CHAPTER 2

INTEGRATION OF THE ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE CYCLE

In his Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War for the period July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1941, General George C. Marshall described the stark situation in which he found the Army as the war in Europe erupted and threatened to involve a neutral United States. President Roosevelt's emergency proclamation of September 8, 1939 had given the authority for the Active Army to expand from 210,000 to 227,000 men and to reorganize from the World War I square divisions to the new triangular divisions. However, General Marshall's problems could not be solved by a manpower increase of less than 10% and a division reorganization. He also had major training deficiencies to correct. There was such a shortage in motor transportation that divisional training was impracticable. A lack of corps headquarters and experienced commanders and obsolete doctrine and organizations further degraded capabilities. Over half the undermanned Active Army divisions were horse-mounted and the horse was still the primary means of mounted movement. At the same time Congress had reduced the Army Air Corps request for replacements to World War I aircraft to only 57 planes. It was even worse in the National Guard organizations. General Marshall's solution to these massive problems was to reconstruct the Army systemically, by resourcing, structuring and integrating new equipment, personnel, and organizations while training. Ultimately, he improved the youth and vitality of the Army by discharging elderly and substandard soldiers. The U.S. Army's success in creating, deploying, and sustaining 89 divisions for the European Theater during World War II was largely due to General Marshall's genius for leadership and his skill at what, today, is known as force management and force integration.

SECTION I
INTRODUCTION

2-1. Chapter content

a. This chapter is an overview of the systems and processes employed by the Army to manage change on a continuing basis. It reflects the fact, as General George C. Marshall understood all too well, that, in complex organizations, every action or problem impacts upon every function of the organization. These systems and processes comprise the entire life cycle of the Army, from the earliest stages of force development to the final disposition of people, equipment, and facilities.

b. This chapter looks holistically at systems and processes where the various products of one become the inputs or constraints of others. This overview of how the Army runs

addresses systems that are necessary to the overall leadership and management of the Army, and that are integral to the force management processes. Subsequent chapters will expand upon the sub-elements presented here.

2-2. Force management and integration terms

There are four terms commonly used when describing the force management process:

a. Force development. Force development is the process of determining Army doctrinal, training, leader development, organizational, materiel, and soldier (DTLOMS) requirements and translating them into programs and structure, within allocated resources, to accomplish Army missions and functions. Figure 2-1 illustrates the six sub-processes that operate as part of force development leading to the approval and resourcing of Army organizations. Each of these sub-processes influences the ultimate design of Army organizations and force structure (force development is discussed in depth in Chapter 5):



Figure 2-1. Force Development Relationship to Force Integration

(1) *Combat development.* The process that determines requirements for doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel, and soldiers and initiates or develops prioritized solutions in one or more of the DTLOMS domains. (The combat development process makes up the first two phases of force development as shown in Figure 5-1.)

(2) *Doctrine development.* The process that develops and documents doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for military operations in publications such as field manuals.

(3) *Training development.* The process that produces programs, methods, publications, and devices to support individual and unit training.

(4) *Leader development.* The process that produces programs for the training and the professional and personal development of competent and committed leaders for the Army.

(5) *Organizational development.* The process that translates organizational requirements into organizational models and force structure.

(6) *Materiel development.* The process that conceives, develops, and executes solutions to materiel requirements.

(7) *Soldier development.* The process or processes that concern the determination, addition, deletion, or modification of the Army occupational specialties. These range from the development of proposals affecting the force and/or grade structure of existing occupational specialties to the creation of entirely new occupational specialties to accomplish assigned missions.

b. Force integration.

(1) Force integration is the synchronized, resource-constrained execution of an approved force development program to achieve systematic management of change, including—

- The introduction, incorporation, and sustainment of doctrine, organizations, and equipment into the Army;
- Coordination and integration of operational and managerial systems collectively designed to improve the effectiveness and capability of the Army, and;
- Knowledge and consideration of the potential implications of decisions and actions taken within the execution process.

