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Research Collection*



**SENIOR OFFICERS DEBRIEFING PROGRAM**



**CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN**

GENERAL LEWIS B. HERSHEY

and

COLONEL BOB ELDER  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL JIM HATTERSLEY

**CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA. 17013**

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USAWC MILITARY RESEARCH PROGRAM PAPER

REPORT OF INTERVIEWS WITH  
LEWIS B. HERSHEY, GENERAL, USA (RET.)

ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

by

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These conversations between General Lewis B. Hershey and the authors were conducted in four sessions: 17 January 1975, 2 May 1975, 7 May 1975, and 16 May 1975, the last of which was an audio-visual television tape interview. The interviews were conducted in Bethesda, Maryland at General Hershey's residence. Approximately eight hours of taped conversation resulted from the interviews. The interviews were directed primarily at those events that General Hershey either participated in or influenced during his 56 years of active duty service. In the main, these events began in the formative years of the Selective Service--the 1930s onward. Tapes and transcripts resulting from the interview series are in the manuscript collection of the US Army Military History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

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## INTRODUCTION

This paper is a summary of General Lewis B. Hershey's participation in the Senior Officer Oral History Program during the period September 1974 to May 1975. This report will reflect the methodology used, highlights of the interviews, the major conclusions reached as a result of the interviews, and selected reflections upon the Oral History Program.

The Nation's mobilization of its manpower to fight World War II, the Korean Conflict, and the Indo-China war is inseparable, in the minds of Americans, from the name of General Lewis B. Hershey. Having directed the planning for the draft in the 1930s, General Hershey became Director of the Selective Service System in 1941 as a Brigadier General and held that position until his retirement in 1970. During the course of our interviews he unhesitatingly shared his recollections and views with candor and remarkable memory which makes the tapes and transcripts a valuable source of information for historians.

This research effort has provided approximately eight hours of taped interviews and associated transcribed manuscripts which are on file at the US Army Military History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. This report serves to highlight and summarize the essence of these historical records.

## METHODOLOGY

In the early going, the mass of Hershey document holdings in the US Army Military History Research Collection was examined for content as an initial point of departure for the research effort. The huge quantity of material, which included the General's personal library, had recently been accepted from Tri-State College in Indiana, General Hershey's alma mater. It became apparent that preparation for interviews would have to be based on selected reading, due to the volume and scope of information contained in these files.

With the determination that we would concentrate on the era of the Selective Service System, we then sought and received the assistance of the Military History Research Collection in identifying pertinent references. These listings were augmented by individual library research in the War College Library. The object was to zero in on what were considered by us to be important issues and events.

Special permission was received from the current Director of the Selective Service System, Mr. Bryan V. Pepitone, for perusal of an unpublished history under final preparation by the National Headquarters in Washington. Its author, Ms. Brenda Curtis, was very helpful by sharing interview information she had gathered.

Of particular value was the voluntary assistance provided by Brigadier General Henry M. Gross of Harrisburg, the Pennsylvania State Director of Selective Service from 1945 to 1970. General Gross

provided a special insight for our preparation. Celebrating his 90th birthday on 21 May 1975, he added depth to our research which made our interviews later with General Hershey more successful.

The last major research preparative action was to talk with General Hershey himself. Our purpose was to ensure that we would include inquiry into the events thought most important by the General. This meeting in January 1975 convinced us that a chronological approach, except in a most general way, was not going to be efficient. Put another way, we were able to crystalize related issues as seen by General Hershey as they applied over time. These fell in the general categories of Institutional, Political, and the ~~Draft~~. A secondary benefit from this approach resulted in avoiding an overkill of single events because our changing topics often seemed to be a more comfortable arrangement for the General. Having reduced our questions and references to index cards made reorganization of interviews immediately possible. Use of cards is a most helpful technique when interviews are conducted by more than one person.

Upon our return from the initial visit with General Hershey, we talked briefly with the Commandant and explained the multitude of topics and variety of events which could easily be presented to General Hershey for comment. We also mentioned how difficult it was to limit the General's comments to specifics, to which the Commandant replied, let General Hershey talk about what he desires. He would, in this way, present matters of interest and value in an unstructured way.

We would be remiss if we did not say that much of the success in this enterprise was due to General Hershey, who George E. Reedy said in his book, Who Will Do Our Fighting For Us?, "has a steel-trap mind, card-file memory and a comprehensive grasp of the subject that is just too obvious to permit an audience any delusions about his competence." Hear! Hear! General Hershey's wry sense of humor is somewhat lost in the transcribing process. On occasion the gleam in his eye shows through. It is a real part of the man.

#### MAJOR TOPICS

The pertinent matters and topics of each of the tape interviews with General Hershey are summarized in the following paragraphs. Detailed reference to specific issues and comments are contained in Appendix A.

#### TAPE 1 - Initial Meeting and Selection of Topics.

The purpose of this meeting was to become acquainted and to select possible topics which would be addressed during the research period. General Hershey's 81 years certainly did not reduce his incredible memory and wit. What became obvious immediately was that here was a "grass roots" American, a product of mid-America, who believes strongly in simplicity, in an awareness of life and in understanding people who make up our society. With a background of rural life, being a deputy sheriff to his father in Indiana, and pursuing an early career in education, General Hershey became a member of the National Guard in 1911 when he was 18 years old and

held every rank from private to sergeant and from second lieutenant to general over his 56 years of active service. He graduated from Artillery Branch schools, Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College.

The influence of his early life and understanding of people were underscored in his comments toward service to country and the need to be appreciative of individual privilege, responsibility, and divergent views.

Probably the most prominent attitude which General Hershey expressed was delegation of authority--which is understandable in the position which he held. However, other topics which were considered suitable for succeeding interviews were the Volunteer Army, planning, individual attitude toward service, education, the mechanics of the Selective Service System, deferments, and amnesty.

TAPE 2 - Deferments, "Channeling", Management, Aliens, Equity, the Press, Volunteer Army, the Draft, and Mobilization.

During this interview, a variety of topics, highlighted above, were discussed. In response to our curiosity about deferring qualified registrants for the draft, General Hershey made it clear that the system was not perfect, and someone will always question the fairness of deferrals. However, deferments are not simply a question of right or wrong; the questions and considerations in judging this exception is that a selection of individuals by need and qualifications must be made with discretion to satisfy both military and civilian sector needs and requirements.

"Channeling" became a misused and misunderstood term largely due to the wrong people--outside of the Selective Service--using it. There was an inherent resistance against compelling a man to do something--whether or not he was suited for the task.

General Hershey would rather rely on "leadership" rather than "management" in the Selective Service System. He seemed bothered by the term "management" and stressed that logic must be used in placement of men coming into the service. He reminded us that Congress "manages" the Selective Service System by placing restraints on the number of personnel allowable for entry via the draft!

Draft eligible aliens were taken in their relative order through local boards. The United States honored her treaties with other nations regarding exemptions to military service, but there are citizen responsibilities, occupation, and children which all impact on the ranking of eligible aliens for the draft.

There were probably more deferments given to the middle-class American youth due to the large number who were enrolled in college, educational requirements, and the large number of conscientious objectors who comprised a good number of this group. And, when it comes to the consideration of equity, there are always inequities in this system. There are always insoluble problems--who should stay in college, who should be deferred, what is a critical job--to name a few.

General Hershey and the Selective Service enjoyed a relatively good relationship with the press. He felt that the purpose of the press was to inform--accurately. One must be watchful for ambitious,

publicity seeking, and recognizing individuals--working for, or being pursued by, the press. Times change as does the environment, but General Hershey is optimistic about the press's role in society.

Replies to questions asked of General Hershey about the Volunteer Army were characterized by qualifications and precaution. Earlier, the draft was successful because there were no jobs in the civilian sector! Some thoughts tossed about were: is volunteerism a circumvention of bribery to enlist; fewer personnel Army-wide drive personnel costs upward because of increased compensation; what happens when there is a need for millions of men for an emergency; will the draft or volunteer Army work; do not become trapped, and exercise caution in comparing civilian occupation to military service; and, we must perpetuate an attitude of dedication to our country.

The problems of the Draft Law of 1940 were mentioned: the US didn't want a war, and we didn't want to pester everyone--just recruit the needs for the service manpower. Accommodations at installations were unsatisfactory, which incensed many Congressmen whose constituency informed them of the spartan conditions for those in the service. Other obstacles were the lack of awareness--in the US--of a war and its consequences, and the bureaucratic machinery required to overcome issues and problems.

The mobilization of the Reserves--including the National Guard, is a sensitive political issue. General Hershey created the keen

perception of the considerations of right or wrong--in a greater sense--and whether it was equitable!

Finally, his strong characteristic of confidence in people and deep-rooted attitude of decentralizing power and authority tends to show his favor of a personal approach--at the community, with local boards--in preference to a dominant computerized system for the draft or similar system.

TAPE 3 - Local Boards, Selective Service, Manpower needs, Volunteerism.

General Hershey said that the strength of the Selective Service System was in having authority decentralized to the local boards. A contemplated computer system of the future which would replace or reduce the role of local boards would have serious disadvantages. For all the criticism received in the 1960s, General Hershey contrasted the American approach of manpower procurement with examples of impressment in Tehran and in China. Money, power, influence and a gift of gab were described as successful tools to avoid conscription which were common to all systems. Draft evasion was seen as an individual choice but not a right in the context of National Security. Conscientious objectors were viewed as much more legitimate citizens than those who ran to Canada who were, "like some who ate dinner but left when it was time to wash dishes."

On the political side General Hershey was emphatic that the Selective Service System must continue--that its personnel should continue to be trained even if the cost must be fragmented among

the Services to avoid excessive Congressional scrutiny. He cautioned that recent history has shown that the periods of quiescence in Selective Service activity have been short-lived. Cited were the time frames from WWII to the Berlin Airlift to Korea and then Indo-China.

In wartime the Armed Services must make known their manpower demands with sufficient leadtime to allow for training before overseas shipment and for the Selective Service System to respond. There has never been a case when the Armed Forces have been physically capable of accepting all the men available at any one time. Deferments were seen, in small part, as a means of reducing the size of the available pool to those most likely to be drafted while keeping the 1A age level relatively low. General Hershey admonished the Armed Services to always keep in mind who would die in war. The draft and its inherent ability to cross the various social and economic lines in American life was not encumbered with a high level of volunteerism. The Services have no such automatic surety, especially in an all-volunteer environment. He applauded the record of Secretary of the Army Calloway in addressing the question of cross-representation.

TAPE 4 - Role of state and individual, Planning, Women in Armed Forces, Reserves, Dedication, Attitude, General Hershey's Departure as Head of Selective Service, Mayaguez Incident.

On the philosophical question as to the competing roles of the state and its individuals, General Hershey felt that the day might come when the state would have to die for the people. He was

convinced that faith, not knowledge, would assure the survival of manmade structures. The state would never die for liberals. It would die because of them.

Discussions on the formative years of the Selective Service System revealed that a significant level of secrecy marked early conferences. The pacifist movement of 1930s was wielding a measurable amount of political influence. It was necessary to plan and exchange information under a deliberate veil of anonymity so that a thoroughly coordinated national plan could be constructed. Lack of funds caused full nationwide meetings to be dropped in favor of regional assemblies. When asked about an unobligated three million dollars at the end of FY 1941, General Hershey was quick to point out the difficulties of first year budget estimates and a resolution not to waste money.

General Hershey decried the argument that a volunteer armed force offered a threat to the country. He thought that the American people would opt for a peacetime voluntary force rather than one raised by conscription. Women's role in the Services would probably be determined by the women themselves. History attests to women in combat roles when the situation demands. The rhetoric, building US defense on the state of readiness of reserve (to include National Guard) forces, has been heard before. The proof of reserve readiness will be demonstrated when a solution to a military equipment shortage does not include a drawdown on reserve inventories.

Exploration into General Hershey, the man, began with a rejection of an assessment by George Reedy that Hershey could not be bested

in a debate on Selective Service issues. A dedicated American was characterized by General Hershey as the product of a solid family unit. A working mother, whose activities keep her away from home for extended periods of time, was seen as a major unsettling problem. Education that wasn't related to the real world and was delivered in an environment that exists only in classrooms was seen as a force eroding traditional values. Automobiles, telephones, and television for all their contributions were also partially responsible for a social departure from earlier simple life.

A journey behind the press reports on General Hershey's departure as Director of Selective Service was revealing. An hour's conference with President Nixon, during which time dismissal was not mentioned, was followed the next day by a press conference at which Hershey's release was confirmed. Events of this day had been preceded by rumors and envendos that General Hershey should go see the President. The General explained that one in government service should go to the White House at the President's pleasure. General Hershey with a son-in-law and grandson in Vietnam was not going to "abandon ship." After the announcement, he had an unpublicized dinner with the President. Appointed as Personnel Advisor to the President on Manpower Mobilization, the General had little contact with the White House. A 1973 memorandum on the necessity for retention of the Selective Service System went unacknowledged for months. General Hershey holds no grudge since hate "wastes adrenalin."

As to what he would have done given the opportunity to direct the system from World War II, General Hershey was explicit. He would:

- o Use the same organizational structure
- o Strive for simplicity in operations
- o Work more closely with Congress
- o Induct registrants shortly after their examination.

As a post script, General Hershey supported the President's (Ford) action on the Mayaguez incident. He did issue a caution that his judgment was based only on his knowledge of the facts. The interviewers did not consider this caveat a sign of the General's advancing age, but rather a prudent statement by a man who has known the complexities of worldly interactions.

#### CONCLUSIONS

General Hershey provided lasting direct and indirect impressions because of his frankness and honesty. Some of the most poignant aspects of our association were his "grass roots" beliefs and philosophy toward our country and way of life, his complete dedication to service and country, and his emphatic view that authority must be delegated to the lowest practicable level. It was our impression that General Hershey was a figure and personality with many similar views and a personality comparable to Will Rogers. His wit, and this belief is attested to by way of the extract of quotes at Appendix B taken from a Selective Service Pamphlet about General Hershey.

The central theme which permeated General Hershey's comments was that any conscription system would have to be locally based.

On record as an opponent to automating the Selective Service draft mechanism, General Hershey saw the volunteer local board members as key to a successful system. Questions of deferment of an individual based on occupation, dependency, or matters of conscience can only be addressed in the man's own environment. General Hershey was adamant on decentralized operations based on delegation of authority to act, being placed at the lowest possible level.

The maintenance of a large Armed Force in peacetime or in war places real national priority on manpower procurement. General Hershey's concern that the Selective Service System maintain a rapidly expandable capability was highlighted on two occasions. First, he drew our attention to the short periods between the wars of this century. Secondly, he illustrated the timely need of manpower with a vignette on George Washington. The New York Times on 15 December 1966 quoted General Hershey on the same story as having said, "What did George Washington spend most of his time doing? Looking for men. He had to arrange his schedule of battles around who might be in town." Whether men are volunteers or are drafted the system for procurement must remain viable. That women would make up a portion of the Armed Forces, General Hershey saw as a sign of the times, with precedents of the past.

#### COMMENTS ON THE ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

We considered the Oral History Program to be one of the highlights of the academic year. This was largely attributable to our

subject, General Hershey. The program was administered well by the MHRC. The concept of having two students work on a project has considerable merit because it provides for a better perspective of the scope and research necessary for a credible history undertaking and permits a reasonable distribution of work and preparation for the variety of undertakings associated with the project. We recommend the continuance of this approach.

There is a need for this report, and the format in which we are submitting it is considered to be useful to the historian desiring further detailed research.

The Oral History Program should continue--indubitably! Academic measurement standards are judged to be subordinate to the total professional rewards gained in this program. The philosophies, opinions, judgments, experiences of great personages encountered in this program have lasting impressions and impact on the students directly engaged, and indirectly, to the segments of the Armed Forces and society which these students will encounter in future assignments and experiences. In our opinion, there is inestimable value to the Oral History Program from the War College student point of view.

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## INTRODUCING THE GENERAL

ON HIMSELF: I am a Hoosier and an isolationist and I believe we should stay out of other people's troubles.—1939, quoted in *Chicago Sun-Times*, Dec. 31, 1967.

ON HIS JOB: *Our job is to sort 'em, select 'em, and send 'em.*—*Chicago Daily News*, Oct. 4, 1966.

ON MORALITY: I have seen somewhat over 20,000 students in the last six or eight months. They have some queers just the same as any place, except in Congress.—Feb. 9, 1967.

ON THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD: The things we cannot test we ignore scientifically.—Jan. 21, 1963.

ON THE WORLD: It would help me a little bit if I knew what years were peacetime.—Jan. 16, 1956.

ON EDUCATION: Up at the school where I'm a trustee we don't take the professors too seriously. They don't run the school—*Chicago Daily News*, Feb. 25, 1967.

ON JURISPRUDENCE: One of the things we have to go a little easy on is the law.—Jan. 21, 1963.

TO CANADA, ON OUR BOYS UP NORTH: Hell, they're your problem, not ours.—*Toronto Star*, May 24, 1968.

ON FREEDOM FOR THE INDIVIDUAL: *I think you have to compel education on many youngsters, and I am talking about training, character building, and that sort of thing.*—Feb. 1, 1966.

ON THE DEMONSTRATORS: I think they should be spanked.—*Newsweek*, Jan. 24, 1966.

ON LEARNING FROM HISTORY: Some fellow around town here says we should not have corporals because Napoleon, Hitler, and Stalin were corporals; and if we abolish that grade, we will solve the problem of peace and more. I do not subscribe to that, but it is because I was a corporal once.—Jan. 18, 1951.

ON ALCOHOL: *I am like the fellow who identified twenty-eight flavors of liquor and he identified them correctly and then they gave him water and he said: "I don't know what it is, but you can't sell it."*—Jan. 21, 1963.

ON THE FARM: It is different whether you are milking cows or raising hogs.—Feb. 2, 1955.

ON THE FUTURE: The rules of yesterday are not those of today and the rules of tomorrow will be worse.—*International News Service*, Feb. 25, 1944.

### I. HIS MAJESTY, THE DIRECTOR

The President of the United States has honored me by appointing me to the office of Director of Selective Service.—*Selective Service*, Sept. 1941.

*I happen to be a trustee of an engineering school. We have more students now than we can even find places for them to live, and we are not what some people think is the best school in the world. I might argue that, but I won't take the time to do it now.*—Jan. 22, 1958.

No one else wanted the job, so I just stayed on.—*Life*, Aug. 20, 1965.

I am just like a fireman.—Jan. 17, 1962.

I happen to be an old National Guard man.—March 11, 1947.

I will say that I always tell the truth.—July 22, 1941.

I am as popular as a bastard at a family reunion.—1967, quoted in *Bitter Greetings*.

### II. THE LEADER'S VIRTUE AND SELF-PITY

I have a great deal of sympathy for you gentlemen, but I do not have so much for you that I do not have a little bit left for myself.—To Senate Appropriations Committee, April 23, 1952.

I am not criticizing now; I am just coming over here and pouring out my soul.—Jan. 17, 1952.

I am probably a rather simple-minded person.—Jan. 30, 1951.

Of course I am a prejudiced person.—Jan. 16, 1956.

I am only speaking as a broken down soldier.—Jan. 5, 1956.

They won't like whatever we do. I can hear them now.—*U.S. News*, Jan. 10, 1966.

*We're finding out that everything is wrong with the draft. We're even taking people.*—*New York Times*, Dec. 15, 1966.

With all the hell I get, I have less power than most anybody else.—*Time*, Dec. 22, 1967.

*I know, but you are saying that because the Director of Selective Service becomes a dodo bird, which he may have been all along . . .*—March 5, 1946.

### III. THE UNIVERSAL SOLDIER

I have never been noted for withholding my opinions.—Jan. 26, 1950.

I happen to be a one-eyed man with a plastic eye that looks better than it sees. I happen to be quite nearsighted in the other. Well, whether I make a contribution is immaterial and controversial, but at least I occupy a position.—Jan. 31, 1951.

I don't want to break up anybody's playhouse.—Feb. 2, 1955.

*I come from the small country part of the world, and we always had the right to go around and get the officials, Saturday, Sunday or any other part of the week, if we could find them.*—March 20, 1961.

I am midwestern. I am the product of the type of farm between sixty and 160 acres.—July 24, 1941.

You can't get more universal than I am.—June 23, 1966.

#### IV. ON RUNNING A TIGHT SHIP

We have nearly 4,000 local boards and every one of them has a telephone, we hope.—March 3, 1953.

We have taken the telephones out of many of our local boards as an economy measure.—Jan. 22, 1958.

We aren't fair to everybody.—Jan. 25, 1954.

I don't think my opinion is worth anything because it is not based on a great deal of knowledge.—Jan. 26, 1950.

The officers under me are in no way responsible. I am in no way responsible either, although I am completely responsible.—Feb. 9, 1967.

We cater to and rather encourage what you might call cussedness on the part of our local board members.—Jan. 22, 1958.

Hell fire, we are just humans operating on humans.—Chicago Daily News, Sept. 24, 1961.

#### V. VIOLENCE IS AS AMERICAN AS APPLE PIE

The draft registrant is not an ordinary citizen. He's one of the active militia. He must register. No one must interfere with him to keep him from that duty.—Commonweal, Jan. 19, 1968.

A registrant is a different guy from the man who commits a murder.—U.S. News, Jan. 10, 1966.

I have said that we need killers. I prefer to tell the truth bluntly.—New York Times, Jan. 19, 1951.

I haven't seen a draft questionnaire yet in which the guy said he shot people for a living.—Time, Oct. 16, 1950.

#### VI. WHAT WOULD WE DO WITHOUT US

What did George Washington spend most of his time doing? Looking for men. He had to arrange his schedule for battles around who might be in town.—New York Times, Dec. 15, 1966.

I have tried to indicate that the extension of the Selective Service System is a positive and powerful move for peace—by its encouragement of our friends, by its warnings to others, and by reminding each and every one of us of the responsibilities that survival in this present world entails.—Vital Speeches, April 1, 1950.

All experiences of the past show that we cannot even hope successfully to defend ourselves without Selective Service.—Selective Service, Oct. 1951.

History does not support the theory that survival can be secured by mercenaries.—Selective Service, June 1958.



#### VII. OF MEN AND MACHINES

I do have more confidence, and I am willing to put up with the mistakes of the local board down there who can look into all the facts, than I have in a computer.—June 22, 1966.

These computers make mistakes.—U.S. News, March 20, 1967.

The poor induction stations—some of them are having a hard time. We've got a lot of men whose papers haven't got back to us after we sent them to the induction stations for processing.—U.S. News, Jan. 10, 1966.

There are evidences that individual man places too great confidence in the machines he has contrived and built.—Selective Service, May 1957.

The Selective Service System is a small cog in the vast machine required for survival.—Selective Service, Jan. 1957.

#### VIII. FREE BONUS INSIDE THE PACKAGE

I do not believe we are so rich in human resources that we can afford deliberately to ignore opportunities we have to channel people into training and application of training.—June 22, 1966.

My job isn't necessarily to run everybody's business, although at times I am accused of it.—Jan. 28, 1959.

If the subject dealt with a less serious matter than survival, some of the results ascribed to the operation of the draft law would qualify as ridiculous.—Selective Service, July 1958.

Our job is to count 'em, sort 'em, and deliver 'em.—Newsweek, April 4, 1960.

#### IX. CLASS I-A: ELIGIBLE FOR INDUCTION

We are trying to take all the single men out of every State of the Union.—Sept. 16, 1943.

I had hoped the Department of Defense would give us a call for 5,000 or 10,000 men above age twenty-six, because we've got a few up there who are I-A—not many—and some of them have kind of forgotten what field of study they majored in, to get their deferments, and they have been doing other things. So I thought a call for some over age twenty-six would tend to turn them back from whence they came. It always does.—U.S. News, March 20, 1967.

Every lug who can lug a gun and isn't, is likely to be invited to lug it.—Chicago Tribune, Jan. 6, 1945.

Let no place be known as "safe from the Army."—Chicago Daily News, June 12, 1942.

Your natural habitat is I-A.—U.S. News, Jan. 10, 1966.

#### X. I-C: MEMBER OF ARMED FORCES

It's nonsense to cry that you can't plan your life because of the draft. You can volunteer any time you want to.—Phi Delta Kappan, May 1, 1967.

It is only because our servicemen have such abiding faith in the real people of America that they have so resolutely

and successfully fought the enemy at the front while the loudness of the dissenting phonies in their rear would have been terrifying to fainter hearts.—*Selective Service*, May 1968.

I don't know what a military mind is. I perhaps never had one.—Jan. 21, 1963.

## XI. I-O: CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS

*If you let an individual come up and say I am sincere and I just don't believe in this particular war, I will fight Hitler anytime—I have had innumerable kids tell me that, they all want to fight Hitler, but you see we don't have him in stock.*—May 10, 1967.

I happen to have been one of the defenders of conscientious objectors for a quarter of a century, and one of the ways I defended them was by trying to keep people who are insincere from climbing on.—*U.S. News*, Jan. 10, 1966.

I tell my friends—and I have a great many of them who are conscientious objectors—that they are a luxury, and if we ever get in the lifeboat where everybody has to pull an oar, they will have to pull an oar or we will have to throw them overboard.—Feb. 9, 1967.

## XII. II-A: OCCUPATIONAL DEFERMENTS

*We have let our scientific age get us all snarled up and there are scientists and there are pseudo-scientists and there are too many of the latter, although there are not very many.*—Aug. 16, 1950.

I know they'll defer a scientist before somebody who is teaching music. I know they'll defer an engineer before somebody doing something else. Biology is give and take. Sometimes they think biologists are going to be in a position to kill everybody in the world, and they'll go a long way to defer one. Sometimes they won't know what biology is—if they think it's botany, they won't go so far.—*U.S. News*, Jan. 10, 1966.

In 1936 you could get atomic scientists at ten cents a dozen wrapped up in cellophane.—*U.S. News*, Jan. 10, 1966.

*Scientists merely have better sounding stories than those who hide in the bushes and say, "I don't want to go."*—*Chicago American*, Aug. 31, 1955.

We have not had very much trouble in getting men to accept deferment.—Dec. 13, 1941.

## XIII. II-S: STUDENT DEFERMENTS

I happened to major in education.—June 16, 1941.

Our educational system must place the youth who has developed a perfect healthy body on a plane above the scholarship grant who in reaching his goal has ruined his eyes, his digestion and his health in general.—*Survey Graphic*, July 1941.

The only reason a boy has for finishing college is that the Government is going to want him.—Oct. 14, 1942.

*You are in college so you will be able to give to the armed forces and society greater service than if you did not go to college.*—*New York Times*, April 18, 1951.

There are too many kids who have gone to school too long.—*U.S. News*, Jan. 10, 1966.

We may not get all the rich men's sons, but we get the ones the colleges won't tolerate.—June 24, 1966.

We gave you a deferment to go to school. We thought you were a man we should train. We have seen your behavior enough to believe we bet on the wrong horse, so we are changing your deferment to I-A.—Feb. 1, 1966.

## XIV. III-A: FATHERHOOD DEFERMENTS

The nation must make up its mind soon whether fatherhood is a substitute for military service.—*New York Times*, Jan. 31, 1953.

I don't see why we throw a halo around fatherhood.—*New York Times*, Oct. 12, 1951.

More people get married as they get older.—Jan. 26, 1950.

## XV. IV-F: EXEMPT FROM SERVICE

*Let's not say "exempt"; let's use the word "deferred."*—*U.S. News*, March 20, 1967.

In [this] class are those who are in such sad shape that nobody wants 'em.—*New York Times*, Feb. 20, 1951.

Our registrants and the public have gotten into the habit of thinking that IV-F means a man will never have to serve, that he has nothing he can contribute to the nation.—*New York Times*, Aug. 26, 1960.

As to venereal diseases, up to the present time we have not gotten the War Department to take them.—June 16, 1941.

*The attitude now seems to be that men without teeth can live just as well in the army as they have up to now out of the service.*—*Chicago Sun*, Feb. 6, 1942.

Mental defects are the main problem I am up against.—Jan. 17, 1952.

## XVI. KIDS

From the very beginning, young untrained boys have entered our Armed Forces and returned to civilian life mature men, trained in respect for authority, understanding the long range self-interest in patriotism, and with a devotion to the flag as a symbol of the land we love as the home of the brave and the free.—*Selective Service*, Nov. 1965.

I am a bull on our kids. I think they are all right, but I think they are growing up under the most horrible conditions because individual responsibility is practically non-existent.—June 26, 1959.

*There are most convincing evidences that our youth are fundamentally sound.*—*Selective Service*, June 1966.

I don't want any revenge. I actually have a lot of confidence in the kids of this country. All I hope to do is to discourage some of the excesses we have had.—*Senior Scholastic*, Dec. 17, 1967.

*I realize I am a little out of touch with the army. I haven't been there for quite a while.*—Jan. 25, 1954.

I will be glad to talk about the front because that is what I hear about when I go to seminars.—Feb. 1, 1966.

I am an old man and an old man thinks things are going to the dogs, but I don't know, that is just the way he is. It is like the army. It isn't like it used to be and as a matter of fact, it never was.—Jan. 26, 1959.

### XVIII. HERSHEY'S HOMILIES

You can't eat your seed wheat and plant it.—Feb. 9, 1967.

You cannot serve God and mammon, and I am not saying which is the one and which is the other.—Dec. 13, 1941.

*It's a fine thing to take off your hat to the past, but it's most important to take off your coat to the future.*—Chicago Sun, June 15, 1943.

### XIX. THE AMERICAN WAY

The Selective Service System is the best example in America of democracy in action.—Selective Service, April 1967.

Survival of our way of life is all that matters in the world today.—New York Times, June 11, 1951.

*One of the difficulties we're in now is an overexaggeration of individualism.*—Chicago Sun-Times, May 29, 1966.

Society that hasn't got the guts to make people do what they ought to do doesn't deserve to survive. A democracy has to make people do things for their own good.—Life, Aug. 20, 1965.

Freedom of speech and thought are our most cherished birth rights. They are the cornerstones of our social and political culture.—Selective Service, June 1943.

I think we have gone way hog wild on individual rights in this country.—June 24, 1966.

### XX. STATUTES OF LIBERTY

When we have uniformity we will have no liberty.—Feb. 2, 1955.

I don't believe you have liberty and uniformity at the same time.—June 22, 1966.

Any government which allows the citizens to do voluntarily that which they will not compel the rest of the citizens to do had better not talk too much about being fair and just.—Jan. 18, 1951.

### XXI. STICKS AND STONES MAY BREAK MY BONES

*Now I wish these people that want to obstruct things will just go somewhere else and do their obstructing. I don't believe you can tolerate these attacks on anything as sensitive as the Selective Service System.*—U.S. News, Jan. 10, 1966.

pickets. Even some of the reporters have let their hair grow long and shaggy.—Chicago Daily News.

If you are a card-thrower-awayer, that classifies you. We don't want people running around as card-thrower-awayers.—New York Times, March 13, 1968.

We are not trying to compel people to do things. We have no interest in punishment except as we are forced into it occasionally when we cannot get out of it.—Jan. 22, 1958.

We don't give a damn about students who demonstrate, but those who violate the Selective Service law with sit-ins and draft card burnings are delinquent, and they go to the top of the list as the law specifies.—Newsweek, Feb. 28, 1966.

I'd induct 'em all; it's a lot quicker than prosecution.—Newsweek, Feb. 28, 1966.

*Reclassification is quicker at stopping sit-ins than some indictment that takes effect six months later.*—Washington Post, Dec. 15, 1965.

### XXII. TIME AND THE RIVER FLOWING

The facts of yesterday are not necessarily the facts of today.—Jan. 22, 1958.

World War I was different than World War II.—May 10, 1967.

My house is ten years older than what it was ten years ago.—Jan. 18, 1960.

One thing we can do is explain why this year is different from last year.—Jan 25, 1954.

A week ago today and today have nothing in common.—Dec. 13, 1941.

*Tomatoes you buy at nine o'clock Saturday night are much worse than the ones you buy at nine o'clock in the morning.*—Oct. 14, 1942.

### XXIII. OLD SOLDIERS NEVER DIE

*I am still young enough that I am trying to have New Year's resolutions.*—Jan. 18, 1951.

I have a grandson who will be fifteen next year and our average age is about forty. It does not describe either one of us very well. He is fifteen and I am—never you mind.—Jan. 18, 1960.

The only thing that's certain is death and nobody's making any preparations for that.—New York Times, Dec. 15, 1966.

I may have more life insurance than I need, and I certainly hope I have, and I hope that I do not cash in on it, but I still must have some, although I feel pretty healthy at the moment.—Dec. 13, 1941.

*Retire? Huh! What do I do? Enjoy myself? What friends I've got left have been retired for years. What the hell do they do? Play bingo five nights a week. Maybe I could stand retirement but I couldn't stand bingo five nights a week.*—Time, Dec. 22, 1967.

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**SECTION 1**

This is the first tape with the interview of General Hershey, conducted by COL Elder and LTC Hattersley, 17 January 1975, 1300 hours.

INTERVIEWER: What restrictions do you wish placed on these tapes?

It's not necessary that it be done today, just so we understand the control you desire of the tapes or information.

GEN HERSHEY: I haven't thought about it particularly. Of course, I don't know enough about the rules of the College on their use of tapes. I certainly have no objections at all of using them completely. That's what they are made for. Now, however, I don't know how much infiltration that you might have in colleges from the press. I'm always very fond of them but they're 500 years off before they're going to get organized. Now that's the only thing because they. . .

INTERVIEWER: Why don't we for sake of our part of "This is your Life," to have, just between us, the tapes to stay in our possession, released to no one and then in time we'll be able to present you some alternatives and you can select the ones which would provide the degree of security that you will release to no one.

GEN HERSHEY: That's all right.

INTERVIEWER: There's no reason to make that decision today, but we will keep them in our possession and you won't have to worry at all during the course of these interviews. If that's agreeable then, to continue General Hershey. Again, we're going to make sure that you understand our approach and the College's approach to the study of your history and what you contributed to our country. Maybe we will be able to complete the project which we're undertaking this year. However, the College right

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now contemplates a continuance, perhaps next year or the following year. Other students would be coming down here to expand upon what you tell us because as Bob and I have mentioned, there is so much in your life to cover. Maybe we could narrow possible subjects down, but we'd also like you to be aware of the continuance if that's agreeable with you.

GEN HERSHEY: That's alright with me, if I survive. If we had had a good screen with all these accomplishments, it would be very little left when you screened it. The trouble is, knowing when to screen and how to screen and what to screen out.

INTERVIEWER: That's what we found.

GEN HERSHEY: And then that will change from year to year.

INTERVIEWER: Our initial visit here today is merely to make sure that we understand what your desires are and what you think is important . . . plus to limit the area in which we're going to be investigating.

GEN HERSHEY: Time is always the thing that limits everybody.

INTERVIEWER: The other point, General Hershey, while we're on that subject; I talked with the people who are responsible for the program in the War College and what they suggested, if it is agreeable with you, would be that maybe on one of our trips coming here, we would bring an audio visual team. They would like to prepare maybe a 15 or 20 minute tape of our interview with you. What they would like to do would be to see you, record your mannerisms, which in fact would help for historical value. If that's agreeable, it wouldn't be for a whole session, it would be for 15 or 20 minutes.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I've got to say one thing about it at the present time. I don't debate time. You know, as we used to say on the farm,

"What's time to a hog?" I'm not doing much except housework because I keep doing other things. Unfortunately, that keeps a fellow busy.

