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SENIOR OFFICERS DEBRIEFING PROGRAM



CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN

GENERAL PAUL D. HARKINS

and

MAJOR JACOB B. COUCH, JR.

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SECTION 1

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PAUL D. HARKINS

By

MAJOR JACOB B. COUCH, JR.

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PAUL D. HARKINS, 28 APRIL 1974, DALLAS, TEXAS.

MAJOR COUCH: General Harkins, you were born on 15 May 1904 in Boston, Massachusetts. Would you please describe your parents, family, your family status, and your father's occupation.

GENERAL HARKINS: Yes, I'd be delighted to. As a matter of fact, that's a long time ago, isn't it? My father was of Scotch-Irish parenthood and my mother was from Killarney. Her name was Kelly. They had five children in the family, I had one brother older, one brother younger and two sisters. We were brought up as a good Christian family. Dad. . .taught quite a bit about self-discipline. I think we all enjoyed good health, as did mother and Dad all through our lives. As a matter of fact, I think, that's one of the key things to success in any field--keep yourself in shape and have self-discipline and good health. If you don't have good health, you can't do your work no matter what you're doing. Dad was a newspaper editor. He was a dramatic critic in Boston for about fifty years, mostly with the Hearst papers. Mother was just busy taking care of the family. But Dad tried to give us a well-rounded background and as he was a dramatic critic, he had access to and had to go to see the shows and the symphonies and all the concerts that came to Boston. Of course, I was dragged along, sometimes willingly and sometimes not so willingly. But it was a good well-rounded background that I received and Dad had quite an influence on my life. My older brother went to Dartmouth and graduated in 1923. Went into the newspaper business in New York and then he went with with Warner Brothers. Now

he's retired and lives in San Clemente, California. My older sister was younger than I was, I was the second in the family, was a pianist, a concert pianist and she studied in Paris for some time and she married a painter over there. Now she lives in Boston. My younger sister was a good student in school, but she married quite young and now lives in Hyannis Port, Massachusetts. My young brother, who was the youngest of the five, became an author and he still writes books. He writes young boys' books, teenage books. He has written several that I know of and he's written mostly about sports. He helped me write the book I wrote, the Army Officer's Guide, which we wrote in 1951, during the Korean War. It was a good life, good food, lots of healthy activities and the normal things that happen in a family of five. We never suffered from any inconveniences that I know of.

MAJOR COUCH: What lasting influence on your life and profession originated with your parents and family, that is, what did you receive from the philosophy of life as demonstrated by your mother and father.

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, I think, probably one of the most prominent things taught was self-discipline and stick-to-it-iveness, and doing the best you can in any job you've been given. I recall one time I was working with the Cunard Steamship Company in Boston. I was an office boy in the foreign exchange department and the quotations hadn't come in from the bank. I had a ball game or something to go to that afternoon, and I didn't wait for them, I just left, and when I got home I told Dad I was late for the ball game or something, I said, "Well, the quotations hadn't come in from the bank, and I just left without putting them out to all the different agencies that had to have them to do their business." He just went up one side and

down the other because I hadn't stayed there and done my job. He said, "You have to stick to it and you have to pay the price if you want to succeed." He was always that way. I think, Mother taught us, maybe sometimes with the back of the hand across the face with the knuckles, a little bit of self-discipline, courtesy and sharing things with others. Well, you have to when you have five children in the family, you can't have everything for yourself. We had a very close knit family; we had dinners together every night. I think I read the other day someplace, that one of the troubles today is that in the olden days the family used to get together around the dishes after dinner and discuss all sorts of things, but since the dishwashers have come in there are no more family conversations. I'm inclined to believe that a little bit.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, what was your family's reaction on your dropping out of school at fourteen years old?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, I don't think it came too much as a surprise to them because I wasn't doing too well in school. For some reason or another I preferred to be outside playing hockey or tennis or golf or something like that and I didn't pay much attention to books. Dad said, "All right, we'll let you try working for a while." He got me a job with the Cunard Steamship Company, Limited to begin with. I worked there for a year or a year and a half and then Dad talked me into going back to school. I went back to Boston Latin School, but I had to repeat the year that I had been out of school. I stayed there a couple of more years, and then I dropped out again. I worked for the Famous Players Lasky Corporation, which is Paramount Pictures, for a couple of years.

MAJOR COUCH: What, who, or why were you influenced to join the Massachusetts National Guard?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, when I was working at Paramount Pictures, I had time on my hands and whenever I did have time on my hands I had a boy that I went around with and played tennis and golf and swam and did everything. His name was Alfred Ewer. He belonged to the Boston National Guard, the 110th Cavalry. On weekends, when we could not be together, he always went over and rode a horse. Well, I couldn't because I wasn't a member of the Guard, and he talked me into joining it so we could ride a horse together on Saturdays and Sundays. I thought that was pretty good because only soldiers and millionaires could do that in those days. I joined, in 1922, just to learn to ride a horse and I ended up forty-two years later in Saigon without a horse. It was while I was in the National Guard, that one night they announced that anybody who wanted to go to West Point through the National Guard could take the exams. Well, when I got home that evening from drill, about ten or ten-thirty, Dad was sitting up and said, "Well, what are your plans for the future?" That was a good question at the time, and I just came right back with "Well, they announced tonight that anybody who took the exams and passed could go to West Point." I've never seen such a change in a man in all my life. He didn't know any more about West Point than I did. But he stayed up till 2 o'clock telling me why I ought to go there. So, the next day he went downtown, and I guess he went to the library, to find out what West Point was all about and he saw what had to be done for a young man who wanted to take the exams and he convinced me that I ought to go back to school again. So, he sent me to Chauncey Hall, which is in Boston and a prep school for MIT. There,

having been out of school for some four or five years, it was like trying to put a frosting on a cake without a cake. But I studied hard and the next summer, Al Ewer, his brother, and I went up to Squam Lake in New Hampshire and just spent the summer doing nothing but fishing and playing ball. We were right next to a boys' camp; so we got in on all their activities. When I came back, Dad said, "How about West Point?" I said, "Oh, I take the exam in two weeks," this was the Congressional exam, and I came out third in that so I was appointed to take the regular exam the next March under Congressman Tinkham. I didn't have all the background that I needed so Dad said, "All right, we'll see what we can do." We went downtown, and we found that there was an Army-Navy Preparatory School, a correspondence course, and I locked myself in my room from 8 o'clock until noon, had lunch with Mother, studied until 5 o'clock, had dinner with the family, and studied until midnight every night until the time of the exam. I took the exam in March, 1925. I was the second alternate, but the principle failed mentally and the first alternate failed physically, so I was appointed. The appointment came as a happy birthday present on May 15th, 1925. I couldn't have gone in the next year because I was 21 on May 15th, 1925. That's how I got to the Academy.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, just from what you said, it took a lot of drive at a young age to prepare yourself, almost cram as you did, for the exams. At that time, did you really understand what West Point was all about or what made you really work that hard to get somewhere, where I gather you really, didn't know what it was all about?

GEN HARKINS: In the meantime, I had looked up to see what it was all about and they (the Academy) wrote and sent me pamphlets on it, and then

if you do or don't recall, in that year, that particular year '24 or '25, there was a picture on West Point starring Richard Barthelmess, and I saw it about fifteen times, I think. He was a country boy, and when he got his appointment to West Point, he came in and did a flip-flop right on to his bed. Well, I did the same thing, but my bed wasn't as big, and almost ended up in the hospital, but not quite.

MAJOR COUCH: Well, sir, in retrospect, at this time of your life, what did you recall as your opinion of the possibility of pursuing a military career and just what was the image of the Army like at this time?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, like anything else after or anytime, I guess, after a war, the image of the Army seems to go down. I don't think it was too good after World War I, and it certainly was cut to the quick. The only ones I'd talked to wondered why I would choose it as a career. When I finally joined my first unit after graduation from West Point, I was talking to some of the officers who had been first lieutenants for seventeen years. We sat down one night and figured out if we did our duty as we should do it, and behaved ourselves, and didn't get into any into any trouble, we might be majors or lieutenant colonels before or at the end of thirty years service. But, really, when I went to West Point, I got to like the military service and the activities, and there was no question in my mind then about making a military career. I've never regretted the decision one day.

MAJOR COUCH: I think it was in Time magazine that they quoted you as referring to yourself as the "maverick of the family". Would you please comment on this?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, I'm not sure that's quite correct. The others stuck pretty close to home. John did until he went to college and then went to New York. He was a writer, and he followed in Dad's footsteps. So did my young brother. The other was my sister, as I said, was a concert pianist for a time and I was the sportsman. I did all the outdoor things. The others were more the indoor type, except my brother Phil, who later on became a very, very fine athlete. He was a hockey player in Switzerland, besides writing books. I just liked to roam, and I think that's what a maverick does.

MAJOR COUCH: While you were at West Point, you were keenly interested in polo. What value do you place on sports as a means of building leadership?

GENERAL HARKINS: Oh, I think, it's one of the keys to good leadership, the competition and the desire to win. To be on the top, regardless of what sport you're in, you have to be in good health, you have to think fast, and I don't think there is any game that I know of that doesn't require some speed and thinking. I've encouraged others, as much as I could, to at least enter in to some activity. When I was Commandant of the Cadets, I insisted that almost every Cadet join some activity, . . . now, they couldn't all be athletes, they couldn't all be on the football team. But we had some fifty-seven different varieties of clubs they could get into. Just to keep them interested, and broaden their field and their background. But, I think, sports has a great influence, and I think it's essential for a young man to be in them.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, who else participated with you on the polo team at West Point?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, there was a boy named Joe Haskell. He was a year behind me. There was a classmate of mine named Billy Greear; he is in San Antonio now. He was the manager and played some of the time and then a boy who was killed in Normandy, a boy named Jimmy Matthews. We formed the West Point team. I happened to go out for polo, and the last year I was the team captain. I started playing polo in the Boston National Guard. When I went to West Point, there was a polo team of sorts. But at West Point only first classmen could be on the polo team. Well, it just happened, I was lucky, and was in the right place at the right time, I guess, and the first class didn't have many good polo players. They found out that I had played polo, as a matter of fact, I put on my selection card when I went into the Academy. When I put polo down I had my neck rammed in for six months. I wasn't even allowed to look at a horse. But they gave me a try-out, yearling summer, and also found out that Haskell, a plebe, was a good polo player. His father had been General Haskell of New York National Guard, and he had played polo in New York. The authorities started making it a corps squad sport, and it made it much better because you couldn't learn teamwork and all that in a year, but by the time we graduated, we had a pretty good polo team.

MAJOR COUCH: I noticed in the Howitzer that the team practices some on Mr. Harriman's, Mr. Averill Harriman's, private field. Did you develop a relationship with him at this time or did your association with him at this time ever develop into anything in the future?

GENERAL HARKINS: Not particularly. We used to go out there and play on Sunday afternoon, which was fine, because we got out of parades, and it was a beautiful field, but the competition was international. Here was

Tommy Hitchcock and Averill Harriman, J. C. Cowden and Strawbridge, and we were on our little Army ponies, and they had all these international ponies. We might as well have taken the camera out there and taken pictures as try to hit the ball, as a matter of fact, we got out of the way every time we saw them coming. I did know Mr. Harriman then and in later years I've run into him in Casablanca. He was in Moscow; he came down to Casablanca during the ANFA Conference. I saw him there and then later he was sort of in the State Department in charge of the Far East. I met him several times when I was on duty in Saigon and in Thailand.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, did any personal relationships develop during this time that would continue professionally throughout your career?

GENERAL HARKINS: Not particularly, except for Colonel Greear and Haskell who were on my polo team. Then another classmate of mine named Major General Red Cooper. We've served together several times, in Africa, Sicily and Europe. And, as a matter of fact, Red was here just last week, so we've kept up that relationship.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, did any of these polo associates achieve General Officer rank?

GENERAL HARKINS: No. None of them.