(2) The scope of force integration includes the functions of structuring organizations, manning, equipping, training, sustaining, deploying, stationing, and funding the force during the introduction and incorporation of approved organizational or force structure changes. It also includes the function of minimizing adverse impacts on force readiness during the introduction and incorporation of change. Force integration synchronizes these functional activities to produce combat ready organizations. Force integration is an enabling process of force management.

c. Force modernization. Force modernization is the process of improving the Army's force effectiveness and operational capabilities through force development and integration.

d. Force management. Force management is the capstone process to establish and field mission-ready Army organizations. The process involves organizational development, force integration, decision-making, and execution of the spectrum of activities encompassing requirements definition, force development, force integration, force structuring, combat developments, training developments, and resourcing.

SECTION II
FORCE MANAGEMENT—IMPETUS FOR CHANGE

2-3. The decade of modernization

a. In the early 1980s, the Army began a series of unprecedented changes designed to significantly improve readiness and effectiveness to execute prompt and sustained combat. A critical aspect of these changes was initiating the fielding of over 400 new equipment items. Some of this equipment replaced less effective items in the inventory. For example, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle System (BFVS) replaced the aging M-113 Armored Personnel Carrier. Others, like the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), brought an entirely new dimension to fire support force capabilities.

b. To accommodate this pervasive equipment modernization effort and concomitant changes in the Army's warfighting doctrine, extensive personnel and equipment changes were documented to virtually all of the tables of organization and equipment (TOE) and modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) that provide the requirements and authorizations, respectively, for Army units.

c. In addition, to fulfill a commitment to improve unit cohesion, the personnel manning system added the Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training (COHORT) system and Regimental philosophy to an individual replacement system that had its genesis in World War I.

d. Separately each of these changes would have been a significant challenge. Together they fully tested every facet of the abilities of the Army to raise, sustain, maintain, and resource our forces. World events of 1989 and 1990 saw the end to the Cold War and resulted in resource and force reductions that further tested the Army's ability to apply and adapt to change. In today's era of dynamic political and strategic change, further change is inevitable and, indeed, is now taking place through the Army's Transformation effort that is discussed in chapter 1 and elsewhere throughout this text.

2-4. Force management inspections and studies

a. The magnitude and the pace of change during the 1980s revealed a wide range of problems in the integration of the systems and processes used to manage change. As a result, the Army leadership directed the conduct of a number of Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) special inspections of force management systems and processes to examine how the Army managed change. Special inspections in 1980-1983 and 1985-1986 revealed the following:

(1) There were extensive documentation and execution problems in the force management system and related sub-systems.

(2) There was a lack of knowledge at all levels of leadership and management of the interrelationships of Army systems and processes and how they were used to manage change. This was described by The Inspector General as a general lack of knowledge of "how the Army runs."

(3) Changes in the orientation and organization of the activities involved in the force integration process, from threat identification to the fielding and sustainment of equipment, personnel, doctrine, and force structure would result in more effective force management.

b. Two other significant studies of force management also examined the interrelationships of the systems and processes used to manage change.

(1) In 1983, the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, formed a special Documentation Modernization Task Force to identify problems and recommend improvements to the existing documentation and associated data management structure of the Army. The need for this effort was generated by the fact that, as the Army began the modernization effort, off-line management became the rule rather than the exception in efforts to solve the crisis of the moment.

(a) The Task Force recommended, and the Army adopted, a new system for how TOEs and MTOEs would be documented and modernized. This system, which remains

as the Army's current system, documents changes to personnel, equipment, and organizational structure in incremental change packages that are then applied on a unit-by-unit basis as units progress along well-defined modernization paths. (Chapter 5 discusses TOE and MTOE documentation in more detail.) The new TOE system and other recommended interim fixes to processes then in existence greatly enhanced the Army's ability to meet the force management challenges of the 1980s and 1990s.

(b) The Task Force also established a long-term goal of creating a single, unified, and interactive data system for executing force management and force integration functions. This monumental effort is still on going with significant progress continuing to be made. For example, development of the Army Flow Model (AFM) now allows the Army Staff (ARSTAF) to conduct cross-functional analyses of force management data from some 40 databases. Additionally, the Force Management System (FMS) that is now under development by the United States Army Force Management Support Agency will integrate four systems into one for the functions of documenting requirements in TOEs and basis-of-issue plans (BOIP), and documenting authorizations in MTOE and tables of distribution and allowances (TDA). The FMS will also be used interactively to record the Army's programmed force as is now done in the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS).

