


**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
ACADEMIC YEAR 2016**

**CORE CURRICULUM**

**DEFENSE MANAGEMENT  
COURSE**

**DIRECTIVE**



**U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA 17013-5050**

**18 FEBRUARY thru 9 MARCH 2016**

This document contains educational material designed to promote discussion by students of the U.S. Army War College. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Army.

**ACADEMIC YEAR 2016**

**DEFENSE MANAGEMENT**



**COURSE DIRECTOR**  
**PROF. LOUIS G. YUENGERT**

**DCLM FACULTY INSTRUCTORS**

PROF. CHARLES D. ALLEN  
Col LANCE D. CLARK  
PROF. EDWARD J. FILIBERTI  
PROF. FREDERICK J. GELLERT  
COL NANCY J. GRANDY  
DR. ANDREW A. HILL  
(CH) JOHN L. KALLERSON  
RICHARD M. MEINHART  
COL BENJAMIN M. NUTT  
COL T. GREGG THOMPSON  
PROF. DOUGLAS E. WATERS  
RANDOLPH C. WHITE  
DR. GEORGE J. WOODS III

DR. R. CRAIG BULLIS  
Col B. SCOTT COON  
DR. THOMAS GALVIN  
DR. STEPHEN J. GERRAS  
Col MARK W. HABERICHTER  
PROF. ROBERT S. HUME COL  
COL SUSIE KUILAN DR.  
CDR KIMBERLY M. MILLER  
COL DOUGLAS J. ORSI  
Col RICHARD E. WAGNER  
COL DALE E. WATSON COL  
CDR MICHELLE WINEGARDNER  
PROF. LOUIS G. YUENGERT

  
STEPHEN J. GERRAS, Ph.D.  
CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT OF  
COMMAND, LEADERSHIP,  
AND MANAGEMENT

  
RICHARD A. LACQUEMENT, JR., Ph.D.  
DEAN, SCHOOL OF STRATEGIC  
LANDPOWER

DISTRIBUTION: USAWC Students (387), Dean (3), DCLM (35), DNSS (1), DMSPO (1)  
PKSOI (1), IF Office (2), Faculty, Assessments (3) AHEC/USAWC Library (6), G-3 (4)

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>SECTION I</b>	<b><u>PAGE</u></b>
OVERVIEW	
General	1
Purpose	1
Objectives	2
Scope	2
Themes and Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)	3
Curriculum Relationships	3
<b>SECTION II</b>	
STUDENT REQUIREMENTS	
General	4
Preparation	4
Contribution	4
Presentations	4
<b>SECTION III</b>	
PLANNING CALENDAR	7
<b>SECTION IV</b>	
LESSON INDEX	8
LESSON DIRECTIVES	9
<b>SECTION V</b>	
APPENDICES	
APPENDIX 1: Mission	69
APPENDIX 2 Senior Service-Level Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME II)	70
APPENDIX 3 SL Program Learning Objectives (PLOs)	73
APPENDIX 4 Enduring Themes	74

**INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## SECTION I

### COURSE OVERVIEW

#### 1. General.

a. Successful warfighting and other military operations do not occur without well-trained, properly equipped, and doctrinally sound forces. National security professionals invest the time to understand how the Joint community and Services develop, train, resource, equip, and sustain military forces. Defense Management (DM) is the course devoted to the study of the processes and systems within the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), the Joint Staff and the military departments that develop and produce trained and ready forces and their resultant capabilities for employment by Combatant Commanders.

b. This course challenges students to understand decisions in complex and uncertain conditions particularly when resources are limited or strategic guidance is vague. The goal is to provide a learning environment that encourages reflection, reinforces critical thinking, and requires the exercise of strategic decision-making skills. Resource-related decisionmaking in the DOD environment requires systems thinking, visioning, consensus building, and other essential elements of strategic leadership. In addition, the DOD uses a variety of councils or groups to shape and process information for senior leaders to make decisions.

c. Through a combination of readings, lectures, exercises, and seminar dialogue, students will become familiar with the issues, processes and systems that drive the development of military capabilities. Students will study the relationship between various defense management systems and processes, and their functions and purposes. The basic knowledge acquired in this course provides students a foundation for continued professional education on DOD, Joint, and Army systems and processes. It also allows them to operate within these systems and processes throughout their career, and assists them as they modify the systems to better lead and manage change.

#### 2. Purpose.

a. Introduce students to the broad array of DOD organizations, systems, and processes used to determine the military capabilities required to attain national security objectives.

b. Provide students with an understanding of the Army's role in the development of landpower consistent with the guidance in national strategy documents.

c. Examine the decision support systems employed by strategic leaders to set priorities, develop the capabilities required by national strategic guidance documents and meet the operational needs of Combatant Commanders.

### 3. Objectives.

- a. Comprehend the Department of Defense's strategic planning, resourcing, and force management processes.
- b. Analyze the roles and responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services, and Combatant Commanders as they relate to strategic planning, resourcing, and force management.
- c. Comprehend how the Services provide trained and ready forces and capabilities to Combatant Commanders.
- d. Analyze the inherent tension between the military departments and Combatant Commanders due to incongruous time horizon and budget perspectives with regard to development of capabilities and the provision of trained and ready forces.
- e. Comprehend the leadership and management challenges associated with cross-functional organizations as large and complex as a military department, the Reserve Components, or the Department of Defense.

### 4. Scope.

- a. The course leads students through the processes used by DOD and the military departments to translate strategic guidance and operational requirements into trained and ready forces and capabilities for use by the Combatant Commanders. It starts with an examination of the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments as they interact with the Joint Staff, the Military Services and the Combatant Commanders to meet the country's military needs. The course examines the resource environment and the resource allocation process to provide a consistent frame of reference for the students, as most of Defense Management systems and processes provide input to and use output from this resource process.
- b. Lessons review how Combatant Commanders and the Services identify requirements and measure the readiness of their forces. Additionally, the course examines the systems, processes, and issues associated with organizing, manning, equipping, and mobilizing the force; tasks assigned to the Military Departments in *U.S. Code Title 10*. While many of the lessons are Army specific, most of these systems and processes are replicated in some form across the DOD. For example, the Joint Capability Integration and Development System is examined from an Army perspective, but this is a Joint process used by all the Services. Students will spend some time understanding the interface between the military departments and the defense industrial base. The current transformation efforts of both DOD and of the Services will be used as a basis to assess current systems and processes including force management, manning, resource management, and the interaction with representatives from the

Defense industry. Additionally, students will examine mobilization processes and issues related to the Reserve, National Guard, and civilian components.

c. The course also includes an exercise providing students with the opportunity to synthesize national strategic guidance and a variety of other data sources into a prioritized missions list worthy of inclusion by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. After development of these priorities, the students will resource them in a severely constrained fiscal scenario.

5. Themes and Learning Areas for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). The USAWC curriculum addresses themes of enduring value. DM concentrates on the following themes through lectures, student readings, and faculty and student presentations: Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment, Relationship between policy and strategy, Professional ethics, Civil-Military relations, History. It focuses on JPME learning areas, principally Learning Areas 1, 3, and 3: “National Security Strategy,” “National and Joint Planning Systems and Processes,” and “Strategic Leadership and the Profession of Arms.” Section 5 of each lesson directive lists specific JPME learning objectives.

6. Curriculum Relationships. This course complements the core curriculum’s introduction to the strategic leader’s environment discussed in the Strategic Leadership course, as it introduces students to DOD resourcing challenges in the political environment that the most senior Service leaders experience in the Pentagon. Practical learning opportunities relate to the subjects of decisionmaking, planning, programming, force management, and other systems critical to the development of the Joint Force in general and landpower specifically. This course flows from the National Security Policy and Strategy course as it addresses how senior leaders use national defense and military strategies to develop trained and ready forces for Combatant Commanders. It also builds on the Theater Strategy and Campaigning course as it identifies how senior leaders ameliorate gaps in warfighting capabilities. Finally, it provides another opportunity to use the cognitive skills developed in the Strategic Leadership course.

## SECTION II

### STUDENT REQUIREMENTS

1. General. The Defense Management (DM) course offers numerous opportunities for students to share their experiences and knowledge while participating in the learning process. The Faculty Instructor (FI) will identify the overall requirements for students during the first lesson. At the end of this course, the FI will complete an evaluation of student performance; specifically, Contribution; 60% (contribution to seminar dialog, exercises and oral presentations), Writing; 40%, and Overall (an assessment of student mastery of the course learning objectives). These evaluations, incorporated into the Course Evaluation Report (CER) in the Student Tracking System, will be included in individual academic electronic files from which the final Academic Efficiency Report (AER) is written.

2. Preparation. While not separately assessed, thorough preparation for each seminar discussion is essential to the learning process. Students must study the required readings specified in each lesson of this course directive, as that may be the only exposure they get to some of the more basic levels of knowledge about these systems. In addition, students will make presentations and lead discussions for various lessons. As a discussion leader, a student may have additional organizing, planning, or directing responsibilities, as well as the requirement to coordinate or conduct broader research into the suggested reading material and reserve references in the library. The FI will evaluate the quality of student preparation based on the demonstrated knowledge of the required course material.

3. Contribution. With varied background and experiences, each student brings invaluable, possibly unique, insights about the course material to the seminar. The mutual exchange of individual experience and perspective is vital to the learning process at the Army War College. Therefore, students are an essential part of both the active-learning process and the teaching team. Their active participation in all seminar activities, exercises, and discourse is important to the entire learning effort. Participation involves being a good listener, an articulate spokesperson, and an intelligent, tactful challenger of ideas. Different observer viewpoints often drive differing perspectives of these systems and processes. As previously mentioned, FIs will evaluate student contribution as part of the end-of-course evaluation based primarily on the quality of participation and not necessarily the frequency.

#### 4. Presentations.

a. General. Students' ability to express themselves clearly, concisely, and courteously is essential to the learning process. Students contribute to the seminar dialogue as part of group presentations or as individuals.

b. Specific. If possible, each student will complete a formal oral presentation. Additionally, there are two written papers for DM. The evaluations for these will be

included in the end-of-course CER. Specific oral and written presentations are associated with different lessons throughout the course as follows:

(1) Oral. Student oral presentations provide valuable enrichment to seminar learning. The FI will match lessons to oral assignments during the first lesson. The assessment of student oral presentations will be included in their contribution evaluation.

(2) Written. All papers will use Arial 12 font. There are two written requirements for the DM course as described below. Both papers are due by 2400, 7 March 2016.

3. The first requirement is a three to five-page paper on a Strategic-Level DM issue of interest to the student that educates an audience on the major aspects of the issue, provides the necessary background information to facilitate understanding of the issue, and articulates and supports a position on how to address the issue. This paper constitutes 30% of the written grade for the course.

4. The second requirement is a 2-page position paper for a senior leader on the same topic as the first paper. Write the paper to convince a decision-maker to take some recommended action regarding this strategic issue. A position paper includes purpose, facts, discussion, and recommendation sections. The first paper is an annex to the position paper and may be referred to in the body. Students will use the Position Paper format provided by the DM FI. This paper constitutes 70% of the written grade for the course.

5. Here are some prompts to develop the topic for these papers.

(a) What is the greatest risk to your service/agency and why? What measures would you recommend to mitigate that risk?

(b) Identify a modernization initiative to support, cancel, or monitor. Provide evidence to support your recommended action.

(c) Another topic approved by your Faculty Instructor NLT 1 March 2016.

6. Standards. The purpose of oral and written presentations is to demonstrate a clear understanding of a particular aspect of DM material and to develop student personal oral and written communication skills. These presentations will also demonstrate student ability to apply the elements of critical thinking that are appropriate to the subject and to understand how senior leaders should approach complex issues. Evaluation standards will be consistent with those described in CBks Memorandum No. 623-1: Personnel Evaluation: USAWC Student Academic Assessment System.

**INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

**SECTION III**

**PLANNING CALENDAR  
February/March 2016**

<b>Monday</b>	<b>Tuesday</b>	<b>Wednesday</b>	<b>Thursday</b>	<b>Friday</b>
15  <b>Presidents Day</b>	16	17	18 DM-1  <b>Introduction to Defense Management</b> ----- <b>NTL</b> <b>Mr. Jay Rouse (JS/J5)</b>	19 DM-2  <b>Joint Strategic Planning System - Roles and Missions</b>
22 DM-3  <b>Resourcing the DoD</b>	23 DM-4  <b>Strategic Requirement I (Combatant Commands)</b>	24  <b>RWR</b>	25 DM-5  <b>Strategic Requirements II (JCIDS / JROC)</b>	26 DM-6  <b>Acquisition of Materiel and Services</b>
29  <b>SRP 9</b>				
<b>March 2016</b>				
	1 DM-7  <b>Industry Day: Strategic challenges for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) (Full Day)</b>	2 DM-8  <b>Strategic Issues in Force Management and Development</b>	3 DM-9  <b>Strategic Issues in Manning the Force</b>	4 DM-10  <b>Strategic Issues in Equipping and Sustaining the Force</b>
7 DM-11  <b>Generation</b> <hr/> <b>Exercise Prep (PM)</b>	8 DM-12  <b>Resource Decisionmaking Exercise (Full Day)</b>	9 DM-13  <b>Capstone Speaker</b> <hr/> <b>AAR</b>		

**SECTION IV**  
**LESSON INDEX**

<b><u>LESSON</u></b>	<b><u>TITLE</u></b>	<b><u>PAGE</u></b>
DM-1-S	Introduction to Defense Management	9
DM-2-S	Joint Strategic Planning System - Roles and Missions	13
DM-3-S	Resourcing the Department of Defense	17
DM-4-S	Strategic Requirements I (Combatant Commands)	21
DM-5-S	Strategic Requirements II (JCIDS and JROC)	25
DM-6 -S	Acquisition of Materiel and Services	30
DM-7-L/S	Industry Day: Strategic challenges for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB)	37
DM-8-S	Strategic Issues in Force Management and Development	40
DM-9-S	Strategic Issues in Manning the Force	46
DM-10-S	Strategic Issues in Equipping and Sustaining the Force	50
DM-11-S	Force Generation	55
DM-12-EX	Resource Decisionmaking Exercise	60
DM-13-L/S	Capstone Speaker	66

## INTRODUCTION TO DEFENSE MANAGEMENT

Mode: Seminar

DM-1-S

### 1. Introduction.

a. This is the introductory lesson for the Defense Management (DM) Course. The DM Course will concentrate on Department of Defense (DoD) priorities and decisions to address the nation's security challenges. This course will address the DoD's major systems and processes and examine how senior leaders use them to make resource decisions and develop capabilities to meet the competing demands of maintaining trained and ready forces to serve the nation today while concurrently modernizing to ensure capable forces for the future.

b. Using these systems and processes, senior leaders make complex planning and resourcing decisions that affect the ability of the Defense Department to execute responsibilities derived from the National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, National Military Strategy, and other strategic documents. This course will identify the many challenges senior leaders will face in the national security and defense arena. As senior leaders, students need to know how to apply defense systems and processes so they can influence how well the DoD runs.

c. The course builds on the preceding courses. The linkage to the Introduction to Strategic Studies Course is that students should consider how forces used in the Gulf War would now be developed by the military Services over time using Defense Management systems and processes. Students will apply various leadership concepts discussed in the Strategic Leadership Course as they examine how leaders make defense management decisions. They should consider how some theories and strategies covered in the Theory of War and Strategy Course broadly influence the development of future capabilities. Students will examine how the military instrument of national power is developed and supported to achieve national policy and strategy objectives introduced in the National Security Policy and Strategy Course. Finally, they will examine the processes used to develop forces to meet the current and future operational needs of Combatant Commanders discussed in the Theater Strategy and Campaigning Course.

d. This lesson has two main parts. Part one consists of an overview from the Faculty Instructor to establish the overall context of the Defense Management Course and discuss specific course requirements. Part two will first focus on the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff and Service Chiefs as covered

in Title 10, U.S. Code. It will then broadly examine Defense Department challenges and concerns as articulated in recent Congressional testimony.

