

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

*“It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other Armed Forces, of preserving the peace and security... of the United States,... supporting the national objectives,... and overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States. [The Army] shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land...[and] is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated... mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.”*

Section 3062, title 10, United States Code

### **SECTION I**

#### **FULFILLING THE INTENT OF THE CONGRESS**

##### **1-1. Change as a constant**

Fulfilling the intent of Congress and the requirements of section 3062, title 10, United States Code (USC), is a formidable task. The Army is a dynamic organization that must constantly change to adapt to changing threats to the Nation’s security and to the assignment of new missions that promote our country’s interests at home and abroad. The Army must be capable of accomplishing the full spectrum of missions ranging from domestic disaster relief through peacekeeping and peacemaking to winning major theater wars.

##### **1-2. Effecting change**

**a.** The Army as an organization performs myriad functions within the framework of well-defined systems and processes in order to effect the changes that enhance its ability to accomplish its missions. Functions such as recruiting and accessing military and civilian manpower, providing individual and unit training and education, developing war fighting doctrine and requirements, designing and organizing units and activities, equipping and sustaining fielded units, mobilizing and demobilizing Reserve Component units, stationing units, and deploying and redeploying forces are just a few of the many complex functions that the Army must address when accommodating change.

**b.** The Army’s institutionalized systems and processes address these and many other functions. Systems such as the civilian and military personnel management systems, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System, and the Army Health Services System and processes such as combat development, force development, force integration,

and materiel acquisition, are some examples of these. The Army's capability to effect change in order to discharge its statutory obligations and effectively accomplish the complex missions assigned to its activities and organizations depends upon how well the functions that are performed by any one of these systems or processes are integrated with the functions performed by each of the other systems and processes.

c. Stated another way, the successful integration of new doctrine, organizations, and equipment into the Army and the subsequent sustainment of the force in a trained and ready posture requires the synchronization of many Army systems and processes at many levels of leadership and management to perform the functions that are vital to enabling the Army to comply with the will of the congress and, most importantly, to fulfill our "nonnegotiable contract with the American people - fighting and winning our Nation's wars" (the *Army Vision*).

d. There is no better nor more recent example of why the Army must change to adapt to changing threats and missions, or of the complexities of effecting change, than the Army transformation effort that began in 1999 and will continue for a number of years to come.

## **SECTION II ARMY TRANSFORMATION**

### **1-3. Why transform?**

a. The former Secretary of the Army (SA), Louis Caldera, cited the experiences of Task Force Hawk in the Kosovo Operation as an example of "...why the Army must transition to a lighter, more agile force." Secretary Caldera stated that, "I use it to talk to senior leaders about whether the Army was willing and able to get into the fight." The need for strategically deployable responsive Army brigades capable of generating lethal combat power was further reinforced during the East Timor crisis in September 1999. In the words of David Whelan, a senior Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) official, whose agency is exploring emerging technologies, "East Timor is an example of a situation that, had we had light agile forces, we probably would have used them."

b. In response to criticism that the Army had failed to adjust to the new post-cold war realities and was poorly postured to respond to the most likely world crises, the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA), General Eric K. Shinseki, unveiled a new strategic vision for the Army. On 12 October 1999, at the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) annual meeting, General Shinseki described the *Army Vision* and its plan to transform itself into a force that is strategically responsive and dominant across the entire spectrum of operations. In his article in the 2000-2001 Association of the United States Army Green Book, the Chief of Staff, United States Army, General Eric K Shinseki, wrote—

*"Our Nation is at peace. Our economy is prosperous. We have strategic perspective and technological potential. This window of historic opportunity will grow narrower with each passing day. We can transform today in a time of peace and prosperity. Or we can try to change tomorrow on the eve of the next war, when the window has closed, our perspective has narrowed, and our potential is limited by the press of time and the constraints of resources."*

c. The mission of the Army remains unchanged: To fight and win the Nation's wars and to support the national security strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS). While the mission remains unchanged, the world remains a dangerous place with a growing array of potential threats to our national interests.

#### **1-4. The global environment - evolving geopolitical and military threats**

a. The United States, as the world leader in promoting democratic values, free markets, and human rights can expect to face threats from failed and failing states, transnational threats, asymmetric challenges, and potentially the rise of a major military competitor.

b. The strategic environment of the 21st century describes a need for a force that can accomplish a variety of mission. The Army must have a force with characteristics that allows it to initiate combat operations at the place and time of its choosing, that can retain the initiative, that will build momentum rapidly, and will win decisively.

#### **1-5. The Army Vision**

The *Army Vision* calls for a transformation to a force that will provide more strategic flexibility and will become more strategically dominant at every point across the full spectrum of operations. The transformation objective is to develop a force that has the decisive warfighting capabilities found in today's heavy forces. The goal is to transform itself into what is termed the Objective Force. The goal is a force that will be more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable than the current force.

