 to April 1919 between Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland and Sandy Hook Proving Grounds. What were your duties and responsibilities during this period?

LTG AURAND: I became a student in Course I, Ordnance School as soon as I got to Sandy Hook Proving Grounds. After the declaration of war, I became a Proof Officer. I proof fired among other things the first 3" anti-aircraft gun and carriage ever built for the United States Army. Also, I fired the first shot at 90 Degrees elevation from this gun. By the summer of 1917, I was making layouts and looking for sites for a new proving grounds. When Aberdeen was selected and the site plans were approved, I designed technical facilities. In the late fall of 1917, I was placed on DS at Aberdeen to supervise the construction of these technical facilities. I returned to Sandy Hook Proving Grounds in April, let's say of 1918, maybe a little earlier as development proof officer and succeeded to the job of chief proof officer that summer. While in this position, I was officially reprimanded for direct disobedience of orders. After the Armistice, I completed the remaining acceptance tests for guns and ammunition 5" and larger. And upon the closing of Sandy Hook Proving Grounds, I was ordered to Fort Monroe. One thing that impressed me was that the munitions I tested in those last months were designed for destroying things and not killing people

MAJ MORRISON : Sir, you mentioned firing this weapon at a 90 degree angle. That's straight up. You're going to have to tell me some more about this.

LTG AURAND: Well, this carriage was designed with a mazimum elevation of 85 degrees. And I decided I'd like to know where a shot fired straight up would come down. In other words, which way was right. Is it supposed

to drift to the right because of the rifling. So I got some steel wedges and we wedged the base ring up to a slant of 5 degrees from the concrete. And we decided to fire this shot. So we were going to fire a proof slug. That's an unpointed projectile. I informed the commanding officer about it and he was very interested. And in those days, the people permanently commissioned in the Ordnance Department had a special black uniform. They were known as "Black Legs" to us people who were "on duty with," and he wanted to see it. So I said, "Come on out." So we pulled the string and off went the gun, nothing happened to the gun carriage, and made a little sand kick up. That was all. And finally, he said to me, "How long is it going to take this to come down?" And I said, "About two minutes and forty-five seconds." And he said, "Where are you going to take cover?" I didn't expect it to come straight down, but a new 10" Barbette Carriage had just come in to be proof tested and the sleeve in which the gun goes was sitting right next to this 3" anti-aircraft gun. And it was full of Cosmoline. It was fresh from the arsenal, but there was a good 2 by 12 sitting in the bottom of it. And I said, "Sir, you can get in on that 2 by 12 and take cover." It was big enough for him to . . . by stooping down to get in there. And I said, "I'll follow you in." So he got in and, of course, the board slipped. And if ever I saw a monkey going around and around in a cage, this was the picture that I had. He came out of it all covered with Cosmoline and I was laughing to beat hell. And all he said to me was, "Young man, this is no laughing matter." So he never saw where the projectile came down.

MAJ MORRISON: The other thing that you brought up a few minutes ago was your being disciplined. Would you explain that?

LTG AURAND: Yes. At this time the two proving grounds were commanded by Colonel Phillips who stayed at Aberdeen because most of the work was at Aberdeen. I guess it was while I was Chief Proof Officer. At least in the fall of 1918, we were getting pretty close to the end of the war. There was a deputy commander at Sandy Hook. He was the senior officer present. I was the next. He was a man named Kirk of the Class of 1912, whom I knew very well and was a good friend of mine. He had been a great football star at West Point and so he organized a football team in the enlisted detachment . . . the ordnance enlistment detachment that manned the proof front. Well, we had one of the few 16" power tests on the way and for various and sundry reasons, it kept getting slower and slower. Now, the rule was that you had to complete the powder test on the same day because you were making a test of uniformity of the powder, and you had to have the same exterior atmospheric conditions. And I think the whole test altogether involved a preliminary round or two to establish the charge. That is to find out how much powder it could take. Then five rounds for uniformity and then a final round of excess pressure. In other words, so you wouldn't blow the gun . . . a little heavier charge. And we were along until the last round for uniformity and the excess pressure and two rounds to go when I got an order from Colonel Kirk to send all members of the football squad into him immediately for football practice. And hell, the whole detail started leaving, and I said, "Come back here. You're going to stay here. You're going to stay right here, and I'm going to write a message and one of you is going to take it to Colonel Kirk." And I wrote this order. And the fellow went off with it; and

before he got back, we got off all but the last round. And when he came back, there was a note scribbled on the back of my note saying, "Kirk: Send that detail to me immediately," which I didn't do. He reported it to Colonel Phillips who reported to the Chief of Ordnance. And the Chief of Ordnance wouldn't touch it. He had my former commanding officer at Sandy Hook, Colonel Ruggles now General Ruggles, ordered me to Washington for the reprimand. And I'll never forget what he said to me when he finished. He said, "If you weren't so damn crazy, and if I didn't fear if I brought you down here to the Ordnance Office, you'd break up the Ordnance Department, I'd have you here in Washington working for me." He said, "Cut out all this foolishness." And that was about the extent of the reprimand.

MAJ MORRISON: Well, I don't think it really did you a whole lot of damage, sir. In 1919, you spent eight months at Fort Monroe. What were your duties?

LTG AURAND: I wore two hats at Fort Monroe. I was the ordnance officer of the Coast Artillery Training Center which included Camp Eustis, Virginia which is near Williamsburg where the railroad artillery was being stored; Fort Wint, an island in Hampton Roads; and some 16" mortars which were being emplaced at Cape Henry. Also, I was the ordnance member of the Coast Artillery Board, which had to do with proposals for and standardization of new coast artillery equipment. The Training Center Ordnance Officer was my first staff job, and I seemed to be the boss of the ordnance officers at the various sub posts. Since they all knew what the score was, I learned from them. The Coast Artillery Board job did not differ too much from my big gun testing at Sandy Hook Proving Ground. And I enjoyed

immensely listening to the coast artillery members of the board complaining about the kind of equipment which the Ordnance Department furnished them. I viewed Navy target practice from four different battleships and a different observation point on each ship: the fire control roam, the fire control mast, the bridge, and inside a turret. All of this was cut short by a case of the flu which was diagnosed as tuberculosis, and I spent 2½ months in the TB hospital in Osteen, North Carolina before they were sure I didn't have it. Then the Ordnance Department very kindly sent me to San Antonio Arsenal to recuperate my strength. It was after I arrived at Fort Monroe, Virginia, in fact, in June 1919, that I completed my four years compulsory commission service. I could resign and go to my graduate school as my father had promised, but I had a wife and a young son and a permanent captain's commission. I doubted very much that my father could afford to send me to graduate school under these conditions. I had three excellent offers from industry: The Pyralin Corporation, Bethlehem Steel Company, and one other that I can't remember. Should I resign? No, the monthly check was best for my family.

MAJ MORRISON : During this time, World War I was taking place in Europe. What were your thoughts on the war and did you want to get in on the action?

LTG AURAND : Like all of the other officers "on duty with" the Ordnance Department that were in Course I Ordnance School, I put in immediately for a return to the coast artillery. Only two of these people escaped. Jimmy Lester, a classmate of mine, was one who escaped and Helmick. They were both field artillerymen. And, of course, the shortest category of officers in World War I were field artillery. They took coast artillerymen

and cavalrymen and made them field artillerymen... .filled all of the vacancies. Being caught in my own trap, I decided to give whatever job I had everything I could. And I didn't even read the papers to see what the action was in Europe.

MAJ MORRISON: In 1920, you again went to Texas; first, as an assistant to the Department Ordnance Officer for the Headquarters, Southern Department; and then one year as Adjutant and Disbursing Officer at the San Antonio Arsenal. During part of this year you also commanded the Arsenal. I read somewhere that you were the only officer present. What were the circumstances? Was this normal for an arsenal in 1920, and what was the ratio of enlisted men to civilians?

LTG AURAND: Let me say first that mind is not certain about this. But I never reported to Southern Department Headquarters. I don't know about this assignment that you read. It may have been in the orders, but I didn't go there. San Antonio Arsenal was not a normal arsenal. It was a small depot used to supply the ordnance needs of the Southern Department. It had an ammunition subdepot at Camp Stanley about, I guess, 15 miles from San Antonio, where there was supposed to be another officer. And I used the word "suppose" advisily. Both areas were exempt from the control of the Southern Department. The personnel operating the San Antonio Arsenal were entirely civilian; however, while I was there, it was used as a demobilization center for ordnance soldiers. There were temporary barracks and other facilities for several hundred. The "only officer present" was a technical term which authorized the disbursing officer to OK his own vouchers.

MAJ MORRISON: Did you find Army life and procedures to have changed because of the war?

LTG AURAND: Except for eight months at Fort Monroe in 1919, I have no basis for comparison. There I found everybody trying to restore the good old days.

MAJ MORRISON: You had a bedding roll shipped from Sandy Hook to Fort Monroe and later shipped the same to Fort Sam Houston. My question is, what's a bedding roll?

LTG AURAND: A bedding roll consists of a sleeping bag with a couple of straps attached so that the sleeping bag can be rolled and the straps closed around it, so it will stayed rolled. In it, there was suppose to be bedding. And I usually shipped mine. . .I usually used mine when I shipped it to put in all the junk that I couldn't find any other place to take along.

MAJ MORRISON: At this time, did the billets, or BOQ's, or what not, not have linen and what not that you had to furnish your own?

LTG AURAND: No, this was a field bedding roll. It wasn't for use on station.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: But you had to have it. So it was a great convenience. You could check it in the baggage on the train or you could express it. If you're going in the summertime, you put all of your winter clothing in there. You know your shirts, underclothes, wool socks, and so on. Because you don't need it if you just ship it without accommodating the passengers.

MAJ MORRISON: I guess now we let the supply sergeant take care of it. On

July 1, 1920, you change branches, officially going from the Coast Artillery Corps to the Ordnance Department. As stated, you had several ordnance assignments, but what was your real reason for transferring?

LTG AURAND: Well, I had neither war nor overseas service in the coast artillery. And also I was carrying out my objective set on graduation from West Point for an ordnance career. And what is more, until this date, I looked forward to a series of four year details in the Ordnance Department. Now, under the new National Defense Act, I had the privilege of being commissioned in the Ordnance Department. This seemed to be the climax of what I had planned as a cadet.

MAJ MORRISON: Also, in July 1920, you wrote a letter to the Chief Administrative Division at the Ordnance Office in Washington concerning the procurements of patents. Your questions were: "Would the Administration Division secure patents for officers in the Ordnance Department? Does subject have to be strictly ordnance? And do officers have the right to sell patents to civilian firms for the purpose of manufacture?" These were the questions that were in your letter, sir. My question is, what did you have in mind?

LTG AURAND: Well, I had in mind flashless powder. Apparently flash ranging was one of the technical devices they used to locate enemy artillery in France in World War I. And there was a great demand for a flashless powder while I was the Proof Officer at the Sandy Hook Proving Grounds. By pure chance, I was reading a mine Safety Manual in German one evening at Sandy Hook, and I found that they used to ram salt in after the black powder charge when they were blasting, in order to prevent the black powder from flashing and setting off any gas that might be in the mine.

MAJ MORRISON: What kind of salt was this, sir?

LTG AURAND: Rock salt.

MAJ MORRISON: Rock salt.

LTG AURAND: Like you used to make ice cream with, you know, from the freezer. Well, I had a couple of spare old 6" guns, and I put one on an universal carriage that I had designed.

MAJ MORRISON: This is while you were still at Sandy Hook?

LTG AURAND: While I was Chief Proof Officer at Sandy Hook. And we tried a couple of rounds. I put four or five pounds of rock salt in a cartridge silk bag -- it looked like a pancake and rammed that in just after the projectile, and then put the powder charge behind it. It worked fine, but it gave an awful lot of smoke. . .terrible. . .no flash. So that was alright, I thought. They could have a pillar of smoke by night and a pillar of fire by day which was backwards from what the Israelites had it, but would suit our purposes. Well, at this time, two of the big powder companies were trying to solve this flashless problem. And I was very much afraid that they would get ahold of this and patent it. I didn't know whether it was patentable or not, but I didn't want them to get it. And if the Ordnance didn't want to patent it because it seemed so simple and it could be patented, I wanted it patented in my own name. So if there was any change coming in I'd get it. When I got to San Antonio Arsenal, I talked with General Moseley who commanded the field artillery brigade of the 2nd Division. And he was going to have this 1st Brigade night firing problem which was to be a walking barrage out at Camp Stanley. The whole brigade participating, and they had some 155 Howitzers. So I got permission

from him to try this in one battery to see what it would do. And it worked very well indeed. The only difficulty was that the moon was out so bright that night that we could see the smoke. Given any kind of cover from the moon, it worked fine. I thought now that the news was out, and before anybody grabbed this off, I better get it patented either by the Ordnance Department or hopefully myself. But nothing came of it. It wasn't patented.

MAJ MORRISON: In August of 1920, you requested flight training in order to better understand the equipment being furnished the Air Service. You were turned down by the Chief of Air Service at that time Major General Charles T. Menoher, after the Ordnance Department had approved your request. Do you think they made a mistake. Not the Ordnance Department, the Air Service.

LTG AURAND: This is a strange thing to come to me because I told you that there may be a question that I wanted to change a little bit. And this was one of them. I guess this is alright to go on the record.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: Incidently, General Monher's son is a classmate of mine. . . a very fine soldier. And I'll try to tell you the story. In San Antonio at the time I was there, I had a great many friends at the two Kelley Fields. There are two Kelley Fields there: Kelley I and Kelley II. They persuaded me that I could make up for my absence of overseas service by becoming an aviator. And they said they'd see I got a little flying training to see how I liked it. So they assigned me a very excellent pilot who had been flight instructor. And he took me up and after making me sick three or four times, he really began to teach me to fly. And I was doing fairly well with cross country and take-offs when he said, "Now it's about time to try some landings." And on my first approach, I

came in about the height of the hanger roofs. So after he got the plane down safely, he said, "I think you better go have a physical exam to see whether you can get in the Air Force." It was then the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps. And I said, "Alright." So I had to go through the red tape of asking to transfer in order to get a physical exam. Well, that was approved, and I took the physical exam. And I found that I lacked depth perception and failed physically. So when the report went back to General Monoher, who was the head of the whole business, he had to turn it down. I wasn't physically qualified.

MAJ MORRISON: In September 1921, you were assigned to the Ordnance School at Watertown Arsenal as a Special Studies Officer or Special Student. What kind of studies were you involved with?

LTG AURAND: The Special Studies were to prepare me for a job in Washington as Chief of Design of Railroad and Seacoast Gun Carriages. When this job was done away with, I joined the regular students in Course II at the Ordnance School. Also, to complete Course I which I had started at Hook Proving Grounds, I attended a summer school at MIT. My efficiency report when I left Watertown Arsenal was shown to me by the commanding officer. It contained a remark degrading for an ordnance officer which read, "Suitable only for field service." The boards of line officers who passed on my subsequent classifications considered this remark to be a compliment.

MAJ MORRISON: In October 1922 you requested transfer back to the Coast Artillery Corps. What were your reasons and what happened?

LTG AURAND: Well, about this time, I had had twenty-seven months of a twenty-four month Ordnance School and I couldn't get anybody to give me a

diploma because they kept changing the course and adding something that I hadn't had before. You see by then it was six years since I'd started the school, with the war intervening. So I decided that if they didn't have a job for me, I might as well go back to the coast artillery. I wanted a career in ordnance; not to be a perpetual student. But before any action could be taken on this, they found a job for me as Ordnance Officer of the V Corps area at Columbus, Ohio. I don't remember if I ever got a reply to that letter. I think I got a telegram or something or maybe a phone call.

MAJ MORRISON: I think you asked them to. . .

LTG AURAND: Tear it up.

MAJ MORRISON: You asked it to be withdrawn.

LTG AURAND: Yeah. I knew all of the Ordnance personnel officers, and I was on the phone to them pretty often.

MAJ MORRISON: Well, sir, during your 1½ years as the Ordnance Officer of V Corps area, what were you doing? What was the V Corps Area's mission?

LTG AURAND: Well, it had the administration and training of all Regular Army, National Guard, Reserves, and ROTC's in its area. And its area was Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, and West Virginia.

MAJ MORRISON: What did the Ordnance Officer do?

LTG AURAND: Well, I was supposed to go out and inspect all of this ordnance equipment once a year. I had two armament machinists. One who was an artillery machinist and one who was a small arms one. And they actually did most of the physical inspection. My office consisted of a warrant officer, who was sort of my alter ego; clerk, who was also a secretary; and these two machinists. I was on the road practically all the time and

I hit all of the ROTC's. And there were an awful lot of them in those four states. Indiana and Ohio are just filled with small colleges. All of them have ROTC. The National Guard was very well scattered in company units, battery units. Of course, in Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Indianapolis, there were regiments and that's something we could go through in about a day. Based on the fact that I had travel money and none of the other tech services did, I also inspected all of the Signal equipment; all of the Quartermaster stuff; and whatnot. I learned a lot about these other services and their equipment. That was, I think, the primary duty. Then too,the camps out there were down in the winter. Knox was closed for the winter. Perry was closed for the winter. And I've forgotten where the place was in West Virginia, where one regiment trained. These all closed down, and we put the stuff in storage that was used by the Reserves and people who didn't have any armory service. You know places to keep equipment. They'd come there for summer training and they had to have stuff. And I had a few Ordnance enlisted men at these places in the wintertime. But I always managed to go down to Knox in April to help these guys out, and also the 10th and the 11th Infantry would go to the target range down there in April. So I had some excuse for being there, but I never missed a Derby all of the time I was down there.

MAJ MORRISON: Were these inspections along the lines of the. . .of what we have now, the annual general inspections or maybe more so the CMMI, the Command Maintenance Management Inspection, which the Army had done away with and now they are assistance teams.

LTC AURAND: They just changed the nomenclature. That's all. We'd go into an outfit. All of these outfits and camps and what not had some full

time duty soldiers. They might be Regulars or National Guardsmen; no reservists. They'd be one or the other. The National Guard camps had National Guardsmen. The National Guard armories had them. And they'd clean everything up. They'd clean all of the grease off the rifles, and everything else. And we'd test everything for functioning. We'd star gauged so many of the rifles. We'd get the head space on the bolt and all of that sort of thing. To make sure it was a safe weapon to fire and that it was in reasonably good shape. We didn't scream if there was a little rust on the trigger, but if there was in the bore, we did. In other words, it was more of a safety inspection, I would think. . .

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: . . .than anything else.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. At anytime, did you find that you had missed anything by not having served in Europe during World War I?

LTG AURAND: I'm not so sure that I had found that I had missed something by not being overseas in World War I. But I certainly felt sure that I had missed something which would have helped me in my career if I hadn't missed it. For example, the V Corps Area commander and nearly all of the staff, Special and General, had had overseas service. Colonel Symmonds, the G-4 advised me to make up for this by attending all of the Army schools that I could. And I think that I maxed that one.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. You were promoted to major for the third time on . . . , well, in January 1924. Having been promoted the first time in 1918. You were demoted to captain twice in 1920 and 1922. The U.S. Army had demotions after World War I, RIF's in 1957, RIF's in 1973 and '74, and there's some talk of demotions today. In retrospect, what are your thoughts

and reactions to being demoted, and do you think it's a better solution than a RIF?

LTG AURAND: Well, I don't know what happens to an officer in a Reduction-in-Force.

MAJ MORRISON: He's gone.

LTG AURAND: He's just gone. That's all. He gets a blue ticket. . . .

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: . . .and he's out. Well, we had a little RIFing in 1922 also. My demotion in 1920, I was told, was in connection with my transfer from the Coast Artillery Corps to the Ordnance, which had to be made in my permanent grade. So I had to be busted back to captain in Coast Artillery and transferred to Captain of Ordnance, then remade a major of Ordnance.

MAJ MORRISON: This was all paper work.

LTG AURAND: It took about five weeks. I lost about five weeks of major's pay. My demotion in 1922 was without loss of pay and allowances. So in fact as far as I was concerned, I've been a major from '18 to when was it . . . '36. My solution to this demobilization problem is too complicated to present here. As it envisions separating grade from pay throughout all time, not just at the time of demobilization but always. This enables you to not reduce a man's pay and give him a job where there's a vacancy no matter what the grade is. You get away from the nuisance of sending things to Congress and all of that sort of thing. The job carries the grade.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: Your length of service carries the pay and you'll have none of this trouble. But that's too complicated. Anyway my solution under the

present system is to let the rank be held until regular promotion catches up. And then change the date of rank to the date of the regular promotion. And that saves an awful lot of trouble. . .just an awful lot of trouble. But that's too simple for them.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, you had what seems to be an interesting assignment during the winter of '24 to '25 in the Ordnance Office in Washington as Chief of Field Service Mobilization Planning and Custodian of Captured Enemy Property. What was the scope of your duties and responsibilities?

LTG AURAND: A new general mobilization plan was to be presented to General Pershing upon his retirement in September 1924. I'd worked on this in the V Corps area. Along in July of 1924, the Ordnance Department discovered that it had an excellent industrial mobilization plan, but no plan for the distribution of what the industrial mobilization plan would produce. I was yanked and I mean yanked into Washington to make a plan for the distribution of these supplies. With the aid of an excellent and experienced secretary and an adding machine, I turned out a plan in about five weeks which was given a commendation by General Pershing. I guess everybody got one. This over, the Ordnance Office had no job for me. So they gave me odds and ends to do which nobody else wanted. One of these was Custodian of Captured Enemy Property, which gave me my first chance to appear before a Congressional committee. . .shades of things to come. My specific responsibility and scope came from the law enacted by Congress concerning this property. And all I did was turn these laws into regulations for the depots which had custody of this material and for the people who wanted to get it. Apparently the intention of Congress was to put a piece of every park in the country under the administration of the American Legion. Another job, odd job, was the

transfer of the procurement and distribution of the oils and greases used by the Ordnance Department from the Quartermaster Corps to the Ordnance Department. I worked this out with a friendly opposite number in the Quartermaster Corps.

MAJ MORRISON: During this period, sir, what authority did you have to make decisions and/or policy?

LTG AURAND: I set the policy and made the decisions on the mobilization plan as I went along. These were based for the most part on getting the thing done on time. Congress made the policies about the captured enemy property, and I decided how they would be carried out. The decision to transfer the oil and grease had already been made. My job was to negotiate transfer procedures. For the other odd jobs, the policy was, "Get this thing out of my hair."

MAJ MORRISON: In connection with the captured enemy property, what connection did you have with the German tanks and guns at Aberdeen?

LTG AURAND: I suppose they just complied with my regulations and put them there.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. Sir, from July 1925 to July 1927, you were the Ordnance Officer for the harbor defense for Manila and Subic Bays in the Philippine Islands. After ten years of military service. . .after over ten years, this was your first assignment outside the United States. What were your thoughts and aspirations at this time in your life.

LTG AURAND: My predecessor on Corregidor was killed in a run away trolley accident. I had his job according to the local time and at Washington before the accident happened. I wanted to get out of Washington and get overseas. My two main aspirations were not involved in this desire.

These were, of course, to have an ordnance career and to go to all of the Army schools. On Corregidor, Colonel Embick was the executive officer and he took me in hand. He had me prepare a paper on the use of railroads in war. With no decent library to help my research, but it gave me my start in the field of logistics and my first thoughts of a career as a logistician rather than an ordnance officer. Also, I travelled with the Navy around the Philippines and up the China coast, stopping at very seldomly visited ports to show the flag. And while I was on Corregidor, I received my second reprimand. It was for calling the Chief of Ordnance parsimonious in an official communication.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, generally what was the mission of the U.S. Army in the Philippine Islands during your period of assignment?

LTG AURAND: Well, I'm not sure about the Army, but the mission on Corregidor was to hold Manila and Subic Bays against attack for at least six months.

MAJ MORRISON: My memory slips me. In 1926-27, who were we holding. . .

LTG AURAND: Who were we holding it against?

MAJ MORRISON: . . .against?

LTG AURAND: Why primarily Japan?

MAJ MORRISON: Japan.

LTG AURAND: Japan, yeah. Japan's Navy had grown to beat hell, and then they had the 1922 Naval Treaty. . .

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: . . .and the 5/5/3 ratio and so on. And Japan was in the process of violating it in '27. We knew it and everybody else knew it, but they finally said publically. . .they said it about '31-'32. . .somewhere around there. I don't know when that was. Also, and I was going to speak

about this perhaps in connection with another subject if you asked me. There were inspections of fortifications. . .provisions for that in the 1922 Naval Treaty. And so the British in Hong Kong and the Japanese would come down and go over every damn bolt on Corregidor to see that we hadn't anything since the last time they inspected.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. Did we have the reciprocal. . .Did we go into Hong Kong and Japan to look at. . . ?

LTG AURAND: I didn't know. Of course, they wouldn't let us in the Marshalls and Carolines and the islands there that they had fortified.

LTG AURAND: I've forgotten the name of the one island that we knew that they had fortified very strongly.

MAJ MORRISON: What were your general feelings and those of your contemporaries of U.S. foreign policy at this time towards the Philippine Islands, toward China, possibly toward Japan?

LTG AURAND: Well, we certainly disapproved of the British and Japanese inspections, or at least the way they made their inspections under the 1922 Naval Treaty. And most of us agreed that the Philippines were not yet ready for independence. And we also had some idea that we were China's best friend because of our Open Door Policy. And as far as I saw on my trip up the China coast, I think this was correct.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. You're aware of the racial tensions, drugs, and supposed breakdown of discipline in today's Army. This isn't new. What problems did you experience with your troops?

LTG AURAND: Well, I had an ordnance detachment of a little over a hundred. It varied from time to time because of the irregularity of transports, but say 105 or 110. Something like that. And I never had any trouble with drugs

or alcoholism, which is the use of another kind of drug. And I had very little trouble with VD. But the American troops on the main island of Luzon were subject to alcololism and VD. I never heard when I visited Stotsenberg and McKinley and all of the other posts around there. . . I never heard anyone complain about the use of drugs as they are today. As to racism, there were no blacks on Corregidor. And our soldiers and the Philippine scout soldiers got along beautifully, and so did the officers and the scout officers. By this time, there were a half dozen West Pointers who were scout officers. And Vicente Lim, who was the first Filipino cadet of the Class of 1914. . .the class ahead of me. . .and Ver Quevedo, my classmate, went to all of the parties and all of the clubs. There was no racial feeling whatsoever.

THIS IS TAPE 1, SIDE 2, OF ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW WITH LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY AURAND, 5 APRIL 1974 IN ST. LOUIS.

MAJ MORRISON: During the Vietnam War, we had relatively short periods of troop duty for junior officers in command which were six months to a year. What are your views on the length of time soldiers should spend seasoning at the company level?

LTG AURAND: Seasoning to me means summering and wintering. I have advocated always unsuccessfully replacement by battalion. Get together a good cadre of NCO's and officers; fill it with recruits; train it; and then put it into a division. Relieve it after a total elapsed time of three years; hence the three year enlistment.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir you attended Leavenworth from September 1927 to June 1928. How were you selected?

LTG AURAND: No other ordnance officer put in a request to attend the year I did. However, one other ordnance officer was sent and he died of a heart attack while he was a student.

MAJ MORRISON: So at that time in 1927, there was not a list that came out of those selected. You requested?

LTG AURAND: In the Ordnance Department you did. I don't know the procedure elsewhere. A great many of the machine shop people didn't want any part of it, and so this was easy.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: I had a terrible efficiency report from the commanding general on Corregidor. He's another one who showed me the report before he sent it in. And may I elaborate on that a minute?

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: Everything was wrong with me except that I certainly knew how to store and test ammunition. And the main job of mine was to keep that ammunition war reserve in that tropical climate in good shape. So I thought he gave me a fine report. I guess I carried out my mission beautifully.

MAJ MORRISON: Did the numbers correspond? Did they have numbers at that time, or was it just a written report?

LTG AURAND: I don't know. I don't remember.

MAJ MORRISON: You don't remember, sir?

LTG AURAND: I just know that the rest of the report said I was no damn good.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. In what ways did the Command and General Staff School prepare you for the future?

LTG AURAND: Well, I think that I have these in the order in which I would say they were important to me.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: First, was getting to know the members of both faculty and the class. To me, to know people that you're going to meet in the future who were on that level of accomplishment is the most important thing. Then Leavenworth used to in the old days have a language of its own. And while you learned it by hearing other people talk it when you weren't a graduate; to go there and get it first hand was very, very helpful for communication. Through the problems I got to know better the logistical requirements of divisional units. You see all of my staff had been either post or corp. I never had any association with even. . .well, there weren't any divisions to associate with, but even the theory of divisional supply. And this

helped me to no end. Learning the tactics and technique of the various arms and learning the methods of obtaining coordination in a team with the varying types of units.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, after being exposed to the Southern Department staff at San Antonio; the corp area staff duty in Columbus, to the War Department General Staff by virtue of your assignment to the Office of the Chief of Ordnance; and the post staff duty at Corregidor; what were your impressions of the instructional staff duty at C&GSC?

LTG AURAND: For all of these assignments, I had been prepared with the idea that I had two bosses: the Chief of Ordnance and the local commanding general, in that order. I went back to my cadet experience where frequently I had two bosses. And I would choose the orders that I liked the better of the two that I got, and always without fear of punishment because I always could say, "Well, somebody else told me."

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: And I did this in all of my staff assignments. And I used the technical channel. . .I abused the technical channel of communication. When I got to Leavenworth, I found out that this was not the way to operate. I got a completely different concept of staff procedure, and it came out of a remark that I had heard in Washington. "That the General Staff is supposed to coordinate the Army, but it can't coordinate itself." And I began asking the question here and there at Leavenworth from people that I thought would have some information on the subject. "What was the cause of this?" "What was the foundation of such a comment?" "Was it just kidding, or was there something to it?" And I got all kinds of answers.

Some people said that it was because there were two levels of staffs: the General Staff and the Special Staff. Others said it was because certain technical staff people reported to G4 and certain other people to G1 and were simply parts of his office. And that the coordination down in the level where the work is really done, the Special Staff level, was impossible because of this split of the General Staff into G's. So I got nothing out of it except that this lack of coordination did exist and it was something at Leavenworth. When I went back to Columbus from Leavenworth, I was a different kind of staff officer than I had been on my previous tour. And it's lucky that I was because the commanding general we had then wouldn't let you send anything through the technical channel.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: And he was the only boss you had. You better believe it.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, were there any individuals that you met while at Leavenworth who had a lasting impression on you, either faculty or fellow students?

LTG AURAND: Well, of course, there were quite a goodly number and an omission doesn't mean that I didn't think well of some people I don't talk about.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: But the man who was closest to me was the man who was advisor to my group of students. In those days, there were about 200 or so in my class, and it was still a one year class. The next year, it was two years. But we were divided up into about ten groups alphabetically, and a faculty counselor was assigned to us. And he would hold meetings whenever he felt it was necessary. We'd ask him for meetings sometimes, and they would be held. And a fellow named Tommy Camp, who was an infantryman and an instructor

in infantry tactics, was our advisor. And that guy really kept us straight. He was just wonderful in that capacity. He also was a good platform performer and a good instructor in infantry tactics. And I saw very little of him until we were both retired and I was living in Washington. And low and behold, he lived a half a dozen blocks from me, and we saw a little of each other then and reminisced. But of all of the people I remember, I remember him the best. Colonel Besson who headed the engineer instruction was also an outstanding teacher, and I got to know him very well and his family. I knew General Besson who was the first head of the Materiel Command as a boy.

MAJ MORRISON: Was that his son?

LTG AURAND: That was his son. Yes.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: We had a very controversial fellow there who wrote the Caisson Song. We called him Schnitz. . .Schnitz Gruber, a great big field artilleryman. It seems that they had changed the tactics of field artillery since Gruber has last been at the Field Artillery School. And all of the field artillerymen who came into my class said Gruber was teaching us all wrong. That those weren't field artillery tactics at all.

MAJ MORRISON: I don't think it's changed.

LTG AURAND: I think he was a very forceful instructor and I certainly learned from it. I believe that among my classmates, I had many West Point classmates. And, of course, I knew them better. My West Point roommate and I studied together.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: We lived in what they called the Beehive.

MAJ MORRISON: It's still there.

LTG AURAND: And we lived on either side of the sallyport on the second floor. So our apartments weren't adjoining. The sallyport was between, but we'd go around the backporch and we'd study just like we did at West Point. One week he'd solve all of the problems and post a map, and I'd come over and listen to him. And then the next week, I'd do it in my house. I had to do this because I was working up in the theater after I finished my studying.

MAJ MORRISON: What theater, sir?

LTG AURAND: The Little Theater.

MAJ MORRISON: The dramatic theater.

LTG AURAND: Building scenery and whatnot. I think we put on six plays that year. So I was busy all year long. But it was wonderful to work with him. We understood each other. And, of course, he didn't do very well. He got a division and the next day he got hit in the shoulder and lost a shoulder joint. That was on New Guinea.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: At Lae. There were a number of classmates. I guess a dozen of them. I didn't find any of these people too outstanding. One of the classmates on the faculty was Jack Davis and he became my Chief of Staff in Chicago later on.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: So it went.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. Upon graduation from Leavenworth you were placed on the General Staff Eligible List. What exactly did this mean?

LTG AURAND: Well, in those days there was a General Staff Corps to which officers were detailed. To be eligible for detail to the General Staff

Corps, officers had to qualify themselves. And one way to do so was to graduate with a sufficiently high standing from the Command and General Staff School. When this was done, it was recorded that the officer had been placed on the General Staff Eligible List. This was so important to the students that in some of the classes ahead of mine there were several student suicides.

MAJ MORRISON: After C&GSC you went back to Fort Hays, Ohio and were again the Ordnance Officer for the V Corps Area. What changes did you find during your six year absence?

LTG AURAND: It was the same job; the same chief clerk; the same secretary; and the same armament machinist; and an officer assistant was there which I did not have the first time. Also, while I had the job before, I considered the CG and the Chief of Ordnance as I have already said to be equal. And I found a CG who said I had no other boss. Then there was a growth of pacifism in the area. A very distinct difference in the four years that I had been away. Senator Nye made his famous "Merchants of Death" speech, and the students chartered a train called the "Pax Special" and rode all around the country and staged parades and demonstrations in the various cities. And even the DuPont Company dismantled all of its military plants. Oh, I think it was no worse than we have now.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. It sounds similar.

LTG AURAND: Very, very similar. No longer were these words heard in the land. "Better for us to die in battle than to watch the ruins of our nation." And somebody had this in big print on the front of the paper. It was sort of a rallying call like this Canadian broadcaster thing.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: They were trying to get people back to patriotism again. But patriotism was no longer a virtue.

MAJ MORRISON: No.

LTG AURAND: And I'm not so sure that I'm right in picking this out as an illustration. But patriotism to me was a band marching down the street, and parades, and flags, and everything else. And this practically disappeared from the country. In this midwest part of the country anyway because I visited all around on these inspections and so on. And I wasn't at all surprised when in the protective mobilization plan, in one of them, I think it was for 2,400,000 men. General Marshall struck most of the bands out of the Table of Organization with the remark, "This war will not be fought with bands." In other words, he was saying that the patriotic enthusiasm wasn't there to be generated.

MAJ MORRISON: In the late winter and early spring of 1929-1930, you were sent to the Ordnance School at Watertown Arsenal in Massachusetts on detached service. For what purpose?

LTG AURAND: Due to my recent graduation from the C&GSC, I was made the instructor in the Ordnance School for the Ordnance Field Service Course at Watertown Arsenal. This seemed entirely appropriate to the commanding officer who was the same man who had put on my efficiency report, "suitable only for field service" in 1922. The first year I put together a series of lectures drawn from C&GSC and some of the problems that I got from out there and related these to the performance of the duties of the ordnance officer. I also corresponded with ordnance officers who served overseas in World War I. Obviously a textbook of some sort was needed, so I began the preparation of the Ordnance Field Manual. This manual is based entirely

on what is called "The Book'. Which means that it was based on what I was taught at Leavenworth. This brought into focus certain difficulties in coordination. Was it effective by making the special staff subordinate to the General Staff? Or certain special staff officers subordinate to certain General Staff officers? The book was not clear and explicit on this point, and practice varied with the commanding general. Also, in many instances, including the War Department, the special staff officer was also the commander of subordinate units. And I could find no resolution of the differences which had existed between General W. D. Conner and Moseley, successive G-4's on Pershing's staff in France and General Harbord, the commanding general of the SOS. Likewise the establishment of the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division of the War Department General Staff in World War I violated the generally accepted precept that the General Staff did not operate. Needless to say, I did not discuss these differences in the Ordnance Field Manual. My writing of the manual was interrupted by my attendance at the Army War College as a student in 1930-31. And this particular school session did not help me in the preparation of the manual.

MAJ MORRISON: This series of questions will cover the years in the '30's, covering the period 1930 to May 1940, at which time you were a student at the War College. You were on ordnance assignments at Raritan Arsenal in New Jersey, and at Aberdeen Proving Grounds. You were an instructor at the Army War College; duty at Picatinny Arsenal; and a student at the Industrial College which is now the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Sir, in August 1930, you again found yourself a student. This time at the Army War College in Washington. What did you think about your selection coming just two years after having attended Leavenworth?

LTG AURAND: Well, there were 30 some honor graduates in Leavenworth's Class of 1928. I just barely made it. Consequently, for the War College, I had adequate grounds to make a request. I did so for the Classes of 1929, 1930, and 1931 which I finally got. . .finally made it. I see no good reason for any particular lapse of time between studying for a doctor's degree after having gotten a masters. In the military a little application of what has been learned may be justified purely on the ground that it makes the lesson sink in. In the fall of 1930, I had had two years and two months of experience before becoming a War College student. And I felt that this was ample.

MAJ MORRISON: So you do not think that this was too fast. You were in your 15th year of service. This could very well happen today.

LTG AURAND: If you need a career ladder, you should go to your basic school when you're first commissioned; to the company officer's course of that school in your fifth year; to the advanced course of that year in your 10th year; to Leavenworth in your 15th year; to the Army War College in your 20th year; and to the National War College in your 25th. But this is only for those who need a career ladder. Some academicians. . . civilian educators I mean. . .would recommend that you take the whole business at once before you gain any experience whatsoever. So to answer your question now, yes, I was always nearly the youngest student or the youngest member of the faculty wherever I attended an Army school. But I was making up for not having gone overseas and I was in a hurry.

MAJ MORRISON: After your graduation from the Army War College, you were assigned to Raritan Arsenal until February 1933. Describe your duties during this period.

LTG AURAND: There was a limit to number of officers which the Chief of

Ordnance could have on duty in Washington. So each of the subordinate organizations of his office moved parts of their offices to an Ordnance establishment outside of Washington. The Ordnance Field Service established a branch office at Raritan Arsenal, and I was made its chief. The main functions of this office were to prepare descriptive pamphlets on such major ordnance items of issue which would contain also standard nomenclature lists and lists of spare parts normally issued with the principal item as well as special tools. Also, these pamphlets were supposed to contain instructions for the use of a piece of equipment whatever it was. These pamphlets were even more useful to me in the computation of requirements and tables of equipment when I first began to compute requirements on the General Staff. Actually, they can be thought of as an echelon lower than tables of equipment. But the details they provided enabled me to have a better view of the overall requirements that I computed. In addition, I was to complete the Ordnance Field Manual and to teach the Field Service Command Course of the Ordnance School at Raritan Arsenal rather than going back to Watertown. The students were sent to Raritan for this purpose. This assignment kept me in Washington on travel orders a great deal of the time because I had to confer with my Chief's in the Field Service Branch of the Ordnance Office. While living on my 22 foot boat in the marina in Washington in the summer of 1932, I was asked to be an aide to General McArthur at the time of the eviction of the Bonus Marchers from Washington. Unfortunately, I could not consent because all of my uniforms were back at Raritan Arsenal.

MAJ MORRISON: In February 1933, you were assigned to Aberdeen Proving Grounds. What were your duties there?

LTG AURAND: At this time the location of the headquarters of the Ordnance School was changed from Watertown Arsenal to Aberdeen Proving Grounds. And I was assigned permanently to the faculty with the assumption that I would inherit the commandant's position. Captain George Hirsch, a plebe when I was a first classman at West Point, who probably will appear in my story of China and Hawaii in this history was also assigned as a faculty member.

MAJ MORRISON: Did you get the job as the commandant?

LTG AURAND: No, I got ordered to the War College.

MAJ MORRISON: OK. From August '33 to June '37, you were an instructor at the Army War College. What department were you with and what was the thrust of your instruction?

LTG AURAND: I was in the G-4 Department, if you would call it that. The course was divided somewhat as follows: First, the "G" courses. These were as far as possible, problems of the various G's which the General Staff divisions of the War Department were facing at the time. And we frequently got requests for long range planning things from these various divisions, particularly G-4. The second period was devoted to war planning and mobilization planning. The third period, the execution of war plans mostly through map exercises. And the fourth was leadership at theater and War Department level. It included battlefield visits to Civil War battlefields. An interesting thing here was, the year I was a student, we went up to the Canadian border envisioning an invasion of American continent down the St. Lawrency Valley. And the Canadians got all sore about this, so we had to go back to the Civil War battlefields. The thrust of my own job in G-4 can be described by the title of my principal lecture each year,

"Supply and Transportation in the Theater of Operations." I had done considerable research in this area while writing the Ordnance Field Manual. Basically the supply system and the transportation system should be flexible and certain. I spent quite a lot of time determining how these characteristics could be obtained in both of these systems. For research purposes, I had divided the transportation system into the various kinds of transportation according to their efficiency for military use. In my opinion, these kinds are: first, ocean and inland water way; pipeline; rail; highway; and air. I broke down the supply system into three principal functions which were subdivided as I shall try to enumerate. The three principal functions were requirements, provision, and distribution. Under requirements, there were two functions: requirements as to kind or what we call R&D; and the other, requirements as to quantity. Under provision there were quite a few functions: purchase and contract, or if you're in a low enough echelon, requisition; the next was manufacture which was subdivided into plant, tools, materials, and management; the next was inspection; the next, acceptance; and the final function under provision was plant storage. Incidentally, a very much neglected subject in provision mobilization planning. . .industrial mobilization planning. The last function, distribution, started out with classification; transportation, storage, divided into depot storage, post storage, and unit storage, issue, maintenance, salvage, and finally disposal. The current difficulty at the time I gave these lectures was that at the provision function was vested in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, and all of the other functions of the supply system were under the Chief of Staff. And never the twain shall meet. And my every effort from then on was to try to get a single

single boss for the supply system.

MAJ MORRISON: While on the faculty, did you do any research outside the normal curriculum assignments?

LTG AURAND: Yes. The most important to my future concerned the problems of coordination: First, within a large staff and second, among commands. . . up, down and sideways. I determined to my own satisfaction that basically there was a dislike of large staffs which approached fear that they were unmanageable. To avoid them, the number of echelons of command were increased which greatly increased the number of staff officers required and the difficulty of coordination between command. My solution to the coordination problem was to provide the large staff with a non-hierarchical organization, and adopt a doctrine that a staff officer, at any level, is an advisor to next subordinate commander and to his opposite number on the next subordinate command. Also, that the staff officer and commander of any echelon should consult with his opposite numbers in the next lower echelon before approving plans or issuing orders for the employment of this next lower echelon. Also, I researched the mobilization and logistic support of the employment of the right wing of the German Army in 1914. It resulted in what I called at that time, "The Factory to Firing Line Concept of Logistics".

MAJ MORRISON: Did you reach any conclusions about participation in war with allies?

LTG AURAND: I thoroughly agreed with General "Fox" Connor, quote, "God forbid that we ever fight another war with allies," unquote. Also I agreed with Pershing's policy that the national forces should be placed under a single national commander when there is fighting in an alliance. Further, I agreed with the corollary that the commander of a national

force should have no other duty, particularly an international duty.

MAJ MORRISON: What knowledge did you gain from your attendance at the Army Industrial College?

LTG AURAND: Mostly knowledge about people. The members of the faculty and my fellow students. Two of the medico's who were my classmates took me on as tutor, the usual role for me apparently. And both wore stars in World War II and one finally became Surgeon General of the Army. For myself, I reconstructed a concept that had been stirring in my mind for quite some time while I was on the War College faculty. It was the approach that the military made to playing their part in the achievement of national objective. Of course, the military always had assumed a national objective because none was ever clearly stated during my entire career. The conventional steps of the military were: first, the strategic plan; then a special plan, which usually had a color, a plan for mobilization which would provide the troops required by the strategic plan; then a determination of material requirements for the troops, then, a plan for obtaining these material requirements which was usually called an Industrial Mobilizational Plan. Isn't this backwards? Isn't strategy the art of putting together available manpower and material in order to accomplish an objective. Immediately it becomes apparent that what is needed first is a general industrial mobilization plan which answers the question: How much production can the military have? The strategist then picks and chooses from this plan what he can have and how fast he can get it. However, in line with the then current idea during the course at the Industrial College, the students from each service computed their service's requirements

under the 1938 General Mobilization Plan. (This name may be in error. It may have been a four million man. Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP).

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what was it like to live in Washington during the '30's?

LTG AURAND: We were broke and in debt, but it was wonderful. Everybody else was. After we came to the War College, we lived in a big house at McNair as a major. I found one man who lived in that same big house as a second lieutenant. . .General Egerton. We had many class get-to- at my home and at homes of other classmates because there were many 1915ers on duty at that time. My Annapolis son brought home endless midshipmen for weekend leaves. And then there was that wonderful library at the War College.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, was this one of the row houses with the columns in front of the parade field?

LTG AURAND: Yes.

MAJ MORRISON: Rounding out the '30's, you were at Picatinny Arsenal as Chief of the Technical Group and later as a student at the Army Industrial College in Washington. During this period, Germany was becoming more belligerant. War was at hand. What measures were being taken regarding preparations for war, i.e. to build and train for contingencies?

LTG AURAND: Well, the job of the Technical Group at Picatinny was to increase the productivity or the mass production capabilities of all of the items for which it was required to design. These items included all ammunition larger than small arms for the Army and some items for the Navy. Tests for these drawings as production drawings were made in the manufacturing shops at Picatinny Arsenal to see that our object in the change of design had been achieved. Also, there were some new weapons for which ammunition

had to be designed; such as the 60 MM mortar and the 81 MM mortar. I've already given a description of what I learned at the Industrial College.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what were your reflections on the image of the Army and on the professionalism of the officers and also on the NCO Corps?

LTG AURAND: I had not worked with soldiers since 1927, so I can't comment on the NCO's. The officers I knew, particularly at the War College, were highly competent and so were the ordnance officers with whom I worked. Morale was bad, but it was improving as promotions began coming along. I made major in January 1918 and lieutenant colonel in April 1936.

MAJ MORRISON: How did the depression effect your life and that of your family?

LTG AURAND: I spent the first four years of it paying alimony, yet I was able to live in the Army and Navy Club in Washington. I've already mentioned the good life we led in the mansion at the War College.

MAJ MORRISON: You attended the Army War College and the Industrial College . . .today the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Today that would be almost an impossibility as officers are selected for senior service schools and attend either the National War College, the Army War College, or ICAF. Do you think this is a necessary restraint in order to give more officers the opportunity for senior service school?

LTG AURAND: It isn't a question of giving the opportunity to officers to attend. The one question is, are these people qualified to attend and how many qualified people do you need? In other words, it isn't the number; it's the quality. I would continue the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces as a single school with a two year course. And

I would make this the top educational institution of the Defense Department to be entered only by graduates of the service war colleges.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, before we go on, is there anything that you would like to add at this time?

LTG AURAND: Yes, I'd like to record my third reprimand. This came about one morning when we were walking back from the War College to our quarters for lunch. I had with me the head of the War Plans Section of the college and the G-3 section. And they were both cavalrymen. And they used to rib me a lot about being an ordnance officer and being on the War College faculty. So it happened that just at this time General Craig, who had been for four months the head of the War College, had been made Chief of Staff. And I remarked that, "I hope we get somebody besides a cavalryman to be our next commandant because at the moment with General Craig there, out of the sixteen people who had something to do with the education, nine of them were cavalrymen. The next thing I knew, I had a letter to explain what I meant by this remark, and I said that it had been made in jest and so on in my reply. And I got back an official letter saying that, "I had demeaned the Chief of Staff and I was hereby reprimanded for it."

MAJ MORRISON: Who sent you that letter, sir?

LTG AURAND: It was signed by the then Deputy Chief of Staff, who also was going to leave. . .

MAJ MORRISON: At the college?

LTG AURAND: No, of the War Department.

MAJ MORRISON: Of the War Department, oh!

LTG AURAND: This was a real strong one.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. Sir, at anytime during the 1930's did you have any contact with General Patton?

LTG AURAND: Yes, he wasn't a general then. I think he was a colonel in command of Fort Myer. And, of course, I saw him occasinally. He knew me and I knew him.

MAJ MORRISON: What year was this, sir?

LTG AURAND: He had graduated from the War College in '33, just before I came on the faculty. And I think he went to Myer to command from that. It could have been anytime after that in the next four years when I was in Washington. But I had bought a 22' cabin cruiser, and there was a marina just up the Anacostia River on the same side as the War College. . . right next door to the War College. So I got my 22' cabin cruiser who had a slip there and low and behold there's a 55' yacht with the twin diesel engine auxiliaries to the sails to make it go and it belonged to Colonel Patton, or General Patton. It was right next to mine. All boatmen come down on Sundays and work on their boats. That's a routine which when you buy a boat, you have to enjoy and you have to know that you'll enjoy it. So I'd be down there on Sunday and he'd be down there on Sunday. And one day he looked over the rail of his yacht down on my little 22' cabin boat. . .less than half as long and very much lower. And he said, "Aurand, why in the hell don't you get that tub out of the slip next to mine. It makes my macht look like the devil." Well, it took me a whole week to think up an answer, but the next Sunday, I said, "George." He looked over the rail and said, "What is it now?" I said, "Your damn yacht wouldn't look half as good if my little old tub wasn't tied beside it." Sometime in these years, George got transferred to Hawaii. So he decided

to take his family in his yacht and take the yacht to Hawaii. Well, he touched all the necessary points; through the canal; up the Pacific coast, and finally took off from San Francisco which happens to be closer to Hawaii then Los Angeles; and took off. I don't know what the Pacific Yacht Race time is, but he was about 15 days over that. And they couldn't find him. They had airplanes out and everything else. And one day, he came into sight of Honolulu Harbor and everybody cheered. And everybody on the boat was happy. . .everybody on his yacht. And he was greeted, and somebody said, "Where were you?" "Oh", he said, "We were sailing across the Pacific." And he said, "Well, did you use your engines?" He said, "No, we were in no hurry. I still have some leave left." "Well, did you know where you were all of the time? Weren't you lost?" He said, "No, no. I had a good navigator." "Well, who was the navigator?" He said, "I was."

END OF TAPE 1, SIDE 2.

INTERVIEW WITH LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY S. AURAND

BY

MAJOR WILLIAM O. MORRISON

THIS IS TAPE ONE, ALPHA, AND SHOULD COME BETWEEN TAPE ONE AND TAPE TWO.

THIS IS THE SECOND IN A GROUP OF TAPINGS WITH LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY S. AURAND. WE ARE PRESENTLY IN ABILENE, KANSAS, AT THE TRAILS END MOTEL. THE DATE IS 21 APRIL 1974 AND IT HAPPENS TO BE THE GENERAL'S BIRTHDAY. THIS GROUP OF QUESTIONS WILL COVER THE WASHINGTON DUTY WHICH IS MAY 1940 TO SEPTEMBER 1942, WHEN GENERAL AURAND WAS THE CHIEF PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS BRANCH G-4 OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF FROM MAY 1940, THEN AS CHIEF REQUIREMENTS AND DISTRIBUTION BRANCH G-4 FROM JUNE 1940, CHIEF SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION BRANCH FROM AUGUST 1940, THEN AS DEFENSE AID DIRECTOR OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT FROM OCTOBER 1941, AND AS CHIEF OF THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION ARMY SERVICE FORCES FROM FEBRUARY 1942, AND THEN AS COMBINED SECRETARY OF THE COMBINED PRODUCTION BOARD FROM JUNE 1942.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, you were in the class of 1940 in the Army Industrial College. Under what circumstances were you assigned to the General Staff?

LTG AURAND: Because of the contemplated increase in the Regular Army, the class of 1940 at the Army Industrial College graduated a few weeks ahead of time. Nearly all the students had orders before the closing date arrived, but I did not. It seems the Chief of Ordnance was not kindly disposed to me. Finally, orders came which assigned me as the Assistant Fiscal Officer of the Ordnance Department. I consider this to be a dead end street. I had come to Washington with the idea that this would be an ideal place for me to obtain duty overseas but I felt sure that this assignment, Assistant Fiscal Officer, meant that the request for orders overseas would fall on deaf ears. In those days there was a free bus which shuttled back and forth between the munitions building and the Army-Navy Club at lunch time. One day on the way back from lunch, I rode on the bus with Colonel W. M. Robertson and R. L.

Maxwell. Both were first classmen at West Point when I was a plebe. Robertson had been the logistical instructor of mine both at the C&GSS and at the War College. And in 1933 he had recommended me to succeed him on the War College faculty. Way back in 1918 when I was at Sandy Hook, Maxwell was at Picatinny Arsenal and we worked together trying to develop a flashless powder. Not only did I get to know him well then but our paths crossed many times since we were both ordnance officers. I found on the way down on the bus that Robertson was an Executive Officer G-4 and Maxwell was the head of the Plans and Requirement section of G-4 himself. The next echelon of organization of G-4. I wondered out loud to these fellows why they hadn't grabbed me off to the G-4 section. You know, I had been on the G-4 member of the War College faculty and had done well in both Leavenworth and the War College on the subject. Well, Robbie said, "You aren't pure." And I said, "Yes I am." And I said, "You know the law is that a Staff Officer like an Ordnance Officer is, I should have done one year out of the last five in order to stay on the the General Staff and also if an Ordance Officer or other Staff Branch Officer attends a General Service School which the Army Industrial College is, it counts as one year of troop duty, so I'm as pure as the driven snow." And Robbie said, "Maxie, is that so?" And Maxie said, "Yes, that's so." Well," Robbie said, "Come on up to my office." So, I came up to his office and he went and talked to General Moore who was the G-4, for a few minutes and then he came out and said, "Come on in." And I shook hands with General Moore and he asked me a few questions and looked at Robbie and said, "Okay." So we went on in to Robbie's office and in

thirty minutes I had my orders assignment cancelling my being Assistant Fiscal Officer of Chief Ordnance and assigning me to G-4 and then a G-4 memorandum assigning me to be Maxwell's Deputy in Plans and Requirements for this. And that's how I got on the General Staff.

MAJ MORRISON: During the period May 1940 to September 1942, you were involved in many changes of national policies and reorganization within the War Department. I would like for you to trace some of these changes as you saw them through the whole period and begin with your own assignment, please trace them for me, sir.

LTC AURAND: Before answering this question, I'd like to make two general observations. Many changes of national policy were caused by the President who had to sell the isolationists segment of the country and the even more strongly isolationists Congress by a step to step method to get the industry of the country converted to military manufacture. Second, the War Department itself, in addition to the President's step by step action, was influenced by the military happenings abroad. Without questioning the decisions made at the time, because I can't take my mind back to what those circumstances were, the result was in retrospect a too soon a stop and a too late an effort. As I already told you, my first assignment was Deputy Chief of Plans and Requirements section of the G-4 Division of the War Department General Staff. G-4 was then organized into four sections. The other three were called Supply, Transportation and Construction; no none of these sections, including my own, covered the provision function of the supply system which included procurement. Provision was handled by the office of Assistant Secretary

of War. The officer in the Assistant Secretary's office, with whom I worked, was a Colonel James H. Burns who was known as Jimmie Burns the General because later on Justice Burns resigned from the Supreme Court and became the Chief of Mobilization for the President and, of course, he was known as Jimmie Burns the Justice. In addition, the Assistant Secretary's office there was my classmate, Colonel Tenny, later Brigadier General Tenney and Major McMoreland, later Brigadier General McMoreland. The Plans and Requirement section was manned by a planner, one planner, Lieutenant Colonel Griner by two computers of requirement who were Bill Goodman and Walter Wood and by one director of Research and Development who was Major Tony McAuliffe who handled the boards, the line boards, the infantry board, the cavalry board and so on. Generally he was known as the R&D man and there was still another member, the last member of my section, Lieutenant Colonel Hoag, Army Air Corps who handled the Army Air Corps actions in any of these fields, whether it was Griner's or Goodman's or McAuliffe's. These people constituted a group which was later represented on the Army Services Forces Staff by about four hundred officers. I don't say we did the work of four hundred men but it just seemed like it. The evolution of my assignment began shortly after my arrival when Colonel Maxwell was made the Executive Officer of the Export Control Board under Vice President Wallace who was the Chairman and I then became the Chief of P&R section as we called it - Plans and Requirements. And the next change occurred only a little while later and it came about in this way. The supply section was headed by an old friend of mine named Jeff Keys who later became a Corps Commander who somehow

or other slid out of the General Staff and back to the troops and who should come in to replace him, my West Point roommate Doc Waldon and this made working together very easy. But when the requests for foreign assistance began coming in a year and a half before Lend Lease, we had to work so very closely together and General Moore decided that we'd make it one section and I think I ranked Doc Waldon five files and said, "I was the Section Chief and he was the Exec." And for a while he was a little mad about it but we had known each other too long and too well to make any difference so we became the Requirements and Distributions section. Now all of these solicitors for additional property and whatnot had to have some sort of transportation and most of the transportation at this time, outside of the re-enforcement of the Philippines which was going on, which they were allotted had to go in their own bottoms. Also, there was rail transportation involved in all that, so they said the best way to coordinate all this was to put it in with the supply people, under the supply people. I've always thought that transportation should be under the supply people but then finally it was done here without my soliciting at all so we became the Supply and Transportation Section in G-4 and, therefore, we had only two sections of G-4; Supply and Transportation and Construction. Now the Chinese who had won much sympathy, began coming in directly to my office. The British were already in there rearming Britain after Dunkirk. And so the South Americans were in there, the Under-Secretary of State had promised Armored Division to Brazil and things like this. They were saying when do we get them and it was necessary to begin sorting this out so I brought in officers who

were in charge of specific countries, that is they were older opposites, I mean, not older but opposites to their members of that country who tried to do business with us. And one of them in particular was Major Hayden Boatner, who was an old China hand. He had studied language in China and did a very fine job in handling the Chinese for me at this stage of the game, later he too escaped to combat duty. One of the first things that came up out of this was that we should have some sort of mission in the foreign country to show them how to use this stuff and while it didn't come to pass at this time, Boatner's study on this was the basis of the foreign missions we went over later. At this time, the group began getting so big that I asked another classmate of mine, Lieutenant Colonel V. V. Taylor with whom I had served on Corregidor and who was the Adjutant there when I was Ordnance Officer to head up this foreign group and what became known as my international branch was then created. Finally, the Transportation section as I have said, became a branch of our section. It was Frank Ross who headed it and later became the Chief Transportation Officer in the European Theater of Operations as a Major General. In the meantime, there were other vital changes in G-4. General Moore became the Deputy Chief of Staff of logistics and was replaced as G-4 by General Eugene Reybolt. Robertson got out of the job in order to go to troops and commanded the 2nd Division throughout the war in Europe and he distinguished himself on the north flank of the Bulge with that famous Division. He was replaced by Colonel Frank Mallon. In the early fall of 1941, I was made Defense Aid Director of the War Department, that is,

and I took with me practically all the international branch of my office, including V. V. Taylor who became my executive officer. In the War Department reorganization of 1942, the office of the Defense Aid Director became the International Division of SOS, later the Army Service Forces. The home offices of my missions were transferred to the War Plans Division over my violent opposition, I might say. In June 1942, I became the combined Secretary of the combined production board and I'll explain that if you ask me a question about the board a little later. In early September of 1942, I was ordered to the Sixth Service Command in Chicago to take over that command and this was the ending of that part of my career in which I worked the hardest and I hope accomplished the most of any period in my military career. And I would like to add if it hadn't been for the superlative preparation I had, both by experience and by my work in the Army School system as student and faculty member, I wouldn't have been able to handle the job. I think this is a most important point of view for the future.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, please trace for me the changes in the Neutrality Act of 1936 which prohibited the export of weapons from the United States and what effect did these changes have on your activities?

LTG AURAND: Well, the popular name was given to these changes was on 4 November 1937, pardon me it's 1939, the cash on the Barrel-Head Act or the Cash and Carry Act, whichever you want to call it. In July 1940, the Exchange Contract Act and on 11 March 1941, the Lend Lease Act. The primary computation for all three of these changes, as far as requirements for equipment was concerned, was how much of our War Reserves could

be given to the foreign countries. This amount depended on what the difference was between what we had on hand and how much was required for the protective military program forces. Both of these deteriorated in the wrong direction. The amount in the war reserves decreased and the PMP program increased in strength. So that less and less became available for foreigners. The second dilemma was military services were not allowed to sell directly to foreign countries under the Cash on the Barrel-Head Act. Mr. Stettinius found the solution by having the U. S. Steel Overseas Corporation purchase the supplies from the military and then sell them to the foreign countries. Fortunately, the supplier didn't know this and they went directly from the depot to the dock. The third dilemma was what plant should be allocated for the production of foreign type munitions. This was a job of MacMoreland in the Assistant Secretary's office and I kept a watchful eye on it because I wanted to be sure that the plants which could quickly produce U. S. equipment would not be utilized to produce foreign type equipment. We worked together very closely because we had known each other so well before. Well, in the winter of 1938-1939, we saw the beginning of these orders for foreign munitions by foreign countries. I came in at the peak and toward the end, particularly for airplanes which consisted by far the greatest volume of these orders, the foreign countries built new plants for the protection of airplanes of their own design. This dilemma was partly solved by the Exchange Contract Act which permitted foreign countries to pay for munitions taken from the war reserve by ordering U. S. type equipment of equal value in places designated by our own industrial

mobilization plan and consequently we got back new equipment for old in effect. Lend Lease opened the door wide to invasion of not only our war reserves but the initial equipment of the PMP forces. Nothing needed to be paid for these munitions by the foreign governments and so the requirements rose accordingly. Maybe the cruelest part of all this was, particularly, of the legislation that General Marshall had to certify that these munitions were surplus to the needs of the defense of the United States and I had to tell him that they were. Fortunately, this practice was stopped when Pearl Harbor occurred. There was no more argument about what was surplus and what was not in the Congress.

MAJ MORRISON: Please give me the succession of world wide military events which sparked military preparations of the United States.

LTG AURAND: Well, let me say in advance that these sparks ignited action at the White House and the office of the Assistant Secretary of War and in the War Department General Staff. The events which caused a new look to be taken at our defense posture and which usually resulted in the new troop basis on which we had to recomputate requirements had to be calculated after the following: 1 September 1939, invasion of Poland. Remember I was not yet on the General Staff for that but those computations were in the mill when I got there. 9 April 1940, invasion of Denmark and Norway. That added a few more tanks and planes and whatnot and I wasn't there yet. 10 May 1940, invasion of Holland, Luxembourg and Belgium and I landed in the middle of that computation. 29 May to 5 June 1940, the British evacuation of Dunkirk. And that really kicked

off a lot of sparks, that was perhaps the best spark display that we had until Pearl Harbor. 22 June 1940, the fall of France. In the fall of 1940, the battle of Britain. 2 April 1941, the British defeated in North Africa. 28 April 1941, British withdraw from Greece. 1 June 1941, Crete was captured by the Germans and this was by verticle envelopment which really turned a lot of people's thinking around just like sinking the battleships at Pearl Harbor did. 22 June 1941, the invasion of Russia. And next to the fall of Dunkirk, this was a spark producing and, of course, Pearl Harbor which we all know was on . . . .

MAJ MORRISON: The basis of the increases in the total strength of all components of the Army was called 'Protective Mobilization Plan,' there appears to have been frequent changes in this plan in 1940 and 1941. Can you trace these changes?

LTG AURAND: At the end of May 1940, when I first arrived in G-4, the basis for the computation of the requirements for the Army was one million men. It's actual strength about equally divided between Regular Army and National Guard was just under 5000 thousand. In June 1940, the PMP's first expansion strength was put at two million men and the ultimate strength at four million. In February 1941, these strengths were again changed slightly. The basic strength one million 400 thousand, the first increase two million 800 thousand, and the total strength four million 100 thousand. By June 30, 1941, the actual strength of the Army was in round numbers, one million 400 thousand men, the target for the first step of the PMP. But these numbers were not the only ones computed.

They did not include the large number of various other numbers which had to be summed up and used as a basis for the decision, which determined that these numbers would be used. So that as far as the computation of requirements by G-4 was concerned we may have computed nine different sets of PMP numbers whereas three were all that appeared in the official record. Major, later General Wedemeyer, based his figures for the determination of the requirements of the victory - eight and a half million men by September 1941. One of the purposes of General Wedemeyer's computation was to indicate to the country and those in authority how much productive capacity would be required for military purposes.

MAJ MORRISON: A civilian organization was given the task of dividing raw materials and production facilities between the military and civilian needs. Please trace this history from May 1940 to September 1942.

LTG AURAND: Well, I'll have to go back to August 1916, when there was an established council of National Defense. It had become quite inactive in the intervening period. To undertake the task of dividing the American industrial resources between foreign military orders, the U. S. military requirements and the civilian requirements, both U. S. and foreign, the President appointed an advisory committee to the Council of National Defense in May 1940. In just 1941, it was reorganized into the office of Production Management and on 28 January 1942, it became the War Production Board. I expect to use these terms interchangeably in any further questions that you ask me about this organization. There was a quite separate civilian organization, however, which was created to

handle Lend Lease, called the Lend Lease Administration. The growing pains of these two civilian organizations caused much difficulty for the military, particularly the General Staff. But they were most helpful in those spheres of influence and authority when they finally found out what those spheres of influence were. Most of the difficulty in this respect lay in high classification of the War Department Plans and the inability to give these to the civilian people who needed them. And this was one task that I finally set myself to and did overcome. I was ably helped on this though by Jimmie Burns, the General. Now later on and quite a little later on in 1942, there was another civilian organization which was called the Combined Production Board. This was an offshoot of the U. S. War Production Board. It attempted to combine the whole industrial efforts of Britain and the United States and further than that I can't define the mission.

MAJ MORRISON: Please list the appropriations which supported or influenced your activities during this same period.

LTG AURAND: On July 10, 1940, the President presented to Congress what was called the munitions program of 1940. The amount was roughly 3.91 billion dollars. Now I have a story in connection with this which I think I should tell. It's been published but I happened to be there. I went to the office of the President with General Marshall carrying the papers to defend about five and a half or so billion dollars for this particular appropriation, whose main purpose was to keep up the military manufacturing program. When we got in there everybody sat down, the President

was very jovial and then he said to General Marshall, "I've had in mind all this time just to start you off, you understand, about 4 billion dollars rather than this higher number." and he said, "You know, I have to sell this amount to Congress. Now if my wife went down to shop and saw a hat in the window marked five dollars, she wouldn't buy it, but if it is marked four dollars and ninety-nine cents, she couldn't resist it and she would go in and buy it. So you can have 3.99 billion dollars." Later, it was trimmed down by the budget to about 3.91 billion as I said and we got that back in contract authorities so it was about 4 billion dollars that the U. S. Army first started on its industrial preparedness program. They had the program forever, but this was the first good money they got. Now I'll skip a lot of others because it's almost ritualistic that each one got a little bigger. But the first Lend Lease appropriation came on 24 May 1941 and that was 7 billion dollars, however, that wasn't military Lend Lease, I don't know how much we got out of it but if we got three, I'd be surprised. And to show how the Lend Lease followed along, their next one was about 6 billion dollars. They didn't go up so fast and that was on 28 October. And the reason for this was the Stimpson and McCloy and Henry Aurand were all trying to get the military Lend Lease money and the U. S. procurement money in one appropriation and then allocate the product when it left the factory. It didn't belong to anybody until the time it was finished. And we finally put this over in November, late November 1941, and there are two different accounts of when this was finally ratified. I insist it was just a day or two before Pearl Harbor and some of the

others say it was quickly passed by the Congress as soon as the Pearl Harbor attack occurred. But that was for 28 billion dollars and whether we got going, you know, because of Pearl Harbor but it was fortunate that we had that dough in our hands on Pearl Harbor day.

MAJOMORRISON: Sir, was your experience in the logistics department of the War College a benefit to you in making supply and mobilization estimates?

LTG AURAND: I would like to add Raritan Arsenal and the Army Industrial College to the War College. At the Raritan Arsenal Armor, I learned the mechanics of the details of the compilation of requirements. At the War College, I learned how to make the computations of the requirements for critical items. The ones that usually took the longest time to make and present them to higher authorities, to the Secretary of War or to the President. At the Industrial College, I learned the details of computing mobilization requirements in such a manner as the budget required and as the Congress required so that they could be easily defended before both. And from the three, I had the best preparation for the job of determining requirements that anybody in the military service could have.

MAJ MORRISON: In July 1940, the President obtained funds from Congress in the amount of 3.91 billion dollars for the munitions program of 1940. How was this money spent?

LTG AURAND: The original request of the War Department has been for PMP strength of 800 thousand, note that this is still another basis, the amount for munitions was 5.9 billion dollars. There was some difficulty

in working back the strength that the new amount would buy and, as you know, the new amount was 3.91 billion dollars. Some people guessed that it would be about 450 thousand men and here was a chance to provide facilities for long lead time items and also the tools that were needed in these facilities for production purposes. My memory is that of the first amount, 1.2 billion was earmarked for facilities. And this amount for facilities remained in the lesser amount of 3.91, but when it came to the actual expenditures, I believe that this was more nearly a fifty-fifty split and perhaps 2 billion dollars was spent for facilities and tools. All of which made . . . it gave us a year's jump on production when Pearl Harbor day occurred. Also, I'd like to add that when you figure out the strength then that these things that were ordered, half of it, 2 billion dollars would support, it was less than 400 thousand and yet at this time, we drafted a force which by July 1941, was one million four hundred thousand men, a million more men than we had provided equipment for a year ahead which was about the time it takes to make it.

MAJ MORRISON: How did the cash and carry Act, sometimes called the Cash on the Barrel Head Act, work with respect to rearmament of Britain?

LTC AURAND: The Cash and Carry Act had two purposes which helped the French and the British place contracts for munitions in the United States. First, they could do so without obtaining any credit from the United States. They used their own dollar. Second, they could take the munitions out of the country but not in U. S. ships. This gave us an apparent position of neutrality which was the object of both the Congress and the President.

Now, the third dilemma I've already described and that was they couldn't purchase directly from the government and the U. S. Steel Overseas Corporation was used as an intermediary.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what kind of contact did you have with the British after the fall of France?

LTG AURAND: The British mission arrived shortly after Dunkirk looking for munitions for rearmament. And I was called into a meeting in General Strong's office who was then Chief of the War Plans Division. And my only recollection of that meeting was that I met Brigadier General Donald Campion with whom I worked very closely thereafter. The fact that the British were in touch with the War Department and military British at that, had to be kept completely secret. The British rented some apartments on "K" Street, not far from the Army-Navy Club as individuals. They were not permitted at the start to come to the munitions building at all. When I went to see them I walked down the alley between "K" and "I" streets and went up a fire escape, which fortunately had been anchored to the ground so we didn't have to raise and lower the last flight down. The principle tasks at that time was to match the U. S. surpluses with the British needs. The first few differences in amounts were items which the British needed and so did the U. S. for its protective Mobilization Plan. General Marshall was holding the line on not invading the PMP requirements and then there would be a cable to London for further instructions, but when no answer came, I persuaded Campion, my Brigadier friend, to send them a message reading, "In absence of a reply to ours of a blank date, we are going ahead as follows."

Unquote. In the months that followed before Lend Lease made the British Army Staff's presence legal, I continued my climb up the fire escape almost daily. One of the things that endeared me very much with Brigadier Donald Campion the first time I met him was during an interlude in the meeting in General Strong's office, he took me outside into one of the halls of the munitions building and said to me, "Do you make very cheap single shot pistols?" And I searched my brain and said, "I don't know of any; I imagine there may be some, why, why do you want those?" "Well," he said, "When we go back to France, we'd like to drop these from airplanes so that the French could pick them up and kill one German and get away, drop the pistol, no evidence, no nothing." But what really cheered me up no end was that here was a Britisher right after Dunkirk, talking about going back to the continent and I got along with him very well.

MAJ MORRISON: During the early days in G-4, did you have anything to do with the development of the Jeep?