## 2. Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend the DM course requirements including overall student contribution, writing, and exercise requirements.

b. Examine the roles and responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Service Secretaries.

c. Examine opportunities, challenges, and risks facing our Armed Forces as discussed in recent Congressional testimony by Defense Department leaders.

## 3. Student Requirements.

### a. Required Readings.

(1) Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, *Defense Management Course Directive, AY 16* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, December 2015). (**Read Sections I – III**) **[DCLM Issue]** **[Blackboard]**

(2) *Armed Forces*, U.S. Code 10, Sections: 113, 131, 151, 153, 3013, and 3014, (accessed October 21, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(a) <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/113>

(b) <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/131>

(c) <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/151>

(d) <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/153>

(e) <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/3013>

(f) <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/3014>

(3) Robert M. Gates, *Senate Armed Services Testimony*, 114<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., October 21 2015, [http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Gates\\_10-21-15.pdf](http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Gates_10-21-15.pdf) (accessed November 4, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(4) Ashton Carter, *Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, Submitted Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee on the FY 2016 Budget Request for the Department of Defense*, 114<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., March 3 2015, [http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Carter\\_03-03-15.pdf](http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Carter_03-03-15.pdf) (accessed October 21, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(5) Martin Dempsey, *FY 16 Department of Defense Budget*, Posture Statement presented to the 114<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, March 3, 2015), [http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dempsey\\_03-03-15.pdf](http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dempsey_03-03-15.pdf) (accessed October 21, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

b. Focused Readings. Service Posture Statements:

(1) John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *The United States Army 2015*, Posture Statement presented to the 114<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2015), [http://www.army.mil/e2/rv5\\_downloads/aps/aps\\_2015.pdf](http://www.army.mil/e2/rv5_downloads/aps/aps_2015.pdf) (accessed October 27, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(2) Jonathan Greenert, *FY 2016 Department of Navy*, Posture presented to the 114<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., March 4, 2015, [http://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/CNO\\_SACD.pdf](http://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/CNO_SACD.pdf) (accessed October 21, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(3) Joseph Dunford, *Commandant United States Marine Corps, Statement Before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense*, 114<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., February 26, 2015, [http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/USMC%20FY16%20Written%20Posture%20Statement\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/USMC%20FY16%20Written%20Posture%20Statement_FINAL.pdf) (accessed October 21, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(4) Deborah Lee James and Mark A. Welsh III, *Fiscal Year 2016 Air Force*, Posture presented to the 114<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, March 5, 2015, [http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/James\\_Welsh\\_03-18-15.pdf](http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/James_Welsh_03-18-15.pdf) (accessed 21 October, 2015) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

4. Points to Consider.

a. What are the most important responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff and Service Secretaries?

b. How would you characterize the challenges and concerns facing the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services Secretaries, and Service Chiefs?

c. What advice can you offer service leaders as a member of their staffs on how to meet current challenges while preparing for the future?

5. Relationship to USAWC Core Courses, Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) and Objectives, USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring Themes.

a. Relationship to USAWC Core Courses. Paragraph 1c in the Introduction addresses the relationship of this course to the other USAWC Core Courses.

b. Relationship to Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) and Objectives.

(1) JLA 1.e. Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development of security, defense, and military strategies.

(2) JLA 3.e. Analyze the likely attributes of the future joint force and the challenges faced to plan, organize, prepare, conduct and assess operations.

(3) JLA 5.b. Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decisionmaking and communication by strategic leaders.

c. Relationship to USAWC PLOs and Enduring Themes.

(1) PLO 2. Demonstrate the ability to communicate clearly, persuasively and candidly.

(2) PLO 4. Understand how to recognize change and lead transitions.

(3) PLO 9. Assess the processes and relationships of the Department of Defense, as well as those in the interagency, intergovernmental, multinational and nongovernmental.

(4) Enduring Themes. Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment; Relationship of policy and strategy (relationship between ends, ways and means); Instruments of national power and potential contributions for national security; Instruments of war and national security.

## **Joint Strategic Planning System, Roles and Missions**

Mode: Seminar

DM-2-S

### 1. Introduction:

a. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the primary means used by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to meet the Title 10 responsibilities that were enumerated in lesson 1. The Chairman uses JSPS to assess risk, readiness, and joint military requirements; advise the President, Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and National Security Council on strategic direction, planning, the strategic environment, programs and budgets; and provide direction to the Joint Force. The CJCS, as a strategic leader, must execute significant responsibilities without much directive authority. This requires the employment of several strategic leader competencies to include: envisioning the future for the Joint Force to provide relevant advice on strategic direction; building consensus among several diverse stakeholders; negotiating the allocation of missions and resources to meet the needs of Combatant Commanders, Service Chiefs and members of Congress; and strategically communicating to internal, national and international audiences as the spokesperson for U.S. armed forces.

b. This lesson also opens the discussion about the current Joint Force construct, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, and the debate on appropriate roles and missions for the four military services. Goldwater-Nichols, now almost 30 years old, constituted a major change in how the U.S. organized for and governed Joint operations. The Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings beginning in November 2015 to review the legislation to determine if changes are needed. If Congress amends Goldwater-Nichols, there may be significant implications for how the DoD determines requirements, develops capabilities, and resources the Combatant Commanders to execute the National Military Strategy. Additionally, there is considerable redundancy built into the structure of U.S. armed forces. The discussion of roles and missions is focused on appropriate ways to reduce that redundancy and reallocate financial resources toward high priority capabilities and mission.

### 2. Learning Objectives.

a. Examine the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Strategic Planning System which enables him to provide formal advice to the President, Secretary of Defense, Combatant Commanders, and the Services.

b. Examine how potential changes to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 may affect the authorities of the CJCS, Service Chiefs, and Combatant Commanders

c. Analyze the current roles and missions assigned to the military services and how a reallocation of these roles and missions could affect the operations and resourcing of the DoD.

### 3. Student Requirements.

#### a. Required Readings.

(1) Richard M. Meinhart, *Joint Strategic Planning System Insights: Chairmen Joint Chiefs of Staff 1990 to 2012*, Paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2013), <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1160> (accessed November 17, 2015). **(Scan 1-5; Read 5-18) [Blackboard] [Online]**

(2) Clay Beers et al., *Zone Defense: A Case for Distinct Service Roles and Missions*, January 2014, [http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS\\_ZoneDefense\\_MilitaryFellows.pdf](http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_ZoneDefense_MilitaryFellows.pdf) (accessed November 17, 2015). **[Online]**

(3) James R. Locher III, *Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee 30 Years of Goldwater-Nichols Reform*, 114<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., November 10, 2015, [http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Locher\\_11-10-15.pdf](http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Locher_11-10-15.pdf) (accessed November 27, 2015). **[Blackboard] [Online]**

(4) Jim Thomas, *Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Defense Reform*, 114<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., November 10, 2015, <http://csbaonline.org/publications/2015/11/defense-reform/> (accessed November 27, 2015). **[Online]**

#### c. Focused Readings.

(1) Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Strategic Planning System*, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01C (Washington, DC: Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 20, 2015), [http://dtic.mil/cjcs\\_directives/cdata/unlimit/3100\\_01a.pdf](http://dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3100_01a.pdf) (accessed November 27, 2015). **(Read Enclosures A) (NOTE: Blackboard has only the required pages) [Blackboard] [Online]**

(2) Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Roles and Mission Review*, 2012. <http://odam.defense.gov/Portals/43/Documents/Functions/Organizational%20Portfolios/Evolutionof51001/2012%20Quadrennial%20Roles%20and%20Missions%20Review%20Report,%2020jul12.pdf> (accessed November 24, 2015) **[Blackboard] [Online]**

#### 4. Points to Consider.

- a. How well does the JSPS assist the CJCS in the execution of his responsibilities?
- b. Why is there capability redundancy across the Services? What redundancy is necessary and what is just a result of Service parochialism and competition for resources?
- c. What are the risks of making changes to Goldwater-Nichols? What are the risks of not making any changes to it?
- d. How can the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff influence strategy and resource decisions?

#### 5. Relationship to USAWC Core Courses, Themes, Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Special Areas of Emphasis.

a. Relationship to USAWC Core Courses. This lesson relies on the cognitive competencies addressed during Strategic Leadership, predominantly Systems Thinking, and the management of change. It also requires an understanding of the processes that generate security and military strategy at the national level from the National Security and Policy Course.

##### b. Relationship to Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) and Objectives

(1) JLA 1.e. Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies.

(2) JLA 3.a. Analyze how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means.

(3) JLA 3.d. Value a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts.

(4) JLA 5.a. Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment.

(5) JLA 5.b. Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making and communication by strategic leaders.

c. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs) and Enduring Themes.

(1) PLO 1. Apply critical and creative thinking to national security issues and the environment at the strategic level.

(2) PLO 4. Understand how to recognize change and lead transitions.

(3) PLO 9. Assess the processes and relationships of the Department of Defense, as well as those of interagency, intergovernmental, multinational and non-governmental organizations.

(4) Enduring Themes.

(a) Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment;

(b) Relationship of policy and strategy (relationship between ends, ways and means);

(c) Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security.

## RESOURCING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mode: Seminar

DM-3-S

### 1. Introduction.

The budget represents a crucial set of political decisions. Much of what we consider politically important--what the government does, who decides what it does, and who benefits from it--can be translated into the financial language of budget policy.

—Dennis Ippolito  
*Why Budgets Matter*, 2003

a. Before we turn to the allocation of defense resources, we must understand the resource environment external to the Department of Defense (DoD). This is the world of taxes, deficits, mandatory and discretionary spending, appropriations committees, and the White House Office of Management and Budget, among others. These organizations, factors, and a host of others determine directly and indirectly how much defense the Nation can afford. This is where the “guns or butter” debate occurs.

b. Both the Executive and Legislative Branches of our government participate in the federal budget process. In some cases the two branches perform similar functions in parallel; for example, each independently forecasts expected revenues and expenditures. In other cases there is a sequential division of labor. The Executive Branch develops and presents a budget request based on governmental needs and an estimate of available resources. The Legislative Branch then reviews this request based on its own forecasts and analyses, adjusts it as it deems prudent, and then ultimately authorizes programs and appropriates resources.

c. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process is the strategic management system that is used by the Department of Defense and its subordinate military departments for resource planning and allocation. Senior leaders must develop an understanding of how this process works and the types and complexity of issues that it must address. The lesson will not produce planners, programmers, or budgeters; however, it will provide an overview of how resource decisions are made at the department level and how senior personnel can and must participate in them.

## 2. Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend the key concepts and terms used in the federal budget and differentiate the roles and responsibilities of the Executive and Legislative Branches in the federal budget process.

b. Comprehend the scope and magnitude of the Federal Budget paying particular attention to the differences between mandatory and discretionary spending.

c. Analyze the effectiveness of the PPBE system in translating national-level guidance into well-executed plans, programs and budgets.

d. Evaluate the effects of Federal Fiscal Policy on future defense policies and programs.

## 3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Read the required readings and participate in seminar dialogue.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Lord, Harold W., "Authorization or Appropriation," Faculty Paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 16, 2012). (**Read** pp. 1-11) **[Blackboard]**

(2) Congressional Budget Office, *The 2015 Long-Term Budget Outlook* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2015, <https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/50250-LongTermBudgetOutlook-4.pdf> (accessed October 16, 2015)). (**Read** p. 1-8 and 57-62) **(NOTE: Blackboard has only the required pages) [Blackboard] [Online]**

(3) Donald B. Marron, "America in the Red," *National Affairs*, Issue No. 3 (Spring 2010): 6-19; [http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20100317\\_Marron.pdf](http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20100317_Marron.pdf) (accessed November 3, 2015). **[Online]**

(4) U.S. Army Force Management School, *Department Of Defense Planning, Programming, Budgeting, And Execution (PPBE) Process / Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting, And Execution (PPBE) Process —An Executive Primer—* (Ft. Belvoir, VA: U.S. Army Force Management School, December 2014). **[Blackboard]**

(5) Mike McCord, *Briefing Slides: Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) / Chief Financial Officer, February 2015), [http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/FY2016\\_Budget\\_Request.pdf](http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/FY2016_Budget_Request.pdf) (accessed October 16, 2015). **[Blackboard] [Online]**

c. Focused Readings.

(1) David W. Barno et al., "The Seven Deadly Sins of Defense Spending," June 2013, [http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS\\_SevenDeadlySins.pdf](http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_SevenDeadlySins.pdf). (accessed October 29, 2015). (**Read** p. 5-7; 40-42; 54-57) **[Online]**

(2) Congressional Budget Office, *Approaches for Scaling Back the Defense Department's Budget Plans* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 2013), [https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/43997\\_Defense\\_Budget.pdf](https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/43997_Defense_Budget.pdf) (accessed October 30, 2015). (**Read** chapters 2 and 3) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

4. Points to Consider.

a. Is there a systemic link from the National Security Strategy to the forces apportioned in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)? If there is a system, does it work?

b. What are the implications of the forecasted trends in mandatory spending as it pertains to national security?

c. How can the DoD better posture itself to meet the requirements of the current defense strategy in a resource constrained environment?

5. Relationship to USAWC Core Courses, Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) and Objectives, USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

a. Relationship to USAWC Core Courses: The Resourcing the DoD lesson serves as a foundational lesson for the rest of the Defense Management Course, and informs all following lessons. It has links back to the National Security Policy and Strategy course lessons on Congress and Interest Groups (NSPS-7-S) and Economics and Finance (NSPS-13-S/L).

b. Relationship to JLAs and Objectives.

(1) JLA 3.a. Analyze how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means.