INTERVIEWER: If that's agreeable, we will notify you in advance but it may be in the next two or three visits.

GEN HERSHEY: Whatever you say.

INTERVIEWER: And now to get into more of the subject. Just what do you consider to be general areas that you feel would be worthy of further research? Now, like Bob has mentioned and you already mentioned, we've gone through the archives in the War College and there are just stacks and stacks of paper. We've done limited research, we've done a limited amount of reading on the vital area of manpower in the Selective Service and with the Volunteer Army. Some of the subjects that we came up with, or I came up with, and I'm sure Bob got also were, first the establishment of the Selective Service System. Is that something that we accept or do you think it's worthy of looking into as to its advisability compared to the present day Volunteer Army? Another area was the preference to college student deferments. That was another big issue. The other would be the study of the Gates Commission as an example of the all-Volunteer Army whether that was an objective view or whether it was kind of stacked in that Commission for people that were for Volunteer Army. And, finally, some of the more pressing manpower problems today, what we're concerned with is unemployment, racial imbalances and the social structure. Those are just general areas if you can maybe understand what our problem is. People who were responsible for certain things and work that they did is another consideration. Whether we can come back to that and maybe research

and see its advisability or inadvisability. So, if that may explain some of our problem areas.

GEN HERSHEY: I'll tell you what I think about any of them. . .that's about all you can do any way. You got a problem, first of course, whether you solve the big problem. I can solve, as far as I'm concerned, the big problem of the Volunteer Army very quickly if you tell me about how many people that you want because it's entirely a question of numbers. Now don't get into equity. There isn't any equity involved in volunteering. You bribe people to come in to let others come of aid to their service. That's all there is, I mean that's all there is of that. The way you keep taxes fair is don't take any taxes from me, get them somewhere else. If you can get somebody else to pay them, why not? The problem with me on the volunteer thing, it isn't a question of equity. It's a question of national survival and it's a question of how many people have you got to have, and if you've got to have anywhere over 2½ million or so, you're running a great chance; if you try to get them another way, by some orderly method what you think would probably be fair as far as equity goes, I'd be very careful about that word. The fella that has one leg off, never has to do anything for his country isn't because of equity. It's because the country couldn't use him because of his leg.

INTERVIEWER: In that same regard in describing general broad areas, would you think our approach to the problem . . .we're not trying to have you solve our problems . . .but what we contribute to historical value, would you think that a phase in your life, would be important for research?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, of course I think that, to me the most important

thing in the world is the delegation of authority because we're bitten for defeat all the time because we have been blessed with the finest kind of communication if we have enough sense to use it. We use them by abusing them. And as far as Selective Service goes, the farther you pull out of the community the sending of people, the more quickly you will have the end of the country. To me, delegation, and when I say delegation, that's what I mean. I believe in training. I don't believe in delegating somebody that doesn't know anything about doing something. You have got a training problem. On the other hand, you can overtrain very easily because you can get to thinking if you sit near somewhere, you can run everything out of West Pennsylvania or some place else. You better let somebody out there that knows how they react to things to do your reacting.

INTERVIEWER: I'm sure that's one point we'll want to talk to you in more depth about before. . .

GEN HERSHEY: I'd put that probably about first.

INTERVIEWER: You put that in your letter. I figured that the regions. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, it just scared the devil out of me. I got a son that's a retired Marine. He had a regiment in Vietnam, on the north frontier, and he got a telegram one day and said, "This is secret, secret, secret!" (although it had been in the papers, up in North Vietnam a couple weeks before) "We're going to pull your regiment out of there and we don't want anybody to know it. Cease all aggressive reconnaissance." You come up to a guy that's got wounded and unconscious for a month in Vietnam by somebody not having reconnaissance and guys looking down your throat in a bunker. And, the time that we got into

Cuba, these poor devils down there were shipped, head set on, and somebody up here trying to tell him what to do. We'll get licked sure as hell. Ernie Harmon, who I knew pretty well, he formed a Constabulary over there, and one of the things that I always thought we could lick the Russians was because he said there was always a Commissar around there, and all the officers were afraid to say much until this guy got away. And they wouldn't do anything until they got his approval. We could lick anybody that has to wire into Washington to find out what they're going to do. If we delegate to a guy, tell him what to do, and not how, back him up and don't relieve him the first time he makes a mistake. Let him learn from it, instead of getting a new one in so you got to go through it twice.

INTERVIEWER: Well, we thought another area in that regard would be, you joined what they call Selective Service in the mid-30's where the Secretary of the Joint Service Commission. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah I didn't worry too much about being 50, because at that time, the Secretary was a title and on the other hand, most of the time he didn't have anybody helping him.

INTERVIEWER: Well I was just curious about how this philosophy that you just espoused came into play when you were designing the organization that would be successful in World War II.

GEN HERSHEY: Well I don't know about success, but I did have an unusual experience. Actually, planned something and then got a chance to execute it. The hell of it is when everybody else planned something, they put it off somewhere, and the plan that you lay up on the shelf isn't worth a damn. Any time you get a plan off of legs, throw it away. You might as

well start from scratch rather than the wrong place. And so it was true that I had some opportunity to spend about four years getting acquainted with a couple hundred people that fortunately were scattered all over the United States. And therefore, when some poor governor maybe said to you, "What the hell am I gonna do?" I said, "Get a hold of Jones. He can tell you about your state. "Because if you don't have distribution, your, I mean this thing, 'course I don't happen to believe in sending guys in to run a state. In the first place he's up against enmity. I don't think you can do good, but with kids or anybody else, you've got to make them take the responsibility. You can't do it by getting somebody else to tell them. And so therefore what we have. . . we didn't have more than a hundred, 125 or 130 people. I can't tell you what we had because we weren't paying most of the people we had. We had them under our own circumstances. In fact, I don't suppose I'd work for an organization to try to run things like we did. Hell, I had a guy worked for me a year, he didn't even belong to me. Bill Draper, he died the other day. He was never in the Selective Service System, but he amounted to being the Deputy Director for a year. You can't do that sort of thing.

INTERVIEWER: I think what Bob had mentioned here in relation to that point is what you're talking about--decentralization. What we're really trying to do is to just narrow the subject down as much as we can--an aspect of your life or what you feel is most important. Then what I understand you to say is that you feel that delegation, regionalism, and implementing plans rather than just having plans to use them when the time comes to see if they work. . .

GEN HERSHEY: You see, I had some experiences when I came here in '36. We had a lot of guys that were sending out the things that deal with industry and labor and everything else, and they had a nice big thing in the book and it had the President. He was up there. But you got up about here and you didn't go any farther. I would say, "Why don't the hell you get down here?" Well, details. Well, if I could, I would build it the other way up. Hell, you can tell the President about it anytime. You've got something to tell him about, well he damn well . . . he can tell you when he's not the head of all these things. So I happen to believe that you do have to have legs always on your plans. Now we had the case around Michigan. I spent a couple of years trying to find their plan. They made me one a long time ago. But it was 30. They'd lost the damn thing. Well, of course, it wasn't much lost because in order to get a plan here, they'd send a thing here. They'd tell him all had to do was fill in spaces. That's all right. Maybe it's better than nothing, but not much. It was really a textbook on the draft, rather than plans for Michigan. And so, I happen to believe that it's possible to live. I realize that anybody that has got any sense knows you can't have 50 people under you. But therefore, you get into regions. The next thing they ought to get into areas. And the next thing the state gets to thinking, what the hell are these?

INTERVIEWER: If you had to put your finger on the three or four real tough times in Selective Service, what times would you pick?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I've just gone through that and I didn't do too well. I got a guy that has been trying to write a book for quite a long time and he'd like to have the time that I have the toughest time

with Congress and I had to say something so and of course I did get the original bill passed. I had a tussle with a farmer once that was pretty bad. But on the other hand, if we wouldn't have succeeded the first time, we wouldn't have had to worry about the rest of them so therefore it was more important to get a bill at that time than it was to get something else. And of course there was a whole lot of things that just like the winning independence in the United States that the French fleets happened to be down there at the time they were or Cornwallis wouldn't have surrendered. But the guys who wrote the Declaration of Independence saying the events in their lives and everything couldn't hell, have known that. And so every time they bombed London, we'd pick up a few, but, we're not good learners. At the present time we're going through the very damn thing. We haven't learned anything.

INTERVIEWER: We've said also but that. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah, well that part we don't have to impress on people, but now, for instance, I don't know, there's a lot of things involved, but Eddie Hebert getting bumped yesterday. You got a lot of damn fools that figure, that you can put all the money in everything in the world except defense. I think that Eddie at times, I think he let them know where he stood. I don't mean anybody, but the guys ran against Bill Bray up in Indiana. One of the big things he's hollered about is Bill was giving everything to Department of Defense but he didn't know Bill. Bill had been a tanker. He wasn't so damn crazy about giving everybody anything. He had a pretty good sense about who could, who used it. He wanted very much time to give to the Armed Forces, no question about that. But who in the hell should be? That guy got elected out there. It's gonna

be his neck. It was the Armed Forces veil, and it didn't mean for the general things, unselfish about it. In fact, I'd like to have a guy who is very selfish. He's so selfish that, by God, he wants something to keep him alive and is willing to pay for it.

INTERVIEWER: How about the flak that the Selective Service got during Vietnam? Was that about the only time that was under public criticism?

GEN HERSHEY: Oh no. 'Course one thing about it. It got lighter that time and not only that, there was a lot of things involved there. But you always get flak. Course you get flak when there isn't any war, because then you're a war monger. And of course, I've got people in my own family that don't like to have me say, "Well, we've got, we've trained killers." The people are nasty nice when they don't want to say so. I was deputy sheriff one time and there was a lot of guys that wouldn't like to have you say, "You don't run. Look, I'm going to shoot you. Now I'm not handicapping you. I don't like to if I can help it. So we'll just go along like we was a couple of guys. But I'll tell you, if you start running, I'm going to shoot because I've got to take you to a certain place." Now I never had anybody run, I don't know if I have guts enough to shoot. But just the same a peace officer or anybody else has got to face up to the fact that he may have to kill somebody to keep from being killed. You just seem to be nasty nice. I think you don't mention in high company. Probably don't want to hear it, but I don't know how you can quite be honest. One of the things I got some flak out the other day was somebody found a bag with. . .'60, somewhere along there. . .yeah, I don't know just when it was. Somebody had accused me of saying something about I had never as yet seen in a

questionnaire, a guy who gave his occupation as a killer. Whenever everybody is saying, why don't you all just take people that are fitted to do the things you want them to do. You don't find guys saying, "I'm a killer," do you? Or of course we're nasty nice. As soon as you get a killer in say, "Oh boy, let him in, he's a criminal." And then spend six or eight months trying to get somebody half as good as he is.

INTERVIEWER: Would you, in that regard, would you say that there is reason to maybe investigate the attitude of the quote, "the general American attitude toward military service."

GEN HERSHEY: Oh, I think so, but I don't. Well, if I knew something about what the hell we could do about it when we find out about it. But of course, the first thing, when you're having descended from people that ran off from Europe to get out of military service, you oughtn't to be surprised when they still get over here and want to get out of it if they can. I mean, those are the problems you're up against. I'm an optimist but it's because I have a certain amount of stupidity. Because a smart guy can always figure out how you're going to hell in a handbasket. But you're not very smart and not only that, I have great faith in our people and that sounds different than the criticisms I'm bringing. I happened to major, among other things, in education. I'm not so damn sure that that isn't the reason that our people are going to hell in a handbasket and they're getting so they know too damn much more than they can use.

INTERVIEWER: Good theory about television having contributed to that problem. They've seen too much which they would not have seen.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, and of course you take. . .I, of course, grew up among what you call ignorant people. Farm fella from up in Indiana. Time I finished in school, very few people finished the 8th grade. I guess the average, about 5th grade. And I have contributed more to making a lot of people who had Ph.D.'s, and now, I'm probably wrong. 'Cause I don't know anything about any of the bastards, the ones that did all right, you didn't hear much about them. So if you've heard of hell, you've heard enough. About these that I had permitted to go to London. Course the next thing, they got into college. And then they began to try to tell other people how the hell they could get out of their obligations because they'd already had the experiences of doing. I don't know what the answer is. And not only that, I don't hold personally, one thing I had some experience a good many years ago that got interested in our adrenaline and one thing or another. And of course I don't spend any time feeling mean about a guy. Not because I'm so good. It's not that at all. Cause in the first place, when I think he's an S.O.B., he may or may not know it, but if he doesn't know it, or if he knows it and doesn't care if I think so, I'm not getting any adrenaline out of him and I didn't know anything about him.

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned someone was writing a book.

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: Someone here locally?

GEN HERSHEY: No, he's professor, assistant professor, I guess down in Florida at Atlantic University. It isn't Coca Sole, it's one of those east coast towns just north of, north of Miami a little bit, but it's north of that next town, you see. Oh, two names down around

there on the Florida coast.

INTERVIEWER: Do you remember his name?

GEN HERSHEY: What? Yeah. His name's O'Sullivan.

INTERVIEWER: Did he write a biography on you?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, he hadn't written much. God, he'd been working on it for four or five years. He's another one of those guys, I suppose, that I had jumped into with. About the time he was trying to get his doctorate. I don't know what he, he had some subject that he would come see me about in the summer. I don't know if that's how he got interested or not. I don't know how interested he is. I see him a couple times a year, around three or four days and he must have had. . . Christ, I don't know what he had got. But he hasn't written anything.

INTERVIEWER: Well, you might have, there's two or three things that might be. One guy, that reminds you, and when I hear something slick and serious I got to be a little careful about it because a good many times somebody has been retired, as I live, and they're not very happy about something and so forth. But here two or three years ago, there was a boy who was here, and mighty, but he was public relations, the later group he got in. He got enough money to go around the world studying the way that they ran Selective Service in other places. He allegedly was going to write a book. He's out now and I don't and they're just lucky but they won't be lucky very long. I went through this once and we ended up with four million dollars and we couldn't even get the mail brought in little alone, had they got around 30. Thirty million of course. I don't know how much bigger than the four million is. It's somewhere in there in between.

INTERVIEWER: I was led to believe this effort was being built in house by someone in the headquarters.

GEN HERSHEY: It was in the last. . .

INTERVIEWER: And I thought it was female.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, it was, was in the last. . .

INTERVIEWER: Presently. Currently, right?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, what I know now is I've seen the deputy who is, in fact, these people. . .

INTERVIEWER: Byron Pepitone?

GEN HERSHEY: No, Pepitone is the Director. This fellow's name is, it begins with "D."

INTERVIEWER: I wouldn't know.

GEN HERSHEY: Well anyway, he, some of these underlings got an appointment and he came along and he went out, he was interested particularly in what the hell we did before, when we were not working, because that's a problem. . .

INTERVIEWER: Between wars or when you weren't drafting?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, when we weren't drafting. Course sometimes. . .

INTERVIEWER: Well that came in during your tenure, too, the first time in the history of the country where we drafted in peacetime.

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah. Well, I don't want to get into your history about that. It depends on who you're talking about drafting. Remember up to the 60's, 1860's, drafting was always done with states.

INTERVIEWER: Militia.

GEN HERSHEY: And when we got into the war between the states, you guys are putting it on the line down there and got to be a little

careful about talking about the, the war between the states.

INTERVIEWER: I'm for the states. I can go either way.

GEN HERSHEY: One of my heroes was Robert E. Lee and, of course, one of my psychiatrists was Thomas Jackson. Stonewall, I don't know. Stonewall didn't have some of the vocabulary that George Patton did, but. . .

INTERVIEWER: All the words weren't invented then.

GEN HERSHEY: Well anyway, one of the things that they were up against in the Civil War trying to run a draft was that they were not the people that had been doing it. I'm not saying the states ran it well, because poor old Washington practically who had a guy around for 30 days, he kinda had to write several letters of thanks. But the states were the people that had the compulsion. When I started operating in Indiana as a kid, I never had to do any cold facts because I joined the National Guard before I was 21 years of age and therefore all the time I was there above the poll tax working on the road instead of a military tax. And it was the people in the National Guard that had to do it. So anyway, the states are the one's running. And their tendency was, the community said, who the hell is this guy coming in and telling us how to run our business out here? While it's been changed a great deal, now, I think. Of course, and you shouldn't come down. Knowing that you were the governor, you have the best chance, you know, how in the hell to run this and what we want is so many men. We'll let you know early enough that you can get them for us, and we'll tell you every once in a while how damn good you are if you get them. We'll have time to give badges away to the board members. We're gonna pay them because if we pay them somebody says, "Ah, you're the son of a bitch that got "X"

number of dollars for sending my kid away to get killed."

INTERVIEWER: Did you recall during '36 to '40 designing the system. . .which will really go back in time to history. . .to see that those were, that decentralization had to be keyed to any success you might have or. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well I don't know. I don't want to say that. 'Course I've been a decentralizer even in the service. I get goddamned tired of anybody from the battalion commander up that comes around telling me what to do and then tells me how to do it. And, it's all right. But I might be able to follow his instructions if he didn't give me too many. But the first place, I'd probably forget because by the time he gets through telling me what the hell to do, I forget what it was he wanted done. So therefore, I did grow up. I went into the Guard, which gave me some advantage of dealing with Adjutant Generals during those thirty (1930) periods. I couldn't hope to do much with the governor. I was a major in G-1. But the first place there, we got couple thousand dollars a year. . .\$10,000 a year. . .to train these people. So you didn't get a hell of a lot of running around on that either. It was cheaper in those days to run around. And that's one of the things the War College, we tried to use the committee system when we got them together and we used, and of course it was cheaper to send out questions and did it two or three ways. One is, some of these guys had experiences. We had them writing chunks of the law and doing that sort of thing as a part of their work but they didn't get paid for it. That came after World War II. I did always believe in decentralization. I didn't say anything in the Armed Forces that, ever. . .and I talked to division commanders in World War I who knew how to do squads right and a great

deal better than they knew how to command a division. And the hell of it was, they ran around showing corporals how to do squads right. Well, you can't blame them. A corporal, just because you make him a major general, you can't expect him to stop being a corporal. Well, I don't know if I've answered your question. I did believe in decentralization and I did believe in trying to get local people trained so that they could run the damn thing within their state. And I never permitted anybody outside of. . . If anybody gave an order to a state director, an order, and a lot of people dealt with it. But, they didn't tell them what to do. If they had a good number of relationships, obviously they gave any advice in the world. But there was only one guy in the system that ever told a state director to do something, and I never told him very much. This thing of giving orders is, a lot of, it's hoey if you kind of let them, keep them informed on what the hell's going on, what they're supposed to do.

INTERVIEWER: Based on what you said, I couldn't agree with you more, your philosophy and. . .

GEN HERSHEY: It worked though. That's the hell of it is, and a lot of people think well. . .

INTERVIEWER: The person in your whole thesis or your theme of your ideas are, the person closest to the people has the best rapport and has the problems and at least he's closest to it and he can get the best results.

GEN HERSHEY: Well hell, to get a guy to worry about a guy out there cause he isn't up to a certain level and up here you get a. . . oh a GS something. He's solving problems at a place he's never been. One

of the things I did, I often didn't travel as much as I would have liked to, but once I'd like to get out and get, meet local wards--boards. Get them to shape it in their system (me) as a kind of junior psychiatrist. One of the things you got to try to do better is if something's hurting him, let him get it out. Same way, I don't want to try to underscore the other, I don't want to make the Army into something it damned ought to be, but as a battery commander, I had about 15, 16 years as a captain. I got so I knew so much of and became familiar with the rank and I always kept an open door and most of the time I had a soldier that was all griped up about something, after he got through telling me what's wrong with him, he said, well, I guess I can handle it. It was all right.

INTERVIEWER: He got it out of his system.

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah. Not only that. The very fact that he got and tell me. Of course once in a while when he came in very stiff and getting ready to fight and that was the time to say, "Well, I'm sorry, I'm busy just now, would you sit down?" Because he didn't want to sit down. He'd sit down in the room. And you let him sit there awhile and after awhile, he didn't have any trouble. He wanted to get the hell out of there. Well, I've always let a horse a loose rein. And the bastard I couldn't train right with a loose rein, I'd try to let somebody else run him. And I suppose that I could get some people that I couldn't handle. I tried to let them go. I'm not too sure about that one.

INTERVIEWER: Are you aware of, not asking you to tell me, but were you aware of the set up of Selective Service today?

GEN HERSHEY: Yes, I think so.

INTERVIEWER: One of the things we'll talk about later on might be the adequacy of that system in your opinion and. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, you've got some inadequacies that you're just never gonna be, I don't care what you've got. Because in the first place, again, the plans, unless you get them on legs of men who are using them, you don't have to let a plan lie around long until it's no damn good. Next thing is, I have someone talk with me because I got pushed and pushed on the digital computer business, and I made some starts but didn't go very far, but at the present time, and I may be wrong, I think that's all over board which happens that the Congress will give something a damn quicker than will. . .

INTERVIEWER: It's his district.

GEN HERSHEY: Huh?

INTERVIEWER: His district.

GEN HERSHEY: Yes. And not only that, he said, yeah, I know all those fellows out there. They're all right, but. . .yeah. And so anyway, they are the ones that we stole our decentralized system. You can sell the decentralized system to Congress a damn sight easier than you can to somebody else. Cause he'll want centralization when something's wrong. I think I'm giving you a lot of stories probably won't help you much, but one time we had a little trouble down at Brownsville. Brownsville had some people down there that some of them went overboard. That thing was no damn good and so they figured the next time they had to call me, just send them along and apparently they weren't due to come yet and truth about it. But anyway, they sent him on and somebody came down

from Washington and looked over and said, "Here, what's this? Why has this been dumped? He's around here, he ain't no damn good to us. He might as well be somewhere else." And of course made quite a fuss about it and the local boards got sore and they got a hold of Conley, who was then Senator and I forget his name. . .Wells was this Congressman and they came marching over to see me about the interference they were getting out of Austin. Well, there was probably a lot of good truth about it. I don't happen to know him. I listened to them and said, "You both happen to know where I'm from?" Congressman said, "seems like I do. I didn't know Conley was in the fight to get the bill." He said, "Seems like I do. Up north somewhere. Yeah," he said, "Northern Indiana." "Do you think for one damn minute I'm gonna come down and get between a couple of Texans, having a row over something, you're in the wrong office." He said, "Okay." Well, I mean that. . .

INTERVIEWER: You don't really want me to get in there. You think about it. (Pertains to General Hershey's comment.)

GEN HERSHEY: Well, anyway, somehow or another, it's awfully hard to get people willing to let go of authority, up here. Part of the thing, all the time they want to get somebody to do it. They didn't like to have other people do it like they thought. We used to have, well, they came up here and died as senator. The fellow organized the Selective Service down in South Carolina. A lot of governors didn't pay as much attention to me, but he used to call me up about twice a week during the time we were organizing. Hell of a good guy to work with especially when you let him maybe have his head. But on the other hand, you could always go to the state and say, "Well, I don't know,

I guess you had bad luck last month. You didn't do so well and I'm not going to tell you what states did well or didn't do well, cause I know that you don't want to have your state getting so that it isn't doing its share." And hell, the law report. We had a governor up in Pennsylvania one time, he said to me, "I want you, if you think I'm going off in the wrong direction, you let me know. Now, I'll worry about my road paving and so on, I'll worry about the money that somebody accuses me of this and that, but I don't want any blood mixed up in it. Any time you think I'm doing something, taking somebody's blood, then they ought to be taking somebody else's. You tell him and you'll have no trouble with me because I just don't, I just don't want to be involved in blood." Now, I saw a lot of governors. If I ever write a book, I'd like to write a book. . .I had one or two fired up once or twice, but they didn't stay flared very long and they were flaring me up because they were involved in half a dozen farmers' business and that's always a good one. There's no way of keeping out of, because the first phase of farming, of course I think is getting more of a business. Farming has always, has been a place where the hired man had to eat with the family and had to sleep maybe with one of the kids or something like that and see, going on and getting a replacement is not like. . .course you said earlier about some of the problems about your unemployed, about where a lot of things that you'd like to do from a military standpoint that you have to worry especially in the days the President said that. . .Roosevelt is just gonna build 60,000 planes. That has a hell of a lot to do with your inductions. You got a guy that has worked for six weeks in a plane factory. Well, hell, he

can't be an expert in that time. But how long would it take you to get another man to do as well as he's doing now? At least six weeks. I mean, and of course I had to see the automobiles in Detroit, built, put out in a park and rot. That's steel. We're having a hell of a time getting it. But on the other hand, the unions are strong enough, they didn't dare sit out in those damn factories until they got the airplane factories ready to run so they could push them over. You know, you shouldn't have those problems. And that's just the kind of problems you have when you sit on your burr-hind all the time during peacetime when you should be getting ready and then when you get a war on, it's already on.

INTERVIEWER: Do you think we ought to explore that area in one of our later sessions? The role that Selective Service played in other than procuring people for the military?

GEN HERSHEY: Oh yeah. Because most of the things that they do, see, the result is, what you get from the Armed Forces. That's a hell of a thing to say and it's a hell of a thing to say that a people will hold people to doing things of little consequence. They don't, if you're getting bombed everyday. The English, hell, they had a hell of a time, but they didn't have any problems on some things to the extent that we did. They didn't have to go around telling people there was a war on. But about the people we had the. . .knew the war was on. . .was one who had casualties. And of course those damn fools at first wouldn't publish our casualty list. They would send the poor mother a telegram telling her that her son was dead, but they wouldn't put it in the paper because it might discourage folks. And at times, the kamikaze came along. We

were right at the place where we were slacking away in all of our yards. The war was getting pretty well over. And then suddenly, the yard stopped letting them loose. And so we said, why in the hell don't you tell them you got several of these ships in that have been kamikazed? Well, there was a hell of a lot of reasons. Didn't want any bad news. The bad news generally would make people do more than good news though. And the result was, they finally took the Ben Franklin into New York harbor all like she was when they got through with her. But they were afraid to tell them that there was a war still on. I had a kid who was on the Pennsylvania when she was kamikazed. He lost his room unfortunately one day. He was an engineer officer and he was asked if the kamakaze hit the Pennsylvania aft enough so they had to tow her back to Guam from Okinawa.

INTERVIEWER: Well, we've sort of covered a pretty broad range of things, general.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, if you want to go back on something more specific. I'm a little likely, I think, to wander.

INTERVIEWER: No, all of us, and that's really the purpose, just go kind of sorting out some things, but one of the questions that came up since we've been talking here. I get the impression that in this Selective Service and we're talking in terms of induction, manpower, volunteer, whatever it might be, the role or what you contributed in relation to the War Department or Department of Defense, what was your, is there a relationship that is unique there or is that something. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I think yes, and I think it's one that worries me some because you wouldn't worry too much if you get attacked. They

just blaze the hell out of you. There's no question about it. I don't know whether you're that way or not, but some people don't like to have policemen hanging around there. But you just let the robbery come. Come in and have a cup of coffee to the policeman. Feel free, any time, you know. Kipling says it's much better that any of us can. But on the other hand, one of the problems you got and unfortunately the guy who made the education, I hate to say it, but the goddamn fools that think they're intellectuals. They're the damndest people to want somebody else to do something and if. . .and when they get them to do it, they want to tell them how to do it not knowing anything about it. And the result is, we get into positions where we don't get ready for the damn war until after it starts. But I don't know anything else to do. Course one of the things about it if you get ready for the war too quick, you get ready for the war that's already passed. So, where there's an optimist, I still think that you probably have to go through it, but on the other hand, you get into a tremendous demand for people. In the first place, a lot of it is somewhat artificial cause in the first place, it's the people who stay, who take the people. Well, to start with, Christ, they got a whole damn yard full of them, but the bastards who want the guy that you want. Like the Navy, used to quarrel with the Navy years and years ago about smart kids. They're all talking about wanting them. They all just wanted, they had mechanics and you had to be very careful. Of course the damn liar knew the bright young boy. That's what they wanted. That isn't what they said. Now I'm not anti Navy at all because I had a son who was in the Navy and I got a grandson who's in the Navy and I got a son who's in

Marine Corps. And they're all Armed Forces to me. But on the other hand, I still reserve the right to point out how they like to have privileges like, I told a former commandant of the Marine Corps one time when he was asking me what would I do about. . .he had a problem of being a little slow on education of his officers. He was talking about sending them to school and I said, but you don't, just you be a little careful. Once you get those folks smart enough, they won't want to do a damn thing, fool thing that you made your living on. A guy that is smart wouldn't do a lot of the things that the Marine has been doing. I'm strong for the Marines and I have to be because my wife is the mother of a Marine and. . .but on the other hand, there's no use of trying to get so that eventually. Course I expect we artillerymen figured that somebody ought to belong to the Infantry besides us and I imagine, I don't know the armor. I don't know how much they inherited. You see, I knew the cavalry in those days, but I don't know the armor graduates. I know how, I served four years in the cavalry division and a lot of ways I knew more cavalrymen when the war broke out than I did artillery because we only had one battalion down there. They never had any officers much in that.

INTERVIEWER: On these sessions, what's your own feeling? We've been at it now for about an hour? Just over an hour, yes. Is that a reasonable time length. . . ?

GEN HERSHEY: In the first place, I think the problem if I were solving this problem or running it, you two people would solve it because in the first place, I believe in delegation. Second place, I don't get worn. Probably don't get deep enough, don't plow deep

enough to wear out much. The people that wear out are the people that, I, time in the first place, I'm charging off to recreation now. Well, it's so. . .

INTERVIEWER: That's true.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, for instance, I had a letter from a guy out in New Mexico last week and he said, he's been writing me off and on. He's gonna write a book on generals and admirals and I don't know, I doubt if I belong to either one. I haven't much use on. . .But anyway, he said, "I'll be in Washington on 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th of February," and when could I see him? I wrote back and said, "Any of those days including Saturdays and Sundays or evenings if you want. The only thing I'd like is soon as you decide when you want to come, you let me know because then I can block it out because in the first place, I have no, I made a promise to go down where this son who's retired, he's retired from the Marine Corps and wants to get away and so he's around Lejune. He lives in Jacksonville, but he's selling the Arizona. But anyway, he's down there mixed up with some retired group. Apparently they're all regular retired people and they're all in this little county. Now I don't know. . .

INTERVIEWER: Little community down there?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, from Jacksonville. And of course it's not affiliated, but anyway, they're going to observe the birthday of Washington, the 22nd. At least they know when he was born. . . Now I'm going down there, and I don't expect to be here at that time. The American Legion is going to be in here on the early part of March and I happened to fool around since '53. What we call ANAVAFSUS.

It's the Army, Navy, Air Force veterans of Canada and the United States. That's a mouthful. What they are, they're people that had been elected as life members of the Canadian Veterans Organization, ANAVAFESUS, Army, Navy and Air Force veterans in Canada. I had been by usurpation mostly, imprisoned by that damn thing, since it's organized and we only meet a couple times a year. Meet once at the national convention, the American Legion and once for the other spring meeting in here, and we take in, oh, about 15 or 20 and they're old enough that they die off fast, we're all getting up there, okay, well, I think we've had three or four presidents and I was supposed to get a new one, another one this year, that is, I mean, from the United States. They've always been willing. Doesn't cost anything to join. In the first place, Seagrams is the one that had a great deal to do with it cause Seagrams is a Canadian organization and Frank Schwengel, who is dead now, was president of Seagrams in the United States. He was quite a legionnaire. I'm sort of satisfied that we do have certain people here that understand some of the people up there. I don't think it's universal at all.

INTERVIEWER: You know, our schedule for meeting with you will always be at your pleasure. It's difficult for us to sit and pinpoint any times right now. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, no. The thing for you to do is generally a day or two ahead notice of time.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, I'll just call you as I have done and. . .

GEN HERSHEY: If there's anything I can do much when you don't come.

INTERVIEWER: Well, we're still on. . .

GEN HERSHEY: As far as you're concerned, I'm concerned that you kept it on work days. As far as I'm concerned, Sundays or Saturdays or nights. I don't care.

INTERVIEWER: Could I ask one question while it's on my mind?

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: It came up. We'll sort this out obviously after we try to put it in perspective, but do you think, in your opinion, would you like to comment in our research, you know, maybe set you up about the amnesty issue?

GEN HERSHEY: Yes, I would. The. . .I looked a little more of that and it, the first thing that I've got to say to you is, I don't know what the hell they are talking about when they say amnesty because you know the. . .Christ almighty, a lot of them is picked a bonus and well, there's all sorts of things. And of course, now Lincoln. Yeah, Lincoln sent word around to the Confederate soldiers that if you run off and take an oath of allegiance, we'll welcome you. Christ, that isn't what these guys are thinking about that ran off. Remember I talked to a lot of these guys before they went. They told me they were going and a great many of them came back. They aren't having a bit of luck now because we have got some boys who feel that they ought to have a right to veto any law in the United States and it shouldn't be able to pass over their veto. I mean a veto, as far as they're concerned, is an end. But I realize they're going to have to do something. I don't want to quarrel with the President at all about trying to do something. But I don't think they've done much. Of course, he had to appoint certain people. I didn't give him much on the guys going down to chairman on the damn

thing and that's for our senator from New York state. From Jamestown, New York, western part of New York. Good, what's his name? Well, he got appointed by somebody as Senator and then he ran and got defeated by this conservative Republican.

INTERVIEWER: The point in that regard is, you know, the way it keeps going over my mind is things that are going to affect us in the future. You know, we learn from the history but the amnesty issue is something that is controversial to either a volunteer, you know, volunteer or selective services or attitudes of people and what eroding effect does that have on people who feel like they should or should not have an obligation.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I think it's very bad. But, of course, there's another thing, a question about it. A short memory.

INTERVIEWER: In our future sessions also, I'm sure you've been through many, many tape sessions, but the way that Bob and I will arrange this in future sessions after we get a little bit more established is, what we plan to do is, ask a question or general area and then you would expound upon that and give your ideas.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, that is a disadvantage because I'm liable to expound pretty widely but if you find one possible hard rock, little lone jewel in the whole damn thing. But anyway, you get a broad perspective.

INTERVIEWER: We're trying to seek out things that you could offer to insight. You personally, see, can offer some insight to, it may not be written in history books.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, it probably wasn't because Ed, of course, it is

true, as you know, so much better, so much later than I have. You've gotten all sorts of guys and the way you lead one of them is the way you lead another. And the way you lead him today might be quite different. Some other time. Now for instance, Pearl Harbor, I don't suppose we could ever have a Pearl Harbor again, until our people forget all that they built up, because of that reality. We had a hell of a time before Pearl Harbor. Had a hell of a time after, but it's a difference pertaining to a hell of a time. But still you could do a lot of things right now. You could sink probably the whole damn Navy and not have as much consternation in the country because, and of course, the bastards that survived, they have a right to think I've survived in there for I will. It's pretty hard to argue at that about. . . You don't want what's going on. I said, do you? I said, no. But it is true that at different times, people have said to me, what do you think of the Presidents? Well, to me that isn't a fair question because the Presidents had such a widely different thing to deal with. In fact, young Mrs. Hershey is reading this book. It's about Truman when he's getting on years and of course Truman is a pretty good study anyway when he's himself. And the fellow that brings him out pretty well. Of course she knew Harry some, but she hadn't heard him say all the things. . .but, of course, Harry, a guy who's walking around here being vice-president. Somebody tells him somebody's dead. And they said, "Say you've got to shoot a bomb." "What kind of bomb. . .time? Tell me about it."

