



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY AND THE CENTER OF  
MILITARY HISTORY  
WASHINGTON, DC 20314

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

BG Frank A. Osmanski (ret)  
P.O. Box 656  
Beaufort, South Carolina 29902

20 December 1982

Dear General Osmanski:

I'm sorry for the delay in responding to your letter of 13 November, but it took a little searching to find the document in which you are interested. Enclosed is a "Staff Study" (not a briefing), dated late October 1964, entitled "Improvement of US Logistical Systems in RVN." Obviously, this is the forerunner of the December plan for the introduction of an Army logistical command in South Vietnam.

Once again, if this office can be of any additional assistance to you, please feel free to contact me. Best wishes for the holiday season.

Sincerely yours,

Vincent H. Demma  
Historian  
Southeast Asia History Branch

UNITED STATES MILITARY APO 943, San Francisco, California  
COMBAT SUPPORT CENTER, VIETNAM

G-4

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30 October 1968

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MACJ

SUBJECT: Improvement of US Logistic System in RVN

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TO: Commander in Chief  
US Army, Pacific  
APO 958  
US Forces

1. The attached staff study, subject as above, has been forwarded to COMUSMACV with the recommendation that he approve it and forward it to the JCS with a recommendation that it be implemented.
  2. This copy is furnished for your advance information only.
- FOR THE COMMANDER:

*Frank A. Oranski*

FRANK A. ORANSKI  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army  
Asst Chief of Staff, J-4

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STAFF STUDY WITH CHARTS

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J-4 JCS (Washington, D.C.)	1
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CINCPAC	5
CINCUSARPAC	1
CINCPACFLT	1
CINCPACAF	1
COMNAVPHIL	1
CG USARYIS	1
CG USASCV	1
CO HSAS	1
CG 2d Air Div	1
J-1 MACV	1
J-3 MACV	1
J-4 MACV	3
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Total	20

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25 November 1964  
R&C Branch J-4 MACVCOMPARISON OF LOG COMD PROPOSALS

<u>J-4 MACV</u>	<u>USARPAC</u>		<u>DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY</u>	
	<u>DELETE FROM</u> <u>MACV PLAN</u>	<u>ADD TO</u> <u>MACV PLAN</u>	<u>HUE</u>	<u>TYPE A LOGISTICAL COMMAND</u>
1 MED DET OA				159
1 MED DET KI				
				ORD CO DS PLUS
				2 TMS BB )
				6 TMS BU )
				1 TM KA )
				347
				ORD CO DAS
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				QM CO DS PLUS
				5 TMS AB )
				5 TMS BA )
				17 TMS AB )
				1 TMS HK )
				404
				SIGNAL COM S&M PLUS
				5 TMS KA )
				1 TM K-7 )
				201
				6 ENG TMU BA +
				1 ENG TM HQ
				185
				5 TC TMS BB +
				5 TC TMS JE
				65
				1 MEDICAL DEPOT PLT
				(-) 1 TM JB
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1 QM DET BA	8			
1 MED DET LB	11			
1 SIG DET KA	7		1 TC TEAM SVC CO TYPE B	70
1 ENG DET BA	17		1 ORD DS MAINT PLAT	14
1 ORD DET BA	16		1 ENG FIRE TRK TM FE	2
1 QM DET HL	3		1 ENG UTILITY DET HD	28
1 QM DET AB	4		1 TC MVMT CONTROL DET LD	5
1 QM DET GA	7			
1 TC DET EB	5	X		
1 TC DET JE	8	X		

VUNG TAU

1 ENG DET BA	17	X	1 ENG SUP PT CO TYPE B	40
1 ORD DET BA	16		1 ORD MAINT PLT	14
1 QM DET HL	3		1 ENG FIRE TRK DET FE	2
1 QM DET HI	2	X	1 ENG PURIFICATION DET GP	4
1 QM DET HL	3		1 ENG UTILITY DET HD	28
			1 QM SUP DET BA	8

SAIGON

1 LOG COMD HQ	93			
1 ENG DET BA	17		1 ORD MAINT & SUP BN HQ	37
1 MED DET JB	5		1 ENG WATER PURIFICATION DST	
			GG	12
1 MKD DET DEP	30		2 END DET FIRE TRK FB	12
1 ORD CO DAS	123		1 ENG FIRE FTG HD DET FA	4
1 ORD DET BA	16		1 TC TEAM SVC CO TYPE B	98
1 ORD DET KA	10		1 TC MVMT CONTROL DET LB	6
1 QM DET BA	8			
1 QM DET AB	4			

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USARPAC

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MACV PLAN

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

J-4 MACV

1 QM DET HL	3	
1 QM DET HL	3	
1 QM DET HI	2	
1 QM DET HI	2	
1 SIG DET KA	7	
1 QM DET HK	7	
1 SIG DET KB	20	
1 SIG CO HQ	136	
1 TC DET JE	8	X
1 TC DET BB	5	X
1 ENG DET HQ	83	
1 ORD DET BB	29	
1 ORD DET BB	29	
1 ORD CO DS	181	
1 QM DET BH	12	
1 QM CO DS	284	
1 QM DET JA	10	X

CAN THO

1 QM DET BA	8	
1 ENG DET BA	17	X
1 ORD DET BA	16	X
1 QM DET AB	4	X
1 SIG DET KA	7	
1 TC DET BB	5	X
1 TC DET JE	8	X

1 ORD DAS CO P/S	70
1 TC MVMT CONTROL DET LD	5
3 TC HATCH SEC	9
1 TC CARGO HANDLING SEC	6
1 ENG FIRE TRK DET FE	2
1 ENG WATER PURIFICATION DET	
GP	4
1 ENG UTILITY DET HD	28
1 ENG SUP PT PLAT	19

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OCT 26 1964

STAFF STUDY

IMPROVEMENT OF US LOGISTIC SYSTEMS IN RVN

Logistic Situation in RVN

1. Logistic support of counterinsurgency operations in RVN has always been generally adequate and successful. There is no record or other knowledge of an instance of unsuccessful counterinsurgency operations being traceable to logistic inadequacy or failure. However, this record in itself is no cause for complacency since the logistic support available for counterinsurgency operations has really never been stringently tested and, moreover, there are in fact shortcomings of the logistic systems supporting the counterinsurgency which should be ameliorated.

2. When the logistic support of the original National Campaign Plan was planned, preparations were based on an intensity of operations which the strategic planners estimated would eventuate at an average of 35%. This criterion, intensity of operations, is the ratio of the total number of equivalent battalion-days of operations engaged in by the RVNAF in a month divided by the total RVNAF combat forces available during that month expressed in terms of equivalent battalions; or, in other words, it is that percentage of the total available RVNAF combat forces, including Regional Forces and Popular Forces, which are on the average engaged in active operations daily. At Chart 1 the trace of this ratio is plotted from the beginning of the National Campaign Plan of 1963 to the present. On the premise that logistic preparation was made for a 35% intensity of operations, the logistic systems supporting the counterinsurgency theoretically have on the average about 40% additional capacity available before they are fully stressed. Actually, however, there are problems and difficulties in these logistic systems which must be corrected. On the US side particularly, the increasing strength of US forces in RVN and the advanced preparations which are being made for the possible execution of US or SEATO operational plans require adjustments or improvements in the US logistic system.