(2) JLA 3.b. Analyze the operational planning and resource allocation processes.

c. Relationship to USAWC PLOs and Enduring Themes.

(1) PLO 1. Apply critical and creative thinking to national security issues and the environment at the strategic level.

(2) PLO 9. Assess the processes and relationships of the Department of Defense, as well as those of interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and non-governmental organizations.

(3) Enduring Themes:

(a) Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment.

(b) Relationship of policy and strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means).

(c) Civil-Military Relations.

## STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS I

Mode: Seminar

DM-4-S

### 1. Introduction.

a. This lesson is the first of two that explore the question, “How are strategic requirements determined?” Once the President issues the National Security Strategy and the Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff translate that strategy into guidance for the Military Departments and the Combatant Commanders, these subordinate organizations must identify their readiness to implement the strategy and the capabilities they need to execute the guidance. The reality is that strategic requirements come from two very different perspectives. This lesson focuses on how the Combatant Commanders assess their ability to execute Theater Campaign Plans and the contingency plans the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) directs them to prepare. DM lesson 5 will focus on how the Military Services and Joint community assess their ability to provide trained and ready forces to the current and future Joint Force and submit needed and anticipated capabilities through the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS). All of these assessments come together at the Joint Staff level. The Chairman then provides his advice on capabilities development and resource requirements to the Secretary of Defense.

b. The lesson begins with a holistic look at the highly complex concept of military preparedness, and how various processes and systems within the defense institution address its subcomponents – such as readiness assessment and capability gap identification. This encompasses a fundamental discussion about “what is *preparedness*?” As the readings will show, preparedness at the strategic level is less about the current states of personnel, equipment, and training and more about the alignment of available capabilities against established strategic requirements, expressed in national security documents. The readings present two models for considering readiness – Collins’ (1994) listing of nine measures of “preparedness” that any strategic readiness management system should consider and Betts’ (1995) studies of dichotomies, or tensions, facing decision makers when it comes to assessing readiness and acting upon readiness gaps.

c. Congress requires that the Secretary of Defense have a comprehensive readiness reporting system to include quarterly and monthly joint readiness reviews by the CJCS. This lesson will review the CJCS’s overall readiness assessment system, and examine how this readiness assessment influences the Defense Department’s preparedness and strategic requirements determination.

d. This sets up the remainder of the lesson where we will focus on the two primary means that Combatant Commanders use to identify requirements gaps. The first involves the development and submission of their Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs) for mid to long-term capabilities that need to be developed through established, deliberate processes. The second involves rapid requirements identification for immediate and emergent warfighting needs through Service and Joint urgent needs submissions.

## 2. Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend the enduring challenges and dichotomies that affect senior leader perspectives and decisions about military preparedness.

b. Comprehend the broad approaches employed by the joint community and services that take national security policy and strategy and combatant command requirements and generate trained and ready forces.

c. Examine the way the CJCS assesses joint readiness with a strategic perspective.

d. Analyze select readiness reports and IPLs to determine if they are aligned and how well they support development of capabilities needed to conduct missions required by the NSS/QDR/NMS/JSCP.

## 3. Student Requirements.

### a. Required Readings.

(1) Thomas P. Galvin, *Military Preparedness*, Faculty Paper (Carlisle, PA: Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, 2014). **[Blackboard]**

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CJCS Guide to the Chairman's Readiness System*, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Guide 3401D (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 15 November, 2014), [http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs\\_directives/cdata/unlimit/g3401.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/g3401.pdf) (accessed November 17, 2015). **(Read Chapter 2 and 3) (NOTE: Blackboard has only the required pages) [Blackboard] [Online]**

(3) U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Defense Management: Perspectives on the Involvement of the Combatant Commands in the Development of Joint Requirements*, Report #GAO-11-527R (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, May 20, 2011), <http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/97501.pdf> (accessed November 17, 2015). **(READ pp. 9-18) [Blackboard] [Online]**

(4) Defense Science Board Task Force, "Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs" (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, July, 2009), <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA503382.pdf>

(accessed November 17, 2015). (**Read** Executive Summary and **Scan** Chapter 2)  
**[Blackboard] [Online]**

(5) U.S. Department of Defense, *Rapid Fulfillment of Combatant Commander Urgent Operational Needs*, Directive 5000.71 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, August 24, 2012), <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/500071p.pdf> (accessed November 17, 2015). **[Blackboard] [Online]**

b. Focused Readings.

R. Derek Trunkey, *Implications of the Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System*, Working Paper (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, May 2013), [https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/workingpaper/44127\\_DefenseReadiness\\_1.pdf](https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/workingpaper/44127_DefenseReadiness_1.pdf) (accessed November 3, 2015).  
**[Blackboard] [Online]**

4. Points to Consider.

a. How do Collins' (1994) nine principles of preparedness apply to today's military and its approach to assessing both readiness and capabilities management?

b. How comprehensive is the Chairman's Readiness System in assessing the readiness of military forces in meeting the National Military Strategy?

c. Are Combatant Commander equities adequately represented within the Joint requirements development process?

5. Relationship to USAWC Core Courses, Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) and Objectives, USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

a. Relationship to JLAs and Objectives.

(1) JLA 3.a. Analyze how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means.

(2) JLA 3.b. Analyze the operational planning and resource allocation processes.

b. Relationship to USAWC PLOs and Enduring Themes.

(1) PLO 1. Apply critical and creative thinking to national security issues and the environment at the strategic level.

(2) PLO 3. Demonstrate anticipation and adaptation to surprise and uncertainty.

(3) PLO 9. Assess the processes and relationships of the Department of Defense, as well as those of interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and non-governmental organizations.

(4) Enduring Themes:

- (a) Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment;
- (b) Relationship of policy and strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means);
- (c) Civil-Military Relations.

## STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS II

Mode: Seminar

DM-5-S

### 1. Introduction.

a. This lesson continues the discussion of military requirements. Building upon the previous lesson, it covers some of the lower level processes and decision making organizations which influence guidance in strategic documents and decisions made by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and Secretary of Defense. The Services and Joint community use the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to assess and document military requirements (capability needs) while the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) helps the CJCS execute his statutory responsibilities to identify, assess and approve joint military requirements. The requirements process is a major driver influencing “ways” and “means” and is therefore, inseparable from the Department of Defense (DOD) Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process that was discussed in lesson 3, and the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) that will be addressed in lesson 6.

b. The Military Services and the Joint community assess, validate and prioritize new requirements using JCIDS, a capabilities-based process created in 2002 at the direction of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In a short note, often called a snowflake, Secretary Rumsfeld sent a directive to Gen Peter Pace, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) and the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to “get the requirements system fixed.” The note went on the say,

As Chairman of the JROC, please think through what we all need to do, individually or collectively, to get the requirements system fixed. It is pretty clear it is broken, and it is so powerful and inexorable that it invariably continues to require things that ought not to be required, and does not require things that need to be required. Please screw your head into that, and let’s have four or five of us meet and talk about it. Thanks.

—SecDef Donald Rumsfeld  
Memo to VCJCS Gen Peter Pace, 18 March 2002

Subsequent staff work resulted in the creation of JCIDS founded upon three guiding principles: (1) Describing needs in terms of capabilities, instead of systems or force elements, (2) Deriving needs from a joint perspective, from a new set of joint concepts, and (3) Having a single general or flag officer oversee each DOD functional portfolio.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Joint Staff J8 Capabilities-Based Assessment Users Guide, Version 3, March 2009

The CJCS Instruction 3170.01 details how the current JCIDS process supports and enables those overarching principles. Scan and/or read the CJCSI as necessary to gain a fundamental understanding of the process. The subsequent readings provide the basis for seminar discussion concerning JCIDS, focusing initially on the Army and then expanding the discussion to the joint force. The Army AL&T “Predicting the ‘Whether’” article address the broader notion of concept development by highlighting how the Army views the future and works to identify the right trends and concepts to underpin its capability development efforts. This is followed by a faculty paper, “Aligning Vision to Capability: Fundamentals of Requirements Determination,” that provides a practical look at how capability requirements develop through the major phases of JCIDS. We will then take a closer look at the Army’s Capability Needs Analysis (CNA) process that seeks to prioritize required capabilities across DOTMLPF-P, Warfighting Functions, and formations. The Joint Force Quarterly “Implementing Joint Operational Access: From Concept to Joint Force Development,” reading helps broaden the discussion by examining current DOD efforts to formalize and synchronize its joint approach to operational access capability development - in response to potential threat anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities.

c. The JROC is the primary decision-making body used by CJCS to assist him in making assessments and providing advice on strategic requirements. The VCJCS chairs the JROC and the membership includes general officers of the military services and Combatant Commands as well as civilian advisors within the DOD. The JROC’s membership, broad responsibilities, and methods of sharing information with Congressional Defense Committees are specified in Title 10 U.S. Code. The CJCSI 5123.01F Charter of the JROC details how the JROC operates while the GAO Report “*DOD Weapons Systems: Missed Trade-off Opportunities During Requirements Reviews*” provides an interesting assessment of JROC capability development decisions made in FY2010. The faculty paper “Navigating the JROC Process” is meant to highlight how the actual process works, highlighting how a service component negotiates the bureaucratic DOD environment to influence decisions and secure a JROC approved capability.

## 2. Learning Objectives.

a. Examine how JCIDS identifies, assesses, validates, and prioritizes joint military capability requirements.

b. Examine the role and responsibilities of the VCJCS and the JROC in supporting DOD military and civilian decision makers.

## 3. Student Requirements.

### a. Required Readings.

(1) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System*, CJCSI 3170.011 (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 23,

2015), [https://dap.dau.mil/policy/Documents/2015/CJCSI\\_3170\\_01I.pdf](https://dap.dau.mil/policy/Documents/2015/CJCSI_3170_01I.pdf) (accessed November 27, 2015). (**Scan** pp. 1-6, and A1-A19) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(2) Army AL&T, "Critical Thinking; Predicting the 'Whether,'" *Army Acquisition Logistics and Technology Magazine* (April-June 2014) (Washington, DC: US Army Acquisition Support Center, April-June 2014), <http://usaasc.armyalt.com/?iid=90924#folio=140> (accessed December 4, 2015). (**Read** pp. 138-149) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(3) Gregg Thompson and Lou Yuengert, *Aligning Vision to Capability: Fundamentals of Requirements Determination*, Faculty Paper (Carlisle, PA: USAWC Department of Command, Leadership and Management, January 2015). **[Blackboard]**

(4) LaRon C.. Somerville, "Utilization of CNA in Capabilities Development," May 2, 2014, <http://www.arcic.army.mil/Articles/cdd-Utilization-Of-CNA-In-Capabilities-Development.aspx> (accessed December 9, 2015). **[Online]**

(5) Jon T. Thomas, "Implementing Joint Operational Access: From Concept to Joint Force Development," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 75 (4<sup>th</sup> Quarter 2014), [http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-75/jfq-75\\_139-142\\_Thomas.pdf](http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-75/jfq-75_139-142_Thomas.pdf) (accessed December 1, 2015). (**Read** pp. 139-142) **[Online]**

(6) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council*, CJCS Instruction 5123.01F (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 10, 2012), [http://dtic.mil/cjcs\\_directives/cdata/unlimit/5123\\_01.pdf](http://dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/5123_01.pdf) (accessed November 27, 2015). (**Scan** pp. 1-6, and A1-16) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(7) U.S. Government Accountability Office, *DOD Weapons Systems: Missed Trade-off Opportunities During Requirements Reviews*, Report GAO-11-502 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, June 16, 2011), <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11502.pdf> (accessed November 27, 2015). (**Read** pp. 1-7, **Scan** 8-23, **Read** Conclusions & Recommendations pp. 23-24) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

b. Focused Readings.

(1) U.S. Army, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, October 31, 2014), <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/TP525-3-1.pdf> (accessed November 27, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(2) U.S. Army, "Force 2025 and Beyond," *US Army Stand-To!*, entry posted march 27, 2015, [http://www.army.mil/standto/archive\\_2015-03-27/](http://www.army.mil/standto/archive_2015-03-27/) (accessed November 27, 2015). **[Online]**  
).

(3) Richard M. Meinhart, "Leadership of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council," *Joint Force Quarterly* 56 (1st Quarter 2010), <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a515164.pdf> (accessed October 24, 2014) **(NOTE: Blackboard has only the required pages) [Blackboard] [Online]**

(4) Ashton Carter, "Running the Pentagon Right," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2014), [ProQuest](#) accessed October 27, 2014). **[Database]**

#### 4. Points to Consider.

a. Does the current JCIDS process accommodate both Service and Joint capability needs? Is there a need to better develop Joint requirements? Why?

b. What recommendations would you advocate when advising the VCJCS on the best way to develop the future force?

c. Would you recommend any changes to the processes or organizational structures associated with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council?

#### 5. Relationship to Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), and USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs) and Enduring and Special Themes.

##### a. Relationship to Joint Learning Areas (JLAs).

(1) JLA 2.a. Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations.

(2) JLA 3.a. Analyze how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means.

(3) JLA 3.e. Analyze the likely attributes of the future joint force and the challenges faced to plan, organize, prepare, conduct and assess operations.

(4) JLA 4.a. Evaluate the strategic-level options available in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment.

(5) JLA 5.c. Evaluate how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty.

b. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs) and Enduring and Special Themes.

(1) PLO 1: Apply critical and creative thinking to national security issues and the environment at the strategic level.

(2) PLO 2. Demonstrate the ability to communicate clearly, persuasively, and candidly.

(3) PLO 9: Assess the processes and relationships of the Department of Defense, as well as those of interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and non-governmental organizations.

(4) Enduring Themes:

(a) Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment;

(b) Relationship of policy and strategy (between ends, ways, and means);

(c) Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security;

(d) Instruments of war and national security.

(5) Enduring Landpower Theme – Defense Management. Evaluate the nature of Army/landpower organizations with respect to budgeting and resourcing. Alternatively, evaluate the differences in the marginal cost of landpower versus other elements of power. Consider the expected time horizon of resource investments for landpower capabilities. Evaluate the importance of labor intensive vs. capital intensive requirements.

## ACQUISITION OF MATERIEL AND SERVICES

Mode: Seminar

DM-6-S

### 1. Introduction.

a. Defense Acquisition involves DOD expenditure of Federal Budget dollars to procure goods (i.e., materiel) and services via a contract vehicle. “Materiel” can range from aircraft carriers, tanks, and airplanes to beds, beans and bottled water, whereas “Services” can range from managerial, operational, and research and development (R&D) support to food service, lawn maintenance and trash removal. Failing to consider and understand both the “materiel” and “services” components of Defense Acquisition paints an incomplete picture of DOD budget expenditure on acquisitions.