LTG AURAND: There was a fellow named H. R. Kurtz who was a very old friend of mine, he was a member of the class at West Point of the class of 1911 so I didn't know him at West Point but I knew him very well afterwards. And we ran across each other in the hall of the munitions building one day and he told me that a friend of his had some kind of a motor driven buckboard which the infantry board had turned down as unsuitable for a mobile machine gun mount. Jack, as Colonel Kutz was called, thought his friend had something and would I have him come to see me. Sure. Certainly. Jack's friend was a salesman from a small company near Pittsburgh. The infantry board at Benning had turned down his motorized

buckboard on three counts, lack of road clearance, too long a turning radius and noise. After some discussion, he said that they could do away with the first two objections but then a profile of the thing would be too high which was an even worse objection. He produced some drawings of such a vehicle with a high profile. In my mind, it was absolutely unsuitable for a machine gun mount. But, what a pretty little truck. Let's go see the Quartermaster General who at that time bought our trucks for the Army and when I got there, QMB called in all his motor experts and they looked over these drawings and so on and they were all shaking their heads, "No," Well, I knew nothing about automotive design, but I began asking a few dumb questions and they are always harder to answer than smart ones and by the time this was over much to the red faces of the salesman, I had sold the Quartermaster General's office on buying some - what became known as one quarter ton trucks 4x4. Well, I wasn't going to leave that office because everybody was just shaking their heads "yes" because I saw there was resistance, so I asked the Quartermaster General to bring in his secretary and I dictated a memorandum directing him to buy three of these one-quarter trucks 4x4, all of them with four wheel drive and two of them with front wheel steer and the third one with front and rear steer. This was to overcome a long radius to turn around. And I signed it by order of the Chief of Staff, H. S. Aurand, G-4. Well, I went back to my office and forgot all about it until one day a call came from the Quartermaster's office. There was going to be a demonstration of the one-quarter ton truck 4 x 4 at Camp Hiliber, over the obstacle course and all this sort of thing that they put regular passenger cars

over, would I come? I sure would. The little truck was a dream. Everybody drove it. I mean, they had all of the board members of the field artillery board and the coast artillery board and infantry board and everybody else up there. I guess it was all afternoon until everybody drove it and drove it through the obstacles. Oh, they were enthusiastic about it. We could have board meetings right there and adopted the thing as standard. And then one of these arms people said, "Let's take it to Washington on the Fort Meyer parade ground or somewhere and invite all the Chiefs of Arms to come out, because they'll ask all kinds of questions and we can't answer and have three of the test drivers drive them down and give them a ride." So this was done. And one Sunday morning everybody came down. So, the number one test driver starts this thing up and he gets General Lynch, who was Chief of Infantry and General Moore, then Deputy Chief of Staff of Logistics, no he was still G-4, I don't know, it doesn't matter - and in the back seat and he straps him in like they used to strap yourself on a caisson, you know, your feet in straps and so on, and this fellow takes off around the parade ground and General Moore said, "Well, this is no test. Isn't there some rough terrain around here?" And there was a big swail at the south end of the Meyer parade ground, so the fellow goes down one side and up the other, down that side and back up and you know, on a sort of sinusoidal course, and right in the middle of this thing, along comes General Marshall on his horse. He stopped everybody and he said to General Moore, "Well, what you got there?" "Oh, I don't know," said General Moore, "This is called a quarter-ton truck 4x4." "Well," he said, "Buy one for each regiment,

right away." So this was great. Well, then everybody else had a ride but General Herr, who was then Chief of Cavalry, held back and he wanted to drive this thing himself, so . . . and he wanted to drive the four-wheel steer one which hadn't been driven up to that point. So the fellow drove him out to the middle of the parade grounds , hastily took over and turned the thing over to General Herr, and as soon as he stepped on the gas, he threw the wheel over hard right, as hard as he could. Well, when General Herr picked himself up off the parade ground, he had been policed by a one-quarter ton truck 4x4 and not by a horse. We had a good time with that, you know, at that particular test and the, of course, the tests all went fine. We had . . . nobody had any drawings, these were all in people's heads out there. This little firm, they bought a part from here and a part from there. So, we figured out how many . . . what the requirement was and it was 1500, I think, counting the somewhat higher echelons and the regiment if they wanted some, and so we told the War Production Board, I mean Jimmie Burns the General, did. He was with the War Production Board, to buy 1500 Jeeps from this company because there were no drawings, they were the only ones who knew how to make them. Well, the first thing I knew I was getting requests back from the War Production Board to increase the number required. Now, I said, "I can't do this." And finally, a guy came to see me and said, "I want to tell you something. This company couldn't make 1500 Jeeps in a year."

MAJ MORRISON: Was this the Bantam Company?

LTG AURAND: Yes. It used to make special vehicles for special purposes by assembling bits and pieces that they could buy. A transmission here,

a front-wheel drive there, wheels there and so on that would fit a special requirement, say for hauling concrete reinforcing rods, you know that kind of a . . . a job shop and they weren't doing too badly. This was a great departure from what they were doing and they would have to have done it the same way. And, of course, they would have to get the allocations of the parts in order to assemble it. So, that's why they reported it. And he said Ford and Willis are both looking into it. Well, my ears went this way because at this time the Ford Company was on the outs with Mr. Roosevelt and we didn't dare contract with the Ford Company. Well, I wondered why Willis and Fort were interested in this. It looked like somebody wanted Willis to get the job, I won't say that, but knowing what I did, it looked like that to me at the time. And they said, "In order to get tools for this, really tools for it and whatnot, they need about 4000 or 4500 orders and we'd like to give them each 4500, no it worked each 4000, that's right, and give the 1500 to this company that invented it but make Ford and Willis submit drawings of their own, you see so it would be their drawings and they would be in competition with Bantam and so forth. So I said, "Alright, if it's a question of production, I'll go and see Jimmie Burns," and they said, "Oh, no, we've talked to him and it's alright." And I said, "I'll go and see him," and I saw him and Jimmie said, "That requirement is your baby." So I signed it and I ordered all together I guess it was 7500 that I split between Fort and Willis and the other company the other 1500. Well, in a short time Mr. Paterson arrived as Assistant to the Under Secretary of War. He was very interested in the Jeep and I spent much time with him in his

office talking to him about it and giving my view of its history. After about six weeks he told me that the first job Judge Patterson had given him was to investigate my role in the increase of the orders for the Jeep. He added that he had found me entirely clear of any connivance with either Ford or Willis. And even after that exhorbitant number of 9000 for the next twelve months, we were very, very short of Jeeps a year later. They became very popular. And this gentlemen, despite what Willis, Oberland Company published later, is the true story of the Jeep.

MAJ MORRISON: What contacts did you have with the Advisory Committee to the Council of National Defense?

LTG AURAND: I believe that my first contacts were with Bill Knudsen. We all called him Bill. He was the Chairman at that time. And my recollection is not too clear. But as I recall, there was an effort being made to determine the facilities for long lead time items. The thing that was constantly repeated in the news in those days, facilities for long lead time items. The three I think of to illustrate them were, airplanes, tanks and ammunition. Of course, all of these items would require new facilities. You had to start by building factories and then building tools. And all of them were being ordered by England and France, also, Some of their own types and some of the U. S. types depending on which Act they were under at the time. What was wanted from the War Department General Staff was an estimate of the requirements which would permit at least the planning of such facilities. Colonel, later Major General Burns, Jimmie Burns the General, took me on my first visit to Bill Knudsen. Afterwards somebody from his office took me to

meet some lesser light of Mr. Knudsen's office for conferences. The committee had two economists by the way who were also statisticians and I worked very much with them. The senior was Stacey May and Robert Nathan was the other. Robert Nathan came to my office quite early in my tenure, I believe just after I took over from Maxwell and wanted all the requirements of the Army for a major emergency. I gave him what I could but warned him that these figures were not official figures of the War Department, nor were they my official figures. I went to his office in Washington last February, just two months ago to try to help my memory but I didn't get much farther than this. And I want to say here, parenthetically, that while I was in the Industrial College one of the courses was computation of mobilization requirements. And we were handed the general mobilization plans. And I do not recall whether this was the general mobilization plan of 1938 or 1939. I do not recall if it was based on a War Plan like Rainbow number something or other and I'm sorry to say I don't recall the strength which might give some idea of the size of the plan but it was the largest plan that I had ever seen from 1930 on which had been proposed so far as placing a load on the industrial capacity of the nation was concerned and the faculty of the Industrial College used it for us to compute requirements on the basis of what load would be placed on industry..

MAJ MORRISON: Britain and France had great difficulty in securing the dollars to pay for munitions that is required by the cash and carry Act. How was this solved?

LTG AURAND: Well, very shortly after Dunkirk the British took over all

French contracts and that put a terrific load on their dollar reserve. Now the object of course, is to maintain the American Arsenal on a producing basis. If anything had been allowed to die at this time, it would have been like repealing the draft back in August 1941. This amendment to the Neutrality Act was written so that no credit could be extended by the United States as a temporary stop-gap to the loss of the Britian's dollars. To correct this situation, the Exchange Contract Act was passed which enabled Britain to receive already manufactured munitions in exchange for contracts in the United States to produce U. S. military items. This simply deferred to the out-flow of British dollar holdings. By the end of 1940, it was obvious that something had to be done to finance the manufacture of munitions for the British. The Lend Lease Act was the result. This enabled U. S. appropriations to replace the out-flow of the British dollar. The goods sent to Britain were now on loan or lease from the U. S. Government to the British Government.

MAJ MORRISON: During the year or so following May 1940, you were concerned with material both for U. S. and foreign forces. Have you any views on the mobilization of the U. S. Army during this period?

LTG AURAND: Yes, during this time the Army was confronted with an unexpected choice. Material in existence was being drained out of the country and material of foreign types was being manufactured in it. Some small start had been made in manufacturing U. S. types, particularly in the aircraft but these were in demand by foreign nations as they came out of the factory door. At the same time it became increasingly evident that

fighting men were needed in these abandoned bases from the bulge of Brazil to the Greenland, including the Azores and Iceland, without it having been stated to my knowledge, the decision was to do both which was impossible to accomplish. Now I had little to say officially about this early start of the manpower mobilization in August or September of 1940. I tried to prevent the necessity for completing the camp construction and getting some equipment and manufacturing plants in production with the men who were being called into the military service, before they were called into the military service. There were others who held this view who presented it officially but they were overridden. The result was incomplete encampments, the places where they were to train and lack of equipment for training, even some of the equipment that did become available for training, of course, had to be siphoned off to the British in an emergency in North Africa.

MAJ MORRISON: By the end of the summer of 1941, you had worked near the top side of the War Department for over a year. Can you tell me what the relationships were among Stimpson, Patterson, McCloy and Marshall?

LTG AURAND: Again, I'm in the position of the fish looking up at people in a glass bottom boat. By this time, I knew that these people spoke to each other and now and then I was told about the results of their conversations. From the book entitled, On Active Duty in Peace and War by Henry L. Stimpson and McGeorge Bundy, I gather that the relationship of Stimpson with both Patterson and McCloy was very close. The book says that Patterson in his appointment ended for good and all, quote, "the division between the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary, yet once

assumed direct responsibility for the vast Army program for procurement and throughout the five years that followed he relieved Stimpson of all but occasional labors in this field," unquote. McCloy is described in the book as a man who handled everything that no one else happened to be handling. And he became Stimpson's principal advisor in the battle for the Lend Lease Act and it was his skilled preparation that cleared the way for the War Department's successful assumption of the whole military burden of Lend Lease procurement. My own opinion, that is me, I, Henry Aurand, as of today is that the book is correct, but since I saw Jack McCloy almost daily and Judge Patterson less frequently, McCloy seemed to be Stimpson's alter ego and Patterson was entirely willing for McCloy to play this role. They were three great men. And no project about which I had to appear before any one of them did I ever detect any division among them. In the contemplation of the answer to your question, I presume that the relationship of any of these three civilians with General Marshall would be identical. I've read about General Marshall on the way back from a tough session before a Congressional Committee making the remark that if he could only keep personalities out of it, he might get his job done. Before Pearl Harbor, I heard of several policies which were under high-level consideration on which there might have been some difference of view between these three civilians and General Marshall. The differences were not of substance but of priority. There was no mention of General Marshall on active duty in Peace and War until after Pearl Harbor. In the first of several references, his organizing genius and diplomatic skill is mentioned. There was a fourth member of the

civilian's top side with whom I made contact seldom. He was Harvey H. Bundy whose official title was special assistant to the Secretary. He was described in the book as Stimpson's closest personal assistant. That's the best I can do with this very tough question.

MAJ MORRISON: You computed the requirements for the victory program. Can you tell me how the program evolved and what were its results?

LTG AURAND: Well, this is not my story. It's the story of Jean Monnet who we knew as John Money, the French industrialist. His industry was brandy, and he had been in the joint procurement business with Britain in World War I. Naturally, he became of the British joint council on contracts in North America with regard to the purchase of French and British purchase of munitions in the United States; in other words, they were coordinating with each other to try to establish this American Arsenal that I have spoken of. On the same basis that he had urged Britain and France to buy American in World War I, he urged them to buy American in World War II. Germany and the conquered countries could manufacture more than Britain and France together. The only way to win the war was to get the production of the United States added on to the production of Britain and France and in this way, their side would out produce the Germans. At his unceasing urging, both the British and the French placed orders for military production in the United States as far back as the fall of 1938. At the start the orders were usually for aircraft but later they were for British and French types of ground Army equipment. Monnet urged them to order U. S. tanks because that would be more compatible with the U. S. military procurement people and the U. S.

Industrial Mobilization Plan. But it took the fall of France and several more months of resistance before the British agreed to buy U. S. type of equipment. And if my recollection is correct, they decided on a ten division program completely equipped as U. S. Divisions were. At the fall of France, Monnet urged the British to take over the French contracts in North America and do it quickly. He got a favorable answer and hastened to the United States to see that the British carried out the agreement. As a place to hang up his hat, he was made a member of the British Supply Council in North America without portfolio. Forever after he would be asking where is the complete shipping list? At my first meeting with Bob Nathan of the Advisory Committee of the Council of National Defense, he asked me just that same question. What is the total load the Army will put on U. S. industry in case we get into war. Now a month later, Monnet was asking the same thing. And I hadn't been on the General Staff three months when Jimmie Burns, the General, was also after me for the same kind of figure. Okay, I said to all three, if you'll understand clearly these are my own numbers and I speak for no one in authority, I mean not even myself, I'll give you some modified numbers from the computation and requirements for the - either the 1938 or 1939 mobilization plan. There are two things about these requirements that I remember. They were enormous to all my fellow members of the General Staff. And far too small for the needs of World War II. Throughout all the recomputations of the next eight or nine months the lack of a very long range target production bothered me. Egged on by Monnet and Burns I wrote a study of the subject of over-all requirements and their usefulness for

procurement purposes. I sent this memorandum to the Chief of Staff in April 1941. I gathered that he had heard more than he cared to hear about this subject but that was not my official reply. It was silenced. As things went from bad to worse for our not quite yet allies, the robbing of PMP equipment to support the British in North Africa was at center stage. Now on 9 July, the President sent a memo to the Secretary of War asking him to explore at once overall production requirements. He wanted the program in its entirety. This meant a program of all U. S. requirements plus those of all the rest of the free world. As luck would have it, Hitler invaded Russia shortly afterwards. This meant memos given to General Gerow, then Chief of the War Plans Division for action. He prepared a reply which said in effect that the President's request was backwards. That first came strategy then, of course, to carry out the strategy and then the material requirements. Also, by this time it was becoming apparent that the lack of coordinated orders for production was producing unbalanced supplies. Knowing that Gerow's men ran them, General Wedemeyer, then Major, was given the job of writing the strategics situation of the U. S. forces and defining what they would consist of. And I was given the job of computing the U. S. requirements and adding them to those of our allies for manufacture in the United States. I must confess that I felt that Wedemeyer was making some educated guesses, so I would do likewise. The victory program was submitted to the President 15 days late and was returned as incomplete and amorphous but nobody changed my figures. In my opinion, the best and perhaps the only result of the preparation of the victory program was its publication in the Chicago Tribune in 4

December 1941. I read it in the Washington Post on my way to work. I told Jack McCloy that it was wonderful now that it was published because the people of the United States would now know what they were up against. For six months or more thereafter, I was followed by a member of the FBI who sometimes sat in my office and listened in on my telephone and was there when anybody came in to talk to me. The oddest event of this whole thing was when I went to Chicago about a year later, it was in September of '42, among other things I called on Colonel McCormack, the publisher of the Chicago Tribune and when I walked into the Tribune Tower here standing at the door was the FBI guy that had been following me with a grin on his face about that wide. That was just an off-side remark here. Now only three days later, let's see, this was 4 December, only three days later was Pearl Harbor and everybody in the United States forgot the thing. In other words, they forgot that even this program was not enough.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, you visited the Louisiana maneuvers at Lake Charles in Louisiana on September of 1941. What was the purpose of this visit?

LTG AURAND: The background was this. I'd just about finished the computations for the victory program. We were waiting for the Russian figures and Pat Taylor my deputy was on his way to Moscow in a large plane full to get them to get these figures. It would be a few days before he returned, incidentally he was ranked off the plane by Jimmie Burns, the General and Jimmie Burns brought them back instead of Pat Taylor but I got them. There were rumors of separating Lend Lease activities from Supply and Transportation Division of G-4 and I had promised this new job

to Pat Taylor when it came up. So I had great need to get back to the supply of the U. S.Army and let Pat Taylor take the Lend Lease business. Finally, the 4th Army was going to test the book, just as I taught it at the War College by actually supplying everything but ammunition according to the book. And running trucks around to represent ammunition deliveries. They should see it. On the way there the through Pullman to the West Coast from New York to San Francisco, I think it was on which I rode, was set out on a siding at a railroad yard in New Orleans to be attached from the Southern train to the Southern Pacific train. And a flood came along and we were a lone car sitting out there and with the water up to the car's axels that would have been hit high if we had gotten you know, between the ballast, between the tracks and the only other fellow aboard was Hanson Baldwin who was then a military writer for the New York Times, and he and I got acquainted. And he was a Naval Academy graduate and we talked kind of the same language and he had been a great critic of the progress of the manufacture of tanks which I thought was fabulous and he thought was awful slow and we talked about these things very frankly and very pleasantly. And about three years ago I was invited to a symposium at the Naval War College and who should be there but Hanson Baldwin and we renewed old acquaintances.

MAJ MORRISON: But he got you out of the railroad . . . .

LTG AURAND: Oh, yeah, the shifter came along and he didn't know what track he was on but he hooked . . . and finally got hooked on to us and when we got out of the yard we were on a dike, yeah, so we were above the water and we got hooked in the passenger station, we got hooked very

easy, we had no trouble. This was funny, to be sitting out there as though you were out at sea in a Pullman car. The only reason I was happy to go there was that the Army Air Corps didn't have enough airplanes to supply even reconnaissance for the two Armies that were engaged in this . . . so they asked the Navy for help. Well, the Lexington was in North Island in San Diego at that time and they made all the bachelor aviators go over and form a provisional squadron and go over to fly recon for the 4th Army and my son was one of them. I'm going to tell those stories; I don't care about the length of the tape. I went to the briefing when they all came back from a flight and one fellow said, "I saw the damnest looking things on the road I ever saw in my life; it looked like a flock of cattle cars but they were trucks." And I said, "Do you mind if I horn in?" And they said, "No." "Well," I said, "You just report that right in the phone now to whoever you report to and then I'll tell you what it was." So the squadron commander reported it and he came back to me and said, "What was it?" And I said, "That's the last gasp of the cavalry; they're carrying their horses in mounted trucks and calling it Portee Cavalry." Well, anyway to get back to Lake Charles. After paying my respects to General Kruger and Ike Eisenhower, I visited for two or three days with Colonel Leroy Lutes. He was a 4th Army G-4; I had never met him before although he was a coast artilleryman. His setup was perfect and I mean book perfect and it worked perfectly, both. And it was working so well that when I got back I expressed myself to General Somervell on the subject. He was then G-4 and he said to me, "Well, I've been looking for a guy who has

had some practical experience in the field of handling an Army supply program, a G-4 of an Army and this fellow had been in on the ground." And I said, "Yes." He said, "I'm getting him." In a little while Lutes worked for Sommervell in G-4 and he became his distribution man in the Army Service Forces and when Sommervell retired he took over from Bill Sommervell and he's been my friend and he's still alive . . . .

MAJ MORRISON: Well, you take care of him . . . .

LTG AURAND: Wonderful guy, I sure did and that man earned it. There was one other thing that somewhat predicted the future that occurred on the Louisiana maneuver. The head of the American ordinance association for some time had been retired ordinance Colonel James L. Walsh and he knew quite a few of the big shots on Wall Street. Among them the head of the IBM, the original old man, I've forgotten his name, I should know it, and he persuaded him to mount some business machines on trucks. And he said, "What will I do with them?" "Well," he said, "They are imagining ammunition supply down there; let's go down and keep track of what's in the various dumps and whatnot on IBM cards." So he had one truck on which were sorters and another truck on which they cut the cards, you know, punch machines. And they worked out beautifully. It worked out just beautifully. But there was a smart adjutant general down there and he said, "Hey, that's what we want for personnel." And for some reason or another the AG got these IBM machine records which they were called in World War II and the supply people were all left out. When I got to Cherbourg, the first chapel service that was held there and I attended, was interrupted by a couple of machine records trucks playing to beat the band so that we

couldn't hear the organ or the preacher or anything else and I had my aide go out and shut them off until the service was over. Then I went out and looked at them. I found out that they worked from about the 12th to the 15th of the month very hard and from about the 25th to the end of the month very hard and they just played around with the machines, made funny things come out and whatnot, like people play with computers. So I went to my ordnance officer and said, "Have them put all the ammunition at the Normandy base on these cards." Boy, it was just as wonderful as the Louisiana maneuvers.

MAJ MORRISON: Why was the office of the Defense Aid Director created about 1 October 1941, what was it's mission and how were you selected to be its Director?

LTG AURAND: Well, as I've already told you, I have heard rumors of the separation of the foreign stuff from G-4. A thing that I thought was proper and welcome. And I also told you that I intended Pat Taylor to take this office and I'd stay with the U.S. stuff. But things didn't always turn out the way you planned it. Just what the reason was for splitting this branch off and making separate organizations of the War Department with no apparent profit, no apparent loss, I can't say. It may have been that the foreign missions in Washington wished to deal with someone on a higher level than the War Department section, the G-4 section was pretty far down on the totem pole. It may also have been that Jack McCloy was to have direct access to the office handling Lend Lease because he had been given the Lend Lease job by Stimpson. Or it may have been that someone of the general staff did not see why G-4

should be concerned about supplying anybody but the United States Army. That's another angle that might have entered. My own opinion which was never asked by anybody was that it would be a good thing to get the Lend Lease business out of G-4, although I would hate to lose that very new and interesting activity. The mission of the office would be, of course, to handle all details of all War Department Lend Lease matter. Policy would come from on high but which high, the Assistant Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff, was never clearly stated. The tug-of-war between mobilizing the U. S. Army and getting guns to those who are killing Germans continued. Just after my return from Louisiana, I was in General Moore's office for some reason or another and there was a buzz from his squak-box, this is one of the things that everybody in the room can hear, you know. It was Jack McCloy. He wanted to know who had been selected to be Defense Aid Director as the Secretary wanted to send up his nomination for Brigadier General. Taylor, I said in a low voice to General Moore, Aurand, he said into the squak-box. After General Moore snapped off the box, I told him of my promise to Taylor, whom I hoped was on his way back from Moscow with the Russian requirements. And they, of course, would be incorporated into the victory program and Taylor would know all about it. He was the guy with the know-how. But my protest was of no use. So, I became Defense Aid Director.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, how did you go about manning this new office?

LTG AURAND: First of all, I was limited in the number of regular officers that I could have in this new office by the office of Chief of Staff; in other words, the general staff secretariat. I presumed it came from on

top on a policy basis rather than numbers basis and they translated it into numbers. I could have a deputy and executive and the heads of the British, Chinese Russian groups of the foreign branch. Judge Patterson furnished me the names of about 17 lawyers. And he also gave me the authority which I had had in World War I when I was a First Lieutenant. He gave me authority to commission directly from civilian life up to and including the grade of major. The grade was to depend on the civilian income. I secured secretarial help by taking along the secretaries of the regular officers whom I took out of G-4 and the remainder I obtained from the War Department poll, which was an amazing set-up by the people who ran the Civil Service in the War Department, did a wonderful job of that. My own secretary, Miss Lucille Parker of Plains, Kansas, stayed with me for the rest of my time in Washington, in Chicago, went to Cairo with me and she stayed with me for the next new hitch in Washington and finally went to Hawaii with me and stayed until I retired. David Wainhouse who became a counselor as Lend Lease Director, remained with me for the remainder of my stay in Washington and went to Cairo with me. George Olmsted, 1922 West Point, who came back into the service after resigning, was my operations officer. We later met in China where he was G-5. And finally, I worked for him in the business world in 1964 through 1969. And the remaining officers to whom I gave direct commissions, mostly from the Judge's list of 17, only one was a mistake. Tyson in particular, who was not a lawyer but an accountant, was my statistician and he became very valuable toward the end.

MAJ MORRISON: Were there any additions made to this office after it became operative?

LTG AURAND: Yes, one. It had to do with the home offices of the Lend Lease mission. You recall that I spoke to you previously about Boatner making a study on this in connection with China. The purpose of these missions were primarily to acquaint the recipients in their own countries with the storage use and maintenance of the equipment furnished by the United States. And to keep my office informed of the arrival of the equipment and the country to which they were assigned, accredited. The home offices also represented the head of the mission in obtaining funds and personnel for the mission and action of the many other requests that the mission had submitted. There was already a mission in England for quite another purpose than Lend Lease. A supervision of Lend Lease mission was given to this mission. However, in the military we were quite over-shadowed by the presence of Mr. Averell Harriman as a Lend Lease representative to England. Later, Major General J. K. Crane was head of the mission to Great Britain. The British group from G-4 acted as home office for whoever headed the military Lend Lease mission in Great Britain. On 16 June 1941, Major Boatner as I've already said proposed a smiliar mission to China. On 27 August 1941, such a mission was sent and Boatner became the head of it's home office. On 8 September 1941, General Burns proposed a general plan for mission which I adopted at once. Later it was directed by the President. On 23 September 1941, General Maxwell headed the Middle East mission. General Wheeler, the Uranian mission and General Greeley, the Russian mission. The Greeley mission never got to Russia but remained in Teheran for some time. Colonel Faymonbille, who was already in Moscow, pleased the Russians and they said they didn't need anybody else.

MAJ MORRISON: How was the problem solved of allocating the material to the U. S. Army and the foreign bidders?

LTG AURAND: There were certain ground rules for items other than U. S. standard which had been produced for each country. These ground rules varied as to whether Lend Lease would finance them or whether the foreign country bought them or under which Act they came and so on. Since these were foreign items, it was plain sailing; there was no allocation for this kind of equipment but there were other problems. One of the hassles was over the action of Great Britain of by-passing U. S. Lend Lease by the Lend Leasing itself to some other country. This was very difficult to work out because everybody got mad about it. Finally, if the British would say when they requested it from the United States, that it was for some other country and that if Britain would say that this was U. S. products when they delivered it, it was okay and the British accepted that. I don't see why we just didn't let the British go ahead and do what they pleased because it was a very fine point to be arguing about in the middle of a war. In these ground rules there was a staff of munitions assignment boards under Mr. Hopkins. General Burns eventually became the Executive of this board and my friend and former executive Pat Taylor became his assistant and with it, got his Brigadier General's star. Under this board there were three munitions assignments committee that I knew about. One was munitions assignment committee ground of which I was commissioned . . . of which I was the chairman, one was assignment committee air of which I was a member and the other was the, I presume, the munitions assignment committee Navy. George Olmsted was my

stand-in in both the ground and air committees. These committees were made up of a planning and supply officers of the United States who were concerned in this particular theater or with this particular country. For example, War Plans Division and G-4 were represented on my committee. Also, and this was sort of a moot question, a representative of the petitioning country was invited to attend the meeting when his country's requests were being considered. Some of the U. S. people on the committee objected to this very strenuously; I thought it was only fair that they should make the presentation of the request themselves but Olmsted made the reply of what the action recommended was and then if they wanted a vote, chase both of those guys out. But that they should hear everything that went on. So sometimes they were and sometimes they weren't, depending on who represented WPD and G-4 that day. Also, when we became the International Division of the Army Services, General Clay usually attended or had a representative, representing Sommervell.

MAJ MORRISON: Was that Lucius Clay, General Lucius Clay?

LTG AURAND: Yeah, General Lucius Clay. Once this system of assignments got to working it worked very well and particularly after the assignments were made to theaters and not the country. Although, of course, assignments to theaters was made in only one, two or three cases, it was the bulk of the stuff. We still had about 20 Lend Lease countries we sent a little to by country.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what effect did Pearl Harbor have on the Lend Lease program?

LTG AURAND: Well, there were two effects. There was an immediate effect and a long range effect. And in accordance with the terms of the Lend Lease agreements the U. S. could recapture any material needed for its own defense. In the early morning of 8 December 1941, I attended a very large meeting in General Marshall's office which was considering the reinforcements of the defenses of the West Coast of the United States, I brought the terms of the Lend Lease agreement about recapture to the attention of the meeting and described how British aircraft and anti-aircraft guns on their way to Russia and so on could be repossessed. They were sitting around waiting for shipment. I suggested that General Sommervell who was then G-4, and I could work this out in detail as soon as we knew what the tactical requirements of the West Coast were. And that the port of New York should be closed to outgoing ships carrying munitions immediately. The long-range effect was that the munitions manufactured in the United States would be hereafter allocated to theaters of war and U. S. commanders there in each specific theater would make the final Lend Lease allocation and transfers, in other words, they could keep it themselves if they wanted to. This was a change from the pre-Pearl Harbor arrangement that transferred the material as soon as it was floated, that is, loaded on the ship in the United States. Even with this new transfer policy, there was still considerable work for the munitions assignment boards because of the large number of other Lend Lease customers.

THIS IS SIDE TWO OF TAPE ONE, ALPHA

MAJ MORRISON: What did you do to all the officers in Washington that were called immediately to duty after Pearl Harbor?

GEN AURAND: Well, I had an arrangement, not an official arrangement but a personal arrangement because I spent several twenty-four hour days of the week in the offices, and I would be allowed off, completely off, no telephones or anything from noon Saturday till noon Sunday every week. But there came a time when John Monnet who lived only a five minute auto ride from me would call me up at breakfast and say "Come over here; I've got some news or I want to talk to you about this." In which case I would call my office and say that I was working Sunday mornings so I'd take Sunday afternoon off. Well, this happened to be one of those when I had worked Sunday morning but was taking Sunday afternoon off and I was listening to the Red Skins football game out of the old Griffith Stadium in Washington. And all of a sudden there was a flash, news thing, and it said, "Please do not repeat this message to anybody in Griffith Stadium." They were afraid of a stampede or something. "Pearl Harbor has been attacked. Repeat, do not repeat this message to anybody in Griffith Stadium." And about two or three minutes later a message came through with the same "Do not repeat this to anybody in Griffith Stadium" saying "All members of the Armed Forces report for duty immediately at their places of duty in suitable uniform." Ouch. I had no suitable uniform. The last uniform I had bought, I bought in 1928 when I graduated from Leavenworth and this was now the end of 1941. That is thirteen years of growth later. Well, I hauled out the one outfit that I had and I found that it consisted

of breeches, boots, spurs, blouse to accompany it and, of course, in those days we wore white shirts to dress up and khaki shirts to wear for drill and things like that with a blouse. I had those but the insignia I had was that of a major of the Ordnance Department and I was a Colonel in the General Staff, so I had that difficulty. When I got my breeches on I couldn't sit down. They were very well sewn together because they didn't rip. I stood up and so I said, "I'll get by with this as long as I have to; I have to." There used to be an order that every month on the date of your birth in that month, you went down to your boss in uniform, you went to work in uniform and reported to your boss and he'd look you over to see that everything was alright. But we had been working so hard, that I hadn't been in this uniform at all since I graduated from the Industrial College, which was in uniform, and before that at every War College graduation, which was four and my own five. So in the past thirteen years, I wore my uniform six or seven times. So there I was. So my wife and I began scrounging the neighborhood, there was quite a few officers that lived on Upton Street and I got a pair of General's staff things but I couldn't get any Colonel's eagles because everybody at my time had just been promoted to Colonel. And then my wife remembered that our next door neighbor had bought, anticipating the promotion of her husband, had bought some solid silver eagles to pin on him and he hadn't made it, and so she went over to the back door and begged her for the silver eagles. Well, I got all dressed up, took the way to the office; this was about five or five thirty by this time on Sunday afternoon of 7 December, when I realized the last guy they wanted to see

down in the office, was the fellow who had been giving all the munitions away. I would certainly be the personna non grata in anything that was going on and I just made up my mind that I'd wait till the next morning because my office knew that I was duty officer and, where I was, I got no call. So I thought everything was . . . the hell with this guy, you know, and I'd better stay away. But by about five o'clock on Monday morning my conscience disturbed me and I struggled into my uniform and I went down to my office. And the duty officer said, "There's a note here from General Marshall dated about six o'clock yesterday afternoon saying as soon as the Colonel comes in, I want to see him." I was only twelve hours late. So I went in and here was everybody. All the Service Chiefs, all the Army Chiefs, G-3 and G-4 and whatnot, and Pat Taylor was standing up and I was glad there wouldn't be a vacant chair because I had to stand up. So Pat and I stood there together and I listened for a while and he started whispering in my ear and I said, "No, pay attention or we'll get shot, General Marshall won't like it," and finally I got it that they were talking about the defenses of the West Coast. Now there were none of these and none of that and none of this kind of ammo and Hap Arnold was there and he said, "No planes." Now there was a kind of silence and I said, "General Marshall, I would like to offer a suggestion. There must be maybe a hundred British fighters at this field outside of Brooklyn waiting for suitable transport or waiting for Yanks to fly them to Britain or something. They have already been turned over to the British but they haven't been floated, they are still ours and you can have every one of them and there is plenty of 303 ammunition and

they've all got 303 machine guns on them. If your aviators can pull the triggers on a 303 machine gun as well as they can on a 30, you've got a hundred planes, put gas in them and fly them out." Everybody kind of opened their jaw and the Chief of Coast Artillery spoke up and said "How about 90 milimeter anti-aircraft" and I said, "I just got word that two complete battalions of 90 milimeter and anti-aircraft are on their way down to the Narrows and in New York Harbor headed for Russia. Send a message to the Coast Guard to turn them back." "Well, who'll do that?" And I said, "Pat go out and call the, who runs the Coast Guard, the Treasury Department and have them turn the ship around and have them close the port of New York."

MAJ MORRISON: They used to but now it's the Transportation Department.

GEN AURAND: Yeah.

MAJ MORRISON: At that time the treasury . . .

GEN AURAND: And so Pat in utter disgust that he was leaving this very exciting meeting went out and did that. And that's when I said, "Well General Marshall, Somervell and I can handle this. Let's us get in touch with the West Coast and measure their demands and I can give him stuff and he knows where the stuff is and we'll take care of this." And everybody heaved a sigh of relief and left and I left first. I got out of there because I was afraid that somebody would say to me, "Where have you been all night?" Yeah. I never thought I'd be wanted but I was very badly needed. Isn't that funny?

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. Sir, how did it happen that you didn't wear your uniform except on a couple of occasions in thirteen years?

GEN AURAND: Well, I think it goes back to the anti-military sentiment of the times. I believe that somewhere along in our past questioning that I described this about the Pax special visits everywhere and the military had a low profile, and even when I was the Ordnance Officer of the Sixth Corps area and I would go into West Virginia regiment of the National Guard and whatnot, I always went in civilian clothes. And, anyway, when you go up against those mountaineers wearing burning onions and they wonder who that, you know. So I didn't wear any uniforms at all in the VI Corps area. Then I went to the War College, I wore at graduation day, that was more or less required. And then I went to Raritan Arsenal and I want to tell you, nothing is more discouraging to morale of these old civilian manned arsenals than somebody running around in a uniform, because they think two things; one, he's agin us and two, he doesn't know what he's doing. And if you go around in civilian clothes and act like they do, well they think maybe you're a little smart at that. It's a great morale thing. And in Washington, the word was don't ever show up in uniform anywhere. And, of course, we all rode public transportation then; I went on the trolley car to work and back and nobody wanted to be seen in uniform. That was the feeling. And so it wasn't because I was dead-beating on the wearing of the uniform or getting away with something or not wanting to buy one, but it was because of the low profile prescribed by, I guess it was from the Chief of Staff on down. Look how they are complaining about the number of generals now . . . too many of them running around with their stories.

MAJ MORRISON: I understand.

GEN AURAND: Yeah, okay.

MAJ MORRISON: In the State of the Union message in early January 1942 President Roosevelt set some production goals for American industry in the calendar year of 1942. What were they and how did they compare with the requirements of the victory program?

GEN AURAND: Before making this comparison I'd like to tell you the story of another day in December, eighteen days after Pearl Harbor, seventeen days after the meeting in Marshall's office. On Christmas day 1941, while I was watching my three and a half year old daughter open her Christmas presents, I got a phone call from the usual guy who called me on Sunday, Jean Monnet, John Money. "Come on down to Stacy May's office right away." "Well, what for? I'm here in the middle of Christmas and what's the hurry?" "Well," he said, "You get down here; Stacy May and Bob Nathan and I are here and we need you." So I went down. When I finally got there, he looked at me and he said, "Henry, the President wants some production targets for American industry for the calendar year of 1942." I told him that I had already calculated them into the victory program. He said that they were not nearly high enough, that America and the British combined production had to far out exceed the German production plus what he could get out of the captured country. The only way that victory could be won was by having the Allies have more military production than the Germans. And he said that frequently. Consequently, the industrial capacity of the United States must be stretched to the limit. And I replied this way; I have written this down to read because I want to be fairly accurate, "If I get you what you are saying is that you want a victory program based on how much we

can make, how much we can produce and not based on how much we need." "Quite right. Quite right." "Well, let me call my two former requirements experts, Bill Goodman and Walter Wood, and have them bring some papers from their office because they were then computing U. S. requirements, you see they stayed in G-4 and I was then Defense Aid Director, and while they are coming you and I and Nathan and Stacy May will talk about how these requirements will be computed. How are you going to face this, you know, what basis for a figure?" Well, we have to find some basis in the raw materials or facilities or something of this kind." So we chose steel. Not iron or not finished products or not how many steel mills but the productinn of steel in the United States and what it could be expanded to, and then how it had to be divided between the civilian people of the United States and the civilian people abroad that we were supporting and the military. The United States plus all the allies. That would be fundamental division. So the figures we would get would not only be for the U. S.Army but for the world; that is the free world. So having done that, we began when Goodman and Wood arrived. The three of us, from our long experience in computing Army requirements, selected several long lead time items which required large amounts of steel and determined a balanced program of these items which could be manufactured from the steel allocated to the Army for 1942. This was a startling list. I'll give you a comparison here a little later. About three days after this Sunday, say the 28th of December, I had a call from Judge Patterson. "Come to my office." "Well, what in the hell's up now?" When I got to his office he said, "I sent for you since

you were the fellow who computed the victory program requirements. What do you think of these requirements? And he handed me a piece of paper with oh about twelve items on numbers and I looked at it and these were the things that we had computed in Stacy May's office on Christmas morning. And I said, "Judge, I'll give you a firm answer but I also want to explain it." And I said, "These figures are okay. I computed them myself." And he laughed and he said, "Get out of here." Well, they went into the President's State of the Union message just exactly like I computed them with the help of Walter Wood and Bill Goodman. I didn't do it; we all worked at it. But it was a wonderful thing that things got unchanged for the President of the United States and he used it in a message. Now here's the comparison of what was to be manufactured in the calendar year 1942. The victory program called for 28,000 airplanes. The figures from Stacy May's office were 60,000. Tanks, 20,400 victory program. Stacy May's figure - 45,000. AA guns, victory program, 6,300. Stacy May's office, 20,000. AA machine guns, victory program, 7,000. Stacy May's 14,000. Ground machine guns, victory program, 168,000, Stacy May's, 500,000. Airplane bombs, victory program 84,000. Stacy May 720,000. Now I had two responses from the War Production Board before they got the Stacy May figures; that is on my own victory program figures which I think are interesting. One was that U. S. industry was unable to produce 20,000 tanks by the year 2000, let alone produce them in one year. Actually they produced in 1942 25,000 tanks in one year. The other one was that there weren't enough airplanes being made and to drop 84,000 bombs, but they forgot that these ran from little fragmentation

bombs to 2,000 pound bombs and so they had to give the pilot a choice. So you had to make, I've forgotten the statistician's figure, about one and three quarter times those that could be dropped. And I had an awful time explaining that, even to the Air Corps, the Army Air Force.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what caused the creation of service supply, later the Army Service Forces?

GEN AURAND: Well, I'm going to go back to World War I when they organized in the General Staff the purchase, storage and traffic division of the General Staff which was almost a disaster when you read about it historically. I mean it wasn't at the time. You wonder how the thing ever operated. This was still fresh in the mind, this lesson, most of the people there in the War Department because they had been in World War I, even the very low rank, and they had heard all the gripes about it. So they resolved they were not going to have the General Staff operate and this was a doctrine that followed in all the schools and everything else. The General Staff did not operate and so they were trying to see to it that in World War II that they didn't have an operating general staff. That's one thing that you can't put your finger on because you don't know how much it was in the head of the guy who did the work but it was certainly in the head of a whole lot of people who were in high positions. Well, the General Staff envisioned by Elihu Root was a planning staff. They had no other function; that's why the War College when it started up was not a teaching institution; it was a bunch of officers planning, doing war planning and mobilization planning - nothing else. The old Army up when they were still run by the Adjutant General and

until Leonard Wood came along and more or less conquered the Adjutant General that was the situation. Then, of course, Pershing went to France and added on the G. Well, it was assumed that the four G-s would get together and make the plans. That was what I learned in that '24 or '25, 1924 or 1925 hitch in the ordnance office. They were planners up there. They didn't do anything; they made plans and they'd let the ordnance know if there were any questions, we'd ask them. I used to go up there quite often with captured enemy property. What were their claims about that? Then all of a sudden, somebody stuck in a War Plans Division. Well, what did that make all these other people? They were the War Plans Division already, collectively, so what was that doing in there? Well, it got stronger and stronger. I hate to tell you which Chief of Staff really gave it's full impetus, but it certainly was somebody in the MacArthur, Craig, Marshall regime as far as I can tell. The evidence of the War College in '30 and '31 when MacArthur was Chief of Staff and I was in Washington with both of the other two and they were both Chiefs of Staff. And this thing just grew like topsy. And, of course, what aided it was the joint board and the joint planning committee of the subordinate Navy planning outfit and the Army planning outfit. Now there was no comparison and this was another thing that followed up, the Navy didn't have a general staff. They had a bunch of operating officers, you see, and the bureaus were all civilian run and off on the side and of the Navy plans did follow the Navy planning. They did everything with G-1, 2, 3, and 4 were supposed to do under the original concept of a planning general staff. Well, the WPD liked this, so they

just took over all the staff functions they could grab, just like they grabbed off my foreign missions, which did them no good except having them and I had to run up the War Plans instead of having a guy on the other end of the buzzer. These were the things that practically forced the G-4 to become a nobody and a command to organize, you see. All of this was a tendency; War Plans Divisions took over all of G functions after Pearl Harbor. It became General Marshall's operations outfit. He ran the War with WPD and he had his plans made by WPD. Now, already at this time that this reorganization came up, the Army Air Corps had achieved independence. It had it's own general staff and everything else right there in the munitions building, thank God, so we could just run a few steps or something to get in personal contact. Down at the War College, which had closed, they had established what was called GHQ. And GHQ was originally set up to command all of these bases that we got from the British, you know, the destroyer deal and then one thing after another was added to it. And they finally got the defense of the United States and the Canadian American defense board and they got all of the training and all of the tests of combat training and they became what we later called, the Army Ground Forces. I think they themselves were called Army Ground Forces. So the logic then of having a logistical command was contained in the fact that these other two commands had been taken, where from? Well, both really from G-3. Why not take from G-4 a logistic command? And all they left with G-1 was the manpower mobilization. And that was planning to a certain degree but they planned at the rate that OPD set. And this in my mind was what occurred and

made the Army Service Forces necessary. And we've got its twin right in existance now in the Army Material Command and right at this moment, they are taking everything away from G-4 except his undershirt and his trunks, and they'll get those. And this is the way this thing goes all the time, get the operations out of the general staff, sure. I'm all for it. Set up the commands for these things. Sure, I'm all for it. That's alright but let's not teach in the schools these other things. Let's do away with G-1, 2, 3, and 4. Let's have a War Plans Division or a Plans and Operations Division to serve the Chief of Staff, period and no other divisions in the General Staff, and be honest about it and not be hypocrites. Fine. Or, let's do away with the WPD and go back to your four G-s as planners. Now in all four of these commands, I'm sorry they did away with the Army Ground Forces Command. I think that and the Material Command are essential, absolutely essential. But the decentralization which they are trying to achieve; sorry I made too long a speech.

MAJ MORRISON: The War Plans Division, I mean the Ground Forces Command did much more than ours today. Well, old CONARC and we have the Forces Command now.

GEN AURAND: I know, but that's a piece, a piece, CONARC was a piece of Army Ground Forces and this is a piece of CONARC. And the other pieces of these Chiefs floating around for reserve components and so on. And if there's one thing I hate, and I think doesn't work without friction, oh, of course, you can force anything, is that you have one more than one guy that the Governor of Texas has to go to. I believe in territorial command, and the guy who is the commander having every function of the

Department of the Army in his area, no exempted stations, no nothing. If he can't do it, let's educate somebody that can. But this business of having a whole lot of places around here, each reporting to a different guy upstairs and the Governor wondering what the hell is coming next, is a problem which shouldn't be presented to the State Forces or the Reserves or anybody else.

MAJ MORRISON: Okay.

GEN AURAND: Now wait a minute. I want to add one more thing to this debate which from my notes I see I overlooked. In August 1941, which is six or seven months before this thing, I went to General Reybold and Colonel Mallon and managed to get together with both of them somehow or other and I said, "I want to put something before you that's been bothering me no end." And I said, "I have enough things causing me sleepless nights with this." And I said, "I want to know whether you are going to run this oncoming war when we get big, with a general staff with a thing in it like the purchase storage and traffic division of World War I or whether you are going to take that function out into a separate command with authority -- tell people what to do and so on instead of staffing them." And they said they didn't know and why was I asking? Well, I said, "Whenever we get into this war, the number of officers required, and I had a manning table, a great big sheet of paper about one yard by one yard for my section of G-4. I need seven hundred officers for my section"and they both looked at me and laughed. Bill Somervell, in the middle of the war in Europe in the summer of '44 had 2400 men doing the job that I asked for 700 men to do. There was no appreciation of this

thing at all; in the manpower side of the supervision or in the amount of decisions that had to be made. This comparison of Stacy May's number and my victory program numbers plainly show. And how do you teach this, I don't know; as I told you, I was considered to be a wild man in the numbers I was using by my fellows, by my own roommate at West Point and yet that was a drop in the bucket to what we actually had to do. Where do you get this vision; where do you go with the people? How do you get them to say when you should? Take the men out of the factories and put them into uniform which is the critical decision always. I don't know. I think we need more schooling. When you asked me what the effect of this was on the office of the Defense Aid Director as part of this question, I almost forgot it. The effect on the office of the Defense Aid Director, well it was . . . it became the International Division of the Army Service Forces. And it lost the home offices of the missions of the Lend Lease mission to the War Plans Division. I think I've already talked about that further up in the question. And that just made a lot of extra work for us and did nothing for WPD. They just wanted to have the control. And I see no other great effect except that we became more and more all the time a statistical recording outfit rather than the delightful challenge that we had been in October only a few months before. Now I may sound as though the setting up of this Army Service thing gave me no pleasure but this is quite contrary to the fact. I was pleased that we had gotten operations out of the general staff and into a command and I was also pleased that under Somervell

the supply system had been put back together under one head. Somervell now had it without anything being in the assistant secretary's office or any of those, he had requirements, provisions and distribution and he could run the supply system as a system with one boss. And I think that thing did more to keep our troops supplied than any other organizational device could have done.

MAJ MORRISON: Yeah, he had the Chief of the Tech Services . . . .

GEN AURAND: Oh yes, all the Tech Services were part of the . . . . Yeah, Army Service Forces command. Another thing, I believe we talked about already was the fact that at the beginning of our entrance into the War, right after Pearl Harbor, we were very short of shipping and the railroads across the country were scarcely able to bear the burden which most planners in planning for a Pacific War thought would be taken by ships from the gulf ports to the Panama Canal and across the Pacific. Because of the shortage of ships this couldn't be done. So the transportation people had not only the job of building ships but of reinforcing the strength of the transcontinental railroad. For a while then the supply system was a servant of the transportation system and you had to select the things that could be delivered at the other end more carefully than you had to select what you were going to make in the factory. But the transportation system finally caught up and became the servants of the supply system and then you could make and deliver better what you wanted to. It went all the way back to the White House, as we used to say, the White House said you need this and it goes all the way without any hindrance. This is a very excellent point to make in favor of ASF because Somervell

controlled transportation also and he and his staff and his people. He is a Commander now, not a general staff officer. He could make these things work together. And it was a terrible job to coordinate this on a supervisory and coordination basis by any division of the general staff; I don't care what you call it. So, I'm very happy about the formation of the Army Service Forces as an organization for fighting the war. But I didn't like what it did to me.

MAJ MORRISON: In the pre-war, the pre-world war period, were certain assignments and schools needed for promotion and was this called "ticket punching?"

GEN AURAND: The promotion to the grade of Colonel was largely by seniority. There was a selection out system, I think it was called a Class B system, rather than a selection up system. It must be kept in mind that 1920 promotion was by branch and when the single list came out in 1920, the people began to wonder how any board was going to, let's say, consisting of a field artillery man and a dough-boy,was going to decide whether a colonel of cavalry was going to be promoted or a colonel of engineers. And this is what really killed selection up at that time. I think this same difficulty exists today as far as I'm concerned. It would take a long while before anyone would care to select an officer for promotion from among officers other than his own branch. And your promotion boards were very reluctant, so the out people usually had such bad records that it didn't matter what branch he was and so that was easy but the up was not. The promotion to general officer until the end of

the 30's was usually made by the people with Pershing in Europe. I've forgotten, we had names for them, Pershing's followers or something like that, but nothing in any of this bore any semblance of what today you call "ticket punching." In fact, "ticket punching" didn't come into effect to any great extent until the spirit of career guidance took over the assignment of officers, the same which I detest, despise and otherwise abominate. Let me hasten to add, however, that there were other selections still based on, what do I want to say, each branch by what branch you were in which were indicative of individual progress and this was a selection to go to the Command and General Staff School or the War College or the selection to the staff at the colleges and so on. This was usually made on a ratio basis depending upon the number of officers in each branch and that was the percentage that they would get of students and faculty members in both places and then within that the branches could choose their own. And I don't know of any general officers promotion after the '30's that I attributed to his branch. But everyone watched these school selections to see which branch was going to get the biggest cut.

MAJ MORRISON: In January 1942, you were promoted to Brigadier General. Did you find your rank and job responsibilities greater than your contemporaries?

GEN AURAND: No. At the time there were quite a few of my contemporaries who held very important jobs. If you take the West Point classes of '13, '15, and '16, the ones on either side of mine, there were Somervell and Styer and Eisenhower and Bradley, Stratemeyer, Cousins and Lyon on the Air Force Staff all Major Generals and I'm not sure that I'm beginning

to remember half of them, now, of course, there were quite a few that weren't doing as well as I was but I somehow or other felt that their turn was coming. And I will recount one thing, when we got to be made "Mex" colonels which was the first mass promotion, a very curious thing happened, they skipped four or five of the twenty engineers in my class. I don't know if there were twenty left; that leaves four or five out of eighteen or seventeen. This made me mad as the devil and I got so angry about it that this West Point roommate of mine, Doc Waldron and I used to ride to work in his car sometimes and I said I was going to refuse my promotion. I just felt this was the lousiest selection for promotion that I could imagine, based on these people I knew. And I knew how they were and Doc says you are talking through your hat, keep your shirt on and they'll get it and most of them did. Most of them, some of them, made General later, but I tried to examine this and I found a funny thing, there was no cavalry lieutenant colonel who wasn't rated superior. There was no, practically no engineer officer who was rated higher than average. The engineers expected an average man to be perfect and they very seldom used the excellent and superior rating. And so they just took these average ratings numerically and made this mixed promotion on that basis. Never considering the rating officer, and this brings up another one that you must find something to do about and that is how to get the rating of juniors of their superiors in this system; those are the ones that count.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what was your appraisal of Jean Monnet?

GEN AURAND: Jean Monnet was a man with a single purpose, to win the war. I believe that he was a very patriotic Frenchman, that he is more of an internationalist than any man that I have ever known intimately. Without him, many of these things that occurred in that time from May 1940 to September of '41 would not have happened. He prodded the British in the taking over the French contracts, followed the U. S. to work on the exchange basis, to hold off the day of payment and then when he got that done he prodded the U. S. development of Lend Lease, which was Roosevelt's idea, but it was because of constant prodding of Monnet, we got to win the war by producing more here in the United States, plus England, than the Germans and all its factories can. The other thing was that he insisted constantly on a shopping list, which he always talked about and he finally got into the President and sold it. And that was why, I am told that Jean Monnet had a meeting with the President and sold him that thing he called the "list in its entirety." He did more toward the winning of the war for the United States than any other individual I know.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what was the mission of the combined production board? How did you happen to be assigned as a combined secretary and why did you serve only ten weeks or so?

GEN AURAND: In the spring of 1942, what had been the office of Defense Aid Director was now the International Division of the Army Service Forces - had become a glorified statistical reporting agency. Of course, there were still some other duties beside that but the allocation of

supplies directly to theaters instead of countries had greatly reduced the importance of this job. And I was concerned because I had come to find an overseas job and here I was marking time on this one and I hoped to beg out of it so I could go on my quest for a job overseas. About this time one of my friends on the British Army Staff in Washington told me that the British Supply Council of North America had nominated me to be the combined secretary of the combined production board. And I said, "What is this?" Well, the story was that they were going to treat all the production facilities in England and all those in the United States and in Canada, for that matter, as though they were in one country. This Combined Production Board was to get them together to contribute their best skills and whatnot to get the best production of war purposes. And that sounded like a nice big proposition, rather intriguing to me, so I went up to see General Somervell about this and he had heard of it alright and he said, "Do you want the job," and I said, "Yes, I'd love to have that job." So it was arranged and what I found was this, the combined production board consisted of two people: Lord Beaverbrook, who was a supply chief from England, and Donald Nelson who headed the war production board and they each had a deputy who would sit in Washington and would really be the board: Jim Knowlson from the United States, whom I had known for his work on the war production board and Sir Robert Sinclair, spelled Sinclair, who would be the British man. Well, this wasn't enough so each one of them had to have an attorney and so they each had an attorney and then they each had to have a secretary, a high

ranking official secretary, so they each had a secretary but sometime or other down the totem pole there had to be one guy who presented the papers to both sides and that is what they wanted me for and they called me the combined secretary of the combined production board. I never saw an order which gave me that title but that's what they called me. So I got this job and it was very interesting, a very fine job and I took my friend David Wainhouse along because with all these lawyers and what-not in the upper levels, I wanted a good lawyer for myself and, of course, he was his wonderful diplomatic self just like he had been for me in the Lend Lease business. Below my level, the organization split again into U. S. and British sections. It was like an X on the organization chart, and we got things agreed by our lower half of the organization; I would pass the papers up to the secretaries of the deputies, if they looked alright to me. If the deputies approved, they would both sign the papers and pass them along for action to their national organizations. Two of these papers had grave effects on what the aims and objectives of General Lucious Clay were. He represented Somervell on the War Production Board of the United States and some of its allocation committee. So, he went to Jim Knowlson and said this simply had to be changed, that everything was wrong, that it wasn't in accordance with the wishes of General Somervell or of the War Department and so Jim, with a great deal of ill at ease and Sir Robert Sinclair said hopeful attitude that this would not happen again and so on and got these things reversed. Well, this hadn't happened very long when I got a call from Somervell

and he said to me, "How would you like to command the 6th Service Command with two stars?" I said, "I would." And then I got a call from Jack McCloy almost immediately after this and he said, "You sold your soul for a mess of tinsel." He was so mad at me that you could hear it over the phone. Then I went to Chicago and I knew that I had been kicked upstairs.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, is there anything that you would like to add before we go home?

GEN AURAND: Well, I'm not trying to speculate on what would have happened if, when I make this remark, but if whoever picked the command officer of the communication zone in the European theater of operations had done it with the care that Somervell picked Leroy Lutes for his distribution guy in G, well first in G-4 - then in the Army Service Forces, they would not help but have selected Robertson, W. M. He had graduated from the War College and the Command and General Staff School, he had been a G-4 man on both faculties and he had been the executive to the War Department of G-4. I can think of no greater qualifications for the job of Commanding General COMZ and he was the only guy in the United States Army that had them.

MAJ MORRISON: General Aurand thought of a couple of things, corrections that he would like to make to the tape and this is after we have completed the entire taping. We are putting these items on in this spot because there was room on the tape here. General, go ahead.

GEN AURAND: Well, first of all when I enumerated the functions of the supply system, I enumerated them as determination of requirements procurement and distribution. I should have said determination of requirements provision and distribution. Provision contains the procurement function but just to be clear I will try to enumerate the provision functions as I recall them. Of course, you had to have money to start with, the next thing you had to consider was the place of manufacture and the tools and the raw materials. After that you had to make arrangements for the manufacture which are called procurements and this is all paper work. Once the procurement is arranged a man goes to work and starts making them, making what you have ordered. Then follows inspection and after the inspectors report comes in the goods that have been manufactured are officially accepted; in other words this is the time the contractor gets his money. And after acceptance there is a frequently disregarded function of provision which has to take place if possible at the place of manufacture and that is storage. The items that very rarely come off the production line and go directly into its depot. Besides, there is some function in the distribution system which have to be gone through before destination can be given and I don't care how carefully you schedule the manufacture, it never comes out exactly right. The other thing I have to talk about is about this spiral railroad bridge on the railroad between Brest and Rennes. I've referred to it once as a Stone Arch Bridge and another time as a tressel bridge. As I sit here now I'm not sure which it is and I doubt if I'd bet more than ten cents either way but I'd bet that ten cents that it's a Stone Arch Bridge.

MAJ MORRISON: Thank you sir.

INTERVIEW WITH LTG HENRY S. AURAND

by

MAJOR MORRISON

THIS IS TAPE 2, SIDE 1 IN A SERIES OF INTERVIEWS WITH LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY S. AURAND. THIS PARTICULAR SESSION WAS TAKEN ON 6 APRIL 1974, IN GENERAL AURAND'S HOME IN ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI.

MAJ MORRISON: General Aurand, this next series of questions will cover the period of time 8 September, 1941 to 26 October, 1944, when you were the Commanding General of the Sixth Service Command with it's headquarters in Chicago, Illinois. On 8 September 1942, you arrived in Chicago to be the Commanding General of the Sixth Service Command. How did you go about the assumption of command?

LTG AURAND: When I arrived at the B&O station in Chicago on the Capitol Limited, I was met by a second lieutenant. He reported to me that he -- his name was Bill Reeda and he'd been appointed my aide as long as I desired to have him as my aide. After collecting my baggage, we went to the Chicago club in an official car where one of my friends on the War Production Board, Jim Knowlson had provided me with a guest card. Reeda helped me unpack. He was a young Chicago lawyer that knew his way around the city but he was not so very well acquainted with the higher-ups in the business and professional world. Then we took the car to the post office building where the headquarters were then located. Later, they moved to the Civic Opera building. When I came into my office, I was met by the Chief of Staff who had an office with a connecting door to mine and after the usual greetings between two people who've never seen each other before, we began talking business.

MAJ MORRISON: Who is this, sir?

LTG AURAND: I don't remember his name but I can tell you about him. He was a New Englander, he was a bachelor, he had a career in the Adjutant General's Department. He was very well informed and a very well educated man. He was a Bostonian and still had his New England accent and he had a great love for New England. I think that he fit the description gentleman and scholar as well as anybody I've ever met. When we did get down to business, I saw several large piles of papers on my desk and I asked him what they were and he told me that when he had heard of my appointment as Commanding General Sixth Service Command, that he'd saved all of the papers that had come to his desk from that time on and he thought I might want to read them and approve them or disapprove them. And I said to him,"Well, what would of happened to these papers if I hadn't been appointed?" Oh, he said, "I would of disposed of them." And I said, "Please do." And it took him two trips back to his office to carry all of the papers back. Well, this left Bill Reeda and me sitting and looking at each other and I said, "Do you have an office?" He said, "Yes, it's through that little door on the opposite side from the Chief of Staff's." And I said, "Does it have a door to the hall?" And he said, "Yes." And I said, "Well, if you go -- no, I then said to him, "Have you ever been an aide before?" He said, "No," and I said, "Well, I've never been a Commanding General, let's just sit here at the desk and see what happens next." So we sat there for awhile, I could see through his open door and all of a sudden somebody came into his office and Bill came into me and he said, "Captain King would like to see you." And I said, "Alright, send him in and you come in, too." So Captain King came in and he turned me out a windmill salute and said that

he was Captain King and that he was the music officer of the command. Well, I said, "Sit down Captain King and tell me about it." I said, "You've gotten some insignia on that I don't recognize." "Oh," he said, "The -- I'm a Captain in the officer specialist corps." I don't know how this started but it was abandoned very shortly and people began putting on proper insignia. They -- in other words -- they became members of the Army of the United States. So, he sat down and as I say, told me he was in the officers specialist corps and he -- I said, "What's your problem?" "Well," he said, "I have a proposition. I know a lot of high school bandsmen who are 18 years old. They won't be drafted till they are 19. They haven't got a thing to do. You can't send anybody overseas until he is 19 years old and I would like to have these people enlist and have their basic training given at the post where they're assigned in our -- in our Sixth Service Command and then create bands in their off duty time. Now, I didn't mean to -- they won't do their work but will create bands at every post." I said, "Where are you going to get the instruments?" "Oh," he said, "Petrillo has offered to give us the instruments." Petrillo is head of the musicians union. I said, "Well, this is a good deal. Have you tried it on anybody." "Yes," he said, "I tried it out on G-1 and he turned me down. That's why I came into see you." "My God," I said, "Is he a very old guy?" "Oh, yes, he's older than you." Well, I had known John S. Sullivan since I was a cadet. He was an instructor at West Point when I was a cadet although I'd never had him as my own instructor and he was well known to my class. I think he was there all the time we were. The same period of time. Then when I was at the V Corps area, one of the two times, at Columbus Barracks or Fort Hayes or Columbus, whatever they called it, there was a battalion of the 10th Infantry. The rest of the 10th Infantry was at Fort Thomas,

Kentucky opposite Cincinnati. And he had this independently -- it really was a -- like an independent battalion command and he was a great guy. I liked him,I knew his family very well. I thought my, this is awful because from my point of view I was astonished. I said, "I'm going down to see him. You two fellows talk here till I come back," and then suddenly I remembered that I didn't know my way around the place, so I said, "Well, Bill, you'll have to show me where his office is." As I walked down the hall I said to myself, this is one problem you hadn't anticipated. This is the first time you're going to command a guy as a colonel and you a Major General, although I hadn't gotten my second star yet, and this is a new problem for you and how you're going to do it? Well, I couldn't solve it in the lengths of the hall but when I got in there, there was John sitting at his desk. I said, "Hello, John," and he got up. I grabbed his hand before he could salute and we shook hands heartily and practically embraced each other. We were so glad to see each other and I said, "Look, can you interrupt what you're doing for long enough to come up to my office and do a little reminiscing and also I got a guy up there I'd like to talk with you about?" "Oh, sure." So, we go up there and we talked about families and whatnot, paying no attention to Captain King. So I saw Captain King's face fall as he found out how intimate we were and finally I said, "John, I really brought you up here to hear Captain King's proposition. I know you've heard it before and I've heard it before but I'd like him to tell it to both of us so we both have the same story." So, Captain King went through the same story. Very, very fervently, and avidly because he felt he was on the losing end about this time. So after he was through I said, "John, you turned this down." "Yes, I turned it

down." "Well, why?" "Well," he said,"I believe that these people should, when they first come in the Army, should have a regular basic training, not the kind we get for the corps area complement." He said, "I think they should have this right off the bat. I think this is important." He said, "Also, at the end of the year this fellow's probably going to have to go through combat basic again and repeat the basic training. Well, it seems like we're wasting a lot of his time and also a lot of our training effort." "Well," I said, "John, wouldn't he have something though that the straight draftee coming into the Army didn't have. He'd have a year of military experience. I think you might be rather better off for this experience and in the meantime we would have had his service. He would have released a general serviceman for that year while he was on this job and also I believe that at the -- when this thing is all over, this extra year of service might add to his veterans benefits. In all probability, it would." "Yes," he said, "In all probability, it would." "Well," I said, "John did you consider these things when you came to your decision?" He said, "No," I said, "Well, does that change your mind?" "Yes," he said, "It does. I think I'll approve it." "Well," I said, "You and Captain King go out and get this thing done." That was my first visit during the day. The. . . .

MAJ MORRISON: Was that the first time that -- when this was approved, that 18 year olds were drafted?

LTG AURAND: No, they. . .

MAJ MORRISON: Weren't they. . . ?

LTG AURAND: They enlisted, they enlisted. They could enlist at 18 but they couldn't be sent overseas until 19 and they weren't drafted until they

were 19 and this gave this poor high school kid a year when he couldn't even get a job because everybody knew he was going to be drafted. It was a bad spot and to enlist them, I think, was good for them and good for the country and certainly was good for the Sixth Service Command because we had bands and I want to tell you -- wonderful bands! Then I found out three months later, that Captain King was Wayne King the Waltz King, who played in the biggest dance hall in the world in Chicago and played nothing but waltzes because the little girls came with their mamma's and the boys came on their own. They were all well chaperoned and he had the greatest rating for a radio program. He was sponsored by Lady Esther Cosmetics and, of course, I'd listened to his music and loved it before. And he was a great guy. But he came to me with another proposition. He came to me rather than Sullivan. He knew nothing about military channels and he was a delight and said, "Look, let's do this on the other end of the line." I said, "What do you mean?" Well, the top draft age was 35. They weren't drafting people that old yet but that was the law, at that time. "Why don't we enlist people over 35 for limited service. Enlist them as a limited serviceman and keep them here in the Sixth Service Command. There are a lot of guys that are married and live around here who could go to these posts and not be too far from home and they want to do something patriotic, something for the war and the hell with this working ten hours in the war plant and then going out and playing music in the evening. It's, they don't care for that and it doesn't seem patriotic. They want to come into the Army and wear the uniform." So I had Sullivan come in and listen to this proposition, and he said, "I'll run it down." It was perfectly legal and everything else. We got some of the finest musicians in the country. Some composers as well as just horn tooters. I'll never forget one of the musicians had written

a song called The Music Goes Round and Round and Comes Out Here. He was one of these fellows that enlisted. So, we had bands and we had wonderful bands. And these kids that came in from high school bands were playing along side professionals. That gave them a lot of musical instruction, you know. So that worked -- that worked very well. Well, this being over, Bill Reeda and I looked at each other and I said, "Well, that worked pretty well. There are a whole lot of buttons on this desk. What are these for?" Well, that was AG and G-1 and all this kind of thing. Oh, a mass of them. There must of been, well, 24 anyway. So, and he said, "Well, that's a buzzer system to get the staff officers in here." "Well," I said, "Now I'm going to play on it. You sit right there next and I said, "I'm going to push this one." Well, that happened to be AG. "You tell me what you know about the AG. What's his name and all this sort of thing?" "Well," he said, "I got to get the headquarters telephone directory first." And so we worked this out and then I'd push a button and a guy would show up and I'd say, "Now, sit down and be comfortable." I said, "I want to tell you two things. The first thing is you'll never be summoned by that buzzer again by me unless I'm in a hell of a hurry. So, if you ever hear it, come running but normally I'll telephone you or Bill Reeda will telephone you, and the second thing is that when we telephone you or Bill Reeda will telephone you, and the second thing is that when we telephone you, we're going to tell you what we want to see you about so you don't come up here wondering and then have to go back and get information and come back again." And with that, I'd ask them what they were doing and so on. Well, we spent the rest of the day pushing buttons and meeting staff -- top staff people and that's how I assumed command in my first command as General officer.

MAJ MORRISON: Outstanding sir. Sir, in addition to the music problem -- musician's problems that you found, what were your other immediate problems?

LTG AURAND: Well, my first problem was with the Chief of Staff. I've told you what a gentleman and scholar he was, what a fine person, but if each of us were given a set of facts and had to come to a conclusion, we would come to different conclusions from the same set of facts. We just did not think alike at all. What was even worse when we had finally agreed to a conclusion or I had dictated a conclusion, the action to be taken from that conclusion was always different in his mind than it was in mine. It was just absolutely necessary to relieve him, get him another job and get somebody who thought somewhat like I did and this was a real problem. I think I finally found out at my first service commander's conference, which was very shortly after -- it probably was a month or two after I took command -- from General Miles who'd had the First Service Command in Boston, that he needed a G-1. And I told him about this fellow and he knew him. He'd served with him and he said, that he'd be very glad to have him as his G-1. So I talked to Sommervel and Styer right there at the command conference and to Russ Reynolds who was the personnel, was the G-1 of Sommervell's office. They all said, "OK." When I got back to Chicago I asked -- I almost said his name. I asked him whether he would like to go to Boston as G-1. Oh, he'd be delighted. He was from Boston, yea. Wonderful. So he was gone, oh, I guess in two months, maybe less. Too bad -- there was just no use fighting this battle everyday. So I was without a Chief of Staff. I'd had an acting Chief of Staff and I don't remember who it was, for a little while. Well, I looked at a Chief of Staff. Actually, I was my own Chief of Staff during this interim. The other fellow was just there

to have somebody at the office. My next problem was a tragedy in my family. It occurred only a couple of weeks after my arrival in Chicago. My wife Betty was suddenly hospitalized in Walter Reed and would probably have to stay there for some time. My four-year old daughter was being cared for by a neighbor and my father and mother-in-law were in a state of shock. I got back to Washington as fast as I could and with the help of General Styer, Sommervell's Chief of Staff, I arranged for my mother-in-law to stay in the Walter Reed visitors house as long as my wife was in Walter Reed. Then I took my father with me to Chicago, turning over our daughter to the next door neighbor. I had rented an apartment in the Edgewater Beach Apartment and Mr. Dewey, the manager, permitted me to cancel the lease and to take rooms in the Edgewater Beach Hotel. Of course, it was just for my father and myself. But, Reeda, Bill Reeda had in the meantime, located a family in Evanston whose home was next door to a very fine private school and the family consisted of an older boy and two small daughters who bracketed my daughter in age. They agreed to take Linda for whatever time was necessary and see that she got into the pre-school class in this very fine school. I had a very hard time making them set a price for this -- boarding and taking care of Linda but we finally agreed on one and so I went back to Washington and picked up Linda and brought her to Chicago. We let her have one night in the hotel with Grandpa and me to sort of acclamatize her to the new surroundings and then took her to the Holston's

home. I can never repay my indebtedness to them for this help. I had already told you my push button meetings with my staff officers. However, this was just with the heads of staff and I felt that I should have another meeting with them because of this tragedy before I met the staff as a whole. So, as soon as this -- these things were settled, my family was settled, I called a staff meeting in a room we found in the post office building somewhere, of just these same people. And I told them all the details of what had happened and after that I said that I wanted a meeting of the entire staff and that I would visit them in their offices before I had this meeting of the entire staff. During this period, we moved the headquarters to the Civic Opera building and there was plenty of room for large meetings in the theaters there.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what were the missions of a service command?

LTG AURAND: Well, this is pretty hard to say as far as the view point of the headquarters of the Army Service Forces was concerned. We were continually getting new ones and they were continually telling us we should have done this, that and the other thing, when I had no record or any of my staff that we should have done this, that or the other thing. What I shall give you here was what I finally thought of as my missions. First, to help the war production efforts. I think about a fourth of all war production in the United States was in these three states of the Sixth Service Command, Wisconsin, Illinois and Michigan. And in particular, to help them with the plant security problem. There was a terrific job for getting civilian guards and screening them and all that sort of thing and the fellow who would normally be called a G-2 on a Corps Area or Service Command staff, was called the security officer. And the accent on security

was so great. The second mission was to perform the early functions of manpower mobilization, up to the point of sending them to basic training camps. And we had one-fifth of the population of the country in these three states at that time, so we were doing 20 percent of the manpower mobilization job in addition to 25 percent of the industrial problem. And I considered these two things together to be the most important things that I did. Then to act as hotel keeper at posts where units in the Army Ground Forces and aviation cadets were in training. I got rid of the aviation cadet problem early. They were being trained in some of the biggest hotels in the Chicago Loop and they were training them so far in advance that they were being sent home and sometimes had to wait a year before they were called to get flying training and they were in the same hiatus that the 18 year-olds were, waiting for the draft at age 19. I think largely through my protests through some of my classmates who were on the air staff that this problem was faced finally, by the Army Air Corps and the cadets were signed up but not sent for any training whatsoever until it could be immediately followed by flying training. The ground forces were no problem. They -- they only appeared at two posts -- two camps in my command, Camp McCoy and Fort Custer. And I had three fine division commanders all of whom I knew very well. And we had no trouble, no trouble at all. The next mission was to command the Army First Service Forces training installations and we had a good many of those. We had the JAG school and the MP school, the Medical Field Service School. And at Camp Ellis we had a camp for general units like engineer service regiments, quartermaster service regiments and all the hodgepodge of offshoot's of

of these things which were of use only in the communications zone. Like clothing and bath units and things of this kind and to supervise ROTC and ASTP activities. Not only to supervise but to command them. But we did much more supervising than commanding them. Those are the missions as I saw them at the time.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what were the subordinate commands of the Sixth Service Command?

LTG AURAND: Well, first of all there were the post commanders. There were only two who ran a hotel. They were the commanders at Fort and at Camp McCoy. In all other cases, the post commander was also the activity commander that was at the post. All of these post commanders reported directly to me at service command headquarters. Other commands which did so were what I called district commanders. There was one for each state and one for the city of Chicago and Cook County which surrounded it. These were the people who dealt with the civilian government agencies in these states and had a great deal to do with civil defense and things of that nature as well as the military side of it. Also, they were very helpful in lending assistance to the security officer on my staff in lining up the guard -- plant guard problem and things of that nature in their states and in the Chicago area. All of the ROTC's and the colleges in these three states were under my command and again this was more supervision than a direct exercise of command. They reported to my headquarters. Some of these ROTC people stayed on until the Army specialized training people arrived at these colleges -- but that is another subject. Then I had quite a few military police battalions scattered around. They were mostly in the Chicago and Detroit areas although there was only one at Detroit in River

Rouge Park which had a specific mission to put down a riot in case it occurred in Detroit. The Chicago ones were scattered around in Cook County outside the city and had no specific missions in Chicago. We felt that the scattered situation there as distinguished from the very much centralized city in Detroit did not permit a specific training and I used those -- some of those battalions for other purposes than security. Mostly for morale, civilian morale purposes. These are the main outfits which reported directly to the Sixth Service Command Headquarters.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what was your relationship to the arsenals, such as Rock Island in Detroit and to the combat divisions?

