FM 3-93 (100-7)
The Army In Theater Operations

Third Draft
October 2001

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The Army in Theater Operations (Third Draft)

Contents

Page

PREFACE iv

PART ONE THE THEATER ENVIRONMENT

Chapter 1 FULL SPECTRUM THEATER LANDPOWER 1-1
Introduction to the Army in the Theater 1-2
Army Planning and Execution in the Theater 1-5
Army Capabilities and Core Competencies 1-14
Multinational and Interagency Operations 1-26

Chapter 2 THE THEATER 2-1
The Chain of Command 2-2
The Strategic Hierarchy 2-13
Joint Force Commands 2-18
Multinational Commands 2-28
Theater Organizations 2-36

PART TWO ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING ARMY FORCES IN THE THEATER

Chapter 3 OPERATIONAL-LEVEL ARMY FORCES IN THE THEATER 3-1
Army Service Component Command 3-3
Army Operational-Level Commander Functions 3-19
Numbered Army Option 3-23
Army Commander as a Subordinate Joint Commander 3-30
Tactical-Level Commanders serving as Army Force (ARFOR) Commander 3-36

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Page

Chapter 4 JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL LAND OPERATIONS 4-1
Joint Force Land Component Commander 4-1
Multinational Land Component Command 4-23

PART THREE ARMY COMPONENT PLANNING AND OPERATIONS

Chapter 5 PLANNING FRAMEWORK 5-1
Operational Art 5-1
Ends, Ways, Means, and Risks 5-19
Campaign Planning 5-22
Major Operations Planning 5-47
Multinational and Interagency Operational-Level Planning 5-58

Chapter 6 STRATEGIC RESPONSIVENESS: ARMY COMPONENT OPERATIONS 6-1
Strategic Responsiveness 6-1
Crisis 6-3
Contingency Operations 6-7
Force-Projection Operations 6-17
Army Operations in Peacetime 6-39
Army Operations in Conflict 6-44
Army Operations in War 6-50

PART FOUR ARMY OPERATIONAL-LEVEL TASKS AND FORCES

Chapter 7 OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL; INFORMATION SUPERIORITY; AND INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE 7-1
General 7-1
Army Component Liaison 7-8
Signal Support to the Operational Commander 7-14
Land Information Warfare Activity 7-26
Public Affairs Operations 7-32
Operational Intelligence 7-37

Chapter 8 OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT and MANEUVER; AND OPERATIONAL
Firepower 8-1
Operational Movement and Maneuver 8-1
Operational Fires 8-16
Operational Maneuver and Fires Organizations 8-47

Chapter 9 OPERATIONAL FORCE PROTECTION 9-1
General 9-4
Sustaining Operations 9-10

Combating Terrorism 9-20
Military Police Operations 9-22
Theater Air and Missile Defense Operations 9-39
NBC Defense Operations 9-51

Chapter 10 OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL SUPPORT 10-1
Operational-Level Logistics and Personnel Support Overview 10-1
Operational CSS Planning and Execution 10-16
Operational CSS Functions 10-29
Operational CSS Organizations 10-41
Operational-level Engineer Support 10-70
Other Support Services 10-74

Chapter 11 ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 11-1
Army Special Operations Coordination 11-3
Civil Military Operations 11-5
Psychological Operations 11-10

Appendix A ..... ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND STAFF ORGANIZATION A-1
Appendix B ARMY HQ AS A JTF HQ B-1
Appendix C SAMPLE ASCC DIRECTIVE C-1
Appendix D SUBORDINATE CAMPAIGN PLAN MODEL D-1
Appendix E MAJOR OPERATIONS PLAN MODEL: OPERATIONAL-LEVEL E-1
Appendix F JOINT LAND OPERATIONS PLAN MODEL F-1
Appendix G OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS OF THE ARMY IN THE THEATER G-1
Appendix H COORDINATING LEGACY, ITERIM, AND OBJECTIVE FORCES H-1
Appendix I Army Tasking Documents (Title 10 USC, DOD Directives, DAP 10-1) I-1
Appendix J Theater-level Information Management J-1

Glossary Glossary-1
Bibliography Bibliography-1
Source Notes 1

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PREFACE

This manual establishes doctrinal guidance for U.S. Army forces functioning at the operational level of war in concert with joint, multinational, and/or interagency organizations. It describes how the commander of the Army Service component command (ASCC) applies the FM 3-0, *Operations* fundamentals to Army forces (ARFOR) operating within a theater of operations. This is the Army's manual on *operational art* focused at the operational level of war: the link between theater strategy, campaign plans, and tactics and the bridge between theater wide campaigns and localized battles and engagements.

PURPOSE

This manual applies the *National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy*, joint doctrine, and Army doctrine--to the conduct of operations across the range of military operations and fills a doctrinal void. This operational-level-of-war doctrinal manual addresses the roles and functions of the commander of the Army Service component command (COMASCC) and how the COMASCC relates to the combatant commander, peers, and subordinates within the theater structure of a combatant command. Additionally, this manual describes the ARFOR in a joint force commander's operational environment. It clarifies the various roles and responsibilities of senior Army commanders in theater to include performing as the Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC). Army operations throughout the full range of military operations--*war and military operations other than war (MOOTW)* are described. Principles and functions for planning and conducting subordinate campaigns and major operations that require the integration of Army combat and support capabilities within a joint, multinational, or interagency framework are discussed.

SCOPE

This manual is divided into four parts. Part One (Chapters 1-2) discusses the Army's role in the theater environment. Part Two (Chapters 3 and 4) describes organizing and commanding the Army in a theater. Part Three (Chapters 5 and 6) covers how the Army plans and operates in a theater. Part Four (Chapters 7-11) discusses the five categories of Army operational-level forces.

APPLICABILITY

FM 3-93 is designed to assist ASCC and ARFOR commanders and their staffs to translate strategic guidance into operational execution in joint, multinational, and interagency environments. This manual incorporates lessons learned from recent operations, contains numerous extracts from relevant joint and Army doctrine, and builds on FM 3-0, *Operations*. The doctrine in this manual is authoritative but not directive. Additionally, it links FM 3-92(100-15), *Corps Operations*; FM 4-0 (100-10), *Combat Service Support*; FM 3-07 (100-20), *Stability Operations and Support Operations*; FM 3-90 (100-40), *Tactics;* and other Army manuals.

The proponent for this manual is Combined Arms Command (CAC). Send comments and recommendations on the draft via mail to the following address. Use a memorandum format. Include category of comment (critical, major, substantive, or administrative), recommendation (line-out/line-in format), reason for suggested changes, and reference to the location (paragraph and line number or figure) within the draft manual. Use Joint Publication 1-01, dated 5 July 2000, as a reference. Annex A to Appendix E (Sample General Comment, Comment, and Line-out/Line-In Format), provides memorandum format guidance.

Mail: FM 3-93 (FM 100-7), ATTN: Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (ATZL-O), U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1 Reynolds Road, Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

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PART ONE

The Theater Environment

The Army is a strategic instrument of national policy that has served our country well in peace and war for over two centuries. Soldiers enable America to fulfill its world leadership responsibilities of safeguarding our national interests, preventing global calamity, and making the world a safer place. They do this by finding peaceful solutions to the frictions between nation states, addressing the problems of human suffering, and when required, fighting and winning our Nation's wars – our nonnegotiable contract with the American people.

Louis Calderra, Secretary of the Army and
General Eric K. Shinseki, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Army Vision, 1999

The nation's premier force for conducting prompt and sustained land combat is the Army. This has been the Army's mission throughout history. Its unique contribution to the joint, multinational, and interagency team is its ability to dominate the land, including populations and resources. Army in-theater operations must support the nation's and the unified commander's strategic intent and be synchronized with his strategic concept of operation.

Part One provides the reader with a concise overview of the Army's role in the environment of a geographic combatant commander.

Chapter 1 provides an introduction and overview of the Army's role in a theater of operations. It outlines Army core competencies and capabilities and how these are implemented through operational force categories.

Chapter 2 discusses the joint and service branches of the chain of command, strategic hierarchy, joint and multinational commands, and theater organization.

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Chapter 1

FULL SPECTRUM THEATER LAND POWER

Theater of operations is a term used to designate that portion of the land, sea, and air areas of the theater of war necessary for military operations, either offensive or defensive, pursuant to an assigned mission, and for the administration incident to such military operations. ...The character of modern warfare does not permit a complete division of the administrative and combat functions of the theater into entirely separate areas. Combat operations will take place throughout the entire theater and the commander must organize his forces and area so as to permit the necessary unity of command for both combat and administration. ...It is his responsibilities that operational plans provide for coordination of the land, sea, and air forces at his disposal and that such plans are energetically and effectively executed. ...The assigned mission will require the selection of a physical objective or series of objectives, the occupation, destruction, or neutralization of which will bring about the decisive defeat or destruction of the enemy or will constitute a threat so great as to cause him to sue for peace.

FM 100-15
Field Service Regulations: Larger Units
29 June 1942

While warfare has changed since the decisive victories of World War II, the U.S. Army must be prepared to conduct both combat and administrative functions as part of theater operations in support of National Security Strategy during major theater wars (MTW), smaller-scale contingencies (SSC), or peacetime military engagement (PME). In almost all situations, these military actions will be conducted as part of a joint or multinational force. In order to introduce these 21st Century doctrinal functions of the U.S. Army at the operational-level of war, this chapter will provide an overview of the theater strategic-level and operational-level environment. This overview is consistent with the doctrinal principles as described in JP 0-2, *Unified Actions of the Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, and FM 3-0, *Operations*.

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION TO THE ARMY IN THE THEATER

1-1. Land power is the application of the nation's ground forces to exert decisive and lasting influence on land in support of national interests. Land power remains the most fundamental expression of military power and national will. The Army is a strategic component of the nation's overall military power that provides full spectrum land power to contingency force projection and sustained land operations as part of joint warfare. The U.S. Army almost always conducts operations as part of joint, and frequently a multinational force, to protect and further American vital, important, and humanitarian or other national interests. In response to the needs of America's national security interests, the Army must be prepared to fight and win major theater wars. The Army also supports joint force commanders (JFC), a commander authorized to exercise COCOM or OPCON over a joint force, by conducting military operations other than war (MOOTW). As an instrument of American policy, the Army must be ready to provide the nation a variety of capabilities to influence the international environment, force a decision, and ensure lasting stability following conflict.

1-2. To do this, the Army Chief of Staff's vision is for the Army to provide to the nation an array of *responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable* formations capable of reversing the conditions of human suffering rapidly and resolving conflicts decisively.

- Responsive- The Army will provide strategic responsiveness through forward-deployed forces and capabilities, peacetime engagement, and, when required, through force projection. Potential enemies and allies must realize the quality inherent in America's land power. This

requires a close coordination between Army component commanders and joint and interagency decision making bodies.

- Deployable-The Army must be able to rapidly concentrate combat power in an operational area in a timely manner. Support from other Services will be essential ensure this capability. The Army's deployment is the surest sign of America's commitment to accomplishing any mission that occurs on land.
- Agile-The Army must have the physical and mental agility operationally to transition forces from stability and support operations to warfighting and back again just as we can task organize and transition between offense and defense.
- Versatile-The Army must be structured, tailored, trained, and sustained to meet our nation's requirements with minimal adjustment and in minimum time capable of dominating at any point on the spectrum of operations.
- Lethal-The Army's lethality is essential to the ability to win with minimum casualties, ensuring the rapid conclusion of hostilities and conflict resolution.
- Survivable-The Army must provide maximum protection to our forces from the individual soldier to the combat platform. Army forces are prepared to venture into harm's way and dominate the battlespace.
- Sustainable-The Army must be capable of operating with a reduced logistic footprint and replenishment demand, as well as leveraging reach back and technology systems to revolutionize sustainment.

1-3. Planning and executing major operations to support a theater campaign is a formidable task for the global-based, force-projection Army of the 21st Century. The theater strategic environment is uncertain and dynamic, with ever-increasing threats and instabilities. Army commanders at all levels must organize, resource, train, and employ their forces to be the decisive force when and where required. The Army operational-level commander's challenge is to support the JFCs efforts to shape the military environment and set the conditions for decisive results or victory in all major operations, whether in peace, conflict, or war. The strategic environment and hierarchy of a unified theater is described more fully in Chapter 2.

1-4. The U.S. Army has a long tradition of organizing and employing administrative and operational headquarters above the tactical echelons of

corps, divisions, and brigades. The term Army Service component command (ASCC) is the latest to describe this echelon of command. ASCCs are established on the basis of one per vital region of the world subordinated to geographic unified commands or designated sub-unified commands. The commander of an ASCC (COMASCC) is normally the senior Army officer, not on joint duty, assigned to the unified or sub-unified command. The COMASCC performs three major functions in providing full spectrum land power:

- Establishes the required component headquarters for Army and land operations planning and maintains linkages to joint, multinational, interagency, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and international organizations (IOs) in support of the combatant commander.
- Provides administrative control (ADCON) and logistical support to all Army forces (ARFOR) provided under the operational control (OPCON) of other joint or multinational headquarters. When directed, also provides common user logistical (CUL) support to other Services, other governmental agencies (OGA), multinational partners, or non-military organizations.
- Conducts major land operations as an ARFOR or functional joint land force component commander (JFLCC) to support the theater campaign when directed by the geographic combatant commander.

1-5. The COMASCC provides Army forces (ARFOR) to his respective geographic combatant commander. An ARFOR consists of the senior Army headquarters and all Army forces assigned or attached to a geographic combatant commander, subordinate joint force commander, joint functional commander, or a multinational commander. The commander of an ARFOR, or COMARFOR, for a unified commander may also be the COMASCC. If Army forces are involved in an operation, there will always be an ARFOR designated. Even if there are Army forces conducting separate operations, there is normally only one ARFOR headquarters and one COMARFOR within a joint operations area. See Chapter 3 for more on the organization of

Army forces in the theater and for a brief summary of the historical background and staff responsibilities of the ASCC see Appendix A.

1-6. In a joint environment, when the Army is the preponderant land force conducting major operations, the JFC may assign the COMARFOR as the JFLCC. A JFLCC is designated when operations require close coordination between Army and Marine forces and the Army has the preponderence of land forces and the requsite command and control means. As the JFLCC, the COMARFOR must integrate and synchronize all available land assets to accomplish the mission with minimum casualties in terms favorable to the U.S. and its alliance or coalition partners. See Chapter 4 for more on JFLCC.

SECTION II - ARMY PLANNING AND EXECUTION IN THE THEATER

1-7. Army commanders at the operational level plan and execute operations guided by an understanding of battle command, the time-tested principles of war, the tenets of operations, and using the elements of combat power. Army forces perform full spectrum operations of offense, defense, stability and support operations (ODSS) as part of the application of combat power across the full range of military operations in war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). See FM 3-0, *Operations*. See Figure 1-1.



Figure 1-1. Range of Army Operations

THEATER CAMPAIGN

1-8. The theater campaign focuses Army operations in peace, conflict, or war. It is linked to a theater strategy. A campaign is a series of related and integrated major operations with complementary actions at all levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical) simultaneously and/or sequentially arranged to accomplish national strategic, theater strategic, and operational objectives within a given time and space. The campaign plan describes the conduct of air, land, sea, space, and special operations. If appropriate, it also includes operations with interagency, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), and multinational forces. Unified Action is the broad, generic term that describes this wide scope of joint, interagency, and multinational activities that take place within unified commands and their subordinate organizations. To win rapidly and

decisively, both combat and noncombat operations occur simultaneously throughout the combatant commander's theater of war and the operational-level commander's battlespace and to the depths of the adversary's forces.

1-9. In war, a broadly conceived theater campaign plan normally involves the employment of large unified and joint forces. A single, unifying strategic concept of operations synchronizes the actions taken at each level of war against the enemy's depth. The intent is to concentrate strategically the decisive force, simultaneously destroying and disrupting key enemy capabilities and functions, and exploiting the resultant strategic advantage and initiative before the enemy can react. Achieving the theater strategic objectives, while striving to incur, and depending on the operation, to inflict, minimum casualties, is the measure of success.

1-10. Campaigns during military operations other than war may also be broad in scope, but usually call for smaller forces and may include UN forces as well as other international agencies, NGOs, IOs, and OGA. Also based on theater strategies, these campaigns involve a series of integrated operations with strategic aims at international, national, and theater levels. The intent is to establish and maintain the desired military conditions while employing a wide range of military and nonmilitary capabilities to achieve theater strategic and operational objectives.

1-11. Campaigns covering the full range of military operations demand plans with sound linkages between theater strategy, the campaign plan, and major operations plans. The theater engagement plan (TEP) includes use of forward-deployed forces and force-projection forces involved in peacetime engagement--for example, the Partnership for Peace Program, multilateral

training exercises, meetings—are all part of the geographic combatant commander's strategy.

THEATER STRATEGY, CAMPAIGN PLANS, AND MAJOR OPERATIONS LINKAGES

1-12. The vital linkage between national and theater strategic direction and the tactical employment of forces on the battlefield takes place in major operational-level planning. The theater strategy and campaign plan relate the ends, ways, means, and risks of national strategy to the outcomes, methods, and resources for operational activities. Translating national, alliance, or coalition guidance, the theater commander devises theater strategic objectives, concepts, and resource implications for a broad range of activities in the theater, including provisions across the range of military operations. The theater strategy is the foundation for the OPLAN with time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) developed during deliberate planning and is the framework for force employment.

1-13. With the outbreak of crisis or, more optimally, in anticipation of an outbreak, the geographic combatant commander uses crisis action planning to modify portions of his strategy and OPLAN and, develop a campaign plan. His critical tasks are to identify the military operations that will achieve the desired military end state, thereby contributing to conditions for achieving the strategic end state. The military end state is the set of comditions the combatant commander intends the campaign to achieve and is reflected in his mission statement, concept, and intent. The NCA normally approves the campaign plan and directs the military to support other instruments of national power to achieve a strategic end state that may be broader in scope

than the necessary military end state. The intent of the combatant commander to meet the necessary military end state must be nested inside the broader intent of the NCA. Within the theater of war and theaters of operations, the combatant commander's campaign plan specifies the campaign objectives, the military objectives by phase, and tasks to components. See Figure 1-2.



Figure 1-2 Strategic -Operational- Tactical linkages

MAJOR OPERATIONS

1-14. Subordinate operational-level joint and component commanders set the conditions for tactical plans and support the campaign with operational intents, concepts, and objectives. Service commanders at the tactical level ensure their intents, concepts, and objectives are nested within those of the operational-level commander. Regardless of level, Army commanders

consider the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) in their battlespace to achieve dominance over the adversary and to protect the force. See FM 3-0, *Operations* for more detail on METT-TC and battlespace.

1-15. Commanders of major operations require a fundamental understanding of the principles of planning. Operational and tactical planning share the same basic requirements—a complete definition of the mission, clarity of the commander's intent, thoroughness of estimates, and sound concepts of operations. At the operational-level, the significant imperative is to remain capable of responding to continually changing conditions.

Army Component Planning for Desert Storm

Perhaps all successful military operations are the product of the corporate skills of the institution, but this was particularly the case of [Operation] Desert Storm. Colonel Joe Purvis and his [CENTCOM ground planning] team started the process with a good deal of personal direction . . . from General Schwartzkopf. Certainly Schwartzkopf's forensic abilities counted heavily, both convincing [CJCS, General] Colin Powell that two corps were required for the offensive and in articulating to his subordinates a clear vision of what they were about. [Brigadier]General Steve Arnold's role was decisive in linking the efforts of ARCENT and the two corps with those of CENTCOM. . . .

Ultimately, the ARCENT plan was [ARCENT commander] Lieutenant General John Yeosock's. Not because he can be seen working any particular part of it. Indeed, he seemed to have spent the greatest part of his time in the introduction of Army forces into the theater, provisioning of host-nation support, creation of an echelon-above-corps intelligence capability, and obtaining whatever he could beg, borrow, or steal from the other major Army commands to make Desert Storm work. But it was [Lieutenant General] Yeosock who married what was possible, largely [22d Support Command's Lieutenant] General [Gus] Pagonis' business, with what was thought to be required by his two corps. His life from November to February was a series of tradeoffs and work arounds. He evaluated what was required and more often decided what could be done with what was available. At the same time, he balanced risks and generally strove to unencumber the corps so they could concentrate on the immediate problems of training, deploying/redeploying, and preparing for the anticipated offensive.

Richard M. Swain *"Lucky War": Third Army in Desert Storm*

1-16. Every subordinate campaign or operations plan (OPLAN) requires an overarching operational concept. The subordinate joint force commander (JFC) is normally responsible for the concept--an idea that is initially a product of the higher commander's intent, mission analysis, personal estimate of the situation, and creative imagination and intuitive judgment. Initially, it exists only in his mind. Yet, the operational concept must be clearly articulated relative to the conditions in which it will apply. No finite set of principles exists to help in formulating an operational concept, but history has validated the application of several key military notions or concepts.

OPERATIONAL ART

1-17. The combatant commander practices operational art-- the employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. When he assigns the COMARFOR a warfighting mission, he also practices operational art. Combatant commanders and designated subordinate JFCs plan, conduct, and support theater campaigns, subordinate campaigns, major operations, and battles. Their success is measured by the accomplishment of theater strategic objectives. COMARFORs in joint and multinational operations function at the operational-level of war, thus requiring a broad perspective. They link theater strategy and campaign plans to tactical execution. COMARFORs also employ operational art. The subordinate commanders' application of operational art begins with understanding the theater strategic concept and guidance about the military end state. As strategic realities tend to constrain

the strategic possibilities, the guidance also limits operational-level options. Directly stated, strategic guidance allows the operational-level commander to proceed along clear lines in planning an operational concept to produce a desired military end state.

1-18. As a doctrine based organization, the foundations of the Army's doctrine for full spectrum operations are found in FM 3-0, *Operations*. This manual includes the fundamentals (elements of combat power, principles of war, tenets of Army operations, and operational framework) as well as Army doctrine for battle command and the operations process. Chapter 5 of this manual covers additional concepts of planning and operational art.

1-19. Battlefield organization is the arrangement of forces according to action, purpose, time, and space that commanders create to accomplish a mission. Operational-level commanders should consider both purpose-based and spatial frameworks. Decisive operations are the key purpose-based operation. Many other operations help shape decisive operations. For example, two shaping efforts, an interdiction operation, and a deception operation, both could support a separate, decisive ground battle during a single phase of a campaign. Additionally, sustaining operations are required to assist the continuity and freedom of action for either decisive or shaping operations. Commanders at all levels provide focus by designating the decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations, which help set priorities, determine risks, and unify the effort. (See FM 3-0, *Operations*)

1-20. The operational-level commander also focuses by applying spatial structure to the theater. In circumstances requiring it, commanders have the option of clarifying operations with respect to a linear opponent by

designating close, deep, and rear areas. Additional considerations for structuring the battlespace are security and reconnaissance operations and provision of reserves. The battlefield organization is a product of the strategic and operational objectives, forces allocated for the theater, a concept for their employment, the factors of METT-TC, and the presence of alliance or coalition structures. See FM 3-90 (100-40), *Tactics*; and FM 3-55 (100-55), *Reconnaissance Operations*.

1-21. The COMASCC, as the senior Army commander in the AOR, functionally tailors Army forces to conduct major land operations in support of the combatant commander. The six universal joint task list (UJTL) operational-level tasks--movement and maneuver; fires; protection; command and control; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and logistics and personnel support—are logical ways for commanders to describe systematically the integration of functions that occurs during the conduct of full spectrum operations at the theater-level.

- **(OP 1) Conduct operational movement and maneuver**. This is usually conducted by combined arms formations in conjunction with operational firepower.
- **(OP 2) Provide operational intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance**. Army forces at this level are linked to joint and national intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets.
- **(OP 3) Employ operational firepower**. The Army provides long range fires (such as Army tactical missile system [ATACMS] and attack aviation) to complement other operational fires.
- **(OP 4) Provide operational logistic and personnel support**. This includes support to all ARFOR and—when directed—to other services, multinational forces, and selected NGOs and IOs.
- **(OP 5) Provide operational command and control**. This requires establishing and maintaining linkages to joint, multinational, interagency, and international forces.
- **(OP 6) Provide operational force protection**. The Army has a major role in theater missile defense, antiterrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) damage control, and NBC defense.

See Appendix G for a full discussion of these operational level tasks from CJCSM 3500.04B, *The Universal Joint Task List* .

SECTION III - ARMY CAPABILITIES AND CORE COMPETENCIES

1-22. In order to accomplish these operational-level tasks, Army operational-level commanders combine active Army and reserve component forces provided through the ASCC. These forces normally consist of a wide range of units with varying types of equipment, frequently in conjuction with Marines or multinational land forces, to achieve an effective and efficient land force to support unified action. The process of selecting and combining these elements into force packages is tailoring the force. Within the tailored force packages, Army commanders provide the JFC a full spectrum of versatile land power capabilities that fall into categories related to not only the joint operational-level tasks, but also the Army's core competencies. The Army's core competencies are multi-faceted and articulate the most enduring capabilities that define the essence of our fundamental contributions to our Nation's Security. As defined in FM 1, *The Army*, the Army's core competencies are:

- Sustained Land Dominance
- Prompt Response
- Forcible Entry Operations
- Mobilize the Army
- Shape the Security Environment
- Support Civil Authorities

1-23. Of these core competencies, provide support to civil authorities is strategic and outside the scope of theater operations and will not be discussed in this manual for it is best covered in FM 3-07.7(100-19), *Domestic*

Support Operations. Shape the security environment, respond promptly to crisis, conduct forcible entry operations, and mobilize the Army will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 8.

SUSTAINED LAND DOMINANCE-SUPPORTING COMPETENCIES

1-24. One of Army's core competencies, sustained land dominance, has several supporting competencies. What distinguishes this core competency is its decisive, comprehensive, and enduring nature. This unique Army contribution to America's national defense is providing the capabilities for sustained land dominance across the full range of military operations. A fundamental aspect of the U.S. Army is its ability to develop, train, and execute its sustained land dominance across the full spectrum of peace, conflict, and war. Several specific supporting competencies provide the synergistic capabilities that allow the Army to fulfill this vital role for our country. These supporting competencies are: Close with and Destroy Enemy Forces; Command and Control of Joint and Multinational Forces; Precision Fires and Maneuver; Control and Defend Land, People, and Natural Resources; Conduct Sustainment Operations; and Information Superiority (Figure 1-3) (See FM 1, *The Army*).



Figure 1-3

1-25. Sustained land dominance is the decisive means of attaining national security and military objectives. It is the ultimate end state. Control of land areas may be obtained through conduct of decisive armored, air transportable, or airmobile force operations. Land forces can move quickly into an operational area to deter an adversary or preclude one from gaining an operational advantage. While support from air, naval, space, and special forces may be necessary as enabling or shaping operations, it is through the Army's conduct of sustained full spectrum operations, that land forces can control people and land, contribute to the defeat of an adversary, and establish sustainable postconflict stability.

1-26. Close with and Destroy the Enemy. Army forces are uniquely capable of terminating conflicts on our terms by achieving moral dominance over the

enemies will by having the ability to close with and physically destroy his forces and occupy his terrain.

1-27. Command and Control of Joint and Multinational Forces. The Army provides the leadership and organizations required to exercise command and control of joint and multinational forces in conjunction with OGA, NGOs, and IOs. The Army can provide theater-level communications and intelligence elements to provide the backbone infrastructure for a large part of the joint information environment and provide command and control capability to Army operational-level headquarters.

1-28. Precision Fires and Maneuver is the Army's ability to command, control, and employ land forces in all three dimensions directly or indirectly against an enemy, with lethal or non-lethal means in a small scale contingency or as part of a larger campaign. Army corps, divisions, and brigades are organized and equipped to conduct combined arms and joint operations. U.S. Army airborne, Special Operating Forces, and aviation units are especially capable of providing full spectrum land power in a precise manner anywhere on the globe. Increasingly, Army missile elements have the capability to supplement theater firepower with responsive, all weather deep strike capabilities for many purposes. Additionally, ranger, airborne, or air assault Army forces can conduct precise attacks to seize, secure, or deny critical facilities, ports or air bases as part of a theater operation.

1-29. Control and Defend Land, People, and Natural Resources is the unique ability of the Army to establish the conditions for peace. In order to do this the Army has a full range of capabilities that provide full spectrum protection from a variety of emerging asymmetrical threats. Theater Air and

Missile Defense units provide friends, allies, and U.S. facilities essential protection from air and missile attacks. U.S. Army chemical and biological detection and decontamination assets provide protection to all the services and allies in these critical areas. Law enforcement and rear area and port/base security is a frequent mission for U.S. Army military police or other Army units throughout a theater.

1-30. The U.S. Army provides full spectrum information superiority to affect an adversary's will to resist and its information systems while enabling and defending our own. The Army can provide units such as psychological operations (PSYOP), offensive and defense information operations teams, ground and air based electronic warfare, counter-intelligence teams, and full-scale civil affairs commands. The Army also provides a significant capability to conduct ISR with human and technical means within a joint area.

1-31. Finally, the Army conducts sustainment operations for not only itself, but also to the other Services, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in a theater. These sustaiment operations may take place across the full spectrum of operations from major theater war to stability and support operations. Specific Army capabilities include, but are not limited to, many unique aspects such as medical (including dental and veterinary), logistical (port opening, reception, staging, onward movement, and over the shore operations, munitions and supply management and overland distribution), general engineering, and administrative support (postal, mortuary affairs, and internment or resettlement).

ARMY OPERATIONAL CATEGORIES OF FORCES

1-32. U.S. military actions across the range of military operations will require a COMASCC to provide to the joint force a versatile, tailored force package capable of providing sustained land dominance and executing its supporting competencies. Tailoring the force is normally done during planning and before contact with the enemy. At the tactical level the terms combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) adequately describe units for purposes of tailoring or task organizing of a corps or below combat force. However, at the operational-level, an ARFOR may be better envisioned as composed of the following operational force categories: operational command, control, information superiority, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance elements; operational maneuver and fires elements (including organic combat, CS, and CSS); operational force protection elements; operational logistical and personnel support elements; and Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). The COMARFOR may not have operational control of all of these Army forces, but remains responsible for their administrative control (ADCON). (See Figure 1-4.)

Army Operational Force Categories



Figure 1-4

1-33. Army Forces (ARFOR) tailored for operations in a joint force will normally need to consider elements from all of these categories. When ARCENT/3d Army conducted Operation Desert Thunder in February 1998, the force package deployed to Southwest Asia included all operational categories and served as a deterrent to any aggressive threat options to attack Kuwait. (See Figure 1-5.)



Figure 1-5

1-34. 3d Army headquarters (HQ) served as Coalition Task Force-Kuwait, the command and control HQ. 3d Infantry Division (-) served as the maneuver and fires element, the 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command (-) as the protective element, the 24th Corps Support Group as the support element, and an SF Company (Special operations command & control element) as the ARSOF.

1-35. U.S. Army command and control elements consisting of the operational-level ARFOR HQ, special liaison teams, theater signal, MI, and IO elements will be required in most operations to perform their specialized planning and execution functions. Normally it will be beyond the capability of a tactical-level maneuver and fires element headquarters (corps or division) to perform the function of the ARFOR due to the distraction from its tactical focus that operational protection, support, and information

operations may require. Consequently, the COMASCC may want to assign a separate ARFOR HQ from at least the next higher echelon than the maneuver and fires element. Even when assigning ARFOR duties to a separate HQ, the COMASCC will frequently need to augment this HQ with additional capability in order to function as a fully capable ARFOR for a JFC. Additionally, the JFC may designate the commander of the Army Force (COMARFOR) to serve as the functional Joint Force Land Component Commander. See FM 2-19.1 (34-37*), Army Service Component Command (ASCC) Intelligence Operations*; FM 3-13 (100-6), *Information Operations*; and 6-22 (22-100), *Army Leadership* and Chapter 7 for more on this operational category.

1-36. Operational maneuver and fires elements may range in size from a multi-corps numbered army, to corps, divisions, or separate brigade combat teams. While these combined arms forces may also range in type from heavy forces to lighter air transportable and airmobile forces (such as motorized, light and airborne infantry as well as attack aviation), they are all designed to fight and win in war and military operations other than war. See FM 3-92 (100-15), *Corps Operations*; FM 3-91 (71-100), *Division Operations;* FM 3-91.3 (71-3), *Armored and Mechanized Brigade Operations*; FM 3-91.2 (7-30), *The Infantry Brigade,* and Chapter 8 for more on operational maneuver and fires categories.

1-37. U.S. Army operational protective forces will also be required in all theaters. Army air defense units will normally deploy to conduct air and missile defense of critical assets and forces. As purely defensive weapons, these forces greatly contribute to deterrence by showing US commitment and resolve without increasing tensions.

Theater Protective Deployments

On 21 January 2001, a small Army task force built around a minimum engagement package from a patriot battery of the 6th Battalion, 52d Air Defense Artillery deployed to Israel under the command of MG Robert Dees, Deputy Commanding General V Corps. This deployment was in preparation for a joint US-Israeli anti-missile defense exercise designated 'Juniper Cobra' that included the USS Porter, an Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyer, and was scheduled for 8-23 February 2001. An Army spokesman stated that this deployment was in response to "an agreement with the Israelis to provide Patriots in time of need " and preceded the 16 February 2001 attack by US and British aircraft on air defense sites in Iraq. This was one of the numerous deployments of US Army patriot assets to Israel, Turkey, Southwest Asia, and Northeast Asia since Operation Desert Storm. This type of theater protective deployment to critical allies is an example of Army contributions to operational force protection.

1-38. Additionally, the U.S. Army has the requirement to provide chemical and biological defense forces for decontamination and reconnaissance. This support will be required to support not only the U.S. Army elements, other Services, but may be also required to conduct consequence management in allied countries as well. U.S. Army military police, from brigades to companies, will usually be required to conduct law enforcement, area security, and internment/resettlement operations at designated locations throughout the theater. See FM 3-01.2 (100-12), *Army Theater Missile Defense Operations*; FM 3-19.1 (19-1), *Military Police Operations*; FM 3-11 (3-100), *Chemical Operations Principles and Fundamentals, and* Chapter 9 for more on this operational category.

1-39. U.S. Army operational support forces will almost always be required to provide logistical and personnel support to not only U.S. Army elements, but also to other Services, multinational forces, and possibly to other governmental and non-governmental agencies as well. The largest of these operational-level organizations is the Theater Support Command (TSC), but other specialized operational-level commands (such as engineer, transportation, medical, personnel, and finance) or smaller elements of these commands can be tailored to provide Army Title 10 United States Code functions as part of an ARFOR. See FM 4-0 (100-10), *Combat Service Support*; FM 4-93.4 (63-4), *Theater Support Command*; FM 3-34.116 (5-116), *EAC Engineer Operations, and* Chapter 10 for more on this operational category.

1-40. Army special operations forces (ARSOF) include Special Forces, Rangers, special operations aviation, civil affairs, psychological operations, and their specialized combat support and combat service support units. While these forces are normally provided to the combatant commander by Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and commanded by theater Special Operations Commands (SOCs), they remain an institutional part of the Army and receive common item logistical and administrative support from the Army in the theater. See FM 3-05 (100-25), *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces* and Chapter 11 for more on ARSOF.

1-41. Within the three states of peacetime, conflict, and war, the Army is the nation's predominant and decisive land force as it has been for over 200 years. While other Services may attack the land, its structures, and peoples upon it, only the Army, by its long-term physical presence, can compel lasting

change. This is sustained land power, the application of the nation's ground forces to exert decisive and lasting influence on land in support of national interests. Whenever the Army is called upon, it fights to win and operates to achieve decisive results at minimum cost to life and resources. Army forces in war seek to impose their will on the enemy. In stability and support operations (or MOOTW), they seek to create, set, or control conditions to achieve their purpose. The standard is to achieve the military commander's end state within the strategic end state articulated by the National Command Authorities (NCA).

THEATER OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

1-42. The U.S Army's theater operational concept is to conduct full spectrum operations (offense, defense, stability, and support) as part of unified (joint, multinational, and interagency) power projection actions aimed at achieving prompt and sustained land dominance by contributing to the continuous concentric pressure against an adversary until the strategic, theater strategic, or operational objectives have been achieved.

1-43. Within the theater, continuous concentric pressure is generated by not only the U.S. military, but also the other elements of U.S. power-economic, political, and informational- in order to first shape the security environment, and when required to isolate and then destroy or defeat the adversary. The joint force commander achieves continuous concentric pressure through multiple lines of operation that may be geospatial or informational and are conducted simultaneously and/or sequentially by air, land, sea, space, or special forces.

1-44. The U.S. Army generates continuous concentric pressure by a variety of means. Defensive positioning of forces to protect land, people, and resources; the conduct of conventional or special offensive actions to include forcible entry and the maneuvering of land forces to close with and destroy the adversary; and the conduct of stability and support operations to assist U.S. and friendly civil authorities.

SECTION IV - MULTINATIONAL AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

1-45. Throughout its history, Army operations have been conducted not only with other Services, but also with the armed forces of several nations, other United States Government agencies (OGA), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and International Organizations (IOs) in pursuit of common objectives. The changing world environment dictates that future Army operations will most likely require multinational and interagency involvement.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

1-46. Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. An alliance operation is one which is conducted by forces of two or more nations in a formal agreement. A coalition operation is one in which the relationship among the participants is ad hoc and the military actions are a temporary operation. Multinational operations, whether or not they involve combat, are planned through both international and U.S. command channels. Each multinational operation is

unique, as the planning and conduct vary with the international situation and the composition of the forces. Alliance or coalition members often do not have identical strategic perspectives, but there should be sufficient harmony of interests to ensure a common purpose for the campaign. The need to maintain consensus within the alliance or coalition is paramount to preserve a unity of effort.

1-47. The COMASCC/COMARFOR is often key in developing and maintaining close cooperation among all land forces within a multinational operation. Capabilities will often differ substantially among many national land forces, but higher considerations of national prestige will often be as important to the final success as the contributions to the overall effort. Seemingly small decisions, such as national composition of the decisive operation, may have significant political or military consequences for the overall outcome. Member nations should be consulted on their recommendations for course of action development, rules of engagement, force protection, and assignment of missions. Force protection is an area of special consideration in that historically the U.S. Army force protection standards and tactics often differ significantly from our multinational partners.

1-48. To assure unity of effort, all plans in multinational operations require detailed coordination with member states to achieve mutual support. Host nation support and the capabilities of coalition partners in particular may dictate the tempo of the attack and its form. The multinational force commander (MNFC) must focus on lateral coordination across national and interagency boundaries, in particular the effective sharing of information.

Though unity of command promotes unified effort, American commanders should be prepared to operate within the alliance or coalition under command of other than a senior U.S. commander. See JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*; and FM 3-16 (100-8), *Multinational Operations*.

INTERAGENCY AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

1-49. Interagency coordination occurs within the context of Department of Defense involvement between elements of other engaged U.S. Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), private volunteer organizations (PVO), and regional or international organizations (IO) for the purpose of accomplishing the objective. The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and planners consider all elements of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective. Additionally operations abroad may involve a variety of IO with global influence such as the United Nations (and its subordinate agencies) and the International Committee of the Red Cross, regional and transnational organizations (such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for African Unity, and the Organization of American States), NGOs (such as Doctors without Borders, and Save the Children Fund), and PVOs (such as American Red Cross and CARE (Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere). See JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*.

Chapter 2

The Theater

"But when … governments accept the principle of unified command--which means a … Commander--in a particular theater, I not only believe that they must leave him a considerable freedom in organizing his own forces as he sees fit, but that when it becomes necessary to organize subordinate task forces, he should be free to do it under the principle of unified command, if he so chooses."

GEN Dwight Eisenhower
8 February 1943

2-1. The *Unified Command Plan (UCP)* establishes criteria for a unified theater based on *National Security Strategy*, *National Military Strategy*, geography, and history. The President approves the *UCP*, which sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility (AOR) for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. A key consideration is strategic objectives. National strategic direction and evolution of geopolitical circumstances shape the theater's geographic boundaries.

2-2. Geographic combatant commanders provide strategic direction and operational focus to subordinate commanders. They develop a theater strategy and campaign plan, organize their theaters, and establish command relationships for effective unified (joint and multinational) operations. Through this process, geographic combatant commanders

plan and conduct unified operations that ensure a united effort within the command.

2-3. The military instrument of national security policy requires synchronization with the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments. Circumstances determine the extent of the synchronization required. *Unified action* describes the wide scope of actions taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or JTFs under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands (JP 0-2). Unified action requires the integration of effort across the command including joint, single-Service, special, and supporting operations; as well as interagency, NGOs, PVOs, and multinational or international participants.

2-4. Unity of command requires that one responsible commander focus resources toward obtaining defined objectives and strategic end states. Across the range of military operations, unity of command gives a single, unified commander responsibility for all military operations within a designated theater strategic environment.

SECTION I - THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

2-5. The National Security Act of 1947, the *Goldwater Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986*, and Title 10 US Code prescibe the current US military chain of command. The national command authorities (NCA), which consist of the President and the Secretary of Defense, exercise authority and control of the Armed Forces through a

single chain of command with two distinct branches. The operational branch runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) directly to the combatant commanders for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The administrative branch, used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the combatant commanders, runs from the NCA to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Department of the Army (DA) operates under the authority, direction, and control of the SECDEF. The Secretary of the Army exercises authority, direction, and control through the Chief of Staff of the Army over the Army forces that are not assigned to the combatant commanders.

2-6. The *DOD Reorganization Act* of 1986 placed the CJCS within the channel of communications between the SECDEF and the combatant commanders to communicate the directions of the NCA. Though he does not exercise military command over any combatant forces, all communications between the NCA and combatant commanders normally passes through the CJCS. Additionally, the CJCS acts as the spokesperson for the combatant commanders, especially on the operational requirements of their commands. The CJCS monitors the geographic regions of the world not assigned to a combatant command. See Figure 2-1.



Figure 2-1. The Chain of Command and Control

2-7. The NCA alone has the constitutional authority to direct U.S. armed forces into military action. Once the NCA makes the decision, authorization for military action is passed to combatant commanders. The President, with the advice of the SECDEF and CJCS, establishes combatant commands and appoints combatant commanders under the authority of the *National Security Act of 1947*. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) apportions forces for each combatant command for planning. All Service forces (except as noted in Title 10, Section 162) are assigned to combatant commands by the SECDEF in the "Forces for Unified Commands" Memorandum.

COMBATANT COMMANDER

2-8. A combatant commander is a commander of a unified or specified command. They are responsible to the NCA for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands. A combatant commander is the only leader with the statutory full authority (combatant command or COCOM) to organize and employ all joint and Service commands and forces as necessary to accomplish assigned missions. COCOM cannot be delegated or transferred. See JP 0-2.

SERVICE BRANCH (MILITARY DEPARTMENTS)

2-9. The administrative branch of the chain of command for the military departments runs from the NCA to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. Under Title 10, US Code, these Secretaries are responsible for the administration and support of their Service forces, to include those assigned or attached to combatant commands. They exercise authority, direction, and control through the Service chiefs of their forces

not assigned to combatant commands. Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces. They fulfill their responsibilities for forces apportioned to combatant commands by exercising administrative control (ADCON) through the Service component commanders assigned to the combatant commands. ADCON is subject to the command authority of the combatant commander.

2-10. The commander of an Army Service component command (ASCC), using ADCON authority, is responsible for preparing, maintaining, training, equipping, administering, and supporting Army forces (ARFOR) assigned to the unified and specified commands. The emphasis of the Service branch of the chain of command is administrative (legal, personnel, finance) and logistical support to respective Service forces. Training during peacetime, in preparation for war, and before commitment of forces is also a key element and task for the COMASCC.

2-11. The combatant commander provides the channel for strategic and operational guidance in theater and ensures the U.S. unity of command. The Service administrative and support channel provides administrative, training, and logistics support, ensuring that the geographic combatant commander receives organized, equipped, and trained U.S. military forces.

2-12. Within the parameters set by the geographic combatant commander's organization of the theater and the command relationships he establishes, the COMASCC organizes ARFORs to best accomplish the assigned missions. The combatant commander has the authority to

direct certain Army organizational options, but normally leaves internal Army organization and command relationships to the COMASCC.

COMMAND AUTHORITIES

2-13. Command is central to all military actions. Unity of command is central to unity of effort. The authority vested in a commander must be commensurate with the responsibility assigned. Commanders in the chain of command exercise authority as prescribed by law or a superior commander. Commanders of U.S. military forces use various levels of authority, which are described as command relationships and other authorities. Within the seven levels of authority, four are command relationships--combatant command (COCOM), operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and support. The other three are Coordinating Authority, ADCON, and direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH). See JP 0-2 amd JP 3-0.

COMBATANT COMMAND

2-14. COCOM is the command authority authorized by Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 164, or as directed by the President in the *UCP* to combatant command commanders (unified or specified). COCOM provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. This authority enables the combatant commander to organize and employ his commands and forces, assign tasks, designate objectives, and give authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the assigned missions. The combatant commander normally exercises COCOM

through his Service component commanders. COCOM is not transferable and may not be delegated.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

2-15. Commanders at or below the combatant commander exercise OPCON as their command authority. OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the authority to perform the functions of command over subordinate forces.

2-16. The combatant commander may delegate OPCON to his subordinate Service or functional commands. OPCON is the most authority with which subordinates can direct all aspects of military operations and joint training needed to accomplish any assigned mission. A commander with OPCON may control forces from one or more of the military Services. OPCON does not normally include the authority to direct logistics, administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. The Service component commander retains his Title 10 Service responsibility and authority for forces under OPCON of another command. Commanders and staff must be aware that the U.S. definition of OPCON and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) definition of OPCON are different. The NATO term *OPCON* more closely resembles the U.S. definition of *TACON*. See Figure 2-2.

TACTICAL CONTROL

2-17. The combatant commander uses TACON to limit the authority to direct the tactical use of combat forces. TACON is authority normally limited to the detailed and specified local direction of movement and maneuver of the tactical force to accomplish an assigned task. TACON

does not provide organizational authority or administrative and support responsibilities. The Service component continues to exercise these authorities.

Figure 2-2 NATO OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL COMMAND

NATO OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL COMMAND

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the NATO terminology for subordinate command relationships caused some problems. The NATO terms operational command and tactical command are similar to the Army terms *OPCON* and *TACON*. With NATO forces working for a U.S. geographic combatant commander outside the NATO structure, some confusion resulted.

OPCOM is a NATO term used to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate OPCON and/or TACON as necessary. OPCOM does not include responsibility for administration or logistics. OPCOM may indicate the forces assigned to a commander.

OPCON, as discussed in joint doctrine, is a slightly broader authority than OPCOM. OPCON, besides the authorities stated above, includes the authority to prescribe the chain of command; organize commands and forces; suspend or reassign officers; delineate functional responsibilities; and delineate geographic AORs.

Operational control is also a defined NATO term. In NATO, operational control is the authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks that are limited usually by function, time, or location. It further includes the deployment of units concerned and the retention or delegation of TACON to those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of concerned units. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistical control.

TACOM, the NATO term, is the authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. This differs from TACON in that TACON involves only the necessary control of movements and maneuvers to accomplish a previously assigned mission. Both NATO and joint doctrine share the same definition for TACON.

These definitions demonstrate the complexity of multinational operations. The subtle differences in terms were a source of confusion among allies with a long history of multinational operations.

SUPPORT

2-18. The combatant commander identifies support relationships for one force to aid, assist, protect, or logistically support another force. The *supporting force* gives the needed support to the *supported force*. Establishing supported and supporting relationships between components is a useful option to accomplish needed tasks. This concept applies equally to all dimensions of the joint force organized by the combatant commander. Each subordinate element of the joint force can support or be supported by other elements and may simultaneously receive and provide support in different areas, functions, or operations.

2-19. The ASCC plays a key role in establishing supported and supporting relationships between other Service or functional components. Normally an establishing directive is issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. Unless limited by the establishing directive, the commander of the supported force will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort.

2-20. The supporting commander is responsible for determining the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications to employ in providing support. The supporting commander is also responsible for ascertaining the needs of the supported force and taking action to fulfill their needs within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities, and requirements of other assigned tasks.

2-21. The supported commander has authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort, unless limited by a specific directive.

This includes the designating and and establishing priorities for targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency of the operation for which the support is provided. The categories of support defined in joint doctrine are general, mutual, direct, and close. See Chapter 5 for furher discussion of these relationships.

GENERAL SUPPORT

2-22. *General support* is the action to the supported force as a whole rather than any particular subdivision thereof (JP 3-0). General support is the most centralized support relationship. For combat units, this relationship provides the most flexibility for influencing the battle during conduct of operations and is used when the enemy situation is unclear. It is more commonly used in the defense than the offense.

MUTUAL SUPPORT

2-23. *Mutual support* is the action that units render each other against an enemy because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities. This support relationship should be considered present beteen functional components of a joint command.

DIRECT SUPPORT

2-24. *Direct support* is a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported force's request for assistance. The supporting force provides support on a priority basis to the supported force. Also, the supporting force may provide support to other forces when it does not jeopardize the mission

or put the supported force at risk. The authority to accomplish support of other than directly supported forces rests with the higher tactical or operational commander but also may be delegated.

CLOSE SUPPORT

2-25. *Close support* is the action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force. Close support rendered by air forces to surface forces is termed close air support (CAS).

OTHER AUTHORITIES

2-26. Other authorities granted outside the command relations delineated above are coordinating authority, administrative control (ADCON), and direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH).

COORDINATING AUTHORITY

2-27. *Coordinating authority* is a consultation relationship between commanders, but not an authority to exercise control. The combatant commander and other subordinate commanders designate coordinating authority to assist during planning and preparation for actual operations. The combatant commander specifies coordinating authority to foster effective coordination; however, coordinating authority does not compel any agreements.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

2-28. *ADCON* is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations necessary to fulfill military department Title 10 USC responsibilities for administration and support. ADCON may be

delegated to and exercised by subordinant ARFOR commanders, but the COMASCC remains responsible to the Secretary of the Army for the overall administration and support of all Army forces assigned or attached to his unified commands. ADCON is subject to the command authority of the combatant commander.

DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZED

2-29. *DIRLAUTH* is the authority granted by a commander at any level to a subordinate commander to coordinate an action directly with a command or agency within or outside the command. DIRLAUTH is a coordination relationship, not a command relationship.

SECTION II - THE STRATEGIC HIERACHY

2-30. To accomplish unity of effort within a unified command, the geographic combatant commander devises a theater strategy for that geographic portion of the globe. This military strategy is a combination of the art and science of employing armed forces or the potential threat posed by the presence and capabilities of that force to secure national security objectives through the application of force. The combatant commander derives his military strategy for a geographic region from a hierarchy of guidance and communicates it in the unified theater campaign plan and supporting theater contingency plans.

2-31. The theater strategic environment is shaped by the special conditions, circumstances and influences in the theater that affect the employment of military forces and the decisions of the chain of command. The theater strategic direction is expressed through

hierarchical levels of strategy. *National Security Strategy*, *National Military Strategy*, Unified Command Plan (UCP), and theater strategy all provide the basis for each theater's strategic direction. These strategies integrate national security and military objectives (ends), national security policies and military concepts (ways), and national resources and military forces (means) to achieve national security objectives. The Army's planning and conduct of major operations is the operational-level link between the tactical level force's actions and the strategic hierarchy discussed above. This operational-level link is discussed later in this chapter and in the Chapter 5 discussion of operational art and design.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

2-32. The NCA establish the *National Security Strategy* and appropriate strategic end states. The *National Security Strategy* announces U.S. interests and objectives and coordinates the elements of national power--diplomatic, economic, military, and informational--to achieve these objectives that contribute to national security. National values and principles form the foundation of U.S. interests and objectives. U.S. interests and core objectives outlined in the *National Security Strategy* include-

- *Enhancing Security at home and abroad*. The survival of the U.S. as a free and independent nation, with its basic values intact and its institutions and people secure from diverse threats.
- *Promoting prosperity and human rights*. A healthy and growing U.S. economy ensures opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad and is inextricably linked with security.
- *Promoting democracy*. Healthy, cooperative, and diplomatically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations. A stable and secure

world where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish benefits the United States and the world.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

2-33. *The Goldwater Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986* requires the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to help the NCA in providing strategic direction for the armed Services. The *National Military Strategy* and the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) are the methods the CJCS uses for providing that assistance.

2-34. The *National Military Strategy* describes three fundamental strategic military objectives derived from the *National Security Strategy*.

- Influence the international security environment
- Respond with action across the range of military operations
- Prepare now for an uncertain future.

2-35. To achieve these strategic objectives, U.S. military forces must perform three tasks:

- Remain constructively engaged globally in peacetime.
- Deter threats of organized violence against the United States and its interests.
- Should deterrence fail, our foremost task is to fight and win our Nation's wars.

2-36. The enduring strategic concepts that allow the military to execute these are *strategic agility*, *overseas presence, power projection*, *and decisive force*. See JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.*

2-37. The *National Military Strategy* and defense policy provide strategic guidance for the employment of military forces. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides planning guidance to the

combatant commander's and chiefs of the Services to accomplish their missions based on current military capabilities.

THEATER STRATEGY

2-38. The combatant commander translates the national level strategic directives into a theater strategy. This strategy is the basis for developing campaign plans and leads to operations and concept plans for execution. Joint or multinational forces implement these plans in theater to achieve theater strategic objectives that, in turn, achieve national objectives.

2-39. The combatant commander's strategy has several components. First, it expresses his vision and intent (military objectives)--the theater *ends* to which operations are conducted. Next, it provides integrated strategic concepts, courses of action (COAs), and guidance--the theater *ways* designed to secure national objectives, using the theater's wide-ranging military capabilities. Finally, it gives the Services and functional component commanders guidance for planning to provide geographic component commanders the space-based, nuclear, strategic mobility, or conventional, and special operations forces (SOF) theater *means*.

2-40. The theater planning process determines and allocates the means required. Forces are allocated based on theater missions as they compete with requirements in other theaters. Means are expected to fall short of what would ideally be available. The theater campaign plan sequences unified activities over time and space to compensate for these shortcomings.

2-41. Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) analysis is a traditional assessment method for tactical-level leaders. Under deliberate planning circumstances, tactical-level commanders and staffs should use the Army's military decision-making process (MDMP) in FM 5-0 (101-5), *Army Planning and Orders Production*. As part of the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) procedures, strategic and operational level leaders use joint methods, such as strategic estimates and commander's estimates, as they analyze more complex military and diplomatic situations See Joint Pubs 5-00.1 and 5-00.2.

2-42. At the strategic level, geostrategic analysis focuses on conditions, circumstances, and influences of the theater strategic environment. At the operational level, it includes the mission analysis and the assessment of the operational-level environment discussed in appendix C of this manual. At the theater strategic level, the combatant commander develops his theater strategy by first identifying specified and implied missions and tasks for his theater. He derives these from many sources, including the national security and military strategies, policies, directives, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the *UCP*, Joint Pub 0-2, and other directives and agreements.

2-43. While identifying theater missions, the combatant commander analyzes his theater strategic environment. Using the strategic estimate, he considers the potential instabilities or threats, the limitations, and the nature of anticipated operations. Assessment factors include the integration of capabilities by diplomatic, informational, and economic

instruments of national power provided to the military. In addition, the combatant commander must consider international security agreements. This analysis leads to formulation of a strategic estimate that defines the strategic situation in the theater. Thus, the estimate produces broad, strategic concepts of what must be done in theater. Then, the combatant commander integrates these concepts into the theater strategy.

2-44. The combatant commander's staff and subordinates, to include his *Service* and *functional component commanders*, contribute to the development of the theater strategy. The development of the multiple theater strategic concepts leads to a specific strategic COA for implementation in the theater campaign.

SECTION III - JOINT FORCE COMMANDS

COMBATANT COMMANDS

2-45. With the advice and assistance of the CJCS, the NCA establishes combatant commands (unified and specified) on a regional or functional basis to perform military missions and prescribes the force structure of such commands. Commanders of combatant commands are responsible to the NCA for the preparedness of their commands to execute assigned missions and for the accomplishment of the military missions assigned to them. The *UCP* provides missions, geographical areas, and forces assigned to combatant commands. The *UCP* is normally updated every two years.

SPECIFIED COMMANDS

2-46. A specified command is a combatant command that has broad, continuing missions and is composed normally of forces from a single military department. It may include units and staffs from other services. Currently, no specified commands exist.

UNIFIED COMMANDS

2-47. Unified commands are those combatant commands with significant forces from two or more Services. Unified commands may be functionally or regionally oriented. Regionally oriented unified commands are called geographic combatant commands.

FUNCTIONALLY ORIENTED (GLOBAL) UNIFIED COMMANDS

2-48. Functionally oriented unified commands are the U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM), the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). Functionally oriented unified commands operate globally across all geographic regions.

REGIONALLY ORIENTED (GEOGRAPHIC) UNIFIED COMMANDS

2-49. Unified commands with regional responsibilities are the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). Each regional combatant command has a specific geographic AOR or theater that includes the land, sea, and airspace in the strategic region. UCP-designated AORs provide military focus and a basis for coordination worldwide.

2-50. The geographic combatant commander, using the COCOM options, establishes the theater command structure. Effective use of the nation's military power requires close integration of the separate Services. Unity of effort is required for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized direction provides for unified action by forces. Decentralized execution is essential because of the enormity of the command and control (C^2) span.

2-51. The geographic combatant commander is a strategic-level commander who provides strategic direction and operational focus to his subordinate commands. Geographic Combatant commander's serve as the vital link between national military strategy and theater strategy. They provide the strategic and operational direction required for major unified and joint land, air, and maritime operations. The combatant commander is not simply a planner and allocator of resources; he has a broad range of responsibilities established by public law and described in joint publications.

2-52. The combatant commander organizes his forces, assigns tasks, designates objectives, provides authoritative direction, and employs his forces. He designs and executes theater campaigns and unified operations, supports the operations of other combatant commanders, and continually assesses the environment, anticipating the need for theater operations where his forces may play a supporting or supported role.

2-53. A geographic combatant commander is assigned numerous responsibilities to fulfill his unique command role. The combatant commander is responsible for maintaining the security of his command

and protecting the interests of the U.S., its possessions, and its bases against direct and indirect hostile threats. The combatant commander ensures that his command is prepared to carry out missions assigned by the NCA. The combatant commander assigns responsibilities and missions to his component forces and maintains unity of command. See Joint Pub 0-2 for additional information on the geographic combatant commander's responsibilities.

2-54. The geographic combatant commander executes his strategic planning responsibilities for developing a theater strategy and theater campaigns. He uses operational art and theater design while performing the following critical tasks:

- Prepares the estimates (strategic and commander's) of the situation.
- Establishes a theater strategic end state.
- Determines strategic center(s) of gravity.
- States his strategic vision and intent in his strategic concept of operations.
- Organizes the theater.
- Identifies subordinate commands and determines specific forces required to execute campaign plans.
- Establishes command relationships and delegates authority.
- States readiness shortfalls and develops programs to correct those shortfalls.
- Concentrates his forces and supplies strategically.
- Conducts strategic maneuver to destroy, dislocate, or neutralize the strategic center(s) of gravity.
- Seeks strategic advantage and the initiative.
- Directs the development of theater contingency plans and concept plans leading to the conduct of full spectrum operations.
- Achieves a theater strategic end state.

2-55. The geographic combatant commander's campaign plan provides a common frame of reference within which operations of land, air, maritime, special operations, and space forces, as well as interagency,

multinational, or United Nations (UN) forces, are unified, integrated, and synchronized. Joint campaign doctrine is found in Joint Pubs 3-0, 5-0, and 5-00.1.

2-56. Based on guidance from the SECDEF, Service secretaries provide forces to their Service component commanders to operate for a subordinate joint force commander (JFC) in the operational areas that the theater commander organizes. They further subdivide these areas among their forces. Operating within national constraints, the NCA cannot satisfy all of the combatant commander's requirements. Therefore, during deliberate planning, combatant commander's identify their force shortfalls. The CJCS, through the military department chiefs, identifies forces to fill these shortfalls. The JSCP apportions forces to each geographic combatant commander for planning purposes. This apportionment may not equal the current forces assigned. The NCA assigns additional forces when a geographic combatant commander is required to implement a specific plan requiring more forces than assigned or apportioned for planning.

2-57. The combatant commander, by exercising COCOM authority, performs the following legal functions of command over assigned forces:

- Determines forces required to achieve the military end state, organizes available forces, allocates resources, and commands forces.
- Employs commands and forces.
- Assigns tasks.
- Designates objectives.
- Exercises authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, signal support, logistics, and joint training to accomplish missions assigned to his command.

2-58. Combatant commanders alone exercise COCOM authority by establishing command relationships with subordinates, delegating appropriate authorities, and assigning responsibilities to their subordinates. He may establish subordinate JFCs (subunified commands and joint task forces (JTFs)). Unless specifically authorized by the SECDEF, the commander of a unified command will not act as the commander of a subordinate command. For example, the commander of a geographic combatant command should not also act as a functional component commander (i.e. joint force land component commander-JFLCC) without prior approval of the SECDEF. These subordinate JFCs may be established on a regional or functional basis.

2-59. The geographic combatant commander strives for centralized direction and decentralized planning and execution. He has the following six options, including combining options, through which he may exercise COCOM authority (Joint Pub 0-2):

- Service component command.
- Functional component command.
- Subordinate unified command.
- Joint task force.
- Single-Service force.
- Specific operational forces.

SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND

2-60. All joint forces include Service component commands because administrative and logistic support for joint forces are provided through Service commands. A Service component command consists of those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations of a

single military Service assigned to the unified command. Except for the combatant commander and members of his joint staff, the senior officer of the Service component assigned to a unified command and qualified for command by the regulations of that Service is designated the S*ervice Component Commander*. His assignment is subject to the concurrence of the combatant commander. The Service component commander is responsible for all command aspects of his force, to include logistics within the unified command.

2-61. The Commander of the Army Service Component Command (COMASCC) serves as the principal advisor to the combatant commander for supporting and employing Army forces in theater and Army elements outside the theater tasked to support theater operations. The COMASCC may delegate part of this responsibility as the theater becomes more complex, and it may become necessary to establish an intermediate headquarters (a numbered army) based on the complexity of the operational environment. This alternative is discussed in Chapter 4.

FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND

2-62. Based on his mission analysis, the combatant commander may form a functional component composed of like functional forces from more than one Service. Functional component commands may be established across the spectrum of operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over time involving forces from two or more services. Functional components are appropriate when similar capabilities and functions of forces from more than one Service be directed toward closely related objectives and

unity of command and effort are primary considerations (JP 3-0). The typical functional component commanders are as follows:

- Joint force land component commander (JFLCC).
- Joint force air component commander (JFACC).
- Joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC).
- Joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC).

2-63. Each focuses on operational responsibilities, leaving logistical support to the respective Service component commander. See Figure 2-3.



Figure 2-3

2-64. Normally, the Service component commander with the preponderance of forces to be tasked and the requisite ability to command and control will be designated as the functional component commander. As a Service component commander, the functional component commander also retains the administrative and logistical responsibilities associated with its parent Service. For example, an Army

JFLCC could direct Marine forces and also serve as the ARFOR commander. (See Chapter 4.)

SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND

2-65. Unified commanders, when authorized through the CJCS, may establish subordinate unified commands (also called *subunified commands*) to conduct operations on a continuing basis according to the criteria for unified commands. A subordinate unified command may be established on a geographic or a functional basis.

2-66. The geographic combatant commander may exercise COCOM through a subunified commander for operations on a continuing basis. The subunified commander exercises functions, authority, and responsibilities similar to those of a unified command combatant commander, except for COCOM. He exercises OPCON of assigned commands and forces within the assigned AOR or functional area. The CINC PACOM, for example, has several subordinate unified commands including Alaskan Command (ALCOM), U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ), and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).

2-67. If approved by the NCA, Army forces in a designated subunified command will be established as an ASCC and will operate in the chain of command within the subordinate unified command. The ASCC of a subunified command normally communicates directly with the unified command ASCC on matters that relate specifically to that Service and informs the subunified commander as that commander directs.

JOINT TASK FORCE

2-68. The Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing commander of a joint task force (CJTF) may establish a joint task force (JTF). A JTF may be established on a geographical area or functional basis to execute missions with specific limited objectives that do not require centralized control of joint logistics. A JTF is composed of elements of two or more Services and exists until mission completion. An exception is a semi-permanent joint task force which has been assigned an expanded or follow-on mission and will continue to conduct these operations in a specified area for an undetermined period of time. JTF B in Honduras is an example.

2-69. The CJTF exercises OPCON over forces assigned to the JTF. The unified command's ASCC places an Army forces (ARFOR) headquarters under OPCON of the CJTF for the conduct of operations and retains responsibility to provide Service-specific support to the ARFOR.

2-70. For interagency operations, including participation by non-governmental and international organizations, the combatant commander may designate a joint task force to conduct the military portion of interagency operations. For example, joint interagency task forces (JIATFs) have been established to facilitate counterdrug operations.

SINGLE-SERVICE FORCE COMMAND

2-71. Normally, the Army will not be involved in this COCOM option due to its operational interdependence with the other services. Still, on occasion, such as the support to Charleston, SC, by U.S. Army Forces

Command (FORSCOM) units in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo, the Army may conduct a single-Service operation.

SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL FORCES

2-72. The geographic combatant commander can retain direct command of specific operational forces. This option is used when the circumstances of the mission require urgency and the forces must remain immediately responsive to the geographic combatant commander. Direct command of specific Special Operating Forces is a prime example of this COCOM option. Such forces could be composed of forces from one or more Services. This option would likely be employed for short, sensitive, and small-scale operations.

SECTION IV - MULTINATIONAL COMMANDS

2-73. Operations in a multinational environment have both similarities and differences to normal joint operations. This section highlights some of the differences found in a multinational environment. It details the differences between alliance and coalition operations. It discusses the need for mutual understanding and respect, for capitalizing on inherent operational strengths of a particular nation, and for obtaining unity of effort.

COMMAND STRUCTURE

2-74. Multinational operations can be categorized in one of two major groups: *coalitions* and *alliances*. Coalitions and alliances must create a structure that meets the needs, diplomatic realities, constraints, and objectives of the participating nations. Since no single command

structure fits the needs of all alliances and coalitions, several different models could evolve. A Multinational Force (MNF) is a force composed of military elements of two or more nations.

COALITIONS

2-75. Coalitions normally form as a rapid response to unforeseen crises and are *ad hoc* arrangements between two or more nations for common action. During the early stages of such a contingency, nations rely upon their military command systems to control the activities of their forces. Therefore, the initial coalition arrangement will most likely involve a *parallel* command structure.

2-76. Under a parallel command, no single multinational commander is designated. Usually, member nations retain control of their national forces. Coalition decisions are made through a coordinated effort among the participants. A coordination center can be established to facilitate exchange of intelligence and operational information, ensure coordination of operations among coalition forces, conduct multinational planning, and provide a forum for resolving routine issues among staff sections. During Operation Desert Storm, the coalition coordination, communications, and integration center (C^3IC) was established to effect command relationships. Figure 2-4 depicts a parallel command.



Figure 2-4

2-77. As a coalition matures, the members may choose to centralize their efforts through establishing a *lead nation* command structure. Figure 2-5 provides a model for a lead nation command structure in a coalition.

COALITION

Lead Nation Command Structure

- Under one nation's control
- Lead nation decides staff composition
- Subordinates retain national control



Figure 2-5

2-78. The lead nation arrangement normally assigns command to the commander of the nation providing the preponderance of forces and resources. Typically, a multinational authority with representatives of all members of the coalition provides common strategic direction to the multinational force. The MNF may be composed of national commands with subordinate Service or functional components, multinational functional component commands with subordinate national commands, or combinations tailored to the situation and capabilities of the members. Still, subordinate national commands maintain national integrity. The lead nation command establishes integrated staff sections, with the composition determined by the coalition leadership.

2-79. For Operation Desert Thunder in 1998, the U.S. as lead nation established Coalition Task Force-Kuwait using 3d Army's headquarters.

This headquarters has been retained and re-designated as Coalition/Joint Task Force (CJTF)-Kuwait to better reflect its composition. See Figure 2-6.



Figure 2-6

ALLIANCES

2-80. Typically, alliances are formed because of formal agreements among two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives. Alliances are characterized by years of cooperation among nations and by *combined* forces or doctrine that pertain to two or formal allies. In alliances--

- Agreed-upon objectives exist.
- Standard operating procedures have been established.
- Appropriate plans have been developed and exercised among participants.

- A developed theater of operations exists, some equipment interoperability exists, and command relationships have been firmly established.

2-81. Cooperation among members of an alliance, such as NATO, is advantageous, since mutually developed procedures and combined doctrine for making and executing decisions exist. Often, when members of such an alliance cooperate in operations outside of their alliance sphere, such as in naval operations in the Persian Gulf, procedures worked out within the alliance are adapted quickly.

2-82. As in a coalition, a *lead nation* command structure may exist in a developing alliance when all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation. This means that the lead nation's procedures and doctrine form the basis for planning for and coordinating the conduct of operations. Though this type of arrangement is unusual in a formal alliance, such a command structure may have advantages under certain treaty circumstances existing with Latin America, Southwest Asia, or Japan that may evolve into alliance arrangements.

2-83. A lead nation command in an alliance may be characterized by a staff that is integrated to the degree necessary to ensure cooperation among multinational or national subordinate Army formations. Usually, alliances are organized under an *integrated* command structure that provides unity of command in a multinational setting. The principal characteristics in an integrated alliance command are that a single commander is designated, that his staff is composed of representatives from all member nations, and that subordinate commands and staffs are integrated to the lowest echelon necessary to accomplish the missions.

Figure 2-7 represents a typical combined force organized under an integrated command structure in an alliance. Combined functional Air, Land, Sea, and Special component commands may be formed.



Figure 2-7

2-84. If multinational formations exist below the combined functional component headquarters, the alliance membership will determine the command of those subordinate organizations. Multinational land force headquarters staffs should be integrated in proportion to national representation. Accordingly, heavy reliance will be placed on liaison between forces. In NATO, Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) may be formed for command of contingency operations outside of alliance territory and may include a mixture of NATO and non-NATO nations on an ad hoc or coalition basis. The Dayton Accords Implementation Force (IFOR) was established by NATO as a CJTF.

MULTINATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY

2-85. International agreements should set forth the degree of authority for multinational force commanders (MNFC) who exercise command over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations and procedures that ensure unity of effort. Ideally, the coalition/alliance will designate a single military commander to direct the combined efforts of the participating forces. The U.S. contingent of a multinational force may be a unified geographic command, a specified command, a subordinate unified command, a functional component command, a joint task force (JTF), or a force of a Single service.

2-86. A common understanding of command relationships facilitates the required unity of effort. The U.S. chain of command, from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field, remains inviolate. U.S. forces in a multinational force will continue to recognize their COCOM relationship to a U.S. unified or specified commander. Subject to US NCA prior approval, a MNFC may exercise appropriate and negotiated OPCON over U.S. units in specific operations.

2-87. The multinational force commander and the U.S. geographic combatant commander providing the U.S. forces to the multinational force must coordinate and agree to the command relationships. This agreement must be in consonance with the NCA criteria for C^2 within multinational operations, which may establish limits of OPCON. For example, within these limits, a foreign UN commander cannot--

- Change the mission or deploy U.S. forces outside the AOR agreed to by the NCA.
- Separate units.

- Redirect logistics and supplies.
- Administer discipline.
- Promote individuals.
- Change the internal organization of the U.S. units.

2-88. Other national forces will likely remain aligned to their national command authority.

2-89. International agreements will specify when and how the transfer of authority from national command to multinational command takes place. At lower echelons, command relationships will be identical to U.S. joint relationships (OPCON, TACON, support, coordinating authority) but, commanders of operating forces must clarify how each is applied. See FM 3-16 (100-8), *The Army in Multinational Operations* and JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.*

SECTION V THEATER ORGANIZATIONS

2-90. A theater is the geographic area outside the continental United States for which a commander of a combatant commander has been assigned responsibility. (Joint Pub 0-2). Each theater is unique and may be viewed from a number of different perspectives. The geographic context, the U.S. resource allocation, or the state of infrastructure and and U.S. presence all influence how the Army conducts operations in each type of theater.

GEOGRAPHIC TYPES OF THEATERS

2-91. Military strategists often describe theaters as maritime, continental, or littoral, based on their dominant geographic and strategic characteristics. This description influences the predominant type of

military forces used, the strategic missions assigned, and the strategic and operational objectives pursued in the theater.

2-92. Continental theaters primarily involve control of land and associated airspace. Maritime theaters focus on ensuring free use of the seas and associated airspace. Littoral theaters combine aspects of both continental and maritime theaters, requiring balanced action between land and sea forces.

CONTINENTAL THEATERS

2-93. Continental theaters are established to control the land and associated airspace vital to the security of a nation or nations or to destroy an adversary's means to exercise such control. EUCOM and SOUTHCOM are examples of continental theaters. Military action in continental theaters may vary in purpose and scope across the range of military operations from participation in the internal defense of another nation against subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency to major operations and campaigns to destroy enemy land forces. The focus of continental campaigns is on the integration and sequencing of air, land, sea, space, and SOF operations to dominate vital land areas.

MARITIME THEATERS

2-94. Maritime theaters are established both for the forward defense of the nation and for strategic access to U.S. resource needs, friends, and potential adversaries. PACOM and the AOR of JFCOM are maritime theaters. The focus of maritime campaigns is to dominate vital ocean areas by conducting fleet operations to gain sea control, blockades of adversary ports, joint amphibious operations to control key islands or

coastal land areas, and operations such as presence, shows of force or humanitarian assistance.

LITTORAL THEATERS

2-95. Operations in a littoral region require integration and synchronization of naval, air, and land forces. World political changes and affordability have reduced U.S. access to land bases in forward areas near the most likely crisis regions. This has increased the importance of military operations that can capitalize on sea bases and land lodgments that, once synchronized, project land and air combat power deep into the region. Littoral theaters have not been as well discussed as the other two types of theaters, but have been seen in previous campaigns along peninsulas or coastlines. Operations in the Arabian Gulf or on NATO's flanks in Norway and Turkey can be viewed as in littoral theaters.

ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES AMONG THEATERS

2-96. When considering the requirements of the many active theaters, national planners conduct a systematic evaluation of the theaters and establish the priorities by providing planning guidance, allocating forces, and apportioning limited resources. Theaters are described as *theaters of focus*, *economy-of-force theaters*, or *deferred theaters*. This description corresponds to the rational prioritization of resources for the specific theaters during normal peacetime engagement.

THEATER OF FOCUS

2-97. A theater of focus is the theater for decisive operations requiring more resources (JP1-02). NCA and CJCS provide guidance, forces, and resources accordingly. Until recently Europe has traditionally been a

theater of focus, but CENTCOM was the theater of focus during Operations Desert Shield/Storm.

ECONOMY-OF-FORCE THEATER

2-98. An economy-of-force theater receives a lesser level of forces and resources than the theater of focus because the associated risk and potential for conflict are lower (JP 1-02). SOUTHCOM during the early 1980s illustrates this type of theater. Forces and resource requests are filled after those of the theater of focus. Those that cannot be filled are then identified and tagged for filling when the economy-of-force theater is upgraded to a theater of focus.

DEFERRED THEATER

2-99. A deferred theater receives the least priority for assigned forces and resources, based on its associated risk level and potential for conflict. CENTCOM during the early 1980s was an example of a deferred theater. Forces and resources are apportioned for planning and deployment but not deployed other than during exercises. However viewed, each theater is unique, but at the same time interdependent with the other theaters.

THEATER MATURITY.

2-100. US forces may be deployed to theaters that provide a wide range of infrastructure and support activities. (JP 3-11)

2-101. Mature theaters have forward-deployed forces with a significant amount of logistic infrastructure already in place. Quantities of pre-positioned supplies and equipment may be stored in environmentally

controlled warehouses or covered shelters to reduce their vulnerability to contamination. Host-nation support (HNS) agreements may be in place and routinely exercised.

2-102.Immature (or austere) theaters have few, if any, deployed forces and minimal logistic infrastructure, pre-positioned supplies, or equipment. Other supplies and equipment may be stored at an intermediate staging base outside the theater until the theater logistic infrastructure matures to accept them. HNS agreements may not have been negotiated prior to the onset of hostilities.

ORGANIZATION OF OPERATIONAL AREAS

2-103.Geographic combatant commanders develop a theater strategy and then organize the theater. Considerations for multinational operations should always be prominent as the commander considers his theater structure and command relationships. The Army, besides operating as part of a joint force, must be prepared to conduct multinational operations with land, air, and naval forces of other nations, as well as interagency operations. While unity of command may not be possible in multinational operations, unity of effort is essential.

2-104.Geographic combatant commanders can elect to directly control operations in the theater, or may assign operational areas to subordinate joint forces, allowing themselves to remain focused on the broader theater or entire AOR. The combatant commander organizes his theater to enable him to synchronize his unified operations or integrate single-service, joint, special, and supporting operations with allied and

interagency activities and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs).

Theater of War

2-105.In time of war, the NCA or a geographic combatant commander may elect to define a theater of war within his AOR. The theater of war is that area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. Operations within a theater of war are invariably joint and usually multinational. The theater of war should be operationally self-sufficient, with a sustaining base adequate to support contemplated operations. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander's entire AOR and may contain more than one theater of operations. While part of the theater is in a state of war, it may be possible that all nations within the theater are not at war. See Figure 2-8.



Figure 2-8

Theater of Operation

2-106.A theater of operations is a wartime measure and may not be established without the previous establishment of a theater of war. Geographic combatant commanders may further define one or more theaters of operations-that area required to conduct or support specific combat operations- within the theater of war. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different adversary forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time. Theaters of operations are not operational areas that may be associated with MOOTW. During World War II, the European theater of war was divided into four subordinate theaters of

operations: Atlantic, European (ETO), Mediterranean (MTO), and Russian. These theaters of operation were integrated geographically and the designated allied commanders focused upon enemy Axis forces.

Combat Zone and Communications Zone

2-107.When warranted, the geographic combatant commander may also establish Combat zones (CBTZs) and communications zones (COMMZ). The CBTZ is an area required by forces to conduct large-scale combat operations. Combatant commander's may further subdivide the CBTZ into forward and rear combat zones. It normally extends forward from the land force rear boundary.

2-108.The COMMZ contains those theater organizations, LOCs, and other agencies required to support and sustain combat forces. In linear operations, the COMMZ is in the rear portion of the theater of operations. In many operations, the COMMZ may reach back to the CONUS base, an intermediate staging base, or perhaps to another combatant commander's AOR. The combatant commander may establish these areas for long-term, continuing requirements or for short durations to meet a specific situation.

OPERATIONAL AREAS FOR OPERATIONS LIMITED IN SCOPE OR DURATION

2-109.The range of military operations also may require designating other operational areas such as a joint operations area (JOA), joint special operations area (JSOA), or joint rear area (JRA) for operations limited in scope or duration.

Joint Operations Area

2-110.A JOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a JTF commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. JOAs are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area, such as during most stability and support operations. JOAs also are appropriate when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. The JOA commander's authority is limited to that required to accomplish specific tasks. U.S. operations in Panama during Operation Just Cause in 1989 offer an example of a JOA.

Joint Special Operations Area

2-111.A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities, for use by a joint special operations component or joint special operations task force for the conduct of special operations. JSOAs may be established for short or long duration special operations efforts, normally when they are independent of conventional operations. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operational area. The capture of the hijacking terrorists of the *Achille Lauro* in the Mediterranean in 1987 was in a JSOA.

Joint Rear Area

2-112.In war, as in peacetime and conflict, the geographic combatant commander may designate a JRA. A JRA is a specific land area within a JFC's operational area designated by the JFC to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint force. The joint

rear area coordinator (JRAC), if appointed by the JFC, is the officer given responsibility for the overall security of the JRA and for furnishing a secure environment to facilitate sustainment, host nation support (HNS), infrastructure development, and movements of the joint force.

2-113.The size of the JRA may vary considerably and is highly dependent on the size of the theater, logistics support requirements, the threat, or the scope of the joint operation. The JRA is usually to the rear of the theater or CBTZ, but it is not necessarily contiguous to the CBTZ. With split-based operations, some of the traditional logistical and personnel support functions of the JRA may be accomplished in CONUS or in an intermediate staging base. A JRA is particularly useful in a modern, high-intensity, nonlinear battlefield. A JRA may be segmented and contain isolated pockets of relatively secure support areas that collectively make up a JRA. (See JP 3-10.)

2-114.The theater base is a portion of the JRA. It has logistics facilities such as ports of debarkation, marshaling areas, logistics stockage areas, movement control points, logistics headquarters and units, the rear portion of the intratheater communications zone, airfields and air bases, transitioning land forces, theater missile defense forces, the theater rear headquarters, and strategic reserves. See Figure 2-9.



Figure 2-9

Area of Operations

2-115.AOs are operational areas defined by JFCs for land and naval forces. Within their AO, the land or naval force commander is the supported commander and responsible for synchronizing the operations of all friendly forces to ensure the accomplishment of the mission and the achievement of JFC objectives. AOs normally do not encompass a JFC's entire operational area. However, the AO should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions, protect their forces, and facilitate future operations. AOs should also allow component commanders to properly employ their organic, assigned and supporting systems.

2-116.Component and Army commanders normally designate subordinate AOs for their subordinate units. They use boundaries to designate AOs in accordance with the factors of METT-TC and the capabilities and areas of influence of their units. Commanders specify the minimum control measures necessary to focus combat power, delineate responsibilities, assign geographic responsibility, and promote unified action. At a minimum, these control measures include boundaries on all sides of the AO. When friendly forces are contiguous, a single boundary separates two adjacent forces; when friendly forces are noncontiguous, the AO is physically isolated but forces in them remain linked to supporting friendly forces through the concept of operations. Other frequently used control measures include assembly areas, lines of departure, phase lines, axes of advance, and objectives See FM 3-90 (100-40), *Tactics*, and FM 1-02(101-5-1), *Operational Terms and Graphics* for definitions of these terms.

Battlespace

2-117.Battlespace is the environment, factors, and conditions which must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum, and information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest (JP 1-02). Battlespace is conceptual–a higher commander does not assign it. Commanders determine their own battlespace based on their concept of the operation, protecting the force, and accomplishing the mission. Because it is

conceptual and not assigned, Army forces conduct operations only within that portion of their battlespace delineated by their area of operations (AO). See Figure 2-10, Battlespace.



Figure 2-10. Battlespace

2-118.The cognitive nature of battlespace does not diminish its utility. Battlespace includes the area of operations, influence, and interest; that portion of the information environment that affects the operation; and the unit home station. Commanders use their experience, professional knowledge, and understanding of the situation (METT-TC) to visualize and change their battlespace as current operations progress and transition to future operations.

AREAS OF INFLUENCE AND INTEREST

2-119. Battlespace has an associated area of influence and an area of interest. Areas of influence is a geographic area in which a commander can directly influence operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control. The extent of the area of influence normally guides the higher commander in the

assignment of subordinate AOs. For this reason the AO should not be substantially larger than the unit's area of influence; areas of influence surround and include the associated AO.

2-120.An area of interest (AOI) is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence and areas adjacent to it. It extends into enemy territory, and to the objectives of current or planned operations. Areas of interest include areas occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. Areas of interest serve to focus intelligence and information operations for monitoring enemy and potential enemy activity outside the AO. Areas of interest are normally larger in size than the operational area.

INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

2-121.The information environment is "the aggregate of individuals, organizations, or systems that collect, process, or disseminate information; it includes the information itself" (JP 3-13). That part of the information environment that concerns the commander encompasses the information activity that affects an operation. It is part of the global information infrastructure, which contains information activities that are beyond the direct influence of the military but that collect, process, and disseminate information to national and international audiences. The information environment includes space-based systems that provide data and information to Army forces. To envision their information environment, commanders must understand which information activities affect their operation and the capabilities of their information.

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PART TWO

Organizing and Commanding Army Forces in the Theater

Part Two discusses how Army forces are organized and commanded in a theater.

Chapter 3 describes the operational-level Army echelons of command of Army Service component command (ASCC), numbered army, and the flexible concept of an Army force (ARFOR) as the collective term for all Army forces in a joint operations area. The chapter also discusses Army commanders serving as subordinate joint force commanders and tactical-level commanders serving as ARFOR commanders.

Chapter 4 discusses joint and multinational land operations and how Army operational-level commanders may serve as joint force land component commanders (JFLCC) or as multinational land component commanders (MNLCC).

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Chapter 3

Operational-level Army Forces in the Theater

Third Army/ARCENT [has] a mission to fulfill all of the doctrinal roles of the Army service component command. It is a fully deployable, warfighting, command and control headquarters that is capable of commanding ground forces, operating as a joint task force, a coalition/joint task force, a joint land component command or an Army echelon-above-corps headquarters.

Lieutenant General Tommy R. Franks,
October 1999

3-1. This chapter discusses the Army Service component command (ASCC), the numbered army, the Army commander as a subordinate JFC, and Army Forces (ARFOR) in a joint force. Senior Army leaders, using their theater-strategic and operational-level perspective, tailor and task-organize Army forces to maximize their capabilities in the theater. The Army's theater organization provides the means to execute the designs of operational art while conducting joint operations. Also discussed are the three primary functions of the operational-level Army commander and how they influence theater organization, the environment, and the echelons of command.

- Establishing joint, interagency, and multinational linkages
- Providing designated-Service Title 10 sustainment to subordinate Army forces and Army support to other services.
- Planning and conducting full spectrum operations

3-2. The Army contributes operational-level organizations to conduct joint, interagency, and multinational operations across the range of military operations. Operational-level Army units perform the six operational tasks found in the UJTL. (See Appendix G). Army operational-level forces may be

part of a forward presence that serves as a symbol of U.S. national resolve. Other forces remain in the U.S. to provide a rapid force projection capability to execute contingency operations. Army operational-level echelons that contribute capabilities to joint and multinational operations include:

- Army Service component commands (ASCCs) and their operational-level specialized elements.
- Numbered army (if established).
- Corps.
- Division or equivalent Army Task Force.

3-3. Each of these echelons has its own set of capabilities and, depending on the situation and their function, will require varying levels of augmentation to serve as either a JTF, JFLCC, or ARFOR HQ. All Army HQs need joint augmentation to serve as a JTF or as a JFLCC.

3-4. The senior Army element in a JOA routinely will perform duties as one or more of the following: Army Force (ARFOR), functional component (JFLCC), subunified command, or joint task force (JTF). The Army forces commander (COMARFOR), acting as a subunified or commander joint task force (CJTF), plans and conducts subordinate campaigns or major operations to attain theater strategic and/or operational objectives. As part of a joint force, the Army conducts decisive, shaping, or sustaining operations

3-5. The combatant commander translates strategic guidance to operational terms in the form of a campaign plan, operations plan (OPLAN) or operations order (OPORD). These plans provide clear guidance and specific tasks to subordinates. The JFC provides a clear definition of the conditions that constitute the strategic and military end states. The military conditions for the end states must be understood by the joint force staff and component commanders prior to effective planning for military operations. The Army

operational-level commander may translate these conditions into a single military objective or phased military objectives expressed in major operations that support the joint campaigns.

3-6.The COMARFOR's representatives participate in the joint parallel planning process as described in Chapter 5 to help the JFC understand the proper employment of Army forces.

SECTION I - ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND

RESPONSIBILITIES AND ORGANIZATION

3-7.Army Service component commands (ASCCs) are established for each geographic combatant unified or designated subordinate unified command. ASCCs provide a regionally oriented, long term US Army presence for coalition building, infrastructure development, sustainment operations, joint planning, and theater engagement. The ASCC HQ serves as the senior Army staff for the Department of the Army in fulfilling designated Title 10 responsibilities (See Appendix I) within the AOR of a geographic combatant commander. Normally, it is also an Army Major Command (MACOM). The ASCC includes the Service component commander (COMASCC), his headquarters, and all Army personnel, organizations, units, and installations that have been assigned or attached to the unified command. The ASCC's operational-level organizations provide theater protection and support as well as assist and augment tactical (corps and lower) organizations as required.

3-8.ASCC HQs are Table of Organization & Equipment (TO&E) organizations that are modular and scalable. Selected ASCCs, normally in

theaters of focus, will have an embedded capability to establish a numbered army as an operational-level ARFOR headquarters for either multi-corps or other complex operations in a joint or multinational environment. Other ASCCs in economy of force or deferred theaters, while capable of functioning as an ARFOR, will be primarily oriented on peacetime military engagement and small scale contingencies and will not be resourced to establish numbered armies without significant augmentation.

3-9. The COMASCC is normally the senior Army officer, with the exception of the combatant commander and members of the command's joint staff, assigned to the unified command and qualified for command. The COMASCC is responsible for:

- Recommending to the combatant commander or other JFC the proper employment of Army component forces.
- Accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned as an ARFOR or subordinate joint force commander.
- Selecting and nominating specific units of the Army for assignment to to other subordinate forces.
- Conducting joint training, including the training, as directed, of components of other Service in joint operations for which the Service component has or may be assigned primary responsibility.
- Informing their JFC (and their combatant commander, if affected) of planning for changes in Army logistics support that would significantly affect operational capability or sustainability.
- Providing as requested, supporting joint operation and exercise plans with necessary force data to support missions that may be assigned by the combatant commander.
- Developing Army program and budget requests that comply with the combatant commander's guidance on warfighting requirements and priorities.
- Informing the combatant commander (and any intermediate JFCs) of program and budget decisions that may affect joint operation planning.
- Conducting Army-specific functions such as internal administration and discipline, Service training, normal logistics functions, and Army intelligence matters and specific oversight of intelligence activities to ensure compliance with laws, policies, and directives.

- Informing the combatant commander of joint nonstrategic nuclear support required by the Army.
- Ensuring signal and information management interoperability.
- Providing logistical and administrative support to ARFOR's participating in a JTF. See JP 0-2 and FM 3-0.

THEATER ARCHITECTURE

3-10. All forces, except as the National Command Authorities (NCA) may direct, operating within the AOR of a geographic combatant command shall be assigned or attached in the "Forces for Unified Commands" memorandum to each combatant commander and subsequently to its Service components. The resulting architecture of the Army in a theater has to be flexible enough to meet the needs of combatant commanders. For example, during periods of peacetime deployments and training when Army forces pass through or operate within a geographic combatant commander's AOR, but are not assigned to that combatant commander, the COMASCC coordinates with the ASCC of the appropriate combatant commander to ensure those forces are supported. The COMASCC also has a number of options for organizations which can provide the necessary capabilities to support a force-projection operation--into anything from an austere to a fully developed mature theater.

3-11. Not all Army capabilities available to an ASCC will be initially required in theater for the early stages of a force-projection operation. Rather, the Army structure has capabilities that can be task-organized into a selected force based upon the METT-TC and the commander's risk assessment. Each theater structure is unique, although the functional requirements of a theater organization remain somewhat constant. The variable is the level of capability and support required. The COMASCC tailors units to provide the specific capabilities the geographic combatant

commander requires and echelons those capabilities into the theater as required.

THEATER REQUIREMENTS

3-12. The Chief of Staff of the Army, in coordination with the unified commanders, configures their respective ASCC to meet theater requirements. The COMASCC provides the combatant commander with operationally relevant categories of units such as maneuver and fires, C2/IS/ISR, personnel and logistical support, force protection, and ARSOF to accomplish theater missions. Figure 3-1 illustrates the operational categories of units an ASCC may provide in a mature theater.



Figure 3-1 ASCC/Mature Theater

3-13. These capabilities and functions are further described in later chapters of this manual. Specifically, Chapter 7 will provide additional information on

Operational Command and Control; Information Superiority; and ISR. Chapter 8 will address Operational Movement, Maneuver, and Fires. Chapter 9 covers Operational Force Protection. Chapter 10 will describe Operational Logistical and Personnel Support tasks, capabilities, and organizations. Chapter 11 will cover Army Special Operations Forces, civil affairs, and PSYOP units.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

3-14. The COMASCC is always intimately involved with decisions concerning competing demands for limited logistical resources. He assists the geographic combatant commander and his staff in the development of TPFDDs as they relate to support priorities, particularly those affecting other Services. To support the force-projection concept, the COMASCC must also coordinate the projection of additional required support from continental United States (CONUS), other theaters, or an intermediate staging base (ISB), using applicable lines of communication (LOCs).

3-15. In contingency operations, U.S. forces may be initially opposed or unopposed. In operational situations where there is little or no in-theater support, augmentating logistical organizations must accompany the deploying tactical units. The synchronization of the deployment of essential support units, supplies, and C^2 with forces will be critical.

PEACETIME

3-16. In peacetime, the combatant commander normally exercises combatant command (COCOM) for Army forces through the COMASCC. The COMASCC, if an Army MACOM commander, determines the training focus, resources, and Mission Essential Task List (METL) for assigned units to

maintain the right posture of readiness for anticipated missions across the full range of military operations. The COMASCC must have a theater-strategic as well as operational perspective while executing his responsibilities. He serves as the principal advisor to the combatant commander for supporting and employing Army forces (ARFOR) in theater. The COMASCC participates in mid- and long-range planning to support the combatant commander's theater strategy, theater engagement planning, and campaign planning efforts. He also develops plans for major operations in support of the combatant commander's campaign plan, and develops plans for the sustainment and support of all ARFOR assigned or attached to the theater. The COMASCC may also exercise OPCON of selected forces as a COMARFOR conducting combat operations or MOOTW.

3-17. The COMASCC's principal tasks in peacetime are to carry out the force protection and support tasks as assigned by the combatant commander. The COMASCC's plans for operations and conducts exercises that support the combatant commander's theater strategy, Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs), and campaign or operations plans. The COMASCC is responsible for sustaining all Army forces in theater and maintaining the capability to expand to accommodate ARFORs as required and apportioned for theater operations plans. The Theater Support Command (TSC) along with other specialized commands are the COMASCC's primary organizations for providing this Title 10 support as well as a significant amount of common support to other Services. See FM 4-93.4 (63-4)

ORGANIZATIONAL OPTIONS FOR CONFLICT AND WAR

3-18. With the initial deployment of forces, the COMASCC, based on METT-TC, tailors his organization to provide the required forces to conduct major operations, battles, and engagements. The COMASCC's sustainment function has a major impact on the design and conduct of campaigns and major operations. The COMASCC must get the correctly configured ARFOR to the right place at the right time to enable the combatant commander to concentrate forces with sufficient logistical support to generate decisive land combat power.

3-19. As the theater transitions to conflict or war, the combatant commander may choose one of several options to exercise COCOM. Each of these options has a different impact on the employment of Army forces. The combatant commander may choose to continue to exercise COCOM through the COMASCC. In this case, the COMASCC would conduct major operations as a COMARFOR and continue to provide force protection and support of all other Army forces assigned or attached to the theater. The combatant commander may assign the COMASCC support-related tasks solely or a combination of both support and operational tasks.

3-20. The combatant commander may also choose to exercise COCOM through a joint task force (JTF) for a limited duration mission. The CJTF may choose to organize the JTF by Service element, functional component, subordinate JTF, or any combination of these. If the JTF requires an Army component, the COMASCC would place an ARFOR OPCON to the CJTF for the conduct of operations. The combatant commander also could designate the COMASCC as the CJTF. The COMASCC, if not designated the CJTF,

would continue to focus on force protection and sustainment of all ARFOR assigned or attached to the theater.

3-21. If the combatant commander chooses to exercise COCOM through functional component commanders, three options are possible.

- The functional component commander might also be the COMASCC. The COMASCC would conduct major combat operations as the JFLCC as well as provide protection and support operations for the theater as the ASCC. (See Chapter 4)
- The JFLCC might also be an Army commander--but not the COMASCC. In this option, the COMASCC could establish either a separate numbered army or receive a corps HQ. In this case, the corps or numbered army commander would be the JFLCC.
- The functional component commander might be a Marine, usually a MEF commander. In this option, the COMASCC would place a tailored ARFOR OPCON to the JFLCC. Within this organizational option, the COMARFOR would perform the three operational-level functions.

3-22. In all three cases, the COMASCC would continue to focus on operational force protection and support of all ARFOR theater wide.

3-23. If the theater transitions to conflict or war involving more than one corps, the probability increases that the combatant commander will separate the COMASCC's operational responsibilities from its support role. The combatant commander may designate another Army commander to focus on conducting combat operations, while the COMASCC with the TSC and specialized commands concentrate on conducting sustainment and AOR wide support operations.

3-24. Both the COMASCC and numbered army commanders, if designated, would be responsible for establishing linkages with joint, multinational, international, and interagency organizations. However, the COMASCC would focus on operational force protection and sustainment operations, and

the numbered army commander would focus on the conduct of combat operations and the requirements of a JFLCC, if designated by the JFC.

ASCC HQ OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

3-25. The organizational design of the ASCC headquarters is versatile, agile, flexible, and modular in structure. This design provides the ASCC the flexibility to establish the required C^2 capability, using assigned assets or preestablished functional and modular augmentation packages from other joint or Army assets. For force projection deployments the ASCC HQ can be functionally organized into four command posts. (See Figure 3-2).



Figure 3-2

3-26. These are the Early Entry Command Post (EE CP), the Main CP, the Rear CP, and the Home Station Support Node CP.

- The operational concept for deployment envisions the EE CP to provide the ASCC commander the capability of projecting a small, easily transportable TOC forward into the area of operations. While not

designed for sustained warfighting and/or planning, it is 100% mobile in vehicles and shelters and may be used for short periods while other elements are displacing.

- The Main CP has more limited mobility and is designed to operate from fixed buildings or shelters. It provides the COMASCC with a robust operational and planning capability. This module will normally locate behind corps rear boundaries.
- The Rear CP also has limited mobility and will normally be established in the JRA or COMMZ near the main port of entry. From this location this modular CP can supervise the RSOI, logistical, training, or force modernization activities.
- The Home Station Support Node is designed to remain in operation from its overseas garrison or CONUS location and perform Title 10 and reachback functions for the COMASCC through satellite communications.

3-27. Because of the uncertain nature of the environment, as well as time, and resource limitations, units must be capable of providing mission-essential support before the arrival of logistics units or when deployment of logistics units would exceed what is required to support the force's mission. Mission- and capability-oriented modular elements are designed to support combat-essential requirements by sequencing capabilities into the AO. If a developed support infrastructure is absent or eliminated in an area, an ASCC headquarters could possibly serve as the nucleus for a theater base development process. One example of a possible mature ASCC headquarters organization is shown in Figure 3-3.

Peacetime/Mature ASCC Staff



Figure 3-3

ASCC HEADQUARTERS STRUCTURE

3-28. The ASCC headquarters consists of the ASCC commander, the deputy commanders for operations and support, the commander's personal staff, and the coordinating staff under the supervision of the Chief of Staff. The ASCC commander provides direction to subordinate army forces and develops and supervises planning for a wide range of activities within the AOR of the unified or subunified commander to whom assigned. The deputy commanding generals for operations and support extend the control of the ASCC commander in designated areas and may focus on the conduct of land maneuver (DCG – operations) and operational force protection and Title 10 support (DCG – support). See Appendix A for more detail on the ASCC staff.

3-29. The COMASCC is also responsible for managing the Army's support base in a developed theater. Additionally, the combatant commander may

designate the COMASCC as the joint rear area coordinator (JRAC) responsible for security of the entire joint rear area (JRA), organization and operation of the theater support base, and conduct of rear operations for all land component services (See Joint Pub 3-10, 3-10.1, and Chapter 8).

ARMY SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS

3-30. Unless otherwise specified by the SECDEF, administrative control (ADCON) of Army forces runs through the Secretary of the Army to the COMASCC. This requires the COMASCC to monitor and support all ARFOR in its geographic area and, exercising ADCON, to communicate through the Army Chief of Staff to the Secretary of the Army for Service-specific, mostly Title 10 USC, matters. Army commanders in joint organizations use the ADCON channel from the COMASCC to the Department of the Army for Service-specific requirements. This channel forms a hierarchy for Army support in theater but does not imply a superior-subordinate relationship. Additionally, the COMASCC must be prepared to provide a training center to train replacements, conduct retraining, and conduct force modernization. The ARFOR within subordinate joint organizations perform functions similar to the ASCC within their JOA. Sample ADCON responsibilities include:

- Personnel (including postal and strenth management)
- Finance (including commercial or vendor services).
- Medical and Dental
- Legal
- Provost Marshall
- Logistics: Classes I, II, III, IV, and IX, maintenance, distribution, contracting, and mortuary affairs.
- General engineering (including public works).
- Chaplain and religious activities.

3-31. An illustration of this concept is the organization of the Service channel in EUCOM with JTF NOBLE ANVIL. In Figure 3-4, Army TF HAWK within JTF NOBLE ANVIL received administrative and logistical support through U.S. Europe, (USAREUR). See Appendix C for an example ASCC Directive establishing administrative control and support relationships.

3-32. USAREUR is the Army Service component command of US EUCOM, a geographic combatant command. For Army elements within EUCOM's AOR, USAREUR is responsible for coordinating support and deals directly with the Department of the Army. The purpose of the Service channel is the efficient use of Army resources within a theater.



Figure 3-4 Operational and Service Branches of the Chain of Command

3-33. The COMASCC is also responsible for command logistical support unless a higher command directs otherwise. Sometimes, the combatant commander may direct the COMASCC to provide common user logistics

(CUL) support to other Services within his AOR and the COMASCC may even be required to support multinational forces (even though logistical support is normally a national responsibility).

COMMAND AND CONTROL

3-34. The COMASCC must determine the optimimum C2 structure of Army functions within the JFC's operational arera. The command relationships can range from OPCON of Army forces in a JTF, to ADCON involvement by the COMASCC, to temporary attachment of reinforcements from CONUS or other unified commands. The assessment of the operational environment will determine how the COMASCC should organize the ARFOR C2. The COMASCC has several options at his disposal with the complexity of the environment and the degree of Army participation as determinants.

3-35. The first option is for the COMASCC to provide a single headquarters directly subordinate to the JTF for command and control of Army units. This headquarters may require staff augmentation from the ASCC HQ or from Army-wide assets not assigned to the combatant commander. This option is normally used for smaller and less complex situations.

3-36. A second option is the formation and deployment of a separate headquarters (for example, a numbered army) to focus on C2 of operations, and another HQ to focus on sustaining operations. The COMASCC makes this decision in consultation with the combatant commander. This presupposes a highly complex operational environment with the involvement of large Army forces (usually more than one Army corps). The COMASCC remains the senior Army commander within the unified command and may or may not be physically located within the JOA. If the COMASCC is not

located in the JOA and does not deploy, he may constitute and deploy a forward headquarters to perform C^2 for his Title 10 sustaining responsibilities. This ASCC forward headquarters would be in addition to the ARFOR headquarters conducting operations. None the less, the COMARFOR remains the single advisor to the JFC in the JOA on Army issues.

3-37. While the first two options require coordination with the combatant commander, the third option is internal to the ASCC and concerns only the internal organization of the Army component. The COMASCC may determine a need to consolidate functions under a deputy commanding general (DCG) responsible for operations and a DCG responsible for support. The DCG for Support would serve as the executive agent for the COMASCC responsible for control of all theater protection and support forces as well as coordination of all logistics. If so designated, the DCG for Support would also be responsible for coordinating logistics support for joint and/or multinational forces in the theater or theater of operations.

3-38. The DCG for Operations would serve as the senior operator responsible for supervision of all Army maneuver and fire forces, conducting major operations, battles, and engagements. In this arrangement, the COMASCC would continue his Service responsibilities and establish required linkages among joint, multinational, and interagency organizations. This option reduces the span of control required of the commander, but requires the ASCC staff to manage both functions. As with the first option, complexity of the environment determines the selection of this organizational alternative. These options also provide a means for the Army theater structure to evolve

as the complexity of the theater evolves. The structure of the ASCC is adaptable enough to perform its three functions in any theater situation.

ARMY TASK FORCES

3-39. Army Task Forces are an example of Army organizational flexiblity. The COMASCC may establish Army Task Forces for accomplishment of limited duration tasks during full spectrum operations. While these may be of any size, normally they are of division or separate brigade size (15,000 to 5,000 personnel) and are normally commanded by a general officer. Historical examples include 1st Airborne Task Force in Southern France in 1944, MARS Task Force in the India-Burma theater in World War II, and Army Task Force 201 in Lebanon in 1958. Recent examples are TF Eagle in Bosnia in 1995 and TF Falcon into Kosovo in 1999. Army task forces such as 1st Airborne TF, or the MARS TF have provided theater commanders with special capabilities only the US Army could provide for airborne operations or deep penetration. Army task forces 201, Eagle, and Falcon provided tailored army forces for participation in peacekeeping operations in both Lebanon the Balkans.

3-40. ASCCs may also establish semi-permanent Army task forces for enduring missions such as Southern European Task Force (SETAF) in Italy which has been designated as a EUCOM contingency JTF for selected stability and support operations. These Army task forces may be OPCON directly to the combatant commander or OPCON to a CJTF. They may also provide support to other components, report through the COMASCC, provide a US Army framework HQ for a larger multinational or international force.

Once placed OPCON or TACON to a joint or multinational force, Army task forces become the ARFOR to that HQ.

SECTION I I- OPERATIONAL LEVEL COMMAND

3-41. Regardless of how organized, the COMASCC must conduct three primary operational-level functions while continuously supporting all other Army elements in theater. As the situation changes from peacetime to conflict or war, the theater may develop in complexity and scope, requiring the expansion of C2 of Army forces. On transition to conflict or war, the combatant commander may choose one of six options discussed in JP 0-2 to exercise COCOM. Each of these options has different impacts on the employment of the Army forces in theater.

3-42. The COMASCC supports the combatant commander by conducting Army operations to support or attain the combatant commander's established military objectives. The ASCC contributes forces from the operational categories of maneuver and fires, protection, and logistical support activities in the theater.

3-43. In support of the combatant commander, the COMASCC organizes the assigned or attached Army forces to accomplish the three operational-level functions of the ASCC:

- Establishing the required component headquarters for Army and joint land operations planning and liaison for joint, multinational, interagency, NGO, or IO operations.
- Providing administrative control and logistical support to Army and other Services or agencies as required by Title 10 or DOD directives to provide for continuous sustainment operations by subordinate Army forces.
- Planning and executing land operations as part of the joint campaign when designated as an operational commander or ARFOR by the JFC.

3-44. In many operational situations, neither the ASCC HQ nor the COMASCC will deploy into the JOA. In these situations, tactical-level Army commanders will be required to execute operational-level missions; however, the COMASCC remains the responsible to ensure their proper execution.

ESTABLISH COMPONENT HEADQUARTERS WITH JOINT, MULTINATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND INTERAGENCY LINKAGE

3-45. The first function of the senior Army commander in theater is to establish a component headquarters with linkages to joint, multinational, international, and interagency organizations. These linkages include--

- Receiving joint, multinational, interagency or UN direction.
- Advising the combatant commander on Army operational capabilities.
- Preparing Army supporting plans to the JFC's campaign plans, OPLANs, or OPORDs.
- Planning and executing Theater Engagement Plans.
- Establishing liaison with joint, multinational, and interagency organizations and NGOs and IOs.
- Augmenting the joint, multinational, and interagency staff as required.
- Linking with specific joint, multinational, NGO, IO, and interagency systems.
- Coordinating intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination.
- Establishing required linkages necessary to conduct Army support to other services.

3-46. The JFC's guidance to the COMASCC includes the required tasks that are expected to contribute to the higher echelon's plan. The guidance may also include the assignment of augmenting forces and the sequencing of subordinates' operations. The guidance will also include any delegated authority, other information pertinent to the situation, and any changes that modify subordinate missions and tasks.

3-47. The COMASCC of the unified or subunified command or the COMARFOR of the JTF advises the combatant commander or CJTF, respectively, on employment of U.S. Army organizations and their

capabilities. The COMASCC must ensure that his subordinate commanders and staffs are trained and versatile enough to meet this requirement. The combatant commander looks to his COMASCC for the nomination and selection of specifically Army-apportioned or assigned units for allocation to subordinate joint commands.

3-48. The Army conducts liaison with joint, multinational, NGO, international, and interagency organizations in theater. This liaison includes lateral liaison with other Services, as well as higher and lower liaison with the appropriate joint or multinational force staff and any subordinate joint or multinational organizations as required. The COMASCC must understand the capabilities that the other Services bring to the theater. Such understanding enhances the opportunity for synergy within the joint force. The Army, as in Desrt Shield may be required to establish the basis for a friendly forces coordination center (FFCC). (See Chapter 7 for more on liaison elements).

3-49. There also exists a potential requirement to augment the joint force staff or receive augmentation from other joint forces when the Army is tasked to form the core of a JTF HQ. The COMASCC must ensure that the ARFOR C4 systems can properly interface with other joint components of forces command and control systems. These systems require specific hardware and software that may be unique to the joint force headquarters and may require special Army efforts for effective interoperability.

3-50. Army theater intelligence elements closely coordinate with joint, multinational, and interagency organizations to establish the mutual supporting intelligence structure required to support the JFC's operations.

The intelligence structure of the joint force J-2 should assign collection requirements consistent with available capabilities and assets, conduct timely all-source analysis, and provide rapid dissemination of available intelligence information. See Chapter 7 for more on theater MI capabilities.

CONDUCT ARMY SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS

3-51. The second function of the COMASCC in theater is to execute his Title 10 responsibility of sustaining Army operations in the combat commander's AOR. At theater level, the preponderance of sustaining considerations are logistical but may also include significant specialized efforts (engineer, medical, human resources, etc.), depending upon the existing infrastructure. For strategic response operations, decisions such as the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) sequencing and prioritazation for arrival of all categories of forces and equipment, will be critical to initial operations. These analyses require a full assessment of the factors of METT-TC and a calculated understanding of where and how risks are taken.

3-52. Each joint or multinational organization with Army forces has a COMARFOR and a designated ARFOR HQ that ensures Army sustainment requirements are met. These requirements, which include logistics, human resources support, and health services, are Service-specific and flow through the Service chain of command. The common user logistics transportation (CULT), common classes of supply, and infrastructure construction are examples of the Army's contribution to the overall joint effort. Sustainment functions at the operational level are also addressed in Chapter 10 and FM 4-0 (100-10), *Combat Service Support* and FM 4-93.4 (63-4), *Theater Support Command*.

CONDUCT LAND OPERATIONS

3-53. The third function and perhaps the most important for the Army in the theater is to conduct land operations. When designated by the combatant commander as a Service component to a JFC, the COMARFOR, serves in the operational branch of the command, planning and executing major combat and noncombat land operations that support the theater campaign. He designates and sustains the decisive and shaping operations for subordinate ground forces in support of the joint or multinational campaign plan. His understanding of operational art (see Chapter 5) is essential to his performance of this role. See Chapter 4 for details on conducting joint or multinational land operations.

SECTION III - NUMBERED ARMY OPTION

3-54. Modern forces have significant mobility and technological advantages over their World War II counterparts, when the U.S. Army last formed operational-level commands as large as army groups. That enhanced mobility advantage permits smaller formations to operate over larger AOs. While ASCCs are units of employment with a permanent regional focus, corps serve as the Army's key unit of employment for intratheater maneuver and are normally the structural building blocks upon which the Army tactically organizes.

3-55. When a single US Corps is introduced into a JOA, its HQ normally becomes the ARFOR HQ and its commander the COMARFOR responsible for all Army activities and operations in the JOA. However, in the event Marine

or multinational forces up to corps size are included in larger conflicts, the issue then becomes one of the JFC's span of control in the land AO.

ESTABLISHING A NUMBERED ARMY

3-56. The US Army retains the capability to constitute a numbered army within selected ASCC HQs. When required to provide a unit of employment for supervising multi-corps land operations, the COMASCC with the requisite embedded capability, may recommend to the combatant commander to establish a separate numbered army. The numbered army is an operational-level organization composed of a headquarters, designated army troops, and two to five corps (U.S. Army, multinational, or USMC equivalents) designed to plan and direct major operations. The COMASCC designates the numbered army commander and promulgates a directive or order that forms his command. The directive specifies the rationale for establishing the numbered army, the objectives it should meet, and the composition of its staff and its assigned forces.

3-57. The numbered army serves as the operational headquarters between one or more corps equivalents and the JFC to command and control operations when required by METT-TC considerations. If the requirement to conduct major land operations within a JOA becomes overly complex, even with only one corps, the COMASCC might recommend to the combatant commander to use a numbered army as the ARFOR to direct the operation. If a distinct numbered army is established, the COMASCC would continue to focus on operational force protection and sustainment of all ARFOR assigned or attached to the theater. See Figure 3-5.



Figure 3-5 ASCC with Separate Numbered Army

3-58. Other reasons for the combatant commander to request establishment of a numbered army include: when forces are widely dispersed geographically; when operations require more than one large formation composed of multiple corps to execute distinct, simultaneous campaigns or focus on different major threats (likely to include separate theaters of operation); or when a political situation requires a U.S. operational headquarters as a counterpart to a multinational headquarters or to ensure satisfactory distribution of multinational responsibilities. Intermediate headquarters of this nature currently exist only within combined organizations such as NATO's multi-corps Joint Command Centre or in the Republic of Korea.

Activation of the 1ST Army for D-Day

Although by July 1943 the British had activated two army and one army group headquarters for the invasion of Europe, the Americans did not move to form parallel commands until late August. Responsibility for this task rested with the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA), the headquarters which exercised planning and operational control over American forces in northwest Europe and logistical and administrative authority over all Army elements. The small size of the assault force-initially three divisions-would normally have called for a corps headquarters. Given the interservice and inter-Allied considerations involved, however, the combined planning group wanted at least an army headquarters to direct the operation. Partly out of concern for the real problems of merging two nationalities under one command and partly from the longstanding opposition to Americans going into battle under what would probably be a British army headquarters, the War Department decided to form in Britain the American Army staff that became the First U.S. Army.

David W. Hogan, *A Command Post at War: First Army Headquarters in Eurpoe, 1943-1945*

If the combatant commander chooses to exercise command of Army, multinational, and Marine corps equivalents through a functional component, then the numbered army commander could be dual-hatted as the COMARFOR and the joint force land component commander (JFLCC). So that the numbered army HQ headquarters can focus on transforming into a joint or multinational land component, the COMARFOR may delegate many of his Army-specific duties in the JOA to either a DCG, or to a subordinate Army commander. The numbered army commander would remain responsible for the conduct of the three operational-level functions within the JOA. The combatant command's ASCC would continue to focus on sustainment and support of all ARFOR assigned or attached in the AOR.

NUMBERED ARMY HQ STRUCTURE

3-59. The ASCC would normally form a numbered army HQ from existing assets and augmentees and structure it to meet specific operations requirements. For example, the ASCC early entry and main CPs could provide mobile headquarters elements to serve as the nucleus. Since the administrative and support requirements of the numbered army are much

less than those of the ASCC, the numbered army staff is relatively austere. Primary staff emphasis at the numbered army is on planning for future operations and the conduct of land control operations. Subordinate tactical commanders determine the specific tactics, fire support, and CSS required. The numbered army makes extensive use of liaison officers to enhance its effectiveness. Figure 3-7 illustrates a typical numbered army headquarters.



Figure 3-6 Numbered Army HQ

SUSTAINMENT

3-60. The numbered army provides sustainment requirements and priorities to the ASCC, which normally tasks logistical support to the TSC. The headquarters itself receives sustainment from a designated area support

organization of the TSC. Assigned Army units are normally self-sufficient for limited periods and, therefore, rely on the established theater multi-functional command networks or contingency sustainment arrangements for extended support. The ASCC also could allocate support forces to the numbered army if independent operations are required. For example, the numbered army could execute a shaping maneuver or deploy to a geographically separate area. In this situation, the TSC would provide a tailored logistical support package--an Army support element (ASE)--for the duration of the mission. (See Figure 3-7).



Figure 3-7

3-61. In a linear or continguous battlefield framework, the numbered army usually operates from a main and an alternate CP. The main CP controls current operations, collates information, integrates all-source intelligence,

and coordinates logistical support. The main CP also develops plans for future operations.

3-62. The numbered army commander designates an alternate CP to ensure continuity of operations. The alternate CP may be a subordinate HQ or a small mobile forward CP. In the event that a numbered army executes sustaining operations, the numbered army commander could establish a rear CP to control the ASE as well as coordinate security operations.

3-63. In addition to the headquarters element, the numbered army may include Army aviation elements, MP, ADA or NBC elements; signal units, intelligence support, or information operations elements; an ASE and a variable number of maneuver elements (corps, divisions, or separate brigades). The numbered army is a flexible, modular organization that is task-organized to accomplish assigned missions. See Figure 3-8.



Figure 3-8 Numbered Army

3-64. The COMASCC may also allocate information operations or ARSOF elements to provide HUMINT, PSYOP, or CA capabilities. In rare circumstances, ARSOF units could execute long-range reconnaissance or

strike missions. Engineer support would likely be provided on an area basis or, in an unusual situation, be attached to the ASE.

SECTION IV - ARMY COMMANDER AS A SUBORDINATE JOINT COMMANDER

3-65. The combatant commander may also designate a COMASCC or COMARFOR as a subunified commander, a subordinate JFC, or joint force land component commander (JFLCC). Based on the ASCC structure, the Army commander must reexamine his responsibilities and capabilities to also perform the three functions of the Army operational-level commander. Establishing a joint HQ under these circumstances will be challenging.

3-66. The ASCC/ARFOR staff will normally form the basis for the subordinate joint commander or JFLCC staff. However, the ASCC or ARFOR staff still retains its functions as the primary coordinator for all Army forces in the operational area. The principal Army staff directorates normally assume parallel JFC or JFLCC staff duties. Augmentation from relevent Service components is required to ensure adequate joint representation. At the direction of the commander, officers from other Services may fill key principal or deputy staff positions. In addition to the JFC or JFLCC staff, the Army dual-hatted commander may retain a separate ASCC/ARFOR staff for performance of Army unique functions with reachback to the ASCC sancuary CP or other supporting Army agencies.

SUBUNIFIED COMMANDER

3-67. The geographic combatant commander may exercise COCOM through a subunified commander for operations on a continuing basis. The subunified

commander exercises functions, authority, and responsibilities similar to those of a unified commander, except for COCOM. The subunified commander exercises OPCON of assigned commands and forces within an assigned operational area. COMASCCs of designated subunified commands operate in the chain of command within the subunified command. They normally communicate directly with the unified command COMASCC on specific Army matters and inform the subunified commander as required.

3-68. Rarely will any Army commander be designated as a subunified commander. If this happens, COMARFOR while dual hatted, would normally expect to focus on the conduct of joint operations and the preparation of a subordinate campaign plan (See Appendix D). Army sustainment of the ARFOR in the subunified command will flow through the combatant commander's ASCC. Depending on the situation, the COMARFOR, in coordination with his ASCC, may appoint a different subordinate Army commander responsible for executing typical Army administrative and logistical functions within the subunified JOA as soon as possible.

FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMANDER

3-69. The JFC may organize forces functionally under a single headquarters. As a norm, the Service commander with the predominant forces operating in the same dimension or medium is tasked to provide the controlling headquarters. As a JFLCC, the COMARFOR retains the responsibility, through the administrative branch of the chain of command, to support subordinate Army forces. Because of the complexity of the two tasks--operations and support--the COMASCC may delegate the authority for

performing the support task to a subordinate Army headquarters such as the TSC or another specialized command. The COMASCC, when delegating this responsibility, must ensure his subordinate commanders are aware and understand the combatant commander's intent and concept of operations. This delegation allows the COMARFOR, as the JFLCC, to focus on conducting operations. (See Chapter 4 and Appendix F).