Contrary to what its name implies, the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) is not a system designed to develop and procure both “materiel” and “services” acquisition solutions for the Department of Defense. It is only designed to develop and procure “materiel” solutions for validated DOD requirements. When dealing with high-visibility and high-dollar procurement of advanced weapons systems via the DAS, Congress and the media can readily put a finger on where major defense dollars are being spent and focus Congressional oversight to monitor the effectiveness of the “materiel” component of Defense Acquisition.

However, the acquisition of “services” is much more difficult to track and oversee because there are no distinct programming elements like there are for named systems (e.g. F-22, KC-46A, ACV, LCS, etc.). The “services” contract vehicles, for the most part, are much smaller in dollar amount, more numerous, and more widely distributed both horizontally and vertically across the service departments. Additionally, there is not a clear and visible systemic process like the DAS to enable quality services-acquisition monitoring and oversight. Despite this disparity between DOD “materiel” and “services” acquisition systems and oversight, the DOD annually spends as much on “services” as it does on “materiel” acquisitions – approximately \$285 Billion in FY2014 with an allocation of 45% for goods (mainly materiel procurement), 45% for services, and 10% for R&D.<sup>2</sup> This is more than all other federal agencies combined and constitutes a substantial DOD investment.

Accordingly, this lesson explores three primary topics: (1) DOD acquisition of materiel and the Defense Acquisition System (DAS), (2) DOD acquisition of services, and (3) DOD Research and Development (R&D). Supporting readings are prioritized

---

<sup>2</sup> Moshe Schwartz, Et. Al., “Defense Acquisitions: How and Where DOD Spends Its Contracting Dollars” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 30, 2015).

and should be read in the order offered. The first two readings, a commentary by Senator John McCain concerning the ongoing Congressional oversight initiative assessing the future of defense reform, and a Congressional Research Services Report on DOD contract spending on materiel and services, helps provide context for the lesson.

b. This lesson starts with a closer look at **acquisition of materiel** via the **Defense Acquisition System (DAS)**. As highlighted in previous lessons, the DOD acquires capabilities through the interaction of three primary DOD decision support systems: the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), and the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). The DAS is the primary DOD management process used to develop and acquire materiel and automated information system solutions in response to validated military requirements. Three primary readings support this portion of the lesson that will examine the broad components of the DAS and identify the fiscal, political and bureaucratic challenges inherent in developing, testing, and modifying or producing major systems. The first reading, “The Sisyphus Paradox: Framing the Acquisition Reform Debate,” explores the tension between defense acquisition effectiveness and efficiency and helps set the overarching context for this portion of the lesson. The second reading is a Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, “Defense Acquisitions: How DOD Acquires Weapon Systems and Recent Efforts to Reform the Process,” that explains the DAS, and to some degree, assesses recent DAS reform initiatives. The third, the DOD Instruction 5000.02 “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,” is primarily a supporting reference to provide a foundational understanding of the current DAS. While the lesson does not specifically focus on the DAS process, one must understand how DOD senior leaders use the DAS (in its current form) to manage acquisition programs.

c. The next portion of the lesson focuses on the **acquisition of services** that includes a wide ranging spectrum of requirements including research and development, professional and management support, information technology support, medical, maintaining equipment and facilities, and operational support among others. A “services” requirement’s primary purpose is to perform an identifiable task rather than furnish an end item of supply. While Congress has mandated that DOD reduce spending on services and maintain an appropriate balance between the civilian and contractor workforce (see Section 808 of the FY2012 NDAA, as modified by Section 802 of the FY2014 NDAA and carried over into Section 813 of the FY2015 NDAA), what is the right balance? As the DOD searches for the “appropriate balance,” it is clear that the acquisition of services remains vitally important to DOD mission capability. The initial required reading for this topic is an introduction for the “Acquisition of Services” from the Defense Acquisition Guidebook to establish a common frame of reference for class discussion. Col Rick Wagner, one of the lesson authors, then provides a summary of services-acquisition reform initiatives in the area of Operational Contract Support (OCS) to set up an interesting perspective on how the DOD may consider the issue of balance between materiel and services acquisition to meet warfighter needs in a fiscally constrained environment. Lastly, the very short Thompson article focuses on

how major companies within the Defense Industrial Base are reducing their Federal services portfolios, which could complicate striking an optimal materiel versus services balance.

d. Finally, the lesson will close with a brief look at how the DOD is trying to maintain its technological advantage. The DOD remains heavily dependent upon advancements in technology to underpin its pursuit of superior joint force capabilities. Assuming that premise remains true moving forward, how can the DOD get promising technologies out of the labs, into the acquisition process, and out to the force given the current and anticipated future fiscally constrained environment? This portion of the lesson will explore that broad question by examining current DOD Research, Development and Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) strategy and concerns - as offered in a more recent Joint Force Quarterly article, "The Defense Innovation Initiative," co-authored by the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Defense Research and Engineering, Mr. Alan R. Shaffer. The basic premise of Dr. William's and Mr. Shaffer's article is to make the case that DOD's current RDT&E strategy and planned prototyping efforts will enable the department to deal with an erosion of US technologically based military advantage which poses increasing risk to US national security.

## 2. Learning Objectives.

a. Analyze how the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) enables DOD senior leaders to make sound decisions in managing the acquisition of materiel solutions.

b. Examine how the DAS guides development of materiel solutions to address gaps in joint military capability requirements identified during the JCIDS process, and how the DAS is associated with the PPBE process.

c. Assess the acquisition of services as part of providing and sustaining critical DOD mission capabilities.

d. Understand how the DOD research and development strategy supports investment in long-term science and technology (S&T) efforts to sustain US military technological superiority and support future joint force capability needs.

## 3. Student Requirements.

### a. Required Readings.

(1) John McCain, "It's Time to Upgrade the Defense Department," *War On the Rocks*, commentary posted November 10, 2015, <http://warontherocks.com/2015/11/its-time-to-upgrade-the-defense-department/> (accessed November 24, 2015). **[Online]**

(2) Moshe Schwartz, Wendy Ginsberg, and John F. Sargent, Jr., *Defense Acquisitions: How and Where DOD Spends Its Contracting Dollars* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 30, 2015),

[http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/us\\_research\\_and\\_oversight/csr\\_reports/us\\_crs\\_r4\\_4010.pdf](http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/us_research_and_oversight/csr_reports/us_crs_r4_4010.pdf) (accessed November 13, 2015). (**Scan** pp. 1-15 and study Figure B-I (pp. 24-26) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**)

(3) Linda S. Brandt and Francis W. A'Hearn, "The Sisyphus Paradox: Framing the Acquisition Reform Debate," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 16 (August 1997), <http://dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq-16.pdf> (accessed November 12, 2015). (**Read** pp. 34-38.) **[Online]**

(4) Moshe Schwartz, *Defense Acquisitions: How DOD Acquires Weapon Systems and Recent Efforts to Reform the Process* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, May 23, 2014), [http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc306454/m1/1/high\\_res\\_d/RL34026\\_2014\\_May23.pdf](http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc306454/m1/1/high_res_d/RL34026_2014_May23.pdf) (accessed January 20, 2015). (**Read** pp. 1-18) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(5) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), *Operation of the Defense Acquisition System*, DOD Instruction 5000.02 (Washington, DC: USD (AT&L), January 7, 2015), <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/500002p.pdf> (accessed November 12, 2015). (**Scan** pp. 1-5, and 6-31) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(6) Defense Acquisition University, *Defense Acquisition Guide Book*, Chapter 14, Acquisition of Services (Washington, DC: Defense Acquisition University, 2015), <https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=490640> (accessed November 12, 2015). (**Read** 14.1 "Introduction to Acquisition Services," and 14.1.2 "What is a Service Requirement") **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(7) Richard E. Wagner, *Optimizing Defense Use of Contract Services to Mitigate the Threat of a Hollow Force*, Paper (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership and Management, 2015). (**Read** pp. 1-9) **[Blackboard]**

(8) Loren Thompson, "Exodus: Big Defense Companies are Exiting Federal Services," August 4, 2015, <http://lexingtoninstitute.org/exodus-big-defense-companies-are-exiting-federal-services-from-forbes/> (accessed January 6, 2016). **[Online]**

(9) Edie Williams and Alan R. Shaffer, "The Defense Innovation Initiative," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 77 (April 1, 2015), <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/NewsArticleView/tabid/7849/Article/581867/jfq-77-the-defense-innovation-initiative-the-importance-of-capability-prototypi.aspx> (accessed December 3, 2015). (**Read** pp. 34-43) **[Online]**

b. Focused Readings:

(1) David C. Trybula, "'Big Five' Lessons for Today and Tomorrow" (Washington, DC: Institute for Defense Analyses, May 2012), <http://www.benning.army.mil/Library/content/NS%20P-4889.pdf> (accessed November 12, 2015). (**Read** Executive Summary (p. v), Introduction (pp. 1-4), Assessment (pp.

67-71), Environmental Changes (pp.73-79), Lessons Learned (pp. 81-83), and Recommendations (pp. 91-94) **[Online]**

(2) Ashton B. Carter, "Acquisition Actions in Support of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs)," memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Washington, DC, March 29, 2010, <https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=499958> (accessed November 20, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(3) Dan Goure, "Acquisition Reform Must Start with Culture," July 2, 2015, <http://lexingtoninstitute.org/dan-goures-speech-acquisition-reform-must-start-with-culture/> (accessed November 12, 2015). **[Online]**

(4) M. Thomas Davis, "Blog: Put Service Chiefs Back in the Acquisition Business," *Signal Magazine AFCEA Blog*, <http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=Blog-put-service-chiefs-back-acquisition-business> (accessed December 3, 2015). **[Online]**

(5) Moshe Schwartz and Jennifer Church, *Department of Defense's Use of Contractors to Support Military Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, May 17, 2013), [http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/us\\_research\\_and\\_oversight/csr\\_reports/us\\_crs\\_r4\\_3074.pdf](http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/us_research_and_oversight/csr_reports/us_crs_r4_3074.pdf) (accessed November 13, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(6) Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Operational Contract Support Functional Capabilities Integration Board Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report* (FOUO) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 2013-August 2014). **[Instructor Handout]**

(7) Department of Defense, *Operational Contract Support Action Plan FY 2015-2018* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 31, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(8) John R. Luckey and Kate M. Manuel, *Definitions of "Inherently Governmental Functions" in Federal Procurement Law and Guidance* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, January 24, 2012), <http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=707496> (accessed November 12, 2015). **[Online]**

(9) John F. Sargent, Jr., *Federal Research and Development Funding: FY2016* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, March 18, 2015), <http://www.ndia.org/Advocacy/policyweeklydigest/Documents/21Sept2015/CRS-RPT%20Federal%20Research%20and%20Development%20Funding%20FY2016.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2015). (See DOD Summary at pages 20-22) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(10) Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., "Bridging the 'Valley of Death' for Navy Drones," *Breaking Defense*, commentary posted November 23, 2015, <http://breakingdefense.com/2015/11/bridging-the-valley-of-death-for-navy-drones/> (accessed November 24, 2015). **[Online]**

4. Points to Consider.

a. To what degree do you think current DOD acquisition processes and systems adequately address joint warfighter needs? Are DOD acquisition reform initiatives keeping pace with the dynamic and complex security environment?

b. How do DOD bureaucratic systems like the DAS support effective senior leader decision-making?

c. How can the DOD better balance acquisition of contracted services with its own ability to insource service requirements? Is there inherent risk in an overreliance on contractor services to support DOD mission capability?

d. What are some of the short/long-term implications of out-sourcing traditional DOD civilian and uniformed core competencies and critical functions? What are some advantages and disadvantages?

e. How does the DOD sustain a robust science and technology (S&T) effort to accelerate development and fielding of promising technologies and keep pace with current and future needs in a dynamic and complex security environment?

5. Relationship to USAWC Core Courses, Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) and Objectives, USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring Themes.

a. Relationship to Joint Learning Areas (JLAs).

(1) JLA 1.e. Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies.

(2) JLA 2.d. Analyze the role of OCS in supporting Service capabilities and joint functions to meet strategic objectives considering the effects contracting and contracted support have on the operational environment.

(3) JLA 3.a. Analyze how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means.

(4) JLA 3.b. Analyze the operational planning and resource allocation processes.

(5) JLA 3.c. Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives.

(6) JLA 3.e. Analyze the likely attributes of the future joint force and the challenges faced to plan, organize, prepare, conduct and assess operations.

(7) JLA 5.f. Evaluate how strategic leaders foster responsibility, accountability, selflessness and trust in complex joint or combined organizations.

b. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs) and Enduring Themes.

(1) PLO 1: Apply critical and creative thinking to national security issues and the environment at the strategic level.

(2) PLO 2. Demonstrate the ability to communicate clearly, persuasively, and candidly.

(3) PLO 9: Assess the processes and relationships of the Department of Defense, as well as those of interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and non-governmental organizations.

(4) Enduring Themes:

(a) Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment;

(b) Relationship of policy and strategy (between ends, ways, and means);

(c) Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security;

(d) Instruments of war and national security.

(5) Enduring Landpower Theme – Defense Management. Evaluate the nature of Army/landpower organizations with respect to budgeting and resourcing. Alternatively, evaluate the differences in the marginal cost of landpower versus other elements of power. Consider the expected time horizon of resource investments for landpower capabilities. Evaluate the importance of labor intensive vs. capital intensive requirements.

## **INDUSTRY DAY: Strategic Challenges for the Defense Industrial Base**

Mode: Lecture/Seminar

DM-7-L/S

### 1. Introduction.

a. Research, Development and Acquisition (RD&A) management processes provide materiel solutions supporting the nation's military policy and its trained and ready forces. Although the government has an organic industrial base, it relies heavily on the commercial industrial base to develop, produce and field these materiel systems. This lesson serves as a supplement to Lessons 4 and 6 in regards to the framework of identifying, resourcing, and fielding current and future defense capabilities. Students will have an opportunity to meet and engage with representatives from industry in both a lecture discussion and a seminar format.

b. In an address to the Economic Club of Chicago (July 16, 2009), SecDef Gates provided focus that should be applied to this lesson. He noted, "The security challenges we now face, and will in the future, have changed," and as such, DoD needs "a portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of conflict." Emphasizing the need to meet Combatant Commander Requirements with delivery timelines that range from urgent (months) to agile (2 to 4 years) to traditional (more than 4 years), he noted that,

All these decisions involved trade-offs, balancing risks, and setting priorities--separating nice-to-haves from have-to-haves, requirements from appetites. We cannot expect to eliminate risk and danger by simply spending more--especially if we're spending on the wrong things. But more to the point, we all--the military, the Congress, and industry--have to face some iron fiscal realities.

c. How do we balance support for the operational requirements with other urgent priorities in an era of persistent conflict? Clearly, industry serves as an essential partner in successfully addressing this challenge. Senior security leaders need to have a good understanding of the relationship between the government and industry as part of the dynamics of the entire defense industrial base. This knowledge facilitates informed decisions that will best support operational requirements while balancing cost, schedule, performance and risk.