(2) In 1993-1994, the Army conducted another Force Management Study. The purpose of the study was to evaluate the need for further revisions to the force management system and its processes. The study documented the extent of the inadequacies of the Army's system of force management. It also confirmed the finding of earlier investigation and studies that there was a pervasive lack of knowledge in the Army about how force management systems and processes should interact. The study recommended that an Army Force Management School be established to educate military and civilian personnel who were assigned to force management positions from the installation through the Department of the Army levels. That recommendation was approved and the school was subsequently established at Fort Belvoir. The school has the mission to provide command, management, and leadership expertise in the functions of force management and to train command managers at all levels in these functions.

2-5. Force management changes at Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA).

a. Vice Chief of Staff Army (VCSA) as the Army's force integrator. As discussed above, previous inspections and studies of force management activities, such as the DAIG special inspections, uncovered weaknesses in the manner in which the Army performed force management. Correction of these weaknesses, combined with staff reorganization and streamlined acquisition initiatives, have led to the VCSA being designated as the force integrator of the Army. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) and the newly established Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs (DCSPRO) serve as agents of the VCSA for the management of change.

b. Establishment of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs. Effective 1 December 2000, a new staff agency, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs (ODCSPRO), was established on the Army Staff. Concurrently, the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Army (OAVCSA), was disestablished.

(1) The DCSPRO assumed the materiel program management related responsibilities that were formerly performed by the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans for Force Development (ADCSOPS-FD). These responsibilities include, but are not limited to, the implementation of approved, prioritized, and resourced materiel programs through the execution of materiel fielding plans and the unit set fielding process. The DCSPRO is also responsible for providing support to the VCSA in his role as the Army representative on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). Chapter 11 discusses the DCSPRO materiel management responsibilities in more detail.

(2) With some exceptions, the DCSPRO absorbed the staff of the ADCSOPS-FD, including the systems integrators who are key players in the force integration process. A principal exception is that the Directorate for Force Programs (now the Directorate for Force Management) remains in DCSOPS and retains the organization integrators from the former ADCSOPS-FD.

(3) The Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate (PAED) of the office of the Chief of Staff, Army, has also been assigned to the DCSPRO. Chapter 9 provides a discussion of PAED functions that are now performed by the DCSPRO.

c. Chief of Staff, Army approval of Army warfighting requirements.

(1) In late March 2001, the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA), announced that he had assumed the approval authority for all Army warfighting requirements. This is a major change from the policy of recent years that had delegated the approval authority for warfighting requirements to the Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). In his memorandum announcing the decision, the CSA states in part that—

"1. All Army warfighting requirements in the form of Mission Needs Statements (MNS), Capstone Requirements Documents (CRD), and Operational Requirements Documents (ORD) will be submitted to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) for validation and approval. This applies to all requirement documents, regardless of Acquisition Category (ACAT) level. In this context, Army warfighting requirements include Joint and other Service requirements with Army participation and interest.

2. Major warfighting concepts designed to guide force modernization, (e.g., Brigade Combat Team or higher Organizational and Operational Concepts) will also be approved by the Chief of Staff, Army. These will be reviewed by the Requirements Review Council (RRC) for synchronization with Army modernization strategy and affordability. The DCSOPS will schedule and execute the RRC."

"4. The foundation of the requirements generation process will not change. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) will continue to be responsible for balanced development of concepts, requirements, and products in doctrine, training, leadership, organizations, materiel, and soldiers. The TRADOC Commander's evaluation and recommendation will accompany all requirements submitted for HQDA approval.

5. The Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) will be established to advise the Chief of Staff on Army warfighting requirements …."

(2) The CSA memorandum also notes that the specific responsibilities of the DCSPRO, DCSOPS, TRADOC and the other players in the requirements determination and approval process, as well as the procedures that will be followed in implementing the CSA

decision, will not be finalized until the publication of a revised Army Regulation (AR) 71-9. Discussions of the provisions of the revised AR 71-9 will be incorporated in subsequent editions of this text.

d. Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans responsibilities in the materiel requirements approval process. As discussed above, the DCSPRO is now responsible for the execution of approved materiel programs; a responsibility formerly assigned to the DCSOPS. The DCSOPS remains the responsible staff element for the validation, prioritization, and documentation, of requirements as discussed in chapters 5 and 11. The principal changes affecting the DCSOPS role are that—

(1) The CSA will now approve materiel requirements on the recommendation of an AROC.