MAJOR COUCH: From your experience, what aspects of family, education, and environment tend to identify leadership and moral qualities?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, as I said, you learn to, when you're in a large family, get along with others. You learn that certainly self-discipline is necessary. And you learn to give and take a little bit, which I think, is very important. Whether it's on the distaff side or the male side

of the family. You have to give in a little bit.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, the West Point Howitzer of 1929 states that, "Paul has the means by which the most true and lasting success may be assured. Outspoken and frank, in his opinions, he has the most acute discrimination between right and wrong." Just how did this observation continue in your developed philosophy?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, I think, it carried all through the military. When I was a Cadet, I was on the honor committee. There were no grey areas, you were right or you were wrong. When any violation of the honor code came before the board, we always insisted on getting all the facts before we made our decision. I think once we got the facts and they were proven facts we made the decision, and we stuck to it. I think that sort of helped in my philosophy of going through the military. Just because one person says something is so, it isn't necessarily true, you have to go and get the facts. I think we see a lot of that today in all this Watergate and everything else. They're still trying to get the facts. It takes a long time sometimes, but it's necessary. I think, my family, my mother and Dad influenced me and perhaps Mr. Alfred Ewer, who just died recently, as a matter of fact, I went around with him for many years. And he probably influenced me most on my pre-military life. All were constantly giving me guidance and helping me in anything I tried to do.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, what would you choose as a major contrast between a lieutenant of your day and those of today?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, I'm not sure I can answer that question specifically because I've been out of the service now ten years, and I haven't had too much contact with the military. Here in Dallas there are no military units

as such. There are National Guard units, but I've only been out to visit them and not really discussed military problems with them. However, when this volunteer Army came up I was a little concerned that. . . we wouldn't get a whole spectrum of the country. Now, when you have the draft, you get people from the mountains and the seashore, the rich and the poor, and everything like that. I was concerned and maybe we would just get one group. Maybe the ones who couldn't find anything else to do. I wrote to General Westmoreland and told him my concern and he said, "Well, I want you to come back on duty for a couple of days and visit a couple of posts." So, I went to Fort Carson, Colorado. I was very impressed. I talked to the enlisted men, and I also talked to the junior officers. In fact, I had lunch with two different groups. I was very much impressed with their enthusiasm and their desire to get on with the job. It was in the books that they were going to have a volunteer army. I then went down to Columbia, South Carolina at Fort Jackson and visited the division there. I had conferences with them, and I was very impressed with that group, too, so I changed my views about the volunteer Army. I hope, and I think, it's working out pretty well. Now, as to the young lieutenant, the only thing I recall now is, when I joined you never called an enlisted man by his first name. You always called him corporal or sergeant or first sergeant or whatever it was. I did notice some of the officers calling the enlisted men by their first name. I always felt that if a man had rank, he'd like to be called by that rank, that's the only thing I noticed, but I really couldn't give you a good contrast because I've been away so long.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, what did your troop or squadron commanders do to prepare their junior officers for the duties a lieutenant would be expected to perform?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, my first troop duty after West Point was with Troop F of the 7th Cavalry at Fort Bliss. I'll never forget the first time I went out. We had a Corps inspection and we were doing everything by arm signals in the Cavalry. I brought my platoon up, apparently, in the wrong place. Well, the message I got through the arm signal from the Squadron Commander was something else. I did what I thought he said and right out there in front of everybody, and the inspector, he just chewed me out, and I said, "Sir, I thought you said so and so." And he said, "Listen, son, you don't think when you're in the Army." But, you had to think and I thought wrong and made a mistake and got corrected. I think one of the things in those days they did when a young lieutenant came in was to give him every single duty there was to be performed. I mean, from counting cans of peas in the post exchange to being the movie officer, to the gymnasium officer, to the serving courts, both defense council and judge advocate, and there wasn't one duty that I didn't perform as a second lieutenant. I was the lowest ranking one on the post at the time; so I got all the Christmas and New Years' guard duties, I know that. But, it gave me a good background, experience. They also switched your jobs around. If you had the machine gun platoon, they let you haul machine guns around to see how tough it was. If you were in the cannon platoon, you hauled that thing around. You started right at the bottom, and you worked up even though you were a second lieutenant. This experience helped a lot during my career and gave a good broad background of what you could expect a man to do.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, how did your curriculum, or your four years at West Point prepare you for these duties?

GENERAL HARKINS: Oh, I think, they were fine, I mean, they had a good well-rounded curriculum at West Point when I was there. I think if a Cadet who is at West Point realizes the tremendous education that he gets and the opportunities that he gets, while he is there, that by the time he's graduated he's pretty well qualified to be a second lieutenant. I always stick to that point, now if West Point can't teach a man to be a second lieutenant in four years, then there is something wrong with West Point. I was criticized when I was Commandant of Cadets because in 1950 the class of '50 graduated and the summer leave was cut short and they were immediately sent to Korea. I received several letters from mothers and fathers saying their boys shouldn't have gone there without further training, but I always felt the summer camps at West Point, and the military drills and the discipline and the know how you learn there would qualify a man to lead a platoon.

MAJOR COUCH: What was the impact of the depression on your decision to become a career officer?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, I didn't have much choice, I was already in the service when the depression hit. I just decided I'd take it and do the best I could. As a matter of fact, I met Mrs. Harkins at Bliss in 1931 and I courted her for two years before we got married and that was during the depression. I was getting a hundred and thirty-six dollars a month then, but President Roosevelt decided to cut it to one hundred and six dollars. So, the first pay check came in, at one hundred and six dollars, and there also came a pair of peal boots that cost ninety-five dollars. Well, we chewed on the boots for a little while, and the Peal Company was very nice, they let me pay it over the years. The senior officers or the

commanders knew that we (lieutenants) were up against it; however, as long as we were neat and clean, it didn't make too much difference if you had a patch on the seat of your trousers, as long as it was well patched and matched the material. They knew that we couldn't afford to buy forty dollar britches and one hundred dollars for a pair of boots with the pay we were getting. So they were very kind in that way to us, but we took it and we lived through it.

MAJOR COUCH: What was the social life like on a military post at this period?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, there was practically everything. You made your life right there on the post. They had golf courses at Fort Bliss, they had polo, they had the club, they had dances, they had dinners, they had official guests and there was a lot of camaraderie, particularly in the cavalry. They ate well, they played hard, danced well, and some of them probably drank well. Fortunately for me, I didn't drink in those days. That didn't bother me at all. We formed a lot of friendships and met a lot of people who you would serve with or would serve you in later years. You got to know each other and what a man was capable of doing. You could be a good judge of character to see what a man could do if you gave him a job to do.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, would you please describe the family life on post.

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, there were all sorts of activities and as I say, you could take your choice, both for the ladies and for the men. We were busy of course with the troop duties, running the post, keeping it neat and clean, and making it a model place. The ladies had thrift shops, sewing bee's, and bridge clubs. You made your own life and it was just like being

in a separate community, although we had a lot of contact with the people in town, particularly in Junction City, which was right by Fort Riley. Of course, Fort Riley sort of supported Junction City. There was a big payroll at Fort Riley and we got to know a lot of the very nice town people and we experienced the same thing at Bliss. Now, Fort Bliss was, well, they had a whole cavalry division there, and that was quite a big payroll to go into a town. The only town near Fort Bliss was El Paso so we got to know a lot of the people in El Paso and also the Junction City areas. We were engaged in civic activities and got to know them very well socially. It was a good community life.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, during this period, did they have a special services, and were there many activities for children as we see today on today's post, where they have swimming pools and teenage baseball teams for example?

GENERAL HARKINS: Oh, yes, yes they had several of those, yes almost everything.

MAJOR COUCH: Tasks for the most part were garrison duty, occasional maneuvers, and athletic events. Now, how did this assist in preparing you for higher command in Staff?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, I think right there, you have answered it. It gave one a good broad background to be able to do anything. As you went from second lieutenant to first lieutenant, you got a little more responsibility. You had to depend on people a little more. I think the most senior rank you have you have to depend on others. At least, you have to check them to see that the work gets done. That is one of the things

that I learned from General Patton. When he gave you an order, he'd say "All right, now, we'll go out and check it. I just want to be sure that it's done." I think that's the main thing, life on a post just gave you a good broad background.

MAJOR COUCH: Would you please evaluate the ability of the soldiers of your day with today's?

GENERAL HARKINS: As I say, I've been away for some time, but I have seen tremendous improvements in training aids and the training actually as it is given. It was more or less routine in my day. You had certain months you did pistol shooting, and the next couple of months you did rifle shooting, and the next month you did horse training. Today, I think they get a good broad background right from the beginning. The variety is much greater today. The military has expanded so much in different fields. Today, you have to be a technician. We didn't need any helicopter pilots or things like that in those days. Now, a man can go into the service and become a mechanic or electrician and learn electronics, nuclear physics, anything. We didn't have all those in my day. So, it's a much broader field today and it takes a better soldier, I mean, they are coming along and more broad in their background.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, how did NCO's help you as a junior officer?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, they kept me out of jail, I guess. They were the backbone and they still are the backbone of the Army. If you don't have good NCO's you don't have a good outfit, they are the leaders. They are the ones that sleep with the men in the same barracks, they know what each man can do. They'd give you advice. If you would pick out a certain

man to do a certain job, they might come up to you and say, "I think you had better pick so and so because he is much better at that and we'll give him something else equally as important, but I think this man would be better." I had been in my first troop one week when we went out to the pistol range. I had learned to shoot a pistol both in the National Guard and again at West Point. I was going through all the squeeze, hold, and the aiming, and you get this just right. We were shooting at twenty-five yards. I was just going to show them how to do this and the pistol went off without me knowing it and it hit right smack in the center of the bull's eye. The first sergeant came up and took the pistol out of my hands and said, "You don't have to shoot any more, Lieutenant." He helped me and it worked out all right. They were fine. Most of the NCO's that I had when I joined as a junior officer were World War I veterans and they had been through the mill, so to speak, in combat and they knew what was good and what was bad. They had a lot of common sense.

MAJOR COUCH: During your day, did you have the turnover in platoon leaders as we have it today. I can recall in my day, which hasn't been that long ago, of only being a platoon leader for about twelve months and in Vietnam, for instance, we were turning them over quite rapidly, maybe six months and they would go to a staff job. In your day, were you a platoon leader for a good length of time where you could develop a working mechanism with the platoon?

GENERAL HARKINS: No, there wasn't the turnover that there is today, as a matter of fact, I think I told you, maybe it wasn't on the record that when I joined my first unit, one first lieutenant had been a lieutenant for seventeen years. And he was wondering about whether he ever would

be a captain. That changed a little bit in 1934 or '35, when they started promoting a man from a second lieutenant to a first lieutenant after five years and then to a captain after five years more. Then, World War II came and everything started opening up. I brought in all my NCO's and had night school for them. This was Troop F I had in the Third Cavalry at Fort Myer. Everyone of those NCO's became an officer during World War II. But, we didn't have the turnover that you have today. I don't know whether it's settled down or not.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, in 1929, you were assigned at Fort Bliss and Henry Cabot Lodge was also there. What were your associations with him?

GENERAL HARKINS: At that time, I think if I'm not correct, Henry Cabot Lodge was a major in the Reserve or National Guard and he used to come down to Fort Bliss for his two weeks' duty in the summer. He was a close friend of then Major Crittenberger, who is now Lieutenant General Crittenberger. They knew each other in Washington and General Crittenberger asked him to come down in the summer. I met Lodge on several occasions there. Then, when we went down to Louisiana on maneuvers one year, I was with the G-3 section of the 2nd Armored Division, and Henry Cabot Lodge was one of my assistants in that section. General Crittenberger was the Division Commander. He had put him in there for experience, I got to know him quite well. I did not see him again, well, I did see him when I was at West Point, and I think, he was with the United Nations. I saw him again when I was in Vietnam. He came over as Ambassador.

MAJOR COUCH: What were your impressions of him at this time?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, at that time they became quite different.

MAJOR COUCH: General, you were assigned at Fort Riley and Fort Myer at the same time as General Patton. Did you know him and what was your professional association?

GENERAL HARKINS: Yes, I got to know him quite well. He didn't stay at Fort Riley very long, he was only there, probably, during the summer. When he came, they assigned him to a job that he had recommended be done away with. So, he didn't have too much to do but he joined the hunts and he played polo and I got to know him through that. Then, he was ordered to Fort Clark, as Commander of the 5th Cavalry. I didn't go with him then, but then when I was assigned from Fort Riley to Fort Myer, he was the Commander there and I had a troop in his regiment, "I", top of the 3rd Cavalry, we were called the 'Palace Guard'. We took care of the ceremonies downtown and formed escorts for the President wherever he went. So, yes, I got to know General Patton quite well at Fort Myer. He played polo there. I didn't hunt with him, he hunted with the civilian groups. I didn't hunt at Fort Myer but I did play a lot of polo there.

MAJOR COUCH: Would you please describe a typical duty day during this time?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, at Fort Riley after I had gone through two years of school, I was in the troop officers' class, which is the first course you attended after you had been in the service for about four years. It gave you the basics up to command of a regiment and a little bit on division in those days. Then I was assigned as an instructor in horsemanship. My day was to be at the stables at seven o'clock and see that the horses were ready for the students and teach them how to ride and I rode until noon, went home and had lunch, came back and rode until four. I did that

for four years. I had other duties beside that, but there wasn't any school in the summer in those days so I had the whole summer off and I used to go up and teach riding at a girls' camp in Wisconsin. That was very pleasant because the additional pay helped that hundred and six dollars a month. At Fort Myer it was a little different, you had a troop, you had duties around Washington. You had to be dressed like the 'Immaculate Conception' all the time because you couldn't tell who was coming out to post. Even if you were out on the muddiest day and you had an officer's call you had to go home and change your clothes before you got to the officer's call or you would be chastised. You drilled in the morning, then you had stables, and then you had officers calls. Then in the afternoon, there were special duties throughout the post. It kept you pretty busy as a matter of fact. There wasn't much free time. In the evening, when you were through and you thought you were ready for bed, it was always up to you to see that the horses were taken care of. You had to go down to the stables and see that they were asleep and had been properly fed and properly cared for. It was just taking care of your men and taking care of your horses.