### 2. Learning Objectives.

a. Understand the role of industry in providing materiel solutions for current and future requirements.

b. Analyze strategic issues that affect defense industries as well as ways to develop effective partnerships toward fulfilling materiel requirements.

### 3. Student Requirements.

#### a. Required Readings.

(1) Craig McKinley, "Innovation and the Defense Industrial Base," June 2015, <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/ARCHIVE/2015/JUNE/Pages/InnovationandtheDefenseIndustrialBase.aspx> (accessed November 30, 2015). **[Online]**

(2) Aerospace Industries Association, *The Unseen Cost: Industrial Base Consequences of Defense Strategy Choices* (Arlington, VA: Aerospace Industries Association, July 2009), [http://www.aia-aerospace.org/assets/report\\_industrial\\_base\\_consequences.pdf](http://www.aia-aerospace.org/assets/report_industrial_base_consequences.pdf) (accessed November 30, 2015). **(Read pp. 7- 19) [Online]**

### 4. Points to Consider.

a. How can the government and industry work together to reduce development and procurement cycle times as well as design systems that are better able to exploit future advances in technology?

b. How do changes in requirements affect a contractor's ability to manage a program's cost, schedule, performance and risk? How can the government better manage these changes to reduce program turbulence and still be responsive to users' changing requirements?

c. How do industry and government strike an effective balance between the contractors' (and shareholders') desire for a good return on investment and the government's desire for high quality at an affordable price?

d. A strong teaming relationship is required between government and industry to effectively deliver materiel solutions to our warfighters. How can that spirit of partnership be balanced with a desire for strong competition between contractors to keep costs down throughout the life cycle of a system?

### 5. Relationship to USAWC Core Courses, Themes, Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring Themes.

#### a. Relationship to Joint Learning Areas (JLAs)

(1) JLA 1.a. Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy.

(2) JLA 2.b. Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations.

(3) JLA 2.e. Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions.

(4) JLA 3.a. Analyze how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means.

(5) JLA 3.c. Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives.

(6) JLA 5.b. Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making and communication by strategic leaders.

b. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs) and Enduring Themes.

(1) PLO 1: Apply critical and creative thinking to national security issues and the environment at the strategic level.

(2) PLO 7: Assess the strategic security environment and the contributions of all instruments of national power.

(3) PLO 8: Apply theories of war and strategy to national security challenges.

(4) PLO 9: Assess the processes and relationships of the Department of Defense, as well as those of interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and non-governmental organizations.

(5) Enduring Themes.

(a) Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment;

(b) Relationship of policy and strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means).

## Strategic Issues in Force Management and Development

Mode: Seminar

DM-8-S

### 1. Introduction.

a. Army Force Management is the capstone process for the development and fielding of a trained and ready force. The Army's use of the term "Force Management" subsumes the two enabling Army sub-processes of "Force Development" and "Force Integration" associated with developing and fielding a balanced and affordable force. Army FM differs from the joint usage of the terms within "Global Force Management (GFM)." GFM is part of a joint sourcing system for the assignment, allocation, and apportionment of forces through a predictive, streamlined, and integrated process.

b. Within Army parlance, Force Development (FD) defines required military capabilities, designs force structures to provide these capabilities, and produces plans and programs that, when executed through Force Integration activities, translate organizational concepts based on doctrine, technologies, materiel, manpower requirements, and limited resources into a trained and ready military. Importantly, all services have established analytical processes that they use to establish their overall force structure. The Navy periodically conducts a formal "Force Structure Assessment;" when circumstances warrant, the Marine Corps conducts a "Force Structure Review;" similarly the Air Force uses their "Analytic Framework" to determine their force structure and the Army annually conducts the Total Army Analysis (TAA). Arguably, the most structured of all services, the Army practices a five-phased FD process to continually examine, update and modify its force structure that includes:

(1) Developing the need for new capabilities by comparing existing capabilities with current and future operational and strategic requirements (derived from opportunities and threats).

(2) Determining the corresponding new organizations or modifications to existing organizations to achieve the required capabilities.

(3) Developing detailed organizational models that specify the associated equipment and personnel requirements across all new and affected supported and supporting organizations.

(4) Determining the priority capabilities and related organizational authorizations (manpower and equipment) affordable within available/projected resources.

(5) Documenting the organizational authorizations within approved plans and programs (databases) that allow for the acquisition, requisition and distribution of people and equipment.

c. The initial Army force development activity (Capabilities Integration and Development (CID) Process) parallels and is enmeshed with the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) covered in the DM Course strategic requirements lesson. The Army uses its own internal CID process to develop doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities change recommendations that do not entail Joint Requirements Oversight Council visibility and management. Similarly, the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps all use similar CID processes that feed into the JCIDS and develop required service capabilities. This lesson addresses the post-CID steps of the force-development process and specifically examines those procedures that establish a balanced and affordable force and the difficult resourcing function accomplished through the Army's Total Army Analysis (TAA) activity. However, the lesson's primarily focus is on emerging strategic-level force structure issues for the Army and the other services introduced in the required and focused readings.

d. The follow-on "force integration sub-process" implements the FD approved plans and programs by modernizing organizations, manning, equipping, training, sustaining, deploying, stationing, and funding the force to provide trained and ready forces to the combatant commanders. The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model (currently under revision) is the primary Army force integration process used to synchronize the timing of major modifications to the Army operational organizations as well as manage force readiness and unit sourcing of Combatant Commanders' requirements. A subsequent lesson addresses the ARFORGEN model (and its successor, the Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM)) as well as the other services force generation processes.

## 2. Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend the processes used to determine military force structure in support of the national and military strategies.

b. Evaluate the major challenges faced by the services in developing and resourcing current and future force requirements.

## 3. Student Requirements.

a. Read the required and assigned focused readings to prepare for seminar discourse on force management and strategy-to-force structure challenges.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Army Force Management School, *How the Army Runs Primer* (Fort Belvoir, VA: U.S. Army Force Management School, Updated November 17, 2015). (Read pp. 1-8). **[Blackboard]**

(2) Hans Ulrich Kaeser, *Abandon Ships* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 19, 2008), [http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080822\\_naval\\_equipment\\_acquisition.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080822_naval_equipment_acquisition.pdf) (accessed November 27, 2015). (Read p. 2 and pp. 26-28 (Conclusions) and Scan pp. 4-15) **[Online]**

(3) Mark Gunzinger, "Shaping America's Future Military," 2013, <http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2013/06/shaping-americas-future-military-toward-a-new-force-planning-construct/> (accessed November 22, 2015). (Read Executive Summary (pp. i-vii) and Chap. 3 & 4 (pp. 29-50)) **[Online]**

c. Focused Readings.

**(1) Army and Civilian Students**

(a) Nathan Freier et al., "Beyond the Last War," April 2013, [http://csis.org/files/publication/130424\\_Freier\\_BeyondLastWar\\_Web.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/130424_Freier_BeyondLastWar_Web.pdf) (accessed November 22, 2015). (Read Executive Summary (pp. vi-x) and CH X Conclusions (pp. 72-74) and Scan Chap IX (pp. 56-71)) **[Online]**

(b) Andrew Feickert, *Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, February 28, 2014), <http://www.fas.org/sqp/crs/natsec/R42493.pdf> (accessed November 22, 2015). (Read Summary and pp. 18-20) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(c) U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Army Force Structure: Observations about Aviation Restructuring and Other Relevant Force Structure Challenges* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, May 20, 2015), <http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/670318.pdf> (accessed November 22, 2015). (Read pp. 1-7) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

**(2) Army National Guard Students:**

General Frank J. Grass, *The Army National Guard: A Solution For the Total Force In a Fiscally Constrained Environment*, Presentation to the National Commission On the Future of the Army (Washington D.C., National Guard Bureau, September 21, 2015), <http://www.ncfa.ncr.gov/sites/default/files/CNGB%20Framing%20Paper%20and%20Enclosures%2020150924.pdf> (accessed Nov 23, 2015). (Read pp. 2-6; Summary of

Recommendations (pp. 1-3) and Position Papers #s: 1: Force Size and Mix; 3: Force Structure Distribution and Allocation; 4: Force Generation; 6. Readiness) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

### **(3) Marine Corps Students:**

(a) Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Reshaping America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness: Report of the 2010 Marine Corps Force Structure Review Group* (Washington, DC: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, March 14, 2011), [http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Documents/FSR\\_Final\\_14Mar11\\_ExecSum.PDF](http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Documents/FSR_Final_14Mar11_ExecSum.PDF) (accessed November 22, 2015). (Read pp. ii, and pp. 1-6) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(b) Andrew Feickert, *Marine Corps Drawdown, Force Structure Initiatives, and Roles and Missions: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, January 9, 2014), <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/221267.pdf> (accessed December 8, 2015). (Read Summary and pp. 10-18) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

### **(4) Navy and Coast Guard Students:**

(a) Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, *FORCE STRUCTURE ASSESSMENTS*, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3050.27 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Feb 12, 2015), <http://doni.daps.dla.mil/Directives/03000%20Naval%20Operations%20and%20Readiness/03-00%20General%20Operations%20and%20Readiness%20Support/3050.27.pdf> (accessed December 1, 2015). (Read pp. 1-5 and ENCL 1) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(b) Ronald O'Rourke, *Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, November 4, 2015), <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL32665.pdf> (accessed December 1, 2015). (Read Summary; pp. 25-33; and pp. 55-59) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(c) John Patch, "The Maritime Strategy We Need," June 2007, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/the-maritime-strategy-we-need/> (accessed November 22, 2015). (Read pp. 1-6) **[Online]**

### **(5) Air Force Students:**

(a) Headquarters United States Air Force, MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION C (MAJCOMs/FOAs/DRUs), SUBJECT: Air Force Guidance Memorandum to AFI 90-1001 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 15 January 2015), [http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af\\_a8/publication/afi90-1001/afi90-1001.pdf](http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a8/publication/afi90-1001/afi90-1001.pdf) (accessed November 22, 2015). (Read Attachment 1 (para 1 and para 3); pp 3-5) **[Online]**

(b) Dennis McCarthy et al., *Report to the President and Congress of the United States* (Arlington, VA: National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force, January 30, 2014), <http://afcommission.whs.mil/public/docs/NCSAF%20WEB220.pdf> (accessed November 22, 2015). (**Read** pp. 7-11) **[Online]**

(c) United States Air Force, Report to Congressional Committees: Report on Recommendations of the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, February 2015), <http://ec.militarytimes.com/pdfs/Air-Force-Report-on-the-National-Commission-on-the-Structure-of-the-Air.pdf> (Accessed November 22, 2015). (**Read** pp. 3-10) **[Blackboard] [Online]**

#### 4. Points to Consider.

a. How do the different services determine their force structure requirements and resource levels? How are future force requirements projected?

b. What role does Total Army Analysis play within the Army Force Management process?

c. What are some current challenges with the services' strategies-to-force structure implementation plans and programs? What are some alternative senior leader approaches to resolving strategy-to-resource mismatches?

#### 5. Relationship to USAWC Core Courses, Themes, Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Special Areas of Emphasis.

##### a. Relationship to Joint Learning Areas (JLAs).

(1) JLA 1 e. Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the US force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies.

(2) JLA 3.a. Analyze how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means.

(3) JLA 3.b. Analyze the operational planning and resource allocation processes.

(4) JLA 3.e. Analyze the likely attributes of the future joint force and the challenges faced to plan, organize, prepare, conduct and assess operations.

b. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs) and Enduring Themes.

(1) PLO 9. Assess the processes and relationships of the Department of Defense, as well as those of interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and non-governmental organizations.

(2) Enduring Themes.

(a) Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment: Evaluate strategic thinking about the future (2nd and 3rd order effects).

(b) Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security: Evaluate Military Power.

(c) Instruments of war and national security: Joint: Evaluate the capabilities and domains of joint forces (especially land, maritime, air, space, cyber).

## STRATEGIC ISSUES IN MANNING THE FORCE

Mode: Seminar

DM 9-S

### 1. Introduction.

a. If your expectation for a class at the Army War College on strategic issues in manning revolves around a discussion of the interrelationships between the TAPDB, AAMMP, eMILPO, PMAD, and UAD, you are about to be disappointed. While these Army strategic systems are central to managing the manning of the force, the intent of this lesson is to introduce some complex, ill-structured challenges and topics that affect the long-term health of the Army and the military.

b. The cost of military pay and benefits approaches half of the Defense budget. At almost \$250 billion dollars, one might think the systems and processes associated with manning the force would be under constant scrutiny to justify this significant cost. One might also assume that the external labor market—the alternative employment available to potential and current members of the U.S. military—along with best practices from the corporate world, would be constantly analyzed to ensure that DoD was delivering value to taxpayers. The frustration with some DoD leaders at the lack of change with outdated human resource systems implies that the scrutiny expectations are not being met.

c. Some of the topics this lesson will tee-up are:

(1) What is the proper ratio of Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserves required by today's challenges?

(2) Which jobs or roles should be fulfilled by civilians and contractors versus military personnel?

(3) How should the military recruit, retain, and separate soldiers and civilians?

(4) What are the best models and systems to evaluate, promote, compensate, and develop the human resource talent in America's military?

Although there is no one best answer to any of these questions, there is often a wrong—or outdated answer. None of these questions can be discussed properly without first understanding some of the dynamics and factors in the external labor market.

## 2. Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend the current and anticipated labor force dynamics and their influence on the ability of the Department of Defense to attract, motivate, and retain the soldiers and civilians it requires.

b. Comprehend the unique issues facing senior defense leaders as they work to develop and implement changes necessary to structure, man, and sustain a workforce capable of meeting current and future requirements.

## 3. Student Requirements.

### a. Required Readings.

(1) Tilghman, Andrew, "Force of the Future: career flexibility, fewer moves," *Military Times*, September 1, 2015, <http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/careers/2015/08/28/force-future-report-ash-carter-review/32476549/> (accessed November 4, 2015). **[Online]**

(2) Tyler Cowen, *Average is Over: Powering America Beyond the Age of the Great Stagnation* (New York: Dutton, 2013), 19-43. **(Read Chapter 2) [Blackboard]**

(3) Jack Moore, "GAO: Pentagon needs to connect dots between workforce planning, budget needs," *Federal News Radio*, <http://federalnewsradio.com/congress/2014/07/gao-pentagon-needs-to-connect-dots-between-workforce-planning-budget-needs/> (accessed November 4, 2015). **[Online]**

(4) "Parkinson's Law," *The Economist* (November 9, 1955), <http://www.economist.com/node/14116121> (accessed November 5, 2015). **[Online]**

(5) Andrew Feickert, and Lawrence Kapp, *Army Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) Force Mix: Considerations and Options for Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, December 5, 2014), [http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc491325/m1/1/high\\_res\\_d/R43808\\_2014Dec05.pdf](http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc491325/m1/1/high_res_d/R43808_2014Dec05.pdf) (accessed November 5, 2015). **(Read Summary and pages 1-10) [Blackboard] [Online]**

(6) Gus Hargett, "Commentary: Guard is interchangeable with active duty," *Military Times*, June 8, 2015, <http://www.militarytimes.com/story/opinion/2015/06/08/commentary-guard-interchangeable-with-active-duty/28697297/> (accessed November 5, 2015). **[Online]**

(7) David J. Tier, "Loss of Confidence: The Failure of the Army's Officer Evaluation and Promotion System and How to Fix It," *Small Wars Journal* (August 30, 2015): <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/loss-of-confidence-the-failure-of-the->

[army%E2%80%99s-officer-evaluation-and-promotion-system-and-ho](#) (accessed November 5, 2015). **[Online]**

b. Focused Readings.