(2) The DCSOPS will be responsible for coordinating AROC meetings, developing and promulgating AROC administrative procedures, promulgating AROC decisions, and supporting the VCSA in executing AROC responsibilities.

SECTION III
FORCE MANAGEMENT AND INTEGRATION MODELS

2-6. The Army Organizational Life Cycle Model (AOLCM)

The AOLCM is shown at Figure 2-2. It reflects the stages that organizations and their personnel and equipment will experience at one time or another (and oftentimes concurrently) during their service in the Army. The functions that are performed in these stages develop and field combat ready MTOE units and their supporting TDA organizations, maintain their viability and effectiveness, and remove them or their resources (personnel and things) from the force as requirements change. Each individual resource (a soldier or civilian or thing) required by a unit or activity will be found at some stage of the model beginning with the establishment of need and entry into the Army (defined and managed during the force management activity) to ultimate separation. The model details the critical stages through which an individual resource will move, at some point, during its life span. Generally, the model depicts the life cycle of Army organizations from their development (force management) and their progression (clockwise around Figure 2-2) to separation. The dynamic of the model, however, is that the Army leadership must resource and manage all of the functions simultaneously, since some resources will be in each functional stage at any one time.



Figure 2-2. The Army Organizational Life Cycle Model

a. Life cycle functions.

(1) *Force Management*. Force management is the first phase of the organizational life cycle model and is the basis underlying all other functions. The process involves organizational development, force integration, decision-making, and execution of the spectrum of activities encompassing requirements definition, force development, force integration, force structuring, combat developments, training developments, and resourcing. Force management results in the development of a capable combat force within constrained resources.

(2) *Acquisition.* After the Congress authorizes and the Department of Defense (DOD) provides the force structure allowance in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), the Army must then acquire the people and materiel specified in the requirements and authorizations documents necessary to accomplish the mission. From a materiel acquisition perspective, the acquisition function extends beyond the principal item being fielded and must consider other essential requirements such as the availability of associated support items of equipment and personnel (ASIOEP), technical publications, repair parts, trained personnel, and facilities. From a human resource acquisition perspective, the acquisition function must consider recruiting and accession missions in concert with the overall manpower management program and the influences of personnel life cycle functions.

(3) *Training.* The training function encompasses the system for accomplishing the transition from civilian status to military life. In this context, the training function is somewhat different from what most Army officers think of when discussing training. At this point in the life cycle, training is considered only from the aspect of initial entry training or the requirement to provide soldiers with initial familiarization training on new or displaced

equipment. In other words, it is the aspect of the training cycle that imparts new skills to the soldier or converts the civilian into a soldier. It most often results in award of a military occupational specialty (MOS) or additional skill identifier (ASI). The training function also includes the transition of U.S. Military Academy (USMA), Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and Officer Candidate School (OCS) graduates into officers through the branch basic courses. Traditional collective training and professional educational training is subsumed under the "development" phase of the Organizational Life Cycle Model.

(4) *Distribution.* Having produced or procured the resources necessary to form and sustain units they must be distributed according to established requirements, authorizations, and priorities. The distribution function includes the assignment of people from entry-level training to their initial unit and the delivery of new materiel from the wholesale level to the user. It also includes the redistribution of equipment to less modernized units in the force.

(5) *Deployment.* Once trained or prepared, units, individuals, packages, or things are considered available to support worldwide operations. An individual soldier, civilian, unit, or item of equipment may be subjected to some, if not all, of the mobilization, deployment, redeployment, demobilization, and reconfiguration processes of this function. Deployment represents both a planning and operational function involving agencies on the Army Staff, other levels of DOD, and the civilian transportation structure.

(6) *Sustainment.* In peace or war the presence of people and materiel in units establishes a requirement for sustainment. People, skills, capability, and things are maintained to the standard set for mission accomplishment by replacement, rotation, repair, and training operations. From a personnel perspective it covers soldier reassignments throughout a career or obligation period, quality of life and well-being programs, and other aspects of the personnel systems contributing towards retention. Repair parts and maintenance is also a sustainment process for materiel. Training in units covering the process of sustaining common soldier skills that maintain unit or individual proficiency falls under this function as well. The personnel priority group (PPG), officer distribution plans (ODPs), DA Master Priority List (DAMPL), ten classes of supply, the authorized stockage lists (ASLs), and prescribed load lists (PLLs) are examples of systems or techniques used to apply authorization and priority to the sustainment function.