COMMANDER OF A JOINT TASK FORCE

3-70. When the operation or campaign is predominately on land, the combatant commander may designate an Army commander as the CJTF. This presents a challenge, because the Army CJTF has considerable requirements in addition to his three ARFOR functions of coordination; operations; and support. Under these circumstances, the multinational and interagency coordination mission could require additional resources. He may delegate some of the Army-specific tasks to subordinates.

3-71. As a CJTF, an Army commander may build his joint organization from an existing Army HQ as the core of a JTF HQ. The commander, as the CJTF, receives guidance and missions for the joint force and exercises OPCON or TACON of assigned or attached forces. This includes the responsibility to train the joint force if the JTF was developed during a deliberate planning process to support existing OPLANs.

3-72. The Army CJTF must determine what augmentation requirements are needed for the task at hand and coordinate support through the establishing headquarters. Augmentation of the staff is essential in transitioning to a JTF structure, and the staff must proportionally reflect the oveerall

composition of the joint force. Augmentation can be organized using a modular concept to address the various staff entities such as--

- Command and staff (joint staff and special staff).
- Headquarters support and sustainment (life support functions).
- Signal support.
- Security support for the JTF headquarters.
- Augmentation in technical areas such as civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), etc. (See Joint Pub 5-00.2).

3-73. Although augmentation must be tailored and is METT-TC dependent, some augmentation is almost always required in these areas to ensure linkages to superior HQ:

- Intelligence collection.
- Joint planning procedures.
- Logistics planning.
- Signal support, especially Army Global Command and Control System (AGCCS) access.
- Medical planning.
- Information operations.
- Human resources support (HRS) planning
- Engineer operations.

3-74. One HQ cannot normally function effectively at both the tactical and operational levels. The mission, not the size of the force, determines the level at which the HQ functions. Once fully engaged at one level, a HQ cannot assume the additional functions and command responsibilities that correspond to the other without augmentation. Still, the Army CJTF must fully understand both tactical- and operational-level environments to ensure a supportive relationship exists between his plans and operations and those of subordinate and higher HQ. A consideration would be to passback specific tasks to the ASCC or obtain an additional HQ to focus on tactical tasks.

3-75. The commander thinks not only in terms of military resources but also considers those interagency, diplomatic, economic, and other resources that

may be available and appropriate for the task at hand. The CJTF must understand the strategic and regional environments, to include U.S. policies, treaty commitments, status of forces agreements (SOFA), coalition parties' interests, and so on. These influences affect campaign and operational planning and the establishment of rules of engagement (ROE) for the force.

3-76. The Army JFC must have the additional flexibility to assume the joint coordination role and may choose to augment organic support units with additional divisional, corps, or operational-level protection and support organizations. As such, subordinate Army combat force commanders would concentrate on operations while the JFC conducts a large portion of the joint, multinational, international, and interagency coordination and operations support tasks (internal and external). See Figure 3-9.



Figure 3-9

3-77. The Army JFC could retain these coordination and support tasks when the operation is largely an Army ground operation, the other Services play a

support role to the Army, or the Army JFC has sufficient resources in his organization to accomplish these additional missions.

ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY

3-78. The authority who establishes the JTF designates the JFC, assigns the tasks, prescribes the broad concept of operations, allocates the forces, and defines the command relationships. Generally, the establishing authority designates the JFC from within his own HQ or from the Service within the joint force best suited to accomplish the mission. The establishing authority may direct formation of a joint staff from his own staff, or he may direct the JFC to form the JTF staff from his own resources and augmented by other Service or component headquarters within the designated JTF. See Appendix B for details concerning establishing a JTF headquarters from an Army HQ.

ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCING FACTORS

3-79. Whatever the organizational option chosen, the Army commander must have the capability to fulfill the tasks assigned him by both the Army and the JFC. If assigned both the joint coordination and external support tasks, in addition to his operational tasks, the ARFOR commander must coordinate directly with the required joint agencies and those Army logistics organizations that are supporting the force-projection operation.

3-80. Units designed for tactical operations do not normally have an operational capability inherent in their tactical design. The three operational-level functions of an ARFOR are predicated upon a unit design that provides the capability to perform the operational functions described herein. The ASCC and numbered army are designed specifically for operational-level operations. When fully engaged in tactical operations, an

Army tactical-level HQ needs augmentation to perform simultaneously at both the tactical and operational-levels. As ARFORs are designated to participate in force-projection operations, the commander must consider resource availability and the dynamics of the operational environment on his organizational structure.

SECTION V - TACTICAL LEVEL COMMANDERS SERVING AS ARMY FORCE (ARFOR) COMMANDER

3-81. Corps serve as the Army centerpiece for combined arms maneuver structure and are normally the building blocks upon which the Army organizes. However, at corps and below, these missions are primarily tactical. Corps or divisions, have neither the personnel nor materiel resources to perform both responsibilities and must be augmented to perform at the operational level. Additionally, as part of transformation, the Army will be modernizing to a large extent by corps. As a result, the coordination of legacy, interim, and soon objective Army forces will challenge corps HQ capabilities. See Appendix H, Coordinating legacy, interim, and objective forces.

3-82. With the increasingly nonlinearity of the battlespace, the dividing line between the tactical and operational-levels of war has become blurred. Army strategic responsiveness may require a tactical-level unit to conduct operational-level operations. In principle, these operations should be supervised by an echelon not directly responsible for commanding tactical operations. The tactical force commander should be free to concentrate on the tactical mission, and the Army operational-level commander must be free to

concentrate resources on the execution of the three primary functions--joint, multinational, international, and interagency linkage; conduct of Army operations; and support of Army operations.

ORGANIZATIONAL OPTIONS

3-83. The combatant commander and COMASCC determine the composition of the ARFOR of JTFs. Several options exist for the structure of an ARFOR based upon a METT-TC assessment.

SINGLE ARFOR HEADQUARTERS WITHIN A JOINT TASK FORCE

3-84. The COMARFOR, in conjunction with the JFC, normally organizes under a single Army headquarters responsible for all three Army functions: joint, multinational, and interagency linkage; operations; and internal support. He selects this option when the mission is simple, primarily involves Army forces, and/or the threat is relatively small. (See Figure 3-10).



Figure 3-10

Division as an ARFOR to a JTF

Precedent has been established designating a Army division as the ARFOR headquarters subordinate to a JTF. The 10th Mountain Division (L) was designated as the ARFOR headquarters (HQ) for Operation Restore Hope. The division worked for a JTF commanded by the commanding general of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). While this is not a typical relationship, in the future it may very well be.

3-85. This single Army headquarters may be a corps headquarters or smaller echelon of command. While a corps or division may be able to accomplish these missions, they are not currently staffed or trained to assume these and other operational-level missions. Therefore, both would require additional training, personnel, and command and control (C^2) resources to be effective. Once a corps or division is designated as the ARFOR to a JTF, the commander is subordinated to the CJTF or the establishing headquarters and must look to him for guidance and missions. The CJTF also has the responsibility to train the joint force if the JTF was developed during a deliberate planning process to support existing OPLANs. As the ARFOR to the JTF, the corps and division staffs may require additional training on--

- Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES).
- Management of the Army TPFDD.
- Operational-level functions.
- Theater movement control.

3-86. As an ARFOR, the corps or division commander may be tasked to assume specific operational-level Army responsibilities within the JOA. Under such circumstances, the corps or division would not only be responsible for all Army units in the JOA but could also be responsible for providing the following to all Services for—

3-87. Operational force protection which includes:

- Ground based Air and Missile Defense
- Nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) detection and decontamination.
- Rear area protection.
- Base security.

3-88. Operational personnel and logistical support which includes:

- Mortuary affairs.
- HRS operations (manning, personnel support and personnel services).
- Finance.
- Signal support.
- Environmental protection and cleanup.
- Transportation and distribution of Class I, III, V, and VIII supplies.
- Real estate and contract support.
- Theater topography support.
- General engineering and real property maintenance activities (RPMA).
- Legal support and services.

3-89. The corps/division would assume this support responsibility as the Army executive agent under agreements and memorandums of understanding previously established between Services.

3-90. External augmentation of staff sections, to include equipment, is required to properly perform the ARFOR C^2 tasks. Potential augmentation requirements include--

- Operational planning and control.
- Conduct of Information Operations
- Establishment of a JOPES cell.
- Diplomatic military planning activities.
- Signal support.
- Intelligence support.
- Liaison teams.
- Public Affairs and Media support.
- Civil-Military Operations
- Historical data collection of lessons learned.
- Legal support.

AUGMENTATION REQUIRED FOR AN ARFOR

The 10th Mountain Division's (L) initial experience in planning Operation Restore Hope provides insight into the required augmentation packages and increased responsibilities when assigned the mission as ARFOR to a JTF. The 10th Mountain Division (L) expanded its division signal element into the ARFOR G6 (Communications) Section. The G6 controlled 10 different nondivisional signal units and over 300 added personnel during Operation Restore Hope. The G6 had staff responsibilities on a much greater scale than the normal division signal officer.

After-Action Report Executive Summary U.S. Army Forces, Somalia, 10th Mountain Division (L), May 1993 (Draft).

3-91. Additionally, the ARFOR must be proactive in planning for media relations in order to effectively interface with the media. The capability of the news media to transmit details of ongoing operations to news networks globally cannot be discounted. To effectively manage this sensitive area, the ARFOR's public affairs officer (PAO) is responsible for all media coordination and public requests for information. The ARFOR must develop policies, procedures, and guidelines for evaluating releasable information to the media within OPSEC, accuracy, propriety, privacy, and safety considerations of the ongoing operation.

TWO OR MORE ARMY ELEMENTS WITHIN A JOINT TASK FORCE

3-92. The JFC may desire direct control of several separate Army units. He establishes, with the advice of the COMASCC in theater, two or more separate Army elements that are directly subordinate to the JTF (see Figure 3-11).



Figure 3-11 JTF with Two ARFORs

3-93. This should only be done in unusual circumstances, such as to maintain separate command of ARSOF from conventional forces. Each of these separate Army headquarters would conduct the three Army functions of providing joint, multinational, international, and interagency coordination; conducting operations; and providing internal support within their own AOs. Other reasons the JFC might use this particular option are--

- The operation is relatively simple.
- Two different multinational organizations are involved.
- Two or more lines of operation exist.
- The threat is located in two or more different geographic areas.
- The situation allows the JFC to focus on several dispersed ground operations without diffusing his joint responsibilities.

SEPARATE OPERATIONAL-LEVEL SUPPORT AND ARFOR HEADQUARTERS

3-94. As the operational situation grows more complex, the JFC and the COMASCC may organize the ARFOR to resemble a mature theater organization. In this organization, one ARFOR headquarters would focus on land combat operations, while a separate support element (normally formed

by the TSC and specialized command headquarters) would focus on Army Title 10, common user logistics, and international or interagency responsibilities (see Figure 3-12).



Figure 3-12 JTF with separate ARFOR and ASCC with operational functions

3-95. The performance of the three functions is a constant requirement within the joint environment. Under these circumstances, multiple commanders could share the tasks. The COMASCC would retain traditional AOR wide responsibilities and supervise the support element. The responsibility for the conduct of land combat at the operational-level could then be taken on by the designated COMARFOR within the joint task force. The TSC, specialized commands, or ASE commander may be tasked to command and control all operational-level Army assets not directly needed by the ARFOR for land combat. The requirement for joint, multinational,

and, perhaps, interagency linkage would become a task that must be performed by both commanders.

3-96. This alignment of the responsibilities, though not expected to be a normal structuring, shows the flexibility of the design to meet a wide range of potential operational conditions. The Army might organize under this option when-

- The operation is extremely large, or complex.
- More than one Army headquarters exists.
- The Army has a significant force protection and sustainment responsibilies to other services/multinational forces.
- Two or more lines of communications exist.
- Additional theater support organizations make a forward support element too large to control effectively without dedicated command effort.
- The JTF requires a significant operational force protection and sustainment effort that exceeds normal corps capabilities.

ARMY FORCE HEADQUARTERS FOR INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS

3-97. For small scale contingency operations, the Army has medium-weight Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs). These brigades are capable of deploying rapidly, executing early entry, and conducting combat operations immediately upon arrival to prevent, contain, stabilize or resolve a conflict through shaping and decisive operations. These brigades may also participate in stability and support operations (SASO) as an initial entry force.

3-98. For these brigades to be effective, they require a higher headquarters capable of performing the three primary operational-level functions of the Army in a theater in order to allow the brigade to focus on tactical missions. One option is to augment either a light division or a corps headquarters that

is capable of rapidly deploying an early entry command element for this purpose. The resulting ARFOR would be the single headquarters providing command and control to all Army combined arms maneuver, protection, and sustainment forces within a designated JOA and subordinate to a JTF. This augmentation package would enable the ARFOR to conduct the following tasks:

- Joint, multinational, and interagency coordination and communications management.
- Plan and assess required Army support to other Services
- Army Title 10 administration and logistics for Army elements
- Rear area security to include terrain management of the Army's AO
- Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of Army elements
- Army airspace and control (A2C2) for its AO.
- Performing a full range of information operations, civil-military operations, and public affairs within the ARFOR AO.
- Capable of coordinating and synchronizing digital and analog information and systems to produce a common operating picture to support situational awareness.

3-99. The COMARFOR would consist of the designated corps or division commander and his staff plus the augmentation package. While actual composition would depend on METT-TC, the COMARFOR would organize his headquarters into electronically-linked modular command posts that can displace by echelon. The COMARFOR will be capable of deploying three command posts: an early entry module, a main, and a rear. The ARFOR could establish an Effects Coordination Cell (ECC) to plan, coordinate, and synchronize fires and effects (lethal and non-lethal) in time, space, and purpose to shape the battlespace, protect the force, and set the conditions for decisive operations. Each command post can reach-back to non-deployed organizations to access and obtain necessary information from outside the JOA. An army support element (ASE) from the ASCC, TSC, or specialized

organizations would normally deploy and be placed subordinate to the ARFOR HQ in order to provide supervision of selected functions for Title 10, Army support for other Services, and support to interagency, multinational,



and international organizations as directed. See Figure 3-13.

Figure 3-13 ARFOR for a Interim Brigade Combat Team

3-100. This ARFOR will be capable of transitioning and reorganizing into a JFLCC with additional Army and Marine augmentation. However, the ARFOR will be dependent upon the JTF has to plan and coordinate the response to weapons of mass destruction and for joint theater air and missile defense. Likewise, another headquarters would be required to perform the functions of a JRAC, since this organization lacks the staff depth to handle that function. See FM 3-91 (71-100), *Division Operations*.

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Chapter 4

Joint and Multinational Land Operations

We can make a land component command arrangement work. There will be no more occasions in the Central Command's area of operations where Marines will fight one ground war and the Army fights a different ground war. There will be one ground war and a single land component commander.

General Anthony C. Zinni
Commander in Chief Central Command
March 2000

SECTION I - JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER

BACKGROUND

4-1. Theater commanders seek synchronized employment of the full range of military capabilities of their assigned forces. During World War II, it became common to exercise theater command through functionally organized sea, air, and land component commanders. However, as most theater commanders were ground officers, many dispensed with separate land component commanders and staffs and chose to exercise land command themselves through their theater staffs. This frequently resulted in split focus by the theater commander and his staff and often delegation of "coordinating land operations" to one of the ground commanders.

4-2. Since General Dwight Eisenhower's successful organization for combat in North Africa in 1943 with co-equal component commanders, various joint or multinational operations have been conducted involving land forces. Frequently, Army officers serving as theater commanders have attempted

with varying degrees of success to serve as both geographic combatant commander and the Land Component Commander. While the initial setbacks of Kasserine Pass in 1943, the Battle of the Bulge in 1944, at the Yalu in late 1950, or in Vietnam were not totally caused by the lack of a single ground component, the inability to effectively control land combat operations contributed. Likewise, the difficulties in the closing days of the Persian Gulf War as well as in Kosovo in 1999 were perhaps beyond the expectation of a focused ground commander to resolve. During land operations in Tunisia, Normandy, Okinawa, Lebanon, and the Caribbean, separate Land Component HQs successfully ensured proper coordination with other components, reduced the Joint Force Commander's span of control, and allowed the JFC to focus at the strategic level.

Lack of a Ground Component Commander in Operation Allied Force

During the NATO Operation Allied Force in 1999, Admiral James Ellis served as Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe and as the Commander of the U.S. Joint Task Force Noble Anvil. He concluded after the operation that, "Lack of a Ground Component Commander was a mistake." ADM Ellis continued that even absent a combat ground offensive, that the planning and staffing capabilities that an ARFOR would have provided were needed. Because neither a NATO nor a U.S. overall land headquarters was established, this shifted significant ground planning responsibilities to his JTF staff. The JTF staff was only marginally prepared to handle the myriad issues pertaining to either NATO's Initial Entry Force or the U.S. Army's TF FALCON for Kosovo.

Admiral James Ellis

4-3. For the invasion of Okinawa in 1945, Lieutenant General Simon Buckner was commanding general of the Tenth Army and of the Expeditionary Troops. The Expeditionary Troops consisted of forces from all services to include all landing forces (Army and Marine); all permanent garrison forces;

and all construction and service troops ashore. LTG Buckner requested a joint staff and was augmented by 60 Navy and Marine personnel and a Marine Brigadier General as Chief of Staff. During planning for the assault operation as well as its base construction and defense tasks, Tenth Army found it necessary to enlarge the troop list by over 70,000 Army troops. These included greater numbers of supporting combat, protection, and support elements to include eight battalions of corps artillery, three battalions of coast artillery, thirty-two engineer battalions, and nineteen battalions of Anti-Aircraft Artillery. To the Island Commander, MG Wallace, LTG Buckner delegated responsibility for developing the air, naval and staging base complexes for the invasion of the Japanese home islands. The Island Command was also reponsible for the defense of the base areas, all non-corps logistics, communications, and construction troops. Perhaps because this operation came so late in the war, it was not only the best example of a joint land force, but its lessons were also not codified into doctrine or remembered. See Figure 4-1.



Figure 4-1. Organization of Expeditionary Troops for the Ryukyus Campaign (January 1945)

4-4. Unity of effort through centralized command of theater land assets is the most effective way to employ land power. Current joint doctrine recognizes that this principle is true for land as well as air and naval operations. The Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) provides a Joint Force Commander (JFC) the means to maximize the capabilities of landpower in a theater by achieving unity of command and maintaining unity of effort among land forces.

DEFINITIONS

4-5. Joint Pub 1-02 describes the JFLCC as the commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or a joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of land forces, planning and coordinating land operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force land component commander will normally be the commander with the

preponderance of land forces and the requisite command and control capabilities.

4-6. Additionally, JP 1-02 describes Land Control Operations as the employment of ground forces, supported by naval and air forces, as appropriate, to achieve military objectives in vital land areas. Such operations include destruction of opposing ground forces, securing key terrain, protection of vital landlines of communication, and establishment of local military superiority in areas of land operations. Consequently, the normal function of a JFLCC will be to conduct Land Control Operations as part of a joint force.

JFLCC AUTHORITY

4-7. Joint Pubs 0-2 and 3-0 address the different ways the Joint Force Commander (JFC) organizes forces. While conducting operations through Service component commanders has certain advantages, the JFC can establish functional component commands to conduct operations. Functional component commands can be appropriate when forces from two or more Military Departments must operate in the same dimension or medium or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of an assigned mission These conditions apply when the scope of operations requires that the similar capabilities and functions of forces from more than one Service be directed toward closely related objectives and unity of command and effort are primary considerations. The JFC establishes the specific command authority, OPCON, TACON or support, the JFLCC has over the forces provided by the Service components or national elements. However, a JFLCC does not constitute an independent joint force with the authorities described in JP 0-2.



Figure 4-2. Joint Force Organized Using Functional Components

JFLCC SELECTION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

4-8. When required, JFCs will designate a JFLCC and establish this commander's authority and responsibilities. The designation of a JFLCC may occur when major land forces of more than one Service component will participate in a major land operation and the JFC ascertains that this will assist in achieving unity of command and maintaining unity of effort among land forces. The following factors should be considered when deciding upon the formation of a JFLCC:

- Availability of ports of debarkation. The more limited the points of entry, the more control required by a single land commander to efficiently deconflict two or more users.
- Amount of mutual support possible between land forces.
- Duration of the mission. Duration of operations must be long enough to warrant the establishment of a single land force commander.

- Scope and requirement for simultaneous or sequential land force operations. When the scope of the land operation is large (multiple corps sized units) or the JFC needs to divide his attention between major operations that are functionally specific, it may be useful to esyablish functional component commanders. For example, a theater campaign may have an air component main effort followed by a land component main effort.
- Likelihood of land force operations adjacent to each other necessitating mutual support. Geographically concentrated land control operations, outside of an amphibious objective area (AOA), may require direction by a JFLCC to integrate planning for deployment, employment, transition, and redeployment.
- Requirements for special capabilities resident in one land force being required for use by the other. When the mission requires the unique capabilities of more than one service be directed toward closely related objectives and unity of effort is desired. An example would be an Marine ambious operation linking up with an Army airborne operation.
- Amount, level of intensity, and requirement for coordination of other component support to land forces. Marine and Army land forces may be competing for scarce joint force assets, particularly those provided by the JFACC. The JFLCC contributes to the prioritization and redirection of joint force assets as the situation requires.

4-9. The type of command relationship given the JFLCC will be based upon the JFC's concept of operations and guidance. These typically include exercising OPCON over assigned or attached forces and TACON over other military capabilities/forces made available for tasking. The JFC may also establish supporting and supported relationships between components to facilitate operations. Using a JFLCC eases the burden on the theater staff, frees the JFC to focus more on the strategic aspects of the theater campaign, and provides a single ground headquarters for coordination with the other components. As a norm, the Service commander with the predominant number of ground forces and the requisite command and control capabilities is tasked to provide the JFLCC HQ.

4-10. The primary purpose of a JFLCC is to provide unity of command for employing land power for the benefit of the joint force as a whole and to give

the JFC a workable span of control. The JFLCC must shape his AO for subordinate units by focusing on operations in space and time; to the depth of his forward boundary and more than 96 hours out.

4-11. While Marines are often best employed in Naval Campaigns or as independent formations, they may operate effectively under the operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) of a JFLCC. This would normally include only Marines ashore for sustained operations and not any Marines embarked or afloat. The Marine Component Commander (MCC) would remain responsible to the JFC to train, equip, and sustain all assigned Marines. (MCDP 3, *Expeditionary Operations*)

Operation Desert Thunder

During Desert Thunder in early 1998, ARCENT/3d Army established Coalition Task Force-Kuwait (CTF-K) with the mission of defending Kuwait. In addition to being his Army Service Component Command, General Anthony Zinni, USCINCCENT, designated this headquarters to be prepared to be CENTCOM'S Joint Force Land Component Command if unified operations against Iraq were required. In addition to the Kuwaiti and other coalition forces, the U.S. element of CTF-K was organized with a "maneuver" element composed of the 3d Infantry Division(-) and a MEU (when ashore), a "support" element composed of the 24th CSG, and a "protection" element consisting of the 32d AAMDC. This headquarters has now been retitled as Coalition/Joint Task Force Kuwait with commanders rotating among US Army and USMC generals.

ARCENT/Third US Army
Coalition Task Force Kuwait

4-12. Using the UJTL as a guide, the major conceptual elements of a Joint Force Land Component may be viewed as operational maneuver and fires; operational personnel and logistical support; operational force protection; and operational intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance elements with

the requisite operational command & control elements as shown in Figure 4-3

Below. ARSOF elements may also be placed OPCON or TACON.

JFLCC

COMMAND & CONTROL/ ISR
ISR, SIG, IO Elements

MANEUVER & FIRES			SUPPORT		PROTECTION	
U.S. ARMY	USMC					
CORPS	MEFs		TSC		AAMDC/ ADA BDE	
DIVs	MEBs		ENGR CMD		Cml Bdes	
SEP BDEs/RGTs		MEUs		TRANS CMD		MP Bdes
FA/AVN BDEs			TMEDCMD			
			PERSCOM/FINCOM			

FIGURE 4-3 POSSIBLE JFLCC ELEMENTS

JFLCC STAFF ORGANIZATION

4-13. The staff should be representative of the total land force that comprises the joint land force component command. The JFLCC may build his organization from the "core" of an existing Service component structure and with augmentees from the other services or multinational forces to provide the necessary expertise and to be representative of the total land force. If provided by the Army, the COMASCC retains responsibilities for internal Army support. The structure of the staff should be flexible enough to expand or contract under changing situations without a loss in coordination or capability.See Figure 4-4 for a Notional JFLCC staff

NOTIONAL JFLCC STAFF



Figure 4-3

4-14. Potential headquarters to be used as a JFLCC "core" are Army corps, Marine Expeditionary Forces, Army Service Component Commands (ASCC) or, when separately constituted, numbered armies.

JFLCC RESPONSIBILITIES

4-15. The responsibilities of the JFLCC are assigned by the JFC. These include, but are not limited to:

- Making recommendations to the JFC on the proper employment of the land forces capability made available and under the control of the JFLCC.
- Developing a joint land operations plan/order that supports the operational objectives of the JFC and optimizes the task organization of the land forces. The JFLCC will issue planning guidance to all subordinate and supporting elements and analyze proposed courses of action. The goal is to concentrate the effects of combat power at critical times and places to achieve positional advantages over the enemy to accomplish operational or strategic goals.

- Directing the execution of the land operations plan/order as specified by the JFC, to include making timely adjustments to the tasking of available joint forces. The JFLCC will notify any affected component commanders of changes as appropriate.
- Coordinating the planning and execution of land operations with the other component and joint task force commanders, and other supporting agencies.
- Evaluating the results of land operations and the effectiveness of interdiction operations within the JFLCC AO and forwarding these results to the JFC to support his overall combat assessment effort.
- Synchronization of elements of combat power within the land area of operations. This includes maneuver, fires, leadership, force protection, and information.
- Functioning as the supported commander for fires within the land commander's area of operations (fires includes the effects of lethal and nonlethal weapons). This includes:
  - Designation of priority, timing and effects of fires delivered within land commander's area of operations. (JP 3-0, and JP 3-09).
  - Serving as a member of the JFC's JTCB.
  - Synchronizing the timing, priority, and effects of close air support operations within the AO.
- Functioning as a supporting commander providing assets in support of other components when directed by the JFC. These assets are normally provided in direct support.
- Serving as the Joint Rear Area Coordinator (if so designated) responsible for overall security and protection of the Joint Rear Area.
- Supporting the JFC's information operations by developing the IO requirements that support land control operations and synchronizing the land force IO assets when directed.
- Providing the Deputy Area Air Defense Commander (DAADC) for land-based assets when designated by the JFC. The DAADC may also be the Theater Army Air and Missile Defense Coordinator (TAAMDCOORD). This may be provided by an Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC). (See FM 3-01.94 (44-94), *AAMDC Operations*)
- Establishing combat identification SOPs and other directives based on JFC guidance.

4-16. Regardless of the organizational and command arrangements within joint commands, Service Component commanders retain responsibility for performing Service-specific functions, as required by Title 10, and other

matters affecting their forces, including internal administration, training, logistics, and Service intelligence operations (See JP 3-0).

4-17. The JFLCC will also normally be responsible to provide robust liaison to multinational land forces when not the Multinational Force Land Component Commander (MNLCC). At brigade and below, this requirement may be met by Special Forces Liaison Elements. At division or higher, this will require robust Combat Support Coordination Teams or Mobile Liaison Teams with adequate senior staff representation and communications to provide interface with these headquarters. (See Chapter 7)

OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS

4-18. In executing major land operations as part of the joint campaign, the JFLCC will normally focus on the six operational-level tasks described in the UJTL. The JFLCC should consider the following functions:

OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER.

4-19. The JFLCC plans, coordinates, and directs movement and maneuver so as to gain positional advantage or a mobility differential over the enemy. The JFLCC prioritizes deployment, reception, and onward movement of the land forces into theater. Through decisive and shaping operations, land forces exert a decisive impact on the conduct of the campaign by directly engaging the enemy center of gravity or by striking decisive points, that pressure the center of gravity. Decisive operations will normally be offensive, but may be proceeded by both offensive and defensive shaping operations. To do this the JFLCC may group joint (Army and Marine) forces into operational formations, which complement one another. These may be non-standard task organizations with service forces combined for maximum effectiveness.

4-20. Within the theater, land areas of operation will have forward, rear, and lateral boundaries as established by the JFC. These boundaries will be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missins and protect their forces. The JFLCC will typically establish an operational framework for the land AO that assigns responsibilities to subordinate land commanders, designates subordinate AOs within which subordinate forces operate, and provides a way to visualize their battlespace by means of a common operational picture. Throughout the depth of his AO, the JFLCC integrates operational maneuver of land forces with joint fires. (Figure 4-5),



FIGURE 4-5 THEATER FRAMEWORK

JOINT FIRES

4-21. The JFLCC coordinates fires of assets made available by other components as well as from within the ground forces. As the supported commander of fires made available, the JFLCC designates target priority,

effects, and timing. The JFLCC allocates organic land force fires (such as MLRS, ATACMS, EW, and Attack Helicopters) as well as fires apportioned to shape decisive land operations. The JFLCC may retain approval authority to employ Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS).

4-22. The JFLCC establishes fire support coordinating measures, coordinating procedures, and targeting priorities to include the location of the FSCL. The FSCL is established and adjusted by the JFLCC within the AO, in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. As the supported commander, the JFLCC will be responsible for operational-fires. The JFLCC also defines target priorities, timing, and effects for all weapons delivered in the land AO. Attacks are coordinated with all affected components to prevent fratricide and duplication. The JFLCC nominates targets outside the AO to the JFC for attack by other components. See JP 3-09.

4-23. If nuclear operations are contemplated, the JFLCC coordinates with the JFC for nuclear target nominations and nuclear force protection for all designated land forces. See JP 3-12, *Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations*, and FM 3-12 (100-30), *Nuclear Operations*.

4-24. If formed from an Army HQ, The JFLCC will normally establish an Effects Coordination Cell (ECC) with joint representation to coordinate fires. Coordination will be effected between the ECC and the Battlefield Coordination Detachment co-located with the JFACC. The ECC will normally be colocated with the IO cell to manage JFLCC assets used for IO. These may include Land Information Warfare Activity teams, operational-level MI Brigades, Marine ISR elements (when subordinate to the JFLCC), PSYOP

Groups, COMBAT CAMERA teams, and Public Affairs/Media teams. (See JP 3-13 and FM 3-13).

TARGETING AND BDA PROCESS

4-25. The JFLCC may need to request additional fires from other components to support the conduct of land operations in accordance with the JFC's overall guidance. A Joint Fires Element (JFE) as part of the J3 can provide staff coordination. Additionally, the JFLCC should have access to Battlefield Damage Assessment (BDA) assets in order to make targeting recommendations. As many of these ISR platforms belong to other components, the JFLCC also needs a BDA request system to facilitate timely reporting. A Targeting Coordination Board (TCB), preferably under the deputy JFLCC, with authority to accomplish broad oversight functions at the macro level and recommend candidate target lists (CTL) is a method of providing that support. (See JFLCC Handbook, JP 3-09 and JP 3-60, *Doctrine for Joint Targeting*.)

OPERATIONAL PROTECTION.

4-26. The JFLCC is responsible for preserving the combat potential of all land forces and contributing to the overall force conservation. This includes providing forces for air and missile defense, conducting information operations (including deception and OPSEC), conducting rear area operations (to include combating terrorism), and conducting risk assessments. See Chapter 9.

JOINT REAR SECURITY

4-27. As the JFLCC normally commands most of the JFC's personnel in the Joint Rear Area, the JFC may designate the JFLCC or one of his

subordinates as the Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC). The JRAC is responsible for the multi-dimensional protection of all forces in the JRA and may require dedicated security forces for this function. A joint security force may be formed from Army MPs, Air Force security forces, Marine Rear Area Operations Group (MRAOG) security units, and naval coastal warfare elements. Additionally, a Joint Rear Tactical Operations Center (JRTOC) will be required and will need augmentation from all other components. JP 3-10, *Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations* and Chapter 9.

THEATER AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

4-28. The Army seeks to integrate with other components in TAMD by employing an Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC). The AAMDC commands additional ADA brigades designated to protect the Army echelons above corps (EAC) as well as JFC's Defended Asset List (DAL). While an Army organization, its functions support the entire joint land force as the Marines lack land-based TAMD assets. These functions include establishing an AAMDC LNO at the JFACC's joint air ops center that will assist in integrating land-based TMD, advising on use of land-based air defense, and providing planning assistance. See FM 3-01.12 (100-12), *Army Theater Missile Defense Operations* and Chapter 9.

OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL.

4-29. A Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC) should be established to exercise control of all ground forces and their doctrinal direct support assets (to include Army rotary wing aircraft and ATACMS or USMC Aviation) when employed for sustained land control operations. Marines ashore for sustained periods should be placed OPCON or TACON to the

JFLCC. Marines embarked should remain under the control of the Maritime Component. Likewise the JFLCC should command all ground based air/missile defense assets for the JFC.

4-30. In a major theater of war (MTW), a MEF operating as part of a JFLCC for sustained operations ashore will normally require some augmentation from Army assets. Based upon METT-TC, Army armor, ADA, MLRS/ATACMS, and chemical units may be required. An example is DESERT STORM, where the Army provided the "Tiger Brigade" with an attached MLRS battery to augment Marine armor. Army air and missile defense forces may be required to operate in the Marine AO to extend or provide coverage of critical assets or forces. A MLRS battalion or brigade sized field artillery element may be placed in support of the Marines under a Marine Force Artillery HQ. Additionally, an Army chemical brigade with tailored companies for NBC detection and decontamination may be placed in support of a MEF. These units may be organized as an army task force under a requisite command and control headquarters with the necessary communications and logistical support to operate within the MEF AO for extended periods. Alternately, on a task basis, the JFLCC may task the Army to relinquish control of some of these assets to support the Marines, but they revert back to Army control as the task is completed.

4-31. Marine Air will always remain under the command of the MAGTF Commander for direct support air sorties. Any sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the joint force commander for re-tasking by the JFACC. Consequently, a consideration of the JFLCC may be to increase the AO of a Marine element by extending the Marine forward

boundary further than equivalent Army ground elements so as to maximize the potential of Marine Air within the JFLCC's overall AO.

4-32. The JFLCC is the focal point for planning and executing the land operations portion of the JFC's theater campaign plan. The JFLCC prepares a supporting joint land operations plan that provides the intent, concept of operations, and the supporting details to achieve land force unity of effort. The JFLCC directs current land operations while continuing to plan and prepare for future land operations with the JFC and other component commanders. (See Appendix F, Joint Land Operations Plan)

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE.

4-33. The JFLCC drives the operational-level intelligence effort by ensuring that organic intelligence systems provide unity of intelligence effort in support of land force requirements. Land force intelligence efforts must be synchronized with the efforts of the other components and the strategic collection systems. A Joint Analysis and Control Element may be formed from Service assets for intelligence product and ISR management.

OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL SUPPORT

4-34. The JFLCC must ensure that the most effective and efficient distribution of personnel, material, supplies and services consistent with the ground concept of operations is employed to sustain the land forces throughout the campaign. While logistical support of other services is normally a service responsibility, the ARFOR may be tasked by the JFC with providing certain common user logistic (CUL) support within the JFLCC AO, subject to appropriate coordination and ISSAs as well as provide Army support to other Services.

4-35. The Army's Theater Support Command (TSC) may be tasked to coordinate this support as the joint operational-level support organization. The TSC will have a modular headquarters that will serve as the COMASCC or the JFLCC's single point of contact for the execution of theater–level logistics. Other support functions of human resources, health service, transportation, finance, and engineer support may remain directly under Army command. The other Service components can be expected to contribute appropriate support forces. Examples could be Navy Construction Battalions (SEABEES) or Fleet Hospitals ashore to support the Marines. In addition, a Marine Logistical Command, if formed, will coordinate for logistical support of employed Marine Forces with the TSC (FM 4-93.4 (63-4), *Theater Support Command*).

4-36. The JFLCC would not routinely be the lead for representation on JFC level logistic boards and centers, the Service components would. The JFLCC J4 would particpate in only selected boards and centers for deconfliction. For more details on JFLCC see US Marine Corps Combat Development Command/US Army Training and Doctrine Command *JFLCC Handbook* and JP 3-31, *Command and Control of Joint Land Operations.*

JFLCC INTERRELATIONSHIPS: LAND-SEA-AIR

4-37. The following diagrams depict several of the most important roles of the JFLCC in respect to his relationships to air and sea forces.

4-38. Figure 4-6 shows the symmetrical relationship of land forces primary task of seeking land control from opposing enemy land forces while the air

and sea forces perform the same symmetrical function in their respective regimes.

SYMMETRICAL RELATIONSHIPS



Figure 4-6

4-39. This has been the traditional view of warfare from service perspectives and has been exemplified by classic land battles such as between Grant and Lee in the American Civil War or by classic naval and air battles such as the Battles of Jutland (1916) and Britain (1940).

4-40. Figure 4-7 depicts the primary mutual support relationships requiring close coordination whereby the JFLCC provides suppression of enemy air defenses (such as by AH-64 or ATACMS in Desert Storm) as well as seizing and holding ports and airbases for friendly air and sea forces (such as in Just Cause).

MUTUAL SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS



Figure 4-7

4-41. Likewise, the JFLCC can expect to receive closely coordinated tactical air support (to include airlift and CAS) from the air component and force projection support (to include Naval Air, Naval Gunfire, and Sea Lines of Communication force deployment and Sustainment) from the naval component.

4-42. Finally, the JFLCC can be tasked to conduct asymmetrical operations not requiring close coordination (Figure 4-8).

ASSYMETRICAL RELATIONSHIPS



Figure 4-8

4-43. These may be against enemy ports and airbases directly (as with the elimination of German submarine and V-1/2 bases in France in 1944). Land based elements may conduct air/missile defense operations to deny or reduce the enemy's air effects (as performed by Patriot batteries in Saudi Arabia and Israel in Desert Storm). Similarly, the JFLCC can request from the JFC air interdiction and naval deep strike operations (TLAM, carrier air, etc.) to asymmetrically attack or isolate enemy land forces deep.

JOINT LAND FORCE COMMAND CENTERS

4-44. The JFLCC will establish a joint command and control structure from which to exercise his authority. The JFLCC Operations and Intelligence (O & I) Center serves as the focal point for all operational, logistical, and intelligence matters. The O & I Center works under the supervision of the J3

for the commander. It is manned and equipped to receive, store, and display friendly and enemy information, maintain the tactical situation and status of forces, make recommendations, and promulgate JFLCC orders for execution of current operations. It maintains close coordination with other JFLCC centers such as the joint Deep Operations Coordination Cell, the Joint Planning Group, the Joint Logistics Center, the Joint Movements Control Center, the Joint Search and Rescue Center, and the Joint Rear Tactical Operations Center.

SECTION II - MULTINATIONAL LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER (MNLCC)

TO THE SOLDIERS OF THE 15TH ARMY GROUP

Yours has been the long, hard fight-the longest of this war of any allied troops fighting on the continent of Europe. You men of the Fifth and Eighth Armies have brought that fight to a successful conclusion by recent brilliant offensive operations which shattered the German forces opposing you.

You have demonstrated something new in and remarkable in warfare: You have shown that a huge fighting force composed of units from many countries with diverse languages and customs, inspired, as you have always been, with a devotion to the cause of freedom, can become an effective and harmonious fighting team.

Mark W. Clark
General,USA Commanding
May 1945

BACKGROUND

4-45. Multinational land component commanders (MNLCC) have existed in the U. S. military experience since General George Washington directed the French and American land forces at the Battle of Yorktown in 1783 as the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

Multinational Land Component Command in Italy

In December of 1944, Lieutenant General Mark Clark assumed command of the Allied land forces in Italy. This command, originally formed as 18th Army Group under British General Harold Alexander for operations in Tunisia, was now designated 15th Army Group. The Army Group numbered some twenty divisions organized under seven corps. The two army headquarters contained such divergent national elements as could scarcely be found in the annals of military history. In the truly representative British Eighth Army could be found Canadian, Polish, New Zealand, Indian, Italian, and British units. The US Fifth Army besides Americans included South Africans and later Brazilians. After Clark took command of the Army Group, the staff was reorganized from the British staff system with a small integrated contingent to a basically American staff system with corresponding British integration. British general officers served as Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, Chief Engineer, Chief Signal Officer, and Artillery Officer. Despite losing its most experienced units for the Invasion of Southern France, 15th Army Group succeeded in collapsing the German resistance in Italy, linking up with 7th Army in Austria, and forcing the first unconditional surrender of German forces on 29 April 1945.

4-46. Combined land structures currently exist in Korea and NATO, where the Combined Forces Command Ground Component Commander and Joint Command Centre (formerly LANDCENT) and their staffs, face contemporary challenges in providing centralized command of large multinational land forces.

DEFINITIONS

4-47. There is not a prescribed definition for a multinational land component commander. For the purpose of this manual the following definition will be used. The Multinational Land Component Commander (MNLCC) is the commander within a coalition or combined multinational force responsible to the multinational force commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of land forces, planning and coordinating land operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The MNLCC will normally be the national commander of the land forces of

the nation with the preponderance of land forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. For the remainder of this manual MNLCC will be used to refer to either a coalition or combined multinational land component commander.

MNLCC AUTHORITY

4-48. To be effective, a multinational force must have a common understanding of the political guidance and limiting factors from each member national command authority. Thereafter, establishing documents for an alliance or a coalition will normally give the multinational force commander (MNFC) the authority to organize forces in several different ways. One of these has been by national lines with only liaison between these national land elements. However, increasingly the trend in multinational operations has been to organize functional components to provide centralized direction and control of all the national forces operating in a particular medium such as land, sea, or air. Consequently, the MNFC may establish a MNLCC and establish his specific command authority. For example, this may be operational control or tactical control of the land forces provided by the national elements of the multinational force.

Multinational Land Component Commander in Korea

During the Korean the 8th U.S. Army in Korea (EUSAK) functioned for most of the conflict as the MNLCC. On 14 July 1950, President Syngman Rhee directed the ROK Army Chief of Staff to place himself and his forces under General MacArthur's United Nations Command. MacArthur, in turn, ordered LTG Walton Walker, commander of EUSAK, to assume command of the ROK Army. For the remainder of the war, the commander of EUSAK exercised operational control of the ROK Army indirectly through the ROK Chief of Staff, who issued formal orders to ROK units. Administrative command was maintained separately for each army. By July 1951, EUSAK commanded four corps (three U.S., one ROK) with six U.S. Army, ten ROK, and one Marine divisions. Other UN forces included four brigades (Canadian, two British, and Turkish) and eight battalions (Belgian, Colombian, Dutch, Ethiopian, French, Greek, Philippine, and Thai) that had been integrated directly into U.S. Corps and divisions. In addition, EUSAK remained responsible for operating the UN Reception Center and for providing the theater level logistical support to the entire force.

MNLCC SELECTION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

4-49. The MNLCC will normally be the national commander of the land forces of the nation with the preponderance of land forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. For example, in Combined Forces Command (Korea) the Commanding General of the Ground Component Command (GCC) is a South Korean General with a U.S. Army Lieutenant General as his deputy. When possible, an entire national headquarters should be identified and used as the core for the MNLCC. If the U. S. is the lead nation, a COMASCC or a numbered army should be primary choice for a MNLCC.

4-50. Within the coalition, the total ground forces of the host nation frequently will not be included. Some host forces will probably be retained for internal security under national control. However, all other deployed coalition forces would probably be included after deployment and upon national transfer of authority to the MNLCC.

MNLCC STAFF ORGANIZATION

4-51. The internal organization of a MNLCC should be very similar to that of a JFLCC. The deputy commander will normally be from the second largest force contributor. The principal staff elements should be established by augmenting the national core land headquarters with appropriate members in proportion to their contribution from the other multinational contingents. Additionally, MNLCC staff members should not be expected to also serve as LNOs from their respective national commanders. National LNOs are required from each contingent and have separate critical functions to perform from that of the MNLCC staff. Unlike combined operations where language is predetermined, for coalition operations it is essential to establish early an official (or at most two) language(s) of command for all oral and written communications. A detailed plan must be established to acquire interpreters/translator with not only the necessary language skills, but also staff functional expertise for all staff sections in order to ensure integrated staff functions.

4-52. MNLCC staff interoperability will depend on three primary military issues: technical, procedural, and doctrinal. Technical aspects of interoperability are normally addressed in alliance agreements not always present in a coalition. Technical interoperability will be most critical in the areas of communications, logistics, and intelligence systems. Staff procedures with respect to rapidly merging information management systems will be critical. A Multinational Local Area Network (MNLAN) employing multilingual software can facilitate the cohesion of the MNLCC staff by providing integrated real-time common operating picture and other data base

access for all. In the absence of common operating doctrine, commonly accepted methods and military principles can serve as a point of doctrinal reference. A common planning process is essential. American planning structures may be used because they are reasonably compatible with most nations systems and incorporate all the elements of the planning process. In a multinational environment, collaborative planning between functional components helps ensure that all commands understand the MNFC's intent and strategic concept of operations.

MNLCC RESPONSIBILITIES

4-53. The responsibilities of the MNLCC are assigned by the MNFCand will be similar to those of a JFLCC (see paragraph 4-15 above). These may include, but are not limited to:

- Advising the MNFC on the proper employment of all national land forces made available and under the control of the MNLCC.
- Developing a multinational land operations plan that supports the operational objectives of the MNFC and optimizes the task organization of all multinational land forces. To do this the MNLCC may group national forces into operational formations, which complement one another. These may be non-standard task organizations with allied forces combined for maximum effectiveness.
- Directing the execution of the land operations plan as specified by the MNFC, to include making timely adjustments to the tasking of available multinational forces. The MNLCC will notify any affected national commanders of changes as appropriate.
- Coordinating the planning and execution of land operations with the other multinational component and national commanders.
- Evaluating the results of land operations and the effectiveness of interdiction operations within the LCC AO and forwarding these results to the MNFC to support his overall combat assessment effort.
- Functioning as the supported commander for fires within the LCC's AO.

- Functioning as a supporting commander providing assets in support of other multinational components as directed by the MNFC.
- Providing the Deputy Area Air Defense Commander (DAADC) over the land area when designated by the MNFC.
- Establishing combat identification SOPs and other directives to reduce fratricide as directed by the MNFC.

4-54. The MNLCC will also normally be responsible to provide robust liaison to all allied or coalition land forces. At brigade and below, this requirement may be met by US Special Forces Liaison Elements. At division or higher, this will require robust Coalition Coordination Teams (as in Korea) or Mobile Liaison Teams with adequate senior staff representation and communications to provide interface with these headquarters. (See Chapter 7)

OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS

4-55. In executing major land operations as part of the multinational campaign, the MNLCC will normally focus on many of the same operational-level tasks described in the UJTL for a JFLCC. See Appendix G. The MNLCC should consider the following aspects of several of these functions:

4-56. Intelligence. The MNLCC is responsible for establishing an intelligence system capable of sharing intelligence products among members of the force. Intelligence sharing arrangements must be rapidly agreed upon, even if sensitive sources are not shared. A multinational intelligence center may be established for this purpose or merged with the operations center.

4-57. Logistics. While logistics is normally a national responsibility, the MNLCC needs to establish a centralized operational level management system to allow efficient use of scarce host nation resources and facilities, but without preventing the decentralized execution of tactical level logistics.

Because without the centralized management of a multinational Contracting Center, each national force is likely to contract independently with the host nation. A multinational logistics command (MLC) may be established using the Army's TSC as a nucleus. If established, the MLC must have staff representation from all multinational members. A multinational Logistics Operations Center (MLOC) capable of monitoring and reporting the readiness of all forces operating under the MNLCC is essential. Additionally, a multinational Movement Control Center will assist in tracking and monitoring all land force movements for the MNLCC.

4-58. Operations. Subordinate or tactical commands may be organized as the situation dictates. Because of differing national capabilities to see and strike deep, the MNLCC must arrange its capabilities so as to maximize the potential to strike fleeting targets. Close operations will normally be divided into national sectors. However, the MNLCC must consider the requirement to mass air power, reserves, or other sources of combat power across the front of national boundaries.

4-59. Training. As a matter of principle, training remains a national responsibility. To ensure the units are able to execute their assigned missions and be operationally ready, the leaders must know and understand the capabilities and limitations of the other nations' units. The enhanced mutual understanding of these capabilities and limitations helps to minimize the differences and optimize effectiveness. To that end, all command levels must conduct training, which should include the MNLCC's ideas and desired outcomes. These concepts, specified by content (basic tasks), scope (condition), and objectives (standard), are an essential basis for effective

training. Training should be coordinated and integrated where feasible. Coordination is required among respective participants to ensure mutual understanding and compliance. Although the MNLCC operations and training staff officer must monitor and evaluate the training status of all units, the actual evaluation of the training status and operational readiness of the respective units remains a national responsibility. The standards and criteria used for evaluation should be published and understood by all parties.

MULTINATIONAL LAND FORCE COMMAND CENTERS

4-60. The MNLCC will establish a command and control structure from which to exercise his authority. One option is to establish a multinational Operations and Intelligence Center. Under the overall supervision of the operations officer, this O & I center serves as the fusion and synchronization point for all current operational and intelligence matters affecting the MNLCC. It accomplishes this function by receiving, storing, and displaying friendly and enemy information so that the MNLCC and his staff principals may maintain visibility of the current operational situation and the current combat capability of the coalition forces. As required, O & I center staff members are prepared to make recommendations, and promulgate approved orders that affect the execution of current operations. The O & I center is also responsible for maintaining close coordination with otherpossible MNLCC centers, such as the multinational effects coordination cell, multinational planning group, the multinational logistics operations center, the multinational movement center, the multinational material management

office, the multinational search and rescue center, and the multinational rear tactical operations center.

PART THREE
Army Component Planning and Operations

Part Three consists of chapters 5 and 6 and discusses the planning considerations for Army Service components at the theater-level as well as Army component operations they perform across the range of military operations in a theater.

Chapter 5 discusses the planning framework of a theater to include operational art; considerations of ends, ways, means, and risk; campaign planning; major ARFOR operational planning; and multinational and interagency planning considerations.

Chapter 6 discusses Army component operations to include strategic responsiveness; crisis and contingency operations; force projection operations; and an overview of theater-level Army component operations in peace, conflict, or war.

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Chapter 5

Planning Framework

"A plan of campaign must anticipate everything that the enemy can do and contain within it the means of outmaneuvering him. Plans of campaign are modified to infinity, according to circumstances, the genius of the commander, the nature of the troops, and the topography."

Napoleon I

The major concepts essential to understanding Army planning at the theater level are operational art and campaign planning. Key elements of operational art and design apply across the range of military operations. Commanders must understand these elements when they plan and conduct Army operations in theater. This chapter also discusses the Army operational-level commander's need to analyze the ways and means provided to obtain ends established by theater strategy and campaign plans. Campaign planning is the theater commander's primary tool to orchestrate component and supporting operations.

No particular echelon of command functions solely at the operational level. Command echelons may vary with the nature of the campaign or major operation, strategic and military objectives, organizational structure, or size of the joint force. An operational effect or contribution to achieving operational objectives--not the level of command--is the primary determinant of whether a force performing that operation functions at the operational level.

SECTION I - OPERATIONAL ART

5-1. Combatant commands participate in the development of national military and theater strategies and conduct deliberate planning during peacetime. This is a continual process that provides the framework for employing forces in response to crisis. As described in JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, combatant commanders use strategic estimates to review

the strategic environment and assist in determing the strategic end state and strategic concepts to obtain it. Theater strategic concepts are statements of intent as to what, where and how operations are to be conducted in broad flexible terms. Theater stategic concepts should provide for unity of effort and strategic advantage.

STRATEGIC CONCEPT, STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE, AND STRATEGIC CONCENTRATION OF FORCES

5-2. Strategic advantage as described in JP 3-0 is the favorable overall relative power relationship that enables one nation or group of nations to effectively control the course of a military/political situation to ensure the accomplishment of objectives through national, international, and theater efforts. Favorable military force ratios to achieve strategic advantage cannot always be obtained across the theater. (See Fig. 5-1)



Figure 5-1 Strategic Concept

5-3. Therefore, the geographic combatant commander, working with the subordinate joint and component commanders determines where to deploy

and concentrate forces to gain strategic advantage. Combatant commanders also consider the other instruments of national power for their contribution to gaining and maintaining strategic advantage and include them in their campaign plan. Strategic concentration is the assembly of designated forces so that they are best disposed to initiate the campaign plan. The campaign seeks to gain positional advantage relative to enemy forces by massing the effects of agile, tailored joint forces through maneuver. Strategic maneuver is the employment of unified and joint forces from positions of strategic concentration against the strategic center of gravity to achieve the military end state within the strategic endstate. (JP 5-00.1) Such maneuver includes symmetric control of the mediums--air, land, sea, information, and space—in order to conduct asymmetric attacks, while denying these mediums and freedom of movement to the adversary. Attaining these advantages frequently will involve combat operations and determining in what areas to accept risk.

5-4. Operational art links tactical events to strategic objectives. JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, describes operational art as the employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design, and ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities of all levels of war.

5-5. Operational design is the design element of operational art. The application of operational art in which the combatant commander envisions what the campaign should look like. The goal of campaign design is to ensure

a clear focus on theater strategic objectives and centers of gravity, and provide for sequencing and synchronizing unified actions, joint operations, major operations, and tactical-level battles. See JP 5-00.1

5-6. The COMASCC employs operational art when conducting major operations in support of joint campaigns to sequence these events over time, space, and purpose. Since Napoleon, operational art has been the deployment of several autonomous, independently maneuvering formations in a single theater for the sake of fixing the adversary while also enveloping them. Senior Army commanders and their staffs practicing operational art will operate as part of a joint, and probably multinational and interagency force. When appropriately task organized by the JFC to achieve theater strategic and operational objectives, they sequence Army operations or joint land control operations. JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* and FM 3-0, *Operations* both describe the fundamental elements of operational art or operational design.

SELECTED ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL ART

5-7. Several selected elements of operational art need to be reinforced for the Army in theater operations. These include center(s) of gravity and vulnerabilities; decisive points; lines of operation; operational reach, approach, and pauses; culminating point; and simultaneous and seqential operations. (See Fig. 5-2)

OPERATIONAL ART
Selected Elements

- Centers of Gravity
  - Vulnerabilities
- Decisive Points
- Lines of Operations
- Operational Reach, Approach, and Pauses
- Culminating Point
- Simultaneous and Sequential Operations

Figure 5-2 Operational Art Selected Elements

CENTER(S) OF GRAVITY AND VULNERABILITIES

5-8. The challenge for joint force commanders normally is not to amass more data but to extract relevent information and organize the knowledge most useful for overcoming the enemy. A key concept that integrates intelligence and operations is that of the center of gravity and its associated vulnerabilities. Centers of gravity are those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight (FM 3-0). Centers of gravity are what Clausewitz called the 'hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends…the point at which all our energies should be directed'. Centers of gravity are useful at the strategic and operational levels of war to focus efforts. Examples at the strategic level can be national leaders, a strong-willed national population (the people), a military service or component of it,

or strong economic resources. At the operational-level common examples are a specific military force, critical military capabilities, or a skilled and inspirational military commander.

5-9. Strategic vulnerability is the susceptibility of vital elements of national power to being seriously decreased or adversely changed by the application of actions within the capability of another nation to impose. Frequently, strategic vulnerabilities are exploited in a manner that undermines, neutralizes and/or defeats a strategic center of gravity. Operational vulnerabilities likewise are those critical requirements or components thereof which are deficient, or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction or attack (moral/physical) in a manner achieving decisive or significant results to an operational center of gravity.

5-10. The essence of operational art is concentrating friendly military forces and resources against the critical vulnerabilities of the enemy's main sources of strength (strategic and operational centers of gravity) in a manner that provides the JFC with the strategic and operational advantage and the initiative. The destruction, dislocation, or neutralization of the adversary's strategic center of gravity should prove decisive in achieving strategic objectives. Similarly, the geographic combatant commander, working with subordinate commanders, must identify the friendly center(s) of gravity and vulnerabilities and protect them. Examples of vulnerabilities can be long sea and air lines of communication from CONUS or supporting commands; theater ports and bases; or at the strategic level-public opinion. In the case of public support, friendly strategy and operations will have to be conceived and conducted in such a manner as to preserve the level of public support.

5-11. The concept of a center of gravity with vulnerabilities is most useful as an analytical tool at the strategic and operational levels while designing campaigns and major operations. This assists commanders and staffs in analyzing friendly as well as focusing on enemy sources of strength. This analysis is a continuous process throughout an operation. Within the context of pitting friendly strengths against enemy vulnerabilities, commanders will understandably want to focus their efforts in a manner that will do the most decisive damage to the enemy's ability to resist. But they must compare the degree of criticality with the degree of vulnerability and to balance both against our friendly capabilities.

5-12. In stability and support operations such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance the opposing center of gravity may be more abstract such as the threat of hunger, disease, or other elements of the environment. Even in these operations an analysis of centers of gravity and vulnerabilities may be useful to focus resources. For example in Operation Support Hope in 1994, in order to "stop the dying" the JTF focused on cholera as the opposing "center of gravity" and clean water as its vulnerability. The uniqueness of these operations requires the commander and his staff to understand that, just as it does in offensive and defensive operations, the military' role supports the other elements of national power in stability and support operations as well.

DECISIVE POINTS

5-13. A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, or enabling system that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influences the outcome of an attack. (FM 3-0). Decisive points

provide commanders with a significant advantage. They are often the keys to defeating or protecting a center of gravity. Normally, there are more decisive points in a theater than there are resources to attack them. In some instances a vulnerability may be a decisive point. The commander and his staff must conduct a risk analysis to prioritize the friendly force efforts. The commander then designates the most critical decisive points as objectives as a means of gaining freedom of maneuver to gain and maintain momentum. Correctly identifying and then attacking (or protecting) decisive points, serve as trigger points for friendly force actions that sustain the initiative and may help to determine lines of operation.

LINES OF OPERATIONS

- Directional Orientation of the Force
  - In Time and Space
  - In Relation to the Enemy
- Connect the Force with Its Base & Objs



Figure 5-3 Lines of Operation

LINES OF OPERATION

5-14. Lines of operation define the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy (FM 3-0). (See Fig. 5-3). Lines of operation are used to focus combat power effects toward a desired end. They will normally pass through decisive point enroute to objectives. They connect the

force with its base of operations--from which it receives reinforcements and resupply--and its forward units--where it operates against the enemy. This concept is linked to the concept of interior or exterior lines of directional orientation of a force in relation to the enemy. A force is operating on interior lines if it has an operational mobility advantage over its opponent. This advantage can be geographic, technological, or operational.

OPERATIONAL REACH, APPROACH, AND PAUSES

5-15. Operational reach is the distance over which military power can mass effects and be employed decisively (JP 3-0). This is extended by properly positioning forces, reserves, bases, and logistics forward, by increasing the range of weapons, and by improving the effectiveness of distribution and throughput. Operational reach is reduced by geography, weather, inefficiencies in distribution, mal-positioned forces, and the actions of the enemy. For any given operation there is a finite range beyond which the force cannot prudently operate or maintain effective operation.

5-16. Operational approach (or direct vs indirect in JP 3-0) is the manner in which a commander attacks an enemy center of gravity. In theory, direct attacks against enemy centers of gravity resulting in their neutralization or destruction is the most direct path to victory—if it can be done in a prudent manner. Where direct attacks mean attacking into an opponent's strength, JFCs should seek an indirect approach until conditions are established that permit successful direct attacks. In this way, JFCs will employ a synchronized combination of operations to weaken enemy centers of gravity indirectly by attacking vulnerabilities or decisive points, such as seams and flanks, and critical requirements which are sufficiently vulnerable: LOCs,

rear area logistics, C2, specific forces or military systems, and even military morale and public opinion.

5-17. FM 3-0 describes an operational pause as a deliberate halt taken to extend operational reach or prevent culmination. An operational pause may occur because the force has extended to the limit of its operational reach, because the character of the operation has changed. If the situation requires an operational pause, a shift of effort should accompany it. A COMASCC coordinates operational pauses with other components so that the joint force can sustain the initiative and momentum.

CULMINATING POINT

5-18. Culminating point (or culmination in JP 3-0) has both offensive and defensive relevance at the operational-level. In the offensive, the culminating point is the point in time and space at which an attacker's combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender's. (See Fig. 5-4)

CULMINATING POINT

A POINT IN TIME & SPACE

- Attacker:
  Combat Power No Longer Exceeds Defender
- Defender:
  No Longer Capable of Counterattack or Defense



Figure 5-4 CULMINATING POINT

5-19. While this point may not be precisely determined, the commander and his staff should anticipate where friendly forces may reach culmination and also where enemy forces are expected to culminate.

5-20. The defensive culminating point that instant at which the defender must withdraw to preserve the force. This occurs when the defending force no longer has the capability to go on the counter-offensive or defend successfully. If the defender's aim is to transition to the attack, then the culminating point is where the defender must revert to a holding action and await reinforcement.

5-21. Operational culmination in a stability or support mission usually occurs when circumstances or lack of resources lead to an erosion of will, decline of popular support, or excessive casulties. The commander must sequence operations in such a way that his force never reaches culmination unexpectedly.

SEQUENTIAL AND SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS

5-22. In avoiding culmination, the JFC, working with superiors and subordinates, addresses the problem of deployment to ensure that forces arrive at times and places that support the campaign. Because of limited resources and geographic considerations, the U.S. frequently projects forces in sequential phases.

5-23. At the strategic level, force projection sequential actions include mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces. Because the U.S. is geographically insular, most deployments are with exterior lines of communication (LOCs).

5-24. At the operational-level, sequencing may be seen more in terms of employment. Additionally, sustainment is a critical consideration in sequencing operations within a campaign. The campaign establishes requirements for the procurement and apportionment of national resources from continental United States (CONUS)-sustaining bases. Forward bases must be established, LOCs must be opened and maintained, intermediate staging bases must be established (when required) to support deployment and subsequent phases of the operation, and priorities for services and support must be established by phase. Logistics considerations, then, become key to sequencing the campaign plan.

5-25. Operations within the campaign are normally conducted simultaneously and in depth. Deployment may continue well after employment begins. Sustainment is conducted throughout. Redeployment may begin during posthostility operations. Defense and offense operations are always interrelated. (See Chapter 6, JP 3-35, and FM 3-35 (100-17) for more on Force Projection)

KEY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

5-26. JP 3-0 and FM 3-0 also identify several key planning considerations that apply the concepts of operational art. These key planning considerations include: Concept of Operations (Objective); Arranging Operations to include phases, branches, and sequels; Concept of Logistics; Information Operations; and Risk Management.

5-27. The COMASCC's effective use of operational art and design elements translate theater strategy and the campaign into operational and, ultimately, tactical action. The responsibility to link strategic aims with tactical

execution belong to the joint force commander and, in land control operations, to the senior land force headquarters.

5-28. In MTW, the combatant commander and subordinate component commanders may control large military formations over great geographic distances while sequencing tactical military operations in pursuit of strategic or operational objectives. Conversely, subordinate joint commanders may control relatively small military formations conducting specific, short-term operations for the same purpose. COMASCC/COMARFORs employ operational art across the full spectrum of military operations. Whatever the environment (peacetime, conflict, or war), or the nature of the operation (offense, defense, stability, and support) the COMARFOR links theater strategy and campaigns to major land operations by effectively conducting simultaneous and integrated land operations.

CONCEPT OF OPERATION (OBJECTIVE)

5-29. The concept of operations describes how the JFC visualizes the operation will unfold and describes the overall objectives of the force (JP 3-0). Determining the objective is a central element of operational design because it establishes the necessary focus to achieve a strategic aim. While the combatant commander initially orients on national or alliance strategic objectives, he also supplements them with theater strategic and operational objectives focused on the use of the military instrument of power. To ensure clarity of strategic and operational intent when conducting subordinate campaigns, JFCs may identify and carefully describe essential operational objectives from the combatant commander specified and implied tasks. If Service or functional component commanders do not have clarity in

objectives, they must seek clarity through analysis at their own levels as well as interactive development with the JFC until operational aims are understood and aligned.

ARRANGING OR SEQUENCING OPERATIONS

5-30. The arrangement of operations is an element of operational art in JP 3-0, but an aspect of operational planning in FM 3-0. However viewed, the operational-level commander links theater strategy and campaigns to tactical execution by effectively arranging major operations and battles over time.

5-31. The JFC visualizes the sequence of operations, or the chronological arrangement of events, necessary to achieve the desired military conditions of the strategic end state. Without this linkage, operations are apt to become a series of disjointed events less likely to achieve the desired theater objectives. The visualization includes identifying the adversary center(s) of gravity and vulnerabilities and protecting the friendly center(s) of gravity. This process is useful when determining phases of a campaign, applying resources against these phases, and envisioning requirements for branches or sequels.

PHASES

5-32. Generally, the campaign is divided into phases that focus on major changes in the nature of the total effort, such as defensive to offensive, stability to support, or to shaping. Some campaigns are naturally progressive in their phasing (establish sea control, gain a lodgment, initiate a major continental campaign), while others are more complex. The latter may be the case when an adversary has initiated hostilities and the theater commander must transition from an engagement posture to a detterrent posture, to a

combat posture including decisive offensive operations to achieve the strategic goal. The focus is to attack the adversary's center(s) of gravity simultaneously throughout the depth of the battlespace in a phased manner.

5-33. Each phase in the campaign should lay the groundwork for its successor until a final decisive operation can be joined. A phase may orient on a physical objective or on shaping a certain advantageous condition. The description of each phase should identify the operational ends to be accomplished, together with the ultimate purpose--the why--which links the operational ends to strategic objectives. The description should include a narrative of the geographic combatant commander's strategic concept of how and when these strategic tasks are to be accomplished. It should also include an estimate of force requirements, as well as major shaping and sustaining operations necessary for the effort.

5-34. These concepts and force estimates should be continually refined as assumptions are validated and staff estimates updated up to the time the operation order implementing that phase is required. For continuity of planning, however, changes should be minimized. Prior to terminating the phase or meeting the necessary conditions for moving to the next phase, planning will have begun and the refinement process to facilitate the transition will continue.

5-35. The phasing and sequencing of operations should be at the necessary tempo to retain the initiative and to operate inside the opponents decision cycle. Simultaneous operations may be conducted as soon as conditions permit to overwhelm the enemy throughout the depth of the battlespace. The

JFC conducts simultaneous attacks throughout the depth of his JOA to paralyze the enemy and force an early capitulation.

BRANCHES AND SEQUELS

5-36. Besides phases, the JFC visualizes requirements over the full range of operations for options to preserve his freedom of action. Branches are contingency plans for changing disposition, orientation, or direction of movement and for accepting or declining battle. Branches should account for planning assumptions that do not prove valid. Sequels are actions taken after an event or battle and are based on possible outcomes--victory, defeat, or stalemate.

5-37. Sequels, for example, might reflect a potential transition from the strategic defense to a counteroffensive, to a withdrawal, or to a stability operation. The visualization of branches and sequels is not simply a thought process of events. This visualization is a parallel planning process that provides the command a valuable resource--time.

CONCEPT OF LOGISTICS

5-38. The JFC's concept of logistics is a key part of the synchronization of the joint effort. Through the logistic concept, JFCs enable the deployment, entry, buildup, application, sustainment, reconstitution, and redeployment of joint forces. JFCs identify and reinforce priorities between combat and logistic requirements. Logistic considerations are key to the commander's estimate process, will greatly impact on the development of COAs, and may dictate COA selection.

5-39. COCOM gives combatant commanders authoritative direction over all aspects of logistics necessary to accomplish the mission. Within their commands, combatant commanders use this authority to ensure effectiveness and economy in operations and to prevent or eliminate the unnecessary duplication of facilities and the overlap of functions among Service components. In critical situations, combatant commanders may modify the normal logistic process within their commands. They may use all facilities and supplies of all assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission.

5-40. Combatant commanders ensure that the concept of logistics supports the concept of operations. The logistic concept of the campaign plan does this by establishing a base of operations, opening and maintaining LOCs, providing intermediate bases of operations to support phasing and sustainment, and establishing priorities for service and support for each phase of a campaign. The logistic concept also uses available host-nation support (HNS).

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

5-41. Information operations (IO) involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. This applies across all phases of a campaign, the range of military operations, and at every level of war. The integration of IO must begin at the earliest stages of a planning effort. Identification of adversary and friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity are fundamental to IO planning. Major IO capabilities include OPSEC, PSYOP, military deception, EW, physical attack, and computer network attack/defend (CNA/D). Civil affairs (CA) and public affairs (PA) are often included in IO

planning because of their impact on local and worldwide perceptions of ground operations. Employment of IO is essential to achieving the objectives of the JFC and information operations can be either decisive or shaping operations. Gaining information superiority before the hostilities may preclude combat operations. The ability to get inside an adversary's decision-making cycle (his operational ability to react) is critical to attacking his centers of gravity, exploiting his vulnerabilities, and effectively concentrating our own combat power. (See JP 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations* and FM 3-13 (100-6), *Information Operations*)

DECEPTION

5-42. Military deception is one of the key capabilities now included under IO. Military deception manipulates enemy perceptions about friendly force intentions, positions, and timing. Military deception has strategic, operational, and tactical aspects, and its planning is top-down and compartmented. Deception relies heavily on intelligence information, which helps commanders identify appropriate targets, develop a credible story, and determine the effectiveness of the effort. When deception is planned and executed it becomes the central focus of IO. All other IO elements are coordinated and synchronized to ensure they either support, or do not detract from the deception plan. The best deception is frequently the alternative course of action not selected. (See JP 3-58, *Joint Doctrine for Military Deception*)

SECTION II - ENDS. WAYS. MEANS. AND RISK

ENDS

5-43. In applying operational art, the combatant commander must consider four significant areas; ends, ways, means, and risk. The National Security, National Military, and Theater Strategies all integrate objectives (*ends*), policies and concepts (*ways*), and resources and forces (*means).* The commander must understand from his analysis not only the ends to be accomplished; the authoritative directions that provide limiting factors for his employment of operational art (ways); as well as the resource limitations (means) and the costs or risks to the joint force.

WAYS

5-44. Higher policies and guidance also affect the commanders freedom to employ operational art in his concept for operations. JP 3-0 discusses many of the operational concepts that may form the basis of the "way" a campaign or operation is conducted. The way of a campaign is also affected by the capabilities and limitations resources provide for the conduct of operations,

MEANS

5-45. The means allocated to the operational commander influence the selection of the operational objectives. Tangible resources include military forces and supplies made available to the commander. These may include other nonmilitary assets such as U.S. civilian agencies or HNS and direct augmentation, for example, civilian reserve air, land, or maritime fleet transportation assets.

5-46. Intangible resources include the commander's authority over supporting forces not under his direct command; authority over certain nonmilitary aspects of theater operations, for example, interagency elements; and domestic and international public support of military operations.

5-47. The CJCS considers theater strategies and plans when recommending priorities and allocation of forces and resources among the combatant commanders. National strategic planning for mobilization, deployment, and redeployment, is based on the planned employment and sustainment of forces by the various combatant commanders.

LIMITING FACTORS

5-48. Limiting factors are defined in JP 0-2 as a factor or condition that, either temporarily or permanently, impedes mission accomplishment. The nature of the strategic direction may require that the use of military force be limited by various factors such as rules of engagement (ROE), transit or overflight rights, or political conditions.. JFCs and COMARFORs consider the strategic and operational environment during the estimate and planning process in order to determine potential limiting factors. Limiting factors often limit the COMARFOR's freedom of action to use resources and may influence th Army and form of a campaign or major operation. It is useful to differentiate these limiting factors in the form of *restraints* and *constraints*.

RESTRAINTS

5-49. Restraints prohibit the operational-level commander from performing specific actions or categories of actions. The laws and treaties of the U.S. embody some restraints such as those on the treatment of noncombatants imposed by the Geneva Conventions. Others will be unique to the

circumstances and locale of the particular conflict. Some restraints may prohibit the use of certain weapons, preclude operations in certain geographical areas, prohibit pre-emptive strikes or limit certain tactical methods such as the mining of harbors. Such restraints may influence the achievement of operational-level objectives.

CONSTRAINTS

5-50. Constraints shape operational alternatives. In contrast to restraints, constraints denote actions that the commander must take or methods he must employ. Retaining specific terrain, the imperative to minimize casualties or maintain an alliance are examples of constraints.

5-51. Methods may include objectives unrelated to operational military aims but which have inherent strategic significance. For example, the JFC may require the Army commander to employ multinational forces even though their use would make operations more complex from the Army perspective. Frequently, constraints require retaining or protecting areas deemed diplomatically or psychologically important but tactically insignificant. The French retention of Verdun in 1916 constituted such a constraint, though it resulted in no military gain and cost nearly a million lives.

RISK MANAGEMENT

Risk is inherent in military operations. In JP 3-0, risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Risk management applies to all levels of war and across the full range of military operations. Commanders consider a variety of risks to

include implications of failure to national prestige, operational risks to the mission as well as personal risks to individuals. Commanders integrate risk management into all aspects of the planning process to identify, assess, and weigh risks. See FM 3-100.14 (100-14), *Risk Management*.

SECTION III - CAMPAIGN PLANNING

5-52. Joint plans are proposed under different processes depending on the focus of a specific plan. These interrelated planning processes are designated either campaign, deliberate, or crisis action planning. Subordinate planning at the operational level demands a broader perspective over the whole range of military operations than planning at the tactical level. Joint Pubs 3-0, 5-0, 5-00.1 and 5-00.2 describe the conditions under which unified, subunified, and joint task force (JTF) commanders write campaign plans as part of or to support the theater campaign plan. Functional and Service components of the joint force conduct subordinate and supporting operations--not independent campaigns.

5-53. The theater strategic environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences in the theater that describes the diplomatic-military situation, affect the employment of military forces, and affect the decisions of the operational chain of command. The multinational and interagency aspects of the environment significantly affect campaign design at the theater strategic or operational levels. The availability and capabilities of forward-presence assets--to include multinational forces, interagency organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs)--also influence force allocation decisions.

5-54. The key to designing the theater campaign plan is understanding the desired strategic end state, determining the military end state, identifying the adversary's strategic center of gravity, and--having achieved the strategic advantage by strategic concentrations and subsequent strategic maneuver--attacking the center of gravity to achieve the desired end states. Though theater and subordinate campaigns have different levels of scope, purpose, and perspective, they share the following common fundamentals:

- Provide broad strategic concepts of operations and sustainment for achieving multinational, national, and theater strategic objectives.
- Provide an orderly schedule of decisions.
- Achieve unity of effort with air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces, in conjunction with interagency, multinational, nongovernmental, private voluntary, or United Nations forces, as required.
- Incorporate the combatant commander's strategic intent and operational focus.
- Identify any forces or capabilities the enemy has in the area.
- Identify the enemy strategic and operational centers of gravity and provide guidance for defeating the.
- Identify the friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity and provide guidance to subordinates for protecting them.
- If required, sequence a series of related major joint operations conducted simultaneously throughout the area of responsibility and/or joint operations area.
- Establish the organization of subordinate forces and designate command relationships.
- Serve as the basis for subordinate planning and clearly define what constitutes success, including conflict termination objectives and potential posthostilities activities.
- Provide strategic direction; operational focus; and major tasks, objectives, and concepts to subordinates.
- Provide direction for the employment of nuclear weapons as required and authorized by the National Command Authorities.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS PLANNING

5-55. When directed by the National Command Authority (NCA), joint force commanders plan for the employment of nuclear weapons by US forces in a

manner consistent with national policy and strategic guidance. Nuclear operations planning should be integrated into conventional operations plans to maximize effects required to achieve the geographic combatant commander's desired objectives. The commander of US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is tasked by the Nuclear Supplement of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) to provide specific support to geographic combatant commanders. USSTRATCOM maintains a Theater Planning Response Cell (TPRC) that provides support to these commander's and their staffs during crisis action planning. USSTRATCOM TPRC functions include:

- Advise and assist the Commander on matters related to the planning and employment of nuclear weapons to include objective description, predicted weapons effects, and generation timelines.
- Advise and assist the Commander in specialized weapons of mass destruction (WMD) targeting and planning to include objective description, predicted weapons effects, and generation timelines.
- Advise and assist the Commander and tasked unit staff with nuclear execution/termination procedures, to include the drafting of messages to initiate contingency planning or initiate plan development and execution.
- Act as liaison between the Commander, the Joint Staff's Nuclear Operations Group (NOG), and USCINCSTRAT.
- In coordination with USSTRATCOM, review planned missions prior to execution and assist the Commander in deconfliction with other friendly force operations.
- Assist the Commander with course of action consequence analysis modeling, including meteorological interpretation.

5-56. The NCA, which provides controls and constraints for nuclear-weapons use in theater, returns the approved plan to the combatant commander. He passes the approved plan down to the subordinate commanders and may provide them with controls and constraints for option planning and target nominations. See JP 3-12, *Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, JP 3-12.1,*

Doctrine for Theater Nuclear Operations, JP 3-12.2, Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data (U).

INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS

5-57. The theater and supporting campaign plans are based on evolving assumptions as well as indications and warning. The combatant commander identifies intelligence support requirements for the campaign through the development or revalidation of a supporting intelligence plan. This plan identifies requirements for national-level support from Department of Defense (DOD) intelligence agencies, non-DOD intelligence agencies, and military services. Intelligence preparation is continuous throughout the range of military operations. Intelligence readiness begins in peacetime, before any crisis. The commander establishes intelligence requirements that direct peacetime intelligence operations supporting contingency planning. Two specific elements--staying out front in intelligence planning and understanding how to get intelligence support--are key components to contingency planning. As contingency plans are activated, the commander focuses intelligence and targeting to support specific mission decision and planning requirements. In addition, the commander begins planning for the crossover point in intelligence when initial reliance on higher echelon intelligence is augmented by tactical intelligence and assets within the AO.

5-58. Intelligence readiness means that intelligence organizations must develop broad knowledge of priority contingency areas, continually update those data bases daily, and be prepared to surge in support of emerging missions. Commanders and J2s/G2s must direct the intelligence effort daily to ensure data bases are available if alerted to support contingency planning

and execution. The intelligence staff must provide commanders routine, direct, and habitual links into the intelligence system. These links provide an early focus on the commander's tactical and operational intelligence needs. When a regional crisis occurs, the intelligence system focuses on pushing intelligence and tailored products to the users and prepares for the unit to pull needed intelligence.

INTEGRATION AND SYNCHRONIZATION OF FORCES AND OPERATIONS

5-59. The campaign plan integrates and synchronizes unified, joint, and multinational and interagency operations by serving as the unifying focus for the conduct of operations. The combatant commander coordinates from among the total U.S., multinational, or interagency and international capabilities and applies or focuses those necessary to prosecute the campaign. He orchestrates this application of force so that a variety of supporting capabilities is complementary and reinforcing--all oriented on achieving campaign objectives.

5-60. The strategic concept of operations of the theater campaign plan imposes requirements on mobilization timing and generation of necessary force capabilities. Campaign planners and mobilization planners must coordinate and integrate closely. Strategic deployment planning focuses on intertheater movement of forces and sustainment of the theater for intratheater deployment, concentration, and employment to support the theater campaign plan. The combatant commander's priorities are the basis for either movement.

5-61. The NCA may direct the use of strategic forces or reserves to support the combatant commander's employment concept. The combatant commander considers that these forces may be apportioned to generate decisive combat power and provide protection and security for deploying theater forces or be used against external threats that could affect the outcome of the campaign.

5-62. Additionally, national-level assets may support the combatant commander's employment concept for conducting information operations (IO). This includes assistance in the areas of operations security (OPSEC), miltary deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), and other special operations within his AOR. This also includes the related fields of civil affairs (CA) and public affairs.

5-63. Each service is responsible for providing personnel, administrative, and logistical support to its forces. The COMASCC, in conjunction with his subordinate COMARFORs assigned to the unified or subunified command, develops supporting plans to provide and maintain adequate logistical support to Army service forces and other forces as directed throughout all phases of the campaign.

5-64. The campaign plan integrates and synchronizes unified, joint, and multinational logistics and support operations. It ensures that logistics and support planning are centralized, comprehensive, and continuous. Although implementation and execution of logistics functions and support are normally a national and, specifically, a Service responsibility, the combatant commander coordinates from among the total U.S., multinational, or interagency or international capabilities and applies or focuses US logistical capabilities necessary to prosecute the campaign.

5-65. In the event that national mobilization of forces accompanies campaign plan execution, special plans and management may be required to ensure available supplies to meet campaign priorities. In addition, as these mobilized forces deploy, planners develop theater distribution plans to eliminate bottlenecks at arrival and intratheater movement points. The combatant commander coordinates and effects support agreements with the host nation and allies for logistics, facilities acquisition, transportation, and other operations support.

CAMPAIGN PLANS

5-66. Strategic decision-making that affects campaign planning occurs at three levels: national security level, national military level, and theater level. At the national security level, the NCA uses the national security system to design national security objectives and guidance reflecting a strategic end state. At the national military level, the CJCS uses sequential planning systems, such as Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES), to provide further national strategic direction affecting the theater campaign planing process.

5-67. A campaign plan is a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective assigned to a JFC. It orients on the adversary's center(s) of gravity; achieves unity of effort with unified action (joint, multinational, and interagency); clearly defines what constitutes success; and serves as the basis for subordinate planning. Two of the most important aspects of this plan are the synchronization of land, air, sea, special, and space forces and the concept for their sustainment. Campaign plans are the operational extension of a combatant commander's

strategic vision and theater strategy. They translate strategic concepts into unified plans for military action by specifying how operations, logistics, and time will be used to attain theater strategic objectives. Through theater campaign plans, combatant commanders define objectives, describe concepts of operations and sustainment, sequence operations, organize forces, establish command relationships, assign tasks, and synchronize forces and functions. Campaign planning is a primary means by which combatant commanders arrange for strategic unity of effort and through which they guide the planning of joint operations within their theater of operations. A campaign plan communicates the commander's intent, requirements, objectives, and concept to subordinate components and joint forces, as well as to parent Services so that they may make necessary preparations.

5-68. By means of a campaign plan, geographic combatant commander's give the NCA and the CJCS information needed for intertheater coordination at the national level. In peacetime, theater campaign plan may be used to justify requirements in the development of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). When the NCA, through the CJCS, directs a combatant command to conduct a campaign, other combatant commands are identified as supporting commands. The supported combatant commander has primary responsibility for all aspects of theater campaign plan development. The supported combatant commander requests capabilities, coordinates with supporting agencies, develops his strategic estimate and intent, then prepares the recommended strategic concept as the preferred course of action, which, upon approval, becomes the basis of his campaign plan. The supported combatant commander provides his plan to supporting combatant

commanders, other government agencies, and subordinates for their use as a basis for developing their supporting plans. Supporting commanders provide requested capbilities or augmentation forces to assist the supported commander in accomplishing the mission.

5-69. Campaigns are normally conducted in a theater of war: total land, sea, and air space. They may be along more than one line of operation. Theater campaigns synthesize deployment, employment, sustainment, and supporting operations into a coherent whole. Theater of war campaigns seek to attain national and/or alliance strategic objectives. If required, theater of operations campaigns normally seek to achieve theater strategic objectives. Though commanders traditionally apply campaigns to conflict and war, they can also design them to accomplish theater strategic objectives in peacetime.

5-70. Campaign planning can be directed by the NCA, assigned in the JSCP, originated by the combatant commander, or undertaken by subordinate JFCs. Existing operations plans (OPLANs) or concept plans (CONPLANs) may provide the basis for development of campaign plans. Theater campaigns are planned before hostilities and guide execution during them. A theater campaign may consist of a sequence of related unified actions designed to achieve the combatant commander's objectives. A single campaign is a phased series of major operations each designed to bring about positional advantage and decisive results from engagements and battles. More than one campaign may be required to accomplish a strategic objective.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING, JSPS, AND JOPES

JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM

5-71. The JSPS is the primary means by which the CJCS, in consultation with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and combatant commanders, carries out his statutory responsibilities to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the Armed forces; prepares strategic plans; prepares and reviews contingency plans; advises the President and Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets; and provides net assessments on the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries. (JP 1-02)

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM

5-72. Although not formally part of JOPES, campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. As stated in Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, campaign planning can begin before or during deliberate planning but is not completed until crisis action planning, thus unifying both planning processes. A campaign plan is finalized during crisis or conflict once the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident. However, the basis and framework for successful campaigns are laid by peacetime analysis, planning, exercises, and applying the principles of campaign planning. (Figure 5-5).

Figure 5-5 JOINT OPERATION PLANNING

DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS

5-73. The deliberate planning process is used to develop joint operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. These planning documents include the Secretary of Defense's annual Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) and the Chairman's Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP provides guidance to all geographic combatant commanders and Service chiefs for accomplishing military tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. Deliberate planning is a highly structured process that is conducted principally in peacetime to develop joint operational plans for contingencies identified in strategic planning. Deliberate planning is assumptive. Planners rely heavily on established assumptions regarding the political and military environment in which the plan may be executed. Plans developed under the deliberate

planning process vary in detail from OPLANs with Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) to CONPLANs with or without TPFDD, to functional plans (FUNCPLANs). At the ASCC level, deliberate planning is normally conducted by the G3, Plans & Policy Division. (See CJCSI 3122.01)

THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLANS (TEPS)

5-74. Army Service Component Commands as part of the shaping aspect of the National Military Strategy will participate in the process of development and execution of Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs). This planning process is to be considered as a new type of deliberate plan. The TEP is based on planning guidance provided in the JSCP. Combatant commanders and Executive Agents for unassigned countries will develop, as applicable, TEPs for their assigned theaters or designated countries for a five year period.

Campaign Planning During the Persian Gulf War

In the spring of 1990, Central Command (CENTCOM) reevaluated its OPLANS for the Persian Gulf region in light of new regional strategic and military situations. A new concept outline was completed in late spring. When the decision was made to deploy forces in response to King Fahd's invitation, this plan was selected as the best option, giving CENTCOM the basis for a campaign plan. While important aspects of the planning process for the contingency that actually occurred were quite well along, more detailed planning for the deployment of particular forces to the region and follow-on operations had only just begun. While a theater strategy and overall theater campaign were written, these documents were never published. However, they served as internal headquarters documents that guided policies and actions. As such they guided the development of the detailed operation plans for the major phases of the overall campaign (COMBINED DEFENSE OF SAUDIA ARABIA, DESERT STORM, and SECURITY AND RESTORATION OF KUWAIT) and their supporting plans that were published.

LTC Doug Kraft

5-75. TEPs will be based on prioritized regional objectives for the combatant commanders to shape the security environment in peacetime with the following objectives:

- Access, interoperability, and regional stability.
- Strengthen coalitions.
- Facilitate the ability to respond.

5-76. TEPs provide linkage between theater strategic objectives and engagement activities. Engagement activity categories, for the purpose of TEP, are:

- Operational activities
- Combined exercises
- Other foreign military interaction, such as:
  - Combined training (i.e. JCETs)
  - Combined education
  - Military contacts
  - Security assistance
  - Humanitarian assistance
  - Other combatant commander designated activities

5-77. The TEP also provides the combatant commanders estimate of the resources required to conduct these engagement activities. The JSCP directs that combatant commander planners use both assigned forces (from the "Forces For" document), those rotationally deployed to the AOR, and those which have historically been temporarily deployed for engagement activities. The COMASCC will make forces of all types available to the supported combatant commander and Executive Agents to conduct and sustain engagement activities. Additionally, COMASCC's are responsible for providing their engagement activity data for inclusion in the supported combatant commander's TEPs.

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING (CAP) PROCESS

5-78. Crisis action planning (CAP) is based on actual events. As the crisis unfolds, assumptions and projections are replaced by facts and actual conditions. Deliberate planning supports CAP by anticipating potential crises and developing joint operations plans that facilitate rapid development and selection of a course of action. If the actual crisis conditions closely match the assumptions in a deliberate plan then the decision making cycle of CAP can be accelerated. CAP is often conducted in a time-sensitive environment so the process is intentionally flexible. The procedures provide for the timely flow of information and intelligence; rapid communication of decisions from the NCA to combatant commanders, subordinate JTF, and component commanders; and expeditious execution planning. CAP places a premium on efficient commander and staff planning dynamics and on concurrent planning between multiple levels of command. At the ASCC level, CAP is normally conducted by the G3, current operations division. (See CJCSI 3122.01)

CAMPAIGN PLANNING PROCESS

5-79. Development of a theater strategy and campaign planning are the main elements of a combatant commander's own theater planning process—his means of providing strategic direction and operational focus. These main elements of theater planning are generally related to the established national systems (JSPS and JOPES) as shown in Figure 5-6.



Figure 5-6 THEATER PLANNING

5-80. The arrows reflect the non-sequential, concurrent and overlapping planning interactions between theater and national level. Derived from national (and when applicable multinational) guidance, the theater strategic estimate and theater strategy provide the conceptual basis for all campaigns and operations within the theater. Much, if not all, of the work in peacetime analysis, wargaming, deliberate planning, and exercises can serve as the impetus for campaign planning. Fundamental elements of operational art are incorporated in deliberate plans to the maximum extent possible. Examples of these elements include: phasing of operations; centers of gravity (both friendly and adversary) and the commander's overall intent and intent by phase. Inclusion of these elements provides the NCA, CJCS, geographic combatant commander with a basis for strategic planning and decision making and helps establish intertheater priorities and coordination. These

elements provide a focus to those who are responsible for implementing the combatant commanders' guidance during crisis action planning when operation orders (OPORDs) are developed and multiple operations synchronized.

THEATER PLANNING ACTIONS

5-81. Combatant commanders use the theater planning actions shown in Figure 5-7.



Figure 5-7 Theater Planning Actions

5-82. At the strategic and operational levels, the actions portray an orderly series of activities and procedures that occur within the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). They assist combatant command planners to sequence the necessary strategic and operational tasks to obtain strategic objectives. These actions capture the elements of campaign

planning and of operational art, and are performed continuously throughout the planning effort. The theater campaign plan must be flexible. It must be able to accomplish its designed purpose and adapt to changing assumptions, guidance, or situations affecting the desired outcome. The plan should be continually reviewed and revised to ensure it does not become outdated, unworkable, or overcome by critical events. In developing a theater campaign plan, these planning actions provide a process the geographic commander and planners use to review and revise the campaign plan. The national or multinational strategic guidance the combatant commander receives from higher authority—whether explicit or implicit—drives the process. Strategic guidance is expressed through National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy relative to the deliberate or crisis-action attainment of strategic objectives and guidance. After receiving strategic guidance and evaluating the theater strategy and strategic estimate, the geographic combatant commander then systematically considers his derived mission, commander's intent, commander's estimate of the situation, strategic concept of operations (including phases), objectives and subordinate tasks, command relationships and organizations, and requirements for supporting plans. After completing a flexible campaign plan, the final link in the process is a determination of the plans: feasibility, acceptability, adequacy, suitability, and doctrinal consistency. This leads back to the national strategic guidance and desired end state or requests for additional NCA guidance or augmentation to ensure that the plan can be successfully executed. This sequence is a simplified outline of a process that is dynamic and nonlinear.

Actions, such as revising intent and estimates, are continuous and concurrent. See JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*.

DERIVED MISSION

5-83. Specified and implied strategic tasks are determined from specific NCA guidance; from national or alliance documents, such as the JSCP, the Unified Command Plan (UCP), or Joint Pub 0-2, or from combatant commander initiatives. From these the essential tasks or theater strategic objectives are determined that form the basis of the campaign's mission statement. Using these guides, the combatant commander derives his theater campaign mission--a strategic mission that accomplishes the purpose of national strategic direction. Initially, the mission may be a general statement of the theater strategic objectives and their purposes, but it may later be refined after specific tasks and phases have been developed and delineated as a result of the commander's estimate. In the derived mission, the combatant commander determines what is to be done and states this derived mission in succinct terms that are understandable to superiors and subordinates alike.

COMMANDER'S INTENT

5-84. The combatant commander next provides guidance to subordinate commanders through his application of operational art and the description of his strategic intent. The commander's intent is a concise expression of the purpose of the campaign and the desired end state. In his intent, the commander clarifies the why element of the mission statement for his subordinates. This helps them pursue the desired strategic end state without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned. This

statement may also contain an assessment of where and how the commander will accept risk as well as the posture of units at the desired end state.

REVISED THEATER STRATEGY AND ESTIMATE

5-85. The national and multinational strategic guidance the combatant commander receives from higher authority, whether explicit or implicit, drives the campaign planning process. Guidance is expressed through national security strategy and national military strategy relative to the deliberate or crisis-action attainment of strategic objectives and guidance.

5-86. The theater strategy must be flexible. It must be able to accomplish its designed purpose and adapt to changing assumptions, guidance, or situations affecting the desired outcome. The supporting strategic estimate should be subjected to continued, detailed review and revised as required so that it does not become outdated, is not overcome by critical events, or does not support campaign planning. Major components of the combatant commander's strategic estimate are strategic direction, the theater strategic situation, strategic concepts, specific COAs, and decisions.

COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE

5-87. The combatant commander's study of the situation, coupled with his review of existing theater strategy and strategic estimate, is a continuous process from which strategic concepts are formulated and COAs are derived to become the basis of the theater campaign plan. In practice, the commander's views, as expressed in the commander's estimate during deliberate or CAP, contribute to NCA deliberations in forming strategic guidance. As a minimum, the commander's estimate will include--

- The mission, situation, and COAs.

- Considerations that affect the COAs.
- Adversary capabilities.
- Analysis of adversary capabilities.
- Comparison of own COAs.
- Recommended COA.

5-88. For each COA, the estimate should address--Military forces required by types of units; for example, an Army corps, an operational-level air defense brigade, or a theater support command (TSC).

- The force providing headquarters.
- The destination(s).
- Required delivery dates.
- A coordinated deployment estimate.
- An employment estimate.
- Strategic lift requirements, if appropriate.

STRATEGIC CONCEPT

5-89. The combatant commander's strategic concepts of operation and sustainment in the theater campaign plan are linked closely and derived from his commander's intent. They accomplish the following:

- Describe the strategic end state and requirements and conditions that constitute that end state.
- Design the theater strategic concept, objectives, and tasks and supporting operational direction, objectives, tasks, and concepts for subordinates to carry out their campaigns or operations.
- Organize joint, single-service, supporting, and special operation forces, in conjunction with multinational or UN forces, interagency organizations into a cohesive, unified force designed to plan and execute subordinate campaigns and operations.
- Retain strategic reserves.
- Establish command relationships.
- Integrate the nation's mobilization, deployment, and sustainment efforts into the combatant commander's employment and logistics concepts.
- Concentrate forces and materiel resources strategically so that the right force is available at the designated times and places to achieve combat power overmatch in order to conduct decisive operations.

- Seek to gain the strategic advantage over the adversary that affords an opportunity to take the strategic initiative through offensive operations.
- Defeat or destroy the adversary's strategic center(s) of gravity to achieve the strategic end state.

5-90. In his strategic concept, the commander describes how he visualizes subordinates conducting campaigns, major operations, and the decisive battle, focusing on the employment of his force as a whole. This description includes conditions to be achieved, sequence of events, and expected adversary reactions to friendly forces as the battle progresses. Above all, the commander should specify the desired military end state--the results he expects the battle to achieve, including effects on the adversary and the desired posture of friendly forces after the fight. The commander should describe how this posture will facilitate transition to future or postconflict operations.

OBJECTIVES AND SUBORDINATE TASKS

5-91. The campaign political-military and supporting military objectives assigned to subordinates by phases are critical elements of the strategic design of the theater campaign. These objectives establish the conditions necessary to reach the desired end state and achieve the national strategic objectives. Combatant commanders focus on national military or multinational strategic objectives to select his theater campaign and supporting military objectives. Subordinate unit commander's, in turn, are assigned specific meausures of effectiveness and tasks. The combatant commander carefully defines the campaign pol-mil objectives to ensure clarity of theater strategic and operational intent and linkage down to specific tasks required to achieve those objectives. See Figure 5-8.



Figure 5-8. Strategic-operational-tactical linkage

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND ORGANIZATION

5-92. The combatant commander organizes the subordinate operating areas within the theater and establishes the command relationships for these areas to support the campaign. Organizations and relationships are based on the campaign design, complexity of the campaign, and degree of control required. Within the campaign planning process, the combatant commander determines the organization and command relationships before assigning tasks to subordinates.

5-93. To establish command relationships the combatant commander must determine the types of subordinate commands and the degree of authority to be delegated to each. This further clarifies the intent of the combatant commander and contributes to decentralized execution and unity of effort. The combatant commander selects the types of subordinate commands from

the six doctrinal options, for example, service components, functional components, subordinate joint commands, etc. The options for command relationships emanate from COCOM and include OPCON, TACON, or support. See JP 0-2 and JP 3-0.

SUPPORTING PLANS

5-94. Supporting plans are prepared by subordinate and supporting commanders to satisfy the requirements of the supported commander plan. Typically, supporting commands plans provide augmentation forces, force enhancements, or functional support such as logistics and communications. Supporting plans should address:

- Processes of force.
- Nuclear operations
- Deployment and redeployment operations.
- Force protection.
- Service support operations.
- Plans for generating and focusing national diplomatic, informational, and economic resources in one or more theaters.

5-95. Supported and supporting combatant command strategic planning must take into account potential adversary NBC weapons employment concepts in developing theater campaign plans as well as in planning for plausible but unforeseeable crises. In particular, campaign and supporting plans must include options for generating adequate and timely force capabilities (including force protection) in the event of early adversary NBC employment in the supported combatant command AOR or other areas.

5-96. Subordinate JFCs may develop subordinate campaign plans or strategic objectives that accomplish (or contribute to the accomplishment of theater OPLANs as required against multiple strategic threats. These may

include subunified and JTF commanders and their staffs. Under exceptional circumstances, the combatant commander may utilize the COMASCC and his HQ as a subunified command. Additionally, the COMASCC or other major Army commander may be tasked to serve as the commander of a joint task force (CJTF). Either of these cases may require senior Army commanders to produce a subordinate campaign plan.

5-97. The combatant commander may also decentralize the joint force by establishing JOAs for subordinate JFCs who have OPCON of Service forces. When directed, subunified or JTF commanders prepare subordinate campaign plans that support the geographic combatant commander's strategic concept and theater campaign plan and contribute to the unity of effort in the theater or JOA. A subordinate campaign plan serves as the key employment plan in these subordinate operating areas. This plan is the basis for planning among the staff and various subordinate Service or functional component commands.

5-98. These campaign plans support the theater campaign plan by achieving specific strategic objectives or by establishing conditions for further operations that lead to the specified end state. They provide the subordinate commander's vision and intent. It does this through broad, operational concepts for operations and sustainment throughout the time frame necessary to achieve the combatant commander's assigned strategic concept and objectives. The plan comprises subordinate forces and designates command relationships, subordinate tasks, and objectives.

5-99. The geographic combatant commander reviews subordinate campaign plans, along with the necessary supporting plans, to ensure they are valid,

synchronized, and support the concept and objective of the theater campaign plan. Appendix D provides an example of a subordinate campaign plan.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING SUMMARY

5-100. Campaign planning is a dynamic and continuous process that occurs in peacetime, conflict, or war. It guides the development of supporting operations or subordinate campaign plans and facilitates the implementation of national strategic direction, priorities, and resource allocations.

5-101. The campaign plan is the basis for action within a hierarchy of decision-making and guidance. That guidance links national security strategy and policy directives found in the theater-level campaign plan to tactical-level battles and engagements. Both levels of campaign plans ensure the linkage of those battles and engagements toward the accomplishment of the desired strategic end state. (See Figure 5-9)



Figure 5-9. Hierarchy of Guidance and Implementing Operations

5-102. In practice, the process is sequential only in meeting formal approval dates. All parties conduct concurrent planning throughout the process, via collabrative tools on GCCS, informal and formal drafts, liaison efforts, and action officer and commanders' conferences or video tele-conferences (VTC).

SECTION IV- MAJOR OPERATION PLANNING

5-103. ASCC and ARFOR commanders, as subordinates to a JFC, and their senior staff officers execute operational art through the design and conduct of

major operations. A major operation is the COMARFOR's coordinated execution of the land operation that is part of a particular phase of a subordinate's or combatant commander's campaign. A major operation sequences Army activities, battles, and engagements to attain operational-level objectives.

5-104. Often the COMARFOR is the supported commander planning and executing a major operation. This impacts in particular on the planning of deep strikes; interdiction; Army airspace command and control (A^2C^2); and reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) within the ARFOR's AO.

5-105. In other circumstances, the COMARFOR is a supporting commander who plans and executes major operations of the campaign. For example, the COMARFOR may be the supporting commander to the joint force air component commander (JFACC) who is the supported commander for the JFC's overall air interdiction effort.

5-106. Frequently, Service or functional component commanders will be simultaneously supported and supporting commanders depending on the joint task performed. For example, the COMARFOR as the JFLCC could be the supported commander for land control operations within a surface AO while being the supporting commander employing Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) in a joint suppression of enemy air defenses (JSEAD) role to the JFACC for offensive counter air.

5-107. COMARFOR operational-level planners develop major operations to support the series of related joint operations as part of the joint campaign plan. These major operations also support the unified operations of the

theater campaign when subordinate missions require a phased, related series of joint operations to achieve campaign objectives. ARFOR plans are phase objective-driven and, include linked measures of effectiveness (MOE) or tasks to units to provide the integrated and mutually supported effort to generate and concentrate combat power at the operational level of war. Figure 5-10 gives an example of combatant command objectives down to ARFOR tasks.

Combatant Command Phase Objectives
(With ARFOR MOE &Tasks)

1. Restore Greenland's pre-conflict Border.
  1.1 Secure Greenland's pre-conflict border
    1.1.1 All Orangeland forces in Greenland expelled, destroyed, or captured.
      1.1.1.1 Maintain Defense
      1.1.1.2 Counteroffensive
      1.1.1.3 Information Operations
    1.1.2 No Orangeland Combat Forces Within 50km Of IGB (PL Gold)
      1.1.2.1 Fix III & IV Corps to prevent movement east of PL Gold
      1.1.2.2 Force movement of withdrawing Orangeland forces west of PL Gold

Figure 5-10 COMBATANT COMMAND PHASE OBJECTIVES

ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT-COMMAND PLANNING

5-108. The COMASCC's planning responsibilities are contingent on the Army's role in supporting theater-level unified operations. These responsibilities can range from planning, to participating in joint operations with other components, to participating in major operations, to planning only for the Title 10 USC support of Army forces of the subordinate joint commands. At Appendix E is an example of an Army major operations plan.

5-109. The COMASCC's responsibilities for conducting major operations depend on how the combatant commander exercises his COCOM options. If the combatant commander elects to exercise COCOM through the ASCC,

then the ASCC serves as the ARFOR to the joint force. This situation would normally occur only in major combat operations when the COMASCC forms a numbered army from his HQ to function as the ARFOR to conduct operations in conjunction with the other Service components. In all circumstances, the ASCC provides Title 10 and joint common user logistical (CUL) support for all Army forces assigned to the theater and to other services as directed. The ASCC HQ plans and conducts major operations as directed by the combatant commander. In those instances where the combatant commander elects not to use the ASCC HQ to plan and execute major operations, the COMASCC, while providing logistical support for the Army forces, also recommends to the combatant commander the proper Army force composition and employment as part of the operational-level commander's delineated requirements.

5-110. When required by the combatant commander, the COMASCC or COMARFOR planners go through a joint nuclear-weapons employment planning and execution process. As the Army does not maintain organic nuclear weapons, U.S. Air Force or Navy delivery systems will provide this support to Army operations. The Army's role includes:

- The COMARFOR's responsiblity for participating in the nuclear targeting and weapons nomination process to include coordination with USSTRATCOM to prevent fratricide and ensure unity of effort.
- The provision by the US Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency (USANCA) of nuclear employment augmentation teams (NEATs) prepared to deploy worldwide, as requested by the COMASCC, to provide offensive nuclear-target analysis, consequence analysis, and operational readiness support to corps and ARFOR headquarters.
- The NEAT-
  - Augments exisiting nuclear planning capabilities already resident at the ARFOR headquarters.
  - Provides expert advice to the commander in the areas of nuclear fire planning and integration with conventional fires,

determination of collateral damage effects, preclusion-oriented target analysis, and force protection and warning measures.

- Work closely with the USTRATCOM TPRC to ensure an Army/joint interface in theater nuclear planning.
- Generally deploys at approximately the same time as the TPRC, but always at the COMASCC's request.
- Is available at all times to assist Army planning staffs at corps level and above in nuclear matters (including orders preparation, exercise participation, OPLAN development, and other staff assistance as required) at the commander's request. See FM 3-12 (100-30), *Nuclear Operations*.

5-111. COMASCC/ARFOR's plan and implement actions to counter potential adversary NBC developments during peacetime and early in crises. These plans and actions require aggressive and integrated ARFOR, joint, multinational, and interagency intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities to identify adversary NBC employment concepts and doctrine, weapons developments, activities at suspected or known NBC storage and production sites, and deployments of operational NBC weapon systems.

ARFOR PLANNING

5-112. During an operation, the ARFOR HQ follows a planning process based upon the Army's military decision making process (MDMP) as described in FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production*, but adapted to interface collaboratively with the combatant commander or JFC's theater planning process. See Figure 3-11 ARFOR Operational Planning Process.



Figure 5-11 ARFOR Planning Process

MISSION

5-113. Key to any planning process is the involvement of the commander. Mission analysis and COA decision briefs are normally given to the COMARFOR as part of the process. To a COMARFOR, a mission is more than expressing what the unit must accomplish and for what purpose. In analyzing the mission, he considers his superiors' intent and battlespace and anticipates the missions that could logically follow from the mission in the campaign plan. Anticipating and staying ahead of change requires the COMARFOR to continuously reassess the stated mission in light of changing strategic and operational conditions. Subordinates still require clear, understandable statements of mission and intent before and during battle. In

assigning missions, commanders consider that nested concepts contribute to the unified effort and dominance of the enemy.

COMMANDER'S INTENT

5-114. After mission analysis, the COMARFOR clearly describes the operation's purpose, the desired end state, the degree of acceptable risk, and the method of unifying focus for all subordinate elements. The COMARFOR's intent contains the intent statement of the next senior commander in the chain of command. The commander's intent is meant to be a constant reference point for subordinates to discipline their efforts. It helps them focus on what they have to do to achieve success, even under changed conditions when plans and concepts no longer apply. For major operations, a clear statement of intent in the planning guidance is essential to successful integration and synchronization of effort, including support operations throughout the depth of the battlespace.

ESTIMATE PROCESS

5-115. Just as at the tactical level, the COMARFOR's continuous estimate assists commanders in choosing the best course of action (COA) and in making adjustments to changing situations during execution. Commanders first develop several valid COAs, then consider the adversary's capabilities, his likely intent and COA, and wargame friendly alternatives to get from the current friendly state to the desired military end state. Once a commander selects a COA, he articulates the operational concept—a description of his vision for the operation. He also begins to formulate ways to support the combatant commander's plan to keep critical participants informed of the campaign, thereby gaining their understanding and support. The result of

the estimate is an accurate assessment of the current enemy and friendly situation, a refined understanding of the mission, and a clear expression of alternatives, which is the basis for the rest of the plan.

5-116. Estimates never stop. COMARFORs continually review the situation by--

- Visiting subordinates and getting their estimates.
- Observing operations.
- Meeting with higher and adjacent commanders.
- Receiving updated intelligence and information about support efforts.

5-117. Commanders revise their concepts accordingly. During the execution of the plan, they may adjust the operation. Estimates include changes in military and strategic conditions as a basis for future missions. Further consideration of estimates is important for resource allocation changes, particularly in support operations.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

5-118. The concept of operations describes how a commander visualizes the major operation unfolding. The concept is based on the selected COA to accomplish the mission, expressing what, where, and how the various subordinate operations will affect the enemy. The concept addresses the sequence and timing of events most likely to produce the desired end state. Sustainment, in particular, can be a dominant factor in the determination of the nature and tempo of operations. COMARFORs answer these questions--what, where, and how--in sufficient detail for the staff and subordinate commanders to understand what they are to do, how they are to fight, and how they are to provide sustainment for the fight. The details of the concept of operations should not be such as to stifle the initiative of subordinates. In

the concept of operations, subordinate commanders describe how they see the actions of each unit fitting together to accomplish the mission. They describe their view of probable adversary actions and how they plan to defeat the enemy. The COMARFOR ensures that his concept is consistent with his intent, the intent of the JFC, which should be nested in the geographic combatant commander's intent and strategic purpose of the campaign. Staff estimates as described in FM 5-0 (101-5).

5-119. Planning products from the JFC's staff are made available as they are approved to ensure parrallel planning takes place. Additionally, based on the JFC's strategic concept tasks and organizational guidance is transmitted to the ARFOR for consideration in its COAs. The plan approved by the COMARFOR is submitted for approval by the JFC and inclusion in the JFC's campaign plan or OPLAN. See Appendix E for a major operations plan model. The primary staff agency for conducting planning in the ASCC HQ is the operations plans group (OPG).

OPERATIONS PLANNING GROUP (OPG)

5-120. The DCSPLANS/G5 staff element from the ASCC HQ is the nucleus around which the ARFOR OPG is normally built. In order to facilitate effective staff planning with full participation from all required areas of expertise, the G5 Plans future planners' form and lead an OPG. This group (Figure 5-12) is composed of staff officers from each of the primary coordinating, functional, and special staff elements as well as LNO's or planners (when required) from each of the ARFOR subordinate commands, and when appropriate, multinational land forces. The OPG meets on a daily basis to develop and disseminate staff planning guidance and schedules or as

required. For example, the OPG meets to prepare for a mission analysis session. They confirm the process and products to be developed and delivered to support this effort. All OPG members return to their respective staff sections to actually conduct a detailed mission analysis. At a pre-determined time, the OPG reconvenes to discuss the results of the mission analysis effort, and decides on the details to be presented to the COMARFOR for decision/approval. The OPG is the planning hub and synchronization center for the ARFOR planning effort throughout all phases of the operation. See Figure 5-12.



Figure 5-12 OPG

5-121. Collaborative planning with higher, lateral, and subordinate HQs is enabled by technology. Video teleconferencing and use of GCCS planning

tools are used by the OPG to remain updated on higher and other Service component planning products as well to involve subordinate planners.

G3 OPERATIONS AND PLANS FUSION

5-122. The ARFOR G3 must ensure that the OPG products are fused with operations. The current operations section of the G3 is responsible for monitoring and controlling the current operation as well as issuing FRAGOs out to 48 hours. Within the G3, a future operations cell may be established for near term (48 to 96 hours) that is also responsible for preparing FRAGOs, branches, and crisis action planning. The future planners (G5, Plans) conduct longer range planning. Future plans involve long term planning and focus on sequels and campaign objective assessment (96 hours or more in the future). Coordinating with all three of these sections is the effects coordination cell (ECC). See Figure 5-14 G3 Operations Fusion.

Figure 5-14 G3/G5 FUSION



SUSTAINMENT OR REINFORCEMENT PLANS

5-123. The capability to sustain the campaign or operation from beginning to end sets the tempo of operations. Sustainment or reinforcement planning--part of logistics-preparation-of-the-theater (LPT) process--identifies and provides the available supplies, equipment, materiel, replacement personnel, and HNS infrastructure to sustain the involved forces according to the combatant commander's concept of operations. LPT plans, developed by logisticians at all echelons, must include provisions for infrastructure development and defense and be consistent with the strategic aims and combatant commander's intent. See Chapter 10. FM 4-0 (100-10), *Combat Service Support* describes the LPT process in detail.

SECTION V - MULTINATIONAL AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONAL-LEVEL PLANNING

5-124. Achieving unity of effort in multinational operations is critical for success. Multinational planners ensure success by keeping plans simple and focused on clearly defined objectives. Understanding the personalities and sensitivities of the senior commanders and the capabilities of each of the national forces is the key to successful leadership in multinational operations.

5-125. Commanders must establish effective working relationships among themselves. They must establish rapport, mutual respect, and unity of effort; use liaison officers; develop standardization agreements; and overcome language barriers. History has shown that it is possible for military leaders

having a wide divergence of cultural backgrounds to cooperate effectively while conducting multinational operations.

5-126. Military capabilities of nations differ based on doctrine, training, and equipment. The multinational force commander (MNFC) must recognize the relative strengths and differences of the multinational force cultures. Decisions on employment must include the capabilities of the multinational force. They must be made in consultation with the military leadership of those forces. The MNFC must carefully balance the allocation of capabilities.

RELATIONSHIP TO CAMPAIGNS

5-127. Campaigns may be conducted within the context of an alliance, coalition, or other international arrangement. Planning is accomplished through U.S., multinational, or international channels. Coordinated planning on such matters as operations, logistics (including infrastructure), intelligence sharing, deception, electronic warfare (EW), communications (including infrastructure), ROE, and diplomatic goals is essential for unity of effort. The preparation of supporting plans addressing coordination and liaison, HNS, and the provision of mutual support are examples of essential tasks that the multinational theater commander must accomplish.

EMPLOYMENT

5-128. During multinational operations, the multinational chain of command performs detailed employment planning. These multinational plans may serve as the basis for the U.S. campaign plan and supporting plans, or the U.S. campaign plan might provide the basis for employment planning of multinational forces. Subordinate commands, such as service and functional component commands, subunified commands, and JTFs, prepare the

necessary supporting plans for the conduct of joint operations that support multinational objectives.

LOGISTICS SUPPORT

5-129. Traditionally, the responsibility for logistics support to national forces remained with the responsible national support element (NSE) of the nations concerned. A multinational support command element (MSC/E) may be established to prioritize and synchronize key logistics support from the nations involved. The logistical objective in a multinational environment is to achieve the greatest degree of logistical standardization that is realistically achievable, given operational constraints, diplomatic and legal demands, and the existing capabilities of the multinational participants. Logistical standardization is affected by such factors as compatibility and interoperability of equipment, interchangeability of combat supplies, and commonality of procedures. Also, planners must develop methods to prevent competition for resources, particularly infrastructure and lines of communication (LOCs), that could adversely affect operations.

5-130. Planners should consider options for contracting, acquiring HNS, obtaining support from other national forces, and integrating such support within the multinational force. These options can furnish critical support and resources that are not available through normal organizational means. Planners should understand and consider rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) during planning.

INTELLIGENCE

5-131. Multinational commands include national and alliance intelligence systems. In keeping with the NCA guidance the combatant commander

receives, intelligence information should be integrated and shared with the multinational command. If possible, the multinational command and other involved national forces must agree on these procedures well in advance of commencement of the campaign. Supporting plans should address such matters as information-sharing, complementary intelligence operations, and liaison. These plans also should address interaction with the multinational intelligence center (when established).

INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

5-132. Interagency operations facilitate the implementation of all elements of national power. Interagency operations are critical to achieving the strategic end state, especially in stability and support operations. The Army often operates in an interagency environment alongside other institutions of the U.S. Government. This occurs when the military is the prime strategic option, as it is in war, but also when other elements of national power are the preferred option and the military assists with forces.

5-133. Army forces must be prepared to conduct a variety of operations with a variety of government agencies, other services, and forces of other nations. These could include stability operations, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), counterterrorism, security, or arms control and verification.

5-134. Interagency operations facilitate unity and consistency of effort, maximize use of national resources, and reinforce primacy of the non-military diplomatic elements. National Security Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1), “Organization of the National Security System" guides participation by all US Governmental agencies in national security.

Oversight of ongoing operations and development of specific political-military plans will be developed by the appropriate regional National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCC). Annex V, will be used to document interagency coordination in joint and Army plans.

5-135. DOD and CJCS coordinate interagency operations at the strategic level for the military. This coordination establishes the framework for coordination by commanders at the operational and tactical levels. In some cases--such as peacekeeping---Department of State (DOS) is the lead agency and DOD provides support. In others--such as peace enforcement--DOD is the lead agency. (See JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*)

5-136. The geographic combatant commander is the central point for planning and implementing theater and regional strategies that require interagency coordination. The combatant commander may establish an advisory committee to link his theater strategy to national policy goals and the objectives of DOS and concerned ambassadors. The combatant commander may establish a joint headquarters to conduct interagency coordination, planning, and execution such as a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF). Military personnel may coordinate with other U.S. Government agencies while operating directly under an ambassador's authority, while working for a security assistance organization or while assigned to a geographic combatant commander.

5-137. Coordination among DOD and other U.S. Government agencies may occur in a country team or within a unified command. Military personnel working in interagency organizations must ensure that the ambassador and

combatant commander know and approve all programs. Legitimizing authorities determine specific command relationships for each operation. The command arrangement must clearly establish responsibility for the planning and execution of each phase of the operation.

INTERAGENCY SUPPORT

5-138. Supporting U.S. departments and agencies also use the combatant commander's campaign plan, strategic concepts of operation, and tasks for subordinates as the basis for determining the necessary support for each phase of the campaign. Supporting agencies as well as subordinate commanders respond to the identified tasks by preparing supporting plans and by submitting them for approval to the supported combatant commander.

NATIONAL AGENCIES

5-139. National-level intelligence organizations are essential to campaign planning and execution because of the need for access to different data bases, reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities, and finished intelligence. During the development of the theater campaign plan, the combatant commander should identify intelligence and mapping support requirements and request support from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and other national-level intelligence agencies. Such other federal agencies include the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the intelligence staffs of the DOS and military services.

5-140. The list of agencies with which the Army may find it necessary to establish linkage varies based on the mission. JP 3-08, *Interagency*

Coordination During Joint Operations, identifies in two volumes the U.S. agencies that must be considered. These agencies can also determine foreign counterpart organizations with which the Army may need to establish linkages. Some of these are:

- Defense Intelligence Agency. The DIA is responsible for coordinating national-level support to the unified efforts of the combatant commander. DIA is also responsible for deploying national intelligence support teams to the theater to facilitate the flow of quality intelligence to the combatant commander. When actual operations commence, increased strategic intelligence support may be provided by a DOD joint intelligence center (JIC) to furnish an integrated defense intelligence position to the combatant commander.
- Defense Information System Agency. The Defense Information System Agency (DISA) is responsible to the combatant commander for the employment of communication resources at designated defense communication system (DCS) entry stations and gateways to terminate long-haul trunks and circuits from the JOA. DISA ensures that the required entry station, gateways, and switching centers have appropriate equipment and cryptographic devices to assure worldwide interoperability of the combatant commander's command, control, communications, and computers (C4) assets.
- Department of State. DOS involvement extends from policy formulation at the highest level to mission execution at the host nation and country team levels. At the country team level, the U.S. ambassador is responsible for directing, coordinating, and supervising all U.S. Government elements, except those under the command of an established U.S. theater commander. Additionally, with the incorporation of the former United States Information Agency (USIA) into the DOS, the Bureau of Public Affairs is responsible for supporting U.S. foreign policy objectives by informing the public in other nations about U.S. programs and policies. Officials of this bureau can advise the combatant commander on the implications of foreign opinion on the execution of present and future campaigns.
- POLAD. At the theater level, the combatant commander may use his political advisor (POLAD) to coordinate with U.S. ambassadors and their country teams to plan and conduct campaigns. Throughout the range of military operations, the ambassador remains an important player in the conduct of unified action. The role of establishing and maintaining interagency linkage to this representative of the President is vital for accomplishing the strategic objectives.

INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES

5-141. The capacity of the nation to expand its industrial base may ultimately have a constraining effect on the campaign plan. The combatant

commander must compare the expected consumption rates with the projected availability of critical supplies or precision guided munitions to ensure that the campaign plan is logistically feasible. To manage projected shortages, the combatant commander may plan to restrict or control the use of critical assets. The combatant commander may recommend that DOD implement industrial production and repair surge for specific shortfall systems or items. See Chapter 10 for more on logistical support.

5-142. As relationships among interagency participants mature, increased effectiveness can result. Interagency operations do not necessarily lend themselves to the joint geographic subarea of responsibility previously discussed. Overlapping operational and interagency boundaries can be a source of confusion.

HOST NATION

5-143. Besides extensive U.S. Government agency coordination, commanders also must fully integrate operations into local efforts when appropriate. Such integration requires close coordination with local government agencies and bureaus; local military, paramilitary, or police forces, and multinational partners. A structure such as a mixed military working group comprised of senior officials of the military and other agencies may assist such an effort and include belligerent parties as appropriate.

5-144. As relationships among interagency participants mature, increased effectiveness can result. Interagency operations do not necessarily lend themselves to the joint geographic subarea of responsibility previously discussed. Overlapping operational and interagency boundaries can be a source of confusion.

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Chapter 6

STRATEGIC RESPONSIVENESS: ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT OPERATIONS

To improve strategic responsiveness, we will enable our Army Service Component Commands to function both as Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) and as Army Force (ARFOR) headquarters. We will enable our corps to function as JFLCCs, ARFORs, and Joint Task Force headquarters.

General Eric Shinseki
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
October 12, 1999

SECTION I - STRATEGIC RESPONSIVENESS

6-1.This chapter will discuss strategically responsive Army Service component command employment during force projection operations as well as operations in peace, conflict, and war. Strategic responsiveness is the ability to establish or reinforce credible forces, when and where required by the JFC, to maintain peace, deter conflict, or win wars. The COMASCC meets the goal of strategic responsiveness -- by ensuring that ARFOR units and personnel are properly trained and ready to respond globally with decisive forces capable of executing prompt force projection and sustained land operations that span the full spectrum of military operations.

6-2.The United States Army is the world's premier land force, but it does not have its own strategic lift. This requires the Army to be strategically responsive to the priorities of the combatant commanders. The COMASCC has to ensure that Army forces-including active and reserve-based in the

continental US (CONUS) or overseas-generate and sustain maximum combat power at the time and place JFCs require. to conduct operational maneuver.

6-3. The Army represents a significant portion of the potential military power of the nation. The U.S. uses its military power to compel an adversary to accede to U.S. will. That potential power deters opponents from taking actions hostile to U.S. interests. Peaceful employment of military forces reassures our allies, demonstrates our capabilities, promotes stability, and contributes to our ability to influence international outcomes.

PRESENCE AND DETERRENCE

6-4. Sustained Army force presence promotes a secure environment in which diplomatic and economic programs designed to reduce and causes of instability can flourish. Presence can take the form of forward basing, forward deploying, or pre-positioning assets. Army forces can establish and maintain a credible presence as long as the NCA direct. Army force presence, as part of theater engagement, often keeps unstable situations from escalating into war.

6-5. Army forces are the cornerstone of theater deterrence. The sustained presence of strong, capable ground forces is the most visible sign of US commitment -- to allies and adversaries alike. However, if deterrence fails, committed forces must be agile enough to transition to combat operations. Ideally, deterrent forces should be able to conduct decisive operations immediately. However, if committed forces lack the combat power to conduct decisive operations, they conduct shaping operations while additional forces deploy.

SECTION II - CRISIS

6-6. A crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to the U.S., its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of U.S. forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (JP 1-02).

6-7. During deliberate planning or crisis action planning (CAP), geographic combatant commanders prescribe, in time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) format, who, what, when, and where forces will be deployed. Based on these initiatives and a unit's ability to accurately identify its movement requirements, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) conducts a transportation feasibility review to best determine how units move to meet supported combatant commanders movement requirements.then identifies how the unit will move to meet *National Military Strategy* objectives.

6-8. With the knowledge that extended force closure times may directly increase the domestic and coalition support risks for a particular crisis, commanders rigorously discipline their strategic lift requirements to that needed for the operation. During the deployment process, U.S. forces are most vulnerable to significant casualties. Therefore, as closure times extend, the duration of a crisis extends, increasing the risk of casualties.

6-9. A crisis can occur in peace, conflict, or war. In peace, a crisis can be precipitated by a natural disaster or civil disturbance, resulting in a threat to civil authority. In war, the threat focus can be directed at the sovereignty of a

nation. The extent to which the Army is prepared to respond to a crisis can significantly influence the eventual outcome.

RESPONSE

When crises develop and the National Command Authorities (NCA) direct, combatant commanders respond. If the crisis revolves around external threats to a regional partner, combatant commanders employ Army forces to deter aggression and signal US commitment. If the crisis is caused by an internal conflict that threatens regional stability, US forces may intervene to restore or guarantee stability. Operation Restore Democracy, the 1994 intervention in Haiti, is an example. In other cases, regional stability requires Army force presence to guarantee postconflict agreements. Ongoing operations in the Sinai and Bosnia exemplify this sort of stability operations. Stability operations that respond to crises are smaller-scale contingencies (SSC) and may include both developmental and coercive actions. *Developmental* actions enhance a host government's willingness and ability to care for its people. *Coercive* actions apply carefully prescribed force or the threat of force to change the security environment.

6-10. Adaptive planning is required to ensure favorable outcomes. At the theater level, the geographic combatant commander is responsible for developing a range of response options. These response options are not limited to the military instrument of national power but include economic, diplomatic, and informational alternatives. The requirement for interagency cooperation and multinational considerations is evident.

THE ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY GOAL

6-11. The Army strategic mobility goal is to transform the Army with the capability to provide a strategically responsive force of up to corps size with the following mobility standards:

- A light or airborne, brigade-sized force to be inserted into a theater in 96 hours once in receipt of an execute order with the remainder of that division in 120 hours. This force, including its personnel and equipment and logistical support structure, would be transported largely by air.
- An Army prepositioned afloat (APA) heavy combat brigade to close into the theater and be ready to fight not later than 15 days after the start of deployment. This force would be organized into force modules, tailoring them to meet the combatant commander's needs.
- By C+30 the remainder of four additional divisions to include the logistical support structure, would close in theater. The equipment for this force would transit primarily by sea.
- Air transport is the currently preferred mode of transport for all rapid crisis response personnel; however developments in high-speed sealift may permit personnel to deploy with their eqiupment

6-12. Deterrence is preferable to war. Effective deterrence can prevent escalation of a crisis. Deterrent action can resolve a crisis on favorable terms. When the opportunity exists, the use of a deterrent action, such as a show of force, can send a clear signal of U.S. resolve to intervene should the threat of unfavorable crisis resolution continue.

USE OF FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS

6-13. JP 1 states that to deter or defeat aggression and other challenges to its interests, the United States must be able to employ variable combinations of of the instruments of national security policy. Therefore, the United States maintains capabilities and plans to exercise tailored mixes of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments to reinforce deterrence and cope with the outbreak of conflict. These flexible deterrent

options (FDO) call for detailed peacetime planning by the combatant command, component commands, and other supporting agencies involved. Many of these options are under control of nonmilitary agencies. Senior military leaders are responsible for providing advice and recommendations on the military aspects of FDOs to the NCA. The COMASCC is responsible for preparing and employing trained, ready, and exercised ARFORs when the options are put into action.

- FDOs should facilitate an early decision by laying out a wide range of interrelated responses that are rapidly executable before potential threats can harm U.S. interests. They are specifically designed not to put U.S. forces in needless jeopardy if deterrence fails.
- Combatant commanders should plan to combine FDOs using military forces and resources with diplomatic, informational, and economic actions by non-DOD agencies to demonstrate U.S. resolve. The intent is to give the NCA a wide range of options, encompassing all the elements of national power to deter or forestall the onset of a crisis.
- Force enhancements (FEs) are covertly conducted force enablers designed to provide increased ability to counter critical enemy capabilities and reduce in-place vulnerabilities. FEs are usually not announced and may consist of increasing the alert posture or manning levels of units or activities that "officially" remain at those levels all the time.
- Combatant commanders may request FEs conducted without fanfare to reduce perceived vulnerabilities or to augment an intelligence, protection, logistics, communication or staff capability.

6-14. Sometimes, deterrent actions do not prevent the continued escalation of a crisis. The combatant commander requires an Army capability to rapidly project combat-ready forces. The goal of these forces is to deter conflict or, should deterrence fail, to win quickly, decisively, and with minimum casualties. This Army requirement demands a responsive, deployable, agile, lethal, versatile, survivable, and sustainable force. (See FM 3-0 , *Operations*).

SECTION III - CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

6-15. A contingency is the employment of military forces in response to an emergency caused by natural disaster, terrorists, subversives, or required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require rapid plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. (JP 1-02). Like crises, contingency operations can occur in the environments of peace, conflict, and war.

6-16. A contingency may be a unique, stand-alone event in response to a natural disaster or a man-made event or change in the direction (branch) of an evolving campaign or major operation. Within a campaign or major operation, a branch is a contingency plan for the deviation of operations from the base plan. It is a result of chance or uncertain events that are identified as crisis triggers.

6-17. COMASCCs assess their potential requirements for operations. During this assessment, they anticipate the probability of an occurrence of a particular contingency, and they develop plans (operations plan (OPLAN) or operation plan in concept format (CONPLAN) to respond to that contingency. If a crisis occurs, the commander updates the OPLAN or CONPLAN and converts it into an operations order (OPORD) for execution. The characteristics of a contingency operation include crisis situations, National Command Authorities (NCA) involvement with U.S. national interests at stake, and operations that require a rapid military response.

UNIQUE REQUIREMENTS

6-18. COMASCCs must understand and address additional requirements that are unique to contingencies. Rapid deployment, crisis action, and time-sensitivity all contribute to the unique nature of contingency operations. Successful contingency operations, as in all military operations, require detailed planning and aggressive, synchronized execution.

6-19. Some particularly important characteristics of contingency operations include --

- Rapid strategic response and projection of military power.
- Forcible-entry capability.
- Forces tailored to the situation.
- Unambiguous command relationships.
- Modular command and control structure with split-base capability.
- Thorough coordination among all forces (joint and multinational) and interagency organizations.
- Timely, responsive intelligence and tight OPSEC.
- Lethality for early entry forces -- hold enemy forces at risk, protect the force, deter.
- Sensitivity to the diplomatic implications of the military operation.
- Quick resolution (win early with minimal casualties).
- Major impact of national and international news coverage.
- Effective instant communications with attendant interest by the NCA and senior service leadership in any operation.
- Effective theater air and missile defenses to provide force protection and ensure the security of lodgment areas and protection of U.S. and multinational forces and interests.
- Under the national security strategy, the requirement for possible redeployment with subsequent employment in another theater.
- Establish intransit visibility (ITV) of the deploying force

RAPID RESPONSE AND PRECLUSION

6-20. A critical component of successful stability operations is the ability to rapidly respond in the early stages of an imminent or ongoing crisis. Prompt

deployment of sufficient forces in the initial phase of a crisis can preclude the need to deploy larger forces later. Effective intervention can also deny adversaries time to set conditions in their favor or accomplish destabilization. Deploying a credible force rapidly is the initial step in precluding or blocking aggression. However, deployment alone will not guarantee success. Achieving successful preclusion involves convincing the adversary that the deployed force is able to conduct decisive offensive and defensive operations.

6-21. The preferred model of a *coup de main* (an offensive operation that capitalizes on surprise and simultaneous execution of supporting operations to achieve success in one swift stroke-JP 1-02) remains Operation Just Cause. In this operation the US Army emphasized overwhelming and paralyzing strikes throughout the depth of the battlespace resulting in

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

Operation Just Cause began in the early hours of 20 December 1989, as a United States joint force conducted multiple, simultaneous strikes in the Republic of Panama. Elements of the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps formed the core of the U.S. Southern Command's Joint Task Force (JTF) South in this force-projection operation. Forward-presence forces from US Army South (USARSO), special operations forces (SOF), parachute assault forces, and air elements of the joint force simultaneously attacked or secured 27 critical objectives throughout the depth of the JFC's and enemy's battlespace. The synchronized attack of enemy command and control (C^2) facilities and troop concentrations paralyzed and crushed the Panamanian Defense Force. The objectives included U.S. family housing areas and critical U.S. facilities, which JTF South secured during the attack on Panamanian forces. American forces established effective control of most Panamanian military targets and much of the infrastructure within 24 hours, with limited casualties

The redeployment of conventional forces to CONUS began before the joint staff terminated Operation Just Cause. Elements of the 82d Airborne Division departed Panama as USARSO continued efforts to secure outlying regions and reestablish law and order in the country. These critical Army crisis-response forces returned to home stations to reestablish quickly their peacetime readiness posture. Historians may declare Operation Just Cause as the first war of the 21st Century. The speed and scope of the force projection, the simultaneity and depth of attacks at all levels of war, across the full spectrum, and the rapid reconstitution of national strategic capabilities provide a model for future conflicts.

minimal losses and rapid strategic conclusion.

ASCC RESPONSIBILITIES

6-22. The Army has a major responsibility to execute a variety of contingency operations. This responsibility requires the commander and his staff to exercise operational art in applying joint and Army doctrine in a highly charged, time-sensitive environment. This ability is of particular importance to the ASCC commander in theater.

6-23. While the contingency operation may be somewhat limited in duration, scope, and intensity, the COMASCC, in conjunction with the combatant commander and the other component commanders, sequence offensive, defensive, stability and support operations to achieve the desired end state. This sequencing includes close coordination with Department of State (DOS) to ensure that stability and support operations enable diplomatic objectives after completion of offensive and defensive operations.

6-24. The COMASCC has the following responsibilities relating to contingency operations:

- Training and sustaining the force to conduct operations required by the geographic combatant commander.
- Preparing the Army portion of the TPFDD through JOPES.
- Installing, operating, and maintaining signal capabilities enroute and in theater that are interoperable with joint, multinational, and/or interagency systems.
- Exercising operational control (OPCON) of assigned and attached forces
- Coordinating with other component commanders to ensure effective and efficient conduct of operations.
- Monitoring the operational situation and passing information to the commander of the joint task force (CJTF).

- Planning and conducting operations according to JFC guidance and detailed plans.
- Ensuring administrative and logisitics support to include establishing ITV as required and as directed by the JFC.
- Establishing liaison with the JFC and other joint organizations, multinational organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs), or other government agencies.
- Coordinating with supporting commanders to redeploy the force effectively to home stations or to another theater.
- Planning and coordinating with supporting organizations to reconstitute the force effectively. This may require the use of operational project stocks.
- Coordinating effective support of the media and use of public affairs (PA) assets.
- Ensuring the units comply with federal, state, and local (to include host nation) environmental and pollution abatement requirements.

FORCE TAILORING

6-25. Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix and sequence of units. Units identified for rapid deployment may have little opportunity to tailor forces. They must standardize, as much as possible, an early entry force package based on anticipated deployment requirements. These packages should include configured and basic loads to be included on the TPFDD. Pre-designated load plans should be tailored to match anticipated contingencies. These force packages should include sufficient combat power to sustain and protect them for the short term, wherever they might go. Follow-on forces can then be tailored to meet the specific concerns of the long-term mission.

6-26. Tailoring focuses on the vertical integration of the force, ensuring that capabilities are matched in the proper combinations and sequence at the various echelons of command. Tailoring the force include force allocation, force augmentation, and force refinement. Generally a commander tailors a

subordinate force. For example, the COMASCC may tailor a deploying corps by augmenting with additional operational-level chemical or ADA units. During the tailoring process, a commander balances the capability necessary to accomplish the mission with the speed of deployment to ensure the deploying force is operational and sustainable upon arrival in the AOR.

6-27. Commanders pay special attention to strategic lift, pre-positioned assets, as well as HNS and theater contractor support availibility in their analysis of the factors of METT-TC as they tailor their forces. For an unopposed entry operation, for example, an COMASCC might schedule logistical support, theater protection and special operations units to deploy early, particularly if faced with limited HNS and infrastructure. Faced with a forcible entry operation, the COMASCC would tailor his flow and mix differently, placing the right mix of combat units in the early deploying echelons. Commanders might find they need to substitute one type of unit for another or add units that have never trained together. Whether planning for major conflicts or smaller scale contingencies, commanders must select a force composition appropriate for the mission, build the team, and plan for simultaneous deployment and expeditious employment of the force.

FORCE ALLOCATION

6-28. Commanders tailor a force to ensure the size, capabilities and C2 are sufficient to accomplish the mission. This process begins with the allocation of basic Service force capabilities to the combatant commander. Normally, the US Army's basic force capability is a maneuver unit -- a corps, division, an armored cavalry regiment, a SF group, or a strategically responsive

brigade combat team. In stability or support operations, however, the basic force to be employed may be an ARSOF, logistical support, information operations, or theater protection unit. Examples of these are: SF, CA, or PSYOP; a medical or a water purification; a signal or MI element; or a MP or ADA battalion.

FORCE AUGMENTATION

6-29. Force augmentation rounds out the basic force with specialized capabilities. Army force structure is designed so that at each echelon of command there is a set of capabilities that generally augment it from the next higher echelon. Operational or "above-the-line" forces have associated supporting or "below-the-line" augmentation requirements.

6-30. Several units and capabilities must augment a deploying Army Pre-Positioned Stocks (APS) brigade in order for it to accomplish its mission. These capabilities augment the organic capabilities of the basic force. They are not normally assigned to the brigade although they may be placed under operational control of or in direct support (DS) or general support (GS) to the brigade during the course of the operation. This is an open ended list and must be tailored to meet any new mission requirement.

- Attack Helicopter Battalion, AVIM Slice, ATS element, Airfield Engineer Fire Fighting unit
- Air Cavalry Troop(s), AVIM Slice
- Signal Company (MSE)
- Additional intelligence capabilities (personnel and equipment)
- Effects Coordination Cell
- Chemical Recon Platoon (Fox, BIDS)
- Shorad battery(ies)
- Div TAC CP

- Tactical PSYOP detachments
- ARFOR staff augmentation
- Other considerations include additional CS/CSS units, Civil Affairs units and/or planning augmentation, Interpreters, COLT Tms for Coalition members, BCD/ASOC, LNOs.

FORCE REFINEMENT

6-31. The basic force and its general augmentation must they be refined to reflect the multiple limitations of the projected operation. Force refinement is an iterative, continuous process that includes a wide range of participants throughout the Army and the joint community. Force refinement involves METT-TC adjustments, force sequencing, and staff tailoring.

6-32. METT-TC Adjustment. The basic force and its general augmentation must now be subjected to a METT-TC analysis to determine how it must change to account for the realities of the planned operation.

6-33. Force Sequence. The COMASCC in coordination with the JFC and the other Service component commanders must balance the factors of METT-TC against available lift to determine the appropriate sequence of a deploying force. Finding the proper balance between projecting the force rapidly and projecting the right mix of combat power and resources for the ultimate mission is critical. The COMASCC must seek a balance that provides protection, efficient deployment, and a range of response options to enemy activity. Lift availability is always a constraining factor, so difficult trade-off decision are routine. The COMASCC and his staff closely coordinant with the JFC to ensure that the ARFOR has the requisite capability upon arrival in the JOA and that all command and support relationships are established and clearly understood. These vertical relationships are key, for if a capability is

rescheduled in the deployment flow, then its associated capabilities should shift as well. The COMASCC should avoid uncoordinated changes when possible to reduce the amount of turbulence to pre-existing TPFDDs. TPFDD turblence erodes strategic responsiveness.

6-34. ASCC staff sections may be assigned responsibility for providing input to a mission TPFDD for selected types of units related to their staff function. For example the Chemical Staff officer should provide tailoring input for all operational level chemical units such as BIDs, recon/decon, or the Technical Escort Unit (TEU). The JOPES branch of ASCC G3 plans is responsible for preparing the staff and subordinate input into the ARFOR TPFDD for inclusion into the JFC TPFDD. See CJCSMs 3122.01, 3122.02, and 3122.03.

6-35. Commanders not only tailor units, they also tailor staffs. The standard peacetime staff may undergo significant changes both in size and organization to meet the METT-TC conditions of a contingency. The staff and headquarters (HQ) of the Third US Army/ARCENT for example, underwent a dramatic evolution upon its deployment as the HQ of Coalition/Joint Task Force KUWAIT, during Operation Desert Thunder in 1998 in Southwest Asia. To gain the personnel necessary to round-out the staff, it must identify its specific requirements to its higher headquarters. This sets in motion a series of requests that are either filled by the next higher headquarters or passed up the chain of command. Frequently these requirements are filled by individual augmentees or appropriate small teams.

FORCE REFINEMENT PARTICIPANTS

6-36. ARFOR refinement is an iterative process that includes Army representatives at the DA staff, ASCCs, and ARFOR. While every situation is unique, the general participants are shown in Figure 6-1.



Figure 6-1

Figure 6-1. Force Refinement Major Participants

SECTION IV - FORCE PROJECTION OPERATIONS

POWER AND FORCE PROJECTION

Decisions made on the front end concerning what to shape will directly affect fighting effectiveness on the other end. Not enough stevedores and ship-handling equipment forward early enough in the building of the theater might delay the unloading of combat vehicles and ultimately defeat the intended purpose of putting the [combat] vehicles on the ground first.

Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War by Robert H. Scales

6-37. Power projection is the ability of the U.S. to apply any combination of economic, diplomatic, informational, or military instruments of national power. An effective power-projection capability serves to deter potential adversaries, demonstrate U.S. resolve, and carry out military operations anywhere in the world. Force projection is the ability to project the military element of national power from the continental United States (CONUS) or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations. Force projection operations extend from mobilization and deployment of forces to redeployment to CONUS or home theater (See JP 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations and* FM 3-35 (100-17), *Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, and Demobilization).*

6-38. Force projection operations are undertaken in response to a crisis. That crisis can occur in isolation, as would be the expected case in MOOTW. But a crisis also can occur during the conduct of a major operation during hostilities. Force projection operations can be received as a series of processes that occur overlapping or sequentially. When the contingency occurs during

the conduct of a major operation, these processes assist in both resolving the crisis and in returning the contingency forces back into the ongoing operation as rapidly as possible. For the Army, force projection is the demonstrated ability to alert rapidly, mobilize, and deploy full spectrum Army forces to conduct joint, multinational, and interagency operations anywhere in the world from CONUS or forward-deployed locations.

6-39. The five processes of force projection -- *mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment*--provide the general structure for a force projection operation and can be adjusted to fit the needs of a particular contingency (See FM 3-0) . Execution of these processes may not be distinct. (See Figure 6-2).



Figure 6-2. Force Projection Process

6-40. Deployment activities, for example, might be so closely followed by decisive operations as to be indistinct and will usually begin well before the entire force has closed. Commanders and staffs must consider the--

- Coordination of sequencing and phasing of forces (manuever, operational support, operational protection, SOF, and C^2/IS/ISR)
- Requirement and time frame to establish and build up the theater base.
- Protection of forces, to include rear area security operations (rear area rapid reaction force).
- Preparation time for deployment, operational readiness--types of units and their readiness.
- Combatant commander's critical items list in the TPFDD flow.
- Requirement and level of in-theater stocks.
- Host nation capability and availability.

6-41. Any particular force projection operation may not include all of the processes. For example, a force projection operation may be the first phase of an evolving major operation. Redeployment of all forces may not begin until the end of the subsequent phases of the major operation, of which the force projection was a single phase.

PROCESS I - MOBILIZATION

6-42. Mobilization is the process of augmenting the active force with Reserve Component units and individuals in support of preparing for war or other emergencies. Mobilization must be an integral part of all planning efforts from the initial warning indicators through demobilization. Unity of effort for mobilization request, authority, planning and execution factors are captured in Joint Pub 4-05, *Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning* and Joint Pub 4-05.1*, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operation: Reserve Component (RC) Callup*. The Army

Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES) is the guide for planning and participating in the JOPES.

6-43. Our national mobilization capability rests its flexibility with a graduated response framework for achieving the desired mobilization level in response to early ambiguous or explicit warning of an emerging national security emergency. The five levels of mobilization are *selective mobilization, Presidential reserve call-up, partial mobilization, full mobilization and total mobilization*. These options need not be executed sequentially and are part of the graduated mobilization response. Units and individuals typically mobilize through five phases: *planning, alert, home station, mobilization station, and port of embarkation*. FM 3-35 (100-17), discusses mobilization in detail.

PROCESS II - DEPLOYMENT

6-44. For joint and army force projection operations, four major phases comprise the deployment process: predeployment activities, movement to and activities at POE (fort to port), movement to POD (Port to Port), and JRSOI.

PREDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES

6-45. This is a critical phase of the deployment process for which units throughout the total force train. The COMASCC recommends to the geographic combatant commander the size and composition of the ARFOR required to support the mission, including forces that support assembly and deployment of the force. Additionally, the COMASCC establishes ITV and identifies the lift requirements to move the ARFOR and requirements for

reception and onward movement upon arrival in the theater of operations. The COMASCC's recommendation is based on the assessment of the operational environment. That assessment is continuously revised to reflect the dynamics of the initial reception and onward movement operations in the theater of operations.

6-46. The COMARFOR maintains the Army's operational-level perspective within the JTF for the contingency. The attainment of strategic or operational objectives requires sequencing of Army operations. In force projection contingency operations, the COMARFOR must keep this operational perspective, even if he conducts separate tactical operations directly for the JFC. However, the overall attainment of the strategic objective will require sequenced combinations of offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations requiring an operational-level perspective.

6-47. The CJTF's primary Army advisor for this perspective is the COMARFOR assigned to the JTF. This commander provides an operational-level perspective to the JFC during planning, deployment, employment, and redeployment. During planning, the COMARFOR must receive a clear definition of the desired strategic and military end states from the JFC. Because of the inherent dynamics of the force projection environment, considerable effort may be spent defining the military end state as a subset of the strategic end state. The strategic end state includes those diplomatic considerations that inevitably accompany contingencies over which the Army commander may have little direct control.

6-48. In addition to ends, the combatant commander assigns the ways and means for mission accomplishment. His COMASCC advises him on Army

requirements to employ effective and efficient Army means. The NCA and the combatant commander influence the ways, in the form of constraints and restrictions, for the COMARFOR. For example, the combatant commander may direct the seizure of objectives with psychological, rather than military, significance and may establish specific ROE. Once the COMARFOR clearly understands the ends, ways, and means for the contingency, he begins the planning process in earnest or adjusts exiting plans.

6-49. Based on the combatant commander's concept of operations, the COMASCC reviews all existing OPLANs and CONPLANs for suitability. He updates and adjusts these plans to develop an OPORD. Existing CONPLANs and lessons learned from the joint and Army repositories (Joint Universal Lessons Learned System [JULLS] and the Center for Army Lessons Learned [CALL]) should be the starting point when conducting crisis planning. If no suitable plan exists, the COMARFOR OPCON to the JTF develops OPORDs, using the time-sensitive or CAP procedures outlined in CJCSM 3122.

6-50. The COMARFOR develops his contingency OPORDs based on the maximum capability the enemy can generate. In a crisis caused by a natural disaster, the enemy becomes the threat to human life and safety and the potential for damage to the environment. The COMARFOR conducts parallel, but more detailed, execution planning with the JFC and normally issues a supporting Army OPORD with detailed instructions to subordinates. Concurrent planning occurs at all Army echelons involved in the contingency.

6-51. The COMARFOR issues immediate warning orders to all subordinate units. Because of the time-sensitive nature of contingency operations and the crisis-action system, information must get to the appropriate unit as rapidly

as it becomes available. Subordinate units must recognize that they may not receive complete OPORDs from their higher headquarters until late. Subordinate OPLANs based upon earlier warning orders must be flexible enough to adapt to the evolving contingency operations.

6-52. Therefore, horizontal and vertical coordination must occur between staffs so that plans can be made concurrently. Liberal use of warning orders should be used so that subordinate commanders can begin work.

6-53. Certain planning considerations are critical during this phase. Anticipatory logistics requires appropriate commanders to project support requirements and synchronize support actions with tactical organizations. This action is necessary to ensure combat power can be sustained or reconstituted as required. The COMARFOR ensures the JFC has all the information needed to make knowledgeable decisions on lift prioritization and requirements for establishing ITV over moving forces. Finally, as with all operations, operations security (OPSEC) must not be sacrificed, despite the urgency of the crisis situation.

6-54. An important task facing the COMARFOR is the organization of his staff and the Army augmentation of the JFC's staff to support the planning and execution of the force projection operation. The makeup of the JTF staff should reflect the composition of the operational forces. If the JFC's mission is largely an Army mission, Army personnel should be appropriately represented in the staff. The Army contribution to the JTF may include Army maneuver forces (light or heavy), special operations forces, operational protection forces, or operational logistical and personnel support forces.

CONSIDERATIONS AT THE OUTSET OF OPERATIONS

6-55. At the outset of operations a key task is the establishment of protection against NBC attacks in the operational area and in other areas providing forces and sustaining capabilities. The goals established to carry out military responsibilities in this phase of operations include prevention of adversarial use of NBC weapons either in the United States or abroad, rapid and uninterrupted force preparation and deployment, and comprehensive force protection. These goals should be reflected in joint operation planning, development of branches in campaign plans, redundant assignments of mission essential tasks to forces, and visible exercises that ensure peacetime preparedness and may thereby deter potential adversaries.

6-56. In the design of campaign and operation plans for operations in NBC environments, the JFC should include integrated operational concepts that achieve the maximum synergy from the complementary contributions of all force elements. These operational concepts should reflect AOR-specific NBC threats and the general principles of operations in NBC environments.

6-57. In the transition to war or early stages of hostilities, the NCA may place a high priority on neutralizing enemy NBC capabilities in order to counter the operational threat to US and multinational forces and civilians, limit the coercive potential of NBC attacks, and generally reassure multinational partners, particularly in the theater.

6-58. Allocation of forces is not static. As the theater matures, continuous reassessment of the allocation of forces and the priorities attached to passive defense, active defense, and counterforce operations will be required.

Reallocation of forces and priorities will be affected by changes in the nature and scope of the NBC threat, build-up of forces in the theater, transition from build-up activities to sustained operations, and US and multinational operational tempo. The Army augmentation package given to the JTF staff should reflect the proportional balance of the JTF force package. If the joint staff is not sufficiently and appropriately augmented, the COMARFOR must spend more effort advising the JFC on the capabilities and limitations of the Army force. Therefore, ARFOR likely to conduct force projection operations should have designated augmentation cells automatically push forward to support JTFs. See Figure 6-3.

Considerations During Predeployment

The COMASCC tailors the force based upon the mission assigned and the resources available. He is responsibile for informing the JFC when allocated means do not ensure the probability of success. If he is the joint force land component commander, he also plans for the integration of all land forces allocated to the operation.

The ASCC headquarters ensures that it integrates effectively with the joint communications plan. The COMASCC ensures he has access to the defense communications system (DCS). Some links require specific hardware when the joint force headquarters and core staff are from another service. This communications link must be redundant and apply in all of the functional areas, not just in the maneuver control function.

The ASCC headquarters must coordinate the use of space assets to support the operation. Some considerations include optimizing communications and global positioning systems and receiving current weather satellite data. Additionally, the headquarters must arrange for requirements for rapid response satellite image maps and terrain analysis products.

Theater intelligence organizations are critical to Army preparation. They provide the interface among tactical forces and the joint and national agencies that provide supporting intelligence. These Army organizations must link their intelligence networks into all sources. The COMARFOR ensures he receives an intelligence *push package* and liaison officers for intelligence products.

Army commanders ensure adequate liaison officer (LNO) representation at higher, lower, and adjacent organizations. These LNOs must be of appropriate rank and experience to be effective. LNOs during force projection operations are particulary important because each contingency is likely to be unique, and the organizational requirements are normally *ad hoc*. This type of situation demands rapid communication channels between different units and other service elements that have not had the opportunity to train extensively together. LNOs assist in rapidly establishing these important communication channels.

Figure 6-3. Predeployment Considerations

6-59. The initial response force is the product of a combination of the JTF and the Army's corresponding tasks, along with the lift that has been made available to conduct the necessary strategic and operational movement. Other factors include the capabilities of the host nation to support an ARFOR on either a long- or short-term basis. Finally, the contributions of alliance or

coalition forces shape the initial response by ARFOR. The supported combatant commander's decision on the composition of this force requires the COMASCC to project future events. The COMASCC seeks to maintain versatility, a flexible force mix, and the ability to generate superior combat power, sustainability, and the necessary internal lift capability.

MOVEMENT TO AND ACTIVITIES AT POE.

6-60. POEs include seaports of embarkation (SPOEs) and aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs). USTRANSCOM is the DOD-designated single worldwide manager for common-user ports of embarkation and debarkation.

6-61. Because CONUS deploying units generally require a combination of organic and common-user (including commercial and allied and/or coalition assets) transportation assets to move required personnel and equipment to POEs, movement to POEs within CONUS is a shared responsibility between the Services, other supporting combatant commands and USTRANSCOM. Organic lift movements are normally executed under unit control and coordinated by the deploying unit's transportation managers with designated movement control agencies. Commercial movement to a POE within CONUS is arranged by a unit's installation transportation officer (ITO) or transportation management office (TMO) under the authority of the Defense Travel Regulation to meet the timelines in the POE call forward message. It is at this point that ITV is established over deploying units.

6-62. Movement to OCONUS POEs is the responsibility of the geographic combatant commander whose theater POEs are being used to support the deployment operation. In the event theater movement requirements exceed

theater capability, theater airlift assets can be augmented with USTRANSCOM common-user assets at the request of the geographic combatant commander.

6-63. Activities at POEs focus on staging, marshalling, and loading individuals, units, equipment, and materiel on designated transportation assets prior to movements to PODs. Load planning is driven by the deployment concept and lift assets supporting deployment, the anticipated operational environment, and the anticipated situation at the POD to receive, offload and reassemble mission capable organizations.

6-64. During deployment, units are echeloned, configured, and scheduled for movement based on TPFDD that synchronizes arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel with mission needs. Time phasing allows for rapid theater reception and onward movement of arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel.

MOVEMENT TO POD.

6-65. PODs include seaports of debarkation (SPODs) and aerial ports of debarkation (APODs). Movement to PODs can be conducted using common-user and organic or assigned and/or attached lift assets.

6-66. Movement to PODs on common-user transportation is planned and executed by USTRANSCOM in consultation with the supported and supporting combatant commanders. USTRANSCOM's primary responsibility is to ensure operational effectiveness in support of the JFC's deployment requirements while striving to attain the most efficient utilization of transportation resources. As units move to POD, ITV allows movement data

to be reported over the Gobal Transportation Network (GTN). Alternatively, movement to PODs on organic or assigned and/or attached lift is the responsibility of the deploying unit commander, in response to mission guidance from the supported JFC.

6-67. Successful deployments are characterized by careful planning and flexible execution. Careful and detailed planning ensures that only required personnel, equipment, and materiel are scheduled for movement, unit movement changes are minimized, and the flow of personnel, equipment, and material into theater does not exceed lift availability and the theater reception capability. Alternatively, intermediate staging bases may be used if movement directly to PODs can't be achieved.

INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASES (ISB)

6-68. An intermediate staging base (ISB) is a secure logistics and personnel support base established near to, but not in, the area of operations. While not a requirement in every case, the ISB can provide a secure, high throughput facility when circumstances call for it. An ISB may be used as a temporary staging area en route to a joint operation and/or as a long-term secure forward support base. An ISB may serve as a secure transportation node that will allow the switch from strategic to intra-theater modes of transportation and provide a staging area where units can redistribute and finalize their accompanying loads. It would take advantage of existing, sophisticated capability, serving as an efficient transfer point from high volume commercial carrier to a range of tactical, intratheater transport means which can serve smaller, austere ports. This would then confront the adversary

with an uncertain, wide-ranging access capability of the deploying force thus enhancing our strategic responsiveness. An ISB can also be used by the US Army in conjunction with the JFC to pre-position selected logistics and personnel support capabilities for rapid deployment into the JOA and to perform limited logistics and personnel support functions such as materiel management, selected maintenance support, etc., that has routinely been performed in the COMMZ. ISBs can also serve as a secure staging area for redeploying units, NEO evacuees, etc., until strategic lift is made available for deployment/evacuation to final destinations. Use of ISBs, when operationally feasible, will allow joint forces to minimize in-theater logistics and personnel support footprint and reduce the strategic lift requirement, thus enhancing the combatant commander's ability to rapidly meet the operational requirements. As a general rule, logistics and personnel support activities that can be performed efficiently at home station or an ISB should not be deployed to the AO. As soon as the lodgment has been expanded and the tactical situation permits, the JFC may establish a theater base within the AO as part of the JRSOI process to replace the ISB.

6-69. The selection of an ISB is a JFC decision. However, if the Army is tasked to operate the ISB, it should have a critical role in the selection process. The ISB should accommodate sufficient Army forces, logistics and personnel support elements, and joint support to enable projecting the force into the AO. The ISB should be secured against long-range engagement systems, including missile, SOF, and terrorists and outside the adversary's political sphere of influence. The location of the ISB is influenced by the factors of METT-TC. As a minimum, there is one staging area for each

airport and seaport reception complex. However, the size of the deployment, the host nation infrastructure, and the requirement to adequately disperse the arriving force may compel the COMASCC to establish multiple staging areas.

JOINT RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION

6-70. In a force projection environment, the ability to execute a mission largely depends on the speed with which forces assemble at the required location. JRSOI is the essential process that transitions deploying forces, consisting of personnel, equipment, and material arriving in theater, into forces capable of meeting the combatant commander's operational requirements. Maintaining ITV and promoting efficiency in JRSOI facilitates preparations for operations by providing adequately resourced, mission-capable forces to execute the combatant commander's mission. While JRSOI is a joint operation, it is also a significant ARFOR activity in both execution and in support. The four segments of JRSOI are described below.

- Reception: The process of unloading personnel and materiel from strategic transport, marshaling the deploying units, transporting them to staging areas, if required, and providing life support to deploying personnel.
- Staging: The process of assembling, holding, and organizing arriving personnel and equipment into units and forces, incrementally building combat power and preparing units for onward movement, and providing life support for the personnel until the unit becomes self-sustaining.
- Onward Movement: The process of moving units and accompanying materiel from reception facilities and staging areas to tactical assembly areas (TAAs) or other destinations within the AO, moving arriving non-unit personnel to gaining commands, and moving arriving sustainment materiel from reception facilities to distribution sites.

- Integration: The synchronized transfer of authority over units and forces to a designated component or functional commander for employment in the theater of operations.

6-71. The supported combatant commander is responsible for JROSI. This includes all actions required to make arriving units operationally ready and then integrating them into the joint force. The capability of strategic lift to move personnel, equipment, and materiel to the reception points (e.g., the PODs) must be matched by the capability to receive and process the force. The combatant commander must have ITV of the deployment flow to control the rate as well as the sequence of deploying forces.

6-72. JRSOI is a critical operational challenge that relies on a logistical architecture for successful execution. Even self-sustaining units that arrive in-theater are heavily dependent on logistic systems until they are reunited with their equipment. As deploying units assemble, efforts focus on preparing for future operations and integrating into the joint force. Successful JRSOI requires command emphasis in planning, training, synchronization, establishing and maintaining ITV, and attention to detail. JRSOI is an integral part of an operation and enhances employment potential.

6-73. The Army operational-level focus is on the RSO portion of JRSOI. The COMASCC and subordinate COMARFOR must ensure that JRSOI planning and support meet the operational requirements as laid out in the theater campaign plan. The theater support command and its area support groups are normally responsible for planning reception operations for units arriving in the theater. These commands also coordinate for HNS to meet operational requirements. They also plan and coordinate security requirements. While reception operations are underway, key facilities such as APODs, APS equipment and materiel, ammunition, fuel, and personnel holding areas are

protected. Planners must recognize that reception assets are high-priority targets and plan accordingly. See FM 4-01.8 (100-17-3) and JP 4-01.8, *JTTP for JRSOI* for more detailed information on this subject.

PROCESS III - EMPLOYMENT

6-74. The employment process encompasses the occupation of the initial lodgments in the operations area through decisive operations, to post conflict operations. The COMARFOR sequences his resources into the operations area to create the conditions for decisive operations. This sequencing includes joint mobility of operational forces that seek to gain a positional advantage.

6-75. The COMARFOR coordinates the movement of intertheater or intratheater forces into the operations area. Opposed-entry combat activities may take place during this stage. The COMARFOR deploys operations and support forces into the contingency area and establishes C^2 to provide initial lodgments. While the focus during the phase is the deployment of forces, operations may be required to secure simultaneous entry zones that ensure force protection into the contingency area. See Figure 6-4

Considerations During Entry Operations

The COMARFOR coordinates all joint mobility assets required to deploy his forces and materiel. He requests support in a mission format to the JFC. He does not specify numbers and types of transportation.

This mission-type requirement to the USTRANSCOM avoids confusion and allows for a greater number of options for deployment. Specific requirements may be necessary and should be articulated by the COMARFOR to the USTRANSCOM in terms of numbers of personnel, types of equipment, and required time schedule. The COMASCC's staff works closely with the USTRANSCOM to ensure that the lift provided meets the specifications of the Army force. ITV must be in place to ensure awareness of the status of the force.

The COMARFOR, in conjunction with the JFC, tailors the entry force to accomplish specific operations in preparation for follow-on forces during this phase. This force may or may not participate in the following stages of the contingency. The entry force C^2 structure evolves as the operation progresses. A need exists early on for an operational-level C^2 element. This headquarters unburdens tactical-level leaders and permits them to focus on the tactical-level operations for which they were designed.

Figure 6-4. Entry Operations Considerations

PROCESS IV - SUSTAINMENT

6-76. Sustainment involves providing and maintaining levels of personnel and materiel required to sustain combat for the duration of the operation. Sustainment and ITV are necessary throughout the entire operation. Logistical support will normally be split-based between CONUS and OCONUS locations. The role of personnel and logistical support in this process can be found in Chapter 10 of this manual and FM 4-0 (100-10).

PROCESS V - REDEPLOYMENT

6-77. In this process, the force prepares for future operations. The force may be redeployed to its home station, to a staging base, or to another theater for

subsequent operations. In addition, the COMARFOR reconstitutes his force, within his capabilities, to ensure flexibility for future operations. (Figure 6-5)

Considerations During Redeployment

The COMARFOR controls the flow of Army assets out to the operations area. There is a natural inclination to redeploy all forces out of the area as quickly as possible upon the completion of tactical operations. This may be the CINC's stated objective, but it has diplomatic ramifications. The COMARFOR must find a way to balance this objective with his requirement to conduct restoration operations. He does this by gaining additional guidance from the JFC, who in turn reconciles objectives with the geographic combatant commander.

The COMARFOR may change several times as the Army forces are reduced and their composition changes. Once the JTF is dissolved, the COMASCC assumes the remaining Army missions.

Figure 6-5. Redeployment Considerations.

6-78. Redeployment operations encompass four phases: recovery, reconstitution, and preredeployment activities; movement to and activities at POE; movement to POD; and JRSOI to include demobilization.

RECONSTITUTION

6-79. Reconstitution consists of those actions that commanders plan and implement to restore units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources. Reconstitution consists of two major subsets: reorganization and regeneration. Reorganization is a shift of resources within a degraded unit to restore its combat effectiveness. Regeneration, or rebuilding a unit, requires a large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies. Because of the intensive nature of regeneration, it occurs at a regeneration site after the unit disengages.

6-80. COMASCCs and COMARFORs plan to control reconstitutions two echelons up from the unit being reconstituted. No resources exist solely to perform reconstitution. Reconstitution planning and execution are proactive. ASCC and subordinate ARFOR planners must consider the impact on reconstitution operations of operations in environments of weapons of mass destruction.

6-81. The ASCC is concerned primarily with the regeneration option of reconstitution – the rebuilding of a unit through the large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies; the establishment of C^2; and the conduct of mission-essential training for the newly rebuilt unit. The ASCC must ensure adequate time and resources are allotted to the ARFOR in order to properly conduct reconstitution operations. The ASCC draws from the CONUS base or forward deployed permanent support base, using inter-theater and intra-theater assets based upon the mission of and priorities set by the combatant commander.

6-82. A reconstitution planning cell is located in the ASCC DCSOPS/G3 section reflecting reconstitution as primarily an operational decision. This cell plans for the reconstitution operations in preparation for future operations. The ASCC employs the cell as part of the reconstitution assessment and evaluation team (RAET) that performs liaison functions and assists the ASCC in implementing detailed reconstitution efforts. The reconstitution planning cell may be employed as part of the C^2 of the reconstitution task force.

6-83. The senior ARFOR logistics headquarters, to include dedicated support received from the theater materiel management center (MMC), will be deeply

involved in replacing equipment and supplies. Reconstitution of the force requires an extensive reallocation of resources and skills. Depending on the type of unit being reconstituted, any or all of the ASCC's specialized commands may be required to provide personnel and equipment as directed by the ASCC. For more details on reconstitution, see FM 4-100.9 (100-9), *Reconstitution.*

REDEPLOYMENT

6-84. The ASCC and subordinate ARFOR plan and execute redeployment to effectively meet requirements in the context of the joint campaign. The ASCC and subordinate ARFOR G-3 and G-4 planners integrate redeployment planning into the joint force planning early in the process.

6-85. Several factors complicate redeployment planning and execution. First, the unit must normally be reconstituted either to re-establish unit integrity for movement to home station or to meet combat effectiveness standards of the supported combatant commander if redeploying to a new theater. In addition, redeployment priorities, based on the combatant commander's guidance, must be fully integrated into plans for post-conflict operations. For example, forces for refugee support or demining operations may be the last to return to home station. On the other hand, for a redeployment to a new theater, priorities may be driven by the requirement to reconstitute and strategically move forces needed by the supported combatant commander. Units redeploy as directed by COMASCC/ARFOR consistent with joint movement center (JMC) schedules. For a detailed discussion of redeployment operations see FM 3-35 (100-17) and JP 3-35.

MOVEMENT TO AND ACTIVITIES AT POE.

6-86. Movement to a POE within the theater is the responsibility of the supported geographic combatant commander. Redeploying units will comply with the supported combatant commander's policy for redeployment, movement control plan, use of AIT devices, and the orders provided by theater movement control agencies.

MOVEMENT TO POD.

6-87. Movement to PODs can be conducted using common-user and organic or assigned and/or attached lift assets. Movement by organic or assigned and/or attached lift is the responsibility of the redeploying unit commander in accordance with mission guidance from the supported JFC.

6-88. Demobilization occurs when units, individuals, and material transfer from active to reserve status. Demobilization planning starts concurrently with mobilization planning. Demobilization of some units or individuals may occur at the same time others are being mobilized, deployed, or redeployed. Demobilization is accomplished in those primary activities, preliminary actions, and execution. As with mobilization, detailed planning and execution guidance for demobilization is provided in Joint Pub 4-05, *Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning*, Joint Pub 4-05.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Callup*, and FM 3-35 (100-17), *Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization*.

SECTION V - ARMY OPERATIONS IN PEACETIME

6-89. Peacetime is a state in which the diplomatic, economic, informational, instruments of national power take precedence over the military instrument. Since peacetime is the preferred state of affairs, how well the Army accomplishes its missions in peacetime is vital to US national interests.

6-90. The Army's responsibilities in peacetime are as important as its traditional combat roles. COMASCCs are always postured to present a deterrent to external threats to US national interests or to perform noncombat missions in support of theater engagement. See Figure 6-6



Figure 6-6 Notional ASCC in Peacetime

6-91. ASCC peacetime operations are primarily stability or support operations. These may include, but are not limited to peacetime military

engagement, security assistance, and foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to include consequence management.

PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

6-92. Combatant commanders shape their AOR through peacetime military engagements (PME). Peacetime military engagement encompasses all military activities that involve other nations and are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. It includes programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to shape the international environment, improve mutual understanding with other countries, and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. Peacetime military engagement activities are designed to support a combatant commander's objectives as articulated in the theater engagement plan. Combatant commanders synchronize their TEPs with country plans (prepared by US ambassadors) and integral defense and development strategies that support theater objectives. COMASCCs contribute to all three, usually as partners with host nation forces and in coordination with civil agencies.

6-93. Army forces in theater are ideally suited for PME with host nation land forces. Army. forces are equally suited for contacting and positively influencing host nation civilian populations. The objectives of PME are to-

- Open communications
- Increase interoperability
- Foster regional military professionalism
- Demonstrate by example the role of the military in a democracy

6-94. Reciprocal military-to-military contact is the primary method of executing ASCC conducted PME. Examples include multinational training exercises, joint contact team programs, individual training exercises, medical and engineer projects and exercises, and staff exchanges. The reciprocity concept means all sides-US forces, host nation forces, and international partners-benefit.

6-95. Although developmental in nature, PME activities promote regional stability. They are conducted (planned, prepared, executed, and assessed) like other stability operations. However, PME uses only cooperative actions to accomplish combatant commander objectives. Successful PME activities preclude US forces from having to conduct coercive stability operations.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

6-96. The Army conducts security assistance operations to provide military articles, training, and defense related services authorized by statute law. Security assistance is a key element of US foreign policy, with DOS as the lead federal agent supported by DOD. These operations are strictly controlled by law. COMASCCs must be careful not to commit the US government to providing any assistance that could be construed as security assistance without following the statutory requirements. The in-country security assistance office (SAO) is the military focal point for formulating, planning, and executing these programs. Combatant commanders make significant contributions, to include supervision, support, selection, and command of SAOs. The COMASCC contributes to developing assistance requirements. CONUS-based units are usually called upon to provide security assistance

training teams. In some ASCCs, forward based in theater units may also be tasked to provide the training when available. Security assistance officials, in some circumstances, may direct the ASCC to transfer military hardware or material to foreign nations in response to a crisis requiring a surge of military support.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES

6-97. The US accelerates security assistance when a friendly or allied nation faces imminent threat. In these surges, operations usually focus on logistical support. Geography, the magnitude of the logistics effort, and time limitations determine airlift and sealift requirements. US support to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War illustrates this kind of operation. The geographic combatant commander responsible for the AOR involved may direct his COMASCC to provide equipment from his command as part of security assistance surges. The COMASCC may also provide some of the logistical support (port operations and line haul transportation units etc.) and force protection assets needed to transfer surge equipment to the friendly nation.

FOREIGN CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT (CM)

6-98. Another noncombat support operation that an ASCC may be involved in peacetime is consequence management. Foreign consequence management consists of interagency assistance to mitigate damage resulting from the employment of NBC weapons by national, transnational, or sub-

national actors or the release of NBC contaminants due to natural disasters, failures in industrial safeguards, and other non-malicious circumstances.

6-99. Commanders of geographic unified commands must plan for in-theater consequence management They also coordinate military support to domestic emergencies within their AOR. For Hawaii, Alaska, and US territories in the Pacific, PACOM has responsbility. For Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands, SOUTHCOM is responsible.

6-100. COMASCCs will be called up to provide military support to foreign consequence management operations in which the State Department is the Lead Federal Agency (LFA). ASCCs may be designated as the primary HQ to provide a JTF – Consequence Management within a combatant commander's AOR. For overseas incidents, JFCOM is responsible to provide technical advice and assistance with "reachback" to national level technical assets to supported combatant commanders conducting CM operations. A Joint Technical Augmentation Cell (JTAC) may be dispatched from JFCOM within 12 hours that has representatives from the USMC Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF); the US Army Soldier, Biological and Chemical Defense Command; Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); and the Armed Forces Radiological Advisory Team (AFRAT).

6-101. Potential foreign CM support actions that the Army may be tasked to provide include:

- Transportation and communications
- Shelter, food, and water
- Mass care, health, medical services
- Urban search and rescue support
- Hazardous materials response

- Power generation

6-102. See JP 3-07.6, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance* and CJCSI 3214.01, *Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations.*

PEACETIME PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

6-103. Military decision-making and planning processes also apply to stability and support operations. The operational-level commander faces unique planning considerations because of the nature of stability and support operations. Areas that require special planning considerations include interagency cooperation, parallel and continuous planning, intelligence, and constraints and restraints placed on the operation.

6-104. Gaining cooperation among the multitude of participants is a formidable task. The operational-level commander unifies the efforts of all participants operating within his battlespace by attempting to reach agreement on common goals and objectives. Consensus on goals and objectives requires an understanding of the roles, missions, and capabilities of each participating member. Additionally, both national and international representatives of the media will likely cover the operation. Facilitating their mission keeps the Service member, the local populace, and the international community apprised of the situation and may contribute to the achievement of national aims and objectives.

SECTION VI - ARMY OPERATIONS IN CONFLICT

6-105. In conflict, the ASCC executes a variety of stability or support operations that contribute to the achievement of theater-strategic goals.

These may include operations begun in peacetime, as well as before, during, and after hostilities. Frequently, these operations are in response to a crisis. Army forces conduct several types of stability operations during conflict: peace operations, foreign internal defense, security assistance, support to insurgencies, combating terrorism, noncombatant evacuation, and shows of force. (FM 3-0, *Operations*). See Figure 6-7



Figure 6-7 Notional ASCC for SSC

6-106. JP 3-07 describes Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), as encompassing a wide range of similar military actions to deter war, resolve conflict, and promote peace. MOOTW may include limited offensive and defensive operations conducted by Army units, but the overall weight of effort is generally on stability and support operations. The COMARFOR's role in stability and support is critical to achieving strategic success. Like the decisive phase of combat, most of these operations are land-based. Consequently, the COMARFOR functions as the central integrator of

a joint and multinational team. His challenges include ambiguous threats, unpredictable conflicts, ad hoc staffs and force packages, as well as a multitude of nonmilitary participants. The COMARFOR prepares for a mission of unknown duration and anticipates changes in its nature and scope. To ensure success, he applies operational art executed within the framework of the fundamentals of Full Spectrum Operations. He achieves his desired end state by carefully planning, integrating complementary capabilities with other agencies and organizations, and using landpower in versatile ways. Transitions may have no clear division between combat and peacetime activities, may lack definable timetables for transferring responsibilities, and may be conducted in a fluid, increasingly diplomatic environment. See JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Oprerations Other Than War* and FM 3-07 (100-20), *Stability Operations and Support Operations.*

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

6-107. The requirement to evacuate noncombatants from an overseas theater can arise at any time across the range of military operations. In several areas of the world, the US has considerable numbers of forward-deployed forces. They are often accompanied by their family members. In even more areas are large numbers of government civilian employees and private citizens who need to be evacuated before or as soon as hostilities commence. NEOs normally occur with little advance warning time and therefore, they must figure prominently in transition-to-war plans. Only with extensive, detailed planning and realistic rehearsals can evacuation time be minimized. The ASCC and its subordinate commands are normally responsible for ensuring

noncombatants are transported to departure points where they can be evacuated from the theater. To secure departure routes and holding areas for noncombatants, they must have identified assets. To allow for safe and expeditious evacuation with minimum exposure to ongoing or anticipated combat operations, the senior movement control organization makes the route selections while logistics headquarters designate the holding areas. See JP 3-07.5, *JTTP for NEO* and FM 3-07.5 (90-29), *NEO Operations*.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS DURING CONFLICT

6-108. Parallel planning is essential. Ideally, this begins with the NCA decision to commit military forces. The uncertainty surrounding the mission requires commanders to simultaneously begin planning at all levels. Parallel planning provides planners with the ability to influence task organizations, mission statements, and force caps and obtain access to critical strategic intelligence early in the planning process. The operational-level commander must participate in the development of end states, conditions, and measures of effectiveness (MOEs). He must understand the diplomatic, economic, and social objectives of the operation before determining the military end state and sequencing operations to achieve it. Clarity of mission and desired end state is critical.

6-109. Intelligence is the key to force protection in stability operations. The Army operational-level commander acquires and disseminates information on the country, the people, and the diplomatic, economic, and military situations. Key items of information are shared with members of participating civilian organizations, who in turn can be vital sources of

intelligence. Continuous access to strategic intelligence and reliable low-level sources is paramount to situational understanding.

6-110. Rules of engagement (ROE) reflect operational, legal, and policy considerations. They are continuously assessed at the operational-level considering the current mission, friendly force capability, the adversary, and the operational setting. ROE are the commander's tool for controlling the application of force. See (S) CJCSI 3121.01A, Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces (U).

6-111. The COMASCC must conduct a continuous estimate process. He operates in a dynamic environment. Changes in strategic objectives, operational constraints, or the nature of the adversary are examples that may invalidate the initial mission analysis. Operations, intelligence, personnel, and logistics estimates are constantly updated as new information becomes available. The commander's continuous estimate process serves to integrate the parallel planning and estimate processes ongoing in each functional area.

6-112. The COMASCC obtains clear, strategic guidance on constraints and restraints early in the planning phase. He determines his authority and capability to enforce local laws and assesses restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence. Excessive force could impede the attainment of operational goals and hamper the efforts to maintain legitimacy and obtain international acceptance. Disciplined forces, measured responses, and patience are essential to successful outcomes.

INTEGRATION OF COMPLEMENTARY CAPABILITIES

6-113. The COMASCC integrates and synchronizes complementary capabilities within his battlespace during stability operations conducted in a conflict. Establishing cooperation among many participants is demanding; integrating their capabilities is even more so. The simultaneous application of complementary strengths, concurrently conducted at all levels, provides the necessary leverage to achieve the desired end state. The key to developing this leverage is the ability to establish unity of military and civilian efforts. Without a formal interagency command structure, commanders ensure unity of effort through leadership. They must demonstrate the logic and soundness of their solutions and the competence of their execution. Robust liaison is critical in this role. Providing assistance to other participants promotes integration of their unique capabilities. COMASCC/COMARFORs enhance their integration efforts by--

- Collocating their headquarters with local and regional governments.
- Establishing civil-military operations centers (CMOCs).
- Aligning military and diplomatic boundaries.

6-114. By planning, implementing, and continuously updating a complementary joint and interagency concept, COMARFORs integrate diplomatic, military, and economic power across all dimensions of the environment during conflict.

TRANSITION TO WAR OR OTHER OPERATIONS

6-115. The COMASCC/COMARFOR plans stability and support operations anticipating the requirement to transition to another, similar operation or even war. The experiences of the entire US Army in the 1990s set the

precedent and demonstrate the challenges of remaining prepared for war, while conducting frequent stability or support operations.

6-116. These noncombat operations operations require flexible leaders with versatile, agile forces. The operational-level commander must be able to address a wide array of missions against a multitude of diverse threats. His versatile force must be capable of fighting and winning our nation's wars, yet it must be fully capable of transitioning from warfighting to other operations. Rapid changes in the strategic situation may force sequential commitment from one theater to another; while changes within the same theater may require a transition from one type of operation to another. Activities such as nation assistance, humanitarian support, and disaster-relief operations may continue when higher levels of violence arise. Commitments to stability or support operations may precede combat, follow combat, or flow readily back and forth between the two.

SECTION VII - OPERATIONS IN WAR

6-117. In war, the COMASCC provides the geographic combatant commander full dimensional, highly capable land forces to be integrated into the war winning joint force. With asymmetric and mutual support from the other components, land forces can move quickly to deter the adversary from establishing forces, thereby precluding the adversary from gaining an operational advantage. Through the conduct of sustained operations, land forces can control people and land, contribute to defeating the adversary and establish self-sustaining postconflict stability. (JP 3-0).

6-118. Guided by an understanding of battle command and the time-tested principles of war, COMARFORs combine the tenets of operations with the elements of combat power to conduct full-spectrum operations. He recommends force projection into theaters; links strategy and campaigns to major operations and tactics; integrates assigned and supporting joint capabilities effectively; and transitions smoothly from crisis back to peacetime. The COMARFOR also understands all aspects of the combatant commander's intent. More than merely comprehending the Army or land force role in the joint operation, he understands the planning considerations of the other Service operational-level commanders and ensures a mutual understanding and contribution to the accomplishment of all subordinate missions. He also realizes that the joint team shares limited resources. The geographic combatant commander's vision for the campaign provides direction for the allocation of these limited resources. Most significantly, the COMARFOR recognizes that theater success requires more than the success of a single Service component; it requires unified success of the joint team, as directed by the combatant commander. (See FM 3-0)

DECISIVE OPERATIONS

6-119. A rapid buildup of force capability is the focus of decisive operations phase of a theater campaign. This buildup includes establishing a forward-operating base, closing the remainder of the force, expanding the lodgment, linking up with other joint forces, and establishing multinational and interagency linkages. Decisive combat power is positioned to win the war rapidly by synchronizing and simultaneously engaging enemy forces throughout the depth and space of the operational area. Force protection

becomes increasingly important during decisive operations. Reconnaissance assets are focused to provide the COMARFOR with an accurate picture of the enemy force actions and intentions. OPSEC ensures the protection of the force in part by preventing the enemy reconnaissance from gaining similar information on friendly forces. Deception operations complement OPSEC by painting a false picture of the friendly force's intentions. Effective air and missile defense remains a priority during this phase of the operation. Chem/Bio detection is a must in theaters with that threat. See Figure 6-8.

Considerations During Decisive Operations

The COMARFOR adjusts his plan based upon the situation. No plan survives intact, but a flexible one is adjusted quickly to allow for changes. Adjustments to the plan affect other portions of the operation. This is particularly apparent when adjusting the flow of personnel and equipment into the area. Changing lift priorities may have extensive impact on employment operations during a subsequent stage.

The COMARFOR receives additional forces during this phase. He ensures adequate airports and seaports of debarkation are available and that the force is equipped as required. He marshals and stages the additional forces in preparation for decisive operations and establishes ITV infrastructure at all movement nodes.

The COMARFOR determines if resources are adequate to decisively accomplish the mission. He recognizes the dynamics of the operational environment and adjusts plans and operations to reflect those changes. He makes specific recommendations to the JFC within the constraints and restraints of the operation.

The COMARFOR receives personnel and logistics support from his Service chain or from organic assets. The COMARFOR tasked with the support responsibility stages support resources forward to support the operation. This support includes directing the efforts of Army organizations temporarily tailored for the specific operation. The COMASCC, in conjunction with the ARFOR commander, develops intermediate staging basing (ISB), if required. ISB may be located offshore afloat or in a third country close to the contingency area.

The CINC establishes movement control for the Army assets to the AO. He sets the priority for ARFOR entry and supervises the operational movement. He works closely with subordinate JFCs to enforce lift priorities. The supervision of lift into the contingency area becomes a critical task for several reasons: lift into the contingency area may be constrained, planned lift assets may be diverted, or the lodgment area may have limited reception capability. The sequencing of resources into the AOR becomes a critical task for the COMARFOR.

Figure 6-8 Decisive Operations Considerations

COMPLEX OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

6-120. FM 3-0 provides guidance for ARFORs executing full spectrum operations in environments that contain complex operational considerations. While all operations include challenges, several complex operational considerations require special attention by COMARFORs and staffs:

- Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) environments.
- Local populace and displaced persons.

- Unconventional threats.
- Urban operations.

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL ENVIRONMENTS

6-121. The threat of WMD profoundly changes theater conditions and imposes major force protection requirements. A major JFC objective is to deter WMD deployment, and if deterrence fails, to find and destroy enemy WMD before they are used. The potential for destruction or contamination of infrastructure by NBC weapons increases the requirement for Army forces that can operate effectively in and around contaminated environments. To a significant degree, the readiness of an ARFOR to operate in NBC environments deters enemies from using WMD and encourages them to seek solutions that avoid the risk of strategic retaliation.

6-122. Operations in NBC environments demand careful preparation. Vaccines protect soldiers against some biological weapons, but inoculations may need weeks to fully protect recipients. Therefore, protections against these weapons becomes part of the continuous process of keeping units ready. In similar fashion, soldiers may receive medical countermeasures, such as pretreatment before the operation or antidotes during the operation. Medical surveillance programs provide tactical commanders with a tool to develop a baseline of disease threats in the AO. This baseline aids in detecting when the enemy begins biological warfare. (See JP 3-11; FM 3-11)

6-123. NBC defense force structure and force development activities are the responsibility of individual Services. Combatant commanders remain aware of the salient factors that pertain to NBC defense requirements and the COMASCC's responses to their requirements. The combatant commander is

responsible for ensuring proper placement of NBC defense assets in theater in advance of a crisis or conflict, and in the TPFDD prepared to support movement to the theater. In particular, the combatant commander should be cognizant of any significant shortfalls in the capability or availability of NBC defense assets.

6-124. ARFOR units require equipment specifically designed for operations in an NBC environment as well as NBC defense units to mitigate its effects. NBC operations are logistically-intensive; therefore, sustaining operations require careful planning.

6-125. The psychological impact of WMD affects leaders and soldiers at all echelons. COMARFORs and staffs must be prepared to conduct operations in an NBC environment. Failure to exercise command and staff procedures in scenarios featuring realistic use of NBC weapons can lead to a mentality that NBC hazards present insurmountable obstacles. Only tough command post exercises that force ARFOR commanders and staffs to work through the problems NBC hazards pose can overcome this attitude. Realistic training demonstrates that NBC hazards, like any other condition, are simply obstacles to overcome.

6-126. Successful US operations may increase the likelihood of enemy WMD use. If the enemy believes that only WMD will retrieve victory, he may resort to using them. COMARFORs adjust operations accordingly. Rapid maneuver places forces near the enemy, compelling him to risk employing WMD on his own forces. Army forces disperse as much as possible and concentrate swiftly, and only as necessary to mass effects. Nonlinear operations position Army forces deep within the adversary's areas,

complicating his targeting decisions. Precision attacks destroy adversary C2 and CSS systems. Commanders emphasize active and passive force protection. They disperse assembly areas and CSS units. ISR focuses on locating and identifying WMD-capable enemy forces. Reconnaissance units detect and mark hazardous and contaminated areas. Planning also considers US retaliatory or preemptive strikes. Other active measures include theater missile defense, counterair operations, precision fires against enemy WMD systems, and offensive IO.

LOCAL POPULACE AND DISPLACED PERSONS

6-127. ARFORs create opportunities for success by enlisting the support of the local populace and displaced persons. Frequently, ARFORs operate in AOs characterized by chaos and disorder. They may encounter populations with diverse cultures and political orientations that may support, oppose, or remain ambivalent to US presence. Whatever the type of operations, ARFORs will likely encounter displaced civilians or persons of unknown status. COMARFORs identify these people and design operations with their protection in mind.

6-128. COMARFORs depend on accurate knowledge of group locations and beliefs to ensure actions taken are consistent with achieving JFC goals and objectives. IO and its related activities help commanders influence perceptions and attitudes of the local population. In some operations, IO and its related activities may constitute the decisive operation. The importance of influencing civilians varies, depending on the mission and force objectives.

6-129. The cornerstone of successful action with neutrals is discipline. When ARFORs operate with the local populace, discipline cements the relationship. In circumstances where the populace is ambivalent or unfriendly, discipline prevents tension from flaring into open hostility and fosters respect. ROE guide the use of lethal force, not to inhibit action and initiative but to channel it within acceptable limits. The disciplined application of force is more than a moral issue; it is a critical contributor to operational success.

UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

6-130. COMASCCs protect Army forces in theater from unconventional threats in four ways. First, they require units and soldiers to train to protect themselves against terrorist tactics and intrusion. They complement self-defense capabilities by enforcing security policies, such as movement procedures, appropriate to the situation. Second, COMASCCs consider the threat posed by unconventional elements and act to fill gaps in protective capabilities. These actions may include requesting additional operational protection forces for the theater. Third, commanders use all available information resources (including host nation, theater, national, and organic assets) to understand unconventional threats to the force. COMASCCs may use their theater MI, joint, and other agency assets to form a team focused on unconventional threats. Finally, COMASCCs/COMARFORs must employ their leadership to dispel any complacency toward unconventional threats.

JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS

6-131. Joint urban operations (JUO) are joint operations planned and conducted across the range of military operations on, or against objective on,

a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain were manmade construction and the density of noncombatants are the dominant features (JP 3-0). As the world is largely urban in terms populations concentration, the prospect of US Army forces operating as part of joint force in urban areas is increasing. Conducting offense, defense, stability and operations in an urban environment presents distinct problems to the COMARFOR. During JUO, the COMARFOR may not focus only on destroying and clearing adversary forces, but also may be required to restore essential services infrastructure as well as protect and manage large numbers of noncombatants. The topography and proximity of noncombatants allow a weaker adversary to attempt to negate the advantages the US forces have elsewhere.

6-132. COMARFORs must view urban areas as dynamic entities that include adversary forces, local population, and infrastructure. Planning for urban operations requires careful IPB, with particular emphasis on the multiple levels of the urban areas and the social structure of the population. Logistical planning must account for consumption, threats to LOCs, and requirements for noncombatants.

6-133. If possible, COMARFORs in a JUO will first cut off and isolate the adversary force in the urban area as an enabling operation. Once the cordon has been established, the COMARFOR will focus on sustaining the combined arms teams at the tactical level that will conduct the decisive urban operations. (Sec JP 3-06, *Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations* , FM 3-0, *Operations*, and FM 3-06(90-10), *Military Operatiuons on Urban Terrain.)*

TRANSITION TO PEACETIME OR WAR

6-134. The operational-level commander considers postconflict operations early in the planning process. They fall in two broad categories:

- Actions to restore order and normal social activities following armed conflict.
- Operations to reestablish precrisis readiness levels.

6-135. Early decisions concerning mobilization and deployment establish conditions for critical postconflict operations. Long-term solutions to regional crises usually require more than the defeat of the enemy's military. The operational-level commander develops plans for conflict termination and postconflict operations early. He reviews them as branches and sequels to deployment and combat operations and plans for simultaneous combat. The COMARFOR assists the JFC in supporting the host nation with operations to handle refugees, clear minefields for immediate tactical purposes, control prisoners of war, provide humanitarian assistance, and provide other forms of support. Nonmilitary considerations often require the initiation of these stability and support actions before and during combat operations.

TERMINATION

6-136. Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is a component of strategy and operational art. Planning for termination must be ongoing during all phases of the campaign plan and execution. Ideally, national and multinational decision makers will seek the advice of the JFC or MNFC concerning how and when to end combat operations. Military operations typically conclude with the attainment of the strategic ends for which the NCA committed forces. The JFC or MNFC

consult with their and component commanders to ensure the military conditions have been set and met for ending combat. (JP 3-0)

6-137. A period of postconflict activities exists between the end of a conflict and redeployment of the last US soldier. Army forces are vital in this period. As a sequel to decisive operations, Army forces conduct stability and support operations to sustain the results achieved by the campaign. These operations ensure that the threats do not recur. Postconflict stability operations and support operations -- conducted by Army forces -- transform temporary battlefield successes into lasting strategic results.

POSTCONFLICT OPERATIONS

6-138. During the the decisive operations or stabilization phase, the COMARFOR completes the Army contribution toward attaining those operational objectives to resolve the crisis that instigated the projection operation. Postconflict operations secure the strategic objectives. Planning for postconflict operations must be an integral part of the overall Army plan, which is revised continually as the conclusion of hostilities approaches. The goal during postconflict and post crisis operations is normally to transition responsibilities to the host nation or designated agency as smoothly as possible. The Army contribution to postconflict operations may include --

- Controlling prisoners.
- Handling refugees and displaced civilians.
- Arranging for civilian contractors to clear minefields and conduct demining operations.
- Assist in rebuilding critical civilian infrastructure.
- Reshaping/sizing the defeated adversary's military.
- Peace operations.

- Destroying unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO).
- Conducting foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) to include foreign consequence management.

Post Desert Storm

Immediately following the combat phase of Operation DESERT STORM, US Central Command (USCENTCOM) assigned the US Army component commander, Third US Army/Army Central Command (TUSA/ARCENT), the major post conflict mission to clean up and restore the civil infrastructure in and around Kuwait City. This significant mission included major logistical requirements and was done simultaneously with the support of the redeployment of many ARCENT units back to their home station.

6-139. Postconflict activities typically begin with significant U.S. Army involvement, but transition to civil authorities as rapidly as possible. The COMASCC/COMARFOR must oversee this orderly transition of authority to appropriate US, international, interagency, or host nation agencies. The Army may also be required to support the other elements of national power that are involved in post conflict activities to attain the strategic end state. Simultaneously, units prepare for future operations by consolidating, reconstituting, and training. These future operations can range from the resumption of hostilities to redeployment. See Figure 6-9.

Considerations During Postconflict Operations

The COMARFOR's use of overwhelming strength is a force multiplier. At the same time, the reduction of collateral damage may be a major constraint. The COMARFOR tightly controls the ROE. These controls are an important part in determining the complexity of postconflict operations.

Stability operations begin during this stage, if not before. These may be more significant in the long term than actual combat for achieving strategic objectives.

The JTF may have achieved its primary mission and the combatant commander may disestablish it. The COMARFOR responsible for executing the operation may redeploy with the main body of forces. A modified C^2 structure may replace the JTF, with the combatant commander assuming direct control, or the theater may revert to its normal peacetime organization. Regardless, the Army's must establish a new COMARFOR to continue postconflict operations. The new commander continues with postconflict operations and completes redeployment of the contingency force.

As part of postconflict operations, the COMARFOR normally conducts stability and support operations. These operations consist of a number of activities that have political, economic, or diplomatic impact. Some of these activities include nation assistance, internal security, restoration of law and order, IO, and civil-military programs, and infrastructure repair. IO emphasize the purpose of the U.S. actions and balance any negative residual effects of the contingency.

The COMARFOR carefully sequences these operations into the geographic combatant commander's continuing major operation or campaign.

Figure 6-9. Postconflict Considerations

6-140. Once the war ends, forces may redeploy to their home stations or to another theater. Army forces must be versatile enough to transition rapidly from one regional war or conflict to another. The COMASCC conducting the operation must plan for either possibility. Redeployment should occur only at a pace that does not disrupt his ability to execute continuing missions. The COMASCC must expect the NCA to reduce his forces to precrisis levels and operations. Once forces return to their home stations and their peacetime commanders, they rapidly reestablish predeployment levels of readiness in anticipation of future operations.

PART FOUR

Army Operational-Level Tasks and Forces

Part Four discusses the five operational categories of Army forces and the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) operational-level tasks they perform in a theater.

Chapter 7 will provide additional reference on Army Operational Command and Control; Information Superiority; and Operational Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities and units.

Chapter 8 will address Army Operational Movement & Maneuver, and Operational Firepower as well as operational maneuver and fires units.

Chapter 9 covers Army Operational Force Protection tasks and units.

Chapter 10 will describe Army Operational Logistical and Personnel Support tasks, capabilities, and organizations.

Chapter 11 describes Army Special Operations Forces at the theater-level to include civil affairs and psychological operations units.

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Chapter 7

Operational Command and Control; Information Superiority; and Operational Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

"Iraq lost the war before it even began. This was a war of intelligence, EW [electronic warfare], command and control, and counterintelligence, Iraqi troops were blinded and deafened."

General Bogdanov
Chief of Strategic Studies, USSR
Speaking after the Gulf War

The ASCC commander and his staff have the responsibility to plan for and provide the U.S. Army's capabilities and organizations to the Joint Force Commander to perform the tasks of Provide Operational Command and Control; gain and maintain Information Superiority; and Provide Operational Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.

While these tasks include two complete UJTL operational level tasks, Provide Operational Command and Control (OP5) and Provide Operational Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (OP2), information superiority as defined in FM 3-0 (100-5), *Operations* transcends almost all six operational task categories. Because of the overlapping nature of the operational-level Army units that perform these interrelated tasks, all functions and units from this operational category will be discussed in this chapter. Sections will be devoted to army component liaison units, signal support, Land Information Warfare Activity units, Public Affairs operations, and Military Intelligence. Civil Affairs and PSYOP units will be discussed in Chapter 11.

SECTION I - GENERAL

7.1. The ASCC commander uses command and control (C2) as an essential element of the art and science of warfare. Command and Control is defined as, the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and available

forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission (JP 1-02).

7.2. While this definition encompasses the interrelated aspects of both command and control, command at the operational level has been previously discussed elsewhere while the Army units that contribute to the theater "control system" will be the focus of this chapter. See FM 6-0 (100-34), *Command and Control*, for an expanded discussion of the Art of Command and the Science of Control.

INFORMATION SUPERIORITY

7.3. Information superiority is the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and dissememinate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. All military operations are conducted within an information environment. Information itself is an element of combat power. Consequently, a goal of the COMASCC is to achieve and maintain information superiority and possess better relevant information (all information of importance to the commander and staff in the exercise of command and control) so as to obtain a critical, perhaps decisive advantage over the opponent. Information superiority is achieved by the integration and synchronization of three different contributors: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), information operations (to include related activities), and information management. Information superiority enables and complements assessing, planning, preparing for, and executing full spectrum operations (FM 3-0 , *Operations*).

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

7.4. Information management is the provision of relevant information (RI) to the right person at the right time in a usable form to facilitate decision-making. It uses procedures

and information systems to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information (FM 6-0 (100-34). At the operational level, the COMASCC or COMARFOR is responsible for the establishment and operation of the information system (INFOSYS) as well as establishing his commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) for both friendly and enemy information which serve as the basis of relevant information (RI). The ASCC or ARFOR establishes and operates Army liaison elements, Army intelligence units, and Army signal units that are key enablers to an effective INFOSYS providing RI. See Appendix J, Theater-level Army Information Management.

See Figure 7-1.



Figure 7-1. Attaining Information Superiority in the Theater

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

7.5. According to FM 3-0, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) is also a component of information superiority. Surveillance and reconnaissance activities

provide input from human and electronic sensors to answer the commander's priritized intelligence requirements (PIR). This process may be coordinated by a reconnaisance and surveillance coordination cell (RSCC) nested within G3 current operations section and closely linked to the G2 intelligence section. At the operational level, the COMASCC is supported by an theater MI brigade/group that performs ISR as well as other tasks. See FM 3-55 (100-55), *Reconnaissance and Surveillance*.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO)

7.6. Information operations (IO) are actions taken to affect adversary decision making processes, information, and information systems of adversaries, and influence those of others while protecting friendly decision making processes, information, and information systems. (FM 3-0). IO are primarily shaping operations that may be offensive or defensive. Major elements of IO include operations security (OPSEC), phychological operations (PSYOP), counterpropaganda, military deception, counterdeception, electronic warfare (EW), computer network attack (CNA), physical destruction, information assurance (IA), physical security, counterintelligence (CI), and special information operations. Information assurance includes information security (INFOSEC) and computer network defense (CND) as elements. Other related activities that support IO include, but are not limited to Public Affairs (PA) and Civil Military Operations Affairs (CMO). (FM 3-13) Operational-level Army units that contribute to ASCC Information Operations include PSYOP elements, theater MI brigades/groups, Combat Camera Teams, Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) Teams, Public Affairs detachments, and Civil Affairs elements **;** along with the typical array of combat forces that may be used for military deception, physical destruction, etc.

7.7. For staff integration and management of IO, the COMASCC has an Information Operations Coordinator (IOCOORD) as the chief of the IO division of the DCSOPS/G3. The IOCOORD's responsibilities include visualizing how the collective effects of the IO elements will impact the operation; and to implement coordination within the HQ to ensure IO activities are synchronized with all operations. This division includes separate current IO, IO plans, and PSYOP branches that coordinate with the other divisions of DCSOPS/G3. In addition, the IO plans branch coordinates with the DCSPLANS/G-5 to ensure EW, OPSEC, military deception, and other aspects of IO are integrated and synchronized during planning. See Figure 7-2.



Figure 7-2 ASCC Information Operations Staff

7.8. During planning or crisis, the ASCC headquarters may establishe an IO cell with representatives from all pertinent staff sections as well as representatives from subordinate or supporting commands. Under the supervision of the IOCOORD, the IO cell conducts the information operations working group (IOWG) that serves as part of the larger effects coordination cell (ECC). The IO cell coordinates IO targeting information, provide IO targeting guidance and priorities, prepares or refine target lists, and compiles a list of crucial friendly assets that must be protected from enemy IO. Members of the IO cell coordinate closely with the current operations & intelligence center, the ECC, and the OPG to ensure IO integration and synchronization in plans and

operations. The IO plans branch establishes a IO plan, in coordination with the JFC's plan, to attack high-value targets. The IO plan, developed from the COMASCC's intent, focuses on subordinate unit operations and complements joint operations with other component commands within the theater.

7.9. The JFC also establishes a joint IO cell to perform IO functions that is normally chaired by the J3 or his representative. This joint IO cell has representatives of the J2, J6, joint fires element, and other staff elements and Service components as appropriate. The COMASCC representative to the joint IO cell is from the information operations division. See JP 3-13, FM 3-13 (100-6), and Chapter 8. See Figure 7-3.



Figure 7-3. Notional ARFOR IO Cell

7.10. Army operational-level units provide many of the capabilities to conduct full spectrum Information Operations for either the JFC or COMASCC/COMARFOR in either war or MOOTW.

7.11. The COMASCC/COMARFOR may establish an Army Information Operations Task Force (AIOTF) in order to provide a single commander for the coordination and administrative control of the diverse units of varying size provided to an ASCC commander to achieve Information Superiority. Additionally, an AIOTF may be established to support a multinational or international operation in which the only support required from the United States constitutes information operations or related activities. The senior unit commander performing IO could be selected to function as the AIOTF commander under the staff supervision of the ARFOR G3 through the IOCOORD at the IO cell. A possible AIOTF organization is shown in Figure 7-4.



Figure 7-4. Possible Organization of an Army Information Operations Task Force (AIOTF)

An Army Information Operations Task Force in East Timor

In September 1999 the U.N. authorized the Australian-led Operation Stabilise International-Force-East Timor (INTERFET). In support, President William J. Clinton established U.S. Forces INTERFET (USFI) to provide logistics, intelligence, civil affairs, communications, and staff operations and planning augmentation. CINCPAC, Admiral Dennis Blair, appointed USMC BGen John G. Castelow as Commander, USFI, who established his HQ in Darwin, Australia. BGen Castelow appointed his Army forces commander, COL Randolph Strong, Commander of 516th Signal Brigade, as Commander of U.S. Forces-East Timor (USFET). While most of USFET staff came from U.S. Army Pacific, more than 230 soldiers from various units deployed as part of USFI. USFI provided some 46 intelligence personnel, mostly Army, to provide counterintelligence and secure satellite downlink capabilities. Twelve personnel from B Company, 96th CA Battalion initially established a CMOC in East Timor and were later replaced by ten soldiers from 322d CA Battalion (USAR). The largest Army element was Task Force Thunderbird with 123 soldiers from the 11th Signal Brigade providing long-haul voice and data communications support in both East Timor and Darwin. The U.S. effort in East Timor indicated that the concept of a forward U.S. Army Information Operations type task force providing unique assets can operate successfully as a subordinate command in a multinational peace operations.

MAJ Craig Collier
"A New Way to Wage Peace:
US Support to Operation Stabilise"

SECTION II - ARMY COMPONENT LIAISON

7.12. The ASCC commander is required to establish a structure to maintain contact or intercommunication between elements of the Joint or multinational force to insure mutual understanding and unity of purpose (UJTL OP 5.5.2). Additionally, the COMASCC may be required by the JFC to coordinate host nation or coalition support by means of C4 systems or liaison teams (UJTL OP 5.7.6). Some of the component liaison elements to the joint, combined, and unified effort are Battlefield Coordination Detachments (BCD),

Mobile Liaison Teams (MLT), Combat Support Coordination Teams (CSCT), or Coalition Forces Support Teams (CFST). In addition, the ASCC will normally receive several essential enabling elements such as Army space forces as well as liaison elements from other Services. These liason elements weill be covered in Chapters 8 and 9.

BATTLEFIELD COORDINATION DETACHMENT (BCD)

7.13. The BCD is the Army liaison provided by the COMASCC to the Service component commander designated as the JFACC and is co-located with the Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC). The BCD expedites the exchange of information through face-to-face coordination with elements of the JAOC established by the JFACC. The JAOC is the operational facility in which the JFACC centralizes the planning, direction, and controlling functions over all tactical air (TACAIR) resources. Historically, the BCD has worked with the Air Force in this coordination role, but with the changes in world environment and joint doctrine, the Army BCD can expect to work in contingency operations with USMC and naval JFACCs. Planners must identify and resolve problems that result from these less-practiced and less-refined linkages.

7.14. The BCD's basic mission is to facilitate the synchronization of air support for Army operations. The BCD is responsible to the ASCC/ARFOR commander and coordinates with and receives objectives, guidance, and priorities from his operations officer (G3) through the ECC. Specific missions include processing land forces' requests for TACAIR support, monitoring and interpreting the land battle situation for the JAOC, providing the necessary interface between the ground component commander for the exchange of current intelligence and operational data, and coordinating air defense and airspace control matters.

7.15. The BCD is organized in seven sections: headquarters, operations, plans, intelligence, ADA, airspace management, and airlift. The BCD eases planning,

coordination, and execution of the following functions: battle command, intelligence, fires, airspace management, air defense, information operations, airlift support, and Theater Army Missile Defense (TAMD). In order to integrate the TAMD battle, the BCD supports the ARFOR TAMD cell responsible for TAMD in theater. The ASCC or ARFOR Commander specifies the role of the BCD to help in coordination of TMD active defense and attack operations with the JAOC. Additionally, the BCD exercises supervision over the Army air reconnaissance liaison officer (ARLO) teams and Army ground liaison officer (GLO) augmentation teams that provide coordination between Army forces and USAF reconnaissance, fighter, and airlift wings. See FM 3-100.13 (100-13), *Battlefield Coordination Detachment* for detailed information on BCD operations.

MOBILE LIAISON TEAMS

7.16. Mobile Liaison Teams (MLT) are established in specific ASCCs based on METT-TC to interact with command and control elements of other U.S. services, Allies, Coalition Partners, or host nation armed forces. MLTs provide the ASCC commander a forward liaison element with major subordinate or parallel headquarters. They consist of staff officers with a broad range of expertise, capable of analyzing the situation and facilitating coordination between coalition and allied forces and assisting in cross boundary information flow and operational support. In certain coalition circumstances, these twenty-three person teams are essential not only for routine liaison, but also in advising and assisting coalition partners in conducting planning and operations at division or corps levels. Special Operations personnel may form special forces liaison elements (SFLE) at brigade or battalion levels that assist in the overall liaison mission.

7.17. These teams are an outgrowth of the six teams that LTG Yeosock, ARCENT commander during Desert Shield and Storm, requested to ensure coordination with all coalition ground elements. Contingency missions by these teams may be conducted

anywhere with their actual number required and location determined by METT-TC. In addition to the team proper, each MLT may be augmented with aviation, fire support, engineers, or other specialty officers. In addition, the team will normally receive a signal support team from the supporting theater signal command with both SHF and TACSAT capability. See FM 3-16 (100-8), *The Army in Multinational Operations*.

COMBAT SUPPORT COORDINATION TEAMS

7.18. The Combat Support Coordination Teams (CSCT) assigned to the Army Service Component Command in Korea are similar to MLTs. Located with each of South Korea's Three Field Armies, the CSCTs provide coordination and liaison for Combined Forces Command, U.S. Forces Korea, and 8th U.S. Army. Due to the nature of their duties, these teams have a joint as well as Army documentation and staffing. While the forward CSCTs 1 and 3 are primarily operational, and have augmented staffs, CSCT 2 has a logistical and rear area security focus and it evolves into the U.S. Element of a Combined Rear Area Center during conflict. All the CSCTs serve to facilitate coordination for U.S.-unique aspects of combat, information, support, protection, and logistical support.

COALITION FORCES SUPPORT TEAMS

7.19. Additionally, during Military Operations other than War, Coalition Forces Support Teams (CFST) may be established by the Army Force commander when directed by the U.S. JFC. These teams coordinate activities between participating multinational forces especially during Stability (Foreign Humanitarian Assistance) Operations. CFST duties include:

- Welcoming and orienting newly arrived forces.
- Designating initial staging areas and sources of logistical support.
- Providing briefing on situation updates, legal limits of US support and rules of engagement to arriving forces.

Conducting capability assessments and recommending suitable tasks. (See JP 3-07.6, *JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance).*

ARMY SPACE FORCES

7.20. The Army component of U.S. Space Command, U.S. Army Space Command (ARSPACE) provides Army space elements configured to rapidly deploy in direct support of commander's and staffs of selected ARFORs. These space elements may be placed OPCON to the geographic combatant commander while ADCON to the ASCC/ARFOR. A Space Battalion HQ or Army space task force may be deployed to provide command and control of all ARSPACE assets in a JOA.

7.21. As part of an Army space task force, a Space and Electronic Warfare Detachment (SEWD) may be forward deployed. The SEWD supports space control through mobile space surveillance and space situational awareness operations. If required, the SEWD can also prevent or deny enemy use of space downlinks through electronic warfare operations against adversary ground and airborne targets.

ARMY SPACE SUPPORT TEAMS

7.22. Army Space Support Teams (ARSSTs) configured to rapidly deploy as the land-based warfighter's primary interface to space related capabilities. They provide space related planning and operational support as well as expertise, advice, and liaison regarding the application of U.S. space capabilities to include space control. The team obtains, processes, and delivers space products related to intelligence support, satelite inmagery, navigational data, and space weather. They also provide advice and assessment of the operational impact of friendly, civil/commercial, and threat space-based capabilities. See FM 3-14 (100-18) *Space Support to Army Operations*, and FM 3-14.2 (40-2), *Army Space Support Teams*.

JOINT TACTICAL GROUND STATION

7.23. Army Space Battalion's Joint Tactical Ground Stations (JTAGS) operational sections are transportable, mobile, in-theater element of U.S. Space Command's (USSPACECOM's) Theater Event System (TES). JTAGS performs near real-time tactical event reporting of TBMs and other IR events by using the direct-downlinked data from the Defense Support Program (DSP) sensors. JTAGS uses a variety of voice and data warning networks to report estimated launch point coordinates, predicted ground impact coordinates, and state vectors in support of the theater CINC. JTAGS use of in-theater networks and Tactical Information Broadcast Service (TIBS)/Tactical Data Distribution System (TDDS) broadcasts to support AAMDC and ARFOR TMD operations. (See Figure 7-5)



Figure 7-5 JTAGS Operational Concept

7.24. USSPACECOM furnishes the structure of command relationships and facilitates the full integration of JTAGS into joint and combined operations to maximize its support of the warfighter. USCINCSPACE, as supporting CINC to geographic combatant commanders, has combatant command (COCOM) of JTAGS while the ARSPACE

commander has OPCON. A JTAGS detachment of one or more operational sections may be further placed OPCON to an ASCC based upon operational requirements. See FM 3-14.5 (40-1), *Joint Tactical Ground Station Operations.*

SECTION III - SIGNAL SUPPORT TO THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

7.25. The COMASCC's challenge is to shape the military environment and set conditions for unqualified success. In order to do this, the commander must be able to communicate across a wide spectrum of agencies and forces. Thus, he requires command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) systems connectivity to allow him to conduct his operational mission and enable his tactical commanders to accomplish theirs. These systems must connect the Army operational commander to other services, local governments, coalition forces, and other U.S. and International governmental and non-governmental organizations. In addition, C4I support must interfere with U.S. commercial and strategic communications networks to provide links to the Department of the Army, the combatant commander, and when required, the NCA.

7.26. ASCC signal support ensures an integrated communication network within the theater. This includes ensuring the JRA/COMMZ interfaces with the combat zone systems,and all have out-of-theater access. During the planning phase of any operation, signal planners must consider all phases from initial deployment to post conflict operations.

7.27. This support includes data and voice communications, automation, visual information, printing and publications, and records management. Specific signal capabilities employed from initial entry into the theater to a mature theater are dependent upon the operational environment of the particular theater. The ASCC commander

acquires Defense Communications System (DCS) access primarily through commercial and military fixed ground satellite terminals and mobile tactical satellite (TACSAT) terminals. These DCS "gateways" provide access to the Defense Switched Network (DSN) via military network (MILNET)/Defense Information Systems Network (DISNET) trunks. Communications planning always takes maximum advantage of the host nation communications infrastructure. The allocation to the ASCC G-6 of any host communications resources is normally determined by the JFC J-6.

7.28. If required, the ASCC may receive a theater signal command (SIGCOM) from the US Army Signal Command (USASC). The SIGCOM provides the operational element for communications planning and support in the theater. Prior to the deployment of these SIGCOMs to the ASCC's area of operations (AO), there will typically reside in the AO a signal brigade that will provide initial communications support; including the planning and execution of communications support to the theater's reception, staging and onward integration (RSO&I) of additional forces to the theater.

7.29. The theater signal officer (TSO) is the commander of the theater signal element, whether brigade-sized or one of the above commands. The TSO is dual-hatted with the additional role as the ASCC G6. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications-Electronics (DCSCE) is the separate signal staff element within the ASCC HQ for operational planning functions and day-to-day signal support to the ASCC. The DCSCE is composed of theater signal personnel assigned to the DCSCE/G6 ASCC.

7.30. The theater signal officer commands and controls all assigned operational-level signal units in theater. While there is no definite force structure for a theater signal element, its composition is tailored based on specific requirements and may consist of a SIGCOM. Figure 7-6 shows the organization of a theater signal command.



Figure 7-6. Theater Signal Command

7.31. Subordinate organization may include:

- Two to five operational level signal brigades.
- One strategic signal brigade.
- One combat camera (COMCAM) company.
- One theater signal maintenance company.
- One or more reproduction detachments.

7.32. The actual number of signal brigades and the number and type of their subordinate signal units deployed to the theater of operation depend on the METT-TC. This organization can --

- Provide C2 and supervision for units assigned and attached
- Formulate and implement plans, policies, and procedures for the engineering, installation, operation, and management of assigned elements.

- Provide management, to include centralized management of voice, data, messaging, and VTC capabilities.
- Provide communication planning and management of special purpose communications/information systems.
- Provide internal signal support to the ASCC HQ through the DCSCE.
- Provide intelligence and security support and oversight to subordinate commands.
- Provide ASCC information assurance and protection planning and management for the theater communications system, and to support the protect, detect, and react strategies of the Army as directed by the ASCC DCSCE/G-6.
- Execute protection of Army networks in conjunction with collocated RCERT (Regional Computer Emergency Response Team).
- Provide the Army's portion to the JCCC (Joint Communications Control Center), when established.
- Establish the JCCC, with augmentation from other services, when tasked.

BATTLEFIELD INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE

7.33. The battlefield information architecture consists of an integration of local area networks (LANs), wide area networks (WANs), and battlefield automated systems (BAS). A communications architecture ties the many distributed elements into an integrated, interoperable, and cohesive network. Infrastructure elements and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C^4I) capabilities combine to provide a Global Information Grid (GIG) (see Figure 7-7).



Figure 7-7. Global Communications Network

7.34. The seamless integration of these systems allows the COMASCC/COMARFOR to exercise command and control on the battlefield and supports transparent global C^4I interfaces, nonlinear battlefields, and operational enclaves. These communications means afford the commander and his staff the ability to distribute critical information between higher, lower, adjacent, joint, and multinational forces. Voice traffic and data distribution (to include video teleconferencing) are the primary methods of passing the information. See Figure 7-8.



Figure 7-8. Battlefield Information Architecture Integration

7.35. To support a strategically responsive Army, operational-level information services mesh seamlessly with those of the sustaining base, which may be located within CONUS or another theater. This connectivity and reachback capability allows for split-based operations and reduction of facilities in theater and is achieved using means such as military or commercial satellite communications, high frequency radios, or

commercial fiber optic links. Interoperable gateways provide the means to interface between tactical and strategic systems via DCS entry points. These gateways also provide connectivity with joint and allied forces. The net effect is to allow forces to deploy worldwide without sacrificing their ability to exchange information securely and reliably in theater and with CONUS-based information resources. See Figure 7-9

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

Figure 7-9. The Army Information System Network

SIGNAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

7.36. Planning C4 support of the operational-level commander differs from the support provided to tactical commanders in that support requirements are different for every operation. Corps and division routinely establish communications networks that are nearly identical save for locations of nodes each time they support their respective corps

or division. On the other hand, the SIGCOM must develop each support plan with little reference to what has gone on before. This is due to a number of factors.

7.37. In some cases, the assigned signal force structure differs with each operation. However, the significant factor is the diverse organizations that require C4 support or connectivity to the ASCC and how that connectivity is achieved. These organizations are never the same mix, and the requirements seem to represent an infinite set of possibilities. It is incumbent upon the operational-level signal planner to examine each requirement carefully.

7.38. In planning the ASCC's communications network, the SIGCOM must ensure robust connectivity to other participating services and the joint commander. At the operational-level, this presents some technical challenges that must be taken into account. While the Army's primary tactical communications system, mobile subscriber equipment (MSE), is compatible with the tri-service tactical communication (TRI-TAC) systems and the USMC and USAF systems, it is not always an easy interface. In addition, operational and tactical communications systems' compatability with leased and/or host nation commercial assets must also be planned and implemented.

7.39. In a contingency situation, the JFC is most often initially supported initially by the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE). The JCSE brings numerous capabilities to initial operations and Army signal planners must coordinate their plans closely with JCSE to transition from JCSE-provided communications to longer term, more robust, signal support. An important player in this planning and transition is the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Liaison Team in the AOR. Usually found within the Joint Communications Cordination Center (JCCC), this team closely monitors and coordinates the links between the operational and strategic communications systems.

7.40. The COMASCC may be designated as the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC). This requires Army C4 planners to provide C2 links to USMC forces. Since the Marines use different automated C2 systems than does the Army, it is essential to carefully plan these links.

7.41. Just as mutual doctrine now calls for multiservice communications links between Army and Marine forces, it may be necessary to install multiple C2 systems. Planning for this connectivity also causes the theater signal planner to closely coordinate with the Navy. When Marines initially come ashore, they remain under the C2 of the Navy. When and where they transition to JFLCC control dictate when Army C4 planners must provide connectivity.

7.42. Army forces will normally operate with forces of other countries. This may be under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) or the result of a rapidly formed coalition. In most cases, interoperability issues have not been worked out in advance. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an exception to this rule. Signal planners can assume interoperability between NATO-standard equipment.

7.43. In planning for multinational operations with the non-NATO countries, planners have to assume there is no C4 interoperability and plan enough nodal assets to overcome this shortfall. This lack of standard interoperability is one of the key reasons the Projection for Army Command, Control, and Communications (POWER PAC3) company was formed. Its six liaison-team packages can provide an interface into six different national headquarters in support of the MLTs. And lastly, any communications security (COMSEC) planning for operations with non-NATO countries (and the resulting lack of bilateral COMSEC agreements) will force Army C4 planners to overcome that important interoperability challenge while adhering to US policies on releasability.

7.44. The US government has other agencies, primarily the Department of State, operating in cooperation with US forces and the Department of Defense (DOD). The operational commander takes steps to assist the Department of State and other organizations by facilitating the establishment of secure communications links. Some of these agencies bring their own communications equipment. Interoperability between these communications packages cannot be assumed.

7.45. The UN may also provide support during the conduct of stability operations. This may be in the form of refugee support or oversight if operations are under the auspices of the UN. Unlike US agencies, the UN normally expects to be serviced by US forces for communications. The theater signal command ensures the operational commander has reliable communications with UN agencies.

7.46. Numerous nongovernmental agencies are also frequently present, such as the Red Cross. These agencies range from groups assisting refugees to private groups providing all manner of humanitarian assistance. These groups operate in cooperation with the ASCC and they receive some form of C4 service or linkage as part of the signal command plan. These groups may interface commercially; but based on their role, they may require some level of COMSEC. For a complete discussion of operational communications, See FM 6-02.45 (11-45), *Signal Support to Theater Operations*.

CRITICAL OPERATIONAL-LEVEL SIGNAL UNITS

POWER PAC3 COMPANY

7.47. The POWER PAC3 company's mission is to rapidly deploy and support initial information service requirements of the ASCC commander. Working in concert with deployed Army mobile liaison teams, the organizations are mutually supportive and can meet the entire gamut of communications/information needs of the ground component

commander until the arrival of the SIGCOM. The company can extend US strategic communications systems to support of allied forces.

7.48. The POWER PAC3 company is a critical C2 communications provider, which serves to ensure success during force projection operations. The unit is highly mobile and is tailored to any warfighting ground component commander's mission essential communications and information needs. It can deploy into a logistically austere theater with little or no communications infrastructure. The unit may be required to sustain itself for up to 45 days.

7.49. This unit provides -

- Command, staff planning, control, and supervision of the operations of the company to include any augmenting of personnel or material assets.
- Vehicular, electronic, and COMSEC maintenance and repair, as well as supply facilities to support company operations.
- Communications network planning and management.

7.50. On deployment, POWER PAC3 company's configuration is determined by mission requirements. Generally, the POWER PAC3 company is broken down into three sections: the ARFOR Main CP, ARFOR Forward CP, and six MLT signal support teams (SSTs). Each section provides a variety of communications capabilities for the headquarters it supports. Assets from the LNO teams could extend the theater information infrastructure to support other or additional support missions. Figure 7-10 shows the POWER PAC3 company's signal support team locations.



Figure 7-10. POWER PAC3 Company Signal Support Teams

SIGNAL VISUAL INFORMATION (VI) COMPANY (COMBAT CAMERA)

7.51. The Signal VI company's mission is to provide visual imagery acquisition and exploitation support to satisfy the operational requirement of the ASCC and joint headquarters when required. There is one VI company authorized per Theater Signal Command with Combat Camera (COMCAM) teams to support the ASCC HQ and major subordinate elements.

7.52. Signal VI company provides-

- Tailored VI products, including graphics, to support operational requirements.
- Historical documentation to support the Army VI documentation program.
- Processing, maintenance, and repair support of VI to ASCC units beyond the capacity of those units.

7.53. Integration of the VI company's products into the overall Information Support effort may require close coordination of this unit with the ASCC G3's Information Operations cell and the PAO, or an AIOTF. See FM 6-02.40 (24-40), *Tactical Visual Information Doctrine*, for further information on this unit.

SECTION IV - LAND INFORMATION WARFARE ACTIVITY

7.54. The Army established the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) in 1995 to operationalize Information Operations (IO). LIWA, a subordinate command of U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (USAINSCOM), is under the operational control of the Headqurters, Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. LIWA supports Army commanders in three major areas. First, field support teams (FST) assist Army commanders in planning, executing, and assessing information operations. Second vulnerability assessment teams (VAT) support Army commands' efforts to detect and close vulnerabilities in information systems and associated processes and procedures. Third, the LIWA Army Computer Emergency Response Team (ACERT) and regional computer emergency response teams (RCERT) provide an immediate response to Army computer users experiencing penetration attemps or disruptions. LIWA is also designated the functional proponent for military deception in the Army.

7.55. LIWA requires reinforcement from both the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Army Reserve (USAR) to meet peacetime and contingency IO requirements for the Army. Fig 7-11 illustrates the operational structure of the Land Information Warfare Activity.



Figure 7-11 LIWA-Operational Structure

7.56. The commander of LIWA is charged with providing offensive and defensive IO support to the Army including the reserve components. He also is the commander of the Army's component of the Joint Task Force for Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO). The director exercises his authority through the Information Dominance Center.

Information Dominance Center (IDC)

7.57. Acting as an operations center and IO intelligence analysis center, the Information Dominance Center (IDC) is the focal point of all LIWA activities in support of the Army and of JTF-CND. The IDC performs as a typical command operations center orchestrating the activities of LIWA's deployed teams and internal supporting activities. As an analysis center, the IDC provides support to LIWA's deployed teams (thus the split-based capability) and to the commands the teams serve. Tailored analytical products are generated, frequently on a quick-response basis, to meet a deployed team's immediate needs. The IDC also monitors potential trouble spots worldwide, preparing to

support contingency operations with IO-related products as required. In addition to providing IO planning, synchronizing, and execution support, the IDC provides an advanced environment to leverage new technologies and explore emerging concepts. The IDC is also prepared to provide support to exercises. Finally, in support of the Army Computer Emergency Response Team (ACERT), the IDC uses its communications capabilities to flash computer intrusion alerts and countermeasures across the Army.

Field Support Teams (FST)

7.58. Mission-tailored field support teams (FST) are normally the first to deploy in response to a request for IO support. The FSTs provide direct support to COMASCCs of combatant commands, designated JFLCCs, and COMARFORs of JTFs. FSTs support corps and divisions as requested. For long duration missions, FSTs deploy in an attached (less administrative) status and become part of the supported command's IO cell. Reserve component FSTs provide additional IO support to the Army. The LIWA FST, normally commanded by a field grade officer, consists normally of military personnel with the skills and experience in planning, preparing, and executing IO on a 24-hour-a-day basis. Teams may contain EW, OPSEC, military deception, CNA, CA, PA, PSYOP, intelligence and counterintelligence expertise, as the mission dictates. FSTs may also contain civilians or contractors and be task-organized with other LIWA capabilities depending upon such factors as mission, TPFDD, funding, supported commander's requirements and desires, and theater restrictions. Additional expertise is readily available via a reach-back capability to the IDC. A deployed FST has the following capabilities:

- Provide comprehensive information operations analysis and support
- Support OPLAN/OPORD development
- Assist in planning and synchronizing IO asset employment
- Assist in development of target lists, estimates and assessments

- Monitor and assess current operations significant events for IO implications
- Provide IO expertise not resident on the supported commander's staff

INFORMATION OPERATIONS VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT TEAMS (IOVAT)

7.59. LIWA provides the Army's deployable Information Operations Vulnerability Assessment Teams (IOVATs), designed to assess and enhance an Army commander's ability to incorporate defensive IO into peacetime operations, operational and contingency missions, training and exercises. Through its IOVATs, LIWA provides focused, tailored, threat-based IO vulnerability assessment support and an independent IO opposing force (OPFOR) or adversarial capability to Army commands and the Army acquisition community. The IOVATs contribute to Force Protection and Information Assurance (IA) by conducting vulnerability analyses of computer and telecommunications networks, operational security (OPSEC), electronic warfare (EW), psychological operations (PSYOP)/civil affairs (CA)/public affairs (PA) planning and targeting, decision processes, data and infrastructure, and then recommending defensive IO and countermeasures.

Army Computer Emergency Response Team (ACERT)

7.60. The Army Computer Emergency Response Team (ACERT) provides the Army the capability to prevent, detect, assess, and respond to Army Information System (AIS) security incidents. The ACERT leverages and integrates intelligence support, and network and system management capabilities in a unified defensive IO effort. The ACERT, operating around-the-clock, is the DA single point of contact for reporting INFOSYS security incidents and vulnerabilities, and is responsible to HQDA for coordinating an appropriate response to incidents. The ACERT is also the Army interface point for exchanging reports of computer incidents and intrusions with other Service, joint and national agencies and activities.

7.61. When requested, ACERT dispatches skilled personnel to assist commanders, information security managers and system administrators by providing technical support in dealing with computer incidents and intrusions. ACERT assistance includes post-attack system restoration, when required. The ACERT is the functional manager for Information Assurance (IA) tools for the Army and maintains a repository of security tools.

7.62. The LIWA ACERT is also designated the Army force (ARFOR) component of the SPACECOM Joint Task Force for Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO) in support of the JCS effort to plan for and conduct the defense of DoD-wide INFOSYS and networks.

7.63. Regional CERTs (RCERTs) are collocated with U. S. Army Signal Command (ASC) network operations centers in Hawaii, Germany, Korea, and Ft Huachuca, AZ for area support operations. The ACERT and RCERTs maintain close contact, sharing current information and coordinating defensive IO actions. Additionally, deployable CERTs may be provided by LIWA for network recovery and/or network monitoring for ARFORs.

Army Reprograming Analysis Team-Threat Analysis

7.64. The Army Reprogramming Analysis Team-Threat Analysis (ARAT-TA) identifies and reports changes in worldwide signature information that may require the rapid reprogramming of Army Target Sensing Systems (ATSS). ATSS are those radar warning, surveillance, aviation self protection systems, and smart munitions which incorporate software algorithms to identify threat systems based upon embedded reprogrammed threat parameter data. The ARAT-TA provides assistance that supports Army aviation survivability on the battlefield.

RESERVE COMPONENT IO SUPPORT

7.65. The multi-component concept of operations for the LIWA includes reserve component support to expand the LIWA's capability to support Army total IO requirements across the entire operational spectrum, especially defensive IO emphasizing information infrastructure protection. Both the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve are organized and trained to provide a structure to support LIWA's IO operational capabilities.

7.66. Both reserve components (USAR and ARNG) provide direct support IO teams to operational and tactical commanders to achieve full spectrum dominance; therefore, expanding the Army's capability to perform IO across the operational continuum. These teams, consisting of FSTs, VATs and CERTs, are allocated to theater ASCCs or ARFORs. Additionally, the ARNG IO organizations also support Homeland Defense and State applications of defensive IO in the form of computer emergency response and vulnerability assessment. For command and control of these teams regardless of component makeup, an IO Command and Control Group may be established and deployed. See Figure 7-12. See FM 3-13 (100-6), *Information Operations.*

Information Operations Units



Figure 7-12 Information Operations Units

SECTION VI - PUBLIC AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

7.67. Army Public Affairs is a fundamental tool of leadership, a critical element of effective battle command, and an essential part of successful mission accomplishment. When employed to maximum effect, Army Public Affairs help the commander achieve information dominance and conduct coordinated information operations, and also contributes to the preservation of national will. Effective leaders employ a coordinated public affairs strategy to help reduce distraction and to win the information war. Army Public Affairs contributes to ethical behavior, respect for the law of war and the rights of noncombatants. Army Public Affairs fight rumors, misinformation, boredom, enemy disinformation efforts, uncertainty, fear, loneliness, confusion and other factors that cause stress and undermine efficient operations. Army Public Affairs helps increase understanding, dedication, discipline and the will to win.

MEDIA IMPACT

7.68. A key factor that must be considered at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels is the presence of national and international media representatives and the effects of global visibility on the planning and execution of operations. Leaders must understand that the perception of an operation can be as important to success as the actual execution of the operation. Leaders must recognize that the global visibility of today's media is bridging the gap between the strategic and tactical levels, so that a tactical victory can be an operational or strategic loss and vice versa. The media's ability to provide detailed, graphic, and live coverage of events from anywhere in the world has made military operations into spectator events watched in real time by the American public, allies, and adversaries. This allows media personalities, politicians, pundits, critics, and academics to become active participants in the debate about the way the operation is being executed.

7.69. The American people have a right to know about Army operations. More importantly, the Army has a vital interest in ensuring an expedited flow of complete, accurate, and timely information about Army operations. Doing so fulfills the Army's obligation to keep the American people informed. It also helps to establish the conditions that lead to confidence in America's Army and its conduct of operations in peacetime, conflict, and war. When soldiers, their families, the nation's political leaders, and the general public perceive that the Army is conducting operations competently, professionally, and ethically, the morale, esprit, and effectiveness of the Army force is enhanced. This is critical to successful mission accomplishment.

7.70. The key to achieving an expedited flow of complete, accurate, and timely information about Army operations is the integration of public affairs (PA) estimates and recommendations into the planning and decision-making process. PA elements must assess internal and external information needs and expectations and analyze what is being published by the media. They must develop strategies that support open and independent reporting, while maintaining operational security. They must ensure that their strategies are synchronized with the PA guidance of higher headquarters. They need to carefully coordinate their effort with related information communication functions, such as combat camera, as well as civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP). PA success comes from open, honest, proactive information communication. PA personnel serve as the interface between the military and the media. They work to communicate the Army themes and perspective and to ensure that reporting is fair and balanced. They try to educate media representatives on the military and the operation, and they prepare military personnel to interact with the media. Although the commander and the public affairs officer (PAO) are the organization's official spokespersons, all soldiers are potential spokespersons. The media often perceive junior soldiers as

especially candid, honest, insightful, credible. PA personnel play a key role in facilitating media-soldier interaction.

7.71. Besides serving as the interface between the military and the media, PA supports the commander's program to ensure that the information needs of soldiers and their families are met. PA personnel develop a strategy based upon the critical information soldiers and their families need to understand the operation and the mission and the information they need to maintain their morale and esprit. This strategy identifies the product requirements for communicating information within the theater and between the theater and home station. It synchronizes commercial contract services and Army production capabilities to most effectively and efficiently provide those products.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

7.72. Effective IO require the early coordination and synchronization of PA, CA and PSYOP. Each may use the same communications media to communicate essentially the same messages to different audiences. While CA and PYSOP address local populations and adversary forces, PA operations are directed toward U.S. forces and U.S. and international media. However, media products have no boundaries, so PA operations can impact CA and PSYOP target audiences as well. The target audiences may differ, but the consistency and truthfulness of messages is important to credibility.

7.73. With the expanding role of public affairs and information operations, it remains important to preserve the separation of PA and PSYOP in order to maintain the credibility of public affairs spokespersons and products. Although coordination of PA and PSYOP occurs in the IO cell, the public affairs representative should not be the primary command or operations spokesperson. PA participates in operations planning at all levels and across the full spectrum of operations. Coordination within the IO cell

allows the PAO to plan media operations that does not compromise IO. The PA representative to the IO cell--

- Represents PA concerns in IO.
- Identifies, assesses, and advises the commander on information and issues with PA implications.
- Reviews strategic and operational information with PA implication such as events, missions and propaganda.
- Coordinates with CA and PSYOP representatives to ensure consistency of messages and OPSEC without compromising PA credibility.
- Facilitates the availability of battlefield information for PA purposes (such as releasable visual imagery) used to inform the public of Army capabilities and accomplishments.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS AT THE OPERATIONAL-LEVEL

7.74. At the operational-level, PA operations explain the Army's concept for employing forces and applying resources to accomplish the mission. They clarify the link between strategic goals and operational objectives. The PA staff assists in the development of the IO plan, based on strategic messages and themes, that builds and maintains national will and international public support for the operation. Operational public affairs supports the commander by providing an assessment of the information environment in which his force will conduct operations. It identifies public affairs issues and themes for his consideration, assists him in evaluating the implications of current and future campaigns, operations and plans, and ensures that Public Affairs Guidance is integrated into the planning process. At the operational-level, public affairs supports the commander's requirement to meet the internal information needs and expectations of the force and also plays a critical role in facilitating media efforts to cover the operation.

ASCC PUBLIC AFFAIRS SECTION

7.75. The ASCC public affairs section provide public affairs support to the COMASCC and to units assigned, apportioned for planning, mobilized or deployed in support of combined or joint operations. The ASCC PAO has operational or tactical control over all

public affairs TO&E organizations assigned or attached directly to the headquarters and exercises technical control and coordinates closely with organic PA sections within corps, divisions, and other forces to carry out public affairs operations.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ORGANIZATIONS

7.76. Separate public affairs units augment organic PA sections at ASCC, corps, and division for ARFOR operations. They also operate autonomously when the situation dictates. These separate public affairs units establish media centers to facilitate media operations, conduct public affairs planning and training, and produce information products for internal and external audiences. Public affairs units are predominantly positioned in the USAR and ANG but are seamlessly integrated with warfighting units.

7.77. Units are available as support packages to ASCC, corps, and divisions, as well as to joint task forces and commanders supporting U.S. multinational operations. Public affairs units are organized as Public Affairs Operations Centers (PAOC), Mobile Public Affairs Detachments (MPAD), Broadcast Operation Detachments (BOD), and Public Affairs Detachments (PAD). These units are highly mobile, modularly organized, and capable of rapid deployment to support the widest variety of contingency operations.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT TO JOINT OPERATIONS

7.78. Although there are occasions when the Army will operate as an independent element, it normally conducts operations as part of a joint, multinational or interagency team. The Army also regularly works in concert with other NGOs and PVOs. The Army may be tasked to provide the core of a Joint Information Bureau (JIB), preferably using a PAOC with MPAD augmentation. Additionally, if serving as a JTF, an Army HQ may request a Joint Public Affairs Team (JPAT) from its JFC. See JP 3-61 and FM 3-61 (46-1), *Public Affairs Operations*.

SECTION VII - OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

7.79. Operational intelligence is the link between strategic and tactical intelligence. Commanders use intelligence support to anticipate the battle, understand the battlefield, and influence the outcome of operations. They also use it to assist in force protection. Operational intelligence enables commanders to focus, leverage, and protect their combat power and resources. Specific structures at each echelon, from the national level through the tactical level, include intelligence organizations, systems, and procedures for planning, and directing, collecting, processing, producing, and delivering intelligence to warfighters.

ARMY OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT - 513TH MI BRIGADE: DESERT SHIELD AND STORM

Theater-level Army intelligence played a crucial role in DESERT STORM. The 513th Military Intelligence Brigade's capabilities were instrumental in this effort. The Brigade became a full extension of the 3d Army G-2 operation and functioned as a major operations element of the 3d Army, directing intelligence collection, apportioning intelligence assets, and disseminating intelligence products. The Brigade provided robust liaison elements to every component and major Army command in theater as well as CENTCOM. For example, the 513th's Intelligence Support Element (ISE) at CENTAF numbered nearly 20 officers and NCO's. For air operations, the ISE helped develop targets and provided direct, real time input to dynamic targeting.

The 513th's SIGINT and EW operations proved the value of HF intercept and DF in support of corps and the use of EW for disruption and intelligence. Probably the major highlight of the Brigade's SIGINT operations was the technical control and analysis element (TCAE). It oriented analysis downwardly and focused technical support on tactical units. TCAE analysis provided a precise means for target development of enemy C^2 and key tips on enemy disposition.

The 513th planned and coordinated Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF) operations with the corps, MP's, and engineers. Reports from line crossers and captured prisoners before G-Day portrayed an accurate picture of Iraqi military will and capabilities. During and after the battle, the JIF provided invaluable insight into the Iraqi Army. The 513th MI Brigade, with augmentation from other Services, ran all counterintelligence, document exploitation, and technical intelligence operations in theater for ARCENT (and in the latter two cases), for CENTCOM.

BG John Stewart, April 1991

7.80. The intelligence function embodies a seamless, unified system that anticipates and satisfies the intelligence needs of commanders. Commanders drive intelligence and ensure its proper employment by clearly articulating intent, identifying priority intelligence requirements (PIR), and prioritizing the types of targets to be engaged. COMASCC/COMARFORs exploit the full potential of the intelligence system through the staff supervision of their DSCINT/G2 to realize the total effect of this combat multiplier.

THEATER INTELLIGENCE BRIGADES AND GROUPS (TIB/TIG)

7.81. Theater intelligence brigades/groups (TIB/TIGs) arebmulti-component organizations that support ASCCs, other Army operational-level commands within the theater, and unified, joint, or multinational commands. TIBs/TIGs are under the administrative command of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and are OPCON to ASCCs. TIBs are OPCON to the ASCCs for CENTCOM, and USFK, and TIGs are OPCON to the ASCCs supporting EUCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM.