(1) U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Additional Steps Needed to Help Determine the Right Size and Composition of DoD's Total Workforce*, GAO 13-470 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, May 2013), <http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654879.pdf> (accessed November 5, 2015). (Read pp. 1-24) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**.

(2) Todd Harrison, "Keeping Faith with the Troops: How Congress Can Fix the Military's Compensation Problems," *Forbes.com*, February 3, 2015, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/toddharrison/2015/02/03/congress-military-compensation/print/> (accessed November 5, 2015). **[Online]**

(3) Andrew Tilghman, "SecDef pulls back on personnel reforms, leaves out big changes for now," *Military Times*, November 18, 2015, <http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/benefits/2015/11/18/secdef-pulls-back-personnel-reforms-leaves-out-big-changes/76004136/> (accessed November 19, 2015). **[Online]**

4. Points to Consider.

a. What are some of the challenges in determining the personnel requirements for DoD and the services?

b. What makes transforming the personnel management process so difficult?

c. What role do external stakeholders hold that potentially limits the needed changes in the personnel management system?

d. How do dynamics in the external labor market potentially assist or hurt the military's ability to get the talent it needs?

e. Is the Department of Defense too big to ever get its arms wrapped around all the aspects of personnel management? Is satisficing enough?

f. What are the challenges to agreeing upon the right mix of AC and RC forces in the DoD?

g. Is too much emphasis placed on the role of a centralized selection system that bases its judgments on moderate-fidelity performance appraisal tools?

5. Relationship to USAWC Core Courses, Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) and Objectives, USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes., Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

a. Relationship to Joint Learning Areas (JLAs).

(1) JLA 3.e. Analyze the likely attributes of the future joint force and the challenges faced to plan, organize, prepare, conduct and assess operations.

(2) JLA 5.a. Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic, joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment.

(3) JLA 5.c. Evaluate how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty.

b. Relationship to USAWC PLOs and Enduring Themes.

(1) PLO 4. Understand how to recognize change and lead transitions.

(2) Enduring Themes. Evaluate leadership of large, national security organizations.

## EQUIPPING AND SUSTAINING THE FORCE

Mode: Seminar

DM-10-S

### 1. Introduction.

a. The focus of this lesson is the strategic challenges associated with equipping and sustaining land forces. Additionally, equipping air, sea, and special operations-unique capabilities are discussed as part of the broader Department of Defense (DoD) and joint forces equipping and sustaining processes. Equipping the force involves the functions to acquire, train, employ, sustain, and eventually dispose of equipment. Across the services, equipping the force includes the force integration activities of:

- Managing ASCC and GCC requirements
- Programming and budgeting for equipment and equipping-related activities.
- Repairing, sustaining, and improving currently fielded equipment.
- Replacing major end items with new and more advanced systems.
- Fielding materiel solutions for approved capabilities requirements.
- Distributing equipment to new or modified units and partner nations.
- Mobilizing and deploying forces.
- Disposing of damaged, worn out, or obsolete equipment.

b. Equipping functions are linked to the DoD and Services' acquisition processes, budget systems, sustainment activities, mobilization processes, and readiness systems. Moreover, while the acronym-laden systems and planning horizons may differ, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps manage their equipment requirements under Defense instructions and federal acquisition regulations. Therefore, the services have similar systems and processes to forecast future requirements, develop plans and programs, and procure and distribute equipment. Reserve component forces are equipped as part of their parent services and are included in all equipping activities. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is a DoD function and conducted under Department of State authorities. FMS has been providing approximately \$30B in equipment annually the last few years to partners and allies. These equipment sales must be factored into U.S. forces equipping plans and into the U.S. defense industrial base's production capacity.

c. In developing strategies and plans to equip and sustain forces, leaders at all levels must consider how to manage capabilities. At the tactical level, leaders are concerned with employing capabilities through training, maintaining, and operating military equipment to accomplish assigned missions. At the military service and joint operational level, leaders are concerned with sustaining capabilities by acquiring, distributing, logistically supporting, and disposing of material to provide long term, joint

military capabilities. At the national or strategic level, leaders are concerned with developing capabilities by creating policies, strategies and plans; funding programs; enabling science and technology research and development; managing the defense industrial base; and directing foreign military sales to meet national objectives. Complicating matters further, leaders must constantly balance current and emerging needs with long-term considerations and future requirements within constrained, and currently decreasing, funding levels.

d. Sustainment-related acquisition/contracting is procured and managed differently than materiel acquisition, but is no less significant to effective land power. Sustainment contracts are used across the defense department to sustain forces in and out of combat and to administrate Title 10 functions. These contracts and augmentation programs (e.g., the Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program <LOGCAP>) are a way for senior leaders to leverage the budget (base and overseas contingency funds) to provide capabilities to GCC commanders without impacting force structure authorizations. In this time of defense funding reductions, senior leaders must critically evaluate the right mix of spending to meet force structure, equipment, personnel, plus service and sustainment contracts requirements to provide the best military capability possible.

## 2. Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend the strategic level concepts and national challenges of equipping and sustaining the force in both peace and war.

b. Assess senior leader's decision making considerations in meeting equipping and sustaining requirements associated with operational needs within budgetary constraints.

c. Assess the Army's programs and strategic challenges associated with providing full-spectrum sustainment capabilities.

## 3. Student Requirements.

a. Read the required readings to prepare for the seminar dialogue on equipping and sustaining the force. Students may also read some of the focused readings to learn more on service specific equipment capabilities and issues.

### b. Required Readings.

(1) Andrew F. Krepinevich and Eric Lindsey, "The Road Ahead: Future Challenges and Their Implications for Ground Vehicle Modernization," 2012), [www.csbaonline.org/search/?q=The+Road+Ahead%3A+Future+Challenges+and+Their+Implications+for+Ground+Vehicle+Modernization&x=0&y=0](http://www.csbaonline.org/search/?q=The+Road+Ahead%3A+Future+Challenges+and+Their+Implications+for+Ground+Vehicle+Modernization&x=0&y=0) (accessed November 10, 2015). (**Read** Chapter 2, pp. 29-52, **Scan** remainder) **[Online]**

(2) Edward N. Luttwak, "Breaking the Bank: Why Weapons Are So Expensive," *American Interest* 3, no. 1, September/October 2007, <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2007/9/1/breaking-the-bank/> (accessed November 12, 2015). **[Online]**

(3) Colonel Tom D. Miller, *The Defense Sustainment Industrial Base – A Primer* (Washington, DC: Brookings, June 30, 2010), [http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2010/6/30%20defense%20industrial%20base%20miller/0630\\_defense\\_industrial\\_base\\_miller.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2010/6/30%20defense%20industrial%20base%20miller/0630_defense_industrial_base_miller.pdf) (accessed November 13, 2015). **(Read Chapter 3, pp. 21-25) [Blackboard] [Online]**

(4) Department of Defense, *Maintenance of Military Materiel*, Department of Defense Directive 4151.18 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 31, 2004), <http://dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/415118p.pdf> (accessed November 11, 2015). **(Read Paragraph 3 "Policy" (pp. 2-8)) [Blackboard] [Online]**

c. Focused Readings.

(1) Defense Industrial Base.

(a) Barry Watts, "Sustaining the U.S. Defense Industrial Base as a Strategic Asset," September 2013, <http://csbaonline.org/publications/2013/09/sustaining-the-u-s-defense-industrial-base-as-a-strategic-asset/> (accessed November 12, 2015). **(Read pp. 2-15 [Online])**

(b) The Lexington Institute, "The Army's Organic Industrial Base: What is the Future for Depots and Arsenal?" 2005), <http://lexingtoninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/armys-organic-industrial-base.pdf> (accessed November 13, 2015). **[Online]**

(2) Army Equipping and Sustaining.

(a) U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Equipment Program in support of President's Budget 2015* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, May 2015), [http://www.g8.army.mil/pdf/Army\\_Equipment\\_Program2016.pdf](http://www.g8.army.mil/pdf/Army_Equipment_Program2016.pdf) (accessed November 13, 2015). **(Read pp. 4-19, scan annexes) [Blackboard] [Online]**

(b) U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Army Networks: Size and Scope of Modernization Investment Merit Increased Oversight* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, January 10, 2013), <http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651240.pdf> (accessed November 7, 2014). **(Read pp. 1-27) [Blackboard] [Online]**

(3) Marine Corps Equipping and Sustaining.

(a) Andrew Feickert, Congressional Research Service (CRS). *Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC): Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, February 28, 2014), [http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc462258/m1/1/high\\_res\\_d/R42723\\_2014Feb28.pdf](http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc462258/m1/1/high_res_d/R42723_2014Feb28.pdf) (accessed November 13, 2015). (Read Summary and pp. 1-11) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(b) Lt Gen Richard T. Tryon and Lt Gen William M. Faulkner, *Testimony to the Readiness Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee*, 113th Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., April 26, 2013, <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS03/20130426/100682/HHRG-113-AS03-Wstate-TryonL-20130426.pdf> (accessed November 13, 2015). (Read pp. 1-13) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(4) Navy and Coast Guard Equipping.

(a) Ronald O'Rourke, *Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, August 1, 2014), ([http://www.ndia.org/Advocacy/policyweeklydigest/Documents/5Jan2015/CRS\\_Navy\\_Force\\_Structure\\_and\\_Shipbuilding\\_Plans\\_Background\\_and\\_Issues\\_for\\_Congress.pdf](http://www.ndia.org/Advocacy/policyweeklydigest/Documents/5Jan2015/CRS_Navy_Force_Structure_and_Shipbuilding_Plans_Background_and_Issues_for_Congress.pdf) (accessed November 13, 2015)). (Read Summary and pp. 1-21) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(b) Eric J. Labs, *An Analysis of the Navy's Fiscal Year 2015 Shipbuilding Plan* (Washington, DC: U.S. Congressional Budget Office, December 2014), <https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/49818-Shipbuilding.pdf> (accessed November 13, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(5) Air Force Equipping.

(a) U.S. Department of the Air Force, *USAF Force Structure Changes: Sustaining Readiness and Modernizing the Total Force* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Air Force, February 2012). (Read pp 1-6; Scan pp. 7-12) <http://fleming.house.gov/uploadedfiles/afd-120203-027.pdf> (accessed November 13, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(b) U.S. Government Accountability Office, *TACTICAL AIRCRAFT: F-22A Modernization Program Faces Cost, Technical, and Sustainment Risks* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, May 2012), <http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590593.pdf> (accessed November 12, 2015). (Read Highlights and pp. 1-20) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

#### 4. Points to Consider.

a. Have Krepinevich and Lindsey correctly stated the future environment of land war and the implications for equipping and sustaining ground forces?

b. Have the DoD and the Services correctly balanced funding requirements for equipment, sustainment, and service contracts? How should the services balance immediate, near-term, and long-term equipping and sustaining requirements given declining funding?

d. Where should requirements for equipping partner nations be placed in the competing priorities for resources? How much consideration of partner military requirements, capabilities, and limitations should be considered in planning for material development and acquisition?

#### 5. Relationship to USAWC Core Courses, Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) and Objectives, USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

##### a. Relationship to Joint Learning Areas (JLAs).

(1) JLA 3.a. Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy.

(2) JLA 3.d. Apply strategic security policies, strategies and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives.

(3) JLA 4.e. Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions.

(4) JLA 5.b. Analyze the operational planning and resource allocation processes

##### b. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs) and Enduring Themes.

(1) PLO 8. Apply theories of war and strategy to national security challenges.

(2) PLO 10: Understand the utility of Landpower in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.

(3) Enduring Themes. Instruments of war and national security

## **FORCE GENERATION**

Mode: Seminar

DM-11-S

### 1. Introduction.

a. Force generation is a complex activity that transitions available resources into employable capabilities. At the national level, those resources include the commitment of related materials, labor, capital, facilities, and services to sustain or create the required military capabilities. Within the military, force generation relates to the management of resources over time to produce the required capabilities needed for employment by the national authorities (President and Secretary of Defense) and the combatant commanders (CCDRs). While some of the required military capabilities already exist and are at the required readiness level to meet rotational and emerging requirements, others require time and additional resources to generate. Importantly, all services have force generation processes that manage portions of their active and reserve components at various levels of readiness to meet rotational, emerging and crisis-based requirements. Additionally, all services have related processes and plans that increase readiness of available forces, deploy “surge” forces and expand the number of forces to meet mid- to long-term operational requirements.

b. Global Force Management (GFM) is the DOD process that manages force assignment, apportionment and allocation to meet joint force requirements. The process also provides insights into the operational requirements for service forces and allows senior defense decision makers to assess the risks of proposed force assignment, apportionment and allocation changes. The associated GFM Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) assigns forces to the Combatant Commands for daily use through the “Forces for Unified Command Memorandum.” Additionally, GFM also allocates service forces to Combatant Commands for rotational presence or planned employments through the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). Furthermore, Combatant Commands may receive additional forces by submitting a Request for Forces (RFF) for emerging requirements. Finally, DoDs Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) and the CJCS’s corresponding Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) also apportion forces to combatant commands for possible employment on planned theater contingencies. Overall, GFM and these associated guidance documents provides the process, roles, missions and requirements for the sourcing of service capabilities to Combatant Commanders to meet current, rotational, emergent and planned operational requirements. Correspondingly, the service-specific force generation processes seek to efficiently match unit readiness levels with near-, mid- and long-term force requirements consistent with the GFMIC, GFMAP, GEF and emerging approved RFF requirements.

c. As with most issues at the strategic level, available resources are seldom sufficient to meet all known and projected strategic requirements. Thus, strategic leaders must accept risk in determining what forces to fully resource and those they will resource at lower levels. Thus, the service force generation concepts serve as “ways” to save funds ostensibly expended on excess and unused readiness. Those funds can then be used to purchase additional force structure that helps mitigate the risk of responding to low-probability but high-risk mid- to long-term strategic requirements. In this manner, each of the service force generation processes establish the basis for efficiently providing a sustained flow of trained and ready forces for forward/rotational presence, immediate response/employment, and for near-, mid- and long-term emerging or planned operational requirements. Having sufficient forces at the appropriate readiness levels to respond to current and future operational requirements accomplishes the mission requirements that generally shape the strategic environment and allow the Nation to deter and prevail over potential adversaries.

d. Closely related to force generation is joint mobilization planning and the use of military facilities and infrastructure to support the generation and projection of military forces. The end of major troop deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan and the corresponding drawdown of units provide unique challenges for the efficient management of supporting infrastructure. Facilities are costly, take a long time for approval and, once established, require expensive maintenance for many years. Moreover, once built, facilities are very difficult to eliminate due to political and public resistance. Similar to ‘buying’ unused readiness, every dollar spent on excess infrastructure capacity are funds unavailable for required forces or for higher levels of unit readiness. Consistent with the drawdown and the associated requirement to enable future expansion, the military will need to ensure it has the right facilities, for the right force mix, at the right locations for both current and future strategic demands. Correspondingly, this lesson examines the strategic issues related to reducing or retaining facilities during this drawdown period and the potential for gaining economies and efficiencies.