INTERVIEWER: Big one.

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah. Said, "Well, where is that? What is it? Nobody

ever told me about the damn thing." Well I mean, I never was a Roosevelt man although, give the devil his dues. I always thought that he had the damndest way of being able to do something. It went over pretty well. I don't know how he arrived at it a lot of times.

INTERVIEWER: Well, maybe we're going to talk to some other folks in order to ferret out these times and events that you can talk about. We plan to talk to General Gross, General Gross in the Carlisle area.

GEN HERSHEY: Who?

INTERVIEWER: General Gross.

GEN HERSHEY: Oh Gross. Yes.

INTERVIEWER: He's up in the Carlisle area. Maybe you can help us pick. . .

GEN HERSHEY: He can tell you a lot of things. In fact. . .

INTERVIEWER: Right now we just want him to pinpoint things that we can do so we'll work on so we ask you a question, we can hopefully phrase it from a research point of view so that it will remind you of the circumstances so that you can talk with a little more knowledge.

GEN HERSHEY: Well it depends. I don't do too well on that, because you know U. S. Grant III was a classmate of mine at the War College. He used to tell when he got on in years, "You know, about three things I'm trouble as I'm getting old trying to remember." "First, he said, "I'm not remembering names, I'm not remembering faces." And then he pauses, and of course, there's always somebody in the crowd to help you, said, "What's the third?" And then he said, "I've already forgotten that one." It is true that I stood around here and guess I have't forgotten my kid's name yet although I'm not too sure that Leslie is one of my granddaughters. Sometimes I have to struggle to get Leslie's

name to come up. But still, it is, a fellow does not forget quite a lot of things. Especially a little bit on your psychology. If, I know some people that never forget anything that is distasteful to them and they're very, very unfortunate because they're bedamned with a memory that worries them when it reoccurs and, therefore, their subject pretty good when a psychiatrist said, well the guy he pushes on into subconsciousness forgets the things that he is ashamed of or afraid of, or a lot of other things. How lucky he is. He's the guy that lived to be 80 you know.

INTERVIEWER: The point that Bob was making was, you know, making it easier on you because you know, your lifetime, your lifetime spans two of my lifetimes in the events that took place.

GEN HERSHEY: But when I saw you guys were born in the '30's I thought that, for Christ's sake, I wondered, didn't they get here in. . .

INTERVIEWER: You know, I think of that, on the battalion officer roster, when I was a lieutenant, I always looked and saw, look at my battalion commander. He was an old guy.

INTERVIEWER: Colonels are old.

INTERVIEWER: I looked at the last roster, sir. I was the battalion commander and I saw the lieutenants. I said, look at all those young guys.

INTERVIEWER: You know what got me, was the lieutenants' wives calling me sir. I knew that I was older when somebody said that.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, this boy that I telephoned, who was it, I talked to about it. He's going to school in Infantry now. He's getting the pay for the year. I think he's had three courses for non-speaking

doctors at Benning, so I think he's getting so he can just about guess what's coming next. Now, we take the officers course. I think he is still running into again quite a bit that he ran into the other three times he was there. But, I don't know how he will make it. He's a good kid. He'll work. That gets me back to WALK. I want to talk to the boy scouts. WALK is my leadership. W is work. A is adjustability, term rather. L is loyalty to subordinates and K is knowledge. Course somebody said, you ought to put that K first except that you can't spell walk that way.

INTERVIEWER: That's right.

GEN HERSHEY: But a guy that will work can damn near get a job with me whether they have anything to do or not. I don't want to put it too high. They guy's got to know something. I've seen more guys getting drunk with what they knew.

INTERVIEWER: What we'll do General Hershey, then, we'll take this information. We'll listen to it. We'll research it, what you've done I'm sure you know the problems involved there, and we'll get out and see a couple of people and then I would say tentatively that our next meeting would be at least in three weeks, three or four weeks, but I will call you.

GEN HERSHEY: It will be on the STD. The only time that I have any idea of being away. . .

INTERVIEWER: Washington's birthday. The 22nd.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, if Mrs. Hershey goes, we'll go on the 21st, get down there the 22nd, stay over until Sunday, and come back on Monday. If she isn't able to go, and that's quite a possibility, I'll probably go

on Saturday and come back on Sunday.

INTERVIEWER: These days will never be critical with us. If you have any plans, no problems. We just. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, of course I tried awful hard to have plans but I, it don't work. . .

INTERVIEWER: One of the things we'd like to do and we'd feel a lot better about it if we had the time and could do a little research on the things that we're going to talk to you about. So we can ask the right questions, you know. If you don't say something that will . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, for your sake, I think you ought to ask the right questions because in the first place, I'm likely to wander on quite a little bit.

INTERVIEWER: That's fine.

GEN HERSHEY: But on the other hand, any time, any worry that you happen to have about using up my time, there's where you can save some time, by not worrying about that.

INTERVIEWER: There are some questions we're going to ask you, you're going to say, oh hell, that's worth nothing. I don't even want to talk about it.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I'm not sure. Sometimes that might. . .

INTERVIEWER: That might be the best answer.

GEN HERSHEY: It's little things sometimes and a hell of a lot more to do. In fact, you know, the big thing is an administration. That's one of the reasons why if you can have your local boards and your state headquarters, it's pretty good. And you take the oars. You don't have to get hit very often. Because so many things down there settle

themselves, and of course one of the things, you gotta take a lot of talk. You got to take every time you can. If there's any possible chance of having him doing something that's quite outstanding and you got to be damn careful about harping about what's wrong. I don't know if you ever knew Billy Wilbur or not.

INTERVIEWER: No, I don't.

GEN HERSHEY: Billy, well, Billy was a guy around teaching in the War College. No, it was at Leavenworth. Billy was over age from what they wanted colonels to be. When the war broke out. He's a kind of funny guy anyway, and he volunteered to go over to, I think, Africa. Course he'd gone to College De'Etaire, which I think gave him some prestige and so they put him, they let him get ashore and of course he proceeded to do just about what Billy would like to do. Billy is one of these guys that liked to handle things right down. He liked to tell the corporal what the hell to do. And so he thought he wanted to go over and try to get a French battery about to fire. He finally knew the captain of it. He'd gone to school with him. So he grabbed the damn tank and the companies were going somewhere else. And we had word to get a hold of this guy, and got a Congressional for it. Course he ought to have been shot for taking the damn--that tank--he was going somewhere. Well, anyway, Billy. . .

INTERVIEWER: Turned around. They turned themselves around to it.

GEN HERSHEY: Yes, but it was true that. . .can I get something for you?

INTERVIEWER: No, it's alright. We're just going to see if our sedan. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Oh, whether it's here. He may not come back for you.

INTERVIEWER: That's what we say. I think the point that comes across,

and I am a firm believer also that simple, you know, simple plans, the person with common sense, just being able to size up a situation without going into a lot of detail, a great deal of plans or what goes on in the world rely heavily on those characteristics and attributes. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, you know we had probably see, we had sixty, in World War II, had 6400 local boards run about 30 some and we had transportation for the veterans as we got on farther. Let's take 3500. There were at least probably anywhere from 7 to 15,000 women that were in the local boards. I know how to be over sold on what the local board clerks did. But that's where, if they were good, you didn't have to worry about a lot of things and if they weren't, there wasn't a damn thing you could do about it here. I still hear from quite a lot of them. I hear from the local boards every once in a while, that wants me to write a letter to one of the clerks who wants to retire and they want to read it over there and so forth.

GEN HERSHEY: But they were a great group. And the loyalty they had, I'm a little prejudiced.

INTERVIEWER: I have read a few books on the subject, general, but loyalty you had for them is brought out in both of them.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, in the first place. . .

INTERVIEWER: I think I can shut this right off.

SECTION 2

Today is the 2nd of May 1975, and we're with General Hershey for our 2nd session in this oral history project.

INTERVIEWER: General Hershey, deferments over time have been based on occupational and dependency status of registrants at the moment of their classification. Now a classification schedule might be said to be a set of rules where somebody could avoid service, by the mere fact that it states the thing for which people can be deferred. I was wondering if you have any comments at all about why we defer qualified registrants at all. Why have we in the past?

GEN HERSHEY: I think the biggest thing is, you can't take everybody at the same time and you have to make some selection. And one of the problems that . . . probably for the first two or three years we found, essentially . . . that it was pretty far back on trying to get ready for war, and one of the biggest competitions we had were the people that had to work, and not only the factors there but those that were going to be there as soon as they could get them built, in building them. So for that reason when . . . I guess we had . . . the first crack, we had about 16 million registrants and you're going to make a call of 10,000 or you're going to make a call over a year of, oh, a million say. And it was a number, 16 million, to pick from. Should you do it blindly, or should you try to use some discretion on leaving some guy someplace where he's doing something, or feel, and let somebody else that wasn't doing anything, if you will. Although that isn't anything great on this selection, but it doesn't always happen and a fellow that can build a good rat trap can necessarily shoot a rifle, or want to shoot a rifle. So the whole basis of deferment

is not because of right or wrong. It's a question of trying to use him theoretically, and I'm not defending the use of it because the Lord knows there's other things. But we do take a feel in that the Armed Forces doesn't use them too well, and after all, you don't have perfection. You're not missing perfection. Now for instance, a fellow came here from Sears and Roebuck and got to be head of the industrial business, and he came from a time when he saw a yard of people wanting to work before the war. And the hardest thing for him to get through his head that we weren't in that condition anymore. He said, "Oh, we lost a lot of men," and then of course the Armed Forces do have to exercise a great deal of choosing whether they will be able to get, so they want to choose the people they want. The only time is, hell, and then it's too late. But the reason you just don't take them blindly one, two, three. . .and there isn't anything, I was reading last night when they've gone through this saying they got all kinds of experts around to draw somebody. That no matter how you draw it, if you draw me first and I don't want to go, it isn't fair. Well, what we've done we've gone on here so we can draw on there, and, of course, you get into the hands of the guys who have been in gambling industry or the guys took a bigger chance. What is figuring chance is the best experience you got, but its lousy. And, of course, when you get into the Armed Forces, one guy gets sent to a place and gets killed before he learns how to load his gun, which was true in World War I, or the other guy, he got sent over here somewhere where he never saw such a happy place.

INTERVIEWER: Are you familiar with the term, channeling?

GEN HERSHEY: Yes. Yes I am.

INTERVIEWER: Could you tell us something about channeling as it relates to deferments?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, channeling obviously is what you do anytime you defer, even if you don't cause it. Where we made a mistake probably to let some of the experts find out we were calling it channeling. In other words, you've got to tell the wife and three kids, and he's working in an airplane factory and the President is jumping up and down saying we gotta have 100,000 planes and you got to have 'em quick and all that sort of stuff, and this guy's been there for three months, and it's not very long, but it's three months longer than the guy that takes his place to get to somewhere else if you can find him. And not only that, he's got three or four kids anyway, and you can channel him into a place where you want him, don't let him run gambling, and somebody that does things that you don't need. You try to channel guys that have other reasons for deferring into the places where you normally defer if you can do that. And some of the states are like Oregon which, of course, smaller deal and they had a fellow up there that was very clever, and he had, as he ran a year or two, had most of the people that were being deferred, deferred probably for two or three reasons all the way from physical disability, a family, and being some use to the industry. But channeling, of course, I don't know, it doesn't strike the right chord in American people's minds. I think they thought that somebody, and it's the hardest thing to have. . . Anytime you let an American think that you're trying to compel him to do something. . . The Declaration of Independence says we're all born free or something. But channeling was done quite a long time before somebody got to talking

about it. I don't know. It was '43 or '44 when they were raising hell about channeling.

INTERVIEWER: In that regard, what were the challenges to channeling?

People were challenging, you know, the term, and the system of channeling.

Do you think the challenge was justified?

GEN HERSHEY: I don't care. If you're going to get into the word channeling I'll say it's unfortunate, because first of all it got associated with compelling an American citizen who was willing to take every privilege that was here. But when it comes to paying anything for it, he was against it. And you can't blame him as an individual, but he's a little shortsighted when he thinks somebody else can keep the thing running and him not participate. Or one the problems you always had with Ph.D.'s, if we took him, the Armed Forces had him on their hands and there wasn't anything in the world they could do that would come anywhere near coming up to the standard of what they thought they could do. And they were lousy as officers or anything else unless they're particularly good. That was not because they got to be a Ph.D., it was because they were good before they got to be one.

INTERVIEWER: Let me ask you a question then, sort of a philosophical question about the mission, the role of Selective Service--it would obviously bring people into uniform. . .

GEN HERSHEY: I wouldn't quite go on that one. . .

INTERVIEWER: That's what I want you to talk about. . .

GEN HERSHEY: I don't like the word management because nowadays we get so we teach a person to manage. He doesn't know half to know to lead.

It bothers me. But just the same, the management of manpower, the taking of the men that can fight him for anybody who can figure it--and I don't want to discount the examination business. But, you always get a few that you wouldn't rather have. Of course, you get into another matter. Some people look so they wouldn't amount to anything, but, when they're trained, they do, and there's nobody that can prophesize that. So the Selective Service system was a manager. Now, the Armed Forces got, they got their choice of years. In other words, the Armed Forces wanted their people generally between about 18 and 26. Well, that's fine but everybody isn't in those ages. But, of course their leaders, and one thing or another, came from others. Now, you get into a place where, of course, the building of the atomic bomb business. They wanted to go around and pick who they'd have and they brought them a check and didn't want to be bothered by it. What the hell do you do? Now again, you take a guy that's only been working at it for six months and there isn't anybody else on earth that has been doing it half that long. What in the hell are you going to do? Take him and put him in the Army and give him a rifle and make him a poor rifleman. I don't know. I think I know what you're going to justify these things by logic. Remember, logic was invented by logicians and logic is all right to the guy who invented the logic. It is sort of a lot of agreement that a lot of people agree to, and logic falls down pretty much over in Vietnam these past two or three weeks.

INTERVIEWER: You're saying then that there is a larger role for Selective Service as it was other than bringing manpower just in military service?

GEN HERSHEY: Oh heavens! In fact, in the first place, Congress was a

little sensitive in the past because it had some experiences in World War I where people were put in the Armed Forces and put off somewhere. No tents, no cots, no nothing. No guns. Hell, I was in a regiment for six or eight months when our rifles were taken away in infantry and we got, oh, three-inch cannons, six or eight months later; got some horses without halters. You could very easily say, what the hell did you have all those people down at Camp Shelby all winter with no place to train and no place to live or anything else. So after all, you can't carry on a war and have everything. So, it is true. You do have to have Armed Forces, but Congress was very sensitive this time. In '40, they passed a law that you couldn't induct anybody unless there was hospital facilities where they're going. And we'd back locomotives into Fort Dix, in order to have heat in the hospital. Not that that's an unusual thing. But just the same, this thing of saying how we're going to fight and we always wait around til the war starts, so nobody much, of any proportion much, is ready to fight and not only that, but when we passed this law, we had to get the Guard brought in without declaring a national emergency because if you didn't bring the Guard in, we didn't have people to run the faces that were going to receive the folks. And we talked about sending a brigade down to the French colonies. If we'd had have, everything else about it had to stop. Now I don't think we were in that shape, now, I don't know.

INTERVIEWER: Another question, General Hershey, is about the draft eligibles. Were the draft eligible aliens, the people that came into our country, brought into the service ahead of the draft eligible American citizens?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, we're talking about two or three different types, because the aliens got along pretty well until '51. In '51 any resident alien was liable for service for that time. A lot of times he wasn't, because we didn't respect our treaties or one thing or another, and the law was passed, not that it amounted to anything because they're nice people to have trouble with. Had a lot of trouble with the Swiss, because the Swiss had a treaty, of 1942 and it was an easy treaty. . .rights on the first basis. They wouldn't let an American serve in their Armed Forces, they wouldn't trust him. And secondly, we didn't have any compulsion. So we said, we'll not take anybody. And they said we'll not take yours. That was in 1942. Well, of course after that law was passed in '51, all these Swiss had been living over here on business and one thing or another, their kids were liable. And they said, you're violating a treaty. You can't do that. And I had the State Department on my hands, course they didn't want to violate a treaty and I don't blame them, they have to live with these people. But on the other hand, this treaty is only handled by one of the legislative bodies, the Senate, and when you pass a law, a treaty, if it's in conflict with the law, it isn't a treaty. The Swiss knew that. I said, "Why don't you denounce our treaties? Oh they had so many other things to do. They were perfectly honest about it. They didn't raise hell about this, because we're being pressured by some of our citizens who are over here, that the law and treaty of 1942. So therefore, the alien after '51, the alien had been ducking and dodging. And you see, the people who we had a treaty who were in the war with us, in theory they served with us either go home or stay with us. We had guys running

grocery stores in New York who were on active duty in some of the Central American countries. Because we couldn't induct the guys already on duty. And we had quite a time with Great Britain. They had a lot of people over here and they didn't want to go back very bad. Of course, they didn't know whether to choose to go home, or take a chance with us. Although most of them would take a chance with us. Hell, guys would jump off the ship, and go and register and volunteer for induction because he had been out on these ships that Norway had been sailing around without any home port for four, five, six, seven years and he didn't think the war was going to last long enough that he'd get out of the training camp. The alien business was always difficult because if the treaty didn't provide for them to be excused and they weren't they were drawn; their numbers were drawn the same as anybody else. And if their number came up first, obviously they went to work for somebody whose number was lower, or if they had no reason to be deferred, they went up before somebody that was sitting around with half a dozen kids. Or have somebody, we had some people who were out in industries so they could make their president, if the president of the damn thing, and get contracts through the government, went through several of those which were always interesting.

INTERVIEWER: In an extension to the alien question, there were allegations that there was a lot of talk about the American middle class being given more deferments than. . .

GEN HERSHEY: There's no question about that because they had the money to do the things. First of all, it was probably a little easier for those kids to get a job in an airplane factory if their dad was one of the vice

presidents or whatever they were. Another thing, of course, was that of the you take the blacks. The blacks, two things operated against them. First of all, the blacks, by and large, weren't going to college. And I didn't think they were in doubt probably about the . . . that we made a mistake deferring people to go to college. But with all of the hubbub was worrying about the scientific thing. Remember, everybody needs some kind of an engineer, so the poor guy who went through what I went through in college didn't pay much attention to him. We could have gotten along probably without liberal arts and we still probably could but I, we could have gotten along with less engineers but there was a demand for engineers. I had, of course, a demand among the scientific world for the Ph.D. and God, and of course I've always said that I had a five-year old child and I wanted to give her a Ph.D. degree because she knew everything that was wrong and she hadn't the slightest idea on how to fix anything.

INTERVIEWER: To follow on to that question that ties in with the type of deferments and some of the problems, another question that comes up is the deferment of conscientious objectors in World War II compared to Vietnam. Was there any difference or the policies or programs any different?

GEN HERSHEY: Oh, I don't think so. Course one thing about it, people hadn't read the Asiatic history like they read European history. We saw that at first. We got that a little on our nose at the time in Korea that probably didn't hit hard enough to really get awake to the fact that when you're fighting in Asia, you're not fighting in Europe. And on the other hand, I don't suppose people go to basketball games quite as much in the summertime as they do in the winter because they had been going all winter.

And the longer you have a war, the more weary the people get of it. Unfortunately, unless things press pretty hard, it takes a little time between wars for another generation to come along that maybe hasn't gotten to some of these things. But there was no question about the fact that the opposition to the war down in Vietnam exceeded anything we had in World War II or even in Korea. Although Korea to me was a little stepping stone, a little warning, I don't think we took very much of that. You see, I don't know. We've got a lot of people in Hawaii that has ancestry in that part of the country. But a lot of places you don't have people in ancestry, should either be against, when we were fighting the Germans or the English and the Irish. The Irish could be with the Germans because they didn't take to the English anyway. Of course some of us, even the Germans, after he came over here, he probably ended up generally fighting rather than not. And I think permissiveness, individualism and I hate to say this because I've always been for it, I'm not so sure that our organized education has now always done really, if you got a lot of people thinking that they're too damn valuable to do anything except use something that somebody else furnished them. I hate to say that, but all those instances had something to do on Vietnam. Course another thing, I don't want to be the Senator from Arizona. But, when you start out fighting a war and having well, two things. First of all, you act as though you don't go in so far. And a fellow that doesn't have much brains doesn't understand when you're trying to do something. When you try to do something if you don't do it. I think it's hard to build a spirit of fighting to beat hell and then let him shoot you. Course the next thing is we got communications that a

fellow will sit here and tries to tell somebody out there. I had a kid that had a regiment, the Marines. About a month or so before we took them back to Okinawa and he sent word that he was going, but don't let anybody know it. That's alright. Next thing, cease aggressive patrolling. Now if that's all you get from the rear, you better abolish your rear. Because that might make them. . .course it's probably been in the Hanoi paper before he heard about it. But anyway, they told him, no aggressive patrolling and, of course, he got to be nearly killed one time in Korea because somebody got into the bunker and obviously, I think, probably would have been tried before he ceased. But the idea of it, somebody behind trying to tell somebody not only what to do--God knows he should--but never how. If he hasn't got him trained, he's in a hell of a shape. Having got him trained, he does what he wants to do and lets him do it. And that applies just as much to Selective Service System as it does to anything else.

INTERVIEWER: In tying this together, General Hershey, especially on the conscientious objector, you know, this was a big program in the Army and you had the same problem, I'm sure. But what I was getting at was this sincerity or the validity of the attitudes of conscientious objection. And the best example, I think, of a man who dispelled the idea was Sergeant Alvin York in World War I where he was alleged to have been a conscientious objector and he felt. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well he was one of those mountain religions.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, mountain religions.

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah. But you see, religion has quite a time when it's shoot or get shot. I'm pretty favorable to all religions, try to be. Sort of

have to look at it that way. But to talk about sincerity, when a fella can mouth off without bothering him or costing him anything. You don't have no measure of his sincerity. Now, I have seen a lot of CO's (Conscientious Objectors). I don't know how many I'd like to say that I think had badly been shot, even when it was necessary, but under no circumstances did they take anybody else's life. There's damn few of them. And these guys that ran off, there were of course a lot of that. The media has a lot to do with it. Hell, we had more stuff in about how to run off and go to Canada than you did about how to get to Vietnam. But I am, I have a lot of sympathy for CO's (Conscientious Objectors). I have a lot of sympathy for people that let shine their religion that I doubt a little bit whether they are or not.

INTERVIEWER: I have another question, the issue of the inequity that existed in terms of probability of service, would a man serve. What is the probability I would serve as opposed to another person? One of the books I read said that the quota base, that was their term, and I think it translates to a call being given to a state, the quota base upon which calls were made is based on the number of men in 1-A in that state.

GEN HERSHEY: Near as you can estimate it. Two months ahead of time.

INTERVIEWER: And this author said that, made the point that the upper middle class had many more people in college and hence proportionally a smaller base, upon which to receive a call. I mean, you made the point then that a non-college man either living in that middle class state or outside, had a higher probability of going in the Army than a person who was in college that could be deferred.

GEN HERSHEY: You're saying that they got out of. . .

INTERVIEWER: What he was saying was. . .

GEN HERSHEY: They had a hell of a lot lower percentage of people in.

INTERVIEWER: He was saying that the inequity was in the deferment policy as opposed to the allocation of quota policies. I just wondered. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, there's no question about it. I would be the first to admit that any time a man has to go as far as he is concerned, it's inequity. But on the other hand, that isn't the problem. The problem is, all right. Alright, it's bad. Now alright brother, you tell how would you do it? And, of course, he isn't there then. That's one of the reasons we had local board members that didn't get any pay. Because when they caught hell, all they said, you know, there's going to be a vacancy on board. We're gonna recommend you for it and you never see the guy again. I don't know what you do. When you get into percentages, you're in trouble. This guy, he needed school. The more people that are deferred, the quicker they'll get to him. No question about that. But the more people that are deferred and the quicker you get to him, the quicker the supply he's in and he drops it and then you go through your deferments again, too. Of course the fellow who, well, Ernie Harmon, when he was up around that place where they landed trying to have armor. You know, you just let it just stand still as a fixed position. And he went down to one of the cities that were still being used and he thought Christ, he couldn't get through the town because of the soldiers. And of course they needed him very badly, he thought, up there where they were penned in, but again, inequity that comes with it, and somebody says, "Why don't you send out

everybody on patrol the same day?" I don't know what the answer is. Of course they aren't there, they aren't trained, and they aren't a lot of things. But the fellas who were kicking for the middle class folks, probably never worried quite as much about it as I should've because in the first place, they are people that are getting more proportionally out of this civilization, they're messing around with than these poor bastards, because one reason the boys in college cause you got me and this poor black, hell he didn't get through the third grade. Course one thing or another.

INTERVIEWER: Can I ask a follow on question to that?

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: Since calls were issued by state. . .

GEN HERSHEY: The calls to the individuals were issued by the state.

INTERVIEWER: Could you relate to us any cases where you thought a particular state was dogging it and not building up their manpower pools. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, of course that's obviously that's a continual thing. Of course that's what you got to, your studying their statistics and that's why you got a fellow out there, as a field officer, who has no authority but he has a hell of a lot of other things. But, I don't doubt that there were a lot of efforts made to do something. But, my feeling is, that where you go in America to get some satisfaction of people that are willing to do something, is out where they live. And I talked to states always, who reacted very quickly, to the fact that some other state looks like they're doing more than you are. I'd be a little careful about saying that because it had to be so. It's the hardest thing in the world to know what to do when Massachusetts, and they're one hell of a long ways from

there now, but Massachusetts at one time had a greater percentage of the people within the ages, we were taking, that was only out of one other state and that was Nevada. And there's some reasons. Nevada had more men. Now they had 57 percent of the people within a certain age group that were in Massachusetts. South Carolina had 35 percent. South Carolina had taken married whites a long time before Massachusetts. A fellow that knows all about figures, figured it out. But why? Well, first of all, the rejection rate of Negroes down there was around 90 percent, but they were part of the population. And, of course, if you take him out of 1-A, but on the other hand, blacks went through 1-A's down South Carolina awful fast. And of course, we had as part of that time, black calls and they were caught both ways. They couldn't get either 1-A and after they had gotten 1-A, you couldn't get them to give you a black call. The Armed Forces had all the blacks they wanted but there is so many things get in the statistics. In fact, my chief staff takes a great joy, he was with me for many and many a year and, of course, it was his business to find lies that we could get somebody to agree on.

INTERVIEWER: Some other questions that come up. If you would comment upon the changing relationship with the press, your relationship or Selective Service with the press, as you saw it from the period of World War II to the war in Vietnam, and if there's a change, comment on it.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, there was a great change, but in the first place, we never went out and tried to do anything to the press except inform. We never tried to prosecute. Because after all, I probably felt that such a service is one thing, but you better watch out. I'm getting too much

publicity people. Publicity people are great people, but they're primary publicity, and a lot of things they do don't make any sense which the Vietnamese war proved very well. Because there you had the press without reservation and could do about anything they want. In World War the press is going to reflect a lot of what people want to read. I don't know why I'm reading both at the present time or the New York Times either, and I've known both of them when they were newspapers. They haven't been for a good many years. Well, it's just so. And why? And I don't blame them. I don't think they're stupid. The people are stupid like I read the damn thing. If nobody read it, you'd have a different paper. So the situation changed materially, there's no question about that. But the fellow would probably have been maybe locked up in World War II as being a traitor if he had gone, oh, a 10th of the way, that the great whole mess be enough. I enjoy it. I don't happen to believe that all the people acted like the people did that got in the papers, but the paper is never going to say that John Smith and his wife sat down this morning and had a wonderful breakfast and was very kind to each other and so forth. If she threw a potato masher at him and he stabbed her with a knife, then he would make the papers. And therefore, these kids, I ran around quite a bit at the colleges and used to have rather found them interesting, the guys thinking his cutting the mustard by getting up and saying, "I'd kill you if you weren't so old." Well, you don't have to be very scared with a guy like that. First of all, he covered. He said, if you're not so old, he didn't make any threat. He made a threat to a guy like I was who was much older. Now that kid remembers that as one of the things he really did. And when you've got

that sort of a situation now, when you expect the press to go to print and especially the press probably was anti-war. Most of them, of course, they varied, a great many of them weren't that way. But most of the time they couldn't yell loud enough to be heard.

INTERVIEWER: That's right. You brought up some points there that the anti-war feeling in World War II wasn't as anti-war as I think in the Vietnam or Korean War. I think that's right from Korea onward. . .

GEN HERSHEY: I don't think there's any question. And it seems farther away and it's a lot harder. Now, for instance, I worried around here in summer of 1940 when we were trying to get this law passed. If it had been London, there would have been no problem getting the law passed. They'd been bombed every night or so. And we used to tell a story about the old lady that used to run around and watch while they were digging in the debris of her apartment and getting the kids and everything out. They finally said, "Is your husband down there yet? Oh no, that coward's in the Army!" But it is true, that our problem of getting people to go to war in World War II was much different than the English because you didn't have to tell the English that you have a war on. And the people who were losing the losses, and we had the damndest time trying to get people to publish the names of the people that got killed when the war first started. They didn't want, first of all, they'd send the word to this poor old mother or sister or father or something, of the losses, these losses, but don't let the public find out. They might. . .

INTERVIEWER: Do you think at the time, in World War II would the press or the society demand as much openness, you know?

GEN HERSHEY: It wouldn't have made any difference if they had, they wouldn't have gotten it because people wouldn't have thought much about it, because, they were pretty tight on news. You didn't go tell anything, you didn't go out and take a lot of pictures and send them back, and show what happened the other day. After all, when you go to restricting the news then you're interfering with somebody, and God help us if you have one guy. Robinson Crusoe can do all these things he wanted to do because he's the only guy living on the island and if he got killed, he got killed. But just as soon as you got any kind of a society where a lot of people are in it, and if they don't all get in it, the first thing you know you're getting some people just driving away and unfortunately the young. Who was the guy that said, "Women and children first and old men"? They're the ones that get off on those ships that are going to sink and leave the youngsters. But unfortunately, the kids are about the only ones that have got some of the things you got to have and are young enough to learn some of the things they have to learn. I don't know what you do about it.

INTERVIEWER: Well, there is just a follow-on to this. There's a comment the other evening I heard, when former director, CIA, Helms, was questioned about the assassination attempts, supposedly of certain leaders. And his comment was, and he was very terse about it, and he said, "I don't know what interest the American public have in this type of thing. They're not going to get involved so why is it of interest to them?"

GEN HERSHEY: Well, that wasn't a wise thing to say, but on the other hand, if the public is going to monitor CIA and FBI and a lot of other things, I don't know how long it will last, but you just, hell, a share of

us, I started out as a deputy sheriff, there's something he doesn't go blabbing around to everybody. And one of the things I am proud of in the world, is that I had a bunch of women as local board clerks, and there were people dying to find out who got turned down because he was a homosexual. I never had a leak that ever got so I knew about it, because I had the homosexuals on my hand wanting to have me bring all the homosexual records in here and sit on them, so that the public wouldn't be finding out they're homosexuals. And I said, "Okay, when you bring me one leak, I'll consider it." He never came back.

INTERVIEWER: And finally in this question, because this is very sensitive about the press, did you find yourself when you were the director of Selective Service in World War II, say in the period 1940 to 1950, were you really hounded by the press saying, "General Hershey, how about this?" "Would you tell us this," or "We're trying to get this," with a lot of people around? As you noticed.

GEN HERSHEY: No.

INTERVIEWER: Had you noticed, say in the 1960's, you know. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, in the 60's, late 60's, yeah. Probably 65, 66 along til I left. Course they were hounding anytime they could get anything. I never had many press conferences, but when I went out of town, I got pretty good exposure, and of course, you went into, take a thousand college kids and everybody asking questions, and anybody that wants to write up something can get something out of that all right.

INTERVIEWER: But just by the comparison, then you would say that the difference in the times, the attitudes and both the public and the

restraints placed upon the people. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Don't think there is a question about it. But, of course, that's now a question. . .have we gotten our disease so deep that it's in the bone and one thing or another, we can't come out of it. I happen to be an optimist, but everybody gives me two ratings. First, you're a damn fool because nobody but a fool could be an optimist which is all right. I'll buy that. And then the next thing is, what do you base your optimism on? And I'll say, "Faith," because there's not anything else that you can base it on. You got to have faith in your people. And I think there's a hell of a lot of good people in this country yet. I just get out where I could see them. And, of course, one thing about it, a lot of these places aren't all steamed up like they were around the college. Course they had nothing to do but get steamed up. If he'd been studying a little bit more, and of course I had some of the responsibility for that. Because I was the one that made it possible for them to have Ph.D.'s, who had escaped, and therefore, of course, they didn't teach escapism, whether he tried to or not. Well, hell, and I always worried when we got somebody that came into our organization that never had any service. The next fellow I worried about is the guy that had service, worried about him more, worried about him more if he'd had service and it was not what he thought that he was capable of, and obviously, I often used some of his examples, very fond of Arthur Fleming. Knew him very well, both when he was civil service, after he was in the cabinet, and a lot of other times. But, I never expected him to be able to look a fellow going in the service without drawing a sigh, because he'd never gone. And asking a guy to

rise above himself, I oft lived with him and negotiated with him. Got along all right, but on the other hand, I never figured that he'd understand. He might give a lot of words about what a wonderful thing it is to go out, you know, bear your chest and die and so forth. There were some reservations, I mean, he didn't have quite the attitude that some guys had that lived through some times.

INTERVIEWER: I have a question on the, back in the Civil War and perhaps other times in our country's history is possible for a man to buy his way out of going in the Army, buy his way out after he got in? Well, looking at it on the front end of buying your way or paying somebody else to go for you, do you see any possible way that in the future, in a popular war or an unpopular one like Vietnam, that we might have that provision in a Selective Service System again?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, of course I would start out by saying that I certainly hope not. But because in the first place, he wasn't even a very successful man. I still, remember, we had a hell of a time in the North and the South, the draft, during the Civil War. But the draft was never a very good means of raising men because of the fact that you had so many ways to get out of the thing. And not only that, even the enlistment business. Guys would enlist to keep from being drafted. And they started out by sending you over somewhere. Well, you didn't come. Same way with guys buying out. You remember the buying out only bought out for that time, and if you got honked up the next time, you had, and the bounty business. You had bounty jumpers running all over the country. It got so funny they tried to take the veterans that were back and hadn't been discharged yet,

that were lame and home, and put these guys in chains, and the ones that had enlisted under the bounty, and start taking them somewhere and they had to walk and then tried to put them in jail at nights, and they killed each other to get the money, the bonus money the other guys got. I mean, and the hell of it was they weren't getting very many people. I don't know how many they got but they didn't get very many. And therefore I wouldn't want to say what somebody might do because, you have to make a computer so that the computer will take the money as well as, that's what frightens me more than anything else, is what I'm afraid they're trying to do with the computer of the Selective Service System. I think they're trying to get the thing so it will handle, you merely send in the registration and when the time comes, you set the crank, and it notifies, I don't know who they're going to notify, if they notify the guy, he may not get it. And another thing is, you take from the people the war that you want them to keep, take their fighting, and just as sure as you let birds get up in the high places and they start asking a guy to wear headset until each guy, from now on. He said, "Somebody is shooting at us." I said, "That's all right. We're watching it. We'll let you know when you're supposed to shoot back." Ernie Harmon used to come over and tell me when he informed the constabulary, about how the Russians were taking it those days after peace was supposed to be on, that the Russians, poor officers, would also be worrying about the Commissar, and when he'd go off said, "Now the son of a bitch is gone," we could talk. And I thought, we could lick the bastards if they'll have to go back to Moscow, to find out what they do, but Christ after Vietnam, I'm not so sure. I'm more afraid of lack of decentralization, and the lack of trusting somebody, that's right, of course a lot of that is back

of what is going on. Because you're trying to have a smart way of doing something that just about got addicted. You still better wash them off before you put them in, because they wash much easier before you put them in then they do after you let them dry off.