7.82. The mission of the TIB/TIG is to plan, coordinate, manage and execute intelligence operations, all source intelligence analysis, production, collection management and dissemination, in support of ASCCs and deployed ARFORs. Continuous theater engagement and small scale contingencies (SSC) missions require the TIB/TIG to be considered part of the base engagement force (BEF). As a BEF, the TIB/TIG has two missions. First, on a day-to-day basis through the ASCC, it provides dedicated long-term, continuous support to the unified or sub-unified command as part of the CINCs Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) and to other ARFOR in theater shaping the environment to support U.S. national interests. Second, the TIB/TIG provides in-theater intelligence support for deploying ARFOR.

7.83. During normal operations, TIBs/TIGs contain only the minimum scalable organizations specifically designed and structured to support theater engagement activities and SSC operations for the ASCC in theater or within a JOA. TIBs/TIGs reduce the footprint forward and are responsive to theater needs. They provide efficiencies by being resourced with both active and reserve component manpower.

7.84. In support of an ASCC for a MTW, TIBs can be expanded by active and reserve augmentation and deployed as more robust organizations. A TIB is designed specifically

to support the theater in which it operates. This regional tailoring ensures the appropriate mix of organizations, intelligence equipment, linguists, area expertise and data bases to meet the commander's requirements. The TIB can operate split-based in force-projection operations by early deployment of a small, highly technical force. This operational-level MI brigade serves as a C² headquarters for subordinate and attached MI elements. The operational-level analysis and control element (ACE) is the principal organization for producing all-source intelligence. It controls, manages, tasks, processes, analyzes, synthesizes, and disseminates intelligence. The ACE supports operations security (OPSEC) and deception, sensor cueing, target development, situation development, and force projection. It also coordinates with and provides connectivity to national, joint, allied, and multinational intelligence sources. For theater-level functions, the TIB may be augmented from other Services. Figures 7-13 shows a generic theater intelligence brigade.

THEATER INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE (TIB)



Figure 7-13

7.85. TIBs/TIGs provide COMASCCs a dedicated intelligence capability across the spectrum of intelligence disciplines. Each TIB/TIG has dedicated signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations capability and SIGINT collection and analysis; and robust counter intelligence/human intelligence (CI/HUMINT), with both CI interrogation and exploitation capability. This capability is multi-component across the TIBs/TIGs. Additionally, each TIB/TIG has dedicated imagery intelligence (IMINT) analysis, and most have IMINT collection capability as well as measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). FM 2-19.1 (34-37), *Army Service Component Command Intelligence Operations* discusses the operational-level MI organization in detail.



Figure 7-14 show a generic theater intelligence group.

7.86. INSCOM provides direct, general support, and reinforcing intelligence operations. Direct support is provided by two brigades and three groups that are tailored to the specific needs of the different theaters. Other INSCOM groups or activities located

worldwide focus primarily on a single intelligence discipline or function. They are available in a general support or reinforcing role and are thus able to provide any combat commander INSCOM's full range of unique capabilities. For example, multi-component technical (TECHINT) collection and analysis capability has been centralized and can be provided by the National Ground Intelligence Center. The Army JSTARS Element provides Army personnel for flight duty aboard the U.S. Air Force E-8s. In addition to the forward deployed brigade-level SIGINT activities, the Army Technical Control and Analysis Element (ATCAE), serves as the single focal point between the National Security Agency (NSA) and forward-deployed operational- and tactical-level forces for providing technical support to SIGINT operations. Collocated with the NSA, the ATCAE is uniquely suited to provide tailored products to support TCAEs located in TIBs or corps level MI brigades. The COMASCC's injection point to the ATCAE is through the theater-level TCAE in TIBs/TIGs.

THE DEPLOYABLE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT ELEMENT (DISE)

7.87. The DISE is an integral part of the concept for MI support to force-projection operations. It is a tactically tailored support package from the TIB/TIG that brings together communications capabilities, automated intelligence fusion systems, and broadcast downlinks able to deploy with the early entry forces of a force-projection operation. It is not a specific piece of equipment or a particular configuration of equipment. The DISE is a flexible organization that can be expanded to support any type of ground force, whether Army, joint, or multinational. Through split-based operations, the DISE provides tactical commanders a link from their forward-based C^2 element to an intelligence support base located outside the AO or in CONUS. This link provides commanders access to multisource theater, and national intelligence assets and data bases.

7.88. The mission of the DISE is to provide the deployed commander accurate, detailed, continuous, and timely intelligence during the rapid introduction of U.S. forces across the range of military operations. It is tailored tactically from TIBs/TIGs according to METT-TC. The two types of tailorable DISE configurations are manpack and vehicular.

7.89. Basic tactics and techniques call for the DISE to deploy with the initial assault forces. The DISE works closely with the organic intelligence element of the supported unit. The DISE works with the supported force during both planning and execution of operations to ensure corps, theater, and national intelligence is synchronized with the ground commander's scheme of maneuver and intent. The supporting ACE stays abreast of changes in the friendly situation through close coordination with the DISE. Together, they ensure assets stay focused on the needs of the commander, allowing the commander and his staff to pull intelligence based on actual need.

7.90. Depending on the size of the deployed force, the DISE may be the only intelligence asset actually deployed in country receiving processed intelligence from its supporting ACE located outside the AO. In large-scale deployments, the DISE is with the forward-deployed assault element until the ARFOR main or tactical command post (CP) arrives with the full processing capability of the ACE. In that case, after the main CP arrives and is functioning, the DISE could move forward to support the tactical CP, remain in the rear area, or move wherever its capability is needed, based on METT-TC.

Intelligence Tasks

7.91. MI accomplishes its mission through six primary tasks. These tasks generate intelligence products tailored to the mission for warfighters and other consumers and serve as a framework for training. The products derived from these tasks assist the combat commander in focusing and leveraging his combat power. The six intelligence tasks are--

- Providing indications and warnings (I&W).
- Performing intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlefield (IPB).
- Developing the situation.
- Supporting target development and targeting.
- Developing force protection intelligence.
- Performing battle damage assessment (BDA).

7.92. The operational-level MI organization focuses on providing multidiscipline intelligence support to the ASCC, ARFOR, JFLCC, or JTF (see Figure 7-15). Army operational-level MI organizations have the capability (though augmentation and/or reach back) of providing —

- Deployable, scaleable, high-frequency, intercept, direction-finding, and jamming support (SANDCRAB and TRACKWOLF).
- Aerial SIGINT, reconnaissance and surveillance systems (Guardrail/common sensor, and Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL).
- Overt human intelligence (HUMINT) collection, interrogation, document exploitation, and counterintelligence (CI) support {operating the Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF), the Joint Intelligence Debriefing Center (JIDC), and the Joint Document Exploitation Center (JDEC)}.
- Battlefield technical intelligence {operating the Joint Captured Material Exploitation Center (JCMEC)}.
- Operational intelligence products such as graphic templates, annotated imagery, and tailored weather forecasts (operating a Joint Imagery Processing Center (JIPC).
- Ground component intelligence support to the theater joint intelligence center (JIC).
- Reinforcement to deploying Army forces in the form of a deployable intelligence support element (DISE). See FM 2-0 (34-1), *Intelligence* for additional detail.
- Polygraph & Technical CounterIntelligence Support Measures (TSCM).

- Enhanced IMINT and ELINT reachback using the Common Ground Station (CGS) and Joint Service Work Station (JSWS).



Figure 7-15 Army Theater Intelligence Network

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Chapter 8

Operational Movement and Maneuver, and Operational Firepower

While some fires will support operational and tactical movement and maneuver by air, land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces, other fires are independent of maneuver and orient on achieving specific operational and strategic effects that support the JFC's objectives.

JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*

The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) includes the Operational-level Tasks of Conduct Operational Movement and Maneuver (OP1) as well as Employ Operational Firepower (OP3). As maneuver is most effective when combined with firepower, these are complementary elements of combat power. Although maneuver or firepower may dominate one phase of a campaign, the synchronized effects of both are present in the majority of operations. The threat of one in the presence of the other magnifies the impact of both. One without the other may prove indecisive. Their combined use makes defeating a larger enemy feasible and enhances the operational protection of friendly forces.

Operational maneuver and operational fires may occur simultaneously within a commander's AO but may have very different objectives. In general terms, operational fires are *not* fire support, and operational maneuver is not necessarily dependent on operational fires. However, operational maneuver can be affected by such fires and can exploit opportunities created or developed by the JFC's operational fires, operational fires are normally furnished by assets other than those required for the routine support of tactical maneuver. However, as the range of assets used to support tactical maneuver increases, those same assets will play a more significant role in the delivery of operational fires. The Army has significant capabilities for contributing to joint interdiction beyond the Army's AO, or for planning and conducting throughout the depth of its AO operational maneuver and/or operational fires. (See Joint Pub 3-09, *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support* and FM 3-09 (6-20), *Doctrine for Fire Support*.

This chapter will describe how operational-level Army units conduct movement, maneuver, and fires as part of a joint force as well as describe the Army units capable of conducting these functions.

SECTION I – OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

8-1. Operational movement and maneuver is the disposition of joint and/or multinational forces, conventional forces, and special operations forces to create a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign or major operation to achieve operational results. The commander achieves this decisive impact either by securing the operational advantages of position before battle or by exploiting tactical success to achieve operational objectives. Simply put,

operational movement and maneuver involves positioning the needed Army forces and resources at the critical time and place.

8-2. The theater combatant commander designs, organizes, and conducts theater campaigns. He sets the tempo and direction for the conduct of major operations. He centralizes mobility planning, to include supporting plans. His component commanders consider mobility requirements from initial planning, or prehostilities, through mission accomplishment, or accomplishment of posthostility activities.

8-3. The campaign plan provides the framework the ASCC or ARFOR commander uses to develop his supporting plan. The essence of the Army commander's plan is the distribution of his available force to support the JFC. Operational movement and maneuver produce decisive impact on the campaign or major operation. All other operational-level operating systems seek to maximize the effect of movement and maneuver. They are synchronized to produce a series of operational maneuvers that provide subordinate commanders with the necessary leverage to gain, retain, or sustain the initiative. The DCSOPS/G3 is the ASCC's principal staff advisor for the integration of operational fires and maneuver.

8-4. At the operational-level, the scope and complexity of movement and maneuver usually involve joint and multinational operations. Still, scale alone does not make movement or maneuver operational. Rather, operational movement and maneuver creates operational advantage; and this can be achieved at various echelons.

OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT

8-5. Operational movement is the regrouping, deploying, shifting, or moving of Service, joint, or multinational operational formations to and within the theater from less threatened or less promising areas to more decisive positions. From the COMASCC's perspective, movement involves forces deployed into his area by the combatant commander as well as forces under his control that he moves within his AO.

STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT

8-6. Strategic deployment, specifically the time-phased arrival of forces in the theater, may be among the most challenging problems at the operational-level. An error in determining the proper sequencing of forces may be difficult, if not impossible, to correct. The Army operational-level commander must ensure the correct mix of maneuver, protective, and support forces are sequenced to arrive in the theater to support the campaign plan. He does this by influencing the development of the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) to ensure Army units and sustainment are prioritized into his operational area to support the planned sequence of operations. Forces required for port opening, reception, and onward movement (and the elements to protect them) must be sequenced early in the TPFDD to flow into the AO once the lodgment area is established.

8-7. The COMASCC is responsible for moving forces allocated by the combatant commander from ports of debarkation to specific locations within the his AO. This responsibility includes the actual relocation or movement of operational forces by any means or mode of transportation. Prior to deploying

the forces into combat formation, the COMASCC directs movement from positions within the operational area to a forward staging area or position.

TYPES OF JOINT FORCE MANEUVERS

8-8. Types of joint force maneuvers include forcible entry, sustained action at sea and from the sea, sustained action on land, and sustained air operations. (JP 3-0)

8-9. Forcible entry is the seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. In many situations, forcible entry is the only method of gaining access to the operational area or for introducing decisive forces into the region. Forcible entry operations are normally joint and may include airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations or any combination. The Army participates in forcible entry operations with not only airborne and air assault forces to seize a lodgement, but also with protective and support forces to enable combat operations to continue unabated. See JP 3-18, *Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations* and FM 3-97.4 (90-4), *Air Assault Operations*.

8-10. The strategic mobility of Army airborne forces permits rapid employment to accomplish strategic objectives anywhere in the world. With the requisite airlift, Army airborne units can conduct a strategic brigade airdrop (SBA) to seize decisive points deep in the adversary's territory with little warning. Operation Just Cause in 1989 was such a strategic mission. See FM 3-18.11 (90-26), *Airborne Operations*,

8-11. Sustained action on land requires coordinated movement and effective concentration of combat power against the enemy in spite of enemy

interdiction efforts. Air and missile defense, intratheater transportation, reconnaissance and security, service support, and traffic control are among the chief concerns as these large movements occur. Ground combat operations have the best chance of success when they are synchronized with air superiority and interdiction operations. COMASCCs direct the movement of subordinate forces, ensuring that each distinct phase of the major operation, decisive and shaping forces are positioned in a way that enables rapid transition to subsequent phases. Additionally, the ASCC's capability to conduct sustaining operations may set the tempo of the overall joint operation since the Army is frequently the lead Service for logistical support. Within the framework of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations, the COMASCC will designate and shift the main effort.

OPERATIONAL MANEUVER

8-12. Maneuver is the means by which combat power is concentrated at the critical point to achieve the surprise, shock, momentum, and dominance that enable smaller forces to defeat larger ones. Operational maneuver is the means by which the commander sets the terms of battle, declines battle, or exploits existing situations. Throughout an AO, offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations often take place simultaneously as each combatant attempts to mass, economize locally, and maneuver against his opponent.

MANEUVER OPERATIONS

8-13. Prior to the conduct of offensive, defensive, stability or support operations, COMARFORs, in conjunction with their JFC, posture their operational forces to influence the enemy. As the COMARFOR positions his

forces, he attempts to visualizes the depth and duration of the campaign. Although initial deployment is important, the COMARFOR postures for subsequent operations based upon his visualization and understanding of the JFC's intent and operational end state.

8-14. A numbered army (if separately established) serving as an ARFOR HQ may control up to five US or multinational corps or equivalents. Operational control of corps require a number of actions: development of the supporting major operations (or land) plan integrating all six operational-level tasks; task organization of the corps with requisite combat, combat support, and combat service support assets; establishing priorities of effort with designation of a main effort; designating subordinate control and fire support coordination measures such as boundaries, AOs, and FSCLs; designation of an operational-level combined arms reserve; and the synchronization of the operational-level assets including fires and ISR.

8-15. The ARFOR's reserve may often also be the JFC's ground reserve. As such, this maneuver element must be of suitable size to have an impact (frequently at least a division) and needs to have a mobility differential over the adversary. Army aviation and air assault brigades and divisions may be assigned the missions of constituting an operational reserve.

8-16. A numbered army as an ARFOR HQ, if controlling one or more corps, does not need to directly supervise the close combat. Normally, deciding the specific form of maneuver to be used and all tactical-level operations are left to judgment and discretion of the commander's of the ARFORs major subordinate commands, the corps and divisions. Shifting corps boundaries, resources, and reprioritizing, re-task organizing, and weighting the main

effort are the principle means for the ARFOR to conduct operational maneuver.

8-17. The ASCC as an ARFOR may participate in the conduct of various types of operations to operational depths to achieve a position of advantage for the destruction or neutralization of adversary centers of gravity. This task includes both conventional and SOF. Examples of operations in depth include conducting a show of force, a demonstration, unconventional warfare, raids, direct actions, as well as forms of offensive and defensive operations.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

8-18. The offensive is the decisive form of war. The key to success in an offensive operation is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy force. The Army seeks to mass effects, but not necessarily forces, as it pursues offensive operations. Offensive operations seek--

- To destroy the enemy force
- To secure decisive terrain.
- To deprive the enemy of resources.
- To gain information.
- To deceive, divert, and hold the enemy in position.
- To disrupt the enemy's attack.
- To set up the conditions for future operations.

8-19. At the operational-level, offensive operations may be directed against an operational center of gravity: such as a visible mass of adversary forces, or against something more abstract, such as the cohesion among adversary forces. Offensive operations may also be directed at a critical vulnerability of the enemy, such as the boundary between two of its major combat formations, a vital command and control (C^2) center, a logistical base, lines of communication (LOCs), or the mental and psychological balance of a key

adversary commander. Operational-level commanders conduct offensive operations within the operational framework. They synchronize their forces in time, space, resources, purpose, and action to conduct simultaneous and sequential decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations throughout the depth of their battlespace to ensure the best chance for success. Operational-level commanders execute five forms of offensive maneuver: envelopments, turning movements, infiltrations, penetrations, and frontal attacks--all of which must be integrated with air operations. See Figure 8-1 and FM 3-0.



Figure 8-1 Offensive Battlefield Framework

8-20. Turning movements are a preferred maneuver at the operational-level as they can achieve decisive results when successfully executed. Operation Chromite conducted by General MacArthur at Inchon is an example of using an amphibious assault by Xth Corps as a turning movement. This decisive operation unhinged the main body of the North Koreans that were fixed by the defensive shaping efforts of the Eighth Army by placing a large force in the North Korean rear area. See Figure 8-2.



Figure 8-2 Classic Turning Movement at Inchon by X Corps

8-21. The multicorps maneuver of Third Army's XVIII and VII Corps during Operation DESERT STORM was an example of an operational-level envelopment as the decisive operation. This envelopment with VII Corps as the main effort, coupled with the frontal attacks of the Marines and coalition corps-sized forces as shaping operations, destroyed the Iraqi forces in Kuwait. See Figure 8-3.



Figure 8-3 Third Army's Operational Envelopment in DESERT STORM

8-22. Frontal attacks may also be performed sucessfully at the operational level of war, especially if the attacker has an overall superiority of forces across the front. Examples include General Grant's synchronized Union attacks during the campaigns of 1864 and 1865; General Eisenhower's broad front strategy across France and Germany in 1944/5; the Allied Southwest and Central Pacific drives during World War II; and the Allied attack in Desert Storm. The continuous concentric pressure exerted by ground forces during these frontal attacks denied their adversaries the opportunity to focus their defenses at any particular point across their front and exposed their vulnerabilities. As General Schwartzkopf stated about Desert Storm before the Senate Armed Services Committee, "The campaign was designed to put continuous pressure on all centers of gravity in the first 48 hours."

8-23. In addition to forms of maneuver, there are four types of offensive operations: movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. Operational-level Army commanders direct these operations sequentially and in combination to generate maximum combat power to destroy the enemy. The COMARFOR may employ the complementary capabilities of the different types of Army forces. While heavy, motorized (IBCT), light, airborne, air assault, attack aviation, and cavalry forces are all combined arms teams, they have characteristics that are optimized for certain terrain or missions. One type of force may be better suited as the initial attack force, while another for the exploitation force as listed below:

Initial Attack	Exploitation
Deep airborne or air assault	Heavy force linkup
Heavy assault force penetration	Motorized (IBCT) follow up
Airborne assault forcible entry	Light or motorized (IBCT) air land

Attack aviation deep strike Cavalry follow up

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

8-24. Army forces conduct defensive operations to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, concentrate forces elsewhere, control key terrain, wear down enemy forces as a prelude to offensive operations, or retain operational objectives. The defender must counter the attacker's initiative. At the operational-level, the defender may disrupt the enemy attack with spoiling attacks, information operations, and interdiction operations. A successful defense has static and mobile ground and air elements working closely together to deprive the enemy of the initiative.

8-25. Army forces may either conduct a mobile defense or an area defense. The mobile defense orients on the destruction of the adversary force by employing a combination of fire and maneuver to defeat its attack. The area defense focuses on the retention of terrain and absorbs the enemy into an interlocked series of positions from which the Army commander destroys the adversary largely by fires. Units smaller than corps do not normally conduct a mobile defense because of their inability to fight multiple engagements throughout the width, depth, and height of the AO, while simultaneously resourcing striking, fixing, and reserve forces. A striking force is a committed force organized to conduct the decisive attack in a mobile defense. It normally comprises between one-half and two-thirds of the combat power available to the COMARFOR at the time of the attack. See FM 3-90, *Tactics*.

Third US Army in the Battle of the Bulge

Third Army's counterattack from Lorraine into Belgium in December 1944 furnishes one of the best examples of an operational-level mobile defense. With little warning and in less than three planning days, Lieutenant General George Patton shifted 3d Army from its attacks to the east to a northwest axis of advance involving the establishment of an entirely new support network. While elements of First Army retained key positions such as Bastogne, Third Army committed III and XII Corps with six divisions on 22 December 1944 to crush German forces on the Southern flank of the Bulge in extremely adverse weather. Third Army's 4th Armored Division lead by LTC Creighton Abrams broke through to Bastogne four days later on 26 December 1944 ending the Germans last chance for a major victory in the west.

Russell F. Weigley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants*



Figure 8-4 Third Army's Counterattack December 1944

8-26. COMARFORs normally hold operational reserves in depth to seize the operational initiative during a defensive operation. These reserves may include dedicated forces, designated operating forces, generated forces from reconstitution, or newly arrived forces.

8-27. A retrograde is a type of defensive operation that involves organized movement away from the enemy. The three forms of retrogrades are withdrawals, delays, and retirements. They gain time, preserve forces, avoid combat under undesirable conditions, or draw the enemy into an unfavorable position. Control of the airspace is the key to their success. The underlying reasons for retrograde operations are to improve an operational situation or prevent a worse one from occurring. Operational-level commanders may conduct retrogrades in order to shorten extended LOCs.

PEACETIME STATIONING REQUIREMENTS

8-28. The combatant commander addresses peacetime stationing requirements in light of his potential warfighting needs and availability of forward deployed forces. Most COMASCC's control assigned trained and ready Army forces forward based for JFC employment. Those forces are backed by rapid reinforcement of Army forces from the U.S. or from other theaters. An evident mobilization capability and a demonstrated determination to respond effectively can have significant deterrent value to preclude crises.

MOBILITY AND COUNTERMOBILITY

8-29. Operational mobility is linked closely to the concept of movement and maneuver. Operational movement and maneuver include the functions of

providing mobility for operational forces and countering the mobility of enemy operational forces.

8-30. Facilitating maneuver of major formations without delays includes counteracting the effects of operationally significant obstacles. It also includes enhancing operational movement by preparing and improving facilities and routes critical to major operations. Operational countermobility delays or otherwise hinders the movement of enemy operational formations, to include selecting and emplacing systems of obstacles for operational effect. Operational-level engineer units provide support for mobility and countermobility.

8-31. Terrain, both natural and man-made, significantly influences operational mobility. Terrain consists of coastal plains, mountain ranges, forests, jungles, deserts, rivers, river deltas, built-up areas, railroad embankments, pipelines, and so forth. Terrain affects the ability to sustain forces, often dictating the capacity of LOCs. This effect, in turn, can limit the size and composition of supported forces. In war, the operational-level commander considers the effect of terrain features upon ground movement and the ability of air power to influence that movement by detecting ground forces and subsequently delaying, disrupting, and destroying the forces. In peacetime, the Army commander may consider how these features affect accomplishment of missions supporting peacekeeping or humanitarian operations.

8-32. The commander must consider the effects of weather and be cognizant of its effects in the theater. Key terrain considerations for the operational-level commander are linked to an understanding of battlespace. The

commander seeks to preserve freedom of operational movement by countering the effects of natural or man-made, operationally significant obstacles. He must be prepared to counter enemy movements by delaying, channeling, or blocking operational formations. The commander achieves this through the use of countermobility.

CONTROL OPERATIONALLY SIGNIFICANT AREAS

8-33. Army forces are essential to the control of operationally significant land areas, whose possession provides either side an operational advantage, in the JOA. This requires land forces to control an area, geographic point, or position that is important to the success of a campaign or major operation or deny enemy occupation or use of the area through fire, fire potential, or physical occupation of the land area. In military operations other than war, control of an operationally significant area could involve assisting a friendly country in populace and resource control through stability and support operations. See FM 3-0, *Operations* and FM 3-90 (100-40), *Tactics* for additional guidance on operational movement and maneuver.

SECTION II – OPERATIONAL FIRES

8-34. Operational fires are the operational-level commander's application of nonlethal and lethal weapons effects to accomplish operational objectives during the conduct of a campaign or major operation. The JFC's concept of fires describes how tactical, operational, and strategic fires are integrated and synchronized to support the concept of operations. Operational fires are joint, and potentially multinational, activities and are a vital component of any operational plan. Commanders concentrate the effects of their fires

rather than massing the weapons themselves. Extended-range acquisition and attack systems allow the commander to reduce the vulnerability of his forces by dispersing the friendly forces and massing effects on the adversary. However, fires alone are unlikely to achieve completely operational objectives. Integrated properly with operational maneuver, fires can help achieve decisive results. This section discusses how the ASCC or ARFOR commander thinks about applying joint fires to support his concept of operations.

FIREPOWER

8-35. According to JP 1-02, firepower is the amount of fires that may be delivered by a position, unit, or weapons system while fires are the effects of lethal and non-lethal weapons. Joint force commanders (JFCs) use a variety of firepower means to divert, disrupt, delay, damage, or destroy the adversary's air, surface, and subsurface military potential.

8-36. Firepower provides the destructive force essential to defeating the adversary's ability and will to fight. Firepower and maneuver are complementary elements of combat power. Firepower magnifies the effects of maneuver by destroying adversary forces and restricting his ability to shift surviving forces to meet friendly maneuver. Just as firepower supports maneuver, maneuver creates the conditions for the effective use of firepower.

8-37. Firepower includes fire support functions used separately from or in combination with maneuver. The extended range, capabilities, and accuracy of modern Army weapons systems (direct and indirect) and target acquisition systems make firepower more lethal than ever before. This allows commanders to create effects throughout the AO. Combatant commanders

integrate and synchronize strategic, operational, and tactical fires to accomplish their mission by employing fires at all levels.

STRATEGIC FIRES

8-38. Theater strategic firepower is the application of lethal and non-lethal means to achieve the desired impact in the conduct of theater strategy, theater campaigns, and joint operations. Strategic fires include the top down selection and assignment of firepower resources to targets and target sets that have major and possibly decisive impacts on achieving strategic objectives. Strategic fires will always be applied in concert with national strategic guidance. In a war involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), nuclear fires could be the instruement that directly attacks the enemy's strategic center of gravity. Operational-level Army commanders are normally in support of another component in the application of strategic fires.

8-39. Systems capable of providing strategic fires are generally those also capable of providing operational fires. The intended effect or outcome qualifies a system, weapon, or operation as either strategic or operational. Nuclear munitions, because of the escalation they signal, are normally categorized as strategic --whether they are delivered by aircraft, missile, or other means--and are closely controlled by the theater commander. See JP 3-70, *Joint Doctrine for Strategic Attack*.

OPERATIONAL FIRES

8-40. Operational fires are the operational-level commander's application of nonlethal and lethal weapons effects to accomplish objectives during the conduct of a campaign or major operation. They are a vital part of any plan at

the operational-level. Operational fires include selecting and attacking targets whose destruction or neutralization would have a significant effect on a campaign. COMARFORs also use operational fires to create the conditions for success in major operations. Operational fire planning include allocating apportioned joint and multinational air, land, and sea means.

8-41. Operational maneuver and operational fires may occur simultaneously but may have very different objectives. In general terms, operational fires are not the same as fire support and operational maneuver does not necessarily depend on operational fires. However, operational maneuver is most effective when it combines and complements such fires and exploits opportunities that develop. The combination of operational fires and maneuver generates asymmetric, enormously destructive, and one-sided battles, as the Desert Storm ground offensive showed. Assets other than those supporting tactical maneuver normally furnish operational fires. However, as their range increases, Army assets used to support tactical maneuver will play a more significant role in delivering operational fires.

8-42. Operational fires include the allocation of joint and multinational air, land, sea (surface and subsurface), and space means. It is a separate element of the subordinate JFC's concept of operations (addressed separately from operational maneuver) but must be closely integrated and synchronized with his concept for maneuver. In that regard, operational fires is normally integrated with operational land maneuver for synergistic effect, staying power, and more rapid achievement of strategic aims. All Services contribute capabilities that can be used for operational fires. To synchronize operations, the JFC may task one component to provide fires to support another

component's operations. However, as each Service's assets for operational fires are limited, the JFC should consider preserving their organic capabilities as he develops his concept of fires.

8-43. A synchronized, systematic, and persistent plan of attack among air, land, sea and space commanders is essential. Air superiority enables the COMARFOR to execute operations without interference from enemy air forces and maintain tactical flexibility. Air component missions that contribute most directly to land operations are counterair, counterland (close air support-CAS and air interdiction-AI), special operations, airlift, and surveillance and reconnaissance. Land forces contribute to air operations by fire--suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), land-based air defense, ground defense of air bases--and by maneuver through attack helicopter operations or seizure of air bases and air defense sites by ground forces.

8-44. Operational fires includes targeting and attacking land and sea targets whose destruction or neutralization will have a major impact on shaping a subordinate campaign or major operation. Additionally, operational fires can be designed to attack operationally significant objectives that could have a decisive impact on the campaign or major operation. Operational fires may include the interdiction of a major adversary force or forces to set the conditions for subsequent, decisive operations.

8-45. Operational fires are planned from the top down, starting with the JFC's guidance. The operational commander establishes objectives, identifies targets, and then passes them to subordinate joint or multinational units for execution. Subordinate target nominations contribute to this top-down approach.

8-46. The ASCC as an ARFOR has various means with which to execute concentrate the ARFOR's combat power. He may mass fires, concentrate long-range precision fires, employ attack helicopters, or coordinate the use of air or naval forces with Army resources. While the COMARFOR may employ organic assets, his primary means in the application of operational fires is through the nomination of operational targets in the joint targeting process.

TACTICAL FIRES

8-47. The primary purpose of tactical fires is to directly and immediately support battles and engagements directed against appropriate tactical decisive points. Therefore, maneuver commanders exercise control over tactical fires and joint fire support that enables their maneuver operations. Joint fire support is defined in JP 3-09 as joint fires that assist land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, and key waters. Joint fire support may include, but is not limited to, the lethal effects of close air support (CAS) by fixed- and rotary- wing aircraft, naval surface fire support (NSFS), artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles, as well as nonlethal effects such as electronic warfare (EW) and psychological operations (PSYOP). Tactical fires include the coordinated and collective use of target acquisition data, indirect-fire weapons, armed aircraft (both fixed- and rotary-wing), and other means against adversary elements in contact or imminent contact. COMASCC's normally allocate sufficient tactical fires and target acquisition assets to subordinate units to provide for their own tactical firepower.

8-48. Commanders concentrate the effects of their fires rather than massing the weapons themselves. Extended-range acquisition and attack systems

allow the commander to reduce the vulnerability of his forces by dispersing friendly forces and massing effects on the adversary. However, fires alone are unlikely to completely achieve operational objectives. Integrated properly with operational maneuver, fires can help achieve decisive results.

SYNCHRONIZATION OF INTERDICTION

8-49. Interdiction contributes substantially to operational fires, although it also can have tactical and strategic effects. All interdiction missions affecting the land battle require coordination between several levels of command, both within and across Service lines. Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays, or destroys the adversary's surface or subsurface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. Its effects must be synchronized in time, space, and purpose with other supporting or supported operations of the joint force. Interdiction-capable forces include, but are not limited to--

- Fighter or attack aircraft and bombers.
- Ships and submarines.
- Conventional airborne, air assault, or other ground maneuver forces.
- Special operations forces (SOF).
- Surface-to-surface, subsurface-to-surface, and air-to-surface missiles, rockets, munitions, and mines.
- Artillery and naval surface fire support.
- Attack helicopters.
- Electronic warfare (EW) systems.
- Anti-satellite weapons.
- Space-based satellite systems or sensors.

8-50. Synchronizing interdiction and maneuver is critical to the successful execution of the campaign or major operation. Interdiction and maneuver should not be considered separate operations against a common adversary, but rather complementary operations designed to achieve the JFC's campaign objectives.

8-51. Potential responses to synchronized maneuver and interdiction can create an agonizing dilemma for the adversary. If he attempts to counter friendly maneuver, adversary forces can be exposed to unacceptable losses from interdiction; if he employs measures to reduce such interdiction losses, adversary forces may not be able to counter the maneuver. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing interdiction and maneuver assists commanders in gaining the greatest leverage against the adversary at the operational-level.

8-52. The JFC establishes boundaries to define surface areas in order to facilitate the coordination of maneuver and interdiction. Synchronization of efforts within these boundaries is of particular importance. According to Joint Pub 3-0, the operational land commander is the supported commander for air interdiction in his AO, and he therefore specifies the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations therein. While this may mean specifying individual targets or target sets and the desired effects to be achieved in attacking them, the preferred method is for the land component commander to specify the operational-level effects he intends the interdiction to achieve, the target priorities to achieve those effects, and the date/time by which the effects are required.

8-53. Interdiction operations, whether by land, air, or naval forces, complement overall maneuver to help destroy the adversary's center of gravity. For example, actual or threatened maneuver can force an adversary to abandon or reveal covered positions or attempt rapid resupply. These reactions provide excellent and vulnerable targets for interdiction. See JP 3-03, *Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations.*

GENERAL TASKS OF OPERATIONAL FIRES

8-54. Operational fires help the Army commander accomplish his mission and protect the force. Operational fires achieve both operational and tactical objectives while holding adversary critical functions at risk throughout the depth of the battlespace. They achieve operational objectives by extending the battlefield in both space and time. Targeting of adversary information systems through the use of IO also characterize operational fires. Targets critical to the success of friendly operations exist throughout the depth of the battlefield. Current and emerging capabilities permit their acquisition and attack at increasing ranges and with faster response times. Operational fires expose or attack adversary centers of gravity directly or indirectly. Attack of key operational targets helps to set the conditions for operational maneuver. Disrupting, delaying, or limiting critical adversary functions helps the COMARFOR dictate the terms for a close fight. Operational fires assist in holding or denying key terrain in support of both operational and tactical objectives.

8-55. Support of both operational and tactical objectives through operational fires is based on the ability of operational fires to hold all critical adversary functions at risk throughout the depth of the battlespace. Operational fires neither leave the adversary a place to hide nor time to rest limiting his freedom of action. As such, operational fires hasten the physical destruction of the adversary force and the disintegration of cohesive operations and demoralize his will to fight. In stability and support operations, the availability of operational fires to the commander acts as a deterrent to escalation of conflict and, when necessary, provides him additional means to accomplish the mission and protect the force.

8-56. The adversary may possess a sophisticated operational fires capability. The Army commander must consider such adversary capabilities and also establish measures to protect the force. Operational fires may be used to disrupt his capabilities before they can be used against friendly forces. Examples include theater air and missile defense, counterfire, and joint suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD).

8-57. Operational fires focus largely on one or more of three general tasks in support of the ARFOR: facilitating maneuver, isolating the battlefield, or destroying critical adversary functions and facilities.

FACILITATING MANEUVER

8-58. Operational fires can facilitate maneuver in depth by suppressing the adversary's deep-strike systems, disrupting the his operational maneuver and tempo, and creating exploitable gaps in tactical defenses. When the campaign calls for ground operations to be the main effort i.e. the defeat mechanism, planning for the interdiction operations and target prioritization must be based on the ground commander's concept of operations based upon his knowing and understanding the capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of opposing ground forces.

8-59. Proper interdiction planning requires both air and ground expertise. The interdiction and maneuver planning responsibilities of the operational-level commander fall into two areas: influencing joint air interdiction operations and ensuring that ARFOR and JFLCC target nominations are attacked according to available assets. To ensure integration of interdiction and maneuver, the Army operational-level commander must--

- Define Army interdiction objectives and priorities and provide them to the JFACC.
- Establish allocation of CAS effort between subordinate Army forces and the operational headquarters.
- Ensure the effects coordination cell (ECC) has identified high-payoff targets.
- Ensure that consolidated target nominations reflect ARFOR priorities.
- Facilitate notification to subordinate unit commanders when the JFC determines that the circumstances have changed thus changing priorities.
- If designated as an appropriate ground forces commander, establish a fire support coordination line (FSCL) within boundaries and in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders.

ISOLATING THE BATTLEFIELD

8-60. Isolating the battlefield is another major task of operational fires. Operational-level commanders isolate the battlefield by interdicting adversary military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. Commanders usually combine this isolation with other operations in a simultaneous attack designed to use superior combat power to achieve quick, decisive outcomes.

8-61. While interdiction destroys adversary forces, its primary contribution to the operation is curtailing his freedom of movement and information flow and influencing the adversary's battle tempo by diverting, delaying, and disrupting his forces. Interdiction can slow the action of adversary reserves and obstruct the redeployment or movement of forces.

8-62. Interdiction of the logistical support system disrupts adversary operations by choking off his combat power. Friendly ground and air forces must exploit the adversary's reduced freedom to maneuver and synchronize this with other operations to achieve the desired tempo of operations.

DESTROYING CRITICAL ADVERSARY FUNCTIONS AND FACILITIES

8-63. Operational-level commanders may use operational fires to destroy critical adversary functions and facilities. Critical targets may include high-value C^2 systems, mobility assets such as fixed and mobile bridging, air defense sites, and adversary long-range delivery systems such as surface-to-surface missiles, theater ballistic and cruise missiles, airfields, and aircraft.

8-64. The objective in such cases is the deliberate elimination or substantial degradation of critical adversary operational capabilities, for example, attaining air superiority by destroying his air forces and air defense capabilities. Operational fires do not necessarily depend on other concurrent operations for success; however, they may be employed with other systems and maneuver in a simultaneous attack of adversary operational capabilities. Operational fires are particularly attractive in a theater where lack of resources may preclude major ground offensive operations.

8-65. The COMARFOR, as a major planner of operational fires and fire support, participates in the management of scarce operational resources, especially air assets, through the theater air-ground system.

THEATER AIR-GROUND SYSTEM

8-66. The theater air-ground system (TAGS) is not a formal system in itself but rather the sum of various component air-ground systems operating in the theater. The TAGS includes the organizations, personnel, equipment, procedures, and techniques comprising the Army Air-Ground System (AAGS), the COMAFFOR's theater air control system (TACS), the Marine air command and control system (MACCS) and the Navy Tactical Air Control System (NTACS). Although components and agencies of the TAGS belong to

different Services or different nations, they function as a single entity in planning, coordinating, and integrating air support with ground operations.

8-67. The supported combatant commander must effectively employ the air capabilities provided by the assigned or supporting Service or functional component forces within his AOR. Each component within the unified command may conduct a variety of air operations in the combatant commander's AOR. Additionally, supporting combatant commander's may also fly missions to support the supported commander's objectives. The supported combatant commander must integrate assigned and supporting forces into his theaterwide air operations and ensure component direct support air operations are coordinated with his theaterwide operations.

8-68. To ensure this integration, the combatant commander normally establishes a joint force air component commander (JFACC). This is normally assigned to the Service component that has the preponderance of air assets and the best capability to command and control joint air operations. Responsibilities of the JFACC are described in Joint Pub 3-30 (3-56.1), *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*. If the JFACC is not established, the other Service component commanders share responsiblility for providing fixed-wing tactical air support to Army forces under the direct supervision of the JFC. See FM 3-52.1 (100-103-1), *Multiservice Procedures for Integrated Combat Airspace Command and Control*.

ARMY AIR-GROUND SYSTEM (AAGS)

8-69. The AAGS is the system necessary for providing the JFLCC or ARFOR with the means for receiving, processing, and forwarding the requests of

subordinate commands for air support missions and for the rapid dissemination of information and intelligence produced by air means. It is also the Army's system for synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating air operations with the commander's scheme of maneuver. The AAGS begins with the ARFOR/JFLCC in the theater or JOA and extends through all echelons down to maneuver battalions. At each echelon down to division level, the commander is responsible for integrating fire support, deconflicting the airspace, and coordinating air support as required. The AAGS is the Army's operational approach to accomplish the functional activity of airspace C2. The operations officer (G-3) is responsible for staff supervision of all Army component air-ground operations. The AAGS is composed of operations, fire support, air defense, Army airspace C^2, and coordination and liaison elements, such as the BCD. Each Army component of the system is designed to operate with an element of the USAF TACS but is also compatible with both NTACS and MACCS.

8-70. Army airspace command and control (A^2C^2) process integrates the maneuver of Army aviation into the overall scheme of maneuver. Users of Army airspace achieve operational influence through the synchronization of air maneuver focused throughout the depth of the AO. All Army airspace users fire and maneuver within the third dimension of the ground commander's AO. The A^2C^2 process is used to synchronize Army assets in the airspace above the ground commander's AO. The Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS) digitizes and modernizes the A2C2 and air traffic services from division to ASCC A2C2 element. See FM 3-52, (100-103), *Army Airspace and Control in a Combat Zone.*

8-71. Under the JFC's airspace control authority (ACA), the A2C2 element of the G3 is the Army's principal organization responsible for airspace control in the COMARFOR's AO. The Army provides airspace management liaison to the Air Force control and reporting center's (CRC) airspace management liaison section (AMLS). This liaison handles real-time Army airspace management issues that may arise during execution of air operations. Figure 8-5 illustrates the key links of a typical theater air ground system and the locations of the liaison elements. See FM 3-52.2 (100-103-2), *Multiservice Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System*.



FIGURE 8-5 THEATER AIR GROUND SYSTEM (TAGS)

OTHER FIREPOWER SYSTEMS

8-72. Technology is improving extended-range acquisition and attack systems such as the multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), the Army tactical missile system (ATACMS), and the Apache attack helicopter. These systems allow the Army to operate at greater depths within its AO.

8-73. The COMARFOR must orchestrate available Army, joint, and multinational lethal and non-lethal delivery systems to disrupt, delay, destroy, or degrade adversary operational forces or critical functions and facilities. They must ensure that systems designed to impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of adversary operational forces, functions, and facilities are coordinated with fires. The extended range and flexibility of attack helicopters and fire support systems make it possible to shift the focus and concentration of fires rapidly over the width and depth of the operational commander's battlespace. All aspects of the effects of information operations (EW, PSYOP, CNA etc.), as well as SOF must be synchronized with operational fires in offensive and defensive operations, or they may be used by themselves in stability and support operations.

PLANNING

8-74. Previously theater air forces have provided most operational fires; however, the increasing range and accuracy of projectile, rocket, and missile systems, combined with maneuver and attack capabilities from attack helicopters and light forces, now provide the Army commander with his own organic operational-fires capability. The ability of each Service to engage targets at operational depths demonstrates the inherent joint nature of operational fires.

8-75. The COMARFOR synchronizes ground and air operational fires in his AO to achieve operational and tactical objectives. The COMARFOR applies operational fires in depth to achieve operational objectives quickly with minimum casualties. The COMARFOR plans operational fires from the top down by establishing objectives, designating priority targets, and passing them to the subordinate units for execution. The COMARFOR executes fires with organic and allocated assets, and by nominating targets that he cannot strike to the JFC. He uses the targeting process to shape the battlespace and synchronize fire support, interdiction, and maneuver. He does this using the decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D^3A) methodology and participating in the JFC's joint targeting process.

TARGETING PROCESS

8-76. Targeting is the process to detect, select, and prioritize targets; match the appropriate action (weapon system); and assess the resulting effects based on the commander's objective, guidance, and intent. The targeting process is proactive. The process allows the commander to identify those targets most critical to the success of Army operations. The commander's plan focuses sensors and shooters to find and attack critical targets before they can be committed to the battle, or at a time when attack will be most disruptive to the enemy courses of action. The payoff of a proactive targeting process is the ability to seize the initiative from the adversary and set the conditions for success. Although the process is proactive, the ability to rapidly react to unforeseen action by the enemy requires courses of action and plans allowing adequate flexibility to freedom of action. Targeting methodology is based on the **decide**, **detect**, **deliver**, and **assess (D3A)**

functions performed by the commander and staff in planning and executing targeting (see Figure 8-6).



Figure 8-6 Decide, Detect, Deliver, and assess Methodology

8-77. The D^{3}A methodology enables commanders to respond rapidly with synchronized operations to events vital to establishing favorable conditions for mission accomplishment. The D^{3}A methodology is a process that helps a commander's structured attack of critical targets and creates a favorable battle tempo for friendly forces, particularly at decisive points and times during the operation.

8-78. This methodology requires extensive lateral and horizontal coordination, which the ARFOR staff does, based on the commander's intent. In planning operational fires, both ground and air component commanders consider the effects that all fires, especially scatterable mines and cluster-type munitions, may have on future ground operations. Targeting by the

ARFOR staff follows the same targeting process used at subordinate echelons. This process is detailed in FM 3-60 (6-20-10), *TTP for Targetting* and FM 5-0(101-5), Army *Planning and Orders Production.*

8-79. At the operational level, the focus of the targeting effort is more on planning and coordination, rather than on execution of operational fires. Because of the use of air interdiction as a primary tool, ARFOR target planning is based on the air tasking order (ATO) timeline and the battle rythem of the joint targetting process. Typically, when the ARFOR staff identifies time sensitive targets (TSTs), it will coordinate with subordinate units for acquisition and attack by systems allocated or organic. There will be some emerging or immediate TSTs that subordinate units are not capable of acquiring or engaging. The critical nature of these targets--and the requirement to coordinate and synchronize the employment of several joint acquisitions/attacks as quickly as possible--requires the ARFOR commander to employ a staff element to support the associated targeting effort. This element is the effects coordination cell (ECC).

EFFECTS COORDINATION CELL (ECC)

8-80. COMASCC's transform their former Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC) into a digitized Effects Coordination Cell (ECC) – to become the centerpiece of effects-based fires. Effects coordination divisions are authorized as part of the DCSOPS/G3's of selected ASCC's to provide situational awareness, planning and coordination, targeting, and control of designated operational firepower. The G3 is normally responsible for fires and effects coordination planning and execution. The primary function of the ECC is to provide centralized fires and effects coordination and management

(vertically and horizontally), precision target acquisition, and delivery of both lethal and nonlethal action to create the COMARFOR's desired effects against the full range of target sets throughout the AO and not just for deep targets. The ECC ensures effective and efficient employment of critical assets and facilitates synchronization of joint operations. The primary functions of the ECC apply across the entire range of military operations. Normally when the ECC is employed, it will be augmented with appropriate Army, joint, and multinational force representatives and will routinely incorporate an Air Coordination Cell (ACC) from the Air Force.

8-81. The ECC also serves as the operational fires element at the operational-level that plans, coordinates, and executes employment of operational lethal/nonlethal fires and effects and may serve as the counterfire HQ. The chief of the ECC acts as the ASCC Fire Support Coordinator. Deep strikes are particularly crucial to the Army commander's AO. They allow the commander the freedom of action to exploit speed, range, lethality and versatility of modern land based systems to accomplish the mission. Long-range precision fires are necessary to support the JFC's mission and enable the commanders at each level to shape the battlespace, set the tempo, set the conditions for success, and protect the force. An important aspect for the commander is synchronizing operational fires with other effects and activities of the land battle to ensure achievement of maximum relative combat power for the decisive operation.

THE ASCC ECC

8-82. The operational-level commander uses aerial-delivered and long-range precision indirect fires as a principle means of shaping the theater battlefield. The commander's areas of interests are theater-wide enemy forces, functions, facilities, and operations that impact on future ground/land force plans and operations. The ASCC HQ contains a ECC to execute the operational fires for the COMARFOR. As the COMARFOR/JFLCC ECC, it plans, coordinates, and synchronizes operations in its deep area with its attached or OPCON/TACON corps, MEFs, or multinational forces. Its primary tool for operations in the ARFOR deep area is joint interdiction. Air, SOF, PSYOP, EW, attack helicopters, ATACMS, and maneuver forces are all employed to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the adversary's surface potential.

8-83. The ECC provides a streamlined, automated process to employ the D3A methodology for ARFOR shaping operations. Through automated linkages, the ECC provides the means to integrate and display a common relevant operating picture (CROP) of the battlespace. The ECC ensures effective and efficient employment of critical ARFOR collection and attack assets. This includes recommending the pairing of fire support assets, both lethal and non-lethal, to targets and the coordination of assets to create a synergistic effect. The ECC determines the optimal means of engaging targets based on location of ARFOR attack assets, range, operational status, munitions available, other missions, air defense threat, and accuracy of target acquisition data. Members of the ECC participate in the planning, coordination, and synchronization of operational fires and maneuver.

8-84. The ECC brings together those multifunctional staff elements within the ARFOR command and control structure formerly associated with deep operations. These staff elements are electronically connected via advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS), Global Command and Control System (GCCS), the All Source Analysis System (ASAS), and other Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS). As planning, coordinating, synchronizing, and executing operational fires and effects is a continuous process, the ECC meets daily in accordance with the established ARFOR battle rhythm.

ARFOR BATTLE RHYTHM.

8-85. The ARFOR battle rhythm is a sequence of daily meetings that are impacted by the JFC's and JFACC's planning and execution cycle, and especially by the air tasking order (ATO). While the DCG may represent the COMARFOR at selected meetings, the BCD represents the ARFOR at the JFACC's meetings.

8-86. In addition, under the supervision of the ECC, the Information Operations Cell provides offensive and defensive IO integration skills to achieve information superiority by protecting friendly decision making processes while influencing neutral and adversary decision making processes. Members develop and disseminate guidance/plans for IO that is passed to the components, supporting organizations and agencies. The IOWG must integrate, coordinate, and deconflict across the full spectrum of the COMARFOR's battle plan. The IOWG 's efforts should result in synchronized IO capabilities and related activities, and produce a synergistic IO plan. See Figure 8-7.



Figure 8-7 JFC/ARFOR Battle Rhythm

8-87. Operational fires planning involves all staff elements of the ARFOR. Personnel within the ECC facilitate the planning among the other staff elements and coordinate with the current operations, future operations, and the OPG of the G5. The main tasks performed by the ECC in the planning function include:

- Develop situational awareness.
- Evaluate assessment of future enemy situation. (Assist in development of ARFOR High Payoff Target List).
- Develop operational fires guidance including the Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM), target selection standards, and trigger event criteria.
- Develop deep strike plans.

- Develop courses of action and war gaming.
- Issue/provide input for warning orders, FRAGOs, OPLANS, and OPORDS
- Develop IPB Products to support deep operations.
- Develop intelligence collection requirements for deep operations.
- Determine BDA requirements.

8-88. The ECC provides the means to coordinate the use of deep strike assets within the ARFOR. Coordination involves the horizontal orchestration across all operational-level systems within an operation to gain maximum payoff from each system. Synchronization involves the vertical orchestration of operations with joint and theater assets. The main tasks performed by the ECC in the coordination and synchronization include:

- Coordinate the deconfliction of terrain, movement, and release.
- Coordinate nonlethal attack means and supporting fires.
- Coordinate intelligence and contingency plans.
- Synchronize deep area operations to ensure mutual support.
- Optimize combat power effects in joint operations

8-89. The ECC is the focal point for centralized coordination and deconfliction for all fires and effects. The ECC will monitor while subordinate elements execute. With near real time situation displays, the COMARFOR, or his representative, can make last minute Go/No Go decisions, modify plans, monitor the progress of an operation, direct contingency operations as required, and begin planning for follow-on operations. The main tasks performed by the ECC in execution include:

- Perform target processing.
- Receive reports.
- Monitor situation.
- Recommend attack means..
- Recommend changes to theater FSCMs.
- Perform combat assessment as part of the JFCs federated BDA system

8-90. The core organization of an ASCC ECC which includes the effects coordination division and elements from the IO division is at Figure 8-8.



Figure 8-8 Operational-Level ECC Organization

JOINT INTERFACE

8-91. The COMARFOR as the Army operational-level commander is the critical link for coordination of joint support for Army operations and Army support for joint operations. The COMARFOR has a key role in ensuring that ground and air operations, as envisioned by the JFC, complement and reinforce each other. The COMARFOR begins coordination with the JFC and JFACC early in the operational planning process. During the operational planning process, the COMARFOR, in coordination with his subordinate commanders and staff, identifies Army requirements for air support (reconnaissance, CAS, air interdiction, and airlift). He also participates in the

joint fires process by nominating targets for Army and other component engagement and recommending fire support coordination measures.

8-92. The ASCC-level ECC coordinates with other Services through the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD), the ground liaison officers at the wings, and the Army liaison officer aboard the airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC). The BCD is collocated either ashore or afloat with the JFACC's air operations center (JAOC) or theater equivalent. The BCD is digitally linked to the ECC by the Air Forces theater battle management core system (TBMCS) which serves as the JFC's target development application program for the exchange and transmission of targeting priorities, targeting lists with supporting intelligence data, and targeting damage assessments. The BCD also expedites the exchange of information through face-to-face coordination with elements of the JAOC established by the JFACC.

8-93. The JFACC normally provides an Air Coordination Cell (ACC) collocated with the ARFOR/JFLCC to synchronize joint air operations with ground maneuver and fires. An Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), normally allocated to support Army corps, may augment the ACC in direct support of the ARFOR/JFLCC for major operations when required., Similar functions are performed within the Navy Tactical Air Control System (NTACS) by its tactical air control center. These assets receive information from and provide feedback directly to the ECC. See Figure 8-9.



Figure 8-9 Tactical Air Control Links

CONTROL AND COORDINATION MEASURES

8-94. JFCs employ various fire support coordination measures (FSCM) to facilitate effective joint operations. Many maneuver control measures have fire coordination implications. Specific joint fire support coordination measures and the procedures associated with those measures also assist in preserving the fluidity and flexibility of successful joint operations.

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION LINE

8-95. The COMARFOR may establish and adjust a fire support coordination line (FSCL) within his AO to support his concept of operation. The COMARFOR must coordinate the FSCL's location with the appropriate superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commands. If an FSCL is established, its purpose is to allow the ARFOR, its subordinates, and

supporting units, such as Air Force, to swiftly attack targets of opportunity beyond the FSCL. Such attacks by Army assets must be coordinated with all other affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary action to avoid friendly casualties. This coordination includes informing and/or consulting with affected commanders. The inability to effect this coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL; however, failure to coordinate this type of attack increases the risk of friendly casualties and could waste limited resources through duplicate attacks. The FSCL is not a boundary. If the land force commander desires to shoot or maneuver beyond his lateral boundaries, he must first coordinate with the appropriate commander. The interface within the ECC among the various fire support representatives provides an excellent means of initially coordinating the attack of targets in the area.

8-96. The FSCL must complement the COMARFOR's concept for shaping operations and optimize the synergy between operational maneuver and operational fires. To achieve this synergy, supported and supporting commanders must have clearly defined responsibilities, selective targeting, and coordinated operations. As the supported commander, the COMARFOR provides necessary guidance, such as target restrictions and weapons constraints, for all operations in the deep area beyond the FSCL and within the forward boundary of the designated ARFOR AO. The COMARFOR does not necessarily have to control the shaping operations or joint service activities in this area. Still, supporting commanders must follow the COMARFOR's intent and guidance for activities in this area.

8-97. The COMARFOR may also use the FSCL as a control measure to delineate deep areas for subordinates. Subordinate commands would conduct strikes out to the FSCL, while the ARFOR is responsible for shaping operations in the deep area from the FSCL to the forward AO boundary.

8-98. Interdiction occurs both short of and beyond the FSCL. Attack of planned interdiction targets on either side requires no further coordination, if the target is within the AO of the attacking command. Deviation from the plan requires coordination with affected commanders. Attack of interdiction targets of opportunity short of the FSCL requires coordination with the affected commanders. Before attacking targets of opportunity beyond the FSCL, supporting commanders should coordinate with the COMARFOR. However, if he cannot effect coordination, the supporting commander controlling the attack must follow the COMARFOR's guidance for attacking targets in this area. Thus, the COMARFOR need not directly control the overall interdiction effort (air, ground) but, as the supported commander, he exercises general direction over interdiction and other activities of supporting commanders in his AO.

8-99. Besides the FSCL, other fire support coordination measures may be used to facilitate or restrict operational fires. These include restrictive fire areas (RFAs) and no-fire areas (NFAs) to protect friendly elements on either side of the FSCL or to preserve other protected targets. If rules of engagement (ROE) permit, commanders should consider the use of free-fire areas (FFAs) or common reference systems such as kill boxes to expedite fires or the jettisoning of ordnance in specific areas. See JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*.

8-100. Whether attacking or defending, the COMARFOR usually designates an initial FSCL and plans for a subsequent series of on-order FSCLs. Execution of on-order FSCLs must be transmitted in sufficient time to allow higher, lower, adjacent, and supporting headquarters time to effect changes.

AIRSPACE CONTROL MEASURES (ACM)

8-101. All components of a joint force use the airspace. The JFC normally designates the JFACC as the airspace control authority (ACA) to consolidate, coordinate, and deconflict the airspace requirements of the components and to publish ACMs in the airspace control order. For the ground commander, these airspace requirements are directly above his AO and provide for freedom of maneuver for those Army forces operating in the third dimension, indirect fire trajectories, and UAV operations. The coordinating altitude is a common procedural ACM designed to coordinate airspace between high performance fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. The use of a coordinating altitude permits a three-dimensional view of the battlefield for the ground commander and allows him to retain freedom of maneuver without overly restricting any of the other users of airspace. ACMs may be established to facilitate operations between the FSCL and the land force commander's forward boundary. Changes to ACMs within a land force AO are initiated by the ASCC's A2C2 element of the G3 and submitted through the BCD. See JP 3-52, *Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.*

COORDINATION

8-102. To coordinate operational-level fires, the ECC interacts with multiple Army, Air Force, Marine, and sometimes Naval aviation organizations. The

ECC works very closely with the TIB and its analysis and control element (ACE) which is the ECC's main source of targeting data.

8-103. The ARFOR ECC also works closely with subordinate unit's ECCs or fire support elements (FSE) to deconflict targets and targeting information, to task corps for operational fires support, and to forward air support requests to the air operations center (AOC). The ECC also provides the corps with target feedback, especially battle damage assessment (BDA) received through the BCD.

8-104. The ECC provides liaison with the JFC's staff involved in the integration of joint fires. The JFC may form a joint fires element (JFE) to assist the J3 accomplish fires planning and coordination. Additionally, the ECC provides Army members to the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) and the joint information operations cell when these are established.

JOINT TARGETING COORDINATION BOARD

8-105. The combatant commander or JFC may establish a joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions or as a JFC-level review mechanism to include special operations targeting. The role and composition of the JTCB is determined by the JFC and normally consists of members of the joint staff and representatives of each subordinate command. The JTCB ensures the effective employment of all theater-level deep surveillance and attack resources, including SOF. The JTCB typically:

- Reviews target information,.
- Develops targeting guidance and priorities
- Maintains a macro-level view of the JOA and ensures targetting nominations are consistent with the JFC's concepts.

- Prepares or refines joint target lists (JTLs).
- Maintains the restricted target list (RTL) and SOF operational areas.
- Ensures IO integration and deconflicts lethal and nonlethal assets.

8-106. The JTCB's organization reflects theater force composition, strategic objectives, geography, and the threat. The JTCB is usually chaired by the deputy combatant commander or DJFC or his representative. It includes senior representatives of all components, the JAOC, and other specialized planning cells. Input from the joint staff element is used also to prepare the joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL).

8-107. The JTCB normally meets daily to ensure that JFC targeting guidance is disseminated, to monitor the effectiveness of lethal and nonlethal targeting efforts, to coordinate and deconflict joint force operations, to validate fire support coordination measures, and to approve new target nominations for inclusion in the JIPTL. The JFC's targetting related decisions based upon the JTCB's recommendations are provided throughout the joint force. See Joint Pubs 3-09 and 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targetting*. Joint Pub 3-05.5 contains discussion of SOF mission tasking as part of the JTCB process.

SECTION III – OPERATIONAL MANEUVER AND FIRE ORGANIZATIONS

THE CORPS

THE CORPS' ROLE IN THEATER OPERATIONS

8-108. Corps are the largest tactical units in the US Army. They are the subordinate instruments by which numbered armies or JFLCCs conduct operations at the operational-level. ASCCs tailor corps for the theater and the mission for which they are deployed. They contain organic combat, CS,

and CSS capabilities to sustain operations for a considerable period when employed as part of a larger ground force.

CORPS UNITS

8-109. There is no standard corps organizational structure. Figure 8-10 shows a typical corps organization. Most corps will have a similar structure, although the specific number, size, and types of units will vary. Corps may be assigned combat, combat support, and CSS organizations based on their needs for a specific operation. A corps normally has from two to five divisions of any type and combination the mission requires. Light infantry, armored, mechanized infantry, airborne, and air assault (AASLT) divisions are all available and each type of division has unique capabilities and limitations. (See FM 3-91(100-71), *Division Operations*.)



Figure 8-10 Corps Organization

8-110. Separate maneuver brigades, ACRs, field artillery brigades (FAB), engineer brigades, air defense artillery (ADA) brigades, and aviation

brigades are the nondivision combat units commonly available to the corps to weight its main effort and to perform special combat functions. Signal brigades, military intelligence (MI) brigades, military police (MP) brigades, civil affairs (CA) brigades, chemical brigades, and psychological operations (PSYOP) battalions are the combat support organizations commonly available to the corps. Other special operations forces (SOF) may support corps combat operations as necessary. The corps CSS organizations are the personnel group, the finance group, and the corps support command (COSCOM).

CORPS FUNCTIONS

8-111. Corps usually link the operational and tactical levels of war. They may also link operational and strategic levels of war as well if serving as a JTF headquarters. Corps normally plan and conduct major operations and battles. They synchronize tactical operations including maneuver, fires of organic artillery, naval fires, supporting tactical air, and actions of their CS and CSS units.

8-112. Corps are capable of deploying anywhere in the world. For this reason, they must consider not only the employment of a variety of light, special operations, and armored maneuver forces, but also the conduct of operations in a variety of situations. Corps may require augmentation of selected operational-level forces to perform theater sustainment or protection operations. An army support element (ASE) may be formed for that purpose.

8-113. There may be times when corps' must provide resources to support operations that do not otherwise involve their headquarters. The corps then

acts as a force-provider. Corps may at times have considerable assets committed to other commands in support of regional contingencies around the world.

8-114. Future corps operations will possess several key characteristics. Operations will be joint and, often, multinational in nature. They will reflect a need for tailored forces employed in force-projection operations, likely in response to short-notice crisis situations. They will be conducted across the full range of offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations.

CORPS AS JTF HQ

8-115. A corps headquarters may function as the ARFOR headquarters of a subordinate joint force, the JFLCC headquarters of a JTF, or as the JTF headquarters itself. In such cases, the corps is responsible for both operational and tactical planning and execution. The centerpiece of the corps' operational responsibilities as a JTF HQ may be participation in the development of a subordinate joint campaign plan. (See JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning* for a detailed discussion.

8-116. Corps will most likely be found conducting force-projection operations as part of a tailored joint force. When the mission calls for a preponderance of land power, the corps may perform duties as a JTF headquarters.

8-117. The corps will require augmentation to transition to this joint staff structure. Augmentation may be in the form of a deployable joint cell to provide initial assistance or a major augmentation of personnel and equipment based on the JTF's size and composition.

8-118. The establishing authority is responsible for providing augmentation to the JTF. However, the corps commander, as the CJTF, must make his augmentation requirements known.

8-119. The corps as a JTF can conduct either tactical or operational-level operations. The mission, not the size of the force, determines at which level the JTF functions. When the focus is on conducting joint operations to attain theater-strategic objectives, the JTF serves as an operational headquarters. However, the comander must fully understand both the tactical and operational-level environments to ensure a supportive relationship exists between his plans and operations and those of subordinate and higher headquarters. See JTTP 5-00.2, *JTF Planning Guidance and Procedures*.

THE CORPS AS THE ARFOR OR JFLCC HEADQUARTERS

8-120. Corps operations are habitually combined arms operations. The corps possesses the organic capability to synchronize these activities across all of the battlefield functional areas. As such, corps are readily adaptable to function as an ARFOR or the JFLCC headquarters of the JTF. However, the staff will be required to make the conceptual change from a tactical to an operational-level focus.

8-121. Corps are optimized for executing battle command functions required of the higher headquarters of ground maneuver forces. They can coordinate sustainment activities for significant numbers of assigned or attached forces.

8-122. Corps can also perform joint and multinational force coordination and liaison. In most cases, a corps headquarters can be the ARFOR, or JFLCC headquarters in a JTF without significant Army personnel augmentation.

8-123. With the exception of small operations of limited scope and duration, the corps headquarters cannot simultaneously function as the JTF and the ARFOR headquarters. If ARFOR requirements are relatively small, the corps headquarters may function in both capacities. Operations Just Cause and Restore Hope are recent examples of a single corps HQ performing both functions.

8-124. When designated as the COMARFOR, or the JFLCC, the corps commander has the following additional responsibilities:

- Coordinating with other JTF-level component or functional commands.
- Coordinating with the supporting ASCC headquarters for administrative and logistic support.
- Planning and conducting operations in compliance with CJTF guidance and detailed plans.
- Providing liaison personnel to CJTF, other component commanders, and supporting commanders, as necessary or as directed by the CJTF.

See FM 3-92 (100-15), *Corps Operations* for more information on corps.

Aviation Support

8-125. Operational-level Army aviation support, normally provided by a theater aviation brigade, provides C^2, air traffic control, and air movement support for the ASCC. Special operations forces (SOF) and the Long Range Standoff Biological Detection System (LRSBDS) (located in bio-detection companies) rely heavily on this brigade for in-theater support. The aviation brigade has the capability to conduct joint or multinational air maneuver to support theater campaigns and major operations. The brigade also provides combat capabilities to assist in rear area security operations. The ASCC tailors the theater aviation brigade to provide maximum flexibility for the specific theater in which it operates. The brigade may be organized with any combination of fixed-wing, attack, reconnaissance, assault, medium-lift, air traffic services, and aviation maitenance units. In instances where the ASCC

does not have an assigned aviation unit, that capability may be established using resources and assets available in theater.

8-126. Army attack aviation units will normally operate under the command and control of corps or division level commanders. However, the ASCC may determine the requirement for the employment of a tailored Army aviation task force built around attack aviation directly under the ASCC for either a critical deep strikes or to provide operational support to another component. The forward deployment of the 6th Cavalry Brigade to Korea is an example of this type of force. FM 3-04.111 (1-111), *Aviation Brigades* provides detailed doctrine for the theater-level Army aviation brigade. Figure 8-11 illustrates a theater aviation brigade.



Figure 8-11 Theater Aviation Brigade

ARTILLERY SUPPORT

8-127. The ASCC normally does not retain any field artillery units at its level; all should be provided to subordinate corps, divisions, or separate brigades for fire support. However, Army Tactical Missile Systems

(ATACMS) are valuable theater assets due to their capabilities, range and scarcity. These systems may be required to support the JFC in suppression of enemy air defenses or in support of multinational forces. Consequently, the COMASCC, if given an operational role, may retain approval authority for a percentage of the ATACMS of subordinates to directly support JFC objectives. For this purpose, the COMASCC may retain control of designated ATACMS capable firing units and employ his ECC to coordinate their engagements against COMASCC controlled targets. See FM 3-09 (6-20), *Fire Support*.

Chapter 9

OPERATIONAL FORCE PROTECTION

In the defense of coast lines the missions of the Coast Artillery Corps are:

In conjunction with the Air Corps and the Navy, to protect the fleet (or detachments) while at, entering, or debauching from its bases; to defeat naval and air attacks against harbor defenses, naval bases, cities, or other important areas.

FM 100-5

Field Service Regulations – Operations

May 22, 1941

Providing Operational Force Protection to conserve the force's fighting potential to be applied at the decisive time and place is one of the six operational level tasks (OP6) in the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL-CJCSM 3500.04B). For the Army, protection is an element of combat power and has four components as described in FM 3-0, *Operations*: force protection, field discipline, safety, and fratricide avoidance. As defined in JP 1-02, force protection consists of those actions to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place. It coordinates and synchronizes offensive and defensive measures to enable the joint force to perform while degrading opportunities for the adversary. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the adversary or protect against accidents, weather, and disease. Figure 9-1 depicts the elements of operational force protection.



Figure 9-1, Elements of Operational Force Protection

9-1. According to JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations,* elements of operational force protection include but are not limited to the following:

- Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense
- Antiterrorism (to include programs Combating Terrorism)
- Defensive Information Operations (IO)
- Operations Security (OPSEC)
- Physical Security for Operational Forces and Means
- Law Enforcement

In addition, defensive counterair, while an element of countering air and missile threats, also contributes to force protection.

9-2. In safeguarding operational forces, the COMASCC conducts or participates in all of these elements. Defensive information operations (to include employing OPSEC, conducting operational deception, and providing counter deception and PSYOP) were all previously discussed in Chapter 7. The COMASCC also conducts elements of sustaining operations, to include area security, physical security, and law enforcement operations primarily

with Military Police formations; implements combating terrorism measures; integrates air and missile defense coverage; and implements NBC defensive measures. The remainder of this chapter will cover these aspects of operational force protection and the Army organizations involved. The U.S. Army has along tradition of providing operational protection to itself as well as other services.

ARMY COAST ARTILLERY IN THEATER PROTECTION

Until the advent of the airplane, American land defense against overseas threats rested on two deterrents: fortifications to protect vital coastal areas from seaward bombardment, and mobile combined arms units to repel land attack. The organization of combat troops into coastal or fortress units (virtually identical to the later Coast Artillery Corps) and mobile troops (infantry, cavalry, field artillery) reflected this conceptual framework. After the Spanish-American War rekindled interest in coast defense, Congress established a separate Coast Artillery Corps in 1907 administratively distinct from the mobile field army. During the 1930's, the Coast Artillery Corps (including seacoast and antiaircraft artillery) was larger than the cavalry with over 13 percent of the Army active duty combat strength and almost half of the authorized wartime strength.

Until World War II, the U.S. Army structured its forces in its two major overseas departments (the Philippines and Hawaii) into three major subordinate elements: Army Air Corps units; mobile field units (Philippine and Hawaiian Divisions); and Coast and Harbor Defense Commands. The primary task of those overseas garrisons was to protect naval bases from air and sea attack and thus insure the U.S. Navy's freedom of action. The Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays even boasted the "concrete battleship" of Fort Drum. Manned by 200 soldiers from the 59th Coast Artillery it had four fourteen inch guns mounted in two massive turrets from which fires continued to deny Japanese access to Manila Harbor until ordered to surrender on 7 May 1942.

Various sources

9-3. JFCs and their subordinate commanders must address operational force protection during all phases and types of planning. All aspects of operational force protection must be considered and threats minimized to ensure maximum operational success.

SECTION I - GENERAL

9-4. Operational force protection includes enhancing freedom of action and preserving the force from enemy symmetrical and asymmetrical attacks, including countering the enemy's use of terrorism or weapons of mass destruction, by making soldiers and operational formations and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. This task includes protecting joint and multinational air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces; bases; A/SPODs and essential personnel; and lines of communication (LOCs) from enemy operational maneuver and concentrated attack; chemical and biological warfare; and terrorist attack.

9-5. While the Communications Zone (COMMZ) extends from the rear of the Combat Zone and connects with the theater base and is relatively secure, the combat zone frequently includes a joint rear area (JRA). The JRA is designated by the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces that provide shaping or sustaining operations to decisive operations. Successful rear area security operations are critical since the joint rear area contains the LOCs, establishments for supply and evacuation, and agencies required for immediate support and maintenance of field forces. In addition, the ARFOR or JFLCC commander may also designate a rear area within its AO.

THE THREAT

9-6. The threats to rear areas and COMMZ range from individual acts of sabotage to the insertion of battalion-size or larger forces, to air and missile

attacks. Large-scale enemy attacks may require the commitment of US reserve forces, combat units from forward areas, or HN or multinational resources. The potential magnitude of the threat dictates that US forces are trained to cope with threat forces when and where they attempt to interrupt rear area operations. They must use every appropriate active and passive measure for defense against detection from the air, attack from the ground, and compromise of their defense systems.

9-7. Three levels of response to threat activities serve as a guide for planning rear area security. Rather than focusing on the size or type of threat, these levels focus on the nature of friendly actions needed to counter the threat. The threats listed here provide typical examples of the types of threats that can be expected.

- Level I-Those threats that can be defeated by base or base cluster self-defense measures.
- Level II-Those threats that are beyond the base or base cluster self-defense measures but can be defeated by initial response forces. Bases and base clusters are able to delay Level II threats until arrival of response forces.
- Level III-Those threats that will probably target several friendly rear elements as part of a larger, coordinated effort, rather than individual, separate entities requiring a tactical combat force to defeat them.

9-8. The combatant commander or JFC is ultimately responsible for all rear area functions in a theater of operations. The combatant commander may have a joint security directorate (JSD) for staff coordination AOR wide. For campaigns or major operations the commander or JFC normally designates a subordinate commander or member of the JFC's staff as a Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC), who is responsible to the JFC for coordinating and maintaining the overall security of the JRA. The JFC must empower the JRAC with requisite responsibility and authority in the establishing

directive. The JRAC is a critical link in coordinating security, establishing reliable intelligence and counterintelligence support, and securing communications to all forces operating in the JRA. The JRAC may form a joint rear tactical operations center (JRTOC) using elements of the JRAC's staff and representatives from the components operating in the JRA. The JRAC's overall coordination responsibility for security does not lessen the responsibility that component elements have for their own security. The JFC normally assigns subordinate component commanders the responsibility for operations in a JRA in coordination with the JRAC in accordance with missions requirements, force capabilities, the strategic environment, and the threat. (See JP 3-10, *Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations*).

REAR AREA FUNCTIONS

9-9. According to JP 3-10, operations within the joint rear area consist of eight broad functions, to protect the JRA and assure freedom of maneuver; or to support the joint force and ensure continuity of operations. These functions include but are not limited to: security, communications, intelligence, sustainment, area management, movements, infrastructure development, and host-nation support. All rear area functions are interrelated. When planning or conducting one function, commanders and staffs must consider all the other functions, thus synchronizing rear area functions. This synchronization is the Joint Rear Tactical Operations Center's (JRTOC) responsibility.

JOINT REAR AREA COORDINATOR (JRAC)

9-10. Frequently, the COMASCC or ARFOR may be assigned by the JFC the responsibility for rear area operations subject to applicable HN laws and agreements. In this case, the JRTOC should be co-located with the COMASCC's rear CP. Depending on the size and complexity of the AO, the responsibilities of the JRAC may be further delegated a deputy. This may be the commander of the theater support command(TSC). As an alternative, the deputy commanding general of the ASCC for support [DCG(S)] may be delegated the duties of the DJRAC as well as OPCON over the theater protective MP, chemical, and other rear area operational units to allow the TSC commander to focus on providing operational logistical and personnel support (see Figure 9-2). In a multinational operation a combined (or coalition) security operations center (CSOC) may be designated. Normally, the CSOC director will be from the Host Nation with staff representation and liaison from the other multinational members to include the U.S.



Figure 9-2 Command and Control for the Joint Rear Area

LIAISON ELEMENTS

9-11. All services having forces located in the JRA or ARFOR/JFLCC rear areas will provide liaison to the appropriate ROC. Their primary duties are to coordinate ground defensive operations and procedures. Normally these liaison elements will be dependent upon the Army elements for logistical support on an area basis. Each service element will provide appropriate communication between its liaison officers and ROC representatives.

AIR FORCE

9-12. In addition to the tactical air control parties provided for maneuver elements, the Air Force component will provide air liaison elements to all land levels according to joint force guidance and directives. The Air Force will normally provide an air support coordination element (ASCE) to the JRTOC.

The ASCE's primary duties are to assist and advise in the planning of CAS in the rear area and to coordinate for the use of HNS in airbase security. Additionally, a Security Forces Group may be employed by the Air Force to supervise air base security forces. Liaison members monitor communications nets for subordinate ASG ROCs and selected bases and units to-

- Advise and assist unit commanders in understanding CAS capabilities, limitations, and procedures.
- Assist in preparation of the fire support annexes in operations plans of the senior logistics headquarters and subordinate logistics headquarters ROCs.
- Train senior logistics headquarters and subordinate logistics headquarters ROC personnel to implement the provision of this concept.

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

9-13. In the Navy Component's area of operations, a naval coastal warfare commander (NCWC) is normally responsible for the security of territorial seas contiguous to the JRA up to the high water mark and in conjunction with the Coast Guard, for ports and harbors (but not the builtup areas around them). The NCWC will provide a liaison team to the JRTOC and subordinate support headquarters ROC or the highest land component headquarters located in the harbor. The team will provide naval expertise, intelligence, and liaison capability with naval assets to support rear security operations and to prepare naval fire support plans. Navy security forces may be employed to provide point security for naval facilities ashore as well as for naval ships or aircraft conducting replenishment activities.

9-14. For Rear Area Operations behind a MAGTF, the Marines may establish a Marine Rear Area Operations Group (MRAOG) under the Marine Service Component Commander. In some situations Marine Corps assets could also be tasked to provide fire support for rear security operations. The

Marine Corps element should then provide a liaison team or an air naval gunfire liaison company team to the senior or subordinate logistics headquarters ROC. Within a MAGTF AO, a Marine Rear Army Operations Center (RAOC) may be established to coordinate security within its own rear area.

ASCC RESPONSIBILITIES

9-15. Contributing to the conservation of the fighting potential of the joint force is one of the ASCC commander's most important responsibilities. Establishing a Force Protection Working Group, chaired by the ASCC or ARFOR chief of staff that meets regularly with representation from all coordinating staff, special staff, and major subordinates is a useful technique to identify and focus resources on significant threats.

SECTION II - SUSTAINING OPERATIONS

9-16. According to FM 3-0, *Operations,* as part of their battlespace visualization, COMARFORs arrange their forces by purpose by alocating forces into a battlefield organization of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. Sustaining Operations are operations at any echelon that enable shaping and decisive operations by providing CSS, rear area and base security, movement control, terrain management, and infrastructure development. At the operational-level, sustaining operations focus on preparing for the next phase of the campaign or major operation. Army sustaining operations are inclusive to the joint rear area functions described in JP 3-10.

- **Combat Service Support (CSS)** encompasses those activities that provides essential capabilities and performs the functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain the ARFOR in theater. Also includes CUL support to other Service components, multinational partners and OGA/NGOs as directed by the combatant commander and subordinate JFC.
- **Rear area and base security** includes those measures taken by a military unit, an activity or an installation to defend and protect itself against all acts designed to, or that may, impair its effectiveness. It has four components: intelligence, base and base cluster self-defense, response force operations and combined arms tactical combat force (TCF) operations. See FM 3-90 (100-40), JP 3-10 and JP 3-10.1.
- **Movement control** includes joint and Army planning, routing, scheduling, controlling personnel and materiel movements into, within and out of an JOA/theater of operations. Maintaining movement control, keeping LOCs open, managing reception and transshipment points, and obtaining host nation support are critical to movement control. See FM 4-01.3 (55-10) and JP 4-01.3.
- **Terrain management** includes allocating terrain, designating assembly areas, and specifying locations for units and activities within a JOA. It includes grouping units into bases and designating base clusters as necessary.
- **Infrastructure development** applies to all fixed and permanent installations, fabrications, or facilities that support and control military forces. Infrastructure development focuses on facility security modifications and includes area damage control and repairs. See FM 3-34.250 (5-104) and JP 4-04.

ASCC REAR COMMAND POST

9-17. The ASCC HQs is ultimately responsible for all Army sustaining operations in a theater of operations. Through the ASCC Rear CP, subordinate commands are normally assigned responsibilities for sustaining operations in the area of operations in accordance with mission requirements, force capabilities, the strategic environment and the threat. The chain of command for sustaining operations consists of the ASCC Rear CP, the Theater Support Command (TSC) and separate subordinate commands and the ASG. Depending on the size of the area of operations, the ASCC HQs will further delegate sustaining operations authority to the separate subordinate commands and the senior logistics headquarters,

normally the TSC. Sustaining operations functions are further delegated to the Area Support Group HQs. The ASCC Rear CP coordinates these activities. Regardless of the options, the ASCC Rear CP has the responsibility to coordinate with higher headquarters and other sister services. Sustaining operations are coordinated through this chain of command.

9-18. The ASCC Rear CP has the primary responsibility to coordinate rear area and base security responsibilities with the Theater Support Command HQs and all separate subordinate commands. Sustaining operations synchronization is the responsibility of the ASCC DCG/Support. Within the ASCC Rear CP is a command section and an operations center. It consists of an operations cell, an intelligence cell and an NBC cell. These three sections are organic elements to the ASCC HQs and form the nucleus of the rear operations center in the ASCC Rear CP. The ASCC Rear CP synchronizes the sustaining operations functions with all subordinate commands. Representation from all staff sections and subordinate commands may be required in the ASCC Rear CP.

CSS

9-19. Synchronizing CSS operations within sustaining operations is critical to the success of decisive and shaping operations. Rear CPs monitor sustainment operations and advise their respective commanders on security implications resulting from these efforts. See Chapter 10 and FM 4-0 (100-10), *Combat Service Support*.

REAR AREA AND BASE SECURITY

9-20. Within the ARFOR/JFLCC rear area, the planning and coordinating area and base security is conducted by the TSC Rear Operations Center (ROC). The TSC ROC interfaces with the TSC HQ and its separate subordinate commands through its G3 section. Within its assigned AO, the TSC HQ has the responsibility to manage the full range of sustaining operations responsibilities and coordinates them with its subordinate support headquarters, the Area Support Group (ASG). Each ASG also has a Rear Operations Center (ROC) that interfaces with the TSC. Threat levels, response requirements, and terrorist threat reporting procedures and responsibilities are coordinated through this chain of command. Rear area and base security has four components: intelligence, base and base cluster self-defense, response force operations, and combined arms tactical combat force (TCF) operations.

9-21. The security, plans, and operation staff (SPO) is the ASG commander's focal point for rear area operations and intelligence planning and execution. Key intelligence tasks are:

- Conducting an Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) for the JRA or Army or joint rear area.
- Collecting, integrating, analyzing, and disseminating timely and accurate intelligence.
- Developing early warning systems to prevent surprise.
- Keeping the Host Nation (HN) and local authorities informed
- Aggressively patrolling, in coordination with the HN, to intercept and defeat small threat forces before they close on their objective

BASES AND BASE CLUSTERS

9-22. The base and base cluster form the basic building block for planning, coordinating, and executing base defense operations. Bases are formed within the base cluster. A base is a single-service base or a joint-service base.

A joint-service base is either one in which one service has primary interest or two or more services have co-equal interests. The senior officer within the base is the base commander. Base commanders establish base defense operations centers (BDOC).

9-23. The ROC, in coordination with the SPO, organizes units occupying the subordinate unit AOs into base clusters. He does this based on the SPO's requirements and recommendations for placement. The base cluster commander is the senior commander in the base cluster. The base cluster commander forms a base cluster operations center (BCOC) from his own staff and available base assets. (See JP 3-10.1, *JTTP for Base Defense*), FM 4-93.4 (63-4), *Theater Support Command*, and FM 3-90 (100-40), *Tactics*.

RESPONSE FORCES

9-24. The senior ROC may designate response forces, normally MP elements, to respond to bases or base clusters under Level II/III threat. The size of the response force is based on the current IPB and the commander's risk assessment. Once designated, response forces, conduct a joint IPB, review bases and base cluster defense plans, exchange signal operations instructions, coordinate for fire support and identify response forces necessary to counter likely enemy activities.

9-25. The JRAC or Army rear area commander's concept and intent establish force protection priorities, and the rear area IPB drives the response planning. Base defense and response forces incorporate this information into their own IPB and, in coordination with the senior ROCs, position themselves where they can best respond to major enemy incursions. Should

response forces encounter or engage enemy forces beyond their ability to defeat, they will immediately notify the appropriate ROC and maintain contact with the enemy until a tactical combat force can be committed.

TACTICAL COMBAT FORCES

9-26. When the threat in the area of operations exceeds local ASG response force capabilities, the JRTOC or TSC ROC requests the commitment of a tactical combat force (TCF) from the ASCC Rear CP. The TCF normally remains under the TACON of the COMASCC or DCG(S). However, the TSC or the ASG commanders may be given TACON of the TCF under special circumstances. The TSC ROC or the ASG ROC will assist the TCF in completing all necessary coordination for area security operations in their areas. The TSC ROC will coordinate with the TSC Distribution Management Center (DMC) to divert critical supplies and services to support the TCF and to identify and control routes to assist the TCF moving into its positions. Upon completion of the mission, the TCF returns to its parent unit or reconsolidates in the area of operation.

9-27. Tactical combat forces are usually combined arms organizations and are obtained from the following:

- Tactical units passing through the rear area to the forward-deployed force.
- Units assigned or reconstituted in the rear area. The ASCC may have units assigned to rear security operations, including MP brigade(s) and chemical elements based on METT-TC.
- Tactical units of other Service components or allies within the AO under OPCON of the senior Army commander.
- Tactical units from forward-deployed elements.
- A task-organized force from assets arriving in the theater.

9-28. Planning and providing fire support in rear areas is challenging and only provided on a contingency basis. There may, however, be times when fire support assets are positioned in rear areas in preparation for a pending threat. An essential part of the planning process in rear security operations is targeting in support of bases, base clusters, and the commander's overall plan for conducting rear security operations. Clearance of fires in the rear area outside of designated bases must be cleared through the JRTOC.

9-29. The availability and timely use of fire support in security operations is critical to the overall rear area security plan. Many units and agencies, such as MPs, located in the Army or joint rear area have assets to detect and locate enemy forces. Army aviation or close air support is the most responsive fire support asset for use in rear areas. Additionally, Army aviation can be employed as an alternate response force capable of rapid reaction and effective during periods of limited visibility.

9-30. If the HNS is viable and has retained responsibility for external base and base cluster security operations, the TSC headquarters or ASG headquarters ROC will coordinate with HNS for TCF requirements. The HN will assign its TCF to a tactical area. Depending on existing agreements, US forces within the area may also be placed under TACON of the HN tactical combat forces.

TERRAIN MANAGEMENT

9-31. The ASCC G3 ICW respective Host Nations is the overall terrain manager for the Army's area of operations. He coordinates unit locations with the ASCC Rear CP. If a JRA is established, the JFC J3 is the area manager supported by the JRAC. Based on the J3's guidance and security

implications, the JRTOC coordinates separate positioning units in the JRA. Within the TSC's assigned area, the TSC G3 is the terrain manager. He coordinates with the JRTOC or TSC ROC for specific locations. It positions units based on their mission, concept of the operation, and anticipated commitment. While sustainment units are normally positioned close to MSRs and LOCs to facilitate timely support, they should not be positioned near likely enemy avenues of approach or in likely enemy landing zones or drop zones. Sustainment units are dispersed as much as possible to minimize the effect of enemy attacks on their overall sustainment effort. Security for rear areas in non-linear operations with non-contiguous unit areas will be especially challenging and require centralized planning for local security.

MOVEMENT CONTROL

9-32. Movement control in rear areas consists of theater and local movement of maneuver, support, and protective forces. This includes operational- and tactical-level movement and maneuver, support unit movements, and unit relocation based on changes in the tactical situation. Each type of movement must be scheduled based on command priorities to prevent congestion and support the concept of operations. The ASCC Transportation Division of G4 provides guidance and staff supervision for all Army movement in a theater. This section may provide the basis for a Joint Movement Center (JMC). This section is located at the ASCC Rear CP in coordination with the host nation, other services, JMC, and the Movements Control Agency of the TSC's DMC. Movement regions may be established by Movement Control Battalions and Movement Control Teams to control movement on MSRs in accordance with theater priorities. Rear Operation

Centers control routes other than MSRs. Effective control of movements in the rear area requires synchronized planning and execution of movements by MC units, MPs, the moving unit staffs, and the ROC. For further information see Chapter 10, JP 4-01.3, *Joint Tactical Techniques and Procedures for Movement Control* and FM 4-01.30 (55-10), *Movement Control.*

INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

9-33. The ASCC Rear CP has the overall responsibility to manage the infrastructure development and area damage control (ADC) functions for the Army rear area. The Property Branch from the Facilities and Construction Branch, DCSENG is assigned to the ASCC Sustaining CP for purposes of coordinating resources for real estate and legal claims requirements within the area of operations. This section advises the DCSRM on the funding for procurement, utilization, maintenance and repair of real estate within the theater. Representation from the Facilities and Construction branch, DCSENG may be required in the ASCC Rear CP for the purposes of planning and coordinating battle damage repair and facility security modifications to the established infrastructure and the existing facilities.

9-34. Within the ASCC Rear CP, the Host Nation Affairs Cell has an Infrastructure Branch that is concerned with public works, utilities, and transportation throughout the area of operations. The Construction Branch, DCSENG provides liaison with the host nation cell on engineer construction issues. It also monitors commercial engineer leases and contractor support in the area of operations.

9-35. Infrastructure development is a primary concern of the Engineer Command (ENCOM) headquarters. Several specific functions of the ENCOM HQs include monitoring engineer support for real property, monitoring requirements and priorities for Class IV and engineer Class V materials, and performing the engineer battlefield assessment. These functions are coordinated with the ASCC Rear CP, Host Nation Cell and through the TSC supply and maintenance directorate, the DMC, and the MMC.

AREA DAMAGE CONTROL

9-36. ADC measures are those taken before, during, and after hostile action or natural disasters to reduce the probability of damage, to minimize its effects, and to aid in the continuation or reestablishment of normal operations. Repair, if necessary, occurs after the damage is controlled.

9-37. Area support groups supporting specialized commanders prioritize overall ADC requirements relative to theater missions and capabilities. US engineers and HNs have a major portion of the capability to perform these tasks. The HN, depending upon agreements, may have overall responsibility for ADC. In such circumstances, the US has responsibility for ADC on bases/installations and may provide assistance to HNs for ADC missions within their capability.

9-38. Other forces and assets that contribute to the ADC mission include ordnance, EOD, MP, chemical, CA, maintenance, medical, signal, supply, transportation, and transiting units. HNS can be a vital resource for ADC in the rear area. Early HNS identification and coordination are essential to supplement ADC efforts. Responsibilities and support from HN assets will

normally be negotiated at theater level and as part of the status-of-force agreements and treaties.

9-39. Senior and subordinate support headquarters are responsible for planning ADC operations that employ assets within their areas. They must plan ADC operations through their respective ROCs. Plans identify anticipated requirements for ADC that exceed capabilities and the relative priorities of those ADC missions. Senior commanders of bases and installations within the rear areas coordinate requirements for ADC with the ASCC Rear CP. Army and Air Force commanders establish priorities for ADC missions as part of their planning process at the base or installation level. All units are responsible for providing ADC within their base/installation to the extent of their resources and capabilities. Engineer headquarters are assigned ADC missions in a specified area. These engineer headquarters and their supported areas coordinate the development and execution of ADC plans. See FM 4-93.4 (63-4), *Theater Support Command*.

SECTION III- COMBATING TERRORISM

9-40. Combating Terrorism involves actions taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum including: antiterrorism (AT) or defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability to terrorist acts; and counterterrorism (CT) or offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Every commander, regardless of echelon of command or branch of service, has an inherent responsibility for planning, resourcing, training, exercising, and executing AT measures to provide for the security of the command.

9-41. Protecting the forces is an embedded requirement in all Army missions, it is not the mission. Due to counterterrorism's (CT) highly specialized, resource intensive nature, only certain special operations forces units maintain a high state of readiness to conduct CT operations and possess a full range of capabilities. Combatant commanders may maintain designated CT contingency forces to respond to CT situations *in extremis* when national assets are not immediately available.

9-42. The COMASCC is responsible for an integrated, comprehensive antiterrorism program to counter the terrorist threat to military installations, bases, facilities, equipment, and personnel. These AT programs will consist of two phases; proactive and reactive.

9-43. Proactive measures encompass the planning resourcing, preventive and engagement measures, preparation, awareness education, and training that takes place continually. A detailed AT plan is required for all Army installations and units, and these will be regularly evaluated by vulnerability assessment teams from the ASCC, the combatant command, or the Joint Staff. AT engagement is the technique of actively engaging with local US or host nation communities by US military forces in order to give commanders greater visibility and opportunity to observe changes in the environment and increase their international understanding.

9-44. Reactive measures include the crisis management actions taken to resolve a terrorist incident and include designation of an initial response force, usually military police, to provide the initial response to a terrorist

attack. See JP 3-07.2, *JTTP for Antiterrorism* and FM 3-07.2 (100-35), *Force Protection*.

SECTION IV- MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS

9-45. This section discusses the role of military police (MP) at the operational level. While all MP functions discussed in this section are not specifically oriented on operational force protection, all operational-level MP missions and functions contribute to sustaining operations and are conducted in the Army or joint rear area. MP support to these areas is provided through an array of multifunctional MP units. Military police units provide the ASCC commander with a flexible force to execute force protection and sustainment support missions throughout the rear area. METT-TC, the nature of the operation, and supported commander's requirements will determine MP supporting requirements and subsequent force structure. MP units providing support in theater include Combat Support (CS), Internment and Resettlement (I/R), CID, and Law and Order Teams (including Military Working Dogs and Customs). The MP brigade (CS) commander is often dual-hatted as the ASCC Provost Marshal (PM) until the theater matures. The PM (MP brigade commander) exercises staff supervision and command and control of all assigned MP plus serves as the executive agent for I/R, customs, and combating terrorism.

MISSION

9-46. Military Police have five functions: maneuver and mobility support (MMS); area security (AS); internment and resettlement operations (I/R); law and order operations, and police intelligence operations (PIO). MP support in

the JRA/COMMZ will normally focus on force protection and MMS to ensure freedom of movement and security for the ASCC commander's RSOI and sustainment missions.

9-47. MP support to the rear areas will normally include at least one MP brigade (CS) that focuses on MMS and area security (AS) for extended LOC and supply corridors which include ports, inland waterways, railways, pipelines, airfields, MSR and MSR critical points. MP play an important role in security of rear areas by performing combat operations against the threat. When properly augmented, the MP brigade headquarters may serve as the ASCC TCF headquarters. If resources are available, the MP brigade (CS) provides escorts to move US noncombatants (if present) from assembly areas to theater ports of embarkation. Theater MP units may also be tasked to support the TSC or work directly for the DCG(S). Normally an MP brigade is assigned to support forces operating within the TSC AO. Until arrival of MP brigade (I/R) in theater, CS MP units will perform I/R operations (EPW, confinement, civilian internees, etc.). If METT-TC drives the requirement for a full MP Brigade or Command (I/R) and CID Group, these commanders will operate cooperatively but separately from the ASCC PM or MP Brigade (CS) commander. The following are the typical MP units providing theater MP support in the COMMZ (See Figure 9-3, Theater MP Elements).

- MP Brigade (CS). The MP (CS) is assigned to the ASCC or TSC based on METT-TC. The MP Bde (CS) can provide all five MP functions.
- MP Brigade/Command (I/R). The (I/R) Brigade/Command may augment the ASCC or TSC during wartime. The mission of MP (I/R) units is to provide command, staff planning and supervision of I/R operations.
- Criminal Investigation Command (CID) Group. The MP CID Group is a stovepipe organization that reports directly to the Commander, US

Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIC). The CID Group provides support to the ASCC and subordinate commands.

- MP support to other oprational-level commands is performed as determined by the ASCC commander's mission priorities.



Figure 9-3 Theater Military Police

9-48. In an immature theater the MP brigade (CS) commander's/ASCC PM's priority of effort will go to supporting the RSOI and sustaiment operations. In a maturing theater the ASCC PM coordinates MP unit support to facilitate sustainment operations and security requirements. The ASCC PM/MP Brigade (CS) commander will OPCON or attach MP units directly to key organizations as rquired. Examples may include MP support to transportation headquarters for security of ports, waterways, and railway facilities. See FMs 3-19.1 (10-1), *Military Police Operations* for a full discussion of MP support in the rear areas.

9-49. The size and composition of a theater's MP force is tailored to meet the theater strategic environment and is determined by the -

- Nature of the operation, whether unilateral, joint, or multinational.
- Size of the rear areas.

- Maturity of the theater.
- Nature of the sustaining/rear area, whether friendly or hostile.
- Capability of the HN to provide MP-related support.
- Extent of civil law and order operations.
- EPW evacuation and internment policy: to retain in US custody, transfer to HN, or evacuate to CONUS or some other out-of-theater location.
- Size of the MSR network and MC required behind the corps rear boundaries.
- Number of designated critical facilities.
- Resources or key personnel requiring dedicated MP security.
- Ability of HN forces to control the civilian population to preclude interference with military operations.
- Resupply strategy: air, ground, or sea.

9-50. For the theater of operations, the senior MP officer at each echelon serves as the Provost Marshal. The Provost Marshal -

- Advises the commander and staff of MP capabilities.
- Prepares plans and policies.
- Coordinates MP operations.
- Assists and supervises interaction of supporting and supported units.
- Reviews current MP operations.
- Coordinates with allied forces and HN military and civilian police.

9-51. In the absence of specific directions or orders, the PM plans the use of MP assets based on assumptions consistent with a thorough knowledge of the situation and mission.

9-52. The PM considers -

- The strategic and military end state.
- METT-TC.
- IPB.
- Environment within the operational area, both physical and cultural.
- Specific missions of MP units in the area.
- MP unit equipment and personnel.

SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

9-53. MP units provide a variety of functions within the rear areas. MP units perform all five MP functions independently or simultaneously; area security, maneuver and mobility operations, law and order operations, internment/resettlement operations, and police intelligence operations.

AREA SECURITY

9-54. Throughout the Army or joint rear areas, MP perform area security (AS) function to protect the force and enhance the freedom of units to conduct assigned missions. MP conducting area security operations play a key role in support to forces in the rear area and during sustaining operations. MP are a response force to delay and defeat enemy attempts to disrupt or demoralize military operations in the AO. MP mobility makes it possible for them to detect the threat as they aggressively patrol the MSRs, key terrain, and critical assets. MP organic communications enable them to advise the appropriate headquarters, bases/ base clusters, and units in the RSO process of impending enemy activities. With organic firepower, MP are capable of engaging in decisive operations against Level II threat and delaying (shape) Level III threat until commitment of the TCF.

9-55. Throughout all aspects of the AS function, MP conduct operations to protect the force and to prevent or defeat Level II threat operating within MP AO. MP countermeasures may include implementing installation vunlerability assessments, developing procedures to detect terrorist actions before they occur, hardening likely targets, and conducting offensive operations to destroy the enemy. MP uses checkpoints and roadblocks to control movement of vehicles, personnel, and materiel and to prevent illegal

actions that may aid the enemy. MP use of these control measures serves as a deterrence to terrorist activities, saboteurs, and other threats. However, at the same time, checkpoints and roadblocks expose MP soldiers to these potential threats. The implementation of viable force protection measures is critical to improve MP survivability.

9-56. MP provides combat power to protect C2 headquarters, equipment and services essential for mission success. MP provides the battlefield commander with a flexible fighting force that can shoot, move, and communicate against any threat. Major sub-tasks associated with the AS function includes reconnaissance operations, area damage control, base/air base defense, response force operations, and critical site, asset and High-Risk Personnel (HRP) security.

9-57. The nature of rear areas will lend Level I and II activity to concentrate along the LOC and other areas of military significance. Military commanders depend on the MP to delay and defeat threats in their Area of Operations (AO) with a mobile reaction force. In the rear area, MP units will encounter an enemy that is capable of disrupting our operations through employment of terrorist activities, enemy-controlled agent activities, enemy sympathizers and saboteurs. If the enemy is Level III capable, MP leaders must expect infiltrations, air, missile and/or NBC attacks as a presursor to a major Level III operation.

9-58. The MP can assist the base/base cluster commander's response force against Level II enemy attacks in the rear area or during sustaining operations. MP gathers information about the enemy while performiong missions throughout the AO. This information provides commanders with

enemy activity near bases/base clusters. When needed, MP provides a mobile response force to respond to bases/base clusters under attack. A base commander's defense plan is the cornerstone of the protection in rear areas and during sustaining operations. The base commander is responsible for the defeat of all Level I threat. When this threat exceeds his capabilities, he requests MP support. MP, patrolling or conducting AS, consolidate their forces, respond as quickly as possible, and conducts combat operations to close with and destroy the enemy. If needed, MP conduct a battle-handover to the TCF.

9-59. MP provides security to designated major command posts (CP) and other designated critical facilities within the AO. MP employment maximizes mobility, lethality and communications capabilities as a security screen. MP may be required to establish security measures such as, checkpoints, and listening/observation posts as an additional measure to protect these facilities. When the critical CP relocates, MP provides in-transit security. Other locations of critical site security include ammunition supply points, deep-water ports, petroleum, oil, lubricant (POL) terminals and pipelines, trains/railways, and APOD/SPODs.

9-60. MP may provide convoy security for top-priority units transporting critical supplies to combat forces. MP assets should be employed primarily on aggressive patrolling, route, area and zone reconnaissance measures that would create a safe and secure environment for all types of vehicular and unit movement.

9-61. MP and CID provide protective services to designated key personnel. They do this by providing access control of restricted areas within CPs, in-

transit security or static security measures around the clock. MP coordinate with CID when close-in protection of key personnel is needed. MP and CID also provide training on personal protection countermeasures. Military Working Dog (MWD) teams may be employed to enhance MP and CID detection and protection capabilities.

MANEUVER AND MOBILITY OPERATIONS

9-62. The Military police maneuver and mobility support (MMS) function involves measures and actions necessary to support the commander's freedom of movement throughout the rear areas. MP expedite the forward and lateral movement of combat resources, ensures commanders get forces, supplies, and equipment when and where they are needed. This is particularly important on the modern battlefield, where there is a greater geographical dispersal of forces and lengthened LOC. MP maintain the security and viability of the strategic and tactical LOC to ensure the commander can deploy and employ his forces. Whether the MP are operating traffic control posts (TCPs), securing defiles, conducting mobile patrols, erecting route signs on Main/Alternate Supply Routes (MSRs/ASRs), or conducting reconnaissance for by-passed and/or additional routes; they support the commander and help expedite military traffic. MP move all units quickly and smoothly with least amount of interference possible. The MMS function in the JRA typically includes support to straggler control; dislocated civilian control; route reconnaissance and surveillance; MSR regulation enforcement.

9-63. MPs implement HN and US staff element plans to control the forward movement of combat resources along LOC, working closely with the senior

MCA's highway traffic division and the local MCT. In multinational operations, this support integrates the capabilities of available HN and allied forces and various US staff elements, including transportation, personnel, engineer, and CA. Army aviation supports MP maneuver and mobility operations when available.

9-64. MP operating traffic control posts and mobile patrols help stragglers return to their respective units through the personnel system. Refugee movement, which is restricted to routes other than MSRs/ASRs, is primarily the responsibility of the G5/S5 and HN authority. MP assist, direct or deny the movement of civilians whose location or direction of movement may hinder military operations. They also provide escorts to move US noncombatants from assembly points to theater embarkation terminals.

LAW AND ORDER OPERATIONS

9-65. Law enforcement (LE) operations assist the battlefield commander in preserving his force. MP dedicate assets to conduct law enforcement operations based on the needs of the commander. Since MP L&O and CID assets may be limited during the initial stages of any operation, the PM depends on the supported commander's development of an effective crime prevention program and use established investigative tools (i.e., inquiries, AR 15-6 investigations, etc.) to enforce rules. This will allow the PM to employ limited MP assets to perform other functions. LE operations include responding to civil disturbance, conducting customs operations, investigating traffic accidents, conducting vehicle searches, supporting the commaner's force protection program and providing supprot to HN and civil enforcement

agencies. LE also includes employing Military Working Dog (MWD) Teams supports US Customs Service (USCS).

9-66. MP in multinational operations may assist with the creation of multinational police units. Circumstances that may support the establishment of these police forces include existing or negotiated terms of an international standardization or security assistance programs, multinational operational agreement, or as directed in appropriate militry directives. MP provides the capability to train foreign military police and/or reconstitute indigenous constabulary forces as part of stability and support operations. MP can provide the initial mentoring to these forces and provide temporary, LE assistance capabilities until the foreign military or civilian police forces are functional.

9-67. MP investigate offenses against US forces or property committed by persons subject to military law. Major incidents involving death, serious bodily injury, and war crimes are referred to investigators of the US Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIC). USACIC also conducts sensitive investigations, supports area security operations, and manages criminal- and terrorist-related intelligence.

9-68. A USACIC group is normally assigned as the CIC theater support element (TSE). They are placed in general support of the theater, but remain under the control of the USACIC region. TSEs, their subordinate theater area support elements (TASEs), and port area support elements (PASEs) provide USACIC support in the JRA. One TSE supports each senior logistics headquarters, one TASE supports each subordinate logistical headquarters, and one PASE supports each seaport.

MILITARY POLICE INTERNMENT AND RESETTLEMENT (I/R) OPERATIONS

9-69. I/R operations include, not only enemy prisoner of war/civilian internee (EPW/CI) and other detained persons, but also handling, protecting, and accounting for dislocated civilians and conducting battlefield confienment of US military prisoners. When handling captives US policy, US Laws, Army Regulations, and international conventions demand the strict accountability and the safe, humane treatment of all captives.

9-70. Division and corps MP units operate collecting and holding areas respectively to control captives until they are moved to the theater internment facility normally located in the JRA. Collecting points and holding areas provide limited sustainment, ensure a minimum level of field processing and accountabity, and safeguard the captives. The internment facility is for longer-term sustainment and internment. Wounded and sick captives receive medical treatement at the collecting and holding areas and those needing life saving medical attention are evacuated through medical channels. Other captives are also turned over to the MP at the nearest collecting or holding areas.

INTERNMENT AND RESETTLEMENT (I/R) FACILITIES

9-71. The US Army is the DOD's Executive Agent for EPWs. This responsibility falls across the full spectrum of Army functions and command. Within the US Army, MP have the responsibility for EPW/CI operations. The COMASCC provides the necessary engineer and logistical support to the MP commander for the establishment and maintainenance of EPW/CI facilities. Planning, coordinating, and establishing EPW/CI facilities must begin during the build-up phase of an operation. This ensures the facility is

ready to receive captives at the start of the operation. EPW/CI facility construction must be included in the planning phase of the operation. Whether built by engineers or contractor, the MP leaders and their staff must be part of the planning process. Each facility constructed must ensure the appropriate segregation, accountability, security, and support of all internees. An I/R facility normally consists of one to eight compounds capable of interning 500 people each and is of a semi-permanent nature.

9-72. EPWs must be segregated according to rank and gender. Civilian internees are not interned with EPWs nor are US Military prisoners. Each category of prisoner (i.e., officer, enlisted, male, female, US Military, civilian) must have their own compound. EPWs may be interned in theater under US control, transferred to CONUS, or transferred to the Host Nation if the HN is party to the Geneva Convention, a US reprentative has certified that the HN is willing and capable of applying the Geneva Convention, and the Secretary of Defense has authorized the transfer. The Internment Resettlement Information Center (IRIC) collects and stores information on each EPW, CI, and retained person (RP) captured and detained by US Forces. This incudes those EPW, CI, and RP captured or detained by US Armed Forces but are in custody of other powers and those who have been released or repatriated.

EPW/CI PROCESSING

9-73. Processing of the EPW or other detainees begins when US Forces capture or detain the individual. The processing of the individual is accomplished in the combat zone for security, control, intelligence reasons, and for the welfare of the EPW while in the evacuation channels. This is referred to as field processing. At the collecting point and holding areas the

MP will continue the field processing. A more formal processing will take place further along the chain of evacuation. Medical personnel decide which captive must be medically evacuated or moved within MP channels, with MP or other command directed non-medical personnel providing prisoner security. Generally, walking wounded are moved through MP channels and litter patients through medical channels.

EPW EVACUATION

9-74. EPW are removed from the combat zone as rapidly as possible. The intent is to move EPW through the various division collecting points to the corps holding areas and then to the internment and reettlement (I/R) facility as fast as possible. The goal of the EPW evacuation system is for the higher echelon to go to the lower and evacuate EPW to the rear. As such, MP at the Division Central Collecting Point move to the forward collecting points to escort EPW back to the central collecting point. Corps MP then move forward to the Division Central Collecting Point to escort EPW back to corps holding area. Theater MP then move to the corps holding area and escort captives back to the I/R facilities. When MP escort guard companies are present in a theater of operations, elements from those units go forward to the corps and the division to escort captives back to the appropriate internment facility. Coordination of transportation for the movement of EPWs is the responsibility of the holding MP with the regional movement control team (MCT). The MCT will task for transportation assets to move the EPWs from forward holding/collecting areas to the designated facilities while the MP provide security.

EPW INTERNMENT

9-75. EPW are selectively assigned to appropriate internment facilities that best meet the needs of the detaining power and the EPW. Those captives that hold violent opposing ideologies are interned in separate facilities in an effort to isolate them from the general population and preempt any unforseen problems. Once EPW have been assigned to a facility, they may be further segregated because of nationality, language, or other reasons.

US MILITARY PRISONERS

9-76. In a mature theater, the Military Police may be required to operate a Field Detention Facility (FDF) and/or a Field Confinement Facility (FCF) to hold US military prisoners or pretrail detainees in custody for a short-term. This short-term may be as part of pre-trial or post-trial confinement. Post-trial confinement may include temporary custody until the prisoner is evacuated from the theater to a permanent facility or for short-term sentences as determined by the combatant commander.

9-77. Military Police use FDFs in the CZ to detain soldiers placed in custody for a short-term. FDFs are used to hold soldiers in custody only until they can be tried and sentenced to confinement and evacuated from the area. Whenever possible, soldiers awaiting trial remain in their units. Only when the legal requirments of Rule for Courts-Martial (RCM) 305 are met are prisoners placed in pretrial confinement and held by MP.

9-78. MP establish FCF in the JRA/COMMZ to detain soldiers placed in custody for a short-term. This short-term may be during pretrial, post-trial or in –transit to another facility outside the theater. The FCF may be a semi-

permanent or permanent facility that is more complex and elaborate that a FDF. CS or I/R MP units may be tasked with operating the FCF or FDF.

MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT TO POPULACE AND RESOURCE CONTROL

9-79. Civilian and military authorities exercise populace and resource control (PRC). PRC operations provide security for the populace, deny personnel and materiel to the enemy, mobilize population and material resources, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control includes curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement operations. Resource control measures include licensing, regulation or guidelines, checkpoints, ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities. Most military operations employ some type of PRC measures. MP support dislocated civilian operations conducted under the umbrella of PRC operations.

MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT TO DISLOCATED CIVILIANS

9-80. Dislocated Civilian (DC) operations are a special category of PRC. The goal of DC operations is to minimize civilian interference with military operations and to protect civilians from combat operations. DC operations are normally performed by Civil Affairs (CA) element with minimal military resources. Additional agencies, such as nonmilitary international aid organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and international humanitarian organizations (IHO) are the primary resources used by CA. However when needed, CA elements may employ other military units, such as MP I/R units, to assist with a particular category of civilians during DC

operations. See FM 3-19.40 (FM 19-40) *MP Internment and Resettlement Operations.*

POLICE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

9-81. Police Intelligence Operations (PIO) supports, enhances and contributes to the commander's force protection program, situational awareness, and battlefield visualization by portraying relevant threat information that may affect his oeprational and atactical environment. This threat information, whether it is police, criminal, or combat information is gathered during the conduct of MP functions. The PIO function:

- Demonstrates the MP/CID capability to actively and/or passively collect relevant threat information.
- Ensures that all information collected during the conduct of maneuver and mobility support (MMS), area security (AS), internment and resettlement (I/R), and law and order (L&O) continues to be reported up through the proper channels, so that it can be analyzed by the S2/G2 with support from the appropriate MP echelon.
- Coordinates with U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIC) elements to employ data developed by USACIDC's programs such as: Combating Terrorism Program (CBT/T) as outlined in AR 525-13 and CIDR 195-1, the Criminal Intelligene Program (CIP), Personal Security Vulnerability Assessments (PSTA), Crime Threat Analysis, and Logistic Security Threat Assessments (LSTA). Note: MP/CID must ensure criminal information is released in accordance with existing controls and restraints.
- Maintains constant liaison and communication with higher echelon S2/G2, PYSOP units, HN police, and other law enforcement agencies, joint, combined, interagency, multinational forces, Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), Civil-Military Operation Center (CMOC), Civil-Affairs teams, and Force Protection Officer.

9-82. The MP brigade commander, battalion commander, and/or PM are responsible for the PIO function. As such, each one must determine which is the best way to employ available staff resources to monitor the execution of this function within his command.

CONTINGENCY/FORCE PROJECTION OPERATIONS

9-83. MP units provide the contingency force commander with a multifunctional force capable of providing a wide range of combat and combat support capabilities. Because of their unique blend of mobility, firepower and versatility, MP units are one of the most frequently deployed forces in the US military. The MP organizational transition to up-armored HMMWV and Guardian Armored Security Vehicles (ASV) have significantly enhanced their warfighting capability, as well as survivability. MP units serve as enablers and combat multipliers for LOC security and regulation, critical site and area security, EPW/CI/refugee control, building-clearing, and providing requisite law enforcement suspport. During PKO and SASO, MP units conduct operations across the spectrum, serve as maneuver forces, TCF and take the lead in reestablishing HN law and order in regions where civil and military law enforcement institutions have collapsed. During a forced entry contingency, the ARFOR commander will have to assess through METT-TC the appropriate size and role of MP support when weighing the availability of scarce strategic lift resources. The size of an MP force may be influenced by:

- The number and distribution of LOC.
- The availability of adequate MSRs.
- The number of critical fcilities and resources requiring security.
- The mission of the force.
- The type of terrain.
- The threat: military, terrorist, indigenous population.

SECTION V - THEATER AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE OPERATIONS

9-84. Army air and missile defense operations are required in each theater and most joint forces. Air defense (AD) organizations provide the Army's primary contribution to joint counterair operations. The senior Army air defense commander ensures that—

- Army air defense is integrated into joint and multinational counterair to include theater missile defense (TMD) operations and plans.
- Theater force projection, protection, and sustainment requirements are achieved.
- Execute and coordinate integrated theater air and missile defense operations throughout the theater of operations.
- Provide theater air and missile defense expertise for campaign planning to the joint land, sea, and air component commanders.
- Recommend air and missile defense priorities for protection of the force and geopolitical assets, to include force allocation.
- Execute active and passive air and missile defense measures to deny enemy surveillance.
- Centralize command (less engagement control) of all operational-level air defense organizations through all phases of force projection in peacetime, conflict, or war.

IX AIR DEFENSE COMMAND IN WORLD WAR II

During the Second World War in Europe, the IXth Air Defense Command was formed to alleviate the 9th Air Force's Tactical Air Commands of any rear-area air defense responsibilities on the continent. During most of its existence it had few Army Air Force elements assigned, but directed the operations of over 30,000 Army Ground Force antiaircraft artillery personnel attached to the command. Additionally, large elements of this command were employed to provide air defense protection to the vital Belgian port of Antwerp not only from German aircraft but also from German V-1's in late 1944 and early 1945. To defend from some 4900 V-1s launched, the allies relied exclusively on 18,000 troops manning over 500 antiaircraft guns and 1,400 balloons. The air defenders downed 2,183 V-1s and only 211 of them reached the docks designated as the critical asset.

9-85. The purpose of joint counterair is to attain a degree of air superiority to allow freedom of action and to protect the joint force. JP 3-01, *Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats*, discusses operational-

level joint counterair function. Counterair operations include both offensive counterair (OCA) and defensive counterair (DCA).

9-86. The senior Army air defense artillery (ADA) commander in a theater is normally designated the theater Army air and missile defense coordinator (TAAMDCOORD) to the ASCC/ARFOR commander and JFLCC (if designated). As the TAAMDCOORD, he ensures that the Army is an integral part of joint counterair and theater air and missile defense operations planning. He is also the theater air and missile defense integrator, that ensures that Army air defense elements provide optimum force and geopolitical asset protection throughout the theater. He ensures that multinational and corps air and missile defense requirements are integrated into joint counterair planning. He assists in developing Army OCA and DCA input to the joint air operations plan. Normally, the commander of the Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) performs the role of TAAMCOORD.

9-87. The TAAMCOORD performs the following functions:

- Plans theater air and missile defense force projection and sustainment operations.
- Integrates the air defense communications systems with the area air defense commander (AADC) and operational-level ADA brigades, corps, joint air operations center (JAOC) (battlefield coordination detachment (BCD)), control and reporting center (CRC), and AWACS (airborne warning and control system).
- Coordinates the theater air and missile defense linkages with the JFACC, Naval component commander (NCC), and multinational ADA forces. These linkages include interface with intelligence sources, OCA, space operations, and logistics.
- Warns of attacks by theater missiles (TMs) according to warning release criteria.
- Trains and evaluates all Army ADA organizations assigned to operational-level air defense units.

- Monitors theaterwide unit status and recommends priorities for allocation of missile and repair parts requirements for all ADA organizations within the theater.
- Serves as the subject matter expert on enemy TM capabilities, limitations, doctrine, and procedures.
- Identifies and recommends pre-positioning of war reserve materiel stocks related to air defense missions.

9-88. The typical command and control relationships for air and missile defense in a theater are shown in Figure 9-4. In multinational commands, especially where the MNLCC is not a U.S. officer, the AAMDC may be placed OPCON to the JFACC and therefore these relationships must be modified to suit the specific theater requirements.



Figure 9-4 Theater Air and Missile Defense Command & Control Relationships

THEATER AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE (TAMD) OPERATIONS

9-89. TAMD operations are all activities focused on the identification, integration, and employment of forces supported by theater and national

capabilities to detect, identify, classify, locate, track, discriminate, minimize the effects of, and destroy air and theater missile (TM) threats (to include large caliber rockets). This includes the destruction of TMs on the ground and in flight; their air, ground, or sea-based launch platforms during pre- and post-launch operations; and their supporting infrastructure.

9-90. While TAMD is an Army term, successful conduct of TAMD requires a coordinated joint effort. This coordination originates in the doctrine described in Joint Publication (JP) 3-01, *Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats* and supporting service publications. The Air Force's contribution to joint counterair is described in Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.1 *Counterair Operations*. The Navy's contribution to joint counterair is described in Naval Warfare Publication 3-0.1, while the Marine Corps' contribution is described in Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-25, *Control of Aircraft and Missiles*. The Army's role in the joint theater missile defense (JTMD) is the focus of FM 3-01.12 (100-12), *Army Theater Missile Defense Operations*.

AIR DEFENSE IN DESERT STORM

During Operation Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein launched SCUDs against Israel in an attempt to provoke a reaction and perhaps shatter the fragile coalition. As Israel was defenseless from the SCUD attacks, the US Secretary of Defense offered two U.S. Army Patriot batteries. Never before had Israel used any foreign military force to strengthen its own defense, but the Israeli Defense Minister quickly accepted. Within five days, two batteries from the 32d Army Air Defense Command's were operational. Later two Israeli Patriot batteries returned from training in the U.S. and were placed under the operational control of Colonel David K. Heebner, Commander of the 10th ADA Brigade. Two additional US Patriot batteries and one Dutch battery were later contributed to the defense of Israel comprising a Multinational Theater Ballistic Missile Task Force.

U.S. Army Patriot units have remained in Southwest Asia since 1990 and have deployed back to Israel and to Turkey to provide host country missile defense against the threat of Iraqi SCUDs. In this manner, the U.S. Army has provided significant strategic protection capability to the theater commander in demonstrating U.S. resolve to protect friends and allies.

AIR SUPERIORITY AND JOINT COUNTERAIR

9-91. To protect the United States and its vital interests from air and missile threats, combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders, integrate the capabilities of each component to gain and maintain air superiority. Air superiority prevents adversaries from interfereing with operations of air, space, or surface forces and ensures freedom of action and movement. Air superiority is achieved through the counterair mission, which integrates both offensive and defensive operations from all components to counter air and missile threats. Defensive counter air includes both active and passive air defense measures.