#### **1-6. The transformation strategy**

a. The Army Transformation Strategy has two basic principles:

(1) During transformation, The Army must maintain sufficient capability to overmatch near-term threats while sustaining the current technological superiority of our legacy forces through timely recapitalization.


(2) The Army must not sacrifice dominance for responsiveness. While it is easy to increase responsiveness by developing marginal capabilities, The Army is committed to "no fair fights," and will resolutely ensure the development and commitment of Army forces to decisively defeat any and all opponents.

b. The Army Transformation Strategy is conditions-based, which means that while milestones have been set they are not preordained. At every step along the transformation path, the determination to move forward to the next stage will only be made after all of the necessary preconditions have been met. The primary condition that must be met at every step is to sustain the capabilities to meet the Nation's immediate security requirements. The Army Transformation Strategy involves moving the Army toward the transformation objective along three interdependent, simultaneous axes.

#### **1-7. Transformation over three axes**

Transformation is occurring along three axes as depicted in Figure 1-1. The three axes strategy is critical to shaping and responding today, while preparing for the future. Transforming the Army to the objective force will be a 30-year process. The Objective Force will be dominant at every point on the spectrum of operations. The Legacy Force guarantees

our near-term warfighting readiness to support the National Military Strategy. The Interim Force meets an immediate requirement to provide the commanders in chief (CINCs) with increased warfighting capabilities. By its nature, transformation requires difficult resourcing trade-offs between current force modernization efforts, research and development (R&D) investment to develop necessary future capabilities and sustainment and re-capitalization of an aging legacy force. Many hard decisions have already been made, and many others remain in a politically charged and inter-service competitive environment.



**Figure 1-1. The Army Transformation**

**a. The Objective Force.**

(1) The objective force is not driven by a single platform, but rather the focus is on achieving capabilities that will operate as a “system of systems.” Transformation to the Objective Force will take thirty years with the key being the development of enabling technology to meet the seven desired characteristics – Responsive, Agile, Deployable, Versatile, Lethal, Survivable, and Sustainable.

(2) The Army has reprogrammed 96 percent of science and technology (S&T) spending through fiscal year (FY) 07 in order to develop the Objective Force platforms and equipment. In FY 03 the Army will select the best technologies and concepts to enter the detailed design and demonstration phase for the future combat system (FCS) in order to meet the engineering and manufacturing development milestone by FY 06.

**b. The Legacy Force.** The current Army forces must be prepared to fight and win the Nation’s wars and be able to supplement the capabilities of the Objective Force until 2032. The Legacy Force's continuous readiness to fight is paramount to enabling the remaining portions of the Army to transform. Unfortunately, this will also be problematic. Since the Army skipped a procurement generation, the current force’s equipment has begun to exceed its expected service life. In order to maintain its warfighting readiness and to reduce operating costs that have risen significantly over the past three years, the Army has begun to recapitalize and modernize its current force until the transition to the Objective Force is complete. It is this Legacy Force that guarantees our near-term warfighting readiness in support of the National Military Strategy.

**c. The Interim Force.** For the past ten years, the Legacy Force has had an operational shortfall — it's inability to get forces on the ground quickly with the requisite combat power to influence a potential crisis. In order to meet this shortfall, the Army will convert six to eight combat brigades to interim brigade combat teams (IBCT). The IBCT is a rapidly deployable, combat brigade task force that will be centered on an interim armored vehicle (IAV). This force will be trained and ready to deploy and is not an experimental force. It will provide the CINCs with an increased warfighting capability that they do not now possess. The Army funded six of the eight required interim brigades needed out through FY 07. The Army began the transition of these brigades by forming two initial brigades at Fort Lewis with surrogate vehicles. The Army held its source selection for the IAV and selected the winner in March 2001.

### **1-8. Army Transformation and the force development process**

**a.** The Army has been, and will continue to be, doctrine based during the transformation process. While doctrine specifies the "how" we will accomplish a mission, the concepts will remain well out in front of doctrine in describing the "what" we want to do. Historically, material changes have required up to 15 to 17 years to develop and field. *The Army Vision* has established an accelerated material development and fielding process. This accelerated process establishes the goal of fielding new technologies to the genesis of the objective force beginning in eight to ten years. This is approximately one half of the time that has been the historical norm.

**b.** Equally as dramatic as the material modernization efforts, is the organizational redesign occurring during the transformation process. This redesign effort has been greatly accelerated as well. Organizational redesign historically requires between four to eight years to accomplish. Most notable is the nearly instantaneous (two to four months) force structure modifications made to the initial brigade combat teams (BCTs) at Fort Lewis, Washington that will serve to provide insights and refinements in the organization, training and doctrine for the follow-on interim and objective forces.

**c.** Doctrinal changes have historically required between two to four years to formalize and produce. During the transformation process the BCTs will change the way the Army fights. Their efforts will be captured in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that will serve as the basis for further doctrinal development. Again, like material modernization and organization redesign, the doctrinal development timelines will be reduced on an order of magnitude of 50 percent that will result in the production of doctrinal products in one to two years.