INTERVIEWER: To tie in slightly to some of these questions here. In reading one of the books, The End of the Draft, the title of the book, was written by Thomas Reeves. Anyway, you were quoted in one of your addresses to the Press Club, you were quoted as saying that you needed to think of the day, you hated to think of the day when your grandchildren would be defended by volunteers and I just was wondering about your ideas. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, the idea was. . .of course, I'm not quarreling. You, probably for convenience, maybe because you're better. I don't know. But there's no use talking about, even in a democracy, if you're either going to hire somebody to defend you, or you're going to have him support. Now I happened to have lived under the draft, and a lot of people, because when I was a captain, most of the people we got were drafted by the fact that they had no money. They couldn't get a job anywhere else and they were just driven in. Now days some people say to me, "We're not bothered very much I guess by the college people in the services." And I said, "Hell, when I was a captain I never saw a college graduate, and that damn few had ever been near and when I got to be in high school two years, I moved him in the office immediately. Because generally he could write. No, there isn't anything about the volunteer that hurts my feelings at all, but on the other hand, who is here, gonna pick out to keep you alive? Is that your business or do we delegate it to somebody? And, of course,

I was thinking, course that was during wartime, I was thinking of any-time you got more than two or three million in. . .I haven't seen the time that you could get three million in, somewhere between three and five is about where I'd say you're mobilizing on. But at the present time, until things got pretty damn rough, because all of the bribery of getting people to enlist, and I don't know much about it. I have got a grandson by the fact that he married one of my granddaughters that's in the service now. The boy had gone to Vietnam and came back and got out. The West Coast wasn't a good place to do much, and the recruiter comes along and said, "If you enlist the next two months, you can enlist in your grade," which was sergeant. He said, Well, unfortunately I had gotten married in the mean-time. "\$137.00 a month for your wife, sergeant." Well, now, he volunteers? Well, there's your life. It's not easy now days to get in officer's training. And he got commissioned. I don't know how long he can hold it, because he's a high school graduate. But he went through high school and Vietnam, and he has, he's had jump school since he got commissioned, and started Ranger and got a blister on his foot and they kicked him out. But he was signed up for flight training and they sent him to an earlier time of flight training. And the kid'll work and he has a reasonable sense, and he knows that other people know some things. But on the other hand, the volunteer business. I don't know just what, the one thing about it, we're gonna get caught, if we aren't awfully careful about, if we make up our minds, whether we want a few people and a very high rate or not so many because when you get 55 or 60 percent of your money paying people, you're going to be in a hell of a fix to do any research, gonna be in a hell of a fix to get anything from the. . .I was around in the Armed Forces quite a while but

they never gave me a gun. And that's not particularly satisfactory. So, the volunteer business, this was during the war, but I wouldn't kick. . .advise that you put in any time we got to get three or four million people.

INTERVIEWER: This, you know, this statement many times has often happened to be just taken out of context.

GEN HERSHEY: Oh sure.

INTERVIEWER: This was just stated and I was just kind of curious whether you felt you already hit on a lot of points that, you know, the money for personnel versus R&D and other aspects of the military requirements.

GEN HERSHEY: Yes, all the things out of an organization, I always try to keep in the organization thinking they're in it and to be in it, they have to do something. And the volunteer, it's all right for him, before everybody else it's ho-hum, they're looking after it at the present time. A lot of the boys who belong to this middle class we worry about, especially our middle class, are probably neither going to college, and they're pretty damn careful during the war. . .because it's a mistake, and I'm not so sure always you escape mistakes.

INTERVIEWER: Do you think that our pay scales are too high now? Do you think there are too many benefits or do you think there aren't enough?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, which one are you talking to? Me or thee?

INTERVIEWER: I'm talking about. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well you see the the trouble from the standpoint of what I get out of it, or you get out of it, I would think that's good. But

on the other hand, when you look into this thing of trying to compare what you got in the Armed Forces, once somebody gets outside, it's just damn nonsense anyway because there's so many things out there that he gets that you don't get. He's got some things that he got yesterday and today he's laid off, and, of course, I was at Leavenworth and trying to go to school, two years that were pretty deep in the depression. And God, I knew a lot of guys that had been in 28, 27 or 28 that didn't even speak to me. And by 31 he wanted to borrow money. And he really did. I mean he was hungry. And the guy selling apples on the streets. So, everything is comparable when you go to the grocery now, there's no question about the salary doesn't seem too high, but the guy who goes to the grocery that hasn't got any salary. And of course he's been coming along now getting the benefits of the guys that's not working. Of course that's one of the things the recruiter has got up against. When the benefits are low, a guy said, how much you paying? Well let's see, that's a little more than I got but it isn't enough. I'm getting, you try to hire a guy to mow the damn lawn. Well, I don't mow lawns. All right, I do.

INTERVIEWER: What your saying then is, it's one of the issues that I want to get at, General Hershey, in that particular point about the volunteers, and that is, you've already said is how do you compare a man in the service to a civilian, and unfortunately, in my judgment, we've gotten into that rut.

GEN HERSHEY: What we got into the rut when our salaries outside were up. And we wanted to be up with them and we sure as hell don't want

to go back down when they go down, but I'm not so sure that, well, you got a choice. You either go down, or you don't have so many. And Lord knows, I'm not, I don't see how. . . I sleep pretty good nights anyway. But if I didn't, I'd be pretty damn well awake by the amount of time, and of course, I'm not as worried as much about our numbers as I am our attitude, because I happen to be a little cocked over on the psychological side. And, if you don't consider that. . . Now of course, a lot of people were worrying about how everything went to hell so quick over in Vietnam. If they had studied a few of the times that troops hadn't eaten or fled or have a lot of things. It's a very fine point. First, you've got an army and the next thing you haven't got anything. And they sure as hell gave up a lot of the hilt over there awfully quick. But the thing that was dangerous was not what they gave up but the attitude that caused them to do it. Because if they gave up that, hell, why fight? Down here, we're so far away we can't fight successfully. So I worried a great deal more about the public's attitude and the idea they probably tried to bring up our kids so they wouldn't have as hard as we did. I don't know. The attitude, and that's one thing that's going to govern what the press says, and of course all this with Watergate business. Probably a little more of it, and it's on different scale, because money isn't worth as much as it used to be. But they didn't think anything had happened there. Probably you could go back. I'm reading the 80's now, in a book, hell, I don't think, they wouldn't think we were so damn clever even if you got caught. Around election when I was a kid, there used to be people around that had

dollar bills just outside the polls but how the hell, you know, a guy voted. . .course you found out after they added up and it didn't add up. You knew you hadn't voted, but it was a little late to find it out then. And yet they were giving him dollar bills, and I would never give enough to the fact that the election of 1960 was stolen. I think it was stolen in two places, Texas and Illinois. Somebody the other day said, and they asked the mayor of Chicago how to handle some of these things. I'm very fond of the old guy because one thing, he ran a tight shop. I didn't like the way he ran it, but he ran it, and even when he was so old that we couldn't beat him. But just the same, there's probably a lot of things. Maybe he didn't use as much money. Maybe he didn't have to. He might have been smarter. I don't think these guys that were running the campaign in 72 were smart. Of course, I'm coming up post but on the other hand, I didn't think at the time it was smart to run a President and forget you had a party. You see, I was brought up in the party system.

INTERVIEWER: So what you're saying in all these things that you've said, is not so much of a volunteer against a concriptee, but just the attitude of the individual. You can have an attitude. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, the attitude towards the group. Now I happened to fool around in quite a lot of things that are volunteer--Boy Scouts, Red Cross--and we got a Canadian organization, but that would be volunteer anyway. But Red Cross, I think a lot of people do a lot of things, and yet they're suffering now. Everybody is trying to get the government to take care of the veterans around in the neighborhood,

trying to get the government to take care of the families of the soldiers. You see, in this county with a Navy base over here. I had 16 years as chairman of Red Cross here. You had a lot of families and the people you ought to look after were the people that lived there. Because they're doing a much better job than the government. Oh, the government first of all, you have more people to take care of and then you get them taken care of. You're taking care of some people that way. But. . .

INTERVIEWER: I'd like to take you back in time, General, 18th of November 1940 when the first peacetime draft began.

GEN HERSHEY: 18th of November? In 1940. That was the first call?

INTERVIEWER: Right. You recall that that draft was limited in scope somewhat. Some of the. . .

GEN HERSHEY: 10,000 or 20,000, something like that.

INTERVIEWER: Well, you could not take in more than 900,000 into training. Not more than 12 months tour.

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: No fighting outside the western hemisphere. No group deferments or substitutions.

GEN HERSHEY: No what?

INTERVIEWER: No group deferments.

GEN HERSHEY: Oh no, well. Got a, that of course got legislation from that. You've got both in World War I and try to not get into the Civil War was. . .

INTERVIEWER: The last thing was that, the first time National Headquarters of Selective Service ran the show and not the Army.

GEN HERSHEY: They did what?

INTERVIEWER: You were running the show. You were in charge. National Headquarters was in existence and it wasn't the Army Provost Marshal that was drafting people, as had been done in previous years for the first time.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, wait a minute. Oh, you mean in World War I?

INTERVIEWER: World War II.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, when did the Army draft people in World War II?

INTERVIEWER: No, they did not. I'm saying Selective Service did.

GEN HERSHEY: Yes. That's right.

INTERVIEWER: Those were a lot of stipulations that were put into the draft and I was wondering if you could go back in your memory and maybe develop for us any issues that were. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Why they were?

INTERVIEWER: Yeah.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, if you take them one at a time I think I can.

Because in the first place, when I joined this thing in '36, they had been working some since '27 on a draft law. In fact, we had quite a lot of lawyers on the original planners and, most, the lawyers, of course, he wants a law and you have to have that first, there's no question about that. On the other hand, I very early got the place around these lawyers about arguing over some little point, but I used to say to them, "Well, we're going to have six thousand or so local boards and they may have lawyers but they may be good, bad, or indifferent. And if you people are arguing that much about something you've written, for Christ's sake

throw it away and write something else that you both agree on. Because if you people who know so much about it can't agree on what the hell you said, why do you pick some guy way off here in the country and he's got to get the people. So, this law, we had quite a lot of laws that was mussed around with, I mussed around for four years and some of the others spent nine years messing with it. And most anything you'll find there you'll find something even in the Civil War, which was the greatest source I was thinking not to do. Because there was an old man who was head of the draft in Illinois, a lieutenant colonel, that wrote in about two, three, four pages one of the finest things that ever got out on, "What the hell not to do," and I think first of all no bonus, what are some of these other things, that you had mentioned there?

INTERVIEWER: Twelve month tour only.

GEN HERSHEY: Hmm?

INTERVIEWER: Twelve month tour only.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, that's another matter. That was a compromise. In the first place, the Armed Forces would like to have two or three years.

INTERVIEWER: Well, what I'm really asking of you is, can you think back, what were some, here we are the year before Pearl Harbor, at the time of draft law.

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: Can you think back to some of the issues involved and try to get a draft that all. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Oh yes. Of course the big issue was, why the hell, why

don't you go out and recruit people and not try to pester everybody? And of course the next thing was, it's unfair to make people serve. We had a lot of people in the Congress that felt, we hadn't had a draft, course it's 20's, 18's, and the people were against the draft. In the first place, they didn't want to get into war. There was no question about that. And they, some of the members of Congress had been in World War I. Some of them had been enlisted men somewhere and they weren't very happy about some of the people that they thought tried to absorb all their obligations and so forth and give them hell. And not only that, they had somebody that had been sick in a tent without any cot or something and therefore you got in the law that you had to have bed space where you sent this soldier or you couldn't take him, and you had all that. But one of the things, when you give me a law that's very hard to his view, you just find yourself hanging all the time with a lot of things that you don't want. But do you want the law?

INTERVIEWER: Well, let me ask a question like this. Was then, probably then Lieutenant Colonel Hershey involved in trying to show the need for having an active draft at that point in time?

GEN HERSHEY: Oh yeah. And here's the way we started out. Stimson came over and told him we had to have men. Marshall came over and told him he had to have men, but gave him a little more idea of what the hell he was going to do with them. And then Shedd who was G-1 at that time, and of course, I guess you people are old enough maybe you remember that they were G-1's, Shedd came up and gave them the detail of what the Army needs. My job was to pick it up there and show how to get what these

other guys had been up, Shedd and, I don't think Marshall got. . .he knew better than to stay three years because he knew he'd scare them off. But they're talking, too. But we got given back to 18 and eventually got driven back to 12. But on the other hand, we did have a million men under arms when Pearl Harbor come, haven't started any other war I know of when you had that many, so you do have to compromise, and compromises on all sorts of things are CO's. CO's didn't have a lot of strength but they had some. And they were up there. Course, they were trying to see, and they were talking about mostly in those days the Brethren in Christ, Mennonites and the Quakers. Because in World War I, a man that was just against the war had no damn reason why he shouldn't goin. He had to belong to a peace church. And, personally I never thought that was quite fair. I'm told by a CO that I've known and I'm going to see some of them on the 19th of this month. I told them many times that they were getting grace, they were get to thinking in the wrong damn minute they were entitled to it. No great country maybe should not do that sort of thing, but anytime you get so it's tough going on, just can't fool around with people that won't carry their part of the load. But it was easier with the number of people we had to try to get them something. And one of the problems that obviously we tried to get them to do was get them far away as we could from home. Although the Congress didn't do me much good. I had, not long, about 30 I guess, on a boat going to China, to drive ambulances over there. And the Armed Forces went along with us, the Army did. And when somebody raised hell around, they hit me in the Appropriations Committee,

one of the committees that I worked with. I had to bring them back, because they didn't want any of them to get away, where the one thing where we sent them. I could send the CO to hell and gonna send him, because in the first place, to get him away from home so he can't be around his folks. You've solved part of your problem, because that's the big reason the other folks around the neighborhood says, how come your kids never leave the country? And if you can get him gone, the farther the better but if we didn't make it. So the CO did come in and I don't believe that unless we'd have done something for him. Because remember, even in colonial days they let them haul stuff instead of going in the militia. I mean, there's nothing new, and of course this thing of saying we've always done that isn't any argument. But it's a pretty good, you overcome some of the things. And so we had, oh, I've said many times that every time they bombed London we gained a vote or two in the House or the Senate. Because somebody begin to realize that there was trouble in the world. I went up one time to. . .this was Yale, had quite a meeting up there of ROTC and a fellow later who became Secretary of State was up there oh, under Truman. And, he got up and said, I just came back from London and when I arrived in Washington, I just couldn't imagine that people could be as, about normal affairs, as they are and he said, I found as much difference between Yale and Washington as there was between Washington and London. So you could see, he though it was pretty peaceful up there. . .what the hell you trying to interfere with things that are going on. So the legislation was, you had all the guys who wanted a lot or none. But legislation is always a compromise. And

the only thing you can possibly do is to try to get, first of all, something. And we did get a draft. It wasn't easy, but it took all summer. And they, in fact, I give Lodge odds, that is young Lodge, one of our Senators quite a bit, he was speaking one day on a bill and he said, "I understand that they can't draft anybody for three or four months, because you just can't get ready that quick." And we sent a guy down on the floor and told him that we're still staying 60 days from the date of the past issues of the Act. And, he listened to the guy and said, "I want to withdraw what I'm saying on this amendment at a 90-day prohibition on inducting anybody. You see, we passed a law which says you can't use it for 90 days." He said, "I changed my mind, they tell me to do it in 60 and therefore I'll not support this amendment and so there was a senator from Connecticut that had to build an amendment to hold off the draft for 90 days at. . .I mean, you had all sorts of things that people put in if they could get them in. They would try and keep you from operating.

INTERVIEWER: Can you speak to the question of what were the main obstacles to be overcome in order to get a draft?

GEN HERSHEY: Most everybody. Well, well the need, yes and not only that. You see they told each other for a lot of centuries, couple of centuries anyway. There's still a lot of people who say, we've never had a draft except in wartime which is a damn lie because there was 618 laws passed in the colonies before we ever got to be a nation, compelling, at the fact that the state compelled them and not the nation. What the hell difference does it make the poor guy that had to go? But still,

you'll find people now said that well, you've got to have war. In fact, in a lot of our planning, we figured you'd probably have to have something overt. You had to. . .everybody tried to take the last war as a basis for what you do in this war. In '17, we declared war before we passed the law. And therefore we were at war although, and I lived through those days and somebody said oh well, we'll send the Regular Army over maybe. Of course, the Navy probably, they could look at them. We did the same damn thing in Korea. Well, you know, I think the air can take care of it. By then, let's let the Navy to go and then of course when Korea got still worse, and then let's send over a bobtail battalion and let them get into trouble. So, I think the feeling, a. . .that a lot of folks out there, war is a long way off. What the hell we worrying about it? And they figured, we don't need a war and there's a lot of people, see, Bill Bryan, he's been dead a while maybe, but a million men would spring to arms over night when they know there's a danger. And I think that's true, except the canker is when they know.

INTERVIEWER: When do they know? I'll toss another one out here, General Hershey. The question that comes up now, is going back to when the Selective Service was changing from under Department of Labor to Department of War and vice versa.

GEN HERSHEY: Wait a minute. . .

INTERVIEWER: What are the problems is what I'm saying?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, are you talking about what is talked about?

INTERVIEWER: Yeah. This in fact in. . .

GEN HERSHEY: '41, let's see, '41 and Pearl Harbor '42.

INTERVIEWER: '42, '43.

GEN HERSHEY: '42 when we transferred under.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

INTERVIEWER: What I was getting at is, what were the problems that were different from the Selective Service standpoint when you operated under Department of War versus the Department of Labor?

GEN HERSHEY: Wait a minute, we were never under the Department of the Army.

INTERVIEWER: Department of War.

GEN HERSHEY: The President, you mean?

INTERVIEWER: Yes, in other words, the supervision. You were under the supervision or control, weren't you, by Department of War?

GEN HERSHEY: The President.

INTERVIEWER: No?

GEN HERSHEY: First of all, you didn't have the Department. You had the War Department but, of course, the Navy was getting men, too, and we were an independent agency until we got hooked into the department. The manpower. . .

INTERVIEWER: The labor. Yes.

GEN HERSHEY: No, we never were under Labor.

INTERVIEWER: So what was the relationship then, maybe I'm misinformed.

GEN HERSHEY: When do you want to hear? In 40?

INTERVIEWER: In the '40 or '42.

GEN HERSHEY: There's no question about, I don't want to be very

independent around either General Marshall or old man Stimson. Because after all, I suppose I recognized them as my boss. But neither one of them ever tried to tell me what to do. Summerfield came close to it, but he didn't bother me much. And that was when he wanted to draft certain people to decode, but he wanted to go out and pick them out no matter what age they were and of course they had no law or anything and there wasn't any problem about that. But, we obviously, before we got a law, I was in a planning agency in the Department of. . .it was the War Department, and it had its understanding through a committee with the Navy. After we got the bill, and after the President, by Executive Order, created the System, we still had no head. Some people said we never got one. But that is a little bit debatable. But anyway, he issued an order saying that Lieutenant Colonel Hershey will have the right to carry out all the duties under a certain article which shows our own damn business. The only thing that the Secretary of War could do, or had to do, on the strikes. He could declare somebody this and that, and we would have to try to induct him, but we'd have to try to induct him. So the next day after the registration, Dykstra was out there, and then, he was the Director. And I, after a while, was Deputy. And during those times we were independent. And we dealt directly with the White House, and in fact when we were getting these regulations ready to have the President sign them. And of course you had the Labor Union and everybody else raising hell around. But they didn't bother by that time. They were bothering the Department of the Army unless they were trying to line them up to cut our throats a little or

or something. But by and large, they did and we were dealing straight with them (White House). Of course, everybody said this manpower management is a big problem as the industry does, and therefore, it ought to be when the forms, when the War Manpower Commission because I was under Paul McNutt. And we went on and along the summer of '43, I guess '42 to '43, that was the, what is it, the Bible talks about the people living on. . .they took them to Egypt. Anyway, this was during the bondage time. And although, we never got bothered much, our relationship with the Department, with the War Manpower Commission in a lot of ways, was not very different. I didn't sit at the big table, I sat back with the staff when they had meetings. But, I went to Paul McNutt and I knew him while we were both Hoosiers although he had never known me much as a Hoosier, and I hadn't known him. And I went to him and said, well we got to live together, and there's not much problem with me. I don't know if there is with you. In the first place, I will not transmit any order from you for classification. I will not tell anybody to classify somebody the way you want them classified because I don't have the authority, and you don't have it. It's in the law. But you might sometime think maybe you'll have it. And I said, there's one thing I do want you to know, probably know it anyway. I happen to be blind in one eye and I can retire any Goddamn time I want to. I said, Christ I could. And that's the way we lived. Now, still we didn't like it. So we had a lot of people over on the Hill who didn't like it either. And we started working around and Senator Bailey, who was from

North Carolina, was on the Armed Forces Committee and we had several people over in the House. And we got legislation which took us out from under the War Manpower Commission. Now, I don't know anything about what the President thought about it. He signed the damn bill which made it a law and he didn't veto it. Although he was over in Africa at that time. And then, he got back and we had started to work with the War Manpower Commission on how we were going to get an Executive Order to break loose. And we thought we were getting along fairly well until one day I heard from a guy over at the White House who happened to have been a good friend of Paul's and another Hoosier. He said, I got an Executive Order over here that the President wants you to come over and talk to him about. And I said, how in the hell did you get this Executive Order? Well, he didn't pretend to know, but I think he did. Well, I went over that afternoon. And, of course, the President had just gotten back, and I figured, I didn't know what the hell he was going to say. He could have said a lot of things. But the first thing he said to me, "Did you ever see anybody plow with a mule and a camel?" He'd been to Morocco. I saw that when I was in Morocco afterwards. But at that time I had to say, "No." And he went on talking about this and talked and talked about his trip, and then his Secretary, he . . . General. . . the guy afterwards. Anyway, he first looked into the peephole, the keyhole. Eventually he opened the door, come in and went out. And the President kept on talking. And finally he said, Mr. President, you're getting pretty behind on your schedule. Oh, yeah. He said, "Here, take that along and if you don't like it,

let me know". . .I don't pretend to interpret. He was a funny guy. He always knew more than to get in some places. And I don't know if he had cat's whiskers or not, but he could feel when he touched them. I never cared for him in a lot of ways, but I gave him credit for knowing where you better stay out of. And anyway, so I went back and telephoned this guy that had called him before and told him the old man had told me to come back and tell him what I didn't like about it. He said, well, can you come over to my office and I'll have Paul come over and we can talk about it. And we got that, and I got my General Counsel and said, "Paragraph 1, clean bridge. No if's, and's or but's or out. Endless dicker on the rest of them. "Christ, if they wanted me to come over and talk to them before I do this, I'll go put a little fire on that one. But the first paragraph, something, no matter how you read it, backwards, forwards or anything else, we're out from under the War Manpower Commission. Course I went back out and remembered that then. But that's about, and we got eventually so that between the Manpower Commission. . .see, Manpower Commission had a great enemy, the guy who's handling industry, and of course Paul had a lot of troubles on his hands. He had the damn doctors and this and that and the other thing. But we finally got those files of used to meeting just as about effective or, the last six or eight months of the war, but nobody was trying to, you see they'd already found out about how they get along with us by getting us under them.

INTERVIEWER: I probably misinterpreted, because I know it was the way you said. What I was getting at, you worked for the White House,

but the Department of Labor and Department of War were haggling over, I think, who should exercise, trying to fight, and trying to get into your business.

GEN HERSHEY: Well sure, because each one of them. . .and they were very friendly to these others, but they'd rather see the Army. Of course this Army has got enough people than they know what to do with now and of course when they made a mistake about 800,000, that's truth, and of course that happened fortunately after we got off from under. Cause White called me up one night and said, "What would you say about stopping inductions tomorrow?" I said, "My God. What's happened?"

INTERVIEWER: General, a question of alternative service has come up many times and most recently with the present amnesty program. But I don't want to talk about amnesty. I want to talk about service as an alternative in the Armed Forces. George Reedy wrote a book and in the book he, I'll read the quote to you. He said, "To assume the business of human butchery can be placed on the level with constructive tasks and civilization as to mock the sacrifice of the soldier and to degrade the work of the builder. Sensitive men cannot avoid the thought that work of national importance should come from need and not because it enables men to escape the fighting." I was wondering, both back in 1940 and later on during your career in Selective Service if the question of alternative service come up?

GEN HERSHEY: Oh yes. In fact, this guy is, of course this fellow is a thinker. He's absolutely right, but of course on the other hand, if you're going to figure it that way, why in the hell you figure it

out some way so you can send a machine out, to do the fighting for you and then you can all stay at home. Now, the only reason we tried to do something was to see, first of all, if we could. Of course in the first place they weren't going in the service. We tried that in World War I, they went to jail. Then you can very well, to follow reason, I don't know which Reed this is. I wouldn't know. . .

Reedy. He's new in town. Yeah, I know Reedy pretty well. I did know, well, it wouldn't surprise me, he wrote a book. But one of the things is, that you've got a problem, where your choice isn't whether he goes to war or whether he doesn't go, he isn't going. You had a lot of it in World War I, that, and of course we had a lot of them that wouldn't even go out and work either. And of course I don't blame him. I'd have joined him the same. . .they shouldn't. . . but how are you going to stop him going to jail? Well, you shoot him. But that isn't the best alternative in the world because we're having a hell of a time trying to even have the right to kill somebody that goes out and kills a dozen people. So therefore, the problem wasn't because he had any idea, that is ideal. First of all, here are guys that you could have a choice about whether you put them in jail, or whether you tried to get them to do something. Now in World War I, they put them in jail, or whether you tried to get them to do something. Now in World War I, they put them in jail and then they let some of them out to go out there to harvest and all that sort of thing, figuring it's better to get harvest out of them than to get nothing but jail out of them. So we had a lot of people that milked in the Los Angeles

area. And a lot of other places, allowed to work in dairy farm places and have a hell of a job, and time, getting anybody to work the cows. Now, I'm defending it, but if somebody thinks it's better to have him in jail I wouldn't argue with them either. But I wouldn't have him working for me.

INTERVIEWER: Let me ask you this. Was this done on a basis of a deferment from the draft or a person who was. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Trying to get a deferment from Britain. Figuring that there was something he could do that was more valuable for the war than the damn prison. In fact, I did the best I could to try to get people out of the prisons. That's another story, but we got a good many out. And it happened that the guys that got out of prison did better on getting awards for bravery. Well, these guys weren't conscientious objectors, they'd done something they shouldn't and we did get some penitentiaries quite a lot of people out. We're pretty careful who we took out. They had to volunteer and they had to be acceptable. But we did take several hundred out of penitentiaries, because they weren't being so damn helpful there. In fact, I used up your space, on stories, but once upon a time a fellow who's already retired now who was in the Army. He was a captain in World War I and one day a fellow came into El Paso and the sheriff from up in Arizona said, "I'm looking for a man who killed a man in a fight on Saturday down there." And he told him about him and the guy said, "Well, I'll look over the thing and see whether I've got such a man or not." He knew at the time, I think, that he had. He was a captain, this gentlemen. So he got this guy and told

him about it and he said, "You'll volunteer to go overseas immediately. . . you'll be gone." All right. And he didn't think much more of it and he went back and told the guy he didn't have him. But after the war, a big tall rancher came into El Paso one time and he said, "I don't know if you remember me," and he said, "Yes, I remember you," he said, "What happened?" He said, "Well, I came back and stood trial and his claim was in self-defense." And he said, "I got acquitted." He said, "Maybe my Congressional Medal of Honor helped me a little."

INTERVIEWER: Was there ever any serious attempts on the government's part or anyone in government to try to organize or create an organization that would allow people who did not want to serve, CO or otherwise, to do work in war effort. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, you've got a contradiction of terms there. One of the things you've got to be so careful with these guys is that they're not going to work in an ammunition factory. You've got to get them somewhere. Course I think they didn't have enough sense, to know, that milking cows maybe was doing a hell of a lot more than if they had been over somewhere working in an ammunition factory. Cause I understand that now they give our ammunition to people and they lose it. I don't know. But anyway, no, not in the sense of the war effort. There again, maybe we've got to be a little bit dishonest but you don't go to a fellow and say, "Now, I've got something here, more and more effort being in the penitentiary. . .just as well stay here. . .How would you like to go to Germany. Of course a lot of this was after the war, but I did have these CO's headed for China one time, but the Congress thought they

didn't like it. But we did have them doing quite a lot of things that had something to do with war. In fact, a little proud of this one. We got some balloons that began to appear on the West Coast that had explosives in them. And, there was a preacher and his wife that had their kids out on a picnic one day and they messed around and tried to pick one up and it killed several of them. And unfortunately, we didn't have enough hold on things, it didn't get published all over the damn country. Well of course, nothing could be better for the Japanese to know where this damn thing, they could spot out on the map and exactly where the damn thing went. So, we sent two or three thousand of these CO's up into the woods, because it was getting time of the year that you got a fire started and didn't know what the hell what would have happened. Not only did we have them up there on the ground, but we had a couple hundred of them that jumped. When they couldn't get in any other way. You flew over it through, you had a cotton parachute and threw your tools over, then you hit the silk. Course they went in where you couldn't get in on the, didn't say. . . How in the hell are you going to get out? And as far as I know, none of those ever let on what the hell this movement of a couple of thousand of them to the West Coast woods was. But they were up there all summer. But, you see that guy is thinking to himself, this balloon come over here in some purpose to pick it up will kill him. And therefore doing something by being around over the fire and burn up a lot of people. They got some sort of a rationalization. And you got to give a guy a chance, to kind of rationalize himself into something. Cause there's no question about

the fact, the question was there, but I don't know. This boy that wrote this he was a news hound. But he wasn't so damn anxious to go til he went. Course he was maybe too old. I don't know--he's a good guy. He's all right. I didn't happen to know that he's gotten. . .I don't know what he was writing about on, about the war in general or something.

INTERVIEWER: Yes. The book was about that, but he had a great respect I can bring a copy to you next time. Has a great deal. . .

GEN HERSHEY: I knew that guy pretty well. In fact. . .

INTERVIEWER: He was a member of one of the committees that investigated the Selective Service in mid '60's. I don't have all my notes with me or I could put my finger right on it.

GEN HERSHEY: Maybe that was a time when Mrs. Rosenberger was on that so, yeah.

INTERVIEWER: I have another one, kind of a change of pace here, that maybe will attack the memory banks a little. But Congress passed, on the 12th of June 1948, Congress passed a Selective Service Act in '48 which was the second peacetime draft in history, not counting the ones back in our origin. And calls were issued in November and December of '48 and January of '49, but then there were no more calls until August 1950 when Korea began. I was wondering, could you remember why we had that three-month draft and then no more?

GEN HERSHEY: Yes I think I can tell you. In fact, I can tell you why we got the legislation passed in the first place. Yes. Let's go back to February of 1948. Selective Service, of course at that time, had been passed. Had been gone into the Selective Service records. And

when we came up to find out about getting Selective Service Bill passed, because remember at that time, recruiting was not good. The Army, of course, was over strength, because they had a strength of, I don't know whether it was 800, but it was either 800 and something or 500 or something. Something like that. They hadn't figured it. But they had it, but they were discharging at a rate that wasn't going to be long or they didn't have it, because they were all going out and nothing coming in. And so, what the result was that they were hoping, I guess, to get this, remember we also had the Berlin airlift on at this time. And that, of course, was people were worrying, a great many people. But anyway, the Secretary of the Army came up. And he didn't get much of anywhere because he just about opened his mouth and they sat down and they. . . I couldn't have listened in if I wanted to. He said, that's all right. You see, during the time that they were down, they closed out their recruiting stations. Not so smart to do but probably all right. And so he never got to read much of his thing because they all bedeviled him about the fact, I think they couldn't enlist if you wanted to. So then they didn't try again until in May of '48.

INTERVIEWER: Excuse me general. Recruiting stations now, they had closed them during war, had been World War II because the draft was the only thing. . .

GEN HERSHEY: See, this was after the war. . .

INTERVIEWER: Figures. . . probably because they were over-strength. See, they were reducing them down.

GEN HERSHEY: I think that's true. Although you better check on whether they are closed or. . . They were closed then, but when they were closed I don't know. But anyway, the last part of May 1948, Louie Johnson who was then Secretary of Defense came down before the Committee and said, "We've got to have the draft because we're now just below at least 585,000 was their thing that we talked about in February. But by the first of June or the last of May, they were down to about 490,000. Of course you see, when your letting people out, you never know where the hell you are and they said the Navy 24,000 under strength and the Air Force about 15,000 or something like that. Now we've got to have this law, not just for standby, we got to have this to get some people. Well, we got it finally in August. It just goes to show that these people who think that you can get the power to induct by just going over and saying "Boys, yesterday they showed how they react to emergency, when they turned their President down." Course they turned him down because they didn't want him to have power to invade. And I guess they'll give him the money maybe. But he's stuck now with the incurring, either violating the law. I've done it. I know how it is. I've done it right, about those days. You do something that you have no appropriations for, and no authorization for. But if we hadn't have, we wouldn't have been able to induct anybody very early in the Korean business, because they never got the damn legislation for about six months after the time the Secretary of the Army had first started asking for it. And, not only that, when June came, the North Koreans came over. Didn't hurry them too much and when they finally passed the

damn thing, they only passed it again for a year or for two years so the next thing we know, we had to go back. . .

INTERVIEWER: That three months period was just for a strength adjustment to offset that. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well yes, but of course the reason why we had the draft, had the law passed in '48 was the thing of Berlin. Berlin was our. . .

INTERVIEWER: But the three-month period of November, December and January when you brought people in. . .

GEN HERSHEY: After you got the law. . .

INTERVIEWER: That's after the law.

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah. I'll have to check on when we got the law.

INTERVIEWER: The law was passed the Selective Service Act of '48 was passed on 12 June 1948.

GEN HERSHEY: 12th of June. I'd have thought it was a little later than that but, maybe not.

INTERVIEWER: Because the first calls were issued in November '48.

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah, but Christ. Where were we all the time in between? We did have some things. Course they did try to say how many you could have and so forth and so on and, of course, the Korean War was damn. . . a long ways away and people hadn't read Asian history much and it wasn't. . . nobody but England wasn't sinking, and the Irish might have been happy if it was. But a lot of other people looked to Europe for things. But the thing in Berlin was only the excuse for it. Now you took in several. Why did you stop? Well, because of the fact that you got to. . . you see, it didn't take very long to get up 25, 30,

40,000, and I think by then they had. . .I think when we passed the law, they'd cut the 585 down to about 550 or 540. And the bureau was 60 or 70,000 below. You don't need many calls. . .if you call, that is, if you call 20 or 30,000.