JOINT FORCE COMMANDER

9-92. The combatant commander or JFC establishes guidance and objectives for joint counterair. The JFC normally designates the JFACC as the area air

defense commander (AADC) and supported commander for counterair with the authority to plan, coordinate, and integrate overall joint counterair operations. The JFC employs DCA (including JTMD forces) to achieve two primary operational objectives: gain control of the air environment and protect the force and selected critical assets. The JFC defines and implements a methodology for the protection of these selected critical assets which may include geopolitical and military assets of theater strategic significance. Examples include cities, economic facilities, and religious or cultural sites. Normally, the requirement to protect any strategic assets in the JOA will be established by the NCA. The JFC issues planning priority guidance by phase for the defended asset list (DAL).

9-93. The Army TAMD commander considers METT-TC, IPB, and the supported commander's intent and concept of operations before recommending air and missile defense priorities. The TAMD commander develops these priorities based upon the factors of criticality, vulnerability, recuperability, and the threat. The Army TAMD commander recommends these priorities to the supported commander for approval.

9-94. Service component HQs are tasked to develop their detailed priorities of assets by phase. Once components provide their priorities by phase, the AADC, with component LNOs goes through an arbitration process to coalesce all priorities into a single DAL. The JFC's CONOPS specifies the objectives to be met and provides guidance for the employment of C4I systems, attack operations, active defense operations, and passive defense measures. See FM 3-01.20/AFTTP(I) 3-2.30*, JAOC/AAMDC Coordination.*

ARMY IN JOINT THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE (JTMD)

9-95. JTMD is composed of four operational elements: passive defense, active defense, attack operations, and C4I. Because of the continual advancement and proliferation of TMs, the threat cannot be quickly countered by any single technical solution. The threat can only be countered by the synergy achieved by coordinating and integrating all four operational elements into cohesive and coherent combat operations.

9-96. Army TAMD capabilities are integrated with those of the other services to provide a cohesive JTMD effort. Army, national, and theater intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets will be used to detect and track the movement of TM launch platforms, cue JTMD active defense and attack operations forces for engagements, and warn the force of TM launches. Army aviation and fire support units provide the JFACC (supported commander for OCA attack operations) with responsive attack operations capabilities to complement friendly offensive aircraft and cruise missiles (CMs). Army air and missile defense systems execute a major role in active defense and a supporting role in attack operations. Commanders at all levels ensure the appropriate passive defense measures are taken to execute force protection. An integrated C4I system will be established to integrate all the elements of JTMD at the Army, joint, and multinational level. Army air and missile defense elements form a cohesive JTMD force with the other components and multinational forces that is synchronized, integrated, synergistic, fused, and seamless to provide protection of theater forces and critical assets.

9-97. Army air and missile defense units normally enter the theater during the early entry phase of force projection to provide a combination of area and

point defense, and continue to arrive during the buildup leading to decisive operations. During these activities, the priorities for air and missile defense protection to selected critical assets can change. Generally, the prioritized critical assets will receive dedicated air defense.

9-98. Army air and missile defense units provide combatant commanders with the ability to protect critical assets from the TM and WMD threat. Additionally, TAMD helps the combatant commander project, protect, and sustain friendly forces by defending airports and seaports of debarkation (APODs/SPODs) and LOCs against TM and WMD interdiction.

ARMY THEATER AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

9-99. ARFOR are assigned to the JFC to conduct sustained land operations. The COMARFOR plans and executes TAMD operations as directed by the JFC; and executes active defense in accordance with weapon control procedures and measures established by the AADC as approved by the JFC. The COMARFOR normally retains OPCON of his forces for joint counterair.

9-100. The COMARFOR plans and executes combat operations and jointly coordinates and prioritizes his operations and needs with the JFC and with other component commanders. Inside his designated AO, the COMARFOR or JFLCC is normally the supported commander to designate the target priority, effects, and timing of fires within their AO. However, the JFACC is normally the supported commander for counterair and plans, organizes, and executes counterair operations theater-and/or JOA-wide. In accordance with JFC guidance and priorities, the JFACC should determine the priority, timing, and effects of counterair fires throughout the theater and/or JOA. In coordination with land or naval force commanders, the JFACC has the

latitude to plan and execute JFC-prioritized counterair operations and attack targets within land and naval AOs. The JFACC must coordinate counterair operations in order to avoid adverse effects and fratricide. See JP 3-01, *Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats.*

9-101. The COMARFOR, as are all component commanders, is responsible for providing warning to assigned and attached forces. Close coordination among component commanders, the JFC, and the AADC is necessary to achieve effective JTMD operations. Within an ASCC, the air defense element (ADE) of DCSOPS/G3 is responsible for daily coordination of air and missile defense operations. During contingencies, the ADE facilitates integration of an AAMDC into the ASCC/ARFOR operations. If the AAMDC is not present, the ADE may function as a higher-level staff for theater air defense systems and provide direct early warning to ARFOR units as appropriate. See FM 3-01 (44-100),*U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations.*

ARMY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND

9-102. The Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) is the Army's theater-level organization for planning, coordinating, integrating, and executing TAMD operations in support of the COMASCC, the COMARFOR, and the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC), if designated. When deployed in theater, the AAMDC assumes primary responsibility for integrating land-based AD operations for the AADC.

Army Air and Missile Defense Command



Figure 9-5 Army Air and Missile Defense Command

9-103. The AAMDC integrates the four operational elements of JTMD: active defense, attack operations, passive defense, and C4I to protect contingency, forward deployed, and reinforcing forces as well as designated theater strategic assets. The AAMDC prepares the air and missile defense annex for the ARFOR operations order (OPORD). The AAMDC commands the EAC ADA brigades not assigned to corps. (See FM 3-01.94 (44-94*), Army Air and Missile Defense Command Operations* for detailed information on the AAMDC organization and capabilities.) Figure 9-6 provides a functional comparison between the AAMDC and an ADA Brigade Headquarters.

- AAMDC
  - C2 Headquarters tailored for joint ops
  - Performs theater-level TAMD planning, coordination, and synchronization
  - Conducts Four Pillars of TAMD
  - Commands EAC ADA Bdes and provides TAAMDCOORD and Deputy AADC
  - LNO capability to link with key C2 nodes throughout the theater
  - No organic signal capability
  - Limited logistic readiness capability

- ADA BDE HQ
  - C2 Headquarters tailored for Army component operations
  - Executes tactical-level engagement and force operations
  - Primarily conducts active and passive defense
  - Commands ADA Battalions
  - No LNO capability
  - Organic signal capability
  - Has a Logistics readiness center

Figure 9-6 Functional Comparison AAMDC and EAC ADA BDE HQ

9-104. The AAMDC provides the staff and equipment to plan, coordinate, deconflict, and monitor the execution of the COMARFOR (or JFLCC's if designated) air and missile defense plans during force projection operations. As part of the Army's initial force-projection capability, the AAMDC deploys its TOC under the OPCON of the ARFOR/JFLCC.

9-105. The AAMDC is a multicomponent, fully integrated air and missile defense organization that is entirely mobile with its own organic C4I systems and shelters comprising the Air and Missile Defense Planning and Control System (AMDPCS). The AAMDC focuses on TAMD operations for the COMARFOR (or JFLCC) and is continuously collecting intelligence, analyzing information, and coordinating missions across all TAMD operational elements. The AAMDC coordinates with the ARFOR G2, G3, and Effects Coordination Cell (ECC) to recommend prioritized TMD targets. In addition, AAMDC LNOs deploy to all major theater elements: JFC, JFACC/AADC, JFLCC, JFMCC, JSOTF, BCD, ECC, ACE, and multinational headquarters to provide coordination and deconfliction for the execution of integrated air and missile defense. While not directly involved in executing

attack operations for the ARFOR, the AAMDC attack operations section submits TM target nominations to the ECC for inclusion.

9-106. If the AADC needs a strong advocate for land-based air and missile defense, the AAMDC commander may also be designated and the Deputy Area Air Defense Commander (DAADC). The AAMDC has the requisite personnel and equipment to support this DAADC mission for US and multinational land-based air and missile defense units. Air space control measures are integrated into TAMD planning. The functions of the AAMDC as the DAADC are:

- Integrate land-based air and missile defense forces into theater DCA plans and operations.
- Advise the AADC regarding ROE: weapons control procedures and status, air defense warnings (ADW), and weapon control measures.
- Assist the AADC in the air defense plan development.
- Advise the AADC on matters regarding land-based air and missile defense operations and ensure effective integration of ASCC/ARFOR assets into the air defense plan
- Advise the AADC on Army AD weapons capabilities.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

9-107. Army TAMD C2 in units at the operational-level is closely tied to joint and multinational forces. The COMARFOR receives all missions and guidance, to include those related to Army TAMD operations, from the JFC or JFLCC and staff. Coordination is accomplished with other Service components, host nations, and multinational forces.

ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE

9-108. Units at the operational-level capable of conducting active defense normally consist of at least one EAC ADA brigade that provides C2 for one or more PATRIOT battalions or air and missile defense task forces (AMDTF) and battalions. These task forces may consist of Avenger, PATRIOT, and

Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) fire units. ADA units at this level receive missions from the AAMDC to defend the force and critical assets prioritized on the combatant commander's DAL.

9-109. Corps active defense units normally consist of an ADA brigade that provides C2 over assigned ADA battalions. The corps ADA brigade commander task organizes his resources to protect the corps and division commander's air and missile defense priorities. Corps/division commanders may be tasked in the theater air defense plan to protect theater assets in the their areas using organic ADA forces. See FM 3-01.7, *Air Defense Brigade Operations*.

SECTION VI - NBC DEFENSE AND SMOKE/OBSCURANTS OPERATIONS

9-110. At the operational-level, U.S. Army chemical elements not only provide critical force protection in the Communications Zone (COMMZ) and Joint Rear Area (JRA) for the ASCC/ARFOR, but also to other Service and functional components, and supporting unified commands. Chemical units protect the joint force by assigning NBC staff personnel to headquarters at every level of command, scaling those staffs as necessary, and employing specialized units throughout the COMMZ and JRA based on METT-TC. These staffs and units perform two vital functions: NBC defense and smoke/obscurants. FMs 3-11 (3-100), *Chemical Operations, Fundamentals, and Principles* and 3-11.100 (3-101), *Chemical Staffs and Units* provide details on chemical missions and units.

NBC DEFENSE PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES

9-111. Theater-level logistic support is generally furnished from Service-operated and other functional fixed sites throughout the JRA. Logistic NBC defense operations in the JRA are based on Service and site requirements, but will be coordinated with the joint rear area coordinator (JRAC) and base cluster commanders (when designated). One of the JRAC's responsibilities is NBC defense integration. Component commanders will incorporate NBC plans, exercises, equipment considerations, individual decontamination measures, and preventive measures into their area and base cluster defense plans. They will also position NBC defense personnel and assets to support current mission requirements and facilitate future operations, in accordance with JFC and area commander directives and priorities.

9-112. The JFC must plan for and integrate US and multinational force capabilities to sustain the multinational operational tempo in all mediums (air, sea, land, and space), regardless of the nature and targets of an adversary's NBC attack. The JFC will establish and implement a deliberate process for assessing the vulnerability of manpower and materiel to NBC attack. This process will integrate all offensive and defensive capabilities to reduce the threat of NBC use and sustain operations if attacks occur. The process will also include executing mitigation and restoration plans to reduce the operational impact of NBC contamination and other toxic hazards.

9-113. Combatant commanders must be able to execute the campaign under NBC conditions through unified action at the theater level. Unified action for subordinate JFCs is equally important for combat, combat support, and combat service support units of all Services and multinational partners.

Unified action encompasses not only NBC-related actions but also all other actions that permit continuation of theater operations and focus on attaining the single theater military objective in line with the JFC's intent.

9-114. NBC defense force structure and force development activities are the responsibility of individual Services and USSOCOM. Combatant commanders remain aware of the salient factors that pertain to NBC defense requirements and USSOCOM or Service components' responses to their requirements through the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. The combatant commander is responsible for ensuring proper placement of NBC defense assets in theater in advance of a crisis or conflict, and in the time-phased force and deployment data prepared to support movement to the theater. In particular, the combatant commander should be cognizant of any significant shortfalls in the capability or availability of NBC defense assets.

See JP 3-11, *Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments.*

NBC DEFENSE

9-115. NBC defense operations consist of **sensing** nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards, including toxic industrial materials, resulting from symmetrical and asymmetrical attacks on friendly formations, key infrastructure, and lines of communication; **shielding** the force by reducing the threat, reducing friendly vulnerability, and avoiding NBC hazards; **sustaining** the force by restoring combat power, critical infrastructure, and freedom of maneuver; and **shaping** the battlefield through NBC battle management.

9-116. All units in the Army and joint rear areas actively participate in the planning and execution of NBC defense operations. Only through a coordinated effort in which all units-not solely specialized chemical units-perform defensive measures can the ASCC's critical functions continue to be performed effectively. The performance of allocated defensive tasks counters the effects, including cumulative effects, of employing NBC weapons. However, they make normal operations more difficult and reduce overall efficiency; therefore the affected commander must consider mission degradation and hazards when employing defensive measures. Defensive tasks include contamination avoidance, protection, and decontamination. See FM 3-11.3 (3-3), *Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance* and FM 3-11.4(3-4), *NBC Protection.*

9-117. While each Service has the responsibility for NBC defense, greater effectiveness may be realized through cross-service operating agreements either at DOD or theater level. When cross-servicing applies, the Army is normally tasked to support the other services. For example, the Army will normally provide NBC units for protection of the JRA.

9-118. NBC Reconnaissance Companies, Dual-purpose Reconnaissance/ Decontamination Companies, and Bio-Detection Companies when assigned to the theater chemical brigade conduct NBC reconnaissance and surveillance missions in the COMMZ and JRA to sense NBC hazards and shield friendly forces. NBC Reconnaissance and Bio-Detection units are employed near air ports of debarkation (APOD), sea ports of debarkation (SPOD), logistical and maintenance facilities, critical routes, and rear operations centers (ROC) to support reception, sustaining, and command and

control operations. NBC reconnaissance units report information to the NBC centers (NBCC) where it is analyzed and disseminated through appropriate NBC reports to US and multinational forces.

9-119. NBC Reconnaissance Companies and Dual-purpose NBC Reconnaissance/Decontamination Companies employ the M93 series Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance System (NBCRS), a lightly armored vehicle equipped with a mobile mass spectrometer (MM-1), a remote sensing chemical agent alarm (RSCAAL), and a radiacmeter. These systems enable the NBCRS crew to conduct nuclear and chemical route, area, and zone reconnaisance as well as to conduct surveillance on chemical named areas of interest (NAI) up to five kilometers away (line of sight).

9-120. Bio-Detection Companies conduct biological surveillance in the COMMZ and JRA utilizing the M31 series Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS) and the helicopter mounted Long-Range Standoff Biological Detection System (LRSBDS). The BIDS is a point detector mounted on a High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). These systems provide a basis for medical personnel to determine effective preventive measures and appropriate treatment if exposure occurs. Detection and identification of biological agents within the AO will limit adverse effects on operations and sustaining systems. See FM 3-11.86 (3-101-6), *Biological Defense Operations Corps/Company Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*.

9-121. Decontamination and Dual-purpose Smoke/Decontamination Companies assigned to the theater chemical brigade conduct mobile terrain, fixed site, and sustained thorough decontamination missions in the COMMZ and JRA to sustain the force by restoring combat power, critical

infrastructure, and freedom of maneuver. Decontamination units employed near APODs, SPODs, logistical and maintenance facilities, critical routes, and rear operations centers (ROC) to support reception, sustaining, and command and control operations.

SMOKE/OBSCURANTS

9-122. Smoke/obscurant operations consists of **sensing** threat reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) systems, **shielding** friendly formations, key infrastructure, and lines of communications from threat RSTA systems; **deceiving** the threat by concealing friendly activities and intentions; **attacking** threat RSTA systems through non-lethal means; and **shaping** the battlespace through battle management.

9-123. Mechanized and motorized Smoke Companies when assigned to the theater chemical brigade conduct large area obscuration missions in the COMMZ and JRA to shield, deceive and attack. Smoke/obscurant units are employed near air ports of debarkation (APOD), sea ports of debarkation (SPOD), logistical and maintenance facilities, critical routes, and rear operations centers (ROC) to support reception, sustaining, and command and control operations.

9-124. Mechanized Smoke Companies employ the M58 Smoke System which is mounted on M113A3 chassis. Dual-purpose Smoke/Decontamination Companies are authorized the M56 Smoke System, a HMMWV mounted smoke generator. Smoke/obscurant units can defeat threat RSTA systems which use the visible, infrared (IR) and/or millimeter wave (MMW) portions of the electromagntic spectrum. A complete description of chemical smoke

generator units and their capabilities is included in FM 3-11.50 (3-50), *Smoke Operations*.

ORGANIZATIONS

9-125. In a major theater of war (MTW) or Smaller Scale Contingency (SSC), NBC defense and smoke/obscurant units are task-organized into battalions either on a area or functional basis based on METT-TC. Chemical companies are not permanently assigned to battalion headquarters in order to maintain a high level of flexibility in the contingency operations. Area-based battalions would have mixture NBC defense and smoke units assigned. Functionally-based battalions conduct either NBC defense or smoke/obscurant missions.

9-126. The ASCC/ARFOR allocates theater NBC defense and smoke/obscurant units in the following manner:

- One NBC Reconnaissance Company per theater
- One Bio-Detection Company per theater
- One Dual-purpose NBC Reconnaissance/Decontamination Company per SPOD
- Four Dual-purpose Smoke/Decontamination Companies per theater
- One Dual-purpose Smoke/Decontamination Company per USAF airfield
- One Dual-purpose Smoke/Decontamination Company per APOD
- One Dual-purpose Smoke/Decontamination Company per SPOD

9-127. Approximately 15% of all chemical units are in the active component. The majority are assigned to the U.S. Army Reserve and are located in every region of the United States. As a result, the number of NBC defense and smoke units available to support the COMMZ and JRA may be inadequate, at least initially, until the NCA orders unit activations.

9-128. As the theater matures, chemical battalions are assigned to chemical brigades. The ASCC/ARFOR allocates chemical brigades as follows:

- One chemical brigade is retained by the ASCC/ARFOR and may be OPCON to the Deputy Commanding General for Support (DCG(S)/Deputy Joint Rear Area Coordinator (DJRAC) or is assigned to the Theater Support Command (TSC)
- One chemical brigade is assigned to each army corps
- One chemical brigade is attached to a MEF (when directed).

ASCC/ARFOR CHEMICAL OFFICER

9-129. The ASCC/ARFOR Chemical Staff Officer, normally assigned to the DCSOPS/G3, is responsible for NBC defense and smoke/obscurant operations in the ARFOR rear area and normally the JRA. He provides staff supervision for all NBC defense and smoke/obscurant units. His responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

- Producing/updating the NBC defense and smoke/obscurant estimate/plan/annex to the ASCC/ARFOR plan/order
- Establishing the ASCC NBC Center (NBCC) and operating the the NBC warning system
- Maintaining NBC situational awareness
- Advising the commander and staff on the effects of NBC weapons employed in the theater
- Advising the commander and staff on the effects of toxic industrial material (TIMs)
- Planning and monitoring NBC defense and smoke/obscurants missions in the rear areas.
- Coordinating NBC defense and smoke/obscurants missions with the ASCC/ARFOR staff, other components, the JTF, coalition forces, supporting governmental agencies, nongovermental organizations and/or the host nation.
- Monitoring and coordinating theater-level NBC logistical, personnel, and intelligence requirements
- Recommending chemical unit allocations
- Planning, coordinating, and monitoring NBC sampling and evacuation operations performed by Technical Escort Units (TEU)
- Coordinating and monitoring NBC medical management and integration

9-130. The command and control relationship between the ASCC/ARFOR, the chemical brigades and supported units is depicted in Figure 9-7.



Figure 9-7 Chemical Force Command and Control Relationships

NBC OPERATIONS

9-131. U. S. Army chemical units are indispensable to theater NBC operations. They offer a range of capabilities necessary to a versatile force. They can support operations as individuals, teams, or units. A mix of different units (decontamination units, NBC reconnaissance elements, smoke units, and [BIDS] units) is often necessary to achieve the proper balance of capabilities—force protection and mission accomplishment. Forces deployed in countries with WMD or chemical industrial complexes require support from both NBC battle staffs and units. They provide training support and

technological and consultative operations for nuclear accident- and incident-response operations and chemical accident- and incident-response operations that involve NBC material, flammable and combustible substances, and industrial chemical hazards. In addition, the U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency (USANCA) provides nuclear employment augmentation teams (NEAT) to support land component commanders in offensive nuclear planning, nuclear operations, and consequence analysis.

NBC WARNING AND REPORTING SYSTEM.

9-132. The ASCC operates a network of NBC warning and reporting centers that provides information about NBC hazards. They direct the NBC warning and reporting collection effort and evaluate and disseminate NBC information. Commanders at all levels then use NBC hazard information to execute their missions.

9-133. The theater NBC center (NBCC) at the ASCC headquarters normally coordinates activities throughout the theater. It acts as the focal point for all NBC battlefield contamination information. This centralized information point is particularly important because unit boundaries change often and known NBC contamination information is passed to the new units. The ASCC chemical section may be augmented by a Chemical Team JA to form the NBCC.

9-134. Chemical teams JB may be assigned to senior logistics headquarters, other Service headquarters, and joint staffs to provide a NBCC for their areas. These subordinate centers function as the focal point for their area and provide the evaluated NBC information to the theater NBCC.

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

9-135. The NBC force organization in contingency operations depends greatly on the threat. US forces are organized and trained to operate against a sophisticated threat capable of employing NBC munitions. Based upon the actual contingency area to which deployed, the NBC force is tailored to meet the specific situation. The COMASCC normally assigns NBC defense responsibilities in a contingency to a subordinate unit: an ARFOR, a corps, or theater support command. Frequently, an active duty chemical battalion will provide NBC support for a larger force until reserve component units can arrive. Early arriving NBC units must be aware of the large area occupied by tactical units as well as the Army rear area or JRA. The senior chemical unit commander, his staff, and the functional units assigned normally perform NBC missions in support of the joint force in addition to their own service.

9-136. The transition to conflict termination must include a comprehensive effort to locate, identify, secure, and recover residual adversary NBC capabilities. This effort may have begun during hostilities. However, if adversary NBC weapons and facilities have not been captured by friendly forces during the campaign, gaining control of them before cessation of hostilities is likely only if the adversary has collapsed to the point where cease-fire terms can be dictated. Completion of search, identification, control, and recovery tasks provides a critical foundation for post-conflict planning to eliminate adversary capabilities and establish effective monitoring and other controls.

9-137. A recovery, search, identification, and control plan should be established and executed with sufficient forces to gain timely control of NBC

capabilities. Specifically designated search and recovery task forces (S/RTFs), normally provided from the ARFOR, should be responsible to the JFC and include personnel with the technical proficiency necessary to identify and evaluate NBC weapons, equipment, and associated materiel. Figure 9-8 depicts a notional Army S/RTF organization. S/RTFs should also be capable of emergency response to NBC accidents or incidents. S/RTFs should be prepared to initiate operations as soon as a cease-fire is in effect or, at the latest, upon the formal cessation of hostilities. Assuming ongoing efforts by the adversary to disperse, conceal, or remove NBC capabilities, early expansion of the area under positive US and multinational control is a central concern. See JP 3-11, *Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments.*

SEARCH AND RECOVERY TASK FORCE



Figure 9-8 Search and Recovery Task Force

9-138. The JFC must determine the appropriate mix of forces to accomplish NBC-related conflict termination objectives. Security and

compliance forces, such as ARFOR combat, military police, and engineers will also be needed in addition to specialized intelligence, technical, and medical personnel. ARSOF may also be required to perform civil-military operations (CMO) and civil affairs activities, and PSYOP tasks specifically related to NBC aspects of conflict termination.

9-139. In the early stages of post-conflict operations, returning US equipment to CONUS or other locations will be a major activity as forces are withdrawn from the theater of operations. Goals for contaminated materiel retrograde from the theater are mission support, protection of forces and resources from NBC hazards, and the control of contamination. The JFC will establish the relative priority among these goals in view of the circumstances at hand, in particular operational timing and the extent of contamination. Two key roles are performed by the JRAC and the NBC retrograde support element (RSE). Consistent with JFC and component commander guidance, the JRAC determines if mission requirements warrant the risk of emergency retrograde or if other COAs are acceptable. To assist with requirements for deliberate contaminated materiel retrograde, the JRAC may organize an NBC RSE from ARFOR assets to accomplish tasks from marking equipment to contamination monitoring. FM 3-11.34 (3-4-1), *Fixed Site Protection*, provides useful assistance. Redeployment planning should address requirements for consolidation points for equipment with residual NBC contamination.

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Chapter 10

Operational Logistics and Personnel Support

> This was absolutely an extraordinary move. I can't recall any time in the annals of military history when this number of forces have moved over this distance to put themselves in a position to be able to attack.… It was an absolutely gigantic accomplishment, and I can't give enough credit to the logisticians and the transporters who were able to pull this off . . .
>
> General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA
>
> 27 February 1991

This chapter is designed to provide a doctrinal overview of the UJTL task OP4- provide operational logistics and personnel support- from the COMASCC and COMARFOR perspective. It includes major doctrinal principles, a synopsis of key Army operational-level CSS functions and associated units along with COMASCC operational-level logistics and personnel planning and execution considerations. Key related publications that cover similar information include: FM 3-0, *Operations;* FM 4-0, *CSS*; JP 1-0, *Doctrine for Personnel Support in Joint Operations;* JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*; Allied Land Publication ALP-9C *Land Forces Logistics Doctrine*, and Allied Joint Publication (AJP-4) *Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine.* Additionally, functionally focused operational-level techniques and procedures discussion can be found in numerous Army field manuals, the JP 1-0 and 4-series publications, as well as numerous NATO publications. See Figure 10-1 for a cross walk of operational-level CSS functions to relevant Army and Joint publications. Additionally, applicable references are identified within the text where appropriate.

SECTION I - OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL SUPPORT OVERVIEW

10-1. First and foremost, Army operational-level logistics and personnel support is commander's business. Specifically, the COMASCC and subordinate COMARFOR(s) are responsible for the effective planning and execution of Army operational logistics and personnel support. The changing nature of modern military operations requires Army forces to be strategically

responsive to a wide range of threats while at the same time economically maximizing the effect. The ASCC along with its subordinate support units must ensure responsive, flexible, and economical logistics and personnel support to sustain an agile combat force—getting the force what it needs to initiate and extend operations, quickly adapting to a changing range of operations and missions, while expending as few resources as possible thus minimizing the logistics and personnel service support footprint in theater.

10-2. Provide operational logistics and personnel support consists of joint logistical and other activities required to sustain the force during campaigns and major operations within a theater of operations. It combines the joint logistics functions of: supply, maintenance, transportation, civil engineering, health services and other services supporting joint operations from JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistical Support of Joint Operations* and personnel support functions from JP 1-0, *Joint Doctrine for Personnel Support*. These functions are based upon the Army's Combat Service Support (CSS) functions as described in FM 4-0 (100-10) but also includes engineering (OP 4.6.2) and managing contracts (OP 4.6.6). This field manual addresses general engineering in this chapter because civil engineering is a joint logistic function IAW joint doctrine and the UJTL. Army doctrine however, considers general engineering a combat support, not a CSS, function.

10-3. According to JP 4-0, operational logistics links the national sustainment base and strategic logistics to tactical support requirements to form a single, integrated logistic system within a unified commanders AOR. Support planners at this level coordinate support from the national and theater strategic levels to meet requirements at the theater operational and tactical

levels. See Figure 10-1 for a cross walk of operational-level logistics and personnel support functions to relevant Army and Joint publications.

Operational Logistics and Personnel Support Functions and Key Related Publications

Army Operational CSS	FM 4-0 (100-10) FM 4-93.4, other FM 4-93 series
Supply	FM 4-20 (10-XX) series, FM 4-30.1 (9-6), JP 4-03
Maintenance	FM 4-30.2 (9-43-1)
Transportation	FM 55-1, JP 4-01 series
Combat Health Support	FM 4-02.12 (8-10-2), FM 4-02.9 (8-10-9), JP 4-02 series
Field services	FM 4-20 (10-XX) series, JP 4-06
Explosive ordnance disposal support	FM 4-30.12 (9-15), FM 4-30.11
Personnel support	FM 1-0(12-6), JP 1-0
Financial management operations	FM 1-06 (14-100), JP 1-06
Religious support	FM 1-05 (16-1), JP 1-05
Legal Support	FM 1-04 (27-100), JP 1-04
Band Support	FM 1-08 (12-50)
Additional Functions	
Civil Engineering	FM 3-34 (5-100), FM 3-34.114 (5-114)
	FM 3- 34.116 (5-116), JP 3-34, JP 4-04
Contracting	FM 3-100.21, FM 4-100.2
Joint and multinational logistics and C^2	JP 4-0, JP 4-07, JP 4-08, AJP-4, ALP-9

Figure 10-1. Operational Logistics and Personnel Support Functions and Related Publications

10-4. The operational-level of war is where logistical and operational concerns are brought together. The COMASCC and subordinate ARFOR commanders rely on experience and judgment to balance the deployment and support of all operational categories of Army forces to maximize overall force effectiveness.

The ASCC, and often ARFOR, staffs are required to look in several directions, not only linking tactical requirements with inbound strategic-level support, but also in meeting joint, multinational, and interagency common user logistic (CUL) support responsibilities as outlined in applicable JFC OPLANs/OPORDs. Operational logistics and personnel support requirements can be a major challenge for the ASCC, but even more so for subordinate tactical-level ARFOR(s) and their associated support units which are often not manned, organized, nor trained to properly manage and execute major operational-level Army and CUL missions.

10-5. Operational logistics and personnel support generally consists of the Service Title 10 USC (ADCON) functions as well as combatant commander directed joint, and possibly, multinational and interagency CUL requirements. Army operational-level CSS is focused on the sustainment support to ARFOR(s) operating in campaigns and major operations within a theater of operations and/or JOA. Joint, multinational and interagency common support requirements arise from the combatant commander's directive authority for logistics as described in USC Title 10, Section 134 and JP 0-2, *UNAAF*.

SUPPORTED GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDS

10-6. Geographic Combatant Commanders are responsible for developing joint plans and orders in response to mission taskings in their AORs. They are responsible for developing effective and efficient logistics and personnel support concepts to include use of their own directive authority for logistics in establishing CUL responsibilities. Combatant commanders are responsible for coordinating with all strategic and operational-level supporting and

supported organizations to ensure there is effective and efficient logistic and administrative support is available to subordinate JFCs. As units are transferred to the supported combatant commander, the combatant commanders activities and roles change. Key combatant commander logistical and personnel support requirements are to ensure-

- Overall effectiveness and economy of the joint force, Service component, and applicable agencies' logistics and personnel support plans.
- Establishment of the critical item list and allocation of critical resources.
- Coordination of supply support among Service components.
- Establishment of supply build-up rates and establishment of stockage levels for selected critical items.
- Prioritization of the joint theater distribution and logistics and personnel support effort.
- Management of all intra-theater movement of assets and of the deployment, employment, and redeployment of forces and the retrograde of materiel.
- Coordination of the overall logistics preparation of the battlefield effort in order to identify key terrain, facilities, etc.
- Prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping functions among the Service component commands.
- Coordination of manpower and personnel support to include standardization of personnel policies, ensuring strength management, coordinating postal support, and developing augmentation and reserve component requirements to include operating a joint reception center and CONUS sustaining base requirements (JP 1-0)
- Achievement of required economies by clearly identifying detailed logistics and personnel support planning and specific lead Service or agency CUL designations in the operation plan (OPLAN)/operation order (OPORD).
- Proper and detailed delegation of directive authority for common-item support to the appropriate joint force, Service component, or agency as either a CUL lead and/or as formal single integrated theater logistic manager (SITLM).

ARMY LOGISTICS IN DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

During the deployment stage of Operation Desert Shield, U.S. forces were faced with the task of conducting operations in an austere theater. Having anticipated the difficulty of operations in this environment, plans had been made and resources put in place for this eventuality.

On 22 August 1990, the first Army pre-positioned ship, the USS Green Harbor, completed its 2,700-mile trip from Diego Garcia to discharge its cargo at ad Dammam, Saudi Arabia. During the mid-eighties, the Army had stocked the Green Harbor and three similar vessels with enough tentage, food, ammunition, and water purification and refrigeration equipment to provide a logistical jump-start to any Gulf operation until seaborne transport could arrive from the United States. After the Green Harbor arrived, the logistics was well under way and the theater in Saudi Arabia continued to build at an extraordinary rate.

Adaptability, innovation, and ingenuity worked to fill voids in the logistics system. Soldiers' and leaders' individual initiative and determination to get the job done made the logistical system work. The 22d Support Command was established to centrally control all logistical and personnel support in theater for ARCENT. This command became critical for the orchestration of host nation support, reception of joint and allied forces, and the provision of sutainment. Peaking at 40,898 soldiers, the contributions of Reserve Component personnel were vital as they constituted some 75% of the command.

Upon initiation of the ground war, logistics support was even more critical. During the planning stages, logisticians realized that as the LOCs extended, resupply efforts would become increasingly difficult. Therefore, moving as quickly as possible, yet stealthfully, to retain secrecy, the 22d Support Command began to establish forward logistics bases to counter the extended LOCs. Vast quantities of supplies were also shifted to the west by the 22d Support Command. These supply bases contained enough materiel to support combat operations for up to 60 days if enemy resistance proved more significant. Some supply bases were moved several times, to the west and then northward, once the ground operation commenced.

Robert Scales, *Certain Victory* and
Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, An Interim Report to Congress, July 1991.

10-7. It is important to understand that a combatant commander's directive authority for logistics may be delegated, but only for specific common item support. Combatant command delegated common item support authority—accomplished through either temporary CUL lead Service/agency or long-term SITLM responsibilities—must be clearly delineated in, and executed in

accordance with, combatant command OPLANs/OPORDs and/or directives. Since the Army has the most robust CUL capabilities of any of the Service components, it is critical that the COMASCC DCSLOG/G-4 staff work closely with the combatant commander J-4 staff in developing and defining the parameters of the Army lead Service CUL responsibilities.

Directive Authority for Logistics Matters

Commanders of combatant commands may exercise directive authority for logistics (or delegate directive authority for a common-support capability). The exercise of directive authority for logistics … includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the following: effective execution of approved OPLANS; effectiveness and economy of operation; and prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands.

Under peacetime conditions the scope of the logistic authority exercised by the commander or a combatant command will be consistent with the peacetime limitations imposed by legislation, DOD policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, local conditions, and other specific conditions prescribed by SecDef or the CJCS.

JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*

ARMY OPERATIONAL-LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

10-8. USC Title 10 lists twelve Department of the Army functions (see Appendix I). Of these functions, the following are directly related to COMASCC ADCON responsibilities: supplying, equipping, servicing, administering, maintaining and civil engineering. FM 4-0 further delineates the CSS related Title 10 functions into separate CSS functions plus general engineering as previously depicted in figure 10-1.

10-9. Army CSS and the related general engineering tasks are clearly separate functions, but are highly dependent on each other. ASCC logistics and personnel support commanders and staffs must carefully plan, manage, and synchronize these functions to accomplish responsive and efficient delivery of logistic, engineer, and personnel support.

10-10. Each Service component to a JFC is responsible for the personnel and logistic support of its own subordinate forces, except when this support is otherwise provided for by agreements with sister Services, DOD agencies, multinational partners, or by assignments of common support requirements by the combatant commander or JFC. CUL requirements within joint operations can be short term or long term in nature, but in all cases, these requirements will be a COMASCC responsibility, although they may sometimes be executed by tactical-level ARFOR support headquarters. See Figure 10-2 for a list of possible ARFOR CUL lead Service requirements.

Possible US Army Lead Service CUL Requirements

- Class I (wholesale)
- Class III (B) (storage and distribution)
- Class IV (barrier and construction material)
- Class V (common small arms ammo and explosives)
- Class VIII (medical materiel and blood products)
- Transportation (common ground, movement control, port operations, logistics over the shore)
- Civil engineering (base development, force protection, environmental support)
- Health service support (land and rotary-aircraft medical evacuation, hospitalization, veterinary services, dental services, preventative medicine)
- Other services (mortuary affairs, explosive ordnance disposal, water support, food service, laundry and shower, clothing and textile repair)

Figure 10-2 Possible Army Lead Service CUL Requirements

ARMY LEAD SERVICE COMMON USER LOGISTICS

10-11. CUL requirements can come from numerous sources. These sources include formal DOD-level executive agent responsibilities; inter-Service,

intra-governmental support agreements (ISSAs); support agreements CUL requirements can come from numerous sources. These sources include formal DOD-level executive agent responsibilities; inter-Service, intra-governmental support agreements (ISSAs); support agreements between US forces and allies called acquisition and cross-Service agreements (ACSAs); and, lead Service designation as determined by the combatant commander. See FM 4-0 (100-10) *CSS* and JP 4-07 *JTTP for Common User Logistic Support During Joint Operations* for additional CUL discussion.

OPERATIONAL-LEVEL CSS PRINCIPLES

10-12. Effective and efficient Army operational CSS has several fundamental characteristics as discussed in FM 4-0. They apply across the full spectrum of operations and are consistent with the seven logistics principles listed in JP 4-0. Although the Army's CSS characteristics align with the joint principles, an eighth characteristic “integration", has been added which is critical to the Army. Integration is important in both of the aspects discussed below to ensure responsiveness as well as economy. They are not intended to be a checklist but are a guide to help enable analytical thinking and prudent planning. The power of information technology (IT) is a key tool to leverage limited operational CSS resources in order to meet the high performance demands indicated by these characteristics. The characteristics are:

- Responsiveness.
- Simplicity.
- Economy.
- Flexibility.
- Attainability.
- Sustainability.
- Survivability
- Integration.

10-13. At the campaign- and major-operation-planning levels, logistics is a dominant factor in determining the nature and tempo of operations. Army operational-level commanders, planners and forces must always be capable of supporting the Army in a major war; however, they also must also be flexible enough to provide properly tailored logistical and personnel support forces across the entire spectrum of military operations. In some support operations, such as a foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) mission, logistics and/or civil engineering support may be predominant activities and possibly, the decisive operation.

10-14. Operations and operational CSS are inextricably linked. The purpose of operational CSS is to build combat power, expand the commander's operational reach, and sustain the force. Operational CSS activities are characterized by--

- High consumption of military materiel.
- A great diversity of equipment types.
- Expansion of the battle area, resulting from the employment of sophisticated weapons, communications, and sensors by both sides.
- Extended lines of operation.
- Constrained resources.
- Asymmetric threats.

10-15. The COMASCC provides the supported combatant commander with the requisite sized and configured ARFOR(s) to include appropriate operational logistics and personnel support forces. In many operational situations, the ASCC HQ may not actually serve as ARFOR HQ. In many SSC operations, an augmented corps or even a division may serve as the ARFOR headquarters. In any case, it is still the COMASCC who is overall responsible to establish ARFOR C2 relationships.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

10-16. Establishing effective and efficient operational logistics and personnel support C2 relationships can be a major challenge for the COMASCC. When planning for the logistics, personnel, and civil engineering support of a particular operation, the COMASCC must closely consider the best option for based on METT-TC. Often, these C2 relationships will be modified by phases of an operation. The goal of the COMASCC is to establish effective and efficient C2 relationships focusing on the following main points:

- Keeping logistics and personnel C2 overhead to a minimum (reduces footprint in theater)
- Maximizing the early deployment of critical capabilities (port operators, airfield control groups, engineering units, medical units, etc.)
- Maximize centralized C2, especially in early phases of an operation
- Expand C2 only when the span of control requires it

10-17. Army operational logistics and personnel support or Army lead Service CUL support is best executed by, and commanded by, operational-level organizations designed and resourced to execute these challenging tasks. Army operational logistics and personnel support organizations include the multifunctional theater support command (TSC) as well as specialized engineer, finance, medical, personnel and transportation commands (see separate discussion on each of these commands in Section IV below). However, to enhance the Army's strategic responsiveness, modified and streamlined C2 options will almost always be required, especially during SSC operations and during the early phases of major operations .

10-18. The Army has developed a modular concept for opening theaters in which the TSC is a critical component. Modularity involves incrementally deploying only the minimum capabilities required to an AO, and the basis for

this modular support is called the theater force opening package (TFOP). The TSC early entry module (EEM) provides command and control of many of the elements initially supporting RSO&I as directed by COMARFOR. TSC TFOP functions are detailed later in this chapter and in FM 4-93.4 (63-4).

DETERMINING ORGANIZATIONAL AND C2 OPTIONS

10-19. The Army support structure is designed to provide the combatant commander and ASCC a phased expansion of capabilities and functions linked to mission requirements. As determined by METT-TC, the COMASCC may choose to centralize operational logistics and personnel support C2 under a deputy commander for support or under one of the operational-level specialized commands, such as the TSC. The COMASCC may also choose to he may choose to retain direct control of the support functions and orchestrate them through his chief of staff or appropriate coordinating staff office--that is, deputy chief of staff for personnel (DCSPER)/G-1, deputy chief of staff for logistics (DCSLOG)/G-4, or deputy chief of staff for resource mangement (DCSRM).

10-20. How the COMASCC chooses to structure his support organization for a particular operation depends on a number of factors which include the peacetime relationships within and among the commands, the size and complexity of the operation, the infrastructure of the AO, and availability of strategic lift, as well as how early in the operation forces may be operating. In task organizing the ARFOR logistics and personnel support forces, the COMASCC has a mixture of three basic command relationships: attached, attached less OPCON, and support.

10-21. Attachment is the placement of units in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary. Subject to limitations imposed by the attachment order, attachment includes full command authority to the commander of the organization receiving the attachment to include the responsibility to provide the attached units with logistics and administrative and security support beyond the organic capabilities of the attached unit.

10-22. Attachment less OPCON may be appropriate when the COMASCC desires direct control over the specialized commands, but wants to minimize duplication of internal support requirements. This C2 relationship works best for units that do not require a large amount of internal support such as USAMC's LSE, theater PERSCOM and FINCOM units. Utilizing the attached less OPCON C2 option would allow these units to deploy with minimal internal support and to go to the TSC or other major support command for security support, life support, legal support, etc.

10-23. A DS or GS relationship may also be appropriate, especially between the ENCOM and the other major support commands. A support relationship may also be appropriate between the TSC and the specialized commands.

10-24. Regardless of the option the COMASCC chooses for the specialized commands, these commands must retain technical linkages with their appropriate strategic-level provider. Additionally, even when there is no formal C2 relationship designated, there should be at a minimum DIRLAUTH established between the specialized commands and the TSC support operations section. This is necessary to ensure that the TSC can adequately execute its theater distribution mission. DIRLAUTH should include an exchange of LNOs as determined necessary by the COMASCC.

10-25. In some SSCs, a corps or smaller element may be designated as the ARFOR HQ. As its tactical-level CSS organization may be required to perform operational-level Army and lead Service CUL functions, an option is to attach a tailored army support element (ASE) formed with the requisite operational logistic and personnel support units and staff augmentation to the ARFOR HQ. This option would allow both the COMARFOR and its tactical-level support commands to focus on tactical-level tasks. Another option is to attach a TSC(FWD) headquarters with the early entry module (EEM) and selected modules from the specialized commands to the COSCOM thus allowing the COSCOM to provide both operational- and tactical-level support. This is a viable option in some SSCs, if the COSCOM is not fully engaged conducting its traditional tactical CSS mission. See Figure 10-3.



Figure 10-3. Theater Support Command (Forward)

10-26. A command and control option, especially for the early phases of major operations and during SSCs, may be to use the multifunctional TSC to

execute operational logistical and personnel support C2 within the JRA/COMMZ. Depending on the operational situation, a specialized command such as an ENCOM or MEDCOM could provide this senior HQ depending on the major focus of the mission. Utilizing the modular nature of the TSC and other operational-level commands, the COMASCC can ensure that there is the requisite functional C2 expertise available in the theater of operation while minimizing the overall C2 overhead.

10-27. If the COMASCC determines that there is an operational requirement for selected specialized commands to report directly to the COMARFOR, the TSC would normally provide administrative and security support to these units through "attached less OPCON". This "attached less OPCON" relationship would allow the functional commands units to report directly to the COMARFOR, yet deploy only the minimal internal support forces thus ensuring that the in-theater CSS footprint is kept to a minimum. In any C2 option, the "technical" chain-of-command between the operational-level specialized commands and their strategic-level headquarters will not change.

10-28. The operational-level CSS C2 structure will often be modified by phases of an operation. In later phases of major operations, the COMASCC may determine that it is desirable to fully deploy one or more of the operational-level specialized headquarters. For example, the COMASCC may determine that a fully deployed Engineer Command (ENCOM) HQ may be required to facilitate all ARFOR engineering functions during the ground counter-offensive phase of a major campaign. If and when this occurs, these specialized commands will normally report directly to the COMARFOR.

SECTION II –OPERATIONAL CSS PLANNING AND EXECUTION

OVERVIEW

10-29. As the combatant commander develops his strategic concept of operation, he concurrently develops a concept of logistics in coordination with his Service component commanders and other key DOD agencies such as DLA. These key organizations and their planning staffs collaboratively consider a myriad of logistics factors, which may adversely impact the ability of the operational forces to conduct operations. Among the most conspicuous, tangible resources are equipment and other materials of war. When resources are limited, the combatant commander must prioritize the allocation of materiel among his component commands. The combatant commander, along with subordinate JFCs, will normally establish priority of support and priority of supply by campaign phase ensuring that the preponderance of support is earmarked and delivered to those forces making the main effort of the decisive operation and sometimes shifting those priorities as the campaign unfolds. JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning,* and JP 5-00.2, *JTF Planning*, provide significant joint logistics planning discussion.

10-30. Service component support to their attached and assigned forces is outlined in Title 10 USC. For the Army, it begins with Army support to the force projection process at CONUS force projection platforms through to the JOA. This strategic reach to the JOA and ultimately the theater(s) of operations becomes operational with the JRSOI process of ARFOR units through APODS and SPODS.

10-31. Army operational logistics support systems in theater are comprised of "specialized" support *capabilities* which can be modularized into multi-functional packages to meet theater unique requirements (METT-TC). Ideally, these packages should be identified early on in the deliberate planning process for an OPLAN or CONPLAN with or without timed-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). Eventually, whether it's a derivative of the deliberate planning process or the result of crisis action planning, the combatant commander's campaign plan (the result of a detailed course of action analysis process) is specific to the point of detailed phasing of support further determining priority of support and supply to which Service component (e.g., ARFOR, AFFOR, MARFOR, etc.) or functional component (e.g., JFLCC, JFACC, etc.) in each phase of the campaign plan.

10-32. Army operational logistics support in the theater requires that Army logisticians concentrate their planning efforts on providing the JFC, through the J4 planners, with Army logistical capabilities, not just organizations. The ASCC G-4 and other Army planners at the operational-level focus their planning efforts on the physical characteristics of the theater (S/APODs, MSRs, army prepositioned stocks [APS], facilities, etc.). In addition, they examine constraints and the resources required to support the mission (services, contractors, LOGCAP, HNS, etc.). Informational requirements (e.g., global combat service support [GCSS] and joint total asset visibility/in-transit visibility [JTAV/ITV], etc.), which are tailorable to meet gross requirements and designed to be flexible enough to sustain the needs of joint/multinational campaigns throughout the full spectrum of operations. Its primary focus is

the detailed planning and responsive allocation of limited logistics resources using distribution based technologies and agile logistics infrastructure.

10-33. Early in an operation, the ASCC G1/AG and G4 planning and management cells are used to ensure rapid establishment of C2 of logistics, personnel services for current operations as well as anticipate future support requirements. As the theater matures from an austere infrastructure environment, a requirement for a separate, more formal logistical and personnel C2 organization may develop, again METT-TC dependent. Based on the combatant commander's campaign plan, intent, and the operations to be conducted, the COMASCC constantly evaluates the nature and scope of the theater logistics and personnel systems.

10-34. Logisticians use a system of support bases consisting of tailored support forces at both intra/inter-theater to meet support demands as far forward as possible. Support bases may include a temporary or long-term intermediate staging base (ISB) if deemed required by the combatant commander and COMASCC. The ASCC tailors the ARFOR logistics forces so that the required capability, and nothing more, is deployed and employed. Although local resources are used, logisticians rely heavily on a CONUS-based support source through assured communications and reliable transportation and distribution systems.

10-35. The theater support base, in performing its logistics function, links strategic sustainment to tactical CSS. At the operational level of activity, the familiar distinction between operations and logistics begins to blur. Logistics is synonymous with operations and becomes a significant undertaking of the COMASCC and ASCC staff.

10-36. Key elements of the Army's logistics and personnel support structure at the operational level include dedicated GS transportation and supply, sustainment maintenance, Echelon III medical (with in-theater hospital facilities), and personnel support units. DS elements also support forces operating in the AO. Many of the stocks to support the AO are stored at the operational level, allowing CSS units at the tactical level to remain as mobile as possible. A wide variety of sources contribute to these support functions. These sources include contractors, DA and DOD civilians, US and multinational military organizations, and HNS.

10-37. The primary focus of Army operational logistical and personnel support planning is on—

- Reception.
- Position of facilities.
- Materiel
- Human resources support (HRS).
- Movement control.
- Distribution management.
- Lead Service support requirements
- Reconstitution
- Contracting
- Health services support
- Redeployment.

10-38. In planning and executing operations, the COMASCC's focuses on generating combat power by moving forces and material into theater as well as the sustainment of the forces during theater campaigns and operations. COMASCC's, in concert with their associated geographic combatant commanders, are responsible to identify requirements, coordinate resource distribution from the strategic base or local sources, allocate necessary

logistical capabilities, and establish requisite Army logistical and personnel command and control relationships within the theater of operations.

10-39. Proper logistics and personnel support planning reduces the need for emergency measures and improvisations, which are usually expensive and often have an adverse effect on subordinate and adjacent commands. Logistics and personnel support planners must avoid focusing solely on the deployment problem at the expense of the sustaining the employment portion of the campaign. Planners identify critical or key issues unique to a specific operation plan they must support. These issues include the increased demand associated with an expanding force, critical supply items, constrictive distribution bottlenecks, control of all means of transportation, and the sourcing of supplies and services. See FM 3-35 (100-17) for more discussion on force tailoring and FM 4-0 (100-10) for general discussion on each of the operational-level CSS functions, and numerous other FMs and JPs that address specific operational-level CSS functions and planning considerations.

JOINT SUPPORT

10-40. Joint theater logistics coordination ensures a campaign plan or OPLAN's feasibility from planning to execution. The Army support system, starting with the COMASCC, and including the Army's operational-level support commands, plan for and ensure proper execution of Army and Joint CSS operations. Joint doctrine describes several techniques for managing/controlling joint logistics and personnel support operations. JP 5-00.1 discusses logistic planning from the combatant commander's perspective while JP 5-00.2 discusses logistic planning from the JTF perspective. Additionally, JP 4-0 describes the boards and centers that J4s

may use to monitor and coordinate logistics activities. It also describes how a JFC may establish a joint theater logistics management (JTLM) element to fuse movement control and material management for the joint force. The other potential joint logistics centers, offices, and boards include:

- Logistics readiness center
- Joint movement center.
- Sub-area petroleum office.
- Joint civil-military engineering board.
- Joint facilities utilization board.
- Joint logistics procurement support board.
- Joint human resources support.
- Joint blood program office.
- Joint mortuary affairs office.
- Theater patient movement requirements center
- Global patient movement requirements center.
- Joint materiel priorities and allocation board.
- Joint transportation board.

10-41. Another key document to understand joint logistics is JP 4-07 which describes CUL in joint operations. This JP provides detailed discussion of CUL organizational options to include any combination of the following:

- Single Service component dedicated support where each Service component supports its own forces.
- Lead Service or agency support where a lead Service or DOD agency provides common user/item support to one or more Service components, governmental or other organizations. May or may not include OPCON or TACON or other Service logistics organizations.
- Logistically focused JTF to provide C2 for designated logistics organizations from two or more Service components.

10-42. Key to success of joint logistics is for the ASCC G-1, G-4 and related special staff (surgeon, engineer, etc.) to ensure that the JFC and Army logistical and personnel support requirements, capabilities and responsibilities are well coordinated and understood. The COMASCC must ensure that subordinate ARFORs, and associated units understand and are

prepared to execute joint CUL functions. Identifying who will represent the COMASCC/COMARFOR on applicable logistic boards and centers is also an important planning consideration.

MULTINATIONAL SUPPORT

10-43. This category of support consists of military sustainment support provided from one multinational partner to another under pre-approved standardization agreements (STANAGs) and Quadripartite Standardization Agreements (QSTAGs) or short-term ACSAs directed by the MNFC within the applicable laws and regulations of the contributing nations. Although each contributing nation understands that logistics is a national responsibility and that they are responsible for providing sustainment for their deployed forces, varying degrees of mutual logistics and personnel support can be expected in order to achieve economy and influence unity of effort and avoid duplication. National logistics provided by national support elements (NSEs) should not supplant detailed logistics and personnel support planning in multinational operations.

10-44. Just as for US Services, common logistic responsibilities can be delineated to specific multinational partner Services based on the overall multinational force requirements as well as the ability of each country to provide materiel and services. An accounting system may be required to ensure the appropriate nation or international agency is properly billed for the logistics they receive. Nonetheless, MNFC must coordinate the use of facilities such as highways, rail lines, ports, and airfields in a manner that supports mission accomplishment. The Multinational Joint Logistics Center (MJLC) concept was developed to provide a NATO CJTF with the structure to

exercise his logistics authority and responsibilities in an effective and well coordinated fashion.

10-45. There are three generally accepted methods of executing cooperative logistics in a multinational force. These can be used singularly or in combination. They include:

- Lead nation, in which a nation accepts responsibility to provide one or more logistic functions within a specified area.
- Role specialization, in which a nation accepts responsibility to provide a particular class of supply or service for all or most of the MNF.
- Pooled assets and resources, in which two or more nations form an integrated logistic support structure to provide supply or support functions to the MNF.

10-46. The COMASCC could be responsible for CUL support to a multinational operation even when the Army does not have significant combat units in the MNF. In this type of operational situation, the COMASCC may be established logistically focused ARFOR, most likely built around the TSC or other operational-level support command. See FM 3-16 (100-8), JP 4-08, AJP-4, ALP-9, and various other STANAGs and QSTAGS for further doctrinal discussion on multinational logistics operations.

INTERAGENCY SUPPORT

10-47. In many joint operations, the combatant commander, Service components, and DLA may be required to coordinate and/or provide support related to movement or supply of foreign humanitarian assistance materiel. As the most significant provider of CUL support, the COMASCC must always consider potential requirement to provide CUL interagency support to both other governmental agencies (OGAs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The Army will often be required to provide CUL support to key OGAs, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and to

any number of the approximately 350 NGOs registered with the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Support to NGOs may be done on either a dedicated or a space-available basis depending on the particular program, operational tempo and as dictated by the combatant commander or subordinate JFC. In all situations, the combatant commander, the subordinate JFC, and their staffs must evaluate the operational situation to ensure that CUL support is properly coordinated and legally authorized and that a balance is achieved in providing support throughout the theater. It is imperative that the COMASCC and COMARFOR are involved early on in the planning and execution of this interagency support.

CSS REACH OPERATIONS

10-48. To enhance the strategic responsive of the ARFOR, the COMASCC must focus on leveraging all available support capabilities to include other Service components, HNS, theater support contracts, etc. CSS reach is the notion that Army CSS support may be provided by different logistics and personnel support agencies not initially deployed from CONUS or permanent forward deployed base into the tactical area to meet its units' needs. CSS reach includes reaching back to national-level assets as necessary for such things as materiel management. CSS reach includes use of ISBs, split-based operations, and maximizing the modular nature of modern CSS forces.

10-49. CSS reach operations are not without risk. Planning and coordination must be deliberate and detailed to ensure effective ARFOR and lead Service support. Effectiveness cannot be compromised for the sake of efficiency. CSS reach also entails timely decisions made early in the process that can and will

affect the end result. See FM 4-0 (100-10) for further discussion on CSS reach operations. See Figure 10-4.



Figure 10-4. CSS Reach Operations.

LOGISTICS PREPARATION OF THE THEATER

10-50. Logistics preparation of the theater (LPT) is the process in which logisticians at all echelons determine the logistics requirements to support the JFC's campaign plan. The combatant commander's concept for the campaign or operation is the basis for LPT. As soon as possible after the initial logistic mission analysis is complete, the LPT effort begins.

10-51. The LPT process must be closely linked to the joint intelligence preparation of the battlefield (JIPB) process. LPT is originated by the supported combatant commander J-4 and pervades both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. LPT is used by the COMASCC and COMARFOR planners in order for them to build a flexible operational-level

ARFOR support plan. It consists of the actions taken by logistics and personnel staffs at all echelons to optimize means--force structure, resources, and strategic lift of supported combatant commander's campaign plan. LPT actions include identifying and preparing ISBs (if utilized); selecting and improving LOCs; and forecasting and building operational stock assets both at the ISB (again, if utilized) and forward in the theater of operations/JOA. ASCC DCSLOG/G-4, in coordination with the combatant commander's J-4 and key Army logistical unit planners, focus on identifying the resources currently available in the theater for use by friendly forces and ensuring access to them. A detailed estimate of Army and CUL lead Service requirements, tempered with LPT, allows ASCC support planners to advise the COMARFOR and combatant commander of the most effective and efficient method of supporting the theater campaign plan from start to finish. It focuses on priority of support and priority of supply by phase while minimizing the logistical and personnel footprint. See FM 4-0 (100-10) for additional discussion on LPT.

THEATER DISTRIBUTION

10-52. The Army is in the process of moving away from the robust, but cumbersome, supply-based logistics system to a more efficient and flexible distribution-based logistics system, referred to as theater distribution. Theater distribution is a system optimizes available infrastructure, reduces support response time, maximizes throughput, and provides a more time-definite delivery of logistical support. Effective theater distribution management synchronizes and optimizes the various sub-elements of the distribution system.

10-53. Several Army activities and initiatives support the ARFOR in theater distribution. These include establishment of distribution management centers (DMCs), developments in automated information systems, advancements in configured loads and emphasis on maximizing throughput, and enhancement of capabilities to operate intermodal terminals.

10-54. DMCs can be found at all levels to include TSC, corps, and division support commands. For the ASCC, the key link to the theater system is the TSC DMC. The DMC acts as the distribution management support element for the deputy commander for support operations (DCSO). It provides staff supervision to the TSC material management center (MMC) and the movements control agency (MCA) and coordinates with the medical logistics management center (MLMC). The TSC's DMC synchronizes operations within the joint theater distribution plan to maximize throughput and follow-on sustainment and ensures priorities are executed in accordance with combatant commander/JFC and COMASCC directives. Specialized commands/organizations provide liaison personnel to ensure the distribution aspects of other logistical functions (such as postal or replacement operations, Class IV and V support to engineer operations, Class VIII and medical materiel operations, and contracting activities) are integrated into the overall distribution operation. DMCs utilize automation and communication enablers to provide total asset visibility, in-transit visibility, real-time communications. See FM 4-01.4 (100-10-1), JP 4-01.4, and JP 4-09 for additional theater distribution related discussion.

10-55. Detailed planning for theater distribution operations is a key part of the environment of the distribution manager. Commanders, support

operations elements, and control centers must plan far enough in advance to influence the flow within the strategic segment of the distribution pipeline. Since much of Army sustainment support comes via surface mode, this planning time may be up to 30 days or more out.

10-56. Successful theater distribution requires continuous monitoring of resource and movement transactions, knowledge of trends and performance, and knowledge of the commander's operational priorities. For TSC organizations to provide effective support, the planners must thoroughly understand the mission, determine requirements, assess the capabilities of the supporting force, and apply resources against requirements resulting in the most responsive support possible. TSC and specialized command staff officers and commanders must anticipate rather than react when determining support requirements.

10-57. The distribution plan is closely related to the LPT and is a part of the service support plan with its associated annexes and appendices. The ASCC OPLAN/OPORD provides operational mission information essential for DMC planner, in coordination with the ASCC DCSPER/G1 and DCSLOG/G4, to develop the LPT. The LPT provides the data required to prepare the logistics estimate that is critical to develop the distribution plan. The logistic estimate draws conclusions and makes recommendations concerning the logistics feasibility of various COAs and the effects of each COA on logistics and personnel service support operations. Once the commander selects a COA, the TSC staff coordinates with the specialized commands using both the logistics and personnel estimates to develop the service support and distribution plan. The LPT, service support plan, and distribution plan are

living documents within the support planning triad that are changed, refined, and updated as a result of continuing estimates and studies.

SECTION III – OPERATIONAL CSS FUNCTIONS

10-58. This section provides a brief overview, along with links to other applicable doctrinal publications, on the major operational-level Army CSS functions. All these functions are discussed in more detail in FM 4-0 (100-10) as well as the specific manuals cited for each function below.

SUPPLY, MAINTENANCE, FIELD SERVICES, AND EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL FUNCTION AND ORGANIZATIONS

OPERATIONAL-LEVEL SUPPLY

10-59. Supply involves acquiring, managing, receiving, storing, and issuing all classes of supply, except Class VIII, required to equip and sustain Army forces. It is a wide-ranging function that extends from determination of requirements at the national level down to issue of items to the user in the theater. Supply flows for all classes of supply are shown in Appendix C of FM 4-01.4 (100-10-1).

10-60. The TSC's support operations supply directorate develops plans, policies, programs, and procedures regarding theater supply issues. The TSC DMC integrates the directorate's plans with the plans of the other functions associated with distribution.

Class I

10-61. Class I is subsistence and gratuitous health and comfort items. During the initial phase of a conflict, the system pushes rations--meals, ready-to-eat (MREs) and unitized group rations (UGRs). Personnel strength, unit

locations, type of operations, and feeding capabilities determine the quantities and types of rations ordered and pushed forward. As the battlefield stabilizes, the supply system converts to a pull system with limited fresh fruit and vegetable supplements. The distribution system throughputs rations as far forward as possible.

10-62. Health and comfort packages (formerly referred to as ration supplement sundry packages) are Class I supply items managed by the Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) Defense Personnel Supply Center (DPSC). They have a national stock number and are issued through the standard supply system without cost to soldiers early in a force projection operation. They contain items such as disposable razors, toothbrushes, toothpaste, and other personal care items. The Class I system provides packages until AAFES tactical field exchanges are operational and providing Class VI support. FM 4-20 (10-1) and FM 4-20.2 (10-23) provide additional details.

Class II

10-63. Class II supplies include a wide variety of supplies and equipment from clothing and individual equipment to tools. Unclassified maps are also Class II items. In most cases, Class II consumption by Service is predictable. Demand history, together with anticipated fluctuations, can provide accurate forecasting of needs. See FM 4-20 (10-1) and FM 4-20.1 (10-27) .

Class III

10-64. There are two categories of Class III supplies--bulk fuel and packaged petroleum products.

10-65. **Bulk Fuel**. During peacetime, each Service is responsible for planning and preparing for bulk petroleum support to its own forces. This includes

managing prepositioned stocks and peacetime operating stocks. It also includes operating bulk storage, handling, and distribution facilities. Each Service computes its requirements and submits them to the DLA's Defense Energy Supply Center (DESC) for supply and acquisition action.

10-66. The availability of fuel depends on the location of the theater of operations. If operations are in an industrialized area, initial supplies may be obtained from HN or theater contractor support. DESC can perform an important role in obtaining fuel. When necessary, tanker ships bring in subsequent supplies through marine petroleum terminals. In an undeveloped area, Air Force aircraft may effect the initial resupply. In these "emergency" type situations, the fuel bladders may be discharged directly into the operating units' support vehicles. As soon as practical, the Navy's offshore petroleum discharge system provides bulk fuels in over-the-beach operations. The Navy is responsible for providing fuel to the high-water mark on the beach. The ASCC then assumes responsibility for the fuel through its tactical petroleum terminals.

10-67. During war (or in specified military operations other than war), the ASCC is responsible for the inland distribution of bulk fuels. This includes distributing bulk fuels to air bases and to the MARFOR. This inland distribution responsibility requires the Army to provide the necessary force structure to construct, operate, and maintain overland petroleum pipelines and to distribute bulk fuels via non-pipeline means. It must be understood, however, that the ARFOR and MARFOR remain responsible for the retail distribution of bulk fuels to their subordinate units. Inherent in this

responsibility is the requirement to manage the distribution of bulk fuels within the theater.

10-68. A geographic combatant commander may establish a joint petroleum office (JPO) to provide staff management of petroleum at the theater level. Subarea petroleum offices (SAPOs) may be established at the subunified command/JTF level to provide in-country staff responsibilities for all Services. More information on the JPO and bulk fuel support can be found in FM 4-03 (10-67), FM 4-20.12 (10-67-1), DOD 4140.25-M and JPs 4.0 and 4-03.

10-69. **Packaged Petroleum Products**. Packaged products include lubricants, greases, hydraulic fluids, compressed gasses, and specialty items that are stored, transported, and issued in containers with a capacity of 55 gallons or less. (Normally, this category does not include fuels.)

Class IV

10-70. Class IV items consist of fortification, barrier, and construction materials. Units use barrier and fortification materials to prepare fighting and protective positions as well as field fortifications. Engineers use Class IV materials to prepare fortifications beyond the capabilities of units. Engineer staffs also work closely with the TSC MMC to ensure the proper quantity and types of Class IV materiel are available to support engineer operations. They also use them for such functions as:

- Upgrading, maintaining, or building roads, bridges, and bypasses.
- Repairing airfields or building expedient airstrips and landing zones.
- Assembling rafts or bridges for river crossings.
- Upgrading, repairing, or building facilities in support of the CSS effort or to enhance the infrastructure of the host nation as part of a stability or support operation.

10-71. Most materials are standard items used by both the military and civilian sectors. Whenever possible, forces obtain them locally. When resources are scarce, the JFC establishes procedures to prevent competition among Services. This may be done through the CINC's logistic procurement support board (CLPSB). Otherwise, items are requested, managed, and distributed using standard supply procedures. Because of their bulk and weight, transportation units throughput them as far forward as possible to avoid overburdening the limited transportation assets of using units and to minimize handling.

Class V

10-72. Class V includes all munition items from small arms ammunition, grenades, mines, rockets, missiles, and tank and artillery cartridges to all components for separate loading artillery rounds, chemical rounds, and pyrotechnic/specialty items such as explosive bolts, ejection cartridges, and demolition charges. The COMARFOR, based on JFC guidance, establishes priorities for theater Class V supplies, giving priority to the most common and critical types of ammunition. The highest level Army MMC in theater, normally the TSC MMC, coordinates the shipment and delivery of stocks from CONUS in accordance with the JFC's logistics support plan. The ARFOR and JFC logistics planners must consider total force ammunition requirements in a contingency response environment when planning for the movement of stocks and support forces. Theater ammunition stocks are maintained at the theater storage area (TSA), which is maintained by the TSC. FM 4-30.1 (9-6) has details on Army Class V operations.

Class VI

10-73. Class VI supplies are AAFES items for sale to troops and authorized individuals. Class VI supplies may be available through local procurement, through transfer from theater stocks, or through requisitioning from the AAFES in CONUS. Available shipping space dictates Class VI supply to the theater. Class VI supply responsibilities differ significantly from other classes of supply.

10-74. Soldiers deploy with limited quantities of health and comfort items to meet initial personal requirements. The command may authorize the issue of Class I health and comfort packages (HCPs) as long as necessary. AAFES provides Class VI support beyond the issue of HCPs to meet the JFC's needs. Class VI can be limited to basic HCP items or expanded to include food and beverages and entertainment items. The COMARFOR must be concerned about the availability of Class VI as it is a morale multiplier.

Class VII

10-75. Class VII supplies consist of major end items such as launchers, tanks, vehicles, and aircraft. A major end item is a final combination of end products which is ready to use. Due to their importance to combat readiness and their high costs, Class VII items are usually controlled through command channels. If not, the supporting materiel manager controls them. Each echelon intensely manages the requisitioning, distribution, maintenance, and disposal of these items to ensure visibility and operational readiness. The ARFOR MMC or DMC has this responsibility.

10-76. Forces report losses of major items through both supply and command channels. Replacement of losses requires careful coordination and

management. Managers at each command level work to maximize the number of operational weapon systems. Replacement requires coordination among materiel managers, Class VII supply units, transporters, maintenance elements, and personnel managers.

10-77. The intensity of future battles may produce heavy losses of both personnel and materiel. Weapon systems complete with on-board spares, a basic load of ammunition, and a trained crew will have to be replaced quickly and efficiently. These weapons systems replacement operations (WSRO) are done by exception only and would normally only be conducted during operations where significant casualties are expected. WSRO are normally planned at the ASCC level in coordination with DA guidance. More details on Class VII operations are in FM 4-0 (100-10).

Class VIII

10-78. Class VIII is medical materiel including medical peculiar repair parts and equipment. Class VIII also includes: controlled substances, tax free alcohol, precious metals, nonexpendable medical items, expendable medical items, all drugs and related Federal Supply Classification 6505 items not otherwise restricted.

10-79. Combat health logistics is normally a Service responsibility. However, a combatant commander may designate a single integrated medical logistics manager (SIMLM) to provide central logistical support to all participating Services in the AOR. As the dominant user, the US Army has been formally tasked by DOD to perform the peacetime SIMLM mission in the European and Korean theaters. Under wartime or crisis conditions, the US Army, in all

probability, will be the dominant Class VIII user and must plan for the SIMLM mission.

10-80. The SIMLM system encompasses the provision of medical supplies, medical equipment maintenance and repair, blood management, and optical fabrication to all joint forces within the theater, except Navy ships. Combat health logistics can be provided to Navy hospital ships for common, demand-supported medical supplies in the later stages of theater development. See FM 4-02.11 (8-10-11) for further information.

Class IX

10-81. Class IX items (repair parts) consist of any part, subassembly, assembly, or component required for installation in the maintenance of an end item, subassembly, or component. They support the maintenance and repair functions performed throughout the Army on all materiel except medical materiel. They range from small items of common hardware to large, complex line replaceable units.

10-82. The MMC or DMC at the appropriate level manages Class IX supplies. At the Army operational-level, it is usually the TSC MMC/DMC. The degree of management is generally proportional to the contribution the repair parts make to the operational readiness of the end items they are supporting. Items, such as major assemblies, that directly affect the ability of the end item to operate in combat receive particular attention. Another factor affecting management is the item's dollar value. Combat-essential and high-dollar-value items are intensely managed at all levels. Low cost, noncombat-essential items may be managed within the established parameters of the

automated systems at the various echelons of supply, thereby allowing the manager to concentrate on fewer items.

10-83. The operational-level of Class IX supply focuses on managing the distribution of items from strategic providers to tactical-level recipients and on providing a GS level of supply that provides a safety level for all repair parts and a level of stockage for the items that will not be sent to the theater via ALOC. Easing these supply requirements are the serviceable assets that GS maintenance repair of line replaceable units generate. These theater-generated assets can offset the requirement to support from the strategic level of supply.

Class X

10-84. Class X is materiel to support nonmilitary programs such as agriculture and economic development that are not included in Classes I through IX. The ASCC or ARFOR may be directed to provide some supplies to civilian populations. The TSC's host nation support directorate personnel normally would coordinate such support through the civil-military operations center (CMOC). FM 3-57 (41-10) has further details.

OPERATIONAL-LEVEL MAINTENANCE

10-85. Maintenance entails keeping materiel in a serviceable, operational condition, returning it to service, and updating and upgrading its capability. It includes performing preventive maintenance checks and services; recovering and evacuating disabled equipment; diagnosing equipment faults; substituting parts, components, and assemblies; exchanging serviceable materiel for unserviceable materiel; and repairing equipment. The ultimate key to success is to be able to anticipate requirements.

10-86. The current Army maintenance program is a flexible, four-level system. The levels are operator/unit, direct support (DS), general support (GS), and depot. Each level has certain capabilities based on the skills of the assigned personnel and the availability of tools and test equipment. New maintenance concepts will consolidate levels of maintenance into a two-level maintenance system. In the new system, unit and DS maintenance comprise the first of the two maintenance echelons known as field maintenance. This focuses on repair and return of major end items and components for immediate use by the supported force. The second maintenance echelon is sustainment maintenance. This includes GS and depot levels. Sustainment maintenance focuses on repair of major end items and components in support of the supply system. When properly integrated, the levels serve as a logistics multiplier, adding an extra dimension to the commander's action plan.

10-87. The goal of the overall maintenance plan is to support the operations plans and objectives of the COMASCC/COMARFOR. Its primary purpose is to provide field maintenance and maximize the number of operational combat systems available to support the tactical battle. Commanders tailor and position maintenance units in the theater to best support this goal. The maintenance-supply interface at the operational-level is the fusion point between the field and sustainment maintenance management echelons. ARFOR maintenance managers support the tactical battle by ensuring that the maintenance system supports campaigns and sustains theater forces. Through the judicious use of maintenance assets, the COMARFOR can overcome shortages in the supply system or support unexpected requirements by pushing maintenance capabilities farther forward on the battlefield.

10-88. The operational-level support plan ties together the requirements of the tactical units with the capabilities of the strategic base. The maintenance system both drives and supports the supply system. DS (field) maintenance units meet tactical requirements through close support, while GS (sustainment) maintenance units/activities alleviate supply shortfalls. Surge maintenance capabilities from all sources, including the industrial base, meet unexpected demands. FM 4-30.3 (9-43-1) has details on ground maintenance and FM 3-04.500 (1-500) covers aviation maintenance.

OPERATIONAL-LEVEL FIELD SERVICES

10-89. Field services involve feeding, clothing, and providing personal services for soldiers. They consist of laundry, shower, and clothing and textile repair; water purification; mortuary affairs; preparation for aerial delivery; and food service. The COMARFOR determines the priorities for field service support in coordination with the subordinate JFC. At the operational level, HNS or contractors may provide a great deal of field service support. FM 4-0 (100-10) and FM 4-20 (10-1) provide additional information on field services.

Mortuary Affairs

10-90. The Mortuary Affairs Program consists of three subprograms: the current death, graves registration, and concurrent return subprograms. The current death subprogram provides full mortuary services for permanent disposition of remains and personal effects. It operates around the world in peacetime. It may continue in areas of conflict depending on the logistical and tactical situations. The graves registration subprogram provides for search, recovery, initial identification, and evacuation of remains for temporary interment. The concurrent return subprogram provides for search, recovery,

and evacuation of remains to a mortuary. It provides for the positive identification, embalming, and disposition of remains as directed by the next of kin. The supported combatant commander decides which of these subprograms will be used. FM 4-20 (10-1), FM 4-20.64 (10-64), and JP 4-06 contain additional information on mortuary affairs.

10-91. The Army maintains the Central Joint Mortuary Affairs Office, which functions as a coordinating group consisting of colonel or Navy captain-level representatives from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff Logistics Directorate, and the Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFME). The US Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii, has the mission to search, recover, and identify the remains resulting from previous wars as well as humanitarian missions and other conflicts and operations as directed by competent authority. In addition, the Army has quartermaster mortuary affairs companies available to support military operations. The ARFOR can also expect to be designated the lead Service for mortuary affairs in most continental joint operations.

Laundry, Shower, and Clothing and Light Textile Repair

10-92. The need to provide the soldier with clean, serviceable clothing and a shower has long been recognized as essential for hygiene and morale purposes. The standard is to provide at a minimum a weekly shower to each soldier and, also on a weekly basis, to launder, make minor repairs, and return his own individual clothing to him within a 24-hour period. The weekly shower is even more important if individuals have had to wear NBC defense clothing for any length of time. This field service is provided only in the DS mode. At the tactical level in hostile environments, this support is

provided almost exclusively by field service units; at the operational-level, by a mixture of field service units, HNS, and civilian contractors. If a laundry and renovation GS capability is required, it comes from HNS or contractor. More information on laundry and shower support is in FM 4-20.03 (10-27-2).

OPERATIONAL-LEVEL EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) SUPPORT

10-93. EOD provides the capability to neutralize domestic or foreign conventional, nuclear, chemical, and biological munitions and improvised devices, which present a threat to military operations, and military and civilian facilities, materiel, and personnel. EOD ordnance companies provide general support (GS) on an area basis or general support-reinforcing (GS-R) to specified elements in support of operations. The geographic combatant commander's planning staff develops the theater-level concept of EOD support. The ASCC staff planning staff tailors EOD forces to support specified operations down to a brigade combat team. Additional details of EOD operations can be found in FM 4.0 (100-10), FM 4-30.1 (9-6), FM 9-15, FM 21-16 (4-30.12), FM 100-38, and FM 4-30.15 (to be published).

SECTION IV – OPERATIONAL CSS ORGANIZATIONS

NATIONAL LOGISTICS ORGANIZATIONS

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

10-94. The DLA is DOD's major logistics agency. It is the combatant commander's strategic link to DOD's partnership with our national industrial base. DLA provides supply support, contract administration, technical and logistics services as well as materiel disposal to all military services.

10-95. DLA is responsible for providing a variety of logistics and technical services to the military Services. These services include inventory

management, procurement, warehousing and distribution of all classes of supply (except classes V, VI and VII); and reutilization of surplus military materiel. In general, DLA eliminates strategic-level logistical redundancy between the Services and standardizes common supplies. DLA procures, stores, and distributes a wide variety of common items to support the military Services and other customers.

10-96. In the COMMZ, DLA provides reutilization and marketing services, which establish theater-specific procedures for the re-use, demilitarization, or disposal of facilities, equipment and supplies, to include hazardous material and waste. Initially, salvage and excess materiel destined for the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Services (DRMS) is collected in the corps and division areas as the situation permits. As the theater matures this materiel is evacuated to the COMMZ/JRA for inspection, classification, and disposal by DLA-directed activities. The TSC MMC coordinates DRMS operations for the ASCC/ARFOR commander to ensure that usable materiel is not disposed of or evacuated from the theater.

10-97. The DLA contingency support team (DCST) is DLA's focal point for coordinating DLA activities in a theater. It is designed to enhance strategic and operational linkages. It facilitates integrating materiel management support of DLA common commodities such as subsistence, clothing and other general supplies, package/bulk petroleum, and medical materiel. When deployed to a theater, the DCST provides liaison support, as required, to the TSC DMC.

US ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND

10-98. The US Army Materiel Command (USAMC) operates the Army's strategic national logistics system through its major subordinate commands to fulfill the Army's needs for logistics support. USAMC performs assigned materiel functions and related functions for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDTE). It also provides acquisition, logistics support, and technical assistance for materiel systems. USAMC provides the Army's national logistics system-level maintenance support for items of materiel used by the Army and serves as the DOD single manager for conventional ammunition

10-99. USAMC provides management of operational policies, programs, objectives, and resources associated with its worldwide Logistics Assistance Program (LAP). It also provides contract support and management for the Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). Additionally, USAMC accounts for and manages worldwide, the Army pre-position stocks (APS) except for medical materiel. USAMC capabilities and functions are provided in a theater through a deployable logistics support element (LSE) with an assured and critical link to the Army's national strategic logistics system for weapons and materiel. The LSE projects to the theater the full capability of CONUS with its national inventory control points (NICPs), depots, arsenals, plants, and the industrial base. FM 4-93.11 (63-11) discusses LSE operations in much more detail.

ARMY AND AIR FORCE EXCHANGE SYSTEM

10-100. Army and Air Force Exchange System (AAFES) mobile field exchanges are deployable truck-or tent-based resale outlets that provide

health and comfort merchandise support to deployed US forces. AAFES civilian employees operate these nonappropriated fund activities whose merchandise originates from AAFES system stock.

10-101. AAFES has responsibility for worldwide planning and monitoring of all tactical field exchanges. HQ AAFES-Europe plans and monitors tactical operations within the NATO area of responsibility. In the Pacific area, HQ AAFES-Pacific is responsible. Other regions are the responsibility of HQ AAFES. AAFES determines requirements; procures, stores, and distributes supplies; operates resale facilities; designates the parent exchange; and determines whether an operation requires an operational site general manager. AAFES support is tailored to meet the COMARFOR's needs. FM 4-20 (10-1) contains additional information about AAFES support.

THEATER LEVEL LOGISTICAL ORGANIZATIONS

THEATER SUPPORT COMMAND

10-102. The theater support command (TSC) is a multifunctional support command that works at the operational-level with links to strategic and tactical-level support organizations and agencies. The COMASCC supervises the TSC's peacetime contingency planning. When the TSC, or any part of it, deploys to an AO, the deployed portion reports to the COMARFOR. The COMARFOR may be the COMASCC, or a lower level commander, depending on the scale of operations. During peacetime planning, the COMASCC provides guidance for the types of logistical, personnel, or general engineering units that may be attached to the TSC for a given contingency.

10-103. TSCs normally have permanently assigned major subordinate units such as a DMC, area support groups (ASGs), ammunition groups, or

petroleum groups. The COMASCC attaches other units to the TSC for specific operations. The TSC can be easily tailored to meet the varied support requirements depending on the type of operations and the scale of the deployment. See Figure 10-5.



Figure 10-5 Theater Support Command

10-105. In many operational scenarios, the TSC commander would execute most of COMARFOR's lead Service CUL responsibilities in the AO. TSC planners must assist the ARFOR G-4 planners to identify all lead Service CSS responsibilities (to include joint, multinational and interagency responsibilities) as soon as possible so that scarce resources can be distributed throughout the force. TSC planners must also be aware of the

support responsibilities falling to other Army specialized commands and synchronize it with any applicable portion of the distribution plan.

10-106. At the operational level, the TSC's maintenance capability is organized to provide DS and GS maintenance to units in and passing through the AO, to provide DS maintenance support to back up tactical-level organizations, immediate support to aviation units, and to provide sustainment maintenance support for the theater. The support operations supply and maintenance directorate provides planning and policy for maintenance provided by Army maintenance units, maintenance elements under the logistics support element (LSE), and contracted support. If required, a theater sustainment maintenance manager may be established. The deployed elements of the sustainment system fall under the operational control of the TSC with a direct link to the national sustainment maintenance manager. The TSC MMC manages the workload.

10-107. The TSC MMC also manages Class I, II, III (packaged and bulk), IV, V, VI, VII, and IX supplies, and water. Class IV supply actions are coordinated with the ENCOM and/or COMARFOR engineer staff. In accordance with the COMARFOR support priorities, the TSC MMC provides direction for receipt, storage, and issue of Army operational-level stocks. When the required stocks are not available or stock replenishment is required, the TSC MMC passes requirements to the appropriate national inventory control point (NICP). For requirements being considered for local procurement, the MMC is the organization that validates the requirement prior to forwarding to the TSC contracting directorate. When practical, arriving shipments move directly from the port to the requisitioning general

support unit (GSU)/direct support unit (DSU). Otherwise, shipments are directed to an operational-level GSU with sufficient storage capacity.

10-108. The TSC director of field services exercises staff supervision over field services functions. The ARFOR, via the TSC, may be responsible to provide significant field service CUL support within the AO/JOA.

FORCE PROJECTION OPERATIONS

10-109. During the initial phase of a force projection operation, the TSC and other support commands deploys a C2 and assessment team. Its purpose is to support the ASCC assessment team in analyzing the situation in the theater. It updates the LPT by validating planning assumptions on support requirements and capabilities to include available HNS and theater contracted support, the condition of the infrastructure and the current usage levels, and the flow of forces into the theater. With ENCOM representation, the team determines maintenance priorities for existing infrastructure. This includes setting priorities for repairing damaged or destroyed infrastructure and for constructing facilities to compensate for infrastructure shortfalls. See Figure 10-6.



Figure 10-6. Notional TSC Headquarters Assessment Team

10-110. Team personnel would include key members of the TSC headquarters EEM and specialized command representatives. As deployment continues, the rest of the TSC's headquarters EEM deploys into the theater, and normally becomes the command element of the TFOP

EARLY ENTRY OPERATIONS

10-111. The TSC headquarters contains an EEM, which provides the ASCC with a rapidly deployable logistical C2 and planning capability. Elements from the TSC's DMC, MMC, MCA, along with other specialized command EEMs as designated by the COMASCC, are employed along with the C2 EEM. The TSC EEM normally commands the theater force opening package (TFOP), although in some cases, the TFOP could be commanded one of the other specialized operational-level support commands, such as ENCOM, depending on the major focus of the support mission.

10-112. The TFOP is a modularly configured, multifunctional support task force. A typical TFOP needed during the initial stages of deployment includes transportation, engineer, supply, contracting, maintenance, and medical modules. The COMASCC, in coordination with the combatant commander, may also elect to include strategic CSS cells from the USAMC and USAMMA. The composition of the TFOP varies throughout the stages of the operation. It may remain a composite HQs or expand into a complete TSC with or without C2 of non-TSC units. However, if and when a complete specialized command headquarters (ENCOM, TMEDCOM, etc.) is deployed, it would normally report directly to the COMARFOR and not to the TSC.

10-113. The composition of the TFOP also depends on numerous other factors including the type of operation, the nature of the supported military force, the available infrastructure in the theater, availability of contracted support, support provided to and by other Services and/or multinational partners and the nature of the threat. See FM 4-93.4 (63-4) for much more detailed discussion on TFOP operations. See Figure 10-7.



Figure 10-7. Notional TSC Headquarters Early-Entry Module (includes assessment team members)

10-114. The role of the TSC headquarters EEM, with required augmentation from the specialized commands could include

- Establishing TFOP C4I links to provide in-theater connectivity among tactical, joint, and strategic support systems for the integration of initial Army force deployments.
- Providing TFOP survey, liaison, and reconnaissance party (SLRP), offload preparation party (OPP), port support activity (PSA), and advance party elements.
- Exercising control over ASCC theater-level support operations to include CUL support to other Services.
- Updating logistics LPT information to refine theater force opening module requirements.
- Coordinating support requirements of the supported ARFOR with the strategic-level support system. Initiate requests for theater sustainment supplies.
- Planning, acquiring, and managing HN real estate in coordination with the subordinate JFC staff (ENCOM representative).
- Manage initial local procurement, contracting, and FNS activities.
- Planning force protection, physical security for operational support area RSO&I nodes in conjunction with the COMARFOR and JRAC (if established).
- Helping develop and execute the Army portions of the joint movement program developed by the JMC.

10-115. As the EEM headquarters establishes its operations, operating elements of the TFOP arrive in the AOR to rapidly expand the theater base. These theater force opening modules (TFOMS) are tailored elements of operating units/commands providing support to theater forces. As previously indicated the actual support forces required depends on numerous factors. Teams, platoons, or sections from the units deploy as required to become a part of the TFOP. As requirements change additional elements are called forward to provide support.

Area Support Group

10-116. Area support groups (ASGs) are subordinate units assigned to the TSC. They are responsible for area support in the ASCC/ARFOR AO, and

may be tasked to provide sustainment support to corps or other forces. The basic mission of the ASG is to provide direct support (DS) logistics support to designated units and elements within its operational area. This support typically includes DS supply (less ammunition, classified map supply, and medical supply and support), DS maintenance, and field services, as well as other support directed by COMARFOR through the TSC. ASGs can also provide GS supply and sustainment maintenance support to TSC and combat zone DS supply organizations, and sustainment maintenance in support of the theater mission. If an operational-level ammunition group is not established, specialized battalions assigned to the ASG provide ammunition support. ASGs can support intermediate staging base and RSO&I operations.

10-117. ASGs are composed of specialized and multifunctional units. The mission, functions, and organization of ASGs vary according to the type and extent of support required. ASGs provide a wide variety of support to units stationed in or passing through their areas. An ASG area of support depends on the density of military units and materiel to be supported and on political boundaries and identifiable terrain features. Normally, one ASG is assigned to a TSC for every 15,000 to 30,000 troops supported in the AO. ASGs are generally located along land LOCs to take advantage of the transportation network and provide responsive support to the units they support. Additional details on the composition and capabilities of ASGs are in FM 4-93.40 (54-40).

AMMUNITION GROUP AND BATTALIONS

10-118. When established in theater, the ammunition group provides DS ammunition support to units in its area of responsibility. Ammunition

support includes the supply and maintenance of conventional ammunition and the supply of ammunition peculiar repair parts.

10-119. When the TSC and its subordinate elements, including the ammunition group and its battalions are operating in joint and multinational environments, their missions and functions become more complex. FM 4-30.13 (9-13) describes the safety; field storage; issue, receipt, shipment and turn-in; maintenance, inspection and surveillance; and destruction procedures for ammunition. Reporting and accountability procedures will be affected with the addition of joint or multinational forces ammunition. The TSC and the ammunition group staffs must incorporate into their plans accommodations for joint or multinational ammunition. This may require trained ammunition liaison personnel from the joint or multinational forces to provide assistance in interfacing with US Army procedures.

10-120. The conventional ammunition ordnance battalion may be attached to the ASG to establish and operate ammunition supply facilities on an area basis. This battalion may serve as the theater-level ammunition unit. It may also be assigned or attached to an ammunition group. (For more information on ammunition operations, refer to FM 4-30.1 (9-6.)

EOD Units

10-121. Army EOD forces are designed to support the geographical combatant commanders in two simultaneous theaters. The Army allocates each major theater of war one EOD ordnance group at the ASCC level. An EOD group normally has three EOD battalions. An EOD battalion supports Army forces at corps/division level. EOD groups and battalions provide EOD companies at locations that best support the maneuver commander. The EOD ordnance

group headquarters operationally commands and controls all Army EOD assets and operations in theater. The senior EOD commander will normally function as the ASCC/ARFOR EOD special staff officer. See FM 4-30.15 (9-15) and FM 4-30.16 for further information on EOD operations.

PETROLEUM GROUP

10-122. The petroleum group is the principal organization responsible for bulk fuel distribution at the operational level. It commands petroleum pipeline and terminal operating battalions/companies. These units operate and maintain petroleum distribution facilities to support the theater petroleum mission. The group also includes petroleum supply battalions to provide general support petroleum supply. These battalions receive, store, and transfer bulk petroleum to direct support supply units. They operate 5,000- or 7,500-gallon tankers and when practicable, rail cars or barges to distribute bulk fuels. When required, this battalion can also provide bulk and retail supply point distribution. A petroleum supply battalion may also be attached to an ASG. In such cases, it serves as the link between the pipeline system and DS supply units in its area of operation (AO).

10-123. The petroleum group also commands all general support water assets required in a theater, such as bulk storage and distribution facilities. Water operations are conducted by water supply battalions, companies, purification detachments, and truck companies dedicated to the line haul of water. If the petroleum group does not deploy to the theater, water supply battalions may be attached to ASGs. Details on petroleum and water operations are in FMs 4-20 (10-1), 4-03 (10-67), and 4-20.21 (10-52).

TRANSPORTATION FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS

10-124. Transportation is moving and transferring units, personnel, equipment, and supplies to support the concept of operations. Transportation incorporates military, commercial, and host nation capabilities. Transportation assets include motor, rail, air and water modes and units; terminal units, activities, and infrastructure; and movement control units, and activities.

10-125. Army transportation operates as a partner in the Defense Transportation System (DTS) to deploy, sustain, and redeploy forces in all military operations. Transportation provides vital support to the Army and joint forces across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. It is a seamless system that unites the levels of war with synchronized movement control, terminal operations, and mode operations. Army transportation incorporates military, commercial, and supporting nation capabilities. It involves the total Army--active and reserve components. More detailed information on Army and Joint transportation can be found in JP 4-01, FM 4-01(55-1), and the entire JP/FM 4-01 series of publications.

10-126. Responsibility for Army mode transport operations at the operational level rests with the ASCC. Depending on the size of the force deployed, the ASCC may have a TRANSCOM, a composite transportation group, a COSCOM, or a DISCOM with transportation units.

10-127. The ASCC considers augmenting corps and division mode of transport capabilities when these organizations execute transportation functions at the operational level. The augmentation is tailored to the special requirements of the military operation.

US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)

10-128. The USTRANSCOM is a functional combatant command responsible for providing and managing strategic common-user airlift, sealift, and terminal services worldwide. USTRANSCOM supports the geographic combatant commands with international cargo booking and inter-theater movements. Materiel handling equipment and services may be provided by either USTRANSCOM or the geographic combatant command. However, USTRANSCOM assets do not normally support intratheater operations unless released to do so by the CINC USTRANSCOM.

10-129. USTRANSCOM's major subordinate commands include: Air Mobility Command (AMC) for airlift, Military Sealift Command (MSC) for sealift, and the US Army's Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) for terminal services worldwide. The TSC establishes a link with USTRANSCOM, normally through AMC and/or MTMC, to ensure it has visibility over resources en route to the theater. The TSC normally works closely with the MTMC and AMC to coordinate seaport and aerial port operations respectively. Details on USTRANSCOM are in JP 4-01.

10-130. To ensure efficient operations of the port (air and sea) and to achieve maximum throughput at the port, AMC and MTMC (as single port managers (SPM) as designated by USTRANSCOM and in accordance with Command Arrangements Agreement with other geographic combatant commanders) are identified as common-user theater port managers with the mission of overseeing the entire reception phase of RSOI. MTMC is normally the SPM for all common-user seaport. See JP 4-01.8, *JTTP for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration.*

TRANSCOM

10-131. The ASCC TRANSCOM, through subordinate transportation units, provides transportation support to operational-level Army, Joint, and multinational forces as directed by the COMASCC. The command maintains a technical relationship with the DSCLOG/G4 transportation officer of the ASCC/ARFOR headquarters to assist in establishing transportation policy for the theater.

10-132. When attached to the TSC, the TRANSCOM supervises the preparation and coordination of the transportation portion of TSC support plans. The TRANSCOM also provides transportation input to other theater support plans as directed. It provides staff supervision over all operational-level Army transportation units. If not attached to the TSC, the TRANSCOM still works closely with the TSC support operations section to maintain the efficiency of the distribution system. It also works closely with the MP for security and traffic management functions and with the theater engineers for operational mobility.

10-133. The TRANSCOM facilitates Army use of inter and intra-theater air movement by identifying arrival/departure airfield control group (A/DACG) requirements and coordinating air support with the MCA and DMC. It also identifies rail movement requirements and the availability of rail assets. It coordinates rail support with the support operations section/DMC and the MCA, as well as the HNS and contracting directorates.

10-134. TRANSCOM is also responsible for coordinating terminal support and port operations with MTMC. It identifies capabilities and availability of TRANSCOM, TSC, HN, and other cargo-handling personnel, equipment, and

facilities. It coordinates requirements, acquisition, and use of resources with elements of USTRANSCOM, as well as the HNS and contracting directorates of the TSC support operations section. In multinational operations, other forces may conduct a port operation simultaneously with the US. USTRANSCOM coordinates with the ASCC/ARFOR staff and other nations to resolve allocation problems in such areas as berthing space and storage areas.

10-135. Emerging doctrine and structure for the theater TRANSCOM will make it more modular in order to support multiple, simultaneous contingencies. FM 4-01(55-1) provides additional information on transportation services in the theater.

TSC Movement Control Agency (MCA)

10-136. The Army normally executes movement control at the operational-level through a TSC MCA. In some instances, this organization reports to the DCSLOG/G4 transportation officer in the ASCC staff. The TSC MCA helps develop and executes the Army posture of the joint movement program developed by the joint movement center (JMC). It is flexibly structured using a building block approach to position subordinate movement control battalions or teams at critical transportation nodes.

10-137. The TSC MCA serves as the primary element for the planning and controlling of transportation operations at the operational level. The TSC MCA synchronizes its operations with those of the JMC, USTRANSCOM, the TSC DMC and lower echelon movement control centers (MCCs). It also follows the priorities established by the ASCC. FM 4-01.30 (55-10) contains additional information on army movement control.

Transportation Group

10-138. The mission of the transportation group headquarters is to C2 transportation units. The group may serve under the C2 of the TRANSCOM, if deployed, or may be attached to the ASCC/ARFOR or TSC, or as an augmentation to the corps. The transportation group may be the senior Army transportation organization in theater. As a mode operator, the group—

- Commands and controls transportation assets.
- Operates inland intermodal and transfer points.
- Provides transportation assets as committed by a movement control organization.
- Provide common user port operations to include heavy lift crane operations, stevedores, and personnel capable of loading and discharging all classes of cargo including ammunitions; control of port support activity; and cargo documentation.

COMBAT HEALTH SUPPORT FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS

10-139. Combat health support (CHS) maintains medical force protection by preventing disease and nonbattle injuries; clearing the battlefield of casualties; providing far forward medical treatment; providing en route care during medical evacuation; ensuring adequate Class VIII supplies and medical equipment are available; and providing veterinary, dental, and laboratory services. The CHS mission is to minimize the effects of wounds, injuries, disease, environment, occupational hazards and psychological stresses on unit effectiveness, readiness, and morale. A proactive preventive medicine program and a phased health care delivery system can accomplish the mission (based on capabilities) that extends from actions taken prior to and at the point of injury or illness through evacuation from a theater for treatment at a hospital in CONUS. The primary objective of CHS is to conserve the commander's fighting strength of land, sea, air, and special operations forces. CHS in Army operations requires continuous planning,

coordination, and training to ensure a prompt, effective, and unified health care effort.

10-140. Operational-level CHS encompasses all of the medical activities to support the force employed in campaigns and major operations. CHS functional areas are--

- Medical treatment (area medical support).
- Medical evacuation and regulating.
- Hospitalization.
- Combat health logistics and blood management.
- Preventive medicine services.
- Veterinary services.
- Dental services.
- Combat stress control.
- Medical laboratory services.
- Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I).

10-141. In addition to supporting Army forces, the Army may be designated the single integrated medical logistics manager (SIMLM) as well as managing the blood program and providing medical evacuation on the battlefield for other components of the joint force. FM 4-02.12 (8-10-2), *Combat Health Support in Corps and Echelons above Corps* and JP 4-02 series provides additional information on CHS.

MEDICAL ORGANIZATIONS

US Army Medical Materiel Agency

10-142. US Army Medical Materiel Agency (USAMMA) is under control of the US Army Medical Research and Materiel Command. It has the mission of assisting The Surgeon General in the execution of his responsibilities for the management of medical materiel programs in support of Army wide combat health logistics.

10-143. The USAMMA operates the Army's strategic logistics system for Class VIII in coordination with the DLA depot system. The USAMMA coordinates Class VIII support of the theater with the MLMC and DLA DPSC. The support consists of procurement and shipment of preplanned medical supply packages in support of deploying medical units. The resupply packages are primarily modular medical assemblages, chemical defense, and medical resupply packages for hospitals. The USAMMA also controls the management and release of Army pre-positioned medical stocks to the theater. In addition, the USAMMA provides depot-level medical maintenance, rebuilds medical equipment, and coordinates for repair parts for medical equipment.

10-144. The USAMMA provides medical logistics support teams (MLSTs) to support reception operations at ports of debarkation. The MLST coordinates the integration of medical information management systems modernization packages for the medical force structure. Once deployed to an AO, these teams are attached to senior ARFOR medical unit. See FM 4-02.9 (8-10-9), *Combat Health Logistics in a Theater of Operations*.

Theater Medical Command (TMEDCOM)

10-146. The TMEDCOM directs CHS to all operational-level Army medical elements in the operational area. When the Army is the lead Service for medical support, it also supports joint, and multinational commands and other elements under the guidance of the COMARFOR surgeon. The COMASCC surgeon, who may also be the TMEDCOM surgeon, provides policy and technical guidance to the TMEDCOM and all Army medical units in the theater. The TMEDCOM maintains a technical relationship with

COMASCC's staff surgeon to assist in establishing medical policy for the theater. It also maintains technical linkages to various medical support activities at the strategic level.

10-147. The TMEDCOM is responsible for developing plans, procedures, and programs for CHS in the ARFOR's AO to include patient evacuation, patient care and movement, hospitalization, stress control, preventive medicine services, dental services, veterinary services, and laboratory services. The Army's TMEDCOM supports the JFC surgeon's joint patient movement requirements center in accordance with lead Service directives. It provides staff planning, staff supervision, training, and administrative support of Army medical brigades engaged in operational-level medical support. It provides combat health logistics, including medical requirements determination and medical supply control.

10-148. It coordinates medical regulation operations with the medical regulating office and the joint theater patient movement requirement center, as well as the TSC support operations section/DMC and the MCA. It tracks medical treatment facility locations, capabilities, and workloads to plan and manage medical regulating, evacuation, and mass casualty operations.

10-149. The TMEDCOM must be prepared to oversee CHS during NBC defensive operations which will greatly increase the medical workload. Medical units, often collocated with major command headquarters and base clusters, are simultaneously likely to be degraded. Increasingly, prevention of NBC casualties requires that all personnel receive immunizations, pretreatments, prophylaxis, skin protectants, and medical treatments. The chemical officer coordinates with the surgeon as he prepares his

recommendations. In theater TMEDCOM and MEDBDE units, a medical NBC officer is also available to assist the surgeon in planning and providing medical technical guidance. The area medical laboratory (AML), through in theater sampling and testing, can identify the presence of medical biological warfare agents and provide field confirmation. The surgeon advises the commander and staff on all matters pertaining to medical NBC defense and the concept for medical support of operations. In addition, he:

- Performs medical NBC IPB for impact on current and future operations.
- Maintains, updates, and disseminates medical NBC threat and treatment information.
- Maintain the status of medical units with NBC treatment capabilities.
- Assist in coordinating HN medical NBC support.

FM 4-02.12 (8-10-2) provides details on TMEDCOM operations. See Figure 10-8



Figure 10-8 Theater Medical Command

Medical Brigade (MEDBDE)

10-150. Medical brigades (MEDBDEs) are flexible organizations that consist of an HHC and those subordinate medical units necessary for providing Echelon III and IV CHS. While normally assigned to a MEDCOM, MEDBDEs provide C2 for medical units operating within a designated area of operations. The number and types of units assigned and attached to the MEDBDE will depend upon the mission, strength, and tactical disposition of the supported unit. If the MEDBDE is the senior Army medical organization in theater, it will require augmentation to accomplish operational-level functions.

HUMAN RESOURCES SUPPORT FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS

10-151. Human resources (HR) support provides all activities and functions to sustain personnel manning of the force and provide personnel service support to service members, their families, Department of the Army civilians (DACs), and contractors. Manning the force ensures trained personnel in the right quantities are available when and where they are required for operations. It involves personnel readiness management, replacement management, and career management. Personnel service support includes providing personnel service information; conducting personnel processing; performing personnel actions; conducting casualty management; conducting human relation programs; conducting postal operations; and providing morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) and community support activities.

10-152. Policies and procedures are translated into action at the operational and tactical levels. Theater personnel commands (PERSCOMs), major command (MACOM) DCSPERs, corps and division G1/adjutants general (AGs), and brigade and battalion S1s provide the operational and tactical-

level HR life cycle support to service members, their families, civilians, and contractors. HR providers at all levels are responsible for the successful implementation of the human dimension of soldiering. FM 4-0 (100-10) and FM 1-0 (12-6) provide additional information on human resources support.

HUMAN RESOURCE ORGANIZATIONS

Personnel Support

10-153. The COMASCC, through the ASCC deputy chief of staff for personnel (DCSPER), is responsible for all human resources support (HRS) operations. The theater DCSPER manages critical HRS systems and network operations throughout the theater. HRS provides all the activities and systems needed for manning the force, personnel support, and personnel services to members, their families, DA civilians, and contractors. These activities include personnel accounting, casualty management, essential services, postal operations, and MWR (see JP 1-0; FM 1-0 (12-6)). The operational-level HRS organization must be flexible and able to adjust to specific theater support requirements. The ASCC may initially deploy elements to perform the HRS management function. This element would be comprised of key sections from each functional HRS area. Additional elements deploy in follow-on echelons according to conditions dictated by METT-TC. Further adjustments take place through changes in subordinate unit number and type.

10-154. The ASCC DCSPER/G1 is responsible for human resources. As such, it enhances soldier combat capability through a full range of sustainment activities and thereby increases combat power. The DCSPER/G1 must perform the following functions:

- Monitor and coordinate total Army theater strength with DA Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) and HQDA.

- Integrate all HRS activities within the theater.
- Establish general theater-unique personnel policies and manage services to soldiers, civilians, and joint or allied personnel.
- Assist the COMASCC in evaluating and influencing the theater command climate.
- Direct MWR activities; alcohol and drug abuse prevention and control; equal opportunity; and safety programs.
- Prepare the personnel estimate.
- Recommend theater replacement priorities to the DCSPER HQDA.
- Prepare HRS plans and orders to support the theater campaign plan and its branches and sequels and ensure subordinate plans support the commander's desired end state.
- Direct GS activities within the postal and replacement management systems to include coordination with the Military Postal Service Agency.
- Track the force, project replacement needs, and ensure subordinate unit personnel plans support branches and sequels of the campaign plan.
- Prepare to function as the J1, if designated by the JFC and augmented by additional joint personnel.
- Coordinate additional theater Human Resources needs directly with the Army Human Resource Provider.

10-155. Personnel organizations are tailored to satisfy the operational requirement of the theater independently or with multinational forces. To ensure unity of effort, joint personnel services require formal agreements, MOUs, and exchanges of liaison officers. Personnel organizations use the theater communications network to transmit reports and statistics in theater and to CONUS. It must have access to voice and digital communications capabilities with USTAPERSCOM to exchange information and data on strength management, casualty operations, and replacement operations. The information exchange priority between these organizations demands direct, real-time electronic communication, both voice and digital. The personnel community must also maintain close coordination with medical, mortuary

affairs, provost marshal, and other organizations that provide replacements (such as hospital or straggler returnees) or casualty information.

Personnel Command

10-156. When established, the operational-level human resource support personnel command (PERSCOM) is under the staff supervision of the ASCC DCSPER/G1. In fulfilling its responsibilities to synchronize the tactical functions of HRS, PERSCOM provides technical guidance to the G1/AG and/or S1 staffs in the area of operations. The theater PERSCOM maintains and reports the personnel readiness of theater forces, conducts theater strategic sustainment operations necessary to man the force, and provides personnel services and support. It exercises C2 over assigned and attached theater-level personnel units. The PERSCOM may directly command replacement, postal, and band units. It may form a tailored early entry module for strategic responsiveness. When required, the theater PERSCOM may form the nucleus of a joint reception center (JRC).

Military Postal Service Agency

10-157. The Military Postal Service Agency (MPSA) establishes policy and procedures required for the proper administration of the military postal system. The MPSA acts as the single DOD point of contact with the US Postal System (USPS) and other government agencies on policy and operational matters. The MPSA activates contingency Army post offices and coordinates initial mail routing schemes with the Joint Military Postal Agency (JMPA). It also coordinates an integrated network of major military mail distribution and transportation facilities in overseas areas. The JMPA is the single point of contact with the USPS at the gateways in CONUS and the theater. It coordinates transportation of mail to and within the theater.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

10-158. Financial management operations make resources available when and where they are needed, and assist the COMASCC/COMARFOR in maintaining fiscal responsibilities. Finance operations are necessary to conduct contracting and to provide real-time information, accounting, and services. Resource management operations ensure that operational policies and procedures adhere to law and regulation, develop command resource requirements, and leverage appropriate fund sources to meet them.

10-159. The ASCC commander provides finance support to the force through his operational-level finance unit commander, who also serves as the staff finance officer. Separately, the ASCC Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management (DCSRM) provides the operational-level resource management support to the ASCC.

10-160. The operational-level finance function sustains Army, joint, and multinational operations by providing timely commercial vendor and contractor payments, various pay and disbursing services, and essential accounting operations within theater. Initially, the most critical financial management functions are contingency contracting support operations: disbursing and procurement support for critical subsistence, transportation, labor, and communications. U.S. currency is the most likely practical means to pay for support which is not resident in the force. Follow on financial management functions: military pay, travel, and disbursing missions impact morale support and, as such, are combat multipliers for the fighting forces. Additionally, cost capturing for deployed forces meets the requirements to rapidly, yet accurately, report critical elements of expense to the Congress. If

established, the operational-level finance C^2 organization provides finance support to all joint and multinational commands, as ordered, and provides policy and technical guidance to finance units. When designated by DOD, it also provides currency funding support to other U.S. and multinational organizations in the theater. FM 4-0 (100-10) and FM 1-06 (14-100) provide additional information on financial support operations.

FINANCE ORGANIZATIONS

Defense Finance and Accounting Service

10-161. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) plays a critical role in support of joint operations as the DOD executive agent for finance and accounting, though the Services retain tactical finance personnel to provide the finance and limited accounting support required for their deployed forces during operations. DFAS is responsible for DOD finance and accounting policies, procedures, standards, systems, and operations in support of the combatant commanders and the Services. In addition, DFAS is responsible for centralized cost capturing of the operation. DFAS can provide liaison personnel to augment the staff of a JTF director for force structure, resources, and assessment (J8) and/or DCSRM as required. See JP 1-06.

Finance Command (FINCOM)

10-162. The FINCOM performs theater-level finance operations. The FINCOM provides finance support to all Army, and when directed, joint, and multinational commands in the theater. It provides technical guidance to all Army finance units in theater. In conjunction with the ASCC DCSRM, the FINCOM provides staff advice on all financial management matters and provides financial management policies and procedures for all Army financial management activities within theater.

10-163. The FINCOM commander is responsible for those financial management tasks that support the theater. The FINCOM commander may be assigned responsibility for policy, overall direction, and coordination of strategic and operational finance and accounting tasks that pertain to all Service components. If directed by the combatant commander, the FINCOM may have OPCON of other Services' finance elements. The FINCOM commander commands and controls all finance battalions not assigned to corps finance groups and provides technical guidance over all finance units within the theater. The FINCOM maintains technical relationships with the DFAS, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller (ASA [FM&C]), and the ASCC DSCRM. As required, the FINCOM recommends when/which finance functions are performed, retrograded, or transferred to a designated finance support activity. The FINCOM provides central funding support to all US and allied organizations and operations in the theater, when directed in accordance with US fiscal law and applicable international agreements.

Finance Group (FG)

10-164. The finance group (FG) provides C2, staff planning, and supervision to all assigned finance units in the corps area. A FG is capable of augmenting a FINCOM or other finance units with modules to fit the requirements of the deployed force. The FG has a modular, tailorable design to support the variations of forces required to conduct finance operations in either the corps area or to provide C2 capabilities for a FINCOM's finance battalions. If, in the early stages of a major operation, a FG is the senior Army finance

organization in the theater, it should be augmented from the FINCOM staff to perform operational-level functions.

SECTION V – OPERATIONAL-LEVEL ENGINEERING SUPPORT

ENGINEERING SUPPORT TO CSS OPERATIONS

10-165. The ability of CSS elements to support Army operations depends on the capacities of the existing theater infrastructure such as force reception/bed down, and storage facilities, road/rail networks, and ports and airfields. Though not a CSS function, per Army doctrine, engineering support plays a critical role in the delivery of CSS by enhancing these capacities. Engineer units normally provide general engineer support on an area basis to CSS assets and are responsible for constructing, maintaining, and rehabilitating the theater distribution system. Their responsibilities include support to other Services, agencies, and multinational military forces. The numbers and types of engineer units involved in such operations depends on METT-TC factors including the size of the support bases required, existing HN infrastructure, and the perceived threat.

10-166. Army engineers operate IAW the policies, procedures, and priorities established by the joint civil-military engineering board and the joint facilities utilization board. JP 4-0 discusses these boards in more detail. Further details on operational-level engineering support are found in JP 3-34, JP 4-04, FM 3-34 (5-100), and FM 3-34.116 (5-116), *Engineer Operations Above Corps.*

10-167. The US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) provides support to the regional combatant commanders and the ASCC in coordination with the ENCOM. The USACE may establish a tailored forward element to meet the needs of the ASCC that specializes in contract construction, real property management, and host nation construction support as well as leveraging split-based technical connectivity with CONUS to USACE's laboratories and centers of excellence. USACE missions include planning and design of theater facilities for contract construction, providing quality assurance for contract construction and troop construction, planning and acquiring real estate, and managing finance and accounting for all Army appropriated military construction. USACE districts or divisions in the theater of operations are under the control of the parent organization. In designated countries, DOD has assigned the USACE as the DOD contract construction agency. In wartime, the USACE district or element may be placed OPCON to the ASCC or the JFC.

Engineer Command (ENCOM)

10-168. The ENCOM is a subordinate command of the ASCC and provides C2 and an organizational framework for the operational-level engineer effort in theater. The ENCOM focuses on developing and maintaining the theater-support base. It can also provide engineer units to reinforce and augment tactical-level engineer efforts. This focus involves planning, ensuring operational mobility, and coordinating all operational-engineering assets. It also supervises the direction of topographic operations, construction, real-property maintenance activities (RPMA), LOC sustainment, engineer logistics management, and base development.

10-169. Theater infrastructure development is a primary concern of the ENCOM. The ENCOM is responsible for developing plans, procedures, and programs for engineer support for COMARFOR, including requirements determination, mobility/counter-mobility, general engineering, power generation, area damage control, military construction, topography, engineering design, construction materiel, and RPMA. Engineer units are responsible for infrastructure planning, development, construction, and maintenance. The ENCOM receives policy guidance from the COMARFOR engineer based on the guidance of the JFC engineer.

10-170. The headquarters element of the ENCOM provides staff supervision over operational-level engineer operations in the area of operations and directs engineer support to all Army forces. The ENCOM also may support joint, and multinational commands and other elements in accordance with lead Service responsibilities as directed by the JFC. It provides policy and technical guidance to all Army engineer units in the AO. This headquarters maintains a technical relationship with the COMASCC/COMARFOR and JFC staff engineers to help establish engineer policy for the theater, and it maintains required coordination links with other Service and multinational command engineering staffs.

10-171. Several of the critical specific functions of the ENCOM headquarters include:

- Provide and monitor engineer support for real property management. It consolidates reports from engineer organizations and coordinates additional support with the TSC support operations, HNS, and construction contracting directorates.
- Manage requirements and priorities for Class IV and engineer Class V materials, and coordinate the flow of these materials with the TSC supply and maintenance directorate, the DMC, and MMC.

- Perform the engineer battlefield assessment. It coordinates with the ASCC or ARFOR engineer and G2 as well as the TSC support operations section to communicate critical enemy capabilities to affect support facilities and operations.

10-172. Engineers must be closely tied into current and future operations. Engineer units provide versatility to the operational commander. While engineer combat engineer units focus on operations in the combat zone, they may also support the theater by providing general engineering at the operational level. The topographical units and a variety of specialized engineer teams support or augment engineer forces throughout the theater. Combat heavy engineers weight the main effort and provide for sea, air, and land operational and strategic mobility infrastructure. A typical operational-level engineer C² organization is shown in Figure 10-9. FM 3-34.116 (5-116) discusses the operational-level engineer function.



Figure 10-9 Engineer Command

10-173. Theater construction management often spans multiservice requirements. The combatant commander may direct the establishment of a regional contingency engineering manager (RCEM) to control all theater-level engineering. The Army ENCOM commander can perform this role if the combatant commander designates the COMASCC as the RCEM and the COMASCC designates the ENCOM commander as his agent. To support force-projection requirements for early deploying engineer units, an engineer element may deploy by sections to meet highly variable workloads and situations.

Engineer Brigade (Theater)

10-174. The engineer brigade is the principal subordinate unit of the ENCOM. It commands and controls engineer group headquarters and engineer battalions, companies, detachments, and teams to meet varied operational-engineering requirements. The engineer brigade's AO normally coincides with the TSC boundaries. The engineer brigade normally receives engineer work requests directly from the TSC and ENCOM. The engineer brigade's C2 capability is similar to the ENCOM's except for topographic-support functions.

SECTION IV –OTHER SUPPORT SERVICES

CONTRACTED SUPPORT

10-175. ASCC and subordinate unit planners should consider all available contracted support as a potential source of support when conducting its logistics preparation of the theater (LPT). Contracted support is a powerful tool, a force multiplier, and has the capability of supporting nearly any type

of contingency. When planning contracted support, commanders and planners must be aware that a requirement for a particular system or capability may result in the introduction of these types of contractors into the operational plan and the support structure. All contracted support must be coordinated as directed by the combatant commander.

10-176. Military contractors are generally referred to as one of three types: theater support contractors, external support contractors, or system contractors.

10-177. Theater support contractors are local support deployed operational forces under pre-arranged contracts (does not include HNS contracts), or contracts awarded within the mission area, by contracting officers serving under the direct contracting authority of the subordinate JFC's appointed chief of contracting. The subordinate JFC chief of contracting may be either a Defense Contracting Management Agency (DCMA) forward team or lead Service contracting team. If the ASCC is the lead Service responsible for contracting, the COMASCC will utilize his principle assistant for contracting (PARC). Contracting officers in the TSC, and possibly other commands, award these theater support contracts IAW the PARC's theater contracting plan. Theater support contractors provide goods, services and minor construction, usually from the local vendor base to meet the immediate needs of the operational commander.

10-178. External support contractors provide support to deployed operational forces that is separate and distinct from either theater support or systems contractors. They may be pre-arranged contracts, or contracts awarded during the contingency itself to support the mission. Contracting officers

awarding these contracts are not under the contracting authority of the PARC or the systems offices under program managers or USAMC. For example, USAMC provides commercial depot support through contracts by its commodity commands. Its LOGCAP office also provides external support contractors through its pre-arranged umbrella contract. The USAMC's LSE, normally attached to the TSC, administers this contract in theater. Other commands, such as USTRANSCOM or USACE, may also administer external support contracts in the AO.

10-179. Systems contractors support deployed operational forces under pre-arranged contracts awarded by program executive officers, program managers or USAMC. They support specific materiel systems throughout the system's life cycle during war and peace. When systems contractors deploy to a theater, they are assigned or associated with specific units within the theater. JP 4-0 and FM 3-100.21 (100-21) address the planning for, managing, and supporting contractors on the battlefield. FM 4-100.2 (100-10-2) addresses the use of contracting support as an additional support alternative.

HOST NATION SUPPORT

10-180. HNS is civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises, or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. The NCA is responsible for establishing treaties and agreements for HNS. HNS includes all civil and military support a nation provides to multinational forces located on its sovereign territory. HNS can be performed by local contractors or

military sources. In any case, the combatant commander must carefully weigh the risk of utilizing HNS vice organic support capability.

10-181. HNS is an excellent source of common support, but, of course, is very theater and situation dependent. Available support depends on the geographical area, prior agreements, and friendliness of the nations in the area, and the nations' willingness and ability to provide it. In some potential theaters of operation, agreements may exist between the US and the HN; in others, no nation may be friendly to the US, in which case no HNS will be available—at least, not initially.

10-182. Potential HNS agreements should address labor support arrangements for port and terminal operations, use of available transportation assets in country, use of bulk petroleum distribution and storage facilities, possible supply of Class III (Bulk) and Class IV and development and use of field services. HNS agreements should also consider warehouse space, office space, billets, waste disposal, electric power supplies, and telecommunications assets availability. Agreements with allies or multinational partners should be initiated, continually evaluated for improvement, or specifically spelled out to enable ASCC planners to adjust for specified requirements. See FM 3-16 (100-8) and 4-0 (100-10) for more information on HNS. The role of the HNS directorate of the TSC is discussed in FM 4-93.4 (63-4).