MAJOR COUCH: You mentioned participating in the Louisiana maneuvers. Would you please give your observations of these maneuvers and the benefit the Army derived from it?

GENERAL HARKINS: I think it was the first time they had such large scale maneuvers. The first year I went, I went with the horse cavalry division and people won't believe it, these days; but we had twelve or thirteen thousand horses in the division. We'd had to swim the Sabine River to do our scouting and patrolling. A maneuver would end and after

three days of maneuvering you'd end up on Saturday morning someplace a hundred miles away from where the maneuvers started again on Monday morning, so the poor horse cavalry just had to ride for two days to get to where they could start again on Monday. I was there with the 2nd Armored the next time we went to Louisiana and that was entirely different. It was the first time armor had been used in the maneuvers. We didn't have all the vehicles. We had 2 1/2 ton trucks with trees on them for cannons and things like that, but we learned to handle big units. It was really a Godsend when World War II came, because the only thing we had from World War I to the maneuvers in Louisiana and the beginning of World War II were schools. Everybody got a chance to go to schools and that was the greatest thing that ever happened to the military because they learned. Although they didn't have the big units they learned how to command them, what to do with them, and what to expect from them. These maneuvers showed that you did learn a lot from the schools and staffs could handle a good concentration of troops. General Patton commanded the 2nd Armored and he'd do a hundred mile night march to get to the place to attack the next day. It was fascinating to see how well we did.

MAJOR COUCH: It almost seems that somebody was able to foresee World War II coming and the need for large unit maneuvers.

GENERAL HARKINS: Oh, I think we saw that in '39, when the Germans went through the low countries. We started getting ready for war then, I think. At least everybody got a little more tense. . . I remember Colonel Palmer, I was at Fort Myer and he used to command the summer camp down in Fort Belvoir. We used to take our horses down there for a month and we'd train ROTC and we'd train our own troops. Colonel Palmer came in one

night to observe some of the maneuvers we were on. It was on the old battlefields of the Civil War and we were sitting around the camp fire one night after this invasion of the low lands was announced, and he said, "Well, we had better get prepared because we'll probably be going to war." And that was three years before the war started.

MAJOR COUCH: While you were at West Point, did any particular classmate make a real favorable impression on you that you almost had him pegged as an individual that was going to rise to the highest levels in the Army?

GENERAL HARKINS: I was friendly with many people up there, particularly in the sports field. But, I don't recall any one particular person that I would pick or choose. I didn't know enough about it in those days. Of course, in those days, you picked your branch of the service by where you stood in the class. I don't know whether they still do that today but all the men who had brains, were called engineers. They would go into the engineers and the next popular branch was the cavalry because of the camaraderie. Then some who were technical would pick the Signal Corps. Then the Artillery, and finally the Infantry. Not all, but some of the senior cadets picked the Infantry because they just thought it was a great branch of the service or they had been told it was. There is nothing wrong with the Infantry, as far as I'm concerned, we can't get along without them.

MAJOR COUCH: General, would you please evaluate the war time staffs you were on as to their strengths and weaknesses.

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, I joined General Patton's staff in the 2nd Armored Division in the G-3 Section and he went to command the 1st Armored Corps, I did not go with him. Then when we were going in to Africa in '42, I joined his staff in late August and I became Deputy Chief of Staff for

Operations. I stayed with him in that position all through World War II. Now, there were about eight or ten officers that he took with him from the Western Task Force to Sicily and then back up to England. The other staff officers were named from various headquarters. . .for instance, we had to expand our headquarters going into Sicily and they came from other units around Europe. Then when we got into England before the invasion of the continent, actually he took eight of us up there who had been with him all during the war. General Hodges had brought the Third Army over and General Patton was given the Third Army in January or February of 1945. We just took over the Third Army Staff as it came in from the States. I'll say one thing about General Patton's staff, although he didn't stick to the book sometimes, he wanted people to get things done and when he wanted something done the staff were the do'ers. It was a great bunch. There were no prima donna's and they worked very closely with each other. They all knew what General Patton wanted and they just saw that it was done. One thing about his staff was that he insisted that somebody from the staff go forward every single day. He wouldn't give out any medals for beautiful warehouses and things like that, if the soldiers didn't have what they needed up the front. That was the purpose of a man from each section going someplace up the front every day. When General Gay, C/S, didn't go up, I d go up, or take some of the other staff officers and we'd just visit. At first, the Corps and Divisions didn't think much of having the Army staff come up and bother them, but when they found out we went up there to find out what they needed and then we would get it to them, well; they changed a 180°, they were all heart. But a staff has to learn to get along with each other and coordinate things, otherwise, they'd just go off on a tangent.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, I know what your official duty title was, but would you please describe what your duties actually were, because; a lot of times, the duty title does not necessarily track with actual duties performed?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, whenever General Patton ordered an operation to begin the Deputy for Operations was the coordinator, that was me. If you needed more engineer bridging companies, you would get with the engineer and see where we could pick them up. If you needed more anti-aircraft, you would see where we could pick up some anti-aircraft units and you had to work very closely with the G-3, particularly and the G-4, because the G-3 really, after you got all the information available, really ran the operations and kept track of them. My job was to really see that the staff coordinated and cooperated all the way through. That wasn't much trouble in the Patton's staff because they all wanted to get things done and they wanted to get it done quickly, because as General Patton said, "The quicker you do a thing the more lives you save," that was true.

MAJOR COUCH: Newsday magazine referred to you as, "a ramrod whom pistol packin' General George S. Patton picked to get his orders carried out in a hurry". Would you please explain this, just how did you obtain this reputation?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, I think, that's just a word they used. I wasn't more ramrod than General Gay or some of the other staff officers, but as I say, in my duties as Deputy Chief for Operations, and we were in Operations most of the time, my job was to get them done. I wouldn't sit in the office and do it and read a lot of papers, I'd go down to the staff sections and tell them what we had to do and when we wanted it done and

it was usually the day before yesterday. So, I guess, I didn't have to step on many toes because every time they saw me coming in they knew something was up. It is just a matter of getting across the idea of what the General wanted. He preferred a good plan rather than a perfect plan. Because a good plan, well carried out, would do the job just as well as a perfect plan only delayed a few days longer.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, outwardly you and General Patton appear to be entirely different, however, Newsweek and Time have both stated that inwardly that the two of you were identical. Would you please comment on this?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, as I think I've said before, and it's just repetition. It's I went around with him quite a bit, just to find out what he wanted done. Then it was my job to go back and see that it was done. He always would come to me and say, "Now, we want to change this or change that." I'd understand what he meant and go out and tell the staff and have it redone but I was for getting it done in the quickest possible time and saving lives and he appreciated that very much.

MAJOR COUCH: Would you please comment on General Patton's relationship with Generals Bradley and Eisenhower, as far as the way you saw it.

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, I think they were fine. They were good friends. I think that General Patton was senior to both of them, but that didn't bother him. He liked to fight, he'd rather fight than eat. After Sicily, we had gotten in there and General Eisenhower had really just gotten command of the whole theater. The Sicilian operation was one of the big ones and we came out of it pretty well. One staff officer visiting from Washington said, "Somebody had made the remark that General Eisenhower was making Patton." The staff officer said, "No, General Patton is making Ike."

General Bradley was under Patton in Sicily, but then he was over him in Europe. They got along fine. Bradley's staff was not as involved in operations, as far as keeping the supply coming from the rear and things like that. although they were in the general overall operational planning, but not in the specifics. When you get down to the Army and down to the Corps and down to the Division you are getting in to the operations a little bit more. Bradley visited us frequently and they seemed to get along fine.

MAJOR COUCH: What kind of a relationship existed between General Patton's staff and the staffs of Generals Bradley and Eisenhower?

GENERAL HARKINS: It was fine, excellent.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, would you please give your observations on General Patton's use of air power in the European campaign?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, when we were getting ready for . . .for the . . . battles in Europe, we were not in the initial landing on the 6th of June. The Third Army was coming through later with twelve divisions, mostly pretty well trained. Some of them were in the invasion but not all of them. We also picked up the 19th Tactical Air Force and that was under command of General O. P. Weyland. Members of their staff were right with us all the time. Now, their headquarters couldn't keep up with us because they had their air communications and things, but there were staff officers from the 19th Tac with us every day. When we had our staff meetings, they would take the word back as to what was going on. General Patton would get up at the briefing, when we had three Corps going. He'd say, "Well, let's put the effort to such and such Corps today." They would put the air effort on that. When we were going across France, General Eddy was

brought down when one of the Corps commanders got sick. General Eddy came down to take command. He had been with us in Africa and Sicily and General Patton thought very highly of him. Eddy had been fighting the hedgerows and going about one hedgerow a day it seemed, and the first day he was with us he had to go eighty kilometers. He looked at the G-2 reports and he said, "Well, your G-2 told me there are ninety thousand Germans on my right, and eighty thousand on my left, and you tell me to go right straight through the middle." This in talking to General Patton. General Patton said, "Just ignore the bastards;" and then he got a hold of O. P. Weyland and told him to put reconnaissance out to the flanks to see that none of these Germans moved in on General Eddy. They never did because a lot of them that the G-2 had put down, were the coastal units and they weren't any place near the battlefield anyway. General Patton made a very fine use of air power and he used it as the eyes and ears of the Army a lot of times.

MAJOR COUCH: During an interview with the Air University, you stated that you didn't know why General Patton kept you around. Would you please hazard a guess as to why he did keep you around?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, we were so different, I think, as you mentioned before, in our make-up. I was a quiet type and yet I got things done and I think. . .it seems, I could get it done without making a lot of fuss and feathers, and I think, that is why he kept me.

MAJOR COUCH: General Patton's reputation on relieving commanders who were not extremely aggressive, I think, has grown since the war, however, from reading "War as I Knew It" I gathered he is not quite as quick to relieve a commander as one would think. Would you please give your observations on this subject?

GENERAL HARKINS: Yes, you're absolutely right, he didn't relieve commanders unless the man was sick or he was tired, or he just couldn't perform the job. He had great confidence in his corps commanders. There is only one division commander that I knew he actually relieved because he just didn't carry out the orders as quickly as General Patton wanted him to and I think he could have. One division commander was relieved during the Battle of the Bulge, but he was just exhausted, thoroughly exhausted. No, he didn't go around looking for causes and reasons to relieve commanders. If they were up in the front and knew what their division was doing and doing what he wanted them to do, they got along fine. He'd pat them on the back. Sometimes you have to pat them high and sometimes low, but he'd pat them on the back and say, "You're doing a good job." He had a great admiration for General Walker, the XXth Corps commander, and Troy Middleton, VIII Corps and also he made Eddy XII Corps Commander, later on. He made Van Fleet, XX Corps Commander. No, he might have had that reputation, he'd relieve them if they wouldn't do their duty, but most of them did their duties very well.

MAJOR COUCH: General Patton's maneuvering during the Battle of the Bulge has been recorded in the history; you have referred to it, as fantastic. Would you please comment on this as seen from inside the staff?