3. At the present time there are two subordinate commands under COMUSMACV the titles of which include the word "support": US Army Support Command, Vietnam (USASCV) and Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon (HEDSUPACT or HSAS). At some times and in some quarters it is misunderstood that the support rendered by these two commands is diametrically different: USASCV provides combat support to the RVNAF and HSAS provides logistic support to the US forces in RVN.

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### Logistic Systems

4. At the present time there are 15 different discrete logistic systems supporting the counterinsurgency (Chart 2). Four of these are quasi-military, comprising those of CAS, the local agency of CIA; USOM, the local agency of AID; a number of charitable organizations, most prominently and typically represented by CARE; and the Deputy Officer in Charge of Construction (DOICC), the US Navy equivalent of a US Army Engineer District. CAS has a full-fledged logistic system very much like that of the US military, including an off-shore base in Okinawa, arrangements for its own inter-theater airlift, warehouses and stocks in RVN, and a system of distribution employing essentially civilian personnel but relying in part on US military distribution means. Until recently USOM has had only an embryonic logistic system, consisting of arrangements to stock in Saigon and to distribute up-country essential economic supplies, including many intended for the construction and maintenance of Hamlets of New Life (HNL's, formerly Strategic Hamlets); but recently, as the result of a survey made by a US Army logistician employed by AID Washington and of the assistance of five US Army logisticians seconded to it for a year's duty in mufti, USOM is now developing a more nearly complete logistic system, which nevertheless still relies in part on US military movements means for its operation. CARE and the other charitable organizations move significant quantities of essentially relief supplies to distressed people and placed throughout RVN, again utilizing as necessary military movement means. DOICC moves construction personnel, equipment, and materials throughout RVN largely on military movement systems.

5. Then there is the military-supporting but completely commercial POL logistic system, operated in behalf of the military by the three commercial POL companies: ESSO, SHELL, and CALTEX. All POL used by the military in RVN is imported by these commercial companies and all POL used by US forces in RVN is distributed to them by these same companies.

6. There are then ten military logistic systems, 3 of them RVNAF and 7 of them US. The RVNAF systems comprise one each for its Army (ARVN), Navy (VNN), and Air Force (VNAF), with in addition some minor logistic elements incorporated in the Regional Forces and Rangers. The ARVN logistic system predominates both in the volume of its business, since ARVN represents about 90% of the regular RVNAF strength, and because of the support it renders as a common-user logistic system to all elements of RVNAF, including ARVN, VNN, VNAF, the Regional Forces, Popular Forces, and the Hamlets of New Life. The seven US logistic systems include one each for the Army, with a

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semi-autonomous system for the US Special Forces, and for USAF and USMC; (a Navy-manned and -operated common-user logistic system for immediate support of Headquarters MACV and of other US forces in Saigon and to a limited extent of US forces up-country; ) a retail logistic system operated by the Headquarters Commandant MACV for the support of the field Advisory Detachments; and a separate logistic system supporting the classified operations of the Special Operations Group MACV. Despite the multiplicity of these US logistic systems, US logistic support is still inadequate and incomplete insofar as common-user support is concerned.

7. These 15 logistic systems are coordinated by processes of priorities, allocations, coordination, or control exercised by J-4 MACV (Chart 3). To the extent that all 15 systems depend on military transportation means and movements systems, they are coordinated by the allocations of capacities on these systems by the Combined Movements Allocations Board, to which J-4 MACV contributes one-half of its Movements Branch to cooperate with an equal assignment from the Transportation Branch of J-4 High Command. (The military-supporting POL system and the ten military logistic systems are further coordinated by the Sub-Area Petroleum Office in J-4 MACV, through which contracts for military POL are arranged and administered, issues against these contracts are authorized, and quality control surveillance is conducted.) As respects the RVNAF and US military logistic systems, there is further coordination between them in real estate and construction matters. All GVN- or RVNAF-owned real estate, particularly at airfields and other locations at which it is shared between RVN and US forces, is allocated as the result of direct coordination between J-4 MACV and J-4 High Command. (Major construction in behalf of both RVN and US military forces is performed by DOICC, for whose program priorities are prescribed by J-4 MACV; furthermore the ARVN Engineer Command also performs limited construction in behalf of US forces in RVN, especially at minor airfields. Finally, among the US military logistic systems there is further coordination as respects hospitalization and evacuation and local procurement. The 3 US Services' hospitals in RVN are used interchangeably for treatment of US patients and, as necessary, regulation of the use of their beds is exercised by the Surgeon MACV under the staff supervision of J-4 MACV. Moreover, as a field agency of J-4 MACV, a Central Purchasing Agency coordinates the local procurement and contracting operations of HSAS, USASCV, and 2d Air Division.

8. The commercial POL system is an effective one with only one inherent major problem: that of security of its installations and distribution (Chart 4). Major commercial POL facilities are located at Nha Be, where some 80% of

all POL used in RVN is stored, and at Danang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Tan Son Nhut, and Can Tho-Vinh Long. Distribution from the base POL terminal at Nha Be and from the up-country facilities at Danang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and Can Tho is accomplished by a combination of sea tanker, rail, and road movement. An inherent weakness in this distribution system is that long-haul road movement largely from south to north is used to supply locations such as Ban Me Thuot and Pleiku when distribution to these inland locations should preferably be accomplished by movement to Qui Nhon and Nha Trang by sea and then shorter, more secure road movement from these latter places to the inland consuming sites. The POL companies are now adjusting their distribution systems to conform to these interior lines from the minor ports. Their essential need has been for increased permanent storage facilities at the minor ports of Qui Nhon and Nha Trang, which until recently ESSO and SHELL have not regarded as a sufficiently profitable economic investment but expansion of which they are now beginning to finance. Security of the huge terminal at Nha Be has been a constant concern. The present situation is that the physical security of the some 45,000,000 gallons of various types of POL stored at this location by all three companies is now as nearly complete as it can be made, short of area pacification of the environs which is proceeding as the HOP TAC plan for the pacification of the top priority provinces surrounding Saigon progresses.

9. The RVNAF logistic systems are simple, streamlined, and efficient (Chart 5). Essentially J-4 High Command is directly subordinate to the DCSLOG High Command from whom J-4 High Command gets immediate important decisions and directives; and J-4 High Command directly controls three vital logistic agencies through which logistics operations are accomplished: a Logistics Management School, patterned closely after the US Army Logistics Management Center at Fort Lee, Virginia; the Chiefs of the six ARVN Technical Services (Chemical is included in Ordnance) with their base depots in Saigon; and the, at present four, Corps Area Logistic Commands (CALC's) with their field depots located generally for the direct support of the four ARVN Corps. The ARVN logistic system, including its Chiefs of Technical Services and its CALC's, is used for the common-user logistic support of the entire RVNAF, including ARVN, VNN, VNAF, the Regional Forces, Popular Forces, and the Hamlets of New Life. Certain adjustments and improvements now in process in the RVNAF logistic system will assure even better logistic support of RVNAF operations. First, the present four CALC's are to be realigned as five Area Logistic Commands (ALC's), each with a geographical area of responsibility for logistic support, determined by the natural ease of supporting certain provinces from a particular port, and thereafter are to be divorced from

direct support of the Corps and to be devoted to the support of all units within these geographical areas regardless of the changing Corps boundaries (Chart 6). Second, under each ALC there will be, not only the Technical Service Direct Support Companies as now for the direct support of units of ARVN, VNN, and VNAF, through contact teams as necessary for the more far-flung locations, but also the Administrative and Direct Support Logistic Companies (A&L Companies), which now belong to the Regional Forces, will soon be incorporated directly into ARVN for the direct logistic support of the Regional Forces, Popular Forces, Sector (=Province) Chiefs and their US Advisors, and the Sub-Sector (=District) Chiefs and their US Advisors, and the Hamlets of New Life (Chart 7).