ARMY PRE-POSITIONED STOCKS (APS)

10-183. APS is materiel amassed in peacetime to meet the increase in military requirements at the outbreak of war. APS remains set at the minimum level

needed to sustain and equip the approved forces as outlined in the defense planning guidance. Pre-positioning of stocks provides the capability to rapidly resupply forces until sea lines of communication (SLOCs) can be established. Stocks are pre-positioned in potential theaters. Alternatives are pre-positioning stocks afloat or at ISBs and/or assembling stocks in tailored packages for deployment with projected forces. In areas of potential operations where port facilities are limited and requirements for SLOCs exist, pre-positioning of port construction equipment and materiel is highly desirable. See the FM 3-35 (100-17) series manuals for more information on APS operations.

Chapter 11

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Deployable, agile, and lethal, Army special operations forces (ARSOF) are strategically responsive across the full spectrum of operations. . . . ARSOF soldiers are a force multiplier, complimenting conventional forces before, during and after conflict. . . . The Army relies on special operations forces to act as global scouts, gathering regional information and setting the condition for the successful entry of conventional forces.

LTG William Tangney
October 2000

11-1. To meet our nation's global commitments, the Army maintains a balanced force for Full Spectrum Operations that includes Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) asigned to US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as an integral part of the total Army force. ARSOF possess unique capabilities to support the joint force and consist of five principal elements: Special Forces (SF), rangers, Army special operations aviation (ARSOA), psychological operations (PSYOP) units, and civil affairs (CA) units. The Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM) provides additional combat support and combat service support for deployed elements with a signal and a support battalion. Special operations chemical reconnaissance detachments (CRDs) provide JFCs the capability to conduct chemical reconnaissance in permissive, uncertain, and hostile areas.

11-2. Each geographic combatant commander establishes a subordinate unified special operations command (SOC) to exercise OPCON of assigned or attached special operations forces (SOF). The theater SOC may exercise command and control through Service or functional components, direct OPCON of SOF, or through joint special operations task forces (JSOTF) formed to conduct specific missions.

11-3. ARSOF and conventional ground forces may operate in close proximity to each other in the accomplishment of the JFC's mission. While the JFC may determine the requirement to directly place ARSOF under a command relationship of a conventional ground force, he will normally maintain a centralized SOF command and control structure. Historically, commanders have employed ARSOF in advance of conventional forces follow-on operations to enhance the timing and tempo of the overall theater campaign. During extended operations involving both ARSOF and conventional forces, integration and synchronization of both forces efforts are critical.

Special Operations Forces in Support of Conventional Forces

For operations in his China-Burma-India Theater, in 1944, General Joseph Stillwell requested a special U.S. Army unit to operate with British General Orde Wingate's Chindits in a long-range penetration behind Japanese lines. Officially designated the 5307th Composite Unite (Provisional), the unit consisted of about 3000 men under the command of BG Frank Merill. Known as "Merill's Marauders," the unit was committed directly under GEN Stillwell's command conducting deep envelopments into the Japanese rear in Burma in conjunction with two Chinese divisions conducting frontal attacks. Despite casualties exceeding the strength of the original unit, the 5307th succeeded in seizing the key airfield at MYITKYINA enabling the defeat of the Japanese in Central Burma. In August 1944, Stillwell reorganized the survivors into the 475th Infantry and then combined the new formation with the 124th Cavalry Regiment to form a new long-range penetration group, the MARS Task Force. Attacking along the Burma Road, the MARS Task Force cut Japanese communications and succeeded in reopening the land route to China by February 1945.

David W. Hogan, *U.S.Army Special Operations in World War II*

11-4. The COMASCC, in his Service component role, must sustain all Army special operations forces (ARSOF) in theater under Title 10 USC. In addition, when directed by the combatant commander, the ASCC also supports and

sustains designated SOF of other Services and other multinational SOF. The ASCC, in coordination with the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), identifies the support organization to serve as the link between ARSOF in theater, Army and other service support resources, and the CONUS-based USASOC. Normally, this is performed by a special operations theater support element (SOTSE) attached to the ASCC. The SOTSE is a staff planning, coordinating, and facilitating element. It monitors the ASCC's conduct of RSOI and follow-on support and sustainment of all ARSOF in a theater of operations or JOA. CA and PSYOP units not assigned to the SOC or a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) are normally attached to the supported ASCC under the OPCON of the supported command. They receive sustainment from the conventional force unit (Army or Marine) of attachment. FM 3-05(100-25), *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces* discusses ARSOF.

SECTION I - ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COORDINATION

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COORDINATION.

11-5. To ensure the unique capabilities and requirements of ARSOF are considered in ASCC planning, a special operations staff element (SOSE) is embedded as a functional staff element of the G3. At corps or MEF level, a special operations coordination element (SOCOORD) serves as a functional staff element of the G3. The SOSE and SOCOORD provide advice on SOF integration, capabilities, and limitations. They are the mechanisms by which conventional units identify potential opportunities for ARSOF units in support of land operations.

11-6. The SOSE or SOCOORD also develops SOF target nominations and mission requirements to forward to the JFC. These developments result in mission taskings from the JTCB to the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC), who assigns missions to appropriate SOF units. The nature of the requirement and the total force capability determines whether Army special operations forces (ARSOF) or another element of SOF is tasked to meet a given requirement.

11-7. For command and control of ARSOF (SF and Rangers) within a supported unit's AO, a special operations command and control element (SOCCE) may be established. This normally will be a Special Forces Operational Detachment–B (a SF Company HQ) and/or a LNO package from the Ranger Regimental HQ. The SOCCE possesses appropriate communications for C2 of ARSOF and can operate from brigade to JFLCC level. For selected tasks, a SOCCE may be placed TACON or OPCON to an ARFOR.

11-8. A Special Forces liaison element (SFLE) is a SF or joint special operations element that conducts liaison for US conventional forces headquarters below corps or MEF level and for multinational forces' brigades and battalions. It is formed only as needed. (See Figure 11-1).



Figure 11-1 ARSOF COORDINATION STRUCTURE

SECTION II - CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

11-9. Civil Affairs (CA) forces are ARSOF assigned to the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) of USSOCOM's U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). This section focuses on civil military operations and CA units and their relationship with the ASCC and Army conventional forces.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

11-10. Civil-Military Operations (CMO) is a command responsibility. CMO are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, government and nongovernment civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate and achieve U.S. objectives. These activities range from

assistance for offensive and defensive operations to operations assisting countries in bringing about political, economic, and social stability. At the operational-level, CMO are the activities that enhance overall military effectiveness, support national objectives, and reduce the negative aspects of full spectrum operations on civilians. The DCS Host Nation Affairs (DCSHNA) serves as the COMASCC's staff coordinator and planner for CMO.

11-11. Civil Affairs (CA) activities are an integral part of CMO. CA activities are activities performed or supported by CA forces that embrace the relationships between military forces and civilian authorities in areas where military forces are present; and involve the application of Civil Affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil governments, to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. CA activities require intensive planning and flexibility, maximum adaptability, and use of indigenous political and social structures and resources.

11-12. In NATO, the term civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is used in place of CMO to describe the relationship between allied forces and local governments.

11-13. Successful CA operations will help to assure civil or indigenous understanding of, and compliance with, controls, regulations, directives, or other measures taken by commanders to accomplish the military mission and attain US country team in the HN. For maximum effectiveness, CA personnel, elements, or forces must plan and conduct CA operations. FM 3-05.40(41-10), *Civil Affairs Operations*, describes CA mission activities -

populace and resources control (PRC), foreign nation support (FNS), humanitarian assistance (HA), military civic action, and emergency services.

11-14. Foreign nation support (FNS) is the identification, coordination, and acquisition of foreign national resources to support US forces and operations.

11-15. CA forces maintain capabilities to perform in a number of functional areas. They capitalize on these skills when planning and conducting CA activities and providing support to Joint requirements. Functions interconnect to a certain extent to prevent exclusive interest within any given functional area. Some of them require specialists who are proficient in more than one skill. As an example, the food and agriculture function may require knowledge associated with forestry, manufacturing, processing, storage, and distribution. CA activities are performed in four functional areas: government, economics and commerce, public facilities, and special functions.

11-16. As outlined in Joint Pub 3-57, *Civil Affairs*, the CA assets are available to combatant commanders to achieve US political, military, economic, or psychological objectives include active (AC) or reserve component (RC) CA forces organized, equipped, or trained to carry out missions in support of CA activities; CA personnel assigned or attached to combatant commands; other RC personnel possessing functional specialty skills applicable to CA activities in peacetime, contingencies, or crisis response operations. Although not trained in functional specialty skills for CA operations, other DOD forces and personnel - such as engineer, medical, dental, veterinary, MP, legal, communications, logistics, and transportation

teams and/units - complement CA assets in conducting CA activities and CMO and will routinely provide significant support for them.

11-17. A Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) may be established as a special purpose task force composed of units from two or more Services, flexible in size and composition, organized to plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO in a JOA. The JCMOTF is not a CA organization and may be composed of both conventional and special operations forces attached for the conduct of a specific mission. See JP 3-57.

11-18. CA organizations in the US Army are oriented to specific regions of the world. As such, they provide experience and expertise on the culture and languages in the area of operations. FM 3-57 (41-10) describes CA functions, capabilities, and organizations fully. CA-specific missions and logistics-related capabilities are summarized here.

CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMAND

11-19. The senior CA unit in a theater is normally a Civil Affairs Command (CACOM) aligned with the geographic combatant command. The CACOMs are flexible, multipurpose organizations that support the planning, management, and conduct of CMO in a theater. CACOMs normally only command CA units in CONUS for training and mobilization issues. When deployed, CA forces are normally attached to land force commanders with the CACOM retaining an ADCON relationship. It may also provide CMO staff augmentation to the ASCC DCSHNA/G5 and other component or joint staffs. Its capabilities include --

- Train, equip, mobilize, deploy assigned or attached CA forces.

- Provide predeployment C2 of assigned and attached CA brigades and battalions.
- Establish procedures and processes for cataloging available indigenous resources, facilities, and FNS.
- Establishing procedures and processes for minimizing civilian populace interference with military operations.
- Provide information to the intelligence system.
- Provide information on cultural considerations.
- Assist in formulating the theater policy for civic action, civil assistance, and civil administration activities and missions.
- Provide a Civil Affairs plans, programs, and policy team (CAP3T) as needed.
- Provide a Civil Affairs Planning Team Alpha (CAPT-A) and a Civil Affairs Planning Team Bravo (CAPT-B) to support CMO staffs at unified, subunified, and Service component commands.
- Provide technical expertise in 16 CA functional specialties to plan, coordinate, assess, or conduct CA activities based on mission requirements.
- Provide liaison with government organizations, NGOs, and IOs.
- When directed, establish a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)

11-20. A typical CACOM consists of a headquarters and headquarters company, one CA battalion (Special Operations), and one or more CA brigades.



Figure 11-2. Typical CACOM

CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADE

11-21. CA brigades support corps, JTFs, theater support commands, and when directed MEFs. They command attached CA battalions and other units based on mission requirements and provide staff support to other components and joint staffs as required. If it is the senior CA unit in a

theater, it is aligned with the ASCC and assumes the duties of a CA command. Its capabilities include--

- Augment CMO staffs of a TSC, corps, or JTF.
- Establish procedures and processes for FNS.
- Establish procedures and processes for minimizing interference by the civilian populace with military operations.
- Provide information to the intelligence system.
- Provide CA units to support operational-and tactical-level operations in the theater.
- Provide interface between local civil authorities and US military forces.
- Provide technical expertise in 16 CA functional specialties to supported commands as needed.

SECTION III- PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

11-22. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) units are also assigned to USACAPOC of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). While COCOM to USSOCOM, upon direction of the SecDef, they may be placed under the OPCON of a geographic combatant command. This section focuses on their relationship with the ASCC and Army conventional forces.

11-23. The intent of PSYOP is to influence foreign populations by expressing information subjectively to influence attitudes and behavior, and to obtain compliance or noninterference. This type of information can facilitate military operations, minimize needless loss of life and collateral damage, and further the policy objectives of the United States and and its allies. PSYOP personnel can also assist the commander as they apply influence by advising him of “who and how to influence” in order to achieve his mission.

11-24. PSYOP activities (PSYACTs), subject to US and international law, have certain legal, political, and moral implications. Bilateral defense

treaties and status of forces agreements (SOFA) usually include measures concerning the signatories' conduct of PSYOP. Commanders employing PSYOP assets must be familiar with the risks and implications of those operations.

PSYOP RESPONSIBILITIES

11-25. Army PSYOP units support other military units or US government agencies in reaching US national objectives. Their primary responsibilities are to--

- Advise the commander or the DOD mission director regarding PSYACTs, psychological enabling actions, and targetting restrictions to be executed by the force. Produce select PSYOP related intelligence products.
- Provide public information to foreign populations to support humanitarian activities.
- Serve as the supported military commander's voice to foreign populations in order to convey intent.
- Counter propaganda, misinformation, and opposing information to correctly and positively portray friendly intent and actions.
- Influence foreign populations by expressing information subjectively in order to influence attitudes and behavior, and to obtain compliance or non-interference.

11-26. PSYOP units may support other military units in a variety of ways. They may support a commander's information and awareness program or other mission-oriented activities, such as disaster relief. In such cases, the commander must clearly convey that PSYOP assets are being used in a dissemination role only, not to project a PSYOP message.

PSYOP APPROVAL AUTHORITY

11-27. The geographic combatant commander develops PSYOP implementing plans, including proposed themes and messages, to support national goals in his region. During peacetime, he coordinates these plans with other pertinent government agencies and forwards his PSYOP plans to the NCA for approval

prior to execution. During execution, the SECDEF normally delegates PSYOP approval authority to the supported combatant commander. He may delegate approval authority in full -- all PSYOP activities -- or in part -- for example, PSYOP products only -- down to a JTF commander in the theater. PSYOP personnel at all levels are charged with ensuring that all PSYOP activities conducted in a theater adhere to the combatant commander's approved PSYOP plan.

PSYOP SUPPORT TO CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

11-28. PSYOP forces are regionally oriented and can be called upon to provide area expertise to deployed commanders. The senior PSYOP headquarters in a theater, the PSYOP Task Force (POTF), or joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF) (if one is chartered) is normally a functional component directly under the JFC and has coordinating authority over all tactical, operational, and EPW/CI PSYOP activities in the theater. Properly planned and coordinated PSYOP can enhance the success of conventional operations across the range of military operations.

11-29. The POTF or JPOTF normally is reponsible for disseminating products in support of approved themes and objectives to tactical PSYOP units that may be attached or OPCON to maneuver units. These tactical PSYOP forces have limited product development and production capabilities (leaflets, pamphlets, posters, loudspeakers scripts, etc.)

11-30. Before hostilities, PSYOP can persuade target audiences that engaging in war or warlike activities may not be in their best interest. Activities and actions that may take place include media broadcasts, national

and allied political pronouncements and conferences, and economic sanctions. Military activities include show-of-force posturing and troop alerts.

11-31. Immediately prior to hostilities, PSYOP units prepare hostile, friendly, and neutral foreign target audiences (but not US) for the introduction of US forces into a potential AO. These preparatory programs support US strategic actions by reducing the public's interference with US deployment.

11-32. During hostilities, PSYOP support the tactical commander's operations through surprise, supporting deception operations, and other actions that undermine the opponent's morale and will to fight. They also assist CA efforts to minimize interference with military operations.

11-33. Post hostilities, PSYOP efforts to create a favorable impression of US actions include publicizing US troop withdrawal plans and supporting the public's reorientation and education about the emerging political environment. PSYOP also supports consolidation operations by --

- Organizing populated areas, using information designed to calm the fears of the populace, prevent panicky movement, and create a state of mind conducive to willingly accepting imposed restrictions and controls. These measures reduce the number of troops required for population controls.
- Controlling the flow of dislocated civilians. By publishing and broadcasting instructions, PSYOP units assist the commander in keeping his main supply routes clear and his LOC open.
- Assisting in publicizing labor needs among the civilian populace and in directing potential workers to appropriate labor offices.

PSYOP UNITS

11-34. A PSYOP group (POG) is a multipurpose and extremely flexible organizations that commands organic and attached elements conducting PSYOP in a theater (Figure 11-3). It normally consists of a group

headquarters, regional and tactical PSYOP battalions, dissemination battalions, and enemy prisoner of war/civilian internee (EPW/CI) battalions from the US Army Reserve. It is structured to support conventional and special operations forces.



Figure 11-3. Example of an AC PSYOP Group (POG)

11-35. Tactical PSYOP battalions and companies and the EPW/CI battalion are normally attached to the units (ARFOR, corps, divisions, and below including other Services) to which they provide PSYOP support. The PSYOP branch of the IO division of G3 provides staff coordination and supervision of all tactical PSYOP units. All Army PSYOP units, however, derive their common logistical support from those units to which they are attached or the ASCC. PSYOP-unique sustainment is obtained from the SOTSE attached to the ASCC by USASOC to coordinate logistics support for all deployed ARSOF.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS DETACHMENT

11-36. A Psychological Operations Detachment (PSYDET) is a flexible and tailored organization, normally task organized from a psychological company and located at a critical node or information center within the AOR.

PSYDETs often operate in situations where it is not feasible or necessary to establish a POTF in support of a JTF (for humanitarian or civic action projects) or to support a Service or functional component task force.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY INFORMATION TEAM (IMIT)

11-37. An IMIT is a PSYDET that has been deployed forward to execute missions in support of a geographic combatant commander's TEP or of non-DOD agencies, usually under the auspices of Overt Peacetime PSYOP Program (OP3). For interagency operations, international military information (IMI) is used as a less-sensitive term than PSYOP. IMITs are resourced from regional battalions and are focused on operational-level actions. For more on Army psychological operations, see FM 3-05.30(33-1).

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Appendix A

Army Service Component Command Historical Background, Responsibilities, and Staff Organization

This appendix focuses on the historical background, responsibilities, and staff organization of those operational-level organizations formerly known as echelons above corps. It describes responsibilities, and staff organizations required to conduct major operations and provide logistical support. It pinpoints the functional, operational, and support responsibilities of the Army service component commander (formerly known as the *theater Army commander*) in the theater.

The Army Service component command (ASCC) serves as the senior Army echelon in a theater and is the Army component of a unified command. It includes the Service component commander and all Army personnel, organizations, units, and installations that have been assigned to the unified command. The Army's operational-level organizations assist and augment tactical (corps and division) organizations.

SECTION I – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO ARMY ORGANIZATIONS ABOVE CORPS

A-1. The U.S. Army has a long tradition of organizing and employing administrative and operational headquarters above the tactical echelons of corps, divisions, and brigades. Army-level command traces its origins to the Continental Congress's departmental system. Each department was established on a territorial basis for administrative and logistical support and constituted an "army" under the departmental head of all Continental Army personnel located therein. As Commander-in-Chief and also commander of the "Main Army" in the Middle Department, General George Washington supervised all of the departments but dominated the one in which his army served.

A-2. For most of the 19th Century to include the War of 1812 and the Indian Wars, the regiments of the U.S. Army were administered by geographic departments and districts covering all states and territories in which the departmental heads served as both field commanders and administrators. But, in the Mexican War two "field armies" deployed outside the United States: General Zachary Taylor's "Army of Occupation" to the Texas border and General Winfield Scott's "Army of Invasion" that conducted the decisive operation to Mexico City following its amphibious landing at Vera Cruz.

A-3. For the Civil War, the Union administrative departments formed armies named after major rivers such as the main force in the East, the Army of the Potomac to control the corps and divisions. By 1864, when Lieutenant General Ulysses Grant assumed command of the Union forces, two modern appearing theaters of operation with groups of armies had evolved. In the East, Grant directly supervised the Armies of the Potomac, the James, and the Shenendoah. In the West, General William T. Sherman commanded the Military Division of the Mississippi which had both administrative and operational control of the Armies of the Cumberland, the Ohio, and the Tennessee. But the few lessons that Army leaders learned about high-level command organization and procedures during the Civil War were largely forgotten over the next thirty years.

A-4. During the 20th Century, the U.S. Army's challenge became how to administer and organize overseas forces. After the dismal performance of higher commands in the Spanish-American War, the War Department adopted in 1910 the European concept of the field army. For the First World War, General John Pershing established the General

Headquarters (GHQ) of the American Expeditionary Force as the senior deployed U.S. staff over both Army and Marine forces. For the Meuse-Argonne Offensive of 1918, Pershing employed 1st and 2d Armies with his GHQ also serving as an operational Army Group Headquarters as well.

A-5. After World War I, the Army devoted considerable time to higher-level command and staff methods in its educational system, but doctrine remained largely theoretical, especially since army-level staffs remained little more than cadre organizations. In World War II to command the four million deployed soldiers of the U.S. Army, overseas administrative headquarters were established in each allied Theater of Operations (Figure A-1).



Figure A-1

A-6. The largest of these was European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA) which, after January 1944, was commanded by General Dwight Eisenhower in addition to his duties of Supreme Allied Commander. Lieutenant General James Lee served as his Deputy

Theater Commander and as Commanding General Services of Supply. By 1945, ETOUSA provided to the allied force as operational echelons the 12th and 6th Army Groups as well as 1st, 3d, 7th, 9th, and 15th Field Armies. In the Mediterranean, a separate U.S. Army administrative headquarters, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (MTOUSA), evolved out of its North African predecessor. By 1945, MTOUSA included the 15 th Army Group as the land force headquarters and the 5th U.S. Army as the operational headquarters for U.S. Army corps and divisions in Italy. Additionally, the separate Persian Gulf Command was established in 1943 without combat troops to control nearly 30,000 U.S. Army personnel employed in supplying lend lease supplies and equipment to Russia through Iran for over sixty U.S. divisional equivalents.

A-7. In the Pacific Theater of War, significant U.S. Army elements were employed in three theaters of operation. General Douglas MacArthur's U.S. Army Forces Far East (USAFFE) evolved from commanding and administrating forces in the Philippines to those in Australia. These remained under MacArthur's command as his U.S. Army component after he established the General Headquarters (GHQ), Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). Eventually, he employed both 6th and 8th Field Armies as operational commands. In Admiral Chester Nimitz' Pacific Ocean Areas, Lieutenant General Richardson provided administrative, logistical, and planning support as his U.S. Army Forces Pacific Ocean Area (USAFPOA) commander. For Okinawa, the 10th Field Army was created to operationally control both a U.S. Army Corps and a U.S. Marine Amphibious Corps. While General Joseph Stillwell's U.S. Army Forces in the Chinese, Burma, India Theater of Operations (USAFCBI) contained

only a single brigade sized U.S. Army combat force (the MARS Task Force), it provided nearly 100,000 logistical and coalition support troops to sustain our Chinese ally.

A-8. For the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur's Army component in Japan, 8th Army, was employed as a combined field army controlling all allied corps and divisions in Korea after 1951. U.S. Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE) was later activated in Japan in 1952 to perform the theater army logistical and administrative function. For Southeast Asia U.S. Army Vietnam served as both the Army administrative and ground operational headquarters for the one Marine and three U.S. Army Corps equivalents.

A-9. In the last half of the 20th Century, U.S. Army operational level headquarters atrophied with the use of multinational operational headquaters in NATO and Korea for functions formerly performed by US Army field armies and army groups The Army doctrine for large units described the Theater Army as overseas commands with primarily administrative and logistical concerns. During most of the Cold War, the largest U.S. theater army was U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) with primarily an administrative function to provide trained and ready corps to NATO Army Groups. The 7th Army served as the major operational headquarters until combined with USAREUR headquarters in the 1960s.

A-10. By the 1980s, it was again envisioned that the U.S. may need to conduct unilateral contingency operations, probably in the Middle East. Additionally, Goldwater-Nichols required establishment of Service component commands for each geographic combatant commander. This caused the relook of the concept of the theater army and the development

of the Army Service component command in the 1990s with both operational and administrative functions. For the Persian Gulf War, U.S. Army Central Command/Third U.S. Army under Lieutenant General John Yeosock deployed as the Army's senior administrative and operational headquarters for the over 300,000 U.S. Army personnel employed.

A-11. By the early years of the 21st Century, the U.S. Army has converted its five Army Service component command headquarters into TO&E units to supervise Army operations for combatant commanders across the full range of military operations.

SECTION II – ASCC HEADQUARTERS STRUCTURE

A-12. The ASCC headquarters consists of the ASCC commander, the deputy commanders for operations and support, commander's personal staff, and the coordinating staff under the supervision of the Chief of Staff. The ASCC commander provides direction to army component forces and develops and supervises planning for a wide range of activities within the AOR of the unified or subunified commander to whom assigned. The deputy commanding generals for operations and support extend the control of the ASCC commander in designated areas and may focus on the conduct of land maneuver (DCG – operations) and theater protection and support (DCG – support).

A-13. The commander's personal staff includes the principal assistant responsible for contracting (PARC), a command audit branch, command chaplain, command inspector general, safety office, Staff Judge Advocate, and Public Affairs Office. The PARC provides command policy, advice, and acquisition instructions to the commander, and to the theater finance command as well as policy and instructions on contract operations and commercial vendor service operations. The other personal staff sections provide special staff support to the commander and designated staff and subordinate commands. The IG section provides coverage for ASCC troops without organic IGs.

A-14. The ASCC chief of staff supervises the activities of the general staff, the headquarters commandant, the five liaison teams, and any attached (joint, allied, reserve component) liaison officers.

A-15. Liaison may be provided to, provided by, or be reciprocal with the following:

- Subordinate units.
- The Air Force Service Component.
- The Marine Service Component
- The Navy Service Component.
- Special Operations forces.
- The combatant commander or other JFCs.
- Allied or coalition forces.
- Host nations.
- Ambassadors and their country teams.
- Other US government agencies.
- Other Army MACOMs.
- NGOs and IOs.

A-16. The Chief of Staff and the general staff provide the commander with accurate and timely information; prepare analyses and estimates; and prepare supporting OPLANs and OPORDs. Once the COMASCC

issues his guidance or decisions, the staff formulates policies to support the commanders guidance, to translate decisions and intent into instructions and orders, issue necessary orders, and ensure the execution of those orders. The ASCC staff must anticipate future developments and requirements most just days ahead as with tactical units, but weeks and months ahead in order to retain the operational and strategic initiative.

A-17. The ASCC general staff consists of ten major elements all headed by deputy chiefs of staff: personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, host nation affairs, communications-electronics, medical, engineer, resource management, and Provost Marshall. Field Manual 5-0, Army *Planning and Orders Production* discusses specific responsibilities of those staff sections. However, several noteworthy aspects require elaboration. When an ARFOR or numbered army is established, most ASCC staff elements will detach a cell with appropriate personnel to support those functions.

A-18. The ASCC headquarters conducts planning and coordinates major operations and support through flexible combinations of area and functionally oriented organizations. Headquarters management involves managing the organization and administration of the headquarters, including--

- Coordinating and supervising movement, internal arrangement, space allocation, and administrative support.
- Supervising agencies that service the command, such as the American Red Cross; civilian safety personnel; morale, welfare, and recreation personnel.
- Recommending manpower allocation, especially in the use of personnel authorized in large numbers to the headquarters.
- Allocating shelter in the headquarters area for troops, in coordination with the G3 for area organizations and the G4 for provision of shelter.

- Providing control and standardization of procedures within the headquarters. All staff officers are responsible for proper administrative activities within their own staff sections.

A-19. The ASCC is also responsible for managing the Army's support base in a developed theater. Besides managing the Army's support base, the unified commander may designate the ASCC as the joint rear area coordinator (JRAC) responsible for surface security of the entire joint rear area (JRA), organization and operation of the theater support base, and conduct of rear operations for all land component services (See Joint Pub 3-10 , 3-10.1, and Chapter 8).

SECTION III ASCC TO & E SECTION DUTY DESCRIPTIONS

1. General Summary. Section descriptions are written for mature theater TO&E where all modules are co-located to form one organization. This illustrates how an ASCC headquarters would appear in a mature theater and/or peacetime configuration. If the unit deploys into modules or only partially deploys, we must assume that split sections could not fully perform all functions. The commander would decide where the section's functions will be performed.

2. **Command Post and Staff Section Descriptions.**

a. Early Entry Command Post

(1) DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL (OPERATIONS)/EARLY ENTRY: Responsible for the planning, coordination, execution and supervision of the ASCC's early entry and combat operations.

(2) MOBILITY SURVIVABILITY CELL/EARLY ENTRY: Provides Engineer, Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) and Provost Marshall Office (PMO) support to Early Entry.

(a) NBC Section: **(**Split based) Provides branch representation in the EETOC. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions that may be performed is located in NBC Br/COD/DCSOPS/MN.

(b) ENG Section: **(**Split based) Provides DCSENG representation in the EETOC. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions that may be performed is located in DCSENG/MN.

(c) Area Security/Force Protection/Operations Division (OD)/Provost Marshall Office (PMO): Assess requirements to protect critical resources, personnel and information from asymmetrical threat attacks. Develops, plans and monitors implementation of policies regarding MP Area Security and Force protection operations (Physical Security, Combating Terrorism, Information Security Operations, Law Enforcement and Personnel Security).

(3) DCSINT CELL/EARLY ENTRY: (Split based) Provides DCSINT representation in the EETOC. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions that may be performed is located in the DCSINT/MN.

(4) DCSOPS CELL/EARLY ENTRY: Maintains 24 Hr Comm and Watch team between ASCC HQ & forward deployed ASCC forces. Advises commander & staff on crisis action and procedures. Prepares and coordinates daily CG updates. Limited monitoring of A/C & ships carrying army personnel and equipment. Operates AV equipment and coordinates communications requirements. Operates ADP equipment to prepare all command level or operational briefings. Limited ability to establish boundaries and other control measures on the Current Ops SITMAP. Limited preparation of records and reports. Contains reps from Crt Ops Br, IO Br, Spec Ops Br, PSYOP Br, JOPES Br and Training Br.

(5) EFFECTS CONTROL CELL/EARLY ENTRY: Provides Effects Control Division support to the Early Entry CP.

(a) Effects Control Section: (Split based) Provides branch representation in the EETOC. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions that may be performed is located in Effect Control Br/ECD/DCSOPS/MN.

(b) Fire Support Br: Conducts planning and execution management for Army operational-level fires distribution and joint fire support of Army component units. Prepares fire estimates for COA development. Prepares operational fires plan. Prepares annexes and establishes fire control and distribution measures. Recommends controlled supply rates. Coordinates fire support among Army components. Coordinates fire support with joint and combined elements.

(c) Aviation Section: (Split based) Provides branch representation in the EETOC. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions that may be performed is located in Aviation Br/ECD/DCSOPS/MN..

(6) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT CELL/EARLY ENTRY: Provides DCSPER, DCSLOG, DCSHNA and Public Affairs Office (PAO) support to Early Entry. Exact functions to be performed will be based on METT-TC. Complete listing of functions that may be performed by the sections can be found in the appropriate sections of this document.

b. Main Command Post

(1) COMMAND SECTION: Commanding General provides operational direction to army component forces. Devises military objectives, concepts, and resource plans for a broad range of activities in his CINC's Area of Responsibility (AOR).

(2) CHIEF OF STAFF/MAIN: Supervises the ASCC HQ for the commander. He directs, coordinates, and supervises the headquarters staff and assigned or attached (joint/allied/reserve component) liaison officers; formulates staff policies to support the Commander's guidance. Section also contains the Command Audit Branch which provides oversight of command expenditures.

(3) PRINCIPLE ASSISTANT RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTRACTING/MAIN: Provides command policy, advice, and acquisition instructions to the commander, and theater finance command staff supervision. Provides policy and instructions on contract operations and commercial vendor service operations.

(4) DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT/MAIN (DCSRM/MN): Provides staff supervision of resource management programs. DCSRM is the principal advisor to the COMASCC on all financial management issues. Receives finance and accounting recommendations and information from the commander, theater finance command, and formulates command plans and policies for the effective and efficient use of command resources in support of ASCC mission.

(5) COMPTROLLER DIVISION/DCSRM/MN: Provides advice and guidance concerning resources to commanders and deputy chiefs of staff. Issues instructions, develops and prepares the program and budget. Monitors execution of the program and budget at all echelons of resource management. Develops performance factors, analyzes capabilities based on resources available, and recommends appropriate funding to implement approved programs. Paragraph also contains the following sections:

(a) Budget Section: Establishes wartime budget formulation procedures. Manages budget execution within the theater. Coordinates funding supply support from other sources, theater infrastructure programs, and wartime host nation support agreements.

(b) Policy And Accounting Section: Provides managerial accounting guidance and analysis to the DCSRM and theater organizations and activities. Interprets Army managerial accounting policy and coordinates with the finance command for financial management policy to ensure prudent stewardship of resources. Maintains close relationship with supported CINC, FINCOM, DFAS, and HQDA regarding resource management policies, procedures and automated financial systems.

(6) RESOURCE MANAGEMENT DIVISION/DCSRM/MN: Provides staff oversight of contracting, real estate, and civilian work force. Maintains records

accounting for the use and location of real property and civilian work force. Provides command policy on the use of real property and civilian work force. Develops employment conditions and policies for the use of non-U.S. civilian employees and participates in negotiations with host countries on labor agreements. This paragraph also contains the:

- PROGRAMS BRANCH: Provides input to the planning and programming process for out-year requirements. Based on an analysis of ASCC functions, this branch recommends changes and determines resource and organizational requirements for fiscal years beyond the current and budget years. Develops command's portion of CINC's Integrated Priority List (IPL).

(7) OPERATIONS DIVISION/PMO/MN: Monitors the current theater situation with emphasis on the MP functions of Area Security/Force Protection and Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations. Develops, plans and monitors implementation of theater policies regarding force protection, combating terrorism, information operations, physical security, law enforcement, MP response force operations, MP tactical combat force operations, counter-reconnaissance, command post security, route reconnaissance and surveillance, main supply route regulation and enforcement, straggler and dislocated civilian control, and area damage control (ADC) operations. Monitors the operational and training status on MP forces in the theater area of responsibility.

(8) DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF MEDICAL: Advises the commander on medical matters. Has staff responsibility for medical services provided to the theater. Provides policy, direction, and broad guidance on CHS planning. Provides input and personnel to the joint medical regulating Office (JMRO) as required.

(9) MEDICAL OPERATIONS AND PLANS BRANCH/MED/MN: Provides policy and plans for the utilization of medical organizations within theater. Also plans for and promulgates policy for the prevention of disease, treatment and movement of patients, hospitalization, return to duty, evacuation, dental, veterinary and laboratory services

(10) SUPPORT OPERATIONS BRANCH/MED/MN: Provides oversight for medical readiness. Monitors the status of medical stocks. Oversees the reception and forward movement of medical organizations, equipment and supplies

(11) DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF ENGINEER: Recommends and assists the commander in the employment and sustainment of engineer operations. Provides unity of effort between army engineer assets as well as other services, allied and host nation. Provides planning schedules, policy, and commander's intent to subordinate engineer organizations.

(12) ENGINEER OPERATIONS DIVISION/ENG/MN: Provides policy and guidance for engineer support to the ASCC. Assesses engineer capability to support

operations and sustainment to the engineer force and determines engineer issues that must be forwarded to the DCSOPS. Determines engineer units that best accomplish required tasks and coordinates engineer support requirements not organic to the ASCC. This division also contains the following branches:

(a) Engineer Operations Branch: Provides policy and guidance for rear area construction and war damage repair. Provides policy and guidance for engineer support to the ASCC. Provides policy and guidance for theater topography requirements

(b) Engineer Plans Branch: Plans, coordinates and provides engineer annexes to ASCC OPLANS and CONPLANS. Plans for and represents the DCSLOG on reconstitution efforts for engineer units.

(13) FACILITIES AND CONSTRUCTION DIVISION: Provides staff planning and oversight of engineer planning and facilities. Provides policy, recommendations, and analysis of engineer tasks associated with vertical and horizontal construction; furnishing of various types of utilities, including potable water, electrical power, and refrigeration, and assists in the installation of POL facilities, to support the reception of arriving army and possibly other service units. This division also contains the following branches:

(a) Facilities Branch: Manages facilities, determines requirements and priorities of construction to support current and future operations. Provides real estate assets and assists with processing new real estate requirements. Develops guidance and monitors real property maintenance in the theater.

(b) Construction Branch: Monitors all engineer construction activity within the theater. Integrates facility construction into operational plans. Provides liaison with host nation on engineer construction issues and monitors commercial engineer leases and contractor support in theater.

(14) DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF INTELLIGENCE/MAIN: Provides intelligence requirements identified by the commander before, during, and after execution of the supported plans, to contribute to the intelligence requirements of higher, subordinate and other designated authorities and commanders. Additional functions include weather services, and advising on the threat as it applies to OPSEC and force protection.. When an ARFOR or numbered army is established, the DCSINT will detach a cell with appropriate personnel to support the numbered army's intelligence staff function.

(15) OPERATIONS DIVISION/SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICE/DCSINT/MN: Ensures collection, production, and dissemination of current and predictive intelligence on threat ground forces and on hostile threat to the RCZ/COMMZ to all US Army forces and as directed to other us, joint, allied, and combined forces. Directs, coordinates and supervises the collection of operational and enemy operational situation information. Interprets information for forwarding to the deep operations branch, evaluates threat

information, analyzes the AOR, integrates operational intelligence, identifies and develops enemy intentions, vulnerabilities, indications and warnings, and of intelligence reports. Provides input and personnel to the joint intelligence center as directed. This division also contains the following branches:

(a) Special Security Branch: Provides SCI communications to the command. Administers and safeguards all SCI. Operates and administers the DA privacy communications system at ASCC HQ. Provides education and training in the care and handling of SCI material. Submits requests for and maintains records of personnel clearances, and maintains classified document registers.

(b) Operations Branch: Provides primary interface between ASCC HQ, ACE, and the MI brigade. Develops and maintains ASCC HQ enemy order of battle summary. Identifies IEW requirements, establishes priorities, and interfaces with other intelligence agencies through the ACE. Supports the conduct of operational planning. Synchronizes and deconflicts intelligence support. Lends support to targeting and special operations forces

(c) Space Branch: Serves as the ASCC liaison to joint and national space intelligence assets. Determines space platform support for operations and ensures expedited dissemination of space information in support of army operational forces. Mainly, concerned with reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition and warning. May send representatives to a JTF and an ARFOR when they are formed.

(16) STAFF WEATHER OFFICE/DCSINT/MN: Prepares weather products for AOR. Writes weather annex to OPLANS. Advises USAF of CINCs weather support requirements. Prepares weather update foe briefings.

(17) PLANS AND READINESS DIVISION/DCSINT/MN: Performs the intelligence planning function for execution of ASCC wartime mission. Serves as the ASCC HQ focal point for readiness of the intelligence force. This paragraph also contains the following branches:

(a) Plans Branch: Develops intelligence plans and annexes, Coordinates plans and annexes with higher, subordinate and lateral headquarters. Tracks the time phased force deployment of intelligence units into theater.

(b) Readiness Branch: Serves as the ASCC focal point for readiness of the intelligence force. Reviews systems capability to support the intelligence function on the battlefield. Forwards to the MACOMS requirements for equipment and training improvements to support the intelligence function. Determines individual concern and deficiency (ICAD) issues and forwards to DCSOPS.

(18) DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF OPERATIONS: The principal staff assistant to the commander in matters pertaining to command and control, OPSEC, force structure, force management, and operations (including Psychological operations), army aviation,

rear area operations, training, readiness, NBC defense, information operations, and coalition Warfare or security assistance to allied or friendly nations. Coordinates the employment of friendly and/or allied forces. Serves as the principal deputy to the deputy commanding general for operations. Responsible for campaign plans and integration of operational fires and operational maneuver.

(19) CURRENT OPERATIONS DIVISION/OPS/MN: Maintains the current operation estimate of the situation in coordination with other staff agencies. Prepares, authenticates and publishes the overall command SOP with contributions from other staff agencies. Recommends priorities for allocating critical resources of the command. Recommends task organization and assigns missions to subordinate elements of the command. Coordinates all aspects of operational maneuver with operational fires, to include other services and allies. Exercises staff supervision over Crt Ops, NBC, ADA, Aviation, and Special OPS activities.

(a) CURRENT OPERATIONS BRANCH/COD/OPS/MN: Serves as an operations center or watch center. Coordinates and monitors operations. Acquires and communicates operational and strategic level information. Maintains force status. Evaluates information received through reports to assess the operational situation. Maintains contact with higher, adjacent, subordinate, joint, and combined headquarters. Establishes and maintains communications with national and CINC headquarters, and those forces under ASCC command. Monitors and coordinates activities involving the reception and onward movement of U.S. Army forces in the ASCC AO. Monitors strategic deployment and maintains force tracking visibility to determine impacts. Provides direct input to the joint operations center (JOC) and responses.

(b) NBC BRANCH/COD/OPS/MN: Provides technical data and predicts fallout from friendly employment of nuclear weapons. Predicts downwind hazard from friendly chemical, non-U.S. fires, and disseminates nuclear strike warn messages as necessary. Writes the NBC annex to OPLANS IAW JP 3-11. May also have operational control over chemical team JB, NBC element which may be attached or assigned to the ASCC headquarters to provide NBC warning and reporting for 24 hour operations.

(c) SPECIAL OPERATIONS BRANCH/COD/OPS/MN: Serves as a coordinating agency for the logistical, intelligence, transportation, and training support for Army Special Forces and Rangers IAW JP 3-05. Provides for planning for special operations support for future operations. Coordinates support through the joint or combined command HQ. Provides coordination between Special Forces and/or ranger units and theater civil affairs and PSYOP units through the DCSHNA.

(d) AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY OPERATIONS BRANCH/COD/OPS/MN: Integrates the C2 of theater airspace with the USAF TACC through the army battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) (51002l000) located at the TACC. For the ASCC commander, coordinates airspace control within the theater of operations for those requirements, which overlap the rear CZ, and COMMZ IAW JP3-52. Receives airspace control requirements from A2C2 elements within each echelon. These requirements are

coordinated through the BCD to the airspace planners requirements are coordinated through the BCD to the airspace planners of the tactical air force. Coordinates SEAD operations with senior and subordinate echelons and with the BCD. Is responsible for coordinating theater missile defense IAW JP 3-01.5.

(e) AVIATION BRANCH/COD/OPS/MN: Integrates the C2 of theater airspace with the USAF TACC through the army Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) (51002l000) located at the TACC. The ASCC commander coordinates airspace control within the theater of operations for those requirements that overlap the rear CZ and COMMZ IAW JP3-52. Receives airspace control requirements from A2C2 elements within each echelon. These requirements are coordinated through the BCD to the airspace planners of the tactical air force. Coordinates SEAD Operations with senior and subordinate echelons and with the BCD. Operates the Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) that coordinates the Army portion of search and rescue in the JOA.

(23) INFORMATION OPERATIONS DIVISION/OPS/MN: Integrates the activities of the Current IO, the IO Plans, and PSYOP branches within the Information Operations (IO) Division. Coordinates IO activities with other staff elements, Services and multinational forces as required.

(a) INFORMATION OPERATIONS CURRENT OPS BRANCH/IOD/OPS/MN: Integrates IO within Current Operations by providing personnel to the operations and intelligence center. Writes IO annexes to operation orders and FRAGOs. Coordinates with the DCSINT for the intelligence portion of the IO estimate and annex. Writes IO estimates. Implements, and supervises command and control warfare (C2W) support Operations. Provides personnel to the joint IO cell, as required. Provides input to the joint IO cell, IAW JP 3-13 and may provide personnel to augment the cell.

(b) INFORMATION OPERATIONS PLANS BRANCH/PD/OPS/MN: Plans for the use of information operations at the operational level in the planning and execution of campaigns; and to take steps to protect the integrity of the theater military strategy and campaign plan (operation security [OPSEC]). Writes EW annex to operation orders and plans. Coordinates with the DCSINT for the intelligence portion of the EW estimate and annex. Write EW estimates Creates plans to manipulate enemy operational commander's perceptions and expectations into a false picture of reality that conceals friendly actions and intentions until it is too late for enemy forces to react effectively within the context of the commander's deception plan. Coordinates with DCSPLANS, EW, PAO, PSYOP and other agencies to execute deception plans. Assesses the effectiveness of planned deception for lessons learned. Provides coordination with the JFC's deception staff element. The ASCC commander assigns staff representatives to the JTF deception staff element (DSE) staff as required. IAW JP3-54, provides policy, guidance, coordination and supervision of Operations Security (OPSEC). Prepares OPSEC plans IAW JP5-03.2.

(c) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BRANCH/IOD/OPS/MN: Provides the commander with staff supervision, planning, and policy recommendations on PSYOP

operations against neutral or hostile audiences. Ensures the coordinated efforts between PSYOP units to ensure that their efforts support and complement planned operations. IAW JP3-53, plans for the utilization of the PSYOP assessment team (POAT). When tasked by the CINC. Coordinates with CA to determine PSYOP support requirements. Coordinates and determines support requirements for assigned/attached PSYOP organizations.

(24) EFFECTS COORDINATION DIVISION/OPS/MN: Exercises staff supervision over the Effects Coordination Cell (ECC). Prepares, maintains, and updates the commands operational target list. Provides input and, as required, personnel to the JFC's Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB). Exercises staff supervision, through the DCSOPS air, of the A2C2. Maintains Staff supervision over Effects Coordination and Fire Spt activities.

(a) EFFECTS COORDINATION BRANCH/ECD/OPS/MN: Prepares, maintains, and updates the commands operational target list. Receives target requests from subordinate units and coordinates the command's target list through the BCD to the air force and joint and or multinational headquarters. Provides targeting guidance and assigns priority of targets IAW the commander's concept of operations. Selects, evaluates, and recommends operational targets to determine if and when they should be attacked for optimum effect on enemy centers of gravity and own commander's intent. Participates in joint combat assessment to determine the need for repeated attack based on level of destruction of target. Integrates operational fires on single or multiple targets at the decisive time and place. Integration includes lethal and non-lethal attacks to ensure maximum effectiveness and minimize interference on friendly forces. Provides input and, as required, to the JFC's Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB). Should a standing operational ARFOR headquarters exist or when one is created, this branch resides with that headquarters.

(b) FIRE SUPPORT BRANCH/ECD/OPS/MN: **(**Split based) Provides Fire Support representation in the Main. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions that may be performed is located in Fire Support Br/ECD/EE.

(25) PLANS DIVISION/OPS/MN: Provides the operational concept of operations for the entire campaign or major operation and a specific plan for the campaign's or operation's first phase. Schedules decision points; achieves unity of effort; and displays the commander's vision and intent. Ensures the synchronization of operations of other JTF forces in time, space and purpose to produce maximum combat power at the decisive point. Orients on an enemy center of gravity that is applicable to the particular operation in question, phases a series of related operations, composes subordinate forces and designates command relationships. Provides guidance serves as a basis for subordinate planning, defines success, provides operational direction and assigns tasks to subordinate units. Oversees force modernization and the development of in support of the army service component. Issues planning guidance. Combines plans of other staff elements into a single integrated planning document.

(a) PLANS BRANCH/PD/OPS/MN: Develops and coordinates general war and contingency plans for joint and combined operations. Ensures compliance with law of war, international law and rules of engagement in all plans. Provides policy, tasks and guidance on the development of supporting plans of subordinate units. Coordinates ASCC plans with higher, and adjacent commands to ensure mutual understanding, integration and mutual support with other theater forces.

(b) JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) BRANCH/PD/OPS/MN: Develops and coordinates the development of acceptable operations plans and enters them into the JCS deliberate planning system. JOPES plans for: force structure, support planning, chemical and nuclear planning, transportation planning (TPFDD), shortfall identification, and transportation feasibility analysis for entry into the JCS planning system.

(c) FORCE MANAGEMENT AND READINESS BRANCH/PD/OPS/MN: Plans and oversees force modernization and combat developments. Reviews army, joint, and combined concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Provides policy guidance in the fielding of new equipment. Provides guidance, coordination and supervision of command Individual Concern and Deficiency (ICAD) issues IAW JP1-03.31. Consolidates input from staff sections and forwards for inclusion in the CINC's Preparedness Assessment Report (CSPAR).

(26) TRAINING, EXERCISE, AND SIMULATION DIVISION/OPS/MN: Plans, coordinates, and directs training and education for the ASCC. Provides guidance to provide the means for training replacements and units, especially newly reconstituted organizations within the theater of operations. Monitors the readiness of training facilities and training areas to assess adequacy of training means. This division also includes the:

(a) Simulations Branch: Acts as the commander's decision aid in forecasting requirements based on modeling and simulation. Real world data is maintained on computers with simulation software. The simulation assists the commander in decision making and provides alternative on the same information.

(b) TRAINING AND EXERCISE BR: Plans, coordinates, and directs training and education for the ASCC. Provides guidance to provide the means for training replacements and units, especially newly reconstituted organizations within the theater of operations. Monitors the readiness of training facilities and training areas to assess adequacy of training means.

(27) DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS CELL/MN: Prepares and exercises staff supervision over communications and information support for the ASCC. TOE 11602l000 provides the DCSCE with personnel to conduct this function. The theater signal office also, when directed, provides personnel to the joint communications control center (JCCC). May also be required to operate an integrated JCCC/ASCC communications management center. Installs, operates and maintains the capability for systems administration of the global command

and control system. Operates local area networks. Operates message and distribution center for the theater army. Provides hardware and software support for theater army. Provides Video-teleconferencing.

(28) DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF LOGISTICS/MN: (Split based) Provides DCSLOG representation in the MN. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions performed is located in DCSLOG/REAR.

(29) SUPPORT OPERATIONS CENTER/MN: (Split based) Provides Support Operations Center representation in the MN. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions performed is located in Spt Ops Ctr/DCSLOG/REAR.

(30) LOGISTICS PLANS AND PROGRAM DIVISION/MN: Provides planning guidance and staff supervision of logistical programs for the ASCC subordinate commands. Provides policy and staff supervision for the development and implementation of supply and maintenance support. In conjunction with engineers, recommends number and location of sustaining bases. Receives information on the status of material from the material management center.

(a) PROGRAMS AND READINESS BRANCH P&P DIV/MN: (Split based) Provides branch representation in the MN. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions performed is located in P&RDI BR/P&P Div/DCSLOG/REAR.

(b) PROGRAMS AND RECONSTITUTION BRANCH/P&P DIV/DCSLOG/MN: (Split based) Provides branch representation in the MN. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions performed is located in P&R/P&P DIV/DCSLOG/REAR.

(c) PETROLEUM AND WATER/P&P Div/DCSLOG/MN: (Split based) Provides branch representation in the MN. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions performed is located in P&W/P&P DIV/DCSLOG/REAR.

(31) DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF PERSONNEL: Has staff responsibility for the personnel readiness of the command; primary advisor to the commander on matters relating to the quality and quantity of assigned personnel, and the care and keeping of the force; supervises the development of plans, policies, and procedures relating to personnel. Coordinates military, DOD civilian, contractor, and host nation personnel management functions. Duties include: staff supervision over postal, finance, public affairs, legal services, labor service activities, discipline, law and order policies, civilian evacuation, chaplain support, safety, and other personnel issues. Ensures the uninterrupted flow of trained and organizationally sound units and replacements. Plans, coordinates, directs and supervises the health services support for army forces and medical support to other services, and civilian populations. Prepares to function as JTF J1, if designated by CINC.

(32) DCSPER Cell/MN: Division also contains the following sections:

(a) Programs And Policy Branch: Develops agreements and implements personnel administration systems, policies, and regulations on local national civilian employment and compensation. Coordinates personnel community activities including military law and order and discipline as well as chaplain affairs, legal affairs and financial operations.

(b) Manpower Management Branch: Provides for theater army strength maintenance for military and civilian personnel. Monitors and assesses command data on soldier readiness, unit strength, personnel losses, human potential, organizational climate, and unit cohesion. Based on commander's planning guidance and on information received from other staff agencies, prepares the personnel estimate which culminates in recommendations concerning the feasibility of courses of action from a personnel perspective.

(c) Plans And Operations Branch: Coordinates and provides policy guidance for human resources support related functions for military and civilian personnel. Acts as the personnel services representative of the reconstitution task force headed by the DCSOPS. Plans for the actions necessary to restore combat attrited army units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and availability of resources. Involved in both reorganization and regeneration.

(33) SAFETY OFFICE/DCSPER/MN: Develops accident prevention policy and awareness programs directed towards the prevention of Non-battle accidents and injuries.

(34) DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF HOST NATION AFFAIRS/MN: Conducts operations to advise assist and make recommendations about civil-military cooperation, to include the impact of PSYOP (in coordination with the DCSOPS) on the civilian population. As required, coordinates with ambassadors of nations within AOR and other State Department agencies. Plans provision of wartime host nation support. Advises CINC and assists ASCC staff/major commands in interaction within government agencies, and populations. Is prepared to execute applicable provisions of CINC OPLANS.

(35) CIVIL AFFAIRS, COMMAND SUPPORT DIVISION/DCSHNA/MN: Assists and makes recommendations relating to civil-military operations. Recommends policy for CA activities and preparing, implementing, and supervising the execution of civil affairs plans. Prepares estimates and conducts surveys and studies in support of civil affairs activities. Determines the requirements for resources to accomplish civil-military activities of ASCC to include CA unit(s), personnel, and equipment.

(a) NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY BRANCH/CSD/DCSHNA/MN: Concerned with legal, public safety, property control, and civil defense matters between the military and the civil population. As directed by

the CINC, fosters alliance and regional relations and security arrangements. Enhances regional politico-military relations and provides for or promotes regional security and interoperability. Conducts security assistance activities and humanitarian assistance to include nation building. In conjunction with the DCSLOG, arranges host nation sustainment support for army theater forces or, when directed, other services in addition to army.

(b) PUBLIC AND HUMAN SERVICES BRANCH/CSD/DCSHNA/MN: Is concerned with public administration, public health, public education, public communication, arts, monuments, civil information, cultural affairs, and dislocated civilians. Coordinates with host nation on government and population status.

(36) UNIT MINISTRY OFFICE CHAPLAIN/MN: Provides and coordinates the commander's religious support mission to the ASCC to include assigned and attached units with and without organic UMTs. Advises the commander and staff on religion, morale and morals as affected by religion, the impact of indigenous religions on the mission. Coordinates and plans for denominational religious support throughout the ASCC. Assists the commander in ensuring that policies and leadership practices of the command are in keeping with the highest morale, ethical, and humanitarian standards. Provides for the assignment of Chaplain personnel to the ASCC units, plans and coordinates religious support requirements with DA. Plans, programs and directs the training and sustainment of religious ministry. Plans and directs the reception and onward movement of Chaplains and ecclesiastical supplies. Plan and provide for continuity of religious support. Plans and transitions to war operations. Plans, direct operations and provide religious support in a joint and combined environment. IAW JP1-05, ensures a balance of religious ministry support assets via coordination with the joint force religious ministry.

(37) INSPECTOR GENERAL/MN: Serves as the confidential advisor to the Commander, inquires into and reports on matters pertaining to the performance of the mission, state of discipline, efficiency, and economy of the command by conducting inspections, investigations, surveys, and studies as directed by the commander and as prescribed by law and Regulations. Provides the commander with assessment of overall state of the command. Conducts and reports on special, follow-up, and contractual inspections directed by CINC and as authorized by law and regulations. Conducts, on an exception basis, technical inspections of reorganized U.S. and non-U.S. (host/user nation) units that are assigned special weapons support or delivery means. Receives, reviews and processes IG action requests (IGAR). Ensures action is taken to resolve IGAR. Conducts investigations under IG system standards as directed by CINC, the inspector general or, as required by laws or Regulations. IG positions allocated to support 42,000 (1:6000) troops in immature theater. Augmentation required for mature theater.

(38) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE/MN: Provides legal advice to the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders on all matters involving military law. Supervises and is responsible for the administration of military justice and other legal matters in the command. Provides legal advice to ASCC commander and staff. Supervises administration of military justice during transition to war. Controls

assignment and training of JAG officers, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel. Supervises law of war compliance and legal advice on operational and international law. Supervises and exercises technical direction over claims operations. Supervises legal advice on civil law (military personnel law, civilian personnel law, contract law, and labor law). Directs legal assistance program during transition from peace to war.

(39) PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE/MN: Advises the commander on all aspects of command and public information functions to include information planning, publication of command information newspapers and other information media, operation of command information broadcast stations and networks in overseas commands. Ensures that material for public release has been reviewed for security clearance, prepares the public information and command information portion of SOPS and operations orders. Plans and executes PA functions in support of ASCC operations. Provides PA guidance to the command group and staff. Plans and executes deployment to field locations. Prepares to assume subordinate HQ PA functions. Provides recommendations for the allocation of PA assets.

c. Life Support Area

(1) HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT SECTION: Exercises operational control over headquarters troops that not assigned or attached to subordinate commands. Is responsible for local security of the headquarters, arrangement and movement of the HQ, reception and accommodation of visitors, supervision of maintenance of equipment organic to, or allocated for use by the HQ, and the location of future HQ locations.

(2) COMPANY HEADQUARTERS, LIFE SUPPORT AREA: Provides for the organization, control, and supervision of life support functions within the HQ. In conjunction with the HQ commandant, determines the placement and operation of the life support areas, supervises food service, quartering, maintenance, medical treatment, and supply.

(3) PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION CENTER/LIFE SUPPORT AREA: Provides personnel service support for HHC, advises Company Commander on unit personnel management, soldier assistance programs, and daily personnel status. Manages the personnel data base, SIDPERS transactions, strength management, awards, promotions, enlisted evaluation reports, officer evaluation reports, unit administration, legal postal and finance transactions

(4) MEDICAL SECTION, LIFE SUPPORT AREA: Operates the HQ aid station and provides emergency medical care for the ASCC HQ and organizations located in close proximity to the HQ.

(5) MAINTENANCE SECTION, LIFE SUPPORT AREA: Is responsible for unit maintenance of vehicles and generators for the ASCC HQ. Mechanics are justified by appropriate manpower requirements criteria (MARC) automated computations authorized by AR 570-2.

(6) FOOD SERVICE SECTION, LIFE SUPPORT AREA: Provides for the feeding of the ASCC HQ and attached units on a 24 hour basis. Provides field feeding team(s) to support advance headquarters elements. AR 570-2, MARC, authorizes personnel.

d. Rear Command Post

(1) REAR COMMAND SECTION: DCG (support) is responsible for the ASCC support operations. Responsible for command of rear. May serve as the Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC).

(2) COMPTROLLER DIVISION/DCSRM/REAR: Provides Budget Br and Policy & Accounting Br representation in the rear. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions performed is located in Comp DIV/DCSRM/MN.

(3) PARC/REAR: (Contracting Section) Provides legal validity of contracts and maintains surveillance over contracting performance to ensure adequacy of organizational structure, staffing, and training.

(4) DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF PROVOST MARSHAL: Develops, plans and coordinates Military Police support to include Maneuver and Mobility Support (MMS), Area Security/Force Protection (AS/FP), Law & Order (L&O), Police Intelligence (PIO) and Internment and Resettlement (I/R) Operations. Develops and plans theater transition to war operations, MP crisis response operations, Joint and combined Operations, and policies regarding serious incident reporting (SIR). Executes OPM staff duty system and participates in ASCC Crisis Action Team program. Performs DOD Executive Agent responsibilities for Internment & Resettlement and Customs

(5) MANEUVER AND MOBILITY SUPPORT BR/OD/PMO/MN: Develops, plans, and monitors the implementation of theater policies regarding MP operations in support of freedom of movement and security lines of communication (LOC). Develops and monitors theater policy governing Maneuver & Mobility Support (Route Reconnaissance & Surveillance, MSR regulation and Enforcement, Area Damage Control and Straggler/Dislocated civilian operations). Coordinates with DCSOPS, DCSLOG, and DCSHNA to ensure reception, staging, onward movement, integration (RSOI), and security of units, equipment and supplies throughout the theater area.

(6)PLANS DIVISION(PD)/PMO/REAR: Monitors the current theater situation with emphasis on Law & Order/Police Intelligence, Internment & Resettlement, and Customs operations. Develops, plans, and monitors implementation of plan and policies regarding Military Police support to theater transition to war operations. Monitors and evaluates Military Police support to long-range operational and contingency plans. Plans, coordinates and monitors host nation, DOD, and other law enforcement agency support.

(a) LAW AND ORDER/POLICE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH/PD/PMO/REAR: Develops, plans, and monitors the implementation of policies regarding Military Police operations in support of Law Enforcement and Investigations, Establishment of Multinational Police Units, Law and Order Training, Counter-Drug Support, Criminal Intelligence, Intelligence Collecting and Reporting and Combined Arms Police Information Operation throughout the theater area. Coordinates with CID and conducts host nation, DOD and other law enforcement agency liaison

(b) INTERNMENT AND RESETTLEMENT BRANCH/PD/PMO/REAR: Plans, develops and monitors the implementation of I/R policies regarding the administration, treatment, evacuation/internment, employment and control of internees in the theater of operations (as prescribed by the Geneva Convention). Performs U. S> Military Prisoner Operations, Populace and resources Control (with support of civil affairs personnel), and Dislocated Civilian Resettlement Operations (with support of CID, Military Police, and host nation).

(c) CUSTOMS BRANCH/PD/PMO/REAR: Plans, develops and monitors policy regarding U.S. and various national level customs, agriculture, and border clearance requirements and provides enforcement of customs law within the theater of operations. Reports violations of laws, regulations, inspections and investigative results to the Provost Marshal and the affected Unit(s). Coordinates with U.S. Customs and provides support to pre-customs clearance inspections prior to redeployment from OCONUS back to CONUS installation.

(7) SUPPORTS OPERATIONS BRANCH/DCSMED/REAR: (Split based) Provides DCSMED representation in the rear. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions performed Br is located in Spt Ops Br/DCSMED/MN.

(8) PROPERTY BRANCH/F&CD/ENG/REAR: Coordinates resources for real estate and legal claims requirements within the theater. Advises DCSRM on the funding for procurement, utilization, maintenance and repair of real estate within the theater. Provides command policy, supervision and coordination of real estate funding for the Commander.

(9) REAR TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER/DCSOPS/REAR: Effects all necessary host nation coordination for rear operations with the DCSHNA. Provides ASCC commander directives to the TSC. Provides command policy and oversight of the rear operations mission. Coordinates rear security requirements of other services and/or allied forces with rear operations of TSC and ASG. Coordinates for Fire Support in rear areas. May serve as the core of the Joint Rear Tactical Operations Center (JRTOC).

(10) RECONSTITUTION OPERATIONS BRANCH/PD/OPS/MN: Serves as the ASCC focal point for all reconstitution actions within the ASCC. Produces plans orders, and SOPS on the conduct of reconstitution efforts throughout the ASCC. As required, becomes the nucleus of reconstitution efforts as other staff elements for personnel and

logistics are attached to it. Provides command policy and priorities for reconstitution of the force. Monitors and provides updates on reconstitution efforts. Is employed as part of the reconstitution assessment and evaluation team REAT) which performs and assists the ASCC commander in Implementing detailed reconstitution efforts.

(11) DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS CELL/REAR: Provides DCSCE representation in the rear. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions performed is located in DCSCE/MN.

(12) DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF LOGISTICS/REAR: Has general staff responsibility for sustainment of the force that includes: logistics, (less medical, maps, and COMSEC), war reserves, transportation, services, POL, and base development. Is responsible for logistical: impact and supportability of DCSOPS plans; operation of the logistical operations center of the ASCC headquarters, recommendations on the force structure to include host nation support and LOGCAP, managing theater war supplies, administrative air movements, and coordination material management and movement control with the appropriate agencies in the COMMZ. Also sets priorities, establishes stock levels, manages critical materials and obtains support from the civilian economy.

(13) SUPPORT OPERATIONS CENTER/DCSLOG/REAR: Serves as the watch center for coordination of logistics and personnel support. Functions much the same as the battle staff with concentration on support operations. Monitors the strategic situation. Assesses the operational support situation. Projects future support requirements for major operations or campaigns. Maintains operational information and situation. Determines essential elements of information for support operations. Acts as clearinghouse for emergency requirements.

(14) LOGISTIC PLANS AND READINESS BRANCH/P&P DIV/DCSLOG/REAR: Furnishes planning guidance to subordinate commands and adjacent headquarters for initiation of, and information on concurrent planning. Provides logistic planning for the ASCC headquarters. Determines individual concern and Deficiency (ICAD) issues and forwards to the DCSOPS.

(15) PROGRAMS AND RECONSTITUTION BRANCH/P&P DIV/DCSLOG/REAR: Oversees, coordinates, and prepares for the receipt, storage, issue, and accountability of classes I, V and IX items through the TSC. Provides the nucleus of the logistics reconstitution team that, when necessary, augments the ODCSOPS reconstitution branch providing logistical input to the reconstitution effort. Provides policy guidance and staff supervision for class I and field services including graves registration. Reviews plans received from subordinate organizations relative to equipment maintenance and repair facility utilization. Oversight includes the concentration and provision of maintenance services, including recovery battle damage assessment and repair, and class IX supplies for retaining operational forces in or restoring them to a high state of material readiness.

(16) POL AND WATER BRANCH/P&P DIV/DCSLOG/REAR: Provides policy guidance and staff supervision for class III (bulk) operations. Reviews subordinate units' plans. Coordinates and monitors the uninterrupted flow of fuel and water to army, joint and/or combined operational forces conforming with the ASCC commander's operation plans in addition to routine theater fuel consumption.

(17) TRANSPORTATION DIVISION/DCSLOG/REAR: Provides guidance and staff supervision for transportation support. Manages all facets of transportation related to planning, operation, coordination, and evaluation of all methods of transportation, movement control, and logistical organizations tasked with transportation or transportation support. Recommends priorities; coordinates tasks; allocate resources; and determine model(s) necessary for optimum utilization of assets and timely mission accomplishment. Works with sister services and host nation on all transportation plans and operations to include logistical support. Oversees theater of operations reception operations for personnel and equipment. May provide core for the Joint Movement Center (JMC). This division also contains the following branches:

(a) Land Movements Branch: Provides guidance and staff supervision of land (rail, road) transportation for the theater. Conducts planning; analysis; coordination; allocation of resources; and recommend priorities for land transportation. Advises on the employment, deployment; and capabilities of ground transportation assets required to accomplish personnel and cargo movement. Ensures that all assets and services are economically feasible and judiciously employed.

(b) Air Movements Branch: Provides guidance and staff supervision of aircraft transportation for the theater. Conducts planning; analysis; coordination; allocation of resources; and recommends priorities for air transportation. Advises on the employment, deployment; and capabilities of air transportation assets required to accomplish personnel and cargo movement. Ensures all assets and services are economically feasible and judiciously employed. Oversight includes movement management and control, and terminal operations.

(c) Sea Movements Branch: Provides guidance and staff supervision of water (sea, canal) transportation for the theater. Conducts planning, analysis; coordination; allocation of resources and recommends priorities for sea transportation. Advises on the employment, deployment; and capabilities of sea transportation assets required to accomplish personnel and cargo movement. Ensures that all assets and services are economically feasible and judiciously employed. Oversight includes movement management and control, and terminal operations.

(18) G1/DCSPER/REAR: (Split based) Provides G1 representation in the rear. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions performed is located in DCSPER/MN.

(19) CA CMD SPT DIV/NATIONAL &REGIONAL SECURITY CELL/DCSHNA/REAR: This cell provides for following:

(a) CA Cmd Spt Div: (Split based) Provides division representation in the rear. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions performed is located in CA Cmd Div/DCSHNA/MN.

(b) National and Regional Security Branch: Concerned with legal, public safety, property control, and civil defense matters between the military and the civil population. As directed by the CINC, fosters alliance and regional relations and security arrangements. Enhances regional politico-military relations and provides for or promotes regional security and interoperability. Conducts security assistance activities and humanitarian assistance to include nation building. In conjunction with the LOG, arranges host nation sustainment support for army theater forces or, when directed, other services in addition to army.

(20) COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS BRANCH/DCSHNA/REAR: Provides staff supervision of HNA involving economics and commerce, labor, public finance, food and agriculture, civilian supply. Provides advice and assistance to HNA on measures to preserve, restore, or bolster the local economy. Plans the allocation of resources between military and civilian needs.

(21) INFRASTRUCTURE BRANCH/DCSHNA/REAR: Is concerned with public works, utilities, and transportation throughout the theater. Coordinates operational freedom efforts.

(22) UNIT MINISTRY TEAM/REAR: (Split based) Provides UMT representation in the REAR. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions performed is located in UMT/MN.

(23) INSPECTOR GENERAL/REAR: (Split based) Provides UMT representation in the REAR. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-T. Complete listing of functions performed is located in UMT/MN.

(24) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE/REAR: (Split based) Provides UMT representation in the REAR. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions performed is located in UMT/MN.

e. Home Station Support Node

(1) CHIEF OF STAFF CELL/HSSN: Provides supervision of the home station support node. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions that may be performed is located in COS/MN.

(2) DSCRM/HSSN: This section contains representatives and sections from:

(a) Budget Section: (Split based) Provides branch representation in HSSN. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions that may be performed is located in Comptroller Division/DSCRM/MN.

(b) Policy & Accounting Section: (Split based) Provides branch representation in HSSN. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions that may be performed is located in Comptroller Division/DSCRM/MN.

(c) Manpower Branch: Manages the civilian work force strength within the theater. Maintains civilian personnel database. Provides or civilian personnel retrograde operations to return American nationals to CONUS.

(d) Management Branch: Performs economic analysis to improve operational effectiveness and ensure efficient utilization of resources. Safeguards official resource management records. Assists the Commander and staff sections with setting long-range plans and goals for organizational effectiveness. Conducts organizational assessments and assists the commander and staff in planning, implementing, and evaluating organizational effectiveness.

(3) OPERATIONS AND INTEL CELL/HSSN: This section will contain representatives from DCSOPS, PM, and DCSINT. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC.

(4) ENGINEER READINESS BRANCH/HSSN: Assesses engineer requirements and capabilities in the RCZ/COMMZ. Assesses engineer capability to support operations and sustainment of the force. Determines engineer individual concern and deficiency (ICAD) issues and forwards to the DCSOPS.

(5) CSS CELL/HSSN: This section contains representatives from DCSLOG, SURG, DCSPER, SJA and PAO. Exact functions to be performed will be determined by METT-TC. Complete listing of functions that may be performed by these sections is located in the appropriate sections of the Main.

APPENDIX B

ARMY HEADQUARTERS AS A JTF HQ

HEADQUARTERS FUNCTIONS

B-1 The Army JFC organizes the JTF headquarters to accomplish assigned missions. This headquarters may vary from a small group aboard a ship to a large staff and support personnel at a ground location.



Figure B-1. TYPICAL JOINT STAFF HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION

B-2 The CJTF and staff--

- Plan operations of the JTF in accordance with operational direction from the establishing authority.
- Direct, control, and coordinate operations of assigned forces.
- Coordinate planning activities of subordinate forces.
- Under supervision of the joint staff, establish, when required, joint boards and agencies to plan, control, and coordinate the use of joint assets in specific functional areas, for example, the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB).
- Coordinate with other joint and multinational forces, the UN, other government agencies not assigned, and NGOs and IOs.

- Coordinate with other national forces and/or foreign governments when required by the establishing authority.
- Coordinate signal support.

PLANNING

B-3 During the deliberate planning process, the combatant commander may designate the ASCC as a JTF or ARFOR planning agent. The ASCC G3, plans coordinates the planning effort. The Army staff planners develop JTF and ARFOR plans in each functional area, using Joint Pubs 5-00.1 and 5-00.2 as guides. Each Army staff planner coordinates as required with functional area counterparts in the joint community. Planners should understand and consider rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) during planning. When agencies outside the Army must contribute to the planning effort, the Army force's director of operations, or G3, requests support from the appropriate agency. This planning process develops the base OPLANs and CONPLANs modified for execution during contingencies.

B-4 During crisis action planning, the director of plans directs the planning effort until he receives an execution order. After he receives the execution order, the G3 completes execution planning and conducts operations. The G3, plans begins future planning, normally focusing on the next major operation or phase. The JOPES publications (CJCSM 3122 series) provide planning policies, procedures, formats, and guidance for joint operations.

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

B-5 When designated as the joint force headquarters, the G3 or deputy chief of staff for operations (DCSOPS) organizes the J3 section, receives augmentation from other services, establishes the joint operations center (JOC), and initiates CAP. The J3 assists in planning, coordinating, and

executing JTF operations. The J3 normally organizes a battle staff with representatives of all the directorates within a JOC in order to provide consolidated oversight. When the joint staff does not have a J5 (plans), the J3 performs long-range or future planning. However, the J3 has a future operations cell to conduct near-term planning of branches to the current operation. Besides the JOC, the J3 also may supervise--

- A JTCB to coordinate targeting guidance and objectives and to develop the joint target list.
- A joint rescue coordination center (JRCC), although the CJTF may task a subordinate Service force commander to perform this function.
- A joint information warfare staff composed of component and special staff representatives as well as representatives of the J2 and J6. (See FM 3-13).
- A joint meteorological forecasting unit (JMFU) to provide weather support.
- A joint fires element (JFE) or a Fires & Effects Coordination Center (FECC)

COMMUNICATIONS.

B-6 When designated as the joint force headquarters, the ASCC's theater signal officer or G6 organizes a J6 staff, receives augmentation from other services, and establishes a joint communications control center (JCCC) as required. Joint Pub 6-0 discusses the responsibilities and functions of the J6. A key function among these responsibilities is network management. The JCCC exercises staff supervision over command, control, communications, and computers (C^4) control centers belonging to deployed components and subordinate commands. Joint Pub 6-05.1 describes the JCCC and its functions.

B-7 Alternate communications means are essential. During planning, the primary means is the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). Communications networks include the four major networks of the defense communications system (DCS):

- Defense Switched Network (DSN).
- Secure Voice System (SVS).
- Defense message system (DMS).
- Defense Data Network (DDN).

B-8 Initially, tactical satellites (TACSAT) may be the only means of secure communication with operational forces.

B-9 The Army JFC establishes alternate communication means as soon as possible. The JTF, ASCC, and ARFOR headquarters establish communications during Phase I of contingency operations. Organic signal organizations provide signal support and identify and forward shortfalls to the JCCC for resolution. The JCCC requests Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-controlled contingency communications assets such as the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) as required.

INTELLIGENCE.

B-10When tasked as a joint force headquarters, the ARFOR G2 organizes a JTF J2 section, incorporating other Service augmentation. The ARFOR G-2 as the JTF J-2 (or as CJ2 in a combined joint task force) may establish an intelligence center or a national intelligence cell from organic assets with augmentation from other Services as directed by the CINC. The JTF J2 is responsible for determining the requirements and direction of the intelligence effort to support the CJTF's objectives. He assists the CJTF in ensuring that intelligence objectives are correct, understood, prioritized, synchronized, and acted upon. The J2 is also responsible for employing joint intelligence resources, identifying and integrating additional intelligence resources such as the JIC, and applying national intelligence capabilities. He works with subordinate service G2s (S2s) to develop complementary intelligence operations that support the CJTF's requirements.

B-11The theater JIC is the primary J2 organization supporting the CINC and the service components. The JIC facilitates efficient access to the entire Department of Defense (DOD) intelligence system. The composition and focus of each JIC varies by theater, but each is capable of performing indications and warnings (I&W) and collecting, managing, and disseminating current intelligence. Through the JIC, ARFORs coordinate support from the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps and national, interagency, and multinational sources.

B-12In addition to its other functions (I&W, situation development, target development, battle damage assessment (BDA), intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlefield (IPB), and force protection intelligence development), the JIC coordinates the acquisition of national intelligence for the JTF and the combatant command's staff. The combatant commander posts special intelligence teams to the AOR. These teams are OPCON to the JFC and under staff supervision of the JTF J2. They may include a national intelligence support team (NIST) from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, or the National Security Agency. It may also include specialized intelligence support personnel from within the theater who are battle-rostered for JTF support. Staff weather augmentation, as required, is under staff supervision of the JTF J2. The JTF J2 establishes and supervises required functional intelligence organizations that may include a--

- Joint interrogation facility (JIF).
- Joint captured materiel exploitation center (JCMEC).
- Joint documents exploitation center (JDEC).
- Joint imagery processing center (JIPC).

B-13The JTF J2 requests a cryptologic support group (CSG) and an associated mobile cryptological support facility (MCSF) or equivalent signals intelligence (SIGINT) communications package from the CINC.

B-14Successful intelligence support during force-projection operations relies on continuous peacetime information collection and intelligence production. Peacetime intelligence operations support contingency planning and develop baseline knowledge of threats and environments. These operations engage and challenge the intelligence battlefield operating system to respond effectively to commanders' contingency planning intelligence requirements. During peacetime operations, commanders closely examine MI force structures, operations, and training, which ultimately leads to a combat-ready MI force capable of successfully supporting force-projection operations. Intelligence operations planners must anticipate, identify, consider, and evaluate potential threats to the force as a whole throughout force-projection operations. For smooth transition to hostilities, intelligence staffs must coordinate collection and communications plans before the crisis occurs. MI units continually update their contingency plans to reflect the evolving situation, especially during crisis situations. Immediately before deployment, intelligence activities update deploying forces with the most recent intelligence on the AO. MI units continuously update technical data bases and situation graphics.

LOGISTICS.

B-15The J4 (logistics) plans, coordinates, and supervises supply, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, and other related logistics activities. Each Service component of the combatant command is responsible for the logistics support of its

respective forces, except when the CJTF designates a single-Service responsibility for a particular logistics function. The CJTF establishes logistics priorities for the force, assigns terrain and facilities for use as support bases, and designates and maintains lines of communication (LOCs).

B-16 The J4 supervises the activities of any logistics-related coordinating centers and boards that may be required. These may include--

- A joint movement center (JMC) that coordinates strategic movement with USTRANSCOM and ensures effective use of transportation assets.
- A subarea petroleum office (SAPO) formed around elements from the combatant command's joint petroleum office (JPO) to augment the JTF in managing petroleum-related logistics.
- A joint facilities utilization board (JFUB) to manage real estate requirements (unless the JTF engineer is designated a special staff officer and assigned these duties).
- A joint civil-military engineering board (JCMEB) to provide overall direction for civil-military construction efforts and development of a civil engineering support plan (again, the JTF engineer may manage this activity).
- A joint medical regulating office (JMRO) to coordinate the movement of patients in and out of the assigned area of responsibility (AOR).
- A joint military blood program office (JMBPO) to coordinate the distribution of whole blood within the AOR.
- A joint central graves registration office (JCGRO) to handle mortuary affairs (normally tasked to the ARFOR).

B-17 Logistical considerations permeate the planning effort. These considerations are essential conditions and objectives in each phase of a plan or operation. The proper type of service support units must deploy early for port opening, reception, staging, and onward movement of incoming units; to support initially arriving forces; and to prepare lodgment for rapid force buildup. The combatant commander must decide whether to establish an in-theater communications zone (COMMZ). In most force-projection contingency operations such a capability is not

present. A COMMZ is required if the operational environment assessment identifies a requirement to stockpile support and logistics in theater.

B-18 Logistics planners should anticipate circumstances that could threaten logistics support capabilities. The plan should provide for alternative courses of action (COAs) as external and internal circumstances threaten the support capability. As circumstances warrant, the Army and JFC plan for operational replenishment to protect or regenerate combat power that has been dissipated in the conduct of operations. See Joint Pub 4-0 and FM 4-0 for a detailed discussion of theater logistics doctrine.

Appendix C

SAMPLE ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND DIRECTIVE

Copy No. 001
HQ US Army Europe
Heidelburg, Germany
xx March 200x

Subject: USAREUR Directive xx-03: COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION OF ARMY FORCES SUPPORTING JTF SOLID HAMMER (SH), xx March 200x

1. OPERATIONAL COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

a. The SECDEF has designated CINCEUR the supported commander for Operation Solid Hammer. CINCJFCOM, CINCENT, CINCTRANS, CINCSOC, and CINCSPACE are supporting commanders; DIA, CIA, NSA, NIMA, DISA, DLA, and the Military Departments are supporting agencies.

b. CINCEUR has established JTF Solid Hammer, with headquarters in Brindisi, Italy, to plan and conduct joint operations in Montenegro as part of a multinational force.

2. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL AND SUPPORT (ADCON) RELATIONSHIPS

a. Commander, US Army Europe is Commander of the Army Service component command of EUCOM (designated USAREUR) and has ADCON of all Army forces assigned or attached to EUCOM. The Secretary of the Army fulfills his responsibility for ADCON of Army forces assigned or attached to USAREUR through the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA).

b. USAREUR has been designated by the Secretary of the Army as Army MACOM for providing administrative control and support to V Corps for Operation Solid Hammer. Other Army MACOMs and Agencies will support USAREUR as directed by CSA. FORSCOM, INSCOM, AMC, and HQ DA will be prepared to support USAREUR with planning in their areas of expertise; USAREUR will establish requirements through HQ DA.

c. This USAREUR directive authorizes V Corps to establish Task Force Condor as a subordinate command echelon. Operational subordination of Task Force Condor as the Army Force (ARFOR) of JTF SH and the attachment of Army forces to TF Condor will be as directed through the operational chain of command. CG, USAREUR will fulfill Secretary of the Army responsibilities for administrative control and support of TF Condor through V Corps. Within USAREUR, V Corps is designated the support MSC for Operation Solid Hammer; other USAREUR commands and agencies will support TF Condor through V Corps.

d. TF Condor will be activated when directed by Commander, JTF Solid Hammer and assigned as its Army force (ARFOR). TF Condor will be composed of a commander and staff as provided by V Corps and designated Army forces attached through the operational chain of command. The commander of TF Condor is the COMARFOR for the Army forces of JTF Solid Hammer and will exercise ADCON of all Army forces assigned or attached to that JTF. Annex A, Task Organization contains the proposed structure of TF Condor.

e. The V Corps will supplement this directive by publishing changes to the Task Organization of Army forces committed to this joint operation and such other organizational instructions as he determines are necessary. V Corps may delegate to TF Condor the authority to organize his attached Army forces consistent with operational directives. An information copy of V Corps and TF Condor organizational directives will be forwarded to HQ DA and HQ USAREUR within 24 hours after approval by the appropriate commander.

By order of CG, USAREUR

ANNEX A TO USAREUR DIRECTIVE XX-03

TF CONDOR TASK ORGANIZATION

V Corps HQ (COMARFOR)
- 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) (-)
  - 7th CSG (DS)
  - 41st FA Bde (GS-R)
  - 12th Aviation Bde (-) (DS)
  - 1-508th BCT (173d Abn Bde) (attached)

- TF 18
  - 18th MP Bde (-)
  - 5-7 ADA Bn
  - 83d Chem Bn (XVIII Corps) (attached)

- TF 22
  - 22d Signal Bde (-)
    - 55th Sig Co (COMCAM) (OPCON)
  - TF 205 MI Bde
    - Co A (EW), 323d MI Bn (USAR) (attached)
  - 6th PSYOP Bn (OPCON)
  - 318th Press HQ (USAR) (attached)
    - 350th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (USAR) (attached)
  - 415 CA Bn (USAR) (attached)
    - D/96 CA Bn (attached)
  - LIWA C & C Grp (OPCON)
    - LIWA FST, VAT
    - ARNG FST
    - USAR CERT

- TF 21(Army Support Element)
  - 21st TSC HQ (FWD)
    - Elm 200th MMC
  - 29th ASG (+/-)
  - 24th Trans (Port) Bn, 7th Trans (attached)
  - 28th Trans (TMT) Bn
  - 39th MCC
  - 94th Eng Bn (Cbt Hvy) (+)
  - 67th CSH (-)
  - 421st Med Evac Bn (+)
  - 208th Finance Bn (+)
  - 38th PSB (+)

- ARSOF (ADCON)
  - 10th SF GRP (-)
  - 801st CRD
  - 3-160 SOAR (+)
  - Det, 528th Spt Bn
  - Det, 112th Sig Bn

Appendix D

SUBORDINATE CAMPAIGN PLAN MODEL

CLASSIFICATION

Copy No. _____

Issuing Headquarters

Place of Issue

Effective Date/Time Group

SUBORDINATE CAMPAIGN PLAN: (Number or Code Name)

USXXXXCOM OPERATIONS TO . . .

References: (List any maps, charts, and other relevant documents deemed essential to comprehension of the plan).

Command Relationships. Briefly describe the command organization and composition for the subordinate campaign. Include information on the relationship of this subordinate joint command with the geographic combatant commander and his theater campaign plan.

1. Situation. (This section briefly describes the composite conditions, circumstances, and influences of the theater strategic situation that the plan addresses (see national intelligence estimate, any allied sources, and strategic and commanders' estimates)).

a. General. (This section describes the general politico-military environment that would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the subordinate campaign plan. It should summarize the competing political goals that could lead to conflict. Identify primary antagonists. State US policy goals, the CINC's theater strategy, and the estimated goals of other parties. Outline political decisions needed from other countries to achieve US policy goals and conduct effective US military operations to attain US military objectives. Specific items can be listed separately for clarity as depicted below.)

(1) Environment of Conflict. (Provides a summary of the national and/or multinational strategic context including a theater campaign plan, received from the combatant commander, that apply to the plan.)

(2) Theater Guidance. (This section relates the strategic guidance, endstate, and termination objectives to the theater situation and requirements in its global, regional, and space dimensions. interests, intentions/criteria for termination.)

(a) CINC's/Multinational Policy Goals. (Identifies the combatant commander's strategic and operational objectives and tasks as well as any multinational objectives and strategic tasks assigned to or coordinated by the subordinate joint commander)

(b) Desired Endstate. (Describe the desired strategic end state and relates the military endstate to the strategic endstate.)

(3) Non-US National Political Decisions.

(4) Constraints/Restraints/Limitations. (List actions that are prohibited or required by higher or multinational authority (ROE, LOAC, termination criteria, etc.).

b. Area of Concern.

(1) Area of Responsibility. (Describe the theater of operations or JOA. A map may be used as an attachment to graphically depict the area.)

(2) Area of Interest. (Describe the general area of interest covered by the CINC's Strategic Concept and/or Basic Plan. This description should address all air, ground, and sea areas that directly affect the campaign.)

(3) Joint Operations Area. (Describe the specific areas covered in each option contained in the JFC's basic plan. Maps or overlays may be included as an attachment.)

c. Deterrent Options. (Delineate flexible deterrent options (FDOs) desired to include those categories specified in the current JSCP. Specific units and resources must be prioritized in terms of LAD relative to C-day. Include possible diplomatic, informational, or economic deterrent options accomplished by non-DOD agencies that would support US mission accomplishment.

d. Risk.

e. Enemy Forces. (Identify the opposing forces expected upon execution and appraise their general capabilities. Refer readers to supporting documents for details. However, this section should provide the information essential to a clear understanding of the magnitude of the hostile threat. In a campaign plan, it is imperative to identify the enemy's strategic and operational centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities as depicted below.)

(1) Centers of Gravity.

(a) Strategic.

(b) Operational.

(2) Enemy strategic and operational critical vulnerabilities.

(3) Enemy Courses of Action.

(a) General.

(b) Enemy's Desired Endstate.

(c) Enemy's Strategic Objectives.

(d) Enemy's Operational Objectives.

(e) Enemy Concept of Operations.

(4) Enemy Logistics and Sustainment.

(5) Other Enemy Forces/Capabilities.

(6) Enemy Reserve Mobilization.

f. Friendly Forces.

(1) Centers of Gravity. (This section should identify friendly centers of gravity, both strategic and operational; this provides focus to force protection efforts.)

(a) Strategic.

(b) Operational.

(2) Multinational Forces.

(3) Supporting Commands and Agencies. (Describe the operations of unassigned forces, other than those tasked to support this campaign that could have a direct and significant influence on the operations in the subordinate campaign plan. Also list the specific tasks of friendly forces, commands, or government agencies that would directly support execution of the campaign plan. For example, USTRANSCOM, USSPACECOM, DIA, and so forth.)

g. Assumptions. (List all reasonable assumptions for all participants on which the subordinate campaign plan is based. State expected conditions over which the JFC has no control. Include assumptions that are directly relevant to the development of the plan and supporting plans and assumptions to the plan as a whole. Include both specified and implied assumptions that, if they not occur as expected, would invalidate the plan or its concept of operations. Specify the mobility (air and sea lift), the degree of mobilization assumed, i.e., total, full, partial, selective, or none.)

(1) Threat Warning/Timeline.

(2) Prepositioning and Regional Access.

(a) International Support and Assistance.

(3) In-Place Forces.

(4) Strategic Assumptions. (Include Nuclear Weapons Employment.)

(5) Legal Considerations. (List those significant legal considerations on which the campaign plan is based. Include International Law, US Domestic Law, and Law of Armed Conflict.)

2. Mission. (State concisely the key strategic task(s) the JFC has to accomplish. This statement should address: who, what, when, where, and why.)

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations. (The appropriate strategic concept(s) can be taken from the theater campaign plan and developed into a concept of operation for the subordinate campaign plan. The concept should be stated in terms of who, what, where and how. It also contains how this plan accomplishes the CINC's strategic vision, intent and design in his strategic concept of operation for force projection operations, including mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment and redeployment of all participating forces, activities and agencies.)

(1) Commander's Intent. (This should describe the JFC's overall intent, and intent by phase. It may also include how the posture of forces at the end state facilitates transition to future operations. It may also include the JFC's assessment of the enemy commander's intent. The commander's, though, is not a summary of the concept of the operations.)

(a) Endstate.

(b) Campaign Objectives.

(2) General. (Base the concept of operations on the commander's estimate of the situation. The concept of operations states how the commander visualizes how to accomplish the mission, including the forces required; the phasing of operations; the general nature and purpose of operations to be conducted; and the interrelated or cross-Service support. The concept of operations should include a statement concerning the perceived need for Reserve force mobilization based on plan force deployment timing and Reserve force size requirements. The concept of operations should be sufficiently developed to include an estimate of the level and duration of conflict to provide supporting and subordinate commanders a basis for preparing adequate supporting plans. To the extent possible, the subordinate campaign plan concept should incorporate the following operational concepts:

(a) JFC's strategic intent and operational focus.

(b) Concept of fires that describes how tactical, operational, and strategic fires (to include information operations) are integrated and synchronized to support the concept of operations

(c) Orientation on the enemy's strategic and operational centers of gravity.

(d) Protection of friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity.

(e) Phasing of operations, to include the commander's intent and main effort for each phase.

1. Phase I:

a. JFC's Intent.

b. Timing.

c. Objectives.

d. Risk.

e. Execution.

f. Employment.

(1) Land Forces.

(2) Air Forces.

(3) Naval Forces.

(4) Marine Forces.

(5) Special Operations Forces.

(6) Joint PYSOP task Force (JPOTF).

g. Operational Fires and effects.

2. Phases II-(last). (Cite information as stated in subparagraph 3a above for each subsequent phase based on expected sequencing, changes, or new opportunities.)

b. Tasks. (List the tasks assigned to each subordinate Service or functional element of the command in separate subparagraphs. Each task should be a concise statement of a mission to be performed either in future planning . The task assignment should encompass all key actions that

subordinate and supporting elements must perform to fulfill the concept of operations, including operational and tactical deception. If the actions cannot stand alone without exposing the deception, they must be published separately to receive special handling.)

(1). COMARFOR/JFLCC.

(2). COMNAVFOR/JFMCC.

(3). COMMARFOR.

(4). COMAFFOR/JFACC.

(5). COMSOCFOR.

(6). Commander, JPOTF

c. Coordinating Instructions. (List instructions applicable to the entire command or two or more elements of the command that are required for proper coordination of the campaign's phases. Explain terms pertaining to the timing of execution and deployments.)

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. Concept of Support. (This should provide broad guidance for the theater of operations personnel and logistical support concept for the campaign with information and instructions applicable to the campaign broken down by phases. It should cover functional areas of logistics, personnel policies, and administration.)

b. Logistics. (This paragraph should address sustainment priorities and resources; logistical assumptions; base development and other civil engineering requirement; lines of communications; foreign-nation and host-nation support; and inter-Service responsibilities. Identify the priority and movement of major logistic items for each option and phase of the concept. Note: Logistics phases must complement the campaign's operational phases. Identify strategic and theater ports for resupply. Outline transportation policies, guidance, and procedures fore all options and phases.)

c. Personnel. (Identify detailed planing requirements and subordinate taskings. Assign tasks for establishing and operating joint personnel facilities, managing accurate and timely personnel accountability and strength reporting, and making provisions for staffing them. Discuss the administrative management of participating personnel, the reconstitution of forces, command replacement and rotation policies, and required individual augmentation to command headquarters and other operational requirements.)

d. Joint and multinational responsibilities to include foreign military assistance

e. Public Affairs

f. Civil-military operations.

g. Meteorological and Oceanographic Services and Geospatial Information and Services.

i. Medical Services. (Identify planning requirements and subordinate taskings for hospitalization and evacuation. Address critical medical supplies and resources. Assign tasks for establishing joint medical assumptions and include them in a subparagraph.)

5. Command and Signal.

a. Command.

(1) Command relationships. (State the organizational structure expected to exist during campaign plan implementation. Indicate any changes to major command and control organizations and the time of expected shift. Identify all command arrangement agreements and memorandums of understanding used and those that require development.)

(2) Command Posts. (List the designations and locations of each major headquarters involved in execution of the campaign. When headquarters are to be deployed or the plan provides for the relocation of headquarters to an alternate command post, indicate the location and time of opening and closing each headquarters.)

(3) Succession to Command. (Designate in order of succession the commanders responsible for assuming command of the operation in specific applicable circumstances.)

b. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems. (Provide a general statement concerning the scope of C4 systems and procedures required to support the campaign. Highlight any C4 systems or procedures requiring special emphasis.)

(Signed by _____Joint Force Commander)

Annexes: As required (see theater campaign plan)

Distribution:

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Appendix E

Major Operations Plan Model [1]

Copy No._____
Issuing ASCC/ARFOR Headquarters
Place of Issue
Date/Time Group of Signature

MAJOR OPERATION PLAN: (Number or code name)

References: Maps, charts, and other documents

TASK ORGANIZATION/COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: Briefly describe the organization of the Army in theater to support the combatant commander's long-range strategy and campaign plan, specifically identifying the command conducting the operation. In a plan for a major operation composed of several phases, put the task organization in a separate annex (Annex A) and the command relationships and their changes, if any, as the operation progresses from one phase to the next in Annex J. Include task organizations for Army component support to contingencies in the annexes referring to the plans for those operations. The structure of Annex A deals with the following factors:

a. **Civil-Political Relationships.** Embassies, country teams, non-Department of Defense (DOD) U.S. Government agencies (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], Drug Enforcement Agency [DEA], Agency for International Development [AID]).

b. **Multinational Force Relationships.** Host nations, allies, forces from regional/treaty organizations.

c. **Joint Relationships.** DOD agencies (Defense Intelligence Agency , National Security Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, etc.), unified and specified commands (subunified commands and joint task forces (JTFs) when appropriate), other services in uniservice roles.

d. **Relationships with Other Army Commands.** The relationship with other Army Service component commands, Headquarters, Department of the Army, other continental United States (CONUS) major Army commands, and their stovepipe organizations in the theater and the Service components of other unified commands.

e. **Army in Theater Relationships.** The structure that reflects unity of command within the ASCC or Army forces (ARFOR).

(1) Army components of unified commands, subunified commands, and JTFs.
(2) Other Functional commands (JFACC, etc.).
(3) Major specialized commands directly under the ASCC in peacetime.
(4) Army organizations providing operational-level support such as battlefield coordination detachments (BCD), Multinational Liaison Teams, etc.
(5) Army special operations forces (ARSOF), especially the special operations theater support elements.

1. **Situation.** Thoroughly describe the operational environment as well as appropriate aspects of the strategic environment in which the major operation will be conducted. Include tactical information for the early phases of the operation. Refer to command and staff estimates, country studies, or operations plans (OPLANs). Designate the *trigger event* that signals execution of the operations order (OPORD).

a. **Intelligence.** Use this subparagraph to refer to a separate intelligence annex (Annex B) or the intelligence estimate. The two main components include the following:

(1) A summary of information concerning the area of operations, which consists of—

(a) A strategic overview of the area, to include its climate, politics, geography, topography, demography, economics, and social/cultural factors.

(b) Specific, localized information about conditions affecting the early phases of the operation, especially if a forced entry is anticipated. Include weather, key terrain, observation, cover and concealment, obstacles, avenues of approach, drop zones, landing zones, and beach and hydrographic data.

(2) A description of the enemy, which consists of--

(a) Strategic and operational factors such as the political roots and objectives of enemy activity, personalities, outside support, sanctuaries, logistics capabilities, levels of training and combat experience, morale, strategic and operational centers of gravity, and vulnerabilities.

(b) Factors of immediate concern during the early phases of the operation such as locations, strengths, weapons systems, tactical capabilities, reserves, mobility.

(c) Information about the military strengths of nations not allied or affiliated with U.S. forces. Include order-of-battle information, numbers of major weapons systems, personalities of leaders, levels of training, or combat experience and affiliation with major hostile powers.

b. **Friendly Forces.** Provide information on friendly forces that may affect he execution of the plan being put forth. These effects may impact directly on the command or on the organizations subordinate to that command.

(1) Task organizations/command relationships. State the mission and applicable parts of the concept of operation of the joint or multinational command to which the ARFOR is subordinate. They will normally be as stated in the theater campaign plan. Provide sufficient detail so that key individuals know and understand the higher, joint, or multinational commander's intent, the *end state* desired at the conclusion of the campaign, and how their actions mesh to attain joint or multinational goals.

(2) Higher headquarters. Include the mission, concept, and intent of the JFC/combatant commander. His charter is to further U.S. in the theater and should be stated so that the ARFOR, his staff, and subordinates know and understand the part they play in achieving the combatant commander ‘s strategic aim.

(4) Other Service components. Highlight the roles of the Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard (especially its counternarcotics role) components of the unified command.

(5) Joint, unified, and specified commands and DOD agencies. Highlight the roles of other commands that affect the operations in this theater.

(6) Multinational forces. Highlight the organization, capabilities, and activities of friendly nations in the theater, with emphasis on their military forces. State their roles and missions in support of the CINC’s objectives to further U.S. policies.

(7) Special operations forces. Describe the activities of special operations forces (SOF) in the region that affect the operation.

(8) Department of State. Highlight the contributions of U.S. embassies and country teams in the theater as they affect and interface with elements of the ASCC.

(9) Other non-DOD U.S. agencies. Describe the activities of U.S. Government agencies not included in country teams, such as DEA and AID, as they affect land operations.

c. **Attachments and Detachments.** Highlight critical elements of the Task Organization section (Annex A).

c. **Assumptions.** Provide a summary of the conditions and situations that must exist when the OPLAN becomes an OPORD. They include predictions and presumptions concerning the following:

(1) Conditions within host countries and other nations in the region.

(2) Consistency of U.S. policy for the region such as the application of the *War Powers Act*.

(3) Involvement by hostile powers, both from outside and within the region, in the internal affairs of nations in the theater.

(4) Effects of U.S. actions in the theater on relations with nations outside the theater.

(5) Adequacy of interagency support.

(6) Bilateral and multilateral consensus on the degree or extent of common threats, for example, the narcotics trade, and required actions.

(7) Availability of resources.

(8) Warning times.

(9) Times and locations of anticipated hostile actions.

(10) Anticipated political situations in the host nation and neighboring nations.

(11) The timing of political decisions in friendly nations.

(12) The timing of the release of the use of special weapons.

2. **Mission.** Provide a clear, concise statement of the what is to be achieved, where, when, and by who for the overall operation. If for a military operations other than war (MOOTW), provide a clear statement of the long-range, continuing aim of the ASCC/ARFOR. Summarize essential tasks assigned by the JFC, and tasks derived from the commander's analysis of the environment and his understanding of his superiors' intent. Unlike the single-paragraph narrative common to the mission statement for a wartime operation, the MOOTW mission statement is usually a list of tasks. These tasks may include the following:

a. Plan and organize for transition to war.
b. Support and sustain ARFOR and other designated forces.
c. Protect the force.
d. Participate in stability or support operations.
e. Train ARFOR to maintain readiness.
f. Participate in security assistance efforts.

g. Plan for, rehearse, and participate in contingency operations and responses to crises. Plans for such operations may be included as annexes and generally conform to the format for an OPORD. Such peacetime stability operations include the following:

(1) Security assistance.
(2) Nation assistance.
(3) Search and rescue.
(4) Humanitarian assistance.
(5) Civil affairs (CA).
(6) Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO).
(7) Peacekeeping.
(6) Show of force.

3. **Execution.**

Commander's Intent. Provide a statement, in general terms, of the commander's visualization of the purpose and end state of his command. Thje commander's intent should be restricted to a few bullets or sentences. Examples are restoration of an international boundary, defeat of enemy armed forces, or clearing of hostile armed forces from a given geographical area. This subparagraph links the mission to the concept of operations. It guides all subordinate activities in the exercise of initiative to the overall objective.

a. **Concept of Operations.** Describe the commander's visualization of how the mission will be accomplished. At the operational level, divide the concept into phases; the commander will specify the *end state* for each phase so that subordinates know his intent for each phase. The *trigger event* for the transition between phases is the achievement of some intermediate goal. This knowledge will permit subordinates to plan *branches* within their own plans. The subordinate commanders are empowered to demonstrate initiative in supporting the achievement of the commander's stated end state. The commander and his subordinates can also execute *sequels* within and at the conclusion of phases, depending on the outcome of battles and engagements. Include an operations overlay and the deception plan in the concept (Annex C).

(1) Phase I. The first operational phase of a contingency is usually the detailed preparation of the command to execute the operation. In a highly charged, time-sensitive environment characterized by political maneuvers from a diplomatic posture, the commander prepares his concept by--

(a) Organizing his staff to conduct the proposed operation and integrating those augmentation cells from other components and agencies and subordinate Army units.
(b) Establishing liaison with the host nation, with the unified command responsible for the target area, with other unified and specified commands (especially those involved in deployment), with SOF already in the target area, and with appropriate U.S. Government agencies.
(c) Negotiating status of forces agreements, constraints, and rules of engagement (ROE) (Annex C) for the proposed operation with the host nation, in coordination with Department of State (DOS) and appropriate embassies and country teams.
(d) Establishing or preparing to establish intermediate staging bases in the target region and directing the repositioning of supplies and equipment.
(e) Conducting necessary operations to support political and diplomatic initiatives or to rehearse for the planned major operation.
(f) Ordering his subordinate organizations to prepare to execute the operation.
(g) Stating the commander's concept to attain the end state for this phase by the command as a whole.
(h) Setting forth the commander's scheme of operational maneuver, including decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations when appropriate.
(i) Describing how operational fires will be employed. Include a phased fire support appendix (Annex C) to show complex arrangements for fire support, including priorities of fires and targeting. Augment the appendix with tabs for air support, field artillery support, and naval gunfire support.

(j) Including air and missile defense (App 22, Annex C), information operations (App 3, Annex C), engineer support (App 18, Annex C), rear operations and force protection (App 21, Annex C), provost marshal functions (Annex U), public affairs (Annex F), and space operations (Annex N)

(k) Using the subsequent subparagraphs to direct tasks for subordinate units not already covered in the concept for this phase.

(l) Stating the initial location and tasks for the reserve. Propose the employment of the reserve in taking advantage of branches and sequels.

(m) Providing coordinating instructions applicable to two or more subordinate elements. If reinforcements from outside the theater will impact on operations, include that impact here. Also include instructions for linkups with SOF or ground units involved in the deep battle.

(2) Phase II. The second operational phase is the execution of the operation itself. It can be composed of several phases (deployment, force entry, force buildup and combat operations, decisive combat operations and achievement of end state). In this phase, the commander--

(a) States his concept in detail to attain the phase's end state by the command as a whole. In his narration of the step-by-step execution of the phase, he specifies exactly which subordinate and supporting units will accomplish each operational or tactical task.

(b) Sets forth the scheme of maneuver, as well as the deployment scheme, to attain initial objectives. Where appropriate, the scheme should include the forcible insertion of combat elements and necessary command and control (C^2) elements and their accompanying support.

1. Changes in the form of maneuver.
2. Changes in the nature of the operation.
3. Major regrouping of forces.
4. Significant changes in enemy capabilities.

(c) Prescribes the employment of fires necessary to attain initial objectives according to the fire support App 17, Annex C. The appendix includes targeting priorities and priorities of fire and may be augmented by appendixes for air support, field artillery support, and naval gunfire support. In this subparagraph or its annex, also include joint interfaces such as the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) and the BCD.

(d)) Including air and missile defense (App 22, Annex C), information operations (App 3, Annex C), engineer support (App 18, Annex C), rear operations and force protection (App 21, Annex C), provost marshal functions (Annex U), public affairs (Annex F), and space operations (Annex N)

(e) In subparagraphs subsequent to (d) above, includes direct tasks for subordinate units not already covered in the phase concept.

(f) If appropriate, states the location and tasks for the reserve. This subparagraph proposes the employment of the reserve in taking of *branches* and *sequels*.

(g) Includes coordinating instructions that apply to two or more elements. Also includes link-up procedures between the force and forces already in the operation, if appropriate.

(3) Phase III. The third operational phase is the consolidation of the results of a successful end state for this phase. It does not contain the detail of the preceding phases. In this phase, the commander includes instructions for the--

(a) Redeployment of combat forces to their original locations.

(b) Deployment of CA, military police (MP), engineer, medical, or other types of units necessary to restore peacetime stability to the target region in case a continuing U.S. military presence is required.

(c) Modification of the residual force's relations with U.S. Government agencies and the host nation to aid in the transition to peacetime stability.

b. **Tasks for Major Subordinate Commands.** Set forth tasks that encompass two or more phases of the major operation in a subparagraph for each major subordinate command.

c. **Coordinating Instructions.** Provide instructions appropriate to two or more phases of the operation. Coordinating instructions may include--

(1) Airspace management procedures. Include the formation of an Army airspace command and control (A^2C^2) cell and its relation with the theater airspace control authority.

(2) Operational fires planning guidance. Refer to appendix 17 of Annex C.

(3) Force-protection guidance. Refer to appendix 21 of Annex C. Include the mission-oriented protection posture (MOPP) levels.

(4) Times, events, or situations that signal the transition between phases.

(5) Limiting Factors (Annex B). Operations in situations short of general war are usually constrained significantly by factors other than military ones. Describe such limitations on military actions in an annex detailing the provisions of treaties, agreements, and conventions governing the political, humanitarian, and informational limits on the military effort.

(6) Rules of engagement (Annex C). ROE provide authoritative guidance on the application of force for mission accomplishment and the exercise of the inherent right and obligation of self-defense. Commanders at every echelon are responsible for establishing ROE for mission accomplishment that comply with the ROE of senior commanders and the JCS Standing Rules of Engagement, CJCS 3121.01A.

(7) Times, events, or situations that signal the transition between phases.

(8) Resource management guidance.

(9) Operational planning guidance.

(11) Space operations planning guidance (Annex N).

(12) Public affairs operations (Annex F).

4. Logistics**.** Provide operational support instructions that are of primary interest to the elements being supported. An ARFOR without its own inherent logistical organization will refer to the administrative/logistical plan of the ASCC for detailed procedures on how subordinate elements may receive support from Service support organizations. In this paragraph or in a support annex (Annex D), the COMARFOR describes those support matters necessary to accomplish the combat mission of his force. He must ensure that support plan phases coincide with OPLAN phases.

a. Even without an integral support organization, the COMARFOR may choose to include the following subjects in his plan's support paragraph or annex.

(1) Priorities of supply and maintenance.

(2) Submission of materiel status reports.

(3) Controlled supply rate for Class V.

(4) Designations of lines of communication (LOCs).

(5) Labor policies (use of enemy prisoner of war (EPW), civilian labor).

(6) Medical evacuation policies.

(7) Personnel strength reports.

(8) Replacement policies and priorities.

(9) Reconstitution.

(10) Reception and onward movement of reinforcements.

(11) NEO.

(12) CA.

(13) Host nation considerations.

(14) Public affairs.

b. If a support organization such as an Army TSC is placed under command of a ARFOR, include the detailed information normally found in the ASCC plan.

c. Identify support, such as labor, transportation, and facilities from host nations and friendly third countries. Set forth in detail the procedures for making use of these resources.

d. Include procedures for ASCC support of contingency forces from CONUS or other theaters.

5. **Command and Signal.**

a. **Command.** Provide information concerning command post locations, succession of command, and liaison requirements.

b. **Signal.** In this subparagraph or its supporting annex (Annex K) describe communications procedures and priorities such as radio silence, CEOI, codes, and interface with joint or multinational communications nets.

(Signed)_____

(Commander)

ANNEXES:

Annex A - Task Organization/Command Relationships. This annex is presented in phases. For each phase, list commands directly subordinate to the headquarters issuing the OPLAN as major headings. Indent, under the title of each direct subordinate command, the direct subordinates of that command in order Additionally, this annex--

- Describes the relationships of the headquarters issuing the order with its higher headquarters/authority and its special relationships with non-DOD U.S. Government agencies (embassies, country teams, DEA, CIA).
- Describes relationships with host nations and with forces from regional/treaty organizations, to include their integration into the overall force structure.
- Unambiguously sets forth the command relationships. The commander issuing this order may be the Army service component commander (ASCC) whose existing Army headquarters is the nucleus of an ARFOR headquarters. The commander may be the commander of ARFOR as discussed in FM 3-100, with the responsibility for the operational and tactical employment of ground forces. Separate headquarters may be designated to perform these two functions, or a single headquarters may perform both functions: ASCC headquarters and ARFOR headquarters.
- This annex includes the following appendices:
    - Appendix 1-TFFDL
    - Appendix 2-Shortfall identification
    - Appendix 3- Force module identification
    - Appendix 4-Deterrent options
    - Appendix 5-Reserve component requirements summary

Annex B - Intelligence. Current Enemy situation. Strengths, vulnerabilities, capabilities, dispositions, personalities. This annex also contains an analysis of Limiting Factors or those those political, humanitarian, economic and social/cultural limitations on the application of military power during the operation. It references U.S. laws and treaties, conventions, and international agreements. This annex includes restraints on the use of certain weapons, on tactical methods, or entry into certain areas. It may prescribe constraints such as the seizure and retention of certain objectives for political and psychological reasons or the mandatory use of allied or multinational forces in certain situations. This annex includes policies of nations in or near the target area that may inhibit military actions. Characteristics of the area of operations (AO), Weather, and Terrain. Climate, geography, political matters, aspects of economics, and social/cultural affairs affecting the operation. This annex includes the following appendices:

- Appendix 1- Priority Intelligence Requirements. Essential elements of information.
- Appendix 2- Signals intelligence.
- Appendix 3 -Counterintelligence
- Appendix 4- Targetting
- Appendix 5- Human intelligence. Intelligence administration. Handling of prisoners of war, documents, materiel, and intelligence reports.
- Appendix 6- Intelligence support to IO. Systems Architecture. Joint/multinational intelligence links. Interface with the JACE to provide for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information by allies, U.S. strategic means, and joint sources.
- Appendix 7-Imagery intelligence
- Appendix 9- Captured enemy equipment.

Annex C - Operations

- Appendix 1-Nuclear Support. This appendix includes the concept of employment for nonstrategic nuclear forces (NSNF), to include coordinating instructions for nominating NSNF targets, controls, and constraints; preclusion data for collateral damage and troop safety;

arrangements for the initiation of nuclear operations; and procedures for integrating conventional weapons with NSNF.

- Appendix 2- Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations; Riot control agents and Herbicides
- Appendix 3-Information Operations

Tab A - Deception. This tab includes a description of the deception objective, the deception story, resources available, excerpts of higher headquarters deception plans, and the active and passive deception measures to be taken by subordinate organizations.

Tab B - Electronic Warfare. This annex includes the electronic warfare (EW) mission, enemy EW capabilities, defensive and offensive EW measures, and coordination with other parts of the OPLAN (deception, communications, PSYOP, operational fires).

Tab C-Operations Security

Tab D - Psychological Operations. This annex refers to the intelligence annex, designates PSYOP targets, and describes the PSYOP plan, to include its integration into higher headquarters plans and deception plan operations or related tasks for subordinate units.

Tab E- Combat Camera

- Appendix 4- Special Operations.
- Appendix 5- Personnel Recovery Operations.
- Appendix 6- Rules of Engagement (ROE) ROE provide authoritative guidance on the application of force for mission accomplishment and the exercise of the inherent right and obligation of self-defense. Commanders at every echelon are responsible for establishing ROE for mission accomplishment that comply with the ROE of senior commanders and the JCS Standing Rules of Engagement, CJCS 3121.01A.
- Appendix 7- Reconnaissance
- Appendix 8- Air Base Interoperability
- Appendix 9-Visual information
- Appendix 10- NEO.
- Appendix 11- Escape and Evasion Operations
- Appendix 12- Counterattack
- Appendix 13-Explosive ordnance disposal.
- Appendix 14-Amphibious Operations. Outlines any amphibious operations to be conducted.
- Appendix 15- Branches to the Base Plan
- Appendix 16- Operations Overlay. A graphic representation of the concept of operations.
- Appendix 17 - Operational Fires. This appendix describes the concept for synchronizing operational fires with operational movement and maneuver. It includes priorities of fires, targeting considerations, and control measures. Its phases coincide with those of the OPLAN. Aspects include:
    - Air Support. This outlines the major roles and tasks to be carried out by air elements, priorities of allocations for close air support (CAS) and battlefield air interdiction, specific control arrangements, and procedures for the operational suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).
    - Field Artillery. This describes the organization for combat, missions for field artillery formations providing operational fires, and timing of attachments and detachments or changes in artillery unit missions.
    - Naval Gunfire. This describes the concept for employment of naval gunfire, allocation of observers or spotters, allocations or missions of ships, and limitations and control measures peculiar to naval gunfire.
        - Tab A- Battle rhythm
        - Tab B- Battlespace shaping matrix
- Appendix 18- Combat Engineers. This appendix includes priorities of engineer work to mobility, countermobility, and survival tasks. It also includes planning and execution of operational obstacles and barriers, engineer organization for combat, and engineer tasks for subordinate organizations.
- Appendix 19- Decision Support Template

- Appendix 20- Coalition Warfare
- Appendix 21-Force Protection. This appendix contains instructions for the protection of bases, installations, military personnel, family members, and other U.S. nationals in the theater from terrorism, natural disasters, and other dangers.
  - Tab A-Combating terrorism
  - Tab B-Physical security
  - Tab C-Rear area and Base defense. Instructions for the protection of the designated rear area in the host country and neighboring friendly countries from all levels of threats. It designates a joint/multinational rear area coordinator (JRAC), and outlines provisions for the defense of bases, base clusters, and other facilities, using assigned and attached units, host country resources, and, if necessary, tactical combat forces.
- Appendix 22- Theater Air and Missile Defense. This appendix includes the joint or multinational air and missile defense organization, organic and supporting air defense capabilities, ROE, weapons control procedures, and enemy air capabilities.
- Appendix 23- Airspace Command and Control/ Air Traffic Services
- Appendix 24-Training. Guidance for service training of all units and individuals assigned or attached to the ASCC. Establishes training priorities for all EAC units apportioned for planning to the ASCC.

Annex D - Logistics. This annex spells out in detail the necessary support for subordinate formations to accomplish their missions. The information is keyed to the phases of the OPORD when appropriate. The annex prescribes priorities of supply and maintenance, requirements for submission of reports, and sources of support (units in the force itself, the host nation, or the Army component of the unified command in the region). This annex is organized in categories and may be presented in separate appendixes if necessary.

- Appendix 1-POL. Bulk Fuel Supply
- Appendix 2-Mortuary Affairs
- Appendix 3- Sustainability analysis
- Appendix 4- Mobility and Transportation

··Strategic movements. Coordination with United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and other services for airlift and sealift. Establishment of intermediate staging bases.

··Movements in operational area. Ports, airfields, railroads, airlift, LOCs. Location and functions of the movement control center (MCC).

- Appendix 5- Logistic base responsibilities
- Appendix 6- Supply and Services. Levels for each class of supply at organizational, direct support, and general support echelons. Location of materiel management center (MMC), ammunition, map, and water supply. Field services.
- Appendix 7- Reconstitution.
- Appendix 8- Principal assistant responsible for contracting (PARC).
- Appendix 9-Maintenance.
- Appendix 10- Army special operations forces (ARSOF) logistical support
- Appendix 11-JRSOI
- Appendix 12-LOGCAP
- Appendix 13- Common User Logistics (CUL). Common Item support.

Annex E, Personnel Service Support. Strengths. Casualty reports and replacement policies.

··Morale, welfare, and recreation. Discipline, law, and order.

- Appendix 1- Enemy prisoners of war, civilian detainees, and other detained persons
- Appendix 2-Processing of captured, missing, or detained US personnel
- Appendix 3-Finance and disbursing
- Appendix 4-Legal
- Appendix 5- Military postal service
- Appendix 6-Chaplain activities

Annex F - Public Affairs. This annex contains guidance for facilitating the media effort to cover the operation and for supporting the information needs of the soldiers and their families.

Annex G-Civil Affairs (CA).

Annex H- Meteological and Oceangraphic Services
Annex J- Command Relationships.
Annex K - Command, Control, and Communications systems. This annex includes items contained in subparagraph 5b when its contents are too voluminous to put in the body of the OPLAN. It describes the link provided by the force headquarters between the Service tactical command and control systems, which exists among its subordinate units, and the joint and multinational C² systems, as well as those of the sustaining base.

- Appendix 1- Information security systems. This covers information assurance.
    - Tab A- Cyrptographic instructions
- Appendix 2- Defensive Information Operations. This describes dealing with the possible degradation of communications, with provisions for redundancy, electronic countermeasures, operations security (OPSEC), actions of CERTs, and hardening and the use of radio silence and messengers
- Appendix 3- Communications Planning. This provides for employment of communications conduits: area common user (ACU), data distribution system (DDS), and combat net radio (CNR). These systems are automated, with provisions for parts of the force (allies, other services, reserve components) not possessing the degree of automation capability possessed by the bulk of the force.
- Appendix 4- Satelite communications planning

Annex L- Environmental Factors
Annex M - Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy
Annex N - Space Operations. This annex describes planned and available space support to the OPLAN. It explains how to obtain and coordinate space support, in addition to listing operational constraints and shortfalls.
Annex P-Host-nation Support.
Annex Q- Medical Services. Medical evacuation and hospitalization. Evacuation policies.
Annex R -Construction Engineering. This annex includes priorities of engineer work to general engineering tasks. It also includes planning for facilities engineering and construction tasks for subordinate organizations.
Annex S- Special Technical Operations
Annex T - Consequence management
Annex U - Provost Marshal. This annex prioritizes the four MP battlefield missions for employed MP forces: area security, maneuver and mobility support, I/R operations, and law enforcement. It should correlate with Appendix 21, annex C and appendix 6, Annex C (Rules of Engagement).
Annex V- Interagency coordination.
Annex W-Resource Management.
Annex X- Execution checklist
Annex Z- Distribution

DISTRIBUTION:

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)

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1. This OPLAN format conforms to the format delineated by CJCS Instruction 3122.03 JOPES, Volumes I and II.