LTG AURAND: The arsenals were all exempted stations and, of course, that was as far as the manufacturing activities were concerned, but there were exceptions because of the security problem. These arsenals had -- always had some sort of security arrangements and they felt that they could handle themselves, but they were unrelated to the civilian internal security people like State Police or home guards as we called them when then replaced the National Guard and so this bridge had to be crossed and we helped them to cross it to get the contacts and so on. And after awhile I knew all of these fellows and these places.

MAJ MORRISON: Well, they -- they . . . .

LTG AURAND: It was easy to make arrangements with them.

MAJ MORRISON: What did -- they were in your area but they reported directly to the chief of war. . . ?

LTG AURAND: Chief of war.

MAJ MORRISON: . . .quartermaster general or. . . ?

LTG AURAND: Yes, we had things besides the arsenals. We had several large signal depots in the area and of course, a big quartermaster depot in Chicago. They -- they were all exempted stations but it was the same proposition -- security proposition.

MAJ MORRISON: What about the combat divisions? They were training in your. . . ?

LTG AURAND: Well, I think I already mentioned that there were only two camps and that only two divisions trained at McCoy and one at Custer and there was no trouble because I knew all three of the division commanders so well. We had a little trouble which was not due to the presence of the ground forces and I may talk about that later when I talk -- I'm sure you are going to ask me about my employment of prisoners of war.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: I believe that there was only once or twice at McCoy where the post commander and the division commander didn't see eye to eye and I had to go up there and act as an arbitrator -- arbitrator but they were no trouble. Really, no -- no heat.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. Yes sir. Please describe your first visits to the subordinate commands?

LTG AURAND: Well, I'm going to pick out one of each type of command so that -- subordinate command, so that -- because I can't possibly go through them all. At Camp McCoy we had some very special problems. We had the first Japanese prisoners of war. These people were picked up on life rafts after the Battle of Midway -- the Naval Battle of Midway and I'm told by some of the people who were on the carriers -- US carriers, that a great many of these fellows committed suicide rather than to be picked up by the US. We had about a hundred. Maybe a few more than a hundred of these

Japanese prisoners and the senior officer was a commander. The problem came about when the 100th Battalion which was entirely Hawaiian Nisei's came to Camp McCoy for training under the Army Ground Forces. Because of that, I never tried to work the Japanese prisoners of war. They just stayed -- just stayed in the cage. And then the 2nd Division which had been filled up largely with Mexican-Americans, some draftees and had expected to go the Pacific and they had been trained to hate Japanese, any that they saw, came to Camp McCoy. We had a rather difficult time persuading them that there were two kinds of Japanese. One were US soldiers and the others were prisoners of war. It was a rather difficult job and we did have some affairs in the towns around Camp McCoy when we let them both out on pass. Now, it so happens that the 2nd Division was commanded by General Robertson and Robertson was my G-4 instructor at Leavenworth, my G-4 instructor at the War College, I took his job at the War College and he was executive of G-4 when I reported there in 1940. So we had a long acquaintance. He was a class of 1912, he was a first classman when I was a plebe. And I could sit down and talk with him very well. And we finally agreed that one weekend out of three, although this ratio was not in proportion to the strengths of the 100th Battalion, and the 2nd Division, the 2nd Division would not let anybody in town on pass and the 100th Battalion would have the area to themselves. But the 100th Battalion had to stay home the other two weekends or go down at their own peril. They weren't restricted. This was the arrangement and they could have one night a week and the division. . .

MAJ MORRISON: Again, who was the. . .

LTG AURAND: Five.

MAJ MORRISON: . . .was the 100th Battalion?

LTG AURAND: The 100th Battalion was made up entirely of Japanese nesei's, American citizens, all second generations, all born in the United States from Hawaii. You know they didn't intern any Japanese in Hawaii and why they did on the Pacific coast, I'll never know. The people -- I know some of the people who did it and they wondered why they were being made to do it. It was an insane thing. Without reason I mean by insane. With -- without real reason. They were afraid of a good many things rather than having reason to do it. But the 100th battalion was commanded by an old friend of mine, now an old friend of mine. He's now dead. We saw his widow in Hawaii this Christmas. Turner -- Ferrant Turner. He was one fine officer, no question about it. What I have just talked about is a review of the Service Command problems at a hotel type camp. Now, the next camp I had chosen was Custer which was the military police school. It was located at Battlecreek, Michigan and I had a very interesting time on that visit. I was taken through the school. The commandant later became the provost marshal general or whatever they call it of the Air Force -- in the Air Force of this period. He was a very fine man on whom I could depend a 100 percent. One of the things that Sommervell had established in his headquarters was a control division unknown to Army staffs before and the first outfit they worked on was my international division which had previously been the defense aid state division of the War Department and we welcomed it. We said here is a new outfit and these are the ideas for a few people and anything that you can do to make us more efficient or, you know cut personnel or change our procedure -- we'd be delighted to have you tell us. Well, the two number one guys of the outfit came in and did most of this just to get their own hand in it -- at it and when it was all through they

gave us a clean bill of health. They didn't change a thing. I believe that their going over the place though, helped me very much because I got a lot of information about what was going on that I never would have seen without their thorough scrutiny. So I knew what a control division could do for you. Sommervell had ordered these placed in all of the service commands. But in the Sixth, and I believe in all the other service commands enthusiasm to establish a control division and get it functioning had been lacking and I was looking for people who really had gotten the idea. So every place in the post I went, I had a -- I was briefed on what the control activities were in that particular area. And I came to the quartermaster officer and he said, "This I'd left entirely to Lieutenant Watkins. He'll tell you all about what we're doing about it." And Lieutenant Watkins was the Second Lieutenant and he put on a show that would of done the head of the control division in Washington credit. And when he was all through I said, "Do you have any objection to serving in Chicago?" He said, "No sir." I said, "Pack your trunk and report to me in Chicago when I get back." So that was the start of a long acquaintance. He is on a world tour right now. He just got into Hawaii the other day and I arranged to have some leis sent to him and his wife and I got a cable right back thanking me for it. So you can see how long that's lasted. My next category of call is the -- is the Detroit district and of course, this turned out to be a very vital district as far as I was concerned. I had a conference with the mayor at which we got together on training my MP battalion at River Rouge Park with the riot squad of the Detroit police. In doing it, we used to do it about 3 a.m. on Monday morning just after the shifts changed in the war production plants - so that nobody was on the streets to see us, nobody knew what the

hell was going on and I would do this myself. I'd fly over from or take the train over at night from Chicago and I'd go into some all night bar or telephone stand at a filling station and put in the call to the -- first, to the police chief or whoever was on duty at his office and tell them what we were doing and at what time and I would give them about a half hour and then I'd call the MP officer at River Rouge Park and say this is a drill, this is a drill three or four times and then tell them where the riot was. And the results speak for themselves. But Jeffries and I got along fine and then I went down and inspected this MP Battalion and it was 100 percent limited service people from the Michigan division of the National Guard. Incidentally, the division which my West Point roommate commanded in New Guinea for a few minutes until he was wounded. These people were so glad to be living among Michiganders and be in uniform. They were so afraid they'd be checked out when they were limited service but it was one of the finest and proudest outfits I had. That was also all to the good later on. My final call -- final description of a call was at the University of Illinois ROTC. I never have quite understood the ROTC policy. In some schools the ROTC was kept going and in others it was closed out and whether this was by some knowledge that I didn't have about the schools or whether it was requested by presidents or what, I don't know. The news of ROTC changes came without explanation from the top. I believe that the ROTC at the University of Illinois in Champaign continued until the Army specialized training program started. The PMS&T there was a fine officer who'd been in the G-4 division of the general staff when I was alien property custodian and I'd done quite a lot of business with him and I thought very, very highly of him and I couldn't imagine why this guy was sitting back in an ROTC job. He was too valuable an officer. And since my Chief of Staff would

undoubtedly get a star -- he was a one star in the headquarters table of organization -- I thought I would get this guy as my Chief of Staff. I'd had some work with him. He was far senior to me. Yes, he was in those days. In 1924. But I didn't think this would matter with him and I was much amazed when he turned me down flat. Not even saying a thing. I think he was so mad that he hadn't gotten a star already in the Field Artillery area -- from when he took a Field Artillery Brigade -- he was a Field Commander, but he just wasn't having any part of it. So, with this, I made up my mind that I would not try to get anybody as my Chief of Staff who'd been senior to me and of course, this ruled out John Sullivan whom I'd had in the back of my mind for quite awhile. At this point, I might as well tell how I finally did get a Chief of Staff. On one of my numerous trips to Washington I found that a classmate of mine and a man who'd been on the Leavenworth faculty when I took the course, Jack Davis, had been relieved at the port from command of a cavalry reconnaissance regiment motorized or whatever they called it, the corps -- the corps reconnaissance outfit, because he was overage to go overseas and several of them -- this happened to several of my classmates and why in Sam Hill they didn't tell them in the beginning they were going to be over age to go overseas, I don't know, because it was hard on both of them and on the -- it must have been hard on the outfit. He had been sent to the Port of Seattle and I'm not sure, but I think he was the inspector general of the port which is a pretty tough job at the port. So I called up as Commanding Officer and asked him -- told him I was looking for a Chief of Staff and that if I got Jack he probably would get one star and asked if he, under these circumstances would release him and he said, "Yes." He would. It would hurt him but it -- he thought it was a bigger job. And I said, "How's Jack's morale?" He said,

"Considering what they did to him, it was wonderful." So I said, "Can you have Jack call me?" So, Jack called me up and we kidded around awhile and finally I asked him if he was willing to be my Chief of Staff and he said, "Oh, hell, I can't be a Chief of Staff. I don't know anything about it." I said, "You're on the Leavenworth faculty. You ought to know something about it." "Well," he said, "Alright," and I never said anything about him getting a star -- I held out no bait. He was coming to -- because he wanted to come and not to get a star and so I said, "Well, Jack take your time. I've struggled along for a couple of months now so take it easy and get here when you can." He was there the next morning and that was a wonderful association. Here -- here were two guys who could reach the same conclusions from the same facts and take the same action from the same conclusion and much of the time after that I got out of the day to day problems and got to. . . .

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: . . .and this is the way it's got to be. The boss has to be on the road and then I also might say at this time that I'm tremendously sorry that we didn't have deputy commanders because of the commander and the deputy commander and the Chief of Staff, that triumvirate, you can run a command with a lot of people in it. The Chief of Staff runs a staff. The deputy commander takes care of all subordinate commanders and the boss man sees that these two are well coordinated and that makes a smooth running command post. But back to Jack Davis. He certainly filled the bill.

MAJ MORRISON: What were your problems of coordination and how were they solved?

LTG AURAND: Well, within the staff after my first success at the staff conference, I held a bi-weekly staff conference of all staff officers, all of them over which I presided at the start. At each conference each staff

officer -- each staff division head would report on three things. What he had done, what he was doing and what he expected to do in the future. Anybody could ask questions at anytime. And any of the other staff section chiefs and there were sometimes arguments as to whether he should have it or somebody else should. But the coordination was excellent in that regard. After I felt I was known well by all of the staff officers and after Jack Davis became Chief of Staff, why the Chief of Staff presided at these conferences. Coordination upward was accomplished to a great degree by the semi-annual service and well prepared, by the way, service commanders conferences. But much more detail was needed as far as I was concerned and I'd visited Washington almost once a month on orders from Sommervell. The new control division -- the new job of labor officer which was a technical staff guy we'd never had before and the security officer likewise all presented questions of interest and jurisdiction and so on within the staff as well as the technical challenge, so that I think these trips to Washington were very well worthwhile to insure coordination between me and Sommervell. Of course, at the start these trips to Washington were made at my own expense in order to see how my wife was getting along at Walter Reed but I believe that Styer in particular, found my visits welcome and so useful that after my wife came to Chicago he continued this by ordering -- continued these trips by ordering me in.

MAJ MORRISON: Did the other commanders make the same trips?

LTG AURAND: Well, I understand from talking to them that the fellow in Baltimore lived in Washington in the camp beyond and he got all the news first and really ran an excellent command. He was formally the adjutant general of the state of Maryland and I thought a very fine service commander. The fellow at New York was in often and not so frequently the people of

Boston and Atlanta but the three isolated people at Omaha and Dallas and Salt Lake didn't get in so often.

MAJ MORRISON: Almost never.

LTG AURAND: Well, I think they came in maybe once between service commanders conferences. I'm sure they came in at least once because I've met some of them but they didn't get in on the average of once a month as I did. In addition to these trips and the service commanders conferences, there was a deputy Chief of Staff for service commands who had nothing else to do but look out for the interest of the service commanders on Sommervell's staff in Washington. And we could call him or write him at anytime for anything we wanted. He was a very fine guy. He was a chemical warfare officer and was a BG. General Joe Battley and I kept up with him for quite awhile after the war. I was on very intimate terms with him. Not only did he stay in Washington and handle our stuff but he occasionally made a swing around all the service commands and you know, had all the gossip to give us when he came by and that helped -- he helped immensely.

MAJ MORRISON: By his trips he became more abreast of what. . . .

LTG AURAND: . . .of what the problems were and particularly about the mis-understanding of the problems that some of the people on Sommervell's staff had. It wasn't that they were kind of government that works for us, it was that they didn't understand why we ask for things. Just like I didn't understand why they ordered things sometimes and it-- these are the two things you have to straighten out to get good coordination. To get coordination downward and to some extent crosswise and my next subordinate commands, I held a command and staff conference monthly. These conferences were very much like the staff conferences that I held every two weeks. In

fact, I had a staff conference -- command conference -- staff conference -- command conference, that's the way it worked out, with two week interims. During this conference, the staff people had to keep quiet. They couldn't interrupt each other but the commanders could interrupt the staff officer who is recording at anytime. I usually presided over those conferences and here again, I wished I had a deputy commander who could preside because I had to be not only the protagonist but the arbitrator and I was very much prejudiced in favor of the commanders as my staff found out. The conference was attended not only by all of the staff and all of the subordinate commanders but as many people as they could spare from their staffs or get in their automobiles or whatever, they brought along. We held it in a theater that seated about 350 people and it was usually full. In addition, my civilian advisory council attended and they had the front row of seats. Very seldom was there anyone absent although these all were very, very busy businessmen in Chicago. Also, the press came. Now if there was anything I thought that should not at the moment appear in the public press, I would make a note of it and afterward I would have a press conference after the command and staff conference which the civilian advisory council attended and I would say now for this and that reason I would just as soon that you didn't publish this particular piece of news at this time and I had it on my list and when it can be released I will tell you and I will tell you at one of these conferences so you -- so you all get it at once and they never breached it -- never once. So I felt very good about that and I should, of course, I kept my side of the bargain. I did release this stuff. I just didn't bottle it up and forget it. I believe that's what makes most of the newsmen mad. Then after the press conference there was a -- what's called a malectric club in the tower of the civic opera building

and I would take the -- I joined it and I would take the advisory council up there for lunch and then we would have our own private problem discussing which was most helpful. The civilian viewpoint was most helpful to me and I got some very great help from them. For example, I had a very good -- very famous doctor on the thing and when Camp Ellis was started and most of the troops who went there were black, the VD rate at Camp was terrific and it was all coming from Peoria. So the doctor went down and saw the public health fellow of that city. In fact, I think he had a medical group meeting down there to see what could be done about this medical-wise not police-wise and as a result, practically all of the houses closed up and the girls went to Chicago and the VD rate was down.

MAJ MORRISON: When you took the civilian advisory council to lunch, was it a Dutch treat lunch?

LTG AURAND: No, I had a small expense account. I spent some of my own money. . .

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: . . .on the entertainment business because everybody and his brother came through the place. Sometimes they were already sponsored by the War Department so that the War Department paid all the bills but I used my entertainment money for the luncheon for the civilian council, you see and also for that famous labor leaders dinner that I gave in Detroit later on which turned out to be a very happy event. So, in this way I obtained coordination with the press, with my subordinate commanders and with my civilian advisory council. The coordination of my Sixth Service Command was the adjoining service commands was supposedly accomplished at the service commanders conference but there was so little time for this that I decided to do this on an individual basis. I had two problems which were

problems of the others as well. One was between the Seventh Service Command and myself. A really -- really two problems. One was in the St. Louis area and the other in Duluth, Superior area between Minnesota and Wisconsin. We settled these things on our level with great ease and then what do you want to do about it, well, what do you want to do about it? And anything that was proposed was accepted. That was no difficulty but it was well that we went through the making of the agreement because then we knew exactly where we stood. On the northeast corner of Illinois there were two counties in Indiana which blocked me from getting from Illinois to Michigan and they were part of the Illinois economy and the refineries at, -- I've forgotten the name of the place -- and the steel mills at Gary were most important to the war effort and we were a long way from Columbus, Ohio. So, General Collins who was "Lightning" Joe Collins' oldest brother was in command of the fifth service command which I knew like a book and I think the names of the country were Porter and La Porte but that's of no consequence. I was given jurisdiction of the -- over those two counties for all of the duties of the service command and also had direct access to the Governor of Indiana for that purpose within an agreement with General Collins. Of course, everything I did there I told him about. This went without saying. But he just -- he laid off -- I really took over those places so this sideways coordination at the service command level was worked out individually. And of course, practically all the coordination between the Army Service Forces and the Army Ground Forces was worked out between ASF and AGF headquarters in Washington. But I had one peculiar situation. We had people at the Sault Locks guarding the Locks. I may be wrong on this but my recollection is that we had two battalions of coast artillery. One gun

and one machine gun. We had a regiment of infantry and we had balloon companies to put captive balloons on steel cables up in the air and we had a chemical warfare smoke company to cover the Locks with smoke.

MAJ MORRISON: Where were the Locks?

LTG AURAND: Sault Ste Marie in Michigan.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: Between Lake Superior and Lake Huron. And these were under the command of the Army commander who had been in Chicago and all of the communications for the alerts and everything else came into my headquarters in Chicago but the Army commander, General Ben Lear had moved his headquarters to Memphis. There was nothing but the ordinary telephone line to get to him and he was so far away anyway, he couldn't have done anything about it if something had happened. So, I went down to Memphis to see him about this. There was no SOP for what I'd do if your wife came in or my -- anybody on duty would do. So, I found that Norman Randolph a classmate of mine, was his Chief of Staff. I'm always running into somebody. This helps to beat hell and we talked this over and made the agreement that I would handle the damn thing and report to -- just over the telephone -- to General Lear or to him what I was doing and if they wanted to change it, I'd change it, but there was no use waiting for them to give me orders or try to get orders direct to the Saulte. So, that was agreed and the Army Ground Force headquarters was informed and the Army Service headquarters informed of this arrangement. And they never said anything, so we presumed it was alright. Later on the jurisdiction was changed to the first -- not the First Army -- well, there was an Army headquarters placed on Governor's

Island that General Grunert ran and so the Saulte placed under him and General Jarman was his anti-aircraft expert. This had to do with defense against bombing of all of the cities on the east coast and also against submarine shelling and things of this kind. It was a defense command. So Grunert and Jarman came out and inspected the place and I begged them to take the whole "kit and kaboodle" out of there. Here were a lot of general servicemen just plain going to waste. We could have put a limited service MP battalion up there and do all the guarding that was necessary. Well, they weren't so sure and they would think it over. Then I wrote Sommervell about this inspection trip that I'd been on with him referring to the agreement I made with Lear who no longer had jurisdiction and urging also that these general servicemen to be taken out. Well, nothing happened until one summer in mid-summer at the height of the traffic a Canadian Pacific Railroad engine and about 10 freight cars went through the draw bridge into the canal and blocked it for four or five days before they could fish the thing out and I said, "Look, this is worse than anybody could have done. What are you guarding, anyway?" And doggone, if they didn't take the troops away. But this was another coordination that I had to affect initially. I had a considerable need for coordination with the Army Air Corps. This too, should have been affected in Washington but it was a question of work like we've just mentioned with the ground force people of working out things in detail. And first, of course, was the aviation cadet program. We had hotels in Chicago taken over for aviation cadets to live in and for use as aviation cadet schools. And these people were going home and waiting sometimes for over a year before they were called up for flying training.

I knew some -- I had some friends on the Army Air Corps Staff. They had their own general and special staff at that time. And I put the problems to them on one of my trips to Washington and they were already conversant with it and I said that something had to be done about it and it wasn't long until this problem was off my hands, you see, closed the school in Chicago. Then I gave the hotels back to commerical use and they were really needed for that purpose because of all the industrial activity in the Chicago area. Then there were places where we ran their posts, thus the Army Ground Forces, where we had that same relationship. And also, I had a reception center on Scott Field right across from St. Louis, which was used jointly by me and the Seventh Service Command but I also had to work it out with the command that had Scott Field activities of the Army Air Corps under his jurisdiction and I think that command was either in San Antonio or Tampa. But I made trips both to San Antonio and Tampa to affect this sport coordination at the various installations between the Army Corps and the Sixth Service Command. We had a problem with the Navy. The Great Lakes Naval Training station was the big midwest training establishment and there were many, many sailors in Chicago. Many more sailors than soldiers, and many more on the trains, although we shipped a great many people to camps from our reception center at Sheridan; there was still more sailors than soldiers downtown and they hadn't been either very long. Another problem that -- another situation that made the problem of coordination with the Navy rather difficult, was that our territories didn't have the same boundaries. The Navy territory was much bigger than mine. So we had some problems because of that. In other words, if Admiral Downs who ran the area wanted the same

treatment from all -- from all service commanders, I think he covered four. There was four service commanders with territory in his territory. So, it was hard to get us together to give him the same treatment, but we did come up with some things that helped very much. In those days, we used to have MP's and Shore Patrol on the trains in and out of Chicago to keep the soldiers orderly on the train. They were a bunch of kids and some of them out for the first train ride, believe it or not. They were all over the trains and it wasn't that they were beating people up or drunk and disorderly or things like that, they were mostly just curious. Oh, of course, we had some drunks but why were there four people on the train, two Shore Patrols and two MP's? The same way downtown in Chicago. We had MP's and Shore Patrol, all of them sitting. So, the obvious thing was put all these things together and it took a little doing. Both by Admiral Downs and myself to really set this thing up. He wasn't against it. We had agreed on the idea long before we found out.

MAJ MORRISON: To have a joint plan. A joint. . . .

LTG AURAND: A joint MP, Shore Patrol command and we finally set this up in one of the railroad stations in Chicago for the train riders and one in the main police station in Chicago for the Chicago patrols and then we had a guy who ran both, who had office space in the civic opera building where I was downtown. He was a Navy guy and then the Army and the Navy shared the other two but he was top man and wherever useful, now we saw a Shore Patrol and an MP. We almost cut that command in half. Not quite, because we had established three extra headquarters but those were record headquarters and very few people -- well, they made out the rosters and the schedules for people and they put down the record for the people that they arrested and

and sent them back to the camp where they belonged and that was the duty of the two headquarters. Mostly coordination of training. So it was a very, very successful experiment and when I got to Normandy I did the same thing as vis-a-vis the races. Well, my command was 55 percent black total and about 60 odd percent black on the unlisted level. So, I put a platoon -- added an extra black platoon to each company of the MP battalion and all patrols were one white man and one black man and boy, it worked. It was okay. I've already talked about the coordination with the civil authorities through my district commanders and the coordination at Camp McCoy between the ground force troops there and the post commander. And I believe this wraps up all of the necessity for coordination with which I was faced. One of my staff officers said to me, "Why do you think up all of these problems. You wouldn't have them if you didn't think them up." And I just said, "Well, suppose there was a riot in Gary and General Collins in Columbus wanted me to send in my MP battalion just across the state line and they had never had any communication with the Gary police or the Indiana State Police? It would just be a mess and this is the reason for coordination."

MAJ MORRISON: In November, 1942, the Sixth Service Command set up the first 1-B limited service training center in the Army at Camp McCoy. What were the results?

LTG AURAND: We had such a training center set up at Camp McCoy to utilize the limited service manpower that came through the draft within the Sixth Service Command. We also utilized them with [illegible] in the Sixth Service Command until we finally had that command, principally manned with limited service men by the time I left for France. This greatly increased the availability of general service people for the war effort and also made more efficient the operation of the service command because these people kept

the same job and after awhile got very good at it.

MAJ MORRISON: In late October of 1942 there was a problem with the industrial plants in the Detroit area not participating in blackout drills. I believe it was Mayor Jeffries who was agitated. How was the problem solved?

LTG AURAND: I'm not quite sure but I believe that we compromised on manufacturing plants turning off their lights sometime during the 24-hour period after the alert. In fact, this was done by turning the lights off between shifts and not turning them all off at the same time. There was one good that came out of this confrontation with Mayor Jeffries. I got to know him and he got to know me and that helped us no end later on.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, earlier you mentioned civilian advisory councils and press conferences? Did you have the other means of building good civilian morale?

LTG AURAND: Yes, I had so many that I've forgotten some or have no record of them anyway. One of the things we did to improve civilian morale was to call on the families of soldiers who'd been wounded or were killed in action. This was done by a corps of members of the officers specialist corps for quite awhile were commissioned in various localities so there was not too much travel involved and they did a very fine job. Another inspiration was "E" Awards to the industrial plants and a thing I called a salute to agriculture, industry and labor, in alphabetical order, which was done by sending military police battalions all through the states. We had one going all summer long in each day and the battalion would have all kinds of miscellaneous equipment particularly, if we could, things that were being manufactured in the area where they put up camp. They would camp as near to the town as they could in some place and then have their camp

open for inspection, have a retreat parade and then the next morning they put on a sham battle with a lot of blank ammunition and they got to be very good actors. Then they would go on to the next town and get there in time to set up camp and have a retreat parade, and I'd go -- when the town got fairly large, they would turn out, you know, representatives of the off shift from the factories and some farmers would come in and so the businessmen would march in the parade and we'd have a parade with the -- Wayne King had a band in every MP battalion, don't forget, of these 18-year olds. Very excellent bands and maybe 26 piece band, something like that, all brass. Could make an awful lot of noise and we had a parade through the town and sometimes at the -- before the sham battle started if I was anywhere near there I'd come in and make a speech or I'd have a district commander there to make a speech. We had a pretty well canned speech which we memorized and used everywhere and this seemed to go far. That picked things up very well. Then, of course, we had a very strong and determined WAC recruiting effort and one of the WAC's who suggested that I dress up my four or five year old daughter in a WAC uniform and let her go along whenever they put on a show for recruiting purposes and take her when I went along to these salute parades. Let her ride in the jeep with a WAC behind me in the car. So, I bought her a WAC uniform which she promptly outgrew and then I had to buy her another and believe it or not, those uniforms cost me more than mine did. Very expensive to make. Well, this is some of the things that we did for civilian morale?

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what was your relationship with the civil defense organization?

LTG AURAND: Personally, I had little to do with it. It's hierarchy was civilian and my district commanders coordinated with it through the governors of the states and the mayors. My Chicago district and Mayor Ed Kelly were quite active in the civil defense and the three of us were visited by General U.S. Grant III who headed the civil defense in Washington.

MAJ MORRISON: In April of 1943 you told your people to "forget politeness, let's win the war, stop giving women preference in leaving and entering elevators, shifting around so officers of higher rank leave first, taking off hats because they take up too much space." This sounds like the first for women's lib. What was this all about, sir?

LTG AURAND: Well, our headquarters in the civic opera building was on several floors served by a bank of elevators which served only those floors. Hence, my jurisdiction over the behavior in these elevators was complete. It was not intended for the other banks of elevators that served other floors. My instructions not only saved time but it saved a number of trips of the elevator up and down which consumed quite a bit of energy and the people got used to this very quickly and they would "shoo-up" on a floor just like they would for a bus and they would "queve up" men and women just like they would for a bus. No difference. It was something that was in practice elsewhere, why shouldn't it be in practice in elevators?

MAJ MORRISON: Also in April John L. Lewis charged that military intelligent agents were intimidating his minors. You denied this charge and the War Department refused to comment. Would you like to explain?

LTG AURAND: I wish I could. Lack of coordination either up or down was probably the cause and this was just another example of keeping things secret from subordinate commanders and not taking the -- not taking them into their confidence.

MAJ MORRISON: You addressed a joint session of the Illinois legislature in May of 1943. Was this part of your efforts to recognize states for their war effort?

LTG AURAND: Yes, it was in part. I remember that I was there but not what I said. My appearance did good for both the legislature and the people in the state, I hope and for myself. I was able to thank them for their efforts up to that time to help the war along and applaud what they had done and also urge them to continue these efforts. On the other hand, it made me better known throughout the state of Illinois and had a little more stature particularly among the minors whom I hoped to influence at this time.

MAJ MORRISON: Under what circumstances did you send troops to guard the docks at Superior, Wisconsin in June, 1943?

LTG AURAND: With the consent of General Danielson the Seventh Service Command Commander, I called on the adjutant general of Minnesota and then went to inspect the home guard regiment at Duluth. To my amazement, I found that the commanding officer of this regiment was a former West Point classmate of mine who had not made the grade. He was not guarding the ore-loading docks at Superior, Wisconsin. In fact, he was told that to keep -- to keep on the west side of the Minnesota, Wisconsin boundary line by order of the government and there were no guards on these very important docks which was handling all the ore that was mined in Minnesota. So, I decided to stop by the Madison, Wisconsin and see the governor of Wisconsin and see what went on. Well, he was a very old man, in his 80's and he had some memory of some hassle between Minnesota and Wisconsin at the time these docks were built. Wisconsin wanted to get some income out of these

docks being -- being in Wisconsin and Minnesota was getting all the royalty on the ore and Wisconsin nothing and apparently this argument had never been settled at least in favor of Wisconsin. Well, he said he wasn't going to do anything about guarding the docks and I said, "Well, in that case, I'm going to have to put federal troops in there to guard the docks because this is too vital a thing in the war effort not to be guarded" and he said, "I wouldn't dare to bring federal troops in there." This was his state of and I should -- I just couldn't do it. Well, this time I did call up Sommervell to see whether I should put a guard on there or not and after some talk with the Judge Advocate General of the Army, I got word that I could do it on my own responsibility. That they could find nothing either way and if I thought it was worth making a row about with the governor of Wisconsin, okay. So, I sent the troops in and he protested to the President of the United States and senators and everybody else but this MP battalion stayed there for quite awhile and finally he decided to organize a home guard and send them up there to get the -- that's the only way of getting the federal troops out. That's the way that was settled.

MAJ MORRISON: What were the circumstances and with what results did you send troops into Detroit in June, 1944 to put down a riot?

LTG AURAND: Upon request of the Governor of Michigan without waiting for the authorization of the President of the United States.

MAJ MORRISON: What about the contention of state and city officials, mainly Mayor Jeffries that 12 hours elapsed before arrival of federal troops in riot torn Detroit on the 21st of June. You disputed this at the time saying that federal troops had the situation under control two hours and five minutes after they were summoned.

LTG AURAND: I must guess about this. The governor was at a republican

governor's conference in Columbus, Ohio, when the riot started. I could not get in touch with him for hours. So, I sent my security chief, General Guthner who had been Director of Public Safety for the state of Colorado for some years to Detroit to represent me there. I would guess that it was at least 20 hours after the riot started before General Guthner managed to see the governor and he said at that time that he did not want federal assistance and did not need it and had the wherewithall to put the riot down. Guthner reported almost hourly after this with me and could not help but feel that the riot was out of hand and that we would have to send the MP battalion from River Rouge Park. I told him to alert the battalion to be ready to move on call-- immediately on call. I do not recall the exact time the governor called me. Guthner was with him on an extension phone and I got my JA -- assistant JA who was a Kentucky judge on leave of absence and quite a constitutional lawyer, by the way, and my Chief of Staff on the extension from my office. The pleas of both the governor and Guthner were for immediate action to bring in federal troops. So I told Gunthner to order the MP battalion into the city and the governor that during the putting down of the riot, Guthner would have to control all forces engaged in that operation. However, afterward, he would be in the position of being a military aide to the civil authorities particularly, Mayor Jeffries and his riot police. It's my recollection that Guthner timed this. I don't remember your two hours and five minutes. He said within two hours and the Detroit district commander who, of course, was acting under Guthner's direction at that time, so maybe it was about an hour and a half when there wasn't a soul on the streets of downtown Detroit. Now these are the facts. After all was quiet and the city was back to normal and we were going to withdraw

the military police battalion, we thought we'd made a ceremony of it. Let everybody know that things were all back to normal again. We had quite a parade. The MP battalion with its band let -- led the parade and then came the home guard regiment which had been rather futile, but there were that many more bodies to help anyway. Particularly, in the time of patrolling immediately after the riot and then the riot squads of the Detroit police and when this -- they all formed in a square there, had a stand up and I made a talk and congratulated them on this thing. The governor was there, the mayor was there, everybody and I made this statement in this speech that whatever time -- you say two hours and five minutes it was, these people had put the riot down, all working together. Put the riot down in this time without firing a shot or making an arrest and I said, I'm sure this is a record in American history. And it's a great feather in your people's caps and it shows the value of all the training you've been through in the two years or so that I've been with you." And this is where the governor picked it up and said to me after the talk, "Has this been given to the press." And I said, "Yes." He said, "My God I got to refute you. I just can't take this as governor. I can't let it be known that for 24 hours I fiddled around and you did it in two hours." And these statements came out and Jeffries I think, who hadn't known what went on between the governor and Guthner, wanted to back the governor up and did so with his statement. But, I consider those statements political and very proper for them to make.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, on what basis did you act to reduce the fixed personnel of the Sixth Service Command?

LTG AURAND: I believe I've already related about the replacement of general servicemen by limited servicemen through the use of the basic training camp

for limited servicemen at Camp McCoy. The reduction, of course, was made possible by keeping these limited service people on their same job and having them become more productive as time went on. Also, I put prisoners of war to work on the good many of the lowest level post maintenace jobs. But for the new tasks I usually set up a very large cadre to start the thing off. I mean, I overmanned it. I think this is quite necessary until things settle down and you can -- people begin to get more efficient and you find that you can lope off the over-organized parts or reorganize it to bring the number of people down. I think this is more efficient than starting out with too few people and working them to death and then adding on because you get in the habit of adding people on and the thing gets bigger and bigger, Parkinson's Law, you know. My slogan was: You can do more with fewer.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. Were there any activities aimed particularly at improving soldier morale?

LTG AURAND: Oh, yes. We had quite a few of those. One of the things which we had was a "Thank to Win Program." This was the idea that -- this was based upon the idea that it would get people thinking of their jobs and how they could be improved and what we did for the enlisted men. We couldn't give them prizes or things like that but we gave them a one grade advance for anyone who had an idea which would save the government more than a certain amount a year and there were many extra passes and what not for lesser ideas that didn't qualify. And we got so many requests that we had to hire a firm in Chicago to handle all of the -- so many ideas came in. To handle all of these ideas that came in, evaluate them and see what they -- kind of an award should be given. It was completely beyond the control

divisions capacity to handle by a great margin. It gave quite a lift in -- throughout the command in the morale of the men.

MAJ MORRISON: Then you got in some outstanding suggestions?

LTG AURAND: Oh, yes. We had some fine, beautiful.

MAJ MORRISON: You mentioned ROTC and the ASTP, the Army Specialized Training Program as among the missions of a service command. What part did the Sixth Service Command play in these missions?

LTG AURAND: My recollection is that college ROTC activities were declining almost to zero. I don't know whether or not they were ever cut off -- the ROTC was ever cut off completely or not, but I did find some personnel still at educational institutions when the ASTP started up, not as many. The ASTP was brought on by the association of university presidents as I understand it and it was for the purpose of keeping the colleges and universities from becoming women's schools. I can say quite a little about this but I think the results were not good in any way whatsoever. However, it did bring to my notice Colonel Palfrey who is both the PhD and from the Solbonne in France, a degree he had gotten by being a Second Lieutenant of infantry in World War I and taking advantage of a veterans opportunity to stay in France and study. And he'd come back on active duty of course, as I think a Lieutenant Colonel. He had kept up his reserve commission and I think very highly of him. He ran the ASTP program for me because he was both an academician and a military man and did it well. Colonel McCormick, the publisher of the Chicago Tribune was a great believer in the high school ROTC and I-- he had the praise and awards and everything else, you know, for the best company, best school in ROTC and so on. And I think I reviewed the high school ROTC graduation parade which took place every year about

the time of the high school graduations. All of the June's that I was there. He also had a big party for them at one of the large theaters. I guess it was a Masonic Hall, I don't know in Chicago at -- at the night of the parade which he had all of the talents and the night clubs and what not and I was supposed to speak at the meeting just a few words. Tell them how good they were in the parade or something of this kind. Whatever a thing it was. Incidentally, at the -- one of these I got the measles from some of the high school kids and I was incarcerated in the "No contact ward" at one of the hospitals in Chicago for a couple of weeks. One of the papers came out with their headline, What kind of a Baby Have we got for a Sixth Service Commander? Go ahead.

THIS IS THE END OF SIDE #1, TAPE #2, 6 APRIL 1974.

THIS IS TAPE 2, SIDE 2 IN A SERIES OF INTERVIEWS WITH LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY S. AURAND. THE DATE IS 6 APRIL 1974 AND WE ARE IN GENERAL AURAND'S HOME IN ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI.

LTG AURAND: Colonel McCormick wanted me to find out how these high school ROTC cadets were doing compared to the regular run of the draft and we watched for them at reception centers and then sent word to the basic training center commanders of Colonel McCormick's interest and that these people were coming through and would they please keep track of them for awhile and see how they did. Unfortunately for Colonel McCormick, we found that these people were very valuable when they got in the processing -- initial processing when we moved them from our induction center to our reception center. They were always a platoon or squad leader and what not and the same when we shipped them on to basic training. But after about two weeks of basic training you couldn't tell who had been I -- high school ROTC cadets and who hadn't. So I come to the conclusion that the great value of the ROTC in the high schools is to maintain discipline in the high schools which the civilian teachers can't do. I have one thing I'd like to add about the ASTP. At an off guess, we had 20,000 soldiers in 40 different colleges and universities and Palfrey made me go call on everyone of these schools and I was utterly amazed at the lack of administration in the biggest of these universities. It was just horrible. You couldn't find anything out. You didn't know where anybody was living. If it weren't for the military people who were there, and I had a hard job digging up people for boarding schools and 20,000 soldiers, if it hadn't been for them we would of lost these people -- utterly. There was no course selection for them. There was a -- we found teachers and we said, "What will you teach?"

The military did, not the dean of the faculty or anybody like that. At the big schools, now. Now the small schools did pretty well. The only big school that I had that I thought measured up was the Michigan State University and I think Hanna was the President at that time. I'm not sure of that name. He'd been in Washington on various consulting jobs with the government and I had met him there and I told him he run the best show of the big schools but the one that really stood out was called the Michigan School of Mines and it was on the upper peninsula on Lake Superior. It was really a small -- what you used to call college or normal school. I guess it started that. It was to train engineers for the mines and the -- along the shore of Lake Superior in Michigan and it was well run and well administered. I understand now that it's got a new name and it's a much bigger school and so on but it well deserved to be. These were the contrasts which we met but the saddest part was what happened to the people who attended -- the soldiers who attended. Practically all were noncom's, they were all busted to go -- to become part of the ASTP. They all were people who had had some college education before they went and they all went back in the replacement system as practice and I can think of no greater manpower waste than that caused by the ASTP. I hope it never happens again.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, you had served on a -- sir, before I go on again -- what was Colonel Palfrey's job in the Sixth Service Command?

LTG AURAND: He was assistant G-3 as -- to have a spot to rest in but he headed the ASTP Program for me. He was more of a project officer and a commander than he was a staff officer.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: And of course, he spoke French beautifully as his doctorate was in ancient French poetry. So he could speak almost any dialect of French. He used to take a sabbatical in the time between the wars about every five years and teach a year at a French university. The military career was very active. He was an instructor in a reserve -- an unassigned reserve officers school at -- in Chicago when he was at Northwestern. He had taught at Indiana University and Illinois University and then at -- finally lit at Northwestern. I met him in Washington. He had been the training officer on the staff of the outfit that set up all of foreign government schools, you know, military government schools and this having served its purpose was falling apart. And I met him at a dinner at Colonel Wainhouse's home which -- who will come into the picture later -- and I was so entranced with him that I said, "Have you found a job in Washington?" And he said, "No." "Well," I said, "I'll give you one. You're going to belong to me." And I got him made PMS&T at a small college outside of Chicago. I've forgotten the name of it. I think it was a small Catholic college so that I had him right there. And, of course, he lived in Evanston so he went home to live. It was a great treat for him in that respect but when the ASTP started, I had my man right there.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. Sir, you had served on a corps area staff. Did you find procedures in a service command headquarters any different?

LTG AURAND: Yes, but in two major cases only. The first one I've talked a good deal. There were Army Ground Force -- Army Ground Force units and Air Force units on post which were commanded by the Sixth Service Command but the units and activities of the Ground Forces and Air Forces were not. In the corps areas the corps area commanded all of the Army activities on

the posts. The second great difference was that in the corps areas all requests for supplies -- all requisitions from posts came to the corps area for editing and checking against allowances by the technical service people on the staff. This was not done in the service command and I think this is a very great improvement. Note that this didn't throw the book away. It was a change in procedure in one paragraph with the book so that this was easy to do and was well understood by everybody. Instead of the editing being done at corps area headquarters, the requisitions from the posts were sent to a single depot for each service. For example, all of my post requisitions for ordnance supplies on Rock Island Arsenal which was in my area right away so that I could talk through Rock Island if I wanted -- wanted to but Rock Island did the editing. Now, by editing, I mean putting the proper nomenclature on so that the poor guy out in the warehouse knew what you were asking for. If you didn't ask for it exactly, he had to scratch his head and try to figure out what it was and usually sent you the wrong thing. So there had to be somebody who knew the standard nomenclature lists. Remember, I talked about them earlier. To edit these things so the storekeeper could get them right and this started all the way from the top. If you ordered the wrong thing you never got what you wanted. So the editing was then done by the depot. Now, that depot extracted on another depots just like the old corps area staff officer used to have to send to this depot as well as editing. The checking against allowances was done by the post and this was done by the technical service guy going to each post and saying your stock should be and there was this -- again this document that I worked on at Raritan which said what spare parts and so much -- so many

perhaps whole things like so many extra rifles. You didn't carry extra 75 guns but pistols and rifles and things like that you would and blankets and so on in the quartermaster so that the point at which the post would requisition was set and the amount to be ordered when that point was reached was set by the corps area technical staff officer. Thereby unloading all the paperwork that he ever had in connection with the check against allowances and this worked fine but it worked fine only so long as the technical service fellow in my headquarters would go around to the posts and inventory a few spot items to see whether he was either A-requisitioning on time or B-requisitioning too much and this was the control. And it worked like a charm and I was so delighted with it that when I got to China I put the system in between the China theater and the Burma-India theater. Now these were the two main differences between corps area and service command.

MAJ MORRISON: In the fall of 1943, the Sixth Service Command temporarily moved it's headquarters to Fort Sheridan. What was the purpose of this move?

LTG AURAND: Well, everybody in headquarters was getting stale. There had been so much speculation in the press about a cross channel invasion of France in 1943 and when it did not occur both the civilian community as well as the military were thinking that in terms of an extra year of war. What was needed was a change to really shake things up and Bill, the more -- the move really shook things up in the headquarters. Change for the sake of change used to be my motto. The most surprising part of it was that almost everybody enjoyed it and it received a -- and it remained the conversation piece until D-Day. The headquarters offices were in mess tents and the officers and the enlisted men slept in tent camps. They were out

there somewhere out only ten days, most of us were out for two -- two weeks and three weekends of course, we kept our duty personnel down in the Chicago headquarters because we didn't want to move the communications. And we did run a few through wires from our headquarters to the downtown to the one in Sheridan during this time. The civilian employees really enjoyed it because instead of going into Chicago in the commuter rush, they came out from Chicago in the empty trains, or went in in empty trains and I think it was a very fine thing. We went swimming on the beach at stated hours. That water in that Lake Michigan is cold even in the middle of August, but we managed it. Nobody had a heart attack and one thing we did while we were there, we invited Colonel McCormick to come to a review at Fort Sheridan for the station which we -- for the station complement troops but the entire headquarters staff participated in this parade as a company and I was a company commander.

MAJ MORRISON: Who was Colonel McCormick?

LTG AURAND: Well, he was the publisher of the Chicago Tribune and one of the greatest anti-Roosevelt men in the country. He also published the leaked Victory Program on the first day of December, 1941. He was a colonel in World War I. A distinguished colonel in World War I and his last command before they demobilized in World War I was Fort Sheridan, so it was fitting that I have a review there but I didn't ask President Roosevelt whether to go and hold it.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. Sir, you and your aide, Major William M. Dewey were at a reception for Mrs. Eddie Rickenbacker in October 1943. It was reported that you had Major Dewey destroy some pictures which had just been taken of Mrs. Rickenbacker. A spokesman stated and I'll quote, "This

is a civilian affair and General Aurand was the only -- was only a guest here. Neither he nor any other Army officer had the right to interfere." Quote closed. Sir, what was your side of the story?

LTG AURAND: Well, as the saying goes, I'm glad you asked me that question. First, because I don't want the Oral History to be a lot of self-applause and second, because the incident not only taught me a lesson but also it revealed to me something about myself. Also, it almost ruined my career. I became angry and I issued an order while I was angry. What made me angry or my side of the story as you put it isn't -- is immaterial. That I issued an order while angry is very material. My lesson was never again issue an order in anger. Then I took a good look at myself and found that I became angry frequently but that my anger passed away quickly. The bark was worse than the bite. When people got to know me apparently, they paid no attention to my being mad. He has a short fuse they used to say about me but I must neither impose on them in the future by issuing an order when angry nor put pressure on them by showing that I was angry at something that they might have done. To this day, this is a futile exercise on my part but I keep cool enough not to issue orders when angry at any rate. There is a corollary of this introspection. It has to do with hate. Today I can say quite honestly that I hate nobody but it took me many, many years to reach this happy state. Just plain hatred of an individual has proven the great handicap to me in the past. Life is too short to waste time in either anger or hatred.

MAJ MORRISON: In your speeches during the fall of 1943, you preached the theme that much bitter fighting remained before the war is won and urged the public as well as Army personnel to increase production effort. You said, there has been a noticeable public letdown because of the belief that the

war is almost won. Sir, would you expand on this for a few moments?

LTG AURAND: I believe that I've already explained about the letdown in both soldier and civilian morale, which you could feel as you would a change of temperature of a room, in the late summer and early fall of '43. Somehow or other both the military and the civilian community in my area had expected a cross channel landing in 1943. Even the press people thought so. When no cross channel action took place, there was a feeling that this made the war a year longer and this caused some depression of morale in both civilian and military circles. I found it necessary to do what I could to keep the morale good both among the civilian population and the military. I have already stated some of the things that I did in this regard, like speak to the Illinois legislature and have the civilian advisory council and so on and also the salute to industry, agriculture and labor, so that I did as well as I could civilian-wise and then this "Think to Win" program and various other things we did to keep up the morale of the soldier. One of the best things is to keep up the soldier morale is what was done for them in many cities. The cities themselves provided recreation space downtown. Places where you could shoot pool or bowl or what not for free. . . .

MAJ MORRISON: Is this the USO organizations?

LTG AURAND: No, this was the local people. The USO was in the city also but they were -- they did more in the camps with shows and things of that nature than they did at least in my area downtown. We also fixed up such things as the places where they took their physical exams for the induction. When I got there, the place in Detroit was in a corset factory and the damnest place I ever saw in my life and I went to the Chamber of Commerce and they found me fine space in what had been a GE warehouse for electric lamps. It was, well, a nice building inside and we could fix it up and

another thing I insisted on was that they had to partition the thing off so that no man would see another man naked in the whole examining process. Things like this were done you know, so that the word about the Army that got back home was good. Also, on the civilian side one of the things that my labor officer arranged was to have a dinner for the labor leaders who -- national labor leaders who were headquartered in Chicago or Detroit -- in Detroit and have me get up and make a speech and be shot at by questions and he alone, came there with me with only two of us in uniform. And all of the people that you've heard of that were top labor leaders, teamsters, the auto workers, the toolmakers, the construction industry, all were present there. The electrical union chiefs were assembled, one in Chicago and one in Detroit, and one of the things I had to do was to ask them to recruit sight unseen for certain specialists who go to the atomic energy plant in Tennessee to build it and I couldn't tell them what -- anything about it. All I knew about it was they needed specialists near Knoxville, Tennessee for a very important and very secret government job which would give them a certain premium pay. They'd move their families and pay them enough to keep the rent on their houses back home, you know, for all kind of emoluments at this labor leader's dinner in Detroit. I put in my recruiting pitches and they turned out very well. I mean I never had any more demands so it must of been alright but that was a very famous evening and they asked me many, many embarrassing questions about draft exemptions and things of this kind. The fact was that they were concerned.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, you spoke of using POW's. Where did they come from? How many did you have and how did you use them?

LTG AURAND: Well, I've already told you about the Japanese. We never used

them. The rest of them came from Italy -- well, the rest of them were Italian or German prisoners of war. We used them first on the posts to do the lowest level post maintenance work. Mow the grass and things of this nature. We then used them in the messes but the National Red Cross, they just pulled them out of the messes because they -- this was considered degrading work under the Geneva Convention. I yelled to high heaven about this. It's not degrading work for American soldiers, why should it be degrading work for German and Italian prisoners but I couldn't get it lifted. Then we got a request to use the prisoners in the harvest both in the harvesting in the fields, particularly vegetables and in canning and this presented some very interesting problems. How to get them out, how to garden them. It's going to take an awful lot of people to garden and we finally organized centers in Southern Wisconsin, Southern Michigan and mostly in Northern Illinois. We didn't -- in the south they were more, what shall I say, large fields of grain and things like that or they weren't used. It was in asparagus fields and things of this kind. Tomatoes and grapes and that kind of business, where manpower was used so that we put three or four centers, one was at Grant which took care of Southern Wisconsin, one was at Ellis which took care of Northern Illinois, and one at Battle Creek at Custer that took care of Southern Michigan and then -- and then we fed them out from there. But we ran into all kinds of interesting things. In Southern Wisconsin there were an awful lot of German farmers, farmers of German ancestry. Some of them even spoke English in the home -- I mean the German in the home and English outside. These farmers came to me when I came around on inspection. I watched this thing very carefully myself and said, "Why don't you leave these fellows here. They are not going to

run away. I got room for three fellows. They'll sleep in the barn. They are willing to. I'll feed them. You'll have no trouble." I wish they could have done it, but they couldn't. And then in, I think it was southern Michigan, there is this baby food outfit, Gerbers or something like that and they were a German family. German ancestry and they wanted two companies just to live right there at the plant. They said, don't bother with tents and stuff, we got plenty of houses, just leave them here with us. You don't need any guard and it was a very -- it really was a lot of fun.

MAJ MORRISON: But you couldn't leave them?

LTG AURAND: Oh, no I wouldn't. I think I could of if there -- my neck had been out so much that I wasn't going to stick it out on this one. If one of those fellows had gone into Kalamazoo and held a place up and gotten it closed and disappeared into a Great American public, I would have been hung at sunrise for not having guards. If he would have escaped the guards, it would have been alright, but I had to guard them, it was awful.

MAJ MORRISON: There were many newspaper articles which indicated that the German POW's saved the pea crops.

LTG AURAND: They not only saved the pea crops, they saved the crops because there wasn't the personnel to harvest the crops that year. They had tremendous crops. I think the first year was '43 and we repeated it in '44. I'm not so sure of that, but the first year we sent the Germans out, we would have lost a tremendous amount of food. They were very valuable. The Italians didn't work so well. Particularly when you sent them out in German neighborhoods. We -- they knew we had German prisoners and they wanted German prisoners. So we keep the Italians mostly on the posts and mostly, while we could, in

the messes but when they got out in the field, they were poor workmen. The Germans seemed to have a lot of fun. They had a lot of fun among themselves. They'd go along pulling the asparagus and you had to step over the rows, you know, and my friend Colonel McCormick's Tribune got some pictures of these fellows. It said, "German's goose stepping while working in the asparagus patch." That's the only way they can get through the asparagus patch but there was some criticism, of course. By and large, it was a good thing for the country and a good thing for them and I always come back to this. This is -- this is something I learned about much later and I had to recall what happened and I've never known except a few ardent Nazi's that I had in Normandy later. I have never known a prisoner of war who didn't try to lead the best possible life he could. He was looking after himself, period. And I think the soldiers oath we've devised is utterly unrealistic and I've heard it said by many American prisoners. You can't put that burden on a guy who has been captured and if he knows any thing that the enemy doesn't know already, he shouldn't of been put in a place where he could be captured by the USA and I subscribe to this 100 percent. I think this soldiers oath should be abolished.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, please tell me about the notorious misdirected letter?

LTG AURAND: Well, it was in late April or early May when I first saw this mis-directed letter. I usually got to my office early and some officer was sitting there in my office waiting for me. It was the -- some sort of a duty officer, I don't know whether he was AG or what and he had in his hand a thick brown paper envelope about 9½ x 13 inches whose top was badly torn. Plainly to be seen were the words stamped in bright red ink across the first place, U.S. TOP SECRET, British MOST SECRET. I turned to the postmark and to the address. It was post -- it was forwarded from an

APO in England. It was postmarked of an APO in England and the address was G-4 Division, Division Street, certain number on Division Street, Chicago, Illinois. I told the duty officer to wait right there until I could get in touch with General Guthner, my security officer. He arrived very soon afterwards and took one look at the envelope and then started to open it. "Don't you do that," I said, "And don't you ever do that. You'll leave it just like it is because I don't want to see what's inside and I don't think you should either." Guthner started an investigation at once. Our mail office was open 24 hours a day and this envelope came in during the night before. The attendant who received it was a black girl. A very intelligent one incidentally, and a college graduate and she called the duty officer right away. He had it put in a safe until it was time for my arrival when he took it out and brought it to my office. Both were sure that they -- all that they had seen of it was the U.S. TOP SECRET, British MOST SECRET. We then contacted a postal inspector who translated the pencil markings on the envelope. The postal inspector said that the carrier had marked it, no such person at this address and turned it over to the "dead letter" office. The "dead letter" office in it's own routine way had finally come to this the day before and they had tried to find some place to deliver it and reading this same thing on the top it decided that this was something for the Sixth Service Command headquarters mail and so that's how we got it. Then Guthner sent an operative to the Division Street address. He found it to be a three story building with six apartments, walk up and, you know, a name for mail slot in the wall and one of the names was a girl's name and it was a German name. So he called back and Guthner said, "stick around and see if you can interview the girl." So, we waited

until time people usually came home from work and this girl came in and he said, "Would you mind if I asked you a few questions?" She said, "No, but I don't see why." No resistance at all and he said, "Do you have any relatives in the service?" "Yes," she said, "I have a brother who is a sergeant," and "Where is he stationed?" "Well, he is stationed in England some place, I don't know where." And "What is his duty?" "Well, he's in some staff outfit in England. He writes me but I don't know what it means." So, Guthner reported back to the security officer in Sommervell's office and they found that there was a sergeant by that name in the plans office which was outside of London and in the G-4 part of the planning office. You see, Ike had two offices. One in -- one on the square there, Grosvenor Square and one way out in the country and apparently this envelope was from the G-4 division out in the country to the G-4 in London. That's where it was supposed to have been sent. Well, it turns out that this guy, -- well, in the meantime,I didn't want to put this on the telephone. Guthner did, but I didn't know that so I had his deputy Ferbeshaw put on the Capitol Limited to Washington in a roomette, with the door locked from the outside and three MP's. One at each end of the car and for some reason or another, right in the middle of the car there was a blank space. There wasn't a roomette, there was a bench. An MP sat there facing the door all night and when he got to Washington these three MP's got in the taxi with Ferbeshaw, got in a taxi, and went to the security officer, Sommervell's security office and gave it to them and told the story. Then Ferbeshaw tried to get it -- to take it to London but somebody in Washington needed that trip more than he did so he came back. Well, he came back and he told us the story that when they locked the doggone door on the roomette, he couldn't get the bed

down. There wasn't room for him to get the bed down unless you backed out of the door a little bit and we had sealed the door with sealing wax so you could see whether it was opened or not. So they had to sit up all night. All of these things come about from excitement. Well, the story was that this fellow had been typing apparently or assemblying this report over several days and it was due in the Grovesnor Square or wherever at a certain time on a certain day and by gosh, he got it done, and he said, "Now, I'll put this in the dispatch mail and send it over but before I do that I'm going to write my sister a letter." So he wrote his sister a letter and then he started addressing both and he wrote G-4 Division and apparently the word division made him write such and such a number division street, thinking he was addressing his sisters letter. Well, what he put on the address on his sisters letter, I never heard, but this is known as the tale of the sleepy sergeant. Now there was a very curious thing happened about this. This is told in Eisenhower's book, Crusade in Europe. Not in this detail but to show his concern for revelation of the date of D-Day because the title of that report I found out later, of course, was "Supply Status on June -- what was the date of D-Day?"

MAJ MORRISON: June -- June the 6th.

LTG AURAND: June 6th, 1944. This was a prediction of what the supplies stuff and there was the date of D-Day on it and this is why Ike was worried about it for fear the date would get out because that was one of his two elements of surprise, the date and the place of landing. And he didn't want to -- he only had two, he didn't want to lose one, so he became greatly concerned and he wrote his book but the reason for his concern was that this

whole thing had been mishandled in Chicago. Well, I don't know what else you could have done with it. He didn't blame the sleepy sergeant at any rate.

MAJ MORRISON: He didn't? How was your relationship with your boss, Lieutenant General Brehon Sommervell?

LTG AURAND: To begin with, I'd been a cadet corporal for a couple of weeks when he gave me a skin which busted me back to private. When I heard of the organization of the SOS, later the Army Service Forces, my first communication with him was, "If I were you I would fire me." And he said to me, "Get back to work and keep off being so Goddamn British." Also, this thought crossed my mind when I heard that he was going to command the SOS as a -- called later the Army Service Courses, he is the only man that I know who is enough of a SOB to make a success of that job. When my Office of Defense Aid Director of the War Department became the International Division US Army Forces, I found that I was shorn of all of the mission representatives from the countries where we had sent Lend Lease missions and they were to be put in WPD. I protested this to Sommervell and he said, "I've got enough work to do, organizing this Goddamned thing without fighting with the War Plans Division. On my trips to Washington I always asked General Styer as Chief of Staff if General Sommervell would care to see me. If he was in his office, he invariably had me come in and in a few minutes we were arguing on opposite sides of whatever subject came up. Usually profanely. I feel sure that he kicked me upstairs to the two-stars of the Sixth Service Command when I was for a time, for a few weeks the combined secretary of the combined production board. I had gotten into his hair. He gave me help while I was in Europe and much more help while I was in China.

The last time I saw him was when we -- when he was head of Coppers Coke after his retirement and I was attending a meeting of the National Association of Manufacturer's in New York as a representative of the War Department. Our conversation was carried on entirely by him. He said to me, "Aurand, I wish the hell I knew what made you tick." This may sound like a rather odd relationship between superior and subordinate but there is one thing I'm sure of, we certainly made everything clear to each other.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, why did you decide to live in the Edgewater Beach Hotel in Chicago instead of one of the houses at Fort Sheridan which I'm sure you could have had?

LTG AURAND: Well, when I first went to Chicago, as I said earlier, I wanted to find a place for my family that was not isolated and where we would have city conveniences. Also, I dreaded that long automobile ride from Fort Sheridan into the Loop in Chicago in case of an emergency, and I had to come to the office and there were many, many of those emergencies, I assure you. I think in the summer of '43, it may have been the summer of '44, we did move out to Sheridan to the big house and I was living in it when I was ordered to -- it was the summer of '44. I was living in it when I was ordered to France. Then, of course, my family came back to the Edgewater Beach Hotel while I was in France. But Fort Sheridan was very inconvenient. With all the gas rationing and everything going on in the country, it seemed like our traveling to Fort Sheridan and back over five times a day must have made the people who couldn't get gas, very angry. There was that aspect of it, also.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, would you please explain the rationale behind the Army's

acquiring of large hotels for use as redistribution stations for returning veterans?

LTG AURAND: This is a situation in which I'm a fish looking up through the glass bottom of a boat. I assumed at the time that these men were casuals, they weren't one to be around -- hanging around post and stations. They were between the assignments. They had earned some leave and some vacation and this was one way for the Army to say thank you to them.

MAJ MORRISON: How did you in September 1944 handle the problem of 200 negro civilians living in the Pershing -- Pershing Hotel in Chicago. They were ordered evicted so that negro servicemen returning from overseas could occupy the facility and the occupants refused to vacate.

LTG AURAND: This was a very -- there was a very fine black officer on my staff, a major, and I turned over to him this job which was so delicate and so important as far as staying on good relations with the black community was concerned. He did very well. He got the black community back of him. Told them the necessity for these soldiers having a place to vacation and so on after being in combat and while awaiting reassignment and he got some of the better off people, the more middle class blacks to provide room and board in their homes for the people who had to be evicted from this hotel.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, did you at anytime while in Chicago try to get assigned overseas and if so, when and how?

LTG AURAND: Well, of course, everytime I went to Washington I was looking for an overseas job. Let's say once a month orally but we finally cooked up a deal at my headquarters that we thought couldn't be resisted. I believe this was in the winter of '43, '44 but it was before D-Day anyway.

We picked out a group of people whom we called the home guard who could be left at Chicago to run the Sixth Service Command until they could be reinforced at least, and then we picked out a group who constitute the headquarters for a base section in Europe and we had it all organized, you know, the charts and everything and I'd gotten some dope from England as to how Johnny Lee was organizing base sections for the invasion in Europe and I followed this as well as we could and the description of the fellow who was to fill the job and all his qualifications and so on were followed each assignment, and I took this on and presented it to Sommervell on one of my visits there and I said, "I wish you'd send this to Johnny Lee. Tell him to -- here's a fine outfit that has worked together for a couple of years, they are doing a great job, they are the most efficient utilization of personnel of any service command and he ought to take this -- take us over entoto." Never heard anymore of it at all.

END OF TAPE 2, SIDE 2.

THIS IS TAPE 3 OF A SERIES OF INTERVIEWS WITH LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY S. AURAND. WE'RE PRESENTLY IN ABILENE, KANSAS, AT THE TRAILS INN MOTEL. THE DATE IS 22 APRIL 1974.
THIS SERIES OF QUESTIONS WILL COVER THE PERIOD WHEN GENERAL AURAND WAS IN FRANCE, CHINA, AND EGYPT FROM OCTOBER 1944 TO MAY 1946. HE CONSECUTIVELY SERVED IN FIVE ASSIGNMENTS: DEPUTY CHIEF ORDNANCE OFFICER, EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, COMZ, IN FRANCE FROM OCTOBER 1944 TO DECEMBER 1944; THEN AS COMMANDING GENERAL THE NORMANDY BASE SECTION, COMZ, IN CHERBOURG AND DEAUVILLE, FRANCE, FROM DECEMBER '44 THROUGH MAY '45; THEN AS COMMANDING GENERAL SERVICES OF SUPPLY CHINA THEATER, 25 MAY 1945; THROUGH NOVEMBER 1945. THEN FOR A SHORT TIME AS COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE SIXTH SERVICE COMMANDS CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, IN JANUARY '46 TO FEBRUARY '46; THEN AS COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE AFRICA-MIDDLE EAST THEATER OPERATIONS IN CAIRO, EGYPT, FROM FEBRUARY '46 THROUGH MAY '46.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, did you receive a briefing at the Pentagon prior to your departure from the States? What did it cover and also what happened on your arrival in France in October, 1944?

LTG AURAND: In October, 1944, General Styer called me on the scrambler telephone to inform me that I should prepare myself for duty in Europe. I was to report to him at the Pentagon forthwith. I could take nobody with me. This restriction caused me to conclude that I would be assigned to staff duty. The Pentagon briefings were in generalities. I neither asked or was told why or by whom I had been selected to go to Europe. I was too elated that I was going. After waiting several days near Washington and New York, I was put on a Paris bound plane. All the other passengers were civilian signal corps technicians. There was great surprise at Newfoundland and the Azores and also in Orly Airport in Paris. When a major general arrived in Paris, there was no official transportation for me. I had to find a taxi cab. I had difficulty getting into Versailles and in persuading a guard to pass my taxi and my baggage and me into the enclosed area. Finally, I was shown a

building in which I could go. I entered a long room and I parked my baggage and myself at one end of it. Near by there was a desk with an officer behind it. A counter more or less. It was sometime before he noticed me. No doubt my Sixth Service Command patch was unfamiliar. Also, I guess because major generals were a dime a dozen around Versailles. After studying my orders and using the telephone, he told me to wait until I was paged and then report to General Bedell Smith, then Chief of Staff of SHAEF. After a long wait, I did so. When I finally got to Bedell Smith's office, I found him busy and not too well. We were old friends as he had been Secretary of the General Staff when I was in G-4 and I was also the director of the Defense Air Director of the War Department in 1940-41. But there was no time for reminiscence. He told me I would be assigned to COMZ ETOUSA, meaning communication zone, European theater operations, U. S. Army. General Eisenhower would give me my instructions. Finally, I was escorted to another building in which General Eisenhower had his office. Ike greeted me warmly and told me he was concerned about the ammunition supply. He remembered that I had written the annual about it. He wanted to find out what was wrong and he asked me if I would object to being assigned as Henry Sayler's deputy who was the ordnance officer ETOUSA and COMZ in order to give me a place to hang my hat. He knew I was senior to Sayler and apologized to this but I said, "It's quite alright with me." Sayler was a West Point classmate and whom I knew very well. He was one of my best friends in my class. The meeting with Ike was pleasant. And we talked about our two sons who had graduated from

West Point on D-Day. Soon I was on my way to Bedell Smith's office and he told me to report to Roy Lord who was the Chief of Staff of COMZ and incidentally, Deputy Chief of Staff of ETOUSA to Bedell Smith. Also, Smith gave me a letter of instruction. COMZ headquarters was Hotel Majestic. I reported to Lord, who scanned my orders and my letter of instructions and he took me next door to report to Lieutenant General J. C. H. Lee who was CG COMZ and he scanned my orders the same way and my letter of instruction. I'd known him before but I had not known Lord. Then I was shown a billet. An ample suite. An ample suite but a small one and a dangerous thing where I took time to unpack. My guide then drove me to Henry Sayler's office. To my surprise, he didn't seem very happy to see me. It was almost impossible for me to avoid the impression that my presence in France was not due to the request of anybody in France. The lack of knowledge of my presence in an all civilian passenger plane and my reception at Orly and Versailles and the Hotel Majestic and by Saylor of all people, indicated that I was not asked for by anybody in France. Even before I became certain that this was the case, I had the feeling that I had to watch my step. I put aside the thought that maybe the objection to my coming was because I was the next highest ranking officer in COMZ to General Lee.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, you mentioned the COMZ headquarters was in the Hotel Majestic. Did they occupy the entire hotel and did you have nostalgic memories when the Paris peace talks met in the Majestic in the late '60's?

LTG AURAND: Well, I did have some nostalgic thoughts and I even mentioned

to my wife Betty that I was very familiar with that building. The COMZ headquarters not only had the Majestic Hotel, but occupied office buildings in both directions from it on the Champs Elysee. The Majestic was devoted to the COMZ general staff and General Lee and General Lord's offices. In the basement there was a hugh war room and it was curious that you had to have a special pass to get in and out of that war room. I got one when I arrived and I don't think I ever gave it back. It may be in my file somewhere.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what caused the misunderstanding between the higher U. S. echelons of command?

LTG AURAND: Well, perhaps I've just imagined this misunderstanding, but there seemed to be evidence of it when I made my trip to Army headquarters in connection with the investigation and the ammunition situation. I found plenty of lack of confidence in Lee and in his communications zone. The evidence seemed to be that this lack of confidence came from the top. In my opinion, there were two basic causes. One, organizational and the other, personal. Organizationally, Eisenhower wore three hats. At the top, he was Supreme Commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces. On the next level, he was commander of land forces and on the third, he was commander of ETOUSA. I wanted to say that I misspoke myself. He wore too many hats. I mentioned three already. Montgomery was commander of the British Expeditionary Forces and as such he was on the same level as Ike and as commander of the European theater of operations USA. Montgomery was also an Army group commander commanding the 21st Army Group.

And that became international when the 9th U. S. Army was assigned to it. As such, Montgomery was on the same level as Bradley. If there was any difference between Bradley and Montgomery, all Montgomery needed to do was to put on his British Expeditionary Force hat and be on the same level as Ike as the European Theater of Operations USA commander. So, if there was any difference between Bradley and Montgomery, it immediately became a difference between Ike and Montgomery. This, of course, was organizationally what caused some of these topside differences. I believe the point here is that Ike should not have commanded the ETOUSA and there should have been an American headquarters with a commanding general for that. Ike should have been in the ivory tower with an international staff as Foch in WWI. There's a reason for Ike not commanding the ETOUSA on the U. S. side without considering the British. Ike used some of his U. S. staff officers in SHAPE, international staff, to perform the duties of staff officers of ETOUSA, European Theater Operations, U. S. Army. But their number was so small that they couldn't possibly do the job. So, the COMZ staff under Lee did an awful lot of work as ETO staff. I am going to use ETO or ETOUSA for European Theater of Operations right straight through. Now, consequently, all your technical service staff's like Saylor, was ordnance officer, ETOUSA and COMZ. He wore two hats. Every staff officer in COMZ staff, you know, wore two hats. It was inevitable that Lee thought that he was the deputy commander of ETOUSA. And as such, a senior to Bradley on the totem pole. Well, that didn't make either of these men get along very well together. And this was caused entirely, as you see, by organization. There was still further complications because,

as I said, I believe that Lord was not only Lee's Chief of Staff as COMZ Chief of Staff, but he was Deputy Chief of Staff for ETOUSA to Bedell Smith and you had this curious situation that he,(as Deputy Chief of Staff, ETOUSA) could order Lee to do something, then Lee would tell him to do it as Chief of Staff, COMZ; thus providing chances for short circuit there. Oh, it was just like running a copper wire across two leads. It was right there to be used anytime that Lord felt like it and sometimes unconsciously. While the buildup was going on in England, Lee who had been the commander in England before Eisenhower came, considered himself as deputy commander to Eisenhower and, of course, this was purely a building up of supplies and troops in England and training in England for the landing. And Bradley at this time was commanding general, First Army, which was quite a lesser place on the totem pole. All of this moved to the continent. Lee couldn't help the feeling that he was in the same relationship. I would have been in his place. So, this didn't endear him either to the First Army staff or when the 12th Army Group formed in the 12th Army Group staff. This wasn't only the difference between the two men, but this thing was reflected in the staff. What's my relationship as G-4 12th Army Group to the G-4 of COMZ who was acting as G-4 ETOUSA? Went all the way down the line.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: So here again this was partly organizational but somewhat personal.

MAJ MORRISON: A while ago when you said that the confidence, the last of confidence, was at topside. Did you mean that General Eisenhower and General Smith had a lack of confidence?

LTG AURAND: And Lee?

MAJ MORRISON: And Lee.

LTG AURAND: Well, I think not. I heard Ike say long after the war that at times he wondered about the competency of COMZ as a whole because people up front were complaining all the time. That's just what I was talking about.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: The dissatisfaction went down from the Lee to Bradley level. Ike never seemed personally to have lost confidence in Lee. I don't know about Smith. I've never talked to him about it. But as far as my operation at one level below Lee was concerned, I saw no lack of confidence of SHAEF in Lee. I still marvel at the ingenuity of the man who gave the numbers to Bradley's and Montgomery's Army Group. Bradley's was the 12th and Montgomery's was the 21st and the possibility of accidently reversing the numbers in addressing one or the other made it almost certain that you were going to have confusion. I would have given them single numbers, but they were afraid then that they would be confused with the Army figures. I certainly would not have used 12 or 21 or any couple that could be reversed and be the number of the other group.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, how did you happen to be assigned to the Normandy Base Section?