#### US Logistic Systems

10. When J-4 MACV was organized in March 1962 it was then conceived, and it has since largely developed, that there would be three major phases of its work (Chart 8): a Phase I oriented on US logistics, in which the principal task would be to provide the common-user resources for, and to coordinate, the development of the US logistic systems in RVN which were then being established for the support of expanding US forces which were swarming into RVN and initially overwhelming existing logistic facilities belonging to MAAG-Vietnam; a Phase II oriented toward assistance and advice of J-4 JGS (High Command) for his planning, preparation, and execution of the logistic support of pacification, entailing assistance to him in writing logistic annexes to the various pacification plans, development of logistic policies and procedures, and provision of that logistic support; and now a Phase III in which the principal task is to prepare for the logistic support of possible future execution of US or SEATO operational plans, comprising the three basic tasks of base development, representation to the GVN of US requirements for in-country resources, and reorientation of the US logistic systems in RVN. It is to the third task of this third phase that this staff study is essentially addressed.

11. The US logistic systems in RVN require in the long-term six primary improvements (Chart 9):

- a. Expansion of existing systems in volume to accommodate the increasing strengths of US forces in RVN.
- b. Establishment of an integrated up-country retail common-user logistic system which now does not exist.

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c. Expansion of the base wholesale common-user logistic system into additional supply categories and into services now not provided by HSAS.

d. Integration of these up-country retail and base wholesale common-user logistic systems.

e. Elimination of certain duplications between HSAS and the Headquarters Commandant MACV, between HSAS and USASCV, between USASCV and its Army Special Forces, and between the centralized and decentralized airlift systems.

f. Displacement of HSAS with a US Army Logistic Command.

12. The principal immediate shortcomings of the present US common-user logistic system in RVN which should be remedied as soon as possible are the following four (Chart 10):

a. Inadequate supervision of the handling of US cargoes at the up-country minor ports.

b. Inadequate coordination of logistic functions at locations of US personnel of multiple MACV commands.

c. Inefficiency of a supply system which operates entirely on a retail basis from Saigon or, in other words, in the absence of up-country field depots.

d. Incomplete support by HSAS in the common-user supply and services categories.

13. The movement of cargoes and passengers for the RVNAF and US forces in RVN to up-country destinations is accomplished by a combined logistic movements system which deserves the description "combined" in two respects (Chart 11): first, it is a system combining sealift with airlift and, second, its resources are a combination of US and RVNAF. Essentially, the sealift system operates out of Saigon to the up-country minor ports of Danang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and Can Tho, utilizing at the present time six LST's, three of which are VNN and three US, two of them on charter to HSAS and an additional one employed on a per-diem basis. At the up-country minor ports this sealift system connects through adjacent airfields with the centralized airlift system, in which US C123's, VNAF C47's, and Australian CV2B's radiate from these ports for further movement of US and RVNAF

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passengers and cargoes to major inland airfields, from which in turn smaller fixed and rotary wing aircraft under direct control of the Corps Senior Advisors make further distribution to smaller locations deeper within the country. US cargoes transitting these systems are off-loaded and handled through the up-country minor ports by a combination of three incongruous agencies: the field agents of a prime commercial maritime agency in Saigon under contract to HSAS, which provide as necessary stevedoring, local transportation, and in-transit storage for these US cargoes moving toward their US consignees; three US Army Transportation Corps NCO's under operational control of HSAS, primarily for documentation of these cargoes at Danang, Qui Nhon, and Nha Trang; and, to supervise both the commercial field agents of the contractor and the Transportation Corps NCO's in the physical absence of HSAS, the Senior MACV Transportation Advisors to the CALC's, located at these up-country minor ports, are used in a collateral role, both for this supervision and further to coordinate notifications of US consignees and use as necessary of US resources, such as trucks and forklifts, to assist in the off-loading and movement of US cargoes. These are a jerry-built improvisation which has worked acceptably under past conditions but which, it is considered, will not continue to function successfully under the stress of and increasing strength of US forces in RVN, especially since a substantial part of this increase will go up-country to isolated locations. Although these field agents under contract to HSAS are subcontractors to the foremost and best maritime agency in Saigon, Messageries Maritimes, they are limited both in their resources and in their experience; for example, they lack materials handling equipment, with the result that forklifts used to unload the LST's are usually borrowed from US forces in the vicinity; and their transportation is inadequate and ramshackle, with the result that US consignees in the port areas generally use their own trucks and unload their cargoes directly from the LST; they have labor difficulties in obtaining stevedores; and they operate under a contract which pays them for the cargo arriving on the LST's whether they directly unload it themselves or not. What is needed at these up-country minor ports are proper military port supervisory detachments complete with supervisors, documentors, and coordinators, who can assure the safe transit of US cargoes between the LST's and the aircraft that will carry them farther inland. Such detachments are available as organized units of the US Army Transportation Corps. The Centralized Airlift System, which serves about 80 inland terminals, has available to it at its larger destinations eight detachments of the US Air Force 8th Aerial Port Squadron, at Danang, Pleiku, Qui Nhon, Ban Me Thuot, Nha Trang,

Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, Vung Tau, and Can Tho. At all other of its air terminals receipt and coordination of delivery of US cargoes are charged to "Transportation Agents", who are local personnel with other primary duties designated collaterally to meet all incoming aircraft of the Centralized Airlift System and to insure that cargoes are properly off-loaded, receipted for, and delivered. These Transportation Agents are often not present to perform these functions and at the present time have no equipment with which to assist in the off-loading. What is needed here is individuals specifically assigned and equipped each with a forklift for these purposes.

14. US strength in RVN has never been large by, say, NATO standards but it has expanded often in fitful surges (Chart 12). At the present time there are more than 17,500 US personnel in RVN, who are located at about 150 locations outside Saigon (Chart 13). The extension of the US advisory effort now in progress is introducing an additional almost 6,000 personnel, which will increase the total strength of US forces in RVN to about 23,500 and the number of up-country locations by an additional about 100, to a total of about 250 (Chart 14). These up-country locations of US personnel vary greatly in composition, size, and accessibility (Chart 15). Of the present about 150 locations, almost 30 involve two or more MACV commands. Dynamically shifting as it is in locations and sizes, this US population up-country tends to proliferate in messes, billets, motor pools, medical facilities, POL dumps, and repair facilities but, on the other hand, often to lack arrangements for meeting incoming aircraft and to coordinate construction and real estate matters. What is needed here is a system for logistic coordination of the billeting, messing, medical, motor transport, airlift reception, utilities repair, POL, and construction and real estate functions with which these up-country populations must be concerned. As an adjunct of the increased US strength arriving for the extension of US advisory effort in RVN, groups of logistic coordinators are being introduced and located with each of the Senior Corps Advisors, as a branch of their JTD's, for the purpose of coordinating these logistic functions to insure that duplications and gaps, primarily in the establishment of US logistic facilities, are eliminated.