GENERAL HARKINS: I agree, it was fantastic because in its beginning I was the staff. They were very crucial days. I have mentioned before I told you that we were getting ready to break through the Siegfried Line on the 19th or the 20th of December of '44, and we had pulled out the 4th Armored and the 80th Infantry Division to refurbish and retrain and get them ready for the breakthrough. We had 1500 airplanes that were going

to bomb for three days. Then we were going to breakthrough. We had been practicing how close they could bomb to the leading tanks. Then the call for General Patton came to report, immediately to Verdun, to see General Eisenhower and General Bradley and the British staff because of the Bulge up to our left flank. It wasn't in our area, it was in the First Army area. We had been watching it pretty carefully. Colonel Koch, who was G-2, of the Third Army, and myself had been keeping an eye on it from the 12th to the 13th of December, because we knew something was going on and even General Weyland, in his 19th Tactical Air Force, found out that his planes couldn't get in up around the area, north of our area, as easy as they had to be able to, and that the anti-aircraft was very, very heavy up there. So when General Patton went up on the 19th, we had already made plans of switching our divisions from attacking due east, to attacking to the north. I went with him to the Verdun Conference on 19 December '44, General Eisenhower told him that he'd have to call the attack to the east off and attack north, on the southern edge of the Bulge, and that the Germans had already reached Bastogne. Bastogne was an important road net. It was a road center. It was a very important position. The 101st Airborne was all ready there. They had been called up and were in there and pretty well surrounded by this time. So, when Ike asked him how soon he could attack, General Patton said, "I'll make a meeting engagement in three days and I'll give you a six division coordinated attack in six days." Well, that brought a bit of a chuckle, Ike's staff didn't think that was possible. General Patton turned to me and said, "We can do that," and I said, "Yes, sir." There wasn't much else I could say. We had it pretty well figured out. So, he went to Luxembourg from Verdun and I went back

to Nancy, to brief the Third Army Staff. I told them what we had to do and get things moving. I left that afternoon for Luxembourg to join General Patton and I arrived there after supper. He wanted to know where the hell I had been, and I said, "I've been fighting divisions, moving up this way. It took quite a while all through a snow storm. So, he said, "Well, here's what I did or here's what I've done," and he turned to his driver, Sergeant Mins, who had been with him all day and the only one with him and said, "Didn't you take notes, Mins?" He said, "No, sir, I didn't." "Well," he said, "I'll try to remember what I did," and he started telling me and I said, "I'll start out tonight and go check and see if everything is in order," and he said, "Nobody's going out at night, you stay here. You can go out tomorrow, but you can't go out tonight because they are shooting everybody." So, I went around the next day. The units were so broken up after they got hit by the Germans, anti-aircraft mixed up with infantry, etc. There were tanks mixed up with anti-aircraft and nobody seemed to be in command. Well, General Patton just went up there and got them all together and formed a little task forces out of them and said, "You are in command and you are now known as Task Force--," he named them, gave the men a Task Force name with a commander. It would be Task Force Gregory or Task Force Jones and this is what you got to fight as. I don't think if you sat down in Fort Leavenworth and tried to figure out how you could save that thing, you could have done better than he did. He just had a knack of what should go together and what they should do. In the first place, he just turned them all around and sent them north. It was absolutely fantastic, and when it got all straightened out, in two or three days, and the divisions started coming

up and taking over and absorbing these little Task Forces. They, the Task Forces really held the enemy off while the divisions moved up. As I say, it was fantastic, quite a job.

MAJOR COUCH: Just out of curiosity, were orders published for all these moves or were they person-to-person radio transmissions.

GENERAL HARKINS: Hell, No!! Person-to-person. No orders were published at all. Except for the divisions to move north and go to Bastogne or go to Martelange or go to Alencon or something like that. Orders weren't published, they were just told to go and it worked out very well.

MAJOR COUCH: What are your views on good staff officers making good commanders and vice versa.

GENERAL HARKINS: I agree, they should be both. I know my career is varied between staff and command. I've enjoyed both. I was a young lieutenant, had platoons. As a young captain, I had troops. I didn't go to any schools except three month courses at Leavenworth. I learned how the staff officers worked in the division. I had a few. . .couple of short assignments as a division staff officer. I was a Brigade S-3, under General Carl Bradford, in the 1st Cavalry Division, he had the 2nd Brigade. Then when I went overseas, I went overseas as a staff officer. I came back and I was Commandant of Cadets which is a command position. When you have 2500 sons you really have something to command. They can all read between the lines. Then I went down to the Pentagon, on a staff job, in the Plans Division in G-3. Then, I went over to Korea with General Taylor as his Chief of Staff. Then, I commanded two infantry divisions, the 45th and 25th. I think, I'm the only cavalry officer who ever commanded two infantry divisions. Then, I came back to the Pentagon, again as the G-3, and I was the last G-3 in

the Army. Then, I went to Command South East in Turkey, and commanded the Greek and Turkish forces. Then, NATO, then to Deputy Commander in Hawaii. Then, I was Commander in Vietnam. So, I. . .I think, in my personal experience, a man has to be capable of doing both staff and command. I think a good staff officer, particularly if he is in combat, has to see that the troops get everything they need. He should be going up to the front, not have the commanders coming back and looking for things. You can tell them right there on the ground whether you have it, whether you'll get it, or whether you don't have it, and they will have to do without. A commander in battle should rely on the staff above him and his own staff, to get the stuff he needs. Vice versa, many staff officers have gotten to be good commanders.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, of the many senior officers that you served with in World War II, which of them were to play a part in your future and what part did they play and would you also please identify a few?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, I think two or three of them I might mention. One was General Gay, who was my Chief of Staff and General Patton's Chief of Staff all during World War II I was his Deputy Chief. We had two Deputy Chiefs, one for administration, and one for operations. I was just mixed up in the operations field, but to tie in closely with the other one, because that's where your personnel came from. General Lemnitzer, whom I knew when he went into Sicily. He was the anti-aircraft commander there, and I served with him in the Pentagon and on many other occasions. He was Operations Deputy and I was in the G-3 business and I met General Taylor. . .Maxwell Taylor. . .before the invasion of Sicily. General Patton at that time was up in Tunisia. I didn't go up there, I was writing

the plans for Sicily. General Taylor came down to Rabut to be briefed and was very appreciative of the briefing I gave him. I saw him again in Sicily. Then he commanded the 101st Airborne which was in Bastogne. He was home at the time. He was home on some kind of a mission for General Eisenhower, that was just before. . .Christmas, '44. When we broke in there, he came over as soon as he found out what had happened. He came to the headquarters and he came right to me and he said, "I got to get up to Bastogne." And I said, "Well, they're not quite in it yet," but. . .he said, "Well, I need some transportation," so I gave him my jeep. He kept it for a week. Later on, when he was Superintendent at West Point, I was Commandant of Cadets under him. He asked me to be Commandant. Then, he suggested when I was leaving West Point that I go down and take a look and see how the Pentagon was run. He said, "It's important to know how that squirrel cage operates." So, on his advice, I went there. Then when he went to command in Korea, he asked me to come over and be his Chief of Staff. I left after a year and a half in Korea and came back to the Pentagon and he came back to be Chief of Staff, so I served with him again. Then he was very influential of me going to command the NATO forces in Izmir, Turkey when I commanded the Greeks and the Turks for three years. I went to Hawaii when Vietnam was very much in the news. He came out as the President's representative and on the way through Hawaii, Mrs. Harkins and I had him in for dinner. On the way back he stopped and said he was in a hurry, but he called anyway, and he said, "Paul, you better be ready to get your fist in the dike, there is going to be a flood over there." And I said, "Yes, sir." That's all

that was said until a month later I was called to see the President. He had recommended me to be the commander and so. . .I think he had quite a . . .quite an influence on my Army career.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, what leadership traits that you later might have used were influenced by serving with General Patton?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, I think that I've mentioned as we have gone along here, I think his concept of training was something. It had to be realistic. It had to be very repetitive. He said you have to repeat and repeat and repeat and repeat training because when you're being shot at you just do things automatically and that's the purpose of training and why there is so much repetition and it seems boring to people. But he said once you've been hearing the whine of bullets around you, you automatically take cover or shoot at the other guy. I think he thought a lot of discipline and attention to duty and so did I. He had a lot of self-discipline and, I think, I picked up that trait from him. As I have said before, you have to pat these people on the back and sometimes you pat them high and sometimes you pat them low, I think that's very true. If you tell a man that he is doing a good job, he'll try to do better. And if a man isn't doing a good job, you don't have to tell him so in front of the troops, you can get him aside and tell him he isn't doing it. You never bawl commanders out in front of their troops. As a rule, you always take them aside and give them a tongue lashing, if you have to. If you want to praise them, go ahead and praise them, but not for the critical part.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, from your experiences in World War II, which influenced you the most in your future endeavors?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, that's a little difficult to answer and pin any one thing down, but I think, probably working with General Patton probably

influenced me most. He was an ardent student of history and he was a student of others' mistakes. He said, "You don't study history just to learn the dates. You study history to learn what to do right and what to do wrong." The idea of anybody who wants to be as good as he was, had to pay the price, and do a lot of studying. You don't get anything in life unless you pay the price, one way or the other. We were going up to SPH after the Bulge and I went with him. We were on the way back. We stopped in the Maginot Line, which is where the French were in their defensive attitudes. They had quite a set-up there. . .the turrets would come up and the gun would shoot and the turrets go down. The soldiers lived right underneath and the ammunition was also down there. They had clubs and everything else, all built underground. General Patton said, "This is man's monument to stupidity." He said, "The enemy knows where you are and they'll just leave you there." One time we were at the crossing of the river at Averanche, General Grow and his 6th Armored Division had just gotten to the river. He bivouaced on our side. General Patton and I went down and General Patton said, "You get your division across there, tonight." General Grow was going to let them rest. General Patton said, "Well, if you study history," he said, "I can give you five examples where people stopped on this side of the river and the bridge wasn't there in the morning. Now, I'm going to get two or three divisions across there tonight and then we can take a rest." I asked him why he made Grow do that and he said, "You don't study history to just know the dates." He said, "That's probably the way you did it." I had to agree that that was most of the way I did it. He said, "No, you got to find out what happened. What made the success and what made the failure." He carried that through and I've sort of tried to carry it through ever since.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, did the Command and General Staff College produce good staff officers and staff procedures during this time?

GENERAL HARKINS: Yes, excellent. Although, I only took the short course there. I think what they had during the interim from World War I to World War II where many of our senior officers went through the Command and General Staff School, I think the procedures that . . . really made the staffs of World War II. If you recall, maybe in World War II, we were only allowed five regular officers out of the Regular Army in a division or in a division staff. Those people had the influence of all the other officers that came in through OCS or any other way of teaching them. The staff procedures and making good staff officers was a 'Godsend', from all those schools. I had the short course, but I had worked on staffs, I mean, a division staff on brief periods because that's the way the officers were treated when I was a youngster. You get assignments for a couple of weeks of doing this and doing that and switched around quite a bit. I accused General Patton one time of not using good staff procedures, I said, "At Leavenworth, we learned what the commanders plan is and then the G-2 gives an estimate and the G-3 gives an estimate and the G-4 gives an estimate." I said, "You don't do that, you just say, 'I want this done,'" and he said, "Yes, G-3 Section is an office of record, as far as I'm concerned." But, yes, they were very good, excellent. Now, there is one thing that I'll add to that and that's a lecture I dreamed up for the Cadets at West Point. That is the use of common sense. They were teaching the principles of War at West Point. You probably remember them as "Command and Organization" and "Mass and Movement" and I think there are nine, there are

probably more. But if you will take the word 'Common Sense,' and just put the first letters of Common and Sense in a column on the left, and if you start with cooperation and Offensive and Mass and Movement and Objective and Efficiency and Economy and there you have it. They're right down in Common Sense and that's what I always say. So, to be a good commander, a good staff officer, you have to use Common Sense. Now, there are a couple of "N's" in there that you can't find, but you can and somebody will say "Nuts" but that's all right, it's common sense. It makes a very good talk.

MAJOR COUCH: During the period of time that you were Assistant Commandant and Commandant of Cadets at West Point, what were some of your functions and also some of your observations.

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, after World War II, I stayed over in Europe with General Patton. We were in Bavaria. He was in command down there and then, of course, he got in that accident in December of '45, from which he died some ten days later and I brought Mrs. Patton home. When I got to Washington, I didn't know whether I was going to stay home or what my next job would be. So, I happened to call at the Pentagon one day and I think it was the day after Christmas to find out where I was going. I hadn't had a leave in some time. The assignments officer said, "Well, where do you want to go?" It happened to be a classmate of mine and I said, "Well, I'd like to go to West Point," and he said, "Okay, you go. Take forty-five days leave and I'll send you there." So, I went up and I became Assistant Commandant in February of 1946, and then in 1948, I became Commandant of Cadets. Now, the Commandant of Cadets is in charge of discipline and training of the whole cadet corps. As

I say, it's a fascinating job. You're in with some the brightest young men in the country. You try to give them good leadership. You are trying to teach them the politeness of the things they have to do, all the facets of leadership. They have an academic course they have to go through. Then you are responsible for their military training. You get in to some ticklish questions. I know one time, being in charge of discipline, I put a cadet on the area, as we say up there, for stealing a 2 1/2 ton truck one night and riding up to Vassar. Well, he told his father, who worked in and around Newburg, New York that everybody, all the officers at West Point, including the Commandant of Cadets, were Red, they were all Reds. He said, "You ought to come down here and see them," so the father came down one day. I didn't know it, but he had a pistol under his coat. I didn't know when he was sitting across the desk, whether he was going to shoot me or not. Somebody discovered that he was armed when they hung his coat up. We had the MP's come out and disarm him. Then I turned him over to the first captain and one of the other senior cadet officers. I pulled his son out of class and told him to take his father around and show him the academy. Some of the classes and some of the gyms and things like that. When he was leaving. . .the father came up to call on me and he said, "You can just leave my son on the area for the rest of the year, as far as I'm concerned." Those are some of the problems you. . .you really have to be the father and the mother and the sister and the brother to 2500 sons. I've met them all over the world since then. They all remember me, I don't remember all of them, but I remember the bad ones, not the good ones. Because the bad ones had to come to my office. Now, the superintendent, he's

responsible for the post and general running of the academic staff and all that. The Commandant's duties are really confined, although, to the cadets, he's on the athletic board and the academic board and all the other boards and the chapel board. His main job is the life of the cadet, the barracks, all the equipment, and everything else. It was a very rewarding assignment. I was there for five years. It was a very fascinating part of my career. I think one of the top things that I have ever done.