INTERVIEWER: Following along in that time frame, the Universal Military Training and Service Act passed in 1951. And also was quickly followed by the Reserve Forces Act which established the eight-year obligations.

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: My reading shows that there were, that the UMT was reviewed by Congress in 1955, '59, '63 and '67.

GEN HERSHEY: You mean it was extended. It finally was extended.

INTERVIEWER: That's right. But the term reviewed was used, and I was wondering, when the Congress looks at it with the view to renewing it, were there any issues to be hammered out during those time frames?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, yes. Although those issues weren't bothering too much. Because in the first place, you had a House and Senate Committee that fortunately through this whole time was pretty favorable. In fact, I may be wrong but you never know what they did. I personally think they would have given in without any argument the President the power to induct and when they reviewed it the last time. That is, they extended it the last time. Remember, some of the things you extend and some of the times you didn't. The law itself, the obligation of the boy, was a part of permanent legislation. The power of the President to induct, was the thing that had to be extended each time or he didn't have it. And most of the time, I spent my time over

there fighting to get it. And when the last time they extended it as a House and Senate Chairman at least, was asking that they could extend it to have the Administration said they didn't want it. I had a little trouble with that in my own thinking. Of course at that time I wasn't involved in the Selective Service. I did write the President a memo in December before this law came up the next summer, emphasizing particularly that they must have the power to induct because I had spent some time trying to get it a good many months and, but. . .

INTERVIEWER: You say that those reviews then, every four years, 55, 59, 63, and 67 were fairly routine?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, yes except for, let's see, for 71, was less than routine because the Administration wilted.

INTERVIEWER: That's when the talk of the all-volunteer forces. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, of course, one thing about it, I guess Lady McBeth washed her hands, didn't she, or was it McBeth and washed his hands symbolic of feeling guilt or something. "Out damned spot, out I say."

INTERVIEWER: A related question during the time frame. You mentioned earlier the use of an Executive Order to get the organization off the ground, and Executive Orders were used throughout the whole period, since then. . .

GEN HERSHEY: All the orders, all the power that you had, all the power to regulate was in the hands of the President. And it was handled, when it was put into a regulation, by Executive Order.

INTERVIEWER: My question then is, based on your experience, is that methodology, if we were to have to activate the draft again, is that

methodology satisfactory. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I would say yes. Although if somebody came along and said, "Well, I have a better idea," I'd be very glad to hear what it was. The only thing that bothers me is so much of the help you get when you're administering is that they tell you what not to do but they're just like my eleven year old, they don't tell you what the hell to do. That's why I said that when she was five when I first said she knew everything was wrong but she didn't know how to fix anything. And some of our thinkers, I call them stinkers, but thinkers are people that. . .they can write the most beautiful things on what a hell of a thing it was to do this way. And then they stop writing, they don't tell you how to do, what you had to do. When you're walking somewhere and they said, why the hell you walking, well, you're walking because you have no other way to go. You gotta go.

INTERVIEWER: Were those Executive Orders, generally speaking, fulfilling needs that the Selective Service system recognized.

GEN HERSHEY: We got initiated. . .I don't think they ever got many that we didn't initiate. We didn't always initiate when somebody didn't like something. But we did, of course, have a quite long job. As a matter of fact, sometimes I thought legislation was a little quicker. But, because the number of agents, and other agencies you've got to satisfy. And when you had the Manpower Commission, a fair sample, but that didn't list near all of them that you had to consider. And you've had to get them to sign off and I know when that first Executive Order. . .the Department of Justice we got about everybody cleaned up except them. But, of course,

they were the people, and when this goes to the President, don't make any difference what you're going to do, the Executive Order, the last thing is the Department of Justice. You can't sneak over and say to him to sign something when they aren't looking. And we had a fine old guy up in North Carolina who had drafted this thing that gave the English the destroyers. And we'd get in an argument about the Executive Order that you can't put that in because it isn't legal. Of course a good many times the prohibitions that we'd had something to do in getting into the law was the thing that we tried to defend ourselves against people trying to. And finally the old man was talking about one night when, I wrote this Executive Order about destroyers. He said I could go right along like that, absolutely legal and nobody could get anywhere. Then I went around like that and nobody could say a thing about any of that, but around that corner, that corner was bad. In order to get what he wanted and then go somewhere else. He had to go around a corner. I don't think he wanted to go to the Supreme Court.

INTERVIEWER: I have a question about sort of an issue of whether it is correct to draft and send draftees off to fight a war and not mobilize the Reserves and the National Guard to go fight a war. I just wonder what your thoughts are.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I read quite a bit of history on that because that was one of the things we had quite a go-around on in '40. You see, in '40 you didn't have to worry much about the reserves. There was some, but there were not very many. And when you came along and said, we're going to draft everybody, you're going to hold them ten years in the

Reserves. . .the National Guard said, everybody's going in. Everybody's coming out and they're all going in the Reserves. Where in the hell becomes the National Guard? So to try to placate them safely, we met a week during the time that the Democrats and Republicans, were having their conventions. One one week and one the next. We had a group of people down in the War College, here in town that were trying to get the people who were for the bill so that when we went over that we didn't have a lot of guys that wanted half the bill and then hell with the rest of it. So we had, well this guy here was there and all in the book about the President of the National Guard Association was there. And the guy that was in the National Guard forever, in Maryland was there. And we had some other people from the Reserve Forces that. We finally got into the law that whenever anything is needed beyond the regular forces, the National Guard must be called. I don't think it happened in the Korean War because remember the Korean War had some things that scared McNamara out about trying to do it in Vietnam, that he tried to make a Regular Army war and dependent on the draft so he wouldn't get mixed up with he didn't want all the National Guards. He didn't want all of the Reserves. If you don't, where the hell are you. 'Course later on they took quite a few of them, but there was a lot of them they didn't take. And, I guess they didn't take a lot of them in Korea, or, I mean Vietnam. So, one thing about I, of course, was an old National Guardsman and spent my life living with them some and they had been very kind to me. But on the other hand, I think that the Vietnamese already got to the place where they weren't going to raise a lot of

hell about going out there. They probably never said so, but they could weigh the right. But it did raise an issue, if you're going to control the entire military output, and have it in the Reserves, the Guard had a problem. So, now I don't believe the Guard. . .the Guard might make a little racket. If they meant to make racket as their making and now, because they're getting cut sometimes pretty hard. The guy, who is president of the National Guard Association now, is probably the guy I made director of South Dakota. So, he was a fly boy and he was also a past general and the director of a small state like that, works pretty well, because you don't have two people around the governor, one telling him one thing and one of them telling him another. The man can be your man, and be a National Guard, that's pretty fair. And so he had him. But then the National Guard Bureau came to me and said, "What the hell am I gonna do with that guy's command out there? And he's going on active duty to you. He figures he ought to have flight pay. He says, 'I can't give him flight pay.'" And I said, "Okay, sit down and be quiet," and so he'd give him flight pay. But, the National Guard and the Reserves, the Guard has the advantage of coming from somebody nearer home. Some people have always had sympathy for, and I happened to be, Vice President, former President of the Reserve Officers Association which is an honorary title. At least I pretend to be a friend of both of them. But on the other hand, the people that help the Reserves unfortunately are quite a ways from where they are of the Federal government. And the Federal government has a hell of a lot of things to think about that the governor of South Dakota, or the governor of

New York, or the governor of any other state had all of the Congress. And the two Senators don't have to. One thing about the Guard, they can always stir up congress more than the Reserves can, because there are two senators from each state. In fact, Montgomery who's a member of the Armed Forces Committee House is a colonel of the National Guard of Mississippi. I think McNamara tried his best to get him out. But he probably didn't tell McNamara to go to hell but just about the same thing. McNamara chased a lot of the Reserves out, up on the Hill where the guys that are on committees. . . Christ, one of the fellows you could depend on to do something for you in the regular service and yet some damn fool comes along. . . you know. Hell, of course McNamara, the greatest thing I think he did was to build that one car. It wasn't worth a damn.

INTERVIEWER: Well, let's talk about the question of, a young fellow being drafted who was in a town in a National Guard unit. Let's say that that unit is inhabited by true volunteers, people who want to be in the National Guard for whatever their motivation. It's also inhabited by people who have joined the Guard to avoid being drafted.

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: . . . some with the Reserve units. Well, let's talk about the national point of view about what's right.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I don't think I can do much for you. I can offer some other things. How many in the Navy do you suppose enlisted because they got out of the draft. How many in the air, do you think enlisted because they got out of the draft? How many of the people went in the

the medical before the Army, to get out of the draft? I don't know. I don't know the answer, but I know one thing about it that I bet you that some buys that got into the Navy fought pretty damn good. Got in to get a. . .and I'm not so much worried about what a guy gets in for, if I could be sure that when they got in he'd have proper officers and leadership.

INTERVIEWER: I guess my question is, is it right to send a guy who is drafted off to fight a war, say in Vietnam, popular or unpopular, when the people that have been paid and trained over two or three years period in these units stay right there at home in the unit?

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah. Is it right to send a volunteer in the Regular Army over there to get killed when a lot of people who are over in Germany, with money, a lot of times in the old days, got a hell of a lot more than got his home? I don't know. When you get in right and wrong, you got quite a problem. You'd almost have to stop the war if you're going to be legal and I think, of course, it's damn stupid to have wars to kill each other. But in a way, we're trying to protect war because we're trying to have people at home that kill people in the civilian population and we've had more people killed by murder since the Vietnamese war, you can talk about the 55,000 all we want to, but we killed more on the highways. We've killed more by somebody killing them, and I don't feel so damn good about that, if you want to look into it. Because in the first place, down there it's kill or get killed. But if you're out on the highway while you're driving drunk, or driving too fast near sober, I don't give a damn. I don't want to be killed by a guy who is sober.

INTERVIEWER: A question that Bob is raising and one that has been studied. And of course, allegedly one of our ranking leaders of the Army said that if there were ever another war such as Vietnam they would certainly mobilize. Now that's saying as it is now, whether it would happen. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Do you mean those like, mobilize everybody?

INTERVIEWER: Mobilize the National Guard and Reserve.

GEN HERSHEY: All right. Then would you send them all down there right away? Or are you going to kind of hold some back until you need it?

INTERVIEWER: See, that's the issue but that's also, I think, what Bob was getting at. . .

GEN HERSHEY: I agree. I have no quarrel. I'm not trying to be facetious about the damn thing but what I'm getting at is, that you can't have. . . This, of course, you can get in all sorts of trouble when I have sometimes probably saying about. . . Worry about killing women. Killing some young boys is perfectly all right, and rather than kill his mother, I don't know. But we're going on the assumption that we did know and one of the things that some boy wrote back in World War I or II from down in the Pacific, he said, "It's a hell of a place down here and I have trouble taking it, but I know my folks back home are safe. As long as I know that, I can take it." I guess he probably got killed, but just the same, we get to the place where we want to hire somebody to go out . . . some rather nasty story about somebody deciding whether the people around the Officer's Club worked or whether they didn't. And there were certain things that only the officers did and therefore they assumed that wasn't work because they didn't have the help to do it. Some

of their family relationships.

INTERVIEWER: Well the one thing that you've come out with, I know from our first meeting, and you impressed upon me the one word that we used a lot in the Army but, you know, when you try to apply that equality, you know, equality, and when you say equality then you've got to follow that all the way through. It's pretty easy to get off of the beam.

GEN HERSHEY: Well equality, I think, probably you ought to have just as much of that as we can. Hell, but in the first place there isn't any such thing. John. . .what president?

INTERVIEWER: Louis Johnson?

GEN HERSHEY: Hmh?

INTERVIEWER: Louis Johnson?

GEN HERSHEY: No. The President. . .

INTERVIEWER: John F. Kennedy or. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Hmh?

INTERVIEWER: President John F. Kennedy. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Kennedy. John Kennedy said one time. I don't know what the hell he said it for but he said, you can't talk about equity in the Armed Forces, even in peacetime whether you're serving in Greenland or in Florida or California or some other place. And, of course, if you start shooting at people in California, then maybe you better be in Greenland. But if you're going to be shooting both places, you could live better until you do get killed and maybe this is California. But we use these terms just as though they mean something. But one of the

things in trying to get that sort of thing. It's got it in a place where he doesn't know. Where we think we can excuse everybody from hardship. I don't think we think so. The guys, the sound offers the guys who are in the media. And I certainly believe in inventing everything we can to make life easier. But for Christ's sake, if we don't know enough to handle a computer, we never ought to let people handle it. If a computer, if we find out from the computer what's happened, fine. We ask the computer what's going to happen, you're getting into another field. And to me, I would if I thought that we were going to have a computer handling the next draft, wouldn't be anything I could do about it. But I wouldn't have much trouble knowing who the hell's going to get licked. And, somebody said, we're going to get licked anyway. So, what the hell? But I don't think so. But here, you got so many people I think that may be the act on sometimes, they had no sense. But I think that if we just get government a little closer to our people, but goddamn it, we want to drag it all way off somewhere, state capitol, or Federal capitol, and this town here. We got to have about seven or eight levels of anything we do and the result is told you can't do anything and do it quick. I thought maybe the other day they did pretty damn well of evacuating those people because. . .men doing it. I have all the confidence in the world of guys doing things. And one of the things is Walter Reed. I have to go over there quite a lot with the two of us. And I try first of all to know the doctors as well as I can. I try to know the technicians. I try to know the girls that are keeping the doctors records. So that when I want to get an appointment I get to somebody to mark the damn thing

down. They start word from here, some of the time, somebody forgets to carry it. And I've got a great deal of confidence in our fighting people, if they let them alone.

INTERVIEWER: I think the Marines did an outstanding job over there. Harry Reasoner, last night, over there made a big deal. . .

GEN HERSHEY: I hadn't heard. . .

INTERVIEWER: . . .what a pleasant thing it was that Marines were given a task and they did it just like it was supposed to be done. That was, and you know I agree with you General Hershey when you said that, you know, you've got confidence in what they can do. And I've always found the same thing. You go down, you talk about General Harmon. You've mentioned General Harmon a couple of times. One of his stories that he told down at the Armor School is when they were in Europe. And they were ready to kick off on an offensive and he said, well, even though he was talking to his staff. He said, "Can we or can't we go?" And his G-2 got up and told him, weather's bad, terrain is bad, everything's bad and he said, "The tanks won't make it." General Harmon said, "Are you sure?" And he said, "Yes sir, I'm sure." So he said "Okay." So General Harmon jumped in his jeep and he went down and found a tank company. He went out to a couple of drivers driving tanks, and he said, "Son, do you think your tank will make it across there?" The tank driver said, "No question about it. We'll make it." He went to another tank company and he said, "Son, do you think this tank will make it across there?" And he said, "No question about it." He went back and issued the order and they moved out. But I think this demonstrates the bureaucracy in between. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, of course, you can't blame them, because in the first place, they can't know. That's one reason why I don't want a local board looking at a record to see whether to send him or not.

INTERVIEWER: We'll talk about that a little more next time.

GEN HERSHEY: I don't want to send it to Supreme Court. Harmon told me that he came down from North front up there when things were pretty bad on the Bulge. And they came down at night. And of course he had word, I think Joe Collins had the Corps. Joe said to him, now you keep out of sight. They don't know you're here. He said, "Joe, God almighty, you don't take that much armor to hold that 100 miles of front and nobody knows it's there." And anyway, they were just still going into position and he got the officers together. And they sat down and I don't know whether they were going to eat something or going to have a drink and they saw a car coming back with a guy in it, and he was bleeding. Ernie ran out and said to the guy, "Where you been?" He said, "I was down here just a little ways." They told Ernie not to put any guards out see. You've got guards in front of you. He said, "How far down there did you meet them?" "About two miles," he said. Just then the commander of one of the battalions came past in his tank, and stopped and he said, "How much time are you going to want to get down that road in formation?" He said, "Well, you ought to be gone in two minutes. Just give me air, that is, so I don't have to hold them secret. Well, get going!" And Jesus Christ, they were fighting there for the next two or three days in a place where, you know, held by somebody else.

INTERVIEWER: We planned for a two-hour session, General, and I think

it's a good time to quit.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, fine.

SECTION 3

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL HERSHEY

by

Colonel R. Elder  
Lieutenant Colonel J. Hattersley

Today is the 7th of May 1975 and this is our third session with General Hershey and our third tape on question and answer part of this inquiry.

INTERVIEWER: General Hershey, to begin today, one of the things that seems to permeate many of the writings about the Selective Service System, especially in during the Vietnam time frame, was whether local board composition represented the best way to operate at the local level. There was some criticism that generally board members were much older than the people that they were inducting. They were not a peer representatives. They were veterans of wars past and the boards lacked minority representation. Some states, for instance, in the South during the Vietnam War had zero representation from blacks, even though they were inducting a large number of blacks. I wonder if you have comment about the composition of local boards?

GEN HERSHEY: Oh, yes. It's all true what everybody has said. Of course, those people know how to run it. I never had any other system. You are going to get one as soon as you get this computer working. It will register people, notify them when they are supposed to go and physical exam them, perhaps. The . . . let's take one thing at a time for instance. The black business, there's no question that there was a scarcity of blacks. I had a lot of sweat on that one and eventually got blacks, not on local boards, but every state had some blacks. Alabama and Mississippi were the two that struggled the most and I got into trouble because I finally got

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the fellow who is now governor but he, at that time was . . . had been governor, but he was being governor for his wife who was sick, and I got him to say he . . . putting blacks on the things in the South, you just don't go and stick them on. You got to, first of all, find somebody that wants to get on, and they make a lot of racket. They're noisy people, too. But there's a great many blacks that aren't interested in things that they don't get paid for and the local board didn't get paid and therefore, they weren't making near as much racket as the guys who were running for office making racket. But anyway, he promised to put some people on and he did. Now, not long after that, and I think somebody asked me, there was a kid taking news business in the summer time to make a little money and he asked me about it. And I told him at that time we had not had our conventions for that year. So therefore I went over to the guys that were allegedly running and some of them I knew and some of them I didn't, but we came to George Wallace. He said, "What about George Wallace?", and I said, "Well at the present time I'm very much satisfied because he put on a great many blacks and I imagine it's been a long struggle, but it hasn't been easy for him or anybody else." And the guy left with the impression that I was his campaign manager. A little later, I had the Star here calling me up and wanted to know about when I started carrying the ball for George Wallace. And then of course, Humphrey who I don't blame Humphrey, he's got to say something every time there's anything to be said, and you can't expect to . . . hell he was going to end me as soon as he got elected. Well, I didn't worry too much about that for a couple of reasons. And I had known Humphrey pretty good. In fact, I had seen him within two or three weeks but he. . . it

was a time when I had a little bit of publicity and he wanted to get in on it and he did, which is all right. Well, anyway, we finally got, Mississippi was the last place and there we happened to have a man who was a cripple who was the governor and he promised to do good a little, but he wasn't able to do very much. Now, when we started in 1940, there was pretty near out of the question to get in some of the blacks to the states. We did have people in North Carolina very early and had some in Virginia and we did get them on as advisors very early. We at least have some participation. And I don't know, the black question wasn't made by the Selective Service System and sure we probably made some mistakes on the blacks, but they weren't early mistakes. The mistakes had been made on them for a very long time before that. Now, when you get into the question of these guys being old, I wonder if some of these sap heads think you ought to have an eighteen year old who is obligated, sitting on a board and deciding whether the other boys should go. And the next thing is when you are fighting a war, you ought to use every man you possibly can. If you got somebody that has lived quite a long time and I rather regret, although I know lots of them, they are in the place where it is sort of a dishonor to have served in the service and therefore, if you want to say something mean about the guy say, "Why he's a veteran." And yet he's the same bastard that will want everything in the world and he'll want some veteran to go out and die for him because he's too damn lazy to go and he spends his time writing for the media. I think that's one thing about it when local boards have something to do with it, you don't have to tell the public you are at war.

We better watch ourselves very carefully if we want to start trying to run a war with people that that's all they do and the other people just vacuum at home. And I happen, of course, believe that we ought to delegate more authority, I don't care if they leave the draft out of it. I would give states a lot more authority than they got now. I wouldn't give them near as much money. Let them dig for money. Don't catch hell from the government on getting money that you are going to give to another fellow. Let him. He's got laws he can pass. There's no state in the union can't pass tax laws, even in the District of Columbia city council, if they can settle a few things like who will be superintendent of schools here. If they can get over that, maybe they can do something about taxation. I happen to believe very firmly, in delegation of authority. Give every bit of authority you can to the lowest possible unit of your government. Make him decide. Make them spend their own money and know they are spending their own money. Don't make them at the place where they said that "we are up to about such population so we got to ask the government for so many million dollars." Worst thing in the world. And one of the reasons the cities are in the shape they are in now is that they waited too long and tried to get somebody to subsidize them, instead of taxing their own people. I don't want to try to stick up too much for New England, but in New England when they had the town meeting working, one thing about it, everybody knew who was going to pay for what they decided to do. And that's always healthy. So, I . . . we could go on for a very long time, I happen to believe that what little I know about it, but I'm satisfied with the system. I had some boys who went over to China to help out during the

war on a very Selected Service and they said no matter what they did, they never got anything but the lower class when they brought them in. In Tehran for example, a company goes out recruiting and they bring them in. You have to have a chain around them, but I mean, what you bring them in is what you get. The fast talker sometimes talks himself out of it and the guy with money, he gets out. The guy that's left is the fellow that has neither the gift of gab or money. My son-in-law just retired from his company after a tour over in Tehran and he was rather amused at the way they recruited. When they went out to get some, they got them -- surrounded the village, move in and fast talkers out, money's out, and bring the rest of them in. Now, one of the things has always bothered me a little on criticism, although I suppose I swore like the President did. Maybe sometimes like he said last night, he didn't get mad outside. It was on the inside and as a psychologist, that's a dangerous thing. You ought to let some of that drain off because if you don't you hold grudges, you get so you hate who you despise and hate is what takes you adrenalin. I don't think despising does -- takes some, but not near as much. Hate has retribution in that you are waiting for the chance. I wouldn't hate anybody because I'm too damn selfish because I know he wouldn't care a damn and I. . . about that adrenalin. I've only got so much and I'm not going to spend it, hating some SOB that I don't think even is up to that level of being hated.

INTERVIEWER: General, I was looking into other times when the Selective Service had to reduce it's efforts and reduce its size.

GEN HERSHEY: Now, which time? We've gone through that about three times.

INTERVIEWER: On the 3rd of March, 1947. Harry Truman was President and recommended that the draft law expire and Selective Service System apparatus be put on stand-by. Congress approved it, records were stored, some residual training was given to Selective Service employees who remained, and plans were made for expansion.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, what we did, we passed the law after the office of Selective Service records. Yet we just went in and stole something that belonged to another group, the government. But it was one place to try to maintain the Reserves that you trained. If you have some area that had not gone on, and we didn't have much trouble getting the legislation on the office of Selective Service records and that stand-by business. Well, we didn't register, we kept the records that we had, but I doubt if the basis for that was somewhat of an excuse in order to have . . . something operating to keep people trained because we trained our Reserves very hard in that sixteen to eighteen months between when we had that other business and got back in. You'd have gotten into a hell of a fix in 1950, if we hadn't had it. Just mess around a couple more years and they are still training their people some. But they let the budget people tell them, so they'll pay for it. And as soon as you do that, you got no funds, you are in a hell of a fix to have 800 or 1000 officers on your hands. Better have them scattered a couple of hundred to the Army, a couple of hundred to the Navy, hundred and fifty to the Air Force and hundred to the Marines and the Coast Guard will even take their share. Because

they get money. But it's so little that goes for, that even the comptroller don't bother people much. But you just get it all in a bunch and you are in trouble.

INTERVIEWER: I wonder how you would characterize the difference between the drawdown after World War II, and what we have learned from that, so that it could be applied in Korea and then in Vietnam?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, of course, Korea didn't . . . you didn't have much intermission because if you figure the Berlin Airlift, got people up to be excited where they repassed the law in sixteen to twenty months. . . Let's see we went out, I think we went out theoretically in . . . what was it, May of '47 and the law was passed in the fall of '48 so you see, it was a rather short time. Now, some days I think, it may as well be as long this time. But, from the standpoint of business, I hope it isn't too long as we are going to get in because the longer it is the worse we're going to be off. If it's too long, they'll need some help because you'll grow up a generation that doesn't have so much feeling about it.

INTERVIEWER: I take it then that you probably had to fight to keep the organization in existence at the end of each of those build-ups. Same problems that you have now.

GEN HERSHEY: I was just talking about our friend Keating. He's dead now and I don't know why I'm talking about him. But he was a Senator, a very new one from New York and I don't blame him. He was trying to do something and he laughed, "When you are over there you have to hunt around like hell sometimes, to find something that you can do. You know, something that you can tell the boys back home." In one sense, he got our budget to come over at \$8,000,000, which wasn't very much. We

weren't on stand-by then. We were back in business when the law passed in '48, but he got it cut when it came over to the Senate. . .4 million. And of course, he told everybody he saved nearly \$4,000,000. Of course, the next thing, Korea broke out, and here we were, we didn't have . . . I said it was somewhat ironically that we didn't have enough people to go out and get the mail, let alone open it and try to read it or answer it because 4,000,000 dollars isn't very much. Of course now, they are starving on 47 but they . . . it costs more money to run things and so. . . Anyway, it was pretty rough getting that first 50,000 together. You see, I imagine I told you before, if I did I apologize, but you can stop me, Joe Collins asked me to come over one day. This was probably . . . let's see they went across the line in late June, didn't they, the North Koreans came across . . .

INTERVIEWER: 1950 or are you talking about in . . .

GEN HERSHEY: '50, and of course we go through this well, we'll send the (Air Force) Air/over. That lasts about ten days generally. We'll send the Navy in and that lasts a week or so and then somebody says, "Well. . ." It's like the old bird you know, when they are going to cut the wheat, somebody is going to get somebody to cut it. But one says I'm coming up for my cradle this afternoon and she said no, little bird, it's time to leave because when the guy said he's going to sow something himself, you want to look out for it. So, of course, what we did was send over this little battalion, bob tail in the first place. Hadn't been cooking their own meals for a long time because they were over in Japan riding high you know. It was just a fine damn thing, you know, going back in the field.

It was a long trip. But, anyway, when I went over, he asked for 10,000, I think, probably about, oh. . .middle or late part of July for September. And he was having a meeting over there, I don't know what it was anymore, but something, and he finally got around to me and he said, "We'd like to order 50,000 for September. Are you in favor of it?" And I said, "Yeah." And he said, "You'll get them?" I said, "Nope." He said, "What the hell do you want? Ask me to get them and then you don't get them?" I said, "Well, for Christ's sake, do something, and let's tell them in October why we didn't get them in September." We got 56,000 though. Well, why? Because we were a decentralized system and we told them to get them and they got them. Expected a lot of problems but, by God they got them and when you got somebody . . . but that damn machine you got over there, I don't know.

INTERVIEWER: Well, I'd like to lead on from that point, but this is a big question, General Hershey and it probably can't be answered very easily. But in the draft in World War II, or during World War II, I'm sure there was quite a bit of resentment. . .I can't remember if there was resentment to the draft.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I would say yes, but those folks hadn't seen the 60's

INTERVIEWER: That's what I'm saying, how did that compare to Vietnam? Can you compare it or how . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Oh, you can't. You can contrast. Nope. Now, here mind you, nobody's ever going to like the draft in the United States because if you can go back far enough in our ancestry, probably they ran away from Europe to get away from compulsory service. So, we should be, for good reasons, the haters of any compulsion. And of course, when we went to

the farms or out where we have the Indians on our hands in starvation and cold weather. But otherwise within our fear, we were pretty free. Not as good as Robinson Crusoe maybe, but we were along that line. So as we went from the farms and the west country into the cities, we took with us just the fact that we didn't want anybody to tell us what to do. But we got so that we wanted to tell everybody else what to do. That's about what . . . and the more education we got, the more we got the escapist, a lot of the escapists. I don't blame them for getting some escapists into the teaching business. When you ask a guy that has gotten out of the draft, on what you ought to do, what the hell do you expect him to tell you?

INTERVIEWER: Well, then to carry that question a little bit further, this then leads into two other parts of that question. Do you think that the draft is an unjust law?

GEN HERSHEY: What do you mean, unjust? We were on that the other day.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. When I say unjust, . . .

GEN HERSHEY: I can prove that any damn law's unjust. On the other hand, you can't govern a lot of people and have something so that it fits the average man, of which there isn't. You have a law that fits this guy who you don't have. But on the other hand, if you don't do that, you might as well make up your mind you're an individualist and you are going to eventually get licked by anybody about to come along. And we proved pretty conclusively, that if you have a wonderful nation and very strong and they all want to get out of doing anything they can for the government

to make everybody feel good, North Vietnam can lick you. Don't sound good, but it's certainly true and the . . . I don't see any land in the world that you can have something that'll meet the needs of everybody completely.

INTERVIEWER: And for those people who think it is unjust, it's unjust to them, possibly.

GEN HERSHEY: I never argued with a guy, if they were going to take him and he said, "I don't think it's just and I understand why you don't. But there's a hell of a lot of people that would think it's unjust, if you didn't go."

INTERVIEWER: And also, do you think that a person has a right to evade the draft? And I say a right, not in the sense of, you know, like . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, from his standpoint, yes. From the nation's, no. Therefore, if you avoid the draft and want to get the hell out, let him get out and never let him come back. Although that's sad to me because I saw these kids when they wanted to. They were telling me they were going to Canada and I wouldn't have trusted them with my cat, let alone the car, because they had no responsibility. And I said, well, you know where you are going to be in ten years? And of course, they want people to apologize to them because they passed a law they didn't like, even the conscientious objectors, and I've known a lot of them. Most of them got more sense than that. They have no doubt about the fact that people are making special arrangements for them to do auxiliary service, and most of them have something to offer. Most of them appreciate it. But the guy that never wants to do anything except eat when dinner is ready and leave before the dishes are washed . . . And I don't know how the hell you run a country without . . . and I wouldn't argue at

all with a guy when he says it's unjust. Because I didn't vote for this law. Well, why the hell don't you go somewhere else like . . . I had a first sergeant one time and he was kind of a hard guy and we had a woman that . . . she washed for some of the people back in those days when people had some of the enlisted men's wives (do the wash). And she was up around there probably trying to collect. But one time she was sitting in the car outside of the orderly room and he came out and said, "What are you doing here?" She said, "I ain't doing nothing, sergeant." He said, "Well, you go somewhere else and do nothing." Well, now she had . . . her rights were being intruded on, no question about that.

INTERVIEWER: Well, you touched on the last part of that question and of course, we're wrapping this all up in a very brief period of time, but you said then, if a man says it's unjust, you are not going to argue with him. You felt that, if he wanted to evade the draft law and go someplace else, then he shouldn't stay. And the last part of that would be, what are your views toward amnesty, and those who evaded the draft?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, of course, amnesty, I don't say much about, because everything I've heard about amnesty, there wasn't anybody that was talking about the same thing and I didn't want to get in too much. But, now, for instance, if I were Lincoln and I had a rebellion on my hands and I could get a soldier to desert from the South by telling him that if he'd come over, I'd take care of him. But it is a hell of a lot different of waiting until the war is over and then after the Johnny Reb has shot everybody he can, then he comes up and says now, Mr. Lincoln, I'm ready to take that offer you made to me. Now you see, when you're trying to

have food for the enemy so that you can say, desert and we'll give you meals. Is that amnesty? If it is, I'm for it. But if amnesty is something that a guy gets so that he's abreast of the law, he deserted maybe and went to Switzerland, he ran off from Selective Service and went to Canada or went somewhere else. And when the war is over, he says now I'm ready to come back -- I think it's a rather tragic thing. But on the other hand, if you let all these bastards come back, if you ever have another war, who do you think is going to fight it? He'll say, "Well, I knew a fellow that got out of it by doing so and so and all they did, he had to sign a paper or some damn thing." The President did two things that I worry about. I wasn't trying to be critical at all because he has a hell of a job on his hands. But in the first place, using the word amnesty is, of course what they want you to use. Amnesty is so broad that if you give a fellow everything under amnesty, you'll do even better than deal with him on impeaching on his friends and then give him a short sentence, which to me is about intolerable. This thing of giving a guy something because you come and testify against his best friend, colleagues that he's worked . . . in the first place, a guy who'll do that. . .how the hell do you know he's telling the truth anyway.

INTERVIEWER: Plea bargaining?

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah. The bargaining, of course, is a form of amnesty, I mean . . .

INTERVIEWER: Well, then the argument then that you hear, you know, in different camps is that the people that did not go to Vietnam had visions of the future. They knew it was an immoral war and they were right. Because we are out of Vietnam, do you. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Yes, well, of course, there were some of the British thought they were right when they were trying to keep us under the British flag and I suppose the only reason they found out they were wrong was because they got licked.

INTERVIEWER: So you can use that same argument?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I know but what I'm getting at is are they going to always assume they are the right ones? If we are, then if you are a small nation you got a kind of problem on your hands. Because you don't dare get in trouble. Switzerland has done pretty good keeping out of the war, because they have pretty good boundaries to keep out of war. And not only that, there is no damn monkey business about the fact that I don't happen to believe this is right. They don't ask much of them. All they ask. . . if I can have a second, I . . . (pause)

INTERVIEWER: We were just talking about amnesty and the conclusion of amnesty and I think that your views there give a pretty good idea of the pro and con, and that's the same argument that persists now.

GEN HERSHEY: I'd like to say maybe one more thing. I have talked about the fact that I will go a little farther than them staying away, but I know it's impossible to have anything that you'll make them do, that compares with what they missed doing, because you aren't in a shooting war. Now 'course, if they come back from a shooting war, and we had hundreds of those, that is, we had guys that ran off and decided they didn't like to go in and they come back and we let them . . . We inducted and let them go at that because we never wanted any ruckus about that. But what if a guy comes back and is ready to go, and I don't know how many, if any deserted afterwards or not. I haven't any records on it but a guy comes back and says, "well I'm ready to soldier . . . I defended a lot

of people but I never personally tried to avoid it.

INTERVIEWER: Another question regarding local boards. Selective Service regulations have made or talked about local boards making manpower procurement decisions so as to provide for the, "Maintenance of national health, safety or interest." Another author said that the purpose of the Selective Service board, local board, was to adjust the processes of the draft to the individual and his circumstances. Now, . . .

GEN HERSHEY: If he'd added about three words, I'd go along with him. . . "in the national interest." Well, of course, then that destroys what you've said then because this guy talks as though it was their business to fix this guy up so you met his needs and I don't buy any of that.

INTERVIEWER: One of the criticisms of the local board was that they did not always get enough direction from the national headquarters, from the organization.

GEN HERSHEY: Yes, yes. If he did not like it, it was probably because I told them what, and not how.

INTERVIEWER: When student deferments were big and in the news, and we had a lot of people deferred, you were quoted as having said that lack of definition of 'student' illustrated one of the reasons why local boards can do things that you could never do, because the boards know the truth." I wonder now, looking back, if you would handle the local boards any differently about some of those questions then which you did?