## 2. Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend the processes used to generate service force capabilities in support of the national and military strategies.

b. Evaluate the major issues faced by the services in managing unit readiness and risk in meeting current and future operational requirements.

c. Assess the unique challenges associated with increasing or reducing supporting infrastructure to efficiently support current and future force generation requirements.

## 3. Student Requirements.

a. Read the required and assigned focused readings to prepare for seminar discourse on service force generation and infrastructure management.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Edward J. Filiberti, *Generating Military Capabilities* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2015). **[Blackboard]**

(2) Mark Thompson, "Tiers of Sorrow: Path to a 'Hollow Force' ?" *Time*, December 9, 2013, <http://swampland.time.com/2013/12/09/tiers-of-sorrow-path-to-a-hollow-force/> (accessed November 24, 2015). (**Read** pp. 1-3) **[Online]**

(3) Mackenzie Eaglen, "Shrinking Bureaucracy, Overhead, and Infrastructure: Why This Defense Drawdown Must Be Different For the Pentagon," March 2013, [http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/-shrinking-bureaucracy-report-v2\\_143022914571.pdf](http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/-shrinking-bureaucracy-report-v2_143022914571.pdf) (accessed November 23, 2015). (**Read** Executive Summary (p. iii), 'Eliminating Excess Infrastructure While Realizing Savings' section (pp. 13-17) and **Scan** rest) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]** **NOTE: Cannot access link from USAWC computers.**

c. Focused Readings.

**(1) Army and Civilian Students**

(a) Jared Serbu, "Smaller Force Means Army Will Overhaul Its Strategy for Producing Combat-ready Troops," *Federal News Radio*, February 9, 2015, <http://federalnewsradio.com/dod-reporters-notebook-jared-serbu/2015/02/smaller-force-means-army-will-overhaul-its-strategy-for-producing-combat-ready-troops/> (accessed November 23, 2015) (**Read** pp. 1-2) **[Online]**

(b) Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., "Tiered Readiness Returns In Army 2015 Budget: Not All Brigades Ready to Fight," *Breaking Defense*, March 4, 2014, <http://breakingdefense.com/2014/03/tiered-readiness-returns-in-army-2015-budget-not-all-brigades-ready-to-fight/> (Accessed November 23, 2015). (**Read** pp. 1-3) **[Online]**

**(2) Marine Corps Students:**

(a) Edward J. Filiberti, *Primer on Force Generation in the U.S. Marine Corps* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(b) Paul McLeary, "Issues Await Next USMC Commandant," *Defense News*, June 17, 2014, <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140617/DEFREG02/306170037/Issues-Await-Next-USMC-Commandant> (accessed November 22, 2015). (**Read** pp. 1-4) **[Online]**

(c) Sam LaGrone, "Report: Navy and Marine Corps Strained to Breaking Point: Second Forward Carrier in the Pacific Could Help," *U.S. Naval Institute News*, November 19, 2015. <http://news.usni.org/2015/11/19/report-navy-and-marine-corps->

strained-to-breaking-point-second-forward-carrier-in-the-pacific-could-help (accessed November 22, 2015). (Read pp. 1-6) [Online]

### (3) Navy and Coast Guard Students:

(a) Edward J. Filiberti, *Primer on Force Generation in the U.S. Navy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2015). [Blackboard] [Online]

(b) Sam LaGrone, "Report: Navy and Marine Corps Strained to Breaking Point: Second Forward Carrier in the Pacific Could Help," *U.S. Naval Institute News*, November 19, 2015, <http://news.usni.org/2015/11/19/report-navy-and-marine-corps-strained-to-breaking-point-second-forward-carrier-in-the-pacific-could-help> (accessed November 22, 2015). (Read pp. 1-6) [Online]

(c) U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Navy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan and Comprehensive Assessment Needed to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas Homeports* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, May 29, 2015), <http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/670534.pdf> (accessed November 23, 2015). (Read Highlights and Conclusions/Recommendations (pp. 39-40)) [Blackboard] [Online]

### (4) Air Force Students:

(a) Thomas P. Galvin, *Primer on Force Generation in the U.S. Air Force* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2015). [Blackboard] [Online]

(b) John A. Ausink et al., *Managing Air Force Joint Expeditionary Taskings in an Uncertain Environment* (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2011), [http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical\\_reports/TR808.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR808.html) (accessed December 23, 2015). (Read Summary (pp. xi-xiii) and CH 2 & 3 (pp. 5-17)) [Online]

#### 4. Points to Consider.

a. How stratified are forces arrayed by readiness levels within the services? How difficult is it for each service to "surge" additional capabilities?

b. What are the main drivers of the various service force generation concepts? How efficient are the service concepts in maximizing their forces for employment? How effectively are the Reserve Components integrated into their respective services' force generation processes?

c. How vulnerable or sensitive are the current processes to small or large changes in service resourcing?

d. What role do facilities play in force generation? What are some of the strategic challenges in reducing, increasing and maintaining the required infrastructure?

5. Relationship to USAWC Core Courses, Themes, Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Special Areas of Emphasis.

a. Relationship to Joint Learning Areas (JLAs).

(1) JLA 1.b. Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels.

(2) JLA 1 e. Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies.

(3) JLA 3.a. Analyze how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means.

(4) JLA 3.e. Analyze the likely attributes of the future joint force and the challenges faced to plan, organize, prepare, conduct and assess operations.

b. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs) and Enduring Themes.

(1) PLO 9. Assess the processes and relationships of the Department of Defense, as well as those of interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and non-governmental organizations.

(2) Enduring Themes.

(a) Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment: Evaluate strategic thinking about the future (2nd and 3rd order effects).

(b) Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security: Evaluate Military Power.

(c) Instruments of war and national security: Joint: Evaluate the capabilities and domains of joint forces (especially land, maritime, air, space, cyber).

## RESOURCE DECISION MAKING EXERCISE

Mode: Exercise

DM-12-EX

### 1. Introduction.

a. The exercise will focus on using strategic leadership skills to synthesize what you have learned in this core course and the other college core courses. You will assess the strategic environment and determine if the mission priorities stated in the 2015 National Military Strategy (NMS) need to change as the nation's security challenges continue to evolve. From this mission analysis, you will then be asked to make broad resource decisions over the next decade to best fund the needed capabilities to execute those missions in today's fiscally constrained environment. You will first role-play as members of a Defense Working Group to analyze the resource implications of the strategic environment and prioritized missions under the direction of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD (P)) and the results of your work will be briefed to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF).

b. Following this strategic environment and mission analysis, you will role-play a working group under the direction of the Director of Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (D/CAPE) at OSD. You will develop a resource strategy and then propose specific programmatic changes to implement the strategy. These proposed changes will then be briefed to the DEPSECDEF for approval. Even in good years of resource availability, the Defense Department never has enough funding to meet all the requirements. Senior leaders and staffs must assess, prioritize, and make tough choices regarding where to program and budget limited resources. The demands of current challenges create a tension between addressing immediate needs and making investments in future capabilities. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process you have learned during this course, while complicated, addresses the processes of making choices in a large, complex government organization. The strategic goal is to create the optimal combination of defense capabilities to meet short, mid, and long range institutional and operational requirements under fiscal constraints.

### 2. Exercise Concept.

a. The exercise is the capstone event for the Defense Management course. Each seminar will initially answer questions related to the strategic environment before assessing mission priorities. The seminar will identify those key global challenges that will influence future U.S. Armed Forces mission priorities. Using the environment

assessment and missions as stated in the 2015 NMS, you will first identify what is missing, has changed, or is likely to change in the strategic environment since publication of the NMS. From your environment assessment, you will recommend adjustments to its mission priority list to include if any missions need to be added or deleted from this list.

b. Using the mission priority recommendation, the seminar will develop detailed budget and program recommendations to implement these missions. Using realistic program data, students will develop and defend recommendations regarding adjustments to defense programs to generate the best possible combination of defense capabilities while absorbing a significant cut to resources. The participants will role-play Colonel/GS-15 level defense, joint and service staff personnel with differing resource priorities in a practical experience that will require the use of strategic thinking and leadership competencies to provide advice. Each member will represent their specific area, but also bring to the work group a variety of perspectives and ideas of how to achieve the reductions while still generating the best defense capabilities. This effort is in preparation for a briefing to the DEPSECDEF.

### 3. Learning Objectives.

a. Examine how a changing strategic environment can affect guidance in published Department of Defense strategic documents.

b. Apply knowledge gained in the Defense Management Course, as well as strategic thinking and leadership skills, while experiencing the practical application of determining resource priorities and making decisions on future military capabilities.

c. Synthesize concepts and processes discussed in the Defense Management Course related to mission and fiscal guidance.

### 4. Student Requirements.

#### a. Tasks.

(1) Initially organize as a working group under the leadership of USD (P). The group will have members representing Defense, Joint Service, Reserve Component, and Combatant Command perspectives. Based on what you have learned at the Army War College, identify what has changed or stayed the same in the strategic environment since publication of the 2015 NMS. Then assess the Chairman's 12 mission priority list to determine if you agree with those priorities and if any other missions should be added to the list. Once complete, conduct a briefing on the results.

(2) Following the analysis of the strategic environment and mission priorities, you are now a working group under the overall leadership of the Director of CAPE to develop specific resource recommendations. Try to obtain the best solution for the organization you represent; however, the overarching goal is to achieve a

recommended solution to the required resource reduction that remains consistent with defense objectives published in strategy and guidance documents.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Read Exercise Guidance (**Instructor Handout**) and Required Readings.

(2) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States 2015* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 2015), [http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015\\_National\\_Military\\_Strategy.pdf](http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf) (accessed October 29, 2015). (**Read** pages 1-17) **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(3) William J. Perry and John P. Abizaid, "Ensuring a Strong U.S. Defense for the Future: The National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review" (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute for Peace, 31 July 2014), [http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Ensuring-a-Strong-U.S.-Defense-for-the-Future-NDP-Review-of-the-QDR\\_0.pdf](http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Ensuring-a-Strong-U.S.-Defense-for-the-Future-NDP-Review-of-the-QDR_0.pdf) (accessed November 12, 2014). (**Read** pp. 40-51, **Scan** remainder) **[Online]**

(4) Aaron Mehta, "Mixed Reaction to US National Military Strategy," 12 July 2015, <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/2015/07/12/national-military-strategy-mixed-reaction/29968861/> (accessed October 29, 2015). **[Online]**

c. References.

(1) DoD:

(a) Department of Defense, FY 2016 Budget Request Overview (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2015), [http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/defbudget/fy2016/fy2016\\_Budget\\_Request\\_Overview\\_Book.pdf](http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/defbudget/fy2016/fy2016_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf) (accessed October 27, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(b) Ashton Carter, *FY 2016 Budget Request for the Department of Defense before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, 114th Cong., 1st sess., March 3, 2015, [http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Carter\\_03-03-15.pdf](http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Carter_03-03-15.pdf) (accessed October 27, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(c) Martin Dempsey, *FY16 Department of Defense Budget*, Posture Statement presented to the 114th Cong., 1st sess. March 3, 2015, [http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dempsey\\_03-03-15.pdf](http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dempsey_03-03-15.pdf) (accessed October 27, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(d) Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 4 March 2014), [http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014\\_Quadrennial\\_Defense\\_Review.pdf](http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf) (accessed November 3, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(2) Army:

(a) Thomas A. Horlander and Davis S. Welch, *FY 2016 Army Budget Overview* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, February 2015), <http://asafm.army.mil/Documents/OfficeDocuments/Budget/budgetmaterials/fy16/overview.pdf> (accessed October 29, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(b) John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *The United States Army 2015, Posture Statement* presented to the 114<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, March 2015), [http://www.army.mil/e2/rv5\\_downloads/aps/aps\\_2015.pdf](http://www.army.mil/e2/rv5_downloads/aps/aps_2015.pdf) (accessed October 29, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(3) Air Force:

(a) James Martin, *United States Air Force FY 2016 Budget Overview* (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, February 2015), <http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-150421-011.pdf> (accessed October 29, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(b) Deborah L. James and Mark A. Welsh, *FY 2016 Air Force, Posture Statement* presented to the 114<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess. (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 17 March 2015), <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20150317/103091/HHRG-114-AS00-Wstate-JamesD-20150317.pdf> (accessed October 29, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(4) Navy and Marine Corps:

(a) William K. Lescher, *Department of the Navy FY 2016 President's Budget (Press Briefing)* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2 February 2015), [http://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/16pres/DON\\_PRESS\\_BRIEF.pdf](http://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/16pres/DON_PRESS_BRIEF.pdf) (accessed October 29, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(b) ADM Jonathan Greenert, *Statement Before the House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations on FY 2016 Department of the Navy, Posture Statement* presented to the 114<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess. (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 26 February 2015), [http://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/150303%20CNO\\_Posture.pdf](http://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/150303%20CNO_Posture.pdf) (accessed October 29, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

(c) GEN Joseph Dunford, *Statement of General Joseph Dunford Commandant USMC before the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense, 114<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess. February 26, 2015,* [http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC%20Testimony%202015/USMC%20FY16%20Written%20Posture%20Statement\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC%20Testimony%202015/USMC%20FY16%20Written%20Posture%20Statement_FINAL.pdf) (accessed October 29, 2015). **[Blackboard]** **[Online]**

5. Points to Consider.

a. What are the challenges of responding to ever changing threats and managing risk when developing multiyear strategy and resource guidance documents?

b. What criteria are most important to strategic leaders in identifying and prioritizing U.S. Armed Forces missions?

c. How should a staff officer represent their area of responsibility while ensuring senior leaders receive the best advice in developing integrated and effective defense programs with limited resources?