MAJOR COUCH: What techniques did you use to develop the staff and maintain quality as Chief of Staff of the Eighth Army in Korea?

GENERAL HARKINS: I think I've said before that when I left West Point, I went down to the Pentagon at the suggestion of General Taylor. Then he took me over to be his Chief of Staff when he commanded the Eighth Army. Well, I had learned a lot about a staff job under General Patton and I admit the main thing was to- . .to give a staff officer a job but not tell him how to do it. After all, he was an expert in his own field, and I felt if I had an engineering problem come up, I'd call in the engineer and tell him what had to be done. He'd go do it, but I didn't tell him how to do it, I couldn't possibly. I had to delegate a lot of authority, and I don't think, it worked out very well.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, in your relationship with the staff of the Eight Army and later the 24th and the 45th Divisions, unpleasant tasks of weeding personnel must have occurred. What techniques did you use to solve this problem?

GENERAL HARKINS: I don't think there were too many. My job as both the Chief of Staff and also as Commander of the 24th and 45th was to run a tight ship and a harmonious ship. If. . .no matter how good a man is

even though he is an excellent staff officer, if he doesn't get along with the rest of the staff, there is reason to put him in another job where he won't have that influence or won't upset the functioning of the staff. They just can't be prima donnas, as far as I'm concerned. We didn't have any prima donnas on the staff, I think, it was just a question of getting them to work as a harmonious team, you know. . .I think there were one or two that. . .as a matter of fact, my own executive officer, and I don't remember his name so it doesn't make any difference. He just couldn't take it for some reason or another. I relied a lot on him for facts and figures, but some of the things that he would bring in to me were incorrect and one day he didn't show up. I asked where he was and they said he was sick. Well, I went over to see him because I thought if he was sick, something ought to be done. Well, he was sick, but also passed out with a bottle lying beside him. I just put him in the hospital and that was the easiest way to get rid of him. Get somebody you can trust. I think as I've said before someplace along the line, when you want a job done you might give it to somebody to do but then you have to go out and check it and check that it is done. In most cases, where I gave a job to somebody, then I went out to check to see and it was always done very, very well.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, the War was over when you assumed command of the 24th and 45th Divisions. What were your major areas of interest and how did you approach solving these problems?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, it was a problem. We had full strength in personnel. When I took the 45th Division first and the war was over, I found out that they really hadn't done enough to keep the soldiers busy.

I mean, when you're out there in the mountains and the hills with nothing to do, it's pretty sad. So, I thought, maybe, we could start educating some of them. I had a survey of the division made and found out that over 2500 soldiers in my division couldn't read or write. So, I set up schools. . .I got professors in from the United States, and we setup, I think it was under the University of Maryland, I'm not sure, and we just setup schools. Now, those people would drill in the morning and keep up their training but they were excused and went to school that afternoon. It was pathetic to me to see some of these very fine strapping young GI's, some of them were of foreign origin, and they could fight for you and they could shoot craps and get the right change, but they couldn't spell 'dog' or 'cat'. To see these great big husky lads getting up there and struggling with words like that, it almost brought tears to my eyes. So, that was one way to keep them busy, we started these schools and they turned out to be very fine. Then they decided to order the 45th home. I think it was the first division to leave. In those days, we had what we called the point system, and if you had so many points, you could go home. Well, I couldn't find enough people with enough points. We could only find 1200 people to go home from the division, so they took the division colors home and to some of those we gave a few points because we didn't have enough. When I ended the division had gone home, I still had 18,000 people there. So, the problem then was to. . .to spread them out. On top of that, these 18,000 had been scattered around in Korea, we brought up the 24th Division, so I had about 25,000 people in the division, at one time. But just keeping them busy was the main thing. An unbusy soldier is an unhappy one, but there are so many interesting things to do and particularly that school system, it worked out very well.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, from 1929 to 1953, you served over twenty-four years and achieved the rank of Major General. Would you please analyze the following concerning your success. What part did hard work play?

GENERAL HARKINS: The most, I would say. You. . .you have to give your best, all the time, and you have to work hard. I know when I was in the Pentagon, it was a fascinating job. I was in the Army Plans Division and we were in Plans for everything all over the world. It didn't make any difference, people overseas would send in the different problems at times. . .and we had to coordinate with the State Department. For three years, I never got a day off, including Christmas or New Years, or any other day, it was just hard work, but it was fascinating work. I enjoyed every minute of it, from seven to seven, at least every day, and usually on Saturday and Sunday. But as I say, like everything else, you got to pay the price.

MAJOR COUCH: What part did being at the right place at the right time play?

GENERAL HARKINS: I think it was very important, as far as I was concerned. I was fortunate enough to run into General Patton at Fort Riley, Kansas. The first job I had for him was to. . .was to ship his horses to Fort Clark when he left for Clark. I guess, I did a pretty good job because he remembered it, and thanked me very much. Later, he was the commander at Fort Myer and I had a troop in his regiment, and I got to know him even better because we played polo together and then he was to be my commander all during World War II. At the same time, during World War II, I ran into General Taylor, and he was to have a great influence on my life later on in choosing me for high command, and I think, in those instances, I was in the right place at the right time.

INTERVIEW SIDE TWO WITH PAUL D. HARKINGS, 8 APRIL 1974, DALLAS, TEXAS

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, what traits did you look for in selecting officers for major positions, either staff or command?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, I think the main thing is their ability and knowing their job, and as I said before. They ought to have good sense, as far as I was concerned, common sense. I didn't like any sloppy people around and I like people to have a high sense of duty and when you pick the kind of man with all those qualities, he made a good commander or a good staff officer. I think, as I said before and I say again, a man has to be in good health, I think that's the most important thing. I, fortunately, never missed a day of duty in all my service (and knock on wood,) because I'll probably pass out here this afternoon, but I think that helps an awful lot. Being able to be on the job and do the job. I think if you work hard and do the job as best you can, you will keep yourself in good health.

MAJOR COUCH: When you returned from Korea, you were re-assigned to Washington. This was during the re-organization of the Department of the Army, would you please give your observations and something of the duties that you had during this period?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, I was in the international business then, more or less mixed up with all the South American countries. But, I was also in charge of the MAGS and missions all over the world and I did a lot of traveling. I wasn't actually mixed up with the re-organization, but I think that's during the years of '55 and '56 that they re-organized. Somebody had the bright idea that. . .what did they call it in those days. . . ROAD or something like that, and the re-organized the divisions, but we

found that the real good organization for a division was the Triangular concept. I was sorry to see the change, but I think, it has gone back to more or less that now. We had Triangular Divisions in armored and infantry in both Sicily and in World War II and you always have an opportunity, unless you have a tremendous front, you always had an opportunity to have one of the Thirds out resting and the others doing the fighting. If you were in a narrow spot, you could only use one on a road and then leap frog them. If. . .as the old Leavenworth solution, is you always put two up and one down, but that doesn't always work, according to the terrain. Then they re-organized the staff. I was in the G-3, I was, as I said before, was the last G-3. They made it into what they call Deputy Chief for Operations, and I became the Assistant Deputy Chief for Operations under General Edelman. But there wasn't much change in there either actually. . .because we stayed in the same office, we had the same staffs, we had the same clerks and we did about the same thing only took on a little more responsibility. We had a lot more coordinating to do with the other services. We'd have to fight the battle of the budget, how many ships the Navy could have and they'd tell us, how many divisions we could have. It was very interesting work. I got to know a lot of very fine Navy and Air Force officers in my duties which helped later on because I knew them and knew what they could do and what they stood for.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, in 1957, you were assigned as Commander of Allied Land Forces in Southeast Europe. What problem areas required the majority of your attention and how did you try to solve them?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, of course taking a job like that and having a headquarters, your main headquarters in one of the other countries always upset the other country. So, when I got there, I had my main headquarters in Izmir, Turkey. But to satisfy the Greeks, I also opened up a headquarters in Thessalonike, otherwise known as Salonika. You know the Greeks and the Turks have been at loggerheads for many, many years or thousands and thousands of years. The Military gets along fine, but the politicians, not too well. My job was to try to keep the politicians from influencing the military. We had the problem with Cyprus. We had on the staff. . . I had over a hundred officers, thirty percent were Greek and about thirty percent were Turkish, thirty percent American and the rest were French, Italians and other NATO commands. The Cyprus question came up one day and General Alexan Drakis, who was my senior Greek, called me up Saturday right after lunch, I had just gone home, and he said, "General, I have to be out with all my staff by midnight tonight, they are sending twelve planes to pick up my staff and move them out." I said, "Alex, you can't, you are my headquarters, you're thirty percent of my headquarters." And he said, "We got to go." So, I said, "Well, what do you want me to do?" He said, "Well, we all have houses and we all have Turkish maids and most of them are off for the weekend and we'll leave food in the icebox for them and we'll leave them pay, but we all have automobiles. Would you get word to all these Turkish people, who come in Monday to work, that we are not coming back and they can have the food and pick up their pay and please take the automobiles and keep them for me, I'm sure we will be back." Well, I couldn't stop them. I went over to Greece the next week and the military commanders were fine,

they were just sorry that it happened, because I had a good rapport with them. But, General Alexan Drakis said, "There is nothing we can do about these politicians they just don't like each other, but, we'll be back." Well, it took about six months and then I had the thought that I was going up to inspect the First Turkish Army in the Istanbul area. By that time, six months later, the fireworks had calmed down. They were just fizzling a little bit. I wanted to go from the First Turkish Army in to what was called the C Corps. In the Greek Army they had them by Corps and the Greek commander was a man called General Papathanasiadis. Well, I decided it would be a good idea to end up my Turkish inspection at the Edirne Bridge. Now, there is a bridge over the Edirne River that connects Turkey with Greece and I thought if I had a Turkish honor guard on one side of the bridge and a Greek honor guard on the other and maybe the two commanders meet at the middle it might work and it did. So, we had this very fine Turkish honor guard and we had a Greek honor guard and we walked from the Turkish side across to the middle and General Papathanasiadis came up and shook hands with me and then with the Turk and patted each other on the back then I went through the Greek honor guard. They were good soldiers both the Greek and the Turks. I knew the King and Queen, King Paul and Queen Frederika, and I went to visit them. I asked them when they were going to send the troops back to my headquarters. King Paul smiled and said, "Well, I'll have to see the Prime Minister, I'll let you know." They were back within a month.

MAJOR COUCH: You left Turkey and went to Hawaii as Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of U.S. Army in the Pacific. Would you please discuss some of your duties during this period of time?

GENERAL HARKINS: Besides just running the staff and acting for the commanding general when he was away visiting, he made the point that I should get out and visit. We had a pretty big area. We provided support for troops we had in Korea-Formosa, and the Philippines, and the ordinance and logistical people we had in Vietnam and also in Japan. I spent quite a little time on the road visiting the troops in those areas, and trying to find out what they needed and what I could do for them. It was this time when we were having trouble in Laos and Mr. Harriman was in the State Department, I guess, he was the senior man in the State Department for all the Pacific, including Southeast Asia. He was over there trying to settle the Laotian question and we didn't know how it was going to come out and we kept sort of a map of the invasion from the north and all the different guerrilla fighting. We also formed a little task force called the . . . I forget the number of it, it had a number and it was a very secret organization. I was designated the Commander, in addition to my other duties. Well, General White, who was the commander when I went there, retired on the 1st of April '62, General Collins came in to be his replacement. General Collins arrived on the 2nd of April and on the 3rd or 4th, I was ordered to Okinawa to pick up the Task Force and be ready to invade Laos. When I got to Okinawa I had a Brigade of Marines, that's about all except some anti-aircraft and some engineers, Army engineers. I had a whole stack of airplanes, enough to take the whole Task Force and Brigade and staff right to Laos in one lift. Mr. Harriman didn't do so well in Laos at that time and pretty soon it got hotter and hotter and I was sent to the Philippines with my Task Force and we were stationed at Clark Field. I had some very fine officers. I had chosen a Marine brigadier general

(R. G. Weede) as my Chief of Staff. I had known him before and he was fine. He knew air support. He had just commanded a brigade in Hawaii, and he had an air squadron attached to him. I had a very fine Air Force Deputy who knew transport and some tactical business. I had a Navy man. We didn't have much Navy involved in this thing, but I had a Navy liaison officer. Anyway, we moved from Okinawa, down to Clark Field and were stationed there. All the planes were on the runway and all the people were assigned to the planes. We didn't have much to do except train. As a matter of fact, the Chief of Marines today, General Cushman, was my Marine Brigade Commander and he kept them busy training them, so I didn't have much to do. In the evenings I'd go down to the club, I was Lieutenant General then, I always went in civilian clothes and everybody seemed to know me but nobody ever asked me what I was doing and nobody knew that we were ready to go into Vientiane, Laos. I didn't know what we were going to do but we had some kind of orders to go in there and hold some of the towns. Later on we put some troops in Udon, Thailand getting ready to help in the Laos plan. When an officer assigned to this Task Force was through his particular tour of duty, they'd pull him back to Hawaii or wherever he came from, but they never replaced them, and I was just being attrited to death. I wired back one day and said, "I'm down to less than my combat force, now, what do I do?" So, they said, "Come home." So, I went home and that ended that little episode.