15. There is no true US logistic base in RVN. The logistic bases from which US forces in RVN are supported are those off-shore WESTPAC island bases which have long been stocked for this purpose (Chart 16): Japan and in

part Okinawa for the US Marines in Danang; Okinawa for the US Army forces; the Philippines for the US Air Force and in part for US Navy agencies in RVN. Nonetheless minimum levels of supply are prescribed and held by US forces in RVN: at least 15 days of Class I and III at all locations; at least 30 days of Class II (45 days for aircraft repair parts); and a basic load of Class V. Beyond this holding of minimum levels of supply, such base logistic organization as does exist in RVN is provided by HSAS in Saigon for the common-user logistic support of US forces in RVN. The difficulty, however, is that this base supply support is provided entirely on a retail basis from Saigon (Charts 17-22). For example, subsistence distributed by HSAS to all US forces in RVN is handled, with the single exception of bulk issues made to USASCV; on the basis of small individual packages, packed in cold-pack containers for perishable items, and moved up-country either by centralized airlift for perishable subsistence or in reefers aboard the LST's for the non-perishable items. Even USASCV, to which HSAS issues subsistence in bulk, breaks-down its rations into small individual lots in the Saigon area and similarly distributes in small packages from the Saigon area by sealift or centralized airlift. Likewise the general supplies, PX supplies, and Special Services supplies provided by HSAS to all US forces throughout RVN are distributed in small individual lots from Saigon. As respects clothing, HSAS operates a joint clothing store in Saigon from which direct sales are made to customers in Saigon or from which mail orders from up-country US personnel are filled: again a retail operation radiating in small packages from Saigon. What is needed here is a system of up-country field depots to which bulk shipments of common-user supplies can be made primarily by sealift and then from which retail issues can be made for the final shorter movements to US personnel inland. These field depots do not now exist. In fact the current US up-country logistic system comprises only the three US Army Transportation Corps NCO's already mentioned, who are under the operational control of HSAS to document US cargoes as they transit the minor ports (Chart 23). With the introduction of logistic coordinators to the up-country locations of the Corps Senior Advisors, a second element of an up-country US logistic system will be present (Chart 24). What are additionally needed to complete this up-country logistic system are the port detachments already discussed, Technical Service detachments for operating sections of general field depots, and the transportation agents at air terminals also previously discussed (Chart 25).

16. In addition to providing its common-user support only on a retail basis out of Saigon, HSAS provides its common-user supply support incompletely, in that the supply categories in which it serves include only those of

subsistence, general supplies, PX supplies, Special Service supplies, and clothing; and the items carried in the general supplies and clothing categories are limited. In order to be complete, common-user supply support from the base in Saigon should encompass those additional common-user categories generally recognized and handled, for example, by the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) (Chart 26). Currently DSA deals in nine categories: subsistence, general supplies, clothing, medical-dental, automotive, electronics, construction, industrial, and POL. Since in RVN POL is commercially supplied to US forces and industrial supplies consist essentially of machinery provided for industrial mobilization, there are actually only seven remaining common-user supply categories in which support should be provided to US forces in RVN. Of these seven HSAS already provides support in subsistence and, although not completely, in general supplies. What is needed here therefore is an extension of this common-user supply support from Saigon in the remainder of the general supplies category and completely in clothing and then in medical-dental, automotive, electronics, and construction supplies. As already mentioned, HSAS also provides common-user support in PX and Special Services supplies. In addition, there is no US common-user logistic organization in RVN for providing consolidated repair services for common-user equipment such as general purpose vehicles, common types of radios, small arms, office machinery, and utilities such as generators, refrigerators, pumps, and air conditioners. Repair of these items is at present either duplicative or non-existent and is largely by commercial contract.

17. These four principal shortcomings of the US logistic system in RVN requiring immediate remedy, as discussed above, can be eliminated by either of two practicable solutions: an extension of HSAS up-country and expansion of its base in Saigon; or the introduction of a US Army Logistic Command, to fill the void up-country, to complete the base in Saigon, and eventually to displace HSAS. There are definite advantages to introducing a US Army Logistic Command rather than extending and expanding HSAS (Chart 27):

a. The know-how and the means (that is, organized units) are US Army. If HSAS were to be extended up-country to include port detachments and field depots it would have to improvise organizations for these purposes, as it did in Saigon, by combining USN Supply Corps personnel, equipment on a Tables of Allowance basis, and procedures to be developed ad hoc. On the other hand, organized US Army detachments and units already exist and could operate in these functions immediately upon introduction.

b. To extend HSAS up-country and expand its base in Saigon would require expanding its charter from CNO, most likely Inter-Service Supply Agreements to furnish it means from the other Services, and intricate financial arrangements for reimbursement for its services. To accomplish this would require a long time. / HSAS's charter, as provided it by CNO, provides that HSAS will "provide administrative and logistic support to Headquarters MACV, USMAG-V, and other US activities and units as designated by CNO", not as designated by COMUSMACV. / Past experience has indicated that, when requested to provide additional support of US forces in RVN, HSAS has often been forced to seek its means from the other US Services since these means are either not organic to the US Navy or at the time are not available. To provide for this exchange of means, Inter-Service Support Agreements (ISSA's) must be consummated. Past experience has emphasized that the agreement of these takes inordinately long times; for example, the ISSA on the basis of which HSAS opened the Joint Clothing Store in Saigon, which was to be operated by five enlisted personnel comprising two Navy, two Army, and one Air Force, took 14 months to consummate (most of this time was consumed in Washington); and the ISSA on the basis of which the three US Army Transportation Corps NCO's were sent to the up-country minor ports required 19 months to consummate. (The financial arrangements under which HSAS provides logistic support of the other US Services in RVN are intricate and impractical for an active theater of operations; for example, all supplies furnished by HSAS are stock-funded within RVN, which means that issue of them is tantamount to buying them in that consumer funds must be cited and thereafter return to stock is impossible except on a non-reimbursable basis. This intricacy leads to the Headquarters Commandant MACV's having to establish his own warehouses in Saigon, often side-by-side those of HSAS and carrying similar items, in order that he might have flexibility to issue, withdraw, and re-issue the same supplies to various US advisory detachments up-country, whose establishment, locations, and sizes change frequently and suddenly, without need repeatedly to buy the same items from the HSAS stock fund. Moreover, HSAS is financed largely with other than US Navy funds; for example, during the first two years of its operation the HSAS budget was on the average 12.5 million dollars, to which US Navy contributed 1.5 millions, MAP contributed 3 millions, AIC contributed 2 millions, and the other US Services by reimbursement contributed 6 millions. Financial arrangements such as these, while admittedly involving expert financial management, are incongruous in a theater of operations.

c. All US and SEATO Oplans currently contemplate the establishment of a US Army Logistic Command in Saigon as early as practicable after D-day for the common-user logistic support of all US forces in RVN by D+180.