GEN HERSHEY: Oh, hell no, because . . . I'm back to the same old thing . . . tell a guy what to do and train him so he knows how. But never tell him how to do it. Now that's in the training, yes, but when he gets alone somewhere,

and I was in the planning business long enough to know that many and many and many a thing wasn't feasible at all. . .only planned. But you were damn glad that we thought of it because that was the one thing that worked when you got out against actuality and the guy that you trained and if you trained him so he could kill the other guy before he kills him and all that sort of thing and he's out there, he's in little better shape of knowing which one of those things he better use in order to accomplish the purpose. He won't have to telephone Washington and say I got a guy out here and I don't know how long he'll stay still, but I think I got to shoot him, what do you say about it? And of course they'll appoint a board and . . . I think it's horrible that we've let the science that we've had in media to transmit . . . it's a wonderful thing when you want to use it but God, it's awful when you misuse it.

INTERVIEWER: Well, I think one of the points that one of these authors was making was that without national direction in some areas, you'd have a lot of the boards operating one way in Maine and another way in California to the detriment, if you will of . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah, well let's stop for just a minute and these people . . . anybody who said that the local boards didn't have anything, I wonder what they thought. Look up on one of those shelves and you'll see the regulations. Christ, they had to hunt quite awhile to find something they even had to make decisions about. First you had the law. That was one thing that we tried pretty hard to stick within. We tried, not very successfully sometimes, because I never had boys writing regulations. God, how they liked to tell them, you know, too many more people know about details than they do about generalities and therefore, they can

always say, if I don't tell this guy exactly how to do that, well, hell. In the first place when you are at a distance, you're in pretty tough shape of knowing how you ought to do anyway. And I don't . . . if I regretted anything, it probably would be if I ever did try to influence the local guy. He could read the same regulations that I could read. He knew what the code was and not only that, he knew much better than I did that when he took . . . let this guy stay at home. That guy went ahead of time. You don't defer anybody. You just take somebody else quicker and when he's got to take him, you do a hell of a lot more thinking about it than I will. You know, what the hell, I got twelve million.

INTERVIEWER: That's right. If I could continue on that line, General, in 1966 the boards were directed to tighten up on students. And the direction seemed to come informally from a variety of places. It was implied from word of mouth, from state and national headquarters and your editorials in the Selective Service. And one of the authors seemed to find fault with the fact that some . . . a lot of these things weren't formalized with the boards, that they went out informally. Would you comment about the way you managed that part of the . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Oh, yeah, the . . . I can comment very easily on that, obviously, never issue a regulation if you can avoid it. What the hell do you have . . . the people in between but on the other hand, I never let a field officer give an order to a state director. Of course, he was living on the basis as though he didn't have to give orders. His success with this guy . . . this fellow said what the hell are they doing in these other states about something that was bothering him and

he said that well in one place, and he was very careful not telling what state because you can get into trouble pretty easy that way, because maybe somebody don't like the guy over there. You see, they're all . . . In one state I saw a guy doing it this way and in another state does it that way and another did it the other way. And that is a good way to have it. I happen to believe in leadership is what you do in order to make your laws and your regulations live. I've always said that plans have to walk on the legs of the man or I don't want any of them. We first of all were a small organization. I didn't have state directors I didn't know very long and I didn't have any that I know of that I couldn't trust. I had some that telephoned headquarters two or three or four times a week, generally didn't bother me because they wanted to talk to somebody else. The other kind of a guy who says I'm going to do something, what do you think of it? That's a good idea and he's all set. You got another guy who never telephones in. Hell he solves his problems and the percentage is not much different, because in the first place, if a guy wants moral support, that's what you got a boss for. That has to be, if anything's wrong, there's only one guy that needs to be wrong and that's the boss. And so, there wasn't any of them that didn't call the Director, if they wanted something. But normally the field officer could answer it, or a good many times, the guy. Now he's down there, he's the operations officer, but we called him the manpower officer in the old days, Chief of Division, and a good many times it was some of the staff officers that handled that particular thing and some guy got something bothering him and they would telephone in about it. And that's all right, but this thing of telephoning out. I'm saying so and so was

in here to see me, his father was, and I want you to put that boy . . . to defer that boy. The only time I ever deferred anybody was when a fellow made an appeal to the President of the United States and I handled the appeals. But that was another matter. That was a quasi-judicial process and Indiana. Of course, I knew them probably better than some because I had come from there although I didn't know anybody out there, they used to call in and say to the field officer, what's the boss doing about so and so, and I said, we're not through with the damn thing but if that's what he wants that's what he'll get. But, that wasn't that I knew anything about what . . . they were the ones that were making the judgement on this fellow who was somewhere. Personally we didn't. . .but the only thing I ever did was to these guys where there was something in it that I thought ought to have gotten up to the Presidential Appeal Board was to appeal it. I took. . .oh I don't know, I think it was during World War II, I took about 10,000 appeals. But on the other hand, you appeal sometimes knowing pretty well what's going to happen, but the guy that's been to two or three people and they all told him the same, unless he is kind of damn stupid, he gets to thinking that's what it is. And not only that, he can't say well, for instance, "The Senator from your state (motioning to Colonel Elder), Barkley, very fond of him." But Barkley had a very wealthy person down there one time that had a daughter who had polio and had to be carried and they had a negro that carried her around. And Barkley called me up one day and said, "They are taking that boy and so forth and so on and I don't know what I'll do about it." And I said, "Well let me find out the other side of it first."

And so I had a good state director out there, called him up and he said I've been messing with those people for over a year. I told them that they've got to get somebody else because this boy is going to have to go and they came down to the place where we sent him an order and they came in with tears and I said, "All right, now I'm not taking any negroes from Louisville this time. You've got another home down there, I guess it's the capitol. We could move him down there but the next month he goes because we are going to have black call down there and you had about a year and a half now and you've got to get moving." So, this fellow, I had great confidence in him and I called up Barkley and Barkley said, "Well what shall I do?" which is one form of pressure. I said, "It's very simple. You take that letter and go right over to the President of the United States and lay it on his desk and tell your constituents that that's what you did, because what the hell more could he expect you to do?" And he said, "All right, if I do that what happens?" I said, "Well, there's a bag over there and they put on, 'for answer direct to writer,'" and I sent it over. But, they still think that you de-centralize. There are thousands and thousands cases that probably, if they let them come from your damn computer and had some kind of appeal on it that they settled out there and the guy went off to war and probably got killed before he even had time to go through it. I see too much sense in de-centralization, it's based first on faith that I have in human beings. I got let down some, but I don't worry about that because when I got let down, never begin to add up to all the things that the people gave me, over 900 times I have one of the most silliest things that the state

up in Massachusetts handled for John Kennedy. Now John Kennedy was, the Kennedy family. I think I know something about them. Now I was no buddy-buddy with him, but I did know his father some. Well, they always thought to do things, you know. . .hell of a good joke and they were a little rough on Joe. They may have pushed people into the water, but I didn't know about this until afterwards. But he had. . .he wanted somebody to come down to the golf course wherever, on the private course where they were playing and bring an order for induction for one of these guys who was his guest, and the state director said, "You don't do that sort of thing, I don't give a damn who." So he didn't bother me. But, well, of course, he said no use worrying him about it, I can hand it out. So, that's the sort of thing that anybody likes to have and you can't have it if you keep messing around all the time over other people's business, see. That's another matter. That's in another area and not only that, sometimes the guy, the state director takes an appeal himself when he knows about it, but he just wanted to get the thing off of his shoulders and I always encouraged it. The guy did get a little delay out of it. Of course, some of these guys that you run all over hell's half acres to get -- the brown boxer. And then when you finally get him up in the corner they turn him down mentally and then they change the regulations the next time they get him, try to get him, he's become a preacher. They went to the Supreme Court with it. I never blamed him much. I always blamed the managers because generally most of the blacks that I have had that are prizefighters didn't know a lot of things.

INTERVIEWER: I'd like to ask you a question which is contrary to your

concepts. . .I shouldn't say contrary, it's different from the idea of what you are talking about -- decentralization. One of the books I read, alleges, that is, the author alleges, that the draft is a threat to the system of checks and balances because it creates centralized power, unchecked power. I'd like to know your comments on that.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, now, unchecked power, he didn't say where?

INTERVIEWER: In other words, you, General Hershey as the Director of Selective Service, are the final arbitrator of what goes on in the whole draft system, the . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Did he say anything about the fact that the Congress of the United States made the law?

INTERVIEWER: That's what I'm getting at, I think it's a specious argument.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I don't blame him thinking so, because especially if he has lost the case. When I used to defend soldiers, I generally thought it wasn't fair when I got licked. I defended a lot of them in my time. But the . . . if you use power. But of course, you boys are in the profession, what the hell do the . . . why do they send you out with a regiment or a division and you decide the first battalion gets killed first instead of the second. Is that power? But you'd have a hell of a time running a regiment or a division if you couldn't do anything . . .if you'd have to wait until everybody's satisfied.

INTERVIEWER: Well, not only that but the placement of the Selective Service is under the Executive Branch, the President, and so the President or the Executive is checked by the legislature and judicial branch but . . .

GEN HERSHEY: I wonder if they thought . . . I wonder if that guy had any idea that there was any day that I didn't have probably anywhere from 25 to 100 inquiries from Congress. You had to try to satisfy them, but that I believe in firmly, because of course, I have a good many times disagreed with the way I thought the Congress was being handled by the Executive branch. One way is by ignoring them and thinking they are a bunch of flukes. Congress, to me, was the nearest representative we had of the people, and therefore, you tried your damndest to live with them and you didn't expect them to do as much as you did towards living with them. And one of the things I found, I kept a guy, sometimes two or three, on the hill most of the time. I think the present system is that you get letters from the hill and somebody answers, where we answered a lot of letters. But we tried to avoid letters by having guys up there, especially guys that are always running off at the head, trying to keep those guys informed on what the hell was going on. And I think it paid.

INTERVIEWER: Could I ask a follow up question, General? I don't know if this is what the man was talking about or not, but . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I wouldn't expect you to because chances are that he didn't.

INTERVIEWER: . . . Selective Service, you know, the law was passed, the organization was established and it was run by sort of it's own directive and Presidential decree, . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Powered by the Congress.

INTERVIEWER: Right. The question is, during your tenure there, were

there very many tests in the courts about the law and about the way it was run and just in general, if there were hard . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, there were . . . we had . . . Of course, that opens another area that the judicial people was not a part of the Executive Branch of the government and when they have a guy. . . I hate to say this because I knew this boy ever since he was a kid and I know his father very, very well. When you got Ramsey Clark around and expect to have anything, you just can't take a squirt gun and put a fire out. Ramsey came to me when he was a graduate of high school to ask me what I thought about what he ought to do. And he finally went into the Marine Corps because he had an uncle in it. But I did get my liaison officers out and have them give him the works. He was around there about a day or so. Tom, I had known very well, both as Attorney General and later in the Boy Scouts and I . . . it was a very awkward thing because after Tom, the only guy we had on the Supreme Court that you could depend on resigned, or retired so that damn fool Ramsey could become the Attorney General. Well, I mean, and yet I knew Ramsey's situation, knew him before he was married, and he had a child that was not nearly normal, and I worried . . . Tom talked to me about it through the years. That was before he came up here. I went over one day in the White House and they were talking about a lot of things, the President was walking up and down and he said, "Ramsey, another thing, that son-of-a-bitch you got down there . . . that Communist. I want you to get rid of him." "He's a pretty good man, Mr. President." "Don't tell me that. If you're afraid to fire him, by God, I'll fire him." And I thought, a couple of Texans

talking to each other. He didn't fire him but he's still down there, I think. Well, but the life never gets very . . . I mean you get into . . . just everything.

INTERVIEWER: Day to day activities?

GEN HERSHEY: Tom Clark prosecuted the first guy we ever had in 1940 or '41 and he was Attorney General. No he wasn't either. He was the head of the Criminal Division, in fact, I gave Tom, these were perhaps illegal but when we got the badges after the war, for service to Selective Service System, I made a ruling that certain people who were paid people, but who did things beyond what they were paid for, therefore were volunteers. You can disagree with that if you want to, but that's the way I gave Stimson a medal and I gave Tom a medal. See, again, this is power, it is misplaced because I was the guy who decided who the hell got a medal, and I . . . they made me one in gold. The company did and I wouldn't take the damn thing. I don't like anything that they give you, I don't care a damn who they are, or how good friends they are, that's a good way to lose a friend.

INTERVIEWER: Tokens are best, I think. Just carrying that . . . the idea of the draft along, and I wish we could spend days on it because I think there are a lot of good things to be said about it. But right now, one of the issues that faces our Congress is how much money we spend for Defense and so forth. But, one question that comes up in the draft and our national security is whether the demands for national security overshadow a healthy, economic society?

GEN HERSHEY: Now you're talking about CIA or any of its predecessors or FBI. Well, you see, the reason I'm kind of hedging now on this one, is I never had much trouble with these guys. I mean . . . and I didn't

know when they went out and harrassed. Of course, the FBI, when we had some guy we were looking for, they were the guys we notified. And it was true that during the '60's, when I was going places where some people thought I better not go, because you remember there was a time that Johnson didn't go anywhere. But, I don't know, I was a little stubborn about that and at these colleges, I figured that they may not believe anything you say. But I had a feeling that you had to accomplish something when you faced them. And therefore, the FBI were generally pretty good about giving me a rundown on what I could expect, because these guys that are moving around at these colleges made arrangements to be there when you were there. The FBI kept track of them. I suppose that was a bad thing, I don't know. The CIA, you see the CIA was not formed. We had the cloak and dagger fellows in World War II, Donovan, and I knew quite a lot about some of those. Of course, we had some things before that. For instance, the Navy worried when they went into Iceland. That was before the war started and I did allow . . . we gave some papers to some of the guys who were in the Navy, that the contractor could at least think it was a deferment, so that anytime the Navy wanted a guy out of there, they didn't have anything to do with it. You just let the guy know that he wasn't going to be deferred anymore, for at least, he belonged to the Navy. We had some people in South America that were working with the FBI. They were down there presumably selling automobiles or some damn thing, but we knew about them. Then of course, after the CIA came along. Then it was during the Korean War, we got an input and this was the place where I actually deferred a guy, . . . I put a guy in 4-F and he went into the CIA. Never had but one guy got caught on me. This guy came

home about a year ago, that's the singer's nephew. It broke, the publicity did, that he got shot down in a plane over . . . and the Chinese got him and they gave him about twenty years.

INTERVIEWER: Was that the one through Hongkong, when he came through Hongkong?

GEN HERSHEY: That's right. That guy, of course, the local board, they didn't say much. They were quite surprised though to find out where the hell he was, they thought he was 4-F. Well, I don't know, I don't see much of anyway to make excuses. On the security business . . .

INTERVIEWER: That would be both internal and external. I'm saying that you touched upon the FBI and the CIA. But you're saying that you have to have the draft because there's always the external pressure and there's an external threat to somebody . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah, external and internal. I'd want to know pretty much about who was making and deciding what, because there will be times when, God help you, to try to determine which this thing is. For instance, if, what is it, internal or external, last night they tried to see if the President would get into the killing of Kennedy and now if DeGaulle, or . . . I ought to remember because Mrs. Hershey's doctor is the same name as the guy in Cuba, what's his name?

INTERVIEWER: Castro. D. Fidel Castro.

GEN HERSHEY: DiCastro.

INTERVIEWER: Castro. Castro. Fidel Castro.

GEN HERSHEY: Oh, it isn't "De?"

INTERVIEWER: No "De." It's just Castro.

GEN HERSHEY: Castro. Well, anyway, her Puerto Rican doctor is DiCastro. Well, anyway, when they tried to get into whether he had any part in shooting Kennedy. . . is that external or internal? When a guy who apparently was an American citizen, because he had been a Marine, shoots the President of the United States, it's external if they had anything to do with it, but it sure is internal even if they did. And, I probably if I were running the damn thing, I'd want my CIA and FBI to do a little cooperating. When people cross the damn line, you could say well, I've had a guy and he's gone over on your side now. You'll have to just keep watching him. Either the guy that went across, you're taking some liberties away from him, but a lot of you fellows go along on keeping a hell of a lot of people in the penitentiary and if that's isn't kind of curtailing their liberties?

INTERVIEWER: Well then, do you think that the need for an Armed Force, the need for expanding Army, Navy, Air Force and so on, should that be based upon an external threat, or should there be other reasons why you have a standing . . . ?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I think it should be based primarily and certainly defended most of the time, on the external threat; but on the other hand, you sure as hell don't want to set up something to fight somebody that's away and then when you have a disaster or you have a riot or something, you say, "Well, I can't use those folks because they are external people." The hell with that. Survival. When your survival is up, it's all hands, as far as I'm concerned. And I would expect the President or certainly, a commander of forces or commander of a company

as far as that goes, when he's trying to protect his people from getting killed. I don't want to start to determine whether it's external or internal. Shoot them and then decide it afterwards. I realize that may sound, sound a little . . . anything you say sounds rough if it doesn't . . . isn't based on what you are thinking about. Namely, his life or yours. And I never happened to have anybody that bothered me much. But, as a deputy sheriff, sometimes there's crazy people, I kind of wondered. I let a crazy man go upstairs to change his clothes one time and I thought quite a bit about him coming down that damn stairway with a shotgun. But, on the other hand, I happen to be a little . . . ride a horse was as easy with a snaffle. And then I began riding with snaffle to get rid of him if I can. You can't do that with prisoners. You're kind of stuck with either giving him his head and trying to keep his confidence or . . . And I never had to shoot a guy or anything else. I kind of had a guy that I . . . I never liked to put handcuffs on a man. When I'd take them off the prisoner somewhere, I'd kind of let him know that I was going to have to get him there, conscious or unconscious. And I found guys like that respond pretty well. Of course, I happen to believe and I think he thought I believed something about him and not all there is of the things they'd said. And you do have to somehow, get a guy so you can get some sense in him. But hell, I wouldn't want to have a staff that I didn't have a lot of . . .

INTERVIEWER: I want to ask one other question. If you would discuss this system of a draft as it pertains to the procurement of minority group members. In other words, was there a system based upon percentages?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, you see, it started out in World War I or II, they had colored calls.

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned that earlier, I was going to ask you about if you were going to have a black call in the Capitol, did you have, just by race, certain calls?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, you only had two races, black and white. And we'd get some of the God damnest things. One time we got a guy that was out in Virginia as an Indian, or he said he was; but some of these Indians kind of messed around with the blacks for a century or so, and of course if you've got someone with black blood, that's what he was. And if you don't have any black in you, you're white. That is the way we had to run it. If you'd had yellow and everything else, that's something else. Of course, we got away from that but it was not until after the war was over about . . . Truman, I guess, was President before we began to try to . . . see the units were black and they only took people . . . of course there was a balance. It worked out because so many people got rejected that were black or that it helped a little bit. But, otherwise, you'd been in a hell of a fix, because the blacks were getting rejected ninety percent in some of the states down South, and the whites about twenty-eight.

INTERVIEWER: From World War II, you only had two types of races, white and the black. And how about after you worked on breaking the groups out, say in Vietnam, the Vietnam period. You just put them all together or did you . . . ?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, there . . . of course, one of the things that I had quite a lot of problems about, was I took the color off my sheets and caught hell from a lot of folks because most folks were still keeping their statistics on black and white.

INTERVIEWER: And, you know, at the same time, General Hershey, that's when we were caught up in the late 1960's, although we don't say we managed by race, the point was that we had to be aware of the human awareness of the people percentages and so on. Like right now, if you go out. . .

GEN HERSHEY: . . . You had to record it for somebody.

INTERVIEWER: . . . right now, if you go out into a division, and they'll say what are the percentages of people in your units, and what is the breakdown and you have to have it by battalions. So, what you are saying is that you took it off the papers or took it off . . .

GEN HERSHEY: I took it off and I didn't put it back on either, because in the first place, I don't care . . . you can't play both sides of the road. If you want say, we're just not going to look at race okay, and expect me to ask a guy what he is? Suppose he says I'm Hawaiian and I say no you aren't. Of course, this Indian, or said he was Indian, we tried to induct him. And of course, when he went up, I think he went up on a black call, but he raised the hell. And we had it over at the Department of Interior and of course, they wrote ten, fifteen, twenty pages on it. But we didn't know quite as much as we had known before. Hell, he had some Indian blood in him, there was no question about that and this . . . of course he had gone to an Indian School because in Virginia, I don't know whether they still have it, but at that time they

had, up in the hills, they had some Indian Schools and this guy was an Indian when he entered the school, but when the Army looked at him, they said he's black.

INTERVIEWER: You may not know, but the Federal government has complicated the matter even further because Office of Management and Budget, about two years ago, well three or four, said, okay, departments . . . we've got to start making personnel reports to show the ethnic designation of minority people and this added to race, I think eleven or twelve ethnic designations that a man had to choose to further identify himself. And so the problem in that whole field is . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, they created a lot of problems. Now there is an article written by the President of Hillsdale College. And of course, he happens to be in a private school and he doesn't have to worry about Health, Education and Welfare in this outfit over here . . .

INTERVIEWER: As long as he's not taking Federal money.

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah, Federal money because they said we noticed that you do not have eleven percent or twelve percent or whatever it is, blacks on your faculty. And of course, he said I have other methods, I have a lot of things I look for. I look for teachers and not their colors. But, . . . and the medical schools, Purdue. A lot of schools have found themselves in a hell of a fix in having to take people . . . and one of the things, you had to worry not too long ago I guess he was a lawyer but he was . . . they turned him down because of the fact that they had to take a guy that was two or three guys lower than he was on the examinations they had taken because they had to get their percentages of blacks.

Well, he raised hell and they took him as an extra one and he graduated eventually from law school, but I mean, talk about . . . now you've been talking justice to me . . . Well, of course, I can probably argue that it isn't fair to judge people on what they can or can't do but on how much they know. And of course, I could also argue, if being an arguer, that we who started out trying to find whether that guy can do anything, just ask him a lot of stupid questions. I . . . during the war, we used to have guys that drove these trucks out especially in the hilly, icy country . . . these long trucks and some of those guys, probably couldn't pass an examination in most anything. In fact, I had one of the best guys I ever had, for what I had him do at the beginning of the war. But during the war he got a job as a guard in our building and as soon as the war was over they kicked him out because he couldn't, hell he couldn't pass an examination. But, so I hired him, I had to hire him as a laborer although he drove cars because he couldn't . . . and this boy that I got such . . . he's retired now but he comes and helps me some at times, I had to hire him on an hour basis, and not only he's a hell of a lot smarter than a lot of people I know, but somehow or other I think as soon you put something in front of him and started to ask questions or write about it, he just blows his top. But, I've often said that the guy who had just got in from across country, who had a load of ammunition, one of these long trucks on icy roads, and they gave him the examination and found out he didn't know how to drive. Well, and the guy who gave him the examination, couldn't drive a truck to save his soul from hell, and yet he graded it and so that guy isn't a driver because he can't answer these questions. Well, who wrote the questions?

INTERVIEWER: And the . . . if you'll go back General Hershey, and just briefly explain, if you could, the black call. Was it strictly nationwide? Would you have a black call in one month or would you pick out states that would have . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, of course, one of the problems . . . we didn't control that. We got a guy from the Department of the Army, it wasn't the Department of the Army it was the War Department then. When we had a black call we had no problem because we had plenty. But when they didn't have a black call, then we had a lot of problems. I think I said to you one time Massachusetts, had more people in the Army within from 18 to 35 than any other state except Nevada. But on the other hand, they had taken married whites with children a year ahead of South Carolina because South Carolina had so many blacks. And of course, we couldn't. . . and they were whites. When they get their share out of the whole, they would raise hell but it didn't last too long. And they had a lot of youngsters down there, 20, 22, or 23 years old, single and black. Of course, the next thing that came along, they took examinations and ninety percent of them failed.

INTERVIEWER: And then they were rejected.

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah, in fact, this black boy now, I guess he's a world champion again is he?

INTERVIEWER: Pardon me?

GEN HERSHEY: This world champion, the black . . .

INTERVIEWER: World champion?

GEN HERSHEY: Yes, he's the world champion . . .

INTERVIEWER: Cassius Clay.

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah, Cassius, I had quite a long time . . . occasionally . . . I had no feeling about Cassius. Cassius, after all, he went up and the Army wouldn't take him. And then a year or so later, they got so they needed people badly, and they said they would take him and then he of course, by that time he had become a, not a sheik, a preacher . . .

INTERVIEWER: A Muslim, that's right, a Black Muslim.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, the Black Muslims, I knew . . .

INTERVIEWER: . . . all their folks are preachers.

GEN HERSHEY: I knew that Black Muslims very early in their inception. They came from Chicago and they of course, all those guys with their regular creed have trouble with their preacher because somebody says a minister has got to graduate from high school and go to seminary and then . . .

INTERVIEWER: That's usually a minimum requirement.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, of course, we had down in the, down along the Appalachia and we had a lot of people preaching on license. Of course, I have trouble with the . . . When the intellectuals try to decide who will be a preacher and I think primarily his job is faith. And I don't believe, in fact, I believe the contrary, that the more formal education you get, the less faith you have. I hope that isn't true but I've had quite a little indication . . .

INTERVIEWER: You know it seems to me . . . I don't know how you feel, General, but it seems like the nation watched that case very carefully, that went up the legal . . . the due process chain, and I think the . . . it seemed to me that the nation was satisfied once Ali had gone the due process of law route, enough said.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I had to worry about the fact they didn't get him, but I did worry about the fact that the Armed Forces were so God damned simple that when they had him, they wouldn't take him. And then when somebody had to go and get him again, then of course, they were ready to take him. Of course, you can't blame them for not taking people unless they have to. But one of the reasons you don't induct anybody if you can support by enlistments, and I don't think it is a matter of justice, I think it's a matter of convenience. And now, the recruiting. What in the hell's happened? The recruiting is open again. There was quite a thing about, it was just yesterday, I believe, . . .

INTERVIEWER: I think it's open, it's . . . apparently all the services are doing very well right now.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, that's what I heard.

INTERVIEWER: In other words, they are booked up, they have waiting lines . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, what are they spending 600,000 dollars for publicity on jingles about recruiting, about joining?

INTERVIEWER: Well, let me ask you since you interjected, that was a question I was going to ask you later, because . . . What is your opinion about the recruiting efforts. I'll tell you my opinion, General Hershey, very briefly. In Germany, I was there at the time when we were caught up with all the programs and the changes. And we had a tremendous recruiting effort going on, "Join the Army. They showed a big castle in Europe, . . . come to Europe and travel and so on. And then a soldier would come into a unit and he'd be faced with the realities of barracks life or what it's like to be a soldier. So, you mentioned the 600,000 dollars. When N. W. Ayer got the contract in 1970 time frame for recruiting it was a

10,000,000 - 13,000,000 dollar effort. But, on recruiting then, you know, the longer hair, the attractiveness, the glamor, how do you think a recruiting campaign ought to be . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I . . . of course, one of the things that just goads the hell out of me is, "Come and let the Army join you!" Now, by Christ, if my Army has gotten to the place in the United States where it has to go around and ask to join people. Two or three reasons I don't like it. I don't like what it does to the Army, but the second I don't like it because of what it does to the boy. It isn't fair to the boy. You'll find out pretty soon that that wasn't the way that it works. Well, of course, now mind you, I had a battery during the days when recruiting was tough. You couldn't get anybody unless he was ignorant, or couldn't get a job anywhere else. One day we were getting ready to go out for a month and we had a recruit join us. Now they came of course, we didn't have to worry about them because they had no training. He joined the unit. He came with his stuff in his shelter half and tied over his shoulder and he got there just as we were ready to march and I put him on a caisson and we got him that evening when we helped him, he kind of got so that he could roll up his stuff a little bit, and I wanted to see him quick. After all, I was going to live with him or he was going to live with me, and I hope that he would do his share of it. So I came in and I said, "Well, where did you come from?" "Nebraska." "How did you come to get down here?" He said, "Well, I don't just know. I enlisted and he was ordered to Corregidor to study Civil Engineering." And now on the other hand, I recruited people in 1913 and I'd get awful tired when I

get a letter now, once in awhile, from the Department of the Army, telling me that we are in times now, where people just don't have any respect for the Army and this and that and the other thing. I wonder what the hell they thought it was in 1913. I was recruiting for the National Guard, but they didn't wish to leave home and they were saying I didn't raise my boy to be a soldier. We've never had people just dying to get in. Bill Bryan, of course said, wanted to say something about a million men getting in overnight. And Christ at that time we were having a hell of a time trying to get to enlist. I was in the enlistment business for two months before we mobilized in 1917. One time we went over to an adjoining county that had no unit but we thought we could do something. We had a sheepskin band and some speakers and when we got through we said, "well, now if you want to come up to the courtroom, we'll enlist you." And we'd had already sent one of the recruiters up and I was a First Lieutenant at that time and I had the damndest time getting up that stairway and I thought, Christ, we got a battalion, I guess. And I got up and I went in the . . . the guy's still, I guess he's in the hospital over here now, he's retired Colonel. I said, "How are you coming Fred?" And he said, "They want to know how to get out of it, I haven't got anybody yet." And we got one guy that night and damned if he didn't get turned down. We had five hundred people, probably a thousand down in the yard, but we had five hundred upstairs. Of course, we passed a draft law by that time and they said now I've got sixty-eight or . . .you know. So, I'm not as discouraged as some people are but I don't think that you ever ought to, in selling people, that I'd probably go along with a little with the way I've heard old Patton

talk at times. "Well, son, you're reporting you know, I don't know if I can use you or not, you've got to be a pretty tough man in my outfit. We can't have". . . The old guy said, "Well, let's go out for a walk, if you get tired, I'll go on." "Sit down son." I mean, that was the kind of guy he was looking for. But this thing of trying to make a guy think he never has to do anything and has everything, what the hell do you expect then, when he gets disgusted?

INTERVIEWER: Well, I agree with you and at the time in Europe, this was where your unit commanders, your company commanders come in. I had the toughest time with a lot of soldiers as a battalion commander but I knew my company commanders had a tougher time because they had to tell that soldier how the life really was. And, you know, it wasn't glamorous, and it wasn't everything personalized. It was a tough life, they had to work hard. And they didn't get a whole lot of sleep, and they were away training a lot of times and the guy said, "Gee, this isn't what I thought it was all about." And we said, "Well, unfortunately, we are the bad guys, we're telling you how it is." And now, I've heard . . .

GEN HERSHEY: I wish somebody had told them that it was beer and skittles.

INTERVIEWER: That's what?

GEN HERSHEY: Somebody told them that it was all going to be all beer and skittles over there. And Christ when they got over, and that's one thing with kids, sometimes you have to push kids around more than you'd like to. But if they kind of get an idea that they've got. . .there are some things they have to do and they have to be done if they don't get some other ideas.

INTERVIEWER: Well, I think also, at this time we're going through a phase, you know, we are all so affluent. We've got a lot of money, we've got wealth and so on and the kids, like you say, are students, they are used to a comfortable life, so we have to appeal to them, but in the same vein, we've got to build a strong Army.

GEN HERSHEY: I try to go back past the American University and you can hardly get through the streets because they all have cars, of course. They have to park all over up there. And of course, now the old man speaks, when I went to school there were two boys in our town that did drive their car once in a while but there wasn't any other students driving cars. It wasn't . . . the distance was not great and we walked. They didn't even have bicycles.

INTERVIEWER: I've got another question in relation to the draft requirement and this ties in with the draft call requirement in conjunction with the troop draw down in Vietnam. That was the time we were bringing troops out of Vietnam in 1969, 1970 and in that time frame.

GEN HERSHEY: What do you mean when . . .

INTERVIEWER: We had two ways we were going. We were having a draft call bringing people in, and we had soldiers coming out of Vietnam. Would you be able to comment on the coordination, or the problems, or just how tough a problem that was to . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, it was no tough problem, although of course one thing about it was helpful. We haven't been so unfortunate or lucky to have the hell bombed out of us every few days. When you do, I asked a lot of

English friends during the war and they didn't have to tell their people there was a war on. We had a hell of a job because it was a long ways off but of course, after the casualties began to come, then you begin to have help. But that was the time that the damn fools wouldn't let anything out, wouldn't publish the casualties when they first let them come out. And when the enemy began to take their toll from us, we had the damndest time of finally getting the Ben Franklin into New York harbor since it was blown to hell and gone and from then on they didn't have very much trouble understanding that there was still a war on. Some though the war was over and they weren't telling people. Well, of course, you see, a lot of the ordinance places were pretty well up to where they were going and were letting folks out and there was a lot of things going on that made the guy think the war was over. But when they saw Ben Franklin, you could tell something wasn't over yet. And here's the problem though when we first went over to Korea and we ordered a lot of our Reserves and Guard up. The Marines headed our company up in Montana and by God, if they were going. And . . .they had them over there and had guys killed when they had been in the National Guard just two months because the company had just been formed in this Reserves unit. Now, the task force always raises hell. In fact, Bob Taft and he was a good guy, but he just gave us hell on legislation during World War II because people hadn't had long basic training. . .that is, when you got a guy killed. We had a lot of people killed in World War I that didn't know how to load the gun yet, but that way they got killed and didn't kill anybody else at least. I supposed they saved somebody. But

it is difficult. And not only that but these guys, these justice guys, why do you have one National Guard unit, for instance. I got in between Oklahoma and Kansas in Korea. Oklahoma Division Mobilized immediately. Kansas had a lot of troops and never went. So, there was woman down in Wichita phoning her sister down to Oklahoma City and her sister said, "Has Charlie gone yet?" "No, well, how about your boy?" She said, "Why don't you get your boy," this is the girl in Kansas, "Why don't you get your boys into the Guard." She said, "That's where they are and that's why they've been gone for the last six weeks." Well, but these guys that want everything to be equal. I don't know how in the hell you do it. If somebody has to sleep outdoors in Alaska, should we make everybody sleep outdoors like everybody else, just so we have it all just? I don't think so, because that's stupid. But it is awfully hard to have some people and that's one thing about the volunteer system. That when they are carrying all the load, they obviously think it's unfair. And when the load is easy, they are all willing to carry it. When it starts killing people, then you ought to have some assortment of killed because . . . these local board members, they caught it when they began to get their losses. But on the whole, I thought in World War II, people did very, very well. There was a lot of local boards telling me, it was certainly tough last week, we had three boys they found out they had been killed.

INTERVIEWER: More specifically, in the control of the numbers and the strength of the Army for the strength of the Armed Forces. When you saw the soldiers coming out of Vietnam, in other words, there'd be 25,000

and 50,000 and so many. Were you brought in. . .I'm sure you were brought in, but just the coordination. This is going to be our in strength of the Army and this is going to be the in strength of the Navy and so on, and then the regulation that you had to exercise in regulating your draft calls in a very . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, first of all, way before that you got to know where you are so you can either get people available, to get them classified and you get them examined so that if somebody tells you it's going to be 25,000 next month and then says it's 225,000. That you got to work on and I worried probably more about not being ready to deliver, than for them to have to have the call cut down. Well, in the first place, I knew you were going to catch hell but I'd rather catch hell for cutting something down than catch hell for having somebody lose the war. There's no question about that. And of course, the people who are going to kick are the ones that have to go after these other guys are coming home. But at least, you can say to him, "Well, would you be better satisfied, if they'd been over there and shot at more than they are going to shoot at you for the rest of the time." It's not a very good argument but sometimes it quiets a guy down. Some guys, there is no use what you say to them. And a great many times they are the ones that haven't suffered . . . the people that had five kids lost on one ship, they did have two other children. But of course, there you are, that's the volunteers for you because they got them to enlist, because they could go on the ships with his brothers. So, and of course, you'll have areas. It all depends. Where I had some people I knew pretty well and they still reacted a little bit to the casualty they suffered in World War I. And really

should have been in some other National Guard unit that either didn't get over or didn't get shot up.