MAJOR COUCH: From Hawaii, your next stop was when you were assigned as Commander-in-Chief U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Command in Vietnam. What guidance and instruction were you given prior to assuming Command then of MACV?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, that was quite a hassle actually. They had some problems, I think President Kennedy had some problems in the Bay of Pigs and when he looked up the instructions to the Commanders he wasn't very happy with them and seeing as he was going to appoint me, he had a letter drafted. A letter of instructions to me, I do not have a copy of it. It was signed by the President and by Secretary Dean Rusk and signed by the Secretary of Defense. It was the first time that a commander had been given almost the same status as an Ambassador in a foreign country. In other words, I had direct access to President Diem and to his staff. The only thing in it was that I was to keep the Ambassador informed and if I thought it necessary to ask him to accompany me on my visits. He was to keep me informed as to what was going on politically. I fortunately ran into the best ambassador I've ever seen, Ambassador Fritz Nolting. He and I just hit it off from the very beginning and it was a very close hand cooperation. We never did anything without letting the other know or even if he was going up to see Diem on some touchy question that didn't particularly involve the military, but it might later on, he would ask me to go along. Admiral Felt would come down to see me and I'd always ask the Ambassador to go with me and see President Diem and he usually would. It was a very harmonious and close relationship and I was so pleased that I was sorry to see him leave actually. I think if he hadn't left we would have been much better off.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, I'm sure, prior to going to Vietnam, you received a multitude of briefings on situations and other related occurrences. In your initial planning, how did you go about trying to solve the complex problem of Vietnam.

GENERAL HARKINS: I could write a book on that, but it wasn't a question of me trying to solve the problems. The problems were there all right, but when I got there, everything was closed up, just closed up, tight as a drum. Everybody was scared of something. I know I took over the house from General McGarr, who was the commander there. The shutters in that house had been nailed down or clamped down for two years. I said, "Let's open the place up and get some light on it." I had the shutters removed. They were steel shutters in case anybody was going to shoot at you. I wasn't going to be in the windows in case they were going to shoot. Anyway, I said, "Let's have some air in this place." I went around and I found the same thing out in the field. Everybody was clamped up tight and tense, and it was a ticklish situation. I just decided that the best thing for me to do was to get them out in the open, get them out to training and get them working again, getting the staffs to work with the troops and getting the troops to do what they were supposed to do and put a little optimism in their thinking rather than pessimism. They were very pessimistic. So, I just assumed an optimistic attitude and went around and patted them on the shoulder. When I first went there we had about a thousand advisors. I think at that time we were advising down to regiments and in a couple of years we had gone down to battalions and even advisors to the province chiefs. What I was trying to do was to win over the people. There were a lot of obstacles against winning over the people in Vietnam. As a matter of fact, it is so mixed up. There were so many different groups, ethnic groups, and they were all at each other's throats. You have the religious groups of the Hoa-Hao and the Cao-Dai. They had their own armies and they had their own promotions, and they had

their own logistic system. You had the Nungs and the Chams, the old rulers of the old dynasties. They lived up in the mountains in the central part of the country. They wanted to rule the country again. You had the thirty-five mountain tribes, the Montagnards, they were very primitive in most cases, some of them don't even use cooking utensils, they just eat raw snakes and fish and everything else. Some still even file their teeth. They had formed a small union, and they wanted to rule over the country. Then you had the Cambodians, not the ones that live in Cambodia but the ones that are in South Vietnam. When the Vietnamese came down there in the 1870's, the South Vietnamese just took them over and didn't move them and they are still there. Their ancestors are buried there. They don't like anybody else but Cambodians. You had the Chinese, the overseas Chinese, Saigon is filled with these overseas Chinese. They own all the land and all the properties and make all the money. Then you have the religious groups of the Buddhists, always saying they're being persecuted and never were. Then you have families split between themselves, I mean, some of them were on the Viet Cong side and some on the government side. So, you even had the split down in the families, they didn't trust each other. Then, you had the Vietnamese, who just don't like government anyway. So when you get all these mixed up groups and you try to get them together, that's. . .that's a pretty hard job to do and there was nothing much I could do as a military commander. But, I could go around and have the military try and see the political point of view, but I ran into a stone wall that very first day, I got there. I was inspecting the I Corps. General Don (I Corps Commander), much to my surprise, had been appointed by President Diem. As a matter of fact, there were only nineteen generals and all were appointed by Diem.

Don said, "We're not going to solve this thing until we get rid of President Diem." Here was a senior military man telling me the first day I got there that you couldn't solve the thing until you got rid of Diem. So, I got to know Diem pretty well and I didn't see it that way. He was one of the sharpest guys and knew more about his country than anybody I knew and he was doing a lot of good. That's why with the uprising in '59 and '60 we got into trouble. He was. . .I would say, a benevolent dictator. Well, with the war going on in his own country, he had to be a dictator. He had to get things done and he was benevolent. He didn't have any wealth at all when he died. He had two suits, one for the palace, and one for the field, one hat, and he carried a cane sometimes. He would go out and he would always take money to give to the peasants. He knew a lot about farming, he'd teach them how to farm. He built a lot of roads, canals, airports, schools, hospitals in every town and province, with our help. They only had 400 doctors for seventeen million people, and I think, half of them were in the military. So, it was. . .there were lots of problems and to get them solved, as I said, the main thing was to win over the people. The only way to win over the people was to get agents into the villages and find out who the Viet Cong were, upset their whole applecart. Well, the villages were so close that you might pull a guy out and train him as a fisherman, send him back selling fish and the next day, they'd send his head out and say, "Do you want to send some more agents in." So, it wasn't a very easy thing to do. You had the leaders, if the leader of a village, a province chief, could sleep in the same bed two nights in a row, he was successful. It was that bad. We did see a little light for a while in late '62 and '63, and we formed what we called a National Cam-

paign Plan to have everybody trained except some Air Force people, (the pilots and other Air Force skills took longer), by the 1st of July. Then send them all out in the field and fight forty-three wars in forty-three provinces and get this thing going into the mill. It actually did on the 1st of July '63. We had people that would stay out for two weeks and not come back in every night, bivouacing, patrolling, and all that stuff. They were to stay out and do some night patrolling because the French had done nothing but teach the Vietnamese a defensive war. They'd patrol all day, but they'd come in to these stockages at night and the Viet Cong would just sneak on through. Then we ran into the problem of the Buddhists and the persecutions and the press. Like this man, Halberstam of the New York Times, who would write of the persecutions every day. There were no persecutions, in all the time I was in Vietnam. Actually, Halberstam got a Pulitzer Prize with putting out nothing but lies. It was. . .it was truly pathetic because Diem was doing a good job. But the press didn't like Diem and Diem didn't like the press. The press was very unfair, I know, to Diem. If you'll get the papers from that time on, June '63, you would read where they said there were thirty monks killed on a raid of a pagoda. There were no monks killed in any raid on any pagoda. Where you read about Catholic Battalions fighting Buddhist Battalions. There weren't any Catholic Battalions to fight Buddhist Battalions. You read about Catholic dominated government of South Vietnam. Of the seventeen ministers, four were Catholics and the others were Buddhists. You read about the Catholic dominated Army, of the nineteen generals, three were Catholics and the rest were Buddhists. As I say, the press was not too helpful in solving the thing, they didn't like Diem. Then, of course,

Mr. Harriman, and Mr. Harriman didn't like Diem either because Mr. Harriman finally settled the Laotian thing. Mr. Diem told them that if he, Harriman, put a so-called neutral government in Laos, which consisted of two Communists and one neutral, he was going to pull the South Vietnam Embassy out of Vientiane. Mr. Harriman put the neutral, so-called government in, and Mr. Diem pulled his Embassy out. Then Harriman took the position that Diem must go. That's when I got into the problem of the overthrow of Diem, which was not a very pleasant thing to do. When you are sent over there by the President to back a man, who is the President of another country, then you have people in the State Department fighting that, and giving you orders which weren't even cleared by the President of the United States, it's a hell of a way to run a railroad, as far as I'm concerned. I received such orders and I didn't have to carry them out, fortunately, because when I went to see General "Big" Minh, he wouldn't see me, he wasn't ready to overthrow Diem at that time. But then, when Lodge as Ambassador came over, he pulled the rug right out from under Diem. I suppose, he had his instructions. They stopped the aid, both military and economic. I guess, Diem could have paid his soldiers for the next three months or something like that. Then all would have collapsed, but then he was picked up and shot in the back of the head with his brother, Nhu. Actually, I think, if we had taken Mr. Nhu, Diem's brother, out of the country, we would have been better off. The generals didn't like Nhu at all, and he didn't like the generals. A lot of the generals got along pretty well with Diem but not with Nhu. He didn't have all the power in the country, but when family relationships are so closely knit as they are in Vietnam, I think Diem relied more on his brother's advice than others. That was some of the problems. They are not solved yet and I've been out of there ten years.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, several current writers have stated that in the 1962 to 1964 time frame, the conflict in Vietnam was really Nationalism and not Communism. What are your views or opinions on this subject?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, that's another one that's difficult to answer, in a short answer. But, as I said previously, there were so many different factions that were involved in. . .in Vietnam. I think, I forgot to mention the French were there, too. Now, the French went in some years ago, 1868, and they really bled the Vietnamese, right to the bone. They wouldn't allow any Vietnamese to command with the military. They wouldn't allow them to be anything in government. They wouldn't allow them to see the mountain tribes. They were told to keep out of the mountain areas and when the French pulled out in '54 they had the Geneva Accords and the country was divided. I think we were very much in on that, although, we didn't sign the Accords. The Accords made South Vietnam. The people in the north were given their choice of coming south, if they wanted to, and the people of the south were given a choice to go north. Over a million came south. They became the refugees that Diem had to take care of, he had to find a place for them to fish, to raise their rice, and raise their families. Only about fifty to sixty thousand went north and they were the ones who were taken there, at the point of a gun. They were all young men and they were taken to North Vietnam, trained and brainwashed and sent back in the late '57 or '58. They were told to go back and form little cells, Communist cells, in the villages where they came from and they came from all over the country. So, they had little cells forming throughout the country. They were told just to wait until the word came to 'rise up'. In the meantime, we had put, and I mean, the U.S. Govern-

ment had put up Diem as the ruler, as the Number One. They had an election in 1956, and he was made President, but he wouldn't have an election for the whole of Vietnam, because there was some twenty-million people up north and seventeen million down in the south. The vote would have been against him, so he said, "No, we won't have an election," and he was made the President. Well, nobody expected him to last very long, but he did. He disarmed the religious groups and he started taking their arms away from them. He overcame all the bandits in Saigon, who were running the shipments of rice and the price of rice and all that, he kicked them out "Big" Minh, who was his right hand man militarily, did a very fine job. He was a commander of the Army at that time. Then Diem started a five-year plan, which was going on into the early sixties and we were backing him to the hilt in it. It meant regrouping of the refugees and putting them in places where they could live and raise their rice, go fishing, and raise their families. It meant getting the CAO DAI's and the HAO HOA's on his side again. It meant getting the Air Force and the Navy, and the Army, under one command, and then it meant re-distributing the land, taking it away from some of the wealthy, and giving it to some of the poor. There were an awful lot of problems. The thing was going pretty well, as a matter of fact, it was going so well, and in '59 and '60, that's when the Communists told the little cells to rise up and that's where the Communist influence came in. That was ordered from Hanoi. That's when they formed that National Liberation Army Headquarters, or headquarters up in the hill country, up in North-South Vietnam. They tried to run the war from there. Now, they were pretty primitive, I mean, in those times. They had wooden guns and bows and arrows and things like

that. They didn't have any modern weapons and they didn't have any units any bigger than battalions, but they were Communists, and they played this hit and run business. On the other hand, you did have some Nationalism, because the Buddhists wanted to run the country, but they were also infiltrated by the Communists. Tri Quang, who was the leader, his brother was the information officer up in Hanoi. They wanted to get their say in the country. The Montagnards wanted their own flag and their own government. The French didn't want to lose all the rubber plantations and things they had. The Nungs and the Chams were there, they wanted their own country. So, it wasn't a Nationalism per se, it was different groups, plus the fact that they have twenty-four recognized political parties, and fourteen more that aren't even recognized. They all had their own newspapers that they published daily. All they did was to conduct verbal attacks against one another. So, it was quite a mess, I wouldn't say it was truly Nationalism, but there was a little bit of both. Then when Diem, in '62, late '62 and '63, started getting the better of these Communist groups, the Communists started calling for help from the north and that's when the infiltration really started. Then they started sending even more and more. Then, of course, later on after I left, they were sending divisions. It was a little bit of both. It was multi-Nationalism vs. just plain old Communism. We went in there to help Diem fight, fight the Communists, and see if we could keep an independent country independent and free from Communism. That was the main purpose of our going in there. We have agreements like we had with Vietnam, we have them with forty-two other countries all over the world.