(7) *Development.* While the Army is sustaining itself, it is also constantly developing. Individuals are developed through civilian, enlisted, and officer education programs that include character and leader development modules. Education and training programs range from individual self-development, including graduate-level degree programs to the entire range of branch and skill related institutional training culminating at either the senior service college for officers and civilians or Sergeant Major Academy for enlisted soldiers. Units are developed through collective training processes that include individual training in units, home station training, and deployments for training. Examples are collective training tasks (CTT), leader training, live fire and maneuver training, external evaluations such as those under the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), emergency deployment readiness exercises (EDRE), operational readiness tests (ORT), and training rotations to the combat training centers (CTC).

(8) *Separation.* Finally, there comes a time when people and equipment are separated from military control. People may separate voluntarily by not extending following

completion of an obligated service period or by retiring. Involuntary separation may occur due to reduction in force actions or qualitative reasons. The Army normally separates materiel through the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO) process or through foreign military sales (FMS) actions.

b. External influences affecting the functioning of the model. There are two categories of external influences that affect the functioning of the model:

(1) The first category is the availability of resources. Resources include tangible objects in the form of funds, materiel, or personnel. Also included are intangible resources such as time, information, and technology.

(2) The second category is the influence of command, management, and leadership in planning, organizing, directing, controlling, and monitoring the multitude of inputs, decisions, and actions to ensure that functions at each stage of the model are executed effectively and at the appropriate time.

2-7. The Army War College Model

To aid in examining specific support systems and their interactions, the U.S. Army War College has adopted the model shown in Figure 2-3 (insert). This widely used model highlights key aspects of force management. Each process displayed in the figure is examined in detail in subsequent chapters of this text. The underlying basis for this model is that force management, in its simplest context, is the management of change.

a. The model begins with strategic directives and policy including the national security strategy, and the guidance, plans, and other inputs from OSD, commanders in chief (CINCs), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in determining strategic and operational requirements. When the Army cannot fulfill directed missions and responsibilities with current capabilities the process of force management produces solutions to close the required capability gap. These solutions are initially documented as required capabilities in the requirements determination process. A requirement can be met and a capability acquired by a change in one domain of DTLOMS or some combination of changes in two or more domains.

b. The lower cost solutions are those changes to doctrine and training that can be developed within TRADOC, packaged, and provided directly to the unit. Doctrinal changes may, however, drive requirements for new materiel or organizational designs.

c. If organizational change is required, the necessary changes must be developed through the design and modeling of new or changed organizations and, subsequently, the determination and documentation of authorizations for the approved organizations and force structure.

d. If a change in materiel is required (normally the most expensive solution), it occurs through the materiel acquisition management process. This process must be initiated unless non-developmental (off-the-shelf) items will meet the need. Materiel changes require concurrent changes in organizations that, in turn, require materiel acquisition management to be closely linked to the force development and integration processes.

e. As discussed earlier, the force development process culminates in the Department of the Army (DA) approval and documentation of personnel and equipment authorizations in Army organizations and the force structure. This includes an analysis of the entire Army

organizational structure with approved modifications (through the total Army analysis process) to determine a resource constrained, balanced, and affordable force structure. The resource-constrained decisions on the allocation of authorizations are recorded in The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS) and the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS). The marriage of these two systems occurs in the Structure and Composition System (SACS). SACS, in conjunction with the Force Builder System, produces the Army's time-phased demands for personnel and equipment over the Current, Budget and Program Years and is extended for a total of a ten-year period. Additionally, SACS defaults to FY 2050 and builds a fully modernized objective TOE (OTOE) position for all units. In this way, SACS shows current levels of modernization, levels achieved at the end of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) period and a fully modernized Army (for planning purposes). SACS outputs combine information from BOIP, TOE, SAMAS, TAADS and known force structure constraints not included in the previous files. Key outputs are the Personnel Structure and Composition System (PERSACS) and the Logistics Structure and Composition System (LOGSACS). Both PERSACS and LOGSACS are at the unit identification code (UIC), effective date (EDATE), MOS, grade, line item number (LIN), equipment readiness code (ERC) and quantity level of detail for requirements and authorization for MTOE and TDA units. These systems are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

f. SACS provides the data that drives the processes to acquire, train, and distribute personnel and acquire and distribute materiel. Since at that point we are dealing with individuals and things, the linking of the thought process which analyzes the tools the Army uses to manage change with the functional requirements for producing combat-ready units portrayed in the life-cycle model should be apparent.