LTG AURAND: I'll have to start back at Saylor's office on the day of my arrival in France. I checked the ammunition section there and found out several things. First, we tried to maintain a current inventory of all

ammunition on the continent, but we only managed an inventory of the ammunition at COMZ. This was because as soon as the ammunition crossed the rear boundary of the 12th Army Group, it was dropped from all records. That was to prevent the chore of record keeping up front. This amazed me no end because I couldn't believe that an Army commander or an Army Group commander wouldn't want to know to the last round what he had available. The ammunition office in Sayler's office was very well organized and very well handled outside of the fact that it shouldn't have been in Sayler's office, but back in the base section. I thought it was an excellent operation. There was one curious weakness. The man who ran it was a reserve lieutenant colonel who was a very able man. He was - I think a Washington businessman, a fairly wealthly man in Washington. He was too old for the grade of lieutenant colonel in much more than one sense, as he was the shyest man I ever saw and it took me 2 or 3 days to get anything out of him when I talked to him. I couldn't get him to describe what he was doing. He gave me somebody at each desk who did know. No overall picture until finally we got to be acquainted and he gave me a good start. That's alright. I happened to see him one day or go with him one day up to G-4 conference. I wanted to see how that relationship was. And he never said a word hardly. G-4 had to pull the information out of him, and I finally went to Sayler and said, "Look, Henry Sayler, there is a man over in England on the civil affairs business who knows this ammunition game inside-out. His name is Detrick. I've worked with him. In fact, he helped me a little when I wrote the ordnance field

manual." And I said, "Let's get him over here. I'll pry him loose for you," and I did. I managed - I had some friends in England. Got him pried loose. In fact, I knew the man who headed the civil affairs teams in England and that's how he got in it. And he came over and took over the ammunition. So, at least then Saylor had a decent representative appearing up in the general staff of COMZ. Then I started out on my trip to the Armies and I went to the what they called Eagle Rear, the rear echelon of the 12th Army Group first. There I found nothing but friends because Nisely, who was the ordnance officer, was in the class of 1916, and we had known each other well at West Point and since for years in the ordnance and three or four officers in his office had been students of mine at the Ordnance School. Well, they were just so full of complaints about Sayler and Lee that I couldn't get anything factual out of them for myself. I stayed over there an extra day. Just trying to dig up what they had. This is some of the evidence that I referred to previously when I said that the dissatisfaction on topside was felt ever more strongly the farther down it got. I must tell you about the trip from Paris to Verdun. I was assigned a Captain Bob Miller to escort me on this trip. He belonged to an outfit that went up front with these tank carriers and brought back captured enemy tanks, guns and whatever for inspection to see if we could turn them around and use them ourselves and so he knew the roads to the front and where everybody was quite well. And he had his own driver so the driver came along and Henry Sayler gave me a British Buick. Well, I asked how long it would take and they said, about two hours or something like that even though it was very congested

roads in Paris to Verdun at that time. So, we got started and low and behold! before we knew it, it was night. It was raining and it was dark as pitch because it was black out and these little purple lights didn't do you any good at all as far as I was concerned. Well, the driver was on the right in this British Buick and, of course, Bob Miller's side on my left, but he spent the whole time seeing whether we could pass or not because the driver couldn't see -- you get behind a big truck, he was on the right hand side. Well, we got lost two or three times and I had gotten a Michelin map. Even in the darkness, I could recognize certain marks, landmarks, and I finally would get us back and I could see that Miller was getting madder and madder. First, he would prophesy the length of the trip, although many were getting lost, and I felt that he was ready to call it quits for good. So I used the usual conversation. I said, well, we finally got in a line of trucks; just no use trying to pass. But we went to Verdun. So while we were riding along at ease, so to speak, I said, "Bob, where are you from?" "Oh," he said, "Pennsylvania, sir." I said, "Where abouts?" "Oh, the eastern part, sir." "Well, what town?" "Oh, a town you've never heard of sir. Just a little town." "Well, what was its name?" He said, "Tamaqua, sir." I said, "Where were you born?" He said, "There, sir." I said, "So was I." I think Bob almost fell out of the car. I almost did myself there.

LTG AURAND: I believe that I won't describe this any further except to say that when we got to Luxembourg, Ray Moses, who was the number one man in his class, I think, either he or Styer, they were one - two in 1916,

was Bradley's G-4 and he was at Eagle Forward or it was called Eagle Attack. And he brought me out a whole lot of production schedules of ammunition in the United States. And he said, "These schedules won't meet the demands of the 12th Army Group." And I said, "Freddie, on what do you base this?" "Well," he said, "Everybody's yelling, and the day of fire as we used to call the ammunition unit, is too small." I said, "You're in a passive situation? You haven't been shooting or attacking or anything else for a month or more." "Well," he said, "This is it. This is the expenditure rates and you have it and multiply this by the 90 day or whatever it was - pipelines and you haven't even got that much in France." "Well," I said, "How much have you got in the 12th Army?" "Oh," he said, "I don't know. We dropped that from our records as soon as we get it." I said, "I'll bet you got 90 days up there in front and you are hiding it." "Oh, no, no. It's not that." No, that's what I got in every Army headquarters. I didn't get to see Patton. I didn't get to see his G-4. I didn't get to see his Chief of Staff. I didn't get to see his ordnance officer. They were all out somewhere. And there I got - I saw some dumps that looked pretty full but got no information. At First Army, I was almost hostilely received.. And I had to get permission to go into one of their dumps. They had the dumps guarded so that nobody could get through the network of roads in which the ammunition was placed unless you had a special pass or an order to draw ammunition. They weren't going to let anybody else count them. In Simpson's Army, it was entirely different. They had no Army dumps. They were only about 12 miles from Liege, I think it was, and they were just over the Dutch

order in Maastricht. And they just sent their trucks back to the COMZ Advanced Depot. They didn't bother, and they were doing it by the book.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: Simpson said, "I have no ammunition troubles." By the way, he worked a year with me on the War College faculty and we occupied the same room.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: And the first - previously there had been a medical there and his first lecture of the year was a medical service in the Theater of Operations. I spent most of my time for the first 5 or 6 weeks listening to Simpson give that talk. So then he could at least get by with it because he was a well educated man and logistician.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, when you mentioned the First Army headquarters a few seconds ago, was that General Hodges that was hostile?

LTG AURAND: Oh, no. Not at all. He was very fine to me, but so was his Chief of Staff. The G-4 would just assume that I hadn't come. It was the ordnance officer who was hostile. The ordnance office was in sort of an old French caserne and it was in some sort of a mess hall or very big room. Then it had all these little rooms around and he told me to come over and see him after my first meeting at headquarters with all the staff there when I told him why I was there. So, I went over there and the place was almost empty. He hadn't gotten over there yet and I wandered around looking in the office. See the setup - I'd written a book of how it should be set up and so I wanted to see what he was doing. And I wandered into the ammunition office and here was map

after map after map of all the roads they could find. It was in the forest you know. There's darn few roads and few places to put ammunition, but there was ammunition clear from Patton's Army to Simpson's Army - all across the rear of the First Army and it was a pretty wide front. And just about this time, this fellow comes in. I wish I could remember his name. He is quite a famous guy. And he said, "What are you doing in here?" Why I said, "I was just waiting for you and, you know, looking at the offices. I wrote the manual then for it. I wanted to see how it was working out." Well, he said, "Get out of this office." Getting back to my trip, after I had visited the three Army headquarters, I felt I had no further need to go to the front. Everything that I might have found out there was pretty self-evident. So I decided to look into the COMZ establishments. And I went into this depot at Liege that Simpson drew from. And it was beautifully layed out and it was layed out just like my book. You can't imagine the satisfaction that it gave me. I had never seen the dump anywhere in war time there, and while we were in there, V-1 landed in a dump and hit a pile of 155 shell, unfused, of course. But it made quite a few explosions and some shells flew around the place. We sat there and watched it. We were about a mile away perhaps. Nice rolling country like Kansas, that place where the dump was. And nothing else went off. It didn't spread. We had the safety distances right. So, I even had a test on my calculations of how closely you could stack stuff and how much in one stack and so on. I then visited what I chose to call the intermediate section and the ammunition dump and it was at Soisson and

it was immense. It was very well done. It was bad country. Hilly and not very many roads.

MAJ MORRISON: Did you say it was a mess?

LTG AURAND: No, it was immense.

MAJ MORRISON: Oh, yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: Immense. I'm glad you picked that up. As I say, very well run again and as far as I could see, it was not acting at that time as anything more than a reserve depot, which I believe is its proper role for ammunition supply. If you can get it from base to advance, you don't have to handle it again. Well, as long as that was open as it was from Cherbourg to Liege and to Verdun also there was an advance depot. Fine. Let the intermediate stuff there. And if you're forced back as we were later and your advance stuff was threatened, you could start issuing your ammunition to the Army from the intermediate. And this is a safety factor that you provide in any ammunition supply. If your base doesn't get any ships or something blows up in the harbor or whatnot, you got the intermediate to run until you are fixed up. So then I went to Normandy and Lucuis Clay was in command. He told me of all the difficulties he had with the COMZ staff. And the railroad people, the Americans who were operating the French railroads. The railroads weren't intended to be operated by the American system and we had two very strong railroad men, American railroad men, who were operating vice presidents and things of that kind, division superintendents who were running the railroads in the uniform of colonel of engineers or brigadier general. And I think we'd have done much better if we just let the French railroad administration

run them, tell them what we wanted and let them just run them even though American crews were running the train. And with some American motive power. Well, in any event, Clay had his troubles with the railroads and finally was given a military railroad operating officer at Cherbourg and ran the railroad from Caen where the peninsula really begins. So, then we could switch, we could build what we called shoo-fly tracks on the mud and with the French light engines and light card which our people wouldn't allow on the main line, we could load on rail cars at the port and take the stuff to the depots on rail, and that saves an awful lot. Clay did more to improve the operations at Cherbourg than many of the commanders they had had. I hope we will be talking about Normandy later.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: When I got back to Paris from this trip, I was given stenographic help by Sayler and I wrote a report omitting all figures. That is, tables of how much we had of this, that, and the other, just commenting on the operation of the ammunition supply system and this lack of information from the front. I recommended, in fact, that they be compelled at least at division, corps and Army headquarters to take account of the ammunition they had and not necessarily on a daily inventory basis but keep a running report of expenditures and report shipments received and then every now and then have an inventory to check where they were from the paperwork. That's to see if the paper work agreed with signs. That's about all I remember what was in that report except to say that I didn't understand why Moses was looking over his shoulder all the way back to the United States. He shouldn't have looked back any farther

than COMZ there. It was the job of COMZ to look back behind the United States, and I believe that I said that if Moses' figures were correct; I couldn't find those figures in Sayler's office. How he got them I don't know, and if his figures were correct, why we hadn't set up ammunition production in the United States and somebody who could really talk as a personal representative of Eisenhower should go back and tell Marshall and company just what the situation was. After getting that report up, I took it down myself and hand delivered it to General Smith and then I just waited to see what would happen next. One morning at breakfast, I had breakfast with General Everett Hughes. Hughes I had known for a long time and he and Ike were very great friends. Hughes had been the chief of manufacturer at Picatinny when I was chief of technical crew. And he used to take my drawings and make the pin the biggest diameter in the hole smallest one permitted by the tolerances and see if they go together in mass production. It will never come out that way, mass production, but it was an excellent check on the design engineers drawings by the production engineers. And these two shall never meet. If anybody combines design and production in the same shop, I notice that they had just done this in the Army reorganization so I'm saying it quite loud; he's going to have trouble. He's not going to get the critical test of this design, the separation of these two ships they give. Well, I had breakfast with Hughes and he asked me what I was doing and I said, "Well, I'm, just waiting for, you know, to be told by Ike or Bedell Smith what to do next. See, I was awaiting a letter of instructions. I wasn't assigned to Sayler. That's just where I hung my hat.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: So he said, "Well, you know Maxwell's in town? And I'm having Maxwell and Sayler to dinner in my suite tonight. Would you join us?" And I said I'd be delighted. Here are four old friends, all major generals from ordnance. Sayler was the only one actually on ordnance duty. Maxwell was G-4 of the War Department. Hughes belonged to an organization which Ike called his Inspectorate. He had 4 or 5 people in this Inspectorate and they would go out on special missions places where he would like to go and didn't have time and they traveled a great deal and they brought him back news.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

GEN AURAND: And he gave him a great deal of authority. For example, they could award decorations on the spot. Also, they had a carte blanche letter from him saying that anything this fellow says is an order from me. So they were pretty important guys. Well, anyway, we went to this dinner and they all wanted to know what I had seen and done on this trip and what was in my report. I didn't keep a copy of that report, so I didn't have it to talk from and I haven't got any now. But they were very much interested and they agreed that somebody should go back and get it straightened out. And Sayler felt very happy because there was no fault to Sayler in any of this except that a very efficient ammunition chief couldn't talk to anybody that outranked him.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: And, of course, that had been fixed so things were going better at COMZ headquarters for him. So after that recital was over,

Maxwell said to me, "Well, what do you think of this theater?" And I said, "Maxy, I've only been here a few weeks. Well, I've seen the - practically all of the topside layout, the three Army headquarters, the Army Group, COMZ and the base section and advance section and the communication zone. This is a very sketchy topside look at the things." And I remember what I had concluded when I first got to Sayler on the first day I got to France. Better watch my step because there's something funny about this assignment of mine. Well, they finally said, "Look. Nobody is going to say anything to anybody else of what you say here now. Even if it was only a quick first look, you've had enough training to have a good eye as to what to look for and we want to hear what you have to say." Well, I told him just about what I said in the answer to the previous question. There was only . . . .

MAJ MORRISON: Organization.

LTG AURAND: Organizational friction and there was some personal friction, and there was a complete lack of confidence in COMZ by the 12th Army Group and two of the three Armies. And COMZ knew it and they knew it. Instead, they should have been in an atmosphere in which they relied on COMZ because it was doing a fine job under the circumstances under which it had to work. And there was never a better founded Army in history, better supplied and equipped Army, or better attention to the sick and wounded than the 12th Army Group in France. I can assure you that. So they really had no complaint up front. It was doggone organizational set up and this slight friction that I think between Bradley and Lee began in England. And, of course, it increased. A thing like that snowballs

through. So that was fine and everybody said, "Well, we won't tell anyone." That was Friday night. Sunday morning I got a call from Bedell Smith to come down to Versailles. He wanted to see me immediately. So I got a car and went down and I was admitted to his office. I mean, there was just no interference and the way was greased and Bedell Smith handed me a note. That was a note from Hughes. And he said Aurand has made statements in my room in front of two witnesses, Sayler and Maxwell. Then Smith said, "You are so critical of the organization and operation of this theater that I believe that you can be of no further use to us and work effectively here."

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: And Smith says, "Well, you are going home as a colonel." And he said, "Just when you leave, go through Sayler and tell him to use you as he sees fit until you get your orders." I said, "okay" and got on my way. Well, Bob Miller found me a little room in this office building, which Sayler had his office in. He got 4 or 5 chairs. He didn't have a table. He found one of these cylindrical German stoves which simply . . . They were very thin sheet and they put charcoal in there and they glow hot. You couldn't stand there and touch them. And so we had a warm room and we just waited to see what would happen. I, of course, told Sayler. Sayler couldn't believe his ears but every now and then he would give me a chore. Very much like Ike did his Inspectorate. For example, Antwerp was about to open.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: And he wanted me to find off loading places because the British had taken over Antwerp. It was their port. And what the hell are the Americans coming in for. In crossing the rear of their line of communication and so on. So I went up and got acquainted with the British people and then the Dutch people who actually ran the port. It was their port and they were running it. This was good. Everybody that used that port got the most out of it.

MAJ MORRISON: The Dutch were running it instead of the Belgians?

LTG AURAND: I mean the Belgians, I'm sorry.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: The Belgians were running the port. The Belgians were running the port. You see how your mind sets you up when you get old. But, in any event, they did it very well. And I talked mostly with the port authorities and that's where they off loaded. Well, when it was a commercial port, all the industries took it, you know, or they held it there until the ship came in and then trucked it up to the port. There was very little storage on the piers. They were for loading and unloading goods. They would fill up a pier when a ship was going out and only half full because they would have to unload into the piers and then put the other stuff on and they were very clever about this. Excellent machinery and trains. So, I couldn't find many places. When I came back, I had nothing else to do but visit the Battlefield of Waterloo and I had never seen it but I studied it pretty well and I pointed out everything on the ground. I didn't have any map. This was where so and so happened and this was the sunken road.

MAJ MORRISON: You were pointing out to Bob Miller and the driver?

LTG AURAND: And the driver, yeah. So then we came back to Paris and nothing happened - and nothing happened. I wouldn't hesitate to say how many weeks went by or how many days but it seemed like an eternity when one morning I was, well, I wasn't up yet. See, I had no reason to hurry down to the office and I just delayed it until everybody had breakfast to go down and eat because they were in a hurry and I wasn't and I didn't know -- gum up the chow line. So, I was still in my suite when Johnny Lee called me and said, "How would you like to go on an inspection trip with me?" I said, "I'd be delighted. Where are we going?" He said, "Normandy." He said, "I want you to see how Ininspect. He told me whatever field we were using; I forgot its name, but we went in his plane. So, we went out and he didn't say very much. Then we took off as usual. Johnny Lee was reading his Bible. He was very religious. The clouds were practically on the tree tops and every now and then we would go up in the clouds and then sneak down when the hill scenery was coming along. It was a terrible ride. And finally we landed opposite Omaha Beach in what was then called the Omaha district of Normandy base section. And the commander was there and the guard of honor, the inspection and everything. Pouring rain. Just pouring rain. And then I grabbed a topless, windshieldless jeep and Lee drove the jeep. He always did. The commander sat in the front seat with him and his exec officer was in back with me. Pointed out all things. Every now and then we'd find a billet or something of this kind and we'd get out

and inspect it for cleanliness. We inspected the men that lay around to see that their dungarees had been washed. I'll tell you. This was very necessary in that situation. A man could go crummy in 24 hours unless you kept after him. And then we got in the plane and we went up to Cherbourg and here was Caffey whom I got to know very well. We had the Utah district.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: We had had the brigade, the engineer brigade, planted on the Utah Beach. The other fellow had had the brigade that landed on Omaha Beach. And they were still sitting there doing the supply. Course now members of COMZ, they had lost their combat role. And they took me around and again we went around very extensively. We stopped in a black trucker unit and went through the chow line there for lunch. And finally we wound up at the Visiting Officer's Hotel in Cherbourg. They had two hotels for visitors. One was called the VIP Hotel and the other the Visiting Officer's Hotel, and I liked the Visiting Officer's Hotel much better. Oh, we went into a little - what had been a little - what had been a private dining room, I imagine there, and the four of us sat down and we were all wet and so on, getting ready to go back. And Lee said, "I want to introduce you to the new commander of Normandy base section, General Aurand." Well, I nearly fell through the floor. At least, I was going to have a job in Europe. I wasn't being sent home. How many stars I'd keep I didn't know and I didn't care.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: I was where I wanted to be -- overseas. So the others, too, looked rather surprised, but I found out later that they knew this all along; that Lee had told them that he had an extra very high ranking major general and Lee had to find a place for him and the only place he could find was Normandy and he was sorry that Caffey wasn't going to get the job which he should have had by all rights. Caffey was intermediately commander there 5 or 6 times. Well, I went back to Paris and I don't know whether it was because of the rough ride or because of the sudden release from tension. But I got pretty air sick and I found out what the steel helmet was for.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, do you know who intervened over General Smith's decision for you to go home?

LTG AURAND: No, I don't. No, I have an idea, but when you have ideas about things like this, they are usually wrong.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: The most probable thing was that Smith had made that decision himself. He had just gotten that note and he sent for me immediately. I feel that he hadn't talked to Ike. When he talked to Ike, he found something out. This is my theory now. Ike had been told that he needed a few supply experts and four of us - one was a transportation guy who had been with Grace Lines and he came over as a BG and went on to Frank Ross's Transportation Staff. The other three were Clay, myself, and Lutes, and I would say if I picked the three best logisticians as of that moment, we were it. I was very proud to be in that company. Lutes refused

to take a permanent assignment. But Sommervell sent him over there for a month. By that time, he didn't come till late and by that time, I was commanding Normandy. Clay got over way ahead of me and they wanted no part of Clay. And Normandy was, you know, the farthest place from Paris. That's right and that's just where they put him. Well, Ike knew that this was prompted by the people in the United States. He didn't know who - General Marshall certainly had to agree. And Sommervell had to agree because two of his staff -- Clay and Lutes and important members of his staff came over. So I imagine that my relief stopped with Ike until he could straighten out his lines with the people back home. Then, of course, Smith did what I think I would have done in his place, I didn't say this in the previous record, but I asked him then when he told me I'd be busted and sent home and I said, "How about my report?" "Well," he said, "Your report must be so prejudiced based on this note that I'm going to have somebody else do it over." And he had Clay do it over. And Clay was sent back to the United States as Ike's representative. His report couldn't have been much different than mine because - I won't say his eyes were the same as mine, but I believe he would have reached the same conclusion on the facts that we both saw.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: So he was sent back and he was made special assistant to Jimmy Burns the Justice who was then running mobilization from the White House. All kinds of mobilization. And he started up the ammunition factories some of which had been closed because it was backing up all

over the place. It was a useless thing to do. I'm not so sure that I would have done the same thing; given the numbers that he had.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: But it turned out to be, unfortunately, to be useless.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what efforts did you make to coordinate with the COMZ staff?

LTG AURAND: Well, again I took this out of my background. First of all, how good was coordination within the COMZ staff? Another difficulty to coordinate a higher staff with a mixed lower echelon staff. So this is done by coordination between people of the same specialty and the communications channel that was used, is called technical channel. In the weeks that I have been awaiting action on being sent home, I've visited some of my friends who were tech service chiefs and, you know, got an idea of what they were doing and I saw in their offices how they just issued orders to any place and any COMZ section, base section, or advance section or whatnot, without any regard to the command channel at all. And I knew what that meant - a guy would have his labor troops out somewhere doing a job and all of a sudden they'd be moved over to another place and he'd wonder why in hell the job hadn't been done and what had happened and found that somebody in the technical channel from COMZ had ordered this change. And just kills any work programs that you might send on or any plans. So, I went to each one of the COMZ tech staff chiefs and I said, "What do you want done in Normandy? What do you want done. I want to know. Give it to me in detail. Get your people in. I'm going down there to command and I want to know." So I got

pretty good cooperation. In fact, nobody objected at all. Now, I said, "What means have you put in Normandy to do this?" And they would give all that. And I said, "Can I come back tomorrow?" And I'd go and make estimates of the capacity of the units and so on and go back and say, "Look, you haven't got enough people and the skill to do this job or you got too many. Can't you give me some of the right kind and things like that."

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: And then I would wind up by saying, I want no direct orders issued to any subordinate in my command. Send the orders through the command channel. I don't care whether you sign them or not, but address the orders to: The Commanding General Normandy Base Section. Don't address them to the Quartermaster Normandy Base Section or the Umpity-Ump Clothing and Bath Unit in Normandy. Send them to me and I'll see it gets done and it will get done quicker and with less mix-up for other people if you do it that way. Oh, yes, we'll do it that way and this article you just showed me by Tom Larkin says that that was the procedure. So he said there wasn't much short cutting. That was the book procedure my friend and we'll get into the details of that later, I believe.

MAJ MORRISON: Hank, I have a note here in the aide memoir for answering these questions that for the next 4 or 5 months there was no change in the short circuiting of the NVS Headquarters.

LTG AURAND: I stayed around Paris for about a week and one day I happened to run across Sunny Lee. He said, "Why aren't you down in Normandy?" He said, "You get on down there. What have you been doing?" And I told

him what I had been doing. "Well," he said, "You should have been down there. You get down there as fast as you can."

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, how did you go about meeting your staff and subordinate commanders?

LTG AURAND: When I arrived in Cherbourg, I told the Chief of Staff that I wished to visit as many staff divisions each morning as I could. In the afternoon, I wanted the entire staff, with the exception of a duty officer in each staff division, assembled in the mess hall we had there at headquarters. And those staff division chiefs whom I had visited that morning would report to the entire staff what our conversation was, what we'd talked about, any instructions I'd given and so on. These meetings were presided over by the Chief of Staff and I used to sit up on the platform and watch the faces of the staff officers while their fellows reported about our conversations. I stayed out of the discussions entirely. I wanted this to be their own finding out about each other and, of course, I found out a great deal about them. Every now and then, there were questions, of course, after each presentation. Every now and then somebody would stand up and say, "Look, I should have been in my shop. You send it over to me." So, it did help a little with the coordination within the staff. After one of these meals - we had the two district commanders present during this also and they got together with me afterwards and let me know their views about the subjects which we had discussed. That was most helpful to me. One day after the meeting which had gone out well into the afternoon, Elder, my Chief of Staff, said to me, "This

is all useless. You are trying to do things by planning them. You can't do that in Normandy. All we do in Normandy is meet the next emergency."

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, did you bring in some of your own people?

LTG AURAND: As you recall, I was told by General Styer that I couldn't take anybody with me to Europe. Now that I had a command, I didn't know whether this still applied or not but I thought I would give it a try. First of all, Sommervell had set up a control division in his own staff in Washington and as I understood it, this control division was a management consultant outfit primarily, but it also dug up a lot of information on how orders were being carried out, information which could lead Styer and Sommervell to modify their orders. Perhaps they were misunderstood in explaining them. I instituted it in Chicago as soon as I got out there and later was put in all service commands and I thought I did the same thing at Normandy because it was very helpful and all the supplies that were going through that place, I needed some numbers. I never knew whether we were meeting targets or not until the next month, and then it was too late to do anything. Well, I didn't find anyone on the staff who had any knowledge of this at all. So, I thought I would take my plans officer, who, because of Normandy, was working on nothing but emergencies and was a fairly frustrated person and made him plans and control. I could give him an idea of what I wanted and wanted done for me in Chicago, but I couldn't tell him how it worked, what the machinery was.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: So, I decided I would send for my friend Watkins whom I had rescued from the quartermaster section of post quartermasters office at

Fort Custer and I brought a personal letter to my successor in Chicago and told him I need -- that he had 5 or 6 other good guys in that control office. Watkins was not the chief or was not depriving him of leadership and would he let him go and he said, "Sure." Well, I had learned by this time that it was well to keep the senior aide's spot, which was a major spot vacant. In other words, if I promoted my aide to major as I did several times in Chicago, he had to get out and he had to go in the staff somewhere else. So, I could always ask for an aide outside of a 2nd lieutenant or 1st lieutenant combat type guy, I could have anybody I wanted. So I was sure that if Watkins ever got ordered to Europe just on plain orders, all I would do in the United States would be to order him to the European Theater of Operations. He would be in the rappel system, replacement system, immediately.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: So I had him ordered over as my aide to report to: Commanding General Communications Zone as an aide to Major Genera. H. S. Aurand. That's how I got Watkins. Later on, my G-5 got sick and I thought of my old friend Palfrey who had run the ASTP for me well in Chicago, who was a graduate of the Sorbonne and had gotten his doctorate there. His doctorate dissertation was on antique French poetry so he was an erudite guy and certainly should be able to get along with the French, and he did. I got him, too. And these were the only people I pulled out. I had considered getting a new Chief of Staff, but Elder had been Chief of Staff from the time that it was designated as a base section. He was the only continuity. Caffey - well, it was set up as a base section, was the

Utah district commander as he was under me and he had been a base section commander and out somebody came and then he'd be in again, and somebody else would come, but Elder had been there continuously and I just couldn't leave him. Well, it took us a little while to get adjusted. We made a very good team. And later on, when I got to USARPAC, he was too junior to be my Chief of Staff, but I got him in as Deputy Chief of Staff and I told my Chief of Staff that he should act like he was deputy commander and let Elder do the Chief of Staff's job.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: And it worked very well.

THIS IS SIDE 2 OF TAPE 3 OF INTERVIEWS WITH LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY S. AURAND. THE DATE IS 22 APRIL 1974.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, do you believe in shuffling the staff to make room for people you already know?

LTG AURAND: Well, my answer to your question is, as far as I am concerned, it depends on the circumstances and on the people I find there. I've already told you about my relationship with Elder at Normandy whom I had kept on originally because of his experiences and later found that we worked very well together. On the other hand, when I went to Cairo because of the very short time I was given to close the place out, three months, I took not only the Chief of Staff but maybe as many as ten other people. Simply because I'm sure that the staff could not have gotten acquainted with me or I with them in that short period. Actually, I increased the number of people on the staff that I met by the number of people that I took out except part of the Chief of Staff. And what I had was two people sitting at a given staff desk, one of whom had the Egyptian experience and the other who knew me and for a short time, saying this is fine. Normally, I wouldn't have taken anybody. I would have had some lines out for kinds of people that I wanted. Now I divided this, I think into three, and it adds up to three when I get through. Different propositions. Number one is that you must have a Chief of Staff you can work with. You have the option of taking one along or waiting to see in only the case he needs you, did I take one along, and that was not for any personal consideration. It was a time

factor. I think you should take your own aides. But, in China, I took an aide and gave him up as soon as I got to China. I gave him up as soon as I got there because my predecessor left me two wonderful aides who were fairly knowledgeable on China. So, you can't make any rules about this. I think it might be interesting just to review the Chiefs of Staff situation. As you should know in Chicago, I had to get rid of my fellow as politely as possible and France we've just talked about. I took the fellow who was on the job. In China, the fellow who had been Chief of Staff went with my predecessor and left a vacancy. However, there was a man who had been the Chief of Staff of the Chinese SOS who was available. And I took him and well, he was a very able man and we worked together very well. That was fine. I've just told you about Egypt and USARPAC. The Chief of Staff who was on orders which was not there and he was a very wonderful man in the three and a half years I was at USARPAC. He stayed only about the first year and a half because he was made a BG and he was made a major general before I retired, so he was up and coming guy and he was alright. After that, I filled a spot from local people, some of whom I had known from 1924. They were all available there and I'd go fishing. That's my general feeling. Another second group, that is, the group that Watkins and Palfrey belonged to. Here are specialists who have worked with you in their specialty and you have nobody with those attainments or experience in those specialties in your outfit. You got to bring somebody in that knows the job and the old man can't teach him because by and large while he knows what he wants and what the results are, he doesn't know the mechanism the guy goes through to get these things for him.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes,sir.

LTG AURAND: And this is why you send for somebody that does. And I think there is still a third category. I can't remember anybody that I did this with, but I've seen it done on other staffs.

MAJ MORRISON: Their shifting within the staff?

LTG AURAND: Oh, yes. I usually go on the proposition that anybody that was a lieutenant colonel had been made a lieutenant colonel by somebody else that thought he was worth the job. And if he wasn't doing a good job, it was my fault. He was in the wrong place. Well, I had a G-1 and an AG, both of whom had been Army field clerks, both of whom had reserve commissions. They were normally both lieutenant colonels and they were in each other's hair all the time. And Elder said that it had been going on like that since they had both arrived. And I began sizing these two people up and I realized that the fellow who was the AG was a guy with many ideas, who personnel-wise, would like to try this and that, and morale-wise and all that keeping people happy. And the G-1 was well versed in all the regulations. He carried a trunk locker. How he ever got it to France, and an updated, complete set of Army regulations in it, and I think he knew the whole thing by heart. Well, one day Elder came in to see me and he said these two guys are at it again. You've got to do something about it. "Well," I said, "You stay here and I'll go get them." When I got them in my office I said, "Elder, what's happened?" Well, he told me and I had them standing at attention there in front of my desk. "Well," I said, "Frank, there's just one thing. We can't keep this up. We've got to have a new AG and we've got to have a new G-1,"

and you could see these fellows faces fall. I said, "G-1, you are now the AG. And AG you are now the G-1. And you are not going to move your offices. You are just going to change the signs on your desk. Is that clear?" Yes, sir," they said with much relief. We never had another fight.

MAJ MORRISON: The Red Ball Express had started in its NBS prior to your arrival. How did you view the operation?

LTG AURAND: Well, as you say, the Red Ball Express started before my arrival as far as I'm concerned; it died before my arrival. And the tombstone was some 9,000 trucks out in fields around a balloon hanger, which was serving as a repair shop, which had to be rehabilitated. In fact, clear in this next year, whenever we needed spare parts we could always send a wrecker out along the road and pull a red ball truck out of the ditch and bring it in and strip it. It was the greatest killer of trucks that I could imagine, and I believe that several fundamental things in truck operations were violated in that haste to get things forward and they would have gotten things forward much quicker if there hadn't been so much haste. You know, the more haste the less speed.

MAJ MORRISON: What are these fundamentals?

LTG AURAND: Well, the first one that I knew of, I didn't really learn until I got to China. I was not much of a truck transportation guy, although I was a good rail transportation guy, but not much on the truck business. The first thing is, you don't put a driver on a truck and say, go as far as you can until somebody stops you and then give him the load and come on back. What you do is arrange trucker stops where you not only change

crews on a truck but you inspect the truck. It doesn't take long. The truck keeps on going. You don't wait for the man to get a meal and what-not and come back and move his truck. I found that while it may be absolutely necessary in the combat unit to assign a man a vehicle, it's certainly the wrong thing to do when you are operating a truck line. Now this is still done in the United States by putting two drivers on and let one sleep up in the back of the cab. This is alright. I can't complain about that. But to run this like a railroad keeps a man in shape and the truck in shape. And the truck keeps right on going. It doesn't wait for the man at all. In China we had these trucker stops at 100 miles, but in France you could have had them at 200 or maybe 150, a little farther than that. That's one thing. That would have saved the trucks. The second thing is, you run those trucks at a speed which will not destroy them and that depends on the condition of the road and how many truckloads you get and everything else. Well, the French roads went right on to hell as soon as this Red Ball was started. They weren't built for that kind of continuous heavy traffic. So that the speed on that road should have been no more than 35 and probably 30 miles an hour top speed and you should have that thing patrolled so you immediately take the driver off the truck and get a new one and he goes on the grease racker and other unpleasant jobs. That's the second thing. Controlling the speed. Of course, they didn't run in convoy and by searching I found out that you lost more time running in convoys than you did by dispatching individual trucks. And even though the great majority of my truck drivers in China were Chinese, they ran their trucks individually. No convoy business.

MAJ MORRISON: You say in France they did run in convoy?

LTG AURAND: No, they did not. That was not an error in my book. So that they did right, but the uncontrolled speeds and keeping the driver with his truck until he got back, not until he got there, but until he got back. I guess there were as many wrecks headed toward Cherbourg as there were headed away from it. Maybe more.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: Cause they could go faster with a light truck.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what was the condition of the ports in NVS?

LTG AURAND: Well, if you're talking about Cherbourg, the ports were so -- these were devastated and there were ships sunk in the harbor. Some of them were sunk at the pier. The restoration of the port was a miracle and the engineer regiment which performed this miracle became the nucleus of Normandy base section. It was the only major part of the original Normandy base section. But I'll add two others which came under my cognizance later on. Brest was completely destroyed, not only in the preliminary bombing but in the capture of the city. Brest was to be the main port according to the invasion plan, but never functioned at all. LeHarve they missed. The Air Force missed the port. It took a 2,000 yard wide strip right out of the heart of the city of LeHarve. Just - you could see it. You could see the direction the planes flew just standing on the hill and looking at it. And the port was only lightly damaged. Compared to Cherbourg and Brest. So we got plenty of use out of LeHarve. What amazed me was that the Germans should have destroyed these ports.

We should have let them alone. If we're going to go forward, and we believe we are, we don't destroy our means of movement. And the same thing happened to the railroads and so on. I think that, well, I won't go into that now. I'll stick to the ports, but Antwerp was not hit by us. It was intact. The Germans didn't destroy it. They made one terrible mistake and we made terrible mistakes at the other three. And this idea of destroying things, as I started my story with my mother saying, war is destroying things and has become a substitute in the American psychology to killing people. This idea had become so popular that it had entered the national subconscious. It affects anything that we in the military do just as well as the civilians. We try to destroy things and not kill people. And we kill just as many people destroying the things and we don't have to destroy other things to do it. I would say that the air raids and the gunfire on Brest, the air raids in Cherbourg and LeHarve were completely unnecessary. The last alibi I heard from a very high ranking Air Force officer who was in command of the bomber command or something, who said that they had to smash the submarine pens. Well, that might have been a good idea, but there was no reason why somebody couldn't lay off a harbor and sink the submarines where it wouldn't interfere with our advance and the use of the port. So far, I've been talking about major ports, but there were five minor ports around the Normandy and Cotentin Peninsula. One of them was the Brittany Base Section just off Mon St. Michele. The other four were on the peninsula.

The Germans had damaged these ports somewhat. These were not bombed so far as I know by - there was no evidence of bomb craters or whatnot around it anyway. And they served a very useful purpose when the troops were still in the peninsula. After they got out, the tonnage you could get through there wasn't worth the trouble. You had to have major ports. The only minor port that was still working on V-E day was Granville. It had been used entirely for French civil populations supply.

MAJ MORRISON: Upon arrival, did you have any problem meeting your tonnage discharge goals?

LTG AURAND: By the time I took command, a series of predecessors had overcome bottlenecks which their own specialties enabled them to overcome. But there was always emergencies which had to be met and they interfered frequently with meeting our tonnage of 25,000 tons per day unloaded and forwarded. There were the constant problems of cold, rain, darkness, and mud. We had about three hours of daylight. And the mud, perhaps affected us as much in our unloading as any of the other three because we had to off load from the ships to stack the stuff some place. You'd stack it in a nice looking field and by a week the bottom three layers of boxes were out of sight in the mud and it was hard to get at the stuff to get it in and out. Mud was an unloading problem believe it or not. Darkness must have been a terrible problem during the blackout days, but one of my predecessors had lifted the blackout in Normandy in spite of the fact that there was a general blackout in the European theater, and I added to that by lifting the curfew so that we had plenty of light to work by. Perhaps the worst enemy to maintain our tonnage

rate was human stupidity. By trial and error, the various supply services had accommodated their strengths to the port clearance job. Each service had to do the port clearance of its own stuff. Somebody in New York got the idea of loading ships on an experimental basis with a single commodity and this was alright for POL or ammunition which we prepared for to handle by the shipload, but when we came to rations we were not prepared to handle it by the shipload. One day, lo and behold! . . . three ration ships came in at the same time. Well, the quartermasters had to work to beat hell and everybody else sat in by the fire. And when I discovered this, I turned them all out to help the quartermasters and told them to use the quartermaster personnel as the supervisers and to show these other guys what to do and let everybody work clearing the ships.

MAJ MORRISON: Did you have a storage place to put the rations once you . . .?

LTG AURAND: No, no. No. We put them in the public square at Cherbourg. This occurred only a day or two after I took command. The chateau where I was quartered, wasn't very luxurious; don't let the word chateau throw you. It used one of the rooms for a small officer's bar. After it got fairly well filled with people and whatnot, I decided I'd walk in and say hello and have a drink. Just before I came in, somebody had called for the quartermaster who was Colonel Judd. Judd was a fine energetic officer. He had been a dough boy in World War I and he had had a regiment which got him as far as the port of New York when he was relieved because he was too old to command a regiment. By some hook or crook, I think by transferring to the quartermaster corps on the spot, he came on overseas and then the gathering together of this NBS staff which had no cadre or

anything else from England; it was created on the spot and he became the quartermaster. Well, what he knew about the quartermaster was just what I knew about human surgery. I mean, he had a very fine deputy -- a reserve officer who more than made up for his lack of knowledge. I mean, he provided the technical skill beautifully, and they worked very well as a team. But he was called to the telephone and Judd was yelling in the phone when I came in there. Course, when I came in, everybody came to attention and whatnot. They didn't know me yet. They wouldn't do that three days later. Course, it got very quiet and Judd had been shouting in this phone so when the silence came and he had his back turned, you see, he kept right on shouting. He says, "I don't know," "I don't know." . . . and he turned around and looked and said, "Good evening, general." I said, "Is there anything I can do to help you?" Well," he said, "There is a fellow down there in the public square where Napoleon's equestrian statue is, . . . that statue where he is pointing to England . . . and he said he wants to know how high to stack rations and I don't know how high to stack rations. Do you?" And I said, "No, I don't know either." So he turns around to the phone and yells, "Pile them as high as Napoleon is pointing. Pile them as high as Napoleon's hand . . . ." Another thing that was done to ease this off loading business, we bought our trucks and I guess everything but jeeps came just disassembled to some degree. The bodies were all off. The wheels were off. The frames were shipped separately and we had a regular assembly line, automotive assembly line plants but they were way out in the country. So, I found a couple of streets in Cherbourg that I got the mayor to let me take over and we built whatever kind of roof

we could over the streets and we used the streets right by the port for assembly lines. Then they could be run away under their own power. They didn't have to be put on a truck in pieces and carried a couple of miles and then assembled. Things of this nature were being done all the time to keep us able to get 25,000 tons a day off the ships and forwarded to the troops.

MAJ MORRISON: What about rail movement, sir?

LTG AURAND: Well, the same goes for the rail movement. And the same for the ports. The complete destruction of the railroads. I'm sure that I will never live again in a building which is anywhere near an important crossroads of highways or an important railroad junction or a railroad yard. Every one of these things was flat. The towns where there were important crossroads didn't have one stone on another and the way we got the traffic to go through is to level the rubble with a bulldozer, and throw some dirt on it. That became the highway. I believe that much of this was unnecessary. I've been told and I've read that the reason that this was done was to prevent the Germans from reinforcing the defense against the landing. But it seems to me that the Germans on the road hurrying to reinforce the defense against the landing would have been a hell of a sight better target, a cheaper target as far as our expenditures were concerned to do the job and probably a good deal more effective. I also saw examples of that. There were two German armored divisions who escaped the Falaise Gap and they were headed for Roven, and they had about, oh, a dozen or so miles to go - maybe 15. And all along that - they were on two roads. One on each road, and all along those two roads which were very narrow and

crooked, there was nothing but smashed tanks, smashed trucks and everything else. They'd been gotten from the air in the escape. And they could have been gotten from the air in the advance just as well.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: And these facilities were all left for us to use as soon as we got there. There had been no red ball. No destruction of trucks and roads busted up by our own bombs and it seems to me that for the future, somebody's got to study this thing of why you don't destroy instead of - destroy everything in sight. I just want to give one positive illustration of this. When Brest was being planned as the place to unload, the railroads from Brest to Rennes coming out of the Brittany peninsula had a spiral railroad trestle bridge. In other words, the railroad made a spiral curve. It was a curve on an increasing grade. It was a wooden trestle bridge. It was a double track and in the middle I guess it was maybe a couple hundred feet high and Lee and company were so worried that the Germans would destroy this and make Brest really unusable because it would have been one hell of a job and time-taking job to repair that bridge and you could not reroute the railroad, that they went to everybody, you know, don't hit this whatever you do. Don't hit this. When I took over the Brittany Peninsula, General Lee came to inspect the installations there - there was still a pocket of Germans there so we couldn't go all the way. He turned off the road very sharply. He was driving the jeep and here was this trestle completely intact and he said, "I can't understand why the Germans didn't destroy this." And I said, "Well, General Lee, did you have any trouble keeping the U. S. aviators from destroying it?" And

the only time in my whole time with Lee that I ever saw him shrug his shoulders, he shrugged his shoulders and said, "That was quite a job."

MAJ MORRISON: Did you have any problems with the engineers and their road repair with construction missions?

LTG AURAND: When I visited the NBS engineers during the day, I was going around visiting every staff section at NBS. Instead of going into his office, we went into the war room where there were road maps and locations and depots and units and all that posted. Of course, on this map was shown the deployment of the Engineer General Service Regiments who were on road work. I found some working outside the NBS area from the road from Caen to Paris. Elder was with us. He told me that they were placed there during the operation of the red ball. I said the red ball was dead and it certainly chewed up these roads so badly that they couldn't be used by the French and I didn't see any use in trying to repair them. Besides, I see several reasons why we shouldn't keep our road traffic going through Caen. This was a British enclave but it was the original supply base from Montgomery after the landing. I've been through Caen several times. Twice: when I went down to see the ammunition situation and then again when I drove on down to take command. But I noticed that within the storage area, the British drove on the left of the road. Whether or not they did when they got out was problematical. Also, the steering gear on the right, these trucks were a menace, you know, through traffic. They couldn't pass very well and you could always be afraid someone would dart out in front of an oncoming truck.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: So, I told the engineer to find a new road which would miss Caen and would not be this old cut up road on which these engineers were working and this would be known as the NBS axial road and it would be given first priority on maintenance. And then I called right then Roy Lord and said, "Why have we got engineers for Normandy working outside of the thing? Elder tells me it's from the red ball and so on." "Well," he said, "You might as well not take them off because there's nothing in these provinces now working for establishments for either the British or the Americans, and the British want to try to get rid of all the territory here in the American sector, so we'll probably add these two provinces - I think provinces of Eure and Eure et Loire, but I'm not quite sure. They'll be added to your base section." I said, "Alright. I'm establishing a new axial road and I told him I'd give him the new route and that I'd move the engineers over there and he said, "Okay. That's up to you. But don't think only of the part back in the peninsula because Eure and Eure et Loire are going to be yours anyway." So that was one problem where the engineers were working. Then Normandy took over the three base sections to the South. I can't tell you the names of them anymore. Brittany, of course, is one. We then made a second axial road which ran from our first axial road down to Rennes and then Rennes, LeMans and Chartres and that was almost an unused road, a beautiful road, and many of our -- well, we arranged finally to truck over it all of the stuff that was going to the Armies directly. We shipped directly at ADSEC request then. We would ship directly to an Army to transfer at Chartres which became simply a transfer

point for loaded trucks as all the new trucks had to go forward. We never got them back. So what we did was to load them up with things an Army had requested ADSEC to ship in this manner and ADSEC would pass the word to us. When the loaded trucks arrived at Chartres, either ADSEC or Army people would take them over and our drivers would come back in an empty one of our own.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: So that road proved a lifesaver because it took the traffic off the beaten up old roads that had followed the advance from Paris on east.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what was the troop strength of NBS on your arrival?

LTG AURAND: I'm glad you said a specific date because NBS changed in size in troop strength like a yo-yo. It was up and down and up and down. At this time, it was just the two provinces of Manche and Calvados. There were about 125,000 working U. S. military personnel, at a guess. I arrived there about 14 December 1944 and the November figures had not yet been compiled. In mid-February there were still about 120,000 U. S. military in the working force; but including civilians and prisoners of war, there were about 220,000 in the working force and a total strength of over 400,000. The difference consisted of prisoners of war and U. S. troops in staging areas.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, I believe that most of your troopers were black. Did they present any special problems?

LTG AURAND: I wouldn't call them special problems. These problems were

equally applicable to the whites. I think the main problem was that the Army had customarily had black units and white units. I think also that many of the white higher commanders thought that the black officers and many of these outfits like an Engineer General Service Regiment or quartermaster one might have a white colonel and a white battalion commander. There were white regimental execs and maybe a battalion commander or two that were white and all the rest of the officers would be black. Well, there seemed to be a general feeling that the black officers were not competent and when I began talking to them, they were all college graduates. Every one of them and very well informed people. They were much older for their grade. I think in some cases they had very fine qualities of leadership. Before World War I, the Army seemed to think that a black soldier had no respect for a black officer. That was a myth in my experience. Now, as to numbers, I believe that we varied in Normandy from 55% to 60% black enlisted men, but for officers, the percentage was probably 15% so that my major source of labor particularly was black. There was some skilled outfits in the black, too. The problems that they faced were no different than the problems of white. White problems were what I said about the ports. Darkness, mud, rain, and cold and they were our enemies throughout that very bad winter. There was one odd saying about the statistics on the whole NBS and I never did segregate this into black and white. The rape rate was very high as among the base section. The VD rate was the lowest of all the base sections and I remarked at the cocktail party about one time after the war and the gal

I was talking to said, "Well, what do you expect?" The Prefect of Manche on whom I called, called the black areas where they were camped or billeted or what have you, there were none of them billeted on the French. We always had some kind of shack, portable shack or tent shelter for them. He called them black spots on the map of Manche. And I told him I would talk about disciplining my soldiers, but after that I had no adjectives before the word "soldier." I had neither white soldiers nor black soldiers. I had soldiers and if you had complaints about the discipline of the American soldiers I would be very glad to hear them and I would straighten them out.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: Well, at the subject then remarked when I came back from the next command and staff conference, I said there will be no adjective before the word soldier in Normandy. We have no black soldiers and white soldiers. In those days, we used the word Negro. No Negro soldiers and white soldiers. We had soldiers. There's no distinction. They are all doing the same job. I remember one or two special accommodations I did make. In Cherbourg, where we had no curfew, where we had just as much business at the service clubs and whatnot . . . incidentally, there was a black service club and a white service club. We had just as much business there in the daytime because that was the night shift's time and the day shift, 12-hour shift, you'd be there at night. So they were open all the time. We had a constant patrol. I wasn't worried any about fights between soldiers. Somebody would come along and stop it. And other soldiers, they usually liked

to keep their buddies out of trouble. We got very little trouble that way but the attacks on French people that the mayor complained about incessantly. And I found that the MP's, the white MP's, were complaining about the black soldiers giving them a terrible time. So, I decided to put a black platoon in this MP battalion and that all patrols would consist of two men, one white and one black. And, of course, this fighting on streets stopped immediately. The black soldier arrested the black and the white soldier arrested the white soldier. And that's a rather interesting story. I went to the port, which is almost 100% black because the Belgiums would not let any black man in Belgium and they's taken all of the white stevedores off their outfits from this major part of Cherbourg, some of them gave me black in exchange. So, I went to the port commander and I said, "I want your best, strongest, finest looking 1st lieutenant." "Oh," he said, "That's easy. I have an ROTC guy from Harvard who played tackle on Harvard varsity. He's about 6'6 and he only weighs about 230, but he's the strongest man in this whole port command, and he's a fine looking guy." So I said, "I want to see him. Would you let him go?" "Oh," he said, "It's just tearing me apart. He's the greatest Negro leader I have." I said, "I need him very badly" and I told him what for and I said, "This is mostly for your men, you know. They are the ones that are on the streets in Cherbourg." "Okay. Alright. You can have him." So he sent for him. And I said, "You know my statement about no word, no adjective before the word soldier?" "Yes." Then I said, "Occasionally you have to recognize that the color does cause some amount of difference." And I told him about what I wanted.

And I said, "I want you to command that platoon." "Well," he said, "How about Colonel Smith?" He was an MP battalion commander I said, "You want me - you want to interview him or have him interview you?" "Yes. I want to know who my boss is. I want to know what my terms of reference are and so on." So we went down together to Smith's area. And I went in and told Smith what I wanted to do and without recommending this fellow or anything I said, "I have a candidate the port commander gave me." I didn't have him in there 5 minutes. He said, "Everything is fine." So they went around, found where they were going to live in the MP - there were some French barracks there. The MP had a little wing there. Found a place there for him. And that ended the difficulty. But he picked his men. He picked his men.

MAJ MORRISON: The lieutenant?

LTG AURAND: Yeah.

MAJ MORRISON: Did you know Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis and did he give you any assistance?

LTG AURAND: I saw General Ben Davis at the command and staff conferences several times. Even during my days of waiting. I spoke to him about the high proportion of blacks in NBS and I asked him if he would come to Normandy and visit me. I wanted the people in the command to know that he was down on my invitation. And I wanted him to go to the Negro outfits, black outfits, and see how they were living, what complaints there were and let me know what I could do to straighten things out. And since he had commanded a black regiment himself before World War

I or shortly after, I've forgotten, he would know much more about the limitations on the things I could do for these men.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: And he could look at it from my point of view as well as theirs. So he went around and made these inspections. He came back with some recommendations. We used to feed these people at work by bringing out trucks full of hot food. And they had a mess man aboard and whatnot. And it took quite a number of trucks to do this. So, he said, "First, use the trucks that took the mid-shift meal to the men and bring the men back to the barracks. Feed them a hot meal in the mess hall and give them warm, dry clothes to put on to go back to work. When they come off duty, have a movie in the rec hall." Most of these people managed to get a rec hall. It was used mostly for writing letters home when there was one. "Have a movie in the rec hall when they are through with the shift for the next twelve hours. And when they are off duty, do anything you can to interest them in staying around camp." And I said, "That's a company officer's job." "No," he said, "That's your job. You've got to tell the company officer. It's got to come from you. Not from me." I said, "Okay." I'll tip him off. When people went out on railroad or road repair, they usually took the tentage along with them and they can't, you know, as the work progressed. And he said, "These are the people that are suffering the most and these were entirely black outfits." He said, "Run a roster, have truck service, and give them the day off in Cherbourg. And if you can, let the few people that do very well have a day or two in Paris." And I thought this was

wonderful. We did our part, but Johnny Lee turned down, Johnny Lee personally turned down any black soldiers coming from Normandy.

MAJ MORRISON: In Paris?

LTG AURAND: In Paris. There were several more very simple things that he recommended that I don't quite remember. But I did do that round of seeing every black company commander and laid it on the line to him. This was his responsibility. I said, "You knew it all the time and I knew it all the time but it's better to make sure that we understand each other." And that's the way I approached him. And by April - he must have come there in mid-January and by April we had a zero rape rate and still had the smallest VD rate in Europe.

MAJ MORRISON: Great.

LTG AURAND: And I contribute that entirely to General Ben Davis. Well, there is a sequel to this that I think might be interesting. It's interesting to me. Ben Davis went out, came out to the dedication of the -- no, no. He came out to the annual anniversary in Australia of the Battle of the Coral Sea which, of course, saved Australia from invasion because we won. And they had a celebration there and they always invited us to send officers out there to participate. It so happened that this particular year, Bob Eichelberger, whom I knew very well and Ben Davis who was then very old, came on to represent us at this celebration and their wives were with them. And we had a little informal dinner at my house. I was retired then living in Honolulu up in the mountains. It was casual seating. It was a buffet and I happened to sit next to Mrs. Davis I mean, it happened . . . it wasn't arranged by me. And I said, "I'll

never forget all your husband did for me in France." And she took affront and said, "What could he possibly have done for you?" Well, I said, "Would you listen?" She said, "Yes." And I told her this story I've just . . . .

MAJ MORRISON: She replied to the question?

LTG AURAND: She said he never told me about it. He never told me about that.

MAJ MORRISON: What do you remember of the Battle of the Bulge?

LTG AURAND: Well, I have to go back a little bit and set the stage. You remember that I said when I went to Cherbourg, I would see all of the staff people first because they didn't know anyone and I had these staff visits and reports and then I would go out to the command. The second reason for that. I'd driven all through the place from my ammunition trip down there and I knew the lay of the land and at least where the ammunition was and that was all over the place so that I felt that I didn't need to go out at first. Normally, I would go out first and then come back and stay. I finally got to a place where I could get loose and on my first day when I was getting acquainted with the troops, I reached the first unit at daylight and then I went down to West Coast of Manche. Darkness overtook me at Granville so I had a long ride in the dark, back to Cherbourg. When I got back there, my office seemed very quiet but Elder was waiting for me. He usually did anyhow. I mean, it was the first experience I'd had but I told him that I'd be very late coming back and he didn't have to stick around, so it surprised me.

He said he had to give me the latest news. These were the items of news that he gave me. Something was wrong. Emergency orders had been received for barbed wire and anti-tank ammo and mine. The Armored Division which was stationed at Bricabac, and that was the last one incidentally that was staged in Normandy. They had been alerted and had requested routes through NBS toward Paris. During the afternoon, attempts had been made to get information from COMZ headquarters, but the signal officer had been directed not to place any calls for Paris. Elder thought somebody ought to go to Paris at once and I thought Elder had been through all these emergencies and handled them and I haven't. I'll go to Paris and he can stay home. Hold down the fort. So I went to Paris. Very early the next morning I reached the war room in the Hotel Majestic and there were red arrows on the maps indicating German advances through a sparsely held sector of the front, in the Ardennes Forest. So then I went to Lord's office. Lord was down with Bedell Smith acting as Deputy Chief of Staff ETOUSA. I asked where Lee was. Lee had gone to the front and nobody knew where on the front or anything else. So, I thought I would go to the cafeteria and get a little breakfast. Maybe Lord would be back by the time I finished. When I got there, here was an old friend of mine from West Point. He was a colonel. He had been out of the Army between the wars. Colonel Meacham. I think he was in the class of, the regular class of '17. We exchanged greetings. We hadn't seen each other since I graduated in 1915. Then I discovered that he was the guy that I should have seen in the first place.

He had to do with the assigning of all troops in COMZ, but he was in G-4. It never occurred to me that they'd put the troop assignment in G-4, but that's alright. I won't quarrel with it. But that's why I hadn't found him. I kept looking in G-3 for this guy. When we got back to the - he said that we were going to have to pull a hell of a lot of troops out of Normandy Base Section and I said, "Well, first of all, how about our target. 25,000 tons a day?" "Oh, no," he said, "That's all been changed." Well, I think this was Monday and on Friday I'd been to a command conference and was told again that our target was 25,000 tons. So that was a sudden change. He said, "All we're going to do now is handle ammo and POL and it may be the shipping out of the stuff that we had there already, but there would be no more unloading of anything but ammo and POL." And so we'd have about 6,000 tons a day to unload and maybe 10,000 tons a day to forward and I should figure on that target in giving up the troops. Well, he had picked out some Normandy troops that he wanted to get out of. And I said, "Let's forget that and start over and then we'll see whether these units are in the list we prepared. Oh, we worked there for 2 or 3 hours. Then I called Elder and said we're going to lose the following troops and gave him the list. Incidentally, all the ones that Meacham picked to go were also on the other list so there was no trouble there. And Elder yelled, "You ruined us." I said, "I'll be back to tell you about it and I'll bring the orders, our copies of the orders with me and I'll probably leave after lunch." So, I went back up to the George Cinq and decided to take a bath, and got in the bathtub and three hours later Bob Miller

pulled me out of the bathtub. I had fallen asleep. And we had lunch together and went back. Well, when I got back there, Elder gave me some figures. He said, at the peak in October, which was the latest figure, he had, I think I already referred that I couldn't get a November thing, NBS had a total of 150,000. This has been depleted, however, by sending troops to Antwerp for operation of the port. Of the 150,000, 120,000 had been labor and transport troops, port and so on. According to my list of units to leave, we lost 70,000 of these troops leaving 50,000. The remaining 30,000 at October strength were specialists like hospital corpsmen, machinists, signal type missions, warehousemen -- people of that nature. NBS would lose 5,000 of these leaving a total of 25,000. The total remaining in NBS would be 75,000 which was just about 50% of the October strength. I had to say to Elder, "I don't think I ruined it, if all we're going to handle is 10,000 tons a day instead of 25." The second day following, I went to Paris for command conference. And General Lee as usual had a dinner for his base section, section commanders the night before. I could have wished that he had more of the NBS staff and, I mean the COMZ staff people there, but Roy Lord was the only other staff member. Course, the base section commanders were all in the same hassle I was, getting troops started toward the front and ADSEC was yelling because COMZ had not given specific, had not paid any attention to the specific points he wanted them to come and so the fellow in the intermediate section, they were preparing a defense ahead of the spear, the head of the spear. Had not been given definite points and there was much confusion as to where people would dig trenches and a few things like

that. And they had quite a case. So, it came about that I was the last guy to make my report and the fellow from Antwerp wasn't there. And Lord said to General Lee, now Jacobs is not here because as you know Antwerp has been tied up by no off loading space and it's almost completely blocked. They can't find anything. It's all over the city and the surrounding countryside just to get the ships clear. And they said that before General Aurand says anything, I want to ask him if he could get back to 25,000 tons in and out because we got to send this stuff somewhere. And I said, "Well, give me a minute." I said I wished I'd gone around to talk to some of my friends on the staff before I came to this meeting. I would have had a prepared answer. He said, "No, I don't think they know this yet. This is only topside." Well, I had at that time maybe 125,000 prisoners of war, Germans. Maybe it was more. Maybe it was as much as 140,000. And we had them divided into ardent Nazi's who were troublemakers in camp and the number out of that was about 20,000 so I figured we could get at least 80,000 prisoners to work and maybe 80,000 prisoners could do the work of 70,000 labored people that we had lost, and that's what we needed. People to unload the ships and the people that cart the stuff around and the depots and so on. So I said, "If I can work prisoners of war, I can do it." And Johnny Lee said, "Well, how would you work these prisoners?" Well, I said, "I would use the men who are currently doing the work to be both guards and work supervisers." And he said, "Aren't these people nearly all black?" I said, "Yes, they are all black." He said, "How do you think the Germans and these blacks will react?" Well, I said, "I'm

going to send word down to everybody that has anything to do with this and any black unit that gets German POW's to work will be told that these are the people who called them an inferior race and said that they would never make soldiers. But I was sure that they were soldiers who dressed the part and acted the part; and the more scared they could make the Germans of them, the better I liked it." And it worked. So, having calmed Johnny Lee's fears, I said, "Look, let me go will you? I have to get on the phone immediately." So I called up Elder and the labor officer Harrison and the provost marshall whom we called the high sheriff and we said, "We've got to put 80,000 prisoners to work tonight." "Tonight? What do you mean, tonight." I said, "Tonight." "Well, where are they going to work?" "Well, that's for you to figure out." "Where are they needed?" And then I enumerated the places where just that day or the day before we'd lost these men. Put them in where the units had been lost. "How about truckers?" I said, "Not yet, but start training them on American trucks. Give the truck company some of these guys. Let them ride with the truckers." And the one question that I'm always asked at this point when I tell this story is, "Well, how did you guard them?" "We didn't." The worst thing the German feared was to be loose without friends on his own. He was sure the Frenchman would shoot him. And this is because most of the Germans who were prisoners in Normandy had been garrison troops on the West Wall and they'd lived there for four years.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: They knew the country - they knew the country better than I did. Even some of the Frenchmen. So they weren't about to escape. No, sir. And when I got people on the railroads and roads, they asked me for more guards. The word came, of course, from the proper channels, but these company commanders didn't have any more people to guard them, so it finally got up to me as a personnel shortage. Prisoners want more guards. Why? They are afraid the Frenchmen will snipe at them while they are out there spread along the track working. Well, of course, after that, I visited every outfit that was working prisoners. Elder was really running the place for the first couple of weeks. The schedule that I followed was always published in advance. I wanted the people to know when I was coming. I do not believe in surprise inspections when you go and give them hell because you catch them doing something that just may be the only time they've done it. I want them prepared. It's like seeing your grandchildren. You like them all nice and clean and with their diaper just changed so grandpa can hold them a little while. When they knew you were coming to inspect, they got ready for inspection. Then it was always possible to give them a pat on the back.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes, sir.

LTG AURAND: When you do that kind of an inspection and you do a thorough inspection, you don't fool the troops by just walking through because then they know that they've earned your pat on the back. So these black troops spooned up like you've never seen a soldier to go out in the rain on guard or working these Germans. It was just a sight to see. It worked.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what appeals to you now about the ravages of war?

LTG AURAND: What appeals to me most about the ravages of war is that many of them were unnecessary. You drive over to a French town without a single stone upon another and the road goes through it based on the rubble of the houses that stood along it. It's a tragic sight. This non-existant town was once a civilized place. The fields around were neither good nor ill to friend or enemy. Sometimes the destructive urge is stilled by something of so much beauty that even the bombers based on destroying things, leave it alone. One of these was the Cathedral at Chartres. I guess an odd architecture but a beautiful architectural masterpiece. The people were so sure that their church would be hit. The famous rose window in back of the alter was taken apart, colored piece of glass by colored piece of glass and marked so that it would be put back at least exactly the same place and was stored way down in the ground under the church. Two years later, I was able to go back to Chartres and see the window back in place. But the destruction seemed to me grossly unnecessary. Just grossly unnecessary. And I think what is needed is new weaponry. Entirely new kinds of weaponry which will kill people and not hurt anything, that is, physically hurt anything. Knock buildings down and things of that kind. You can do it without destroying things. And, of course, the most humane weapon of war, gas, has been outlawed and for no other good reason than the sentiment about it; not the science about it. Another thing. War should not be fought on your own soil or on the soil of an ally. If you want to have war, fight it on the enemy's soil. And that should be a basic tenet of strategy.

INTERVIEW WITH LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY S. AURAND

by

MAJOR WILLIAM O. MORRISON

THIS IS SIDE ONE, TAPE FOUR, IN A SERIES OF INTERVIEWS WITH LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY S. AURAND, THE DATE 23 APRIL 1974. THE INTERVIEW IS TAKING PLACE IN THE TRAILS END MOTEL IN ABILENE, KANSAS.

MAJOR MORRISON: Sir, I understand that you had quite a day before Christmas 1944. Would you give me the details?

GEN AURAND: Well, I'll try. Christmas day was on Monday and the day before Christmas, consequently was on Sunday, and on Friday evening I tried to plan a schedule for Saturday, Sunday and Monday. On Saturday, I'd inspect the prisoners working in Cherbourg area and Sunday I'd go to a chapel in the morning. I had a Staff and Command conference in the afternoon and we had planned a Christmas Eve party at the Chateau on Sunday evening. And then Monday I would go to the hospitals and at that time in Normandy we had, oh, over a dozen, fifteen hundred bed hospitals, finally got up to twenty-seven. And I would pin on purple hearts and I had all of the citations, General Lee had sent them down to me and suggested that I do it on Christmas Day which I thought was a fine idea. But Normandy was full of emergencies and you couldn't plan three days ahead, I found that out. Now on Sunday the chapel service was conducted by a brand new Protestant Chaplain who had finally arrived, and the attendance was very small but the commands hadn't realized that I would be at chapel every Sunday and set the example. By the next Sunday the place was full, the word got around. I had thought, however, that having a Chaplain, Protestant Chaplain, present on the day before Christmas might attract more people and it did. The

Chaplain was Raymond Blakney and I hope you will be asking questions which involve him later on. In the afternoon, the Command and Staff conference seemed to go on interminably. I don't know why but, of course, the Bulge was on and working the prisoners was new and there were many, many things that came up that had to be settled between the Staff and the District Commanders. And after the thing was over, I went back to my office and remembered that I had forgotten to put something on my schedule. It appears that on Friday, I guess it was or maybe it was Thursday, Ike had called me up and said that he had just received a commuted sentence on a prisoner that had been in a separate old time French fortress on the bluff at Cherbourg and he was the only fellow in prison there and we expended four or five MP's guarding him. But he had been accused of murder and rape and I believe that I should state the circumstances first. He was with Red Irwin's 5th Division, Red also being a West Point classmate, and they had held the hinge at Avaranche to let the breakthrough take place along the western coast of the Normandy peninsula, when this particular outfit had been hit by the misplaced bombing, which had killed General McNair among other people, and by the time they got the hinge opened far enough there were no officers in this fellows company, he was a platoon sergeant and he couldn't find any of the rest of his company, he had his platoon pretty well in hand, and so he stayed there three days and nights resisting constant attack, and undoubtedly would have been given the battlefield commission, at least that's what Red told me after the war. They were relieved after the third day, in fact, the Germans fell back, and the relief outfit just followed them, and as he was taking his platoon

back, he was told to go back to Avaranche and they were to be rested in that area, I think they were going to rest them at Grandeville. And on the way back they came across the most pleasant chateau which hadn't been hurt at all by the warfare, and there was an old count and a young countess in that place, and they told their story and asked if they could sleep in the barn or the yard or something for the night. He only had a half dozen or so men, I mean there wasn't a very large outfit left. And so they fed them some of the best champagne from the cellar that there ever was and after he got tight he killed the Count and raped the Countess. Of course, he was tried and like all court-martials, this was before I took over, like all court-martials, the court always had the reviewing authority to exercise clemency. It was up to them to go the limit and so they sentenced him to be hung by the neck until dead. And that's the reason that he was put into this separate place. I presume it was anyway. Well, all of the death sentences had to be approved by the President at his order and it took a long while to get -- you know the records back and be approved and what not and when this came back, his sentence had been set at ten years and the DD (Dishonorable Discharge), and Ike told me about this. . .the paper hadn't gotten to me yet, he said it was actually on the way at that moment by officer messenger, and that Ike had talked to Red Irwin and if I would give him a suspended sentence because he was then. . .when that sentence came to me I would have court-martial jurisdiction, Red wanted him back. So he said I should call Red. So after some difficulty I got hold of Red Irwin in the 5th Division. And Red said sure he wanted

him back and if I was going to send him back, please send a new jeep. Well, we got a tailor up there and completely outfitted him in a new uniform with his sergeants stripes and everything else and he was amazed to find the tailor measured him fully, I later heard. When he reported to Red, he told the story of what had happened to him in Normandy and this is what I heard from Red and he also said the MP's came and got him on Sunday afternoon and they had three MP's and an MP officer, and one of them was handcuffed on either side of him, he was handcuffed to two MP's and all three of them rode in the back seat and the other MP was the driver and then the officer. And they went to the MP headquarters in Cherbourg and they waited upstairs, they didn't know what they were waiting for or anything. Well, I came in with my judge advocate and the judge advocate came up and got the guy and he said, "You must remember these things. You do not salute, you're a prisoner. You will stand directly in front of the desk and will not report to the General who would be behind the desk. I will salute and report us both. You will not speak unless you are spoken to, you understand?" Yes, he understood. So they came in and I said to the sergeant, "Your sentence has just come to my hand and it has been commuted to ten years imprisonment and a dishonorable discharge. I'm not your reviewing authority and you are under my court-martial jurisdiction and I have the power to give you a suspended sentence, but before you make any choice I want to tell you that anything you do whatever that is out of line will immediately put that sentence into effect. Do you want to work under these circumstances?" I said, "If you do, I will send you

back to the 5th Division and have you report directly to the Division Commander." And the fellow choked up and he could hardly say anything and finally he said, "Yes sir, I'll take the suspended sentence." So I said, "Very well, here are your orders. There is a brand new jeep outside, all your gear, all new gear for you in there, all your personal possessions that were taken from you are in the jeep and you will drive this jeep to the 5th Division Headquarters. An MP car of mine will accompany you as far as Charte and then a 5th Division MP will pick you up and take you directly to General Irwin." And he said, "Yes sir." And I said, "You may salute me now sergeant and get on your way. I'm sure you'll have a Merry Christmas." Well, I went back to headquarters all filled with the joy of a nice Christmas present for the guy and everything was upset.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, before you go on, the other men that were with the sergeant, were they involved?

GEN AURAND: No, the worst part of that was that they were so amazed by what this fellow had done, that they, you know, nabbed him. As a matter of fact, they were not in the place where either the shooting or the rape took place. They heard it and came on in the room but both acts had been accomplished by the time they got there but the evidence that he had done it was pure and simple. And they grabbed him and really tied him up because they were afraid of him by then, he was still I guess pretty stormy drunk, and they took him back to Avaranche right away that night and turned him in and of course they were the witnesses against him and they were the. . .I read the proceedings and they were the most unwilling witnesses that I've ever heard but they

felt that this had to be told. They were very good soldiers as far as I could tell from the record, the whole gang, the whole outfit, I guess there was, . . .I believe there were five men and the sergeant, I believe there was only six of them left, my memory is rather dim. Shall I go on now?

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir, please.

GEN AURAND: Well, I got back to headquarters and found things more or less in a turmoil which was the usual state when there was an emergency. And Elder grabbed me and he said, "There's been a troop ship sunk just off the port maybe a mile and a half, two miles off the breakwater." I said, "A troop ship, we don't get any troop ships in here." He said, "That's what you think, I didn't think so either." He said, "I called the Captain of the port and he said yes, he knew there was a troop ship coming in. Maybe I better explain Captain of the port?

MAJ MORRISON: Please.

GEN AURAND: Well, the naval organization for the channel was. . .the British controlled it from the headquarters in Portsmouth where there was a British Admiral. Then at Le Havre, where most of the troop ships came in, there was an American Admiral, and he had a Captain under him who was called Captain of the port at Cherbourg. And they controlled most of the ship movement, outside after they got out of the breakwater. And they knew all about where the ships were but they wouldn't tell us and the idea was that this thing had to be kept entirely secret because of the submarine danger. So that's why we didn't know and the Captain of the port knew. Elder told me that everything had been taken care of that could be and this is what he reported as having done. He notified, of course, the port commander right away and they got all of the small boat crews that

they could find, because this being Christmas Eve, it was already dark, this being Christmas Eve, why the fellows off duty were all over the town of Cherbourg and most of the small boat crews were off duty at this time because they worked mostly in the daytime anyway. So we rounded up all they could and as fast as more came they sent these people out and how they ever survived I'll never know. One hell of a gale was blowing, about fifty knots which is about as high as you can get a gale without it being a hurricane, I understand, and raining horizontally. The temperature outside was around 35 and the water temperature must have been freezing or very close to it. And the darkness was so thick you could cut it. But these fellows went out and aided in the rescue. The Navy had a couple of patrol boats that were much more serviceable for this purpose than harbor craft and they were out. And I'll never know what happened to the thing but the whole fantail was blown off this transport and consequently it couldn't make way. It's steering gear and everything else was broken and it lost a great many of the men in that part of the ship. Even in all that wind and rain there were a lot of people on deck waiting to get to shore and I imagine that most of them were seasick from the way the channel looked. Well, there was nothing for me to do. One particularly fine fellow, Colonel Phillips, who was my deputy surgeon, we still correspond. He's an old friend and that, and he lives in Loveland, Texas. And he had done the thing that had to be done. They got all of the people that they could possibly move out of the. . .we had one general hospital and one station hospital nearby and everybody that was ambulatory or even could be moved without harm to them in an ambulance was sent on

back in ambulances to the hospitals in the next echelon back maybe ten or twelve miles back, was the longest journey and then he called those hospitals to send all their ambulances up right away and when the ambulances from these hospitals near Cherbourg got back and delivered their patients, they came back too. So we had ambulances from let's say, three and a half hospitals, a station hospital, I think consists of five hundred beds but there were four 1500 bed hospitals. . .and so everything. . .they brought the doctors from these hospitals in the ambulances when they came back. So every means that we had that I could think of had been utilized and properly utilized for this rescue. Then I went down to the small boat basin and there was the Captain of the port and I said, "I'm leaving to you the choice,. . .putting you in charge of my small craft because I don't want to loose any and I can't tell whether they should go out or not." "Oh," he said, "It's a toss-up." Incidentally he was a 1914 Navy man whom I had met in Hampton Roads in 1915. He remembered me because he had come to the Army-Navy club at Fort Monroe. I didn't remember him. And a most helpful guy. He had gotten out of the Navy and came back in as a Captain and was very happy to get overseas and so on and so forth and he knew he couldn't go to sea again, not technically qualified anymore. And we watched this thing for three or four hours and it was the most depressing thing you ever saw. Well, the Captain of the port finally said my crewmen had to come in. They had been three hours out in this cold and they were all soaking wet and there was ice forming on their clothes. And so we gradually got them all in and all accounted for and we went with them all through the hospital line to make sure that they were alright. Some of them they kept that night. We didn't have any loss of our crewman. But there were 762 of the 2236 men

aboard who were lost. About a month later the Navy Captain and I got the same investigating report on the sinking and it was quite uncomplimentary to our efforts. It didn't say what we should have done and I was so mad about this, I was really put out about it because I thought we had done a magnificent job that I didn't go back to SHAPE with it. What was the use. There was a war on and we weren't going to talk about yesterday. And I might say that this happened to me once more and I guess we'll get to that.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, did you make it to the hospitals on Christmas Day?