Appendix F

Joint Land Operations Plan Model [1]

Copy No._____
Issuing JFLCC Headquarters
Place of Issue
Date/Time Group of Signature

JOINT LAND OPERATION PLAN: (Number or code name)

References: Maps, charts, and other documents

TASK ORGANIZATION/COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: Briefly describe the organization of the Land forces in theater to support the combatant commander's long-range strategy and campaign plan, specifically identifying the command conducting the operation. In a plan for a joint land operation composed of several phases, put the task organization in a separate annex (Annex A) and the command relationships and their changes, if any, as the operation progresses from one phase to the next in Annex J. Include task organizations for Army and Marine component support to contingencies in the annexes referring to the plans for those operations. The structure of Annex A deals with the following factors:

a. **Civil-Political Relationships.** Embassies, country teams, non-Department of Defense (DOD) U.S. Government agencies (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], Drug Enforcement Agency [DEA], Agency for International Development [AID]).

b. **Multinational Force Relationships.** Host nations, allies, forces from regional/treaty organizations.

c. **Joint Relationships.** DOD agencies (Defense Intelligence Agency , National Security Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, etc.), unified and specified commands (subunified commands and joint task forces (JTFs) when appropriate), other services in uniservice roles.

d. **Relationships with Other Service Commands.** The relationship with the Army and Marine Service component commands of the combatant command, Headquarters, Departments of the Army and Navy, other continental United States (CONUS) major Army or Marine Service commands, and their stovepipe organizations in the theater and the Service components of other unified commands.

e. **Army/Marine in Theater Relationships.** The structure that reflects unity of command within the Army forces (ARFOR) and the Marine forces (MARFOR) within the JFLCC. Army and Marine components of unified commands, subunified commands, and JTFs.

(1) Other Functional commands (JFACC, etc.).
(2) Area commands and Major combat and combat support organizations directly under Service component command in peacetime: Army Theater Support Commands (TSC) or Marine Logistical Commands.
(3) Army or Marine organizations providing operational-level support such as battlefield coordination detachments (BCD), Multinational Liaison Teams, and Marine Liaison Groups.
(4) Army special operations forces (ARSOF), especially the special operations theater support elements.

1. **Situation.** Thoroughly describe the operational environment as well as appropriate aspects of the strategic environment in which the major operation will be conducted. Include tactical information for the

early phases of the operation. Refer to command and staff estimates, country studies, or operations plans (OPLANs). Designate the *trigger event* that signals execution of the operations order (OPORD).

a. **Intelligence.** Use this subparagraph to refer to a separate intelligence annex (Annex B) or the intelligence estimate. The two main components include the following:

(1) A summary of information concerning the area of operations, which consists of—

(a) A strategic overview of the area, to include its climate, politics, geography, topography, demography, economics, and social/cultural factors.

(b) Specific, localized information about conditions affecting the early phases of the operation, especially if a forced entry is anticipated. Include weather, key terrain, observation, cover and concealment, obstacles, avenues of approach, drop zones, landing zones, and beach and hydrographic data.

(2) A description of the enemy, which consists of--

(a) Strategic and operational factors such as the political roots and objectives of enemy activity, personalities, outside support, sanctuaries, logistics capabilities, levels of training and combat experience, morale, strategic and operational centers of gravity, and vulnerabilities.

(b) Factors of immediate concern during the early phases of the operation such as locations, strengths, weapons systems, tactical capabilities, reserves, mobility.

(c) Information about the military strengths of nations not allied or affiliated with U.S. forces. Include order-of-battle information, numbers of major weapons systems, personalities of leaders, levels of training, or combat experience and affiliation with major hostile powers.

b. **Friendly Forces.** Provide information on friendly forces that may affect he execution of the plan being put forth. These effects may impact directly on the command or on the organizations subordinate to that command.

(1) Task organizations/command relationships. State the mission and applicable parts of the concept of operation of the joint or multinational command to which the JFLCC is subordinate. They will normally be as stated in the theater campaign plan. Provide sufficient detail so that key individuals know and understand the higher, joint, or multinational commander's intent, the *end state* desired at the conclusion of the campaign, and how their actions mesh to attain joint or multinational goals.

(2) Higher headquarters. Include the mission, concept, and intent of the JFC/combatant commander. His charter is to further U.S. in the theater and should be stated so that the JFLCC, his staff, and subordinates know and understand the part they play in achieving the combatant commander 's strategic aim.

(4) Other service components. Highlight the roles of the Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard (especially its counternarcotics role) components of the unified command.

(5) Joint, unified, and specified commands and DOD agencies. Highlight the roles of other commands that affect the operations in this theater.

(6) Multinational forces. Highlight the organization, capabilities, and activities of friendly nations in the theater, with emphasis on their military forces. State their roles and missions in support of the CINC's objectives to further U.S. policies.

(7) Special operations forces. Describe the activities of special operations forces (SOF) in the region that affect the operation.

(8) Department of State. Highlight the contributions of U.S. embassies and country teams in the theater as they affect and interface with elements of the JFLCC.

(9) Other non-DOD U.S. agencies. Describe the activities of U.S. Government agencies not included in country teams, such as DEA and AID, as they affect land operations.

c. **Attachments and Detachments.** Highlight critical elements of the Task Organization section (Annex A).

c. **Assumptions.** Provide a summary of the conditions and situations that must exist when the OPLAN becomes an OPORD. They include predictions and presumptions concerning the following:

(1) Conditions within host countries and other nations in the region.

(2) Consistency of U.S. policy for the region such as the application of the *War Powers Act*.

(3) Involvement by hostile powers, both from outside and within the region, in the internal affairs of nations in the theater.

(4) Effects of U.S. actions in the theater on relations with nations outside the theater.

(5) Adequacy of interagency support.

(6) Bilateral and multilateral consensus on the degree or extent of common threats, for example, the narcotics trade, and required actions.

(7) Availability of resources.

(8) Warning times.

(9) Times and locations of anticipated hostile actions.

(10) Anticipated political situations in the host nation and neighboring nations.

(11) The timing of political decisions in friendly nations.

(12) The timing of the release of the use of special weapons.

2. **Mission.** Provide a clear, concise statement of the what is to be achieved, where, when, and by who for the overall operation. If for a military operations other than war (MOOTW), provide a clear statement of the long-range, continuing aim of the JFLCC. Summarize essential tasks assigned by the JFC, and tasks derived from the commander's analysis of the environment and his understanding of his superiors' intent. Unlike the single-paragraph narrative common to the mission statement for a wartime operation, the MOOTW mission statement is usually a list of tasks. These tasks may include the following:

a. Plan and organize for transition to war.
b. Support and sustain ARFOR and MARFORs and other designated forces.
c. Protect the force.
d. Participate in stability or support operations.

e. Plan for, rehearse, and participate in contingency operations and responses to crises. Plans for such operations may be included as annexes and generally conform to the format for an OPORD. Such peacetime stability operations include the following:

(1) Security assistance.
(2) Nation assistance.
(3) Search and rescue.
(4) Humanitarian assistance.
(5) Civil affairs (CA).
(6) Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO).
(7) Peacekeeping.
(6) Show of force.

3. **Execution.**

Commander's Intent. Provide a statement, in general terms, of the commander's visualization of the purpose and end state of his command. Thje commander's intent should be restricted to a few bullets or sentences. Examples are restoration of an international boundary, defeat of enemy armed forces, or clearing of hostile armed forces from a given geographical area. This subparagraph links the mission to the concept of operations. It guides all subordinate activities in the exercise of initiative to the overall objective.

a. **Concept of Operations.** Describe the commander's visualization of how the mission will be accomplished. At the operational level, divide the concept into phases; the commander will specify the *end state* for each phase so that subordinates know his intent for each phase. The *trigger event* for the transition between phases is the achievement of some intermediate goal. This knowledge will permit subordinates to plan *branches* within their own plans. The subordinate commanders are empowered to demonstrate initiative in supporting the achievement of the commander's stated end state. The commander and his subordinates can also execute *sequels* within and at the conclusion of phases, depending on the outcome of battles and engagements. Include an operations overlay and the deception plan in the concept (Annex C).

(1) Phase I. The first operational phase of a contingency is usually the detailed preparation of the command to execute the operation. In a highly charged, time-sensitive environment characterized by political maneuvers from a diplomatic posture, the commander prepares his concept by--

(a) Organizing his staff to conduct the proposed operation and integrating those augmentation cells from other components and agencies and subordinate Army units.
(b) Establishing liaison with the host nation, with the unified command responsible for the target area, with other unified and specified commands (especially those involved in deployment), with SOF already in the target area, and with appropriate U.S. Government agencies.
(c) Negotiating status of forces agreements, constraints, and rules of engagement (ROE) (Annex C) for the proposed operation with the host nation, in coordination with Department of State (DOS) and appropriate embassies and country teams.
(d) Establishing or preparing to establish intermediate staging bases in the target region and directing the repositioning of supplies and equipment.
(e) Conducting necessary operations to support political and diplomatic initiatives or to rehearse for the planned major operation.
(f) Ordering his subordinate organizations to prepare to execute the operation.
(g) Stating the commander's concept to attain the end state for this phase by the command as a whole.
(h) Setting forth the commander's scheme of operational maneuver, including decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations when appropriate.
(i) Describing how operational fires will be employed. Include a phased fire support appendix (Annex C) to show complex arrangements for fire support, including priorities of fires and targeting. Augment the appendix with tabs for air support, field artillery support, and naval gunfire support.

(j) Including air and missile defense (App 22, Annex C), information operations (App 3, Annex C), engineer support (App 18, Annex C), rear operations and force protection (app 21, Annex C), provost marshal functions (Annex U), public affairs (Annex F), and space operations (Annex N)

(k) Using the subsequent subparagraphs to direct tasks for subordinate units not already covered in the concept for this phase.

(l) Stating the initial location and tasks for the reserve. Propose the employment of the reserve in taking advantage of branches and sequels.

(m) Providing coordinating instructions applicable to two or more subordinate elements. If reinforcements from outside the theater will impact on operations, include that impact here. Also include instructions for linkups with SOF or ground units involved in the deep battle.

(2) Phase II. The second operational phase is the execution of the operation itself. It can be composed of several phases (deployment, force entry, force buildup and combat operations, decisive combat operations and achievement of end state). In this phase, the commander--

(a) States his concept in detail to attain the phase's end state by the command as a whole. In his narration of the step-by-step execution of the phase, he specifies exactly which subordinate and supporting units will accomplish each operational or tactical task.

(b) Sets forth the scheme of maneuver, as well as the deployment scheme, to attain initial objectives. Where appropriate, the scheme should include the forcible insertion of combat elements and necessary command and control (C^2) elements and their accompanying support.

1. Changes in the form of maneuver.
2. Changes in the nature of the operation.
3. Major regrouping of forces.
4. Significant changes in enemy capabilities.

(c) Prescribes the employment of fires necessary to attain initial objectives according to the fire support App 17, Annex C. The appendix includes targeting priorities and priorities of fire and may be augmented by appendixes for air support, field artillery support, and naval gunfire support. In this subparagraph or its annex, also include joint interfaces such as the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) and the BCD.

(d)) Including air and missile defense (App 22, Annex C), information operations (App 3, Annex C), engineer support (App 18, Annex C), rear operations and force protection (App 21, Annex C), provost marshal functions (Annex U), public affairs (Annex F), and space operations (Annex N)

(e) In subparagraphs subsequent to (d) above, includes direct tasks for subordinate units not already covered in the phase concept.

(f) If appropriate, states the location and tasks for the reserve. This subparagraph proposes the employment of the reserve in taking of *branches* and *sequels*.

(g) Includes coordinating instructions that apply to two or more elements. Also includes link-up procedures between the force and forces already in the operation, if appropriate.

(3) Phase III. The third operational phase is the consolidation of the results of a successful end state for this phase. It does not contain the detail of the preceding phases. In this phase, the commander includes instructions for the--

(a) Redeployment of combat forces to their original locations.

(b) Deployment of CA, military police (MP), engineer, medical, or other types of units necessary to restore peacetime stability to the target region in case a continuing U.S. military presence is required.

(c) Modification of the residual force's relations with U.S. Government agencies and the host nation to aid in the transition to peacetime stability.

b. **Tasks for Major Subordinate Commands.** Set forth tasks that encompass two or more phases of the major operation in a subparagraph for each major subordinate command.

c. **Coordinating Instructions.** Provide instructions appropriate to two or more phases of the operation. Coordinating instructions may include--

(1) Airspace management procedures. Include the formation of an Army airspace command and control (A^2C^2) cell and its relation with the theater airspace control authority.

(2) Operational fires planning guidance. Refer to appendix 17 of Annex C.

(3) Force-protection guidance. Refer to appendix 21 of Annex C. Include the mission-oriented protection posture (MOPP) levels.

(4) Times, events, or situations that signal the transition between phases.

(5) Limiting Factors (Annex B). Operations in situations short of general war are usually constrained significantly by factors other than military ones. Describe such limitations on military actions in an annex detailing the provisions of treaties, agreements, and conventions governing the political, humanitarian, and informational limits on the military effort.

(6) Rules of engagement (Annex C). ROE provide authoritative guidance on the application of force for mission accomplishment and the exercise of the inherent right and obligation of self-defense. Commanders at every echelon are responsible for establishing ROE for mission accomplishment that comply with the ROE of senior commanders and the JCS Standing Rules of Engagement, CJCS 3121.01A.

(7) Times, events, or situations that signal the transition between phases.

(8) Resource management guidance.

(9) Operational planning guidance.

(11) Space operations planning guidance (Annex N).

(12) Public affairs operations (Annex F).

4. Logistics**.** Provide operational support instructions that are of primary interest to the elements being supported. An JFLCC without its own inherent logistical organization will refer to the administrative/logistical plan of the ASCC or Marine Service component for detailed procedures on how subordinate elements may receive support from Service support organizations. In this paragraph or in a support annex (Annex D), the JFLCC describes those support matters necessary to accomplish the combat mission of his force. He must ensure that support plan phases coincide with OPLAN phases.

a. Even without an integral support organization, the JFLCC may choose to include the following subjects in his plan's support paragraph or annex.

(1) Priorities of supply and maintenance.

(2) Submission of materiel status reports.

(3) Controlled supply rate for Class V.

(4) Designations of lines of communication (LOCs).

(5) Labor policies (use of enemy prisoner of war (EPW), civilian labor).

(6) Medical evacuation policies.

(7) Personnel strength reports.

(8) Replacement policies and priorities.

(9) Reconstitution.

(10) Reception and onward movement of reinforcements.

(11) NEO.

(12) CA.

(13) Host nation considerations.

(14) Public affairs.

b. If a support organization such as an Army TSC is placed under command of a JFLCC, include the detailed information normally found in the ASCC plan.

c. Identify support, such as labor, transportation, and facilities from host nations and friendly third countries. Set forth in detail the procedures for making use of these resources.

d. Include procedures for JFLCC support of contingency forces from CONUS or other theaters.

5. **Command and Signal.**

a. **Command.** Provide information concerning command post locations, succession of command, and liaison requirements.

b. **Signal.** In this subparagraph or its supporting annex (Annex K) describe communications procedures and priorities such as radio silence, CEOI, codes, and interface with joint or multinational communications nets.

(Signed)_____

(Commander)

ANNEXES:

Annex A - Task Organization/Command Relationships. This annex is presented in phases. For each phase, list commands directly subordinate to the headquarters issuing the OPLAN as major headings. Indent, under the title of each direct subordinate command, the direct subordinates of that command in order Additionally, this annex--

- Describes the relationships of the headquarters issuing the order with its higher headquarters/authority and its special relationships with non-DOD U.S. Government agencies (embassies, country teams, DEA, CIA).
- Describes relationships with host nations and with forces from regional/treaty organizations, to include their integration into the overall force structure.
- Unambiguously sets forth the command relationships. The commander issuing this order may be the joint force commander (JFC) whose existing Army headquarters is the nucleus of the headquarters of the JTF. The commander may be the commander of ARFOR as discussed in FM 3-100, with the responsibility for the operational and tactical employment of ground forces. The commander may be the commander of the joint task force's (CJTF's) Army component commander, with command less operational control (OPCON) of ARFOR. Separate headquarters may be designated to perform each of the three functions, or a single headquarters may perform two, or even all three, functions: JTF headquarters, JFLCC, ARFOR headquarters, and Army component headquarters.
- This annex includes the following appendices:
    - Appendix 1-TFFDL
    - Appendix 2-Shortfall identification
    - Appendix 3- Force module identification
    - Appendix 4-Deterrent options
    - Appendix 5-Reserve component requirements summary

- Annex B - Intelligence. Current Enemy situation. Strengths, vulnerabilities, capabilities, dispositions, personalities. This annex also contains an analysis of Limiting Factors or those those political, humanitarian, economic and social/cultural limitations on the application of military power during the operation. It references U.S. laws and treaties, conventions, and international agreements. This annex includes restraints on the use of certain weapons, on tactical methods, or entry into certain areas. It may prescribe constraints such as the seizure and retention of certain objectives for political and psychological reasons or the mandatory use of allied or multinational forces in certain situations. This annex includes policies of nations in or near the target area that may inhibit military actions. Characteristics of the area of operations (AO), Weather, and Terrain. Climate, geography, political matters, aspects of economics, and social/cultural affairs affecting the operation. This annex includes the following appendices:
- Appendix 1- Priority Intelligence Requirements. Essential elements of information.
- Appendix 2- Signals intelligence.
- Appendix 3 -Counterintelligence
- Appendix 4- Targetting
- Appendix 5- Human intelligence. Intelligence administration. Handling of prisoners of war, documents, materiel, and intelligence reports.
- Appendix 6- Intelligence support to IO. Systems Architecture. Joint/multinational intelligence links. Interface with the JACE to provide for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information by allies, U.S. strategic means, and joint sources.
- Appendix 7-Imagery intelligence
- Appendix 9- Captured enemy equipment.

Annex C - Operations

- Appendix 1-Nuclear Support. This appendix includes the JFLCC concept of employment for nonstrategic nuclear forces (NSNF), to include coordinating instructions for nominating NSNF targets, controls, and constraints; preclusion data for collateral damage and troop safety; arrangements for the initiation of nuclear operations; and procedures for integrating conventional weapons with NSNF.
- Appendix 2- Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations; Riot control agents and Herbicides
- Appendix 3-Information Operations

Tab A - Deception. This tab includes a description of the deception objective, the deception story, resources available, excerpts of higher headquarters deception plans, and the active and passive deception measures to be taken by subordinate organizations.

Tab B - Electronic Warfare. This annex includes the electronic warfare (EW) mission, enemy EW capabilities, defensive and offensive EW measures, and coordination with other parts of the OPLAN (deception, communications, PSYOP, operational fires).

Tab C-Operations Security

Tab D - Psychological Operations. This annex refers to the intelligence annex, designates PSYOP targets, and describes the PSYOP plan, to include its integration into higher headquarters plans and deception plan operations or related tasks for subordinate units.

Tab E- Combat Camera

- Appendix 4- Special Operations.
- Appendix 5- Personnel Recovery Operations.
- Appendix 6- Rules of Engagement (ROE) ROE provide authoritative guidance on the application of force for mission accomplishment and the exercise of the inherent right and obligation of self-defense. Commanders at every echelon are responsible for establishing ROE for mission accomplishment that comply with the ROE of senior commanders and the JCS Standing Rules of Engagement, CJCS 3121.01A.
- Appendix 7- Reconnaissance
- Appendix 8- Air Base Interoperability
- Appendix 9-Visual information
- Appendix 10- NEO.
- Appendix 11- Escape and Evasion Operations
- Appendix 12- Counterattack
- Appendix 13-Explosive ordnance disposal.
- Appendix 14-Amphibious Operations. Outlines any amphibious operations to be conducted by Marine or multinational forces.
- Appendix 15- Branches to the Base Plan
- Appendix 16- Operations Overlay. A graphic representation of the concept of operations.
- Appendix 17 - Operational Fires. This appendix describes the concept for synchronizing operational fires with operational movement and maneuver. It includes priorities of fires, targeting considerations, and control measures. Its phases coincide with those of the OPLAN. Aspects include:
    - Air Support. This outlines the major roles and tasks to be carried out by air elements, priorities of allocations for close air support (CAS) and battlefield air interdiction, specific control arrangements, and procedures for the operational suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).
    - Field Artillery. This describes the organization for combat, missions for field artillery formations providing operational fires, and timing of attachments and detachments or changes in artillery unit missions.
    - Naval Gunfire. This describes the concept for employment of naval gunfire, allocation of observers or spotters, allocations or missions of ships, and limitations and control measures peculiar to naval gunfire.
        - Tab A- Battle rhythm
        - Tab B- Battlespace shaping matrix

- Appendix 18- Combat Engineers. This appendix includes priorities of engineer work to mobility, countermobility, and survival tasks. It also includes planning and execution of operational obstacles and barriers, engineer organization for combat, and engineer tasks for subordinate organizations.
- Appendix 19- Decision Support Template
- Appendix 20- Coalition Warfare
- Appendix 21-Force Protection. This appendix contains instructions for the protection of bases, installations, military personnel, family members, and other U.S. nationals in the theater from terrorism, natural disasters, and other dangers.
    - Tab A-Combating terrorism
    - Tab B-Physical security
    - Tab C-Rear area and Base defense. Instructions for the protection of the designated rear area in the host country and neighboring friendly countries from all levels of threats. It designates a joint/multinational rear area coordinator (JRAC), and outlines provisions for the defense of bases, base clusters, and other facilities, using assigned and attached units, host country resources, and, if necessary, tactical combat forces.
- Appendix 22- Theater Air and Missile Defense. This appendix includes the joint or multinational air and missile defense organization, organic and supporting air defense capabilities, ROE, weapons control procedures, and enemy air capabilities.
- Appendix 23- Airspace Command and Control/ Air Traffic Services

Annex D - Logistics. This annex spells out in detail the necessary support for subordinate formations to accomplish their missions. The information is keyed to the phases of the OPORD when appropriate. The annex prescribes priorities of supply and maintenance, requirements for submission of reports, and sources of support (units in the force itself, the host nation, or the Army component of the unified command in the region). This annex is organized in categories and may be presented in separate appendixes if necessary.

- Appendix 1-POL. Bulk Fuel Supply
- Appendix 2-Mortuary Affairs
- Appendix 3- Sustainability analysis
- Appendix 4- Mobility and Transportation

··Strategic movements. Coordination with United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and other services for airlift and sealift. Establishment of intermediate staging bases.

··Movements in operational area. Ports, airfields, railroads, airlift, LOCs. Location and functions of the movement control center (MCC).

- Appendix 5- Logistic base responsibilities
- Appendix 6- Supply and Services. Levels for each class of supply at organizational, direct support, and general support echelons. Location of materiel management center (MMC), ammunition, map, and water supply. Field services.
- Appendix 7- Reconstitution.
- Appendix 8- Principal assistant responsible for contracting (PARC).
- Appendix 9-Maintenance.
- Appendix 10- Army special operations forces (ARSOF) logistical support
- Appendix 11-JRSOI
- Appendix 12-LOGCAP
- Appendix 13- Common User Logistics (CUL). Common Item support.

Annex E, Personnel Service Support. Strengths. Casualty reports and replacement policies.

··Morale, welfare, and recreation. Discipline, law, and order.

- Appendix 1- Enemy prisoners of war, civilian detainees, and other detained persons
- Appendix 2-Processing of captured, missing, or detained US personnel
- Appendix 3-Finance and disbursing
- Appendix 4-Legal
- Appendix 5- Military postal service
- Appendix 6-Chaplain activities

Annex F - Public Affairs. This annex contains guidance for facilitating the media effort to cover the operation and for supporting the information needs of the soldiers and their families.
Annex G-Civil Affairs (CA).
Annex H- Meteological and Oceangraphic Services
Annex J- Command Relationships.
Annex K - Command, Control, and Communications systems. This annex includes items contained in subparagraph 5b when its contents are too voluminous to put in the body of the OPLAN. It describes the link provided by the force headquarters between the Service tactical command and control systems, which exists among its subordinate units, and the joint and multinational C^2 systems, as well as those of the sustaining base. A joint communications support element can be attached to the JFLCC headquarters to provide joint interface.

- Appendix 1- Information security systems. This covers information assurance.
    - Tab A- Cyrptographic instructions
- Appendix 2- Defensive Information Operations. This describes dealing with the possible degradation of communications, with provisions for redundancy, electronic countermeasures, operations security (OPSEC), actions of CERTs, and hardening and the use of radio silence and messengers
- Appendix 3- Communications Planning. This provides for employment of communications conduits: area common user (ACU), data distribution system (DDS), and combat net radio (CNR). These systems are automated, with provisions for parts of the force (allies, other services, reserve components) not possessing the degree of automation capability possessed by the bulk of the force.
- Appendix 4- Satelite communications planning

Annex L- Environmental Factors
Annex M - Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy
Annex N - Space Operations. This annex describes planned and available space support to the OPLAN. It explains how to obtain and coordinate space support, in addition to listing operational constraints and shortfalls.
Annex P-Host-nation Support.
Annex Q- Medical Services. Medical evacuation and hospitalization. Evacuation policies.
Annex R -Construction Engineering. This annex includes priorities of engineer work to general engineering tasks. It also includes planning for facilities engineering and construction tasks for subordinate organizations.
Annex S- Special Technical Operations
Annex T - Consequence management
Annex U - Provost Marshal. This annex prioritizes the four MP battlefield missions for employed MP forces: area security, maneuver and mobility support, I/R operations, and law enforcement. It should correlate with Appendix 21, annex C and appendix 6, Annex C (Rules of Engagement).
Annex V- Interagency coordination.
Annex W-Resource Management.
Annex X- Execution checklist
Annex Z- Distribution

DISTRIBUTION:

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)

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1. This OPLAN format conforms to the format delineated by CJCS Instruction 3122.03 JOPES, Volumes I and II.

Appendix G

Operational Tasks

Derived from the Universal Joint Task List, CJCSM 3500.04B

1. This appendix defines the role and responsibilities of the ASCC, ARFOR, or JFLCC by providing a menu of tasks and of capabilities enumerating what aspect/level of detail of operations does/does not concern him. These tasks describe in broad terms the capabilities of our Armed Forces. The tasks described provide a common language for stating capabilities required in the execution of joint/multinational operations.

2. The following three categories characterize the scope and level of either the ASCC, ARFOR, or JFLCC involvement in performance of stated tasks, subordinate tasks, and enabling tasks generally at the operational level of war necessary for the land force to support/conduct campaigns and major operations.

a. ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC. Responsibility. The ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC is actively and directly engaged in commanding, controlling, and directing the land force in accomplishment of tasks, subordinate tasks and enabling tasks so designated.

b. ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC influences. The ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC provides broad guidance sufficient to assure integration, synchronization, and full synergy of the efforts of each land force major subordinate command (MSC), in the context of the overall ground operation, toward accomplishment of the tasks, subordinate tasks, and enabling tasks so designated. The ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC then monitors progress in execution of these; providing additional guidance only as required.

c. ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC Interest. The ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC requires some level of awareness and/or status on accomplishment of tasks, subordinate tasks, and enabling tasks so designated in order to effectively command and control the ground forces but will provide guidance only on an exception basis.

3. The following task discussions are from an Army or joint land force perspective. US Army and Marine forces routinely have an organic aviation

combat element whose operations are an integral and critical aspect of the land forces' operation.

4. See CJCSM 3500,04B, Universal Joint Task List for measures of performance associated with these operational-level tasks.

OP 1 CONDUCT OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To dispose joint and/or multinational forces, conventional forces, and special operations forces (SOF) to impact the conduct of a campaign or major operation by either securing positional advantages before battle is joined or exploiting tactical success to achieve operational or strategic results. This activity includes moving or deploying land forces for operational advantage within a joint operations area and conducting maneuver to operational depths (for offensive or defensive purposes). It also includes enhancing the mobility of friendly forces and controlling battlespace on land, on and under sea, in air, or in space. Operational formations are actually composed of tactical forces moving to achieve operational or strategic operational forces. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-02, 3-09, 4-0, 4-01.6, 4-01.8)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-05.3, 3-15, 3-54, 4-01.6, CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSI 3202.01, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.1 CONDUCT OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT (ARFOR OR JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To conduct actions to deploy, shift, regroup, or move joint or multinational operational formations within JOA from less to more promising locations relative to enemy locations. Such movements can take place by any means (joint, multinational, host nation, or third-country) or mode (air, land, or sea). **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-02, 3-09, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.1)** (JP 3-08vl, 3-61, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.2, 4-01.3, CJCSM 3500.05)
Note: Transportation augmentation for operational movement from sources not organic to an operational formation is covered under OP 4.5.1, *Provide for Movement Services in the Joint Operations Area (JOA), and OP 5.4.5, Coordinate/Integrate Components, Theater, and Other Support.*

OP 1.1.1 FORMULATE REQUEST FOR STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT TO A JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To prepare a request to the theater combatant commander for the strategic movement of joint/multinational operational forces from outside the JOA. The request should be consistent with the joint force commander's campaign scheme, sequencing of operations, and time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). Although the request for land forces during the transition from peacetime, to conflict, to war may be the geographic combatant commander's responsibility, there may be times when a subordinate joint force commander requests additional forces. Such forces may be required to counter a threat to the commander's own center of gravity or to take advantage of a tactical success beyond his current capability. **(JP 4-0, 4-01.1)** (JP 3-0, 3-17, 4-01.3, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.1.2 CONDUCT INTRATHEATER DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES WITHIN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To conduct relocation or movement of operational forces by any means or mode of transportation within a JOA preparatory to deploying the force into combat formation in support of the joint force commander's plan. Accordingly, deployment must support the commander's desired employment dispositions. This task includes generating and dispersing operational forces. Redeployment may be a combat or administrative movement from deployed position in the JOA to home bases or other taskings. Extraction pertains to combat movement of personnel, units, and materiel from positions in the immediate vicinity of enemy forces to designated areas. **(JP 4-0, 4-01.1)** (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-07, 3-17, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-02.2, 5-00.2, 6-02, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.1.3 CONDUCT JOINT RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION (JRSOI) IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To conduct reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of units, personnel, equipment and materiel into JOA. Task includes offloading of aircraft, railcars, and ships, including discharge at pier side and in the stream, and processing and moving them to the point where they are transferred to the responsible tactical commander, making them part of the operational forces available for battle. This task includes clearing air and sea ports of debarkation (POD), moving unit personnel and equipment from PODs to staging areas, joining unit personnel (normally deployed by air) with their equipment (normally shipped by sea or prepositioned in storage sites or vessels), providing supplies and support necessary to achieve readiness for onward movement, and accomplishing integration of forces. **(JP 4-01.3, 4-01.5, 4-07.7, 4-04)** (JP 3-05, 3-07.5, 3-10, 4-01.7, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.2 CONDUCT OPERATIONAL MANEUVER AND FORCE POSITIONING (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To maneuver Army, joint and multinational land forces to and from battle formations and to extend forces to operational depths to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy for accomplishing operational or strategic objectives. **(JP 3-0, 3-02, 3-03, 3-09, 3-10.1)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-05, 3-17, 3-54, 4-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.2.1 COORDINATE THE TRANSITION TO AND FROM TACTICAL BATTLE FORMATIONS (JFLCC/ARFOR RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INTEREST)

To coordinate the extension of (or withdrawal from) operational forces in width and/or depth to increase tactical readiness for battle in conformance with the joint force commander's campaign or major operation plan and to facilitate the tactical commander's plan and intent. The Joint Land Operations Plan or ARFOR major operations plan should indicate disposition of operational land forces in accordance with the battlefield framework without over-controlling tactical elements. **(JP 3-02, 3-07.1, 3-10.1, 4-01.6)** (JP 3-07, 3-08v1, 3-50.21, 4-0, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 4-01.6, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.2.2 POSTURE LAND FORCES FOR OPERATIONAL FORMATIONS(ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCES)

To coordinate the grouping of land forces and means into operational formations for the conduct of major operations and campaigns. Operational-level land formations must support the commander's concept and provide for the effective use of all elements of the force. These formations retain a capability for maneuvering and increasing the strength of forces and means during the operation. The formations need agility to rapidly transform from one type of operation to another without the loss of momentum or effectiveness, continuity of operations, and protection of the force. Operational land formations may consist of several echelons of joint and combined arms organizations, for example, armor, mechanized, artillery, and helicopter forces; grouping of air and missile defense forces, special operating forces, engineers, reserves of various types, and support forces. A commander can use posturing to deceive the enemy of true intentions. **(JP 3-0, 3-50.21)** (JP 3-02, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.2.3 ASSEMBLE FORCES IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE; JFLCC INTEREST)

To assemble designated land forces where they are best disposed in time and place to initiate the operational commander's campaign plan and achieve operational and even strategic advantage. **(JP 3-0, 3-02)** (JP 3-03, 3-07.3, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.2.4 CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN DEPTH (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To conduct various types of operations to operational depths in achieving a position of advantage for the defeat or neutralization of enemy operational forces in order to accomplish operational or strategic objectives. This task includes conventional land forces and SOF. This task can accommodate various types of operational maneuver, offensive or defensive. **(JP 1, 3-0, 3-03, 3-10.1)** (JP 3-0, 3-01.4, 3-01.5, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.2.4.1 CONDUCT A SHOW OF FORCE (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To conduct an exhibition intended to demonstrate military resolve and capability to a potential belligerent to deter war or conflict. This task could be providing for increased forward presence or employing assigned forces. An example of this task is conducting a force training exercise that coincides with a troublesome international political situation. **(JP 3-0, 3-02, 3-08v2, 3-11)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-07.3, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.2.4.2 CONDUCT A DEMONSTRATION (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To employ forces to create a diversion to draw the attention and forces of an adversary from the area of a major operation without an engagement. The demonstration may be staged to deceive the enemy. This task includes the planning of branches and sequels involved if the action goes beyond a demonstration, either as a result of a changing situation or enemy action. **(JP 3-02, 3-07.1)** (JP 3-02, 3-08v2, 3-54, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.2.4.3 CONDUCT FORCIBLE ENTRY: AIRBORNE, AMPHIBIOUS, AND AIR ASSAULT (JFLCC/ARFOR RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To conduct operations to seize and hold a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition, to strike directly at enemy operational or strategic center(s) of gravity, or to gain access into the operational area or for introducing decisive forces into the region. A joint force may be tasked to do this by airborne, amphibious, and/or air assault in conjunction with other maritime, air, and special operations forces comprising the joint force. **(JP 1, 3-0, 3-02, 3-03)** (JP 3-01.5, 3-02.2, 3-03, 3-09.3, 4-01.1, 4-01.5, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.2.4.4 REINFORCE AND EXPAND LODGMENT (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To reinforce and expand the lodgment in a hostile or threatened territory to ensure the continuous air or sea landing of troops and materiel and provide the maneuver space necessary for projected operations. Normally, it is the area seized in the assault phase of an airborne, amphibious, or air assault operation. **(JP 3-0, 3-02, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-17)** (JP 3-09.3, 4-01.6, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.2.4.5 CONDUCT RAIDS IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To conduct raids into hostile territory. These activities are often small-scale and designed for swift penetration to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy key installations. Coordinating the withdrawal of forces conducting raids is part of this task. **(JP 3-0, 3-02, 3-03, 3-07)** (JP 3-02, 3-05, 3-05.5, 3-09, 3-52, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.2.4.6 CONDUCT PENETRATION, DIRECT ASSAULT, AND TURNING MOVEMENTS (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To conduct offensive operation that seeks to break through the enemy's defense and/or disrupt the enemy defensive systems. The turning movement is a variation of envelopment in which the attacking force passes around or over the enemy's principle defensive positions to secure objectives deep into the enemy's rear to force the enemy to abandon his position or divert major forces to meet the threat. **(JP 3-03, 3-05, 3-05.5)** (JP 3-0, 3-02, 3-50.21, CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.2.4.7 CONDUCT DIRECT ACTION IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To conduct short-duration strikes and other small-scale actions by special operations forces in order to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or material. The purpose is to support the campaign plan. This task includes ambushes or direct assaults; the emplacement of mines and other munitions; standoff attacks; support for employment of precision guided weapons, independent sabotage, and antiship operations. **(JP 1, 3-03, 3-05, 3-05.5, 3-09, 3-50.21)** (JP 0-2, 3-02, 3-05.3, 3-50.3, CJCSM 3500.05)
Note: See also OP 3.2, *Attack Operational Targets*.

OP 1.2.4.8 CONDUCT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARSOF RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To conduct military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, within the JOA. Included are guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert or clandestine operations, as well as indirect activities of subversion and sabotage. This task also includes,

when appropriate, integration and synchronization of indigenous and surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed by an external source. **(JP 3-03, 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-07.1, 3-09)** (JP 0-2, 3-02, 3-05.3, 3-05.5, 3-50.3, 4-02.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.2.5 CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To take the battle to the enemy. This task involves taking the initiative from the enemy, gaining freedom of action, and massing effects to achieve operational objectives. This task may be conducted with part of the joint force, while another part is conducting defensive or retrograde operations. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-07.1, 3-09.3, 3-15, 3-50.21, 3-54)** (JP 3-05.3, 3-07.1, 3-09, 3-15, 3-53, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.2.6 CONDUCT DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To counter the enemy's initiative, to defeat an enemy attack and prevent the achievement of enemy objectives. This task includes taking actions to gain time, to control key terrain or lines of communication in the operational area, or to protect forces, facilities, or locations. This task includes creating the conditions to allow the seizing of the initiative, to include eroding enemy resources at a rapid rate. This task may be conducted with part of the joint force, while another part is conducting offensive or retrograde operations. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-07.1, 3-09.3, 3-10.1, 3-15)** (JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-09, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-15, 3-55.1, CJCSI 6510.01B, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.2.7 CONDUCT RETROGRADE OPERATIONS IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To improve an operational situation or to prevent a worse one from occurring by maneuvering forces to the rear or away from the enemy. This task is executed to gain time, to preserve forces or to avoid combat under undesirable conditions or to draw the enemy into a more favorable condition for combat. This task may be conducted with part of the joint force, while another part is conducting defensive or offensive operations. This task includes such movements as withdrawal, retirement, or delaying actions. **(JP 3-0, 3-02, 4-04)** (JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-07.5, 3-09, 3-17, 3-54, 3-61, 4-01.2, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.3 PROVIDE OPERATIONAL MOBILITY (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To facilitate the movement of Army, joint and multinational operational formations in a campaign or major operation without delays due to operationally significant terrain or obstacles. **(JP 3-02, 4-01.1, 4-04)** (JP 1, 3-0, 3-02.2, 3-07.3, 3-17, 3-50.21, 4-01.1, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.3.1 OVERCOME OPERATIONALLY SIGNIFICANT BARRIERS, OBSTACLES, AND MINES (ARFOR RESPONSIBILITY; JFLCC, ASCC INFLUENCE)

To preserve freedom of operational movement by counteracting the effects of natural (existing) and other (reinforcing) operationally significant barriers (i.e., WMD killing fields), obstacles, and mines. Operationally significant barriers and obstacles include any obstruction designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the movement of an operationally significant force. Obstacles can exist naturally or can be synthetic, or can be a

combination of both. Examples of such barriers and obstacles include ports, transportation systems, major land formations (for example, mountain ranges), forests, urban areas, and systems of minefields and NBC contaminated areas. **(JP 2-01, 3-02, 3-03, 3-15)** (JP 3-02, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-15, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.3.2 ENHANCE MOVEMENT OF OPERATIONAL FORCES (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To prepare or improve facilities (for example, airfields, landing zones) and routes (for example, roads, railroads, canals, rivers, ports, port facilities, airfields) for moving operational forces in support of campaigns and major operations. **(JP 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01.1, 4-01.3, 4-01.5, 4-04)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 4-01.6, CJCSM 3500.05)
Note: This activity pertains only to that movement directly related to operational movement (see activity OP 1.1, *Conduct Operational Movement*). Maintenance of transportation modes and LOCs is addressed under OP 4, *Provide Operational Logistics and Personnel Support*.

OP 1.4 PROVIDE OPERATIONAL COUNTERMOBILITY (ARFOR RESPONSIBILITY; JFLCC, ASCC INFLUENCE)

To delay, channel, or stop offensive air, land, and sea movement by enemy operational formations in order to help create positional advantage for friendly joint and multinational operational forces. Operational countermobility exposes enemy decisive points and centers of gravity or high-payoff targets to destruction in conformance with the joint force commander's plans and intent. **(JP 3-15, 5-00.2)** (JP 3-07.3, 3-10.1, 4-01.6, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.4.1 EMPLOY OPERATIONAL SYSTEM OF OBSTACLES (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To identify air, land, and sea sites for reinforcing or constructing obstacles to take maximum advantage of existing obstacles to form a system of obstacles (normally on a large-scale) for operational effect. The system of obstacles is intended to provide friendly force flexibility for movement and increase the variety of obstacles the enemy must encounter. This task includes developing existing obstacles and reinforcing terrain with countermobility means (includes air, land, and sea). Systems of obstacles include, but are not limited to, minefields, and conventional demolitions for achieving operational results in campaigns and major operations. **(JP 3-10.1, 3-15)** (JP 2-01, 3-02, 3-03, 3-07.2, 3-07.5, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.4.2 CONDUCT SANCTIONS AND EMBARGOES (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To carry out acts designed to exclude specific items such as offensive military weapons and associated material from movement into or out of a state. This task includes the planning and execution of operational tasks and synchronization of tactical tasks which compose the sanctions. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-07, 3-08v2)** (JP 2-01, 3-07.3, 3-08v2, 3-09, 3-53, 5-00.2, CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSI 6510.01B, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.4.3 CONDUCT BLOCKADES (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To take action to cut off enemy communications and commerce in order to isolate a place or region. This task includes complete blockades and lesser degrees of blockades. This task also includes the planning and execution of operational tasks and synchronization of tactical tasks which compose the blockade. **(N/A)** (JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-08v2, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3500.05)
Note: Planning of blockades is conducted under OP 5.3, *Prepare Plans and Orders*.

OP 1.5 CONTROL OPERATIONALLY SIGNIFICANT AREAS (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To control areas of the JOA whose possession or command provides either side an operational advantage, or denying it to the enemy. Denial of the operational area can be accomplished either by occupying the operationally key area itself or by limiting use or access to the area. For an area or environment to be operationally key, its dominance or control must achieve operational or strategic results or deny same to the enemy. In military operations other than war, control of an operationally significant area also pertains to assisting a friendly country in populace and resource control. **JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-09, 3-10.1)** (JP 1, 2-0, 3-0, 3-07.5, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.5.1 CONTROL OF OPERATIONALLY SIGNIFICANT LAND AREA IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To control an area or geographic point or position that is important to the success of a campaign or major operation to prevent enemy occupation of the position through fire, fire potential, or occupation of the land area. **(JP 3-0, 3-09, 3-10.1)** (JP 3-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.5.2 GAIN AND MAINTAIN MARITIME SUPERIORITY IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To achieve that degree of dominance in the sea campaign and major battles over opposing forces which permits the conduct of operations by friendly maritime forces and their related land, sea, air, and special operations forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force in the operational area. **(JP 1, 3-0, 3-03, 3-09)** (JP 1, 3-0, 3-08v2, 3-09, 4-01.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.5.3 GAIN AND MAINTAIN AIR SUPERIORITY IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To gain control of the air to the degree which permits the conduct of operations by land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force in the operational area. **(JP 1, 3-0, 3-03, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-50.21)** (JP 1, 3-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.5.4 ISOLATE THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To deny to a regional adversary or the adversary's supporters access to key sectors of the operational area and impede the adversary's movement of supplies by sea, land, and air from areas outside the operational area. **(JP 3-0, 3-02, 3-03, 3-09, 3-10.1)** (JP 3-05, 3-07, 3-09.3, 3-10, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 1.5.5 ASSIST HOST NATION IN POPULACE AND RESOURCE CONTROL (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To assist host-nation governments to retain control over their major population centers thus precluding complicating problems which may hinder accomplishment of the joint force commander's mission. This task includes external support for control of civil unrest and restoration of basic public services (police functions, water, electricity, garbage, basic medical care) the lack of which would precipitate civil unrest. This task relates to providing civil affairs, military police, and logistic support for the movement, collections, housing, feeding, and protection of displaced citizens. **(JP 3-07, 3-07.1, 4-04)** (JP 3-05, 3-07.1, 3-07.4, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 4-02, CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSM 3500.05)

Note: See also OP 4.7.6, Coordinate Civil Affairs in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

OP 1.6 CONDUCT PATIENT EVACUATION (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To conduct patient evacuation and provide transportation of patients by any means to greater capability of medical care. To provide forces, resources, and evacuation channels for patient evacuation. **(JP 3-11, 4-01.3, 4-02, 4-02.2, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-02, 4-02.2, CJCSM 3141.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

Note: Planning for patient evacuation is conducted under OP 5.3, *Prepare Plans and Orders*. Planning evacuation includes identifying and considering all the issues associated with the optimum utilization of patient evacuation resources and producing the necessary products to ensure effectiveness of patient evacuation operations are maximized.

OP 2 PROVIDE OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To produce the intelligence required to accomplish objectives within a joint operations area (JOA), to include planning and conducting subordinate campaigns and major operations. Operational intelligence includes determining when, where, and in what strength the enemy will stage and conduct campaigns and major operations. This task also includes providing intelligence support for friendly IO. Operational intelligence addresses the threat across the range of military operations including operations other than war. Operational surveillance and reconnaissance are included in this task. It also includes intelligence support to friendly nations and groups. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3.01.1, 3-03, 3-09, 3-13.1, 3-50-21)** (JP 2-0, 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-05.3, 3-07.4, 3-07.5, 3-09, 3-50.21, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.1 DIRECT OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To assist joint force commanders in determining their intelligence requirements, then planning the operational collection effort and issuing the necessary orders and requests to intelligence organizations. This task includes reviewing, validating, and prioritizing requirements and taskings. Requirements include intelligence for US forces and for host nations or groups in supporting military operations other than war and warfighting operations. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-09, 3-50.21, 3-54)** (JP 2-0, 3-07.5, 3.1-, 4-02.1, CJCSI 3710.01, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.5)

OP 2.1.1 DETERMINE AND PRIORITIZE OPERATIONAL PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (PIR) (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To assist joint force commanders in determining and prioritizing their priority intelligence requirements. In military operations other than war, it includes helping and training host nations to determine their intelligence requirements, such as in a counterinsurgency. **(JP 2-0, 2-01. 3-03, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-58)** (JP 2-01, 3-05.3, 3-10.1, 3-55, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.1.2 DETERMINE AND PRIORITIZE OPERATIONAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS (IR) (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To identify those items of information that must be collected and processed to develop the intelligence required by the commander's PIR. **JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-03)** (JP 3-09, 5-00.2, 6-0, CJCSI 3810.01A, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05, DODI 8910.01M)

OP 2.1.3 PREPARE OPERATIONAL COLLECTION PLAN (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To develop a collection plan that will satisfy the commander's intelligence requirements. Collection planning includes assigning the appropriate collection capabilities to fulfill specific intelligence requirements. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-09)** (JP 2-01, 3-55, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.1.4 ALLOCATE INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To assign adequate resources to theater and JTF intelligence organizations to permit the accomplishment of assigned intelligence tasks. This task includes requesting support and the reallocation of additional assets from national intelligence agencies and from allied countries. **(JP 2-0, 2-01)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.2 COLLECT AND SHARE OPERATIONAL INFORMATION (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To gather information from operational and tactical sources on operational and tactical threat forces and their decisive points (and related high-payoff targets such as WMD production, infrastructure and delivery systems). It also includes collection of information on the nature and characteristics of the operational area (including area of interest). Locating and reporting captured or isolated personnel falls under this task. In addition, collection of data to support combat assessment is included in this task. The sharing of collected information within the multi-Service intelligence communities can consolidate return of information, promote fusion, and prevent retasking of scarce assets. This task applies in peace and war and those military operations other than war. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-50.21)** (JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-07.5, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.2.1 COLLECT INFORMATION ON OPERATIONAL SITUATION (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To obtain operationally significant information on enemy (and friendly) force strengths and vulnerabilities, threat operational doctrine, and forces (land, sea, and air and space). Threat includes threat allies, and, in military operations other than war, insurgents, terrorists, illegal drug traffickers, belligerents in peace support or peace enforcement situations, and other opponents. It also includes collecting information on the nature and characteristics of the area of interest, to include collecting battlefield damage assessment, munitions effects, medical assessments, and hazards, such as NBC contamination to conduct mission assessment. The nature and characteristics of the area include significant political, economic, industrial, geospatial (e.g., aeronautical, hydrographic, geodetic, topographic), demographic, medical, climatic, and cultural, as well as psychological profiles of the resident populations. This task includes collecting counterintelligence information to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-03, 3-0, 3-50.21, 3-54)** (JP 2-01.2, 3-0, 3-07.5, 3-50.21, 3-55, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.2.2 DIRECTLY SUPPORT THEATER STRATEGIC SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE REQUIREMENTS (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To provide, as directed, surveillance and reconnaissance support, to include natural environmental conditions, environmental protection and human health infrastructure, and

other environmentally sensitive areas, to combatant commanders and national level agencies. This task includes providing the output of joint operations area assets or asset production, to meet the needs of combatant commanders and designated national agencies. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3.01.1, 3-03, 3-09, 3-50.21, 3-55)** (JP 2-0, 3-01.1, 3-05, 3-09, 3-50.21, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

Note: See also OP 6.2.5, *Provide Positive Identification of Friendly Forces Within the Joint Operational Area.*

OP 2.2.3 COLLECT AND ASSESS METEOROLOGICAL AND OCEANOGRAPHIC (METOC) OPERATIONAL INFORMATION (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To collect and assess operationally significant METOC information on enemy (and friendly) force strengths and vulnerabilities and forces. This includes collecting and assessing climatic and hydrographic information necessary to understand the nature and characteristics of the area, and how the climate will effect the enemy's use and friendly forces defense of nuclear, chemical and biological warfare (CBW). This also includes the production and assessment of tactical decision aids and weather effects matrices for the planning and execution of operations. **(JP 2-01, 3-08v1, 3-59)** (JP 3-05, 3-56.1, CJCSI 3810.01A, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3141.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.2.4 DETERMINE LOGISTICAL CAPABILITY OF THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

Determine a host-nation's capability to procure, receive, store, maintain, distribute, and control the flow of military material between the point of reception into the military system and the point of issue. Task includes a detailed analysis of: host-nation's road, rail, and air networks; port and harbor facilities, storage, maintenance, health services, and warehousing capabilities; and other logistical supply and field service activities. **(JP 3-09, 3-50.21, 4-0, 4-03)** (JP 3-0, 4-0, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3150.23, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.2.5 COLLECT TARGET INFORMATION (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To acquire information that supports the detection, identification, and location of enemy targets in sufficient detail to permit attack by friendly weapons. The target acquisition system may be closed loop (an inherent part of friendly weapons system), open loop (separate from the firing system but nevertheless part of the overall weapon system), or an independent surveillance and reconnaissance system. Activities include searching, detecting, locating, and identifying targets and conducting post-attack battle damage assessment. This task includes electronic warfare support (EWS). **(JP 3-01.5, 3-02, 3-09, 3-09.3, 3-10.1)** (JP 3-0, 3-01.4, 3-05.5, 3-09, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.3 PROCESS AND EXPLOIT COLLECTED OPERATIONAL INFORMATION (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To convert collected operational information into forms that can be readily used by intelligence analysts during production. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-54)** (JP 3-0, 3-05.3, 3-09, CJCSI 6510.01B, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.3.1 CONDUCT TECHNICAL PROCESSING AND EXPLOITATION IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To perform activities such as imagery development and interpretation, document translation, data conversion, technical analysis of captured enemy material, and decryption of encoded material. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-08v2, 3-09, 3-54)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.3.2 COLLATE INFORMATION (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To identify and group together related items of information for critical comparison. **(JP 2-0, 2-01)** (JP 2-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.3.3 CORRELATE INFORMATION (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To associate and combine data on a single subject to improve the reliability or credibility of the information. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-07.1, 3-54)** (JP 2-0, 3-08v2, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.4 PRODUCE OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND PREPARE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To convert processed and exploited information into intelligence that satisfies the joint operations area (JOA) commander's PIRs, intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), and other intelligence requirements. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-07.1, 3-54)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-08v2, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.4.1 EVALUATE, INTEGRATE, ANALYZE, AND INTERPRET OPERATIONAL INFORMATION (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To appraise information for credibility, reliability, pertinency, and accuracy (Evaluate). It includes forming patterns through the selection and combination of processed information. It involves integrating strategic, operational, and tactical information (Integrate). This task further includes reviewing information to identify significant facts for subsequent interpretation (Analyze). Finally, the task is to judge the significance of information in relation to the current body of knowledge (Interpret). **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-50.21, 3-54)** (JP 2-0, 3-01.1, 3-08v2, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.4.1.1 IDENTIFY OPERATIONAL ISSUES AND THREATS (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To assess threats to the United States, US military forces, and the countries and forces of multinational partners. This task includes assessing potential issues and situations that could impact US national security interests and objectives within the joint operations area. This task includes analyzing the nature and characteristics of the theater to determine the types and scale of operations the theater will support and the impact of significant regional features and hazards on the conduct of both friendly and enemy campaigns or joint operations. The analysis includes the impact of limiting factors (for example, rules of engagement) and determination of the geographic combatant commander or CJTF area of interest. Significant regional features include political, economic, industrial, demographic, climatic, populace, cultural, medical, lingual, historical, and psychological features of the area. This task also includes analyzing significant alterations to the theater of war that create strategic hazards (such as NBC contamination). Further, this task includes conducting analyses to determine the impact of social, political, economic, and health environment on the area of operations and in particular on campaign plans and joint operations. Finally, it includes an analysis of opportunities for obtaining local resources, facilities, and support in the area of operations and ways of minimizing interference with military operations. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-03, 3-07.1)** (JP 2-0, 3-07.2, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-54, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.4.1.2 DETERMINE ENEMY'S OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES, COURSE OF ACTION, AND INTENTIONS (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To identify, at the operational level, what the enemy (or potential enemy) can do, as well as when, where, and with what strength. This task addresses both military and nonmilitary capabilities. It also includes identifying the enemy's operational centers of gravity. Further, this task addresses the enemy's mobilization potential; operational organization (including alliance forces); and dispositions, doctrine, military capabilities, C2 structure, and decision making processes. This evaluation includes continuous refinement of the orders of battle for the entire array of joint and multinational forces available to the enemy commanders in the area of operations. Also included are the personalities and history of performance of key leaders, determination of who has NBC release authority, and the doctrine for employment of forces at the operational level. In military operations other than war, this activity also includes evaluation of developing insurgencies. Assessment of enemy IO capabilities is included here. This task includes identifying all operational courses of action open to the enemy. When sufficient intelligence is available, determine the relative order of probability of each course of action. Identify any factors that may influence the enemy to adopt each course of action. Finally, this task involves determining the susceptibility of vital elements of the enemy's operational military power to the potential actions of the joint force. Operational vulnerabilities may pertain to political, geographic, climate, economic, scientific, societal, or military factors. This task should, among other results, include the creation of intelligence preparation of the battlespace products for the operational area. These products should include developing templates and reports to assist theater intelligence and targeting organizations in determining, tracking, monitoring, and targeting operational critical target sets, and their associated infrastructure. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-07.1, 3-09, 3-10.1)** (JP 2-0, 3-01.1, 3-55, 4-01.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.4.1.3 IDENTIFY FRIENDLY/ENEMY/NEUTRAL CENTERS OF GRAVITY (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

Identify physical, operational, cultural, political/diplomatic, and economic, organizational centers of gravity for friendly, enemy, and neutral forces, including, as appropriate, IOs/NGOs/PVOs. **(JP 1, 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.4 3-09, 3-56.1, 5-0, CJCSI 3151.01, CJCSM 3141.01)** (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-11, 3-12, 3-55, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.4.2 PREPARE INTELLIGENCE FOR THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To prepare intelligence and present them to the users, including other intelligence personnel, in a finished state. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-03, 3-01.1, 3-54)** (JP 2-01, 3-08v2, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.4.2.1 PROVIDE INDICATIONS AND WARNING FOR THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To report time-sensitive intelligence on foreign developments that could threaten the United States, its citizens abroad, or allied military, political, or economic interests. This task also includes identifying hostile reactions to US reconnaissance activities and indications of impending terrorist attacks. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-03, 6-02)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-07.1, 3-08v2, 4-01.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.4.2.2 PROVIDE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE FOR THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To report operational intelligence of immediate value relating to the joint operations area. This task includes the preparation of intelligence estimates and assessments and periodic intelligence briefings and reports. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-03, 3-50.3)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-09, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.4.2.3 PROVIDE GENERAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE FOR THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To report intelligence relating to the operational military capabilities of enemy forces. This task includes creating and maintaining databases relating to the military capabilities of current and potential adversaries. **(JP 2-0, 2-01)** (JP 2-01, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.4.2.4 PROVIDE TARGET INTELLIGENCE FOR THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To report intelligence of operational targeting value. This includes supporting the operational targeting process and providing data to support offensive IO. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-05.5, 3-09)** (JP 3-02, 3-05.3, 3-56.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3141.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.5 DISSEMINATE AND INTEGRATE OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To provide operational intelligence, in a timely way, in an appropriate form, and by any suitable means, to the geographic combatant commander, JTF, and component commanders and to ensure that the intelligence is understood and considered by the commanders. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-03, 3-10.1)** (JP 2-01, 3-01.5, 3-07.2, 3-08v2, 3-10.1, 3-55, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.5.1 PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE FOR THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To ensure the transmission to all organizations and personnel with a need to know intelligence materials produced in response to the JOA intelligence requirements. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-10.1)** (JP 2-01, 3-07.1, 3-10.1, 3-54, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

Note: The transmission of intelligence products, by message, hard copy, or other method is provided for by OP 5.1.1, *Communicate Operational Information*.

OP 2.5.2 PROVIDE FOLLOW-ON INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) PLANNERS AND DECISION MAKERS (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To be available for and to participate in joint force commander strategic planning and execution. This task includes providing intelligence inputs in response to queries based upon furnished intelligence products or the evolution of events within the JOA. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-07.1)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.5.3 PROVIDE NEAR REAL-TIME INTELLIGENCE FOR THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) PLANNERS AND DECISION MAKERS (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

Ensure near real-time (defined as within 5 seconds to 5 minutes of occurrence) air, ground, and naval threat. Situational awareness, counterdrug, and AT/FP information is disseminated to decision makers at a usable classification level. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-05.3, 3-50.21)** (JP 3-07.4, 3-50.21, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 2.6 EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To determine how well intelligence operations are being performed and to make any necessary improvements. The primary factor is that the consumer's intelligence requirements are being satisfied on time. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-07.1)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-07.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3 EMPLOY OPERATIONAL FIREPOWER (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To employ lethal and nonlethal means to defeat enemy forces or to maintain freedom of movement. Operational firepower is, by its nature, primarily a joint/multinational task. Firepower refers to the delivery of all types of ordnance to include bombs, rockets, missiles, and artillery as well as other nonlethal means against enemy targets at operational depths. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-09, 3-52)** (JP 1, 3-05, 3-09.3, 3-10, CJCSM 3500.05)

Note: Operational firepower is normally furnished by assets other than those required for the routine support of tactical maneuver or strategic attack operations. However, as the range of assets used to support tactical maneuver increases, those assets will play a more significant role in the delivery of operational firepower. Planning for operational firepower is part of the operational command and control activity, OP 5.3, *Prepare Plans and Orders*, in which the joint force commander integrates joint and multinational capabilities into a coherent joint operations area campaign plan with supporting land, naval, air, and special operations plans. Also, see OP 5.6, *Coordinate Operational Information Operations (IO)*.

OP 3.1 CONDUCT JOINT FORCE TARGETING (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To positively identify and select targets that decisively impact campaigns and major operations and match the targets to appropriate joint or multinational systems. Targeting is accomplished primarily by the individual components to attain objectives and achieve effects as directed by the JFC. The term target is used in its broadest sense to include targets in military operations other than war, such as a target audience of psychological operations in a counterinsurgency situation. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-01.4, 3-03, 3-09, 3-56.1)** (JP 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-05.5, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-10.1, 3-55, 3-55.1, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.1.1 ESTABLISH JOINT FORCE TARGETING GUIDANCE (ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE; ASCC INTEREST)

To contribute to the development of the JFC's guidance and priorities for targeting and identification of requirements by components; the prioritization of these requirements; the acquisition of targets or target sets; and the attack of targets by components. The guidance and prioritization matches objectives and guidance with inputs from intelligence and operations personnel to select specific targets. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-01.4, 3-03, 3-05.5, 3-09, 3-56.1)** (JP 2-01, 3-05.5, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.1.2 APPORTION JOINT/MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONAL FIREPOWER RESOURCES (ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE; ASCC INTEREST)

To recomment the apportionment of operational firepower means to operational targets consistent with the joint force commander's plan and intent. To determine and designate the total expected effort by percentage and/or priority that should be devoted to the various land, sea, air, and space operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time by each component. Apportionment of firepower resources allows the JFC to ensure the weight of the joint firepower effort is consistent with campaign phases and objectives. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-09)** (JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-56.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.1.3 DEVELOP OPERATIONAL TARGETS (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To evaluate and choose operational targets for attack to achieve optimum effect in support of the operational level joint force commander's intent. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-03, 3-0, 3-03, 3-09, 3-13.1, 3-55, 3-56.1)** (JP 2-01, 3-09.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

Note: Related activities are found under intelligence and C2, respectively. Air targets for this task include offensive counterair targets but do not include air defense or defensive counter air targets; these are covered in OP 6.1, *Provide Operational Air, Space, and Missile Defense*. Operational targets include the destruction and degradation of enemy C2W means, which include EW. See OP 5.6, *Coordinate Operational Information Operations (IO)*.

OP 3.1.4 DEVELOP HIGH-PAYOFF AND HIGH-VALUE TARGETS (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To identify high-value targets (HVTs). HVTs are those assets the enemy requires for the successful completion of a mission. HVTs which, if successfully attacked, would contribute substantially to friendly operations, are called high-payoff targets (HPTs). This task includes prioritizing the HPTs into a high-payoff target list (HPTL) and developing guidance on what and when they should be attacked and the assets used for the attack. **(JP 3-03, 3-09, 3-13.1, 3-55, 3-56.1)** (JP 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-03, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.1.5 PUBLISH AIR TASKING ORDER(S) (ATO) (ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE; ASCC INTEREST)

To contribute to an ATO that assigns missions and specific taskings for each joint force subordinate command employing air assets in the airspace control area of the AOR or joint operations area. Normally published daily, the ATO is disseminated to appropriate units and C2 agencies. It provides specific instructions to each projected mission as well as general instructions and notification to all joint forces. The ATO can also be used to notify supported land and sea forces of expected missions. **(JP 3-03, 3-09.3, 3-56.1)** (JP 3-02, 3-05.3, 3-09, 3-50.21, 3-52, 4-02.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.1.6 CONDUCT OPERATIONAL COMBAT/MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR ASSESSMENT (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INTEREST)

To determine the overall effectiveness of joint and multinational forces employment in the operational area as it relates to strategic and operational objectives in subordinate campaigns and major operations. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-03, 3-09, 3-56.1)** (JP 2-0, 3-05.5, 3-09, 3-13.1, 3-55, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.1.6.1 ASSESS BATTLE DAMAGE ON OPERATIONAL TARGETS (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To conduct timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force either lethal or nonlethal against predetermined operational objectives. BDA can be applied to all types of systems throughout the range of military operations. BDA is primarily an intelligence responsibility in the targeting process with inputs from operators. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-03, 3-55)** (JP 2-0, 3-09, 3-09.3, 3-55.1, 3-56.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

Note: See also OP 2.2.1, *Collect Information on Operational Situation*.

OP 3.1.6.2 ASSESS MUNITIONS EFFECTS ON OPERATIONAL TARGETS (ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To evaluate damage from munitions employed to determine more effective munitions for continuing attack of these targets in subordinate campaigns and major operations. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-03, 3-09, 3-56.1)** (JP 2-01, 3-03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.1.6.3 ASSESS REATTACK REQUIREMENT (ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To evaluate the overall impact and effectiveness of operations against the enemy and what, if any, changes or additional efforts need to take place to meet the operational commander's objectives in the current major operation or phase of the subordinate campaign. **(JP 3-03, 3-09, 3-09.3, 3-56.1)** (JP 2-0, 3-01.1, 3-12.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.1.7 EMPLOY FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To employ fire support coordination measures and the procedures associated with those measures to assist in the C2 of joint forces. Within their areas of operation, land and amphibious commanders employ permissive and restrictive fire support coordinating measures (e.g., restricted fire line) to enhance the attack

of targets; protect forces, populations, critical infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural significance; and set the stage for future operations. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-01.4, 3-09, 3-10.1, 6-0)** (JP 3-01.4, 3-05.5, 3-07.5, 3-09, 3-09.3, 3-10.1, 3-11, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.2 ATTACK OPERATIONAL TARGETS (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INTEREST)

To engage operational level targets and to shape and control the tempo of campaigns using all available joint and multinational operational firepower (includes ground, naval, air, space, and SOF conventional and special munitions) against land, air, and maritime (surface and subsurface) targets having operational significance. Operational targets can be conventional or NBC (weapons of mass destruction) related. **(JP 1, 2-01, 3-0, 3-03, 3-09, 3-54)** (JP 2-0, 3-55, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.2.1 PROVIDE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT INTEGRATION FOR SURFACE FORCES (ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE; ASCC INTEREST)

To attack operational land and sea targets with available joint and multinational operational firepower delivery systems. To delay, disrupt, destroy, or degrade enemy operational forces or critical tasks and facilities (including C2I targets) and to affect the enemy's will to fight. This task includes integrating the tasking and targeting options, as well as the liaison requirements for aircraft to provide direct close air support to surface forces. **(JP 3-0, 3-09, 3-09.3, 3-10, 3-10.1)** (JP 3-09, 3-09.1, 3-09.3, 3-50.21, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.2.2 CONDUCT ATTACK ON OPERATIONAL TARGETS USING NONLETHAL MEANS (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To engage operational targets with nonlethal joint and multinational means designed to degrade, impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of enemy operational forces, tasks, and facilities. The means include the use of PSYOP, SOF, electronic attack, and other IO capabilities. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-09, 3-11, 3-13, 3-13.1, 3-54, 3-56.1)** (JP 3-0, 3-05, 3-05.5, 3-07.5, 3-09, 3-53, CJCSI 3110.09, CJCSM 3210.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.2.2.1 EMPLOY PSYOP IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE; ASCC INTEREST)

To plan and execute operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences in the operational area to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. PSYOP actions are aimed at making the adversary leadership, military personnel, or population modify their behavior in ways that are favorable to US or allied/coalition efforts in the operation area. PSYOP consolidation activities are planned activities in war and military operations other than war directed at the civilian population located in areas under friendly control in order to achieve a desired behavior which supports the military objectives and the operational freedom of the supported commander. PSYOP activities are integrated and/or coordinated with other IO activities within the area of operation and with other US/multinational government (outside DOD) informational activities within the operational area. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-10.1, 3-13.1, 3-50.3, 3-53, 3-54, 3-57, 3-61)** (JP 3-03, 3-05, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-09, 3-10.1, CJCSI 3110.09, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

Note: This task supports OP 5.6, *Coordinate Operational Information Operations (IO)*.

OP 3.2.2.2 EMPLOY ELECTRONIC ATTACK (EA) IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To employ electromagnetic or directed energy to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability within the operational area. EA includes: 1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming, and 2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams). **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-10.1, 3-**

13.1, 3-54) (JP 3-01.4, 3-09, 3-51, 3-58, CJCSI 3110.09, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)
Note: Electronic warfare includes three elements, EA (above task), Electronic Protection (EP), and EW Support (ES). Electromagnetic deception, an aspect of EA, is included under OP 6.4, *Conduct Military Deception in Support of Subordinate Campaigns and Major Operations*. EP is included under OP 6.2.3, *Protect Use of Electromagnetic Spectrum in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)*, and EWS is included under OP 2, *Provide Operational Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance*.

OP 3.2.2.3 EMPLOY INFORMATION ATTACK IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To employ offensive IO capabilities to achieve operational objectives. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-13.1, 3-54, 6-0)** (JP 2-01, 3-58, 6-0, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.2.2.4 CONDUCT ATTACK ON PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT, AND INSTALLATIONS USING NONLETHAL MEANS (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INTEREST)

To conduct nonlethal attack against personnel, equipment, and installations to neutralize or degrade their combat capability or contribution. This task includes all forms of nonlethal attack not involving PSYOP, EA, and information-based attacks. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-09, 3-13, 3-13.1)** (JP 3-03, 3-09, 3-50.21, 3-54, 3-58, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.2.3 ATTACK AIRCRAFT AND MISSILE (OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR (OCA)) (ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To attack the enemy's assets before they can be employed against friendly assets. OCA is an operation mounted to destroy, disrupt, or limit enemy air power as close to its source as possible. It seized the air initiative through taking the air war to the enemy by targeting air bases, support infrastructure, warning and control systems, TM support and launch facilities, surface-based air and missile defenses, and aircraft. **(JP 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-10.1)** (JP 3-02, 3-03, 3-09, CJCMS 3500.05)
Note: Defensive counterair is addressed under OP 6.1.4, *Counter Enemy Air Attack (Defensive Counterair (DCA)) in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)*.

OP 3.2.4 SUPPRESS ENEMY AIR DEFENSES (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INTEREST)

To coordinate, integrate, and synchronize attacks that neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means. **(JP 3-01.4, 3-03, 3-09, 3-09.3, 3-50.21, 4-01.1)** (JP 1, 3-05.3, 3-15, 3-17, 4-01.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.2.5 INTERDICT OPERATIONAL FORCES/TARGETS (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INTEREST)

To coordinate, integrate, and synchronize actions that divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's military potential (forces, nodes, LOCs, networks, and infrastructures) before it can be used effectively against friendly forces conducting campaigns and major operations in the JOA. **(JP 3-0, 3-03)** (JP 3-01.4, 3-02, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.2.5.1 CONDUCT AIR INTERDICTION OF OPERATIONAL FORCES/TARGETS (ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To conduct air operations as part of the JFC's campaign or major operation to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential. Actions are conducted at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. **(JP 3-03)** (JP 3-0, 3-07.4, 3-09, 3-12.1, 3-56.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.2.5.2 CONDUCT SURFACE/SUBSURFACE FIREPOWER INTERDICTION OF OPERATIONAL FORCES/TARGETS (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INTEREST)

To conduct land or sea operations as part of the JFC's campaign or major operation to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential. Actions are conducted at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each mission with the firepower and movement of friendly forces is not required. **(JP 3-03, 3-09, 3-56.1)** (JP 3-0, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.2.5.3 CONDUCT SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTERDICTION OF OPERATIONAL FORCES/TARGETS (ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE; ASCC INTEREST)

To conduct special operations throughout the joint operations area (JOA) as part of the JFC's campaign or major operation to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential. Actions are conducted at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each mission with the firepower and movement of friendly forces is not required. **(JP 3-03, 3-05.3, 3-09)** (JP 3-0, 3-05, 3-09, 3-50.3, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.2.6 PROVIDE FIREPOWER IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONAL MANEUVER (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To support land and sea joint operational maneuver as part of the JFC's campaign or major operations plan by engaging operational targets (except air defense, antiair, or defensive counterair targets) with available joint and multinational operational firepower delivery systems. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-09)** (JP 3-52, 3-56.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.2.7 SYNCHRONIZE OPERATIONAL FIREPOWER (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INTEREST)

To synchronize, and integrate as necessary, operational attacks on single or multiple operational targets at the decisive time and place. This integration includes lethal and/or nonlethal means and minimizing their effect on friendly forces, neutrals, and noncombatants. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-09, 3-10.1)** (JP 3-09.3, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.3 CONDUCT PEACE OPERATIONS IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To conduct peace operations (PO) in an operational area. This involves actions to preserve, maintain, or restore the peace and coordinate the interaction on military forces with political and humanitarian agencies involved. PO are often associated with foreign humanitarian assistance operations. Such action is normally conducted under the authority of Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter. PO encompasses peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations (PEO) in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. Optimally, PKO forces should not transition to PEO or vice versa unless there is the requisite mandate or political decision and appropriate adjustments to force structure, rules of engagement (ROE), and other important aspects of the mission. In PO there should be plans for transition from PKO to PEO (rapid and unpredictable events may occur) or from PEO to PKO (more deliberate and predictable as the operation unfolds successfully). Types of transition may include: US unilateral operation or multinational coalition to a UN-led coalition; combat to noncombat operations; and millitary to civilian control. PO "mission creep" occurs when a mission changes in response to new events or circumstances. It may develop from inadequate or false assumptions, misinterpreted intent, or unrealistic development of implied tasks in planning. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07, 3-57)** (JP 3-07.3, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 3-09, 3-50.3, 3-57, 3-61, JWFC Handbook, CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.3.1 CONDUCT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To conduct peacekeeping operations (PKO) in the JOA. PKO are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. PKO are conducted by impartial peacekeeping (PK) forces. Peacekeepers conduct operations in an open and highly conspicuous manner to establish a presence, which inhibits hostile action by disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace process. Such action is normally conducted under the authority of Chapter VI of the UN Charter. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07, 3-57)** (JP 3-07.3, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 3-09, 3-50.3, 3-57, 3-61, 4-02.1, JWFC Handbook, CJSCI 3110.14, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 3.3.2 CONDUCT PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To conduct peace enforcement operations (PEO) in the JOA. PEO are the application of military forces, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolution of sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Peace enforcers generally have full combat capabilities, although there may be some restrictions on weapons and targeting, depending on the mandate, ROE, and tactical situation. Peace enforcement forces strive to help create the conditions for conflict resolution. Such action is normally conducted under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. **JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-57)** (JP 3-07, 3-08v2, CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSM 3500.05, JWFC Handbook)

OP 3.3.3 CONDUCT MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To conduct peace operations with multinational partners as part of a UN force, regional arrangements, or other multinational coalitions. Such action is normally conducted under the authority of Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter or by regional arrangements in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. **(JP 0-2, 3-07, 3-07.3, 3-08V1, 3-08v2)** (JP 3-07.3, 3-08v2, 3-57, CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSM 3500.05, JWFC Handbook)

OP 4 PROVIDE OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL SUPPORT (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To provide logistics and personnel support activities required to sustain the force in campaigns and major operations within the joint operations area. The logistic concept should support theater activity by properly organizing support from the CONUS base to the combat zone. At the theater operational level, specific considerations include identification of operational requirements and establishment of priorities for the employment of the resources provided. This theater of operations/JOA sustaining base, which includes the communications zone (COMMZ), links strategic sustainment to tactical CSS. In military operations other than war, the activities under operational support also pertain to support of US forces, other US government agencies, and forces of friendly countries or groups being supported by US forces. Operational support includes sustaining the tempo and the continuity of operations throughout a campaign or major operation. This task includes obtaining sustainment support from sources other than Military Services and includes the following: host-nation support, logistic civil augmentation, DOD civilian support, and captured materiel. **(JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v2, 3-50.21, 4-0, 4-01.1, 4-01.2 , 4-01.4)** (JP 0-2, 3-05, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-08v2, 3-09, 3-17, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-02.1, 4-03, CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)
Note: Sustainment activities related to setting priorities, establishing stock levels, managing critical materials, and obtaining support from civilian economy (i.e., HNS) are covered by OP 5, *Provide Operational Command and Control (C2)*.

OP 4.1 COORDINATE SUPPLY OF ARMS, MUNITIONS, AND EQUIPMENT IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To replenish arms, munitions, and equipment required for joint force components and multinational operational forces in conformance with the commander's campaign or major operation plans. It also includes routine replenishment of arms in the JOA. Transportation and distribution of arms, ammunition, munitions, and equipment are part of this task. It includes distribution not necessarily connected with formations in a campaign or major operation and provision of arms for support organizations and facilities in the COMMZ of the JOA. This task includes collecting, providing, processing ITV data, and actions of the Joint Material Priorities and Allocation Board. **(JP 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-09, 4-0, 4-01.1)** (JP 3-17, 4-01.2, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.2 SYNCHRONIZE SUPPLY OF FUEL IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To provide the uninterrupted flow of fuel (Class III) to joint or multinational operational forces in conformance with the commander's campaign or major operation plans. It also includes routine replenishment of fuel in the operational area. The source of fuel system would include the inland, offshore, or any other fuel distribution system. **(JP 3-0, 3-08v1, 4-0, 4-01.2, 4-01.6, 4-03)** (JP 3-07.5, 3-08v2, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

Note: For the delivery of Class III, see OP 4.5.1, *Provide for Movement Services in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)*.

OP 4.3 PROVIDE FOR MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To establish facilities in rear areas for the repair and replacement of materiel and to establish policies on repair and evacuation of equipment in support of operational forces in campaigns and major operations. This activity includes concentrating on and providing maintenance services (including recovery, battle damage assessment, and repair). It also includes providing class IX supplies for retaining operational forces in or restoring them to a high state of materiel readiness. This task includes establishing repair, replacement, and evacuation policies. **(JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01.6, 4-06)** (JP 3-04.1, 3-05, 3-07.5, 3-17, 3-50.21, 4-01.6, 4-01.7, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

Note: See also OP 4.5, *Manage Logistic Support in the Joint Operations Area* to provide maintenance services and class IX supplies in support of operational forces in campaigns, major operations, and routine COMMZ maintenance activities by employing transportation and supply services-applies to this task.

OP 4.4 COORDINATE SUPPORT FOR FORCES IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To coordinate the providing of trained personnel, units, and replacements to Army forces in the JOA. This task also includes providing personnel and health services support for campaigns, major operations, joint task force organizations, and routine COMMZ support. **(JP 3-0, 4-0, 4-02.1)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 4-0, 4-02, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.4.1 COORDINATE FIELD SERVICES REQUIREMENTS (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To coordinate field services and supplies requirements in support of personnel (including food, water, personal welfare and comfort items; clothing and individual equipment; laundry, bath, and renovation; and mortuary affairs) in the joint operations area. **(JP 1-05, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-09, 4-0, 4-04)** (JP 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-04.1, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 4-02, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.4.1.1 COORDINATE SUPPORT FOR PERSONNEL IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR INFLUENCE; JFLCC INTEREST)

To coordinate nonmaterial support activities of military personnel, Department of Defense civilian, qualifying contractor personnel, and other personnel (e.g., accredited news media representatives). Activities include food, water, personal welfare and comfort items, clothing and individual equipment, laundry and bath. This task includes coordinating rigging support for aerial delivery in support of operational objectives. **(JP 1-05, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 4-0)** (JP 0-2, 3-04.1, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.4.1.2 COORDINATE MORTUARY AFFAIRS IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

Coordinate procedures for the search, recovery, evacuation, identification processing, and temporary burial of remains in the JOA. This task addresses decontamination procedures for processing contaminated remains; processing personal effects of deceased, captured, missing, and medically evacuated personnel; and managing technical services and supplies incident to temporary burial of the remains. This task is normally accomplished through theater mortuary collection points to the joint mortuary affairs office (JMAO). **(JP 4-0, 4-06)** (JP 0-2, 1-05, 3-07.3, 3-07.5, 4-0, 4-01.7, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05, MOP 16)

OP 4.4.2 PROVIDE FOR PERSONNEL SERVICES (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To provide personnel service support (including administration, finance, chaplain, and individual support) to prepare operational forces for campaigns, major operations, routine COMMZ support, accountability of deployed forces, and the sustainment of the tempo of operations. This task includes providing for rest and relaxation (R&R) facilities. **(JP 1-05, 4-01.2, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 1-05, 2-0, 3-05.3, CJCSI 3141.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.4.3 PROVIDE FOR HEALTH SERVICES IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To provide health service support in the operational area to include, but is not limited to: health services resources; preventive and curative health measures; patient evacuation; return to duty determination; blood management, medical logistics; combat stress control, medical, dental, veterinary, ancillary services, optometry, medical food supply, and medical intelligence services. This task includes actions of the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center (TPMRC) and the Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO). **(JP 3-07.1, 4-0, 4-02, 4-02.1, 4-02.2)** (JP 0-2, 3-02, 3-07.3, 3-10.1, 3-11, 4-02.2, 4-05, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.4.3.1 MANAGE JOINT BLOOD PROGRAM IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To provide blood product collection, storage, testing (if applicable), and distribution systems to support peacetime and contingency blood requirements. This task is normally executed through the supported JFC surgeon charged with managing a network of component and area joint blood programs. This task includes, but is not limited to systems: to track and record final disposition of all blood products, to support look-back protocols, and to communicate between Area Joint Blood Program Offices (AJBPO), Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO), and Armed Services Blood Program Office (ASBPO). **(JP 4-0, 4-02, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-08v2, 4-01.7, 4-02, 4-02.2, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.4.3.2 MANAGE FLOW OF CASUALTIES IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To organize and control the flow of casualties within the JOA, and to coordinate the flow of patients to medical facilities within the combatant command AOR or for intertheater evacuation. This task includes coordination activities between the TPMRC and the Global Patient Movement Requirement Center. **(JP 3-0, 3-11, 4-01.1, 4-02, 4-02.1, 4-02.2)** (JP 3-02, 4-0, 4-01.1, 4-02, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.4.3.3 MANAGE HEALTH SERVICES RESOURCES IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To manage the JOA medical resources to provide effective and consistent treatment of wounded, injured, or sick personnel so as to return to full duty or evacuate from the JOA. **(JP 4-0, 4-02)** (JP 0-2, 3-02, 3-07.3, 3-07.5, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.4.4 RECONSTITUTE FORCES (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To reconstitute combat/operationally-attrited units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and availability of resources. Reconstitution includes two types of activities, reorganization, and regeneration. **(N/A)** (JP 3-0, 3-02.2, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.4.5 TRAIN JOINT FORCES AND PERSONNEL (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To train replacements and units, especially newly rebuilt units, in the theater of operations. In military operations other than war, this activity includes training assistance for friendly nations and groups. **(JP 1-05, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-10.1, 4-01, 4-06)** (JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 3-50.3, 3-i61, 4-01, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.4.6 PROVIDE RELIGIOUS MINISTRY SUPPORT IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To coordinate the providing of religious support for the Army components of a JTF. This task includes identifying professional assistance, program funding, and logistics requirements to support personnel within the JTF. Additionally, this task includes establishing and coordinating a Task Force Religious Ministry Support Plan that will provide chaplain coverage to all elements. Additional activities include providing required religious support assets to support planned or ongoing operations, assisting PVO/NGOs with HA programs, and enemy prisoners of war to receive appropriate religious ministry support. Finally, the task includes providing advice to the commander on moral/ethical issues and indigenous/cultural customs that may impact planning and execution of an operation or campaign. **(JP 1-05)** (JP 3-05.3, 3-07.3, 3-07.5, 4-06, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.4.7 PROVIDE FOR LEGAL SERVICES (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To advise commanders and staffs on civil, acquisition, fiscal, military, international, and operational law issues. Provide personal legal assistance to authorized clients, including foreign criminal jurisdiction support; investigate and process claims; provide advice concerning rules of engagement, support of allies, status-of-forces agreements, applicable international agreements, and the law of armed conflict; review rules of engagement and operation plans; and ensure the effective use of legal personnel and resources. This task includes overseeing administration of military justice, international law, operations law, environmental law, intelligence law, battlefield acquisition, claims by and against the United States, and advice on detention and handling of EPWs. **(JP 3-05, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-05.3, 3-07.1, 3-50.21, 4-05, CJCSI 5810.01, CJCSM 3141.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.5 MANAGE LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To maintain the timely flow of stocks (all classes of supply in large quantities) and services (maintenance and personnel) to forces, using joint or multinational transportation means (over ground, air, and sea lines of communications) in support of subordinate campaigns and major operations and normal support operations. **(JP 3-0, 3-08v1, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.6, 4-01.7)** (JP 3-0, 3-07.3, 3-08v1, 4-01, 4-01.5, 4-01.6, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.5.1 PROVIDE FOR MOVEMENT SERVICES IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To move personnel, equipment, and supplies to sustain campaigns and major operations and to provide transportation resources for moving the forces that execute those operations. This task includes transportation mode operations, movement management and control, terminal operations, and joint logistic-over-the-shore (JLOTS) and in-transit visibility (ITV). This task includes actions of the joint movement center (JMC). **(JP 3-08v1, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 4-01.3, 4-01.6)** (JP 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-17, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.3, 4-01.5, 4-01.6, 4-02.1, 4-02.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

Note: Transportation mode operations include moving cargo, equipment, and personnel by various modes of transport and providing transport resources in support of campaigns and major operations. However, analysis of the movement of forces is done under OP 1.1, *Conduct Operational Movement*, and OP 1.3, *Provide Operational Mobility*. Also, movement management and control, although inherent to movement services, is a C2 activity analyzed under OP 5, *Provide Operational Command and Control, (C2)*.

OP 4.5.2 SUPPLY OPERATIONAL FORCES (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To provide all classes of supply, geospatial information and services (formerly mapping, charting, and geodesy), water, and related services for sustaining operational forces throughout a campaign or major operation in the quantities and at the time and place needed. This task includes requesting, receiving, producing, procuring, storing, protecting, relocating, and issuing the necessary supplies and services. It also includes building up the necessary stockage levels in staging areas for conducting the campaign and collecting, providing, and processing ITV data. **(JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v2, 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.7, 4-04)** (JP 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01.2, 4-02.1, 4-03, CJCSM 3500.05)

Note: Establishment of supply priorities is covered under OP 5.3.9, *Prepare Campaign or Major Operations and Related Plans and Orders*.

OP 4.5.3 RECOMMEND EVACUATION POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To recommend policy and procedures for the evacuation of personnel, equipment, and noncombatants from the operational area. For patient evacuation, this task requires the ASCC/ARFOR surgeon to advise the commander on a recommended patient evacuation policy. **(JP 4-02, 4-02.2, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-05.3, 4-0, 4-02, 4-02.1, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.5.4 COORDINATE RECOVERY AND SALVAGE (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To coordinate recovery and salvage of damaged, discarded, condemned, or abandoned allied or enemy material both ashore and at sea. Includes monitoring and management of recovered material from initial identification to disposal, disposition, or repair within JOA. These activities also include disposal and movement of hazardous waste and material. **(JP 0-2, 2-01, 3-02, 4-01.6, 4-04)** (JP 2-0, 3-05, 3-10.1, 3-17, 4-01.6, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.6 BUILD AND MAINTAIN SUSTAINMENT BASES IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To build and maintain principal and supplementary bases of support for the JOA sustainment activities in conformance with geographic combatant commander's guidance. This task also includes coordinating common administrative and interservice support for the minimum essential facilities to house, sustain, and support normal or contingency operations from a garrison, base, or bare base site. It may include, if required, a stabilized runway, taxiways, and aircraft parking areas. Lead or dominant Service component assigned by the combatant commander provides common servicing or cross servicing (reimbursable or otherwise) as required. **(JP 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01.1, 4-02.2, 4-04)** (JP 3-0, 3-07.5, 3-17, 4-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.6.1 DETERMINE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF SUSTAINING BASES IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To identify lines of support and location of sustaining bases to best support the campaign plans. This task includes actions of the Joint Facilities Utilization Board. **(JP 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-04)** (JP 3-0, 3-10.1, 4-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

Note: A related activity is to allocate space and facilities in the theater of operations rear (as well as the combat zone) for sustainment operations in conformance with the geographic combatant commander's guidance. See also OP 4.6.5, *Provide for Real Estate Management*.

OP 4.6.2 PROVIDE CIVIL-MILITARY ENGINEERING (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To dismantle fortifications and to construct and maintain facilities and communications networks that give physical structure to the lines of communication. This activity includes the following: building/maintaining forward staging bases; restoring rear to include sustainment infrastructure, such as repair of water supply and sewage treatment structures; area, sustaining LOC; supporting construction; and acquiring or producing construction material. Environmental protection and restoration will be accomplished in accordance with DOD environmental policy, SOFAs, international treaties, and other binding guidance to which the US Government is a party. **(JP 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01.7, 4-04)** (JP 3-08v2, 4-0, 4-01, 4-04, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.6.3 EXPAND CAPACITY OF PORTS OF DEBARKATION AND ALLOCATE SPACE IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To increase the capacity of ports of debarkation in operational areas to accommodate the throughput necessary to support the joint forces and multinational forces campaign, major operations, and routine support requirements. To acquire, maintain, and parcel out to subordinate organizations the real estate to conduct operations and provide services. **(JP 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.7, 4-04)** (JP 4-01, 4-01.3, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.6.4 PROVIDE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRISONER CONTROL (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To collect, process, evacuate, and intern enemy prisoners of war (EPW) and to enforce military law and order in the COMMZ and in support of operational level commander's campaigns and major operations. This task includes providing specialized technical, forensic, and polygraph support to resolve criminal issues or to investigate acts of sabotage and subversion which impact on the ability of the forces to perform their mission. **(JP 1-05, 2-01, 3-0, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-57, 4-02.2)** (JP 3-0, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-11, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.6.5 PROVIDE FOR REAL ESTATE MANGEMENT (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To coordinate the use and purchase of real estate assets in support of the operational campaign. **(JP 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-04)** (JP 3-07.3, 3-08v1, 3-50.21, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.6.6 MANAGE CONTRACTS AND CONTRACT PERSONNEL (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To ensure performance of contract support supports the joint operations area (JOA). This task requires inclusion of support contractors in the JOA sustainment planning. It also includes monitoring contract performance. This task includes properly adjusting required deliverables in light of requirements and allowable scope of effort. It also includes providing required support, to include support to individual contractor personnel. **(JP 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.2, 4-01.7, 4-04)** (JP 2-01, 3-08v2, 4-01.3, 4-04, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.7 PROVIDE POLITICO-MILITARY SUPPORT TO OTHER NATIONS, GROUPS, AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To provide assistance to other nations, groups, or government agencies that support strategic and operational goals within the joint operations area (JOA). This task includes security assistance, civil-military operations support (such as humanitarian assistance, environmental cleanup, disaster relief), and other assistance from military forces to civilian authorities and population. The assistance can be personnel, materiel, or services. **(JP 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-57, 4-0, 4-04)** (JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-08v1, 4-0, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.7.1 PROVIDE SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To provide friendly nations or groups with defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives within the JOA. **(JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 3-53, 4-0)** (JP 0-2, 3-07.1, 3-07.2, 3-10, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.7.2 CONDUCT CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To conduct activities in support of military operations in a JOA that foster the relationship between the military forces and civilian authorities and population, and that develop favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. This task includes establishing a joint civil military operations center (CMOC). Types of CMO include Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA), populace and resource control (PRC), nation assistance operations, Military Civic Action (MCA), civil preparedness/emergency operations, civil administration (friendly and hostile/occupied territory), and domestic support operations. **(JP 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-57, 3-61, 4-04)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-07.4, 4-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.7.3 PROVIDE SUPPORT TO DOD AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To provide support to DOD, Joint Staff, other Services, DISA, DLA, DTRA, DOS, USAID, USIA, civil governments, and other related agencies. This task includes controlling civil disturbances, countering illegal drugs, combating terrorism, and conducting joint exercises and operations. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-07, 3-08v1, 3-57, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-04)** (JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.2, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 3-57, 3-61, 4-01.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.7.4 TRANSITION TO CIVIL ADMINISTRATION (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To implement the transition from military administration in a region to UN and/or civil administration in the region. This task pertains to situations when the NCA have directed the military to become directly involved in the executive, judiciary, or legislative functions of a host-nation government. **(JP 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-57)** (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-05.3, 3-07.1, 3-57, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.7.5 COORDINATE POLITICO-MILITARY SUPPORT (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To coordinate and support politico-military activities among military commands, DOD, and other US Government agencies, and friendly governments and groups within the joint operations area (JOA). This activity is analyzed under OP 5.4.5. **(JP 3-0, 3-07.4, 3-08v1, 3-57, 4-0)** (JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.2, 3-07.4, 3-08v1, 4-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.7.6 COORDINATE CIVIL AFFAIRS IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To coordinate those activities that foster relationships between operational forces and local civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area. It also includes coordinating activities necessary to maintain the civilian population in an occupied country or area when US or allied military forces are present. **(JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 3-57, 3-61)** (JP 0-2, 1-05 , 3-05, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 3-50.3, 3-57, 4-01.7, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.7.7 CONDUCT FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID) (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To provide assistance in the operational area to friendly nations facing threats to their internal security. FID focus is to support the host-nation's program of internal defense and development (IDAD). FID is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Programs may include multinational exercises, exchange programs, civil-military operations, intelligence and communications sharing, logistic support of security assistance, and combat operations. **(JP 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-05.5, 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-52, 3-57)** (JP 3-0, 3-09, 4-02, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.7.8 ESTABLISH DISASTER CONTROL MEASURES (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To take measures before, during, or after hostile action or natural disasters to reduce probability of damage, minimize its effects, and initiate recovery. **(JP 3-07.1, 3-10, 4-01.5)** (JP 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 3-10.1, 3-57, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 4.8 ACQUIRE, MANAGE, AND DISTRIBUTE FUNDS (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY)

Provide advice to commanders on financial management implications and costs of preparing for and conducting operations. Track and report costs of battlefield operations to support efforts of reimbursement of costs initially paid from available training and readiness funds. Obtain guidance on fund citations and funding levels and provide to tactical resource managers and supporting finance elements. Provide fund control, monitor fund execution, track and report costs and obligations. Operational finance functions include providing policy guidance and centralized currency funding support. Finance and accounting functions include capturing of the costs of operations via standard accounting systems and other means, and operating systems that pay personnel and providers (contractors, host-nation suppliers, etc). **(JP 3-05.3, 3-07.4, 4-02.1, 4-05)** (JP 3-04.1, 3-07.1, 3-08v2, 4-01.7, 4-05, CJCSI 5261.01, CJCSI 6211.03, CJCSI 7401.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5 PROVIDE OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To exercise authority and direction as a commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Provides operational guidance, direction, and vision to assigned forces. Follows the theater strategy and links operational and tactical end states. Joint force commanders employ assigned single service, joint and multinational forces to accomplish assigned missions. When directed as a joint force commander, standup a joint task force to plan, direct, and coordinate operations. Joint force commanders may develop and execute policies, plans, and programs. They provide interoperable C4 systems support for joint operations. This task is applicable across the range of military operations, including military operations other than war. **(JP 0-2, 1, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-09, 3-09.3, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 3-56.1, 4-02.2, 6-0)** (JP 0-2, 2-01, 3-0, 3-02, 3-07.5, 3-10.1, 3-54, 4-06, 5-00.2, 6-02, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.1 ACQUIRE AND COMMUNICATE OPERATIONAL LEVEL INFORMATION AND MAINTAIN STATUS (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To obtain information on the joint operations area (JOA) military objectives, enemy operational forces and centers of gravity, friendly operational forces, terrain, and weather for JFCs, staffs, and subordinates. To translate this information into usable form and to retain and disseminate it to subordinate forces and functional and Service components. This activity includes informing and advising the operational level commander and securing an understanding of strategic guidance or an understanding of national and multinational policy, objectives, strategic aims, other elements of national and multinational power (for example, political, economic, informational), and theater strategic objectives. This task includes interfacing with friendly and enemy (in occupied territory) civilian government authorities in the JOA. This activity includes disseminating any type of information via necessary C4 systems. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-07.1, 3-13.1, 6-0, 6-02)** (JP 3-07.5, 3-13.1, 3-55.1, 3-56.1, 6-02, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3141.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.1.1 COMMUNICATE OPERATIONAL INFORMATION (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To send and receive operationally significant data from one echelon of command to another by any means. **(JP 2-01, 3-07.1, 3-09, 3-56.1, 6-0)** (JP 2-01, 3-05.5, 3-07.5, 6-02, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.1.2 MANAGE MEANS OF COMMUNICATING OPERATIONAL INFORMATION (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To manage (determine, establish, direct, or control) the means used in sending or receiving operational information of any kind and to use DOD standard communication networks and modes, where possible, for obtaining or sending operational information. Produce Annex K for all deliberate plans and operations orders and monitor execution. Monitor and integrate transmission, message, and switching systems to achieve information superiority. C4 systems support other agencies of the US Government and friendly nations and groups in military operations other than war. This task includes ensuring interoperability (through theater policies for transmission, message, and switching systems), anticipating information requirements, and utilizing existing systems to best support information requirements. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-09, 6-0, 6-02)** (JP 2-01, 3-56.1, 6-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.1.3 DETERMINE COMMANDER'S CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To determine the critical information that a commander requires to understand the flow of operations and to make timely and informed decisions. The commander specifies the critical information needed to support a decision making process to retain the initiative. This information may be derived from one or more of three broad information categories of friendly, enemy, and environmental. The joint force staff, functional and Service components may identify, analyze, and submit nominations to the commander for approval. This list of information requirements is both situationally dependent and time-sensitive. This task includes

identification, management, and promulgation of critical information requirements to the joint force staff and components. These information requirements are the most important in the joint force and serve to prioritize information flow. Meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) information (includes ocean, surface, upper atmosphere, and space observations as well as human- or computer-generated forecasts) is relevant to understanding residual civil and military capabilities and the consequences of execution decisions. **(JP 3-02, 6-02)** (JP 3-0, 3-09, 3-54, 4-01.1, 6-0, CJCSM 3500.05)
Note: There are several tasks that are either related to or supportive of this task. They include OP 2.1.1, *Determine and Prioritize Operational Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)*, OP 2.2.1, *Collect Information on Operational Situation*, and OP 5.1.4, *Maintain Operational Information and Force Status*.

OP 5.1.4 MAINTAIN OPERATIONAL INFORMATION AND FORCE STATUS (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INTEREST)

To screen, process, circulate, store, and display operational data in a form suitable for the decision making and planning processes of the ARFOR/JFLCC and staff. The purpose is to enable execution functions of subordinate task forces and components and for supporting other US governmental agencies, friendly nations, and groups in the region. This task includes tracking the movement of friendly forces into and within the joint operations area. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 6-0)** (JP 2-0, 3-01, 3-54, 3-61, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.1.5 MONITOR STRATEGIC SITUATION (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To be aware of and to understand national and multinational objectives, policies, goals, other elements of national and multinational power (diplomatic, economic, informational), political aim, and the geographic combatant commander's strategic concept and intent. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-09)** (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 3-50.3, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.1.6 PRESERVE HISTORICAL DOCUMENTATION OF JOINT/COMBINED OPERATIONS OR CAMPAIGNS (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To collect paper and safeguard, photographic images, electronic documentation, and artifacts of key events, decisions, and observations of joint/combined operation(s) or campaigns to support lessons learned analysis; public affairs efforts, doctrine development, and historical retention and writing. This task includes attending key briefings and meetings, interviewing key personnel to gather firsthand observations, facts, and impressions. This task further includes keeping a daily journal of personal observations and key events and packaging and forwarding collected information to appropriate agencies. Prepare and submit contingency historical reports that include required data. **(JP 1-02, 3-07.2, 4-02.2, 5-00.2, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-05.3, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-13.1, 3-50.21, 3-50.3, 3-57, 5-03.1, CJCSI 5320.01, CJCSM 3500.05)
Note: This task may also support ST 7.2.3, *Conduct Joint After-Action Reporting*.

OP 5.1.7 COORDINATE COMBAT CAMERA ACTIVITIES (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To coordinate combat camera teams and personnel in the joint operations area (JOA) to acquire imagery in support of ongoing operations. Supported activities include intelligence, battlefield damage assessment, IO, PA, deception, training, civil affairs, legal, and history functions. **(JP 3-61, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-05, 3-56.1, 5-03.1, DODD 5040.4, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.1.8 EXECUTE C4 POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To implement tactics, techniques, and procedures to ensure integrated C4 systems for contingency operations. Implement theater information security policies to support daily C4 systems activities. Develop programs and guidance for information security. **(JP 2-01, 3-05, 3-09, 6-0, 6-02)** (JP 3-07.4, CJCSI 6212.01A, CJCSI 8100.01, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.1.9 COORDINATE INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA) PROCEDURES (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To coordinate IA procedures established by the joint force commander for forward deployed operations. **(JP 3-13, CJCSI 6510.01B, CJCSM 3141.01)** (JP 6-0, 6-02, CJCSI 3141.01, DODD 3600.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.1.10 IMPLEMENT ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT, POLICY, PLANS, PROGRAMS, AND DIRECTION (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To provide electromagnetic spectrum management. Submit, coordinate, and deconflict frequency and host-nation support requests. Anticipate frequency requirements. Disseminate techniques and procedures for frequency management during contingency operations. This task includes developing communications electronic operation instructions (CEOI), coordinating with subordinate units to ensure effective frequency management, and developing the joint restricted frequency list. **(JP 3-0, 3-09, 3-12.1, 6-0, 6-02, CJCSI 3220.01)** (JP 3-51, 3-58, CJCSM 3141.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.1.11 PROVIDE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF FRIENDLY FORCES WITHIN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To deteremine discretely and positively, by any means, the individual identity of forces, objects (military formations), or phenomena (such as communications electronic patterns). The objective of this task is to protect friendly and neutral forces, objects, or phenomena from attack by operational level forces or systems. This task facilitates the concentration of effort against the adversary. **(JP 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-09, 3-09.3, 3-10.1, 3-52, 3-56.1)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-07.3, 3-09, 3-09.3, 3-54, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.2 ASSESS OPERATIONAL SITUATION (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INTEREST)

To evaluate information received through reports or the personal observations of the commander (commander's critical information requirements) on the general situation in the theater of operation and conduct of the campaign or major operation. In particular, this activity includes deciding whether different actions are required from those that would result from the most recent orders issued. This includes evaluating operational requirements of subordinate task forces and components. **(JP 0-2, 2-0, 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-50.21)** (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 3-55, 4-0, 5-00.2, 6-0, CJCSM 3500.05)
Note: See also ST 7.1, *Recommend Warfight and Other Requirements and Test Concepts*.

OP 5.2.1 REVIEW CURRENT SITUATION (PROJECT BRANCHES) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INTEREST)

To examine operational information developed by senior headquarters, the ARFOR/JFLCC's staff, and other components and/or task forces. This includes analyzing the assigned mission (includes assigned strategic military and politico-military objectives) and related tasks in the context of the next higher echelon's campaign plan or operation order, the strategic aim. It also involves combining on hand with incoming information while separating critical from noncritical information. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-07.5, 3-09, 5-50.21, 3-54)** (JP 1-05, 2-01, 3-05.3, 3-07.5, 3-54, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.2.2 FORMULATE CRISIS ASSESSMENT (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INTEREST)

To analyze the situation through available intelligence and determine whether a military option should be prepared. **(JP 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-08v1, 5-0, 5-00.2)** (JP 2-01, 3-54, 3-00.2, 5-03.1)

OP 5.2.3 PROJECT FUTURE CAMPAIGNS AND MAJOR OPERATIONS (SEQUELS) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To see beyond immediate battles and estimate enemy's future actions and to anticipate friendly actions for employment of operational forces after each phase of a current campaign or major operation (sequels). This includes consideration of possible local reversals or tactical failures. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-03, 3-09)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-08v1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.3 PREPARE PLANS AND ORDERS (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To make detailed plans, staff estimates, and decisions for implementing the geographic combatant commander's theater strategy, associated sequels, and anticipated campaigns or major operations. Plans and orders address, among other things, centers of gravity, branches, sequels, culminating points, and phasing. Planning includes organizing an effective staff, structuring and organizing the force, considering multinational capabilities/limitations, and cross-leveling or balancing Service component, joint, and national C4 means. Plans should address specific missions and tasks for subordinate joint or multinational task forces, Service and functional components and supporting commands and agencies. Plans should specify main effort(s) and supporting and supported relationships by phase. Planning also should address rules of engagement for force employment. This activity includes determining solutions to operational level needs. All plans and orders must maximize the operational capability while simultaneously minimizing the risk to the force. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-09, 3-10, 3-54, 5-0, 5-00.2)** (JP 1-05, 3-0, 3-03, 3-04.1, 3-07.5, 3-09, 3-17, 3-50.21, 4-06, CJCSI 3100.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.3.1 CONDUCT OPERATIONAL MISSION ANALYSIS (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To analyze the assigned mission (includes assigned strategic military and politico-military objectives) and related tasks in the context of the next higher echelon's campaign plan or operation order, and the strategic aim. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-02, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-09, 4-06, 5-0)** (JP 3-01.4, 3-05.3, 3-07, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 3-58, 5-03.1, 6-02, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.3.2 ISSUE PLANNING GUIDANCE (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To establish guidance for planning tasks to be accomplished by subordinate commanders and their staffs. This includes initial and subsequent planning guidance. Among other things, planning guidance might include constraints and restrictions such as rules of engagement for force employment and risk acceptance guidance. **(JP 3-0, 3-02, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-54, 4-06, 5-9, 5-00.2, 6-0)** (JP 3-0, 3-05.3, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-13.1, 3-50.21, 3-58, 4-02.1, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.3.3 DETERMINE OPERATIONAL END STATE (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To determine the military end state and set of required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives. There may be a preliminary end state, described by a set of military conditions, when military force is no longer the principal means to the strategic objective. There may be a broader end state that typically involves returning to a state of peace and stability and may include a variety of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military conditions. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-09)** (JP 1, 3-0, 3-07, 3-08v1, 4-02.1, 6-02, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.3.4 DEVELOP COURSES OF ACTION/PREPARE STAFF ESTIMATES (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To anticipate and define multiple, feasible employment options within the framework of the next senior commander's concept. **(JP 0-2, 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-54, 5-0)** (JP 2-01, 3-02, 3-08v1, 3-09, 4-0, 4-01, 5-0, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.3.5 ANALYZE COURSES OF ACTION (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To examine or wargame each course of action to determine its advantages and disadvantages. Each friendly course of action is examined or wargamed against each enemy course of action. **(JP 0-2, 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.1, 4-01, 5-0, 5-03.1)** (JP 1, 2-0, 2-01, 3-05.5, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-54, 4-01, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.3.6 COMPARE COURSES OF ACTION (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To analyze the various courses of action against each other. This can be done by comparing the advantages and disadvantages of each course of action previously analyzed or by isolating and comparing decisive factors that are selected based on each situation. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07.1, 5-0)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-12.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.3.7 SELECT OR MODIFY COURSE OF ACTION (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To decide on the course of action that offers the best prospect for success. This also includes modifying a course of action previously selected. This is a cyclical process. The courses of action not selected potentially become sequels and contingencies to phases of the operation as the situation evolves. This enables the commander to respond rapidly to changing situations. **(JP 0-2, 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-09, 5-0)** (JP 2-01, 3-07.1, 3-07.4, 3-09, 3-13.1, 3-50.3, 4-01.7)

OP 5.3.8 ISSUE COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To restate the mission (includes assigned strategic military objectives), develop the concept of operations (operational movement and firepower), give clear statement of commander's initial intent (aim of entire campaign or major operation), and identify subordinates' tasks and objectives. This task pertains to air, space, land, sea, and special operations forces and those of a supported US governmental agency or nation in military operations other than war (that is, the supported organization's concept and intent). The concept of operations could include: allocation of forces, phasing, means of reinforcing maneuver, firepower, air operation requirements, priorities by phase, naval support, use of combat area (and space systems), SOF operations, for example amphibious, may include other elements. This task could include a restatement of rules of engagement, risk acceptance authority levels, and other restrictions and constraints. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.1, 4-06, 5-0)** (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-02, 3-05.5, 3-07.1, 3-07.4, 3-07.5, 3-09, 3-54, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.3.9 PREPARE CAMPAIGN OR MAJOR OPERATIONS AND RELATED PLANS AND ORDERS (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To make a plan or order that reflects the concept and intent of the geographic combatant commander's campaign plan or that of a supported commander. Plans include intelligence collection, logistic plans, and rules of engagement. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-54, 4-01.1, 5-0, 5-00.2)** (JP 2-01, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-13.1, 3-17, 3-50.21, 4-01, 4-01.2, 5-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.4 COMMAND SUBORDINATE OPERATIONAL FORCES (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To promulgate the interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the authority of commanders in the chain of command. Clear delineation of responsibility among commanders up, down, and laterally ensures unity of command which is a foundation for trust, coordination, and the teamwork necessary for unified military action. All lower echelon commanders must understand their mission (and communicate to their subordinates), their contribution to achievement of the commander's concept and intent, and their relationship to attainment of a higher or supported commander's operational objectives. This facilitates maximum decentralized conduct of campaigns and major operations utilizing either detailed or mission-type plans and orders as the situation and time permit. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-03, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 5-0, 5-00.2)** (JP 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.4.1 APPROVE PLANS AND ORDERS (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To obtain the commander's approval and the next higher commander's approval of fully rationalized plans and orders prior to issuance. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-07.1, 3-61, 4-01, 5-0, 5-00.2)** (JP 1-05, 2-01, 3-50.3, 3-54, 4-01.1, 4-06, 5-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.4.2 ISSUE PLANS AND ORDERS (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To submit orders, plans, and reports for transmission to subordinate, supporting, or attached units for execution and to adjacent and higher units for coordination. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-50.21, 3-54, 4-01.2, 5-0, 5-00.2, 5-03.1)** (JP 1-05, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-54, 3-57, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 6-0, 6-02, CJCSM 3500.05)
Note: The transmission of the orders and plans by any means is part of the activity, OP 5.1.1, *Communicate Operational Information*.

OP 5.4.3 PROVIDE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To provide operational commander's directive which delineates the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-07.1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-56.1, 5-00.2, 5-03.1)** (JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.4.4 SYNCHRONIZE AND INTEGRATE OPERATIONS (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To arrange land, air, sea, space, and special operations forces in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point. This activity includes the vertical and the horizontal integration of tasks in time and space to maximize combat output. Synchronization ensures all elements of the operational force, including supported agencies' and nations' forces are efficiently and safely employed to maximize their combined effects beyond the sum of their individual capabilities. This includes synchronizing support to a supported command. Synchronization permits the friendly commander to get inside the enemy commander's decision cycle. **(JP 1, 3-0, 3-03, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-50.21, 3-54, 5-0)** (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-03, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-09.3, 3-10.1, 3-52, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.4.5 COORDINATE/INTEGRATE COMPONENTS, THEATER, AND OTHER SUPPORT (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To coordinate with allies/coalition partners; US component commands; the geographic combatant commander; and adjacent, subordinate, higher, and supporting organizations to ensure cooperation and mutual support, a consistent effort, and a mutual understanding of the joint force commander's priorities, support requirements, concept and intent, and objectives. This task includes coordinating with ambassadors and Country Teams (as appropriate), other US agencies, and leaders of supported nations. This activity includes but is not limited to coordinating concept development, sustainment support, and supporting component operation plans. Coordination of air, land, sea, space, and special operations support begins early in the process. **(JP 0-2, 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 4-0, 4-01.1)** (JP 0-2, 1, 1-05, 2-01, 3-07.4, 3-08v1, 4-02.1, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3500.05)
Note: See also OP 4.7.5, *Coordinate Politico-Military Support*, as a related task.

OP 5.4.6 CONDUCT OPERATIONAL REHEARSALS (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To coordinate rehearsals for operational level operations or to actually conduct commander and/or staff rehearsals within the headquarters. Rehearsals provide a venue for learning, understanding, and practicing a plan/order in the time available before actual execution. Rehearsing key combat and logistical actions allows participants to become familiar with the operation and visualize the plan. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.5, 3-02, 3-**

02.1, 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-05.5, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-50.21) (JP 3-0, 3-02.2, 3-07.2, CJCSM 3500.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.5 ESTABLISH, ORGANIZE, AND OPERATE A SERVICE OR FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT HEADQUARTERS (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To establish, organize, and operate a headquarters for the command and control of designated and organized Service, joint, and multinational forces under the duly authorized commander. This task includes establishing the force and applies to all levels of war. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-09, 5-00.2)** (JP 0-2, 3-05.3, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.5.1 DEVELOP A JOINT FORCE COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To establish a structure for command and control of subordinate forces. This task includes assigning or establishing the range of responsibilities for the various boards, centers, cells, and bureaus that aid the commander in exercising command and control of a joint force. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 4-01.1, 5-00.2, 6-02, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 4-01, 4-01.1, 6-0, 6-02, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.5.2 DEVELOP JOINT FORCE LIAISON STRUCTURE (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To establish a structure to maintain contact or intercommunication between elements of the joint force to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. **(JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 6-0)** (JP 1, 3-02, 3-03, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 3-61, 4-01.2, 4-02.1, 5-00.2, 6-0, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.5.3 INTEGRATE JOINT FORCE STAFF AUGMENTEES (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To integrate augmentees into existing staff structure to form a Joint Staff to support a joint force commander. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-09, 3-56.1, 5-00.2)** (JP 2-01, 3-05.3, CJCSM 3122.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.5.4 DEPLOY JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS ADVANCE ELEMENT (ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To deploy elements of the headquarters into the operational area in advance of the remainder of the joint force. This activity includes collecting and updating information relevant to the predeployment site survey. **(JP 3-08v1, 5-00.2)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-08v2, 4-02.1, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.5.5 ESTABLISH COMMAND TRANSITION CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To establish continuous, uninterrupted, and unambiguous guidance and direction for command transition. To ensure possession of adequate C4I capabilities, specific procedures, adequate communications, connectivity, manning, intelligence support, and C2 capability for command transitions. **(JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v1)** (JP 3-07, 3-08V1, 3-56.1, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.5.6 ESTABLISH OR PARTICIPATE IN TASK FORCES (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To establish or participate in a functional or single service task force established to achieve a specific limited objective. This task force may be single service, joint, or multinational. **(JP 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-50.21, 5-00.2)** (JP 1-05, 3-05, 3-07.5, 3-08v2, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 4-01.1, 4-06, 5-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.5.7 CONDUCT JOINT FORCE STAFF OPERATIONS (JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/ASCC INFLUENCE)

To organize, direct, and coordinate the activities of the JFLCC staff to efficiently support the commander and execute the theater military strategy. This task includes developing staff operating procedures, delimiting watchbill responsibilities, and determining facility support requirements. **(JP 0-2, 3-56.1, 5-00.2)** (JP 3-07.1, 1, 3-13.1, 3-58, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.5.9 ESTABLISH A JOINT MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST (JMETL) FOR A JOINT FORCE (JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/ASCC INFLUENCE)

To analyze applicable tasks derived through mission analysis of joint operation plans and external directives and select for training only those tasks that are essential to accomplish the organization's wartime mission. To establish supporting conditions and standards for each task in the JMETL for collective joint, individual, and leader training. This activity also pertains to missions associated with military operations other than war. **(JP 3-0, 3-05, 3-05.3, CJCSI 3500.01A, CJCSM 3500.03)** (JP 3-59, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.6 COORDINATE OPERATIONAL INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To coordinate the use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, in order to deny information, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary information, information-based processes, and information systems, and to protect one's own against such actions. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-09, 3-13, 3-13.1, 3-58, 6-02)** (JP 2-01, 3-09, 3-51, 3-53, 3-54, 6-0, CJCSI 3110.09, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSI 6510.01B, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.6.1 INTEGRATE OPERATIONAL INFORMATION OPERATIONS (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To integrate the offensive and defensive actions involving information, information-based processes, information systems, and PSYOP activities. This includes IO actions to prevent effective operational command and control of adversary forces by influencing, degrading, or destroying their operational C2 system and protecting friendly C2 through a planned protection effort. This task includes the integration of such activities with the other elements of the campaign plan and major operations and their execution. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-09, 3-13, 3-13.1, 3-54, 6-02)** (JP 2-01, 3-58, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSI 6510.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.6.3 CONTROL INFORMATION OPERATIONS (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To monitor and adjust the operational information operations efforts during execution. This task includes controlling information operations efforts. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-13, 3-13.1, 6-0, 6-02)** (JP 3-54, CJCSI 3110.09, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.7 COORDINATE AND INTEGRATE JOINT/MULTINATIONAL AND INTERAGENCY SUPPORT (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To coordinate with elements of the joint force, allies/coalition partners, and other government agencies to ensure cooperation and mutual support, a consistent effort, and a mutual understanding of the joint force commander's priorities, support requirements, concept and intent, and objectives. **(JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-50.21, 5-0)** (JP 1-05, 3-0, 3-07, 3-08v1, 4-01.2, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.7.1 ASCERTAIN NATIONAL OR AGENCY AGENDA (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To bring out the unstated agendas of each participant in a joint or multinational effort; to understand each nation or agency's individual goals within the framework of a joint or multinational effort; to adjust to the perceptions and needs of each participant in a joint or multinational effort. This task includes understanding

how a member's individual goals can affect conflict termination and the desired end state. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-08v1)** (JP 3-0, 3-05, 3-07, 3-08v1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.7.2 DETERMINE NATIONAL/AGENCY CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To take action to determine multinational force or agency capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses in order to match missions with capabilities and exploit special or unique capabilities of member forces or agencies. **(JP 3-0, 3-08v1)** (JP 2-0, 3-03, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 6-02, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.7.3 DEVELOP MULTINATIONAL INTELLIGENCE/INFORMATION SHARING STRUCTURE (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To optimize each member nation's intelligence and information capabilities, incorporate and exploit those capabilities, determine what information may be shared with multinational partners, and to provide member forces a common intelligence picture tailored to their requirements and consistent with disclosure policies of member nations. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-10.1)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-07.1, 3-07.4, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, CJCSM 3500.05)

Note: This task supports OP 2, *Provide Operational Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance*.

OP 5.7.4 COORDINATE PLANS WITH NON-DOD ORGANIZATIONS (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To facilitate exchange of operational information, ensure coordination of operations among coalition or agency forces, and provide a forum where routine issues can be resolved informally among staff officers. This task is facilitated by robust liaison (see OP 5.5.2). It specifically involves the exchange of plans prior to publication to obtain feedback from other members of the coalition or agencies for incorporation into the final plans. Procedures such as control of attacking aircraft, maneuver control, and fire support coordinating measures, and requests for supporting fires should be standardized as part of the plan to prevent fratricide. **(JP 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-57, 5-0)** (JP 3-0, 3-07.2, 3-08v1, CJCSM 3500.05)

Note: Coordination of intelligence sharing is covered by OP 5.7.3, *Develop Multinational Intelligence/Information Sharing Structure*. Inclusion contractor organizations in plan preparation and coordination is covered under OP 4.6.6, *Manage Contracts and Contract Personnel*.