SECTION IV
COORDINATION OF FORCE INTEGRATION ACTIONS

2-8. Information exchange as a key element of force integration

Coordination of all aspects of force integration requires the constant exchange of information. In the Army's battle to achieve effective force integration, there have been and continue to be initiatives that focus on improving the information flow within and between the multiple systems and processes of force integration. Throughout this text, readers will find detailed descriptions of systems and processes that are designed to exchange information and help coordinate force integration actions. Examples of these systems and processes include the functional area assessment process, the Acquisition Management Milestone System, the Force Modernization Master Plan, and the Army Modernization Reference Data System.

2-9. Objective of force integration

Force integration is a method of change management that focuses Army management actions towards organizations to ensure the orderly incorporation and sustainment of structure, equipment, and doctrine in the Army. The objective of the effort is to assess the combined impact of Army functional systems on units and ensure the appropriate mix of resources (structure, people, equipment, dollars, facilities, and information) is available to support a

planned event for a given organization or system. The end result of this process is combat-ready units.

2-10. The organization integration team approach to force integration

a. Execution of the organization integration process was the responsibility of the organization integration (OI) team prior to 1 December 2000. On that date, the organization of the DCSPRO and the reorganization of DCSOPS became effective. While the materiel management responsibilities of the DCSOPS and the DCSPRO are known in general terms to be as described above and in Chapters 9 and 11, the functions and responsibilities of these staff elements and their individual force management action officers with respect to the force integration function have not been finalized as of this writing.

b. HQDA will continue to use the team approach to execute force integration. Force integration staff officer (FISO) positions have been documented in the TDA; and supplement the force integrator (FI), systems integrator (SI), and organization integrator (OI) action officer staffing. At this time, however, it is not completely known which duties and functions of the former positions will migrate to the FISO or other staff officer positions in the new DCSPRO and DCSOPS organizations. (SI duties and functions that are known to have migrated to the DCSPRO are discussed in Chapter 11.)

c. In the following paragraphs, we include a discussion of the former organization integration team composition and the functions and duties of the team members. In the absence of more current information, this discussion is useful in providing a description of the team approach to force integration and the functions that must be performed by some member of the team, regardless of title.

2-11. Organization integration function

The function of organization integration was formally performed by an ad hoc, multi-disciplinary, group of organization managers, functional area representatives, and special interest representatives responsible for management of organizational change. The OI team included representatives who had knowledge of the doctrine, design, structure, personnel, acquisition, equipping, resources, facilities, information management, and training activities that impact a unit. HQDA team members included, but were not limited to, OIs, FIs, SIs, document integrators (DIs), and resource integrators (RIs). As required, representatives from major Army commands (MACOMs) and Reserve Components and other functional area and special interest representatives were included in HQDA teams. The OI team could be compared to the battlestaff of a tactical organization. The team members were not fixed, nor were the specific roles each would play. They “organized for battle” based on the specific challenge or mission. The OI on the team might have played a leading role in one instance and have been a supporting player in another. The personnel system staff officer (PERSSO) might have been an essential member of the team in one instance, but not have been involved at all in others. The same is true of other members of the team. Each action officer on the team was responsible for preparing, handling, and coordinating actions in his or her area of expertise. A representative team is shown at Figure 2-4.



Figure 2-4. Organization Integration Team Composition

a. Functions of the OI team. The OI team analyzed Army leadership decisions affecting force structure, coordinated implementing action, recommended further action, and monitored the execution of actions. OI teams used and shared information available in existing Army information systems. If disconnects appeared in the information validity or Army plans, the OI team was charged with resolving the conflict.

b. Roles of team members.

(1) *Force integrator.* Force integrators (FI) are assigned to DCSOPS and represent organizational interests of functionally dissimilar organizations grouped into brigades, regiments, divisions, and corps. Prior to the establishment of the DCSPRO, the FI—

(a) Assessed the ability of functional systems to provide personnel, equipment, facilities, and fiscal resources for major units.