We're to act according to our Constitutional processes, to help them, if they ask for help. We didn't go to Vietnam on our own accord, we were asked by the Vietnamese. President Diem particularly. First, we went in with advisors then, of course, he was gone. I don't think anybody asked us to come in and help them then, I think, when I left, as I say, the place went to hell. Then we just started sending people in. Now. . .whether South Vietnam would've stayed on it's feet or not, I don't know. I don't think it would have. But it was a shame to have Diem go when things were going so well. It's cost us fifty thousand American dead and three hundred thousand wounded, and they are still not through with the fighting. It wasn't worth the price, period.

MAJOR COUCH: During this time, did you feel that your staff gave you the correct information, during your tenure as COMUS MACV?

GENERAL HARKINS: That's a difficult question to answer in that they got what they could from the field. When you talk about my staff, I presume, you mean the people out in the field, as well as the ones who were with me in Saigon. Like I learned under General Patton, go out and see what's going on. I don't think that there was a day that I didn't go out if I could get out. If I wasn't out, some of the staff went out. I think I visited every village and hamlet in Vietnam. I knew more about Vietnam than almost anyone, except Diem, because I had the means to travel and I traveled. I went to see the province chiefs, I got their views. I went to see the military commanders, I got their views, I got the best briefings that I could get. Sometimes, the advisor would take me aside, and say, "This isn't quite as it is, General. He is

telling you this because he doesn't want you to go back and report to Diem that he has to be relieved." Only in two or three instances, did I find a man, either a military commander, or a province chief, that I didn't think was telling me the truth. I'd go right back to the Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Army. or I would go to Diem himself, or I would go to the Ambassador, and tell him what I thought. I think, in two cases, the province chief was moved to another job, and in three or four cases, I had military commanders relieved because when they would say they were doing one thing and they weren't doing it at all. All they had were a lot of good charts. One general had a room as big as this, filled with charts. I said, "Well, are you going to get to work on some of these problems?" He hadn't done anything. He wouldn't leave his headquarters. So, I said, "You haven't been out in the field, nobody has seen you since I've been here. I want you to go out and see what's going on." He wouldn't do it, so I just went to General Ty, Chief of the Vietnamese staff, and told him about the guy, and he had him relieved. There was another man, up in the middle part of Vietnam. It was up there near Nhatrang. One day there was a raid near the area that I was in. As a matter of fact, and we went to move some troops, but they were taking a siesta. They couldn't be moved until after the siesta. Well, this commander was removed before the siesta was over. There were things like that, but I just went out and tried to see and prove for myself.

MAJOR COUCH: General, both Mr. Halbestram and General Taylor, indicate that you were perhaps optimistic on the length of time necessary to settle Vietnam. In retrospect, would you please give your evaluation of this tonight?

GENERAL HARKINS: I guess I was born an optimist, I think, and I'll always be optimistic. I always think of the bright side of things. When I got there and I saw what was going on, and after I had been there two years, I could, as President Kennedy put it, he could see a little light at the end of the tunnel. But, when I found out that our government was overthrowing a President of another government, that was the worst thing we could do. That's when we (the United States) lost its sense of balance, I think. I think if we had kept up the pressure (even Ho Chi Minh admitted in late '62 and '63 were Diem years), that is why he increased the infiltration. I think if we hadn't gotten rid of Diem, I think we could have tied the thing together. You see, Diem had formed a five-year plan. It wasn't only rice fields, canals, and things, he had put in hospitals. He had put in schools, all the kids were required to go to schools. He had organized the youth of the country, Madame Nhu had organized all the girls of the country and all were getting along pretty well. We brought in aid programs to teach them how to raise better pigs. I found out, to my astonishment, that there were over three hundred different kinds of rice and with some of our brains that we sent over they got the best and put them together and now. . .in 1963. they exported three hundred thousand tons of rice. The last few years, we had been sending it to them. They were ready to export again. But, Mr. Halbestram lied again just as he was the instigator of all the false reports of the Buddhists uprisings. They just were untruths, period. Now, Halbestram was a Jew and I don't know whether this had relations or influence on the Catholics. . .The Jewish-Catholic relations, I don't know, but he certainly kept harping at Diem, who was Catholic, harped and harped, and

harped, until he won a Pulitzer Prize. Later, you know, he went to Poland, and after trying the same tactics, he was kicked out. I think, he and some of the other people over there, at that time, were very unfair in their reporting and very much responsible for Diem's overthrow. It got the generals looking back to see what was going on. They were paying more attention to the political side rather than the military side. They were getting a bad report all through the world and they didn't like that because they. . . a lot of them were doing their duties. A lot of them were fine officers and they tried hard. But, they had problems. When a division commander would report that he was going to do this, or do that, he would always have to check back to Saigon to see if he could do it. When they'd capture a high-ranking Viet Cong, or whoever he was, they'd leave their post and come in and present him to Diem to get patted on the back or a promotion. That didn't make much sense to me. In the beginning, they didn't have a good intelligence system. That was one of the first things that we worked on. It wasn't as good a system as we had. When I left, it was beginning to work. They were beginning to get information from all the provinces and see how it tied together. We had about eight or nine hundred intelligence experts there to help. We didn't have one intelligence center, but we were teaching the Vietnamese how to read intelligence, and how to interpret information, which is important. They might call me optimistic. . . I said it would take until '65 or '66 to get things under control and I think, if we had gone along the way it was going, maybe it would have been over with by then. I'm certain, my forecast would have been forgotten, as of now, because the thing is still going on the way it was when I was there.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, after Ambassador Nolting left and Ambassador Lodge took his place we had three functions, or three agencies, coordinating activities in Saigon. You, as the head of the military, Ambassador Lodge as head of State and also the CIA. Would you please just discuss some of the problems created by the lack of coordination among these three agencies.

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, that was the whole problem, there wasn't any coordination. When Ambassador Nolting was there and Mr. Richardson ran the CIA, it was fine. It worked like hand-in-glove. We. . .Richardson would see me two or three times a week at my office, or I'd go over to see him, or I'd see Nolting almost every day or every other day in some way or another, or on the phone. When Lodge came in, he was a loner, and he just wanted to do it all by himself. He was very much upset when telegrams came in through the State Department to overthrow Diem. This was in August '63, and "Big" Minh, who was the general to contact, said he wouldn't talk to a low ranking CIA man any more. "Big" Minh had been talking to a CIA man named Conine working with Ambassador Lodge. A telegram went back saying that "Big" Minh wouldn't do this any more, he wanted to talk with someone in authority. A message came back saying, "General Harkins will be the coordinator." So, I was designated the coordinator from Washington, to go and see "Big" Minh and the other generals. I tried to see "Big" Minh, but he wouldn't see me. So, we went back to Washington and said the generals weren't ready for the overthrow, and we were going on with our work. This exchange of messages, I'm not sure if I mentioned it before, in this talk, I know I did to you privately, these telegrams that came in had never been coordinated by the State Department. They came out of Mr. Hillsman's and Mr. Harriman's office, telling us to

go to the generals and set-up the overthrow. The President hadn't seen them, General Taylor hadn't seen them, General Lemnitzer hadn't seen them, Mr. MacNamara hadn't seen them, and this was when Mr. Hillsman was thrown out of the State Department because he was trying to be the President. The overthrow collapsed after that because Lodge was embarrassed that he didn't know all these generals as well as I did. After all, I had been there two and a half years and knew all nineteen generals pretty well. In 1964, on January 28, I got word from General Khanh, I Corps Commander, through my senior advisor, Colonel Wilson, wanting to know if he minded if Khanh had a coup. Well, I was an old coup hand, at that time, and I said that I didn't like coups. He said, "Well, Generals Kim, and Don were going to incarcerate "Big" Minh and take over the government. They had a meeting coming up on Thursday, a Corps Commanders Meeting, and they were going to turn the government back to the French. Now, you wouldn't like that General Harkins, would you?" Well, I had nothing to say really, "No, I wouldn't like it at all." So, Khanh said, "Do you mind if I have a coup?" And I said, "No, I think you are a very fine general." Well, he came down from I Corps for the Thursday meeting he had a friend, a parachute battalion commander with five companies. He just put a parachute company around each one of the generals homes, Don's, Kim's, Minh's, and two others. If the generals asked what's this for? The commander was told to tell them that there was going to be a coup and they had to have protection. Well, at four o'clock on Thursday morning, the parachute commanders all walked in and arrested all five generals. Mr. Lodge was terribly upset because he had never met General Khanh. Lodge wouldn't leave Saigon and didn't know the field commanders. I couldn't get him

to go out of Saigon. He said that everything happened in Saigon. Well, things were happening all over the country. Then lots of messages that he received certainly influenced the military. He never showed it to me and he'd send answers back without consulting me. I noticed in his book that he sent me, and I haven't read all of it yet, he was very sorry about his friend General Harkins, but he had a secret agreement with President Johnson, that they would have a secret messages. I asked General Taylor about this when I saw him last Christmas, '63. He said he saw the book and had seen what was written. He said, "Paul, that's not true, because every time we had a meeting back here in Washington, in answer to one of the messages that you hadn't seen, President Johnson always turned to me and he asked, "What does Harkins think about this," "I had to admit that you hadn't seen it," Lodge wouldn't show it to you." It wasn't a very good relationship. Then Lodge became a true loner. I didn't know it, but although the generals weren't ready to overthrow Diem in August, he immediately got the CIA-man, Conine, working with him again. Unbeknowns to me. I didn't know all this, what was going on behind my back, and I don't think it was very appropriate. It turned out, it wasn't.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, do you believe that the Army image was more credible in your years than now?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, there is a period after wars where the image goes down. It did after World War I, and again after World War II, and then, I think, in a little way after Korea. Certainly after Vietnam. The difference is when I got into the military services, the Army was very small, and didn't cost too much. We had a hundred and seventy-three thousand, I think, in the whole Army. I knew. . .there were nine hundred

officers in the cavalry, and I knew every one of them, because I served at Bliss for four years, and at Riley for six, and at one time or another, they all came through one place or the other, so, I got to know them all. At least, I knew them all by name. Now, in World War II when we had the shock of Pearl Harbor, the country rose up as one, period. I mean, there weren't any factions. We were out for revenge for what happened to our great guys over in Hawaii and the country was behind the Army. We had songs and parades and things like that as they did in World War I. The country didn't do it for Vietnam and they didn't do it for Korea. Both Korea and Vietnam were limited wars to me on a "no win" scale. For instance, we couldn't cross the Yalu in Korea. When I was in Vietnam, you couldn't cross the Vietnamese border. In fact, there was a limit of three miles from the border you could not enter. In some cases, around Pleiku and Kontum there was only one road going in to Cambodia or Laos and when the Viet Cong were being chased, the Vietnamese would pick up the stone that marked the border and take it with them and then bring it back. There weren't any boundaries that you could follow. When the French were there they just put a line across the top of a ridge and the water-shed that went west was Cambodia, and the east water-shed was Vietnam and that's the only time it was ever surveyed. So, . . . no, I think you have to have the country behind you when you go to a war. I don't think we had as many divisive factions in World War II and that helped for getting on with the war and getting it over with. Of course, we still have three hundred thousand troops in Europe, I wonder if we won that war. Germany and Japan lost and look at Germany and Japan today compared to England and France. No, we haven't really won a war, finished

it, came back home since World War I. We still have troops in Korea, we are out of Vietnam, but that war is still going on. I'm sorry, I couldn't come home and say it's all over, ladies and gentlemen, but I couldn't. As a matter of fact, it is almost the same as it was when I was there.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, some people say that the role of the Army officer is to be a manager and that we are losing leadership ability. What are your views on this subject?