Experience in RVN has indicated that such a concept is not practicable. It required a year before HSAS achieved transition from the former MAAG-V logistic support organization and became effective in the performance of its mission; and only now, after two years of operation, can it be said that HSAS is extremely efficient in what it does. To contemplate that a US Army Logistic Command could enter RVN on D-day and within 6 months be operating as efficiently as HSAS, but in a much more extensive and broader province of logistic support, is unreasonable. In fact, it is considered that if a US Army Logistic Command were to be introduced at this time and to be required to displace HSAS entirely within a six-month period, the process would be both disastrous and embarrassing. What is required, therefore, is the introduction now of at least a nucleus of a US Army Logistic Command, in order that it might gradually achieve in related operations an efficiency equal to that of HSAS and only then begin to displace HSAS in its current operations.

18. The expanding strength of US forces in RVN requires that additional US hospital beds be established in RVN. On the basis of actual experience it has been determined that when the US strength in RVN comprised about 16,500 US military and 2,500 US non-military requiring logistic support (Embassy, CAS, USOM, USIS, all dependents, and some contractors), a total of 170 US military hospital beds were needed. On the basis of a projection with these same empirical factors, a future US strength in RVN of about 22,500, with a complementary increase of US non-military strength requiring US Logistic support to about 3,000, will require about 220 hospital beds (Chart 28). At the present time the required 170 hospital beds are attained from the three existing hospitals of the US Services in RVN as follows:

<u>Location of Hospital</u>	<u>Responsible US Service</u>	<u>Active Beds</u>
Nha Trang	US Army	60
Saigon	US Navy	100
Tan Son Nhut	US Air Force	<u>10</u>
Total		170

The additional 50 beds required for a strength of 22,500 will be attained by utilizing the 40 additional beds to which the US Army's 8th Field Hospital at Nha Trang can readily be expanded and by establishing a US Army dispensary with a 10-bed surgical facility at Can Tho, for a grand total of 220 beds. In anticipation of the possibility of even further expansion of US forces in

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RVN and concomitant additional requirement for US hospital beds, it is contemplated that the permanent US hospital in Saigon, for which the necessary land is now being obtained, will be built with a 200-bed core, wards for 100 beds, and remaining land so that it might as necessary be expanded to 200 beds. The reasons for the distribution of these hospital beds as indicated among Nha Trang, Saigon-Tan Son Nhut, and Can Tho are essentially the following:

a. The distribution of US personnel in RVN currently is about 1/3 of the total in the present I and II Corps areas, that is "north"; and the remaining 2/3 in the III and IV Corps areas, that is generally "south" (Chart 29).

b. The routings of scheduled fixed wing aircraft, on which evacuation of US casualties largely depends, is such that about 50% more aircraft routings by volume terminate in Saigon (Tan Son Nhut) than at Nha Trang; and almost none extends to the farther reaches of the Delta. Therefore, a larger availability of hospital beds is required in Saigon than at Nha Trang for reason of the relative densities of these aircraft routings (Chart 30). In addition, to compensate for the dearth of fixed wing aircraft routings through the Delta, evacuation of US casualties from that area must depend primarily on HU1B helicopters, primarily of the US Army Aero-medical Evacuation Detachment. In cases of evacuation from the Ca Mau peninsula, these helicopters must land for refueling in the Soc Trang-Can Tho area, during which time patients are at present held there without available treatment (Chart 31). There is a need, therefore, for the establishment of a small holding facility with a surgical capability in that area and Can Tho has been selected as the better location. Included in the build-up related to extension of the US advisory effort in RVN, twenty-one Army medical personnel were provided and have already entered for the purpose of establishing this facility.

19. US Army Support Command has never yet been provided, or supported by, an adequate complement of US Army logistic troops. Any introduction of a US Army Logistic Command should therefore in its first increment provide for this deficiency (Chart 32).

US Army Logistic Command

20. If a US Army Logistic Command is introduced into RVN, USASCV should be organized to recognize the three major components of which it has always really consisted but all of which have not yet been fully developed:

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an aviation command, which is adequately developed; a signal command, which is being fully developed; and a logistic command, which heretofore has consisted essentially of, only the 8th Field Hospital, some POL teams, and certain aviation supply and maintenance units but which should, with the introduction of a US Army Logistic Command, be fully expanded to a proper such command (Chart 33).

21. If the above-indicated requirements for the improvement of the US logistic system in RVN are satisfied by the introduction of elements of a small US Army Logistic Command, the relationships between that US Army Logistic Command and HSAS initially should be complementary; that is to say, the US Army Logistic Command initially should provide support in those areas into which HSAS has never yet been extended or expanded, primarily up-country and into the remaining common-user supply and service categories (Chart 34). Thereafter, when the US Army Logistic Command is operating as efficiently as HSAS, the US Army Logistic Command should then displace HSAS in most or all of HSAS's present supply categories. The final question for later resolution will be whether or not the US Army Logistic Command should ever displace HSAS in providing exchange, commissary, and hospital support in Saigon (Chart 35).

22. Data on workloads for the US Army Logistic Command (personnel and equipment to be supported and empirical RVN casualty, consumption, and maintenance factors) are given in Chart 36.

23. A logistic troop list, composed to satisfy the requirements for (a) Army-peculiar logistic support of USASCV, (b) establishment of an up-country retail common-user logistic system and expansion of the base wholesale common-user logistic system into additional categories, and (c) increase of US military hospital beds in RVN, has been agreed between MACV and USASCV. It is recognized, but not provided for in this troop list, that certain adjustments may be needed to accommodate new concepts now evolving in the US Army for functional organization, such as CCE TAR. These adjustments are deferred to higher headquarters provided there is no resultant detriment to the satisfaction of the basic requirements stated above. The MACV-USASCV troop list is inclosed herewith (Charts 37-41). The introduction of logistic units indicated on this troop list will enable significant savings in TD spaces now authorized USASCV. These savings are also indicated appropriately in the inclosed logistic troop list. (Contemplated locations of these units are indicated on Chart 42).

24. A preliminary estimate of costs involved in operating a US Army Logistic Command along the lines indicated above is given in Chart 43.

25. When a US Army Logistic Command is introduced into RVN it should assume the up-country retail logistic functions now performed by the Headquarters Commandant MACV in default of HSAS' extension up-country. Studies already in process would have recommended transfer of these Headquarters Commandant's functions (see Chart 44) variously to the logistic coordinators (see para 14 above), to J-4 MACV, and to HSAS. Those functions which would be transferred to the logistic coordinators would, in any event, be absorbed by the US Army Logistic Command when it incorporates those logistic coordinators; and the functions which the study already in process would have transferred to HSAS should, it is now considered, better be transferred to the USA Logistic Command.

26. If the US Army Logistic Command is introduced and it undertakes or assumes all of the logistic functions indicated in preceding paragraphs (see particularly 14 - 16 inclusive and 25 above), there would be some additional savings in personnel spaces beyond those already indicated for USASCV (para 23 above). These savings, including those for USASCV, are summarized in Chart 45.