(b) Developed, maintained, and defended organizational management decision packages (MDEP) for major organizations.

(c) Developed, assessed, and made recommendations for alternative use of resources for establishing and maintaining major organizations to support a warfighting CINC and MACOMs.

(d) Acted as the link between resource allocators and OIs.

(e) Evaluated and analyzed the total impact of incorporating personnel, facilities, equipment, doctrine, structure, and capability changes into major organizations.

(f) Ensured validity of operating system databases.

(g) Reviewed requirements and authorization documents.

(h) Assessed the impact of new doctrine, structure, manning, equipment, and facilities on major units. This included strategic policy, training, mobilization, deployment, sustainment, redeployment, demobilization, and resource strategies.

(2) *Organization integrator.* Organization integrators (OI) are assigned to the DCSOPS and represent organizational interests of functionally similar organizations and integrated management of all aspects of structuring, equipping, manning, training, sustaining, deploying, stationing, and funding. The OI represents all organizations in a specific branch such as infantry, air defense artillery, and quartermaster or specific type organizations within a branch such as ordnance missile maintenance. The OI was also responsible for the organization and synchronization of OI team activities. Prior to the establishment of the DCSPRO, the OI—

(a) Assessed the ability of the functional systems to provide personnel, materiel, and facilities for organizations.

(b) Recommended priorities for allocation of personnel, materiel, and facilities to organizations as integrated packages.

(c) Assessed the impact on readiness as a result of personnel, training, equipment, facilities, doctrine, or structure changes.

(d) Reviewed distribution plans and determines impacts on organizations. Assessed impacts of new capabilities on organization structure, doctrine, or resources.

(e) Reviewed, coordinated ARSTAF review, and recommended final ARSTAF position to the Director, Force Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), on all organization requirements documents (TOE, BOIP, and manpower requirements criteria (MARC) studies)

(f) Coordinated authorization documents. Maintained the documentation audit trail on all additions, deletions, and other changes to organization authorization documents.

(g) Developed, maintained, and defended organizational MDEPs for organizations.

(h) Ensured validity of operating system databases, such as SAMAS.

(3) *Command manager (force structure).* Command managers (force structure) (CM (FS)) are assigned to the DCSOPS and represent the organizational interests of a MACOM, manage its TDA, and serve as the MTOE OI and FI for that MACOM. Prior to the establishment of the DCSPRO, the CM (FS)—

(a) Acted as point of contact for command plans and concept plans.

(b) Maintained the documentation audit trail on all additions, deletions, and other changes to unit MTOEs and TDAs.

(c) Produced manpower resource guidance for MACOM program budget guidance (PBG).

(d) Managed command force structure allowances.

(4) *Systems integrator.* Systems integrators (SI) are now assigned to the DCSPRO. Prior to the establishment of the DCSPRO, the SI represented user interests in all materiel system management aspects of force integration. The SI was involved in all aspects of equipping, from the front-end requirement determination process through system fielding. The SI—

(a) Determined requirements for materiel fielding and other user-oriented functions related to materiel acquisition.

(b) Developed the command position on materiel requirements documents.

(c) Assessed the affordability of the materiel requirements.

(d) Developed materiel acquisition or fielding alternatives.

(e) Recommended materiel acquisition priorities for research, development, test, evaluation, procurement, and materiel change programs.

(f) Recommended priorities for materiel distribution.

(g) Participated in system design reviews.

(h) Ensured all aspects of rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) are considered.

(i) Reviews requirements and authorization documents for materiel user implications.

(j) Recommended disposition of displaced equipment.

(5) *Document integrator.* Document integrators (DI), or documentors, are assigned to the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA), a DA DCSOPS field operating agency (FOA). DIs ensure that requirements and authorization documents meet approved Army force programs. DIs include requirements document developers and authorization document developers. The DIs link requirements, planned or programmed force structure actions and the documentation processes. The DIs—

(a) Develop requirements documents (TOE, BOIP, and MARC).

(b) Produce authorization documents (MTOE, TDA, joint tables of allowances (JTA), and others) based on HQDA guidance, organization requirements documents, command plans, and input from the MACOMs.