GEN AURAND: Well, after a fashion. Of course, we had no Christmas Eve party. And by the time I got back to the Chateau it was three or four o'clock in the morning because after I left the small boat basin, I went to the hospitals where they had taken the people who had come off the ship and also the crewmen. And I found that the fellows that could, you know, show that they were alive and didn't have anything particularly wrong with them and had gotten warm and clothes in the hospitals. That was another thing, the quartermaster saw to it that the hospitals had change of clothing for all these people. They were sent out among our own troops and as I said there were some old French barracks there and our MP's and all our Port outfits and what not that were right there in town, use those. And there was plenty of space to double bunk and all. Well, those people gave up their bunks and slept on the mess hall tables and what not for the night and all of them had had a Christmas party and there were Christmas trees in the mess hall. They got out chow and hot coffee and treated these fellows beautifully when they came ashore, so by the time I got back to the Chateau it was three or four in the morning. Well, there was no use starting out on this visit to the hospitals until the hospitals had

gone through their morning routine which was usually finished about eight o'clock, so I left the Chateau about seven and went to the fartherest hospital and I was hardly on the way until an MP stopped me and said, "Look the Chief of Staff wants to talk to you." Well, the second transport had come in and the brigade commander, a brigade commander and the Chief of Staff of this division that was coming into Cherbourg were on board and they wanted to see me immediately. Well, they had landed and gone to some hospital, of course they didn't know what had happened until they got to Cherbourg, and they had gone to some of the hospitals and they came in and raised hell with me because officers and enlisted men were being treated alike in the hospital. And because in some of these places where the men had to be sent, like in the Port battalion, they had been sent in with black troops to sleep in black troops beds and so on. Well, the list of complaints you know would fill a binder.

MAJ MORRISON: They sound trivial.

GEN AURAND: Well, I thought so. After what I had been through the night before. And they said the division commander would be in, he was flying over and that he was going directly to Paris and they would inform him of how their men had been treated and so forth. And I said, "Okay, now what do you want." And it took me all morning to satisfy them that their men were getting the treatment they should get. We even built a camp now that sounds almost impossible but we had collapsible buildings that had been used for office buildings when COMZ first moved over there and those were still standing around empty and we knocked them down and put up a regimental camp, a camp that would hold 2500 men at least. And these people then by this

time had their own camp. So then I got to the hospital about one in the afternoon and I never did finish on Sunday. I had to go back out on Monday and, I mean, I never finished on Monday, I had to go back on Tuesday and finish up.

MAJ MORRISON: During your War College years, you came to certain conclusions about inter-Allied command structure in World War II?

GEN AURAND: Well, at the War College I concluded that I, that Pershing had the correct solution, that in an allied effort each nation should have a national commander for all of it's armed forces in the theater, and that no national commander, no such national commander should also be the inter-Allied commander. That the way Foch did it in World War I was the way to do it. He had a very small staff. He had nothing to do with the operation of the Army below the national commander, that was his lowest contact. He had an international staff who got their dope from the national staff of the nation to which they belong. And this to me was the ideal setup. Of course, in ETOUSA, Ike was both the national commander and the international commander and I believe that that made for a lot of confusion. Because you never knew when a COMZ guy like Saylor the Ordnance officer was putting on his ETOUSA hat or his COMZ hat and that made a difference. And if he put on his ETOUSA hat he was by-passing himself. However, there . . .when you. . .there was a strange thing in Europe, both Montgomery and Devers who commanded Army groups, had international commands. After the Bulge the 9th Army, Simpson's Army, belonged to Montgomery and of course Devers Army group consisted of Patch's Army. I've forgotten the number of it, and the French Army. So this was splitting the thing down pretty far. In my opinion they should have put it in the French with the British and

left the two American Army groups have all American Divisions.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what did you do to improve the morale of your men?

GEN AURAND: Well, I've already told you about the recommendations of General Benjamin Davis for improving the conditions under which the black soldiers lived and, of course, we did the same thing for the white soldiers. Again, no adjective before the word soldier, they got the same treatment. I think that the removal of the curfew was one of the greatest factors that I exercised, and also the ending of the blackout which had been done before my time. Then there were a lot of minor restrictions that some of these people like you have a. . .as I told you, I think, you'd have a general service regiment of engineers strewn out over forty or fifty miles of road in little battalion camps and maybe company camps on the way. Well, passes and what not for these people so that they did get into town once in awhile. Also, these people setup minor restrictions to beat the band and I finally got some Command conference and maybe when I visited the company, I said I give you direct orders, "You will not put out an order or put up a sign that has the word 'no' in it." Like, "No trespassing" or "Keep off the grass" or anything like this. Little tiny things that bothered the sam hill out of people. What difference did it make. At Camp Huckstep I did this in Egypt later on and the camp commander had a beautiful grassy parade ground out in the desert. How he got it to grow, I don't know. He had been there several years. But it was wonderful, and he had "Keep off the grass" all around it. Well, the barracks were on one side of the parade and the office was, his office was on the other and everybody had to walk all the way around. And I said, "take all those signs down." And he said, "Well they'll start

walking across." And I said, "Alright fine. When they get a good track in there, put in a tar walk, right straight through the parade ground. Then your grass will be green and your walk will be clean and everything will be alright." Those were the kind of restrictions that I tried to get rid of. Now,I also visited every company, I talked to the soldiers informally, usually in the mess hall because it was so wet and rainy anywhere else or in the rec room. And I gave them all the news I had and what effected them personally. I also repeated that in China. The company commander was held responsible for the morale of his men, just like the VD raid and the rape raid and I told each company commander that he had direct access to me by telephone or any other way when he needed any help in these specific jobs which were his and he alone could do. If he wanted orders changed about anything that came out of my headquarters, call me direct, I'd see that it got back through channels. I wanted these company commanders to feel that my door was open. And I got a few calls, it wasn't words wasted.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, did you have any problem getting your people promoted?

GEN AURAND: Oh, terrible. I may get started on this on a long answer. I'll try to keep it short. A unit like an ordnance maintenance company, which has all kinds of machine tools and all kinds of machinists, never fit the job they go to work on. Most of these companies were divided up by their specialities. You had people to do work on small arms unit, a heavy company was to work on heavy artillery, you had an automotive maintenance company to work on trucks and so on. But even then, the skills never matched the particular job. When we wanted additional skills we got soldiers added to our overhead, our bulk allotment, they called it. And we had many of

these people in order to get the specialities you needed, particularly signal corps technicians because we were handling the cable communications with England there and had to have many peculiar specialists. These people in the bulk allotment never got promoted because there was no grade assignment like there is in the table of organization. The TO units got their own vacancies which made for very unequal promotions between, let's say, two general service regiments for that matter and the other people were left out in the cold. Now that went to a great extent for officers also. The people in my headquarters never got promoted, it was just impossible. And I had Elder and Caffey in for a star from almost the day I got there until finally General Lee told me one time when he was inspecting, "Don't send me anymore recommenations on Elder and Caffey. I know about them and I can tell you this positively there will be no more general officers made in the COMZ." And this was the attitude at SHAEF. The G-1 at SHAEF was handling this, not the G-1 at COMZ. And they were all so afraid that their area soldiers would go faster than the fellows in the front and the fellows in the front were getting vacancies all the time from a very sad source but their promotions were four or five times as fast as the rear area. In fact promotions went like this also in China and France. They promoted all the guys who could reasonably be called combat people, by first and then they promoted theater headquarters people next and then COMZ people. They never got to the COMZ people, the war ended. I spoke of promotion to BG, the promotion from lieutenant colonel to colonel went through procedure which was General Lee's own. First of all, I had to inspect the command or the staff section or what not that this lieutenant colonel was actually operating at the time. Then I had to have a personal interview with him,

then I had to write a report on both the inspection and the interview and send that to General Lee of my recommendation for promotion to colonel. Then he would come down on the next trip to Cherbourg, he would do the same inspecting and interviewing. Well I had two lieutenant colonels for hospital commanders which was T.O. colonel spoke and I also had my judge advocate and all the base sections judge advocate's but Berry, I think was his name, were colonels. He was a lieutenant colonel. And we had all the work. Those southern base sections sent their cases back to Normandy to be tried and all that. Practically all the prisoners in my guard house were either combat people or from other base sections. The thing that Lee based his promotion of a judge advocate on was the length of time between the time the guy came into custody and the time he was sentenced or acquitted. And our time was running about 250 days. Why? Because we couldn't get these combat people to send evidence back or witnesses or anything else. They wouldn't send anybody back. It was terribly hard. We had to do it by deposition and JA's up front couldn't find the guys and all this. I thought Berry was doing a tremendous job and Lee said, "When you get that down to 90 days, I'll promote you." From 250 to 90 days. Impossible. So he turned down all three of these people, and that had a very odd effect. The whole command knew this. They knew Lee was there, they knew that these people were inspected and they knew that they didn't get the promotions. And their confidence in me dropped to beat hell. I had no influence with Lee. I wasn't an advocate for them sufficiently as an advocate. I had a hard time living this down. It certainly hurt my morale, you can see that. All three of these people eventually got their

eagles, but it was too late to rescue my plight.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, when certain items in the PX became scarce, how would you handle them?

GEN AURAND: Well, there were two irritations imposed on the men of the U.S. Army in France. The first was that they were paid in invasion currency. And I think somebody should have started a suit in Civil Court in the United States on behalf of the whole mass of soldiery, people in the military, requiring that they be paid in U.S. currency. Fortunately, when I got to China I found that they were paid in U.S. currency. But that was one of the greatest morale killers that I know of, this invasion currency. Also, they couldn't translate it into dollars if they were going home, this was impossible, except at the standard rate and the black market rate was four or five times that. And it was just a gyp all the way through, the government gyped the men in France. And I say this time and again with emphasis and it should never happen again. A soldier should be paid in U.S. currency and nothing else. The second thing was this rationing of stuff in the PX's. You could have one chocolate bar a week or something like that. To me this is entirely cockeyed. Of course the principle Post Exchange stockage was in Normandy. Now I can tell you a fabulous story about that right now. . .

MAJ MORRISON: Please do.

GEN AURAND: The Armies used to want to be sure that they got their share and I was very glad to issue it as I should, but they couldn't send enough trucks back to take this stuff up. So, they would arrange and I would help them to get a railroad train that would go to one Army at a certain

destination with all the PX supplies perhaps for a couple of weeks or maybe a month for that Army. And this particular train consisted of an engine in front, an eingine in the middle and an engine in the back and about forty French boxcars, "40 and 8" in all on either side of the middle engine, all filled with PX supplies. Now that's a lot of PX supplies. And they had two French passenger cars: one behind the back engine so that it wouldn't be pushed. And they had a platoon, a company of MP's from the Army, I don't know which Army it was, split but it was two platoons of a company, a platoon in the front car and a platoon in the back. And whenever the train would stop these fellows would deploy up and down to prevent stealing by the French or anybody else. That train cleared Caen going toward Paris and not a car, not an engine or a man was ever seen again.

MAJ MORRISON: Disappeared?

GEN AURAND: Disappeared. Completely. When I left Europe on VE Day they hadn't found it after several months. They went into the black market and everybody lived happily ever after. But what the sam hill they did with the cars and engines, I haven't. . .they couldn't be found. The railroad looked for them -- we flew cubs over the place along the railroad tracks, no signs of them.

MAJ MORRISON: No signs of soldiers?

GEN AURAND: No. They just disappeared into the population, rich men. Now I'll go with the. . .what I would do with this ration stuff. When an item got so that it couldn't be sold to anybody that came in or you know, no more than five to a person or something like this was a good limit but not one a week. That kind of rationing is what I'm talking about. I would issue it with the eating rations for free. If you couldn't . . .if you had

to ration it in the store, put it into the food rations and when he went by the chow line and this was available, every guy would get the rationed amount. Now this would create a lot of bartering around in the outfit it would be a thing to joke about and it would be good for morale, this would be the day they got their chocolate bar and a lot of kidding about it. Well, whereas everybody got madder than hell about the rationing. I will give you another odd incident, just to doubly point this out. Cigars were rationed, but they were rationed by the box. Well, no soldier bought a box of cigars, so a bunch of them would go together and get a box. Now they were used to smoking the, what Vice President Marshall once called a good five-cent cigar and the United States had bought almost the entire, I mean the military services had bought almost the entire production of a very fine Cuban tobacco which these people had not only never heard of before but didn't like when they tried to smoke them. So we took those brands off rationing . I did it myself. I said put a note on, I had my PX officer put a note on. "This brand of cigars no longer rationed." And we got word up front, "Take this stuff back, we can't sell it." Just to show you how stupid rationing is. They were rationing stuff they couldn't sell.

MAJ MORRISON: Did you make any special effort to keep your troops informed?

GEN AURAND: I made very special efforts to keep the troops informed and I think I've already told you in the morale question that I visited them and talked to them by the company size groups. I believe that was the best way to keep them informed but there was always the command channel that started with the Command and Staff conference. And I always started

those conferences with the statement of what they could pass on to their troops. And I found that it wasn't being done, in a very odd way. So every time I would go out I'd put down. . .take my remarks from the last Command and Staff conference along and I said,"Now, folks your Company Commander told you this." "Oh, no sir."

MAJ MORRISON: Was this the odd way that you found out?

GEN AURAND: Yeah. So I'd go find a battalion commander or whoever the next highest boss was and, "Did you get this from your depot commander or what not?" "No, no, I never heard of it." Well, I'd go to him. "No sir, I've never been told about it." So I go to the guy that was at the conference, I said, "Did you pass this along?" "Why yes, I thought I passed that along." I said, "Look you and the next guy get together now. I'm going to talk to you together." And I knew where the break was. And they would come in. The word they called this, I found out, the aide finds out things for you, they called it the"Chain of Command meeting." Where did the chain break? Boy, after that happened two or three times and got around the command there was no more breaks. I was sure the information was getting down. I didn't do anything to them about it, but I sure embarassed the hell out of the guy who broke the chain. That was all. That was the second way of getting information. Now the third way was of course by rumor. And rumors spread faster than anything. And while I never deliberately spread rumors, I would stand around after in the lobby of a place or even at the, you know, where I had been sitting after these command conferences. I always had the commanders come to the podium after the meeting separately. Sometimes I had them to dinner. It gave us a lot more time to talk and they would take back things that I said that they thought would make good rumors. And a lot of

stuff got out, it was always usually wrong. I found by this same trick I would find that they would have heard things that were not quite so. But things that were in the works and they would ask about those things. So I knew that the rumor route was very good. It was far better in China though than it was in France. I would like to add several things to this information question. Information, of course, was one of the best ways I know of to maintain morale. But there were other things on this which I would like to remark about. Johnny Lee got the idea somewhere that he had been told that the troops in COMZ should live no better than the combat people when they were on the front lines. To me this was entirely absurd. I was getting twelve hours on and twelve hours off, seven days a week out of these men and this is hard because a great deal of it was hard physical work under terrible conditions. So I just turned the thing around and said that you are going to get the best living conditions that the country can afford. I'm not going to take billeting on French families or anything of this kind but we are going to fix ourselves up. And some places that these men were living were unbelievable, I mean I don't see how any morale was left at all. Worst case was a rehabilitation center of all places where you'd think you would try to get your people, you know, on the up and up, they were living in pup tents in all this mire and mud, two men to a pup tent. They had no desire to get rehabilitated. That was one of the things and the other was the recreation facilities. I insisted that every camp that was company size or larger would have one of these knock-down buildings as a recreation hall. And sometimes in the tent camp you'd have three buildings; a mess hall, a rec hall and a bath house. And they had hot water in the bath houses. Those things seem to be

fundamental things for a company.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what caused the variation of COMZ's organization form taught between wars?

GEN AURAND: Well, I'm not at all sure what caused it but Lee was in England early and, of course, was receiving supplies and issuing them in England before the training time. And he had the idea that these people who were doing that in England would repeat the same functions again on the continent. However, he based this on the ports rather than as the book on sections. And he used the book's terminology and called them base sections and he must have had oh, eight or nine England, I don't know, but in that order of magnitude. Whereas, the book says you have to have three or you might have more than one advance section but only one intermediate and one base. This concept he threw out the window and then when we got to the continent, he again started this base section business and he had five or six base sections actually only one intermediate although I would have called them two intermediates because one was the district of Paris, it was really a grand headquarters commandante affair but it also forwarded supplies to the front. And one advance section where he was with the book. The place where he should have more than one, he only had one and the place where he should have only one, he had four or five. If I were King I would have done this thing differently and this is in more or less accordance with the book. And just to make clear what I mean by the book, I'd like to run through how I would have handled it in England and France.

MAJ MORRISON: Please do, sir.

GEN AURAND: I would have one base section in England. And that base section would have had districts, just as I had when Normandy was enlarged

I got split into districts. It had two districts when I took it over. Those districts would have included one, or two, or three ports, depending on how close together the ports were geographically again. I would have had also working in under this base section an outfit that would be called the advance section and I would have used these . . .put these people at the issue depots. It would have had nothing to do with the ports in other words. They would be operating depots and shops and doing the issue to troops. The intermediate section would have been taken. . .would have taken care in England of all the stuff that we were going to ship to France as distinguished from the stuff we were going to issue in England, you see ADSEC would take the stuff to be issued in England, intermediate section would store the stuff that was going to go to France. Then when the Army had pushed forward enough so that if they wanted the ADSEC to come over, I would have put the advance section right behind them. When the breakout occurred I would have brought the base section over and plunked it right down on top of the advance section for a takeover for a couple of weeks and then send ADSEC right, mobile as the Armies were, as the Army group was, after, when that distance increased enough, I would have brought the intermediate section over and leapfrogged it right into the intermediate spot. Then I would have had the base section have branch depots, no general depots on the base section for this reason; that I would have had the base section depot, one base section depot keep all the records that they were keeping in COMZ headquarters of stocks in COMZ and they would have called on the port of New York. And you remember I said that this was not according to the book when I talked about the change between corps area and the Service Command earlier.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

GEN AURAND: Well, I would have done it just like the service commands did it in the United States. The base section depot being the post and the port being the arsenal, the port of the United States being the arsenal. Now actually the United States side of it was worked that way. Both Europe and China, including India-Burma were based on PEMBARK, that's the port of New York. So that the base depot in France would have dealt directly with the port of New York and all of that trouble would have been out of Paris. It would have been down where there would have been warehousemen and people who knew what the stuff looked like, and so on and that would have been according to the book except for the direct requisition which I think was a good change for the book . I don't object to changes in the book, so long as the integrity of the book isn't violated.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, from your reference to General Lee, how would you describe him?

GEN AURAND: Well, I had met General Lee several times for brief periods of time before my arrival in France. And then I heard stories about what he had done while he was in England from, of course, my Normandy base section staff. And he did things for the rear area soldier that I think were most necessary to be done. Let's start out by saying that he was a very religious man. He later headed a national Episcopal order after he retired. Also, he believed that cleanliness was next to Godliness, very firmly. He went to extremes to make sure that this point was made and I believe that this helped greatly to maintain the morale in the rear area because the way to get sloppy was to get wet in the rain and then come home go to bed and just keep the wet clothes on and go out tomorrow. That was the easiest way.

But he made sure that there were plenty of clothes and had dry clothes, almost like Ben Davis talked to me when he came out to see about the black soldiers in Normandy. And he certainly was a man who believed in the old saying "waste not - want not." You recall the famous cafeteria in Grosvenor Square, I think they called it Willow Run. . .

MAJ MORRISON: I'm not familiar with it.

GEN AURAND: Well, you wouldn't be. If you went in you could have anything you wanted to eat, but there was no garbage can, none. Everything you put on your plate you had to eat. Some fellows tried to stick it in their pockets and got caught. They couldn't eat there anymore, that was the penalty. Of course, there were other places but this was a great place. Open twenty-four hours a day and always a line. That indicates those characteristics and of course when he took me to NBS and to see the way he inspected, these were the things I observed because they were unique to me, not doing them was unique but the way he did them was unique. He was so positive about these things and I was glad I had a chance to see him inspect somebody else before the first time he hit me. His command conferences which were bi-weekly were very necessary but they were staged, nobody dared to ask a question and nobody dared make a or say a discouraging word. Everything was sweetness and light. We got practically nothing out of them because what we were after were the troubles and how we could get rid of them when he never heard about any troubles. But the base section commanders had dinner with him and the night before. . .and Roy Lord would be there and I think I told you about that when we put the prisoners to work. And we could speak up then, discouraging words. But I loved his conferences

but I think he only got half of the good out of them because he kept them on a sweetness and light level. And of course, have I told the Deauville story. Have you asked me about that?

MAJ MORRISON: No, sir.

GEN AURAND: Well, when I come to that I did not ask him whether I could move my headquarters to Deauville because the answer would have been no. People up front won't like it.

MAJ MORRISON: This series of tapes is a continuation of General Aurand's service in France. The date is changed and the place is changed. It's now 3 May 1974 and we are in Leavenworth, Kansas in my apartment at 634 F 13th Street, Terrace. . .Sir, were additions of area and activity made to the Normandy base section?

GEN AURAND: Beginning 1 February 1945, NBS was increased in size by various partitions of territory and also by additions of activity. The British had reduced the size of their enclave and most of the provinces of Eure and Eure-et-Loir would come under NBS. The southern part of Channel Base Section which was just north of NBS was turned over to NBS so the Channel Base Section could devote all its' time to the development of Antwerp. On 10 February 1945, the two base sections with headquarters at Rennes and LeMans were turned over to NBS as districts. Later, these base sections together with the base section whose headquarters was at Chartres were organized as a single district of NBS and which was known as the southern district. In the meantime the Utah district and Omaha district of the original NBS were consolidated into the beach district. Caffey at long last commanded the original area of Normandy base section as commander of the beach district. The area north of the same became the northern district

of NBS with headquarters at Rouen. Beach district would soon move its' headquarters to Chateau Chantilly near St. Mere Eglise. The move of NBS headquarters out of Cherbourg and beach district headquarters out of Cherbourg left the port commander at last with nobody looking over his shoulder which I considered a great help.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, in addition to changes that you just mentioned what other changes did these additions make in your command organization?

GEN AURAND: My first decree about the consolidation was that there would be no increase in the NBS staff. Additional work would be pushed into the district headquarters where it belonged. NBS had acquired the work of at least one and a half additional Normandy base sections, so that it now had 2½ times the previous amount of work. Together the two new districts would take one half of this increase and the new beach district the other one-half. Staff to come from within each district. The second decree was that I would. . .that I would hold district command the staff conferences at Rennes and LeHavre as soon as possible. The district commanders would hold similar ones shortly after each NBS command and staff conference. After I held these conferences I would visit each company unit within these new districts which I had not yet visited. After my control officer arrived he made the strength report as of 14 February 1945 and this is what he said and I quote, "To begin with, assigned and attached to NBS are a 120,246 people belonging to the U.S. Army. Only a little over five percent of these are officers. There are 131,531 U.S. Army personnel who are your hotel guests in the staging areas. In addition, there are 12,567 members of the U.S. Army in your hospitals. These figures total 264,834.

Besides the Americans you have 181,172 prisoners of war either working or in central enclosures. 5,359 are in hospitals, total 196,511. We haven't received a firm figure for working prisoners but it is over 80,000. Civilian employees have reached 20,000. General, I present your command, a working force well over 220,000, at total strength in the command of well over 480,000." And I would like to add there parenthetically, that on the basis of ration strength which you might call this, a COMZ base section is comparable to a field army and COMZ was comparable to an Army group and one of my districts was comparable to a Corps.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, you mentioned your control officer and you had one in Chicago. How did you go about setting the one up in NBS?

GEN AURAND: I believe that I've already said that very shortly after my arrival in NBS I designated the Plans Officer as Plans and Control Officer. That I was unable to get my idea of what the control officer did to any of my staff let alone a particular individual. So, I sent for Major George Watkins, one of the control division officers in Headquarters 6th Service Command. He was a long time in coming. His story of this misadventure is many pages long. It involved boarding the plane for Europe with a sealed envelope which was supposed to contain his orders but there were no orders in it. Instead of Paris, the plane went to Prestwick, Scotland. He made friends with an aviator who got him to London and found lodgings for him for one night only. Desperately he finally ran across the headquarters of the UK base section of COMZ. To his surprise the Chief of Staff was a different Colonel Elder, who happened to have been an instructor of his when he took the short course at Leavenworth. One Elder talked to the other Elder and Watkins a control officer to be, was

sent on a troop ship to Le Havre. He was found to be the senior officer present,but that earned him nothing when he went ashore. Laden with his baggage, he was marched in a long single file of replacements toward the replacement depot. He managed to slip out of the file, down an alley, commandeered a jeep and got to port headquarters. He finally got to see the port commander who started him to Cherbourg in a jeep. He was much, much moved by the destruction he drove through and utterly amazed at the stateside dress of my staff and of myself when he finally arrived at my Chateau. Because of this method of entry into ETOUSA he was never picked up which gave me some difficulty later.

MAJ MORRISON: In February of 1945, you moved the headquarters of NBS from Cherbourg to Deauville. What were the circumstances?

GEN AURAND: On 1 February NBS had taken over the southern half of its northern neighbor Channel Base Section as I told you. Most of the activities required were north of the Seine. They constituted most of those in the Channel Base Section except for Antwerp which was now taking up all of Channel Base Section's time. And the trip from Cherbourg to Rouen was long. And the additional load on my staff was increased by the time of traveling. Also, for sometime I realized that both Caffey, the District Commander and I had been looking over the port commanders shoulder as I just said. Both of us should get our headquarters out of Cherbourg. Finally at lunch one day with the Prefect of Calvados he expressed the hope that the U.S. Army would take over the Deauville hotels. Otherwise the French government might put displaced persons in them. He thought the U.S. Army might be persuaded to go home but the displaced persons had no home to go home to. To cap it all off,my newly arrived control officer Major Watkins

from the Sixth Service Command had organized a cabal staff officer. He pointed out to me all of what I have just said, adding that we already had authority to do this on our own under the directive to give the French the greatest possible opportunity for reverse Lend-Lease. So I ordered the move to be made. The headquarters opening at Deauville on Lincoln's Birthday and closing at Cherbourg on Washington's Birthday.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, did the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, ever visit your command?

GEN AURAND: Fortunately, yes. I was called a couple of days in advance by his military secretary. Ike would come by train to Cherbourg and first inspect in that area. Then he'd go by train to Le Havre and inspect in that area. He would have a cocktail party for the local dignitaries on the train at Le Havre and then return to Paris. His football knee had been bothering him and the other knee was sore from favoring the football knee. No walking. The trip was to be kept TOP SECRET. I suggested that the train leave him off at Rouen and pick him up at Le Havre, because he could go through the entire staging area and more readily by making the trip from Rouen to Le Havre and going to Le Havre out and back again. That was okay. I presumed that he would have breakfast and dinner aboard his train both days.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes. How about lunch?

GEN AURAND: Nothing fancy. He would prefer to go in a chow line at a soldiers mess. Okay at Cherbourg but he should mess with the division commanders staging through Lucky Strike. Okay. The train will arrive at Cherbourg about 6:30 A.M. I got Caffey and Elder together and told them about the visit and then I had to phone Phillips, the northern district Commander. Caffey, Elder and I spent the night before Ike's arrival at the

VIP Hotel in Cherbourg. I might add that I very seldom stayed there because everything was so swank you couldn't find anything and also the. . . there was absolutely no company. I usually stayed downtown and it was up on the bluff with a wonderful view and I usually stayed downtown at the visiting officers hotel, much more company there. When we got to the station the morning of his arrival, there was a crowd awaiting the train. At first I thought someone had been listening to my conversation with Phillips, but the Chef de Gare told me that he had received the news yesterday through the French railroad office. Of course, he had invited the Mayor and other officials to meet Ike. Ike had me join him for breakfast after the train arrived and when I told him about the crowd outside and of the officials, he told me to put them in the rear car of the train where he would talk with them. They came aboard. Soon Ike came in and there was the most happy conversation. Ike kept it going because it was still dark outside and it was raining as usual. Finally, Ike's British military secretary who had phoned me in the first place, asked them to excuse the General as he had to prepare for the inspection. As soon as it was light enough to see, we got into sedans. Ike informed me that he didn't want to see things, he wanted to see soldiers, American soldiers. I told him he might as well get back on the train because all the American soldiers he would see would be the. . .those guarding and working German prisoners of war. He didn't want to see any Germans, either. But let's go ahead. I remembered a place where only American soldiers were working. They were unloading barges of ammunition on to flat cars, so we started there. There was a hospital nearby and nothing but Americans there. There was also a truck company nearby where he took his place in the chow line and I never saw

a more surprised guy dishing out chow than when he saw that five stars on a circle come down the line. And finally a barracks full of off-duty stevedores, all Americans. This ended the Cherbourg tour. I saw Ike to his train and reported that I would see him at Rouen the next morning. Aren't you coming on the train? I said, I hadn't been invited. Well, you are now. The train leaves. . .well my bag was brought from the VIP hotel and after dinner he took me into the last car and only the two of us were present. He did the asking and I did the answering. This is an unusual situation because Ike usually did the talking and every now and then he would stop and say "what do you think of that?" This time he was just questioning, there was no introduction of his own opinion. We were up until way late. When I got to my bedroom I wrote down everything that had been said. I did so in order to put it into a report to General Lee. I didn't believe in short circuiting any intermediate commander, particularly my own and I wasn't going to do it to myself. Inspecting the staging division and the other combat troops the next day was a real pleasure for Ike. There were some sour notes, however. We found a tank destroyer battalion in a mess with no officers present. I explained that this was one of the questions he had raised with me last night. The 15th Army commanded these troops. Neither I nor my camp commander had any authority over them whatever. The camp commander was a hotel keeper. The first division we came to was one in which Ike's son was a member. But, John Eisenhower was in England completing machine gun training. The division commanders who started to stage through Lucky Strike were full of complaints most of which bounced off Ike with considerable wit. The lunch was fine and the units staging along the coast on the way to Le Havre were in pretty good shape

because I had persuaded Ike to lift the secrecy and notify the units a couple of hours in advance anyway that he was coming. When we got to Le Havre the road was blocked by replacements trans-shipping from the troop ship directly on to 40" x 8" boxcars. He would fall in beside a soldier, it was just a long single file and he would fall in beside a guy and walk down the trailway with him and talk with him and then he'd say so long and go back and get another guy. While this was going on the British military secretary became more and more worried and he finally turned to me and said, "The train is half full of this cocktail party and they are all waiting for him to come, please use your influence to get him over here to the train." So I joined Ike and a couple of sallies up the line and back and up the line and back and on the second or third trip, a soldier stepped out of line, grabbed Ike by the hand, shook it and said, quote, "I'm so glad you came here to meet me, I would have been disappointed if you hadn't come." Whereupon he fell back in line again and Ike yelled to me, "Get that fellow, I want to take him back to Paris on my train." But the usual soldier cover-up took place and I couldn't find him and he doesn't know what he missed. When the cocktail party was over I said goodbye to Ike and he remarked that I had a command that I should be very proud of. The news that Ike had been inspecting NBS travelled through my command like wild fire. The morale in NBS was never higher and I certainly let everybody know the remark that Ike had made to me. As a postscript I'll add that I immediately wrote a letter to General Lee describing the inspection and relating the conversation I had with Ike the night I was on the train with him.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, with the hundreds of thousands of German POW's in NBS, did you have difficulty with disorders in the camp?

GEN AURAND: We had some small difficulties in the ardent Nazi camps. But these disturbances gave us little trouble. I better say here in explanation, that we screened these people as we got them when we could. Sometimes we just had to throw in a. . .in a. . .we built a fence and issued pup tents and rations in boxes and say go to it boys, fix yourself up and as soon as possible we had some very good screening people in the MP headquarters in my staff headquarters. And they would go through and try to size up whether these fellows were very much pro-Hitler, very much ardent Nazi's as we called them and they would go into special camps. And those camps not only had two fences around the outside but on the inside they were divided by two fences, you see into a very small sector so that no more than, well, I doubt if there were more than a hundred people in any space that could raise hell. Now, of course they could yell and start perhaps other riots by chain reaction from the noise but that never happened. The only one that was ever brought to my attention right away, most of them were put down and I heard about them at the next staff conference, the fellows had got to fighting among themselves in one of these enclosures and it was an inside one, you know like the middle house along the side of the street and all the rest of the fellows and the other two just got on the side of the fence towards the noise and began cheering these other guys on, no disturbance on their part at all. And that's about the worst one we had. For the most part the German prisoners. . .the only effort of the German prisoners. . .they only tried to do one thing and that was to survive and live as comfortably as they could.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, weren't the POW's used to transfer vehicles forward and wasn't there a big chance of their escaping?

GEN AURAND: Well, the German prisoners had no desire to escape because the rumor in the cages was that if any fellow escaped he would be shot forthwith by the French. In fact, the people working on the railroad, the Germans, asked us for more than two guards per fifty men to keep the French from sniping at them. And it was because of this constant fear of being shot by the French that I was able to trust them on the highways driving vehicles. And the usual formation was out of fifty vehicles or whatever there were and an MP at the front and an MP at the back. The first one we sent out through had a bad time. I think the weather report was for very heavy rain or something like that which we had all the time it didn't make any difference, and this convoy started out up the hill out of Cherbourg and by the time they got to the top it had started to snow. And there was a halfway point between Cherbourg where these people started and Chartres where they turned the trucks over to, I don't know, somebody else. At least, that was my delivery point. So they got to this halfway point and by this time about oh, eight or ten of these prisoners had come back to Cherbourg. Incidentally, it was a jeep convoy, and they had come back to Cherbourg and the rest had all gotten in and the two MP's were there, so I said alright, just don't try to have them rejoin. Just let them stay back. Well, at five o'clock the next morning the fellow at this camp, an MP I think, an MP officer called me up on the phone and said, "Shall I start them out?" Well, I said, "I don't know what weather you got there, it's up to you, can they make it to Chartres, make your own decision and I'm not going to hang you if it is wrong, but you got to decide that, not me." Oh, he was profusely apologetic for waking me up but he knew that this was my pet project at the moment so he started them out. Well, the blizzard got worse as it

got further into the continent and the two MP's show up at Chartres and within the next two days all the rest of the prisoners but one. . .one prisoner and one jeep. . .and I used to hound my high sheriff, my provost marshall about this. Well, one day he came in and said, "We got our man." And I said, "Yes, Mr. Bones what man?" "Well," he said, "that prisoner of war that is missing." "And the jeep, we got both of them." I said, "Where is he now?" "Well, he is on his way to Chartres with the jeep and an MP escort." I said, "Where from?" and he said, "LeMans." "Well, what happened?" "Well," he said, "He had been driving truck for the Germans from Paris to Cherbourg and he knew all of the ways to get from one place to another and instead of going to Druex and then Chartres which was then our axial road, he decided to go to LeMans and then Chartres because he thought the roads were much better. So, he gets to LeMans and this was still a base section, headquarters was there, not mine somebody else's, they had a big traffic circle just outside of the city on which they had MP's to check every vehicle that came through. Well, we hadn't any clothes to put on these prisoners except U.S. uniforms and we found some buttons and we cut off the brass buttons on the overcoat and sewed ordinary ones on and we gave them just the knitted things that you wore under the helmet liner, preferably with a steel helmet on top of that. General Lee required that at least the helmet liner be worn over the cap. So, this MP stopped this jeep and he says, "Where is your liner?" He says, "I'm a German prisoner of war, I haven't got a liner." He says, "You're what?" He says, "I'm a German prisoner of war." "Oh, tell that to the Marines," says this fellow. "Give me your trip ticket." "I haven't got a ticket, I'm a German prisoner of war." He says, "You follow me." So he gets in the jeep and

the guy follows him and they put him in the American guardhouse, see and they are trying to get him to tell and they've been sweating him for a week, trying to get him to tell what his unit is. Well, about this time the word came out that this base section was going to become a district so the judge advocate of the base section went down to the jail to see who the prisoners were and he really believed this fellows story, and they called up my high sheriff in Cherbourg and sure enough he was a German prisoner of war. I said to the high sheriff, "You MP's are always trying to pick up U.S. soldiers."

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, were you ever raided by the Germans who remained on Guernsey and the other channel islands?

GEN AURAND: Yes, there was a raid on the French port of Grandville which was being operated as sub-port of the U.S. Army port at Cherbourg. The port was being used primarily for civilians supply for the French, mostly coal and the labor force consisted of mostly French civilians and German prisoners of war. Considerable damage was done to the port facilities and several people who were killed who were aboard the ships that were tied to the pier which were most severly damaged or blownup or sunk. The attack occurred around midnight and lasted about an hour and a half. There were German prisoners working on the dock when the attack took place and they were ordered to get aboard the invading boats but some of them escaped back to captivity. The attack was on the side of a promontory and on the other side of the promonotory there was quite a nice beach. Along this beach there were two hotels. One of these was operated by NBS for rest and recreation hotel for SHAEF. At the time of the attack I found out that this was full of people from UNRAH, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation

administration. I didn't know they were there. I guess there was no reason I should, it was SHAEF's R&R hotel. They could do with it what they wish. But the Germans took one of them back to Guernsey out of curiosity because he couldn't understand what this outfit was. However, when they lined up all these guests at the hotel that night, they shot a major of mine and wounded a colonel quite badly. The success of this raid was, of course, attributed to faulty preparation on the part of NBS. It was a clear night and the boats could be seen in silhouette within 75 millimeter gun range. They came along the coast for about eight miles at that range. They had been tracked by radar for over an hour before they were sighted, before we could see them, yet NBS was not allowed to have any guns to defend the coast. The available infantry was two-thirds of a Polish regiment with completely inadequate transportation because of the truck distribution policy imposed by ETOUSA, which said that all new trucks had to go to the front.

MAJ MORRISON: Did you ever try to do anything about these Germans?

GEN AURAND: You mean the ones on Jersey?

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

GEN AURAND: The important reason for defending against raids from Jersey was the main pipeline supply route which lay right along the coast sometimes visible from the sea. There were three or four pipes in this pipeline side by side. The engineers who operated the pipeline were under the engineer on COMZ staff and we served as a hotel for their personnel. Recon planes which patrolled the pipeline was also sent out of Paris, I doubted if it ever landed in NBS. The Germans tried to shell the pipeline from Jersey and they also tried to shell Cherbourg from Guernsey. We could do nothing to get guns for counter-battery purposes nor would SHAEF authorize

any bombing of the artillery on these islands. Fortunately, their guns just wouldn't quite reach the nearest point of the pipeline and I doubt if any building in Cherbourg could be reached but they came awful close. I've sat up on the bluff and watched these things come over and wondered whether these guys were right that they would only go so far and no farther. That's all the farther they went. But SHAEF, as I said, would give us no artillery or plane attack. We got radar signals when the raid took place as I said and we immediately alerted the Polish regiment. But the point of attack was not yet known and we figured that it was going to be in a swamp, right down at water level or the pipes passed on what you might call tressel bridges, they weren't very high, they were only a couple of feet above the grass, but this to me would have been the place if they were going to, you know, disrupt the pipelines. When they went by there going along the coast, everybody was sure it was Grandville and well, I wasn't in on this, this was entirely handled by Caffey, the Polish regiment was told to get to Grandville as fast as they could. But they couldn't get there very fast because they didn't have trucks. The trucks had to come from the Grandville port to bring them and they were hauling supplies away from the port and couldn't be rounded up. It was just one thing after another going wrong. The. . .of course, British, the reason for most of this was that the water was under control of the British Admiral at Portsmouth and while we had a couple of patrol boats that came out of Cherbourg under a man we called the Captain of the port, he took his orders from the, not directly from the British Admiral but from a British Admiral to an American Admiral at Le Havre to him to the boat and the reason the British gave for all this for us not having guns and for this control was that they didn't

want their own patrol boats fired on because they were sent down secretly by surprise and they couldn't tell everybody about it or the Germans would know that these boats were out. So what we had there then was what you might call for a Normandy base section, a defense at the water's edge.

MAJ MORRISON: Which would. . .part of the British's reason and rationale for that is that was the Channel Islands were. . .was British soil and . . . .

GEN AURAND: Yes, I'll have some more to say about the pride of the British and their own citizens occupying those islands.

MAJ MORRISON: Okay. Yes sir. Was there any measure of the state of discipline in your command which were used by higher headquarters, such as VD rate or rape rate?

GEN AURAND: Yes, the VD rate and the rape rate were both used for the purpose of determining the state of discipline. I have no faith in these figures, as a means of measuring. I'm reminded of the days when the numbers of general, special, and summary courts-martial in any particular unit were used to show whether it was a well disciplined outfit or not. If you had a lot of court cases, it wasn't. That was the general theory. The result was that nobody referred their even most serious crimes to court, everything was handled by company punishment in order to get a good rating for discipline. And this VD rate and rape rate is just in that class. The only real index is productivity. This is not so easy to measure as these other rates but it's a far better indication of the discipline of the command.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, how would you classify your dealings with the French people?

GEN AURAND: First of all, my good G-5 from the Sixth Service Command did not arrive until late February 1945. His story of his arrival at Deauville takes almost as many pages as did Watkins story in describing how he got to Cherbourg. I've recounted two stories about prefects, the Prefect of Manche, hostile, communist was his remark about the black spots on the map of Manche and the Prefect of Calvados, rector of the University of Caen, a great resistance leader and anxious for us to move to Deauville. The mayor of Cherbourg also was a communist and quite hostile to the Americans although he did turn out to greet General Eisenhower. But it was our effort to give back to the French their own property and to do it as quickly as we possible could. For example, old wire left in place after the fighting by the First Army at the landing at the breakout was salvaged by German prisoners and local French telephone system was practically restored. Of course, the wires weren't put up on country poles but we hung them on anything that would hang them and you could make phone calls just as well I guess as they did when they had good poles. They were very grateful for that by the way and also we had gotten some through the help of the railroad administration in Paris. We had gotten some passenger trains that French civilians could ride on running once more complete with French equipment and French crews. And I think a whole line from Caen to Cherbourg was then completely French too, the American railroad troops had been taken off. So, once a day there was a train that French civilians could buy a ticket on and go to Paris if they wanted to and that was new and different for the French. And later on we fixed up the lines from Rouens through LaMans and Chartres to Paris so they could do the same thing. Well, all this had been done before Colonel . . .Doctor. . .Professor Thomas R. Palfrey arrived. He carried out these

same functions to each French village and small town. He had German prisoners fixing the roads into these villages which were absolutely cut to pieces and he was trying in everyway, we were trying in everyway to give the country back to the French. Palfrey thought up the idea that I should have all the prefect to Deauville go for dinner and if it would be the evening before the attack on Grandville and all these French Prefects were my guests in the Hotel Normandy overnight, so I didn't even get down there to Grandville that this dinner was given and they were left in no doubt that we were working to give the country back to the French.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. Sir, what preparations were being made for the end of the war?

GEN AURAND: My order from on high, nobody in the U.S. Army was permitted to even think about the end of the war, let alone plan for it. That the edict was so painfully open to catastrophy and confusion that it wasn't regarded very highly and I started out on my own to do something which I'm sure that COMZ headquarters would not dare to do and that was to build a staging camp at LeHavre. In the nick of time, just before DeGaulle says that there would be no more reverse Lend-Leasing of French land, we reversed Lend-Lease a piece of land near the port of LeHavre and we had some very economical design that is economical in timber for two story barracks and we built a 20,000 man staging area. When General Lee came along and saw it, I was with him when he first laid eyes on it, in fact, I steered him by there to see if he would notice and he did. And he said, "what are you doing here?" And I said, "I'm building a 20,000 man outgoing staging camp." And he didn't say, "By what authority," as I thought he would or anything like that, he said, "I haven't got the authority to order you to do this

but if you get into trouble about it, I'll back you up." Which I thought was a pat on the back. Now there was something else that we did which didn't concern personnel. All this stuff that was left in what we called the Cotentin Peninsula, the north end of the Normandy Peninsula, had practically sunk out of sight in the mud and so as soon as it began to get dry at all we began digging this out having the German prisoners do it and taking it all to hard standing next to the railroad spur so that when they wanted these supplies out of there, if they wanted them, particularly ammo, they could put them on cars and take them to the docks and load them up, fast, right away and so that work or preparation was coming on. If I'd had to do it with American soldiers, I'd never gotten them in, but fortunately I had the prisoners. Among other things I got authority to turn all arriving ammunition ships back as we had ammunition running out of our ears.

END OF SIDE ONE TAPE FOUR.

THIS IS SIDE TWO OF TAPE FOUR. THE DATE IS 3 MAY 1974. SERIES OF INTERVIEWS WITH LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY S. AURAND.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what was the situation of NBS on V-E Day?

GEN AURAND: Well, NBS was already in the shipping out business because in the northern district where we were accumulating recovered Allied military personnel, we were sending them home as soon as processed. Each district was ready to ship out the supplies that were accumulated there and the southern district was just waiting for people to get out. They had two divisions, replacement training center and several displaced persons camps that they hoped would be vacated and they could put us out. Orders were out for the turn-over of the German prisoners to the French which I protested against unsuccessfully, I thought that was a dirty trick because they surrendered to Americans and Americans should have seen to it that they got to their homes and with the money that they had earned while they worked for me. But when I left on V-E Day my protests were unsuccessful and I've never followed it out to find out what did happen. Looking back, Palfrey, Watkins, Bob Miller and I had come there as strangers and certainly helped with the work of NBS and it was still the old guard that met the emergencies and helped the 12th Army Group to become the best fed and best equipped Army that was ever fielded in the world.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what impressed you most about the U.S. military personnel who had been POW's of the Germans.

GEN AURAND: Returning allied prisoners of war were known as RAMP's meaning Recovered Allied Military Personnel. They showered down on NBS without warning. And at first their reaction to Camp Lucky Strike must have been

below, far below their expectations. We soon were told where to send other than Americans and we sent them as fast as we could provided they were able to travel. But the Americans divided themselves into those who were shot down from aircraft and those who were captured on the ground. The airmen were cocky. The ground soldiers on seeing the conditions of Camp Lucky Strike wondered if there might not be a cloud over them because they had surrendered. But all of these allied prisoners of war, Americans and others, beguiled each other with stories of how they had bribed a guard or an official or otherwise made their interment more comfortable. The last time I talked with General Eisenhower in Paris, he was on his way to Camp Lucky Strike in response to long and loud complaints because the station compliment at Lucky Strike consisted of entirely black soldiers and mostly black officers and for the first few days the chow consisted of a salt free diet. I told him the complaints were correct. The black engineer regiment contained the only troops I had available for the station compliment and that all the others in the base section of equal skill were also black and the medicos had prescribed the salt free diet. I believe Ike had some reference to this in his book, "Crusade in Europe."

MAJ MORRISON: What was your involvement with the repatriation of the Russians?

GEN AURAND: About Christmas 1944, that was during the Bulge, I was informed by the provost marshal of ETOUSA and COMZ that I had to stop using German prisoners to handle ammunition. But there was an out. And any Russians who had been impressed into the German Army and the Germans advanced through southern Russia and there may be quite a few of these Russians among the German prisoners of war. We were to screen them out and organize them into

labor units. Guards would be removed and distinctive uniforms were being made for them in England. Of course, being allies and not prisoners of war they could handle ammunition and that suited me fine. As D-Day approached I was instructed to put together a boat load of these Russians and bring them to Cherbourg where a Russian boat would be waiting for them. I used the word boat-load in that sentence, boat-load to them was a lot more people for the size boat they provided then it would be to us. The ostensible purpose was repatriation. I was surprised to see a Russian General from SHAEF come to Cherbourg to supervise the loading of these men. Most of them boarded the boat reluctantly and some tried to escape. The Russian General asked Caffey for assistance in rounding them up. His provost marshal was about out of handcuffs before all were aboard. As the ship went through the breakwater, several were seen to dive overboard although boats were sent to the scene and tried to rescue them none of them survived and one body was found with the handcuffs still secured.

MAJ MORRISON: Did you have any dealings with the UNRAH, United National Relief and Rehabilitation administration while in France other than that which you mentioned in the hotel?

GEN AURAND: Well, the simple answer is no. But I think it's interesting to know that when UNRAH was first set up, the head of it was former Governor Lehman of New York and I was then in Washington on duty and was asked to give Governor Lehman some advice on what military Lend-Lease could do to help the populations of retaken countries and conquered countries as well. This was my first contact with UNRAH and the last I had was when I was invited, not once but twice, to head the. . .to retire and head the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation administration job in China of all places.

MAJ MORRISON: So the only dealings you had in France was that one at. . .

GEN AURAND: . . .at Grandville.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, how did you happen to be reassigned to the China theater?

GEN AURAND: One day I received a call from Major General Tom Larkin who had succeeded Roy Lord as Chief of Staff of COMZ and had the additional title of Deputy Commander of COMZ. He and I were old friends. We went to many a class together at West Point and I graduated one file ahead of him. He wanted me to come to Paris immediately, so I did. He handed me a letter from General Wedemeyer asking me if I could be relieved from COMZ for assignment as Commanding General Services of Supply, United States Forces China Theater. I asked for time. I went to the war room for information but found little or nothing about China. I walked around the Etoile for awhile trying to figure out why I had been requested but I had no answer. Should I go? It was the first of May and Paris was and everything around the city was beautiful. The war in Europe would soon be over. NBS was a wonderful command and they would be very busy for quite awhile getting the people and the supplies home. Maybe toward the end of the outbound flow, I could bring my family over. On the other hand Uncle Sam had trained me for just such a job as Commander SOS, USFCT. From what I knew of it, it would be more of a challenge than Commanding a base section in France. So I went back to Tom Larkin and told him I'd go.

MAJ MORRISON: What did you have in the way of a ceremony for turning over the NBS?

GEN AURAND: Well, the only real ceremony before my departure was a retreat parade and it was held in front of the headquarters building, the hotel

which faced the sea and there was nothing between the hotel and the sea but the beach. Quite a very wide beach. The mines had been swept out of it and it was a fairly safe place to go and it had been a formal garden before the war ruined the formal garden, so it was quite a lovely place and it was a beautiful place to. . .on a May evening to stage a farewell review there and I enjoyed it very much. Brigadier General Jesse Ladd was present and he'd had come to NBS as much as I did a short while before at the request for COMZ to find a job for him. He had been district commander of the southern district and so he was there with me and would take over when I left. After the parade there was a farewell dinner in the private dining room in the Normandy hotel. And, of course, the Normandy was the billet for all our headquarters officers. Well, at dinner Watkins worked up a plan for NBS to take the surrender of the Germans on to the Channel Islands. I told Caffey to help him carry it out. Watkins chugged very close to Jersey in a French tug boat which was based on the port of Grandville, before he got two messages. One was from the Germans, in effect it said, if you come any closer we'll blow you out of the water. The other came from the British Admiral at Portsmouth, into whose domain Watkins had trespassed. It read something like this, "The British Navy will take the surrender of any Germans on his Majesty's soil. Discourage Watkins return from this expedition which was for the purpose of giving the glory of taking a surrender both to Normandy base section and to the communication zone of the European theater of operations." And this I say endeth the questions on France.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. Sir, how did you prepare for the China assignment? Did the Pentagon give you any help and who did you talk to?

GEN AURAND: Enroute to China I spent three days at the Pentagon, mostly reading files. These files were obviously out of date and they were given to me for background reading rather than for any information they might contain. I did get the impression that there had been a plan to land U.S. forces on the coast of China as a stepping stone to the invasion of Japan and I also got the impression that that time was no longer viable that they weren't going to do that. I talked with Somervell and was told by him that I should do everything I could to improve the lot of the American soldier in China. And that's the only positive advice that I got. However, Roy Lutes as usual told me what the supplies were available that I think we were seventh priority out of seven and really prepared me for what I found when I got to China. Brigadier General George Olmsted, who had been my operations officer when I was Defense Aid Director was also visiting in Washington from China. He was Al Wedemeyer's G-5. He told me that he didn't think anything of G-5 in connection with the relationship with foreign governments which was entirely Al Wedemeyer's job. But he did necessary staff duties not assigned to anybody else and he was considered to be a G and they called him G-5 but does not have the usual connotation. As I say, having to be in the Pentagon and I arranged to have him travel back with me to China so I could get briefed by him more thoroughly when we had more time. And outside of that I got nothing.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. In May of 1945, you travelled to China by way of North Africa and India instead of by way of the Pacific route and up from Australia. Why was this?

GEN AURAND: There were several reasons for going to and from China by way of the Atlantic. The war along the Mediterranean was over and the demand

for space was for Europe to the United States, while in the Pacific the war was still going on with two theater commanders competing for space from the United States to their theaters. The flying time was about the same either way but the overwater distances were much greater in the Pacific and reducedvery much the payload capacity of the plane. It was fortunate for me also because first Olmsted (BG George Olmsted) was along and then who should be on the plane but Lowell Thomas, the famous radio newscaster. I would give him a hop on my plane later in China and I have a new story to tell you about that. . .and I had taken with me an aide, Chaplain Raymond Blakney, the NBS Chaplain who had been a teaching missionary for ten years in China. He assured me he couldn't speak the language but he could read all the stuff as he was an authority on it. I absorbed all the information I could from these people. Second, from the Azores to Kunming I was travelling over new territory. I had never seen this part of the world. It was fascinating to me. Casablanca, Tripoli, Cairo, and Dhahran would be in my next foreign visit but I didn't know it at that time.

MAJ MORRISON: You stopped off at New Delhi headquarters of the India-Burma theater. Well, what was their mission and what did you find out?

GEN AURAND: When I arrived in Harachi, I had a letter from Al Wedemeyer saying it would be possible for me to stop in at New Delhi and at Hastings Mill. The India-Burma theater had been divorced from China and fighting had stopped in Burma. India-Burma existed primarily as the U.S. contribution to Mountbatten's command which is located, I believe his command post was Tandy in Ceylon. And his other job was to act as a communication zone for the China theater. Since the COMZ function was the only operative one left,

they very wisely, I think, abolished their own SOS organization. The people I saw in New Delhi were General Sulton, Commanding General, and Vernon Evans, a West Point classmate who was Chief of Staff and Bill Reeder a most remarkable guy who had been a plebe at West Point and I helped to bring him up. IB had at base section of Calcutta, an intermediate section of Chabua and then an advance section at Ledo. Very much according to the book. These sections were commanded in order by Bob Neyland, a former West Point athlete and a plebe when I was first a freshman and little later known as the coach of football at the University of Tennessee. Joe Cranston and Young, I knew Joe very well but I'd only met Young. I knew he was a very bright young officer. I believe he later became Chief of Transportation. There were three separate Army Air Corps Commands outside of Calcutta at Hastings Mill. The 10th Air Force and several other miscellaneous Air Combat outfits were under the command of a classmate of mine named George Stratemeyer and he was under India-Burma but the other two outfits were not. The Air Service Command was under Washington and was commanded by a classmate named Tom Hanley. Incidentally, George Stratemeyer was a classmate of mine too. But the third command under General Tunner, Commanded the Air Transport Command which was also under Washington and I had never met him before. He was a man whom I would depend on for all my supplies or practically all of them. He had the best war room I had seen during the war, including my own and I spent most of the night being briefed there. One point that I never forgot was in General Tunner's mission from his boss in Washington was to move the greatest tonnage per plane and to get the most flying hours out of each plane without having any accidents. I thought it should have been to provide China with what it wanted.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, you mentioned Bill Reeder. What was his job?

GEN AURAND: He was G-4.

MAJ MORRISON: Of. . .

GEN AURAND: Of IB.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

GEN AURAND: In other words he was in effect, the SOS Commander without commanding anybody.

MAJ MORRISON: Describe your arrival at your headquarters in Kunming?

GEN AURAND: Well, my plane was met by General Weart another West Point classmate. We met them everywhere, I'd like to tell you. . .well I'll go on from here and answer your question first. He took me to his own hostel and suggested that I stay there until my successor had departed, and then I could move into his hostel.

MAJ MORRISON: You mean your predecessor?

GEN AURAND: My predecessor, I'm sorry. Weart briefed me in the. . .well, everything to do with China while I stayed in his hostel and it was quite a long briefing and lasting between various and sundry and other activities which he had. The big job that the Chinese Army and the Flying Tigers had done was to keep about two million Japanese soldiers busy on the continent of Asia, and this is a thing, I believe that is not appreciated. Consequently, they were away from the islands of the Pacific and away from the Japanese homeland or they might have offered a great deal more resistance than the Americans found. This mission had been pretty well accomplished because the Pacific theater had, I mean the Nimitz theater had denied them of any means available to get these people out of China and to any other islands or

even back to the mainland. However, it was doubtful that the Chinese could conquer the Japanese forces still in China, but a victory would help allied morale, Chinese morale and discourage the Japanese. In any event, China would be liberated when Japan fell. There was still a possibility of an American landing in the China coast in case of reverses in the Pacific. Finally, the Japanese government might move to China and put up a last stand there. These reasons appealed to me as sufficient to keep up, if not increase, our aid to China. Under this concept mission of the SOS USFCT was to keep China strong. Later, and not much later, I was told in Kunming that China really meant the forces under control of the Generalissimo. The next day I called on predecessor, General Gilbert Cheves with whom I had worked quite closely while on the general staff in Washington. He was in a state of shock as he had not been told about his relief until the day before. He said he believed his deputy commander would stay with me but that he felt sure his Chief of Staff would leave shortly. Also, he would leave his aides but he would like me to promise to release his senior aide if he ever sent for him. Then he told me what he had been doing and his difficulties with the U.S. theater staff, U.S. forces China theater staff or the USFCT staff and he handed me a sheet of carbon copies of letters he had sent directly to Al Wedemeyer. Most of them ended with the request, "I hope you will back me up." Then I asked him the detailed questions but I thought that he was uninterested in giving me any details. It was not long before he asked me how long I wanted him to stay. I told him I thought he. . .it would be better for him to leave as soon as he could get out. He called me at Weart's house the next morning and said he was ready to go. He couldn't even leave

in his own plane which incidentally was given to him by the Air Transport Command, I don't see how anybody kept him from taking it away. But he would go on the day of his C-54 flight direct to Hastings Mill, no other plane could make that flight but a C-54 and there was one a day. He arranged for time for me to come to his office to meet the principle staff officers. I did so and I had to stay through his farewell to them. After he left his office, I had an order issued that I had assumed command of the SOS-USFCT. Now I said I was going to tell a story in here. When I came out of Hastings Mill I came up on this C-54 flight and we got over to Kunming Lake. I guess we all had oxygen masks on, it was 20 odd thousand feet, and we called down for clearance to descend and make a landing and the voice came back, I had a headset on, "stay up there awhile, I got a lot of two-engine jobs I got to get down here" and we got the weather. It was rainy and foggy over the lake. So we circled for about an hour, maybe more and finally we got the go-ahead to let down and we came in and landed and we taxied up along side of a C-47, it must have been based on Assam. I had then been fifteen days getting from Paris to Kunming. Eight of it I was in Chicago having holes drilled in my teeth, three to four in Washington and the other four on the flight and a couple of all night sessions over New Delhi and Hastings Mill. I was very tired. Well, the Chinese put a bamboo ladder up to the door of the C-54 and they climbed up and first of all they made everybody show their orders, these were all military people, I don't think any of the Chinese could read English but they all nodded when they saw the orders and they sprayed us with our own DDT which made me madder than hell. And by the time they got off and it was my turn to get off the plane, I was mad as could be. In this case, I left everybody get off first

because I needed a lot of room with all the gook, junk I had on my person from these conferences to get out of the plane and down that bamboo ladder and when I got on the ground it was raining to beat hell and I turned around and looked at the nose of that plane and it had a name on it and the name was, "My Assam Dragon."

MAJ MORRISON: Please explain the command and organization in the China theater and did you agree with the dual role of Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer?

GEN AURAND: General Weart continued my briefing and I realized for the first time that what I thought was an American theater was an Allied theater. The Generalissimo who was the theater commander and General Wedemeyer, was the Chief of Staff. He was also Commanding General of the United States forces in the China theater. Both headquarters were in Chungking and there were some American Staff officers who were on both staffs. In addition to the headquarters SOS-USFCT there were in Kunming the following, the rear echelon of headquarters USFCT which Doug Weart headed. It's mission was to overlook all operations in Kunming, particularly the SOS. The Chinese combat command, CCC, headed by General Bob McClure which constituted the advisory group to General Ho Ying Chin, Supreme Commander of the Chinese Armies, that is the Generalissimo's Chinese Army, had his headquarters there. Belonging to this group were all the U.S. advisors to the Chinese Armies which belonged to Ho Ying Chin and their lower echelon. The Chinese training command, the CTC, which ran the schools which taught the Chinese how to use the weapons and equipment furnished by the United States of America. The 14th Air Force, formerly the Flying Tigers, under General Chennault, the Hump Allocation Office, locally known as HUMPALCO which was a part of G-4 at

Chunking and made the monthly allocation of tonnage over the Hump. There were three military organizations in Kunming not under Wedemeyer. The Air Transport Command, which ran the Kunming airport and then the Hump service, the Air Service Command which was under Hanley at Hastings Mill and the Air Weather Service which was a plan new to me and which was run from Washington. I also found that the Naval Air Weather Service was an independent command in China very much later. There were also elements of the OSS and the Navy Group China to which I just referred. The top-side organization of this China Theater had been imposed by the combined Chief's of Staff in Washington on which China was not represented. My own solution to this problem would have been different. The combined China theater headquarters would have been in Chungking with a U.S. Chief of Staff and a contribution of U.S. staff officers. The U.S. forces in the China theater headquarters would have been in Kunming. It would have taken over the duties of the SOS-USFCT, the Chinese Combat Command and the Chinese Training Command. All of the functions of these headquarters would have been performed by USFCT headquarters. The elimination of these headquarters would more than have provided the officers for the USFCT staff in Kunming and the idea that it would have increased staff officers to organize this way is erroneous.

MAJ MORRISON: How was the SOS-US Forces China Theater organized?

GEN AURAND: The basic organization of the SOS-USFCT was the base section, at least every section was called the base section. Actually, the base section at Kunming was really the operative base section and it had a sub-base at Chanyi. To some degree the one at Kweiyang was an intermediate section although it had some base section function such as being the headquarters of the trucking command and it had some advance sections, such as

supplying the Chinese area command there. And the advance sections were all the rest, except Chanyi that I mentioned, I think there were four of those. Looked at in his way it was entirely according to the book.

MAJ MORRISON: What was your relationship to the Chinese Services of Supply?

GEN AURAND: General Cheves, my predecessor had commanded the Chinese SOS. I did not assume command of it. There were quite a few U.S. officers on duty in Chinese SOS and they plus all the commanders in Kunming urged me to assume command of the Chinese SOS. I'd been trying to get a date from General Wedemeyer to call on him but I couldn't get a reply except from his staff and all they said was that he was on a trip. I really saw no use in trying to radio him if he was on a trip but finally I got desperate and I sent him a message. The "No" answer came back before I sent the message, I think, it came back very quickly. Slowly but surely, two Chinese Generals arrived to take over the Chinese SOS, General Pai Yun-shung and Ho Shai Li. The last of these two, the latest was known by everybody as Bobby Ho and he had been a classmate of Doug Weart's at Command and General Staff School so that he knew the American Supply System as well as his own. He was very helpful and Pai Yun-shung was very cooperative. Bobby Ho now lives in Hong Kong and we still exchange Christmas cards. After some reorganization of the piece of the USFCT staff resident in Kunming, I obtained General Weart to be advisor to these Chinese Generals. The USFCT staff changed from a rear echelon to a tactical staff as part of USFCT. The only difference it made was that they took all the staff people back to Chungking where they had nothing to do at all. At least we had the use of them while they were down there with Doug Weart. Very bad move I think, but that reorganization cut Weart free. They sent a former Chief of Staff at Chungking

of USFCT down there to run the tactical section and Weart was then free, so I got him to be advisor to these two Chinese Generals that ran the Chinese SOS. He was very happy with the whole thing. So were they. I'm sure that Al Wedemeyer's policy incidentally that Americans should not command either Chinese units or Chinese individuals was very, very sound.

MAJ MORRISON: Did you attend meetings with the Chinese?

GEN AURAND: Yes. The principle one of course was General Ho Ying Chin's weekly Command and Staff meeting. General McClure as U.S. advisor and General Weart also attended, so did Pai Yun-shung and Bobby Ho. In this way I became acquainted with many Chinese officers. The meetings usually consisted of a report of what had happened, received from Chungking, particularly from the G-mo. The reports from the war area commanders, the next subordinate echelon to Ho Ying Chin and the action to be recommended to Chungking. I know of no decision being made or of no orders issued as a result of these meetings.

MAJ MORRISON: When did you first meet General Wedemeyer and what transpired?

GEN AURAND: Two weeks to the day after my arrival in Kunming, I went to Chungking to report to General Wedemeyer. He met me at the airport with a jeep which he drove himself, there were only the two of us in it. On the way to his quarters, he first exchanged information about our families. He had known my wife, Betty and I assured him that she was completely recovered. I had known his wife before they were married as she was the daughter of Colonel Embick on Corregidor that had opened up to me a view of a career in logistics. Also, Al and I had collaborated on a victory program. Let me say that he wrote the words and I wrote the music. After these pleasantries he did most of the talking. What he said I've always considered personal

and confidential so I won't cite it here. When he arrived at his home he left immediately for his office. I was shown my quarters and given a car with an aide and went around and visited all the staff chiefs. I'd seen two of them already in Kunming but I needed to see G-1 and G-2 and G-3 and War Plans they called it out there. I got the usual brushoff the combat officer gives the logistician particularly by the planners. General Olmsted whom I'd seen in Kunming already and I were able to come to an agreement on our mutual problems. I had lunch with Al in his home. I told him that I was anxious to get back to Kunming and asked for an appointment that afternoon. He took me to his office, told the Chief of Staff that he was not to be disturbed and I began my presentation. After the meeting, which was interrupted more than any I had ever attended, he agreed with most of what I had hoped that he would to and I rushed out to record all of the things that he had restored to the SOS which had been taken away from Cheves, found a secretary, and had this written and then I stood in line in the Chief of Staff's office till my turn came and I took this paper into him. He read it very,very carefully. I'd already initialed two copies and he did likewise, gave me one. I said farewell and hurried back to the quarters to see if I could take off for Kunming. However, it was too late. And I found Lowell Thomas there with whom I had ridden part way to China, and he said he had to broadcast the next morning about six, but he would like to have a hop to Kunming, and I said, "Okay, I've just been turned down on my own, going back tonight and I'll be happy to do so." After his broadcast the next morning he asked if we could stop long enough to call on Madame Sun Yat-sen, Madame Chiang's sister, who was in house arrest, I think in Chungking. And I was sure happy to do that. At first we weren't allowed

to go in, she wouldn't receive us, and when she found out that this was Lowell Thomas, the famous news broadcaster, that when we both promised that we would never reveal anything that was said in her presence, she let us come in. I wish I could tell you what she said. Now I said I had a sequel since this question came up. I got a birthday card from a General Hunter Harris, Jr., an Air Force four-star general and who now lives in Hawaii and he is a member of the Honolulu Rotary Club and of course, in their bulletin called the "Tradewind", they print the little pictures of all those people who had birthdays that week and my picture was in it. And that night Hunter Harris was at a dinner with my son who lives out there and I guess in conversation with my son Pete said, "Why don't you write him a letter." And he wrote me a letter and he said, "I shouldn't worry about being eighty years old that he played golf almost every day with Lowell Thomas." I've been trying to find that man to get in touch with him, informally like this and I wrote Hunter Harris a long letter immediately. I haven't heard from it but I'm just hoping I'll get a nice reply.

MAJ MORRISON: Did you meet the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-Shek and what were your impressions?

GEN AURAND: I met Madame Chiang Kai-Shek when she visited Chicago on her first triumphant swing around America. My impression of her was mixed to say the least. Her appearance from the platform was moving and persuading. But offstage there was a trace of queenliness. I talked with her several times in Chungking and later after the war in Honolulu and Washington. Well, I hardly expected her to remember me and I found that in her protest that she did not and was so sorry that she didn't, was quite unconvincing. Why: I can't tell you. But that first meeting in Chungking, Al was very flattering

about my ability as a logistician. The G-mo's only question was about the new Commander of the Chinese SOS. I told him that I didn't know him very well yet as he just arrived. Madame Chiang did all the interpreting. I would like to also say that when we come to the end of the war in this questioning I was left to break the news to the G-mo and the Madame that Lend-Lease had ceased and that was a very moving afternoon. Al Wedemeyer and I called at what they called their summer cottage about fifteen, twenty miles outside of Chungking and they just couldn't believe it. I mean, and yet they were both chins up about it. I said that the first thing they should do was to make concessions to American companies to, you know to get their cities back in shape. And she said we will admit any company in which we own fifty-one percent of the stock, the Chairman of the Board of Directors is Chinese and the majority of members of the board are Chinese and no profits are taken out of China. Now to put a stipulation like that on when they needed bad, investments and capital, I thought was very courageous. Maybe stupid, but courageous.

MAJ MORRISON: What actions did you take after your first visit with General Wedemeyer?

GEN AURAND: Well, I immediately set in preparation a new supply system, which would bring to China what it needed. Under the new policy that the needs of the American soldier had first priority. Part of the new system, I obtained from HUMPALCO the agreement to let me select the items that came over the Hump within the tonnage allotment that he gave me and not let him select the items. This was my job. He was perfectly willing to do this for everything that came by air, but when I asked him to treat the stuff that came over the road that was not within his allocation authority, that this

was mine, that what came over the road was mine. Fortunately, he worked for G-4 and in G-4 was a fine ordnance officer named Colonel Dutton and he had been my pupil on the ordnance school and we had no further squabble about that. And how Dutton came out with his own headquarters over this decision, I fear to say. Anyway that was the law of the Medes and Persians. With respect to getting this stuff over the Hump in accordance with China needs, Somervell was one of the people who had thrown the book away. He used to say that all that's been taught in all service schools, that the impetus of supply was from the rear and that everyone of these old fogies he was given was too old to command a regiment in the line, thought of nothing but pushing everything forward, no matter what it was and he thought the guy up front, like a guest in a new hotel should have the choice of cold water, hot water or ice water, meaning that he should get what he wanted and I was very happy to have his backing in my arguments with the USFCT headquarters people. To effect this choice, I went to India and tried to set up a system of monthly calls. Now let me say why they are calls and not requisitions. China had requisitions. China had requisitioned everything that it was entitled to about six times over. Every month they would requisition for the same thing they hadn't gotten the month before and down in India they didn't know what, they weren't good accountants, therefore, they didn't know what the sam hill China wanted. So, I agreed to have all the requests for American supplies in China come to the Kunming Depot as the base depot. I gave the depot additional technical service help and these people made the calls for a month ahead. We gave every depot a MAX and MIN stock. When they got down to the MIN stock they requisitoned

enough to bring them up to the MAX and the MIN was thirty days. This is awfully hard to calculate because most of this stuff had been issued on an emergency basis. But it was at least something to start this system on. Of course, it never worked long enough to know whether it really worked or not, but in any event I visited Cranston who said it would never work, I visited Bill Reeder and he persuaded him it would. Yount said it wouldn't work and Bill persuaded him that it would. I think on the way back I stopped in and called on Bob Neyland who I named on another trip in Calcutta because he was the base section commander. However, the other items on my memo to Wedemeyer which he had approved, I started the proper people putting into effect before I went on my trip to India.

MAJ MORRISON: In China you found the supply system was serving as a transportation system. You had put a new system into effect. How did you change this system around with General Tunner of the Air Transport Command?

GEN AURAND: My visit to India included a staff at Hastings Mill where I discussed the matter with Tunner of changing his mind and mission on maximum loading and maximum aircraft utilization to sending forward what China needed. He was all for this but believed it should be requested by China theater. I had a feeling that such a request would take forever to get out of China theater headquarters in Chungking and it would take equally long to get the paper work done in Washington. We talked about writing to Tunner's ATC boss in Washington. Toddy George, whom I knew slightly. However, I knew Hap Arnold much better and I had seen much of him during my Lend-Lease days in Washington, so we decided that I should write him a personal letter stating that we were starting on a new target basis at once, that is, the target basis of sending to China what China needed. The hell

with the tonnage but that was less important. If we did not hear from him we'd stay on it, we never heard.

MAJ MORRISON: What actions had the USFCT staff taken on your memo of agreements with General Wedemeyer while you were in India?

GEN AURAND: While I was away my headquarters received a document entitled revision of operational directive number two from the USFCT staff. It was proported to be a draft and comment was requested. I wrote a personal letter to Wedemeyer and an official reply and being one of a very suspicious nature perhaps, I finally obtained a second appointment to see General Wedemeyer. This directive took away all the SOS duties which Al's approval of my first visit had given back to the SOS-USFCT, except two. The agreements which I made with General Olmsted were allowed to stand the policy of first priority to U.S. soldiers remained intact. All that General Wedemeyer told me when I got to Chungking was that he approved the revision of the operational directive number two as drafted. I went back to Kunming with my tail between my legs. However, the return of the old supply system would take so much unscrambling to comply with the directive that I decided to leave the new one in operation.

MAJ MORRISON: You and General McClure signed a memorandum entitled Cooperation between the CCC and the SOS-USFCT which called for mutual cooperation between the personnel of the two commands. Why was this necessary?

GEN AURAND: This answer goes back to Bobby Ho and his command and General Staff School education. At my first Command and Staff conference I had him make a talk on the Chinese supply system as compared with the American. The main point was that there was an SOS in each war area which was under the local war area commander but not under the Chinese SOS in Kunming. All possible procurements were done locally. And that was done by the local

area SOS. To make the two systems fit, you could put the SOS-USFCT section commander under the Chinese combat command advisor even though. . .they are. . .practically all the U.S. stuff had to come by requisition. Whereas, the Chinese brought a great deal of their stuff locally. Also, it would be much better if the paperwork were done down the advisor channel so that the Lend-Lease supplies would go directly to the unit, small unit which would use them or which would have them as their equipment. I took Bobby Ho and this proposition to McClure with the one exception in that I would not permit my base section commander to be put under his CCC commander but that we would mutually write a letter telling him to cooperate or we'd bang their heads together, in fact. He agreed and we issued identical orders on the subject but we didn't expect the reaction that we got from each other from our own people outside Kunming. The advisors insisted that they were combat advisors and not part of the supply system. On the other hand, my people insisted that this was just another invasion of their activities by combat people. So McClure and I issued the joint memo that you referred to, signed by both to try to calm things down. I didn't want word about this agreement to get to Chungking and the USFCT staff. They might have found this new system of carrying supplies over to the Chinese violation of our operational directive number two.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what were the U.S. soldiers doing?