OP 5.7.5 COORDINATE HOST-NATION SUPPORT (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To coordinate host-nation support in the joint operations area (JOA) to ensure the most effective fit with military and contracted support capabilities. As part of this task, the JFC supports the host nation with training and equipment as necessary. **(JP 0-2, 1-05, 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 4-0)** (JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 4-01, 4-02.1, 4-02.2, 6-02, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.7.6 COORDINATE COALITION SUPPORT (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To coordinate coalition support activities to provide the combined force commander the means to acquire coalition force status and capabilities. Accomplished through C4 systems or liaison teams between elements of a coalition, these activities are often focused on efficient command and control and prevention of fratricide. **(JP 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 4-0, 6-0)** (JP 2-0, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 6-0, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.7.7 CONDUCT CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OPERATIONS (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To conduct, when approved by the NCA, certain functions of civil government. In friendly territory, with the agreement of the government of the area concerned, the task is to exercise certain authority normally the function of local government. In occupied hostile territory, to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. **(JP 3-07.1, 3-57)** (JP 3-0, 3-05.3, 3-08v1, 3-57, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.7.8 COORDINATE CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC/ARFOR RESPONSIBILITY; JFLCC INTEREST)

To coordinate support for interagency essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate damage resulting from the employment of WMD or release of NBC or high explosive weapons and/or contaminants. Services and activities can include population evacuation, decontamination, transportation, communications, public works and engineering, fire fighting, information and planning, mass care, resource support, health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food, and energy. **(JP 3-11)** (JP 3-0, 3-07.2, 3-08v1, 4-06, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.8 PROVIDE PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To advise and assist the commander in the JOA and coalition partners in telling the command's story to both internal and external audiences, by originating and assisting civilian news media in originating both print and broadcast news material and assisting with community relations projects. This task includes establishment of a Joint Information Bureau (JIB) and support of the DOD National Media Pool until open media coverage is possible. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 3-57, 3-61, 4-06)** (JP 0-2, 1, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-11, 3-50.21, 3-54, 3-56.1, 3-61, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.8.1 MANAGE MEDIA RELATIONS IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To provide support to the commander in ensuring the timely and correct telling of the command's story. This task includes actions taken to provide the command story to civilian news media as well as military information sources. This task can be performed in a stand-alone US environment, with coalition partners or a host nation, or in conjunction with a Country Team. This task also includes establishment and operation of a JIB and support for the DOD National Media Pool as directed by the joint force commander. **(JP 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-61)** (JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-54, 3-57, 3-61, 4-06, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.8.2 COORDINATE COMMAND/INTERNAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY)

Coordinate with subordinate and component commands to ensure that internal information requirements are being addressed. This includes supporting employment of Armed Forces Radio and Television Services (AFRTS) in theater and assisting in the coordinated distribution of *Stars & Stripes* or similar print media products. In addition, coordination for the production of command information products and the procurement and distribution of Service publications may be accomplished. **(JP 3-07.3, 3-10.1, 3-13.1, 3-61, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-05.3, 3-61, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3141.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 5.8.3 CONDUCT COMMUNITY RELATIONS PROGRAMS IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

Within the joint operations area (JOA) conduct community relations programs in coordination with civil affairs that support direct communication with local, national, and international publics, as applicable. This effort requires close coordination with the Service components and host nations. The program may also

include the use of military equipment and units such as military aircraft/vehicles for static display, vessels for ship visits, military bands, and marching units. Plans may include speaking engagements by selected senior commanders and individuals within the commands as well as unit participation in civic activities. **(JP 3-07.3, 3-10.1, 3-13.1, 3-61, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-61, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3141.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6 PROVIDE OPERATIONAL FORCE PROTECTION (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To conserve the force's fighting potential so that it can be applied at the decisive time and place. This activity includes actions taken to counter the enemy's forces by making friendly forces (including operational formations, personnel, etc.), systems, and operational facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. This task includes protecting joint and multinational air, space, land, sea, and special operations forces; bases; A/SPODs and essential personnel; and LOCs from enemy operational maneuver and concentrated enemy air, space, ground, and sea attack; chemical and biological warfare; and terrorist attack. This task also pertains to protection of operational level forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations and groups in military operations other than war. **(JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-07.2, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-11, 4-0, 4-01.2)** (JP 1, 2-01, 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-07.2, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

Note: Some tasks associated with the protection of the force are included under other related operational level activities. Survivability and protection activities regarding individuals health and welfare are covered in OP 4.4.1, *Coordinate Field Services Requirements* and OP 4.4.3, *Provide for Health Services in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)*. Dispersion and mobility actions are covered in OP 1.3, *Provide Operational Mobility* and OP 1.4, *Provide Operational Countermobility*. Offensive counterair activities are included undere OP 3.2.3, *Attack Aircraft and Missiles (Offensive Counterair (OCA))*. Operational protection includes defensive IO measures that division of IO comprising actions taken to maintain the integrity of friendly information, despite adversary offensive IO actions. Also, see OP 5.6, *Coordinate Operational Information Operations (IO)*.

OP 6.1 PROVIDE OPERATIONAL AIR, SPACE, AND MISSILE DEFENSE (ASCC/ARFOR RESPONSIBILITY; JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To protect operational forces from missile and air attack (including attack from or through space) by direct defense and by destroying the enemy's missile and air attack capacity. This task includes use of aircraft (including helicopters), interceptor missiles, air defense artillery, and weapons not used primarily in an air defense role. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-09, 3-10.1)** (JP 3-10.1, 3-12, 3-12.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

Note: This task pertains to defensive counterair, antiair, and theater missile defense (TMD) activities. Offensive counterair and antiair activities are included under operational firepower and include TMD attack operations. At the operational level of war, air defense concerns protecting critical points, facilities (for example, ports, key bridges, operational C2 facilities) in the COMMZ (joint force commander's operational area), support forces in the COMMZ, forces transiting the COMMZ, or critical facilities in the combat zone with operational significance. This activity also includes the protection of operational forces moving to a major operation or campaign to the point of concentration for deployment to battle (tactical) formation and during operational maneuver. Operational air and missile defense is nearly always joint and may be a multinational activity. Missile defense operations include all forces and activities that support active defense, passive defense, and attack operations. See OP 3.2.3, *Attack Aircraft and Missiles (Offensive Counterair (OCA))* and OP 3.2.4, *Suppress Enemy Air Defenses*.

OP 6.1.1 PROCESS/ALLOCATE OPERATIONAL AEROSPACE TARGETS (ASCC/ARFOR RESPONSIBILITY; JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To select offensive air and space threats to the operational environment and match these as targets for friendly systems. This action is taken to ensure freedom of action for campaigns and major operations and protection of key assets. To allocate specific targets to operational air defense forces for interception or engagement. **(JP 3-01.1, 3-09)** (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-03, 3-09, 3-56.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

Note: Detection of incoming targets is covered under OP 2.2, *Collect and Share Operational Information*.

OP 6.1.2 INTEGRATE JOINT/MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONAL AEROSPACE DEFENSE (ASCC/ARFOR RESPONSIBILITY; JFLCC INTEREST)

To implement an integrated air defense system from all available joint and multinational operational defense forces (aircraft, missiles, ADA). **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-09, 3-10.1)** (JP 3-09, 3-12, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.1.3 PROVIDE AIRSPACE CONTROL (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To provide for safe transit of air mobility aircraft and the prevention of mutual interference between the air mobility aircraft and other aircraft operating in the joint operations area. This task includes providing for the coordination, integration, and regulation of airspace of defined dimensions. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-02, 3-03, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-52, 4-01.1)** (JP 3-52, 3-55.1, 4-01.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.1.3.1 EMPLOY POSITIVE CONTROL MEASURES (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To establish direct controls that minimize mutual interference between operational air defense and other operations. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-01.4, 3-09, 3-52, 3-56.1)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-04.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.1.3.2 EMPLOY PROCEDURAL CONTROL MEASURES (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To establish procedures which will allow aircraft (to include helicopters) to be readily identified based on their routing, altitude, blind radio calls, or other actions, in the event positive control measures fail. **(JP 3-01.1, 3-01.4, 3-09, 3-51, 3-56.1)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-04.1, CJCSM 3500.05)
Note: Task OP 6.2.5, *Provide Positive Identification of Friendly Forces Within the Joint Operations Area (JOA),* applies to this task.

OP 6.1.4 COUNTER ENEMY AIR ATTACK (DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR (DCA)) IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To conduct operations to defeat the enemy's offensive plan and inflict unacceptable losses on attacking enemy forces. DCA consists of active and passive operations to defend friendly airspace and protect friendly forces, material, and infrastructure from enemy air and missile attack. It includes detection, identification, and destruction of attacking enemy air and missiles. It is normally conducted near or over friendly territory and generally is a reaction to the initiative of the enemy air forces. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-01.4, 3-01.5, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-56.1)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-12.1, CJCSM 3500.05)
Note: The provision of standing rules of engagement for establishing standard control procedures applicable to combat engagements with other forces is covered in OP 5.3, *Prepare Plans and Orders*, OP 5.3.9, *Prepare Campaign or Major Operations and Related Plans and Orders*, and OP 5.4.3, *Provide Rules of Engagement*.

OP 6.1.5 CONDUCT JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) MISSILE DEFENSE (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To identify and integrate joint and coalition forces supported by national and theater capabilities to detect and destroy enemy theater missiles directed toward the JOA in flight or prior to launch. This task includes disrupting the enemy's theater missile operations through an appropriate mix of mutually supportive passive missile defense, active missile defense, attack operations, and supporting C4I measures. This task includes providing early warning of theater missile attack to the JOA as well as distribution of this warning to joint and multinational forces within the operational area. The term "theater missile" applies to ballistic missiles, air-to-surface missiles, and air-, land-, and sea-launched cruise missiles whose targets are within the joint force commander's operational area. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-10.1, 3-12, 3-56.1)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-10.1, 3-12.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.1.6 CONDUCT TACTICAL WARNING AND ATTACK ASSESSMENT IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To integrate JOA-based warning systems that provide data and information necessary for tactical warning and attack assessment (TW/AA) of an atmospheric, space, or ballistic attack on the operating area or assigned region. This task also includes the integration of TW/AA data into the JOA aerospace and missile defense system. Further, it includes participation in an event conference by JOA commands. **(JP 3-01, 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-03, 3-12, 6-0)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-09, 5-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.2 PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR OPERATIONAL FORCES, MEANS, AND NONCOMBATANTS (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To safeguard friendly centers of gravity and operational force potential by reducing or avoiding the effects of enemy operational level (tactical risks) actions. In military operations other than war, this activity includes protection of governmental and civil infrastructure and populace of the country being supported; this includes antiterrorism. This task includes supporting Department of State evacuation of noncombatants from areas of responsibility. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.5, 3-07, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 4-01.2, 4-04, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 3-11, 4-01.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.2.1 PREPARE OPERATIONALLY SIGNIFICANT DEFENSES (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To provide construction hardening for operational forces and key facilities to include C2, logistic rear area, assembly areas, and fighting positions. **(JP 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-11, 4-04)** (JP 3-10, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

OP 6.2.2 REMOVE OPERATIONALLY SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INTEREST)

To eliminate or reduce hazards that adversely affect execution of the operational level joint force commander's plan. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-11)** (JP 3-0, 3-02, 3-13.1, 4-01.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.2.3 PROTECT USE OF ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC/ARFOR RESPONSIBILITY; JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To ensure friendly force use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy's use of electronic warfare. This is a division of electronic warfare called electronic protection and includes deconflicting friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. **(JP 3-0, 3-09, 3-13.1, 3-51, 6-0, 6-02)** (JP 6-02, CJCSI 3220.01, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.2.4 PROTECT USE OF THE ACOUSTIC SPECTRUM IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC/ARFOR RESPONSIBILITY; JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To ensure friendly effective use of the acoustic spectrum by establishing procedures that prevent mutual interference between friendly units and counter the enemy's use of acoustic warfare. **(N/A)** (JP 3-09, 3-50.3, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.2.6 CONDUCT EVACUATION OF NONCOMBATANTS FROM THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To use JOA military and host-nation resources for the evacuation of US military dependents, US Government civilian employees, and private citizens (US and third-country nationals). Organizations at various echelons provide support (medical, transportation, religious, and security) to the noncombatants; the support provided is analyzed under the appropriate activity. This task includes protection of

noncombatant evacuees prior to departure from the joint operations area. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.5, 3-08v2, 3-10, 3-11, 4-01)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-57, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-02.2, 5-00.2, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.2.8 ESTABLISH NBC PROTECTION IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC/ARFOR RESPONSIBILITY; JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To ensure protection against NBC threats in the JOA through detecting, warning, and reporting (e.g., individual and collective protection, decontamination, preventive medicine, casualty treatment, consequence management, etc.). **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-10.1, 3-11)** (JP 3-0, 3-07.3, 3-11, 4-02.1, 4-06, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.2.9 COORDINATE AND CONDUCT PERSONNEL RECOVERY (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

Provide for the support of isolated US military personnel and US civilians and other designated personnel within the theater of operations/JOA. This task includes reporting, locating, supporting the person and their family, recovery and return of the isolated person to their family or duty. This task further includes conducting civil and combat search and rescue missions and providing support to evasion and escape. To coordinate the use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialized rescue teams and equipment, to include unconventional assisted recovery (UAR), for returning isolated personnel to US control. **(JP 3-05, 3-50, 3-50.2, 3-50.21, 3-50.3, 4-06)** (JP 0-2, 3-04.1, 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-07.5, 3-50.2, 3-50.3, 3-05.5, 3-55.1, 4-06, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

Note: This task includes coordinating the location, tracking, and report isolated or captured personnel, which is covered by OP 2.2, *Collect and Share Operational Information*.

OP 6.2.9.1 PROVIDE CIVIL SEARCH AND RESCUE (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To initiate and coordinate efforts to recover isolated US personnel, both military and civilian. This task also includes, on a not-to-interfere with military missions basis, support to the efforts of non-US civil SAR efforts. **(JP 3-50, 3-50.1, 3-50.2, 3-50.21, 3-50.3)** (JP 3-04.1, 3-07.5, 3-50, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.2.9.2 PROVIDE COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To provide for combat search and rescue (CSAR), primarily in support of flight operations, with capability to support other personnel recovery requirements. It also includes providing planning and guidance to subordinate organizations, including areas such as host-nation policies, laws, regulations, and capabilities. **(JP 3-05, 3-05.2, 3-50.21, 3-50.3, 3-56.1, 4-02)** (JP 3-04.1, 3-07.5, 3-55.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.2.9.3 SUPPORT EVASION AND ESCAPE IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To support isolated US personnel in evasion and recovery and captivity support and recovery. This task also includes those activities involved in supporting those isolated individuals who, due to unique circumstances, are effecting their own recovery. **(JP 3-50.2, 3-50.21, 3-50.3)** (JP 2-0, 3-04.1, 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-07.5, 3-50.21, 3-51, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.2.10 DEVELOP AND EXECUTE ACTIONS TO CONTROL POLLUTION AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To develop and implement actions to prevent pollution generation and hazardous substance spills to avoid exposing friendly personnel to human health hazards, disrupting operations, adversely affecting indigenous

or refugee populations and national economies; and to avoid damaging the natural environment. Plan and conduct environmental compliance program with appropriate consideration of the environmental laws, policies, and regulations. For hazardous substance spills, ensure prompt reporting and cleanup while avoiding operational interference and ensuring adequate protection of the environment. Ensure all hazardous materials are removed and managed correctly, prior to final transportation to a permitted treatment, storage, or disposal facility. **(JP 3-07, 3-07.2, 3-10.1, 4-01.7, 4-04, 4-05, 4-06)** (JP 3-07.2, 3-07.3, 3-08v2, 3-50, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.2.11 PROVIDE COUNTERDECEPTION OPERATIONS (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage from, a foreign deception operation. These activities contribute to awareness of adversary posture and intent, and also serve to identify adversary attempts to deceive friendly forces. **(JP 3-13.1, 3-58, CJCSI 6510.01B)** (CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.2.12 PROVIDE COUNTER-PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

Conduct activities to identify adversary psychological warfare operations contributing to situational awareness and serve to expose adversary attempts to influence friendly populations and military forces. Use organizations and activities (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, etc.) to identify adversary psychological warfare operations. Counter these operations using public affairs, civil affairs, or internal information dissemination means to convey accurate information to friendly forces. **(CJCSI 6510.01B)** (JP 3-53, 3-57, 3-61, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.2.13 CONDUCT COUNTERMINE ACTIVITIES (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To conduct countermine activities to reduce or eliminate the threat to noncombatants and friendly military forces posed by mines, boobytraps, and other explosive devices by training host nations forces in the location, recognition, and safe disposal of mines and other destructive devices, as well as countermine program management. **(JP 3-05, 3-15)** (CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.2.14 EMPLOY OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To employ operations security (OPSEC) measures to deny critical information necessary by an adversary commander to accurately estimate the military situation. To employ the five actions of OPSEC during planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to protect friendly forces and system capabilities from exploitation by an adversary. This task includes determining essential elements of friendly information (EEFI), identifying critical information from the EEFIs, conducting vulnerability analysis, selecting and implementing appropriate OPSEC measures, and finally monitoring OPSEC actions and comparing the results with desired results. **(JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-07.1, 3-10.1, 3-13.1, 3-54, 6-0)** (JP 3-05, 3-07.5, 3-10.1, 3-54, 3-58, 3-61, CJCSI 3213.01A, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)
Note: See also OP 5.6, Coordinate Operational Information Operations (IO), OP 2.4.1.2, Determine Enemy's Operational Capabilities, Course of Action, and Intentions, OP 3.2.2, Conduct Attack on Operational Targets Using Nonlethal Means, and OP 6.4, Conduct Military Deception in Support of Subordinate Campaigns and Major Operations.

OP 6.3 PROTECT SYSTEMS AND CAPABILITIES IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To identify critical information and subsequently analyze friendly actions attendant to planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. To deteremine indicators adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted to derive critical information. To select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an

acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. **(JP 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-13.1, 3-54, 6-0)** (JP 3-10.1, 3-13.1, 3-54, 5-03.1, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSM 3500.05)
Note: See also OP 5.6, *Coordinate Operational Information Operations (IO)*.

OP 6.3.2 SUPERVISE COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (COMSEC) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To supervise the protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from the possession and study of telecommunications, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their interpretation of the results of such possession and study. COMSEC includes: cryptosecurity, transmission security, emission security, and physical security of communications security materials and information. This task includes COMSEC monitoring (collection, analysis, and reporting) of DOD telecommunications and automated information systems and monitoring of related noncommunication signals. Vulnerabilities that are exploitable by potential adversaries will be identified and recommendations concerning countermeasures and corrective action will be submitted to the commander. **(JP 2-01, 3-02, 3-07.2, 3-13.1, 3-54, 6-0)** (JP 3-05.3, 3-07.2, 3-13.1, 5-00.2, CJCSI 3210.10, CJCSI 6510.01B, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.3.3 EMPLOY ELECTRONICS SECURITY IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) FOR OPERATIONAL FORCES (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To protect all forms of noncommunications electromagnetic radiation's (e.g., radar) from interception and study by unauthorized persons seeking information of value. **(JP 2-01, 3-13.1, 3-54)** (JP 3-07.2, 3-51, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.3.4 PROTECT INFORMATION SYSTEMS IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To take actions to protect information and defend information systems. This task includes integrating and synchronizing indigenous and national IO defensive capabilities with joint force capabilities, ranging from technical security measures (such as INFOSEC) to procedural measures (such as OPSEC, counterintelligence, physical security, and hardening of communications nodes). Information protection includes producing JOA policies and procedures designed to ensure integrity, authenticity, availability, and confidentiality of information. Information system defense includes measures to detect and report attacks or intrusions, and a process to locate, identify, isolate, and recover all affected systems. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-51, 3-54, 3-58, 6-0, 6-02)** (JP 3-13.1, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.3.5 COORDINATE CONCEALMENT OF FORCES/FACILITIES (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To coordinate camouflage and concealment to deny enemy observation and surveillance of forces and facilities. **(JP 3-01.1, 3-09.3, 3-10, 3-11, 3-17, 3-54, 4-01.1, 4-04, 4-06, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-02, 3-07.2, 3-07.4, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.4 CONDUCT MILITARY DECEPTION IN SUPPORT OF SUBORDINATE CAMPAIGNS AND MAJOR OPERATIONS (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To manipulate enemy operational level commander's perceptions and expectations into a false picture of reality that conceals friendly actions and intentions until it is too late for enemy forces to react effectively within the context of the geographic combatant commander's deception plan. Several measures are available for conducting deception, to include physical, technical or electronic (imitative, manipulative, and simulative), and administrative. **(JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-03, 3-10.1, 3-13.1, 3-50.21, 3-50.3, 3-54, 3-58, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-02, 3-09, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3500.05)
Note: This task supports OP 5.6, *Coordinate Operational Information Operations (IO)*, OP 6.3, *Protect Systems and Capabilities in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)*, OP 6.5, *Provide Security for Operational*

Forces and Means; OP 2, *Provide Operational Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,* (intelligence support for deception planning and supervision); and OP 5, *Provide Operational Command and Control, (C2)* (various organizing, planning, and directing tasks, and resource allocation).

OP 6.4.1 DEVELOP OPERATIONAL DECEPTION PLAN (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To develop a plan with measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce a reaction in a manner prejudicial to the enemy's own interests. The focus of the deception is on the enemy counterpart to the friendly operational level commander. To develop and disseminate the deception plan and story. To deceive the enemy commander of the true friendly intentions regarding the campaigns and major operations, the plan must be consistent with the strategic deception plan and focused on enemy expectations, preconceptions, and fears concerning friendly intent. The deception plan should use the entire joint and multinational operational forces and strategic means, as appropriate, to deceive the enemy. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-15, 3-50.21, 3-54, 3-58)** (JP 1, 3-02, 3-50.21, 3-54, 6-02, CJCSM 3211.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.4.2 CONDUCT OPERATIONAL DECEPTION (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INFLUENCE)

To prevent the enemy from learning the true intent of the joint force commander's campaigns and major operation plans and deception plans. This activity includes limiting, to the last possible moment, the number of people aware of friendly plans; delaying or masking operational movements and preparations; and deceiving friendly leaders and personnel where necessary. **(JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-03, 3-10.1, 3-13.1, 3-50.21, 3-54, 3-58 CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-02, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-54, CJCSM 3500.05)
Note: The movement and maneuver of operational forces for deception purposes are analyzed under OP 1.1, *Conduct Operational Movement* and OP 1.3, *Provide Operational Mobility*, respectively.

OP 6.4.3 ASSESS EFFECT OF OPERATIONAL DECEPTION PLAN (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY; ASCC INTEREST)

To determine the extent to which the deception story and related actions have had on the plans and actions of the opposing operational level commander and staff. **(JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-13.1, 3-54, 3-58)** (JP 2-0, 3-10.1, 3-54, CJCSM 3500.05)
Note: The organization responsible for deception planning and supervision requires intelligence support. Those activities relating to intelligence support or operational deception should be analyzed under OP 2, *Provide Operational Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance*.

OP 6.5 PROVIDE SECURITY FOR OPERATIONAL FORCES AND MEANS (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To enhance freedom of action by identifying and reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. This includes measures to protect from surprise, observation, detection, interference, espionage, terrorism, and sabotage. This task includes actions for protecting and securing the flanks and rear area of operational formations, and protecting and securing critical installations, facilities, systems and air, land, and sea LOCs. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-11)** (JP 3-0, 3-01.5, 3-03, 3-07.3, 3-07.5, 3-10.1, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.5.1 PROVIDE COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To provide counterreconnaissance that will prevent hostile observation of operational forces and operational area. **(JP 3-0, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-54)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-13.1, 3-55, 3-58, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.5.2 PROTECT AND SECURE FLANKS, REAR AREAS, AND COMMZ IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC/ARFOR/JFLCC RESPONSIBILITY)

To protect operational forces and means from attack throughout the JOA. **(JP 3-09, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-11, 4-0, 4-01.1)** (JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-09, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.5.3 PROTECT/SECURE OPERATIONALLY CRITICAL INSTALLATIONS, FACILITIES, AND SYSTEMS (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To protect operationally critical installations, facilities, and systems from attack in the operational area. Task includes performing a force protection site survey for beddown of assets and personnel prior to arrival of forces. Survey will provide a threat assessment and, based on that assessment, recommend sites for housing, supplies, ammunition and ordnance, aircraft parking, operations, maintenance, etc. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-09, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-11, 4-0, 4-01.1)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-07.5, 3-09, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.5.4 PROTECT AND SECURE AIR, LAND, AND SEA LOCS IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INTEREST)

To protect the LOCs which connect an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. **(JP 3-0, 3-09, 3-10, 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01.1)** (JP 3-02, 3-08v2, 4-01.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

OP 6.5.5 INTEGRATE HOST-NATION SECURITY FORCES AND MEANS (ASCC RESPONSIBILITY; ARFOR/JFLCC INFLUENCE)

To integrate and synchronize host-nation police, fire departments, military internal security forces, communications infrastructure, constabulary, rescue agencies, and penal institutions into the security plan for the operational area. This task includes the planning and execution of operational tasks that involve operations of two or more nations' forces including the forces of the host nation. **(JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-07.2, 4-01.6)** (JP 2-0, 3-05, 3-07, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

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Appendix H

COORDINATING LEGACY, INTERIM, AND OBJECTIVE FORCES

The Army must transform itself into a force capable of dominating at every point on the spectrum of operations. The Army's Transformation Strategy will result in an Objective Force that is more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable and sustainable than the present force.

General Eric K. Shinseki
October 2000

THE TRANSFORMATION STRATEGY.

H-1. The transformation campaign plan plots the Army's future course to evolve into the Objective Force while maintaining a trained and ready force to meet its National Military Strategy requirements. A transformed Army provides the nation the capabilities needed for an uncertain future by achieving strategic responsiveness and land dominance across the full range of military operations. In general, the Army's transformation strategy will go forward along three major paths, as depicted in Figure H-1: the Legacy Force, the Interim Force, and the Objective Force.



Figure H-1 The Army Transformation

H-2. *Legacy Force*. In order to have the time to develop Objective Force capabilities properly, the Army must sustain the Legacy Force as a strategic hedge to guarantee our warfighting readiness. Selected formations of key armored and aviation systems—from both active and reserve components—will be recapitalized. Light-force lethality and survivability will also be enhanced. The Army will continue to insert digital technologies and rebuild key legacy systems to extend service life, reduce operating and support costs, and improve system reliability, maintainability, safety, and efficiency. The Legacy Force will maintain the capabilities the Army currently has and add selected others that are already scheduled to sustain combat overmatch, thus ensuring the ability

to meet our non-negotiable contract with the American people, to fight and win the nation's wars, for a decade and more. The trained and ready Legacy Force maintains the credible deterrent that will cause our adversaries to hesitate before challenging American interests. The legacy force will remain ready to provide the decisive land component capabilities throughout the current window of opportunity to transform the Army.

H-3. *Interim Force*. The Army has begun fielding an Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) at Fort Lewis, Washington. This initial IBCT, the first step toward the Interim Force, will accomplish two goals. First, it will give the Army an enhanced capability for operational deployment to meet worldwide requirements and fill a full spectrum void for a medium weight force. Second, the initial IBCT will validate an organizational and operational model for the Interim Force.

H-4. More Interim Brigades will follow. These IBCTs will employ an Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV)—an off-the-shelf system. The Interim Force is intended to be an operational capability in FY 2002. The Army will employ it to respond to immediate operational requirements and provide the strategic deterrence that will give the National Command Authorities options. It will allow the Army to train soldiers and grow leaders in the doctrine and organization of these new formations. These Interim Brigades will create momentum for the future Objective Force.

H-5. *Objective Force*. The critical path of the Transformation leads to the Objective Force. Today, the science and technology (S&T) community is working hard to develop the technologies that will give the Objective Force its desired characteristics—responsiveness, agility, versatility,

deployability, lethality, survivability, and sustainability. A force with these characteristics will have the ability to place a combat-capable brigade anywhere in the world, regardless of ports or airfields, in 96 hours. It will put a division on the ground in 120 hours. And it will put five divisions in theater in 30 days.

H-6. The Army will make technology investments that will result in new technologies that underpin the Objective Force design. At that point, when the technologies are mature and when the production lines are ready, the Army will begin to field the Objective Force in unit sets. Organizations will field complete suites of new equipment, thoroughly integrated systems designed to give us all of the capabilities outlined in The Army Vision. Transformation to the Objective Force will encompass the entire Army. The Legacy Force will transform directly to the Objective Force, and the Interim Force will follow. Over the course of 15 to 20 years, The Army will transform itself into the Objective Force design.

H-7. By 2007, the Army will consist of a force composed of the following elements:

-- Active component:

- A digitized legacy heavy corps with all its subordinate organizations for use as a counterattack corps especially in MTWs.
- A forcible entry capability provided by the airborne division and other legacy forces in a legacy light corps.
- Up to eight Interim Brigades, each more lethal, more mobile, and with a more responsive SSC capability (one or more from the National Guard).

-- Reserve component:

- Additional Army National Guard divisions and enhanced separate brigades primarily equipped with non-digitized legacy systems.

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TECHNOLOGY

H-8. Rapid advances in automated C^2 systems require commanders and soldiers to operate highly sophisticated equipment to function effectively on the battlefield. Information about the adversary and friendly formations will be distributed among all committed forces—land, sea, air, and space—to create a common view of the battle space and a shared situational understanding across the force. This shared understanding, coupled with the ability to conduct continuous operations, will allow the Objective Force to observe, decide, and act faster, more correctly, and more precisely than their adversaries.

THE DIGITIZED FORCE (INTERIM AND LEGACY)

H-9. Future information technology will provide the means to collect, process, disseminate, and display information in unparalleled volume, speed, and accuracy. Digitization of the battlefield provides common formats, rapid processing, and timely transmission of data. The COMASCC/COMARFOR must be concerned with asymmetrical capabilities within the Army. While we modernize the force, we must be cognizant of units that are maintaining current capabilities—not only in the Army but also joint and multinational as well. The Interim Force has capabilities and limitations distinctly separate from its legacy-equipped predecessor. The Interim Force has an improved capability to achieve the agility, depth, and synchronization that characterize successful Army operations through the use of shared collective unit images.

H-10. Collective unit images form a battlespace framework. This framework is based on shared real-time awareness of the arrangement of forces in the battlespace, instead of a rigid framework of battlefield geometry such as phase lines, objectives, and battle positions.

Digitization of the force permits commanders at every level to share a common relevant operating picture (CROP) of the battlefield scaled to their level of interest and tailored to their specific needs. Commanders of digitized units at the same echelon share a perspective (situational understanding) of their position in relation to adjacent units. Leaders, horizontally linked by common information, visualize how they will conduct and support major operations, battles, and engagements. Their execution is integrated by a shared vision of the battlespace.

H-11. The commander of a digitized force has significant advantages over commanders of non-digitized-equipped forces. The most significant advantages are—

- An increased situational understanding.
- Enhancement of the planning and preparation of orders and the distribution process.
- Digital aids that enhance the timeliness and accuracy of the reporting process and employment of assets.
- An improved capability to mass effects at the decisive point.
- Digitization and automation of reports, which provide the capability to share information at each level of the chain of command. The recipient of a report can look at the location of the reported adversary element and compare it to his operational graphics and friendly unit locations. This comparison allows the recipient to determine potential problems with the disposition or orientation of friendly units and adjust accordingly.

UNIT INTEGRATION

H-12. The integration of legacy digitally-equipped and non-digitized elements with interim or objective elements into the force presents special challenges for the commander and staff. The commander must ensure that both digital and nondigital procedures are available for communicating and supporting. The COMASCC/COMARFOR must establish provisions to receive automated information from digital units.

H-13. The COMASCC/COMARFOR must use liaison officers or establish other positive control measures to ensure proper coordination between legacy (digital and nondigital) interim, and objective units. The COMASCC/COMARFOR must establish procedures that specify which reports will be communicated digitally, by voice, or in hard copy. Digital information will be processed for distribution to nondigital units.

SUPPORTING THE FORCE

H-14. Application of information mangement (information systems and relevent information) necessitates the formation of strategic alliances between Army logistics mechanisms in theater and civilian industry. This forged linkage between the sustainment base and the COMASCC will largely negate the requirement for Army-managed, in-theater stockpiles and incorporate reachback. Because of situational understanding (the shared knowledge on the digitized battlefield between all units), logistical units can conduct distribution based CSS that provides scheduled or *time definite delivery* of supplies more efficiently. Logistical units will push required support forward—to the right units at the right time.

H-15. Digitization of the battlefield will increase awareness and coordination over a wide area, enabling the commander to obtain the near real-time information he needs in the most efficient and effective format. This digitization provides the commander with—

- A common view of the battlefield.
- Situational understanding.
- Battlefield synchronization.
- C^2 on the move.
- Horizontal integration.
- Combat identification.
- Fratricide prevention.

To effectively plan the application and employment of these new technologies within the force, the COMASCC/COMARFOR must be aware of their advantages and disadvantages. Synchronizing legacy, interim, and objective units will be a major task.

ROLE OF THE ASCC

H-16. The COMASCC and his headquarters will be key to integrating and synchronizing the Army forces of the eary twenty-first century. Legacy (digital and non-digital), interim, and soon objective forces will largely function each within an internally consistent corps structure for doctrine, equipment and training. Corps will be functional in terms of logistics, communications, and automation with their assigned combat, CS, and CSS units. Consequently, Army forces provided as an ARFOR or to an ASCC for theater operations will be composed of elements of significantly differently equipped corps. It will be the responsibility of the COMASCC or the COMARFOR and his operational-level specialized units to provide the theater-level communications, logistics, and automation systems that will enable legacy, interim, and objective forces to operate together. This will require the SIGCOMs and TSCs to provide connectivity down to technologically different corps maneuver elements.

Appendix I

ARMY TASKING DOCUMENTS

TITLE 10, US CODE RESPONSIBILITIES

I-1. The COMASCC is responsible for all Title 10, US Code, functions within its area of responsibility. The US Code states:

- Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and subject to the provisions of chapter 6 of this title, the Secretary of the Army is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of the Department of the Army, including the following functions:
  - Recruiting.
  - Organizing.
  - Supplying.
  - Equipping (including research and development).
  - Training.
  - Servicing.
  - Mobilizing.
  - Demobilizing.
  - Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel).
  - Maintaining.
  - The construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment.
  - The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and the acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified in this section."

REPRESENTATIVE ARMY LEAD AND EXECUTIVE AGENT RESPONSIBILITIES

I-2. Representative Army Lead and Executive Agent Responsibilities for support to other Services and agencies from DA Pamphlet 10-1 and other documents are as follows:

MORTUARY AFFAIRS

Source authority: Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, 15 March 1991

The SA serves as executive agent of the DOD for mortuary affairs. In this capacity, he is responsible for establishing and implementing policy to govern mortuary affairs for DOD.

Responsible official:

Secretariat: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

SINGLE MANAGER FOR MILITARY POSTAL MATTERS

Source authority: DOD Directive 4525.6

The SA, as the single manager for military postal matters, operates a jointly-staffed agency, under broad policy guidance from the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics. A General Officer (or equivalent civilian grade), serves as the Executive Director, Military Postal Service Agency, and is delegated the authorities of the SA for execution of DOD's single manager operations.

Responsible official:

Secretariat: Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

SUPPORT TO THE RED CROSS DURING TIMES OF CONFLICT

Source authority: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) memorandum, 5 May 1992

The SA, as lead for the DOD, is responsible for providing the necessary deployment support to the Red Cross during times of conflict. When deployments occur, costs of transportation, training, and uniforms, except for those paid by the Red Cross, will be borne initially by the Army. The other Services will reimburse the Army, on request, for the cost of deploying Red Cross employees supporting Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force units and personnel.

Responsible official:

Secretariat: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

JOINT TASK FORCE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK MANAGEMENT

Source authority: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) memorandum, 17 August 1993

The SA is responsible for the development of a joint task force communication system within DOD and to establish an integrator for all DOD communications network management systems. Executive agency applies to all communications network management services including configuration control, post development software support, fielding, testing, certification, and system upgrades. Executive agent responsibilities apply to systems administered, managed, acquired, operated, or used by the DOD components and Military Services.

Responsible officials:

Secretariat: Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer

MACOM: Commander, US Army Materiel Command

DOD VETERINARY FUNCTIONS

Source authority: Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, 16 October 1980; DOD Appropriations Bill of 1980; Letter of Instruction, Office, Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), 5 August 1993

The SA shall ensure uniform use of veterinary services throughout the DOD. Army's veterinary services shall be used by all Military Departments and shall include:

a. Control of animal diseases communicable to man.

b. Veterinary care for Government-owned animals supported by appropriated funds.

c. Military veterinarians for Research and Development when required by the Military Departments.

d. The development of military sanitary standards for commercial food plants providing products to DOD components.

e. The development of list of food suppliers published by the DA. The Air Force products are procured for individual Air Force installations.

f. On-base inspection of food products, except food preparation facilities, shall be done by Army Veterinary Services at all joint procurement and storage facilities and facilities under the control of the Navy and Army. Air Force shall provide food inspection program at Air Force bases.

g. Laboratory examination of food products.

Responsible official:

Army Staff: The Surgeon General

CHEMICAL AGENT SECURITY PROGRAM

Source authority: DOD Directive 5210.65

DOD Directive 5210.65 establishes policies and procedures for safeguarding chemical agents stored in permanent storage facilities during normal peacetime operations. The SA is the single manager for conventional ammunition. The SA has the responsibility for developing criteria for implementing the program's policies, approving waivers for exceptions to the Directive as it pertains to assets for which the single manager has assigned custodial responsibility provided adequate compensatory security measures are instituted, evaluating information

concerning threats to the security of chemical agents, and establishing maximum allowable limits of concentration and quantity for dilute solutions that are not defined as chemical agents.

Responsible officials:

Secretariat: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment)

Army Staff: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

DOD MILITARY CUSTOMS INSPECTION PROGRAM

Source authority: DOD Directive 5030.49; DOD Regulation 5030.49-R

Army is the DOD executive agent for the DOD Military Customs Inspection Program. Under the supervision of the US Customs Service and the US Department of Agriculture, Military Custom Inspectors conduct preclearance inspections for customs and agriculture for personnel and materiel leaving the overseas theater.

Responsible officials:

Secretariat: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment)

Army Staff: Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS IN SELECTED HOST-NATIONS

Source authority: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics) memorandum, 7 July 1992

As executive agent for environmental matters in selected host-nations where Army has a presence, the SA is responsible for establishing nation-specific environmental standards. Responsibilities include developing nation-specific environmental standards, conducting a comparative analysis for the host-nation environmental laws and standards with the criteria and standards contained in DOD's Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Documents. When promulgated, DOD components are responsible for compliance with the nation-specific environmental standards. US Army Europe fulfills these responsibilities in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. Eighth US Army fulfills these responsibilities in Korea.

Responsible officials:

Secretariat: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment)

MACOM: Commander, US Army Europe
Commander, Eighth US Army

LAND-BASED WATER RESOURCES

Source authority: DOD Directive 4705.1

The SA is the executive agent for the DOD Land-Based Water Resources Program. This authority is assigned through the Chief of Staff to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. It includes developing and coordinating policies, procedures, and doctrine for all aspects of water support for United States forces in joint contingency operations. This function does not include: fixed installation water supply, ship board or aircraft water systems designed for internal use.

Responsible officials:

Army Staff: Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

MACOM: Commander, US Army Forces Command

MANAGEMENT OF OVERLAND PETROLEUM SUPPORT

Source authority: DOD Directive 4140.25.M; DOD 4140.25-M

The Secretary of the Army provides management of overland petroleum support, including inland waterways, to US land-based forces of all the DOD components. To ensure wartime support, the Army tactical storage and distribution systems supplement existing fixed facilities including host-nation assets and commercial storage. The Army is responsible for inland distribution planning during wartime.

Responsible officials:

Secretariat: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment)

Army Staff: Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

MACOM: Commander, US Army Forces Command

SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS

Source authority: Secretary of Defense memorandum, 22 October 1981

The SA is the DOD executive agent for matters pertaining to United States military participation in and support of the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers. The Commander, US Army Forces Command fulfills this mission on behalf of the SA. In December 1981, Congress approved funds for the multinational force and legislation to commit a maximum of 1,200 United States soldiers to the mission.

Responsible officials:

Army Staff: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

MACOM: Commander, US Army Forces Command

SINGLE MANAGER FOR CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION

Source authority: DOD Directive 5160.65; DOD Instruction 5160.68

The SA is assigned the DOD single manager responsibilities for procurement, production, supply, maintenance, renovation, and demilitarization and disposal of conventional ammunition. The Commander, US Army Materiel Command was delegated the authorities of the SA for execution of single manager operations.

Responsible officials:

Secretariat: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition)

MACOM: Commander, US Army Materiel Command

SUPPORT FOR UNITED NATIONS IRAQ-KUWAIT OBSERVATION MISSION

Source authority: Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, 16 April 1991

The SA is the executive agent for DOD support to the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, including personnel assignments and logistics support.

Responsible officials:

Secretariat: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment)

Army Staff: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

SUPPORT FOR UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS IN WESTERN SAHARA, ANGOLA, AND EL SALVADOR

Source authority: Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, 21 November 1991

The SA serves as the DOD executive agent for support for United Nations Missions in Western Sahara, Angola, and El Salvador. To support the missions, the SA may direct the Secretaries of the Military departments concerned and the heads of DOD components to, under appropriate terms and conditions and with due regard to the requirements of national defense: (a) detail to the United Nations personnel of the Armed Forces, (b) furnish facilities, services, supplies, equipment, or other assistance consistent with the United Nations Participation Act, and (c) obligate funds, procure assistance, and replace items consistent with the act.

Responsible officials:

Secretariat: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installation, Logistics, and Environment)

Army Staff: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

SUPPORT FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA

The SA is the DOD executive agent for furnishing supplies, equipment, services, and other assistance consistent with the United Nations Participation Act, obligating funds, procuring assistance, and replacing items consistent with the act.

Responsible officials:

Secretariat: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment)

Army Staff: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

SUPPORT FOR UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION

The SA is the DOD executive agent for matters pertaining to United States personnel assigned as United Nations Military Observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.

Responsible officials:

Secretariat: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment)

Army Staff: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

CONSTRUCTION FOR DEFENSE AGENCIES AND SELECTED DOD ACTIVITIES

Source authority: 10 USC 2851; DOD Directive 4270.5

The Chief of Engineers has been designated as construction agent for certain DOD agencies and activities which are not under a military department. US Army Corps Engineers provides planning, design, construction, and related services for various DOD agencies and activities, principally for execution of DOD Military construction programs at locations for which US Army Corps of Engineers is designated as the DOD Construction Agent by DOD Directive 4270.5. These include the Defense Mapping Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. US Army Corps of Engineers Districts are funded by the agencies from project funds (military construction appropriations or other agency appropriations). No resources from the Army operating budget are expended at the District level to execute these projects.

Responsible officials:

Secretariat: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment)

Army Staff: Chief of Engineers

CONSTRUCTION FOR MILITARY (AIR FORCE AND NAVY)

Source authority: DOD Directive 4270.5

In 1982, DOD Directive 4270.5 authorized the Army Corps of Engineers to perform design and Construction services for the Army. Department of the Air Force may use services of COE for design and construction of annual military construction program. In accordance with DOD Directive 4270.5, Navy is their own construction agent in the continental United States. Outside the continental United States construction agency is designated by DOD 4270.5. The Corps of Engineers designs and constructs military construction projects for the Navy in countries where the Army is the DOD Construction Agent and for Navy projects located on Army or Air Force installations in the continental United States. US Army Corps of Engineers is the DOD Construction Agent for the Air Force in the continental United States.

Responsible officials:

Secretariat: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment)

Army Staff: Chief of Engineers

MACOM: Commander, US Army Corps of Engineers

CONSTRUCTION FOR SELECTED FOREIGN NATIONS

Source authority: 10 USC 2851; DOD Directive 4270.5

The Chief of Engineers has been designated construction agent for certain geographic areas. These areas are Canada, including Newfoundland; the Canal Zone; Egypt; Europe, excluding Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece; Greenland; Israel; Japan, including the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa); Korea; Taiwan; the Marshall Islands; the Middle East, including the Saudi Arabian Peninsula; Southern Asia, from Iran to Myanmar; and Turkey. As the designated DOD Construction Agent, the Corps of Engineers provides foreign military sales design, construction and procurement services in the Middle East, Africa, and in Central and South America initiated by foreign government and/or United States Embassy United States Military Group.

Responsible officials:

Army Staff: Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

MACOM: Commander, US Army Corps of Engineers

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL PROTECTIVE SUPPORT FOR THE US SECRET SERVICE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Source authority: DOD Directive 3025.1; Office of the Secretary of Defense memorandum, 20 June 1990

The SA is the DOD executive agent for requests of explosive ordnance disposal protective support for the United States Secret Service and United States Department of State for locations worldwide. The Commander, US Army Forces Command is designated the operating agent to act on behalf of the SA to plan, coordinate, task, and execute routine

explosive ordnance disposal protective support employing assets from the armed services and the unified and specific command.

Responsible officials:

Secretariat: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment)

Army Staff: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

MACOM: Commander, US Army Forces Command

DOD ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR/DETAINEE PROGRAM

Source authority: DOD Directive 2310.1

The SA is the executive agent for the administration of the DOD Enemy Prisoner of War or Detainee Program. In this capacity, the SA acts for the DOD in planning, policy development, and coordination for the operation of a program for those personnel captured or detained by the Armed Forces of the United States and personnel transferred to United States custody. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans is designated as the single point of contact within the Army relative to detainee matters.

Responsible official:

Army Staff: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

DOD GEOGRAPHIC MANAGER FOR ARMED FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION

Source authority: DOD Directive 5120.20; DOD Directive 5122.10; DOD Regulation 5120.20-R

The Army Broadcasting Service is the DOD executive agent for armed forces radio and television broadcast operations in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Panama, Central and South America, Korea, the Marshall Islands, and worldwide for contingency broadcast operations. Responsibility includes operations management, program production, budgeting, engineering, contingency planning, and managing personnel for these facilities which provide the only mass communications capability to effectively distribute time-sensitive command information, world-stateside-local news and entertainment programs to DOD personnel and their family members in areas where English language broadcasting is severely limited or nonexistent.

Responsible official:

Secretariat: Chief of Public Affairs

DOD STRATEGIC DEBRIEFING COURSE

Source authority: Under Secretary of Defense Research and Engineering memorandum, 18 March 1982

Army is designated as the executive agent for a joint DOD debriefer and interrogator training program to improve the capabilities of human resource intelligence personnel to acquire and exploit strategic intelligence from foreign and domestic sources. This includes management of the training program to satisfy the requirements of the armed services. Training is conducted at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Responsible official:

Army Staff: Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL TRAINING FOR CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL

Source authority: Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel memorandum, 8 July 1970

At the request of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Army conducts a course of instruction to train law enforcement or public safety personnel in the design, construction, rendering safe procedures, and disposal of various hazardous explosive devices and explosive material using equipment available to public safety agencies. The Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command fulfills this responsibility for the SA.

Responsible official:

MACOM: Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION AND REPATRIATION

Source authority: DOD Directive 3025.14

The SA is the executive agent for repatriation plans and operations. This includes coordination within DOD and with other Federal, State, and local agencies in planning for the reception and onward movement of United States citizens and designated aliens in the continental United States and/or Hawaii who have been evacuated from overseas areas in time of emergency.

Responsible officials:

Secretariat: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

Army Staff: Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

MACOM: Commander, US Army Forces Command

CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM

Source authority: Public Law 103-160 Title III; Joint Service Agreement, 24 April 1995

The Secretary of the Army is designated as the executive agent for the Chemical Biological Defense Program. Responsibilities include coordinating and integrating research, development, test, and evaluation, and acquisition requirements of the military departments for chemical and biological warfare defense programs of the Department of Defense. All funding for this program shall be reviewed by the Secretary of the Army.

Responsible officials:

Secretariat: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition)

Army Staff: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

MACOM: Commander, US Army Materiel Command

MOBILE ELECTRIC POWER PROJECT MANAGER

Source authority: DOD Directive 4120.11

The Secretary of Defense has assigned executive agent responsibility to the SA for establishing a jointly approved charter and appointing the DOD Project Manager for Mobile Electric Power. The Project Manager has authority over the planning, direction, and acquisition of mobile electric power generating sources. The major goal is generator standardization.

Responsible official:

Secretariat: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition)

LOCOMOTIVE MANAGEMENT

Source authority: DOD Directive 4500.9

The SA serves as executive agent for acquisition of all railroad equipment (locomotives, rolling stock, and track maintenance items) within the DOD. This responsibility includes establishing the following: equipment requirements; replacement criteria; inspection policies; operating policies; maintenance policies; information management systems on equipment condition and location; track standards; and information management systems on track condition and construction.

Responsible officials:

Secretariat: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment)

Army Staff: Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

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Appendix J

Theater–Level Information Management

Section I Background

J-1. Information Management (IM) is the provision of relevant information to the right person at the right time in a usable form to facilitate decisionmaking (FM 6-0, Command and Control). In order to provide Relevant Information (RI) – the goal of IM – there are five IM activities; collecting, processing, storing, displaying, and disseminating information. These activities occur in accomplishing all the operational-level tasks discussed in the UJTL. IM activities support each UJTL task with the relevant information for that set of tasks. In the Provide Command and Control (OP 5) UJTL, these activities, if properly performed under a well-conceived Command IM Plan (CIMP), enable situational understanding (SU) and superior decisionmaking by the ASCC commander. Therefore, the goal of IM is to provide a timely flow of relevant information which enables the commander to gain situational understanding and then make superior decisions. In order to guide the performance of the five activities that support effective theater-level IM and to provide Information Assurance measures, the ASCC HQs must establish a Command Information Management Plan (CIMP).

COMMAND IM PLAN (CIMP) PROPONENT.

J-2. The staff proponent for the CIMP within an ASCC headquarters involves a coordinated effort between the G3 and the G6. The G3 addresses operational implementation while the G6 is focused upon the

technical and Information Assurance (IA) aspects of the plan. Ultimately, it is the G3 who presents the CIMP to the Chief of Staff (CoS) for approval. It is also the G3 who recommends to the CoS any changes to the CIMP as a result of operational changes, or necessary technical/IA actions recommended by the G6.

COMMAND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PLAN (CIMP)

J-3. The goal of the CIMP is to provide the necessary theater policies and procedures for optimal performance of all five IM activities and IA measures so that Relevant Information is gained and protected. If successful, the result is optimal theater Situational Understanding (SU) and decision superiority is possible. Conversely, any ambiguous, unnecessary, or incorrect information results in low-relevance of information, devalues theater SU, and the decisionmaking environment becomes less than optimal. In such an environment, decisions are made within an environment of greater risk. In this regard, a well-constructed CIMP is also a necessary plan for risk reduction. By developing a comprehensive CIMP, the ASCC can effectively collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information within a protected information environment, and therefore achieve decision superiority.

J-4. Figure J-1 below depicts the CIMP and its role to support the achievement of an information environment for the theater HQs that supports Decision Superiority.



Figure J-1: The Command Information Management Plan

J-5. At the theater-level, a CIMP covers unique IM needs. These include the duties, responsibilities, and skill requirements of personnel who support the five IM activities and IA; the descriptions of the IM systems supporting the IM activities; the IM processes and procedures for each activity; and the IA plan to defend the IM systems. For example, the CIMP will include specific guidance for the management of the Common Operational Picture (COP) [a collection and display activity], collaborative (integrated) planning systems (a process activity), information request (IR) management procedures (a collection activity), and the command's website (display and dissemination activities).

J-6. The development and execution of an effective theater-level CIMP requires the participation of the COMASCC, Chief of Staff, all staff

sections (in particular the G3, G2, and G6), and the components. The CIMP will also provide the processes, procedures, pathways, and information systems (INFOSYS) required by each staff section.

INFORMATION COLLECTION ACTIVITY OF THE CIMP

J-7. Effective theater-level IM begins with a CIMP that clearly describes the theater's information collection activities. Gaining Relevant Information (RI) - which is defined as all information of importance to the theater Commander and his staff - is the goal of information collection. It is guided by the established information requirements (IR), which are developed and focused as the Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). To effectively collect relevant information, the CCIR must be well defined and all of the collection systems at theater-level must be properly configured to support the focused collection activities. Both the requirements and the theater arrangement of the collections systems are directed in the Information Collection Plan, which is the sub-plan of the CIMP that supports the collection activity of IM. Within the ASCC HQs staff, the G2 has the responsibility for the Information Collection Plan. For a thorough understanding of developing the Information Collection Plan refer to FM 2-33.4 (34-2), *Collection Management*.

INFORMATION PROCESSING ACTIVITY OF THE CIMP

J-8. Once the Information Collection Plan delivers Relevant Information, there is a need for it to become Knowledge. Oftentimes, the RI is simply pure, unrefined data. Processing raises the meaning of this collected information to Knowledge. This is a necessary activity in order to reach Situational Understanding (SU). When leaders and staff apply their

judgment to the Knowledge, they then reach the even higher intellectual condition of SU. Therefore, an Information Processing Plan within the CIMP provides the policies, procedures, and architecture (personnel and systems) for this IM activity. Within the ASCC HQs staff, the G2 has the responsibility for the Information Processing Plan. The G6 will support the G2 in this effort when theater networks are required for data transmission to the processing architecture.

INFORMATION DISPLAY ACTIVITY OF THE CIMP

J-9. The Display activity within IM serves to represent the RI in a usable, easily understood audio or visual form tailored to the needs of the user that conveys the Common Operational Picture (COP) for decisionmaking and exercising C2 function. Properly displayed information and knowledge enables faster decision making and enables a rapid intellectual ascent to Situational Understanding. It does require serious control of the manner we receive data and information. Otherwise, the commander and staff are wasting time on grasping the presentation, rather than performing judgment upon its content to reach Knowledge. This plan therefore dictates presentation formats, templates, and even such subtleties as color-coding and symbology (which must be consistent with FM 1-02). Whether the display is written, audible, visual, or combinations of these, the Information Display Plan will provide the policies (for consistent presentation content), procedures, and architecture of this IM activity. It will also include a HQs reports matrix to manage the information reporting within the command. It will also include the command's website configuration and website management procedures. These will include a depiction of the website's network management technologies used by the Command Web Grandmaster.

Within the ASCC HQs staff, the CofS will approve the Information Display Plan developed by the G2 and G6.

INFORMATION STORAGE ACTIVITY OF THE CIMP

J-10. The IM activity of Information Storage has the goal of retaining RI in any desired form, usually for timely retrieval in an orderly manner. This is not simply a plan to archive collected information or data. It includes the design and support of databases that can be bridged by several applications to achieve automated and correlated results. For example, databases that separately store real-time friendly unit location, enemy unit location, and effects targeting plans must all be accessed to de-conflict fires, confirm targets, and avoid fratricide. Such an architecture is provided by the Information Storage Plan. It establishes the protocol standards for access by applications, the security requirements for using the data, the data sources, and the maintenance support responsibilities to ensure the data is current and authorized access is guaranteed. Within the ASCC HQs staff, the Information Storage Plan is developed by the G2 and G6.

INFORMATION DISSEMINATION PLAN OF THE CIMP.

J-11. IM procedures must provide for the rapid dissemination, vertically and horizontally across the theater, of information. Traditional staff arrangements help determine where information should flow within the organization, but these arrangements should not form firewalls to the information exchange. Effective information dissemination within the ASCC requires the information to be—

- Positioned Properly. A COMASCC's need for specific types of information is often predictable. Positioning the required

information at its anticipated points of need speeds the flow and reduces demands on communications.

- Mobile. The reliable and secure flow of information must be commensurate with the tempo of operations. Information flow must immediately adjust to support the vertical and lateral flow of information between adjacent forces.
- Accessible. All levels of command must be able to pull the information needed to support concurrent or parallel planning and mission execution. If possible, channel information to the required user via automated means and reduce the need for manual exchange (for example, graphic depiction of forces in a COP).
- Fused. Theater-level commands receive information from many sources, in many mediums, and in different formats. Fusion is the logical blending of information from multiple sources into an accurate, concise, and complete summary. The theater-level Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and Information (C^4I) systems provide the means for information dissemination. Users/producers of information are ultimately responsible for its management across all boundaries of command to include Service, coalition and allied Forces. Principal, special, and supporting staff directors or chiefs must clearly identify their information requirements/products and work closely with Information Management Officers (IMO), to ensure processes are automated in the most effective way possible.

- SIPRNET is the primary means for hosting all classified and C4I systems. Theater-level Command organizations must ensure their ability to securely communicate and maintain situational awareness with components and coalition counterparts. This activity is supported by the Information Dissemination Plan within the CIMP. This plan depicts the information flow that is necessary to support the Information Management Battle Rhythm (IMBR). The IMBR establishes the temporal and physical arrangement of required information and knowledge in the theater. This rhythm sets the information expectations of the commander and his staff into a time-phased information delivery so that recurring decisions, and subsequent actions, are always supported. In particular, Theaters of Operation which include Coalition or Multi-National forces must ensure that the non-U.S. networks have access to the proper information to ensure seamless coordination between U.S., coalition, and allied forces. The IMBR not only identifies key information sources for U.S. forces, but also dictates the requirements for key information to be passed to non-U.S. forces. The IMBR is time sensitive and establishes a synchronized planning tool for the staff to ensure the timely movement of key information to both U.S. and non-U.S. networks.

J-12. A theater-level CIMP includes procedures to filter, fuse, and prioritize required information.

- Filtering is a process of organizing information based on specified criteria.
- Fusion assesses information from multiple sources and develops a concise and complete summary.
- Prioritization focuses the efforts of the HQ on developing information supporting the Commander's decisionmaking process.

J-13. Information flow within an ASCC is a complex yet vital function for reducing uncertainty and ambiguity while facilitating a clear understanding of the battlespace for the commander. Optimum information flow within the command requires both speed and clarity of transfer without creating fragmented or useless information. This CIMP assigns responsibilities and provides instructions on managing information for the COMASCC. This is a vital step ensuring decision-makers have the required information, when they need it, and in an understandable format. Information management is vital to mission success and requires across the staff involvement. Within the ASCC HQs staff, the G3 will approve the Information Dissemination Plan developed in coordination between the G2 and the G6.

INFORMATION ASSURANCE PLAN OF THE CIMP.

J-14. IM systems are high-value targets to the enemy and must be adequately protected and defended to maintain the integrity of the joint force C2 infrastructure. Mission accomplishment depends upon protecting and defending information and information systems from destruction, disruption, corruption, and safeguarding from intrusion and exploitation. Everyone should assume their information and information system is a target. To provide IA policies and procedures, the theater will

have a comprehensive IA Plan within the CIMP. Within the ASCC HQs staff, the G6 will develop the IA Plan.

J-15. The predominant means to apply information assurance is through INFOSEC, which includes intrusion detection, effect isolation, and incident reaction to restore information and system security. The IA Plan will provide INFOSEC guidance and include:

J-16. Threats to the theater IM. - The IA Plan must anticipate internal and external threats and provide guidance in preventing, mitigating, and recovering from such threats as:

- Hackers (inside or outside the command)
- Disgruntled system users.
- Poor communications security (COMSEC), computer security (COMPUSEC), and OPSEC.
- Viruses (malicious code).
- Unauthorized/unintentional disclosure of data. This threat increases proportionally to the Command's use of automation.
- Corruption of data. An insidious method of deception, if undetected, leads to faulty guidance, coordination, decision making, and execution.
- Physical disruption or denial of communications.
- State sponsored information warfare (IW) attacks.

J-17. **Defensive Information Operations.** The IA Plan will address the actions against these threats in the context of Defensive Information Operations. Defensive Information Operations actions include—

- Determining what data adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted, or pieced together, to derive critical friendly information.
- Identifying critical information resources, and assessing all vulnerabilities of these resources (e.g. personnel, equipment, software, and procedures); then use physical and procedural measures to protect these resources.
- Verifying the proper installation and use of crypto systems.
- Protecting transmissions from interception and exploitation.
- Using warning banners.
- Using password protected screen savers.

- Safeguarding passwords and establishing password generation procedures.

J-18. **Information Destruction.** The IA Plan will also address the proper destruction of information and information media IAW Army Regulations and the Federal Records Act (44 USC 21 and 33).

SECTION II Responsibilities

COMMANDER, ASCC

- Establishes the priorities for information gathering and reporting by establishing the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR).
- Approves the CIMP.

Chief of Staff:

- Approves the HQ daily operations cycle/battle rhythm
- Implements the Theater-level CIMP.
- Appoints the Command Information Management Officer (CIMO).
- Appoints a web administrator and a web grandmaster.
- Appoints the Command Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO).
- Approves the Information Display Plan that includes the format and structure of information displayed and distributed within the command (e.g. briefings, reports, etc.).

PRINCIPAL STAFF SECTIONS. THE PRINCIPAL STAFF SECTIONS—

- Establish internal staff section procedures for home pages, message handling, e-mail, RFI, and suspense control.
- Appoint a staff section IMO as a point of contact for the CIMO and all IM matters.
- Appoint a webmaster for their section as a point of contact for the Command Web Administrator and Command Web Grandmaster.
- Ensure training on basic IM and security procedures for all staff section personnel.
- When operating in a coalition environment, appoint on orders, a Foreign Disclosure Representative (FDR) and ensure proper training. The staff section FDRs will work closely with the Command's Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO) for all disclosure and releasability issues.
- Identify all key information products/reports and develop an internal staff section Information Management Battle Rhythm

(IMBR) to be incorporated into the Information Dissemination Plan of the CIMP.

- When operating in a coalition environment, ensure the staff section IMBR is properly maintained so that it will include coalition and allied forces.

Army Service Component Command IMO (CIMO)

J-19. The ASCC HQs Command Information Management Officer (CIMO)—

- Overseas the development of the five separate activity plans discussed above, integrates them, and publishes the resulting CIMP.
- Publishes the HQ daily operations cycle/battle rhythm.
- Publishes the required reports matrix depicted in the Information Display Plan and advises the CofS when fulfillment of the matrix is threatened.
- Coordinates additional training requirements by staff and component elements to support IM.
- Acts as Chief of the Information Management Board (IMB) to ensure successful development and execution of the CIMP.
- Works closely with the Common Operational Picture Manager (COPM) to develop effective, efficient track/location management procedures.
- Works closely with the command's web administrator to ensure establishment of the web site infrastructure as a critical part of the Information Dissemination Plan.
- May be a commissioned or non-commissioned officer regardless of rank, specialty, or Service, as best meets the requirements of the COMASCC. However, selection should reflect the best use of trained personnel and existing expertise.

J-20. ASCC Staff Section IMOs. The staff section IMO—

- Oversees the internal and external information flow of their staff section.
- Provides the CIMO with staff section information requirements for incorporation into the CIMP.
- Provides the G6 a list of their requirements for network support.
- Ensures compliance with the CIMP for the establishment of newsgroups and/or web sites, message handling, e-mail, RFI, and suspense control procedures.
- Coordinates/conducts internal IM training for staff section members.
- May be a commissioned or non-commissioned officer regardless of rank, specialty, or Service. However, selection should reflect the best use of trained personnel and existing expertise.

- Identifies all key staff section information products/reports and develops the staff section's internal Information Management Battle Rhythm (IMBR) to be incorporated into the CIMP's Information Dissemination Plan.
- Ensures the staff IMBR is properly maintained when operating in a coalition environment.

J-21. **Component and Supporting Agencies.** Theater-level commands will most likely establish web sites for the coordination and dissemination of information in accordance with the CIMP's Information Dissemination Plan. Web sites require each component and supporting agency to appoint a webmaster as a primary point of contact for web site technical matters. Each component, supporting agency, and separate staff section will also appoint an IMO as a primary point of contact for IM matters. Component and supporting agency IMOs:

- Review the HQ's daily operations, information cycle/battle rhythm, and CIMP
- Conduct liaison with the CIMO.
- Coordinate and conduct IM training for members of the component or agency.
- May be commissioned or non-commissioned officers regardless of rank, specialty, or Service. However, selection should reflect the best use of trained personnel and existing expertise.

J-22. **Information and Information System User Responsibilities.** The information and information system user responsibilities are to—

- Ensure accuracy of information.
- Properly control, classify, protect, and archive all information and information systems for which they are responsible.
- Validate the authority to destroy information before destruction.
-
- Read and comply with the information requirements published in the IMP.

J-23. **ASCC Web Management Responsibilities.** The ASCC CIMO uses four distinct roles to manage the Information Dissemination and

Display Plans: Command Web Administrator, Command Web Grandmaster, Webmasters, and information producers.

J-24. **Command Web Administrator**. The Command Web Administrator is appointed by the CofS and reports to the G3. This position is responsible for the overall management of information displayed or disseminated on the command's web site. The Command Web Administrator must coordinate with the Webmasters located in the various staff sections, components, and supporting agencies. This ensures compliance with the CIMP's Information Display and Dissemination Plans which facilitate the necessary information exchange throughout the command. The Command Web Administrator is not a technical role, although an understanding of web technology is required. The Command Web Administrator ensures maintenance of the posted information in accordance with the CIMP. The CIMO may also be designated as the Command Web Administrator.

J-25. **Command Web Grandmaster**. The Command Web Grandmaster works within the G6 and must work very closely with the Command Web Administrator and the CIMO for the technical development of the command's web site. The Command Web Grandmaster coordinates the activities of the subordinate webmasters throughout the command. The Command Web Grandmaster is responsible for the technical infrastructure of the command's web site to include compliance with the CIMP's Information Display Plan for templates and forms. When new network management technologies need to be installed, the Command Web Grandmaster will make the necessary recommendations to the G6 for adjustment of the Information Display Plan in the CIMP. The

Command Web Grandmaster provides the tools which enable users to publish, access, and customize information themselves rather than doing it all for them.

J-26. **Webmasters**. Each staff section assigns a staff officer/NCO as a Webmaster. The Webmaster is responsible to the staff section principal for ensuring their organization or staff section can use the command's web. In addition, the Webmasters post and maintain their respective homepages, and assist their information producers. These webmasters are also responsible for compliance with the CIMP Information Display Plan at their level. This includes such actions as properly converting documents to appropriate HyperText Markup Language (HTML) format and ensuring that HyperText Transfer Protocols (HTTP) remain current.

J-27. **Information Producers**. Each component, supporting agency, and staff section, as producers of information, determines what information they create and maintain on their web site. The information producer is responsible for keeping their portion of the web site, at their level and below, current and accurate. Their Webmaster ensures information producer compliance with the CIMP.

ASCC INFORMATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEM PROTECTION RESPONSIBILITIES

J-28. **ASCC Information Systems Security Manager (ISSM).** The G6 ISSM is the focal point and principal advisor for INFOSEC matters on behalf of the DAA. The ISSM has the following responsibilities:

- Develops, implements, and maintains the staff INFOSEC plan for all systems operated in the command.

- Ensures information systems security officer (ISSO) and other information system (IS) security staff are properly trained and appointed in writing.
- Assists ISSOs with preparing accreditation support documentation including risk assessment documentation, security test and evaluation (ST&E) documentation, and contingency plans.
- Ensures that configuration management of staff hardware and software complies with the INFOSEC plan.

J-29. Each staff directorate normally appoints a security manager to coordinate with the ISSM. See DOD 5200.1-R, DOD Information Security Program, AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security Program, and AR 380-19, Information Systems Security for additional details.

J-30. **ASCC Special Security Officer (SSO).** The SSO is responsible for sensitive compartmented information (SCI) management, controls, and access. This position is normally an Intelligence Directorate (G2) function.

J-31. **Operations Security (OPSEC) Officer.** The OPSEC officer is responsible for oversight and implementation of the command's OPSEC program. This position is normally an Operations Directorate (G3) function.

J-32. **Designated Approving Authority (DAA).** The DAA ensures, implements, and monitors a reliable information security (INFOSEC) program. The theater-level function of the DAA for all theater information systems, with the exception of those systems processing Special Compartmented Information (SCI), is normally the responsibility of the G6. The DAA for accrediting SCI information systems is reserved at the National Security Agency and such accreditation issues are handled via the SSO. The theater-level DAA has the following responsibilities:

- Accredits all automated information systems (AISs) under their jurisdiction before approving their operation.
- Allocates resources (funding and manpower) to achieve and maintain an acceptable level-of-protection and to remedy security deficiencies.
- Ensures certifying officials, functional OPRs, and Information Systems Security Officers (ISSO) are identified for all AIS under their jurisdiction.
- Approves theater information system security policies and ensures their compliance with AR 380-19.

J-33. **Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO).** The ISSO is normally a G6 responsibility. The ISSO is responsible for implementing and maintaining information systems security on behalf of the ISSM. The ISSO reports to the ISSM for INFOSEC matters and implements the overall INFOSEC program directed by AR 380-14. Each staff directorate in the organization appoints in writing an ISSO. Larger directorates may appoint multiple ISSOs. The ISSO is the point of contact for INFOSEC matters within their area of appointment, with the following responsibilities:

- Develops a local system security policy (IAW AR 380-14) for AIS and networks that process or protect sensitive unclassified and classified information.
- Ensures audit trails are reviewed periodically (e.g. daily, weekly, etc.).
- Performs an initial evaluation of each vulnerability or incident, begins corrective or protective measures, and reports according to established network incident reporting procedures.
- Notifies the DAA when AIS are involved in security-related incidents.
- Evaluates known vulnerabilities to ascertain if additional safeguards are needed. Ensures approved “patches” to known vulnerabilities are installed and maintains records of those fixes.
- Coordinates with the ISSM on matters concerning INFOSEC.
- Ensures INFOSEC procedures are implemented within their assigned area.
- Ensures users within assigned areas are operating, maintaining, and disposing of systems per INFOSEC policies and procedures.
- Trains the IM users within the assigned area on INFOSEC responsibilities.

- Ensures personnel and physical security requirements are followed.

J-34. **ASCC Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO).** The theater-level HQ FDO maintains oversight of the Foreign Disclosure of information. The G3, G2 or G5 are all possible candidates for maintaining foreign disclosure oversight. Each Army headquarters will assign the FDO where it best serves the command. The FDO is responsible for implementing and maintaining the Foreign Disclosure policies established in the National Disclosure Policy-1, or promulgated by the CINC, or the Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ODCSINT). The Commander will appoint a Headquarters FDO. The FDO is the Command's point of contact for matters involving the disclosure of all military information to foreign governments and international organizations. The FDO's responsibilities are:

- Ensures the proper disclosure and releasability of all products within the headquarters. Authorizes the first-time disclosures of classified military information (CMI) by the command to foreign governments and international organizations. Ensures products and information originated outside of the command are approved for disclosure in writing by the appropriate disclosure authority for that product or information.
- Coordinates with the Foreign Disclosure Representatives (FDR) and acts as the final approval authority on all issues originated at that subordinate level.
- Works closely with the Command Web Administrator to ensure timely dissemination of information to coalition and allied forces.

J-35. Foreign Disclosure Representative (FDR). The FDR is appointed at each staff directorate. The FDR is responsible for implementing and maintaining security on behalf of the FDO. The FDR reports to the FDO for any releasability matters to coalition and allied forces, and implements the overall Foreign Disclosure Plan (FDP) established by the FDO. Larger directorates may appoint multiple FDRs. The FDR will ----

- Ensures the proper releasability of all products within their section.
- Coordinates with the FDO for final approval.
- Works closely with the section IMO to ensure timely dissemination of information to coalition and allied forces.
- Remains the point of contact for all information that has been released to foreign countries.

J-36. **Contact Officer**. A Contact Officer will be designated in writing by the commander, to facilitate and oversee the activities of Foreign Liaison Officers (FLOs). The contact officer should be of equivalent rank/grade or higher if available, to the FLO. A primary and an alternate contact officer must be identified in the Designated Disclosure Authority Letter (DDAL) and the Extended Visit Request. Contact officers must be physically accessible and have daily contact with the FLO. All contact officers must be familiar with AR 380-10 and other applicable guidelines governing the disclosure of Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) and specific disclosure guidelines established in the DDAL. The ASCC FDO will brief the Contact Officer of his or her duties. Contact Officers will also comply with the guidelines below. Note: In all cases, Army commands will not assign the duties of a Contact Officer to U.S. contractors, unless it is specifically written in their contract that they are official representatives of the U.S. Army. The Contact Officer for a FLO will--

- Be briefed by the FDO upon assumption of duties.
- Become familiar with AR 380-10, and the specific terms of certification approved by the ODCSINT for the individual FLO position.
- Initially brief a new FLO on DA and local policies and procedures affecting the FLO's status and performance of functions, as well as customs of the U.S. Army.
- Render advice and assistance to the FLO in complying with policies and procedures.
- Evaluate the FLO's requests for consultations and visits, and assist in arranging activities deemed substantively consistent with the

FLO's approved terms of certification. Consultations and visits beyond a FLO's terms of certification require the submission of formal visit requests by the FLO's embassy in Washington, D.C.

- Receive, evaluate, and recommend/refer all FLO requests for classified military information (CMI) through the FDO.
- Receive, evaluate, and refer all FLO requests involving Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) to the FDO for administrative processing and forwarding to the originator/proponent. Notify the ODCSINT, HQDA through foreign disclosure channels when the designated Contact Officer is changed or upon permanent departure of FLOs under their oversight.
- Notify the supporting counterintelligence and local security offices of any foreign visit activity, which is reportable under AR 381-12.
- Comply with the procedures of paragraph K-5d of AR 380-10 regarding misconduct on the part of the FLO.
- Brief U.S. personnel with whom the FLO will have official contact, to include one-time and recurring visits external to the command, to ensure that they are made fully aware of disclosure guidance and restrictions.

J-37. **Network Security Officer (NSO).** The NSO is normally a G6 function. The NSO is responsible for implementing and maintaining network security on behalf of the ISSM. The G6 appoints the NSO, who has the following responsibilities:

- Ensures incorporation of countermeasures and safeguards in the network design and daily performance of the network.
- Informs the ISSM of external network connection requirements so the ISSM can request Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs).
- Develops and promulgates the standard INFOSEC procedures governing network operations.
- Ensures security measures and procedures used at the network nodes fully support the security integrity of the network.

J-38. Terminal Area Security Officers (TASO). When needed, the officer-in-charge for each remote site with a terminal connection to a network designates a TASO in writing. The TASO is the representative of the ISSM or ISSO in matters pertaining to the security of each terminal. Each HQ's staff directorate operating both a classified and unclassified network terminal normally appoints a TASO. The TASO enforces all applicable security requirements implemented by the INFOSEC program and the ISSM.

Section III - Theater Level Information Management Systems

J-39. **Background.** The goal of theater-level Army Information Systems and IM procedures is to produce Situational Understanding and create decision superiority. Information systems must provide effective and secure information exchange throughout the command. Users need to develop an understanding of the information systems available and develop IM procedures which comply with the CIMP to match their information requirements.

J-40. **Global Command and Control System (GCCS).** GCCS is a comprehensive, worldwide system providing information processing and dissemination capabilities necessary to conduct command and control (C2) of joint forces. There are six primary software modules within GCCS that provide critical information flow to enhance situational understanding: Global Command and Control System – Army (GCCS-A), the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES); Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS); Common Operational Picture (COP) segment (chart)/Common Tactical Picture (CTP); Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC); and a software package containing both a browser and e-mail/newsgroup capabilities. Basic descriptions of each module follow:

J-41. **Global Command and Control System – Army (GCCS-A).** The GCCS-A is the Army's Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) system designed to implement the concept of

providing modern C4I support for the warrior (C4IFTW) at echelons above corps (EAC). GCCS-A, part of the Army Battle Command System (ABCS), supports the Joint Staff sponsored Global Command and Control System (GCCS). The GCCS-A architecture consists of common hardware and software components that can be assembled to support the specific physical architecture of the theater or site. The basic building blocks consist of UNIX based servers strategically located in the theater and linked to other wide area network (WAN) and local area network (LAN) servers. These servers support end-users on personal computer (PC) workstations. The PC users have a graphical user interface (GUI) via fiber-distributed data interface (FDDI) or Ethernet LAN connections to the LAN servers. Remote users should have access to high-speed lines (56 kilobits per second [KBPS] per user) to maximize capabilities. One of the key goals is migrating GCCS-A to a client-server architecture that efficiently divides processing between the user workstations and the servers.

- JOPES. JOPES supports military planning, deployment, execution, redeployment, and operations monitoring.
- JDISS. JDISS is a transportable workstation and communications system that electronically extends a theater Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) to other tactical users.
- COP. The development and maintenance of the COP requires the command and all components adherence with established COP procedures. The command's COP feeds the commander in chief (CINC) COP. Component reporting systems provide friendly and threat air, maritime, and ground locations/tracks. The COP provides commanders with a near real-time force tracking mechanism.
- Software Package. Currently GCCS uses a browser application program to provide e-mail and newsgroup capabilities.

J-42. **Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC).** C2PC is the primary warfighting information management tool for the command and is a Windows-based software application designed to facilitate

military command and control functions. This system can produce overlays and operational graphics for the command's internal use. As part of the network, C2PC has the capability of depicting the current locations of the friendly and enemy units that have been input into a tactical database, as well as instantly share overlays and message traffic. Given the electronic connectivity of the network, C2PC becomes a powerful tool for the commander by providing a COP throughout the command. C2PC is the system of record for COP Management.

J-43. **How it Works.** C2PC allows the common user to provide input into the COP for situational awareness. Users can now provide tactical overlays from their NT workstations and have them transmitted to/from the tactical level at echelons below corps to ASCC and theater levels.



Figure J-2: How C2PC Works

J-44. Concept of Operations. C2PC is loaded on all required Personal Computers. Live feeds are received from both the GCCS and GCCS-A. C2PC can also be loaded on computers located on coalition and allied networks. Information can be manually or automatically pushed to these networks IAW the Information Management Battle Rhythm. This information is then posted on the coalition and/or allied websites. All such information sharing is first reviewed and approved by the various staff FDRs and the Theater FDO.

J-45. Each staff section will identify key C2PC overlays (approved by G3). Staff sections are responsible for timely dissemination, based upon the IMBR, to all recipients dictated in the Information Dissemination Plan of the CIMP.

J-46. The following figure describes the SIPRNET COP and how each staff section is responsible for posting the tactical data into the coalition and/or allied network.



Figure J-3: C2PC Concept of Operations

J-47. **Network Application Management.** Networks provide the access to unsecure and secure information, allowing individuals to send and receive unclassified and classified information worldwide. The NIPRNET provides access to the Internet. SIPRNET and JWICS provide access to classified information. The Intranet is a communications network where access to published information is restricted.

J-48. **Web Sites and Web Pages.** A well-organized web site assembles vital information, organizes it in a logical sequence, and delivers it efficiently. The HQ, staff directorates, components, and supporting agencies will use their webmasters to maintain their own web pages for their sites. Information on these web pages should conform to the Information Display Plan in the CIMP. That plan will provide theater-level guidance on the subordinate web site content and format.

J-49. **E-Mail.** E-mail provides rapid dissemination of time critical information within the COMMAND. E-mail permits rapid and asynchronous communications. It permits a single user to communicate with one or several users simultaneously. E-mail can overload the network if used improperly. Therefore, the Information Dissemination Plan of the CIMP will address command email policies and use. It will include emphasis against unnecessary information (e.g. jokes, chain email) and large message attachments which stress the system. The plan will also provide guidance on the imposition of email MINIMIZE when the system is overloaded or has suffered diminished performance.

J-50. **VTC.** Improvements in digital video compression and readily available high-capacity transmission systems make it possible for secure, interactive color video worldwide. The primary purpose of the VTC capability is support to the commander. The secondary purpose of the VTC capability is to facilitate the transfer of information between subordinate commanders and staffs. Types of VTC:

- - General Service (message) [GENSER]. This is the primary means of VTC between components and the HQ for UNCLASSIFIED and up to TOP SECRET (TS) Collateral.
- - JWICS VTC is the primary means of VTC involving SCI requirements.
- VTC Concept and Procedures. The GENSER and JWICS VTCs should be available for scheduling 24 hours a day except for required maintenance. The battle rhythm dictates the schedule of the VTCs, and the HQ is network control for the VTC. The JWICS VTC is the backup for the GENSER VTC. The JWICS VTC is always located within a permanent sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) or a tactical SCIF (T-SCIF). All procedures for VTC use will be included in the Information Dissemination Plan of the CIMP.

J-51. **Communication Means.** The G6 directs the specific component responsibilities for establishing connectivity between the HQ and themselves. Normally, the higher HQ is responsible for establishing all

connections to lower HQ. In the Information Dissemination Plan of the CIMP, the G6 will include an architecture for the ASCC's communications networks. It will include the:

- - Radio Communications Network.
- - Command net.
- - Intelligence net.
- - Air coordination net.
- Theater Missile Defence Nest
  - - SIPRNET/NIPRNET.
  - - AUTODIN (Defense Message System)
  - - Functional Specific Communications.
  - - SCI intelligence collection - JWICS.

GLOSSARY

A²C²-Army airspace command and control (JP 1-02)

AADC-area air defense commander (JP 1-02)

AAMDC-Army Air and Missile Defense Command (FM 3-01.94)

AAGS-Army Air-Ground System (JP 1-02)

AAWC-antiair warfare commander (JP 1-02)

ABCA-American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies Standardization Program (JP 1-02)

ABCCC-airborne battlefield command and control center (JP 1-02)

ACC-air component commander (JP 1-02)

ACCS-Air Command and Control System (JP 1-02)

ACE-analysis and control element (Army); aviation combat element (Air Force)

ACR-armored cavalry regiment (JP 1-02)

ACSA-acquisition and cross-Service agreement (JP 1-02)

active missile defense-measures taken to intercept, destroy, or negate the effects of an enemy missile launch

ACU-area common user

AD-air defense

ADA-air defense artillery (JP 1-02)

ADC-area damage control (JP 1-02)

ADCON-administrative control (JP 1-02)

ADE-air defense element (FM 3-01.20)

admin-administration

ADPE-automatic data processing equipment (JP 1-02)

AFAC-airborne forward air controller

AFCC-Air Force component commander (JP 1-02)

AFSCC-Air Force service component command

AFSOC-Air Force special operations component (JP 1-02)

AFSOD-Air Force special operations detachments (JP 1-02)

AFSOE-Air Force special operations elements (JP 1-02)

AFSOF-Air Force special operations forces (JP 1-02)

AGCCS-Army Global Command and Control System

AID-United States Agency for International Development (JP 1-02)

AIOTF-Army Information Operations Task Force (FM 3-100)

ALCOM-U.S. Alaskan Command (JP 1-02)

allocation-the translation of apportionment into total numbers of resources

all-source analysis system-a system that collects and fuses intelligence data to support the commander's decision-making process

ALOC-air lines of communication (JP 1-02)

AMDCOORD-Army Air and Missile Defense Coordinator

AMDPCS-air and missile defense planning and control system (FM 3-01.94)

AME-air mobility element (JP 1-02)

AMD-air and missile defense (FM 3-01)

AMEDD-Army medical department

AML-area medical lab (FM 4-02.12)

AMOPES-Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System

amphibious objective area (AOA)-a geographical area, delineated in the initiating directive, for purposes of command and control within which is located the objective to be secured by the amphibious task force (JP 1-02)

AO-area of operations (JP 1-02)

AOA-amphibious objective area (JP 1-02)

AOB-advanced operational base (JP 1-02)

AOC-air operations center (JP 1-02)

AOI-area of interest (JP 3-0)

AOR-area of responsibility (JP 1-02)

APA-Army pre-positioned afloat

APOD-aerial port of debarkation (JP 1-02)

APOE-aerial port of embarkation (JP 1-02)

apportionment-the determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time

APS-afloat prepositioning ships (JP 1-02)

Area of interest-that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. Also called AOI. (JP 1-02)

area of operations-an operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (JP 1-02)

area of responsibility-the geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called AOR. (JP 1-02)

AREC-air resource element coordinator (JP 1-02)

ARL-aerial reconnaissance low

ARLO-Army liaison officer

ARFOR-Army forces; the headquarters and mission forces assigned to an Army service component command, subordinate joint force

command, or multinational command (JP 1-02)

Army Command and Control System-a system that encompasses the command and control systems, communications, and hardware and software required to implement the Army's portion of the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System and execute full-dimensional operations doctrine

Army service component command-the Army service component command is assigned to a unified command or designated subunified command. The *ASCC* performs service functions assigned by the UNAAF for the Army forces within the command and performs three strategic and operational-level missions-- establishes linkages, conducts land operations, and conducts sustainment operations; the ASCC functions in both the operational and service chain of command (JP 3-33)

ARSOA-Army special operations aviation

ARSOC-Army special operations component

ARSOCC-Army special operations component command (JP 1-02)

ARSOF-Army special operations forces (JP 1-02)

ARSST- army space support teams (FM 3-14)

ASA-FM-Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management

ASAS-all-source analysis system (JP 1-02)

ASCC-Army service component command (JP 3-33)

ASCS-air support control section (JP 1-02)

ASE-Army support element (FM 3-93)

ASG-area support group

ASI-all-source intelligence

ASMB-area support medical battalion (FM 4-02.12)

ASMP-Army Strategic Mobility Program

ASOC-air support operations center

ASOS-Army support to other Services

assign-to place units or personnel in an organization where such

placement is relatively permanent and the organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel

ATACMS-Army Tactical Missile System (JP 1-02)

ATCS-air traffic control section (JP 1-02)

ATF-amphibious task force (JP 1-02)

ATO-air tasking order (JP 1-02)

attack operations-actions taken to neutralize or destroy an adversary's ability to produce, deploy, and employ theater missiles

AUTODIN-automatic digital network (JP 1-02)

AVIM-aviation intermediate maintenance (JP 1-02)

AVUM-aviation unit maintenance (JP 1-02)

AWACS-Airborne Warning and Control System (JP 1-02)

battle-a series of related tactical engagements

battle command-is the exercise of command in operations against a hostile, thinking enemy. It applies the leadership element of combat power to operations. The art of command lies in the conscious and skillful exercise of command authority through visualization, decision making, and leadership.(FM 3-0)

battlefield coordination detachment-an Army fire support coordination detachment located at an Air Force air operations center whose function is to monitor and interpret the land battle situation and provide land force needs for tactical air support to the air operations center and the Air Force component commander

battlespace-the environment, factors, and conditions which must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission.(JP 1-02)

BCD-battlefield coordination detachment

BCOC-base cluster operations center (JP 1-02)

BDA-battle damage assessment (JP 1-02)

BDCT-base defense coordination team

bde-brigade (JP 1-02)

BDOC-base defense operations center (JP 1-02)

BIDS-biological identification/detection system

bn-battalion (JP 1-02)

branches-the contingency options built into the basic plan. A branch is used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions (JP 3-0)

C²-command and control

CA-civil affairs (Army) (FM 6-99.1)

C&C-collection and classification

CALL-Center for Army Lessons Learned

campaign-a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 1-02)

campaign plan-a plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space (JP 1-02)

CAP-crisis action planning (JP 1-02)

CAS-close air support (JP 1-02)

CATF-commander, amphibious task force (JP 1-02)

CBRNE-chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high-yield explosive.

CBT-combating terrorism (JP 1-02)

CBTZ-combat zone (JP 1-02)

CCT-combat control team (JP 1-02)

C-Day-the unnamed day deployment operations commence

CDC-combat direction center

CENTCOM-United States Central Command

CFC-Combined Forces Command (Korea)

CHS-combat health support (Army) (FM 1-02)

CI-counterintelligence (JP 1-02)

CIA-Central Intelligence Agency (JP 1-02)

CID-criminal investigation division (JP 1-02)

CIMIC- civil-military cooperation (NATO)

CINC-the commander in chief of a combatant command (JP 1-02)

CINCPAC-Commander in Chief, Pacific

centers of gravity-those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also called COGs. (JP 3-0)

CJCS-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JP 1-02)

CJTF-commander of the joint task force (JP 1-02); combined joint task force (NATO)

CLPSB-CINC's logistic procurement support board

CM-cruise missile or consequence management (JP 3-07.6)

CMO-civil-military operations(JP 1-02)
CMOC-civil-military operations center (JP 1-02)

CMISE-corps military intelligence support element

CNA/D-computer network attack/defense (JP 3-13)

CNR-combat net radio

COA-course of action (JP 1-02)

COCOM-combatant command (command authority) (JP 1-02)

CofS-chief of staff

combatant command-a unified or specified command with a broad and continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or

functional responsibilities.(JP 1-02)

combatant commander-a commander in chief of a one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 1-02)

combat power- combat power is the ability to fight. I t is the total means of destructive or disruptive force, or both, that a military unit or force can apply at an adversary at a given time. Commanders combine the elements of combat power--maneuver, firepower, leadership, protection and information- to meet constantly changing requirements and defeat an enemy. (FM 3-0)

combat zone-that area required by combat forces for the conduct of operations; the territory forward of the Army rear area boundary (JP 1-02)

COMARFOR-commander, army force (JP 1-02)
COMASCC-commander, army service component command (FM 3-93)

COMCARGRU-commander, carrier battle group (JP 1-02)

commander's intent- describes the desired end state. It is a concise expression of the purpose of the operation, not a summary of the concept of operations. It may include how the posture of units at that end state facilitates transition to future operations. It may also include the commander's assessment of the enemy commander's intent. (JP 1-02)

communications zone-rear part of the theater that is contiguous to the combat zone; contains those theater installations and organizations required to support combat and combat support forces; has a three-dimensional aspect and reaches back to the CONUS base (JP 1-02)

COMMZ-communications zone (JP 1-02)

COMSEC-communications security (JP 1-02)

CONPLAN-operation plan in concept format (JP 1-02)

consequence management-those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation. Also called CM. (JP 3-0)

constraint-actions the commander must take or methods that must be employed (FM 3-93)

CONUS-continental United States (JP 1-02)

coordinating authority-the authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, two or more services, or two or more forces of the same service; this authority can require consultation among involved agencies or their representatives but cannot compel agreement; unresolved disagreements are referred to the appropriate authority

COP-common operational picture (FM 3-0)

COSCOM-corps support command (JP 1-02)

countermobility-to delay, channel, or stop offensive movement by the enemy in order to destroy enemy forces directly or indirectly by enhancing the effectiveness of friendly direct- and indirect-fire weapon systems

coup de main- an offensive operation that capitalizes on surprise and simultaneous execution of supporting operations to achieve success in one shift stroke (JP 1-02)

CP-command post (JP 1-02)

CRC-control and reporting center (JP 1-02)

crisis action planning-the JOPES process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. CAP follows prescribed crisis-action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. (JP 1-02)

CROP-common relevant operating picture (FM 5-0)

CS-combat support (JP 1-02)

CSC- CINC's strategic concept (JP 1-02)

CSCE-communications system control element

CSCT-combat support coordination team (FM 3-100)

CSG-cryptologic support group (JP 1-02)

CSH-combat support hospital

CSR-controlled supply rate

CSS-combat service support (JP 1-02)

CSSAMO-combat service support automation management office

CSSE-combat service support element (MAGTF) (JP 1-02)

CUL-common user logistics (JP 4-07)

CULT-common user land transportation (JP 1-02)

CVBG-carrier battle group (JP 1-02)

CWC-composite warfare commander (JP 1-02)

D^3A-decide, detect, deliver, and assess

DA-Department of the Army (JP 1-02)

DAADC-deputy area air defense coordinator (FM 3-01)

DASC-direct air support center (JP 1-02)

DAL-defended asset list (FM 3-01.20)

DASC-A-direct air support center airborne (JP 1-02)

DC-displaced civilian

DCA-defensive counterair (JP 1-02)

DCS-defense communications system (JP 1-02)

DCST-Defense Logistics Agency Contingency Support Team (FM 4-0)

DCSENG-deputy chief of staff for engineers (FM 3-93)

DCSHNA-deputy chief of staff for host nation activity (FM 3-93)

DCSINT-deputy chief of staff for intelligence (JP 1-02)

DCSCE-deputy chief of staff for communications-electronics (FM 3-100)

DCSLOG-deputy chief of staff for logistics (US Army)(JP 1-02)

DCSOPS-deputy chief of staff for operations (US Army) (JP 1-02)

DCSPER-deputy chief of staff for personnel (US Army)(JP 1-02)

DCSRM-deputy chief of staff for resource management (FM 3-100)

DDN-Defense Data Network (JP 1-02)

DEA-Drug Enforcement Agency (JP 1-02)

deception-those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (JP 1-02)

decide, detect, deliver, assess-targeting process that identifies enemy targets for possible engagement and determines the appropriate system to be used to capture, destroy, degrade, or neutralize the target in question, and then assess the results

decisive engagement-an engagement in which a unit is considered fully committed and cannot maneuver or extricate itself; in the absence of outside assistance, the action must be fought to a conclusion and either won or lost with the forces at hand

decisive point-a geographic place, specific key event, critical system, or function that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack. (JP 3-0)

Defense Logistics Agency-provides logistics support to the Army in areas of supply support, logistics services, and defense contract administrative support

deliberate planning-the JOPES process involving the development of joint operations plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. Conducted principally in peacetime, deliberate planning is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other DOD planning cycles in accordance with the formally established Joint Strategic Planning System. (JP 1-02)

DFC-deputy force commander (JP 1-02)

det-detachment (JP 1-02)

DFSA-designated finance support activity

DIA-Defense Intelligence Agency (JP 1-02)

direct support-a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported force's request for assistance (JP 1-02)

directive authority for logistics-combatant commander authority

to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the effective execution of approved operation plans. Essential measures include the optimized use or reallocation of available resources and prevention or elimination of redundant facilities and/or overlapping functions among the Service component commands. (JP 0-2)

DIRLAUTH-direct liaison authorized

DISA-Defense Information System Agency (JP 1-02)

DISE-Deployable Intelligence Support Element

DISNET-Defense Information Systems Network

div-division

DLA-Defense Logistics Agency (JP 1-02)

DMC–distribution management center (FM 4-0)

DMS–defense message system

DOD-Department of Defense

DOS-Department of State (JP 1-02)

DS-direct support (JP 1-02)

DSE-deception staff element

DSN-Defense Switched Network (JP 1-02)

DTRA-Defense Threat Reduction Agency

EAC-echelons above corps (JP 1-02)

EAR-executive agent responsibilities

ECC–Effects Coordination Center (FM 3-93)

EEI-essential elements of friendly information (FM 3-0)

EEM–early entry modules (FM 4-0)

ELINT-electronic intelligence (JP 1-02)

EMP-electromagnetic pulse

engagement-small, tactical conflicts, usually between opposing maneuver forces

EOD-explosive ordnance disposal (JP 1-02)

EPW-enemy prisoner of war (JP 1-02)

EUSA-Eighth United States Army--the Army component to U.S. Forces, Korea

EW-electronic warfare (JP 1-02)

FAC-forward air controller (JP 1-02)

FAC(A)-forward air controller (airborne) (JP 1-02)

FACP-forward air control post

FDO-flexible deterrent option (JP 1-02)

FFA-free-fire area (JP 1-02)

FG-finance group

FHA-foreign humanitarian assistance (JP 1-02)

FID-foreign internal defense (FM 1-02)

FINCOM-finance command (FM 4-0)

FLOT-forward line of own troops (FM 3-0)

FM-field manual (JP 1-02)

FNS-foreign nation support(JP 1-02)

FOB-forward operation base (JP 1-02)

Foreign Nation Support-(JP 1-02)

FORSCOM-United States Army Forces Command--the Army component of US Joint Forces Command (a unified command) (JP 1-02)

FSCC-fire support coordination center (JP 1-02)

FSCL-fire support coordination line

FSE-fire support element (JP 1-02)

G1-assistant chief of staff, personnel (FM 3-0)

G2-assistant chief of staff, intelligence (FM 3-0)

G3-assistant chief of staff, operations (FM 3-0)

G4-assistant chief of staff, logistics (FM 3-0)

G5-assistant chief of staff, civil affairs (FM 3-0)

G6-assistant chief of staff, signal (FM 6-0)

G7-assistant chief of staff, information operations (FM 3-13)

GCCS-Global Command and Control System (FM 3-0)

GCE-ground combat element

GIE-global information environment

GLO-ground liaison officer

GP-general purpose

GS-general support (FM 3-0)

HHB-headquarters and headquarters battery

HHC-headquarters and headquarters company

HHD-headquarters and headquarters detachment

HNS-host-nation support (JP 1-02)

HQ-headquarters (JP 1-02)

HQDA-Headquarters, Department of the Army (JP 1-02)

HRS-human resources support (FM 4-0)

HUMINT-human intelligence (JP 1-02)

IA-information assurance

I&W-indications and warnings (JP 1-02)

ICAC²-Integrated Combat Airspace Command and Control

IES-imagery exploitation system

IEW-intelligence and electronic warfare (JP 1-02)

IG-inspector general (JP 1-02)

IGSM-intermediate general support maintenance

IMET-international military education and training (JP 1-02)

IMIT-international military information team (FM 3-05.30)

IMINT-imagery intelligence (JP 1-02)

infrastructure-a term generally applicable to all fixed and permanent installations, fabrications, or facilities for the support or control of military forces

INSCOM-United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (JP 1-02)

intel-intelligence

interdiction-an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface military potential before it can be effectively used against friendly forces (JP 1-02)

in-transit visibility-the immediate access to data pertaining to the location of materiel in transit from the provider to the requester

IO-international organizations; information operations; organization with global influence, such as the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (JP 1-02)

IOCOORD-information operations coordinator (FM 3-13)

IPB-intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlefield

IPW-interrogation prisoner of war

IR-information requirement (JP 1-02)

ISB-intermediate staging base (JP 1-02)

ISC-integrated systems control

ISE-intelligence support element (JP 1-02)

ISSA-intra-governmental support agreements (JP 1-02)

J1-manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff (JP 1-02)

J2-intelligence directorate of a joint staff (JP 1-02)

J3-operations directorate of a joint staff (JP 1-02)

J4-logistics directorate of a joint staff (JP 1-02)

J5-plans directorate of a joint staff (JP 1-02)

J6-command, control, and computer systems communications directorate of a joint staff (JP 1-02)

JCCC-joint communications control center; joint combat camera

center (JP 1-02)

JCGRO-joint central graves registration office (JP 1-02)

JCMEB-joint civil-military engineering board (JP 1-02)

JCMEC-joint captured materiel exploitation center (JP 1-02)

JCS-Joint Chiefs of Staff (JP 1-02)

JCSE-joint communications support element (JP 1-02)

JDC-joint deployment community (JP 1-02)

JDEC-joint documents exploitation center (JP 1-02)

JFACC-joint force air component commander (JP 1-02)

JFAST-joint flow and analysis system for transportation (JP 1-02)

JFE-Joint Fires Element (JP 3-09)

JFC-joint force commander (JP 1-02)

JFLCC-joint force land component commander (JP 1-02)

JFMCC-joint force maritime component commander (JP 1-02)

JFSOCC-joint force special operations component commander (JP 1-02)

JFUB-joint facilities utilization board (JP 1-02)

JIATF-Joint Interagency Task Force (JP 1-02)

JIC-joint intelligence center (JP 1-02)

JIF-joint interrogation facility (JP 1-02)

JIPC-joint imagery production complex (JP 1-02)

JMAO-joint mortuary affairs office (JP 1-02)

JMBPO-joint military blood program office

JMC-joint movement center (JP 1-02

JMEC-joint materiel exploitation center

JMFU-joint meteorological forecasting unit (JP 1-02)

JMPA-joint military postal agency (FM 4-0)

JMRO-joint medical regulating office (JP 1-02)

JOA-joint operations area (JP 1-02)

JOC-joint operations center (JP 1-02)

joint force-a general term applied to a force that is composed of significant elements of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force or two or more of these services operating under a subordinate joint force commander authorized to exercise operational control over joint forces or service components operating under a unified commander

joint force land component commander-the commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFLCC. (JP 3-0)

joint operations area-an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. (JP 1-02)

joint rear area-a specific land area within a joint force commander's area of operations that is designated to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint force

joint rear area coordinator-the officer with responsibility for coordinating the overall security of the JRA in accordance with joint force commander directives and priorities in order to assist in providing a secure environment to facilitate sustainment, host nation support, infrastructure development, and movements of the joint force. (JP 1-02)

joint targeting coordination board-a group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance and

priorities, and preparing and/or refining joint target lists. The board is normally comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and if required, component subordinate units. Also called JTCB. (JP 1-02)

joint urban operations-all joint operations planned and conducted across the range of military operations on or against objectives on a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain where manmade construction or the density of noncombatants ae the dominant features. Also called JUO. (JO 3-0)

joint zone(air, land, or sea)-an area established for the purpose of permitting friendly surface, air, and subsurface forces to operate simultaneously (JP 1-02)

JOPES-Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JP 1-02)

JPO-joint petroleum office (JP 1-02)

JPOTF-joint psychological operations task force (JP 1-02)

JPOTG-joint psychological operations task group (JP 1-02)

JRA-joint rear area (JP 1-02)

JRAC-joint rear area coordinator (JP 1-02)

JRCC-joint rescue coordination center (JP 1-02)

JSCP-Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JP 1-02)

J-SEAD-joint suppression of enemy air defenses (JP 1-02)

JSOA-joint special operations area (JP 1-02)

JSOACC-joint special operations aviation component command (JP 1-02)

JSOTF-joint special operations task force (JP 1-02)

JSPS-Joint Strategic Planning System (JP 1-02)

JSTARS-joint surveillance, target attack radar system (JP 1-02)

JTAC-joint technical augmentation cell (JP 3-07.6)

JTAGS-joint tactical ground stations (FM 3-40.1)

JTB-joint transportation board (JP 1-02)

JTCB-joint targeting coordination board (JP 1-02)

JTF-joint task force (JP 1-02)

JTL-joint target list (JP 1-02)

JTLS-Joint Theater Logistics System (JP 4-0)

JTTP-joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JP 1-02)

JULLS-Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JP 1-02)

Land power-the application of the nation's ground forces to exert decisive and lasting influence on land in support of national interests. (FM 3-93)

LCC-land component commander (JP 1-02)

letter of instruction-a means for defining interagency linkages at the operational level

LFA-lead federal agency

light forces-units from an Army light, airborne, or air assault division or ranger regiment

line of communications-a route, either land, water, and/or air, which connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. (JP 1-02)

lines of operation-lines which define the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objective. (JP 1-02)

linkage-a relationship between two or more parties, elements, or commands in any form that formulates a mutual understanding, agreement, or exchange of information

littoral theater-a theater established on a shore or coastal region where major actions between land, sea, and air operations are combined and must be synchronized

LNO-liaison officer (JP 1-02)

LOC-line of communication (JP 1-02)

LOGCAP-Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (JP 1-02)

logistics-the process of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces to execute military strategy and operations; includes the design, development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; the movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; the acquisition or construction, maintenance, operations, and disposition of facilities; and the acquisition or furnishing of services

logistics support element-a multifaceted logistical organization with a work force of DA civilians, military, and contractors that is easily tailored to meet theater logistics requirements; the LSE can control the interface among strategic, operational, and tactical logistics (FM 4-93.11)

LOI-letter of instruction (JP 1-02)

LPT-logistics-preparation-of-the-theater (FM 4-0)

LSE-logistics support element (FM 4-93.11)

MACOM-major Army command (FM 3-0)

MAGTF-Marine air-ground task force (JP 1-02)

main battle area-the portion of the battlefield in which the decisive battle is fought to defeat the enemy (FM 6-99.1)

major operations-the coordinated actions of large forces in a single phase of either a theater or subordinate campaign; a major operation could contain a number of related battles or a single critical battle (JP 5-00.1)

MARLO-Marine liaison officer (JP 1-02)

MASINT-measurement and signatures intelligence (JP 1-02)

MBA-main battle area (FM 3-90)

MCA-movement control agency (JP 1-02)

MCC-movement control center (JP 1-02)

MCC-Marine component commander (JP 1-02)

MCSF-mobile cryptological support facility (JP 1-02)

MDCI-multidiscipline counterintelligence

MEB-Marine expeditionary brigade (JP 1-02)

MEDCOM-medical command ( )

MEF-Marine expeditionary force (JP 1-02)

METL-mission-essential task list (FM 3-0)

METT-TC-mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (the major factors considered during mission analysis) (FM 3-0)

MI-military intelligence (JP 1-02)

MIA-missing in action (JP 1-02)

military end state-the required military conditions determined by the theater commander and integrated into the campaign plan that, when achieved, attains the strategic objectives or allows the main effort to be assumed by other instruments of national power to achieve the final strategic end state

mission forces-Army forces assigned, attached, apportioned, or allocated with an ARFOR commander to an Army service component command, a subordinate joint force command, or a multinational command to conduct missions as assigned by these commands

MIST-military information support team (JP 1-02)

MJLC-multinational joint logistics center (FM 4-0)

MLRS-Multiple Launch Rocket System (FM 3-40)

MLC-Marine Logistical Command (MCDP 3)

MLST-medical logistics support team (JP 1-02)

MMC-materiel management center (JP 4-0)

MOA-memorandum of agreement (JP 1-02)

MOE-measures of effectiveness (JP 1-02)

MOOTW-military operations other than war (JP 1-02)

MOPP-mission-oriented protection posture (JP 1-02)

MOS-military occupational specialty (JP 1-02)

MOU-memorandum of understanding (JP 1-02)

MP-military police (JP 1-02)

MRAOG-Marine Rear Area Operation Group

MRS-Mobility Requirement Study

MTMC-Military Traffic Management Command (JP 1-02)

MTW-Major theater of war (FM 3-0)

MWR-morale, welfare, and recreation (JP 1-02)

Multinational force commander (MNFC)-a general term applied to a commander who exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations (JP 3-16)

multinational operations-a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance (JP 1-02)

NALE-naval and amphibious liaison element (JP 1-02)

NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (JP 1-02

NAVFOR-navy forces (JP 1-02)

NAVSOF-naval special operations forces (JP 1-02)

NBC-nuclear, biological, chemical (JP 1-02)

NCA-National Command Authorities (JP 1-02)

NCC-Naval component commander (JP 1-02)

NEAT-nuclear employment augmentation team (FM 3-12)

NEO-noncombatant evacuation operations (JP 1-02)

NFA-no-fire area (JP 1-02)

NGO-nongovernmental organization (JP 1-02)

NICP-national inventory control point

NIST-national intelligence support teams (JP 1-02)

NIMA-National Imagery and Mapping Agency

NSA-National Security Agency (JP 1-02)

NSCC-Navy service component command

NSNF-nonstrategic nuclear forces (JP 1-02)

NAVSOC-Navy special operations component

national support element-any national organization or activity that supports national forces that are a part of a multinational force. Their mission is nation-specific support to units and common support that is retained by the nation. Also called NSES. (JP 0-2)

NSS-*National Security Strategy*

NSWTG-Naval special warfare task group (JP 1-02)

NSWTU-Naval special warfare task unit (JP 1-02)

NTACS-Navy Tactical Air Control System (JP 1-02)

Nuclear Weapon Option-a discrete grouping of a specific number of nuclear weapons by specific yield planned for employment in a specific area for a designated time for a specific purpose employed at corps level or higher (FM 3-12)

NUMBERED ARMY-operational echelon for multi-corps operations formed by an ASCC when directed (FM 3-93)

obj-objective (FM 3-0)

OCONUS-outside the continental United States (JP 1-02)

OCA-offensive counterair (JP 1-02)

ODA-Special Forces Operational Detachment-A (also called A Team) (FM 3-05)(JP 1-02)

OGA-other governmental agencies (JP 1-02)

OP-operational projects (JP 1-02)

OP3-Overt Peacetime Psychological Operations Program (JP 1-02)

OPCOM-operational command (NATO)(JP 1-02)

OPCON-operational control (JP 1-02)

operational approach-is the manner in which a commander attacks the enemy center of gravity (FM 3-0)

operational area-an overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as area of responsibility, theater of war, theater of operations, joint operations area, amphibious objective area, joint special operations area, and

area of operations (JP 3-0)

operational art-the employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design and, ultimately, tactical action by integrating the key activities of all levels of war (JP 1-02)

operational design-the design element of operational art; the application of operational art which includes the design, organization, and execution of subordinate campaigns and major operations to achieve strategic objectives(JP 1-02)

operational firepower-to apply the amount of fire that may be delivered by operational forces through all available means and systems, the application of firepower and nonlethal means to achieve a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign or major operation (CJCSM 3500.04B)

operational-level logistics-military operations other than war activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between organized forces

operational pause-is a deliberate halt taken to extend operational reach or prevent culmination (FM 3-0)

operational reach- the distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities (JP 3-0)

OPLAN-operations plan (JP 1-02)

OPORD-operations order (JP 1-02)

opposed entry-combat operations required to land deploying forces

OPSEC-operations security (JP 1-02)

PA-public affairs (JP 1-02)

PAO-public affairs officer (JP 1-02)

PARC-principal assistant responsible for contracting (FM 3-100)

passive missile defense-those individual and collective measures taken to posture the force to minimize the effects of a missile attack

PE-peace enforcement

peacekeeping operations-operations using military forces and/or civilian personnel at the request of the parties to a dispute to help supervise a cease-fire agreement and/or separate the parties

PERSCOM-personnel command (Army) (JP 1-02)

PIR-priority intelligence requirements (JP 1-02)

PM-provost marshal

PME-peacetime military engagement (FM 3-0)

POAT-psychological operations assessment team (JP 1-02)

POTF-psychological operations task force (JP 1-02)

PRC-population and resource control (JP 1-02)

PSD-personnel service directorate

PSYOP-psychological operations (JP 1-02)

PSYACT-PSYOP activities (FM 3-05.30)

PVO-private voluntary organization (JP 1-02)

QASAS-quality assurance specialist - ammunition surveillance

QSTAG-quadripartite standing agreement (JP 1-02)

RAOC-rear area operations center (JP 1-02)

RCC-Rescue Coordination Center (FM 3-93)

RCCM-regional contingency construction manager

RCEM-regional contingency engineering manager (JP 1-02)

RDT&E-research, development, test, and evaluation (JP 1-02)

RAET-reconstitution assessment and evaluation team (FM 3-93)

recce-reconnaissance

restraints-prohibitions on specific actions or categories of actions (3-93)

RFA-restricted fire area (JP 1-02)

RGFC-Republican Guard Forces Command

RI-relerent information (FM 3-0)

RISTA-reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (FM 3-90)

RAOC-rear area operations center (JP 1-02)

ROC-rear operations center (FM 3-93)

ROE-rules of engagement (JP 1-02)

RPMA-real property maintenance activities

RPV-remotely piloted vehicle (JP 1-02)

RSE-retrograde support element (JP 3-11)

RSI-rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (JP 1-02)

rules of engagement-directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other encountered forces (JP 1-02)

RWCM-regional wartime construction manager (JP 1-02)

S&S-supply and services

SACC-supporting arms coordination center

SARSS-O-Standard Army Retail Supply System-Objective (FM 4-0)

SALT-supporting arms liaison team

Sandcrab-AN/TLQ-17A (V3)- HF/VHF jamming and direction-finding system

SAO-security assistance office (JP 1-02)

SAPO-subarea petroleum office (JP 1-02)

SBA-strategic brigade airdrop (FM 3-93)

SEAD-suppression of enemy air defenses (JP 1-02)

SecDef-Secretary of Defense (JP 1-02)

sequel-a major operation that follows the current major

operation. Plans for a sequel are based on the possible outcomes (success, stalemate, or defeat) associated with the current operation. (JP 3-0)

SEWD-space and electronic warfare detachment (FM 3-14)

SF-Special Forces (JP 1-02)

SFLE-Special Forces Liaison Element (FM 3-05)

SFOB-Special Forces operational base (JP 1-02)

SIGCOM-signal command for a theater (FM 3-93)

SIGINT-signals intelligence (JP 1-02)

SIGSEC-signal security (JP 1-02)

SIMLM-single integrated medical logistics manager (JP 1-02)

SITLM-single integrated theater logistics manager (JP 4-0)

SJA-staff judge advocate (FM 3-0)

SLOC-sea line of communication (JP 1-02)

SOA-special operations aviation (JP 1-02)

SOC-special operations command (JP 1-02)

SOCCE-special operations command and control element (JP 1-02)

SOCOORD-special operations coordination element (JP 1-02)

SOF-special operations forces (JP 1-02)

SOFA-status of forces agreement (JP 1-02)

SOI-signal operating instructions (JP 1-02)

SOSCOM-special operations support command (FM 3-05)

SOSE-special operations staff element (JP 1-02)

SOTSE-special operations theater support element (FM 3-05)

split-based operations-dividing logistics management functions so that only those functions absolutely necessary are deployed, allowing some management functions to be accomplished from CONUS or another theater ( )

SPM-single port manager (FM 4-0)

SPO-security, plans, and operations

SPOD-seaport of debarkation (JP 1-02)

SPOE-seaport of embarkation (JP 1-02)

sqdns-squadrons

S/RTF-search and recovery task force (JP 3-11)

SSC-small scale contingency

strategic advantage-the overall relative power relationship of opponents that enables one nation or group of nations to effectively control the course of a military/diplomatic situation (JP 1-02)

strategic concentration-the assembly of a designated force in areas from which intended that operations of the assembled force shall begin so that they are best disposed to initiate the plan of campaign (JP 1-02)

strategic endstate-the set of required diplomatic, economic, informational, and military conditions integrated by the NCA in national security policy to achieve a desired strategic outcome or national security objectives in a crisis situation (JP 5-00.1)

strategic maneuver-the employment of unified and joint forces from positions of strategic concentration against the strategic center of gravity to achieve the military endstate within the strategic endstate (JP 5-00.1)

strategic vulnerability-the susceptibility of vital elements of national power to being seriously decreased or adversely changed by the application of actions within the capability of another nation to impose. Strategic vulnerability may pertain to political, geographic, economic, scientific, sociological, or military factors. (JP 5-00.1)

supported commander-the commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the CJCS (JP 1-02)

supporting commander- a commander who provides augmentation

forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commander and Defense agencies as appropriate (JP 1-02)

SVS-Secure Voice System (JP 1-02)

SWC-strike warfare commander (JP 1-02)

SWO-staff weather officer (JP 1-02)

TAC(A)-tactical air coordinator (airborne) (JP 1-02)

TACAIR-tactical air (JP 1-02)

TACC-tactical air command center (USMC); tactical air control center (USN); tanker/airlift control center (USAF) (JP 1-02)

TACOM-tactical command

TACON-tactical control (JP 1-02)

TACP-tactical air control party (JP 1-02)

TACS-theater air control system (JP 1-02)

TACSAT-tactical satellite (JP 1-02)

TADC-tactical air direction center (JP 1-02)

TAGS-theater air-ground system (FM 3-52.2)

TAI-target area of interest

TAIS-tactical airspace integration system

TALCE-theater airlift control element

TAAMDCOORD-theater air and missile defense coordinator

TAMD-theater air and missile defense

TAOC-tactical air operations center (USMC) (JP 1-02)

TBM-tactical ballistic missile; theater ballistic missile (JP 1-02)

TCAE-technical control and analysis element (FM 2-19.1)

TCF-tactical combat force (JP 1-02)

TDA-table of distribution and allowances (JP 1-02)

TECHINT-technical intelligence (JP 1-02)

TENCAP-tactical exploitation of national capabilities (JP 1-02)

TEP-theater engagement plan (FM 3-0)

TF-task force (JP 1-02)

TFOM-theater force opening module (FM 4-0)

THAAD-theater high-altitude air defense (FM 3-01)

theater-the geographical area outside the continental United States for which a commander of a combatant command has been assigned responsibility (JP 1-02)

theater base-a sizable portion of the joint rear area containing logistics facilities, such as ports of debarkation, marshaling areas, logistics stockage areas, movement control points, logistics headquarters and units, and the rear portion of the intratheater communications zone, together with airfields and air bases, transitioning land forces, theater missile defense forces, the theater rear headquarters, and strategic reserves (JP 5-00.1)

theater design-the theater commander's strategic intent to be derived by a strategic estimate and translated into his theater strategy and campaign plans, which provide strategic direction and operational focus to the principal subordinates

theater missile defense-protection against theater missile attack through an integrated and coordinated mix of mutually supporting measures, all service components participate in TMD; TMD for force projection, forward presence, reinforcing forces, and designated theater strategic assets, such as ports, airfields, or civilian population centers, must be considered; supporting measures are called TMD pillars and entail passive missile defense, active missile defense, attack operations, and battle management and C^3I ( )

theater of operations-a subarea within a theater of war defined by the geographic combatant commander required to conduct or support specific combat operations. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time. (JP 1-02)

theater of war-defined by the National Command Authorities or the geographic combatant commander, the area of air, land, and

water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander's entire area of responsibility and may contain more than one theater of operations. (JP 1-02)

theater strategic environment-a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences in the theater that describe the diplomatic-military situation, affect the employment of military forces, and affect the decisions of the operational chain of command (JP 5-00.1)

THREATCON-terrorist threat conditions (JP 1-02)

threat conditions-a system that provides procedures for terrorism analysts to assess the terrorist threat and for commanders to determine appropriate security measures based on the assessed threat of terrorist attack ( )

TIB/TIG-theater intelligence brigades/theater intelligence groups (FM 2-19.1)

TM-theater missile (JP 1-02)

TMEDCOM-theater medical command (FM 4-02.12)

TMD-theater missile defense (JP 1-02)

TOC-tactical operations center (JP 1-02)

TO&E-table of organization and equipment (JP 1-02)

total asset visibility-the immediate access to data pertaining to the location of aircraft, ships, trucks, and trains moving equipment and supplies from the provider to the requester

TOC-Tactical Operations Center (FM 3-90)

TOR-terms of reference (JP 1-02)

TPFDD-time-phased force and deployment data (JP 1-02)

TPFDL-time-phased force and deployment list (JP 1-02)

TPMRC-theater patient movement requirements center (FM 4-02.12)

TRADOC-United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (JP 1-02)

trans-transportation

Trackwolf-AN/TSQ-152(V); operational-level, high frequency skywave communications-intelligence collection and direction-

finding system used to support the operational-level commander

TRANSCOM-United States Transportation Command, a functional command

Trojan-AN/TSQ-190(V); intelligence dissemination satellite terminal that provides access for intelligence processing and dissemination systems

TSA-theater storage area (JP 1-02)
TSC-theater support command (FM 3-0)

U-2R-variant of U-2 aircraft sensing platform

UAV-unmanned aerial vehicle (JP 1-02)

UCP-Unified Command Plan (JP 1-02)

UN-United Nations (JP 1-02)

UNAAF-Unified Action Armed Forces (JP 0-2)

unified action- a broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activites with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of commanders of those commands (JP 1-02)

Unified Command Plan-the document, approved by the President, which sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders, establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders

US-United States

USANCA-United States Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency (FM 3-12)

USA-United States Army (JP 1-02)

USACE-United States Army Corps of Engineers

USAF-United States Air Force (JP 1-02)

USAID-United States Agency for International Development (JP 1-02)

USAMC-United States Army Materiel Command

USAMMA-United States Army Medical Material Agency

USARJ-United States Army Japan

USARPAC-United States Army Pacific (JP 1-02)

USASOC-United States Army Special Operations Command (JP 1-02)

USC-United States Code (JP 1-02)

USEUCOM-United States European Command—a unified command

USFJ-United States Forces Japan (JP 1-02)

USFK-United States Forces Korea (JP 1-02)

USIA-United States Information Agency (JP 1-02)

USJFCOM-United States Joint Forces Command (JP 1-02)

USMC-United States Marine Corps (JP 1-02)

USN-United States Navy (JP 1-02)

USPACOM-United States Pacific Command (JP 1-02)

USPW-United States prisoner of war

USSOCOM-United States Special Operations Command, a functional command (JP 1-02)

USSOUTHCOM-United States Southern Command, a unified command (JP 1-02)

USSPACECOM-United States Space Command, a functional command (JP 1-02)

USTAPERSCOM-United States Total Army Personnel Command (FM 4-0)

USTRANSCOM-United States Transportation Command (JP 1-02)

USSTRATCOM-United States Strategic Command, a functional command (JP 1-02)

UW-unconventional warfare (JP 1-02)

UXO-unexploded ordnance (FM 4-0)

WMD-weapons of mass destruction (JP 1-02)

WOC-wing operations center (USAF) (JP 1-02)

WRSA-war reserve stocks for allies (FM 4-0)

1 **WSRO**-weapon systems replacement operations

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