#### Recommendations

27. The basic elements of a US Army Logistic Command should be authorized and introduced into RVN as soon as possible in order to enable the establishment of an up-country retail common-user logistic system, expansion of the base wholesale common-user logistic system into additional categories, absorption of the US Army Transportation Corps NCO's already in country and the logistic coordinators and dispensary with surgical capability being introduced under the extension of US advisory effort, and establishment of a logistic organization which in time might displace HSAS and thereby provide in advance the basis for executing US or SEATO operational plans.

28. With the introduction of this USA Logistic Command, USASCV should be organized with three major components: an aviation command, a signal command, and a logistic command.

29. HSAS initially should be continued in its present operations and in conjunction with the US Army Logistic Command should operate the common-user logistic base in Saigon under direct coordination of J-4 MACV.

30. Consideration should be given at a later time to the question of whether HSAS finally should be phased-out of Saigon entirely or whether it should be reduced only to the point where it continues to provide logistic support of US forces in RVN in exchange, commissary, and hospital services in Saigon.


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**J-4 MACV**

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# INTENSITY OF OPERATIONS (INTOPER)



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## LOGISTIC SYSTEMS IN RVN

### 4 QUASI-MILITARY:

CAS

USOM

CARE

DOICC

### I MILITARY SUPPORTING

COMMERCIAL POL

### IO MILITARY:

3 RVNAF:

ARVN, VNN, VNAF

7 US:

USA

USASF (P) V

USAF

USMC

HSAS

HQ CMTD MACV

SOG MACV

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COORDINATION OF LOGISTIC SYSTEMS

IN

RVN

CAS

USOM

CARE

DOICC

POL

ARVN

VNN

VNAF

USA

USASF (P) V

USAF

USMC

HSAS

HQ CMDT MACV

SOG MACV

LOCAL  
PROCUREMENT  
HOSPITALIZATION & EVACUATION

REAL ESTATE & CONSTRUCTION

POL


TRANSPORTATION & MOVEMENTS

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
# COMMERCIAL POL FACILITIES

## METHODS OF DISTRIBUTION

- ROADS
- +— RAILROADS
- WATERWAYS




# RVNAF LOGISTICS SYSTEM





12

# LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF RVNAF



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## PHASES OF J-4 MACV WORK

### PHASE I

(MAR-OCT 62)

PROVIDE COMMON-USER RESOURCES FOR, AND COORDINATE, DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. LOGISTIC SYSTEM IN RVN.

### PHASE II

(NOV 62 - PRESENT)

ASSIST AND ADVISE J-4 JGS IN PLANNING, PREPARATION, AND EXECUTION OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION.

### PHASE III

(NOW)

PREPARE FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF POSSIBLE FUTURE EXECUTION OF U.S. OR SEATO OPLANS.

#### TASKS:

1. BASE DEVELOPMENT.
2. REPRESENTATION TO GVN OF U.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR IN-COUNTRY RESOURCES.
3. REORIENTATION OF U.S. LOGISTIC SYSTEMS IN RVN.

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IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED

IN

U.S. LOGISTIC SYSTEMS IN RVN

1. EXPAND EXISTING SYSTEMS IN VOLUME.
2. ESTABLISH INTEGRATED UP-COUNTRY COMMON-USER (RETAIL) SYSTEM.
3. EXPAND BASE (WHOLESALE) COMMON-USER SYSTEM INTO ADDITIONAL SUPPLY CATEGORIES.
4. INTEGRATE UP-COUNTRY AND BASE SYSTEMS.
5. ELIMINATE DUPLICATIONS BETWEEN HSAS AND HQ CMDT, HSAS AND USASCV, USASCV AND USASF(P)V, AND CENTRALIZED AND DECENTRALIZED AIRLIFT.
6. DISPLACE HSAS WITH A USA LOG COMMAND.

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


## **PRINCIPAL SHORTCOMINGS OF PRESENT US LOGISTIC SYSTEM IN RVN**

- 1. INADEQUATE SUPERVISION OF HANDLING  
US CARGOS AT MINOR PORTS .**
- 2. INADEQUATE COORDINATION OF LOGISTIC  
FUNCTIONS AT LOCATIONS OF US PERSONNEL  
OF MULTIPLE MACV COMMANDS .**
- 3. INEFFICIENCY OF TOTAL RETAIL SUPPLY  
FROM SAIGON ; NO FIELD DEPOTS .**
- 4. INCOMPLETE HSAS SUPPORT IN  
COMMON-USER SUPPLY CATEGORIES .**

# COMBINED LOGISTICS MOVEMENT SYSTEM

- ★ 8th AERIAL PORT DETS
- ▲ TERMINALS SERVICED BY SCHEDULED AIRLIFT



QUANG TRI

HUE

DA NANG

QUANG NGAI

KONTUM

PLEIKU

QUI NHON

HAU BON

TUY HOA

BAN ME THUOT

NHA TRANG

DALAT

PHAN RANG

SONG MAO

PHAN THIET

GIA NGHIA

TAY NINH

BIEN HOA

SAIGON

VUNG TAU

MY THO

VIKH LONG


LONG XUYEN

CAN THO


SOC TRANG

CA MAU


# BUILDUP OF US MILITARY PERSONNEL IN RVN ( IN THOUSANDS )



# LOCATIONS OF IS PERSONNEL IN RVN



# LOCATIONS OF US PERSONNEL IN RVN



PRESENT 149  
Planned 106


# VARIETY OF LOCATIONS

## 1. COMPOSITION :

( I.E., HQS MACV, USASCV, CTE 79.3.3.6, 2D Airm V, 4SAS )

A. 1 MACV COMMAND	1	
B. 2 MACV COMMANDS	2	
C. 3 MACV COMMANDS	3	
D. 4 MACV COMMANDS	4	
E. 5 MACV COMMANDS	1	( 1 IN )
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>149</u>	

## 2. SIZE :




A. 1 - 10 PERSONNEL	62
B. 10 - 50 PERSONNEL	66
C. 51 - 100 PERSONNEL	5
D. 101 - 1000 PERSONNEL	11
E. OVER 1000 PERSONNEL	5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>149</u>


## 3. ACCESSIBILITY :

A. SEA	5	
B. C-47, C-123, C-130	34	
C. CV - 2B	9	
D. HELICOPTER	84	
E. AIR DROP	12	( INCREASES TO 26 DURING
F. ROAD	5	RAINY WEATHER )
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>147</u>	

# US OFFSHORE WESTPAC BASES




# US BASE LOGISTICS SYSTEM SUBSISTENCE




# US BASE LOGISTICS SYSTEM GENERAL SUPPLIES


18



# US BASE LOGISTICS SYSTEM PX SUPPLIES




# US BASE LOGISTICS SYSTEM SPECIAL SERVICES SUPPLIES




# US BASE LOGISTICS SYSTEM PERSONAL CLOTHING


21



# US BASE LOGISTICS SYSTEM ORGANIZATIONAL CLOTHING (AND INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT)




# US UP-COUNTRY LOGISTICS SYSTEM



**NOW**

# US UP-COUNTRY LOGISTICS SYSTEM


TO BE INTRODUCED WITH  
EXTENSION OF ADVISORY EFFORT



# US SHIP-COUNTRY LOGISTICS SYSTEM

TO BE INTRODUCED WITH  
EXTENSION OF ADVISORY EFFORT

DESIRED AS PART OF  
USA LOG CMD



# COMMON-USER SUPPLY CATEGORIES

## DEFENSE SUPPLY AGENCY PROVIDES :

- SUBSISTENCE
- GENERAL SUPPLIES
- /● CLOTHING
- MEDICAL - DENTAL SUPPLIES
- AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLIES
- ELECTRONICS SUPPLIES
- CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES
- INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES
- POL

## ADDITIONAL NOW PROVIDED BY HSAS :

- SPECIAL SERVICES SUPPLIES
- PX SUPPLIES

- : *PROVIDED BY HSAS*
- / : *COMMERCIALY PROVIDED*
- /● : *ADDITIONAL THAT SHOULD BE PROVIDED*

# ADVANTAGES OF INTRODUCING USA LOG CMD RATHER THAN EXPANDING AND EXTENDING HSAS

- 1 . "KNOW HOW " AND  
MEANS ( UNITS )  
ARE US ARMY .
  