INTERVIEWER: The Secretary of the Army right now is concerned about the fact that we are enlisting a lot of members of minority groups and the percentage is rising. His concern is strictly because of the number of casualties that we might lose because most of them will end up in combat arms and that's where the casualties come from. That, you know, is a difficult subject to talk about. Just who do we want to have killed in the defense of our country.

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah, and he knows something about it because he's a Congressman from the Fort Benning district.

INTERVIEWER: That's right, he was, in fact.

GEN HERSHEY: The . . . he sent the troops from Fort Benning from and he was sitting on the district down there, I remember it very well. I never knew him much but I knew he was one of the guys who were catching hell. Of course, this is one of the advantages of letting the regulars fight first.

INTERVIEWER: Well, I'll tell you right now, and it's on the record, he's a very dynamic fellow. I doubt if the Army has ever had a more dynamic Secretary because he takes problems like that and hits them head-on. He started things around the Army staff now that somebody asks a question, no matter how tough the first words spoken in reply are "I'm glad you asked that question." He thinks the Army ought to be able to stand up and answer tough questions and so do I.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I think that's good . . . Now days, everybody says I hope you have a pleasant day. I had a guy who called me up yesterday

and he wanted to run down the record of a transfer from 4,000 acres of the Boy Scouts and when it happened and so forth and so on, and these are the guys that knew a lot of people that I know down in Missouri. But anyway, when he got through, he said, "Well, thanks and hope you have a nice day." Well, the girls in the stores, the girls that . . . even the, when you get off the plane, the girls said, "Well, I hope you have a pleasant day," makes no difference how hard it's raining.

INTERVIEWER: Let me ask you a question, General, through the years, Selective Service and the Military Service have sort of been jointly responsible for determining a guy's qualifications to serve, and . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Wait a minute. Who?

INTERVIEWER: Selective Service.

GEN HERSHEY: What did we have to do with it? Now, you are talking about qualifications?

INTERVIEWER: Well, qualifications, sir, the military does the mental and the physical and moral qualification to serve. All other things, Selective Service handles about whether he should be deferred or whether he should not.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, they handled . . . when it got to . . . we did . . . I went through this with a girl named Green, who was writing her Ph.D. on the early examination. And she had an idea that Selective Service examine them. Well, now, they did certain things you called obvious defects all the way, but what happened? When we got started in 1940, the load of trying to get examiners fast enough was just, . . . and

then they appealed to us to give them at least a screening examination and we examined about 14,000,000 before we got through with it. And I have said a great many times, if somebody will ever get doctors to examine 14,000,000 again for nothing, I'll take off my hat to them. They'll be dead. We didn't pay our doctors, and most of the time they handled these things at night. For instance, we used to . . .

INTERVIEWER: Didn't they all the way through Vietnam?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, you see in Vietnam all we did was try to eliminate a man if he had an obvious defect. In the first place, we didn't have a lot of money to send him up to have him turned down.,

INTERVIEWER: You may not know in the latter years. The Army got in the business of helping make that determination on a requested basis.

GEN HERSHEY: They what?

INTERVIEWER: Got into business of helping the local doctor because of the problems . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, all they did was to set up certain things but the . . . Remember, the law in 1940 said, "that a man should be inducted only after he's been examined and accepted by the Armed Forces." Because we had 250,000 in World War I that were inducted by the local boards there. They had the authority. They were sent down and then were sent back and then we got into a big legal question about whether they were in. The Army chose to discharge them from the draft, so they never had any draft. I think they got some legislation to lift the Veterans Administration benefits and administer the guys discharges

from the draft the same as they did those discharged from the Army. But we had 250,000 and never discharged from the Army, although they reported at the Army and stayed long enough to get examined and rejected.

INTERVIEWER: The question I'm leading to is just speaking in general terms, what's your opinion about the standards that have been used and the methods that have been used, . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I wouldn't do too well on that because procurement always is of course, trying to get . . . take anybody they can. I think if I'm trying to be scientific, I would say that I have never found examinations that determined what they ought to determine. And I'm not so sure. . . I'm being a counselor here, and out on some drug business and we have feasibility and advisability and I don't know how feasible it is to ask people to have guys come through too damn fast and determine whether or not that guy will be able to make a soldier or not. Because I know damn well they run down some people that they shouldn't. Of course, they had something wrong with them, there's no question about that, but most people do. And of course, it makes a little bit of difference what kind of spirit the guy's got because there are men that have dragged some legs a long ways, that other people wouldn't even be able to walk on. So, I don't know what the answer is. Of course, I got caught among the psychiatrists. I happen to have some sympathy for psychiatrists because I'm sort of a . . . well, I like to think I'm sort of a jawbone psychiatrist anyway. That's part of the area I'm interested in of a human being. Not his head, because I don't happen to believe that you devise people into mental, moral and physical. I don't think there is any division. I'll grant you he has a heart that beats

a certain thing, but that damn heart beats differently when the guy's frightened and if the heart is so much by itself, why don't that just beat on and pay no attention to the fact that he's terrified. Why is it that his bowels move so much when he's frightened. Why is it that adrenalin goes in to make the blood go faster, the heart beat faster, the lungs take air faster and so forth? A lot of things happen but the . . . and to follow the pace where the food is being digested is all out of kilter. I think if a guy . . . I think his morale depends on a lot of things and generally it involves his health. His attitude has something to do with it. The whole damn thing is . . . and they don't examine a whole guy . . . these experts, each one looks at his chunk. And yet, I shouldn't be trying general practitioners although there is something to be said for them. And at the present time, we are dealing with about three different departments for Mrs. Hershey alone. And I got three departments that I'm dealing with. She's got a heart department, and she's got an indigestion department and she's got one other outfit that we see once in a while. We get along pretty well, too. But yet, I'm right now at a place where I've had a guy two years ago, say that my retina was in such a shape that I should never mess with it. In the last six weeks, I've had two guys that work for this fellow. They said your retina is all right, and therefore, we could proceed with taking off the cataract. Well, I don't know what the answer is. I think probably now, if I were sure that I wasn't going to be involved in some health difficulty for Mrs. Hershey most anytime, I'd probably have the damn thing taken off. But I don't want . . .

just at the present time, I . . . we don't know what day we are breathing and what day we are not.

INTERVIEWER: Nothing is ever black and white.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, and if the guy for ten years she had and two or three different doctors that gave her emphysema. And what she has is the . . . the thing around the heart problem.

INTERVIEWER: One last question for this session, here, sir, deals with a comment that was made by General Gross, whom we interviewed. General Gross is very loyal to you and he thinks very highly of you and I'm sure you'll . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Yes, but we'll have to take some percentage off because . . . well, I don't want to bet that a lot of my boys . . . you better be careful about believing them too much because they were loyal to me.

INTERVIEWER: This question, I thought was interesting question and it ties in to this draw down of Vietnam and the cutting down of your draft calls. But, General Gross had mentioned that during the Battle of the Bulge, apparently the Selective Service was criticized for not providing sufficient manpower to satisfy the Service needs and I'd just like to know what your comments were . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I think, . . . I think I know what he's talking about. And I think they widened it a little bit besides the Battle of the Bulge because I think the boys were left on the beaches in Italy without any transport and . . . I could dig up for you sometime if you want to read it. In the first place our tangle . . . I went over to see

General Marshall about it and I got a copy of his final report before it was published, not that it did any good, because it was printed, but he said that he charged us as having not met our calls, which was true. But, of course, the thing was this long harangue which I wrote and took over to him. In the first place, the Armed Forces discharged, oh I don't know, two or three hundred thousand at the point of embarkation because they decided they didn't want to take them. Now, maybe you trained a guy and then decided that he . . . of course you find out more by training them and the next thing was they had given the Navy their men during the times when they were coming pretty good but the main thing they did, though was wrong. They allowed . . . they took people out of their units they had at colleges, 100 or 150,000 of them. And those people were in the line to be shipped abroad, but when they took them out and sent them to basic training, you see, the number of people that went abroad fell off. Hell you couldn't send people abroad until they had been trained and it didn't make any difference how many people you do or don't get, when you get them it's six months at least. They had a law that they had to have six months service before you shot them, and so I think he's referring to that controversy. I never was very satisfied about it, because General Marshall whom I have very, very high regards for, but not as a man. I happen . . . if I were running the store, I'd have looked anywhere at tactics, strategy, operations. . . a lot of things. But one of the things he had and it wasn't his fault I guess, and I don't know whether it was Milliard White's or not, but he was off 800,000 on how many people they had at one time.

INTERVIEWER: What you're saying is the problem that occurred . . . look, let's put it two ways. First of all, Selective Service couldn't respond fast enough to a tactical battle to . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, no matter how many we brought in . . .

INTERVIEWER: That's right, they still had to go through training and all the rest . . .

GEN HERSHEY: And not only that, when you get them in and you take them to the places of embarkation and then turn loose a hundred and some thousand of them, that's going to throw off your program to beat hell. Then if you take another hundred thousand and instead of sending them to basic training, or send them to basic training. When you take them out of your college group, they aren't going to be . . . and so, of course, it was true that we didn't always make the numbers of people, although, I think over the whole, I think it's pretty good. But remember that if they were wise, they always asked for enough people to meet their needs with liberal percentages of them that don't make it and that you discharge along the way. When you mobilize, start to mobilize, sometimes the day before you started de-mobilizing. Well, you brought up one thing, when you are trying to get out . . . but the people they had down in Vietnam. God knows, they were enough, but 5,000,000 is quite a lot of difference than 16,000,000, that's about we processed and they didn't get them all in and didn't have them all in . . . I think about 12,000,000 is about the most they ever had at any one time. And the war lasted four, five or six years. And of course, the numbers we had

at the time in Vietnam. And that was in our favor, because of. . .it was not doing good for the Armed Forces. When you are trying to run a war on two-year men. And not using them one of the years of the two. And so, on this, of course, it's long gone. But we finally went after the Department of the Army after the war was over to be sure they watched what they were doing when they put people in schools in the service and counting those people and then suddenly deciding to use them and started thinking of them as available as those that had basic training.

INTERVIEWER: That is our system now, that we developed the system, of course, there always was a system but it was charging and controlling that system of a transient account of about 50,000 people. There were 50,000 people going around, unaccounted for. In other words they were between units. They were in school or coming out of school and so that they were accounted for but they were unaccounted for as far as . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah, but you see, one of the places that you got 800,000 all was shipping people east and west and people picking them up when they got notice they were embarking. Now, they'll probably come off several numbers short or long on these groups because you are getting all sorts of damn notice at different times of who has got what and then they change and . . . it's quite a thing. And so, . . . it did upset us quite a bit because, well, there a little earlier and it did have some bearing on it. We had a supply that was running, first of all we ran up to forty-five, well, they didn't have very much of that, they didn't want it, so we cut back to thirty-five. And, we were at thirty-five when Milliard White called me one night and said, "Are you standing

up?" And I said, "Yes." "Well", he said, "Sit down, I got something I want to tell you about." He said, "Can you stop inductions tomorrow?" This is in the Spring.

INTERVIEWER: Which Millard White is that?

GEN HERSHEY: He was a G-1. He was a National Guardsman from Georgia. I think Millard is living out here somewhere now. Mrs. White is dead and he's got a son Millard, Jr. who is either in the Air Force or retired, the hell of it is, I retired, too. Well, anyway, I knew Millard very well and of course, he had his troubles trying to keep track of all these damn people and he said . . . I finally sold him on keeping everybody under 26, but you see we immediately found ourselves shut off without . . . we had to go up later to 27 and then later go up to 30, and God, that's pulling teeth. When you . . . in a war have had set-up started at first at 45, then 35, then 26, then 27 and then 30, he said, "What the hell, you weren't taking them only up to 26." Well, that was about the time we got in this area where they didn't know for sure how many people they were going to get.

INTERVIEWER: He called you one day and told you could you stop . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Yeah, but we finally . . .

INTERVIEWER: . . . wasn't there any notice . . .

GEN HERSHEY: It wasn't right. Well, what we did, we wired them that night to turn back everybody that was over 26. Well, . . .

INTERVIEWER: That creates a few problems and lot of heartburn and people . . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, of course, it is our justice again.

INTERVIEWER: Well, that's right in . . .

GEN HERSHEY: You know, you see sometimes, the statue of justice. Did you ever notice she quite often has a bandage over her eyes? She's got the scales, all right, but she has a bandage over her eyes, so she can't see. Well, I don't want to make light of it but . . . and I had been a counsel at courtmartial long enough to know that sometimes your argument is not very good but it's all you got. And so you have to hammer as hard as you can so that the guys say "well it isn't fair", and if he says, "who for, you or the other guy?" "For me." "Well," I said, "Of course not for you." But on the other hand, you went through college didn't you?" "I know a hell of a lot of people that didn't get to go to college, that wasn't fair either was it?" Well, in other words, there is no use running around hunting things that aren't fair. And of course, you can always say to an old man, if he would have what was fair, he'd been dead long ago. Kids, the average age . . . of course when you go running around averages, you got something on your hands.

INTERVIEWER: That's like you mentioned earlier, there is no average -- what's an average person? There is no average person.

GEN HERSHEY: And there's never a man . . . the average man. Well, I don't know, I think I could . . . if you'd like to see that damn thing? Well, I don't want to say I think I can find it quick.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, no. If you find it, before my next trip we can bring

it down you know, the next trip. But I think for this particular session, we'll conclude with this question and then what we'll do is we'll proof this tape write it out and then we'll come down again on the 16th and that'll be a resumé of what we've discussed, if that's agreeable?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, yes. When you guys are doing the work, you don't need to worry much about me.

Insert: General Hershey's letter to General Marshall is printed on page 299 of Special Monograph, Number 18, Volume 2, "Evolution of the Selective Service Program", Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1956.

SECTION 4

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL LEWIS B. HERSHEY

By

Colonel Bob Elder and Lieutenant Colonel Jim Hattersley

TODAY IS THE 16th OF MAY 1975. WE'RE SEATED IN THE HOME OF GENERAL HERSHEY IN BETHESDA, MARYLAND. THIS IS ONE OF A SERIES OF INTERVIEWS IN WHICH WE ARE GETTING SOME INSIGHTS OF GENERAL HERSHEY ON EVENTS AND ACTIVITIES THAT TOOK PLACE DURING HIS 56 YEARS OF ACTIVE SERVICE. COLONEL JIM HATTERSLEY AND I, COLONEL BOB ELDER, ARE INTERVIEWING GENERAL HERSHEY AS PART OF THE ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM OF THE U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE IN CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA, WHICH PROVIDED THE SUPPORT FOR THESE DISCUSSIONS. COLONEL JIM HATTERSLEY HAS THE FIRST QUESTION.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, this will be a continuation of some of our past talks and interviews. This first question I'm going to ask deals with the responsibility of the nation and the individual of the nation. In one of the books that I've read, again I go back to Steven Reeves, he feels that there may be a time when the people will turn to the State and ask the State to die for them rather than them to die for the State. I think that is a rather overly liberal statement. I was just wondering what your views are on it.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I don't see any question about the truth of it? I don't know if anybody consciously sat down and said, "Now, I'm going to help kill the State." There's no question about the fact that when you got. . .sort of. . .to a place where. . .somewhere not anywhere near a majority of the people or contrary to the whole business, I think that's exactly what's going to happen. That's one of the things that frightens us. When we think somebody, in order to protect his individual desire, is willing to be a party to kill the State. Of course, there are probably some compromisers in the way that might. . .ought to be moved instead of making everybody else move. But then he goes on to find a place he likes

better. Well, of course, one of the things that I always got shouted back at me was, "Well, I don't know any place I like better than here." Then you've got the case where a guy won't eat and he won't let anybody else eat. I don't know. I don't think there's any question about it, but that doesn't help it any. To say that anytime enough citizens wanted to kill their State, they can kill it. Because one thing about it, I think in most of the wars, whenever the time came, when people began to realize that there was no chance to win, which probably might have been one of the times when they decided to abandon so much territory down in Vietnam. As soon as that happens, the whole question of fear as a complex comes into being, and you can't tell what they'll do. You can bet they aren't going to do much of anything unless they do it without intention. Because they have lost faith. Faith, of course, is far more important than knowledge in maintaining any sort of a structure. Whether it's a family, a State, a business, or a nation.

INTERVIEWER: In that regard, just to take it a step further. I used to have a hard time myself, accepting that proposal that you would ask the State to die for you. In other words, you're speaking in terms of a consensus, the number of people, as long as they want the State to die for them. Do you think it's a legitimate. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I don't think that they want the State to die for them. I think they're so short-sighted that they think they can have their food, eat it, and still have it on hand. I think that most of the individuals . . .of course, I don't like to tear into so-called liberals. . . but most of the things, they've got to the place where they've lost sight of anybody else's rights or priviledges except their own. They're willing

to even bust up the State to do. . .I don't like to have them say that, "The State dies for them." The State dies because of them. There was no question about that, if there were enough of them. Of course, when you start shooting, the people who don't belong, in the primitive thing, you just killed them. It's a tough thing, but that's the way you got rid of a great deal of opposition. . .In the first place, a lot of the folks who didn't agree with you died. A lot of people who didn't agree with you decided they'd rather live and agree with you. So they stopped doing the things that got them killed in order to discipline yourself. But we've gone pretty far in our humanity business. In fact we agreed, you know, last week on humanity. You know they robbed and killed 600-800 people. They didn't want to kill anybody. But they stuck one guy's eye out. But that was in the name of being good to each other.

INTERVIEWER: Well, I just fall back to our history lessons and some of the quotes, "United we Stand, Divided we Fall". In this particular aspect, the divisiveness and the attitudes of selfishness, the way I see it, would corrupt and destroy our State.

GEN HERSHEY: I don't think there is any question about it. Of course, I just happen to believe that the majority of our people are better than the people that are making the noise about what they believe. That's my only hope. If I believed all of the things of the people I deferred to go to college, so they got their doctor's degree, we were goners.

INTERVIEWER: Let me ask a question about General Hershey. George Reedy, who was a member of the Burke Marshall Commission, in his book Who Will Do Our Fighting for Us in 1969, described General Hershey as follows: "Of all of the myths I have encountered on college campuses, the most absurd is the

idea that Lewis B. Hershey is a second rate time server who owes his position solely to friendships he has established over the years. This concept, of course, has survived very few college appearances by Hershey. His steel trap mind, card file memory, and comprehensive grasp of the subject are just too obvious to permit the audience to sustain its illusion." And to finish off the picture, "Generations of critics have gone through his agency with a fine comb to locate evidence of chicanery and have emerged empty handed." He says further, "That there is simply not enough knowledge available and concentrated on a continuing basis to best General Hershey in an argument." Is that a fair assessment of the General Hershey who was running Selective Service?

GEN HERSHEY: Oh, I don't think so. In the first place obviously, if I were in a law suit, I'd accept it immediately. But if I'm going to be perfectly candid, this fellow I knew pretty well. He was a new talent and later in government. He did sit through one or two of the times when Burke Marshall was trying to tell the President of the United States how we ought to get everything in here in Washington and handle things the proper way. He was present that night. Before we got through, the boss said, "Tell them what you told me the other night." Of course, I went back to the old story. If the responsibility is down where it is, get the people who were doing what had to be done or know something about what ought to be done. At least have a feeling that they are given the responsibility of saving their own lives as they can. They don't have to sit around and wait for somebody to come and tell them how to do it. That's a philosophy of believing in people and getting them to believe in you, by giving them their heads. When we were on the farm and we used to

get lost once and a while at nights especially, generally our old horses we were riding were using their heads. They took us home. But you can't do that if you think you know more than the horse.

INTERVIEWER: Let's follow along with a question about the 1969 time frame. It was on October the 10th, to review, in 1969, that President Nixon announced that he was appointing a new Director of Selective Service. It was expected at the time it would be a civilian who would become your deputy for a while and then take over in February of '70. You're quoted as having said earlier that you would stay on the job until you got sick or got fired. A White House spokesman at the time described General Hershey as in excellent health and in excellent spirits. I was wondering if you could discuss some of the things behind the scenes.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, most of that's true. The day that they announced that somebody was going to take my place, I had about, I guess, an hour maybe talking to the President. Strangely enough, we didn't talk about any of the things that was going to happen. I knew what was going to happen. But I was told, oh, several months before that, that I ought to go see the President and I intended to go any time that he sent for me. Because my philosophy was that I went to see the President when he wanted to see me. He was the guy that was busy. I finally got told that I was going on the 16th of February because that's when I enlisted in the National Guard originally. I figured that there was no use in going to talk to him then. Talking time was over. But they sent for me, and I went. We talked very pleasantly about a lot of things. But we didn't even mention the fact that they were going to announce immediately after I left at a press conference that I was going to leave. Now, it is true that I said that I

didn't ask for the job. It was given to me without my request. In the old times if you wanted to come and get it, come and get it. But I had a son and a son-in-law and a grandson in Vietnam at that time and I hadn't any intentions of abandoning the boat. I wasn't fooling them. Because in the first place, I'm not trying to brag about how much courage I had. It didn't take any courage. Because when the thing is gone anyway, what are you worrying about. You know, who can tell you anything after you've already done the work you can do. There's no sense in scaring a guy to death because he isn't any threat to them. Of course, he might not have promoted me, I thought they were dragging their feet a little about that. But some of the boys that I knew over there, I guess probably the Department of the Army was giving them a little trouble. I don't blame the Department of the Army. Normally, they prefer to do their own promotions. The story was that I wasn't there. The President sent over word that he had sent over a directive to recommend me for a promotion. But he didn't ask their advice. . .that he'd like to have it forthwith. Whether he did. . . You hear all sorts of stories.

INTERVIEWER: Well, about the time then when you were replaced, President Nixon said, "That you had served with distinction, and the nation owes General Hershey a hearty well done."

GEN HERSHEY: We came to dinner, but didn't allow any pictures or publicity.

INTERVIEWER: But you were promoted to four stars and appointed as a full time Presidential Advisor on Manpower. I think Jim may have a question in that area.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I wasn't blaming the President; he had a lot of problems. Of course, I knew very well from 1940 that I was going to be along there,

that it got so that somebody thought I was more expense than I was income. Now, that's all there is of it. But there's no use sitting around and worrying about it. It doesn't come any quicker and it doesn't come any later. "Is" is the only verb that you need very much of.

INTERVIEWER: Well, what Bob had mentioned there. . .the one question that I have on your duties in the latter part of your active service. That was, what were your duties, and the acceptance of your views while you were Personal Advisor to the President on Manpower Mobilization?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I think of that as being quite frank. I'd say nothing. I'd say quite a lot of stuff. But unfortunately, I represented something that had been. I never had any idea that if we could get the war over, we were going to keep on drafting people. That's probably one of the big things that I didn't get anywhere on. I'm not so sure. . .Maybe, I picked up something the other day. I had thought it would be very bad if they lifted the power of the President to induct. At that time. . .my memory may not be so good. . .I thought we were in a very unusual position. Both the Chairmen of the Armed Forces Committee in the House and Senate were advocating the continuing the power of the President. Now, I had gone for legislation many times when they were telling me. . .they were going to give it to me. When they told me they were going to give me something, I always thought that it was very stupid if I didn't take it if I wanted it. In December. . .let's see. What year? The draft was extended. . .

INTERVIEWER: Until '73.

GEN HERSHEY: '73. Well, then in the fall. . .probably December of '72, I wrote a quite long memorandum to the President, telling him, "Whatever you do, whatever you throw away, don't throw away this." Well, I never

heard from him, which I didn't expect. But about the 1st of March, I got a letter from him saying, "I just saw your recommendation today." But, of course, hell, . . .I don't know anything about it. Trying to find out when it was carried over in the first place. I never knew if I found out something, it would be anywhere near the truth. I don't want to be pessimistic. Most anybody unless they're pretty tough will tell you as true a story as he can. Therefore, why have him tell it. O.K.? So, I don't know. I don't think I accomplished much. I don't know if I was supposed to. In the first place, the last thing I was going to do was to serve with the Acting Director for a little while. He had been with me for a year. The day that they announced they were going to appoint the director, I called him up, I had known him, because he was the Secretary for Manpower for the Air Force, I guess.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, he was M and RA. M and RA. . .Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

GEN HERSHEY: So I called him up and said that anytime. . .I told him my telephone number. "Anytime, if I can do anything, let me know. But otherwise, you're not going to hear anything out of me." When a girl divorces her husband and marries another man, she doesn't want her husband coming there telling her when to wind the clock and all of that sort of stuff. I think the only time I was over there was, perhaps was the time that the club over there had a habit of giving a cup to each guy from the club that graduated. I was over that time. He was there. I knew the boy some before hand. After all, he didn't have very much to do anyway because the calls. But I don't think he would have called. I wouldn't if I were him. I didn't expect him to.

INTERVIEWER: But did you, when you were in the Manpower Commission for Mobilization. . .you kept close ties with the Selective Service.

GEN HERSHEY: With the Manpower. . .I think, we're talking about World War II?

INTERVIEWER: This is in your latter stage of your service.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I was never on the Manpower Commission.

INTERVIEWER: But I'm just saying you were on the Manpower Mobilization. . .

GEN HERSHEY: That's what I was supposed to be for the President.

INTERVIEWER: That's right.

GEN HERSHEY: No way. I wasn't trying to tell whatever the office was to do something for me. . .I kept in my area, but I didn't get anywhere. I stuck in my area. Because things that I was standing for. . .Well, you had everybody. . .See, at that time, we wanted to let down. I didn't mind being let down. But I think you ought to kind of start out with things you want to keep. Because I think you could have gotten it. Because the fellows over on the Committee. . .hell, no. . .Don't you folks want it. . .Don't say you'll vote for me. . .I wasn't Secretary. I don't hold the Secretary. . .The President didn't say anything about it, one thing or the other, except that was the day he got it. Of course, the thing had already been decided in January.

INTERVIEWER: That's right.

GEN HERSHEY: Or February. Of course, I hold no grudge anyway. I tried pretty hard to keep from a grudge. Because it happens to be my philosophy, I'm the guy that suffers. Whenever you get anywhere near hate, or you go anywhere near hate, you're going to use up your adrenalin. That's your's. Most of the time when you're hating somebody, he doesn't know. If he did,

he's probably glad of it. So you aren't getting anywhere. I've never tried. I did have a lot of sympathy for Nixon and I still do. Part of it, if I had been the Almighty, I wouldn't have made him just like he was made. But you can't do much about it.

INTERVIEWER: Bob, did you have a question?

INTERVIEWER: Yes, I'd like to go back in time a bit to the days before World War II, and ask a question about something that took place during the time frame of the Joint Army-Navy Selective Service Commission in the Thirties. One of the minutes from one of those meetings back in October, 1934. . .

GEN HERSHEY: '34?

INTERVIEWER: . . .'34. . .indicated that no one attended the meeting from west of the Mississippi and cited as the reason, "The lack of funds to bring people to Washington." I wonder if you would describe briefly some of the early pre-World War II days as far as money went, on the role of the States in supporting the early efforts to create the Selective Service.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, of course, 1934 was two years before I was here. But I am sure that was the problem. They got 10,000 dollars for traveling in a year. You had about 86 people on the list. You could see that you couldn't do much even though the dollars bought more than they do now. Now, remember, that you could go back to about 1929. I think it was the year that they gave one of the National Guard officers who came on for. . . well, all of the way from six months. . .He came on six months, and if he was good, he stayed four years on the general staff. Because at that time, you had five officers from five different G's from the 1 to the War Plans, that arrived on the general staff from the Reserves and from the National

Guard. Somebody had an idea that they ought to get the States to make plans. Well, you get travel money involved. About the best you could do was hope maybe that the Adjutant Generals would meet here sometime, so you could go and see and hear when they figured to get here. The effort was made to try to get somebody that could go around and call on the governors. Obviously, they didn't get money for it. I don't believe at that time, we got much stuff from the governors anyway. Because even as late as '36, it seemed to me that you didn't have money, but you could write letters. We had franking privileges. What I had to do was to get so that I could get along with the Adjutant Generals because they were the guys that generally the governor looked to, for anything that had to do with the Armed Forces. So therefore, I started cultivating the Adjutant Generals. They came here sometimes. I got to see them. I had an advantage. Having been an old National Guardsmen, I could always, you know, try to be one of the group. Well, I'm not trying to be facetious about it either. Because I did have some knowledge of the Guard. The Guard at that time was much better than when I was with it, which wasn't much to say either. But we did get the people who tried to make plans in each State. Now, that was done, some of it, before my time. I'm not quarreling with it all, because I thought it was a very good idea. Their plan was practically an instructional deal that had blanks in it where they put in things. Now, trying to teach them. . .well, what a local board is, and so forth, and so on. . .they had all of that. Then how do you divide up 3,000 registrants for each area? Then if you get one in each area? Then if you get one in each county, if they were small. . . which counties do you add to the cities? Whatever there was. . .When

you could write in the names of the guys that you had got promised to come on as local board members. So you see, what you had was a funny thing as a plan because it was mostly instruction. But on the other hand, I think the guys started to do it because one of the things he had to do, he was talking to people, but he didn't know it. That's one of the advantages I had when I got here. At least there was a guy in each state, pretty near, that I could call up, and he would know something about it, or write him a letter. . .I probably couldn't call. We didn't have much for telephones either in those days. We did, however, have one in the state of Michigan. One of the first times I had anything to do with. They had a plan. But it was months before they could find it. I can understand that. I can get something on this desk here. It can get piled up high enough, and I may not find it. So you had to somehow or other, get some money. See, this 10,000 dollars, that would send our guys that went out to run these conferences. The National Guard generally could find a little money to send the fellow to the conference. Sometimes maybe they would send him out of state funds. So, it was quite often the fellow who came to the conference was one of the staff officers of the Adjutant General. So if the Adjutant General had a job, he'd give it to somebody. Well, I won't quarrel about that. But it wasn't until, oh, probably late '38 and '39 that you could begin to try to get them to go to the governor and put the plan in front of him.

INTERVIEWER: I'd like to ask you a question too. We were talking 1934 when national meetings were being held. One book I've read, said that in 1936. . .

GEN HERSHEY: That's the National Guard meetings?

INTERVIEWER: Regional conferences started being held. Although the author didn't say that General Hershey directed. . .then Colonel Hershey directed that. . .I was wondering whether or not if that had not been your influence.

GEN HERSHEY: It got so that we could have four a year, because, remember, back in '31, they had one a year. Then they didn't have one for two or three years, and then they had another one. Sandy German got a lot of credit. Sandy was a classmate of mine at the War College. But he went to the War Department General Staff a year ahead of me. Then he got the job I got. So he got a chance to move up one, when he got to head a subsection. He had something to do with me coming in the first place. I had been with him at the War College. He knew something that I knew something about--the Guard. He thought I would be a good one to work them over. He knew that I made speeches and that sort of thing. So, Sandy had done quite a lot of things. In the first place, he adopted the war plans out of two officers by making them believe that probably they didn't want to tell National Guardsmen and Reservists all their secrets. Therefore, they couldn't use them. So, we did have a couple of officers that we could use. Of course, the G1 officer and the other part of G1 got in. But we did have two Reserve officers. In fact, one of them was Miller White, who later on got to be G1 of the Army during the war. That was some help. We didn't get four periods a year until starting the fall of 1936. Sandy was the guy that was out looking for money, and looking for people.

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned the word "secret" brought to mind, during the period '36 to '38, one author I read, mentioned that the pacifism move in the U.S. caused a swearing to secrecy of attendees at regional Joint Army-Navy Conferences.

GEN HERSHEY: Oh, yes.

INTERVIEWER: I wonder if you could talk about that.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, yes. There was no question about that. Remember, we had a fellow that was a senator. He was from, maybe, South Dakota. I came to know him pretty well afterwards. He went around the country lecturing. He got more money maybe than the fellow from. . .what is it. . . one of the investor aides. . .making more money on lectures. . .49,000 dollars, I think.

INTERVIEWER: You're talking about Dean. Are you talking about John Dean? Or Haldeman?

GEN HERSHEY: No, this is a senator

INTERVIEWER: Oh, a senator.

GEN HERSHEY: The senator from Tennessee. The boy that was on the committee a year ago.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, the Watergate Committee.

GEN HERSHEY: The Republican senator. He's a good guy. I'm not rubbing him down. But the fellow from Wisconsin was second. Some other guy was only a thousand less. The fellow from Wisconsin was giving us hell. He got 48,000 dollars out of his lectures. Well, this fellow was around yelling loud pops at the War Department and so forth and so on. They got pretty sensitive about it. I think as early as probably '33 or '34, somewhere down there. When I came here, they didn't talk about these things. Maybe I told you the story of a guy from Texas who went out to San Francisco in '35 to one of the conferences they had in that three or four year period. At El Paso, a fellow got on. They got to talking. They were both Texans and one thing and another. "Where are you going?" "San Francisco." "Where

are you going?" "San Francisco." "Why are you going?" "I've got some business interests there," . . . and so forth and so on. When they met in San Francisco, they were rather surprised to see both of them. They had been lying to each other because they were told not to be telling people. Well, we had a fellow Brainerd, who afterwards ran the Field Division. He had a fellow named Cockeworth that he was very, very friendly with. He went to this '35 convention and Brainerd said, "Where are you going?" "Well, I'm going out there for electrical business." Brainerd didn't know until that he got into the thing about a year later that he had gone to a conference. Of course, Brainerd wouldn't have gone to it anyway. But that's how much people talked even to their friends about being in it. And '38 was the first time that anything got into the newspapers that scared everybody to death. Because it said that old man Kramer, of the state of Louisiana, paid his way down there. He wasn't on duty anymore, but just saying that he had done a lot of the planning as a Reserve officer. But the state of Louisiana paid his way down to the fifth conference and paid his expenses while he was there. Nobody said anything about it. Couldn't have paid it if they wanted to because they didn't have it.

INTERVIEWER: Well, was the object of holding people to secrecy just to avoid the flak that might come, or was it because you might be afraid that the Congress wasn't going to support the legislation?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I think probably both. Although I would say the flak had come before the Congress. Well, of course get in '36, '37, '38 passage of the Selective Service Bill. Even if it wasn't going to be offered until we got in a war. We had an awful time in 1940. By that time, they were

battering London two or three times a week. Some people had been in London. Well, be that as it may, it was pretty hard to get. . .

INTERVIEWER: General Hershey, you've seen and associated with quite a few young Americans. What do you feel are the traits and the characteristics of a dedicated American?

GEN HERSHEY: Dedicated?

INTERVIEWER: Dedicated American. What does it take or what is required to make a good soldier, or sailor, or marine. . .a good service member?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I would start at the rear end and come backward. I don't know if I could tell you either what they ought to be trained or who. One of the things that would indicate something is that I've always felt very strongly that the family, has a terrible problem on their hands to try to go modern in a way. Well, the wife working. . .It would make a difference if she spent her time doing something else away from the home. I think one of the hardest things in the world is to try to do something in the home. I would say we start there. I happen to feel, maybe without reason, but I think the Boy Scouts have done a pretty good thing. Now, I'm prejudiced, because I've spent a lot of time on it. I had six years presidency of this 40,000-85,000 outfit here. That's about we've got in this area, which goes up as far as Frederick and down as far as Fredericksberg. I think this is hard because I don't know just exactly how you're going to get your schools to the place where you can divorce some of our pseudo-educators from the executivacy, the gist. . .the content of education rather than the purpose of it. I am frightened at times while going to colleges. Because it seems to me that they were having difficulty relating their education to life in any way. That is, they lived apart.