(c) Review proposed authorization documents to ensure compliance with manpower, personnel, and equipment policies and directives.

(6) *Command manager (program budget guidance).* Command managers (program budget guidance) (CM (PBG)) were assigned to DCSOPS and ensured that the manpower allocation for each MACOM was accurately reflected in the SAMAS system, in conformance with Army leadership decisions, and within the manpower controls as specified by OSD. The CM (PBG) represented the Army's budget interests of functionally dissimilar organizations grouped into the various MACOMs. The CM (PBG)—

(a) Managed the manpower database of record by MACOM, at UIC, MDEP, and Army management structure code (AMSCO) level of detail, by fiscal year, by category (military and civilian) for each budget cycle.

(b) Maintained the Army's only detailed audit trail for manpower.

(c) Interfaced with all ARSTAF agencies and MACOMs during each budget cycle.

(d) Produced the manpower addendum to the PBG at the conclusion of each Planning, Programming, and Budget Execution System (PPBES) event.

(e) Managed and maintained the Army's controlled accounts.

(7) *Army component commands and MACOMs.* Force management staffs at these echelons will continue to manage the planning and execution of the force integration mission through—

(a) Document integration, including authorization document (MTOE and TDA) review, and database management.

(b) Systems integration, including, requirements and authorization document review, the materiel fielding plan (MFP) process, new equipment training plan (NETP) review, and facilities support annex review.

(c) Organization integration, including the organizational assessment process, review of requirements and authorization documents, and doctrine review.

(d) Force structure management, including TDA manpower management and end strength management.

(e) Force planning, including the total Army analysis (TAA) process, command plan process, force reduction planning and monitoring, and concept plan (CONPLAN) development.

(f) Readiness management, including Status of Resource and Training System (SORTS) input and the unit status reporting (USR) process.

(8) *Corps, division, regiment, separate brigade, and installation.* Force management staffs at these levels will continue to manage force integration through—

(a) Force structure management, including authorization document management, USR monitoring, and force structure review and analysis.

(b) Systems integration, including action plan development, distribution plan reviews, and facilities review.

(c) Organization integration, including organizational assessments, force structure review and analysis, and authorization document review process.

2-12. The future of organization integration

a. The representative OI team carries a significant manpower bill. This is necessary because of the diverse knowledge required to perform all the OI functions. A robust team is also needed to access the many different databases and models that provide information needed by the OI members. However, steps are underway to apply technology to help reduce the manpower costs of this process.

b. The AFM, developed by the Army Strategic and Advanced Computing Center, is a decision support system designed to provide the Army Staff with an integrated, quick turnaround planning tool to assess actual or notional force structures and/or policies across the Army's major functional areas (force structure, personnel, logistics, installations, and budget). AFM supplements the current functional models, which remain "stovepipe" systems and that cannot easily conduct "What If" analyses in a timely manner. The AFM provides the

capability to readily make force structure or policy changes and assess the effects of these changes on unit fill levels and readiness both within and across functional areas.

SECTION V
SUMMARY AND REFERENCES

2-13. Summary

a. In modern, complex organizations there is certain to be a cause and effect relationship involving almost every process and system. An appreciation of this interrelationship and knowledge of the individual systems that contribute to force integration will in turn lead to an understanding of how the Army runs.

b. Changes within the Army and the processes that brings them about, require a holistic application of cross-functional factors. To be successful, future senior Army leaders and managers must understand the nature of the interrelations of the systems and subsystems, as well as their individual tasks and functions. Only then can force management objectives be effectively and efficiently met. The overviews of the Army Functional Life Cycle Model and the Army War College Model introduced in this chapter provide a basis for subsequent and more detailed examinations of the Army as a system. Additional information can be found at the following web sites:

(1) carlisle-www.army.mil.

(2) www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil.

2-14. References

a. Public Law 99-433, *DOD Reorganization Act of 1986*.

b. Public Law 103-62, *Government Performance Results Act of 1993*.

c. Report of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission), *A Quest for Excellence,* June 1986.

d. Memorandum, Chief of Staff, Army, undated, subject: *Approval of Army Warfighting Requirements.*

e. Army Regulation 11-40, *Functional Area Assessment*.

f. Field Manual 100-11*, Force Integration*.

g. Army Modernization Reference Data (CD-ROM).