- 2 . EXPANDING HSAS ' CHARTER ,  
ACCOMPLISHING NECESSARY  
ISSA'S , ARRANGING FINANCIAL  
REIMBURSEMENT WOULD  
REQUIRE LONG TIME .
  
- 3 . OPLANS CONTEMPLATE  
ESTABLISHMENT OF USA  
LOG CMD .

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## U.S. HOSPITAL BEDS IN RVN

<u>REQUIREMENTS</u>		
<u>U.S. MILITARY</u>	<u>U.S. NON-MILITARY</u>	<u>TOTAL BEDS</u>
16,500	2,500	170
21,500	3,000	220

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
<u>LOCATION IN RVN</u>	<u>RESPONSIBLE U.S. SERVICE</u>	<u>RESOURCES</u>		
		<u>AVAILABLE BEDS</u>		
		<u>ACTIVE</u>	<u>EXPANSION</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
NHA TRANG	U.S. ARMY	60	40*	100*
SAIGON	U.S. NAVY	100	0	100
TAN SON NHUT	U.S. AIR FORCE	10	0	10
(CAN THO/SOC TRANG)	(U.S. ARMY)	(0)	(10)	(10)
	TOTAL	170	50	220

\* ANOTHER 100 COULD BE SET UP IN TENTS.

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
# DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. PERSONNEL



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# DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. PERSONNEL

DENSITY OF SCHEDULED AIR TRAFFIC (C-123)




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# DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. PERSONNEL

DENSITY OF SCHEDULED AIR TRAFFIC (C-123)



SUMMARY


I & II CORPS = 30% U.S. POPULATION  
III & IV CORPS = 70% U.S. POPULATION

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INCREMENTS  
OF  
U.S. ARMY LOGISTIC TROOPS

1ST INCREMENT

TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF  
PRESENT USASCV.



2D INCREMENT

TO ESTABLISH AN UP-COUNTRY (RETAIL) COMMON-  
USER LOGISTIC SYSTEM.

3RD INCREMENT

TO EXPAND THE BASE (WHOLESALE) COMMON-  
USER LOGISTIC SYSTEM.

4TH INCREMENT

TO INCREASE U.S. HOSPITAL BEDS IN RVN

# ORGANIZATION OF USASCV

( AFTER INTRODUCTION OF USA LOG CMD )


**USASCV**



**AVIATION  
COMMAND**


**SIGNAL  
COMMAND**

**LOGISTIC  
COMMAND**



# SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF HSAS-USA LOG CMD RELATIONSHIPS

PORT DETACHMENTS  
FIELD DEPOTS (INCL MAINTENANCE)  
LOGISTIC COORDINATORS  
TRANSPORTATION AGENTS



UP-COUNTRY " (= OUTSIDE SAIGON )  
BASE (= SAIGON )

CO-OP EXCHANGES  
SPECIAL SERVICES

USA

HSAS

LOG CMD

HOUSEKEEPING FOR HQ  
MACV  
COMMON-USER SUPPLY:  
SUBSISTENCE  
GENERAL SUPPLIES  
EXCHANGE SUPPLIES  
SPECIAL SVC SUPPLIES  
HOSPITAL IN SAIGON  
SEALIFT OPERATIONS

COMMON-USER SUPPLY:  
CLOTHING  
MEDICAL-DENTAL  
AUTOMOTIVE  
ELECTRONIC  
ENGINEERING  
COMMON-USER SERVICE  
(= MAINTENANCE ):  
VEHICLES  
RADIOS  
SMALL ARMS  
OFFICE MACHINES  
UTILITIES (REFRIGERATORS,  
GENERATORS, AIR  
CONDITIONERS, PUMPS)

COORDINATED BY J-4 MACV

# TRANSITION FROM HSAS TO USA LOG CMD

FUNCTION	PHASE I	PHASE II	PHASE III
<p>HOUSEKEEP FOR HQ MACV            EXCHANGE SERVICE            COMMISSARY SERVICE            HOSPITAL IN SAIGON            SEALIFT OPERATIONS            COMMON-USER SUPPLY :</p> <p>SUBSISTENCE            GENERAL SUPPLIES            EXCHANGE SUPPLIES            SPECIAL SERVICES SUPPLIES            CLOTHING            MEDICAL - DENTAL            AUTOMOTIVE            ELECTRONIC            ENGINEERING            COMMON-USER SERVICE :</p> <p>VEHICLES            RADIOS            SMALL ARMS            OFFICE MACHINES            UTILITIES</p>	<p>HSAS</p>	<p>HSAS</p> <p>USA LOG CMD</p>	<p>HSAS *</p> <p>?</p> <p>USA LOG CMD</p>

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\* OR HQ CMDT

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# WORKLOADS FOR USA LOG CMD

## U.S. PERSONNEL TO BE SUPPORTED

<u>AREAS</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
I	1,568	933	111	491	3,103
II	2,017	156	13	0	2,186
III	1,415	504	0	0	1,919
IV	11,632	3,698	891	22	16,243
V	2,423	126	0	0	2,549
TOTALS	19,055	5,417	1,015	513	26,000

(As in Chart 6, numbered from North to South)

## U.S. EQUIPMENT TO BE SUPPORTED

GENERAL-PURPOSE VEHICLES	6,300
COMMON-USER TYPES OF RADIOS	6,000
SMALL ARMS	27,300
OFFICE MACHINES	3,900
AIR CONDITIONERS	5,200
REFRIGERATORS	5,600
GENERATORS	4,700
USA FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT	175
USA ROTARY-WING AIRCRAFT	325

## U.S. EQUIPMENT DEADLINE RATES

GENERAL-PURPOSE VEHICLES	5 %
COMMON-USER TYPES OF RADIOS	6 %
USA FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT	18 %
USA ROTARY-WING AIRCRAFT	8 %


## U.S. CONSUMPTION FACTORS

CLASS I SUPPLIES	6.4 lbs/MAN/DAY
CLASS II & IV SUPPLIES	1.3 lbs/MAN/DAY
CLASS III SUPPLIES	28.0 lbs/MAN/DAY
CLASS V SUPPLIES	3.5 lbs/MAN/DAY
TOTAL	39.2 lbs/MAN/DAY