They lived in an atmosphere that doesn't exist except it did just while they were there. But, I still think that you've got to go back to the home. I don't pretend to know how you go back to the home, because automobiles, telephones, and television. The television, I'm rather bitter about probably. Well, in the first place, I think that television obviously because it seems, about the war. If we hadn't had a lot of this stuff, people taking pictures of something that happened. . .I'm not quarreling about that. . .but it didn't have any continuity of what happened. . .There was a lot of things that happened that wasn't in the picture. The schools, I don't know what the answer is. But, I don't believe that the system of the country's schools wasn't worth much. But one thing about it, they did know that they were in America and they were glad they were. Not only that, the teachers didn't know so much, which she knew that you could destroy the state and get elected in the riot. You see, she was kind of a stupid girl. If she could add and subtract, divide and multiply, you know. . .maybe even wrote a note to the parents; of course, her spelling wasn't too good. Somebody thought that was more important. But, of course, if you get somebody that teaches the kid a philosophy that's suicidal in its elements, I'd rather have him misspell a few words. I don't think I've answered your question because you don't know.

INTERVIEWER: I think your comments are centered around the issue, which a lot of feel, and that is that your values begin at a home or begin with real life values not materialistic values.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, there's no question about that. Of course, the home has some problems. . .well, the problems we had amongst folks that weren't

too smart, was to have them send their kids to school, and have the kids more or less learn to turn up their noses at their families. Because there were certain little niceties that their families hadn't learned.

INTERVIEWER: To take that question and now transit to another aspect of values. There's been quite a bit of talk about the volunteer force, and we've discussed this in the past. But, there are certain charges and allegations that a volunteer force is dangerous to a democratic society. What danger is there in your opinion?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, one of the first dangers they got, I don't buy at all. That is, they think that they're going to get those guys to take over the government. I just have no. . .I don't see that. Because the guy that takes over had got to find enough to go along. . .they guy that's going to overturn the government. That's going to be some trouble. The next thing he's going to do, he'll get so many people in that he can't trust them. Then he won't be able to take over anything. The fact that our volunteers. . .they're probably the people who believe about as strongly in their government. If you want to turnover the government, I can get some of the guys that didn't volunteer. Because I think they're more likely to be revolutionary and, of course, they've had a lot of revolutionary stuff thrown around. They hadn't had enough deepening to accredit it as what it is. They saw something, but somehow or another they figured because somebody did something bad to them that they ought to do something about it. Not realizing that this guy who did things bad to him would give you about 60 percent of the things that are good. When you end up getting the guy that you thought you wanted and you find out that he'd give you 80 percent of the bad, you haven't any liberties at all left. Then, of

course, it's rather too late. I don't happen to buy that. Now, it is true if you get people for a long time and keep them satisfied and so forth and they're more effective for it, then some people are dissatisfied. Or, they don't get until the day you want to fight. . .no question about that. But I've always thought we had to compromise in there. You couldn't have them as long as we wanted to, but get them at all. I have no quarrel. I wouldn't advocate the running of the draft. In fact, I don't know what we would do if we ran a draft and made everybody serve, which is the idea of the Universal Military Training. Because in the first place, you'd have a terrible time to keep him very long and keep him doing something that he was interested in. So, I don't know. I've sort of felt that you compromise. You had to place the volunteer system when you couldn't have something else and you didn't need too many men. But if you have a time when you can't have anything else, and you need a lot of people, then the state is going to carry out what you want done until they extinguish it. Because 200,000-300,000. . .No, I don't mean that. I mean two or three million. . .somewhere between two and a half and five million is where. . .I know you can't do anything if you need five. That is, you don't get them. I'm not so sure what you've got when you have to extend some of the things to be. When you have to go around and tell a guy that you want to come and join him, in order to get him to come and join you, you're getting pretty cheap. Yet, there's a lot of people. . .we spent a good many millions of dollars telling people, "Come, we want to join you." A guy that's going to lead somewhere, he doesn't start. . ."Come and tell me how you want me to run you, so that I can run you like you want to be run." All you're going to have is chaos.

INTERVIEWER: Well, your comments in the last half of your answer to that question tied into another one of my comments and observations. That was in some of the readings that referred to General Hershey "quietly being ready for unforeseen circumstances," such as in Vietnam when the draft calls had to be increased. The President turned to you and said, "I need to have them increase," . . .or whatever might be. You had already put the machinery in motion to have those people standing by, which you had mentioned in our past discussion. But, I think your philosophy and your attitude had always been readiness. Therefore, tied into the volunteer system, that you don't oppose the volunteer system as such in a peacetime, but you cannot survive in war time in a volunteer system.

GEN HERSHEY: Of course, I hated to hear. . .at the time we began to move back into the volunteer system, which I thought was more for political reasons than it was for others. That we began to talk that for now on the National Guard and the Reserves are going to be just like anybody else. You won't know them from the Regulars. Well, already, when you've got something you have to have some guns, and you can't manufacture them, you take them away from somebody that isn't using them as much as the guys you want using them. So, you had the planes taken away from the National Guard and the Reserves time and time again. Everytime they get a plane that's worth much, they don't have it very long. Well, if I were the Secretary of the Army, I would take it from where I could get it if I had to have it somewhere else. There's no question about that. I just would like to be in a place where I didn't have to do those things. Of course, trying to have a guy that's on a part time basis being ready to fight anyway, they didn't even do that so well in the colonial times when every

guy had a gun and if he couldn't shoot pretty straight, he didn't eat. Not only that, he was the fellow that didn't have the idea that somebody else was going to save him when the Indians came. He knew about who was going to keep the Indians back to the edge of the woods. He liked to have a gun that he could at least shoot twice while they were coming in. That's all I'd ask now. But when you've got a place where anyplace we've got could be attacked under darkness from places well off the continent and to get two shots before anybody left the woods and got to the house.

INTERVIEWER: In that regard, in our involvement in Vietnam, the National Guard and the Reserves were not fully utilized. Do you think that was a mistake?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, to tell the fellow that did it. . . I know what he would have said to me. We would have said, "What a hell of a time they had when we went into Korea." Because we did take some of these units and we didn't take all of them. I haven't the answer to that either. I don't know. You know, I used to say sometimes that when I couldn't very well say to Mrs. Hershey when somebody was down trying to break the door down. I said, "Now, you go down and straighten that out because I'm pretty important to the government. I don't think we ought to risk it either." I said, "I didn't figure I'd get by with that one." That's one of the reasons why it's pretty hard to try to know what we ought to do. The Guard, of course, would be better fitted than the people who were drafted in to take over. But on the other hand, somebody said, "Well, we don't intend to do that." Bob Taft got a law through that you couldn't send them over for six months because somebody got shot and hadn't been over there so long. So therefore, I don't know. Somebody said, "Well, you

shouldn't let any political motives handle you." Well, I'm not a good soldier quite at that. Because I have seen soldiers sent and get themselves killed because somebody didn't gage the political situation properly. Because if he gaged the situation properly, he would have either had other things done, or he wouldn't have got confronted at that particular time. He who fights and runs away will live to fight another day. I'm not arguing that. But on the other hand, the question of diplomacy is so clearly tied in. So, I don't know.

INTERVIEWER: That's a controversial question. But I was just interested in your views on it. I think that in any future conflict, that's going to have to be carefully weighed whether we. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I think they'll go the other now. Because, you see, what they tried, didn't work.

INTERVIEWER: Didn't work?

GEN HERSHEY: But on the other hand, just because something doesn't work the first time, and it's a question of what to do with the Guard in between and the Reserves. The Reserves, I'm a past president of the Reserves. . . honorary. You know a guy around 1911 by the name of Gardner, a Congressman, one time gave a dinner and had only Reserves there. I don't know, there were 70 or 80 of them. We were better than that when the war came in 1940, but not very. The Reserves pretty much were paper, and a lot of the Guard was paper too, as far as that goes. You also had a problem recruiting. You always had more recruits than you had most anything else. People moved around. We're the greatest country to move. We always had to discharge a guy in the Guard if he moved somewhere where he wasn't

available. You couldn't try him for not coming to drill if he was in San Francisco and the drill was in Angola, Indiana.

INTERVIEWER: General, I came on sort of a tid-bit of information in my reading that wasn't explained. There may be nothing behind it, but maybe there was. We're talking of the time frame of 1941. The initial legislation. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Just before the war?

INTERVIEWER: Yes, sir.

GEN HERSHEY: Before Pearl Harbor?

INTERVIEWER: The initial legislation was about to. . .I guess, it had come in. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Expired in a year.

INTERVIEWER: Right. Selective Service had been given by the President 750,000 dollars to operate on.

GEN HERSHEY: Now, wait. This was before we got any money?

INTERVIEWER: That's right.

GEN HERSHEY: This is when we needed it.

INTERVIEWER: That's right. But when Congress then appropriated roughly 25 million dollars.

GEN HERSHEY: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: The tid-bit of information unexplained is that at the end of FY 41, there was an unobligated amount of money to the tune of three and a half million dollars. I was wondering if there is anything to why that money wasn't used?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, yes. You may not believe this. But Selective Service didn't use money just because they had it. Not that it was a little ancient.

You see, in the first place, you live with Congress better when you can justify. In the first place, I don't believe in shading money to save money. If you can save lives by saving money, why do it. But on the other hand, just because it just turned the 30th of June, you say, "Well, I guess we better send some people to Puerto Rico or some other place." Health, Education, and Welfare, they sent them down at Christmas time. But anyway, there has been a tendency in government to do so. Now, if you do something that you ought to do, I'm not going to quarrel about it. But I wonder, "Why the hell you didn't do it before." He said, "Well, I didn't know if I was going to have money." That's a good excuse. I'd buy it. But on the other hand, that was our first operation. We probably didn't maybe induct as many people as we expected to. Obviously the government could spend the money some other time. I was never worried about the fact that this was the last time. It was a little hard to make up that first budget. Bill Draper did most of that. He had been making up budgets, of course, for this outfit in New York. Oh, Jimmy Forrestal was president of it when he came down here. That wasn't the name of the corporation. They were guys that did all sorts of selling bonds business and stuff like that. But anyway, I don't think there's anything about it except that's where we were when the end of the month of June came. I'm not the least bit embarrassed. Most of the time I was up there for deficiencies. But that time. . .in fact, you had probably to remember the enthusiasm about working for nothing at that time by a lot of people too. For instance, we didn't pay the rents much at first. Because most places were in a court house or state house or somewhere, . . .not federal. They gave it. They got tired after a while. Well, they saw everybody else

running off with government money. But it was true that we paid the minimum. Even after we got the rent taken over by the General Services, General Service couldn't take over anything if they hadn't known about 18 months earlier because they wouldn't have the money in their budget. Of course, if anybody had moved out so we had to have new contracts, or something, we had to find the money to pay it, or get somebody to let us stay somewhere for nothing. Well, that's one of the things you can do when you've got people out there that are your men. If I'm going to deal with people, I like to have the guy that's down in Cincinnati, I'd like him to know Cincinnati. I don't care if he doesn't know so much about Washington too well. If he knows Cincinnati, he can help me a lot more than knowing Constitution Avenue. . . Because in the first place, those people if they're the right kind of people know the right kind of people generally, so they can dicker with them. Well, there's a lot of things you can do when you've got good will.

INTERVIEWER: I'd like to return to the question of volunteers, General Hershey. We touched on the volunteer aspect before.

GEN HERSHEY: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: But, do you think that we can continue to support and afford a volunteer force? There were many precautions mentioned when we were developing an Armed Force about the cost. In fact, General Clarke, who headed the. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Mark?

INTERVIEWER: Yes, sir. He warned of the exorbitant costs for salaries. Then at the same time, the proposals were to capitalize on benefits. Now, we're caught up in a situation today where about 60 percent of our budget

is tied up in manpower costs and personnel costs.

GEN HERSHEY: Yes, admitted at least. Sixty percent. . .

INTERVIEWER: At least. In addition to that, we're talking in terms of cutting away our benefits. We're talking about commissary stores going to a nonappropriated fund basis. So, we've got a contradictory situation where you've got. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Oh, I think that you ought to anticipate when you start raising your salaries that you're going to lose the things you've got because you didn't get salaries. I mean, like night and day, one follows the other.

INTERVIEWER: But we understand that. But for the soldier that's coming into the Army, you see, your benefits going down on the scale and you see your costs as a planner or a comptroller going up. So, the man that's thinking or contemplating, "I'm going to volunteer." He says, "Gee, this doesn't really measure out to what I hear."

GEN HERSHEY: If we lose the depression, then, we're going to be in trouble.

INTERVIEWER: That's right.

GEN HERSHEY: I don't think there's any question now. At the present time, the only thing that I see, the civil service has been reassessing a lot of their grade scales. Of course, you won't make much money doing it because probably the guy that's already in the grade. . .when you move him back from a 16 to a 14 or a 13, you'll probably keep on paying him the 16 until you can retire or shoot him or something. Well, you know, civil service has got built in now. . .a lot of times when they cut a grade, the guy that was in it, got paid at the old grade until you got somebody else in. So, how will you start off? I don't know the solution. How do you suddenly

tell the Armed Forces that they're going to get a 10 or 20 percent cut. That gets some good licks quickly too. Well, at the time when we were kicking officers out when they had a few too many back in the Twenties, and at the same time we were trying to get guys to go to West Point and graduate and go in. Who are those guys coming out? Well, just think of going in someplace where they got up out of the place where they can't go somewhere else now very handily. Now, you kick them out. Of course, we've got our retirement business. Remember, I was in the Army when you never got retired if you served in anything except the Regular Army. Of course, on the other hand, we didn't have people that served 30 years on active duty in the National Guard in those days either. But I don't know. I think you've got quite a problem. Because if you think it was hard going up with the Congress, it will be ten times as hard with the guy that's drawing the money going down.

INTERVIEWER: General Hershey, we're a few minutes before the end of this video cassette. I suggest we take a short break. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Alright.

INTERVIEWER: I'd like to ask your opinion, General Hershey, of what do you see as the role of women in the Armed Forces. We are increasing the number of women that are coming into the Armed Forces and the jobs that they perform. Specifically, if you would comment upon how you see women being used. You saw them in World War II. Plus, do you think there is a role for women in combat units?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, of course, that's very difficult for me because what I knew about World War II didn't have anything to do with combat units. In the first place, it's a political question that we're going to have

to face. You're going to have to probably face. You're going to have them pushing more and more until they get to the place where maybe they'll get fingers burned and they'll back off. But, in the first place, it's awfully hard to know what a combat unit is if you're going to have. . .I wondered what the combat unit down in Saigon was because how much different is that from some unit that isn't. Now, I happen to have a belief that you can build a pretty good clerical force of women. But that isn't the problem you've got in the Armed Forces. You've got them on your hands. You're going to have to run a different sort of a deal than you're running if you have the men doing the clerical work. There's always this if they're going very far to the front or not. But if you're going to stop worrying about killing them, you can put them in a lot more places than you could otherwise. Now, I wonder. . .if they were Amazons. I guess probably in World War I, I don't know, maybe in World War II, there were quite a lot of Russian women fighting up with combat units. At least I was told that. Now, whether we're moving into that area or not, I don't know. If we're moving in that area, there's no reason why probably they couldn't handle a machine gun. Maybe somebody would have to carry it for them. I think you'd get over that. The women of Europe in World War I carried suitcases. Men weren't carrying suitcases for women. Women were carrying suitcases for men sometimes. So therefore, this thing of thinking that women are weak. . .of course, if I were a commander and wanted somebody that when I told them to do something and they did it a certain way, I'd be more sure that they'd always did it that way with a woman than a man. So, I don't care too much of women taking authority. . .but on the other hand, you've got to forget some of these things about tiring them, or killing

them, or wounding them, or something like that. Because equality doesn't start out when there are still a lot of restrictions on it. Now, on the other hand, if this is a phase we're going through, then they will go up to a certain river and decide they aren't going to get across, and they tend to back off. The thing will start tending to solve itself because you use them in the back area. Probably if you have women, maybe you won't be as careful about handling manpower because you'll think you have a lot of it. You'll have more clerks than you need. You'll have clerks to read the things that you first write. Then somebody else to read that. Then, you'll begin to form the old levels. But I don't think that's where we're going. . .of course, I don't know where we're going. But on the other hand, I think we're still in a period that's somewhat formative. They're feeling their way. Quite a lot of the things that we're having in the Congress are legislative escapes. Part of it is this very question of them serving or not serving in the Armed Forces. Somebody may not be in favor of it. I don't know. I have some trouble of wondering what more is it that they want. I debated this women's suffrage business once in high school. Somewhere I got out of a book that a guy said, "Here's to our superiors of today and our equals of tommorrow." The women worry a great deal because they aren't in the top grade. Why, I said many times I wouldn't have a man running an office that I had under any circumstances. Because if he's good, he wouldn't need me. If he wasn't good, there wouldn't be much I could do. If it was a woman, of course, you see, you get into this other phase. They want to be content to take charge of something that's not too big. She says, "The damn thing is run the right way. The general doesn't want that." Of course, sometimes they were

probably wrong. Some of them were pretty good at being right as your local board clerk. But I don't think you could have gotten men by and large to have done a good job as they did. To live with these kids even when they come home after they had sent them. . .they'd try to have their picture up somewhere so the kids could look around and. . .heh, heh.

INTERVIEWER: I'd like to change the subject from the volunteer and the women just for a moment and touch upon your concept and your idea of decentralization and your idea on "don't tell people how to do it; just tell them what to do in so many words". In the book that I've read, A Case Against the Volunteer Force, there was a particular portion of that book that mentioned that during the draft and during the Vietnam phase in the mid 1960's that you did not put out a specific instruction, but it was guidance about those people who avoided the draft, or talked against the policies of the country, or recruiting at that particular point in time. Where a man should be brought up to the top of the list, or be offered jail, or service to the country. The question that comes up here is, the alternative of a penal sentence. . .of going to jail, or serving in the Armed Forces. Would you comment on that as to the accuracy of the allegation?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I don't think there's any question about the allegation. If they thought that I told everybody so that all they had to do when the guy came in was to go to page so and so and tell them exactly what they'd do. If that's what they were talking about; of course, I didn't tell them. Because in the first place, the stupidest thing you can do is start telling a guy a lot of things in the first place that he never can use, and you never know if he can remember it. One of the

troubles with regulations. . . anyway, we've got too many of them. People can't read them. You get so many, we can't even find what you want to read. Now, I always told the local boards that, "If you get to a place where a guy says, "Why in the world was I sent." You said, "Well, the regulations say you have to go." Because that puts your onus or takes it off of him and puts it on the regulation. Or if you say, "Well, the State Director makes me send these people." . . . or the National Director. that's alright. That's what you've got these fellows for up there anyway. To lay things off on to. Most of the time he'll never hear about it. So therefore, I think could easily over-regulate. The Constitution, with all of the noise we have about that. Suppose that Constitution was about somewhere near what the one John Locke wrote for North Carolina and South Carolina. He told women how to comb their hair, and told everybody to when to wear a neck tie and when not to, and, you know, all of that sort of stuff. Well, in the first place, you know nothing about the conditions you're talking about when you prescribe something. Of course, if anybody feels that you could set down on just one thing. That is, a guy who says, "I'm a conscientious objector." You think you can write a dozen books that would cover all of the cases that you have. Because in the first place, outside of the Mennonites and the Brethren, who happen to pretty well drilled, but the Quaker and anybody else that you can think of is an absolute individualist. He probably doesn't agree with anybody in his group. I can take a bunch of Quakers and have them sit down here, and you'd be surprised at what they would tell you. "Would you go in the Armed Forces?" "I would if I had to. I wouldn't tell anybody, but I would go in. Because in the first place, I've got to go somewhere and I'll go that way." "How

about you?" "Oh, I wouldn't go near the place." "Would you take work of national importance?" "No, not under any circumstances. . . what I'm against." "Well, will you go to jail?" "Well, I suppose I'd have to." "Do you feel it's proper?" "No, I don't feel it's proper, but it's my only choice." Now, you just start out trying to write up, so that the local board when they get hold of the guy can listen to what he says. "Here, you come under this." Even dependency, take that one if you want to work at it a while. I'd rather leave somebody else somewhere so that they would know how she was or whether she was putting on too. Of course, this draft is in better shape in the rural community or the small town. Because there, people generally know about what the situation is. But when you get to the city, is like I am. I don't even know who lives across the road. Don't come and ask me whether to trust that guy or. . . Of course, I'm opposed to anything that tends to decentralize. Because in the first place, you get a horde of people to do the decentralizing. I'd rather trust the folks that are out there, especially those that work for nothing, and a guy who's working for nothing on a local board is in much better shape than a guy who's getting paid.

INTERVIEWER: But specifically in that regard in your guidance in the actions of your local boards or of people out in the local boards, was there a practice of moving people from the bottom of a list for the draft up to the top if they voiced strong opinion against the recruiting?

GEN HERSHEY: As a matter of fact, it bothered me to have to do something like. . . one time down in the Mexican border. . . the town of Brownsville. . .

INTERVIEWER: Brownsville, Texas.

GEN HERSHEY: Brownsville had some. . .suppose they were probably Mexicans. . . They were around there and they weren't doing anything and so forth and so on. The board just moved them up. Of course, the State Headquarters came down there and said, "How could you send that guy when he's way up there?" "He wasn't doing good around here." So then I don't know who went to Senator Connally. I can't think of who was his Congressman. But they came over to see me. I think I told you this story.

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned it.

GEN HERSHEY: Because what I said it was a guy from Indiana. I didn't want to get mixed up with a couple of Texans. Now, the people down there obviously are not going to get. . .they got by with perhaps, if they got by with it, because they were Mexicans in the first place. They probably didn't get the same consideration. Now, of course, if a fellow isn't deferred, that's another matter. When you get to the place where about everybody is deferred that hasn't gone, then if you take a guy out of the deferred list, there's only about one place where he goes. Now, that's quite another matter.

INTERVIEWER: That's right.

GEN HERSHEY: A fellow that's deferred as a conscientious objector goes out and beats somebody up, you can say, "Well, you're no longer a conscientious objector in my business. So you're back in the 1-A where you would normally be and you would have been gone anyway." So you see, there's so many things get into it. Because these things are quite common. There was a guy who had a wife as his dependent. They really didn't live together. That didn't take long. Because the local board was especially out where they knew things. They had the guy up in 1-A. If you can't have

your wife for a dependent, maybe she can't live on what they'll give, but maybe she isn't getting that much now.

INTERVIEWER: General, I have kind of a summary question on Selective Service and then one of a little more contemporary subject. If you had it to do over again, your years in Selective Service, I wonder if you could mention some of the changes that you might make in maybe the design in the system or any policies that occurred in World War II, or Korea, or Vietnam.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, in the first place, the design business, we went through that pretty thoroughly not here. Rice. . .but the guy was the one who was going to get the thing all organized so you could run it with a computer. I have no sympathy there at all. Because in the first place, I wouldn't establish any intermediate points. If I could possibly help it, I'd stick with the director and a small staff; a state director, whom I'd expect to have an ear to the governor; and the local boards; who would look to the state director initially. . .I'd have field officers, but they wouldn't have authority. They'd be eyes, not mouths. Don't think for a minute that you can have field officers who are eyes and not be mouths a great deal. They knew that they couldn't give an order to anybody. But when it came to training the Reserves, who were not on active duty, that was a horse of another color. But there they were operating. But otherwise, they were told, "Get so you know your state directors well. Don't get so that you know him so well that you can start telling him how to do it, because I'll hear about it. It's about the first thing. Because about the first time somebody tells me something. When they knew they couldn't give an order, they could give advice far more valuable. Not

only that, the guys who's getting it knew very well that he didn't have to take it if he didn't want it; therefore, he could take it. It's a lot easier to take advice because you don't have to take it. You can let it go. But it's a little harder to take orders when. . ."He knows I know something. Why is he telling me to roll up your curtains mornings when you open your office or something like that." So therefore, I'd be very careful about not getting anything into a system that was very complex. Now, auditors. . .I told the auditors who went out. . .remember, we didn't have any money people below the State Headquarters. Therefore, when we first sent them up, a lot of guys didn't know much about it. I had a guy who had been on active duty quite a while by the name of Caldwell. I put him in charge of going out, and getting some auditors, and indoctrinating them. "You go and you audit this guy's account maybe about six or seven months or whenever you get around to it. I don't care how long you stay. You stay until you get that guy straight. Don't be sending me a lot of reports about what's wrong with him. I want him. . .teach him now. Maybe next year when you go back and he doesn't want to be talking, we'll do something else. But you're out there to teach him, not to show him how smart you are beyond what he is. When you get him so you think he can run it, you move on and look for somebody else." Now, that's the way I had it. Because there, you see, you're teaching first, and then giving the responsibility, and expect them to use the knowledge that you've given them. I don't believe that you ought to have State Directors that you don't get together and teach them. But you teach them, and then you expect them to operate. I happen to believe a great deal in education as to the point and the right kind. Now, so therefore, I don't think I

wouldn't want to get anything in there. Now, getting along with people. We went quite a ways, maybe too far or maybe not. I wouldn't want to say too much about it. But I certainly gave quite a little attention personally to the CO situation. . .always did and always would. Because in the first place, remembering World War I, unless you're a Quaker, let's say the Mennonites. . .the Quakers or the Brethern of Christ. . .they're the only people that were cleared as C.O. . .It didn't matter how much if they were Methodists or Espiscopalian or something else. I happen to remove from a place where a fellow could belong to any church or not belong to any church. And tried to stand on that. That you take a boy who was raised as a Mennonite; he's been a Mennonite all of his life and he's lived up to it; you have several reasons in believing he's going to be different than a guy who has been a Methodist and who was a firey John Methodist. As soon as the war got started, he kind of lost his fire. I'm not picking on the Methodists. It's helping to bring me up. I went to Sunday School with Methodists. So I think that anytime you've got "dissies", you're giving them more attention than they deserve. But on the other hand, you're going to have to live with these things. The nearest you can come to get them to do something that you are willing to let him do, he's off your hands. I don't believe that I would do anything different about Congress. I would have two or three people that didn't do anything but live on the Hill. If I didn't get over, I rode with somebody else. Because a Congressman, the thing that some of the help on the Hill. Remember, this guy on the Hill, he's going to get acquainted with the Congressman. It's pretty much hard to do business than sitting up around here. He starts with the Executive in that office and trys to

find where the guy is that gets all of these belly aches, and then tries to get these belly aches, and everything we know helps a lot on correspondence. Because a lot of times, they don't have to. On the other hand, you could work it another way. After I let, they pretty much left the Hill. You probably heard somebody tell you executives shouldn't be hanging around legislators. But we had a girl. She comes over and sees me once and a while. She's a Catholic over here. She had been a local board clerk originally, moved up to headquarters, and she was everything up there including acting director, although I didn't call her that. But she was well groomed, and she came up as our legislative person. She got so she knew a great many of those girls on the Hill. So that by telephone, she did something that sometimes we had boys out doing. That's alright. But she did it because they didn't allow anybody to go over. They said, "Let people over there write you." I know that half of the guys feel that, "I know. I'll write him, but I know what he'll say because I know what they do about that." Now, I don't know just what you're going to do on whether you're going to abolish all sorts of deferments. Something you always think about. You always do it when you get to the end of the war if it's a long war. But on the other hand, that doesn't mean that it wasn't a good thing to do for a long time. Take 1940. . . In 1940, you had the President going to Congress. He says, "I want 10,000 planes built before a certain time." Lord knows, they needed them. Remember, before 1940, most of the guys that were building planes got a contract for a plane or so at a time. . . a big one. The result was when he got a contract, somebody else didn't get it. Therefore, the guys who knew how to build planes, they tended to go to Seattle when a contract

got over there. Then when somebody else got the contract, then they went somewhere else. You weren't building any skill at all. You were just using what you got. Well then, when you had all of them running at the same time. Of course, if you had a few people, did you take them? No, hardly. If they had some people that had been working there two weeks. . .well, you don't learn much in two weeks. But it's going to take somebody else two weeks to get up where they guy is now. Here, you've got a million men, and you're only taking 10,000 of them. So you're supposed to come and take them out of the place that some poor devil is hollaring. Of course, he'll overwork you, there's no question about that. But still, I think that with the size of manpower that we have, we're always going to be forced into deferments in order to help some other people. Of course, it's one to keep the guy doing something that you want him to do, rather than saying, "Well, if I have to go in in six months, I guess I might as well have a good time. Because I don't know if I'll ever have another good time." He starts off visiting all of his aunts and everybody else, and staying a week or two. I know one of the cartoons that impressed me. They had the Army and the Navy and all of them started to have the guys come down and get inducted, and send them back home, and, kind of, you know, get oriented. I'm through reading some of that book about that. They had two guys from Arkansas sitting on one of those porches of a shack. They had their bare foot toes sticking up and so forth with black hats on. They said, "What are you doing?" "Well," he said, "I'm home reorganizing my business before I have to go in the service." And how damn true it was. In other words, the Armed Forces was just throwing away three weeks. In fact, I had a guy who used to be

with one of the Companies. He always said, "In our Company, the day you decided to take a guy, you take him. In the first place, he knows where he's going. You'll know something about him." You know, when you're somewhere and you know why you're doing certain things. What about the place where you are when you know where you're going next. It makes sense a little. You know, some things you kind of have to be thinking about.

INTERVIEWER: That's for sure.

GEN HERSHEY: It's the most natural thing in the world. So I don't think I've been helpful. I'm probably narrow. But in the first place, letting everybody who doesn't want to go, out of it, is one of the things. Nobody says that. But that's one of the things that's always going to be pushing you. You're going to have the Air Force and the Navy wanting to set up a different standard of rejection. Because we're highly mechanized with them. You read gadgets maybe, maybe you can't. So the fellow that had to go out probably as a doughboy on patrol, he's probably got to have a lot of things that you don't need in some of these places. Going into the danger, it's just telling how much ingenuity you ought to have. The more machinery you have, the less ingenuity you're going to have probably in the guy who's running it. I don't know. I don't know if I've explained it. I don't know if I do.

INTERVIEWER: Now, how about wartime?

GEN HERSHEY: Well, one of the things you've got to watch. . .you've got to watch pretty closely that if you don't keep the war as close as you can to your public, you couldn't expect them to be interested in it. One reason after you get the first million in. . .remember, you've got a mil-

lion in people and there are so many families of them back there that said, "My boy went. Is there any reason why your boy shouldn't go?" But if you had them up here on a computer, you couldn't even go to the local board member and say, "You took John. I don't like it. Now, what about that other guy down there?" Of course, you don't like telling him that he's a homosexual. That's something to figure out. Of course, now, I think you're probably getting better because we've got homosexuals on the committees here in the District.

INTERVIEWER: And New York, also.

GEN HERSHEY: Yes. Well, I used to know this fellow Zoman. He was to become chief. They wanted me to know all of the homosexuals in the headquarters. So people wouldn't tell folks that they were homosexuals. It wasn't very smart when they'd never come back. I said, "Plant one local board that's ever leaking and then come back and talk to me." He didn't come. Of course, he might have found them. I don't care any damn way. . .

INTERVIEWER: I wonder if you have any comments on the President's handling of the Mayaguez incident. . .

GEN HERSHEY: Well, in the first place, I would certainly support the President in what he did. Unless I knew some reason why I shouldn't. Because I don't like the idea. . .I think one of our problems now is media that starts out trying to assess something without any of the facts. The average writer. . .and, of course, I'm not blaming the writer because he's supposed to write something. He's supposed to write something for somebody to read. He ought to say something about somebody because people read. . .the women. . . You go out to a woman and say, "You know Susan Brown? She bakes the best bread of anybody that I know of." "Well, I don't know if she bakes it good

or not." "You see that man who came out of Susan's house?" "Oh, tell me, what do you know?" You can get that around town pretty fast. So the writer, he's got to say something. Of course, he has got some people that he didn't like probably. But he isn't too smart if he allows it to come over him. Jack Anderson, he took over from what's his name and made a pretty good business to find out things wrong about folks. In fact, I missed a dinner once on account of that. I was invited to go to the American Legion dinner a year ago. They gave a dinner for the Congress. It seemed like a good thing to go to. I saw a Congressman from down in Virginia. I said something to him about the dinner. He said, "Yes, I'm not going to it. I'm damned well going to be up there when Jack Anderson gets an award." I said, "What's he getting an award for?" "I don't know what he's getting it for. I don't care." Mrs. Hershey has a great affection for Anderson, the same as I do. So neither one of us went. Well, of course, I don't think Anderson as far as I know knew anything about that. But I've known Jack quite a long time. I don't think he ever bothered me much because he hadn't gotten in. But Drew (Pearson) . . . Drew was not particularly harrasing. The only thing that Drew ever said about me. I had a car. . .

INTERVIEWER: Was this Drew Pearson?

GEN HERSHEY: Drew Pearson.

INTERVIEWER: Drew Pearson.

GEN HERSHEY: I had a car come one time to get me when I was on the HILL. It was below zero. . . That really cold spell. The driver let the car run to try to keep warm. And Drew. . . Somebody saw the car keeping warm. He asked me a couple of times to come before this organization of platform

people. I wouldn't want to be any closer than that, or I wouldn't want to be noted as the guy of the culture people, who are the guys who are feeding the noise. That would be awfully terrible. Because if he doesn't know somebody, you're feeding. . .

INTERVIEWER: General Hershey, this concludes the final tape and our final session for the Oral History Program. On behalf of General Smith, the Commandant of the War College, and Colonel Agnew, who is the Chief of the Military History Research Collection, we express our thanks and gratitude for your participation and your views expressed during these interviews.

GEN HERSHEY: Well, I certainly appreciated having an opportunity for two or three reasons. In the first place, nothing has happened to anybody except flattery, when somebody acts so that they have some interest in what he knows. I did meet Colonel Pappas and talk to him quite a lot. While I never knew Pappas very much, he knew Commander Denny pretty well. When the thing didn't work out after the Tri-State College, why, I was in a position where I could call up Pappas and say, "Come and get me." So, I guess he got a couple of truck loads. So, I have been interested in it. I think it's asking too much for any future generation to, first of all, determine what was the lesson of the past and certainly to follow it. But anyway, certainly in anytime when things are moving fast, the more we can know about what was, to know what about will be, the better we are prepared to meet the will be. So I, of course, in addition, at my age, am somewhat flattered to have an opportunity to associate even a very small part of time with people who are still alive. I do want you to know that I have appreciated more than I could say, having an opportunity

to add a little bit of knowledge around for. . .So the government doesn't owe me anything. I've gotten a lot more than probably I've been entitled to and haven't given back too much.

INTERVIEWER: I think we can all say that, General. I think that would be questionable.

GEN HERSHEY: The people who mouth about the government, if they could go find another one right quick, we could both go to hell.

INTERVIEWER: O.K., sir. Thank you.

POSTMARICCO

31 May 75  
(Date)

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MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, USAMHRC, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013

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Lewis B. Hershey

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*Lewis B. Hershey*

(Signature)

Gen. Lewis B. Hershey Ret  
5500 Lambeth Rd.  
Bethesda, Maryland 20014

(Print Name)