6. Relationship to USAWC Core Courses, Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) and Objectives, USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes, and Enduring and Special Themes.

a. Relationship to USAWC Courses. This exercise uses strategic documents discussed in the NSPS and TSC courses, but focuses on the Secretary of Defense's staff providing advice to execute his responsibilities in a resource-constrained environment. It also links back to the SL course, as you will use the different thinking and decision making concepts discussed in that course to answer the exercise's strategic questions. The upcoming elective courses provide greater depth and detail to these topics, e.g., Defense Resource Management, The Defense Industrial Base, and Leading the Joint Force.

b. Relationship to JLAs and Objectives.

(1) JLA 1 a. Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute of strategy.

(2) JLA 1 e. Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies.

(3) JLA 3 a. Analyze how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means.

(4) JLA 3 b. Analyze the operational planning and resource allocation processes.

(5) JLA 4 a. Evaluate the strategic-level options available in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment.

(6) JLA 5 b. Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision making and communication by strategic leaders.

c. Relationship to USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs) and Enduring themes.

(1) PLO 1: Apply critical and creative thinking to national security issues and the environment at the strategic level.

(2) PLO 2: Demonstrate the ability to communicate clearly, persuasively, and candidly.

(3) PLO 7: Assess the strategic security environment and the contributions of all instruments of national power.

(4) PLO 10: Understand the utility of Landpower in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.

(5) Enduring Themes:

(a) Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment:

(i) Evaluate leadership at the strategic level (national security policy and strategy, especially in war).

(ii) Evaluate leadership of large, national security organizations.

(iii) Evaluate strategic thinking about the future (2nd and 3rd order effects).

(b) Relationship of policy and strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means): Analyze how to resource national security.

(c) Instruments of war and national security: Joint: Evaluate the capabilities and domains of joint forces (especially land, maritime, air, space, cyber).

## **CAPSTONE SPEAKER**

Mode: Lecture/Seminar

DM-13-L/S

1. Introduction. The Tenth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Paul J. Selva, delivers the capstone speech and discussion with students in Bliss Hall. Opportunity for an in-depth review of the Vice Chairman's remarks occurs in seminar rooms following the presentation.

### 2. Learning Objectives.

- a. Comprehend the Department of Defense's strategic planning, resourcing, and force management processes.
- b. Analyze the roles and responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services, and Combatant Commanders as they relate to strategic planning, resourcing, and force management.
- c. Comprehend how the Services provide trained and ready forces and capabilities to Combatant Commanders.
- d. Analyze the inherent tension between the military departments and Combatant Commanders due to incongruous time horizon and budget perspectives with regard to development of capabilities and the provision of trained and ready forces.
- e. Examine the leadership and management challenges associated with cross-functional organizations as large and complex as a military department, the Reserve Components, or the Department of Defense.

### 3. Student Requirements.

a. Read the required materials, be prepared to ask questions of the Vice Chairman in Bliss Hall and be ready to discuss the readings and speaker comments in seminar. General Selva should provide a presentation that touches on almost all aspects of the Defense Management course. Indeed, based on the responsibilities of the VCJCS, his presentation will almost certainly touch on most of the core curriculum, especially SL, NSPS and DM (with TSC a possibility if he discusses his time as the TRANSCOM Commander). His presentation offers an excellent opportunity for synthesis of many of the major concepts learned to date, and should provide an excellent transition into the Oral Assessments.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Biography of General Paul J. Selva," <http://www.jcs.mil/Leadership/ArticleView/tabid/3893/Article/611782/gen-paul-j-selva.aspx> (accessed December 1, 2015). **[Blackboard] [Online]**

(2) Senate Armed Services Committee, "Advance Questions for General Paul J. Selva, USAF, Nominee for the Position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," [http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Selva\\_07-14-15.pdf](http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Selva_07-14-15.pdf) (accessed December 1, 2015). **(Read 1- 6, 14-33) (NOTE: Blackboard has only the required pages) [Blackboard] [Online]**

5. Relationship to USAWC Core Courses, Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) and Objectives, USAWC Program Learning Objectives (PLOs), and Enduring and Special Themes.

a. Relationship to USAWC Core Courses.

(1) The Vice Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff's responsibilities directly or indirectly span most of the areas of study during the Defense Management course. General Selva also brings a former Combatant Commander's perspective, and is expected to touch on strategic leadership issues. Therefore this lesson serves not only as a capstone for the DM course, but also for much of the Core Curriculum overall.

(2) This lesson links directly back to the Strategic Leadership and National Security Policy and Strategy core courses, and indirectly to Theory of War and Strategy and Theater Strategy and Campaigning.

b. Relationship to JLAs and Objectives.

(1) JLA 1.a. Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy.

(2) JLA 1.e. Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies.

(3) JLA 3.a. Analyze how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means.

(4) JLA 3.b. Analyze the operational planning and resource allocation processes.

(5) JLA 5.a. Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment.

(6) JLA 5.b. Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decisionmaking and communication by strategic leaders.

(7) JLA 5.c. Evaluate how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty.

c. Relationship to USAWC PLOs and Enduring Themes.

(1) PLO 1. Apply critical and creative thinking to national security issues and the environment at the strategic level.

(2) PLO 7. Assess the strategic security environment and the contributions of all instruments of national power.

(3) PLO 9. Assess the processes and relationships of the Department of Defense, as well as those of interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and non-governmental organizations.

(4) Enduring Themes: Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment; Relationship of policy and strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means); Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security; Civil-Military Relations

## SECTION V

### APPENDIX 1

#### MISSION

The USAWC educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application of Landpower.

#### INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE

The purpose of the U.S. Army War College, according to its founder Elihu Root, is "not to promote war, but to preserve peace by intelligent and adequate preparation to repel **aggression.**" **Accordingly, Root enjoined students "to study and confer on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command."**

Stemming from the purpose is the institution's mission: "The U.S. Army War College educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application of Landpower." The purpose explains "why" we exist; the mission statement explains "how" we meet that purpose.

Derived from the purpose and mission statements is the Institutional Learning Objective, which focuses the War College's academic programs on the knowledge and abilities required of military leaders at the strategic level:

*Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.*

Achieving this objective requires proficiency in four domains of knowledge:

- Theory of war and peace
- US national security policy, processes, and management
- Military strategy and unified theater operations
- Command and leadership

And the ability and commitment to:

- Think critically, analytically, creatively, and strategically.
- Frame national security challenges in their historical, cultural, and economic contexts.
- Make ethical decisions and promote military culture that reflect the values of the American Profession of Arms.
- Listen, read, speak, and write effectively.
- Advance the intellectual, physical, and moral development of oneself and one's subordinates.

## **APPENDIX 2**

**CJCSI 1800.01E**

**29 May 2015**

### **Service Senior-Level College Joint Learning Areas and Objectives (JPME-II)**

1. Overview. Service SLCs develop strategic leaders who can think critically and apply military power in support of national objectives in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment. Service War Colleges hone student expertise and competency on their respective Service's roles, missions and principal operating domains and focus on integrating them into the joint force, unfettered by Service parochialism across the range of military operations.
2. Mission. Each Service SLC is unique in mission and functional support. However, a fundamental objective of each is to prepare future military and civilian leaders for high-level policy, command and staff responsibilities requiring joint and Service operational expertise and warfighting skills by educating them on the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military and economic), the strategic security environment and the effect those instruments have on strategy formulation, implementation, and campaigning. The goal is to develop agile and adaptive leaders with the requisite values, strategic vision and thinking skills to keep pace with the changing strategic environment. SLC subject matter is inherently joint; JPME at this level focuses on the immersion of students in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment and completes educational requirements for JQO (level 3) nomination.
3. Learning Area 1-National Strategies
  - a. Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy.
  - b. Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels.
  - c. Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations.
  - d. Apply strategic security policies, strategies and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives.
  - e. Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense and military strategies.

#### 4. Learning Area 2 -Joint Warfare, Theater Strategy and Campaigning for Traditional and Irregular Warfare in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational Environment

a. Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations.

b. Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations.

c. Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns.

d. Analyze the role of OCS in supporting Service capabilities and joint functions to meet strategic objectives considering the effects contracting and contracted support have on the operational environment.

e. Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions.

f. Evaluate key classical, contemporary and emerging concepts, including IO and cyber space operations, doctrine and traditional/ irregular approaches to war.

#### 5. Learning Area 3-National and Joint Planning Systems and Processes for the Integration of JIIM Capabilities

a. Analyze how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate and apply national ends, ways and means.

b. Analyze the operational planning and resource allocation processes.

c. Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives.

d. Value a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts.

e. Analyze the likely attributes of the future joint force and the challenges faced to plan, organize, prepare, conduct and assess operations.

#### 6. Learning Area 4-Command, Control and Coordination

a. Evaluate the strategic-level options available in the joint, interagency,

intergovernmental and multinational environment.

b. Analyze the factors of Mission Command as it relates to mission objectives, forces and capabilities that support the selection of a command and control option.

c. Analyze the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control created in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment across the range of military operations, to include leveraging networks and technology.

#### 7. Learning Area 5 -Strategic Leadership and the Profession of Arms

a. Evaluate the skills, character attributes and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational strategic environment.

b. Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decisionmaking and communication by strategic leaders.

c. Evaluate how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty.

d. Evaluate how strategic leaders communicate a vision; challenge assumptions; and anticipate, plan, implement and lead strategic change in complex joint or combined organizations.

e. Evaluate historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives.

f. Evaluate how strategic leaders foster responsibility, accountability, selflessness and trust in complex joint or combined organizations.

g. Evaluate how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces, and develop/preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry.

## APPENDIX 3

### SSL PROGRAM LEARNING OBJECTIVES (PLO)

The School of Strategic Landpower (SSL) establishes program learning objectives (PLO) that delineate critical fields of knowledge and appropriate jurisdictions of practice for our students to master. The core competence of our graduates is leadership in the global application of strategic landpower.

To accomplish its mission, SSL presents a curriculum designed to produce graduates who can:

PLO 1: Apply critical and creative thinking to national security issues and the environment at the strategic level.

PLO 2: Demonstrate the ability to communicate clearly, persuasively, and candidly.

PLO 3: Demonstrate anticipation and adaptation to surprise and uncertainty.

PLO 4: Understand how to recognize change and lead transitions.

PLO 5: Analyze ethical decisions and distinguish military cultures that reflect the values and traditions of the American profession of arms.

PLO 6: Understand the ability to operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding (Mission Command).

PLO 7: Assess the strategic security environment and the contributions of all instruments of national power.

PLO 8: Apply theories of war and strategy to national security challenges.

PLO 9: Assess the processes and relationships of the Department of Defense, as well as those of interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and nongovernmental organizations.

PLO 10: Understand the utility of Landpower in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.

## APPENDIX 4

### ENDURING THEMES

Elihu Root's challenge provides the underpinnings for enduring themes within the USAWC curriculum. The enduring themes stimulate intellectual growth by providing continuity and perspective as we analyze contemporary issues.

#### Enduring themes across the core curriculum (all departments and courses):

- Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment
  - Evaluate leadership at the strategic level (national security policy and strategy, especially in war)
  - Understand the profession's national security clients and its appropriate jurisdictions of practice
  - Evaluate leadership of large, national security organizations
  - Evaluate strategic thinking about the future (2nd and 3rd order effects)
- Relationship of policy and strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means)
  - Analyze how to accomplish national security aims to win wars
  - Analyze how to connect military actions to larger policy aims
  - Analyze how to resource national security
  - Evaluate international relations as the context for national security
- Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security
  - Comprehend Diplomatic Power
  - Comprehend Informational power
  - Evaluate Military Power
  - Comprehend economic power
- Professional ethics
  - Evaluate the ethics of military operations (to include jus in bello and post bello)
  - Evaluate the ethics of war and the use of force (to include jus ad bello)
  - Evaluate the ethics of service to society (domestic civil-military relations)
- Civil-Military Relations
  - Evaluate relationships between military and civilian leadership
  - Evaluate relationships between the military and domestic society
  - Evaluate relationships between armed forces and foreign populations
- Instruments of war and national security
  - Joint: Evaluate the capabilities and domains of joint forces (especially land, maritime, air, space, cyber)
  - Interagency: Understand other U.S. government agencies and departments
  - Intergovernmental; Understand potential relationships with other national governments
  - Multinational: Understand potential relationships with armed forces or agencies of other nations/coalition partners

- History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives and choices
  - Identify and analyze relevant historical examples of strategic leadership and strategic choices (across time and around the world)
  - Evaluate historical examples relevant to war and other national security endeavors

### **ENDURING LANDPOWER THEME (by core course)**

**Defense Management:** Evaluate the nature of Army/landpower organizations with respect to budgeting and resourcing (for example, the potential segmentation and nature of landpower organizations with their “smoother” capital profile versus the more “lumpy” capital of air and naval assets). Alternatively, evaluate the differences in the marginal cost of landpower versus other elements of power. Consider the expected time horizon of resource investments for landpower capabilities. Evaluate the importance of labor intensive vs. capital intensive requirements.

### **SPECIAL THEME FOR COMMANDANT’S LECTURE SERIES (CLS)**

We will use the special theme for developing the Commandant’s Lecture Series as well as to provide suggested guidance for student Strategy Research Projects (group or individual), faculty research, case study development, and conferences.

The AY16 special theme is: “**Educating and Developing Adaptive Senior Leaders for a Complex World**” [This draws on key elements from Chief of Staff of the Army priorities: “Adaptive Army Leaders for a Complex World” and “A Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged Army”]. This is the same theme as AY15.

Supporting elements of the theme:

- Analyze means for strengthening education and life-long learning
- Evaluate the evolving roles and challenges for strategic leaders
- Evaluate and refine concepts of strategic leadership and mission command
- Evaluate ways to better work across domains (land, sea, air, space and cyber)
- Understand and evaluate competing visions of American grand strategy as they affect evolving joint concepts and capabilities, particularly with respect to landpower
  - Understand the International environment, particularly the “security paradox” posed by positive global trends potentially subject to increasingly dangerous threats
- Understand American domestic political priorities and constraints
- Evaluate Integration with allies and partners—traditional and non-traditional
- Evaluate the relevance of post-9/11 experience with respect to anticipated future challenges

The Commandant’s Lecture Series (CLS) presents prominent speakers of the highest quality, representing diverse backgrounds, expertise, and varied perspectives. A limited

number of lecturers, with a formal invitation by the Commandant, will explore the special theme. Chairman DMSPO, with the assistance of the Deputy Dean, will schedule the lectures throughout the academic year. Faculty will nominate speakers and the Commandant will approve speakers and topics. Students may have assigned readings to provide context and background information for the series and will have seminar time to reflect upon the lecture.