## U.S. CASUALTIES

KIA	7.1 PER 1,000 MEN/YEAR
WIA	52.5 PER 1,000 MEN/YEAR
MIA	.42 PER 1,000 MEN/YEAR
NON-EFFECTIVE RATE	5.0 PER 1,000 MEN

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**US ARMY LOGISTIC COMMAND**

**INITIAL TROOP LIST**

LOGISTIC TROOPS REQUIRED

STRENGTH    TD SPACES SAVED

1ST INCREMENT

TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF PRESENT USASCV

2	ENG	GEN SUP DET (-) BA	34	22
1	ORD	AMMO DET BB	29	8
1	ORD	DAS CO	123	30
2	ORD	GEN SUP DET BA	32	15
1	ORD	EXPL DISP DET KA	10	
1	QM	GEN SUP DET (-) BA	8	8
3	QM	MHE RPR DET HL	9	
1	QM	PLAT HQ AB	4	
3	QM	OFF MACH RPR DET HI	6	
1	QM	EQUIP RPR DET HK	7	
1	SIG	STORAGE AND ISSUE DET KB	20	2
1	SIG	SUP DET (-) KA	7	4
1	SIG	MAINT CO (-HQ) (4 PLAT)	136	10
1	TC	MHE (HVY) DET JE	8	8
1	TC	LCL FRT DET BB	5	5
		<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>438</b>	<b>112</b>

ENABLES USASCV TO MEET OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND TO ADEQUATELY CARE FOR EQUIPMENT WHICH HERETOFORE HAS RECEIVED ONLY LIMITED MAINTENANCE.

LOGISTIC TROOPS REQUIRED                      STRENGTH      TO SPACES SAVED

2ND INCREMENT

TO ESTABLISH AN UP-COUNTRY (RETAIL) COMMON-USER LOGISTIC SYSTEM

4	ENG GEN SUP DET (-) BA	68	44
1	MED DET OA	9	
1	MED DENTAL DET KI	3	
1	MED PVNT MED DET LB	11	
4	ORD GEN SUP DET BA	64	9
4	QM GEN SUP DET (-) BA	32	32
4	QM MHE REP DET HL	12	
4	QM PLAT HQ AB	16	
1	QM LDRY DET (-) GA	7	
4	SIG DEP SUP DET (-) KA	28	16
4	TC LCL FRT DET BB	20	5
4	TC MHE (HVY) DET JE	32	
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>106</b>

PROVIDES FIELD SUPPORT OF ALL US FORCES IN RVN AT UP-COUNTRY PORT AREAS  
RELEASES ADVISORS TO FULFILL THEIR ASSIGNED DUTIES OF ADVISING RVNAF.

LOGISTIC TROOPS REQUIRED    STRENGTH    TD SPACES SAVED

3RD INCREMENT

TO EXPAND THE BASE (WHOLESALE) COMMON-USER SYSTEM

1 ENG R & U DET HG	83	24
1 MED PLAT DEP	30	
1 MED VET DET (-) JB	5	
1 ORD AMMO DET BB	29	
1 ORD DS CO	181	20
1 QM BAKERY DET BH	12	
1 QM DS CO	284	15
1 QM GR REP DET JA	10	
	<u>654</u>	<u>59</u>

EXPANDS USAS INTO ADDITIONAL COMMON-USER SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE CATEGORIES.

4TH INCREMENT

TO INCREASE U.S. HOSPITAL BEDS IN RVN

1 MED DET OA

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*NOTE 1: ALREADY REQUESTED AND APPROVED AS PART OF EXTENSION OF ADVISORY EFFORT, NOT INCLUDED IN TOTALS FOR USA LOG COMMAND*



PROVIDES ADDITIONAL BEDS AT A LOCATION WITHIN RADIUS OF HELICOPTER EVACUATION FROM CA MAU PENINSULA.



## SUMMARY

( INCREMENTS 1 THROUGH 3 )

TOE SPACES REQUIRED	=	1374
TD SPACES SAVED	=	277
		<hr/>
NET SPACES	=	1097
HQ LOG CMD SPACES	=	93
		<hr/>
GRAND TOTAL	=	1190



# ESTIMATED COSTS TO OPERATE USA LOG CMD

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>BASIS</u>	<u>COST</u>
	<u>ONE-TIME</u>	
CONSTRUCTION	MODIFIED EMERGENCY STANDARD	\$ 4.96 MILLIONS
	<u>ANNUAL</u>	
OPERATIONS	OFFICE SUPPLIES, HOUSEKEEPING, ETC.	\$.25 MILLIONS
POL SUPPLY	—	\$.25 MILLIONS
CLOTHING	\$ 50 PER MAN PER YEAR	\$1.30 MILLIONS
MEDICAL-DENTAL	\$ 30 PER MAN PER YEAR	.78
AUTOMOTIVE	\$ 24.50 PER MAN PER YEAR	.64
ELECTRONIC	\$ 10 PER MAN PER YEAR	.26
ENGINEER (R&U)	\$ 70 PER MAN PER YEAR	<u>1.82</u>
	SUBTOTAL	\$4.80 MILLIONS
	<u>TOTALS</u>	
FIRST YEAR		\$10.26 MILLIONS
EACH SUCCEEDING YEAR		\$ 5.30 MILLIONS

# HQ CMDT MACV

## TRANSFERABLE FUNCTIONS

CATEGORY	FUNCTION	TRANSFER TO
MESS	PLANNING FOR ADV. DETS. FOOD SERVICE SUPERVISION	J-4 MACV LOG. COORDINATORS
TRANSPORTATION	MACV MOTOR SUB-POOLS ADMIN. VEHS. FOR ADV. DETS.	HSAS <sup>+</sup> J-4 MACV
CONSTRUCTION & MAINTENANCE	HOUSING & UTILITIES FOR ADV. DETS. UTILITIES REPAIR FOR ADV. DETS.	HSAS <sup>*</sup> LOG. COORDINATORS
FISCAL	AIK BUDGET FOR ADV. DETS. IMPREST FUNDS	HSAS <sup>*</sup> HSAS <sup>*</sup>
SUPPLY	CLASS II, IV, & V SUPPLY DEVELOPMENT OF MACV JTA	HSAS <sup>*</sup> J-4 MACV

+ ALREADY TRANSFERRED

\* OR USA LOG CMD



# SPACES EFFECTS ON MACV COMMANDS IF USA LOG CMD IS INTRODUCED

<u>MACV COMMAND</u>	<u>SPACES ELIMINATED</u>	<u>SPACES TRANSFERRED</u>
MACV ADVISORS	0	54 <sup>(1)</sup>
USASCV	0	277 <sup>(2)</sup>
22 AIR DIV	0	0
HSAS	2 <sup>(3)</sup>	3 <sup>(4)</sup>
HQ CMDT	4 <sup>(5)</sup>	0
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>334</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>		<b>340</b>

- NOTES:**
- (1) = LOGISTIC COORDINATORS
  - (2) = SEE CHARTS # 38 - #41
  - (3) = CLOTHING STORE ATTENDANTS
  - (4) = MINOR PORT SUPERVISORY NCO'S
  - (5) = 2 EACH FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AND TRANSPORTATION SECTIONS