GEN AURAND: The American Soldier in China was supposed to be a well trained specialist. There were plenty of Chinese to do the manual labor. As time went on the supply of skilled men became insufficient and some of the Chinese became expert in single operations in a line production like building an automobile. They were even doing such delicate things as honing clyinders which was supposed to be a tool maker's job in any shop in the United States.

The unbelievable small number of deadline trucks in my command was testimony to the ability of these people to accept this kind of training. Hospital corpsmen, that is U.S. hospital corpsmen became practical nurses while the rest of their duties were taken over by Chinese trained to do just one thing, but we had lots of them and we could afford to do that. Then the Air Corps people told me that every control tower in China was manned when I got there by people who came to China as untrained basic fighters. So that the main job of the U.S. soldier in China was first to get trained and then to train other soldiers and then to train the Chinese. And I'm sure he did it very well. This even applied to truckers and that may seem a little far fetched, unless you could see the mountains and the roads that the trucks had to travel over. But they found Chinese drivers and then the Chinese drivers trained other Chinese drivers which seem to be impossible but was done by General Pai Yun-Shung and Bobby Ho. I think on V-J Day we had five hundred American truck drivers and twenty thousand Chinese truck drivers. You just can't imagine the training job that that was for these five hundred Americans.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what were the living conditions and recreation facilities and so forth for the U.S. soldiers?

GEN AURAND: The living conditions were fair to poor. Of course, they were better at the air bases and elsewhere because they had been provided for the flyers when they were the Flying Tigers and not part of the U.S. Army. Along the highways the living conditions were terrible. Tonnage was too heavy for possible airlift and particularly when they were of materials for construction, particularly mud brick, you could make all kind of things that didn't have to be hauled over the Hump. We did have

soldier in the China theater. Well, peanuts grew all over China and we had all the peanuts we could eat and what do you suppose they sent us? Cans of salted peanuts. From then on I asked for what I wanted, and didn't leave it to somebody's imagination.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, did you have the same problem with morale, promotion, curfew and the like that you had in Europe?

GEN AURAND: Yes, only more so. Promotion in the SOS came to frequent standstills. And then after it stopped standing still it came through hesitatingly. On my second trip to Chungking I made a plea to G-1 to get some action on SOS promotions. His plea was that there was a limit on strength for each grade imposed by Washington and that there were many more deserving promotions to be made before the SOS would be reached. People in units didn't have this trouble because they were promoted in accordance with their tables of organization and you practically had organizational promotion in China. But I hated to play the old trick of transferring people in and out of units in order to get promoted. There were no recreational facilities except movies. We were all supplied with the movies by IB and they were plenty and different, including one called "Kansas City Kitty" since we are here in Kansas City. Curfew was tight on orders from theater headquarters. Each commander down the line seemed to get the spirit and put on other restrictions. The only good thing was that the pay was in U.S. money and it should have been so in France. There are two things about personnel management in China that I should add to this answer that I've just thought of. First, in both Europe and China, promotions for both officers and enlisted men were made in this order. First, combat

zone. Second theater headquarters. Third, SOS. I think you will recall that Lee told me positively there would be no more promotions to general officers in COMZ. Second, in China the machine record unit was not even in the theater. It was somewhere in Burma-India and I never could find out where. But I believe it might have been in Chabua, although Joe Cranston said he had none when I visited him there. I tried in vain to have it brought at least as far as China and Kunming because it certainly would have helped not only with promotions but the administration of the personnel policy of the theater, but I couldn't get it in.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what was the feeling toward the Stilwell days?

GEN AURAND: When I arrived there was no question in the minds of anyone still in China who had served under Stilwell. And every American in China lived austerely while Stilwell was there. Some who got used to the Chinese way of life didn't suffer as much as those who couldn't stand it. With his departure the austerity rules were not so strictly enforced. They weren't taken off the record but the supply system was still operating under the old priorities. A break came when General Wedemeyer announced that the U.S. soldiers need have first priority. The tonnage limitations hardly made life any better except for U.S. rations and new clothing. So far as those with whom I talked with were concerned, from colonels to privates, Stilwell was synonymous with austerity.

MAJ MORRISON: Did you think the Americans had too many headquarters in China?

GEN AURAND: Yes. As I've already indicated there should have been one American headquarters in Kunming and that should have been the U.S. Forces China Theater Headquarters. The one in Chungking should have been a combined headquarters, an international headquarters. The USFCT headquarters in

Kunming should have taken over the Chinese combat command headquarters, the rear echelon or TAC, whichever it was called of the United States Forces China Theater Headquarters, the SOS and Chinese training command. And all of the people sent down from the Chinese U.S. Forces China Theater Headquarters to Kunming to work, like HUMPALCO and people of that nature. Proper organization of the USFCT headquarters in Kunming should have reduced the number of staff officers and their supporting personnel in the overall USFCT.

MAJ MORRISON: After V-E Day in Europe, many senior generals were offered to the China theater. Were you in favor of or opposed to accepting these officers and why?

GEN AURAND: Apparently General Wedemeyer was put very much on the spot by some very high, someone very high up in the hierarchy in Washington to accept the successful commanders in Europe into the U.S. forces in the China theater. The logic of sending these commanders to China escapes me because there were no ground U.S. combat troops in China and after Stilwell there were going to be no more Chinese troops commanded by American generals. General Simpson, a very fine Army Commander in Europe, I thought he was the best Army Commander in Europe and General Moore his Chief of Staff, came to China to look over the prospects. McClure and I were told by separate route of rumors that there was another lieutenant general coming over from Europe so we decided to offer our respective jobs to the two European lieutenant generals that were coming over there. However, Al would have none of it. Other headquarters would be created in China for them. Knowing what these headquarters were like in Europe, I shuttered to think of supplying them. Fortunately after the trip over the road in a jeep from

from Chanyi to Kweiyang and I guess further on then that although I left the convoy at Kweiyang, Simpson decided that he wouldn't come to China. I was happy to have both Simpson and Wedemeyer look at my installations along the route on this trip, although this was an unannounced trip which I despise, I found some things to improve and my people at work for a fine thing to see and Al Wedemeyer thought I was too harsh on them at this inspection. I was glad to have it that way instead of the reverse. Of course, this trip like everything else started rumors. Boy, in China, rumors started to travel faster than trucks, I can tell you that. And the rumor went around through the truckers that a big offensive was being planned using American troops.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, why did Lieutenant General Chennault retire?

GEN AURAND: Al summoned his commanders to a conference at a place up the river from Chungking where the first over the Hump flights began. I still forget its' name. Here he informed us that Tenth Air Force would be moved from India to China and Stratemeyer would come over as Deputy Commander of the theater and Army Air Corps Commander of USFCT. This was the end of Chennault, as this action took away from him the position of senior Army Air Corps Commander in the theater. Stratemeyer was supposed to be given the third star with this move so that left no doubt in Chennault's mind that he had been outranked. He asked for retirement and was given it. His long effort to support the G-mo against Stilwell and then I believe he thought he was supporting the G-mo against Wedemeyer although Wedemeyer was supporting the G-mo too. That finally ended. I felt very much like going with him. HUMPALCO would have no tonnage left for the Chinese Lend-Lease and the Tenth Air Force and Stratemeyer, after the Tenth Air Force

and Stratemeyer arrived. I have just recalled the name of the place where the command conference was held -- it was Chengtu.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, in July 1945 you wrote General Wedemeyer, asking to be relieved. What led to this letter and what became of your request?

GEN AURAND: Well, I believe that I've talked enough about the turn-down of all of the things that Al Wedemeyer had agreed to in favor of his planners and I think that I've just mentioned the fact that Stratemeyer's coming had driven Chennault to ask to retire and that I thought under the circumstances there was no job left for an SOS-USFCT Commander. At least in the field of keeping China strong which was the mission I thought I had when I went there. When along came a plan for offensive action by the Chinese against the peninsula on which Fort Bayard is located with the idea of capturing Fort Bayard as a port. And the plan as I recall it, gave completely insufficient logistical support to the Chinese, either through their own SOS or assistance from us, and practically nobody to work the port after they got there. I had at one time in Normandy three major ports working for me and I was measured by the tonnage in and out, of the people in and out,which they produced and I was, of course, very much interested in port operations. I had done some studying of it during my War College years when I was teaching supply and transportation at the War College. And I felt that there was no use setting up an expedition to capture a port when, that when you got there you had nobody to work it. So I wrote my objections to this plan and finally the chief planner came down and said that the plan would stand as written, that my comments were turned down. So, I wrote Al a letter and said that while I agreed that under present practice, strategy came first there was no use undertaking

operations which did not provide a sufficient logistical support and I hope that he would see to it that this plan was changed. And he wrote back and said, that no undertaking was ever started with all of the supplies available for it or all the people available for it or none would have been undertaken and that his decision stood. So I decided that this was the trigger for me to do what I had thought of doing when Chennault retired and that is to write and ask to be relieved under the same conditions as my predecessor and I did so. I didn't hear from this for several weeks, in fact this trip over the road with Simpson that I talked about was made during the waiting period. One day without any warning as far as I was concerned, General Wedemeyer showed up in Kunming and came to my office and asked me to withdraw my letter and tear it up. And I asked him why and he tried to make me feel that I was displaying dog in the manger and it was a boyish trick and things of this kind and I said I didn't think so at all that there was no use wasting my talents out here when there was nothing for me to do when the job had been taken away and my recommendations were given no consideration. And he said that, well, he said in effect that he had so damn much to do and what not that he simply had to rely on his staff to run the USFCT. He didn't say that in so many words but that was the impression that I got. And he said he wished I'd stay on and get along with him as best I could, but he knew the spot I was in, okay. And with that I tore up the letter.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, did you find the jeep which you had sold the Army on to be holding to your expectations?

GEN AURAND: Well, it certainly did in China. There wasn't any other passenger carrying vehicle that I know of except the 6 x 6 truck that

could have negotiated those mountainous roads. The work horses of the Burma Road into China which was a one-way by the way, as far as Kunming. The vehicles and everything else stayed there when they got there. And the intra-China movement from Kunming or Chanyi to the various base sections and the Chinese units was done by the 2½ ton 6 x 6. And I don't care which motor company made it. I understand that the ones we had out there were made by Chrysler, but I never looked to see who made them. When you can keep ninety percent of your trucks on the road with Chinese mechanics whom a few American mechanics have trained to do one single operation, I don't bother who made the trucks. But the jeep justified itself there and not only in the highway sense but in going around the airports and you know, from place to place anywhere, any errands you had to do, you better have the jeep. My predecessor had sawed a Lincoln automobile in two, long ways, so that it could get into a C-47 cabin, flew it to China and had it welded together again so he could use it there and you couldn't drive it a hundred yards from the house without tearing out the transmission or the differential or something. It was just impossible to drive an automobile there.

MAJ MORRISON: What finally became of the Lincoln?

GEN AURAND: I don't know, probably still there. I think somebody got it as far as the surplus property deal.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what were the functions of the control division which by now Colonel George Watkins inherited?

GEN AURAND: Lieutenant Colonel Watkins from 2nd Lieutenant in less than three years, did not arrive until after the main action was over. My memory is that I didn't send an official request for him but wrote a personal

letter to Tom Larkin in ETOUSA, who by this time was running COMZ in fact if not in title. I asked him for Watkins and in spite of his decision when I left Europe, that I could take only an aide with me to China. After waiting for a couple of weeks, I sent another letter to Tom. I was very sure that he was such a good friend that he wouldn't leave my letter unanswered. And so presumed that the first letter had not reached him. I had a reply to both letters, stating that there was no such officer in the European theater of operations, U.S. Army. Shades of Watkins lost orders. I radioed Tom that he was in NBS which confused everybody because there was no NBS, it had been combined with Channel to form Chanor Base Section. At last COMZ was on the ball. There was only one major base section, so he had to be in that. Someone in Tom's office decided to find out if he was at the headquarters in Brussels. And sure enough he was. And five or six weeks later, he arrived in Kunming. He had a habit of arriving late. The control division in those days was the management consultant type of business which oversaw the execution of plans and reported on the progress usually with numerical statistics. Once having had that kind of information to use in making decisions, I was somewhat lost without it. Watkins contributed greatly to the close-out of southwest China. One of his progress reports bore a title, "A Monument to Mis-Management."

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, under what conditions did you decide to close-out southwest China?

GEN LAURAND: Remember the real purpose of the SOS-USFCT was to make China strong through Lend-Lease. And the other purpose was to improve the lot of the U.S. soldier in China. Lend-Lease ceased on September 2, 1945. Mission One was no longer possible. With Mission One gone there was no

use for any U.S. soldiers in southwest China, and so when they left Mission Two would be gone. Let's get the men out of here. SOS-USFCT drew up a plan for it and started the men on the way. These plans involved turning over to the Chinese SOS all non-classified supplies except those necessary to be consumed by the U.S. soldiers before departure. This meant getting "chopped" or signed receipts for all of this material. And we finally got them both in English and Chinese. I completed a camp near Kunming airport for a staging area and we called it Camp Ding Hao, meaning OK. Thank you for your work. But it was a hurry up and wait process because the SOS was actually closing out while the theater planners were still making a closeout plan for the theater. So we had to wait every now and then until the theater plan caught up with us.

MAJ MORRISON: Well, what other plans were made by V-J Day?

GEN AURAND: None. As I mentioned after V-J Day there was a close-out plan of search being made by the planners at headquarters USFCT. But for some reason Wedemeyer wanted to keep 20,000 troops in China. What kind of troops? I never found out. Some of them certainly would have to be SOS type. A Shanghai base command was organized under Weart and took over the SOS duties for a force about that size in the Shanghai area. I felt that the rest of the SOS personnel should go home. Wedemeyer had gone back to Washington to get the future of USFCT straightened out, but we never heard from him, whether or not the retention of 20,000 men in China had been acted on there. So there was no other close-out plan of our own, SOS's as far as we were concerned. Incidentally, we started our close-out plan on the day that we heard that the peace negotiations were under way and while it

was a rumor, then it was a true rumor. And that was on the 19th of August. And by the 2nd of September, when the Lend-Lease ceased by order of President Truman, our plan was all ready to go. So that we didn't wait till, I guess that was officially V-J Day also -- 2nd of September I don't recall the exact date. But we were ready to go before V-J Day and it wasn't until then that the planners would admit that the war was over. Because of this sweeping order from Washington that we shouldn't think of planning for the end of the war until the war had been won.

MAJ MORRISON: I understand there was a point system used to determine when a person was allowed to depart the theater. What effect did the Chinese surrender have; did replacements stop coming in; and did you have to keep the troops longer than would have been the case otherwise, and the officers too?

GEN AURAND: Yes, there was a point system. It was based upon length of service, length of overseas service and length of combat service. As soon as the Japanese surrender occurred, Bob McClure issued an order that all members of the Chinese combat command were entitled to combat points, thus putting them ahead of the men in the SOS of similar service in China. It was hard for some of them to take, but I demonstrated that they would have had to stay anyway to get the McClure's people out so that this didn't effect them too severely. And it was their pride that was hurt more than anything else because most of McClure's men were in Kunming where mine were. Replacements were stopped from coming into China shortly after the Hiroshima bomb. We had to keep SOS men from there for another reason and that is to assist the Chinese to take the surrenders of the Japanese before the Chinese communists could take these surrenders. Non-

regular officers were under the point system but regulars were not. I appealed to Stratemeyer in Wedemeyer's absence to treat regulars the same as non-regulars but he said that Wedemeyer had directed him not to. In China the point system confused closing out of southwest China but I believe did an unjustice only in a very few individual cases. What it did to the command as a whole should not be mentioned.

MAJ MORRISON: Where were you when the Chinese surrendered to the, excuse me sir. Where were you when the Japanese surrendered to the Chinese and what were your experiences?

GEN AURAND: I was an observer at the surrenders at a place they called Chih Chiang and Canton. These surrenders were made to the Chinese and no American was allowed to be present in the room where the signing took place. Chih Chiang had been the headquarters of our most advanced section was -- very close to Yangtze. The Japanese flew in their plane escorted by U.S. fighters. They were loaded into jeeps and motored to the place assigned. It was quite a sight. I was very much moved by it and I wrote my wife a long letter describing it. I got to Canton by mistake. I came into Nanning early one morning and found the U.S. advisors to the war area, Chinese war area commander there waiting for me at the airport. This was the first time in many trips to this place which was one of our most advanced places that I had even seen him. The reason for his presence there was that his Chinese commander had been promised a plane to take him to Canton for the surrender ceremony. And Stratemeyer cancelled it. Since my plane was furnished by the ATC, would I take him to Canton? Fortunately, Bobby Ho was with me and we arranged to take the war area commander, his

U.S. advisor, and an aide for each to Canton. Of course, my plane load of people went along. Bobby Ho and I stayed in the plane while the immense throng at the airport greeted the Chinese general. After the crowd had dispersed, Bobby Ho and I got into a Japanese version of the jeep and with armed Japanese MP's guarding us front and rear, went shopping. Afterward we went to a dinner celebration of the surrender, given by the war area commander which lasted four hours.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what impressed you the most about the U.S. military personnel who were POW's of the Japanese?

GEN AURAND: Well, as in Europe I had to do with recovery of Allied personnel interned or held prisoner by the Japanese. The organization and means for this purpose had been set up by General Olmsted of the USFCT staff. After the successful recovery of General Wainright, and other high ranking persons held in a separate camp in Manchuria, the whole apparatus was turned over to SOS to operate. The procedure was to parachute a medical team into the prison camp with a communications detail to find out what was most needed immediately, send this up by air and bring back those who were the worst off physically. At first, of course, we couldn't land there but we dropped the stuff that was needed. When we could drop, when we could land there by it, we would bring back those who were worse off physically whom I saw in Kunming because they were brought to the hospital there first. The reaction was the same as I had gotten from the German and the Italian prisoners of war when I had worked in the United States and in Normandy and the RAMPS, the Recovered Allied Military Personnel in Normandy. A prisoner of war should do his best to survive in the greatest attainable comfort. That the spirit of most of these prisoners was not broken is shown by five officer prisoners in the Mukden Camp whom

I invited to accept my hospitality in Kunming. They replied that these . . . .that none of them were in as bad shape as the others who needed hospital care and they would not accept. For the record, they were Balsam, McDonald and Quesenberry, all West Point 1915, all classmates. Hirsch . . .whom I had mentioned before, and Chandler 1931. Now you may ask why Chandler 1931 -- he had married a daughter of a cousin of mine and his father was a very well known cavalryman and I met him in San Antonio several times. He was on the staff of the 8th Service Command during the war and I had to go down there occasionally to coordinate so that I met him again -- young Chandler. He could have gotten out medically, he had a bullet next to his heart buy they couldn't operate on it and he is still alive and doing well.

MAJ MORRISON: Did you make any special effort to keep your troops informed?

GEN AURAND: Yes. Well, it took some time to do this. I visited every company size command as soon as I could. But there were small detachments along the road and along the pipeline which I did not reach. To them I sent Chaplain Blakney with his message and also my message. After the surrender by the Japanese, I made a second round, telling the men that I had no definite news about their going home, what they had yet to do before they went home and that they all would know that they all would go home before I did. Also, I told them that whenever I got any news that affected them, I would pass it along as fast as I could. Dixie Tighe, a reporter was along on one of these trips, ate with the men after one of my talks and wrote me a note in the airplane how they had received my information. They hadn't believed that they should be kept in China for some of the things which I told them still had to be done. But they all agreed that

it was decent of the old man to come and tell them himself.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what was your primary mission now that the war was over?

GEN AURAND: My primary mission as commander of the SOS China theater was to close-out southwest China. Nobody gave me that, I gave that to myself. I have already explained how I made this decision by determining that all the other missions no longer existed.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, were there any problems between the Chinese and U.S. soldiers?

GEN AURAND: The Chinese soldiers and the American soldiers didn't get along as well as the U.S. soldiers and the Philippine scouts whom I had seen together from Corregidor. Some of my staff kept a score sheet on which follow-ups were made that indicated that the Chinese and American soldiers were both tried for offenses against each other but the Chinese punishment never came about, but my guardhouse had quite a number of pretty good American soldiers in it as a result. So I turned the whole gang in the guardhouse loose, not only then so as long as they had no. . . they had done nothing which would be considered as a crime under civil law. And it was a parole -- if they ever got into trouble again, they were back in. And what it did for me was to give me back a lot of skilled men that I needed very badly and couldn't possibly get replacements for and I was able to reduce the number of guards in the. . .I called it the corral. I can recall no arrests in the area of the SOS by Chinese civil authorities for crimes against Chinese.

INTERVIEW WITH LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY S. AURAND.

by

Major Morrison

THIS IS SIDE 1 OF TAPE 5 OF A SERIES OF INTERVIEWS WITH LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY S. AURAND. THE DATE IS 3 MAY 1974 PRESENTLY LOCATED IN LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS AT MY APARTMENT. THESE QUESTIONS ARE THE LAST ON GENERAL AURAND'S SERVICE IN CHINA AND THE FIRST QUESTION FOR THIS TAPE IS, SIR, DID YOU HAVE ANY IMPORTANT VISITORS WHILE YOU WERE IN CHINA?

LTG AURAND: No, we didn't have nearly as many as we had in Normandy. Chungking was a little rougher trip. On one particular day by coincidence, I had T. V. Soong whom I've known well in Washington in Lend-Lease days and Henry Luce of Time Life Fortune. They were there for the same reason, although Henry Luce didn't know that he was. G-mo had promoted Governor Lung Yung of Yunnan Province to some ineffective Board in Chungking and Lung Yung didn't want to be promoted. For three days and nights, Lung Yung's troops and the G-mo's exchanged a few rounds, mostly over American camps and hostels. However, most of Lung Yungs troops were in Hanoi taking the Japanese surrender there. So, the G-mo's troops won and T. V. Soong flew down from Chungking to escort Lung Yung to Chungking. In the early stages of the shooting, Henry Luce arrived in Kunming and I insisted that he stay inside my hostel until the shooting stopped. And so, I had 3 days with him. A small group of members of the house military appropriations committee visited about the same time, not too long after that. With them were Jack McCloy, Douglas Southall Freeman, the biographer of Lee and Lee's lieutenant and my classmate George Richards, then budget officer of the War Department. The verdict was that there was no luxury in China. Freeman's comment was "what a story." The chairman of the group, Snyder of Pennsylvania who had been a high school teacher and band leader, led an impromptu band, ala Wayne King, which greeted the group.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, there were many stories of banditry, Chinese looting U.S. military goods and shooting at U.S. personnel. What first-hand information did you have?

LTG AURAND: First-hand. When the signal building, which was next door to my hostel, had all of the equipment removed, we no longer had a U.S. guard on the building. It was made of mud brick, but the windows and roofs were framed. One morning I woke to find nothing left but the mud brick. The principle places of banditry were the outlying airfields. The Chinese troops which guarded them for the most part had been withdrawn and small groups of airmen were engaged in protecting the U.S. property there. When Chinese troops were present to defend these airfields and also other installations, there was always the question of who was guarding this. The G-mo's troops or the bandits. This was true even in my own hostel. I could never find out who the commanding general was. Nobody knew. At this time, I was the last U.S. general officer left in Southwest China and had been for some 2 months. I was told that the Chinese referred to me as the last American warlord. Things finally got so bad that I reported to Headquarters USFCT that I could no longer be responsible for the safety of my troops and recommended turning all remaining unclassified property over to the Chinese and getting the men out of Southwest China.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what became of your request?

LTG AURAND: Well, the reason I made this request was that Olmsted and I, who were helping each other to get this place cleaned out, found that in the regulations for the disposal of surplus property abroad, that if the foreign liquidation commission representatives had not yet arrived and if

the commander of the theater decided that his troops were in danger, that such a declaration by him would be sufficient to authorize the disposal of the property as best he could in getting the troops out of there. So, after a very severe raid, they gave me the opportunity. I sent that crucial message. I don't know whether you are going to ask me about this later, but I can tell it just as well now. When I finally did get to see General Wedemeyer when he came back from the United States, we had already sold the surplus property, that is, General Olmsted had arranged the sale and gotten paid for in dollars of the U. S. property turned over to the Chinese in Southwest China. And, of course, the basis of the action was that message, the foreign liquidation commissioners had arrived by this time and were protesting the action and General Wedemeyer said, "I approve entirely the actions of General Aurand and General Olmsted." So, that one got approved by General Wedemeyer in person. Of course, first we knew about the foreign liquidation commission was when two officers came over from India in the midst of what we were doing and stopped in Kunming to see me. One of them was Colonel Hesketh who had been Captain Hesketh when I was on Corregidor commanding a 12-inch mortar battery or something of this kind and we had played bridge together a good deal and were great friends. And he told me the whole scoop and he said they are working on India now and when they get through working on India, they are coming to China. Well, I didn't protest at all because in there was my loop hole and it had time to get out before they got there and they were very kind to come over and thus give me warning in advance. Well, they weren't the ones that came back to this meeting in Chungking that I told you about. These were two civilian State Department people. So that Hesketh

didn't have to regret the tip-off he gave me. At the end of this meeting, I asked General Wedmeyer if I could now go home. My SOS consisted of about 80 regular officers and a few enlisted men who didn't have enough points. That's total officer and enlisted men there, 80. And I had about 500 tons of classified supplies that would take ten trips of a C-54 which were then shuttling from Shanghai to Kunming, to get out of there. And he said, "Alright," and I said, "I will issue an order when I get back there saying that this command is hereby dissolved." "Yes," he said, "go ahead." He called his aide in and had a conversation with him and he said, "I'm sorry I can't go to the airport with you. I've all these people and so my aide will take you down," and I thought that was what it was about. While he had been in Washington, he had gotten another DSM, my third one approved, and when I got off the plane at Kunming, there was Bill Creasy, and the whole formation of the 80 people with a DSM to pin on me.

MAJ MORRISON: Outstanding.

LTG AURAND: I thought Al was very kind to me indeed. After all, the vicissitudes of our relationship to give me that.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what were your general impressions of the Chinese?

LTG AURAND: I regret that I've read Barbara Tuchman's Stilwell and the American Policy in China before answering this question. My staff told me that our mission of making China strong and making the G-mo's troops strong, and later I discovered that there were very few G-mo's troops. Most of his military forces belonged to warlords who were loyal to him. The alternative of going along with the Communists is out of the question, to most of them. But there were still some independent warlords who were fence sitting. The way I found this out was through the designation of

the divisions which were to receive Lend-Lease supplies. The people in the villages and the other end of the spectrum wished everybody would go away including the landlord. There was a 50 percent tax on the crops that they raised and some of the peasants told me that they had already paid 3 years in advance. I didn't quite see how that could be done, but I gathered what they meant. These poor people had no cloth for 8 years and they had intermittent hunger according to the season. The Chinese soldiers were drafted by gangs of Chinese soldiers who usually brought the draftees in with their hands tied behind their backs. The junior officers of the G-mo's troops were not well trained. My contacts with the senior Chinese officers made me think of them as fairly well trained. Some very well trained like Bobby Ho, for example. I met both Mao and Chou En-Lai at Wedemeyer's house in Chungking. I only had an opportunity to shake hands with Mao, but I had a half-hour's conversation with Chou. Now I know that I should have realized that there were three wars going on in China at once. The G-mo against the Communists, the G-mo against the Japanese, and the Communist against the Japanese.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what was your impression of Chou En-Lai?

LTG AURAND: Well, I thought he was a very well educated man although when I read his history since, he must have done a lot of self education. We were talking mostly about the possibility of getting supplies up to the Yellow River Bend to give the Communist zone military equipment. This was being urged upon us from Washington. And I talked this over with Tunner and I worked into the road net which was terrible, but you could get a truck all right from along, - well, up near Chih Chiang following the Yangtze and then crossing it and then going up to the Yellow River in

a favorable place. But it would hardly carry enough gasoline in either one, the airplane or the truck to get it there and back. And Joe said, he figured that it would be the most unprofitable of operations, that it would not be dependable if they couldn't be sure whether they could get parts or ammunition or whatnot. And saw no use to it. Well, after they had left that evening, I sat down to dinner with Al and some of his staff who lived in the house with him, and he said, "Well, today I convinced Mao that we could supply them with U. S. Lend-Lease supplies." He should have told me in advance what the purpose of the meeting was.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. Sir, how could the U.S. have prevented a Communist takeover in China?

LTG AURAND: Looking on this question from my viewpoint in 1947, or '48 when I wrote my experiences in China so that they were freshly recorded, I came to the conclusion that it was the sudden stopping of Lend-Lease which doomed the Generalissimo, but that answer is too easy. Also, I heard people speak freely about getting someone besides the Generalissimo who could hold China together in 1947 or '48. I thought Madame Sun Yat-sen might have done so. But when we went through the ruckus of swapping the G-mo for Madame Sun Yat-sen, the Communist might have made a lot of hay. With the political objective of a China friendly to us, they were stuck with the G-mo. Some have suggested that we should have sent U.S. troops in to help him and we did so after a fashion when we landed some Marines. But, I'm afraid Russia wouldn't have liked that and there would have been quite a confrontation. In 1948 and for 25 years later, nobody in the United

States of America would dare mention the final alternative in keeping the China friendly to us, which was to support the Communists. Hindsight today makes me believe that this might have been the best choice we could have made, the best wisdom, although impossible at the time. No doubt just as impossible as persuading the G-mo to turn his government peacefully over to Madame Sun Yat-sen.

MAJ MORRISON: In November 1945, you returned to the United States and in January 1946 again took over command of the Sixth Service Command after' an overdue vacation. What changes did you find in the service commands mode of operation?

LTG AURAND: In November 1945, I returned to Fort Sheridan just outside of Chicago to report as ordered to the reassignment center or whatever, or whatever it's name was at that time. I'd left China with an infected ear which they treated with the sulfa drug in Hawaii. Between Hawaii and the West Coast, I found I was allergic to sulfa so we stopped my plane for an afternoon while they fixed me up at Hamilton Field. When I got to Sheridan, they put me on sick report, sick in quarters and no orders came so they finally sent me to Greenbrier, Virginia on R&R and my wife and daughter and I spent Christmas there. A very pleasant vacation. When my R&R was up, I thought I'd stop by Washington on the way back to Chicago and I went in to see Tom Handy who was Ike's Deputy Chief of Staff. Well, Tom, of course, immediately told Ike I was there and Ike told me to come in and asked what I was going to do. And I said, I had no orders and I expected to retire. And he said, No, you don't. All you logisticians are going out and getting fat jobs and there are very few around anymore

and I want you to stay." Well, I said, "There is no job for me." He said, "Just a minute." So, he called Willard Paul who was the G-1 and Willard Paul came up and he said, "Get a job for this guy," and Willard Paul said, "Well, the Sixth Service Command is vacant. Do you want it back?" I said, "Sure. That would suit me fine." And I took it over - I've forgotten the date. It was a little after the middle of January, I think. Well, the situation was entirely different than it was when I had it before. They were demobilizing and they were certainly doing it fast and had been doing it fast. So, all I did was go around from place to place and have a few ceremonies and close it out and it was while I was in . . . .

MAJ MORRISON: These are plants and . . .?

LTG AURAND: No, not so much plants. We had a great many places like our district headquarters for example, and we had special places for where we had recruited WAC's. WAC recruiting was a great job.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: And we wanted to thank all these people that had helped us. Oh, the induction stations where we took the people in for example, the Masonic Hall in Kalamazoo, Michigan was turned over to us for an induction station and we wanted to go and say thank you and the general couldn't avoid being part of the closing-out ceremony.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: So it meant a lot of travel and all that sort of thing.

MAJ MORRISON: What were the circumstances for your almost immediately being transferred to the African Middle East Theater?

LTG AURAND: Well, my family had moved into the big house at Fort Sheridan.

I think we lived in it less than a week. And as I said, I was going around the circuit demobilizing things. And on this particular night in late January, I was at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. Their law school had been taken over as the Judge Advocate General School during the war and we were giving the law school back to the University and it was a big dinner and was quite a ceremony made over it. So, in the middle of it, I was told that I had a phone call and Roy Lutes was on the phone. Roy had succeeded Somervell and then had transformed the Army Service Forces into the, if I can remember, services, supply, and procurement division of the general staff. In other words, he was back as G-4. He had still quite a large office, perhaps a 1,000 officers or so, but it was now staff and not a subordinate command. Of course, he was my boss as Somervell had been as the Sixth Service Commander. Roy said they had bad news for me that Judge Patterson had insisted that I and nobody else be sent to the Africa East Middle East Theater to close it out and that I should get to Cairo, Egypt as fast as I could.

MAJ MORRISON: Patterson at this time had succeeded Stimpson as . . .?

LTG AURAND: Secretary of War. So, Roy said he would ask the Judge not to send me that I was just back from China and so forth, but the Judge insisted. So, I asked for three days because I had to get my family somewhere and I arranged with Roy and later Judge Patterson sent a letter out to make it official for my wife and daughter to have one apartment in the BOQ at Sheridan and one for my father as I was supposed to be gone only three months. Judge Patterson gave me three months to close it out and when I got them all settled, I went on to Washington. One of the funniest

things that happened about this when I went back to the table after getting Lutes phone call I said very abruptly to my wife, "I'm going to Cairo" and she was so surprised that she said, "Where is that?"

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, were there conditions or circumstances which had prevailed in France and China which you hoped to avoid in Egypt?

LTG AURAND: Well, being on top of the totum pole in Egypt, I saw to it that I didn't wear two hats, but seriously there was little resemblance between France or China and Egypt. Even the close-out in Egypt was different because I had a foreign liquidation commissioner for that area to deal with.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: It was hopeless to try to see my men, for example. They were scattered from Casablanca to Teheran and from Constantinople to Cape Town. They were in very small groups. In some places there was a sergeant and four men. It was impossible in the period of three months to do anything of the kind. I did visit several places that were to be turned over. I didn't bother with the places that were going to be kept. I think one of them was in Tripoli. I don't recall now. Of course, I visited Lydda in Palestine where we had quite a little property. The camps around Cairo, that was about the extent of my calling on the troops because of the great distances in very short time. I had one press conference at which I had all of the local commanders around Cairo, there being two, and my staff. But outside of that, my usual practice of regular command and staff conferences was discontinued, again because of the distance. I ran into the usual restrictions that had been placed by commanders on

enlisted activities. I've forgotten whether or not there was a curfew when I arrived, but I certainly would have taken it off and there were a lot of minor things. At Camp Huckstep, there was a movie theater built entirely of brick and concrete and metal roof and all that and all the chairs in it were metal folding chairs and there were no smoking signs all over the place and I had them taken down, although the fellow who ran the theater said it was against the rules of the Army Theatrical services or whatever it was, motion picture.

MAJ MORRISON: Army Air Force Pictures Exchange or something like that.

LTG AURAND: Yeah. Then I went over to the post commanders office and he was trying to grow grass out there in the desert and he had "Keep Off the Grass" signs all over the place and I told him to take them all out and not only that but he should take down every sign he had in his command that had "no" or a negative command in it. And I tried to keep the pestering little things out of the lives of the men.

MAJ MORRISON: What did you say to him when he said, "They'll have a path across my grass?"

LTG AURAND: Oh, yeah. Well, I said if anybody beats a path across the parade ground or across your front lawn or anything, put in a walk. Don't stop the people from going the best way they know how.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir again, did the Pentagon give you any direction or advice prior to your departure for Egypt? And if so, who did you see?

LTG AURAND: Oh, primarily I saw Judge Patterson and his instructions were very, very clear. Get this place closed down in three months, period. I then went to see the usual people in the Pentagon. I went to WPD, War

Plans Division. I don't know what it was called then, which had charge of the overseas theaters and the top guy wouldn't see me and he sent me along to the fellow who had that area who happened to be an Air Corps major general. I was relieving an Air Corps major general. I didn't think I would get much information out of him, but he was a very fine guy and gave me a good deal of information, particularly about why he thought that my predecessor was being relieved. And this was simply that the guy enjoyed the place a lot and he was hoping to stay there as long as possible which was, I thought a sufficient reason, but Judge Patterson was in a hurry. I also got to see Tom McCabe for a moment. He was the head of the Foreign Liquidation Commission, which was then a State Department. Fortunately, I'd worked with him during the Lend-Lease days because he was the number one assistant to Stettinius when the Lend-Lease administration was set up. And this Foreign Liquidation Commission was part of the State Department, although some of the personnel had been in Lend-Lease Administration. When Stettinius, who had been Lend-Lease Director, became Secretary of State, he moved Tom McCabe, who had been his Deputy Director over to State and gave him the foreign liquidation job. Tom McCabe is, or was until recently, the head of Scott Paper Company in Philadelphia or in Chester and of course, the great benefactor of Swarthmore College where my daughter went to college. Of course, since McCabe was in the State Department, he worked through the ambassador and his representative in Cairo was merely part of the embassy. It wasn't an embassy at that moment, but it became an embassy while I was in command of AMET. I then went to see Roy Lutes and Roy told me that he had nothing to tell me that I'd closed out Southwest China so fast, I ought to be able to do this one

very easily. And I told him if he would only give me George Olmsted and take the FLC representative off my neck, I'd do it as fast as I did Southwest China. But those things he could not do. One thing that both Judge Patterson and Lutes permitted me to do was to pick anyone I wanted to take with me to form a staff in Cairo and this I appreciated very much, indeed. I was even permitted to take along the girl who had been my secretary in my previous Washington service and also in Chicago and I did this on the insistence of my wife. She said she wanted somebody out there whom she trusted to take care of me.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, who else did you select to take along with you and why?

LTG AURAND: Well, since I had almost cart blanche, I decided I would take a few key people who would fit into the existing staff. I wasn't going to displace anybody. However, I knew that the Chief of Staff out there was going to leave with my predecessor so that I could take a Chief of Staff. I wished I had had a deputy commanders spot here, it would have been a very useful thing. So, the fellow I picked for Chief of Staff I picked for the qualifications of a deputy commander. I wanted him to run the U.S. military personnel in the command because I knew that I would be negotiating with the FLC commissioner and the government and somebody else ought to do that job.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: So, there was a fellow who I had met here when I was a student at C&GSC and I believe he was on the faculty. I'm not sure of this. He was a very fine guy and at the moment, well, he had been over age to take a regiment overseas and that happened to everybody. At the moment he was

in Washington waiting retirement and I asked him if he wanted a last shot in an overseas job and he was delighted. And I took him over as Chief of Staff and he did exactly the job I wanted of him. He was perfect. I also took along my old friend, David Wainhouse, who was my consul when I was Lend-Lease Director and he had a job in the State Department that was coming up at the end of February, 1st of March, and he wanted to come and I wanted him so we went to see his boss. I think he was going to be under Dean Acheson at the moment. He's going to be in the office that wrote all the stuff for our representatives to say, our representatives in the UN to say and it was going to be a very fine job. So, he qualified as the man who could get along with the ambassador in any of the countries involved and also keep me straight with our own Foreign Liquidation Commission and he filled that job. But I could only have him until the 1st of May. I was glad to get him that long. I tried to find somebody of the controller type or control officer type and they were the people who had gone out and gotten the fat jobs as logisticians. One of them became President of Westinghouse and one of them became President of Carborundum Company up in Buffalo. I mean, these were the jobs they got as soon as they could get out. Not my people but I mean control type people. Bendetson went with Champion Paper, later became under Secretary of the Army and then went back to Champion. In other words, they were completely in short supply and I took nobody for that job. My son, Hank of the class of 1944 at West Point, had worked with Watkins in China after V-J Day. I would never look up where my sons were. I could do so with ease from their APO or NPO numbers, but no other dad could and I refused

to do it. So, after the signing on the Missouri, I looked up where Hank was and he was on Okinawa. So, I arranged with General Stilwell and Styer in Manila to send him over to work on my staff. Give him a picture of higher staff work. And I put him under Watkins and Creasy said, "No man has ever been so persecuted by Watkins." But he was still in China. So I knew there was no use in sending him to Al Wedemeyer. He wouldn't let any regular officer out of China, so I sent back to War Plans and got his orders to come to Cairo forthwith. In the meantime, I had picked the guy on the staff who was, I thought, quite capable of doing the job. By this time, I understood it a little better too with Watkins in China. So, together we worked out approximately what we wanted the control to produce and he began figuring how he could get it. He'd been there almost from the time of Maxwell, the first mission that went over. So when my son Hank arrived, they just got their heads together and went over the affair and he had a chance to go to a civilian college to get a Masters degree. So I let him go at the end of about two weeks . . . .

MAJ MORRISON: Is this your son?

LTG AURAND: Yeah. I did have a good control officer. The first thing he prepared for me was a list of all of the surplus property in this location, not by item, but so much worth approximately here so much here, or so many tons. I was never sure to this day whether he picked it all up and I don't think anybody else has. I think all together I took 7 or 8 people with me. I made one mistake. The aide I picked was the poorest pick I could possibly have made. I don't see how I could have done worse.

MAJ MORRISON: You arrived in Cairo on 13 February 1946. Did you find a plan for MAEDA, is that the right . . . ?

LTG AURAND: AMET.

MAJ MORRISON: AMET? For the plan AMET for the closeout and what changes did you make?

LTG AURAND: There was a plan in effect and it was being carried out, but it had not been formulated - what I would call a formal document with everybody's job set in it and when and who. What needed to be done was to get a joint plan between Mr. Ramsey who was a Foreign Liquidation Commissioner and AMET. It was like Normandy in some respects as it was being carried out, I mean the carrying out of this plan was like Normandy. It went from one emergency to the other and in this manner, things got done. It was too late to make any changes in this plan about going to get this thing done in three months and I did try to have Mr. Ramsey agree to it. If he had, schedules could have been made and I think things could have been done with good coordination, but we still were working on the emergency basis until Ramsey and I were finally brought together.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, did you have a deadline for the close-out and if so, who were you responsible to, to make this date?

LTG AURAND: Well, I felt that I was responsible to the Secretary Board the AMET should be closed out in three months. Those were his very clear instructions. As I arrived on 13 February, I figured I had until 13 May. I actually closed the theater on 23 May so I was a little late.

MAJ MORRISON: What work did your soldiers perform?

LTG AURAND: In the small places, mostly guard duty. The inventories had already been taken in every one of these places before I got there. Some places they might have to be taken again, particularly if the buyer wanted

a joint inventory. In the larger places like Huckstep, the soldiers were being used in addition as sales clerks and warehousemen. Of course, there were those who kept the rest of the soldiers alive by furnishing them with the necessary supplies and transportation. One thing I had to watch out very carefully was that we had no places for the people who were simply taking in their own laundry.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what do you mean by the expression, "taking in your own laundry?"

LTG AURAND: That means that all you are doing is supporting yourself, handling the supplies and transportation necessary to keep yourselves alive.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. What were your dealings with the foreign liquidation commission?

LTG AURAND: Well, this was a real problem for me. Mr. Ramsey and I'm sorry I can't give you his first name, is the most conscientious and religious man. He was independently wealthy and he was very familiar with the Middle East. He had retired from business and of all things, he spent several years building a Young Mens Christian Assocaition building in the new part of Jerusalem. He considered this his mission, as far as liquidation commissioner, to get as much money for the military supplies as you could, as much money as he could and when I protested that the soldiers were costing Uncle Sam more than the money he was getting, he insisted that the soldiers would be on Uncle Sam's payroll anyway and selling these supplies wasn't costing the government a cent. He had no instructions whatever to close out the theater in a hurry or even three months. It took a long while

to convince him that he couldn't sell an airport, which was built on ground which the U. S. had leased with the proviso in the lease that the U.S. would return the ground in the condition in which they found it when they were through using it. Here's where my friend Waynehouse came in. He thought I could do better with a little more tact. You've heard that before. Suddenly, I recalled a dinner for Mrs. Rickenbacker in Chicago and the lesson I learned from that. But it wasn't until under Tom McCabe and Under Secretary of War Royal had visited us both, both Ramsey and me and gave us both the same instructions that I could bring myself to be tactful as I might have been at the start. There's no, I want to finish this question, there is an odd sequel to this story. I was Director of Logistics in the Army when I got a phone call. "This is Mr. Ramsey who was with you in Cairo. I'm now the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner in Washington and I'm trying to close out my office but someone in your shop is delaying me by not acting promptly on some papers I have over there." "Mr. Ramsey," I replied, "You shall have those papers today." Talk about the shoe being on the other foot.

MAJ MORRISON: Could you have done without the FLC representatives and saved time and money?

LTG AURAND: I don't recall whether there was any act of Congress establishing a Foreign Liquidation Commission or whether it was merely an executive order or perhaps only a State Department order which set it up. Nonetheless, if we had to go through all the paperwork that the Foreign Liquidation Commission went through, I don't think it would have saved us any time at all. In later days while I was in AMET, I heard more complaints about

foreign governments wanting everything for nothing than for any delay in the Foreign Liquidation Commission. I believe, however, that with the Foreign Liquidation Commission out of the picture in China, we saved the U.S. government a great deal of money. Given the problem of disposing the overseas Army surplus supplies, I would have placed the directorate right under the Chief of Staff in the Army for the purpose and manned it with not only a few logisticians from the military but as many civilian experts on the various parts of the world as I could lay my hands on and given them general direction of this surplus and letting them figure out what authority had to be given to the theater commander. Then I would have placed on the theater commander the job of getting rid of the supplies in his area under the directives which these Washington people had sent out making them as broad as possible and, of course, reporting to the Washington people whatever he had done with the surplus property. Then I would have given the theater commander a similar directorate for his staff, particularly thecivilian experts. Some of the FLC civilian experts in Cairo were excellent, and I believe nobody in the military had that kind of experience and consequently the civilians did a better job.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, did you have any difficulties determining what property was to be retained in Africa after deactivation of AMET?

LTG AURAND: Well, the instuctions on this subject were already in AMET when I got there and I gave very little attention to them because I was going to get rid of the property that still had to be gotten rid of. The only one that I recall was the keeping of Wheelus Field in Tripoli. On the other side of the picture, the stuff that we didn't dare sell as surplus, the United States Army had issued instructions on that and they were

complied with. These were about the same as I had in China and consisted of such things as classified signal communication equipment.

MAJ MORRISON: What was your relationship with King Farouk?

LTG AURAND: Well, he was very friendly. He was despised by the British, and he hated them in turn. He claimed that they had tried to kill him by making him wreck his fast sports automobile. He attended our officers dances which wer held at a nightclub which he owned. While I lived in Kairouran, he called on me informally several times, usually about 0200. On one occasion, he was accompanied by a very beautiful young lady from Belgium. He told me he had been on good terms with my predecessor. I saw him formally 3 or 4 times and after the usual ritual which he seemed to enjoy, our conversations were anything but stiff.

MAJ MORRISON: Please describe your visit to King Ibn Saud of SaudiArabia.

LTG AURAND: The reason I went to visit King Ibn Saud of Arabia in his capitol at Riyadh was to negotiate an agreement to purchase the equipment--for him to purchase the equipment which had been used to build the Dhahran Airport. It was understood that he wanted to build a railroad from Dhahran to Riyadh and of course, this equipment would be ideal for the ground moving part of the construction. Waynehouse had contacted the consul at Jidda - found on the Red Sea where the acting ambassador lived. A consul was all we had in Saudi Arabia at the time and he had agreed to arrange the visit. The plan was for AMET to send a C-47 to Jidda, pick up a consul and the consul was to go to Dhahran. In the meantime, my party and I would come to Dhahran on a C-54 and we would transfer to the C-47 and go and get on board with the consul and all of us go together to

Riyadh. Unfortunately, there was trouble with the C-54 and we couldn't use it. We had to use the C-47 which meant that we had to stop to refuel on the way and we refueled at the British airfield at Bagdad. There was still time though if we could get the consul's plane up in the air to meet us, rendezvous with us at Dhahran, with the two planes to get to Riyadh in time to go to the feast that was to be layed on for us that night. We were to spend the night in the palace. Well, a sandstorm came up and not only did neither of the planes find Riyadh but we couldn't find each other in the air and so we communicated, of course, and one fellow flew 2,000 feet higher than the other and we managed to find our way back to Dhahran where we spent the night. Well, the next morning we were up early. The storm had blown away and we landed on the strip of desert which was marked with white stones. It was a sole improvement as the landing strip and then we got in cars and drove right straight across the desert. I couldn't see any markings. As a matter of fact, there were about 5 or 6 cars and they all took different routes, sort of racing each other, and we finally got to Riyadh. We were met by Prince Faisal who was the king's, I think, second son and gave us a very good welcome. After this welcome, we went into palace Courtyard, a very beautiful place where the king received us and we went about our negotiations with some few difficulties. One was how to finance this purchase because we wanted the money right away and it was suggested that we could make a loan and Ibn Saud said, "No, I can't pay interest. It's against the Koran to pay interest and as keeper of the Holy places, Mecca and Medina, I am obliged to live very closely by the Koran." I don't know how the financing was

finally arranged, but we got an agreement for one of Saud's people and one of Ramsey's people to go to Dhahran and negotiate for the equipment and I believe it was eventually bought by Ibn Saud. Well, on the way back, we flew to Jidda where we refueled and then flew up the Red Sea to Cairo. It was a most interesting trip from the scenic point of view. I thought at one time that on that trip I had stopped at a town in Ethiopia about 8,000 feet elevation where we had a very powerful signal station in the world-wide network. Apparently, I didn't. I checked this at Abilene the other week when we were there. So, I must have made a separate trip and there is another town whose name I can't remember even though it was in the newspaper only a week ago. But it was a signal station place. I forgot to say that when we went back to the airstrip at Riyadh, we were met again by Prince Faisal and he had gifts for everyone in the party, and I received an Arab costume for myself and one for my wife and a very beautiful scimitar, a curved sword, which I treasure very much. This sort of hospitality is something that is peculiar, I think, to Mohammedans. I don't know why, but it is the duty of them to entertain anybody that comes to their house even though he is their worst enemy. Bill has just gotten out the map and the name of that town is Asmara.

MAJ MORRISON: That's way over in Ethiopia where . . . .

LTG AURAND: Ethiopia. Now that I look at the map I can see that it was impossible for me to have gone from Jidda to Cairo by Asmara.

MAJ MORRISON: Was there any popular resentment over U.S. troops remaining on duty in the countries of North Africa and the Middle East after the war was over?

LTG AURAND: Only in Cairo had I a chance to be familiar with such a situation. My headquarters were in the city and the soldiers who were assigned to it were pleasantly billeted nearby. The people of the city were able to distinguish between the American soldiers whom they liked and the British soldiers whom they disliked. Then something happened on the international level which I have been unable to discover and put the American soldiers in a class with the British. I moved our entire headquarters operation to a closed out general hospital at Camp Huckstep. That was out in the desert. The reason I announced for doing so was not the real one. I think this is the only time I attempted to fool the troops.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: Cairo was such a lovely place that everybody wanted to keep on staying there and they weren't working hard enough to close out the theater and I believed that if they were out in the desert they might work a little harder toward that end.

MAJ MORRISON: Did you have any important visitors and if so, please describe their visits.

LTG AURAND: There were quite a few visitors. One was a Navy rear admiral who I believe commanded the American Navy in the Eastern Mediterranean. I'm not at all sure of his title. He came into Alexandria where I met him. He left me with the impression that he thought I was under his general command and I didn't try to change his mind. General Lutes dropped by on a wide world trip but he was ill. I tried to get him to come to our hospital out at Huckstep. We still had a small station hospital joint but he prepared to stay in Shephards Hotel, the famous old hotel in Cairo.

I've already mentioned the visit of Tom McCabe and Under Secretary Royal which got Mr. Ramsey and me back on the track. I had some business with the British in Palestine and they offered to take me to some of the Holy places if I flew up to Lydda. My COMA commander, General Lee, now had a command in Italy at Leghorn and I invited him to come to Cairo and make the trip with me. I knew he was a very religious man and would enjoy doing this. All went well until our return flight. The pilot asked me how we would like to fly a quarter of a mile below sea level and I said, "Fine. That's something to talk about later on for a conversation piece." So, we flew over the Dead Sea and while doing so, one of our four engines quit. However, we were so light that the other three took us to Cairo without any danger. Mr. Hoover, the former President, came by on his around the world food mission. I asked the ambassador what the protocol for an ex-President was and he said that it was nothing. He was just a plain John Doe. But I turned out a guard of honor for him and he was very pleased. I have a picture of him coming down the ladder off the plane with a wide grin on his face. When I met him four years later, he remembered his entire around the world trip. King Farouk gave a dinner for Mr. Hoover to which I was invited. The King must have gathered together all the bands in the kingdom to play the National Anthems of Egypt and the United States. The assembled bands were entirely brass, but they played in a courtyard of the palace that was far enough away so that the reception we got in the dining room was just about the right amount of music and Mr. Hoover told the King that he had never heard our National Anthem

played so beautifully.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, did you continue the point system in sending your people home?

LTG AURAND: The point system was in effect in AMET as it was all around the world so far as I know and it caused some difficulty. Not nearly so many as China, by the way. For example, there were men at some of our fighter strips just clear across the bulge of Africa into the Sudan whom it would have been senseless to replace just because their points were up. Getting men in and out and getting somebody there to replace them was very difficult. And so I had the officer who was handling the disposal of these places ask the men to stay on until the place was declared surplus and then I went to Mr. Ramsey and asked him to let us turn this thing over on hand receipt, all this stuff, to the only possible purchaser. There was only one guy in each of these places who would possibly buy that stuff. Usually, it was a landowner, the fellow who had owned the land originally. Sometimes it was the government. He finally consented and then we pulled this whole bunch of people out so that that wasn't an embarrassment or didn't hurt anybody, anyway. For some jobs I had to bring in replacements, communicators primarily. And then there were the people whose jobs were over at AMET, we didn't need them anymore. They didn't have enough points to go home and those people we had to send to Europe as replacements for people in Europe. I thought that was terrible. But let's never have another point system.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, why did you have to be back in the United States by 28 May?

LTG AURAND: This was a mystery to me. It may have been an inquiry from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. After I returned to Chicago on leave from AMET, perhaps around the 7th of June 1946, Mayor LaGuardia had come to see Mayor Kelly of Chicago. He made an appointment for me to come see him, that is, to come see LaGuardia. LaGuardia was then the head of UNRAH and again I was offered the job of head man of UNRAH in China. No thank you. While in Cairo, I thought it might have been Ike who had found a job for me asking me to get back in time to take the job over, but when I got back to Washington, nobody knew anything about any upcoming job. In fact, I got back on Sunday the 26th of May 1946, and probably the fewest number of people that has been in the Pentagon since it had been built. I turned in my final report to a duty officer in what I call the War Plans Division and asked if there were any orders as I've said. And then I asked if the duty officer could get me an order for a months leave and he said yes he could. So, I took an order for a months leave. I expected to return from the leave about the 26th of June and retire on June 30. The commanding general in Chicago had very kindly sent a plane for me to get me from Washington to Chicago, sent his plane. There was a railroad strike starting at that time and it insured that I would get back to see my family. At this point I would like to explain why I requested the order I did. By letter of 22 March 1946 from the adjutant general, I received a list of general officers to be reduced one grade on 30 June 1946. I was told as theater commander to so inform these officers by a very complimentary letter, copy of which was enclosed for me to use. As I was the only officer in AMET on the

list as well as the only general officer in AMET, I replied that I refused to write myself such a letter. About the same time, I received a list of major generals who had served in the European theater arranged in order of performance of duty. I was next to last. This was somewhat less than I had expected because I had already been awarded both a DSM and a Bronze Star. Nonetheless, my future looked dim, so regardless of what Ike had said to me in January, I resolved to retire before I was reduced to BG.

MAJ MORRISON: In May of 1946, what was the purpose of activating a West African District of AMET in the Casablanca area when AMET was about to close out?

LTG AURAND: The West Africa District of AMET consisted of all French colonies in Africa. DeGaulle would not turn over to his colonial governors. any negotiations with the United States on any matter. I had already arranged with the surplus property officer of the U.S. command in Europe, I've forgotten the official title, for this arrangement. He was General Pritchard, a classmate and a very famous Army quarterback, Vernon Pritchard. He had come to AMET with a party to talk about the takeover of the surplus property in the French colony and the creation of an AMET district which could become his district as soon as AMET closed out. This seemed to be the easiest way and as my violin teacher used to say, "the easiest way is the best way."

MAJ MORRISON: This next series of questions will cover the period of time when General Aurand served in the Pentagon from June 1946 to April 1949, first as Director of Research and Development of War Department from June 1946 and then as Director of Logistics from November 1947. Sir, in June

1946 you became Director of Research and Development of the War Department. How did you happen to be selected as the Director and did you have other plans?

LTG AURAND: Upon my return to Chicago from AMET late in May 1946, I made up my mind to retire on 30 June 1946. In the meantime, I took 30 days leave which I spent with my family in Chicago. I was looking for a job. Through one of the trustees of Northwestern University whom I had called to active duty while I was in command of the Sixth Service Command in 1942-44; to straighten out some difficulties I was having with the general courts martial, and through Colonel Thomas R. Palfrey whom I've often mentioned in this account, who was a Professor at Northwestern University, I was proposed to the trustees for a position on the faculty which would be known as the Chair of Military History. I felt that I couldn't get rich at this, but it would be thoroughly enjoyable for me. I had been interviewed by quote "finding committee" unquote, of the board and was to appear before the board on Wednesday the 15th of June 1946. About a week before, however, Tom Handy who was still Ike's Deputy Chief of Staff, called me on the phone and said, "How soon can you get here to work?" And I told him of my intention to retire 30 June and that I wasn't coming back to work as a BG. "Don't worry about that," Tom says. "You'll probably have three stars by the time you get through here." I told him that the telephone was not piped for hot air, that if I were to keep my two stars, what was the job? "Director of Research and Development." "Well, what becomes of Borden?" I think it's William E. Borden if I remember correctly who had been in the ordnance school with me in 1916-17.

He was the director at the time Handy made this call. "Borden had an offer of a fat civilian job and was retiring. And he wants to go on leave, he, Borden wants to go on leave as soon as possible so he can get to work." Handy's question was, "How soon could I get there?" I said, "I'd catch the Capitol Limited on Thursday evening, the 9th of June." I think this was Wednesday afternoon he called and on 10 June, I was Director of Research and Development, War Department. How or why this came about, I don't know except that Borden was retiring and they wanted somebody quick.

MAJ MORRISON: What instructions did you recieve from your boss, Army Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower?

LTG AURAND: First and foremost, I was to keep scientists and development engineers in a friendly mood toward the Army. Second, during the demobilization period, I was to do my best to keep as many of them in the employ of the War Department as possible. When Ike retired on 7 March 1948, I reported to him that I considered that I had failed completely in carrying out these instructions. Undoubtedly, you will ask me in questions to come just what basis I had for making such a report and I believe that this is the place to give some general opinions on this subject. First, all the scientists who did war work in their own laboratories or in their own drafting rooms or what have you, wanted to switch them over to peacetime problems as soon as possible. They had enough of the military work. Next, those who were working in government establishments wanted to get back as quickly as possible to peacetime tasks, also. Finally, those who did stay in the government were harassed constantly by arbitrary reductions in force due to budget cuts. A sample of this

kind of order I received is this: have each technical service reduce it's personnel in the top three civil service grades by 10 percent.

MAJ MORRISON: What was the organization of the Research and Development Division and did you have to do any re-organizing?

LTG AURAND: About the internal organization of the R&D Division and the General Staff when I became the Director, I have little either memory or in my papers except that it may have been divided into sections of 1 or more technical services. I recall no organization, but I had never believed that one technical service should have a corner on one branch of science. They were all entitled to all the sciences. So ad hock groups were formed to suit each particular problem. This arrangement was made possible by the fact that I had an excellent deputy and an equally good administrator and through this proper structure at the top, I was unable to have all the people work directly for me. With no lower echelons or hierarchy and you've heard me talk about a non-hierarchical staff? Well, this a sample of a small one.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: I wouldn't say that because this worked it would work in a big one. I don't know. But it sure worked in R&D for me. When I came to R&D, General Doriot, Brigadier General Doriot, was the Deputy and he came to the Army from a professorship at the Harvard Business School and my administrator was Major Eklund. Doriot was offered a permanent Regular Army BG to stay on, but he refused it. Colonel Trichel, a very competent ordnance officer, chose to retire when he was told that he could not be promoted to BG if he took the deputy job. At this time, Colonel Creasy

came back from China, m. Deputy Commander in China. I got him as my Deputy. At the time, Dr. Marvin, President of George Washington University, became an additional Deputy. He was influential in both the scientific and political world which was an unusual combination. And among college and university presidents, he was a very well known and he had some very excellent ideas about supervising research and development work. Also, in the interest of carrying out my instructions from the Chief of Staff to keep the scientists friendly with the Army, Dr. Marvin and I together, went on several trips to make calls on scientists. One was in the general Boston area where I wished to visit Bordan, my predecessor at his civilian job in Southern New Hampshire. Dr. Marvin arranged for us to call on Doctors Compton and DuBridge at MIT and Dr. Connant who was the President of Harvard. I must tell this story. The only time that Dr. Connant could see us was to come early to work some morning at 7:30 because his days were very full. Doctor Marvin and I went up in the Washington night train to Boston and got in very early in the morning. So that we got out to Dr. Connant's office a little after 7. And my recollection is that his office occupied one small building on campus. There wasn't anything else in it. And there was just two big rooms, a reception room and his office. And the reception room was open and Dr. Marvin and I went in. And when we came in there was a man sitting in there. I wouldn't say that he had on the best clothes I ever saw, but he was nicely turned out. He wasn't dowdy. And there was no greeting. We just thought somebody was waiting to see Dr. Connant. About 7:25, the secretary came in and said that Dr. Connant would be in in a moment and pretty soon she said, "I'll take you in now

and we went in and this fellow followed right after. So, Marvin introduced me to Dr. Connant and when we had exchanged greetings, this man shook hands with Dr. Connant and he says, "Dr. Connant, you don't know me. I'm the biggest drunk in Cambridge. I have a bet that I would shake hands with you this morning and I've been sitting up all night waiting to do so." And with that, he disappeared. So, I'm sure now that you understand all about the organization in my office, this great Research and Development, War Department.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what was your relationship with the other G's?

LTG AURAND: Well, when there was an official getting together of all the G's, I was invited. But I insisted that the sharp line be drawn between Lutes services supply and procurement division and mine. That's not because of any hostility but it was too easy for one or the other of us to get in any other fellows business. We belonged as part of that section, and not as a separate directorate and that's what it became later. So when I say we drew a sharp line . . . .

MAJ MORRISON: Right now it's not officially part of it?

LTG AURAND: No, I was a separate . . . He was a G-4 and they called me G-6. I was so far away from the rest of the G's. I felt that that was better than getting into scrubbles of which officers should do what, and I insisted that my people not get into any affairs. I want to explain this for a minute to tell you what I mean. In the Army, it had always been the custom to buy prototypes out of procurement money so that as soon as we had a design made and it was ready to go to a firm to contract, we turned it over to Lutes. When it was built and ready for test, say

it was going to Aberdeen Proving Ground, it was turned back to R&D. We had to be very careful of who did what, both procurement and both in return. And that's what I mean by drawing a sharp line and that's what I mean when they say should all be under the same guy. Theoretically, I was responsible for Army Air Corps R&D which was completely organized to move into the position of R&D of the Department of the Air Force. The air line of demarkation with a remainder of the supply system was different from that which was then and continued to be for some time at least, the demarkation in the Army as I just explained. The Air Corps bought their prototypes out of their R&D funds so that their R&D people had complete control until it was standardized. There was also another G that I had to watch my line of demarkation with and that was G-1. Fortunately, Willard Paul and I were the greatest of friends and we would bargain with each other about it. The money was appropriated for this particular purpose so we weren't fighting for any money. The money went with the contract for this kind of research or the people who were doing it in house. But it seems to me that if you're going to have an outfit that's going to be the contact of the scientific world, it should be across the board and not part of the scientists who contact one of the G's and rest who make contact somewhere else. As I said before, you should have access to the whole rainbow, all the colors of science. By the way, I see there's been some little difficulty about this in the latest reorganization of the Department of the Army.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. R&D has now been, the Chief of R&D has been abolished and his duties will be put under a Deputy Chief of Staff for material acquisition, research and procurement, I believe.

LTG AURAND: Yes, but that leaves the human research business in the personnel department's hands. It's split again.

MAJ MORRISON: Oh, I don't think so.

LTG AURAND: Well, as I read it in one of the Army magazines I get, I think it was Army, G-1's bill has the field of human research which has to do with the individual from the time he is inducted until he becomes Chief of Staff. It's whether what kind of people should we send to . . . and all that part of business and incidentally, the best schools for that in the time I was Director of R&D was Princeton. They had at that time a unique human research group working on just these questions.

MAJ MORRISON: I thought that you were talking about items for the individual soldier.

LTG AURAND: Like the clothing they've tested up in Nahant or someplace?

MAJ MORRISON: Natick and what not.

LTG AURAND: Natick.

MAJ MORRISON: What was the main thrust of the War Department's R&D effort in the early years following World War II?

LTG AURAND: Of course, I considered the two instructions I got from the Chief of Staff to be my own personal main thrust but the R&D Division had several others. The constant reduction in budget made necessary a selection out of project. My operating procedure for this was to leave each technical service chief make his recommendations as to what he should quit working on to stay within his budget limitations. Then the people in my shop would look at all of those, all of those to be continued and all of those that had been cut out and see if there were some, let's say

quartermaster things that we wanted added to the quartermaster list so what can we cut out in the signal course. That kind of review at my level. Of course, this would all go back for reclaim if we made any change. But this was the way we arrived at the projects that would be discontinued with the amount of money that was allocated. There is always one guy that wants to ball up the thing -- having been one I know. And one of the chief's sent out, cut out all his most expensive projects. Well, of course, these were the ones that the War Department wanted most. So, I went down to see him and said, "You are playing games with me and I want you to quit and if you don't have this list, a reasonable one submitted to me by next week I'm going to make out your list myself." Under that threat, I got a very reasonable list. There was another bothersome thing that we were still doing R&D for Air Force support and even some of the signal equipment on the aircraft is being done by the signal corps. So, I had the tech service chief's make a separate list of that and turn it over to LeMay who was the R&D man for the Air Force, Curtis LeMay, and he would match it up against their own R&D because they were being cut back, also. So, the items that were for the support of a plane that was on the board, -- if it was being deferred -- our items could be deferred by us in the same way. And we had excellent coordination on that. Incidentally, I was warned about what a bad time I'd have with LeMay but I found him to be very friendly and cooperative. He and I had a difference. We never had to pass it up to the Chiefs of Staff to settle. We settled it ourselves. But, some of my subordinates who had difficulty with LeMay, I believe are inclined not to share my view.

MAJ MORRISON: Was there a large civilian participation in the R&D effort?

LTG AURAND: Well, a very large civilian effort both in my office and in the technical service, of course, some of thes civilians were in uniform. They were people commissioned just because they were scientists. I think I remarked that Wayne King, for example, had been commissioned in what was called the specialists, officer specialists corps. Well, they were later made UAS, but I don't believe any of the scientists in uniform had ever gone to basic training. They knew nothing about the military. The uniform was a convenience and I think it gratified them very much because they felt that they were in uniform during the war. Like Bill Knudsen being made a Lieutenant General. Same idea. Now, some of them stayed after the war and they were discharged as officers, you know, and hired back as civilians, and I think a great many of those who stayed on with us had been in uniform during the war.

MAJ MORRISON: What was the relationship between you and your R&D Division in the scientific world?

LTG AURAND: There were two considerations which made an easy relationship difficult. The first I can't emphasize too much so even though I've said this several times before, I'll say it again. The scientists had had their fill of working on military projects. They wished to be concerned only with peace time projects. However, there were a few, particularly in the aircraft business, who couldn't find anywhere, anywhere nearly comparable jobs. These men were invaluable to the soon to be formed Department of the Air Force. But there were not enough defensible in house jobs to take care of them even those that apparently existed were liable to be greatly reduced by demobilization and cutting of the budget.

Out of this situation grew Project RAND, which I believe is now the RAND Corporation. The second consideration was the lack of communication. The Army officer and the scientists spoke different languages and there was no Army scientific dictionary. I could think of no short range solutions to this problem nor could anyone else with whom I talked. But for the long pull, I recommended that we send potential R&D officers to civilian schools and universities to obtain Ph.D.'s in areas of their own choosing and let them bridge this communication gap. I went to G-1 to get approval for this and made the concession the G-1 could have a few each year in what they considered to be their area or his area of R&D. I'm not sure of the number but I believe that 25 in school at one time was the first limit set. But, alack and alas, by the time when the first one got out of college and got his Ph.D., neither the G-1 that made this agreement with me nor I were longer in Washington. Upon receiving his doctorate, he was ordered to the advanced course at the Armor School and then he was assigned as a tank battalion executive officer. To rescue him, I brought him to Honolulu as assistant control officer on the USARPAC staff and when this tour was up, he resigned. Again I say, damn career guidance. When I was R&D Director, I tried to bridge this communication gap by joining, by personally joining the American Society of Mechanical Engineers and I made speeches before various scientific and engineering groups at their regular monthly meetings of their local sections in the various cities. After one of these in Philadelphia where I had spoken of the Ph.D. training for officers, one of the press asked me after the meeting whether the officers selected to get this degree were all West Pointers. On the

contrary I said, there were people that had been integrated in the Regular Army who already had masters degrees and they were selected as they would get back to us sooner. The ne t morning, the Philadelphia press carried a front page headline which read, "General says West Point education no good." I stayed in Philadelphia for 2 or 3 days before I went back to the Pentagon. I should add that when Dr. Marvin became my deputy, he helped greatly in this matter of communication.

MAJ MORRISON: Did you get any flack when you got back to the Pentagon?

LTG AURAND: Yeah, I took it for about a week and then they forgot it.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. What was the purpose of the Joint Research and Development Board and did it do anything?

LTG AURAND: It's mission was to coordinate the research and development activities of the War and Navy Department. It was presided over where Dr. Vanever Bush and he selected as his board secretary, Dr. Berkner. Both of them were from the Carnegie Foundation. There was an assistant secretary of the Board for the Army and one for the Navy. The original members were, original board members were representative of the office of Chief of the Naval Operations who I believe was the Director of the Office of Naval Research and probably a civilian although I don't quite recall that. And a representative of the Chief of Staff of the Army who was General Devers then commanding the Army Ground Forces at Fort Monroe, Virginia. But the budding Air Force had to be placated. So the Chief of the Army Air Corps staff, General Spatz, was made a member along with the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for air. They had to have two airmen on board. All four of these officers, I believe, I'm sorry, all four of these board

members were officers except for the one that I mentioned who might have been a civilian and they all had deputies. I was General Devers Deputy. But these four people thought this board was so important that I never attended a meeting that all four principles weren't there. Since most of the confrontations in the board meetings were between the air members, I'm not sure what help it gave. There was very little in dispute between the Navy and ourselves until after unification and I might mention this although it was settled beyond my time in Washington. The office of Naval Research wanted to do a single service job for the Army and for the Air Force of placing all contracts for basic research. I opposed it for only one reason. It would still further cut the Army off from scientists and I considered that to be more of an objective for the Army Chief of Staff than to have somebody clear the contracts through. I did get a great deal of help from Drs. Bush and Berkner in making contacts with scientists and I believe that they obtained for me the first chief scientist of the Department of the Army.

MAJ MORRISON: What was the view of the War Department in '46-'47 toward performing basic research work by contract vs. in-house?

LTG AURAND: I believe we need a few definitions before I answer this question. Basic research means a different thing to the hearer than it does to the speaker and I don't care who the hearer and the speaker are. It is not a good term for communication purposes. It certainly isn't a good term to divide work, to base a division to work upon. Mostly it is accepted to mean undirected research. Merely doing what happens *if* but you must have been doing something when the *if* happens and so that some-

thing must have been directed. So how do you define basic research? To put it another way, people doing directive research often make discoveries in the process and that becomes basic research. These may be basic discoveries or they may be worthless discoveries. So there again, you have a confusion of what basic research is. The next definition which is needed is that of the term, "in-house". A clearer term would be in Army arsenals. If you use the word arsenal to mean not only the ordnance arsenals but any Army managed and financed plants. So, using arsenal in that term for in-house, I will try to answer your question.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: It has been my understanding that the combat people have always in the United States since the 1880's I know from history, reading my history, that the combat people have always been suspect of their fellow soldiers who ran arsenals and perhaps for good reasons. In the days of World War I when gas and tanks were new, it was popular for the combat people to say that the military never had invented a significant new weapon. Improvements, yes. Breakthroughs, no. After World War II, and other significant facts were added, you could not get the best scientists and best development engineers to work for the government even at the top civil service ratings. Their salaries were too low. But you could get them to work not only on military hardware but on military problems by paying them enough. Corporations like RAND are an illustration. But universities, industrial laboratories and private laboratories, all took contracts for military research. At any rate, while I was Director of R & D, the old split between the combat people and the technical people over

the arsenal system continued. The Army Air Corps had abandoned the arsenal system at the outset and had gone to project RAND for outside civilian help and the combat people in the Army wanted us to follow the same routine in the Department of the Army. The Navy objective to this also is that they wanted to keep their Navy Yards going. But, finally, the arsenal system is practically out and the saddest to me was that of the Metallurgical Laboratory at Watertown Arsenal which was the first one in the United States and for many years the people who studied metallurgy at Harvard and MIT came there for their practical instruction.

THIS IS SIDE 2 OF TAPE 5 OF A SERIES OF INTERVIEWS WITH LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY S. AURAND AND THE DATE IS 4 MAY 1974.

MAJ MORRISON: Did you agree with the idea that a "push button" war was the war of the future?