GENERAL HARKINS: I disagree with it. I've seen, as I say, I haven't seen the young lieutenant, but I've seen many senior officers in my visits to the divisions that I visited in my trips back to Washington and I certainly wouldn't say that we are losing leadership. I was very much enthused with what I saw of the junior officers and the middle grade officers in my visits. Just take a look at Chief of Staff, General Abrams, he is one of the greatest we've had.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, periodicals have continually referred to your diplomatic tactfulness, just how did this trait play a part in your success?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, I think besides being a commander and Chief of Staff, in many instances, I think you have to treat your people with respect and be polite to them. I learned a little bit of swearing from General Patton. He used to swear between syllables, some times, but, I never did that to a staff officer. If I don't think his hair was properly trimmed or something, I might put it, "Who was your Barber, and when did you see him last," or something like that. I put a little humor into the thing, but I insisted that they be immaculately dressed, clean, and alert. I think I was brought up by my family to be respectful to the oldest and the youtest, both, although I might have gotten bawled out at home. I

was never bawled out in public, and I never bawled anybody out in public.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, we addressed the question of the credibility of the Army, I would like to look at a different area. What do you think that the Army must do to regain it's prestige?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, I don't know. I think one thing, if people think that they can get along without an Army or a Navy or an Air Force, they've got another thought coming to them, because the armed forces doesn't go out and make wars, they are the fireman and they are ready to put out the flame if the flame ever pops up. Since I retired, I've done a lot of lecturing to civic groups and we have a lot of military people here in this area messed up with civic activities. They know the civilians by knowing their point of view and engaging in civic activities, in many ways and get the civilians to help with the military. I've been on the U.S.O. Board for years, and you'd be surprised the number of people who want to volunteer to help. Unfortunately, we had a good U.S.O. out at Love Field, but now with this big airfield, we don't have a chance, because it's so spread out and it's hard to get volunteers to go that far every day. We had churches and other groups giving us food and cookies and coffee and the airport was very nice to us. Then the American Legion, which I'm in, sponsors a baseball team, a boys' baseball team and gives out ROTC awards and things like that. So does the Military Order of World Wars and the Army Association that is here. . .has two, three scholarships a year. We contribute to sending boys and girls to college and so do men of the other military organizations. I think it's great and I think we should be involved. . .I think the civilians must understand what the Army stands for and what it means to them. Because if

you don't have an Army and a Navy and an Air Force, you don't have a country, period. You don't have churches or anything else. Once they realize that, I think, they will back us up.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, you have already addressed this partially, but what are your views on the volunteer Army and can it succeed?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, as I said, I had some hesitation about it in the beginning, but I think, it can succeed. I think it must succeed and the Commander-in-Chief says it's going to succeed, so it's up to the officers and men to make it. I talked to several officers, one from Washington, here just recently said that they are not too far short, and they are getting better people and it's only been in a year. Give it a chance. I think we have to keep the draft in embryo because if you go to a big war, say like World War II, you are going to need more than the Volunteer Army, you are going to have to draft people again.

MAJOR COUCH: What is your opinion of the value of OCS, ROTC, and West Point, as a source of officers for today's Army?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, I understand the OCS has been cut back quite a bit. I've served with officers on a staff with officers from OCS, ROTC, and West Point. I think they are all a must, they have to be. West Point couldn't possibly supply the needed number of officers for the services. And some of the ROTC men I've seen have come through just fine, they're outstanding. We have to keep both programs going, and I hope they don't stop them because I think they are very necessary.

MAJOR COUCH: General, your career has no flavor of undue harshness nor did you appear often as a target or issue of the news media until you became Commander in Vietnam. Would you please discuss why?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, I suppose because I was never in the position to be picked on by the press but I know the press used to pick on General Patton. I'd go to the news conferences with him. I suppose they picked on General Taylor here and there and I would go to news conferences with him. It's usually the commander that they try to get at, to see if they can trip him up or whatever they try to do. You know, I was sent to Vietnam by the President of the United States to back President Diem. I was sent there to do that and I did that and until I was told differently by the President, I wasn't going to change my attitude, whether the press liked it or not. I was told by President Johnson to back Diem and back the generals after they overthrew Diem this. . .after President Kennedy was killed. So, I backed the generals. Then I was told by President Johnson to back Khanh. So, I backed Khanh. I was just taking my orders from the Commander-in-Chief. Now, if the press didn't like me, that was something else, but they just didn't like Diem. . .I don't know, they had a . . .a very funny attitude out there. They all seemed to be young kids in their twenties. The main thing was to get a by-line, get their names on the front page someplace. I know that Time Magazine got so many conflicting reports, they sent two of their editors out there and they removed the Time man. Just pulled him right out, said he wasn't getting the truth. I think you'll find that in some of the other press stories that came out, particularly during that Buddhist uprising. Terrible. . . terrible unfactual reporting.

MAJOR COUCH: Sir, throughout your career, to what degree did you rely on your schooling?

GENERAL HARKINS: Well, as I said before, in one of these questions and answer periods, I think that the schooling that officers went through and the troops went through, from World War I to World War II was the real key to the answer of the success of World War II because the schools were fine. That's all we had, we didn't have too many troops and sometimes you had to stand in line for the senior officer above you to move or die or something or get awful sick before you were promoted. But you did have a chance to go to school. Now, I didn't go to many schools, as a matter of fact, I went to the Cavalry School and then I took the short course at Fort Leavenworth, a three months' course, I think my schooling was based on service with troops, I think this experience and the job I had during World War II that qualified me for higher command, I mean, it was about the same level of job that they teach in the senior schools. I didn't go to either the War College, the Army War College, or the National War College, but I had had the experience of four years overseas, and I think my staff experience taught me a lot about getting reliable people and delegating authority and telling them what to do but not how to do it. I think working with General Patton taught me how to be a commander. I could never be a General Patton. When the Lord made him, he threw away the mold, but. . .but, he certainly taught me a lot about learning from the mistakes of the past, and not to make them again. I think it was such a variety of situations and the vast. . .broad experience I had that they all added together in making it a very fine career, as far as I was concerned. Then, I had a wife who understood what was going on, she didn't know where I was half the time, but she said that's my business and I'll be the good wife. I know when I went to World War

II we were in Washington and I was in a munitions building and we were going to sail from. . .from Norfolk on the 23rd of October '42--for Africa. We went down the afternoon of the 22nd, in General Patton's plane, and I told Mrs. Harkins that morning, I said, "Honey, if I'm not home for dinner tonight, I'll write you a letter. You take off for Texas," because her mother lived here in Dallas. So, I didn't see her for four years and she didn't know where I was going until it appeared in the paper that General Patton had broken out at Casa Blanca. When I came back from World War II, she had stood it very well. When I came back from a trip around the world and I was in the Pentagon, she said, "Oh, I understand you are going to Korea," I said, "No, I'm not going to Korea, nobody mentioned it to me." She said, "Well, I just heard you were going over as Chief-of-Staff to General Taylor," and I said, "Where did you get that?" And she said, "Oh, just some little birdie," and it was true "Washington Gossip". So, she said, "Okay." "Well," I said, "you can't go," so that was two wars that she couldn't go to. Then when I heard I was going to Turkey, I said, "Honey, how would you like to go to Izmir?" And she said, "Where is that?" And I said, "Well, when you and I went to school, it was Smyrna." So, she was allowed to go this time and she was a great help, she really was. In fact, half the battle in the military if you marry, you marry someone who gets along with people and also has good health and a pleasing personality. We have had a very fine relationship and she understands the military very well. As I've said she was more than half the battle in making my career a successful one.

Now, Colonel Agnew, I'd like a few do's and don'ts and Tid-bits I've picked up over the years.

1. Be yourself.
2. Common Sense is the first principle of war.
3. Don't be a corporal all your life.
4. Don't punish the 'whole' for an individual.
5. Don't force things down peoples' throats.
6. Don't harass the troops.
7. Don't criticize unless you have a remedy.
8. Don't have two systems one for Peace and one for War.
9. Have few CPX's.
10. Cut out a lot of 'Eye Wash'.
11. Don't be 'catty'.
12. Politics and the Army don't mix. But there's plenty of it.
13. The Principles of War.

Cooperation
Objective
Mass
Movement
Offensive
N

Simplicity
Economy of Force
N
Security
Efficiency
Surprise

14. Cut out big headquarters and unnecessary departments.
15. Establish a fair system of awards, decorations, and promotions.
16. Be specific and accurate.
17. Put things out to troops in time to have them act.
18. Have units trained all around.
19. Don't be a 'horse's ass' even if you are one.
20. Bring order out of confusion.
21. Get all facts before making decision.
22. Teach soldiers to kill before they get killed, that wins wars.
23. Officers must lead, not push soldiers, not be Monday Morning Quarter Backs.
24. Look beyond your nose.
25. Be Americans, fight for an American Army, run by none but Americans,
26. Recognize ability, even if you don't like a person, personally.
27. Know your leaders and keep things simple.
28. Check all orders to see if they are carried out.
29. Men underfire for the first time are apt to be timid. But after a couple of engagements are O.K. They find out that not everyone gets killed.
30. Officers should reduce in weight or be reduced in grade.
31. All services should work TOGETHER AS UNDER ONE ROOF.
32. Rest must be provided for all combat units--a soldier can go for seventy-two hours without rest--period.
33. There are many tired officers but few tired divisions.
34. Advanced planning is a must.
35. If staffs are competent--leave them alone, if not, relieve them.

36. Keep staffs small, make them work, not increase numbers to do the job.
37. Chain of command must be definite.
38. Discipline is the basis of a good army.
39. Loyalty from the top is more important than loyalty from the bottom.
40. Nothing is impossible--take no counsel of your fears.
41. Keep people informed.
42. The best is the enemy of the good.
43. ATTACK! ATTACK! ATTACK!
44. Never worry about the enemy--let him worry about you.
45. Say what you think and mean do not evade the issue you only confuse it.

That's about all I have to say.

Also, though this is--as you say--not for publication--I have no objection to parts being relieved--not out of context, however. And when and if--I'm sure I will--cross the last horizon--I would like members of my family--wife-daughter and grand children to be able to have a copy--Doubt if they'll want it.

Oral History Transcripts

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13 Feb '76
(Date)

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, USAMHRC, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013

SUBJECT: Access to My Oral History Audio and Video Tapes and Their Transcripts

1. My initials have been placed adjacent to one of the possible access arrangements under subparagraphs a, b, and c below to indicate the degree of accessibility I desire.

a. To my audio tapes access is granted to:

PAH all who seek access.

_____ only those who are determined to be bonafide researchers and scholars by the Director, US Army Military History Research Collection.

_____ only active and retired uniformed members of the Armed Services and Department of Defense civilians who are determined to be bonafide researchers and scholars by the Director, US Army Military History Research Collection.

_____ only those who first secure my permission directly or through the Director, US Army Military History Research Collection.

_____ no one until such time as I direct otherwise or upon my death or incapacitation.

_____ (other, please write out) _____

b. To my video tapes access is granted to:

PAH all who seek access.

_____ only those who are determined to be bonafide researchers and scholars by the Director, US Army Military History Research Collection.

_____ only active and retired uniformed members of the Armed Services and Department of Defense civilians who are determined to be bonafide researchers and scholars by the Director, US Army Military History Research Collection.

Gen Paul D. Hopkins

_____ only those who first secure my permission directly or through the Director, US Army Military History Research Collection.

_____ no one until such time as I direct otherwise or upon my death or incapacitation.

_____ (other, please write out) _____

c. To the transcriptions of audio and video tapes access is granted to:

~~ALL~~ all who seek access.

_____ only those who are determined to be bonafide researchers and scholars by the Director, US Army Military History Research Collection.

_____ only active and retired uniformed members of the Armed Services and Department of Defense civilians who are determined to be bonafide researchers and scholars by the Director, US Army Military History Research Collection.

_____ only those who first secure my permission directly or through the Director, US Army Military History Research Collection.

_____ no one until such time as I direct otherwise or upon my death or incapacitation.

_____ (other, please write out) _____

2. My initials have been placed adjacent to one of the possible access arrangements below to indicate the degree of access that I desire upon my death or permanent incapacitation.

~~ALL~~ be open to all.

_____ remain the same as indicated in paragraph 1 above.

_____ be as the Director, US Army Military History Research Collection feels it will best serve the interests of the Armed Services.

3. My initials in the paragraph below indicate the disposition of the literary rights to my Oral History materials upon my death or permanent incapacitation. The literary rights to my Oral History materials become the property of:

_____ the United States Army.

or

_____ (other, please write out) _____

_____.

Paul D Harkins
(Signature)

PAUL D. HARKINS
(Print Name)

Gen WJ Army (Ret)