**d.** The rapidity of change inherent in the Army Transformation Strategy will require intense and continuous management by force managers and leaders at all levels of the Army to minimize human and materiel costs and to ensure that the Army maintains its readiness to fight and win the Nation's wars. Moreover, the transformation effort itself should yield valuable insights into how the Army's systems and processes can be streamlined and accelerated to further improve the ways in which the Army manages change.

## **SECTION III**

### **PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS TEXT**

#### **1-9. Purpose**

**a.** The purpose of this text is to provide a primer and ready reference to officers preparing to assume command and management positions at the senior and strategic levels of leadership. It explains the relationships of the systems and processes that produce both future change and contribute to daily mission accomplishment. It is these systems and processes that will be taxed to their fullest capabilities and capacities during the execution of the Army Transformation Strategy.

**b.** While the principal use of this reference text is to support the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management (DCLM) portion of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) curriculum, there are additional objectives that serve broader purposes. These other objectives include its use—

**(1)** By nonresident students in meeting objectives of the USAWC Distance Education Program.

**(2)** As a general reference for branch and service schools in the military education system.

**(3)** As a primer for all who seek to better understand the Army's organization and functions, and how its systems and processes relate.

**c.** The major focus of the text is on the United States Army; however the text also addresses how the Army interfaces with the other Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commands.

#### **1-10. Scope and objectives**

**a.** This reference text supports the DCLM portion of the USAWC curriculum. Elihu Root founded the institution “not to promote war, but to preserve peace by intelligent and adequate preparation to repel aggression.” He charged the faculty with directing “the instruction and intellectual exercise of the Army, to acquire information, devise the plans, and study the subjects indicated, and to advise the Commander-in-Chief of all questions of plans, armament, transportation, and military preparation and movement.” Much of that original emphasis remains in the current USAWC mission that includes preparing leaders to assume high-level leadership responsibilities and in the objectives of the DCLM program of instruction.

**b.** The DCLM presents that portion of the curriculum that promotes a better understanding of the theory and practice of command, leadership, and management in the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army. Methods of instruction include faculty presentations, lectures, and discussions with distinguished academicians and prominent practitioners, seminar group discussions, case studies, independent reading, and practical exercises.

**c.** From 1977 to 1997, the primary reference text published by DCLM was entitled Army Command, Management, and Leadership: Theory and Practice. Because of the growing volume of discussion and information in the category of theory as well as the many

changes that have occurred in Army organizations and systems since the end of the Cold War, the single theory and practice volume was replaced in 1997 by two texts. How the Army Runs is an outgrowth of this. This text addresses the operation and relationships of the systems and processes that enable the Army to fulfill its roles and accomplish its missions.

## **SECTION IV TEXT ORGANIZATION AND RELEVANCE**

### **1-11. Three part text**

This text is organized into three parts:

- a. A review of the Army as a system.
- b. A detailed examination of planning and structural processes, systems and subsystems; how they operate and how they relate to each other.
- c. A review of management and management support systems.

### **1-12. The Army as a system**

Chapter 2 addresses the Army as an organization and provides an overview of the systems and subsystems that affect its operations. Chapter 3 discusses Army structure. Chapters 4 and 5 identify the processes of force planning and design, determining manpower requirements, and developing the manpower management program. Chapter 6 deals with mobilization and deployment. Chapter 7 examines the role, structure, and status of the Reserve Components, and Chapter 8 provides a description of force readiness concepts, the system, and its reporting procedures.

### **1-13. Army systems and subsystems**

The major and supporting systems of the Army are identified, described, and analyzed in the remaining chapters. Chapters 9 and 10 examine the Army's resource management systems at Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), major command, and installation levels, and the interface with the Department of Defense systems. Throughout, the interfaces with Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are examined. Chapters 11 and 12 describe the organizations, functions, policies, and procedures associated with research, development, and acquisition, and the logistics systems at HQDA and the U.S. Army Materiel Command.

### **1-14. Management and management support systems**

Chapters 13 and 14 address the military and civilian personnel management systems. The remaining chapters through Chapter 23 examine Army training, information management systems, installation management, intelligence management, health services, legal affairs, civil functions, public affairs, and military assistance to civil authorities.

### **1-15. Relevance**

- a. This text is in consonance with the goals of the Army's senior leadership, addressing the areas of readiness, people, materiel, strategic deployment, future development, and management. The published goals encompass specific objectives for the Army to be a full spectrum force, globally engaged, cost effective and changing to meet the Nation's needs.

This text is about the systems and processes that will enable the Army to remain as effective in service to the Nation in the future as it has been from Valley Forge to Desert Shield/Desert Storm and beyond.

**b.** It is hoped that students and practitioners of the military art who use this text will more fully appreciate the truth in the words of General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, Army, 1964-1968, who said—

*"The Army is like a funnel. At the top you pour in doctrine, resources, concepts, equipment, and facilities. And out at the bottom comes one lone soldier walking point."*

**c.** It is to this ultimate end that this reference text is written.