LTG AURAND: This question is one for strategists to answer, not a logistician. My memory is not at all clear as to my thoughts on the subject from 1946 to 1948. The German corps commander who was POW in Normandy sent a note to me which I told him I would not accept at which I sent word I would not accept, and one of my people read the note. In it, he said that most of his corps were prisoners and he would be willing to lead them against the Russians when we got into our inevitable war with Russia provided, of course, that we would equip his corps. He expected us to attack Russia immediately after the German surrender. This led me to think that we would be at the peak of our power in Europe on V-E Day and with the A-Bomb in our possession alone, solely. Nobody else having it yet. We could have an easy victory over Russia that would not be possible later on. Also, I was a great believer at what the Chinese said to me in Kunming, when I asked one of them when the war with Japan would be over. They replied, "When an American soldier stands guard at the door of the Palace of the Emperor of Japan." Thinking along these two lines of these two memories, I would say that my view of the atomic bomb between 1946 and 1948 was that it was a useful tactical weapon in support of the infantry.

MAJ MORRISON: Under wartime conditions, certain information must be withheld for obvious reasons. What were your views as Director of Research

and Development toward classifying of information for security purposes in peacetime.

LTG AURAND: My view of classification of papers and drawings in 1946-48 was based entirely on the purpose of not classifying them at all. For example, going to the absurdities perhaps, I was sure that there was great need for the complete classification of everything concerning the atom bomb. But I saw no reason at all for secrecy about atomic power. In fact, I felt that the impression should be given that these two were not connected at all. On the other hand, I felt it was absurd for the French to maintain or attempt to maintain any secrecy whatever about the recuperator of their 75 milimeter gun carriages at the time of World War I. Security here had two important drawbacks. First, they called attention to the recuperator and second, it made it very hard to manufacture. In maintaining the R&D office in 1946, I rarely, personally placed a classification on any paper. At least any that I originated myself. It was remarkable to me how quickly after it got to its first recipient, it got a classification put on it. While all this over-classification, as I call it, was going on I was told by the Chief of Information, to give Joe Alsop all the information that I had, photographs and everything else for two articles in The Saturday Evening Post and I was told this by the Chief of Information. Apparently he had arranged for these without consulting anybody else including myself but so long as he said give it to Joe, I gave it to Joe and it was so long as an article that it was split in two and published in two issues as I have indicated.

MAJ MORRISON: In 1946, what was the ratio between the R&D money given

to the seven technical services as opposed to that given to the Army Air Corps and do you think that this ratio was correct?

LTG AURAND: There are many reasons why the ratio should have been two thirds of the R&D money to the Army Air Corps and one third to the technical services and I've already told you one fundamental reason the Army Air Corps procured it's pilot and test models out of R&D money and the Army procured those out of procurement money. Likewise, the Army Air Corps had no arsenal system and consequently had to contract with organizations like RAND for most of it's basic R&D work. Although the modern thought is that the arsenal system is more expensive at that time, 1946, I feel sure that the Army plants and the arsenal system were under-bidding outsiders for the R&D work on a straight competitive bid basis. This alone made it necessary for the Army Air Corps to expend more money than if it had had an arsenal system. And since the tech service had an arsenal system, they didn't have to spend quite so much as the Army Air Corps for the research and development purposes. I read several published articles and one private paper by an excellent economist, that proved that the arsenal system is more expensive than outside contracting, but none of their arguments included the many side benefits that come from the arsenal system nor did they put a value on these side benefits. I feel quite sure that the arsenal system was the best in the long run and that by now, 1974, the arsenal system had been just about killed and there is no use crying over spilt milk.

MAJ MORRISON: How was the R&D program split when the Army Air Corps became the Department of the Air Force and how was it worked out?

LTG AURAND: When I took over the War Department R&D in May of 1946, most of the split had already been arranged by the creation of LeMay's office in the Army Air Corps staff. To the best of my recollection in using terminology of a later period, Eisenhower and Spatz, compromised the only two outstanding issues as follows: all the R&D being done at that time for the Army Air Corps by the seven technical services would continue to be done by them, by the seven technical services. In exchange, the Army Air Corps would do the R&D work on ballistic missiles beyond a certain range, a range which might be considered as the limit of direct ground support missiles. Spatz's argument was that beyond that range the missiles would be complimentary to the strategic bombers rather that the ground forces and even might develop into satellites. The R&D board however, declared that there would be no immediate work done on satellites because the expense was too great.

MAJ MORRISON: Was the Army reluctant to give up it's role in atomic energy to a civilian commission?

LTG AURAND: As far as I was concerned, this matter was handled entirely by General Groves and by the Manhatten District staff. I was informed of what went on but I was no part of it. To me it was more of a political problem than a technical problem. I believe I've already stated my view that the weapon part should have remained with the military and a separate civilian commission should have been set up to take over civilian use of atomic energy, particularly power. The exact War Department position during the hearings in Congress I don't recall and it is quite probably that I never did know it.

MAJ MORRISON: How did the reduction in force effect the efforts of those engaged in the R&D effort?

LTG AURAND: It wasn't so much the imposed reduction in number of people in both the technical services or my office, as the rush to get out of the Army. They were all the best people, and that really hurts. These best people were civilians in civilian clothes and civilians in uniforms and regular military. To this great loss, it was later added in force reductions according to budget set by higher authority. When we finally obtained authority to have this reduction expressed in dollars rather than in number of people, the effect was much, it was not so bad. It was much less than it had been when they say, take 10 percent of your first three grades of civil service people which was just murder.

MAJ MORRISON: While the reduction in force was taking place, were you contacted at all about the unification of the Armed Forces?

LTG AURAND: Yes. In two areas. The one that concerned R&D directly was the preparation of the separation agreements which were necessary to accomplish unification. This statement is so contradictory in terms that it should have been obvious to all, that what was being created was further separation, not unification. Which brings me to my second involvement, the concurrence in or objections to the various plans of unification which were sent to each one of the G's. I'm positive that my comments had no influence on the final decision. Finally, after I had been Director of Logistics of the Department of the Army with R&D, one of my subordinate divisions, I wrote a personal letter to Jack McCloy on the subject. The letter was dated in November 1948 and it contained the remark, "The easiest

way to obtain unification was to have abolished the War Department," was I thinking of my violin teacher again, the easiest way is the best way and I added, "I'm perfectly serious about this."

MAJ MORRISON: As a result of your experience over a long period in R&D, what would you consider to be the ideal weapon?

LTG AURAND: An anesthetic non-detectable gas good for days or even weeks with its - with no discernable after affects, the knowledge of whose discovery and production would be kept 100% secret. Try and get that one.

MAJ MORRISON: How did you happen to move from Director of Research and Development of the War Department to the Director of Services Supply and Procurement division of the Department of the Army. Also, what happened to the R&D Division?

LTG AURAND: Well, Roy Lutes who had been G-4 of War Department moved up to the Secretary of Defense's office as an executive to the assistant secretary who had handled things logistical in the Department of Defense. The R&D Division went to the Army G-4 as a subordinate division. I went with it and since I was the senior guy who moved over, I was made G-4.

MAJ MORRISON: What instructions did you receive in your new assignment?

LTG AURAND: None. Lutes briefed me on outstanding problems and my Deputy General Orval R. Cook of the Air Force who knew what was going on and what needed my personal attention, stayed on. Also, I had had quite a good deal of contact with both Lutes and Cook, while I was R&D Director. I told you about this sharp definition we had to make. And Lutes new office was only about 100 feet away from mine so that any trouble I had I could go in and see him. Cook was staying on until the separation had progressed to the

satisfaction of the Air Force as Norstad did as Chief of Plans and Operations. When Cook left, I had two Deputies in succession who were both excellent. The first was Dan Noce with whom I had lived in my first class camp at West Point while he was a yearling and then Bill Reeder whom I had brought up as a plebe and then met again in the far East during World War II when he was the G-4 man in IB.

MAJ MORRISON: As stated before when you first arrived in D/Log, it was called the services supply and procurement division. Its name was almost immediately changed to the Logistics Division. Why was that?

LTG AURAND: I believe I've already told you that the name was a misnomer because procurement is part of supply as, say, service, supply and procurement is sort of redundant. Also, one of the services that people get is supply so supply is part of the services you are under.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: Using that as my front for changing the name, I had a private reason. The day on Corregidor when General Embick had pointed out to me how much broader a field logistics was than ordnance alone, I had embarked upon a logistics career. Wouldn't it be great to be the first Director of Logistics of Department of the Army? Ike okayed the formal plea based on the duplication of names when he heard my real reason for wanting the name changed. His position was, he was tired of changing names . . . .

MAJ MORRISON: Please evaluate the members of your staff divisions, their strengths and weaknesses.

LTG AURAND: At this date, I can't recall how big the directorate was or

the details of it's organization. My guess would be there were 500 officers. I may be way off, but that's the best guess I can make. My recollection is that there were the following divisions, R&D, Plans and Requirements, Procurement, Distribution, Transportation, and Construction. The chiefs of these divisions all had had war time experience in the fields to which they were assigned. Lutes had assembled them with great care and great knowledge of their abilities and he had aimed them for his office in Washington. He knew them because he was on Sommervell's staff in Washington and had first a good line on them before he brought them in. I found nothing but strength and no weaknesses. And these same remarks applied to every officer in the directorate that I had occasion to see.

MAJ MORRISON: What qualities did you look for in a staff officer?

LTG AURAND: Well, first of all, he had to have those qualities of an officer of his own branch to such a degree that his contemporaries in his own branch thought of him as a comer. To this quality, I added certain specifics. He must have attended all the schools of his branch and at least the Command and General Staff College. Particularly, the junior officers of the staff were welcome with this minimum qualification. For the more senior officers, I desired previous staff duty and War College graduation. These were the things that could be measured that were on the record. There were other things that also might be added. Minor unit command was not essential, but it was desirable. He should have been a company commander in otherwords. For the immeasurable qualifications, I desired ability to work long hours without tiring. When a man gets tired, he doesn't think. The ability to work in a team which was very hard to

find on a staff. Pride of authorship in man is as great as his instinct for aggression and he likes to do the things his own way. The ability to make a good front board presentation, which I found very hard to find and a feeling of conscience and responsibility that he must never let his commander make a mistake. That's the number one duty of a staff officer, I don't care what level he's on on the staff. And a few staff changes and most of these were made because of the inability to produce what I considered to be a well researched and thought out staff paper. The staff produces nothing but papers and it's hard to get that idea across, too. Or sometimes, once at least, I had a complete mis-assignment. There's nothing much you can do about that except get somebody else.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. What was your relationship with the technical service chiefs and did you write their efficiency reports?

LTG AURAND: Of course, I had worked with all of them when I was Director of R&D, so there was nothing new about working with them when I became Director of Logistics. Most of them were old friends. Tom Larkin, my West Point classmate, who had been Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff in COMZ during my last months in Europe was quartermaster General. Even though up to the time of his appointment as such, he had been an engineer. Everett Hughes who had sent the memo to Bedell Smith, stating that I should be sent home from Europe was Chief of Ordnance. And we worked well together. We never talked about that incident, and we got along fine. If you remember, I don't believe I told that in a story but when I came back from my interview with Bedell Smith, I went to see Hughes right away. And I couldn't find him, but I did find him at lunch and asked him to come up to my suite

afterwards. I said, "Everett, I want you and I to continue to be friends. I've just seen the note you sent Bedell. We're going to have to work together in the future and I'm sure you did this for the good of the country and for winning the war and not against me personally." He never said a word, We shook hands and he never mentioned the thing again, although we were very much together and here was a case where we were very much together.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: If there was any noticeable difference in the normal relationships, it was because we were in a period of decline of men and money. Having closed out Sandy Hook Proving Ground in World War I, Southwest China and AMET in World War II, I knew something about how to get out and go about this reduction without upsetting the apple cart. I think I did a fair job because I had had plenty of experience. The chief of the chemical corps had gone about seeking re-appointment in a strange way. He hired a five percenter. Tony McAuliffe, the real pinch hitter for R&D, was brought back from line duty in Japan and made Chief of the Chemical Corps. Otherwise, things were pretty calm. I made it a habit to call on each of the seven technical service chiefs at their offices from time to time and to meet their most important people. I thought my relationships with all of them except the chemical guy were fine.

MAJ MORRISON: Was any effort made to change the supply system while you were the Director of Logistics?

LTG AURAND: Well, I didn't start anything anywhere. There might have

been changes in the supply system within overseas commands. There had to be. As commanders were changed and as the demobilization took place. But from the Department of the Army viewpoint, the book was being put back together again. The big difference between 1948 and 1950 was that the three main functions of the supply system, requirements, provision and distribution, were all in my office. The aberration of separating procurement from the rest of the supply functions which existed between the World Wars was ended by Somervell. The aberration of separating R&D from the rest of the supply system during the last days of Somervell was terminated when I moved R&D into D/Log. But the lack of understanding of the necessity for maintaining unity of the supply system had once more caused the confusing separation of its elements in the latest 1974 reorganization.

MAJ MORRISON: How were the separation agreements worked out between the Army and the Air Force with the respect to logistical matters and how were these put into effect?

LTG AURAND: The separation agreements involved not only the Army and the Air Force but also the Navy. The Navy was in there grabbing off anything we argued about. A committee was established under the chairmanship of Roy Lutes reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense, the top representatives in the logistics business from the Air Force, Army, myself and Navy Admiral Carney. Carney had two observers with him. One from Naval Air and one from the Marine Corps. We met weekly or most of one day each week, putting out propositions and either agreeing on them or sending them back to sub-committees for reconstruction of the points of difference.

When agreements were reached, the formal paper was prepared, signed by the three regular members of the committee and Roy Lutes, and then sent to the respective Chiefs of Staff. They were seldom sent back for further consideration. I believe that they went on up to Roy Lute's office from the Chiefs of Staff to the Assistant Secretary for Logistics and he put the final approval stamp on it. But actually, when all three chiefs had signed them they issued orders putting them into effect and that's the way they were put into effect by orders in each department saying that this is now the arrangement. And I don't know whether those orders were filed with the committee.

MAJ MORRISON: Wasn't there a problem in the servicing of the Air Force stations and bases?

LTG AURAND: Yes there was. This problem entered into the final compromise to which I've already referred between Eisenhower and Spatz. Ike was determined that there would be no duplication of the Army technical service in the Air Force no matter under what name they were disguised. In the long run this position proved to be untenable. My memory is that this agreement was openly violated in the case of flight surgeons who were supposed to be part of the Army Medical Corps. So, with the Air Force's foot in the door in the medical business, it wasn't too long before they were running their own general hospitals. This foot in the door tactic which proved to be successful for the medico's was repeated in almost every one of the Army technical services.

MAJ MORRISON: You mentioned the Department of the Army having a chief scientist. How was he obtained?

LTG AURAND: I believe he was obtained through Bush and Berkner of the R&D board.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: Through the Carnegie Institution anyway. So we had one but he was very hard to obtain. I had been seeking for one all the time I was Director of R&D without success. I exchanged Christmas cards with this first chief scientist for some years afterwards. But his name escapes me and if you want a guess, it was Loughbridge. Now there may not be a "b" in the name. It may be Loughridge. I think he was from the University of Washington. Anyway, he was from the Northwest corner of the country. He was succeeded by Dr. Gaskill who I still know very well even though we were together a very short time. We both, many years later, worked for George Olmsted in Washington and his name is Howard, Dr. Howard Gaskill. Don't count too much on that.

MAJ MORRISON: How did the reduction in force effect the efforts of those working in the logistics directorate?

LTG AURAND: As far as personnel was concerned, by January 1948, the level of the directorate, that is in Washington, had pretty well stabilized. The difficulties were mostly in the close out. Procurement wise, they were the problems of contract negotiation in closing of government owned plants. Incidentally, that contract negotiations went on for years. I don't know how long. It seemed to me that it was overly emplasized by the controller general, the fellow that works for Congress, and he put a lot of snags into the making of final agreements. Somehow or other, if this thing ever happens again, of course, I don't know what happened now after Vietnam.

There has to be the formula approved in advance and it should be on the Books of Congress now, I mean it should be a law now of what we're going to do to re-negotiate it at the end of the war. The contractor should know that in advance instead of having to wait for years to get his money. Probably have to borrow it and if he borrowed it now he'd go broke with the interest. So, I've mentioned contract re-negotiation as one of our most serious problems of the times, although we didn't do it. I mean, this was a tech services and the contractor who really did it and the contractors were all going to court but we were supposed to work out policy direction for the tech services and we got interpretations of the law from the judge advocate general which we passed on so that all the tech services would have the same interpretation. There was a lot of good foot work that had to be done to keep this thing on the track. Within the United States, there was a problem of disposition of surplus property just like there had been overseas and this also involved a disposition of real estate. Some of these problems involves civilian manufacturers. For example, the problem of disposing of trucks. The manufacturers feared that we'd flood the market with a great number of second hand Army trucks and resumption of production of civilian types of trucks would be delayed, and that would keep that many more people unemployed and so on. I don't know what the answer to that was. I've forgotten. I believe that Congress suggested to one of the appropriations committee that the Army keep them and, you know, rob them for parts and keep those trucks going for their own purposes rather than put them on the market and maybe that was the answer, but it was after my time. There were places overseas where

military property was lying about rusting and unguarded. To clean these up would be impossibly expensive. In the Western Pacific, Generalissimo was told that he could have everything he wanted that he found left on the atolls provided he furnished the labor and transportation. I don't know whether he took any or not. The problems of providing both construction and supplies for occupying troops overseas were new and different. It was not only reduction in force that brought strange problems to bear, the construction of the future, for the future at the new stations of troops overseas that had a great effect on D/Log during the period that I held that office.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. You made a deal with General Wedemeyer, the Director of Plans and Operations, to put your plans people with his. How was this done and what did it accomplish?

LTG AURAND: The purpose was to put logistical information into the minds of the strategic planner in the early planning process thus preventing the working out of complete plans which were logistically illogical or impossible. While not intended to prevent taking some chances on shortages or insufficient personal logistical support, this arrangement did provide the strategic planners with some idea of by how much they were short and whether they were that much short, if there was any use in going ahead. It was an attack on the old planning concept announced by Gerow at the time Wedemeyer wrote the victory program in 1941 that the strategy would come first, the forces to carry out the strategy next, and the logistical requirements last. Without reversing this order, which I believe is absolutely necessary to sound planning, it provided simultaneous planning

of all three. They weren't steps anymore. This arrangement greatly reduced the amount of work which had to be done in previous cases where the plan was completed, the logistical requirements computed, that plan was found impractical, and we had to start it over again. I thought it worked fine. I never heard Al Wedemeyer make any complaint about it and I don't know whether it's being used today or not. But it certainly worked well. All it was was that my planner - I turned over a certain number of rooms to Al Wedemeyer out of my space allotment in the Pentagon and I said, "Now, I'm taking my planners and I want to put, you can spread your planning division out into those, but in every office where you have a planner, I want a fellow of about the same grade, a logistic planner." And they worked in pairs like that.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, he changed his mind from the days of Fort Bayard.

LTG AURAND: Fort Bayard? I don't know that he changed his mind as I told you already, I think he was so absorbed with what was going on between the ambassador and the G-mo and himself and he had endless problems of the Navy. You can't believe this, but it's so. I just know, well, I've read his book and I've known some of them from that and I've talked to him a little bit. How he could pay any attention to the USFCT forces is amazing.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: I don't think Al did a bad job in China. I think he did a marvelous job in China. I'm not critical of him at all. He just had too much for one man to do. That was the simple answer to that.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. While you were D/Log, the name of the Army ordnance association was changed to the American Ordnance Association. What brought

this about?

LTG AURAND: The change was brought about by the spirit of unification, believe it or not, selling of this idea within the association was done by its first secretary and later president, Colonel James L. Walsh. He came to me about the proposal of changing the name and after talking with Secretary Forrestal's military secretary and briefing this military secretary on the proposal, I suggested that it would be some help to unification if he would receive Colonel Walsh and give the Colonel time enough to explain the proposal. The Secretary of Defense did so and I accompanied Colonel Walsh when he made the call. I believe that this was the only military association and I'm sure it was the first to take such a step. By the way, now, the association changed it's name again. It's now the Preparedness Association, the American Preparedness Association.

MAJ MORRISON: In 1949, an idea was developed whereby the Army would exchange Army posts and their valuable plots of land within city limits for land further out in the countryside and equivalent facilities. I believe that the cities were to pay for the land and the construction of the new facilities. What part, if any, did you pay?

LTG AURAND: My part was to personally investigate the possibility of such exchanges from the point of view of the city governments. This was to be a preliminary survey with no publicity so that the real purpose of my visit was not told even to the local commanders. They were given my schedule and asked to make dates for me with the mayors of the cities in which I would call. As I remember it, the cities were Salt Lake City, Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles and San Diego.

MAJ MORRISON: All on the West Coast.

LTG AURAND: Yeah. I left out Monterey. I visited Monterey also. I met with all the mayors except in San Francisco and the mayor there was away but I met with his stand-in. I got the same answer in every city. The mayors laughed at the proposal. They thought it was very amusing. Each one of them told me that there would be a nice profit in exchange of land outside the city for a very valuable piece inside even if they had to build a new post. But they weren't going to spend anything. They had senators and representatives in Congress and they were going to get the things for free.

MAJ MORRISON: They weren't for free. Somebody was paying for it.

LTG AURAND: Not their city taxpayers, anyway.

MAJ MORRISON: General Bradley became Chief of Staff a few months after you became D/Log. How was it to work for him?

LTG AURAND: He was changed from Ike in manner but not in substance. Brad's experience as a Secretary of the general staff in 1940 apparently made the early days of his regime much easier, at least procedurally. He sent for more often than Ike had. But this may have been because most of my duty under Ike had been as Director of R&D rather than Director of Logistics. Both held regular meetings of the G's and such others as the Chief of Information. Based on my recollection of more than 25 years, Ike sent for me more often to explore his own thinking or present an idea which might be investigated. Brad usually wanted my personal views on some problem already before him. But really, there was very little difference

between them particularly in the way they functioned as Chief of Staff.

MAJ MORRISON: Did you ever have any differences with your superiors?

LTG AURAND: Yes. With one of my civilian superiors. D/Log really had two bosses under the new organization of the Department of the Army in 1948-49. They were the Chief of Staff and the Under Secretary of the Army. The Under Secretary looked after the logistical things for the Secretary. The Under Secretary was Gordan Grey. He was one of the finest gentlemen as well as a most confident Under Secretary. He had a room at one of the corners of the Pentagon. On one side was his military executive, Colonel Hiese, an old ordnance friend of mine. On the other was my office. Both of us, Hiese and myself, had inside connecting doors with Gordan Grey's office. And both of us used these doors freely as did Gordan Grey in the other direction. I believe that it was in the summer of 1948 that there was a dock strike on the Pacific Coast. Harry Bridges was the union leader. The Army was dependent on him to provide stevedores for Army cargo at Oakland. And at Seattle, also. On the day the strike began, Bridges furnished no stevedores for this purpose, for the handling of Army cargo. A meeting was called in Grey's office to consider what action should be taken. It was a small meeting. Ed Leavey, the Chief of Transportation, Hiese and myself were there, but I recall no one else. Leavey had most of the facts bearing on the study not only through his technical channel with the port commanders, but also because he was married to the sister of Hawaii's delegate to Congress and had served in Hawaii. He knew of Bridges and his ILWU pretty well; Grey then said that he proposed to call Bridges and find out whether he would handle Army

cargo during the strike. I demured. I remarked that he had a very fine port commander in Oakland who reported directly to Leavey. The port commander should make the first approach to Bridges in this particular matter. Also, Mark Clark was the Army commander in San Francisco and he might be called upon next if the port commander failed. Grey should hold himself as the last reserve, if they both failed to open the port and should go to San Francisco to deal with Bridges and not tie the deal with him on the telephone. But Grey insisted on calling Bridges and asked us to remain in his office while he made the call. Apparently, over the phone, Bridges agreed to open the port on the first shift the next day. Well, due to the difference in time, it was late the next morning when Grey called us together again. The port was not open and he couldn't reach Bridges. He was calling Mark Clark to give him the mission of opening the port. Then we were dismissed. But he never came through the unlocked door to my office again. Most of our conversations took place through Colonel Hiese. After the strike was over, I informed Brad that I thought he would be better served with a new D/Log than by me. I told him the story of the affair with Grey. I asked him for personal reasons to give me an assignment for 2 more years of active duty. I was willing to do so at my permanent rank of Major General. He asked me to wait. It seemed a long time before he asked me if I would like to go to Hawaii for the 2 years that I wanted until I retired. I had learned another lesson. Never get into a position with your boss where you might truthfully say, I told you so.

MAJ MORRISON: When did you leave D/Log and who was your successor?

LTG AURAND: Well, I left in the latter part of March 1949. Tom Larkin was my successor and I was much pleased. Gordan Grey gave us a farewell dinner and my wife Betty was seated next to him. During dinner he asked her if we were leaving because of anything that he had done. She didn't have to act surprised. She was. And she replied to the effect that I did not always tell her everything about my official business. I've seen him now and again since and he has always been most cordial. I saw Mark Watson after my orders were out to go to Hawaii and he asked me to review his book that he had written for the historical section entitled, Chief of Staff, Pre-War Plans and Preparation. I read it on the transport on the way to Honolulu and the only comment that I made was to indicate where he could give Jimmy Burns, the General, more commendation. For the group part or group four part of this Oral History, as you know, this book has been our memory assistance to a great extent. Somehow or another, I've had a theme song whenever I left for a new assignment. When we left Aberdeen Proving Ground for Washington it was, "when I'm in Washington." On the way to China, it was, "well, we'll all go up to China in the springtime." On the way to Hawaii, my wife, daughter and I sang, "Red Sails in the Sunset." It would be 15 years before Betty and I would be singing, "California, here we come."

MAJ MORRISON: What was your most pressing issue when you were D/Log?

LTG AURAND: There were a number of short lift pressures but none of them can be described as most pressing. Off the cuff, there was the standardization with the British, the San Francisco dock strike, the attempt to arrange for the removal of the Army facilities from the heart of the

various cities, the last Hoover commissioned report on government reorganization and the relationship with the new atomic energy commission. The pressure that was constantly with us was pressure of writing up all of the separation agreements. I can think of nothing else that stands out at this time.

MAJ MORRISON: What achievement as the D/Log and/or as the Director of Research and Development, did you take the greatest pride in and why?

LTG AURAND: Well, I'm going to change the word pride in your question to pleasure. The only thing I took great pride in was the standardization with the British of the nut that fastens the wheel to the axle of the jeep. When I was on duty in Washington in the winter of 1924-25, I was told that any man who wants to get a single thing accomplished could get it done before his general staff tour was up if he began to advocate it as soon as he got on the staff, and also that he had to stick to it all the time in between. During my 1940-41, I decided to give this a try. I would get rid of the Sam Browne belt. I went to the commodity section of the office of the assistant Secretary of War and found out sure enough that leather was in short supply. Then I went to the quartermaster general's office and asked him how much leather would be required to make a 100,000 Sam Browne belts. It was a terrific amount, even when it was reduced to the number of animals required to furnish it. But what made this situation still worth while was that the leather for this belt required an odd tanning process and there were very few and there was a very limited capacity, very few tanneries that had this process. I put these facts into a staff study for approval by the Chief of Staff to the abolishment of the Sam Browne

belt and it was approved, much to my surprise. However, the approval had a codicil. The Sam Browne belt could be worn as long as anybody owned one or as long as one could buy one. They didn't want to gyp the military uniform suppliers who they stocked up on the Sam Browne belt. My reason for doing this was that I hated the Sam Browne belt. When I was D/Log, I thought I would try this again. I would abolish the horse. I had someone else start the study but the idea was kicked around so much that I don't know who actually signed the original study. My task was to follow the study around and see that it didn't die in somebody's "hold" basket and convince any objectors or their daughters along the way to act favorable on paper. Whether or not I signed the final study or merely concurred in it, I don't remember. But the horse was abolished. I hate horses. There's a sequel to this story. We had quarters at Fort Meyer and our 10 year-old daughter was in a riding class for girls about her age. One day she reported that there would be no more riding class because the horses were being taken away. A little later she came in one day, looked me squarely in the eye and said, "My friends tell me that you are the one who sent our horses away?" I had to admit that I had something to do with it. Whereupon a flood of tears, she beat me on the chest screaming, "Meanie, Meanie." She wouldn't speak to me for quite a while. Well, you can't please everybody.

MAJ MORRISON: This next series of questions will cover the period of time when General Aurand was in Hawaii as Commanding General of the U.S. Army, Pacific from 9 April 1949 to 31 August 1952. Sir, what were the circumstances surrounding your reception upon arrival in Hawaii?

LTG AURAND: Well, the reception was wonderful and in true Hawaiian style. The transport was boarded by Lieutenant Colonel Weyand, a very fine staff officer, who had left leis on the transport as we arrived. It was a pretty choppy day for him to come out. Nice strong tradewinds and the weather was, you know, full of little clouds in the sky. Lovely Hawaiian weather. He briefed us on the ceremony at the dock, which was very much like the ceremony which greets all the tourists and the cruise ships and what not. My daughter had leis from her heels to her head and we were equally decorated, and by the time we reached quarters #4, Palm Circle, our home for the next three and a half years, there was no doubt that we were welcome.

MAJ MORRISON: Was that the present Vice Chief of Staff?

LTG AURAND: Yes.

LTG AURAND: Officially, I performed my usual routine of visiting each staff section and having staff meetings afterwards at which the staff section chief whom I've visited since the last meeting made reports to the staff.

MAJ MORRISON: Did your previous experience as a Commanding General in the United States, in France, in China and in Egypt assist you in Hawaii?

LTG AURAND: Well, there are a few specific things which I learned along the way. A few of them fit the situation in Hawaii. Being a U.S. Army Commander in a joint overseas command was unique and so was my relationship with the U.S. Army - and so was my relationship with the U.S. Army Far

East, MacArthur's outfit in Tokyo. My basic training experience in the U.S. helped me with the Hawaiian Infantry Training Center which I believe we'll talk more about later. I had medical evacuation experience in France which helped me out with that during the Korean War. I had the actual practice of coordination within my staff and command from all four places. Then there was the concept of civilian advisors from my U.S. experience, that is, m Sixth Service Command experience. And I suppose a lot more of this sort of thing that does not immediately come to mind. I believe what happened to me can be summed up in three pictures I can no longer find. All of them were of me seated at my desk as the newly arrived Commanding General. The first one was taken in Chicago. I was still wearing one star as my two stars had not yet been confirmed by the Senate and there was the expression of a lamb being led to the slaughter. The second was in China with my two stars in place and a rather pleasant expression on my face. Third was taken in Hawaii. There were the three stars and the facial expression of a man who had just inherited a billion dollars. I never got to the place where I put them in order in one single frame with a sign underneath reading, confidence requires experience.

MAJ MORRISON: Please explain the composition of your command.

LTG AURAND: A staff was organized very much according to the book. The main difference from the pre-war book being the control division. It was a spot for deputy commander which was filled by Floyd Parks. He was pulled out in a hurry to go back to Washington as Chief of Information to replace General Pritchard who had been killed in a motor boat explosion. Percy Clarkson who was his replacement soon became engaged as commander

of one of the atomic bomb tests so he was away most of the time. During his absence, I had Wootch Fielder, Kendall J. Fielder, also a quarterback. This one from Georgia Tech, as my Chief of Staff who acted as Deputy Commander and Frank Elder who was my Chief of Staff in Normandy as Deputy Chief of Staff and he acted as Chief of Staff. All of these people I had known before and I believe I had referred to Vernon Pritchard as the head of the surplus property disposal outfit in Europe. He was a quarterback and a classmate. The Fielders lived in the same apartment building as we did in Washington during the winter '24-'25 and the headquarters at the War College during the time I was there from '33-'37 on the faculty and as I said, Elder was my Chief of Staff in Normandy. Ed Hull, my predecessor, acquired a new Chief of Staff whom he recommended highly. Before I left Washington he asked that I give him a trial to see if he was satisfactory. He hadn't arrived when I did but he got there shortly afterwards and he was a very fine staff officer and it wasn't long before he became a BG. His name was Bob Young. He certainly lived up to Ed Hull's description and I was very sorry to see him go. Afterwards I got along with Fielder and Elder arrangement. On the command side, there still existed two of the defense sectors on Oahu. Ferenbaugh and Pierson commanded them. As these excellent people returned to the mainland, I abolished the district organization. The main posts on Oahu, and they were all on Oahu except one, were Fort Shafter, the headquarters post, Schofield Barracks, home at that time of the 5th Regimental Combat team, Fort Ruger which was mostly occupied by the Hawaiian National Guard and in addition when the trust territory was set up as a civilian organization,

the trust territory had it's offices there. Fort DeRussy, a reserve headquarters and a recreation area on Waikiki Beach, Fort Armstrong and Fort Kamehameha, both used for quarters only and many small tracks of land which contained fixed batteries of guns ranging from 6 to 16 inch, all surplus, ammunition storage areas and ravines and old craters and mountain top observation posts. All of these were on Oahu. On the island of Hawaii, there was Kilauea Military Camp, a recreational facility. There were troops at the port, Fort Shafter and Schofield only. There was also the ROTC unit at the University of Hawaii which controlled the high school ROTC units on Oahu. I demobilized the ports stevedores early in the game and I substituted civilians in the employee of the civilian company.

MAJ MORRISON: What coordination did you make with the CINPAC, commander in chief, Pacific?

LTG AURAND: Well, I was with two-hatted commanders. On my last assignment before retirement, my boss wore two hats. Admiral Arthur Radford was both CINCPAC and CINCPAC FLEET. He held weekly briefings at CINCPAC headquarters and that was about the extent of the coordination. The fact that the Far East command under MacArthur was not part of his domain made his job most difficult. I understand there's a proposition afoot now to split the Pacific into two and that will be terrible. Reaching back into my solution of two-hatted problems without changing anything but titles, MacArthur should have been CINCPAC and Radford, CINCPAC FLEET and I sould have been under MacArthur as U.S. Army Hawii. But given the situation as it was and with specific instructions from Bradley to get along with the Navy, I spoke pleasantly to Radford anytime I was spoken to. Local coordination

within the Navy was effected through the commandant, 14th Naval District and starting with Soc, for Socrates McMorris, they were all great fellows and easy to work with. By the way, McMorris was Nimitz's Chief of Staff during World War II. We worked out the joint shore patrol MP command in Hawaii much as we had in Chicago with Admiral Downs and we had many cooperative uses of our two ports, the port of Pearl and the port in Honolulu Harbor. And there were many other minor things where we saved money for the government and worked for ourselves.

MAJ MORRISON: In the summer of 1949, the Army held a joint exercise with the Navy which was called Operation MIKI. Was the joint exercise worthwhile?

LTG AURAND: By this time, the lower ranks of both services, Army and Navy, had not participated in the landing operation. It was my understanding that the purpose of this exercise was to provide them with this experience. I believe it was the 2nd Division which stationed at Lewis at that time which was embarked from the West Coast and accompanied by suitable Naval forces, came to Oahu to make a landing on the leeward side of the island. The defending forces consisted of the 5th RCT Army, a few Navy patrol craft, and a couple of submarines. A group - I wish I had had it. A couple of submarines, Navy, and a few passenger aircraft representing reconnaissance planes and bombers provided not by the Air Force but by the Navy, but they represented Air Force. As a tactical exercise, it was meaningless particularly to my forces on the island of Oahu. The 2nd Division had to get ashore so they had to win and as the experience

for the men of the division, it certainly was something. I think they got a great experience in landing, half of the boats coming through the surf on even the quiet side of Oahu, came in sideways and they had a lot of real good fun getting ashore through the coral. As an experience for the men of that division, it was something. Undoubtedly, the Navy, both sea and air, got a good deal out of it. Coincidentally, Major General W.M. Robertson who had meant so much to my career and has been mentioned here so many times and had commanded the 2nd Division in Europe, was chief umpire for that maneuver. He was then Deputy Commander in San Francisco. Altogether, it was a happy experience for all of us but I believe what we learned on Oahu was very little. I think what the Navy and the 2nd Division learned was a great deal.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir. I believe that you participated in the dedication of the National Cemetery of the Pacific on 2 September 1949. Sir, what were the circumstances?

LTG AURAND: The National Cemetery of the Pacific had been located in a crater which was almost in the business center of Honolulu. Here was buried all the casualties from the Pacific that were not, either returned to the United States or buried further forward like in the National Cemetery in the Philippines. And all the residents of Hawaii whose families decided to have them brought home to be buried. Due to the large number of Buddhists wheels and Stars of David, that would be required - not so much the Stars of David but the Buddhist wheels in Hawaii. A vote was taken by the newspapers to determine whether they wanted vertical crosses and Buddhist wheels or whether to take flat stones at ground level and just

inscribe those. The vote was overwhelmingly in favor of the flat stones. However, by the time the cemetery was to be dedicated, the flat stones had not arrived and for some reason the day of the dedication couldn't be set back or the authorities didn't want to set it back. So, the engineer in charge of the construction of the cemetery had the brilliant idea of putting up temporary wooden Crosses and to satisfy the Buddhists and the Jews, he had metal wheels stamped or metal Stars of David stamped which he nailed right at the intersection of the Cross. It made beautiful sight. He lined them up so that anyway you looked at them, you were looking down a straight line of Crosses even though it was quite undulating land. In this fashion, we dedicated the cemetery. When the stones finally came, I talked with the two newspaper editors and some of the people in Honolulu that I knew, I'd gotten to know, about taking down the Crosses and everybody was against us 100% but I had no money to maintain the Crosses and the termites were getting them pretty fast. I finally layed off one man and his salary per year replaced the first years loss but by the second year, the loss was getting too thick for me to take it out of my hide on cemetery maintenance. Lloyd Parks who had been my Deputy for awhile and was now Chief of Information in the Department of the Army headquarters in Washington knew the situation very well, particularly about the ballot taken before I came, as to the flat stones and I told him the story and asked him to see if he couldn't sell keeping up the wooden Crosses until things have died down. But he had no luck and I finally appealed to, I think it was Joe Collins by this time. It may have been Bradley. And they said, "no." You got to pull them out. Well, the question was how to do it. And I

was sure if I announced it in advance and again trucking Crosses out to be burned on a dump at Fort Kamehameha, there would be people lying in front of the trucks and everything else. The cemetery might be full of demonstrators and it would be a mess. So, I conducted a drill with a bunch of truckers and a bunch of men out of an ammunition crater which was back of Pearl Harbor and going in there and loading up a theoretical load of ammunition, hauling it out to Kamehameha and dumping it in the dump. And we worked this drill 2 or 3 times. I found the best time of the day to do it traffic-wise and so on. Then Fielder who had lived in Honolulu and lives there now went to one newspaper editor and I to the other, and we said now on a Friday and we said, "during next week, we're going to take out the wooden Crosses." And they said, "Will you let us know further?" And we both said, "The decision has not yet been made." Well, on Sunday night, I alerted the outfit to be in the National Cemetery of the Pacific, not the other crater, at 4:00 a.m. and by daylight there wasn't a Cross in the cemetery. Well, the cemetery didn't open until 9:30 amyway, and when the first visitors came up there, there were no Crosses and, of course, the papers got hold of it immediately and I was in dutch for a couple of months in the local population.

MAJ MORRISON: Was any pressure places on you to release the general recreation areas of Kilauea and Fort DeRussy and if so, what was your reaction?

LTG AURAND: Ed Hull had warned me of this pressure and had expressed the opinion that it could not long be resisted. Before taking it any further in Washington, I thought it would be well to experience the pressure in

Honolulu. It was there alright. Not so much about Kilauea which only had one single pressure point but about DeRussy where the pressure was constant. There were plenty of small plots of land all around the islands which I declared surplus and after a review in Washington, their plots were returned to the territory. We didn't sell any of those plots that I recall. My public relations people did get most of these transactions into the papers, but the comment was that DeRussy was no longer needed by the military and it should be disposed of in the same way. I really came out on the wrong end of that publicity. To strengthen my hand, I obtained money to build a reserve training center there. There was much opposition until it was built and then, of course, the building being there and the reserves enjoying it, the opposition rather died. The Korean War silenced any further criticism of the Army holding on to DeRussy. Kilauea, next to a national park and furnishing the water supply for both the park people and visitors and for the Volcano Hotel was much wanted by all the visitors that came along, including my own people. And Kilauea was run by all three services. We had Army, Navy, and Airmen maintaining the camp. Very few of them. It didn't take much to keep that up. So it was not a great expense. It was most useful to the park and to the tourists. I tried to get at the real reason, this pressure came -- it was built up and it came from the island of Hawaii, the big island on which Kilauea was located. It had been built originally as an internment camp and the people of Japanese ancestry in the population wanted to get rid of it. It was an ugly mark. Very few people were interned in Hawaii and I believe that the people who were interned were officials of Japanese

owned companies or company offices or branch banks or things of this kind that were directly people who were temporarily in the island. There were people who were interned and were very carefully screened to make sure that they couldn't be left out rather than the other way.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: They had to be put in. One of the most humane things that was done during the war. But the pressure began - we want this camp out of sight. Done away with. Nobody wanted it for anything else. It was just a sore mark and that's all I could make out. It may have had other reasons but if so, I never found them. Anyway, CINCPAC persuaded the authorities in Washington to hold fast and the pressure there slowly died much to the delight of the park service and the volcano huts.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what was your relationship with the United States command in Japan?

LTG AURAND: I was told to visit General MacArthur once a year. Again, I was not told why or when. Going back to my own ideas of coordination, I construed these visits to be coordination sideways. So my call was actually on the Commander U.S. Army Forces, Far East Command. I reported to CINCPAC both my scheduled departure and return and what transpired during my visit. I did not make my first trip until late in March of 1950 since my first year was not up until 9 April 1950.

MAJ MORRISON: In March 1950, during the visit to Japan, you were briefed by General Willoughby who was General MacArthur's G-2. You later saw General MacArthur and General Walker. What was the substance of you conversation?

LTG AURAND: Willoughby told me that the North Koreans were preparing to attack early in June. He said that he wasn't supposed to know anything

about this because South Korea had been removed from MacArthur's domain. There was a MAAG there at that time, at the time of my visit, which reported directly to Washington. Willoughby received copies of the G-2 reports made by the MAAG which discounted the possibility of such an attack but -- Willoughby was pretty sure of it. The head of the MAAG was on record as saying that the South Koreans had a fine little Army which would resist any attack from the North. MacArthur asked me if I had seen Willoughby when I called on him and when I said that I had, he asked me to talk to General Walker who commanded the 8th Army. That's Walton Walker, I think. Walker gave me a dark picture of the weakness of his own four divisions. I knew of this weakness from my days in D/Log. My 5th RCT would undoubtedly be brought into the fighting in Korea and they hoped I would adopt the training programs and regulations of the 8th Army and carry them out with the 5th RCT. I said that I would. Then he told me the names of the staff division chiefs with whom the staff officers I had brought along should talk about this training program. The result was that the 5th RCT was ready to become a part of the 8th Army three months later and provided the balance and strength to save the Port of Pusan. Never was a trip more valuable than that one I took to Japan in March 1950. There was something to sideways coordination even if you don't know in advance why or when.

MAJ MORRISON: In October 1950, President Truman stopped off in Hawaii, both on his trips out to Wake Islands to see General MacArthur and on his return. What transpired in Hawaii during the Presidents visit?

LTG AURAND: President Truman divided his time while in Hawaii between

politics and the military. I have no recollection at all of what went on in the political side. I don't think I even heard at the time. On the military side, I was given one day to entertain the President by Admiral Radford. Most of it was spent in the President's car. I was seated in the middle of the front seat and I had a hard time conversing with President Truman who was seated in the middle of the back seat. I had the driver, a secret service man, on one side and another secret service man on the other and Truman had a secret service man on one side and Admiral Radford on the other. My opportunities for even hearing what he had to say were very poor. Because we were going to go to Schofield Barracks which was quite a way out in the city, Radford had decided to make this the around the island day for the President. I remember three things. As we went through Lake Waipahu which was a sugar mill town, the high school was just leaving out and the President ordered the car stopped. He stood up and waved a greeting to the kids as they came out of the school and they surrounded the car and cheered. As he left, he remarked that he hadn't realized that there were so many democrats in Hawaii. When we went down one of the streets of the NCO quarters at Schofield, it was full of children. He remarked that there was no sign of race suicide in the U. S. Army and at the Pali, he saw how rain was made. As the tradewinds blew the clouds against the mountains and as the clouds rose to get over the mountains and were chilled, they discharged their moisture in the form of rain.

MAJ MORRISON: What problems arose during your command being a part of the joint overseas command and yet being located in the territory of the United States.

LTG AURAND: I had experienced two-hatted commanders and I had the experience of having two bosses, but this was the first time that I had faced the problem of having two lines of communication. One theoretically, as you say, an overseas commander and the other as being in the territory of the United States. The staff section office in Washington would say to itself, well, this fellow is overseas and this for, you know, territory of United States commanders so we won't send it to him or the other way around. And I missed getting a lot of important mail. And one of these missings got me into trouble. One day a man came in my office. He was a rough looking customer, and he said he came from the general accounting office and he wanted me to let him audit the non-appropriated funds and I told him that I was an overseas command and he had no authority to even come in and audit my appropriated funds. Well, he said he had already done that and now he wanted the non-appropriated funds. So I said, "Did you do this for the Navy?" He said, "No." And I said, "Why not?" "Well." he said, "Admiral McMorris said that they could audit them just like you are saying I can't audit them." And I said,"Did you force your way in?" And he said, "No." So I said, "Just a minute." So I called Soc McMorris on the phone and I said this auditor from the general accounting office is here looking for an audit of non-appropriated funds and Soc says, "Throw him out. I did." So, I practically threw him out and said, "Don't bother me with things you don't have any authority to do," and he didn't have any piece of paper that gave him authority, you see. It wasn't until I was back at the next command conference and by this time Bendetsen was the Under Secretary of the Army and he had George Watkins in there while control

officer pal as special assistant and George had a note in the Chief of Staff's office that as soon as I got in, he wanted to see me. So after the usual greetings, he said, "You know, Carl is madder than hell at you" and I said, "What's the trouble?" "Well," he said, "You threw out that auditor from the general accounting office and he's been working for months to make peace with the general accounting and one of the things he gave in on in order to make peace was the auditing of non-appropriated funds and it cleared the staff and it was approved and it was issued as an order to all commanders." I said, "Let's see the order." Well, he fished around in his desk and found a copy and I said, "Look at the distribution" and USARPAC wasn't on it. I said, "How in the hell was I supposed to know about this?" So George triumphantly goes into Bendetsen's office and shows it to him and he comes back in two minutes with a much fallen face. And he said, "Carl says that in the first place you should have treated the man like a gentleman and in the second place you should have called up and asked Washington whether he was right." So, you are wrong no matter which way you do it.

MAJ MORRISON: That's right. Did you have any civilian advisory council as you had in Chicago?

LTG AURAND: No, but I would have had had not there been a very adequate substitute. First of all, Frank Midkiff, a very well known man in Honolulu, was the aide to the Secretary of the Army, a position which had been established since World War II, I believe.

MAJ MORRISON: A civilian aide?

LTG AURAND: Civilian aide, yeah. And he attended all my staff conferences

and whenever I had any problems or whenever he heard of any problems of mine or the civilian community, he was on the phone or into see me. Very fine. Then I joined the rotary club of Honolulu as an honorary member to start with and I found there between 2 and 300 people, business people in Honolulu, and the problem of the civilian community came up that some expert wasn't a member of that Rotary Club. I had a 300 man advisory council as a matter of fact and I became so interested in rotary because of this that I gave up my honorary membership for an active membership and now I'm still a member of the Rotary Club of Honolulu living in St. Louis and attending rotary at West St. Louis County Rotary Club.

MAJ MORRISON: What about other visitors?

LTG AURAND: First of all, I should tell you that all visitors in the military were considered to be visitors to CINCPAC and I think that's entirely proper.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: A visit to the senior commander. The policy of Radford was to let me have certain ones of these visitors if they, you know, belonged particularly to the Army. But he liked to entertain and unless he was sorely pressed with a bunch at one time or unless he was away or something of this king, and he was away quite often, why, he did the entertaining at Makalapa. Otherwise, I was next on the totum pole and finally the Naval District Commander. The Air Force had no command there at that time. The Air Transport Command, which was being operated as a joint command of the Navy and Air Force had a deputy commander who was an Air Force BG. He represented the Air Force in the Pacific. Two examples of the visitors who came very frequently, I'll tell you about. John Foster Dulles was then

negotiating the peace treaty with Japan and made frequent trips to Tokyo. We became sufficiently friendly for him to radio me about 3:00 a.m. to have cars at Hickam Field to take 15 people to breakfast at my quarters and be back to take them to the field in 45 minutes. Estimated time of arrival, 5:00 a.m. We found both Mr. Dulles and his wife to be very pleasant and our conversations with them are memorable. Senator Knowland and his wife stopped with us quite often. They were going to and from Taipe, Taiwan and as you may have heard, he was known as the Senator from Formosa. Again, my time with them was most pleasant. By the way, I had no guest house. My guests stayed in my quarters on Palm Circle.

MAJ MORRISON: What efforts did you and your command play in the Korean War effort?

LTG AURAND: I've already mentioned the training of the 5th RCT along the lines of the training of the 8th Army. The 5th RCT was off to the war as soon as shipping was made available and they distinguished themselves in battle as soon as they landed. Next, the general service people were gathered together and sent to Korea as individual specialists. The remaining small command I reorganized to require as few men as possible. I did away with all post headquarters and had but one headquarters for all posts on Oahu. Next, I permitted the families of all of the officers and men who had gone to Korea to remain in their quarters. When the time came to remove those whose husbands had become casualties, this was done through the Red Cross and the Army relief, if necessary. This was also done to be sure that they had the place to which to go on the mainland and money enough to get there. Tripler Hospital became a stopping point in the air evacuation of the

wounded. Things did not go so far or so fast as they do today and this stopover was necessary. Many civilian volunteers worked at Tripler. I arranged to meet as many of the air evac. planes as I could and tried to go through the wards of Tripler with every change of patients.

MAJ MORRISON: In April 1951, your two years of duty which General Bradley had stipulated when you went to Hawaii, were up. You stayed on duty almost a year and a half longer. How did this happen?

LTG AURAND: When I went to the command conference in Washington in April 1951, I talked with G-1 about this and said that I would like to retire. He replied that it would be impossible for me to retire while the Korean War lasted. It appears that the Navy had permitted a regular medical rear admiral to retire and to replace him they called to active duty a reserve medical rear admiral who was older than the regular and there was a storm in Congress about this. The result of this action was a great victory for both the Congress and the media and so no more flag of general officers were going to be retired during the Korean War. How true this is, I don't know. Nor did I think of seeing the new Chief of Staff, Joe Collins, who had not been party to the agreement. The result was a near disaster for me when quite unexpectedly I was asked to retire in mid-1952. I finally retired on 31 August '52 to permit my successor to return his third star. Apparently the Secretary of Defense approved. There is one thing in here that might be a small mystery which I would like to clear up or explain. When I went to Brad and asked for two more years and said I would do it in my permanent grade of Major General very happily and here when I say that my successor wanted to keep his third star, the highest permanent

grade in the Regular Army was major general. And you became a lieutenant general or a general only with the job. The job carried the rank. I still think that's the best way to run it. But it isn't run that way. At this time, there was one more guy who had three stars than there were posts that had three stars and I'd been asking for retirement for a long time and Joe Collins thought that I'd be glad to get out. I was but he caught me flat footed by such a sudden approach to it. If he had told me three months before, there would not have been any trouble and perhaps I'll explain that a little later, but I did want to explain that the stars went with the job above major general.

MAJ MORRISON: I think they still do.

THIS IS SIDE 1, OF TAPE 6 IN A SERIES OF INTERVIEWS WITH LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY S. AURAND, RETIRED. THE DATE IS 4 MAY 1974 AND WE ARE IN LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS. THIS IS A CONTINUATION OF QUESTIONS RELATING TO GENERAL AURAND'S EXPERIENCE AS COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE U.S. ARMY PACIFIC.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, at the world-wide commanders conference in April 1951, it was announced that the Army was running out of space in the United States for both unit training and individual training. You volunteered Schofield Barracks. Was your offer accepted? If so, how did you get started?

LTG AURAND: It was accepted with some doubt about it's feasibility. I stayed over in Washington for a couple of days to study the manning tables of an infantry replacement training center. After some persuasion, the pick and shovel boys drew me up a plan for about 10,000 at one time, total trainees. And then I went to see D/Log, equipment and transportation. I could borrow equipment from the Hawaiian National Guard to get started but all of the training equipment didn't arrive promptly. Two transports would be placed on a shuttle run from the West Coast to Hawaii and this shuttle would be extended to Korea when we began to have graduates. Additional consumer supply could be built up faster than the personnel build-up. Turning to G-1, I felt that I could find enough officers to get started but I might need some later on. We worked out a schedule for the additional non-coms I would need. The rest of the trainers would be assigned to me as they graduated from the Fort Ord Infantry Replacement Training Center. They would come to the - on the shuttle transports with the recruits about two weeks ahead of the time they were needed to start training the trainees. The plan was approved by all three G's, but the actual dates were left for me to fill out after I got back to Hawaii. I sent a long message to

USARPAC outlining the plan. Once again Elder was getting instructions from a higher, for me, from a higher headquarters. He would be reminded of France. I was received with open arms at Fort Ord which was already overcrowded. The San Francisco port had received it's instructions before I reached there. In a very few days, I sent the dates to be put into the plan to the various G's in Washington and to Fort Ord and the San Francisco port.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, were your trainees better than those trained in the United States? And why did you stop the program?

GEN AURAND: Throughout the build-up, a question for which I could get no answer was, how were these trainees compared with those trained on the mainland? There was no way that I could see to determine the answer. A few of the officers that were in the training center had friends of their's in combat in Korea. When enough time had elapsed for some of our trainees to have seen combat, the officers of my training center staff wrote to their peers in Korea to get an answer to this bothersome question. From this rather unreliable comparison, we gathered that our trainees were doing rather well. In fact, they might be doing better than the others. In seeking a reason for this, we ascribed it to the fact that these trainees in Hawaii didn't go home for leave between graduation and going to Korea. And consequently, the sharp edge of their training was not dulled by seeing mamma and pappa and sweethearts. Strangely enough, this was our downfall. Letters of protests from parents and others reached Senator Johnson, the majority leader of the Senate and he demanded that all trainees be treated equally. So the Department of the Army directed the phasing out of the

Hawaiian Infantry Training Center. I have always believed that all trainees should be treated equally and I believe they would have been better off and so would the Army if they hadn't had a leave at the end of their training and had been sent directly to Korea.

MAJ MORRISON: With the close-out, what happened to the instructors?

LTG AURAND: The instructors who came from the mainland, other than those who came from Fort Ord, reported to the Department of the Army for disposition. Those from Fort Ord were sent to Korea about two weeks after their services were no longer required. In this way, each instructor remained in Hawaii the same length of time. Their morale was good and they felt lucky to have had their shipment to Korea delayed. But even more than that, they felt they were much more competent soldiers than they would have been if they had gone directly from Fort Ord to Korea. The people that we dragged out of jobs in the USARPAC went back to their jobs in USARPAC. Some had extended their tours to stay with the Hawaiian Infantry Training Center and they reported to the DA for disposition. The whole shut-down to me seemed unnecessary and I've already given you the answer that to take care of Senator Johnson, they should have sent everybody directly to Korea.

MAJ MORRISON: Did you make any special effort to keep your troops informed while you were in Command of USARPAC?

LTG AURAND: Yes, but there were three different situations and I employed a different method for each one. At the start when the 5th RCT was at Schofield, I made my usual visit to each company in the 5th RCT and to each company size unit on Oahu. But the general situation of the Command was the reverse of those in France and China. You could drive around the

island in three hours. I think they saw enough of me without making any visits. Until my return from Japan almost a year later, I felt no need to personally inform the troops. Then I told them, without quoting Willoughby about joining in the training exercise of the Eighth Army because of the possibility that this was the only organization with which the 5th RCT could be used. When the HITC was being established, I addressed each class shortly after arrival until there was a graduating class. Thereafter, I spoke to the entire command of all of the men under the training center at each graduation with the graduating class taking their review of the march pass like the first class does at West Point. When the HITC was over, I always worked through the company commanders as I had before and any news that I had was fed through the company commanders. And what I knew was disseminated by-what I knew that I wanted disseminated by the company commanders was distributed by the minutes of my bi-weekly conferences which went to all officers.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what was the circumstances of your retirement?

LTG AURAND: I believe that I've told you the sudden decision to permit me to retire some seventeen months after the date of retirement that I had agreed on with Bradley. After the words from G-1 that no flag of general officers would be retired during the Korean War, I bought a home on Tantalus Drive in Honolulu expecting to move into it from Quarters #4 on Palm Circle as soon as retirement was effective. For awhile we used to hold empty house parties in our new home which were quite fun. The real estate dealer came to me with a proposal to rent it for a short time. It appears that some people who were building a house on top of Mt.

Tantalus had two big panes of glass for their view windows broken in transit. Also, they had to move out of their home which they had sold. Having no inkling of the impending demand for my retirement, I rented my home. On the day of my retirement, the glass had not yet arrived. I insisted that I be permitted to live in a VIP house at Fort DeRussey until my home became vacant and this was very reluctantly agreed to. So into storage went my household goods but out again they came three months later. There was the usual retirement review at the time of my retirement which was much larger than had ordered. I had a reception at Quarters #4 afterward and the next day being Sunday, 31 August 1952, I preached a sermon in chapel as my farewell to active duty. I would be less than truthful if I failed to say that I did a terrible job of it. It may seem strange that we purchased the house after we received the news that I would not be retired, I would be kept on until the end of the Korean War. But this was our situation; our daughter wanted to go to high school in September of 1952. So that summer of '52 we had to have a place to live in in case I was suddenly retired so that she could, you know, continue in school. So I sold my house in Washington first, where we had intended to retire and then I had a real estate person just looking and we came across this place on a mountain which was almost exactly my specifications for what I wanted and I thought well, we might as well buy it. The money is just sitting around doing nothing. I didn't have to pay any interest, I got enough for my Washington house to buy it and we just broke even so I paid no income tax. It was a good deal to pick up and I thought I had better take

it. So that's why we had the empty house and the empty house parties. So our daughter could go to one high school and this was a great private school, I think one of the greatest primary and secondary private schools in the world. Name was Punahou. It started out as Oahu College and during the days of the forty-niners in California, instead of sending their kids around the cape to go to school in the east, they sent them out to Oahu College in Hawaii for their college education.

THIS IS PART 2 OF THE ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL AURAND AND IT WILL COVER HIS RETIRED ACTIVITIES FROM AUGUST 31, 1952 TO THE PRESENT AND WILL ALSO RECEIVE SOME OF HIS REFLECTIONS ON HIS CAREER.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what was your situation as a retired Commanding General of USARPAC and continuing to live in Honolulu?

LTG AURAND: I decided to cut all contact with the active military. A newcomer should not be bothered by his predecessor's heritage. If he were, there would be no progress. Worst still, he might embalm his predecessor's mistakes.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what did you do to keep busy?

LTG AURAND: Initially in the few days before I retired, I looked for a job. I had a consulting job all lined up, I believe, the day of my retirement. I rented an office in which to put my files, which would act as a base for my consulting work. Over the door I put up a sign, "Logistician." My job fell through because the executive that was to give it to me, unexpectedly moved back to the mainland, But, I kept the office open for a year to retain my membership in the Honolulu Rotary Club. I had to have some business classification to do that. Having nothing to do suddenly thrust upon me, I immersed myself in non-paying activities. I will list

some of them, this is only scratching the surface. Of course, my Rotary Club; the Pacific Club which was a town club like the Army-Navy Club in Washington; the Central Union church; the setting up of an ASME section in Hawaii; the chairmanship of the Hawaii section was to lead me to be a Vice-President of the ASME. The association of the U.S. Army, I was the first chapter chairman in Hawaii; World Brotherhood, it was really the Hawaiian chapter of the Association of Christians and Jews, but since we had so many Buddhists, we had to change the name to World Brotherhood. I was a board member of the Boy Scouts of America for a short time but I abandoned this for work with the Police Activities League, which I found much broader, I thought and also teaching the boys that ought to be reached. And then the high school program of the Pacific and Eurasian Affairs Council and I became a member of the board of advisors of the Institute of World Affairs which was based on the University of Southern California. We traveled a great deal although for the first two years after retirement we didn't leave the island. This travel was due primarily to my acceptance of an offer from General George Olmsted. You may recall from my earlier answers to your questions that he had been my Operations Chief when I was Defense Aid Director and he was the G-5 in China who helped me close-out Southwest China. He put me on the board of directors of the United Service Life Insurance Company and on the board of the George Olmsted Foundation. Both boards met on the same day, once a quarter in Washington. While on active duty shortly after assignment as R&D Director, I dictated to my secretary two books of my experiences in France and China. This was done completely outside of my official office and at no expense to Uncle Sam.

Now that I was retired, I combined these into a single book called COMZ COMMAND. When I tried to sell it, the last agent I employed gave me the answer, quote, "A very well written book, but who in hell wants to read the story of a logistician." Unquote. Anyway the writing took up time, so I finally became a weekly columnist for the Honolulu Advertiser and the bi-weekly columnist for the Maui News. I insisted in being paid enough to qualify as a professional writer but my wife said she would have gladly paid the papers to take me on.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, please enlarge on some of these activities which employed your time?

LTG AURAND: During the two years I was the Vice President of the ASME, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, I visited each year, all of the student sections and all of the adult sections west of the Great Divide. A visit went something like this, a half day with the Executive committee and if this was a student section, this included the faculty advisor; a dinner meeting of the section and a review of the activities with the officers of the section the next morning. Also, I attended two meetings a year of the Council of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, which was the governing body and usually held in New York. And a regional assembly each year sponsored by one of the sections in my area. I think one was in San Diego and the other was in Sun Valley, Idaho, two lovely places to assemble. Such problems arose as the accreditation of Mechanical Engineering courses at colleges and universities which had to be redone periodically, depending on the size of the place and a few reputations of a few other places but it averaged about once in three years,

so that I had about sixty percent of them to go to in my time. The laws governing the registration of Engineers in various states, we tried to get them uniform, an impossibility and even one case of unethical practice. I visited many plants of great interest, including the atomic plant at Hanford and the atomic testing grounds about forty miles from Idaho Falls. Also, I renewed acquaintance with some of the scientists whom I had contacted in my days as R&D Director and particularly Dr. DuBridge, then President of the California Institute of Technology. I think one more description of that activity should suffice. The Pacific and Asian Affairs Council high school program and I might say that Pacific and Asian Affairs Council was the foreign affairs council of the then, Territory of Hawaii; before World War II had been in the -- an example of interesting students, an international affair, I mean it was almost an example for all high schools in the country. But the director who had supervised this had died and the volunteers who had a hand at it since World War II had been unable to get it going again. Betty and I decided to give it a whirl and volunteered. She had been a high school teacher many years before, who could still communicate with high school teachers, I certainly couldn't. The great advantage we had was that Hawaii had only one school board and believe you me, I'm in favor of only one school board, a state school board in every state, and one school superintendent. Well, it was easy to do business with the schools. Three times a year on Saturday morning, there was a meeting of all interested high school students on each island, at one of the schools to talk over prepared questions, I mean we prepared the questions and sent them out as

the discussion questions. Committees were formed at these meetings to discuss each of -- two of these questions for an hour each and then all were assembled to hear committee reports. We visited each high school after hours, before the meeting to help to prepare the students who had signed up to attend the meeting. We were assisted by a faculty advisor, who donated his or her time. On Oahu, the student attendance on a Saturday morning reached a thousand and on Kaui, with only three small and remote high schools, it reached 200. While this program turned out to be a satisfactory way to pass one's time, it surely was expensive because we paid all our expenses in doing it. My lasting memory of this program is of a fine looking Japanese-American boy who started his committee report to the plenary session by saying, quote, "When our forefathers landed on Plymouth Rock."

MAJ MORRISON: With all thise activities to keep you busy, what caused you to leave Hawaii?

LTG AURAND: Primarily as I have looked on it, my departure was brought about by the 1958 gyp in retirement pay. It took a long while and some arithmetic to realize that we could have met the increasing costs of living in Hawaii if the retired pay had been left at seventy-five percent of the active duty pay. But, an even more pressing reason was that General Olmsted's oft expressed desire for me to work for him as consultant. On December 1962, I agreed to give it a try. We sold our house in late January '63 and within a week we were in Los Angeles awaiting the arrival of our car by ship. I had been president of the George Olmsted Foundation for some time and found a great deal that had been left undone between my quarterly visits. Also, George wished me to establish a leadership development program in

his many businesses. Twenty-six banks; four insurance companies and a variable number of industries. I gave it a try but decided to go back to Hawaii and try apartment living before making up my mind. We spent the first three months of 1964 in a Honolulu furnished apartment and then began thinking again on where in Washington. I was employed as a consultant on 1 April 1964. In three weeks I would be seventy years old.

MAJ MORRISON: What was your life like in Washington?

LTG AURAND: Well, it was fun to go to the office every day. I didn't realize how much I had missed doing this during the last twelve years. I got on a bus in front of my apartment and got off one block away from the office. I soon realized that I worked better early in the morning, so I worked from about seven, everybody else coming in at nine, until shortly after lunch. Incidentally, we had an executive mess and it was almost compulsory to be there because that was George's place for this exchange of information that I had as my staff conferences. Then I'd go to the Army-Navy Club, three short blocks away from the office and play bridge. Quite often Betty would come down on the bus and we'd have dinner at the club. There were many parties and we gave two parties a year at the club in return, about two hundred people at each party. There were class lunches once a month and Betty started a wives and widows of 1915 luncheon at the Distaff Hall. And I was drawn to the downtown club ever since it's been started. Good chapping and good theater, both available by bus. Betty became active in the league of Republican women. I lived up to my exercise belief pretty closely, but in the city walking gets you around better than any other means of transportation. The sad part of our stay there came from the

saying attributed to Robert Hutchins, I'm sure he said it because I asked him one day and he said it again, quote, "Every time I think of exercising I lie down until I forget it. I get all the exercise I need acting as a pall bearer for my friends who exercised."

MAJ MORRISON: Did you continue to work until you left Washington?

LTG AURAND: No, on April 1969, I became seventy-five years old. I was not working up to my own satisfaction. About all I was doing was administering the George Olmsted scholarship program of the George Olmsted Foundation. This program provided for sending two graduates of each of the three service academies abroad to study whatever they wanted to study for two years. They must be foreign language qualified and they couldn't go to study the foreign language, they had to study something else. Also the foundation sent their wives for foreign language training before they went, that is if they were married. The program now includes one ROTC honor graduate for each service each year. But it was originally intended to break through the restrictions on the acceptance of educational grants of service academy graduates. It took an Act of Congress to do this. Anyway, in April of 1969, I asked George to relieve me of all jobs except the board memberships I had held with him originally when I lived in Honolulu. He very kindly put me off. I asked again in June and in September, with the same results. In October, I made a very dumb and inexcusable error, about a twenty-five thousand error, by the way, but it was easily corrected, but it was so significant that I knew that I could no longer work without having a constant fear of tying things up and that ceased to make the work fun. This time I brought George my resignations from every job I had with him,

there must have been six or seven, and he was hurt, he really was hurt. And he doesn't believe to this day that the reason that I brought them in was because this was the only way I figured I could quit. We are just as good friends as ever and I think George likes me just the same, but I don't think he'll ever believe me that I quit because I couldn't do the job anymore.

MAJ MORRISON: Well, why did you leave Washington?

LTG AURAND: My daughter was married and living in St. Louis and was completing her education by working for a doctorate in psychology at St. Louis University. This was made possible by the fact that her three sons were all in school. In early 1970, we received word that she was again expecting a child. It didn't take us long to decide that we should move to St. Louis to take care of the child until she had her doctorate, I underscore that. She found us a place to live near her home and we moved on 1 July 1970. On 10 July 1970, her fourth son was born. We just made it. Not far away in Peoria our granddaughter was expecting her second child. Someone had to baby sit for the first one who was just two years old at the time while the second arrived. So Betty undertook that task and I commuted by car to see how things were going. On 8 August, our second great-grandson arrived. Since that time the great-grandchildren have moved to Lima, Peru where the father represents Caterpillar. But our daughter has been teaching psychology at the college level ever since. So, David Steele Nelson, after Betty's father, has been with us five days a week during the school year ever since he was born. To me it has been an illuminating experience. I never had a chance to watch my own children

develop, particularly mentally.

MAJ MORRISON: Besides looking after David, what do you do in St. Louis?

LTG AURAND: As you know, we live pretty far out in the county and there is no bus line anywhere near us. I no longer drive at night. We haven't been to a live theater since we moved to St. Louis. We live in a Christian Science community so I've got nobody to have a cocktail with before dinner. There are no people anywhere near our age around us. We do get to angle dinners, such as the American Preparedness Association, formerly Ordnance; the Association of the United States Army, the Military Order of the World Wars, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers and the Association of Graduate Founders Day dinners and of course, the Rotary Club of West St. Louis County has two family dinners a year usually, sometimes three and I attend the Club regularly at lunchtime. I'm still a member of the Rotary Club of Honolulu, however. But what we do is take care of Davey, and then rest from doing it.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, between 1915 and 1952, you served over thirty-seven years and advanced to the rank of Lieutenant General. Please analyze the following concerning your success. What part did being in the right place at the right time play? What part did hard work play? And what part did your superiors play?

LTG AURAND: It's rather hard to sort these things out, as I hope all three were present at the critical time. The most important right place at the right time was on the luncheon bus from the Army-Navy Club in 1940. That it took my seniors, Robertson and Maxwell, to take the action that we discussed

on the bus and I hope it was because they knew me as a hard worker. Routine applications were responsible for my assignment to the Coast Artillery Corps, the Ordnance Department and my four service schools. The Ordnance School, Command and General Staff College, the Army Industrial College and the War College. Only for the War College did I have suitable credentials and I can't say that they were due to hard work at the C&GSS as I spent a great deal of the time as a stage manager for the amateur theatricals when I was a student. The assignment of R&D Director and Director of Logistics were made by the Chief of Staff. I don't why. So was the assignment to USARPAC. In the lesser grades most of my assignments were at my own request except the one to Washington to write the mobilization plan for the Ordnance office and the one by General Tschappat, Chief of Ordnance to Picatinny Arsenal.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what are your views on good staff officers making good commanders and vice versa?

LTG AURAND: I saw only one case of a good staff officer failing to make a good commander. I know of quite a number of good staff officers who made good commanders, all the way up to the top. On the other hand, I saw very good commanders - very few good commanders whom I thought made good staff officers. There were several cases of officers on the War Department General Staff in the 1940-1941 period who had nothing but troop duty except for the two schools, the Command and General Staff School and the War College. The best description that I heard of them was by a Chief of Staff who said that they had lived under Army regulations so long and that

they didn't know how to write them. I would give all people who are called comers, who might be future commanders, three years of general staff duty at least, immediately upon graduation from Command and General Staff College.

MAJ MORRISON: Well, did the Command and General Staff School produce good officers, good staff officers and good procedures?

LTG AURAND: Well, I'll have to include the Army War College because these two go together and their results came from the same sort of indoctrination, I hate to use that word but that is what it is. They did produce good staff officers and good procedures. At least, as good as the input and the people would permit, the qualifications of the students. A great accomplishment for World War II for getting officers to know a common language and to know each other while they were in college, not only their fellow students but the faculty members. To these ends, the small number of students in each class was in favor of their producing good results. In all the confusion of the reorganization and changes of mission, the basic teachings of these two institutions held the Army together. During the War, the short courses held at C&GSS supplied the Army with officers who were at least conversant with the language and properly trained.

MAJ MORRISON: What techniques did you use to develop your staff and maintain quality?

LTG AURAND: The basic technique was the conference. I held bi-weekly staff conferences, I guess you have heard enough of that, at which each staff division chief had to report to the entire staff, what have you done since the last meeting? What are you doing currently and what do you propose to

to do next? Every other one of these conferences was a command and staff conference at which not only the staff but also the next subordinate commanders were present. And they brought along their next subordinates and so on. And the commanders were free to question the staff officer making the presentation at any time, they could interrupt them with a question or comment. The necessity for making clear presentations and answering tough questions did much to improve the quality of not only the staff officer but of the staff work. All these conferences passed along information which gave the staff officers present, information about what the other members of the staff were doing and what the problems were that the commanders had. Another thing I did was to have the staff member who had prepared the paper present it to me just as he had written it. His staff superiors could put in non-concurrences or add anything they wanted to either written or orally when the presentation was made. But the staff officer who wrote the paper presented it as he had written it. And he took a great deal of care in the preparation of that paper which made him a better staff officer. Finally, I always tried to have an officer, an office, rather, with three doors, one to the Chief of Staff and one to the side and secretary, and one to the hallway. All three were kept open at all times. Anyone could come in through any of the three doors.

MAJ MORRISON: What means of - what means did you use to gain and maintain subordinate loyalty.

LTG AURAND: Looking back as best I can, I can't remember that subordinate loyalty was ever a problem or that I ever did anything about it. I did have tech service officers who were divided in their loyalty between the

next higher echelon staff officer and myself and sometimes I had to use a little persuasion to let them know that I considered their loyalty was to me and not to the tech service chief. But from the amount of information I received about what was going on in the technical channels, I felt that it was worth at least fifty percent loyalty to me and fifty percent loyalty to the technical chief. I had one case where a tech staff officer refused to comply with my instructions because he had different orders from his next higher tech staff officer in the next higher echelon, but I gave a written order to his affected people, not to him, but to the subordinate people that I wanted him to tell his technical service superior about this, in my own handwriting and signed it and it turned out to be a good thing both for my staff officer and for his technical service chief in the next higher echelon. I did not consider this the lack of loyalty but rather an effort to keep me out of trouble when he told me that he had orders otherwise.

MAJ MORRISON: In your relationships with all your staffs, unpleasant tasks of weeding out personnel and so forth may have occurred, what technique did you use?

LTG AURAND: There were such differences in individual cases that I can give you no rule as to the methods that I used. In one case, I had a Chief of Staff who was a complete mis-fit. I managed to get him a job elsewhere which he prized and was perfectly happy to get and in another case I had an officer who was wanted in another theater for further investigations and, of course, when I got permanent change of station orders for him, I sent him to the other theater. There were some staff officers who were not doing so well in their current assignment and I usually tried to find another

assignment in the staff where they might do better. This exchanging of jobs by staff officers was once called the General Grant method, as General Grant is said to have originated it when the members of his small staff came to him and said there was a major on the staff who wasn't worth his salt and he said that it wasn't the major's fault, it was his fault, General Grant's, because somebody had once made him a major and certainly he could do something worthy of that rank, consequently it was up to him, General Grant, to find a job that he could do. And that's the principle on which I worked by generally when a man wasn't just exactly up to snuff. Among the junior officers, I don't remember any cases at all that I handled personally. With the others, I was tolerant, relied on my ability to instruct them mostly indirectly so that they became sufficiently proficient to do the job they held. Among those on whom I worked this procedure, were a G-4 and an Ordnance officer, both of whom were afraid that I knew more about their own jobs than they did and they were continually coming to me with insignificant problems which they should have solved themselves. One day I got them in my office together and said, "Look, fellows, I haven't got time to do your jobs. I may be a better G-4 than you, Colonel whosis and a better Ordnance officer than you, Colonel what not, but these are your jobs and I'm not going to go into them. If you produce poor results you are going to get it, but you fellows, I know both of you fellows and you both can do your jobs well. Now get out of here and don't come back unless it is something you can't solve within your own means and brains." And they quit; they became good officers. But I really had to stomp on those two fellows.

MAJ MORRISON: What common quality or qualities do you know of that a man needs reaching three and four star rank?

LTG AURAND: None, is the only answer. None. I had two five star classmates; two four star classmates; and at least two three star classmates, not including myself. I knew all six of these officers quite well. In 1940, all but one were staff officers. I believe all but one were War College graduates and also C&GSS graduates. Four of them might be called the strong, silent type; the other two were outgoing. I believe none of them had any excessive personal ambition. I believe none of them, I believe only one of them was a perfectionist. The others were easy going. There wasn't a back-stabber in the bunch, nor did any of them climb on anyone's shoulders. Only one might have said to a patron, and one had a hard struggle because a senior officer mistakenly didn't like him. So that balances out. And all of them were completely devoted to duty, honor and country. A very poor try at an answer I know, but did you ever try to find what common qualities existed between Rommel and Patton?

MAJ MORRISON: No. To what degree does success depend on being sponsored or groomed?

LTG AURAND: I know of nobody who fits this description. I've often heard of the Pershing gang after World War I, and the European crowd after World War II. Selection to high places of people who might seem to belong to one or the other of these groups might have justified such allegations. By those who weren't selected and served elsewhere. I knew that in 1937 there was great rejoicing when the first officer was selected as BG who

had not served overseas in World War I. But individual sponsorship not that I know of. As to grooming, I thought that was something you did to a horse.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, do you believe that the Army was more credible in your years than now and if so, why?

LTG AURAND: If you mean by credible, believed by the citizenry, I would say that it might be a little less credible now because there is an undercurrent of belief that the Army deliberately prolonged the Viet Nam War to test its new weapons in battle, particularly the helicopters.

MAJ MORRISON: Some say that the role of the Army officer is to be a manager. Others argue that we are losing leadership abilities because of the management syndrome, what are your views?

LTG AURAND: Don't be confused by terminology. Leadership is nothing without management, and management is nothing without leadership. The gripe is that the tools of the manager are much more useful today than the tools of the leader. Improvement in the tools of leadership has been almost nil. They are still arguing whether leaders are born or can be taught. The one hope of teaching leadership at the present time is in teaching the officer to apply the new management tools to his leadership problems.

MAJ MORRISON: What differences do you see in the demands of civilian leaders in peace time and in war time and the same for military leaders?

LTG AURAND: Again, I am making a presumption and that is that you mean in both cases the leaders in the, the civilian leaders in the Department of

Defense and in the Department of the Army. During World War II in the War Department, the civilian leaders were very comfortable among themselves and of one mind. Just before mid-1940, the Secretary of War and his assistant, were what might be described as at swordspoints. Now that there is a Secretary of Defense and a whole bevy of civilian leaders on that level and likewise the Secretary of the Army and similiar entourage, I feel quite sure that they have like minded political opinions and will either in peace time or in war time. In other words they will reflect the views of the President. As to the military leaders, the Chief of Staff of the Army has a secretary upon a secretary over him. With each of his- and each of his principle subordinates are in the same fix with civilian supervision. Not only that, but while the Chief of Staff they have theoretically direct access to the President, it is highly doubtful that any chief in peace time or war time would by-pass the civilian hierarchy. Besides, since the Chief of Staff of the Army is not a member of the National Security Council, direct influence of the President through that organization is unlikely. If this is civilian control over the Armed Forces, we have it up to here. The military leaders will do what the civilian leaders tell them in peace time or war time and the civilian leaders will ask for advice from the military when the, the civilian leaders, think they need it.

MAJ MORRISON: What are your views concerning below the zone promotions for officers?

LTG AURAND: I didn't know that the Army had adopted the Navy system of promotion. But I am somewhat familiar with the Navy system because my

son, Vice Admiral E. P. Aurand, USN, retired, has been through it. I'm sure that all the people still in the service are in favor of the system because they benefited by it and that makes it the greatest system of all. Views of onlookers are neither requested or desired. It is a lousy and unfair system. Up to 20 years of service, promotion should be seniority with a selection out process like the old class B board. Thereafter, promotion should be made by starting at the senior in-grade to be promoted and going down the list, one by one until the prospective vacancies are filled. Selecting those for promotions who are qualified as you go down the list. Those passed over will come up again but when they have been passed over twice, they will be allowed to remain in their permanent grade until they have 30 years service when retirement will be compulsory.

MAJ MORRISON: You mean permanent grade or their present grade?

LTG AURAND: I'm talking about permanent grade only. No "mex" promotion at all. Let the geniuses wait. The additional experience will do them good. I have two five star general classmates who spent about 17 years in the grade of major and one of them was a lieutenant colonel in World War I and it didn't seem to hurt him any.

MAJ MORRISON: Defense spending continues to be an issue. Some feel the threat of the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. does not warrant our large defense force. How did you meet such issues and what should be our approach?

LTG AURAND: The only issue I had anything to do with was the retention of troops in Korea after the Japanese surrender there. The President put a tight ceiling on the military budget for 1950, FY1950, and when the divisions were counted, it would suppor there weren't enough for our world-wide

committments. I presume there was a conference with state but I don't know whether the problem was ever put before the President. The decision that I got was that we would withdraw all troops from Korea and leave only a MAG. The outward movement was to begin early in 1949 so it would be completed by June 30, 1949 when fiscal year 1950 began. But sort of an anchor to leeward, I was asked to come up with a figure for keeping a Corps in Korea. To build decent quarters for even a temporary garrison and maintain the Corps for a year, the first year, came to about two billion dollars. So the remnants of the troops came - became the 5th RCT and went to Schofield barracks, arriving there just after I did on April 9, 1949. For the future I have no G-2 information whatever on which I can evaluate the U.S.S.R. or the Chinese Peoples Republic as threats. But I can suggest some different ways of spending the money when it is obtained. First, all launching sites for ICBM should be at sea and not on a billion dollar submarine. The carrier is a dead duck, particularly in the Mediterranean Sea. The tank is rapidly becoming obsolete but it will be harder to get rid of than the horse. The service headquarters in the unified command should be eliminated. I see USARPAC has been. The Corps and regimental echelons should be eliminated in the division. So should the brigade if it is still alive, and that's just a start. However, I believe there is another approach to spending the - for the security of the United States. It's not strange that some of the things that you are taught when you were a youngster stick with you for the rest of your life. My very fine English and History teacher at West Point, Bill Ganoe, gave me this thought;

practically all wars have been caused by one or more of three differences; religious, racial or economic. I would amend only the first to read; religious or idealogical. The probability of war because of these differences is not so great when only one is present, but if two or all three of these differences are present, war is much more likely. In my recent readings, I have discovered that all humans are born with an aggressive instinct to the extent that each individual suppresses this aggressive instinct, he becomes civilized. However, there is some ways of getting rid of this aggressive instinct without hurting anybody and one psychologist said that aggressive people take their treatment by watching a bloody afternoon football game and during the football season they become quite civilized people indeed. Now, let's take a look at the United States. Idealogically, we are capitalists and religiously we are hypocritically lost white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. We are a mixture of races with more than eighty percent white. And even in the sad state we are in today, we are economically the greatest nation in the world. The aggressive instinct of the people of all the other nations of the world are turned against us and we better believe it. Also, I doubt if any international ping pong match will reduce their aggressive attitudes. We must do good to them who hate us and our reward will be greater hatred. Can't we someday and in some way let somebody help us? Within our own country we are in the same fix. Our laws are based on what is called the Judeo-Christian civilization and in actual practice the Ten Commandments have been reduced to the three military virtues; Thou shall not cheat; Thou shall not steal; and Thou shall not lie. Like all of our other laws, these commandments

are kept more in the breaking than in the keeping. Our shop-lifting has reached an all time high. The breakdown of law and order in some places, the forming of gangs for killing whites, such as we are experiencing in San Francisco is merely the beginning of guerilla warfare inside our country. When it comes to our economic situation, strangely enough we go back to our religion to defend having poverty in this affluent society, Quote, "The poor shall always be with you." Unquote. To wipe out poverty is a doctrine of socialism which is opposed to our doctrine of capitalism. So that within our country we have all the causes of war. The conflict of socialism and capitalism; the conflict of races and the conflict about the economic wealth being shared. Religious, economic and racial. So, both from without and within, we are threatened - our system of life is threatened by attack and I said earlier when all three are present, there is much more danger than when only one is present. I'm old enough to have seen and heard what has happened to us in the twentieth century. We started out by fighting another Christian white country in order to give freedom, quote - unquote to another race on some islands of the world. We have fought two world wars against Christian people of the same race for maintaining a balance of power which being translated means a superior economic position. We have fought two wars in Asia on the side of one part of a country against the other part of the country and these nations in Asia were of different race; different religion and different, certainly different economic status. It's not such a very good record, but it certainly seems to prove that these are the factors which bring about war. This line of thinking, I won't call it reasoning, leads to the conclusion

that we must resist aggression both from within and from without and the insurance premium for our survival is a defense budget adequate to deter aggression against us.

THIS IS SIDE 2 OF TAPE 6 IN A SERIES OF INTERVIEWS WITH LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY S. AURAND. THE DATE IS 5 MAY 1974 AND WE ARE IN LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what do you have to say about the organization of military operations?

LTG AURAND: Once upon a time there was a doctrine which said a peace time military organization should be capable of expansion into the war time operations without any change in organization. This was not true in World War I and it was not true in World War II. Organizational change is brought about to some extent by new weapons but I believe it is equally dependent upon the experience of people at the top of the military ladder. There are some firm factors, however, which have persisted through these two wars and I believe should be used in the future as a basis for organization for military operations. The first is that the United States will have to be the arsenal for our side. The number one task of the military is to keep this arsenal ready for rapid expansion. It has been going down the drain since World War II. The only out for this is a fourth department in the Department of Defense to be called the Department of Logistics. As I wrote to McCloy in November 1948, if we can't get this fourth department let's just abolish the War Department and let the Navy take over the job of National Security. The second most important thing is that after the industries are going strong, there will be a great demand to mobilize the manpower. This should be deferred however, until the camp construction is well under way and the manpower can be placed in these camps. Plans for the location and construction of these training facilities should be on

hand and construction should be started immediately upon the need for it. For the purpose of running the training in war time and also of exercising command of the Army units in peace time, there should be a mobilization command in the Army whose headquarters should not be Washington, D.C. As to the people in the overseas commands, replacements should be sent over in troop units and not as individual and the unit should be at least of battalion size. Service units should be at full strength in the United States in peace time. The reason for this is that they are much more highly specialized in the combat units and the time for training is much longer, consequently you have to have them ready before your combat units are ready, which means an early start. And it also means that they have to be on hand because there isn't time to complete their training while the combat units are training. The JCS and the Joint Staff should have no other jobs, in fact, they should have no commissions, in either the Army, Navy or the Air Force. After they are once in this joint field, they should oscillate between the joint overseas commands and Washington and those are the people who should run the whole show. I think the main objection to the Chief of Staff of the Army being made a member of the Joint Chief's of Staff is that he hadn't time to do both jobs, they are both full time jobs. And consequently it is a matter of delegation somewhere and that's usually in his own service so his own service doesn't get the full results from his skills. To say anymore would be to get into too much detail. Let the modern organizational artist take this job on. But the Army command structure would then consist of the headquarters in Washington,

which would be small, a single staff division so to speak, which might be called Plans and Ops. The Ops being a very small portion of it. And the mobilization command not in Washington which would take over the training in war time and peace time and would run the Army in peace time. And the Army overseas units assigned a joint command, the easiest way is the best way.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, how do you view efficiency reports by subordinates?

LTG AURAND: Absolutely necessary. But the most on re-classification boards see only one-half of the moon. The dark side remains dark to them. Every person with whom I've talked with about this over the many years, has agreed in principle with this, but could find no practical way to put the thing into effect and anything I might propose as a method can and will be shot full of holes. Isn't this ample evidence that efficiency reports made by subordinates are badly needed and isn't that the very reason that they should be submitted? I'll try to pose a few questions and answers. What subordinates will make out the efficiency report? The same officers whose superiors make up the efficiency reports on them. Will the report be signed? No, it will be placed in a wax sealed envelope addressed to the Adjutant General with a symbol indicating that it is a subordinate's efficiency report on his superior. How will the subordinate know when such a report should be submitted? He will be informed by his superior that he--the superior--is now making out an efficiency report on him--the subordinate.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what are your views on national service?

LTG AURAND: Since we live in the land of the politically possible, we

will never have national service. But nothing could be better for any nation. To have every person give one year to the nation is a small price to pay for living in his own organized society. While I'm generally in favor of the formula of bringing people into national service, in the year they are eighteen upon graduation from high school for a period of service of one year, there is some additions I'd like to make. I would bring them in earlier if they are drop-outs from school. And I would permit these people to stay in the national service until they were nineteen. Also, I would have the federal government give these people in national service complete health care, particularly maintenance work on their bodies, such as filling teeth. It is too bad that the national service is too Utopian, let's say, for the United States. Of course, a certain number of federal jobs would have to be held open for the people in national service and assignment to jobs would have to be made. This would be a headache. The problem of putting these people into jobs has been one of the stumbling blocks to obtaining national service. The most difficult assignment to make is to the military. However, the federal department who receives people from national service would probably be able to do nearly all their recruiting by recruiting the people in national service into the permanent civil service and thus filling their requirements for new personnel.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, how do you view the future of the federal academies?

LTG AURAND: They are too costly and have too many students at present. And particularly, for the future. The time may come again when there are more graduates than enough to fill the military vacancies for them. The difference between the academies and civilian colleges of about the same

size is not so much the curriculum or the contents of the courses at the service academies but disciplinary training is given there and there is some indoctrination. And there a civilian comparison is the theological seminary but there the difference in costs is so evident that I hate to make this comparison. I believe that the chances of survival of the service academies as schools of discipline and indoctrination depends upon their holding the line together, but the Naval academy has let the line break in several ways. Most importantly by introducing a civilian faculty. Also the Naval academy fails to reward the officer members of the faculty to the same extent that the other two academies do. This caused another breach in the line as I have mentioned. Someone should come up with a statistic about the percentage of officers who have served on the faculties of each of the three service academies who have arrived at flag rank. Eventually I see no - I see the three academies becoming federal colleges of general education for the bright young people of the country who must be totally supported by welfare.

MAJ MORRISON: What about ROTC?

LTG AURAND: If you'll recall I have described my experience gained in inspecting material in the hands of the ROTC in the colleges and universities as well as the "tin" (military) schools in Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, and West Virginia during the five winters in the 1930's. That I was Commanding General of the Sixth Service Command during 1942-1944 and watched the falling off of the ROTC during World War II and the catastrophe of the Army specialist training program. Visiting over forty colleges and universities in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Illinois during that period. And now at the end of my

active service, I had the ROTC at the University of Hawaii in my command when I commanded USARPAC. The first experience gave me the greatest detailed knowledge because I usually accompanied the officers who then made the annual inspection. I never dressed in uniform and I had the best observation post available as a result. In addition for five summers in the 1920's, I provided the material for the ROTC Camps at Camp Knox and again I had the most beautiful observation post to see what went on at these camps. Now that I've qualified myself, here are my observations: The ROTC gives the individual who wishes a military career the next to the best start he can get and it isn't second best by much. I mean when compared to the service academies. To the government the cost is so much less than the service academies, that I feel sure that I will wake up some day and find the ROTC to be the primary source of military officers. I think it is today in numbers but I'm looking at the day when there won't be any service academies. The difference of course is discipline and doctrine and as the academies exist today, these two objectives are very expensive items. Admiral Holloway broke the ice for the improvement of the ROTC program by having pay provided for all ROTC cadets. And the college students themselves have cleared the air by terminating compulsory ROTC. It is how you put these two things together, pay and volunteers, that gives you varying results, but there are other considerations. The military has never been popular in peace time throughout the country and I have a memory of, which encompasses this period, so keep the uniform off the campus. Have no officers teach anything on campus and when I say keep the uniforms off the campus, I mean both uniforms for the ROTC cadets and the wearing of uniforms by Regular Army personnel, either on duty at the university or visiting it. In other words, read the handwriting on the wall.

And read also that it should be the officers training Corps. The "R" should be dropped from ROTC. Let a student join the OTC at any time until June of his second year. Require three-ten week summer camps before commission is earned. And require an academic degree and a reasonable score on the advanced degree test, I think - I don't know whether that is the name for it or not - I think it is the Advanced Education Test or something like that, but you know what I mean. The test they take in their senior year for graduate school . . .?

MAJ MORRISON: For graduate school . . . The College Records Examination.

LTG AURAND: Good, I'm glad you supplied the name. Otherwise, have no academic requirement . . . .

MAJ MORRISON: It's the Graduate Record Examination, Graduate Records.

LTG AURAND: Yeah. Make all the other tests to your heart desires while the cadet is in summer camp and do all your military classroom work there. Grade him at the end of each camp. Either he can continue or he cannot continue as an OTC cadet. And get the college academic rating each year before he goes to camp and determine then if you want to keep him in. Don't bother about his marital status, but don't pay anything extra because he is married. Have two military officers, preferably retired so they can remain, you know, permanently in the faculty he gets to know, in civilian clothes on campus to run the show with civil service assistance for record keeping. Pay all educational expenses plus about what a West Point cadet gets plus a reasonable cost for bachelor quarters.

MAJ MORRISON: What are your thoughts on career guidance?

LTG AURAND: Have you got a fire extinguisher handy? I might set the tape

on fire. I am emotionally disturbed on this subject because I can't sell anyone on how unnecessary this thing is. This whole scheme is completely unnecessary. Not to mention the personnel wasted on administering it and the inability to find anyone who is wise enough to carry it out even if it is a good thing. It has become just what you called it awhile back - "ticket punching." And how easy it is for officers on various staffs or personnel boards to match the holes in the officers ticket against those in a standard ticket and so pass judgment on the officer. Terrible. Instead, they should find out what he is good for or bad for, for that matter, and what he wants. The system is inordinately wasteful of people's time and of the excellent talent that is over-looked because the right hole isn't in the right place on the ticket. Did it ever occur to anybody that when a man knows he can get ahead merely by following a career laid out in advance that he will not be very productive, that he will follow this in order to get ahead rather than developing his own talents. Career-guidance is a sure road to mediocrity, particularly at this time, which means that will always be the way to go because the top got there that way and consequently, because they did, this is the way to go. Can't get change from the top on this. So there will be no end to career guidance, I'm afraid and the Army will be much the worse off for it.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what are your views on pay and rank?

LTG AURAND: They should be separated. At least in peace time. And let me explain. Kipling wrote a song about promotion and pay. This double incentive for getting ahead is more powerful than a single one, but it can take away from the most important incentive, professional excellence. A man will

sacrifice this almost every time for getting more pay, although he has to have some to get more pay. He chooses the wrong objective. And that's the reason they should be separated. Let the table of organization of the manning table show the rank. This overcomes the disadvantage of having a second lieutenant doing a captains job, like commanding a company, without the insignia. And there are many similiar and more important situations at higher levels. In my discussions with others on this subject, those who would listen at all propose the promotion - that the promotion to captain be based on longevity also as well as pay and the pay in war time be based on a certain grade being paid at a rate of a certain number of years of service. Which means fixing the pay to the grade again. Also, I suggest that the pay table be based on a factor of one for a second lieutenent newly commissioned. And purely as an illustration, the pay for the factor of one be multiplied by a new factor for each year of service. For example, after one year of service, your pay would be 1.05, the pay for factor one; and after the second year, this would be increased in this manner, every five years, that is at the six, eleventh and sixteenth and so on years there would be a jump of 0.5 in the factor so that the factor for six years would be 1.5; for eleven years it would be 2.0; for sixteen years 2.5 and so on. With an addition of course, of 0.5 for every five years thereafter. Then all Congress needs to do to authorize the amount of pay is to prescribe what the amount for factor one is.

MAJ MORRISON: In making military decisions in recent times, what is your impression of the use that is made of the written account of the experiences

of ideas of others? In other words, by the searches of the files of history for precedence, good or bad?

LTG AURAND: Well, my motto on this subject is; it has been tried before and I shall never forget how I struggled to find some precendent for my Lend Lease efforts in 1940 and 1941. I couldn't find any. I found just a few years ago that there was a precedent, it took me a long time. And the British did supply the Germans with equipment who came to the Battle of Waterloo. They were British, the Germans were British for the most part, British equipped, so there had been Lend Lease in the past. The modern tendency seems to be however, to omit reading history, and to omit doing any research in arriving at decisions. Action is based on the limited experience of the individual in his life time. History becomes a delightful, maybe, reading of fiction and no lesson is to be derived from it. It is a past time, not something to be used for business. I believe this to be the modern approach, because in a briefing on the then current reorganization of the Army about two years ago, the briefers were asked, I asked three different briefers. One from -- a BG from the Reserves, a BG from the National Guard and a Colonel from the Army who was a PMS&T in the -- at Washington U., or St. Louis U., in St. Louis. He was both a Leavenworth and a War College graduate and had done Department of the Army Staff duty and was quite a good guy and I asked all three of these people if any study had been made of any previous reorganizations or particularly the Hoover commission study in 1948, which is a sort of a basic -- to jump from when you are going to reorganize, and they all said that no such research had taken place as far as they knew. There wasn't time for it they said.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, do you believe that there is any use in trying to figure out after the resolve of the decision is known, what would have been the result of a different course of action?

LTG AURAND: Well, again I have a catch phrase - nobody knows what would have happened if . . . . The most time wasting and self-flagellating exercise that I can think of is to try to determine what would have happened if, at a certain point, a different course had been taken. For example, if the A-Bomb had not been dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would hundreds of American soldiers been lost in the attack on Japan?

MAJ MORRISON: Have you any observations to make on the relationship between a commanding general and his troops?

LTG AURAND: Well, there again I have a catch phrase. You can't fool the troops. The CG should bring to the troops in person important specific items of information of news, of changes and of similar items. He should also check that important orders that are clearly understood and that information he sends down the command channel actually arrives at the lowest ranking soldier. The CG visits should be scheduled and I always insisted on this. And they should be scheduled sufficiently in advance so that people can get ready for the visit. A pat on the back of approval for everything being in good order is worth a dozen skins which lower morale and make everybody mad at the old man. When the CG inspects or comes to visit troops, and make an inspection, such things as gun salutes; ruffles and flourishes; guards of honor; and other formations should be dispensed with. They are time wasting, not of the troops time but of the commanding general's time. Troops should be assembled only for the purpose

of hearing the old man make a talk. What has he got to say? Why is he there? And he should be there to tell them something. The uniform worn while the CG is there should be that which would be worn at that time of day if the guy was - if it was a normal day, if the CG wasn't coming. In other words, the work clothes or whatever, duty uniform or whatever it should be. And the CG's visit should be made to single companies or to single activities, in case of a large installation, because he doesn't want more than 200 or 300 people to be present when he talks, and it should be a question and answer session. The CG should use the Command and Staff conferences to get additional information down the channel command. And as far down the hierarchy as possible, the commander should be assembled and addressed by the CG and this should be done about once a month, I would think, in a normal situation if there is one. The staff should be present to be questioned by the commanders present at the conference.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what is your opinion of the code of conduct?

LTG AURAND: Well, I'm not familiar with the code of conduct. The thing that I remember most vividly is what was called in my time, the soldiers oath, and it had to do with his conduct while he was a prisoner of war. Is that in the code of conduct?

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: Well, that's the one thing that I want to talk about. With my experience with German and Italian prisoners, both in Continental United States and in Normandy, and I had hundreds of thousands of them in Europe. And then the reception of our own recovered prisoners of war in both Europe and China, it is my very strong opinion that there is but one thing

for prisoners of war to do and that is survive. And survive as comfortably as they can. I think this soldier's oath is a mockery. The information which any POW can furnish is in all probability already known to his people who capture him. If a guy bails out of a bomber, certainly they know they are being bombed and if he gave out anything to the information they had. And if the higher command places a man who has information important to the enemy in a position to be captured, it isn't that guys fault, it is the fault of the damn fool who put him in a position to be captured. And there is still another restriction that I think is important for the higher command. They should not permit people with information which would be important to the enemy, to put themselves in a position to be captured and the greatest example of that, of course, is General Dean at the outbreak of the Korean War.

MAJ MORRISON: Then you totally disagree with General Eisenhower?

LTG AURAND: Well, General Eisenhower's feelings about this were very strong. I believe that he had - the first soldiers oath as he called it, that's where I got the name, was written by him in longhand while he was President. And I had many of our people who were prisoners of war, work for me later on. I've spoken of Colonel Hirsch here, several times, he was in the Mukden camp, and they just say that this is an impossible thing to comply with and that it should never be given and I agree with them entirely.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what is your opinion of the establishment of a Corps d'elite organization, such as Rangers or Green Berets, within a larger organization?

LTG AURAND: The morale of any organization of any size is not increased,

it is probably decreased by the establishment within it of a corps d'elite. An individual soldier is entitled to wear anything on his chest, sleeve, collar or shoulder which has been won as an individual by his own efforts. This recognition is respected by all of his peers. But, any differentiation due to assignment is a cause of friction between individuals in different units as well as between the units as a whole in themselves, and it results in a lack of both cohesion and morale in the organization as a whole. This differentiation goes all the way from the Marine Corps and the Department of Defense to that of giving distinctive designations to small units, such as three cheers for troop A, Battery D, Company C or the 4998 Clothing and Bath Unit. And there is, of course, always the case of Smith, Smith and Schmidt. In case you don't know what that is, read the history of the attack on Saipan.

MAJ MORRISON: What do you think should be the criteria for measuring the state of discipline in any organization?

LTG AURAND: Well, of all those to which I have been exposed, the poorest is the VD rate. When I took command of the NBS in Europe, it had the lowest VD rate and the highest rape rate of any comparable command. A realistic measure of discipline is performance and even though that's awfully hard to measure sometimes, it's the only one I know of that really presents, the state of discipline.

MAJ MORRISON: What are your views on war?

LTG AURAND: Well, that's a broad question. A primary cause of war - all human ills including war, is that there are too many people riding on this space ship called earth. I don't know what we are going to do about

it, but we should keep that in mind. And the more people there are riding on this space ship, the more likely we are to have war. The fundamental thing that has stuck with me through all my life is what my mother said that war is killing people. And this criterion is rejected by most of the citizens of the civilized nations. They find this definition difficult to stomach. This difficulty led them to the idea that war is destroying things. Civilian leadership in these nations has introduced - has indoctrinated the military with the idea that war is destroying things to such a degree that they have begun to believe it themselves and they have lost this idea that war is killing people. For example, in World War II the harbors in France and the bridges and the river boats in China were destroyed. But if we had any idea that we were going to go forward, we should have preserved these things because we were going to need them ourselves. This insensible idea of destroying things is still a part of our military doctrine and of Britains at that time. The only case that I can recall of saving anything from this destruction, was a high stone arch spiral railroad bridge in Brittany peninsula. This was to be preserved because they had planned to use the port of Brest as the main supply port, initially, in Europe. But in capturing Brest, they destroyed Brest completely. And so it was impossible to use so they might as well of destroyed the bridge. In other words, they didn't save Brest, too, which is stupid. In World War II and also I believe, in the Korean and Viet Nam Wars, this has been the established doctrine, the doctrine of destroying things rather than killing people. So far, we have fought on both friendly and hostile land and we have destroyed things indiscriminately on both.

The result has been that after the war we restored not only the things we destroyed on the friendly lands but those on the hostile lands as well. Utterly unnecessary lay-out of money and effort because it was not necessary to destroy many of these things. For whatever wars we may have to fight in the future, the objective should be to kill enemy people, not just enemy military people, enemy people. And save all possible destruction of things. The old rules of land warfare which seem to be still in effect, if somewhat modified, were written to salve the conscience of the people of the civilized world and not for the purpose of guiding the people who were waging war. This distinction seems never to have been recognized by our military in the United States. And so far, the victors have never tried any of their own people as violating these rules of land warfare or as military criminals. The victors have tried the vanquished for inhuman conduct in violation of these rules. The only case that I know of is the Calley case where the conquerors have ever tried anybody. And to me this is entirely due to the fact that the civilian population does not realize that war is killing people. The objective in designing new weapons should be to design them to kill masses of people at one time and not destroy things in the process. Perhaps better still the weapons should be able to incapacitate people for considerable periods of time. They should be able to obtain these objectives as I said before and emphasize again, without destroying a thing. The military must resign themselves to the fact that military victory is no longer a prerequisite of political victory nor does it make political victory certain. In fact, a stand-off may be the best political victory possible. This is hard for the military planners to take and for the old military people like

myself to swallow, particularly MacArthur. And it's got to be done and it's got to enter into our planning and this para-political situation has got to be taught certainly at least introduced here at the Command and General Staff School and be very thoroughly taught at the War College level. I would hate to try to prepare a course.

MAJ MORRISON: Under what command arrangements should we participate in an alliance?

LTG AURAND: In an alliance all the military forces of each nation should be grouped under a single national commander who should have no other duty. This principle was violated by Eisenhower in Europe and to an even greater degree it was violated in China where Wedemeyer in addition to commanding U.S. forces in the China theater was Chief of Staff to a Chief of State as well as the theater commander. My understanding was that these arrangements were dictated by the combined Chief's of Staff in Washington. I have no proof of this at all but since they existed in two such diverse places, I thought it did come from some place in Washington, at least. The result was predictable confusion within the U.S. forces. This is what you paid for and this confusion meant the loss of the logistician's basic measure man, days and, of course, if you didn't get your work done, so what? As General Fox Conner stated in an address at the Army War College in the 1930's, "God forbid that we ever fight a war with Allies."

MAJ MORRISON: What protocol should be followed by military commanders in a foreign country to which the United States has an accredited diplomatic representative?

LTG AURAND: I happened to be in Washington in February and I asked my old

counsel in G-5 and Egypt, Colonel Wainhouse this question and I think his last job was counselor of the Embassy in Vienna, that is, he was the number two man to the Ambassador then. And he said, "What an unnecessary question." He thought everybody knew that the Ambassador was the only guy who dealt with the country. And the military commander did not. The place of the military commander is always subordinate to the Ambassador who doesn't take his military orders from him but any dealings from within the country, he goes to the Ambassador to have them properly presented to the government in which his troops are residing. The reason I speak of this was from my experience in Egypt, where I brought David along entirely for this purpose and then got to be quite friendly with King Farouk and David Wainhouse would ask me time and again, "What did you and Farouk talk about?" When he wasn't along. I finally arranged it so that David lived in my apartment with me and when the King would come and call at two in the morning, he was there. But this is so necessary in getting along with the government of the country in which you are located that I believe that no military commander is going to forget it now. We had very little experience in this before World War II, that is having our troops in the friendly countries, you know, actually stationed there. Like we had in Germany now, for example. And I don't know what the procedure is in Germany now but if they don't go through the Ambassador to Germany they are missing a bet.

MAJ MORRISON: Oh, I'm sure they do. In the future can we expect a friendly attitude toward our troops when they are stationed in a foreign country?

LTG AURAND: The presence of foreign soldiers in any country is resented by the citizens of the country. Their feeling is that the troops are either

there because the country has just been conquered by those troops or the troops are there because the country can't defend itself and they need Allied troops in the country to help with their defense. Both of these ideas are repugnant to the citizenry and so that while they try to be pleasant on the top, there has to be a basic human hostility to the presence of our troops in any other country.

MAJ MORRISON: Have you any suggestions for the guidance of up coming officers in the U.S.Army?

LTG AURAND: I sure have. And nobody will take my advice. Never but never make an agreement to take action which begins with if I don't hear from you . . . More things have gone wrong because the fellow couldn't get the news back and the guy took the if I don't hear from you contingent thing and it just messed everything up. The proper way to do business in a case of an agreed action is when I hear from you . . . otherwise you sit on your fanny. My next piece of advice is either you go along with your boss or you quit. You can always ask for a transfer. You don't have to resign or retire. And sometimes the request for a transfer has the boss bring you in and you straighten the thing out. But the alternative of an - appeal to a higher authority is just out of the question. No matter which fellow wins, the relationship between you and your boss is never going to be the same after you've had to call an arbitrator in about something. So this I would advise any man even when he is a second lieutenant working for a captain to watch very carefully because if you are in complete disagreement with what he is doing, try to go somewhere else and get a boss that you can agree with. There is no right or wrong to this. Nobody should say that it was

wrong for the captain to do this - no he doesn't know what - the captain doesn't when he did it. Do you get my point? So, either get along with your boss or quit. I've done many, many things that I thought were wrong because it was more important to get along with the boss. Now, in the Army you must solve your problems in the prescribed manner. I don't mean you must come out with the prescribed answer. But the method of doing this must be identical. I mentioned some time ago that one of the things that held the Army together in World War II were the procedures I learned here at the Command and General Staff School. And when everybody used the same procedure you have a basis of understanding no matter what the answer comes out at the bottom. So never vacillate or use your bright ideas about changing procedures. Use the procedure and come out with the answer that you think is right and you will be part of the team. Incidentally, this use of the same procedure to me is basic to all teamwork and while it's a boring thing, I'll admit that, it certainly pays off. During World War II this went as high as the very top echelon, particularly in the logistical side. Both Lee, then in England, who had commanded COMZ in Europe and Sommervell who commanded the Army Services Forces, bragged that they had thrown the book out of the window. And that, of course, meant the procedurial book, the way you did business. They replaced the book first of all, as in China, by an operational directive which was completely inadequate because the guys who wrote it didn't know all of the things that were going to be encountered. So then they issued dozens of mimeographed memoranda. And in addition to that in certain circumstances, they gave oral directives which of course, never got throughout the command. And the

confusion that this caused was great. Now this could all have been saved by them doing one thing. If there was something in the book they didn't like, put out a memorandum changing that one particular thing and distributing it as widely as possible. I think I've told you about the change in the supply system within the United States from the Corps Area Supply System to the Service Command Supply System which is a perfect illustration of making an excellent change in keeping it in effect without destroying the whole structure. I've ofter thought that most of these people who threw the book out the window had never read the book. But the thing that held the Army together in World War II was the instruction given between the World Wars here at the C&GSS and at the War College. When you receive more than one set of instructions, you have an option to choose the one that you will follow and this can be done with impunity. I began my career with this happy option but I found out later that I was bawling things up by making the choice myself. If at all possible try to get the two sets of instructions correlated before you act. If there isn't time of course, you've got to choose one and follow that. Never ask for a decision from higher authority if you know the answer is going to be NO. Either do it yourself or don't. Many times I believe I took the heat off my boss by going ahead with something I was sure he wanted done but he didn't want to stick his neck out to order it and properly didn't want to stick his neck out and order it. Like building the staging camp at LeHavre, for example. If you want a NO answer however to back up your own authority, why go ahead and ask for it and you get it. That's sometimes very helpful. Another thing I discovered was in this effort to save personnel that you could do more with fewer people. Now this sounds a little absurd but practically every organization

in war time has started from scratch and to get anything going, you need more people than you do after it begins operating smoothly. There's several reasons for this but the primary one is that people begin to learn their job and become vastly more productive. Also, in an effort to make sure that you decentralize you are liable to over-organize, you get too many subordinate organizations in the new one that you are starting or has been started. The thing to do there is to start combining two of these subordinate organizations till you get them to the minimum. At one time in Normandy, for example, I had six districts and wound up with three. And then after that reduction in personnel, you keep after these people to reduce because of the superior productiveness they are getting from individuals. You got to keep the production on all the time, I mean the pressure on all the time, for this reduction. But I succeeded pretty well in doing more with fewer. Square pegs in square holes and round pegs in round holes make for a very running organization, but it isn't going any place. You got to have a few square pegs in round holes and round pegs in square holes to have progress. The best illustration I know of this, is the very fine metallurgist, an ordnance officer who spent a great deal of his time in the metallurgy laboratory at Watertown Arsenal, about which I've spoken already. And for some reason or other he was assigned to the technical group at Piccatinny Arsenal, the explosive plant you know, ammunition design plant. And knowing no other tools but the tools of the metallurgist, he began taking microphotographs of powder grams and things like that that he would do if they were metal and he found so many imperfections in the structure of the powder grams that he re-vamped completely the manufacture of smokeless

powder to get a better product. And that was a square peg in a round hole or vice versa that really was productive and progress resulted.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, what are your definitions of a line and staff?

LTG AURAND: The art of organizing which includes the employment and coordination of the staff must be employed by the military. In fact, in my opinion the military should be and I believe that they are, the best practitioners of this art of organizing. But in the military practice of this particular art a schism has developed between line and staff. Similar schisms have developed in ordinary civilian practice of the art. In the beginning of the military practice of the art, the definition of line was simple. The line consisted of those who met the enemy face to face. As the range of weapons increased and the face to face contact got farther and farther apart, the line was defined as those who were the trigger pullers. But then for reasons of promotion and pay or prestige, other people got into the act. The engineers and the communicators became designated as line people. And during World War II the distinction between line and staff became fuzzy because even the rear areas were under attack from the air, so that they enjoyed some of the sensations of combat. In order to keep these people clear in my own mind and for the purpose of what might follow in your questioning, I'm going to call these people generalists and specialists, instead of line and staff. And I want to make it clear here right now, that an infantryman on the front line is a specialist under this definition.

MAJ MORRISON: How would you organize a large headquarters?

LTG AURAND: Every large headquarters particularly military headquarters should be operated by three officers who, when they are in these positions are considered to be generalists. One we call the commanding general; another, the deputy commanding general and the third, Chief of Staff. These people should be so alike in mind and character that given any particular situation all three of them would arrive at the same solution of the problem. Diagrammatically, if you want to make a diagram for this, you can use an equilateral triangle, sit it on it's base and it's apex of course, being at the top. And naturally the commanding general would be at that apex. On the left corner at the base would be the deputy commanding general and a line would be drawn from him down to all of the subordinates commanders. On the other side, on the right side if you will, at the base corner would be the Chief of Staff and a line would be drawn from him to the staff, note that there is no line from the staff to the subordinate commanders. That is the most important part of the diagram. When the commanding general is absent, the deputy commanding general acts for him and when both the commanding general and deputy commanding general are absent, the chief of staff acts as the commanding general. There's an old saying that the deputy commanding general and commanding general should have only one desk, that is when one fellow is in the headquarters, the other one should be out visiting the subordinate units.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, you've spoken of non-hierarchical organization of a staff. What do you mean?

LTG AURAND: Since the staff purpose is to widen the knowledge of the commander, staff officers should have some special knowledge which he

normally would not possess or I could say that better by saying which he normally would not be sufficiently be specialized in. Since staff officers possess special knowledge, they should be treated as specialists. The line or the generalists, are usually provided with a pyramidal organization. But such an organization inhibits the proper use of the specialists on the staff. In other words, as I said back awhile ago, you can't put a scientist in a single G slot, he's useful in all four. And any staff specialist is useful across the board, and needed by the other staff people. To each problem therefore, there should be brought the staff specialists who are needed to solve that problem and this should be done by a - the chief of staff or his deputy or somebody, determining what specialist should go on this paper, naming them, telling one guy that he's the author of the paper, he acts more as a secretary than as of a chairman of the committee, he's responsible for getting the paper out anyway, and then bring into that paper all of the specialties that are needed for the proper solution of the problem that is being attacked. There are no G's, no structure at all, there's just the chief of staff and the staff officers and they are put together on these projects as needed. This is a non-hierarchical organization. I think I mentioned this when I described the way I used these people in my directorate of research and development.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir, you did.

LTG AURAND: This freedom of association to attack specific problems is best organized on the level of the specialists, the bottom level of the staff into what I call desks which are occupied by people of a given specialty, so that you have - you may not need a certain specialty too much so you

combine several specialties in one desk, one fellow might represent them. And another place where you need a lot of specialists because you have problems, a lot of problems which use these specialties, you have a desk for that specialty and there may be a half a dozen fellows at that desk. So you have desks as your echelon below your chief of staff. These desks consists of individuals and the option of the chief is always to pick the individual at a desk when he wants to work on a certain problem. Of course, this isn't done by the chief of staff. He'll have a deputy and some assistant chief and these people - I would organize this way. I would have a person an assistant chief of staff who had to do with plans. I would have an assistant chief of staff who had to do with the present which is sometimes called operations or OP's and I would have an assistant chief of staff who had to do with the past, what is happening on OP's is doing, is it in accordance with the plan of what not, this was my control officer in my practice. On the other side, and crossing all of these interests of past and present plans, I would have three fellows. I would call that side the P side of the staff, I call this the M side of the staff and these assistants and a very large staff would be present. First the one that dealt with men, and I would have in under his cognizance not only the individuals but units and unit training and everything else. Anything that had to do with the men and their performance either as individuals or in an organization. Then I would have another one called material. This is all of the material wants, whether it's weapons or food or whatnot and very much like my job as D/Log. And then I would have means. This you might call out as budget officer of the Department of the Army but it's broader than that. A logistician

does not measure things in dollars, he measures things in man-days, or man-months or man-years and it's awfully hard to convert this to dollars. One of the toughest jobs in logistics is conversion of the man power requirements expressed that way into dollars and then for the budget purposes and then writing the dollar defense. This becomes even more difficult. But I believe the true logistician forgets about dollars. It's not a measure. So whether it's manpower or material, this means that the logistician has to provide it and be cognizant of it and get it. And this usually of course, bought by appropriated funds from Congress. But the computation and defense of these requirements is a science all its own. And I believe it belongs under logistics. I believe the coordination of the budget officer should not be directed by the chief of staff. The equilateral triangle that I gave you as a diagram and the description of it that I gave of the various assistants, the desks and the various assistant chiefs of staff is much too complicated to present an adequate picture of the non-hierarchical organization of the staff. It requires a lot more diagrams and a lot more description to present the real picture.

THIS IS SIDE 1 OF TAPE 7 IN A SERIES OF INTERVIEWS WITH LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY S. AURAND. THE DATE IS 5 MAY 1974 AND WE ARE IN LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

MAJ MORRISON: Sir how would you effect coordination between commands vertically?

LTG AURAND: Since the range of abilities of the specialist on the higher command or the expertise should be greater than those of the specialist on the command immediately below it, there should be constant correspondence on the lower. In fact, in some of my writings I have said that the first duty of any specialist at any echelon is not only to be a staff officer to his boss but to also be a staff officer for the next lower boss and put himself in that position so that he can properly advise the specialist at the - or the next lower level of the same kind that he is. This makes a great deal of sense because not only should the only guy on the top side be more skillful but also he should be training the lower specialist on the lower level. He's really a training guy to make that fellow a better staff officer as well as to give advice to the -- if directly, if necessary, to the lower commander. The great danger in this, of course, is bypassing the command channel's orders but it is very, very necessary. The - another advantage is this, that most planning is done in such a secret way and a very small group at the top that the capabilities and ideas of the subordinate commanders are not brought into the planning process. To me these are the -- this is the essential basic information, what does the lower commanders think of what he has to do under the plan and by doing this -- by this specialist who is in the planning on the higher level going down

to the lower guy and saying, how about this and what do you think about it and what are your capabilities down here. He becomes a much better planner on the higher level and I believe this goes for generalist, the Chief of Staff and the deputy commanders and so on, as well as the specialist. In other words, they bring in their subordinate commanders to a planning session. I am more worried about lack of coordination and giving impossible, orders impossible to execute then I am about loss of secrecy, because I believe that a well organized thing, even if it's gone to the enemy can be executed and a secret thing that is not known to the -- allies or the home people any better than the enemy knows it, it's going to be terrible.

MAJ MORRISON: Should there be any other staff organizations?

LTG AURAND: The size and compensation of other staff organizations should be the prerogatives of the commanding general, the deputy commanding general and the Chief of Staff. Each one of them knows what personnel he needs to assist him personally because each person has different areas in which he needs assistance. The personnel who make up these additional staffs and I'll talk only about one which I call a personal staff, is up entirely to the -- as I said, to the commanding general, the deputy commander and the chief of staff. They are not under the chief of staff. I believe that the chief of staff needs this kind of an organization - a personal staff - less then the other two people because he has the whole expertise of the staff to call upon. In my opinion, a personal staff is most valuable and most necessary. As I said, they should not be part of the main staff and should not be under the chief of staff. Basically, the personal staff

consists of the aides, the chauffeur and the orderly and they are usually provided for by tables of organization or manning tables. In all of the rest of my discussions of the personal staff, we'll consider that these people are there all the time. I'll only discuss the others and sometimes though in lieu of an aide there is a military secretary but he does the same thing so we'll consider -- if there is one of them we'll consider him there in the personal staff all the time. A few centuries ago, a personal staff might of considered -- might have considered a chaplain, a doctor, a lawyer and somebody who could read and write, - a scribe. In those days it was beneath the dignity of a prince to be -- to be able to read and write. He always had a transcriber around to do that for him. In certain situations he had advisors and I use this -- it's an advisory council in Chicago. They, I consider to be members of my personal staff and in Europe, General Eisenhower had a personal staff. I do not know its complete size or its composition but within it he had what he called an inspectorate and these were three or four major generals who had nothing else to do but be personal staff officers. He invested them with great authority, particularly in the area of awarding decorations on the spot and doing things of this kind but they were his eyes and ears. Sometimes they didn't see him for a month. Sometimes he'd call them in every day. In other words, they responded to his needs and I think they did a remarkable job in Europe as far as I saw of their operation but this just gives you a small idea of what I mean by personal staff.

MAJ MORRISON: Perhaps from your experience you could illustrate some of

the concepts which you have just described. How about coordination within your own staff or command?

LTG AURAND: First and foremost of all, I didn't throw the book out of the window. My command and staff organized as prescribed by regulations, by the instruction I recieved here at the Command and General Staff School and by the instruction that I received and I taught at the Army War College. My self-imposed problem was to get the coordination from a hierarchical staff which I believed a non-hierarchical staff would of produced. I believe I said enough about my use of the staff conference and command and staff conference and visits to my company size units and so on to obtain this coordination.

MAJ MORRISON: Would you please summerize your visits to higher headquarters for the purpose of coordinating?

LTG AURAND: Because of the few visits I received from the next higher headquarters either from the commander or members of his staff, I made it a point to visit the next higher headquarters as frequently as possible. In a little over two years in Chicago I had a visit from the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, a West Point classmate and the general who commanded the defenses of the Sault Locks. The only staff officers who came to Chicago to call on me were the chief of ordnance who wasn't there to see me but to give a lecture to a bunch of industrialists and the judge -- and the provost marshal general, General Allen Gullion who is an old friend who came to reprimand me quite peacefully and not on my record for sending the troops into Detroit without the authority of the President of the United States at the time of the riot. So that I'd visited Army Service Headquarters

just about once a month. Sommervell did hold two very fine and well prepared command and staff conferences for the service commanders and they were always sponsored by some service command headquarters.

MAJ MORRISON: Was this twice a year?

LTG AURAND: Yes. Every six months and it was rather unnecessary to go the first month after that but as we got farther away from the conference it became increasingly necessary to go to Washington and what I found out there prepared me for orders that I was about to receive. I knew - I didn't go on carrying out those orders until I got them but we had all the studies made and everything ready - when we get this we'll do so and so and it really paid off. Of course, the fellow at Baltimore was in there almost everyday. He had the jump on the rest of us. But, I believe that my visits paid off in that I had at least the second best service command in the country because of that. In France, the COMZ commander unlike any of the others I had, visited often. He was most welcome. I attended also his bi-weekly command and staff conferences in Paris but the command conference itself was a stage show. We commanders who came in couldn't bring anybody along. I smuggled in my chief of staff onde or twice or maybe my provost marshal general but we had -- we couldn't ask any questions. We just listened to the staff reports of the COMZ staff. They were quite informative. The back and forth question and answer business between the visiting commanders and the staff was completely absent. Lee insisted that everything be sweetness and light. However, the night before the staff conference we had a dinner for the base section commanders and he and Roy Lord, the Chief of Staff were there. The only ones from COMZ. So, we really couldn't get

after the guys we wanted. The tech service people and the G's on the COMZ staff. But there we could yell out loud about what was being done to us by the COMZ staff and we had a receptive audience in Lee and Lord. So we couldn't complain too much. Nonetheless, Lee's visits were very much appreciated and he usually gave some pretty good advice. The China theater held only one command and staff conference and I recall only the emergency meeting of the subordinate -- and I call this only a emergency meeting of subordinate commanders. The Chief of the Planning Division of US Forces China Theater came to Kunming once and we treated him so badly that I think it hurt us later on in dealing with him. We gave him a rough time about the plans he'd prepared. The one session that I believed I talked about already was held at Chengtu when Chennault retired and I almost wrote my letter asking to be relieved. In Egypt I had a most helpful visit from the Under Secretary of War and the Chief of the Foreign Liquidation Commission which resulted in straightening out differences between the FLC commissioner and myself. There were semi-annual world wide commanders conferences at that time held in Washington. None occurred during the three and a half months that I was in Egypt. From USARPAC in Honolulu, I attended these world wide conferences regularly and -- but I could take no one with me, which doesn't pay off. I had to be all of the G's and what not and except for the time we got Schofield Barracks for the Infantry Training Center. These visits didn't pay off very much.

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: I finally persuaded the powers that be to hold these conferences at the time of June week at West Point and at the time of the Army-Navy

game. The Chief of Information was all aginst it. He said, "What is Drew Pearson going to say about this?" And I said, "Well, I'll tell you what you can do about it. Write Drew Pearson a letter telling him we're going to do it and we're going to do it -- it has to be done twice a year and we're going to do it at this time to increase the morale of our overseas commanders and let him print it. That's alright."

MAJ MORRISON: Did he print it?

LTG AURAND: No, he didn't print it. I don't know if the letter was ever sent, as a matter of fact. As to the lateral coordination, I visited MacArthur headquarters once a year as I related already and had the very frugal result of getting the 5th RCT ready for the Korean War. I think those visits really paid off, particularly where distances are so great. And on that occasion I took along, oh, I guess seven or eight staff officers including my Chief of Staff. This is the way you establish coordination between what I call the staff specialists. They are the guys that do the work. They produce the papers. It's alright for the general staff to be together and discuss higher thinking. The working is done by taking staff people with you and I think this is very much overlooked even today.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, would you discuss again your experiences with a deputy commander?

LTG AURAND: Whether or not I had a deputy commanding general dependent upon the manning table for my particular headquarters at the time. There was none in Chicago and none in France. In China I inherited one who was in trouble in India and had to be replaced. The replacement was ideal. He later served me as Deputy Director of R&D in Washington and finally and

eventually became Chief of Chemical Corps. I had a fine Chief of Staff in China and the three of us worked together according to my equilateral diagram. There was no deputy commanding general in Egypt. In Hawaii I inherited a very wonderful Chief of Staff who was promoted to BG and left while the deputy commander was authorized, he was Floyd - Floyd Parks and as I've told you he was taken away almost immediately and replaced by Clarkson who was put on a detached service almost immediately. So, we worked out this deal about Fielder being Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander and doing the deputy commanders work and Elder the Deputy Chief of Staff doing the Chief of Staff work but that worked out very well indeed. I'm convinced that the best setup for the top of a large headquarters or a higher headquarters is this triangular diagram. Where I outlined with the CG at the top, the Deputy CG looking up at the subordinate units and the Chief of Staff running the staffs.

MAJ MORRISON: You've spoken of a commanding generals need for a personal staff. What was your experience with one?

LTG AURAND: My personal staff varied with the commands. However, there are two situations which were common to most of them. I was entitled to two aides. However, I kept but one on duty except in China, of course, where I inherited two aides and I used the vacancy of senior aide to obtain specially qualified majors for my staff. When these people first arrived they would be nominal aides for a time while they were familiarizing themselves with the staff job and then they would be assigned to the staff job and my major vacancy would be again available for this chicanery that I practiced. This was most interestingly done when I took Chaplain

Blakney to China with me. I din't even wait after the day we landed in Kunming to make him chaplain again. He was older than I was and I took care of his baggage on the entire trip from Paris to Kunming. The other common thing about my personal staff in all of my commands was that there were no manning table vacancies for these people. Consequently, I had to really put two hats on staff officers. Now this was not done by the publication of any order. Usually, the staff and the guy knew that he was also serving me as a personal staff officer. And in many cases the staff didn't know it and sometimes the officer didn't know it himself. This caused some hurt feelings on the parts of some staff officers who didn't get into the inner circle that they called it, particularly Elder when he was my Chief of Staff. Although, by and large, I would rather have not have had my chief of staff in my personal staff but when he became deputy chief of staff in USARPAC he was very happy to be a member of the personal staff and approved of it heartily.

MAJ MORRISON: Did you discuss it with him?

LTG AURAND: Oh, yes. I did both in Normandy and in USARPAC. He had never heard of such a thing and was wondering whether he was -- whether I was trying to bypass him by talking to members of his staff on a personal basis. He had some real fears about this and I believe I said in my account of my arrival in Normandy that it took us quite awhile to get in step but we did and it was well worthwhile keeping it because he had the whole history of the place. It was at his finger tips. Now to get to the specific

situations in Chicago contrary to all that I've just said, my first personal staff officer was my chief of staff who was my classmate, Jack Davis and of course, we got along famously. Later he was joined by Wayne King the waltz king of radio fame who started out as the music officer of the command if you'll recall. My aide at that time was rather a person who looked on the black side of everything. So he and Wayne King became known as sad face and glamour boy. The last edition was the staff officer in charge of the Army special training program. I haven't got that right. Army Specialized Training Program. The thing in the colleges who was of course, Palfrey, who later came to be my G-5 in Normandy and was on my personal staff there of course. Watking was not a member of my personal staff in Chicago. I just want to make a point of that because he was ever after, and then I had my civilian advisory council whom I said I considered my personal staff and there are a few people around the edges who sometimes were and sometimes were and sometimes weren't. One of them was the labor officer another new fellow on the cabinet but he lined up all the union heads in the industries and all that sort of thing. I believe I told you he arranged a dinner with all these union chiefs which was, I thought,a very profitable experience. It was for me and I believe they learned something. Now, I was permitted to take nobody with me to Europe as you recall at the start so that I had to send back to Chicago finally for two people and they were Palfrey as I mentioned, and Watkins from the control division who has been mentioned frequently in here and they were the beginning of my personal staff. I remember my aides were all the time so my non-inclusion of Bob Miller here doesn't mean he wasn't on my personal staff. We stuck as sort of a separate

inner circle from all the old timers for quite awhile until I decided this had to quit and that was when we organized the commanding generals table in the mess hall with the inspector general and the provost marshal general and the deputy chief of staff and the aide and myself and a couple of vacant places at the table. And the aide would always go and get two guys to come eat with us. So we had a constant change in people and getting to know the - getting to know the other staff officers that informally. There were other people that again were in and out of the personal staff. A judge advocate whom I got to admire greatly. I've already mentioned the inspector general and the provost marshal. The headquarters commandant who furnished us with a great deal of humor. He was a former pitcher for the St. Louis Cardinals. Quite an athlete. And a couple of other people. The French Liaison officer occasionally joined us and we used him pretty much as a personal staff officer but only when the occasion demanded. He wasn't, shall I say a permanent member. In China my personal staff began with my chaplain and as I've already said and he stayed my only personal staff officer for quite awhile. My two aides were excellent and I didn't feel a need there and -- after VJ Day, Watkins finally showed up and of course, he was immediately on the staff. In Egypt my G-5 was my only personal staff officer, Wainhouse and of course, I've explained the reason for that, his contacts with the governments. In Hawaii my post chaplain, not the command chaplain, my post chaplain, my deputy chief of staff who was Elder and occasionally my assistant control officer, not my son this time, made up my personal staff. But I had a whole civilian staff in addition to the

aide to the Secretary of the Army which was a Rotary club of Honolulu and so I didn't need many personal staff officers and that concludes your question about personal staff.

MAJ MORRISON: Based on your experience, do you have a solution for staff specialists bypassing the command channel with orders?

LTG AURAND: Whether the staff has an hierarchical or non-hierarchical organization, the danger is always present that orders might be transmitted through the so-called technical or I call it specialist channel -- vertically, that is, between vertical adjacent echelons and the great problem is how to keep communication going and still prevent this transmission of orders. In my early years this was a great concern to two of my commanding generals at the sixth service -- at the fifth -- at the sixth, I'll get it straight, at the V Corps area. One of them just let us do anything we pleased. The other one shut the channel down completely. We didn't dare write a personal letter to the post ordnance officer at Fort Thomas, for example, telling him to clean up the brass on the cartridge cases before issuing it for target practices or something of this kind, a purely big piece of technical advice and I believe that something between the two is the way to handle this proposition. In my opinion this should be handled by the specialist policing themselves. Now, this is a little too much to ask of human nature but when I got to be the commander in USARPAC, I had the technical chiefs -- my technical chiefs come in and say I wanted this done both ways. Well, back to the chiefs in Washington and down to the Schofield and the posts on Oahu and I wanted them to be responsible for it. I believe I only caught one or two violations of this confidence I put in these people and I

think they were caused by Washington, not by my own people. At least, I'd like to think so. In each case I wrote the Chief in Washington, sent in the correspondence and said I'm sorry that it came this way. I wished he would repeat it through official channels so that I would have something to back up for me, my boss back up his instructions which I had already carried out. I never held anything up. If anybody is available to police these channels I believe it is the secretary of the general staff but I understand the new organization in Washington has done away with this office.

MAJ MORRISON: There's -- there's still a section within the secretary of general staff's office that will handle staff action.

LTG AURAND: There is?

MAJ MORRISON: Yes sir.

LTG AURAND: Well . . . .

MAJ MORRISON: Within the new Director of the Army Staff.

LTG AURAND: Well, that has to be -- that has to be the secretary of the general general staff in my opinion should be an assistant to the chief of staff and secretary to the general staff. Just like they have Vice President and secretary of a commercial company and he should be of the same rank as all the other assistant chief's of staff. He's too long been a rank below or sometimes two ranks below. I know for awhile I was delogged with the secretary of the general staff was a brigadier and all of the director -- staff directorate were lieutenant generals and this is just too much difference. The secretary has got to tell those fellows where to head in sometimes and he should have at least the same rank. I have one other thought about this that may be useful. I believe that in the Technical

Service Schools, this matter should be taught with a good deal of emphasis as to its importance and I believe it should be taught here at Leavenworth or at least explained here at Leavenworth. I doubt whether this is a war college problem but just reference to it and repetition of the fact that this channel should not be used for orders might not be amiss there. I believe that the educational process in this particular field is not sufficient and perhaps that's why there is so much bypassing that goes on. Now you showed me I believe a letter from -- an article written by Tom Larkin who said that -- said that there wasn't so much of it as people declared that there was and that subordinate commanders declared that there was but there was an awful lot. A great deal too much. And my word for it is undisciplined conduct on the part of the higher technical service chief. Please don't think that I never did it.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, do you have any last words you wish to add to your Oral History?

LTG AURAND: Well, Bill, you and I have been working on this Oral History now for five months. I don't know whether you realize that that much time has passed or not. I'm really happy about my military career because I have seemed to learn from my mistakes and gain confidence from my successes. I believe that I didn't get down more than one day after I got a blow. I started that night again and if I had anything to recommend to a young fellow at this time from my career was take it, forget it. Learn from it but don't let it bother you. I changed my career objective three times. When I went to West Point I had the idea of becoming a civil engineer. I was going to go to Penn State to become a civil engineer. When I didn't

like the engineer officers that I saw at West Point, I decided to become a mechanical engineer and when I got that famous remark on my efficiency report at Watertown Arsenal at the end of course II of the ordnance school "suitable only for field service," I knew I wasn't going to have a mechanical engineering career. It took about three years before I decided on just what I wanted and that was -- I was aided greatly as I've told you, by Colonel Embick and I decided to be a logistician. A logistical career being broader than an ordnance career. During this period I had three setbacks and I believe if I'd let them bother me too much I wouldn't of gone any farther. I had two official reprimands and I was also the only officer commissioned in, detailed to or on duty with the ordnance department of the day of declaration of World War I who wasn't promoted to the grade of lieutenant colonel. I believe very firmly that the very kind message that I got from the ordnance personnel office that this thing was not approved because they had ceased making boys lieutenant colonels was a mere cover-up for my poor efficiency report which prevented promotion. On the plus side during this period I'd done a very fine job and I classified that way myself. On mobilization planning in the V Corps area not only did I do the G-4 planning but finally a separate office of mobilization planning was set up in corps area headquarters, where I was given an assistant and we did the whole corps area mobilization planning. A fellow named Roy Thurman, Infantry Captain and myself. This, of course, attracted the attention of the ordnance office and I was yanked in a hurry to complete the ordnance field service plan which they had overlooked entirely. So that was quite a plus for me during this period. It gave me a little

confidence and I think helped me get over the shock of the other three blows. I forgot to mention another blow and that was that I didn't get overseas in World War I and I think this hurt me more than you can ever imagine and you figured to be promoted to Lieutenant Colonel but General Symmonds who was the G-4 at the V Corps area rather took me under his wing and he told me not to worry about that but to go to all the Army Schools that I could get to. And he said that little -- he erased this lack of duty overseas in World War I in the long run and he was exactly right and I followed his advice. Incidentally, I'd give that advice to any officer in the Army today. Go to all the Army schools you can get to.

MAJ MORRISON: Thank you.

LTG AURAND: I believe that the real start of my career came when I was sent to the Command and General Staff School after Corregidor. In 1927 I'd had 12 years commission service. I was 33 years old and I was determined to be a damn good officer and live down some of this bad stuff that had happened in the past. I can't say that I worked tremendously hard here but I had one very great advantage. I studied with my West Point roommate who was -- lived in the beehive right across the arch from me and we both did very well in the course. There were no honor graduates that year, if I recall, but there were people who were graduated with honorable mention and I was on the list. I knew somebody in the school secretaries office and found out that there were 32 people had made it and I was number 31. I don't know whether he was kidding me or not but in any event, this gave me a tremendous boost and a great deal of confidence and all I wanted to do -- I was sure then that I would get to the War College as a student and all I

wanted to do was to fill the time and put in every year to go to the War College as a student. So, I went back to the V Corps area where nothing of consequence career wise happened. My War College year as a student was wonderful and I did well there. They didn't publish any standings of students in those days. You got a recommendation for duty in the War Department general staff or as a division commander. That's about as high as they would go. In those days they were very modest about such recommendation and I'd miss -- I missed one which didn't bother me in the least. I had the same instructor at Leavenworth as I did at the War College in G-2. He was a classmate of mine with a fine sense of humor, Charlie Busbee. And Charlie said that I was the poorest G-2 he could imagine and he was going to flunk me and he did, both at Leavenworth and the War College. I was not recommended for duty in G-2. I have never agreed with the recommendation more. I picked my duty after the year as a War College student with the idea of becoming commandant of the ordnance school. I'd been teaching the field service course on DS for three or four years. So, I took the job of chief of the field service branch office at Raritan Arsenal. Each tech service allowed only a certain number of people in Washington so they put branches of their office out in the field. This made me independent, it made it possible for me to come frequently to Washington. As the Navy says, keep my finger on my number and I enjoyed it, I enjoyed it there. I learned a lot in that job. In the Second year I was at Raritan and they moved the Ordnance school from Watertown Arsenal to Aberdeen Proving Ground where it should of been all the time and they transferred me permanently to the school with the idea that I would succeed Bethel Simpson, the Commandant, as Commandant of the school. And I brought George Hirsch who

comes up all in time like Watkins, in to succeed me in my job, you see. That's the other guy at the school and right about this time I went down to see Robertson who was my instructor at Leavenworth and my G-4 instructor at the War College about the problems for the joint command post exercises that the War College staged at that time. They brought all of the technical school students in to be the ordnance officer or the quartermaster or what not engineer officer, on these staffs, made up of the War College people. And it was certainly wonderful instruction for the tech service schools. So, I went down to get all of their situations and whatnot and prepare the things that we would have to have for the problems for the ordnance group people, and he said my job is up this year and I recommended you along with -- quite a list for my replacement and I said, "Wonderful." So knowing this, it happened that a fellow named Cleve Bomar, an ordnance officer, was MacArthur's military secretary and I went up to see him. To say that my name was on this list and if there was anything that might be said in addition when the final choice was made, why I hope you put in a good word for me. Lo and behold! who should be sitting at the next desk but Eisenhower. He had come up with Mosley who had been executive to the assistant Secretary of War. Eisenhower came to MacArthur's office when Moseley was made Deputy Chief of Staff. So the two guys were sitting side by side and, of course, Ike eventually became MacArthur's military secretary and then went to the Philippines. Well, I didn't talk to Ike. I talked to Cleve Bomar. How much Ike had to do with this, I don't know, but I did get the job as member-faculty member at the War College. And those were the four most pleasant years in my life. Of course, they had to be offset by something

and they were offset by an official reprimand and by having charges preferred against me by the commanding officer of Aberdeen Proving Grounds of all places. I don't know what happened to those charges. They must of laid around in somebody's "hold" basket until they died a natural death. After my War College tour, I arranged with the field artillery to transfer to the field artillery. I felt if I wanted to get ahead in logistics I had to cease holding a single technical service's commission or I'd become known as a specialist in ordnance instead of a specialist in logistics. So, this was all about to be consummated except that I had to send my application in through the ordnance office and just as I was about to do so, General Tschappat sent for me and said that I had such a fine technical mind he wanted me back at technical work at Picatinny Arsenal at the Army Ammunition design group and since he was the man who inspired me when he was Professor of Ordnance and Gunnery at West Point to go into Ordnance work, I just couldn't turn him down. I should have and I'm like everybody - wondering what would have happened <u>if</u>. So, I went to Picatinny for two years and who should become Chief of Ordnance in the meantime, but the man who had preferred charges against me as Commanding Officer at Aberdeen Proving Grounds and I had to get out somehow. I did by becoming a student at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in the class of '39-'40 which brought me back to Washington and I was sure that the war was coming and I was sure that I was going overseas this time. That is where -- that is where I could pick my place. I did very well at the Industrial College. I came out number two. I should have, my gosh, with all of the education I had. The only fellow that beat me was Styer who later became

Sommervell's Chief of Staff. Why two old men like us were in that course, I don't know. But we won tooth and nail there, with all their youth. And then by accident as I recounted, I got into G-4. Well, of course, I considered that period from May 1940 to September of '42 as the most productive period of my life as far as what I did for my country was concerned and I felt very highly successful. I gained confidence. And then I crossed up Sommervell and got kicked upstairs to a Major General's commission and commanded the Sixth Service Command which was probably the best thing that ever happened to me accidentally and not on purpose. I learned a great deal in my first command which was useful to me later but I believe that I had fought so long and so hard on this staff problem -- on the staff organization problem when I was on the War College faculty and I researched it a great deal, history of staffs and all that sort of thing, that I was sorely tempted to play around wiht staff organization. And then as I've said before, my problem was to get as good results coordinated staff action and coordinated action within the command with the regular staff prescribed by the book as I could have with my theoretical staff which had never been tried. I was unexpectedly yanked to France again getting into trouble. Got a good command I thought, a Normandy base section and then to China, another command; then to Egypt, another command. I was only a couple of weeks in between. And then finally back on the staff again. My years at Washington -- in three and a half years, a little less than three years, I guess, June of '46 to March of '49. They were well spent but mostly trying to separate the Army and Air Force and seeing that the Navy didn't pick up too many of the pieces that fell off the table. In USARPAC, my main accomplishments,

if any, were preparing the V RCT for combat in Korea and handling the evacuation of the sick and wounded from that war and then establishing the Hawaii infantry training center which I think was a great success. So, I'll wind this up by saying what I said at the start of this question, I learned from adversity and gained confidence from success.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, for the record I want to tell you how much I've enjoyed participating with you in this interview and how militarily rewarding it's going to be for them. Thank you very much.

LTG AURAND: And thank you, Bill. Well, although I've signed this thing off now there's still a little bit left on this tape and spite of the fact that if takes over 22 hours which is way beyond what I expected, I would like to add a - oh, a correction or two on another idea. First of all, I'm subject to inversion of numbers. I invert them in other words. The quarters on Palm Circle were number five, not number four. Number four was the quarters at the War College during the four years that I was instructor and I made a very bad omission in describing the OTC which you call the ROTC. The only consideration which should be given to the instruction at the college or university gives to our student is that he gets his degree or immediately does satisfactorily academically in the eyes of the faculty of his college. This is not a judgement for the military. It doesn't matter what course he takes, there must be no prescribed courses by the military. No core subjects nothing else. We have taken time of War, college graduates - period. And I don't care whether they came from the study of ancient French poetry, they were fine educated people and they made very good officers. To me it's immaterial about what the education

is there except for what it does to the guy. If it broadens him out and it lets him understand humanity and other human beings, it contributes more to leadership instruction than if he took electrical engineering, for example. So it's immaterial what he takes in the course. Now I can't emphasize that too much. Now I am probably double crossing myself with this. I am so against career guidance, but it has occurred to me that in damning career guidance, I haven't come up with anything that might be considered my idea of what an army officer's career should be. Now, I can't recommend mine because I stumble over my own feet too often so I don't want anybody to follow that but I think for a man to be Chief of Staff, he should have a career something like this. And I hope nobody ever follows it. To begin with, well, just one other thing. I'm going to call what you call a branch school or whatnot, a specialty college and I'm not going to call the -- higher group, a military arts college. A military specialty college and a military arts college. In other words, the first military arts college is the C&GCS here. Well, the first year of a man's commissioned service he should take a year at the military specialty college and he can specialize in anything he wants but I'm going to use armor here just as an illustration. So, he goes to the military specialty college on armor and he gets a degree of a bachelor of military science armor. Now, he should have some, what I call company duty. I think this whole period, the second, the third and the fourth years are to be company duty and I think he should switch around within that specialty of armor, one year on this and one year on that and one year on the other, whatever those specialties are. I don't know. Now,

in the fifth year, after he's had four years of service, he should go back to the military specialty college and he should take a course which would give him a master's degree in armor from that college and after that he should be a company commander for at least a year and he should do a year or so on battalion staff.

MAJ MORRISON: How long should both of these schools last?

LTG AURAND: One year.

MAJ MORRISON: One year each?

LTG AURAND: Yes, I think one year plus the leave he has accumulated, in other words, if he has been in for a year he'll have at least, may have three months so that this is three months and nine months. Three months leave and nine months service. This is the time it takes leaves and change stations and all that.

MAJ MORRISON: But the school should . . . .

LTG AURAND: Nine - nine months.

MAJ MORRISON: Nine months school.

LTG AURAND: Yeah. Now, on the sixth to his ninth year, or did I say that already. It doesn't matter, he should be a company commander or the equivalent and he should have at least one year's battalion staff. I'm repeating myself. In his tenth year he should go to the final school in his military - final year in his military specialty college and he should get the degree of doctor of military science and thereafter he should be on a battalion staff or battalion exec or he could be battalion commander. But, his staff duty should be on - on that level. Now, the next school he goes to in his 15th year, would be the military arts college which is

C&GSC and he gets a degree from here of bachelor of the military art. He's through being a specialist. He's now a generalist or he's beginning to learn to be a generalist. Now after that he should be on school faculties of his own speciality because he's going to bring down generalism to those now or he should be a battalion commander or battalion exec. Now in the 16th to 19th years in addition to those things, he can be even an instructor in his own college from which he just graduated if he gets a year or two of experience to cinch what he's learned. In his 20th year, he would go to the military arts college again and his degree would be master of military arts and by the way, I mean degrees. We can grant degrees. The hell with the civilian college accreditation system. And thereafter, he should be on the theater or the department -- on theater or department of army staffs, I mean by theater in peace time joint command -- joint staffs and overseas command - Washingtons staff. Or he should be an instructor of the junior course at the arts college of the first year. Now, I think that lasted to the 21st to 24th year. Now, in the 25th year, he should attend a military arts college again and get his degree as doctor of military arts. Now he is equipped to be a, perhaps, a division commander or a department staff chief of something of this kind. And finally, he should go to a two year's school, joint service school where he would be a Fellow using the academic term and this would be the culmination of his education. From here, of course, he could either teach there or in any subordinate school of military arts, maybe be the assistant commandant or the commandant of one of those things. And he's on his way to being Chief of Staff and all I can say, Bill, that this has been the most enjoyable five days here at Fort Leavenworth and I hope everybody at the War College knows it.

MAJ MORRISON: Sir, again let me thank you for participating in this program.